

SCAPIN

- 1545 APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO USE FACILITIES OF TAKIKAWA CHEMICAL INDUSTRY CO., LTD., FOR FERTILIZER PRODUCTION, dated 25 February 1947. (ESS)  
Amends SCAPINs 962 and 1118. Approves application subject to specified conditions. Amended by SCAPIN 1695.
- 1546 APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINAL, dated 25 February 1947. (LS)  
Amended by SCAPINs 1675, 1699, 1710, 1723, 3989-A, 4246-A, 4282-A, 4321-A, 4380-A, 5090-A, 5370-A, 5480-A, 5544-A and 5861-A.
- 1547 APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS, dated 26 February 1947. (LS)  
Amends SCAPINs 1188 and 1331 by deleting the name of one Japanese.
- 1548 DISPOSITION OF GARBAGE AND WASTE, dated 27 February 1947. (GD)  
Informs the Japanese Government that it is responsible for collecting and disposing of garbage and waste from Occupation Forces installations. Amended by SCAPIN 3577-A. See also SCAPIN 1915.
- 1549 APPREHENSION OF A SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINAL, dated 27 February 1947. (LS)
- 1550 ROAD TRAFFIC OF PEDESTRIANS, dated 1 March 1947. (PM)  
Approves continued enforcement of the traffic regulation which requires Japanese pedestrians to walk on the left side of the road in the direction of traffic.



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- 1715 APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO MANUFACTURE SMALL-SIZED PASSENGER CARS, dated 3 June 1947. (ESS)  
Amends SCAPINs 58 and 977-A. Approves application.  
Rescinded by SCAPIN 2053.
- 1716 ALLOCATION OF GOLD, SILVER AND PLATINUM FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION, dated 3 June 1947. (CPC)  
Approves allocation of precious metals for use by Ministry of Education to 30 listed educational institutions. Amended by SCAPIN 1716/1.
- 1716/1 AMENDMENT TO SCAPIN 1716, 3 JUNE 1947, dated 29 September 1947. (CPC)  
Amends SCAPIN 1716 by changing procedure in four allocations of platinum, which will be made from stocks in EIGHTH Army vaults; requires Japanese Government to deposit specified quantities of platinum, gold and silver in EIGHTH Army vaults.
- 1717 DISPLAY OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS, dated 3 June 1947. (CE)  
Approves display of specified aerial photographs by War Rehabilitation Bureau at the "Reconstruction Exhibition of Bombed-out Cities."
- 1718 CLARIFICATION OF STATUS OF FORMER SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS, dated 4 June 1947. (IS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1316 by deleting the names of two Japanese.
- 1719 APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS, dated 4 June 1947. (IS)  
Amended by SCAPINs 4143-A, 4299-A, 4375-A, 4516-A, 4917-A, 5132-A and 5291-A.
- 1720 REPATRIATION OF EVACUEES FROM BONIN ISLANDS, dated 4 June 1947. (GA)  
Disapproves temporary return of Japanese nationals to Bonin Islands.
- 1721 CLARIFICATION OF STATUS OF FORMER SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS, dated 6 June 1947. (IS)  
Amends SCAPINs 243, 447, 611, 807, 840, 877 and 1287 by deleting the names of seven Japanese.
- 1722 APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS, dated 6 June 1947. (IS)  
Amends SCAPINs 1317 and 1590 by deleting the names of two Japanese.



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- 1723 CLARIFICATION OF STATUS OF FORMER SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS, dated 6 June 1947. (IS)  
Amends SCAPINs 374, 877, 1506 and 1546 by deleting the names of two Japanese.
- 1724 CONSTRUCTION OF BREAKWATER IN THE IZU ISLANDS, dated 9 June 1947. (ESS)  
Approves construction.
- 1725 APPLICATION OF JAPAN RADIO COMPANY, LTD. (NIPPON MUSEN K.K.), FOR CHANGE OF ITS STATUS AND REMOVAL OF CERTAIN SUBSIDIARY CONCERNS FROM SCHEDULE OF RESTRICTED CONCERNS, dated 9 June 1947. (ESS)  
Amends SCAPINs 403 and 813. Approves release of 11 subsidiaries of Japan Radio Company, Ltd.; denies release of ten others. Denies application requesting Japan Radio Company, Ltd., be designated a subsidiary of Okura Industrial Company, Ltd.
- 1726 APPLICATION OF DIRECTIVES TO PATENTS, UTILITY MODELS, TRADEMARKS, DESIGNS AND COPYRIGHTS, dated 10 June 1947. (CPC)  
Directs the Japanese Government to afford proper protection to trademarks registered on 7 December 1941 in names of nationals of United Nations as required by SCAPIN 26.
- 1727 CLARIFICATION OF STATUS OF FORMER SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS, dated 11 June 1947. (IS)  
Amends SCAPINs 611 and 1596 by deleting the names of two Japanese.
- 1728 APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS, dated 11 June 1947. (IS)  
Amends SCAPINs 1331, 1399 and 1506 by deleting the names of three Japanese.
- 1729 APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS, dated 11 June 1947. (IS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1456 by deleting the name of one Japanese.
- 1730 APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINAL, dated 13 June 1947. (IS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1188 by deleting the name of one Japanese.
- 1731 APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS, dated 13 June 1947. (IS)  
Amended by SCAPINs 4452-A, 5971-A, 6201-A and 6800-A.



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- 1732 TRANSFER OF CUSTODY OF FLOATING EQUIPMENT OWNED AS OF 7 DECEMBER 1941 BY ALLIED NATIONALS, dated 13 June 1947. (CPC)
- 1733 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 14 June 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1166. Authorizes changes in the Master List of Frequencies assigned for use by the Japanese Government. Rescinded by SCAPIN 1744.
- 1734 REPATRIATION OF KOREANS FROM JAPAN TO KOREA NORTH OF 38 DEGREES NORTH LATITUDE, dated 16 June 1947. (GC)  
Designates the "Shinyo Maru" to lift Koreans listed in SCAPIN 1680. Japanese repatriates carried on the return trip will be processed in accordance with SCAPIN 1680. Rescinded by SCAPIN 927/16.
- 1735 PAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST ON JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BONDS OWNED BY PERSONS RESIDING OUTSIDE JAPAN, dated 16 June 1947. (ESS)  
Approves application.
- 1736 ANGAUR PHOSPHATE PROJECT, dated 21 June 1947. (ESS)  
Directs the Japanese Government to assume responsibility for complete operation of the Angaur phosphate project under the supervision of SCAP. Amended by SCAPINs 1736/1 and 1736/2.
- 1736/1 ANGAUR PHOSPHATE PROJECT, dated 2 October 1947. (ESS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1736.
- 1736/2 ANGAUR PHOSPHATE PROJECT, dated 15 October 1947. (NR)  
Amends SCAPIN 1736 by deleting "Economic and Scientific Section" and substituting "Natural Resources Section" therefor.
- 1737 JAPANESE WHALING OPERATIONS IN THE ANTARCTIC IN THE 1947-1948 SEASON, dated 21 June 1947. (NR)  
Authorizes whaling operations.
- 1738 DISPOSITION OF VESSELS ABANDONED ON THE JAPANESE COAST, dated 23 June 1947. (GD)  
Directs the Japanese Government to place subject vessels in custody, in order that they may be effectively put to use.
- 1739 REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION FOR CHANGES IN CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM OF FISHING VESSELS, dated 26 June 1947. (ESS)  
No objection offered to changes in location of construction as indicated. Amended by SCAPIN 2033.



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- 1740 AMENDMENT TO EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, dated 27 June 1947. (IS)  
Amends SCAPINs 756 and 1218 regarding Japanese courts' jurisdiction in cases involving illegal possession of Occupation Forces property.
- 1741 DISSOLUTION OF TRADING COMPANIES, dated 3 July 1947. (ESS)  
Directs the Japanese Government to take steps for the immediate dissolution and liquidation of the Mitsubishi Trading Company and Mitsui Trading Company.
- 1742 SUPPRESSION OF ILLEGAL ENTRY INTO JAPAN, dated 8 July 1947. (GC)  
Amends SCAPIN 1391.
- 1743 ADDITION OF UBE INDUSTRIAL COMPANY, LTD. (UBE KOSAN K.K.), TO THE SCHEDULE OF RESTRICTED CONCERNS, dated 8 July 1947. (ESS)  
Amends SCAPINs 403 and 1058 by adding subject company to the Schedule of Restricted Concerns.
- 1744 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 14 July 1947. (CCS)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 321, 1166, 1222, 1283, 1323, 1379, 1500, 1592 and 1733. Six inclosures are attached: Geographical List of Japanese Radio Stations, Frequency List of Japanese Radio Stations, Call Sign List of Japanese Radio Stations, Definitions and Abbreviations and Frequency Limitations, List of Japanese Ship Radio Stations and List of Authorized Inactive Police Radio Stations. Amended by SCAPINs 1744/1, 1744/10, 1744/11, 1744/15 and 1744/19. See also SCAPIN 2028.
- 1744/1 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 16 August 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744. Amended by SCAPINs 1744/2 and 1744/4.
- 1744/2 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 20 September 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744/1.
- 1744/3 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE JAPANESE WHALING FLEET, dated 4 November 1947. (CCS)  
Authorizes frequencies for use by the 1947-1948 whaling expedition.
- 1744/4 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 24 November 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744/1.



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- 1744/5 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 26 January 1948. (CCS)  
Transmittal memorandum for two inclosures (not attached) of all Japanese fixed and land radio stations and a combined list of SCAP registry numbers of all Japanese ship radio stations and an alphabetical list of all Japanese coastal and marine beacon stations. Amended by SCAPIN 1744/6.
- 1744/6 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 20 March 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744/5. Amended by SCAPIN 1744/7.
- 1744/7 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 13 May 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744/6.
- 1744/8 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 22 July 1948. (CCS)  
Transmittal memorandum for two inclosures, "List of Japanese Ship and Coastal Radio Stations" and List of Japanese Radio Stations" which were authorized by SCAPIN 1744 and all additions, deletions and changes that have been subsequently authorized by memoranda to the Ministry of Communications up to 1 July 1948. Amended by SCAPIN 1744/9.
- 1744/9 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 24 September 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744/8. Amended by SCAPIN 1744/12.
- 1744/10 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 1 November 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744. Inclosure 1 of this memorandum is the call sign list of Japanese radio stations as revised to conform with Article 19 of the Radio Regulations annexed to the International Telecommunications Convention, Atlantic City, 1947. This list, effective 1 January 1949, includes the former call sign, new call sign, SCAP registry number, frequency and station name of each call sign. This memorandum reaffirms the authorization of call sign amendments granted by direct communications between Civil Communication Section, SCAP and the Ministry of Communications.
- 1744/11 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 6 November 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744. This memorandum reaffirms the authorization of call sign amendments, dated 1 July and subsequent amendments thereto, as granted by direct communication between Civil Communication Section, SCAP, and the Ministry of Communications.



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- 1744/12 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 16 November 1948.  
(CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744/9.
- 1744/13 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 24 January 1949.  
(CCS)  
Lists all Japanese radio stations that have been authorized by memoranda to the Ministry of Communications up to 1 January 1949. Amended by SCAPIN 1744/14.
- 1744/14 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 17 March 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744/13. Amended by SCAPIN 1744/16.
- 1744/15 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 12 May 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744. Directions to exercise the utmost surveillance by monitoring methods and take such action as may be necessary to assure that authorized Japanese stations are operating in accordance with established radio regulations. The Japanese Government will also be responsible for monitoring and locating unauthorized radio stations in Japan and taking such action as is necessary for discontinuance of unauthorized radio stations.
- 1744/16 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 16 May 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744/14.
- 1744/17 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 1 August 1949. (CCS)  
Inclosures 1 and 2 of this memorandum include all Japanese radio stations that were authorized by SCAPIN 1744 and all additions, deletions and changes that have been subsequently authorized memoranda to the Ministry of Telecommunications up to 1 July. Amended by SCAPIN 1744/18.
- 1744/18 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 14 September 1949.  
(CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744/17.
- 1744/19 CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, dated 31 October 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1744.



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- 1760 REPATRIATION OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN NATIONALS, dated 10 August 1947. (GD)  
Amends SCAPIN 1750.
- 1761 DESTRUCTION OF FORMER JAPANESE NAVAL VESSELS, dated 12 August 1947. (GD)  
Supplements SCAPINs 910 and 1002. Certain additional ships will be released to the Japanese Government from time to time for destruction by scrapping or by other method approved by SCAP.
- 1762 OSAKA-COLOMBO RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUIT, dated 12 August 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPINs 578 and 1206. Rescinds SCAPIN 1657.  
Amended by SCAPINs 1762/1, 1762/2, 1762/3, 1762/7, 1762/9, 1762/10, 1762/11, 1762/12, 1765/2 and 1962.  
Rescinded by SCAPIN 2052.
- 1762/1 OSAKA-COLOMBO RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUIT, dated 23 September 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1762.
- 1762/2 OSAKA-COLOMBO RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUIT, dated 30 December 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1762.
- 1762/3 OSAKA-COLOMBO RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUIT, dated 30 December 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1762. Directs rendering of statements of accounts on a semimonthly basis and making deposits in accordance therewith.
- 1762/4 EXPANSION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH SERVICE VIA OSAKA-COLOMBO CIRCUIT, dated 14 April 1948. (CCS)  
Directs the Japanese Government to expand radiotelegraph service to include private, press and government messages between Japan and the points listed in inclosure 1.  
Amended by SCAPINs 1762/5 and 1762/8.
- 1762/5 EXPANSION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH SERVICE VIA OSAKA-COLOMBO CIRCUIT, dated 19 April 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1762/4 in so far as it pertains to word charges and division of revenue for full rate radiotelegrams destined for Portuguese East Africa.
- 1762/6 EXPANSION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH SERVICE VIA OSAKA-COLOMBO CIRCUIT, dated 11 May 1948. (CCS)  
Directions to expand radiotelegraph service via Osaka-Colombo circuit to include private, press and government messages between Japan and points listed in inclosure 1.



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- 1762/7 OSAKA-COLOMBO RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUIT, dated 6 July 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1762 by listing the additions, changes and deletions to List of Public Offices of the Ministry of Communications by Bureau Areas and Prefectures.
- 1762/8 EXPANSION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH SERVICE VIA OSAKA-COLOMBO CIRCUIT, dated 9 August 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1762/4 in so far as it pertains to word charges and division of revenue for full rate and British Commonwealth Government radiotelegrams destined to Aegean Islands.
- 1762/9 OSAKA-COLOMBO RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUIT, dated 7 September 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1762 by listing the additions, changes and deletions to List of Public Offices of the Ministry of Communications by Bureau Areas and Prefectures.
- 1762/10 OSAKA-COLOMBO RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUIT, dated 10 November 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1762 by listing the changes, additions and deletions to List of Public Offices of the Ministry of Communications by Bureau Areas and Prefectures.
- 1762/11 OSAKA-COLOMBO RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUIT, dated 8 December 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1762 by listing the changes, additions and deletions to List of Public Offices of the Ministry of Communications by Bureau Areas and Prefectures.
- 1762/12 OSAKA-COLOMBO RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUIT, dated 28 January 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1762 by listing the changes, additions and deletions to List of Public Offices of the Ministry of Communications by Bureau Areas and Prefectures.
- 1762/13 EXPANSION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH SERVICE VIA OSAKA-COLOMBO CIRCUIT, dated 20 May 1949. (CCS)  
Directions to expand radiotelegraph service via the Osaka-Colombo circuit to include private radio-telegrams between Japan and the points listed in inclosure 1.



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1763

CONTROL OF SURPLUS UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT VEHICLES SOLD TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, dated 20 August 1947. (CTS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1384. Amended by SCAPIN 1993.

1764

DISPOSITION OF SILK, dated 20 August 1947. (ESS)  
Amends SCAPINS 58 and 1802-A. Rescinds SCAPINS 438 711, 866, 870, 901 and 1465. All raw silk, mixed silk articles, end items, or any other form of silk in raw, yarn or manufactured state, are hereby released to the Japanese Government for specified uses.

1765

EXPANSION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH SERVICE BETWEEN JAPAN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AREAS, dated 20 August 1947. (CCS)  
Amended by SCAPIN 1818. Rescinded by SCAPIN 2052.

1765/1

EXPANSION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH SERVICE BETWEEN JAPAN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AREAS, dated 11 September 1947. (CCS)  
Directions to expand radiotelegraph service between Japan and British Commonwealth areas to include private messages between Japan and Hongkong. Amended by SCAPIN 1765/2.

1765/2

EXPANSION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH SERVICE BETWEEN JAPAN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AREAS, dated 26 September 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPINS 1762 and 1765/1. Substitutes new schedule of rates and division of revenue; authorizes private, press and government messages between Japan and Canada under specified conditions.

1765/3

EXPANSION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH SERVICE BETWEEN JAPAN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AREAS, VIA OSAKA-COLOMBO CIRCUIT, dated 14 October 1947. (CCS)  
Authorizes private, press and government messages between Japan and British Commonwealth areas listed in inclosures 1 and 2. Amended by SCAPIN 1765/4.

1765/4

EXPANSION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH SERVICE BETWEEN JAPAN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AREAS, VIA OSAKA-COLOMBO CIRCUIT, dated 9 August 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1765/3.



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- 1766 USE OF FOREIGN TRADE PAYMENT CERTIFICATES BY PRIVATE COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES IN JAPAN, dated 25 August 1947. (CCS)  
Authorizes Ministry of Communications to accept Foreign Trade Payment Certificates from private commercial representatives in payment of telecommunications charges.
- 1767 PROCEDURE FOR SUBMITTING REQUESTS FOR RELEASE OF PRECIOUS METALS, dated 25 August 1947. (CPC)  
Rescinded by SCAPIN 1914.
- 1768 INTERNATIONAL MAIL SERVICE, dated 26 August 1947. (CCS)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 1177 and 1432. Establishes new regulations for postal service between Japan and all other countries. Amended by SCAPINs 1792, 1814 and 1884.  
Rescinded by SCAPIN 1900.
- 1769 RESUMPTION OF CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CHARGE, dated 30 August 1947. (CCS)  
Authorizes collection, at time of delivery of parcels, of fees which shall not exceed amounts specified by Universal Postal Union Convention or applicable bilateral parcel post agreements. Rescinded by SCAPIN 1900.
- 1770 CLOSING OF THE UJINA (KURE AREA) RECEPTION CENTER, dated 8 September 1947. (GC)  
Amends SCAPIN 927. Amended by SCAPIN 1770/1.
- 1770/1 CLOSING OF UJINA (KURE AREA) RECEPTION CENTER, dated 9 December 1947. (GC)  
Amends SCAPIN 1770.
- 1771 RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESTRICTIONS, dated 9 September 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPINs 989, 1204, 1433, 1612, 1707 and 1746.  
Rescinds SCAPINs 114 and 326. Outlines procedures for international telecommunications. Amended by SCAPINs 1771/2, 1771/3 and 1771/5.
- 1771/1 RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESTRICTIONS, dated 27 October 1947. (CCS)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 1030 and 1087.
- 1771/2 RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESTRICTIONS, dated 12 November 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1771
- 1771/3 RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESTRICTIONS, dated 28 March 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1771.



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- 1801 QUARANTINE INSTALLATIONS AND PROCEDURES, dated 14 October 1947. (CTS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1787 to include Kagoshima and Hakata as ports of entry for Japanese shipping only.
- 1802 MOVEMENT OF GERMAN PROPERTY TO UNITED STATES EIGHTH ARMY WAREHOUSES, dated 16 October 1947. (CPC)  
Directions to inventory, pack, crate and deliver to United States Army Warehouses the property belonging to specified German concerns and/or organizations.
- 1803 EXPANSION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH SERVICE TO EGYPT VIA OSAKA-COLOMBO CIRCUIT, dated 16 October 1947. (CCS)  
Amended by SCAPIN 1818. Rescinded by SCAPIN 2052.
- 1804 DESTRUCTION OF SPECIAL PURPOSE MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, dated 21 October 1947. (ESS)  
Directs the Japanese Government to destroy by scrapping or other approved manner all special purpose machinery and equipment, regardless of ownership or location, functionally limited to use in connection with combat equipment products.
- 1805 HOISTING OF NATIONAL FLAG, dated 22 October 1947. (GA)  
No objection offered to display of Japanese national flag on 3 November.
- 1806 APPROVAL TO ABROGATE IMPERIAL ORDINANCE NO. 243 CONCERNING PROHIBITION OF AND RESTRICTIONS ON DIVIDEND PAYMENTS, dated 22 October 1947. (ESS)  
Rescinds SCAPIN 599. Corporations will be permitted to pay dividends if specified conditions exist.
- 1807 CHANGE IN CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM OF FISHING VESSELS, dated 24 October 1947. (ESS)  
Amends SCAPINS 949, 1120, 1356 and 1682. Amended by SCAPIN 2033.
- 1808 ALTERATION AND CHANGE IN CONSTRUCTION PLANS OF TWO (2) COMBINATION CARGO-PASSENGER VESSELS, dated 27 October 1947. (ESS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1303. No objection offered to change of two cargo-passenger vessels to freight ships.
- 1809 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION AND MARKING OF JAPANESE FISHING VESSELS, dated 28 October 1947. (NR)
- 1810 REVISED METHOD OF HANDLING PRESS AND GOVERNMENT MESSAGES VIA THE OSAKA-COLOMBO CIRCUIT, dated 31 October 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPINS 578 and 1563.



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- 1811 OPERATION OF GREAT NORTHERN TELEGRAPH COMPANY CABLE STATION AND FACILITIES AT NAGASAKI, dated 3 November 1947. (CCS)  
Authorizes company to transmit international telegraph communications by submarine cable into, through and from Japan.
- 1811/1 OPERATION OF GREAT NORTHERN TELEGRAPH COMPANY CABLE STATION AND FACILITIES AT NAGASAKI, dated 8 November 1948. (CCS)  
Approves application. Rescinded by SCAPIN 2052.
- 1811/2 OPERATION OF GREAT NORTHERN TELEGRAPH COMPANY CABLE STATION AND FACILITIES AT NAGASAKI, dated 1 June 1949. (CCS)  
Approves extension of agreement between Ministry of Communications and Great Northern Telegraph Company, Limited.
- 1812 CONCENTRATION OF CURRENCIES AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT SURRENDERED BY REPATRIATES AT PORTS OF ENTRY IN JAPAN, dated 6 November 1947. (CPC)  
Directions requiring all currencies and financial instruments surrendered by repatriates at the various ports of entry in Japan, exclusive of those cities listed in paragraph 3, be deposited in the Bank of Japan. Superseded by SCAPIN 1966. See also SCAPIN 6610-A.
- 1813 PROCEDURE FOR THE EXPORT OF SAMPLES, dated 6 November 1947. (ESS)  
Rescinds SCAPIN 1513.
- 1814 INTERNATIONAL MAIL SERVICE, dated 7 November 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1768. Rescinded by SCAPIN 1900.
- 1815 REMOVAL OF CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS ON NATIONALS OF COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAVE BEEN AT WAR, dated 10 November 1947. (GB)  
Amends SCAPINS 426 and 861.
- 1816 HOISTING OF NATIONAL FLAG, dated 11 November 1947. (GA)  
No objection offered to display of Japanese national flag on 23 November.
- 1817 APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO EXTEND PERIOD OF DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF PRECIOUS METALS IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1947, dated 12 November 1947. (CPC)  
Amends SCAPIN 1754. Approves application.
- 1818 EXPANSION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH PREPAID REPLY (RP) SERVICE, dated 12 November 1947. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPINS 1612, 1707, 1759, 1765, 1786 and 1803.  
Directions to accept prepaid replies from accredited organizations, persons or military personnel in Japan.  
Amended by SCAPINS 1707/6 and 1818/1.



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- 1863 INVENTORY OF CRITICAL MATERIALS, dated 21 February 1948. (ESS)  
Directs the Japanese Government to make a comprehensive inventory of all goods and materials designated as critical materials presently held in industrial, commercial and distributive installations, with specified exceptions.
- 1864 REPATRIATION OF RYUKYUANS, dated 28 February 1948. (GA)  
Informs the Japanese Government that Ryukyans will not be permitted to travel to the Ryukyus unless they can prove bona fide residence in the Ryukyus prior to 2 September 1945 and those who are repatriated will not be permitted to return to Japan except upon individual authorization by SCAP.
- 1865 RELEASE OF PRECIOUS METALS FROM JAPANESE GOVERNMENT STOCKS FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION AND FOR USE IN ITEMS APPROVED FOR EXPORT, dated 27 February 1948. (CPC/CD)  
Approves release of gold, silver and platinum in amounts specified and by companies listed.
- 1866 ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF DIRECT RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUIT BETWEEN JAPAN AND HONGKONG, dated 28 February 1948. (CCS)  
Directs the Japanese Government to establish and operate a direct radiotelegraph service between Japan and Hongkong in accordance with provisions set forth herein.  
Amended by SCAPINs 1866/1 and 1962. Rescinded by SCAPIN 2052.
- 1866/1 ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF DIRECT RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUIT BETWEEN JAPAN AND HONGKONG, dated 4 January 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1866.
- 1867 DISPLAY OF JAPANESE NATIONAL FLAG, dated 1 March 1948. (GA)  
Authorizes display of the Japanese national flag on 12 listed Japanese national holidays. Rescinded by SCAPIN 1934.
- 1868 DISPOSITION OF PROPERTIES BELONGING TO DISSOLVED ORGANIZATIONS, dated 1 March 1948. (CPC/CD)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 1069-A and 2472-A and two CPC memorandums on above subject. Title to all assets, negotiable instrument, accounts receivable, movable properties, real properties and any other properties or assets belonging to dissolved organizations, named in Appendix A hereto, and in addition thereto any other organization that falls under the purview of SCAPIN 548, is transferred to the Japanese Government. Amended by SCAPINs 1868/1, 1868/2, 1868/3 and 1868/4.
- 1868/1 DISPOSITION OF PROPERTIES BELONGING TO DISSOLVED ORGANIZATIONS, dated 30 December 1948. (CPC/PLD)  
Amends SCAPIN 1868.



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- 1868/2 DISPOSITION OF PROPERTIES BELONGING TO DISSOLVED ORGANIZATIONS, dated 25 March 1949. (CPC/PLD)  
Amends SCAPIN 1868.
- 1868/3 DISPOSITION OF PROPERTIES BELONGING TO DISSOLVED ORGANIZATIONS, dated 22 July 1949. (CPC/PLD)  
Amends SCAPIN 1868 and two specified memorandums to Attorney-General's Office.
- 1868/4 DISPOSITION OF PROPERTIES BELONGING TO DISSOLVED ORGANIZATIONS, dated 26 August 1949. (CPC/PLD)  
Amends SCAPIN 1868.
- 1869 REPATRIATION OF GERMAN NATIONALS, dated 10 March 1948. (GA)  
Amends SCAPIN 1750. The German nationals listed in inclosure No. 1 to this memorandum will be repatriated by air under the provisions of SCAPIN 1750 with specified amendments.
- 1870 FOURTH AND FIFTH SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTS FOR PERMISSION TO USE PRECIOUS METALS FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1948, dated 23 March 1948. (CPC/CD)  
Approves application for permission to use liquid gold and precious metal pigment in the amounts specified and by the companies listed. Amended by SCAPIN 1870/1.
- 1870/1 AMENDMENT TO SCAPIN 1870, 23 MARCH 1948, dated 13 May 1948. (CPC/CD)  
Amends SCAPIN 1870.
- 1871 REINSTATEMENT OF MIYAZAKI, ISAO, FORMER PROFESSOR AND STUDENT INSPECTOR AT RIKKYO UNIVERSITY, dated 25 March 1948. (CIE)  
Amends SCAPIN 183. Directs the Japanese Government to reinstate Mr. Miyazaki in his former position.
- 1872 EXPENDITURES FROM FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR OCCUPATION FORCE REQUIREMENTS, dated 31 March 1948. (CE/GD)  
Rescinds SCAPIN 1160. Defines and limits the instruments which constitute authority to expend funds appropriated by the Japanese Government to meet the requirements for support of the Occupation Forces as differentiated from those funds appropriated to meet requirements for compliance with directives issued by SCAP for the benefit of the Japanese people, to carry out the terms of surrender or to otherwise accomplish the purpose of the Occupation. Amended by SCAPINs 1872/1, 1872/2, 1872/7, 1872/10, 6544-A and 6616-A. See also SCAPIN 1949.



SCAPIN

- 1891 RADIOTELETYPE TESTS ON INTERNATIONAL RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUITS, dated 3 May 1948. (CCS)  
Authorizes conducting of radioteletype transmission and reception tests on existing commercial circuits in accordance with specified stipulations.
- 1892 TWELFTH SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTS FOR PERMISSION TO USE PRECIOUS METALS FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION IN SECOND QUARTER OF 1948, dated 4 May 1948. (CPC/CD)  
Approves application of Nippon Kankohin Seisaku K.K., as altered, to use gold dust, liquid gold and pigment. These commercial forms will be released from stocks in the pooled reserve under custody of the Ministry of Finance.
- 1893 APPLICATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS RECONSTRUCTION AND REORGANIZATION LAW TO 2ND RESTRICTED DEPOSITS OF WAR CRIMINAL SUSPECTS, dated 13 May 1948. (CPC/CD)  
Approves application of above law. Outlines procedures and reports to be made concerning accounts of war criminal suspects.
- 1894 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT FOR THE PACKAGING, TRANSFER AND DELIVERY OF EQUIPMENT AND RECORDS ALLOCATED TO CLAIMANT NATIONS UNDER THE REPARATIONS PROGRAM, dated 14 May 1948. (ESS/AC)  
Defines the responsibility of the Reparations Board, Special Procurement Board and the Japanese Government Ministry directly concerned. See also SCAPIN 1751.
- 1895 HOISTING OF FLAGS BY THE MARITIME SAFETY BOARD, dated 16 May 1948. (GA)  
Approves request of the Maritime Safety Board to fly the Board's flag on vessels and on buildings belonging to the Maritime Safety Board.
- 1896 RELEASE OF PRECIOUS METALS TO BE USED IN THE PRODUCTION OF ITEMS LICENSED FOR EXPORT, dated 18 May 1948. (CPC/CD)  
Approves release of gold and silver in amounts specified and to companies listed.
- 1897 TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES FOR USE BY NON-OCCUPATION FORCE PERSONNEL AND FIRMS, dated 20 May 1948. (CCS)  
Directions to print copies of occupation force telephone directories for sale, at central telephone offices, to commercial firms, agencies, etc.



SCAPIN

- 1898 DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMS DISPOSAL COMMITTEE, dated 25 May 1948. (ESS/IND)  
Directions to dissolve the Arms Disposal Committee and all other committees and agencies for the disposal of war materials; to terminate contract, dated 16 May 1946, between the Home Ministry and the Arms Disposal Committee for the sale of war material by the Arms Disposal Committee; to take all supplies, material, etc., now in custody of dissolved agencies, into custody or control of the Procurator General's office; and to make available to Procurator General's office for examination and inspection all books, records, etc., of the dissolved agencies. The Industrial Recovery Corporation is the designated agency to receive, account for, and distribute specified equipment and material. See also SCAPINs 1826 and 1835.
- 1899 PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS ACCRUING TO STOCK OWNED BY UNITED NATIONALS, dated 26 May 1948. (CPC/FP)  
Denies four applications and directs the Japanese Government to deny all future applications of a similar nature, and advises that preemptive rights accruing to stock owned by United Nations' nationals may be exercised only by the shareholder or his duly authorized agent. Upon appropriate demand for return of property on the part of the shareholder the Japanese Government will restore to said nationals their shareholdings as of 7 December 1941, and will, at the option of the United Nations' national, make available to said national such additional shares as might have been acquired by exercise of preemptive rights during option period.
- 1900 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 28 May 1948. (CCS)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 1768, 1769, 1792, 1814, 1862 and 1884. International postal service between Japan and all other countries will operate in accordance with the instructions embodied herein. This memorandum neither adds to nor abrogates any of the international postal services which have been authorized to date. Amended by SCAPINs 1900/1, 1900/2, 1900/3, 1900/6, 1900/7, 1900/8, 1900/9, 1900/10, 1900/11 and 1900/12. See also SCAPINs 1900/4 and 1900/5.
- 1900/1 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 9 August 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1900.
- 1900/2 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 28 September 1948. (CCS)  
Amends paragraph 3c of SCAPIN 1900, by deletion of the words "patents or" therefrom and authorizes direct communication between CCS, GHQ, SCAP and the Ministry of Communications, within the scope of this memorandum.



SCAPIN

- 1900/3 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 16 November 1948. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1900.
- 1900/4 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 13 December 1948. (CCS)  
Authorizes mailing to and from Japan of "Blind"  
literature, subject to the provisions and limitations  
of the Universal Postal Union Convention at Paris,  
5 July 1947.
- 1900/5 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 22 January 1949. (CCS)  
Authorizes mailing of parcels containing ashes of  
deceased persons under classification of "parcel post",  
to and from Japan, subject to the provisions and limi-  
tations of the Universal Postal Union Parcel Post  
Agreement of Paris, 5 July 1947, and/or bilateral  
parcel post agreements and to the specified regula-  
tory provisions.
- 1900/6 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 18 February 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1900.
- 1900/7 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 28 March 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1900.
- 1900/8 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 21 May 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1900.
- 1900/9 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 26 May 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1900.
- 1900/10 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 9 June 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1900.
- 1900/11 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 27 July 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1900.
- 1900/12 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, dated 5 October 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1900.



SCAPIN



SCAPIN

- 1951 REMOVAL OF CERTAIN COMPANIES FROM THE SCHEDULE OF RESTRICTED CONCERNS, dated 27 December 1948. (ESS/AC)  
Amends SCAPINs 403, 572, 813, 831, 855, 893, 950, 970, 972, 982, 998, 1004, 1024, 1077 and 1753 by removing 73 companies from the Schedule of Restricted Concerns.
- 1952 HIMEKO-JIMA AIR BOMBING AND GUNNERY RANGE, dated 23 December 1948. (GC/TNG)  
Designates the island of Himeko-Jima as an air-to-air bombing and gunnery area.
- 1953 ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ADEQUATE PROCUREMENT POLICY FOR THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT RAILWAYS, dated 30 December 1948. (CTS/R)  
Directions to submit for approval within 30 days a comprehensive plan for revising the present procurement policy and procedures employed by the Japanese Government railways to insure specified requirements.
- 1953/1 ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ADEQUATE PROCUREMENT POLICY FOR THE JAPANESE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, dated 7 October 1949. (CTS)  
Approves plan as submitted by the Japanese National Railway in compliance with SCAPIN 1953 for provision of open bidding on all material purchases and sales and all construction and maintenance contracts by the Japanese National Railways.
- 1954 CHANGE IN CONSTRUCTION PLAN OF STEEL FISHING VESSELS, dated 5 January 1949. (ESS/IND)  
Amends SCAPINs 1120, 1356 and 1745 by cancelling the authorization contained therein for the construction of six steel fishing vessels specified. Approves request for construction of six steel fishing vessels in accordance with specifications indicated.
- 1955 MANUFACTURE AND USE OF INDUSTRIAL EXPLOSIVES, dated 5 January 1949. (ESS/IND)  
Authorizes manufacture of specific types and quantities of explosives and explosive accessories for the period 1 January to 31 December 1949.
- 1956 DISPLAY OF JAPANESE NATIONAL FLAG, dated 6 January 1949. (GA)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 1934 and 1934/1. Authorizes the Japanese national flag to be displayed and used without restriction within the territorial limits of Japan, as defined by SCAPINs 677 and 841.



SCAPIN

- 1957 EARTHQUAKE REPORTS AND TIDAL WAVE FORECASTS, dated 6 January 1949. (GC/O)  
Designates the Japanese Government as responsible for insuring that the Central Meteorological Observatory, Ministry of Transportation, furnishes the Occupation Forces geophysical reporting and forecasting service as specified. Rescinded by SCAPIN 2049.
- 1958 REMOVAL OF CERTAIN COMPANIES FROM THE SCHEDULE OF RESTRICTED CONCERNS, dated 11 January 1949. (ESS/AC)  
Amends SCAPINs 403, 813, 855, 950, 972, 1004 and 1753 by removing 15 listed companies from the Schedule of Restricted Concerns.
- 1959 DISPOSITION OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF PROPERTY TAKEN UP AT REPATRIATION PORTS OF EXIT THROUGHOUT JAPAN, dated 11 January 1949. (CPC/CD)  
Directions to dispose of through sale, those properties accompanied by inventory appended to specified C.L.C.O. memorandums.
- 1960 FUR SEAL RESEARCH IN JAPANESE COASTAL WATERS, dated 11 January 1949. (NR/FI)  
Directions to provide two vessels as specified for hunting fur seals in Japanese coastal waters, and to assign an inspector to accompany each vessel.
- 1961 BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF NON-JAPANESE IN JAPAN, dated 14 January 1949. (ESS/EX)  
Directs the Japanese Government to implement the principles set forth in SCAP Circulars 1 and 2, both dated 14 January 1949, for specified purposes. Amended by SCAPIN 1961/1.
- 1961/1 BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF NON-JAPANESE IN JAPAN, dated 21 October 1949. (FIB)  
Amends SCAPIN 1961.
- 1962 MODIFICATION OF EXPEDITIONARY FORCE MESSAGE SERVICE BETWEEN JAPAN AND ALL POINTS IN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, dated 14 January 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPINs 1206, 1762 and 1866.
- 1963 PURCHASE BY JAPANESE GOVERNMENT OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES AND EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS, dated 17 January 1949. (CPC/CD)  
Directions to acquire by purchase in yen, title to such foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments, now in the Bank of Japan, Tokyo, acquired under terms of SCAPINs 927, 1368 and 1812, as are specified by authorized representatives of SCAP. Directions to deliver the foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments which are purchased to Custodian, EIGHTH Army Vaults.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CATALOG  
OF  
DIRECTIVES  
TO THE  
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

VOLUME II

SCAPINS 2001 - 2054 INCLUSIVE



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
APO 500

31 October 1949

CATALOG OF DIRECTIVES TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

VOLUME II

These pages contain the catalog of SCAPINs 2001 through 2054 which were issued by General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, to the Japanese Government 4 May 1949 through 31 October 1949, including the following:

2010/1  
2026/1

2030/1  
2032/1

2034/1

These pages are fastened to permit the addition of subsequent pages which will be published periodically to keep this catalog current.



SCAPIN

- 2016 COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES OCCURRING FROM EXECUTION OF CONSTRUCTION WORKS BASED ON PROCUREMENT DEMAND, dated 16 June 1949. (CE)  
Lists procedures to be followed by Japanese Government upon receipt of construction procurement demands from Commanding General, EIGHTH Army.
- 2017 OPERATION OF JAPANESE WEATHER SERVICE, dated 16 June 1949. (GC-0)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 1782 and 1782/2. Authorizes the Central Meteorological Observatory to operate approximately 150 weather stations in specified locations. Lists ships authorized for subject use.
- 2018 CANCELLATION OF REPORTS, dated 17 June 1949. (ESS/FIN)  
Amends SCAPINs 827 and 1312 by cancelling reports requested therein.
- 2019 ESTABLISHMENT OF IMMIGRATION SERVICE, dated 22 June 1949. (GA)  
Directs that effective 1 November, subject to supervision of Commanding General, EIGHTH Army, Japanese Government will be responsible for immigration surveillance of all individuals authorized by SCAP to enter or depart from Japan (except Occupation Force personnel traveling under official orders). Authorizes entry into Japan of individuals in specified categories. Lists procedures to be followed by Japanese Government in implementation of immigration service.
- 2020 PURCHASE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE CREDITS FOR THE PURPOSE OF STIMULATING EXPORTS, dated 24 June 1949. (ESS/FTC)  
Directions to submit plans and procedures to permit purchase of foreign exchange credits by export of Japanese goods in accordance with specified principles. Amended by Memo: "Foreign Exchange Credits applicable to Cultured Pearls," (BT-49-5215)A, dated 28 June 1949 (ESS/FTC).
- 2021 AUTHORITY FOR THE USE OF FIREWORKS, dated 25 June 1949. (GA)  
Authorizes manufacture and use of fireworks on any occasion deemed appropriate by Japanese Government, subject to specified provisions.
- 2022 AMENDMENT OF SCAPINS, dated 27 June 1949. (ESS/FIN)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 337 and 635. Amends SCAPIN 1186.
- 2023 HOUSING PROGRAM FOR OCCUPATION FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS, dated 27 June 1949. (GD)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 1637 and 982-A.



SCAPIN

- 2024 ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUIT BETWEEN OSAKA, JAPAN AND TAIPEH, FORMOSA, dated 27 June 1949. (CCS)  
Authorizes establishment and operation of a radiotelegraph circuit between Osaka, Japan and Taipeh, Formosa, in accordance with provisions herein set forth.
- 2025 RESISSION OF MEMORANDA TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, dated 8 July 1949. (CPC/PLD)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 1530 and 5133-A.
- 2026 TRANSFER OF PROCEEDS OF IMPORTED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO THE COUNTERPART FUND, dated 11 July 1949. (GD)  
Lists instructions regarding imports of petroleum products and payment thereof. Amended by SCAPIN 2026/1.
- 2026/1 TRANSFER OF PROCEEDS OF IMPORTED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO THE COUNTERPART FUND, dated 19 October 1949. (GD)  
Amends SCAPIN 2026.
- 2027 OPERATION OF PACIFIC COAST REFINERIES AND IMPORT OF CRUDE PETROLEUM, dated 13 July 1949. (ESS/IND)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 134, 640, 1236 and 1404. Authorizes repair and rehabilitation of Pacific Coast Refineries, excluding ex-military refineries, subject to approval of SCAP. Plans for repair will be submitted, including specified information, to SCAP for approval.
- 2028 INTERNATIONAL HIGH FREQUENCY BROADCASTING SERVICE, dated 15 July 1949. (CIE)  
Amends SCAPIN 2. Rescinds SCAPINs 28 and 1006. Authorizes broadcasting organizations to engage in international high frequency broadcasting services subject to specified provisions. See also SCAPIN 1744.
- 2029 INTERNATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE FOR THE RYUKYUS, dated 18 July 1949. (CCS)  
Rescinds SCAPIN 1673.
- 2030 FOREIGN CREDITORS' YEN DEPOSIT ACCOUNT, dated 19 July 1949. (CPC/FP)  
Directions to establish a yen account in the Bank of Japan, Tokyo, to be known as "Foreign Creditors' Yen Deposit Account" for the purposes specified, and subject to listed provisions. See also SCAPIN 39.



SCAPIN

- 2030/1 TRANSFER OF FOREIGN SEAMEN BENEFICIARY FUNDS TO THE FOREIGN CREDITORS' YEN DEPOSIT ACCOUNT, dated 4 August 1949. (CPC/FP)  
Directions to effect the transfer and deposit of all subject funds to the Foreign Creditors' Yen Deposit Account with Bank of Japan. Subject transfer is to be accompanied by a statement grouping the beneficiaries by nationalities and reflecting the names of beneficiaries and the amounts due. Any funds in addition to the above and in the same category shall also be transferred and deposited under provisions of this memorandum. Transfer of any funds subject to the provision of SCAPIN 338 is not authorized.
- 2031 EXTENSION OF SIXTY DAY VISIT TO VISIT RELATIVES AND FRIENDS, dated 21 July 1949. (GA)  
Authorizes extension of 60 days stay in Japan of individuals visiting friends and relatives. Outlines responsibilities of Japanese Government regarding visitors and visit.
- 2032 JAPANESE PORT OPERATIONS AND CHARGES FOR PORT FACILITIES AND TERMINAL SERVICES, dated 25 July 1949. (CTS)  
Amends SCAPIN 1927. Amended by SCAPIN 2032/1.
- 2032/1 JAPANESE PORT OPERATIONS AND CHARGES FOR PORT FACILITIES AND TERMINAL SERVICES, dated 29 August 1949. (CTS)  
Amends SCAPIN 2032.
- 2033 CANCELLATION OF AUTHORIZATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF STEEL SHIPS, dated 27 July 1949. (ESS/IND)  
Amends SCAPINs 949, 1120, 1356, 1739, 1745, 1807, 1824 and 2033-A.
- 2034 JAPANESE OVERSEAS RADIOTELEPHONE SERVICE, dated 27 July 1949. (CCS)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 1309 and 1830. Authorizes radiotelephone service, via the United States, between Japan and any place in the world including the United States and its territories and possessions.  
Amended by SCAPIN 2034/1.
- 2034/1 JAPANESE OVERSEAS RADIOTELEPHONE SERVICE, dated 21 October 1949. (CCS)  
Amends SCAPIN 2034.
- 2035 TRAVEL OF JAPANESE TECHNICIANS OUTSIDE OF JAPAN, dated 1 August 1949. (GA)  
As a measure designed to assist the Japanese economy through deposits in the SCAP Commercial Accounts, broadening Japanese participation in the world wide industry, advertising Japanese technical skills and products abroad and accruing good will, the restrictive policy of SCAP concerning travel abroad of Japanese technicians is now liberalized as specified.



SCAPIN

2036

PAYMENT OF FARES BY OCCUPATION PERSONNEL UTILIZING JAPANESE TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, dated 10 August 1949. (GD)

All occupation personnel in Japan have been instructed that commencing 15 August, they will pay the usual yen fare charged the Japanese public for all travel on Japanese transportation facilities not on procurement demand to the Occupation Forces. Accordingly, no charge will be made against occupation costs for such travel made by occupation personnel on or after 15 August.

2037

RELEASE AND SALE OF PEARLS, NATURAL AND CULTURED AND ARTICLES CONTAINING PEARLS, dated 11 August 1949. (ESS/FTC)

Rescinds SCAPINs 1935 and 1935/1.

2038

TRAVEL FROM RYUKYUS TO JAPAN, dated 12 August 1949. (GA)

After 15 August, travel from the Ryukyus to Japan may be approved for compassionate reasons or where such travel is in the interest of the occupation of the Ryukyus or Japan. Travel solely by right of repatriation will be suspended until further notice.

2039

REVISED PLAN FOR RECEIVING PAYMENTS DUE AMERICAN CARRIERS FOR MESSAGES AND RADIOTELEPHONE CALLS FILED BY UNITED STATES MILITARY AND ACCREDITED CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FOR TRANSMISSION TO OR THROUGH THE UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES AND POSSESSIONS, PREPAID IN JAPAN, dated 26 August 1949. (CCS)

Rescinds SCAPIN 1197. The provisions of SCAPIN 1197 were superseded by SCAPIN 1228, as amended, and therefore are no longer applicable.

2040

PRODUCTION OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND PARTS, dated 27 August 1949. (CCS)

Rescinds SCAPINs 1583 and 5896-A.

2041

LOSSES OF, OR DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PROPERTY SHIPPED BY JAPANESE RAILWAYS, dated 1 September 1949. (GD)

Shipments of United States Government property via railways in Japan have resulted in numerous instances of damage to or shortage of such property. Such discrepancies will be investigated by the United States occupation forces and responsibility for the loss or damage will be determined. In those instances in which the railways are found to be responsible for the loss or damage, such reports of investigation will be retained by SCAP as a basis for applicable action as defined herein in effecting reimbursement for the value of the loss or damage sustained.



SCAPIN

- 2042 TRADE-MARKS, TRADE NAMES, AND MARKING OF MERCHANDISE IN JAPAN, dated 9 September 1949. (CPC/FP)  
Directions to provide and enforce the necessary procedures to implement the provisions of this memorandum relating to trademarks, trade names and marking of merchandise in Japan.
- 2043 PRICE AND DISTRIBUTION CONTROLS OVER POTATOES, dated 9 September 1949. (ESS/PD)  
The Japanese Government may eliminate price and distribution controls over sweet and white potatoes in 1950 since the supply of grains in Japan is considered to be sufficiently adequate to make unnecessary the continuation of these controls. See also SCAPIN 1978.
- 2044 RESCISSION OF MEMORANDUM FOR THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, dated 13 September 1949. (ESS/IND)  
Rescinds SCAPIN 1291.
- 2045 REMOVAL OF CERTAIN COMPANIES FROM THE SCHEDULE OF RESTRICTED CONCERNS, dated 17 September 1949. (ESS/FTP)  
Amends SCAPINs 403, 572, 813, 831, 855, 893, 923, 931, 972, 982, 998, 1004, 1024, 1077 and 1320 by removing 67 companies from the Schedule of Restricted Concerns.
- 2046 AREA AUTHORIZED FOR JAPANESE FISHING AND WHALING, dated 19 September 1949. (NR)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 1033 and 1033/1. Japanese fishing, whaling and similar operations are authorized within the area bounded as specified.
- 2047 STABILIZATION OF THE COAL INDUSTRY, dated 29 September 1949. (ESS/EX)  
Rescinds SCAPIN 1984.
- 2048 IONOSPHERE MEASUREMENTS AND ASSOCIATED RESEARCH IN JAPAN, dated 30 September 1949. (CCS)  
Rescinds SCAPIN 1936. Information of General Application included.
- 2049 EARTHQUAKE REPORTS AND TIDAL WAVE FORECASTS, dated 3 October 1949. (GC-0)  
Rescinds SCAPIN 1957. Directs the Japanese Government to take specified steps concerning tidal wave forecasts and earthquake reports.



SCAPIN

2050

JAPANESE FISHERY INSPECTION SYSTEM, dated 10 October 1949.  
(NR)

Rescinds SCAPIN 1033/2. Authorizes establishment of fisheries inspection system, subject to specified modifications.



SCAPIN

- 2051 NOTIFICATION THAT THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE ARE OWNERS OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF FORMER GERMAN PROPERTY IN JAPAN, dated 13 October 1949. (CPC/PLD)  
Rescinds SCAPIN 6112-A. The United States, United Kingdom and France, for whom SCAP is trustee, are the owners of all right, title and interest to the listed categories of property in Japan.
- 2052 REVISION OF STERLING RATES VIA CABLE AND WIRELESS, LIMITED, AND GREAT NORTHERN TELEGRAPH COMPANY CIRCUIT, dated 19 October 1949. (CCS)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 1762, 1765, 1803, 1811/1 and 1866. Telecommunications services covered by the listed SCAPINs and the rules and regulations governing the provision of such services and the applicable rates and division of revenue contained therein will form the basis for continued operation of such services except as may be hereinafter, or in the future, modified.
- 2053 APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO MANUFACTURE SMALL-SIZED PASSENGER CARS, dated 25 October 1949. (ESS/IND)  
Rescinds SCAPIN 1715.
- 2054 RECEIPT AND DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES FROM LICENSED AGENCIES FOR RELIEF IN ASIA, dated 25 October 1949. (PH)  
Rescinds SCAPIN 1169, effective 1 April 1950, with specified exception.



SCAPIN



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
APO 500

31 October 1949

CATALOG OF ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVES (SCAPIN-A's) TO THE  
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  
VOLUME II

These pages contain the catalog of SCAPIN-A's 2001 through 4000, which were issued by General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, to the Japanese Government, from 15 August 1946 through 23 June 1947, including the following changes issued subsequently:

3189/1 - /2  
3201/1

3527/1 - /2  
3674/1

3688/1 - /2  
3721/1  
3976/1

These pages are fastened to permit the addition of subsequent pages which will be published periodically to keep this catalog current.



SCAPIN-A

- 3183 RESTITUTION TO MR. F. E. DOWN OF PROPERTY WRONGFULLY TRANSFERRED, dated 6 February 1947. (CPC/FP)
- 3184 APPLICATION FOR WITHDRAWALS FROM THE SPECIAL PROPERTY ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT, dated 6 February 1947. (CPC/FP)  
Approves, with specified exceptions, withdrawal of funds for administrative expenses of certain Japanese concerns acting as custodians.
- 3185 QUININE SHIPPED FROM BANGKOK NOW AT THE URAGA AND HAKATA QUARANTINE OFFICES, dated 7 February 1947. (CPC/FP)  
Directs impoundage of quinine sulfate at Uruga Quarantine Office and quinine sulfate tablets at Hakata Quarantine Office in compliance with SCAPIN 1950-A and investigation and report on origin and method of acquisition by Japanese Government of subject quinine which was shipped from Bangkok, Siam, to Japan during May and June 1946.
- 3186 RESTITUTION TO MAJOR LARDNER W. MOORE OF PROPERTY WRONGFULLY TRANSFERRED, dated 7 February 1947. (CPC/FP)  
Amended by SCAPIN 3601-A.
- 3187 APPLICATION OF TOKYO OFFICE OF MEIJI SEITO KAISHA, LTD., FOR PERMISSION TO MAKE AN INVESTMENT IN JOINT ASSOCIATION FOR SUGAR IMPORTATION, dated 7 February 1947. (CPC/FP)  
Denies application.
- 3188 REQUEST FOR USE OF YEN BANK ACCOUNTS BY GERMAN CONCERNS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PAYING SALARIES AND INCIDENTAL EXPENSES, dated 7 February 1947. (CPC/FP)  
Disapproves request.
- 3189 APPLICATIONS FOR WITHDRAWALS FROM BLOCKED ACCOUNTS OF UNITED NATIONS NATIONALS, dated 7 February 1947. (CPC/FP)  
Directs that all applications to withdraw funds for purpose of paying repair and preservation expenses be disapproved in accordance with SCAPINs 26 and 1370. Specified routine applications may be approved without prior permission of SCAP. Amended by SCAPINs 3189-A/1 and 3189-A/2. Rescinded by SCAPIN 6885-A.
- 3189/1 APPLICATION FOR WITHDRAWALS FROM BLOCKED ACCOUNTS OF UNITED NATIONS NATIONALS, dated 10 May 1949. (CPC/FP)  
Amends SCAPIN 3189-A. Rescinded by SCAPIN 6885-A.
- 3189/2 APPLICATIONS FOR WITHDRAWALS FROM BLOCKED ACCOUNTS OF UNITED NATIONS NATIONALS, dated 17 August 1949. (CPC/FP)  
Amends SCAPIN 3189-A. Rescinded by SCAPIN 6885-A.



SCAPIN-A

- 3190 PROPERTY OF DISSOLVED ORGANIZATIONS, dated 7 February 1947.  
(CPC/GP)  
Directs dissolution of and prevention of all transactions involving property owned or controlled by the Essa Shiso Taisaku Kenkyo Kai or any related organizations.
- 3191 ACQUISITION OF RESIDENCES, dated 7 February 1947. (GD)  
See also SCAPINs 2815-A and 3314-A.
- 3192 REQUEST FOR RELEASE OF STAPLE FIBER YARN IN THE STOCKS OF KOEKI EIDAN, dated 7 February 1947. (CPC/GP).  
Disapproves application.
- 3193 ACQUISITION STATUS OF RESIDENCES, dated 7 February 1947.  
(GD)  
Amends SCAPINs 2748-A and 2878-A by changing status of five residences. See also SCAPIN 1519-A.
- 3194 RELEASE OF IMPORTED FOOD, dated 8 February 1947. (ESS/PC)  
Directs distribution of 87,500 metric tons of imported wheat, wheat products or beans, and storage of 72,500 metric tons of rice for release only upon directions of SCAP.
- 3195 RELEASE OF FUNDS DEPOSITED IN JAPAN SINCE 15 AUGUST 1945 FOR PAYMENT OF TAXES LEVIED ON PROJECTS OVERSEAS, dated 8 February 1947. (CPC/GP)  
Disapproves application.
- 3196 FIRE HAZARDS IN BUILDINGS PARTIALLY OCCUPIED BY THE ALLIED OCCUPATION FORCES, dated 8 February 1947. (GD)  
Directs immediate action be taken to correct fire hazards which exist in certain parts of the Mitsui Main Building and inspection of all buildings partially occupied by Allied Occupation Forces. See also SCAPIN 254-A.
- 3197 APPLICATION OF TAIWAN SEITO KAISHA, LTD., FOR PERMISSION TO MAKE AN INVESTMENT TO JOIN ASSOCIATION FOR SUGAR IMPORTATION, dated 8 February 1947. (CPC/FP)  
Denies application.
- 3198 ACQUISITION OF OPEN AREA ADJACENT TO MARUNOUCHI HOTEL, dated 8 February 1947. (GD)  
See also SCAPIN 2638-A.
- 3199 ENTRY AND REGISTRATION OF NON-JAPANESE NATIONALS IN JAPAN, dated 10 February 1947. (GA)  
Lists foreign nationals who have been cleared to enter Japan.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
APO 500

31 October 1949

CATALOG OF ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVES (SCAPIN-A's) TO THE  
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  
VOLUME III

These pages contain a catalog of SCAPIN-A's 4001 through 6000, which were issued by General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, to the Japanese Government from 23 June 1947 to 11 September 1948, including the following changes issued subsequently:

4384/1	5509/1	5766/1	5888/1
4422/1 - /2	5599/1 - /2	5770/1 - /11	5895/1
4762/1	5605/1 - /2	5776/1	5901/1
4841/1	5668/1	5783/1 - /10	5904/1
4918/1	5677/1	5822/1 - /5	5911/1 - /4
5045/1	5685/1	5825/1 - /52	5945/1
5223/1	5737/1 - /3	5836/1 - /2	5947/1
5259/1	5738/1	5842/1	5959/1
5260/1	5743/1	5851/1	5962/1
5273/1	5750/1	5875/1 - /3	5978/1
5308/1	5753/1	5877/1 - /3	5981/1
5344/1	5754/1	5880/1	5985/1

These pages are fastened to permit the addition of subsequent pages which will be published periodically to keep this catalog current.



SCAPIN-A

- 5825/37 TRANSMITTAL OF REPARATIONS ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 20 June 1949. (CPC/RP)  
Transmittal memorandum for allocation notice numbers for reparations goods accepted by China, the Netherlands, the Philippines and the United Kingdom. Amended by SCAPINs 5825-A/39, 5825-A/44 and 5825-A/45 and by Memos: "Destination for Reparations Allocation Notices," dated 2 July 1949 (CPC/RP) and "Destination for Items on Allocation Notice Number 4-62," dated 16 August 1949 (CPC/RP).
- 5825/38 CANCELLATION OF ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 25 June 1949. (CPC/RP)  
Rescinds SCAPINs 5825-A/9 and 5825-A/20.
- 5825/39 AMENDMENTS TO ALLOCATION NOTICES 1-66, 2-58, 3-48 AND 4-62, dated 30 June 1949. (CPC/RP)  
Amends SCAPIN 5825-A/37.
- 5825/40 TRANSMITTAL OF REPARATIONS ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 30 June 1949. (CPC/RP)  
Transmittal memorandum for allocation notices for reparations goods accepted by China, the Netherlands, the Philippines and the United Kingdom. Amended by SCAPINs 5825-A/46, 5825-A/47 and 5825/48 and by Memo: "Destination for Reparations Allocation Notice," dated 20 July 1949 (CPC/RP).
- 5825/41 TRANSMITTAL OF REPARATIONS ALLOCATION NOTICE, dated 30 June 1949. (CPC/RP)  
Transmittal memorandum for allocation notices for reparations goods accepted by China. Amended by SCAPIN 5825-A/52.
- 5825/42 AMENDMENTS TO ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 23 July 1949. (CPC/RP)  
Amends SCAPINs 5825-A/31 and 5825-A/32.
- 5825/43 AMENDMENTS TO ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 9 August 1949. (CPC/RP)  
Amends SCAPIN 5825-A/35.
- 5825/44 AMENDMENTS TO ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 9 August 1949. (CPC/RP)  
Amends SCAPIN 5825-A/37.
- 5825/45 AMENDMENTS TO ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 25 August 1949. (CPC/RP)  
Amends SCAPIN 5825-A/37.



SCAPIN-A

- 5825/46 AMENDMENTS TO ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 8 September 1949.  
(CPC/FP)  
Amends SCAPIN 5825-A/40.
- 5825/47 AMENDMENTS TO ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 20 September 1949.  
(CPC/FP)  
Amends SCAPINs 5825-A/33, 5825-A/34 and 5825-A/40.
- 5825/48 AMENDMENTS TO ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 28 September 1949.  
(CPC/FP)  
Amends SCAPINs 5825-A/36 and 5825-A/40.
- 5825/49 AMENDMENTS TO ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 7 October 1949.  
(CPC/FP)  
Amends SCAPINs 5825-A/31 and 5825-A/32.
- 5825/50 AMENDMENTS TO ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 8 October 1949.  
(CPC/FP)  
Amends SCAPINs 5825-A/30 and 5825-A/35.
- 5825/51 AMENDMENTS TO ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 17 October 1949.  
(CPC/FP)  
Amends SCAPINs 5825-A/29 and 5825-A/33.
- 5825/52 AMENDMENTS TO ALLOCATION NOTICES, dated 20 October 1949.  
(CPC/FP)  
Amends SCAPINs 5825-A/28 and 5825-A/41.



5

1/3/2

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 740.00119 CONTROL  
(Japan) / 12-1549  
Date 15 December 1949  
From Green  
To Allison

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
- Otherwise Restricted Information

Australia / 1949  
Authority

30 June 1978  
Date  
GG



December 20, 1949

Central Files

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bill:

Our Spanish desk has asked that we endeavor to find out if there is any truth to a confidential report that General Willoughby is planning to visit Spain in the near future at the invitation of General Franco. You may wish to discreetly seek this information.

Sincerely yours,

John M. Allison

The Honorable

William J. Sebald,

Acting United States Political  
Adviser for Japan.

FE:NA:HM:eseley:clh 12/20/49

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

740:00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-2049

740.00119 Control Japan 12-2049

CS/T

DS/R

15

Handwritten initials: P. M. C.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Confidential* *ALD*  
**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : NA - Mr. Allison  
 Mr. Moseley

DATE: December 21, 1949

FROM : NA - Mrs. Dunning *(ed)*

SUBJECT: Developments Re Japanese Participation in International Relationships at Meeting of Steering Committee on December 20, 1949.

Re SC 339/18. Appointment of Japanese Official Agents Abroad, the UK member stated that he could not support the paper as it now stands. His Government had no objection to that part relating to civil status or property rights of Japanese nationals abroad provided they had no consular or representative privileges, but it could not support that part relating to trade as it did not consider it necessary to appoint Japanese official agents abroad for the purpose of facilitating Japanese trade. The Chinese member stated that he could support that part relating to trade but objected to that part relating to civil status or property rights.

The US member moved that the paper be approved and forwarded to the Commission. This motion was defeated by a vote of 6 to 5 with 1 abstention.

For: 5 (US, Pakistan, Canada, France, Netherlands)  
 Opposed: 6 (UK, USSR, Philippines, Australia, Burma, China)  
 Abstention: 1 (India)

A motion to split the paper into two sections, one relating to trade and the other to civil status and property rights, was then introduced and accepted by a vote of 8 to 1, the US opposing.

The consensus of the members appeared to be to take a vote on the two sections of the paper. The section on trade was approved and forwarded to the Commission by a vote of 7 to 2 with 4 abstentions.

For: 7 (US, Pakistan, India, France, China, Canada, Netherlands)  
 Opposed: 2 (Philippines, Australia)  
 Abstentions: 4 (Burma, USSR, New Zealand, UK)

The section on civil status and property rights was approved and forwarded to the Commission by a vote of 7 to 3 with 3 abstentions.

For: 7 (UK, US, Pakistan, India, France, Canada, Netherlands)  
 Opposed: 3 (Australia, Philippines, China)  
 Abstentions: 3 (Burma, New Zealand, USSR)

740.00119-CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-21-49

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 DEC 21 1949



- 2 -

Re SC 339/17, Japanese Participation in Technical Agreements and Conferences, the UK member stated that his Government could not support this paper because it felt that Japan could not have full membership rights in international organizations, etc. before a peace treaty. The Chinese amendment which provided that SCAP participate in international conferences on behalf of Japan was defeated by a vote of 7 to 3. A formal vote was not taken on the US amendment in view of the fact that the general consensus of the committee appeared unfavorable toward it.

The Canadian representative proposed that Japanese going abroad shall not engage in "political" activities. This motion was accepted by a vote of 5 to 1.

For: 5 (India, France, Canada, Australia, Netherlands)  
Opposed: 1 (US)  
Abstentions: 7 (Burma, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, USSR, UK, China)

The US moved the deletion of paragraph 2 in its entirety but this motion was defeated by a vote of 4 to 3 with 6 abstentions.

For: 3 (US, Pakistan, Netherlands)  
Opposed: 4 (France, Australia, China, India)  
Abstentions: 6 (Burma, Canada, New Zealand, Philippines, USSR, UK)

The Committee agreed to vote on the paper paragraph by paragraph. Each paragraph was accepted by a majority. The US voted against the new paragraph 2. The Committee agreed to approve and forward the paper to the Commission by a vote of 5 in favor, 4 opposed and 4 abstentions.

For: 5 (Pakistan, India, France, Canada, Netherlands)  
Opposed: 4 (Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, US)  
Abstentions: 4 (USSR, Burma, China, UK)

The US member proposed that in view of the vote that the motion be laid on the table, i.e., if no action to the contrary is taken at the next meeting of the Steering Committee the paper will be automatically forwarded to the Commission.

#### Recommendations

1. Re SC 339/18, it is recommended that the US member at the Thursday meeting of the Commission refer briefly to the urgency of this question and state that the US would like to see the other governments represented around the table give this matter their urgent attention and that the US feels it will be compelled to call for a vote on this paper at the next meeting of the Commission.

*There is attached a memo for US member for your approval & signature.*

2.



- 3 -

2. Re SC 339/17, it is recommended that we try to find a substitute for paragraph 2 that may be acceptable to ourselves and the other members.

*old*  
FE:NA:ALDunning:clh



DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AC

ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF INCOMING TELEGRAM NORTHWEST ASIAN AFFAIRS

DEC 21 1949 RESTRICTED



18

Action: FE Info: EUR IC UNA UNAR OLI CIA AAN DS DCR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Control 8466

Rec'd December 21, 1949 5:42 a.m.

Action Assigned to NA Action Taken

FROM: Tokyo

Date of Action 1/1/50

TO: Secretary of State

Action Office Symbol per Director 1/11/52 Name of Officer

NO: 579, December 21

Direction to DC/R

File

Record

PRIORITY

Immediately upon opening of regular Allied Council meeting this morning Soviet member Lt. Gen. Derevyanko raised question of procedure charging that rejection his subject "on violation of the principles and fulfillment of the problems of the democratization of Japan" proposed in his letter dated November 14, 1949, had been arbitrary and unjustified and that subsequent letter dated December 5 stating his intention to discuss "anti-democratic measures of Japanese Government" at forthcoming meeting of Council had been similarly rejected without reason. He also strongly protested against discussion of repatriation problem which I had placed on agenda for today APOS's meeting at Supreme Commander AFO's direction stating that proposed discussion of this subject not only was inappropriate but obviously constituted a part of campaign of hostility and propaganda conducted against Soviet Union by SCAP Headquarters. I pointed out that subject for discussion proposed in Soviet letter of November 14 had been rejected because, as phrased, it involved review of action taken by SCAP under directives issued to him in conformity with FEC policy decision and that such review was proper subject for FEC and not ACJ; also that letter of December 5 only stated an intention to place subject on agenda but contained no specific wording of subject. After further brief exchange during which Soviet member refused

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-21-49

740.00119 (Central) Japan 12-21-49 CS/H

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RESTRICTED

-2- # 579, December 21, from Tokyo

follow ruling of chairman and conducted himself in unruly manner, Soviet member stated he could not take part in meeting permitting discussion of Japanese repatriation and thereupon left meeting accompanied by staff.

I then proceeded with statement as outlined in MYTEL 569, December 16 (which Department has by separate means).

British Commonwealth member Ambassador Hodgson after a few remarks and questions on procedural issue strongly supported position taken in my general statement confirming propriety of discussion of repatriation issue by Allied Council, reviewing general problem of repatriation, stressing Soviet failure to challenge GHQ statistics on repatriation and strongly affirming necessity of securing information from Soviet Union regarding present status of repatriation. Pointing out ACJ APOS's responsibilities for advising SCAP on repatriation problem and making constructive recommendations he proposed that the Council recommend to SCAP that Soviet Government be reminded of obligations under 1929 Prisoners of War Convention and Geneva Convention signed by various nations, including Soviet Union on December 8, 1949, as well as other agreements, Potsdam Declaration, and UN Declaration of Human Rights, and invited conclude new repatriation agreement incorporating principles in these conventions and declarations, asking Swiss Government as protecting power of international organization such as Red Cross to make impartial investigations of conditions of Japanese remaining in USSR.

Chinese member General Chu Chih-ming spoke briefly expressing general interest of his government in repatriation program and pointing out that Chinese part of repatriation program had long since been completed.

SEBALD

TT:HL

RESTRICTED

*very plain, general  
Muller - Kuroyama  
10/21/50*

*Soviet not present  
to 10*

*revised  
12/21/50*

*Miss Whelan  
2280  
2257*



NOTICE

ANALYSIS SECTION  
CATALOG SECTION

No white copy of this telegram was received for record in DC/R.  
Recrd must be made from this "yellow" or action copy.

When this has been done, please remove and destroy this notice.

DC/R. INTERIM CONTROL UNIT



DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM

MB

ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS DEC 22 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

9 D Action: FE Info: SS G P SAM EUR L UNA UNAR OLI CIA AAN DS DCR

Action Assigned to NA

Control 9073

Action Taken Notes

Rec'd December 22, 1949 9:14 a.m.

FROM: Tokyo Base of Action TO: Secretary of State NO: 585, December 22

NA Files m card

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS DEC 22 1949 DEPUTY DIRECTOR Department of State

REMISTEL 579, December 21

Japanese press prominently featured yesterday's meeting ACJ. While Soviet walkout given big play also lengthy treatment my statement, particularly estimates that approximately 370,000 Japanese may have died in Soviet custody. Secondary accounts devoted to Soviet member's letter to SCAP December 21 charging anti-democratic developments in Japan encouraged by occupation for Fascist revival.

Extensive editorial comment re repatriation problem day after meeting indicative of importance Japanese attach to subject. Press shocked at possibility such large number Japanese may have perished but reaction generally restrained with almost tone of resignation to inevitable. While accepting tragic possibility, press insists Soviet Union remains obligated to furnish names of deceased and those still detained.

ASAHI

DC/R 15

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) /112-2249 Japan/12-22 49 CS/H



RESTRICTED

-2-, 585, December 22, from Tokyo

ASAHI editorial December 22 notes with regret that Soviet Delegation "stalked out" of Council meeting, and fact that "members of Council could not come to an agreement must be indeed regretted by Japanese nation". ASahi believes, however, large number Japanese still remaining, and "if there are any unavoidable circumstances which prevent Russians from sending back those Japanese we should like to know them". Desire of Japanese that issue be discussed at Council considered not anti-Soviet move as charged by Soviet member but "only a matter of humble supplication of those families whose members are not yet returned from Russia". Japan merely asking, ASahi stated, to be "treated as defeated nation within law and custom universally practiced by every nation of world".

MAINICHI's editorial hopes Stalin will heed appeals Japanese people raised at ACJ. "We pray most earnestly" that appalling picture so many Japanese have died may be altered by revelation of truth. "We only wonder why it is that Soviet authorities refuse to supply vital statistics. This is not matter of political or doctrinal differences; it is simply matter of humanity". "On occasion of 70th birthday of Prime Minister Stalin, we beg on our knees for such humane handling of repatriation question".

Jiji SHIMPO hopes that figures given ACJ are not true, but recognizes they are based on careful investigation and portend an "unprecedented tragedy". If figures are fantastic as Soviet member charged, "we hope Soviets will explain to us why they are fantastic", but attitude Soviet member in walking out of meeting most regrettable since he has continued to remain silent "at very best opportunity to speak". Jiji feels this attitude "may implant deep grudge in minds of Japanese against Soviet Union".

TOKYO

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

-3-, 585, December 22, from Tokyo

TOKYO SHIMBUN in editorial entitled "Appeal to Soviet Humanity" regrets that meeting of ACJ "ended without reaching any conclusion due to withdrawal of Soviet representative". Clinging to hope some Japanese still alive, "we appeal to Soviet humanitarianism for early repatriation our fellow countrymen".

In issue December 22 Communist daily AKAHATA carried first page spread full text Soviet member's letter to SCAP December 21 with headline "Revival of Fascism". This followed by brief article quoting Soviet member that SCAP's repatriation figures "groundless", concluding with brief account ACJ meeting last sentence of which makes casual reference to my statement on repatriation figures.

Only other paper to carry Soviet member's letter of 21st was English language NIPPON TIMES which also carried my statement in full and had substantial editorial criticizing Soviet walkout. Subject of repatriation, according to NIPPON TIMES, is "embarrassing and distasteful one for Soviets", and not surprising that Soviet member unable to face discussion of issue. After yesterday's proceedings at ACJ civilized world awaits Soviet answer, desiring facts, not walkout, NIPPON TIMES concluded.

SEBALD

RB:RT

RESTRICTED





THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*[Handwritten initials]*

UNCLASSIFIED

NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Office of the United States  
Political Adviser for Japan

JAN - 3 1950

Tokyo, December 23, 1949.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*no action required*

13  
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DEC 28

ACTION  
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No. 896

INFO  
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EUR  
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Subject: Transmitting Copies of Correspondence between Chairman of  
Allied Council for Japan and Soviet Member of Council.

scm

With reference to the Mission's telegram no. 498 of November 16, 1949, as well as to its several telegrams dated December 21 and 22, 1949, concerning the discussions which took place between the Chairman (and United States Member) and the Soviet Member at the December 21 meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, the Acting Political Adviser has the honor to transmit herewith copies of two letters mentioned in the course of the debate on the problem of Japanese repatriation, as follows:

- 1/ 1. Letter dated April 25, 1949, from Acting United States Political Adviser in his capacity as Chief of Diplomatic Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, to Lieutenant General K.N. DEREVYANKO, Soviet Member, Allied Council for Japan, requesting the latter to obtain from his Government vital statistics regarding Japanese prisoners of war;
- 2/ 2. Translation of letter dated December 5, 1949, from the Soviet Member of the Allied Council for Japan to the Chairman of the Council protesting against the rejection of the Soviet request that a special meeting be called to discuss "antidemocratic measures of the Japanese Government".

Enclosures: *att*

- ✓ 1. Copy of letter dated April 25, 1949, from Diplomatic Section to Lieutenant General K.N. Derevyanko.
- ✓ 2. Translation of letter dated December 5, 1949, from Soviet Member to Chairman of Allied Council for Japan.

310/321.4  
CKHuston:hh  
Parchment Mat to Department.

UNCLASSIFIED

JAN 19 1950

FILED

FAP

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-2349

ACTION COPY

RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

*[Handwritten initials in a circle]*



UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 896 dated December 23, 1949, from Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "Transmitting Copies of Correspondence between Chairman of Allied Council for Japan and Soviet Member of Council".

COPY

Diplomatic Section

Tokyo, 25 April 1949

Lieutenant General K.N. Derevyanko,  
Soviet Member,  
Allied Council for Japan,  
Tokyo.

Dear General Derevyanko:

Reference is made to discussion on the problem of repatriation at the forty-fourth meeting of the Allied Council for Japan on October 29, 1947. Specifically, your attention is invited to those remarks pertaining to appropriate information concerning records of death, disappearance, or serious illness of Japanese prisoners of war.

It is a matter of grave concern to the Supreme Commander in his implementation of the Terms of Surrender and, by reference, of the Potsdam Declaration, that the Japanese people be kept informed concerning matters of vital importance to them, such as the pertinent data mentioned above. As you are no doubt aware, there has at no time been any report whatsoever from the Soviet authorities concerning Japanese prisoners of war held in the Soviet Union, nor is it apparent from information available to the Supreme Commander that any effort is being made by the Soviet authorities so to apprise the Supreme Commander as the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan. Such information would be of interest not only to the Japanese people and particularly to the families of the individuals concerned, but, it is believed, also to the member nations of the Far Eastern Commission charged with the formulation of policy pertaining to the Occupation of Japan.

It is therefore requested, in conformity with the normal dictates of international law, that you approach your Government with a view to obtaining all available information concerning vital statistics of Japanese prisoners of war, with especial reference to names, units, and/or last recorded places of domicile or residence, nearest relatives, date and place of decease or serious illness, and such other information and data as might be of interest to the families of the individuals concerned.

Sincerely yours,

W. J. Sebald

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 396 dated December 23, 1949, from Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "Transmitting Copies of Correspondence between Chairman of Allied Council for Japan and Soviet Member of Council".

COPY

TRANSLATION

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN  
TOKYO  
OFFICE OF THE MEMBER  
FOR  
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

TO: MR. V. SEBALD, CHAIRMAN OF THE ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

Dear Mister Chairman:

With reference to the letter of the Secretary General addressed to the Office of the Member, Allied Council for Japan from the USSR, dated 14 November 1949, I consider it necessary to state, that your refusal to call a meeting of the Allied Council and discuss the question presented by me concerning anti-democratic measures of the Japanese Government is a violation of the procedure of discussion of questions existent thus far in the Allied Council.

Your assertion, that discussion of the question presented by me "cannot be considered appropriate under regulations pertaining to the Allied Council" is without basis, as, in bringing the indicated question to consideration by the Allied Council, I acted specifically in accordance with Regulation I pertaining to the Allied Council, which foresees presentation of advice to the Supreme Commander by the Allied Council on matters relative to terms of the capitulation, occupation and control over Japan, as well as matters relative to compliance with directives supplementing these terms.

In presenting this question for discussion, I intend to include for consideration by the Allied Council recommendations for the Supreme Commander, the right for inclusion of which by representatives of governments of the Allied Council is foreseen by the very Agreement on the Allied Council.

In connection with the above, I anticipate, that the question presented by me will be included in the agenda of the bi-weekly meeting of the Allied Council for Japan.

Respectfully,  
MEMBER OF THE ALLIED COUNCIL  
FOR JAPAN FROM THE U.S.S.R.

General-Leytenant  
/s/ K. Derevyanko  
/t/ K. DEREVIANKO

5 Dec 49  
No 1349

UNCLASSIFIED





THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

740.00119 Control (Japan)/12-2349

United States Political Adviser  
for Japan

GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, December 23, 1949

NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

No. 897

JAN - 3 1950

REC'D  
DEC 28

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*no action required  
mg.*

*ack  
File*

ACTION  
FE-2encs

Subject: One Hundred-second Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan,  
December 21, 1949.

INFO  
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SUR\*ENC  
OLI-enc

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch no. 862 of December 8, 1949, and to previous correspondence in regard to meetings of the Allied Council for Japan, and to forward as enclosures five copies each of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the one hundred-second meeting of the Council held on December 21, 1949.

Enclosures: *W*

- 1. Five copies of Agenda, One Hundred-second Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, December 21, 1949.
- 2. Five copies of Corrected Verbatim Minutes, One Hundred-second Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, December 21, 1949.

310

CKHuston:gd

- cc: American Embassy, London.
- American Embassy, Moscow.
- American Embassy, Canberra.
- American Embassy, New Delhi.
- American Embassy, Wellington.
- American Consulate General, Hong Kong.  
(Manking's copy)

Parchment Mat to the Department.

UNCLASSIFIED

JAN 19 1950

FILED

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-2349

FAP

ACTION COPY

RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

*al*



~~HWM~~  
DC/R file

D-897 Tokyo

HWM

102-1221

I believe all this  
has come out in the  
press & there is no  
need to summarize

mg.

AGENDA

for the


HUNDRED-SECOND MEETING

LIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

in the Meiji Building, Tokyo,  
Wednesday, 21 December 1949, at 1000 Hours

- I APPROVAL OF THE CORRECTED VERBATIM MINUTES OF THE  
ONE HUNDRED-FIRST MEETING (1 Session, numbered 101-127).
- II PROCEDURAL MATTERS  
None held over or submitted as subjects for this Agenda.
- III OFFICIAL MATTERS
  1. The Problem of Japanese Repatriation.

By Direction of the Chairman:

  
THOS. G. DOBYNS  
Colonel, U. S. A.  
Secretary-General

1 Incl. - Agenda Item 102-1221-1

16 December 1949



D-897 Tokyo

102-1221

AGENDA

for the

ONE HUNDRED-SECOND MEETINGALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

To be held in the Meiji Building, Tokyo,  
Wednesday, 21 December 1949, at 1000 Hours

- I APPROVAL OF THE CORRECTED VERBATIM MINUTES OF THE  
ONE HUNDRED-FIRST MEETING (1 Session, numbered 101-127).
- II PROCEDURAL MATTERS
- None held over or submitted as subjects for this Agenda.
- III OFFICIAL MATTERS
1. The Problem of Japanese Repatriation.

By Direction of the Chairman:

*Thomas G. Dobyne*  
THOS. G. DOBYNE  
Colonel, U. S. A.  
Secretary-General

1 Incl. - Agenda Item 102-1221-1

16 December 1949



ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPANPROPOSED DISCUSSION AGENDA

- I AGENDA ITEM NO. 102-1221-1
  
- II PROPOSED BY: THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. SEBALD, Deputy  
for the Supreme Commander, Chairman, and Member for the  
United States.
  
- III SUBJECT PROPOSED FOR DISCUSSION: The Problem of  
Japanese Repatriation.
  
- IV DATE PROPOSED FOR DISCUSSION: Wednesday, 21 December  
1949.

Inclure #1



102-1221

CORRECTEDVERBATIM MINUTES

of the

ONE HUNDRED-SECOND MEETINGALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

Meiji Building, Tokyo, Wednesday, 21 December 1949 at 1000 Hours

MEMBERS PRESENT

The Honorable William J. Sebald, Deputy for the Supreme Commander,  
Chairman, and Member for the United States

His Excellency Lieutenant General Chu Shih-ming, Member for  
China

His Excellency W. R. Hodgson, Member representing jointly the  
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India

Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko, Member for the Union  
of Soviet Socialist Republics

SECRETARY-GENERAL

Colonel Thos. G. Dobyms

Office of the Secretariat  
Allied Council for Japan  
21 December 1949



THE CHAIRMAN: The meeting will please come to order.

The Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the One Hundred and First Meeting have been circulated among the members and in the absence of objection (Pause) are approved. Are there any procedural matters?

LT. GENERAL DEREVYANKO: Yes, I have a question MR.

CHAIRMAN.

THE CHAIRMAN: Does it relate to procedure?

LT. GENERAL DEREVYANKO: Yes, it does. I deem it my duty to bring to the knowledge of the members of the Allied Council the fact that as far back as November 14th, 1949, I formally submitted to THE CHAIRMAN of the Council the proposal that the question of Anti-Democratic Measures of the Japanese Government be included into the agenda. THE CHAIRMAN of the Council has not placed this subject for discussion on the agenda of the Allied Council. This constitutes a gross and unprecedented violation on the part of THE CHAIRMAN of the Council of the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Allied Council which, as it is well known, provides that subject matters for discussion at Allied meetings will be without restriction on all phases of the Occupation. Such actions of THE CHAIRMAN cannot but be regarded as his deliberate attempt to prevent the Allied Council from discussing essential matters pertaining to the democratization of Japan and to the progress of realization of the Joint Policy Decisions of the Allied Powers on the democratization of Japan.

At the same time the fact that MR. CHAIRMAN has placed on the agenda the problem of Japanese repatriation shows the intention of MR. CHAIRMAN to make use of the Allied Council



for further intensification of the propaganda in Japan hostile to the Soviet Union, the propaganda which is directed and sponsored by the Headquarters of the SUPREME COMMANDER together with the Japanese Government and is pursuing their mercenary aims of definite ideological indoctrination of the Japanese population which the American imperialists in alliance with Japanese reactionaries are dreaming to use as cannon fodder during the new imperialistic war which is being prepared by them. Therefore, it is no more chance that the American Headquarters and the Japanese Government headed by Yoshida publish fabulous figures of the Japanese still not repatriated from the USSR and disseminate other slanderous insinuations with regard to the conditions of the Japanese prisoners of war in the USSR and the internal situation in the Soviet Union in general.

All this makes the aim to incite among the Japanese people the feelings hostile to the Soviet Union quite obvious.

In view of all stated above as well as due to the fact that the question of the repatriation of Japanese from the Soviet Union proposed by MR. CHAIRMAN does not come within the purview of the Allied Council for Japan, I insist that this subject be withdrawn from the agenda of the Council. I also insist that the question of anti-democratic measures of the Japanese Government be placed on the agenda.

I place all the responsibility for disseminating in Japan the propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union in connection with the problem of repatriation, the propaganda which is based on fabricated and completely unfounded data, upon the Headquarters of the SUPREME COMMANDER and I insist that such propaganda hostile to the USSR be discontinued.



THE CHAIRMAN: That was a very fine propaganda statement on the part of the SOVIET MEMBER. I hardly see how the SOVIET MEMBER can prejudge the subject which I have placed on the agenda of the Council for today before my statement has been delivered. In order that we may clearly understand the problem which has been raised with regard to the subject that the SOVIET MEMBER proposed to place on the agenda of a special meeting which he wished to call for November 15, 1949, I will read the relevant correspondence and table it, to make it a part of the record of today's meeting.

LT. GENERAL DEREVYANKO: (Interrupts)

THE CHAIRMAN: The SOVIET MEMBER is out of order. Under date 14 November I received a memorandum from the Secretary General which reads as follows:

(Reads letter of 14 November from Secretary General, attached as Appendix A)

I immediately instructed the Secretary General to notify Colonel Beznosikov to submit the request in writing in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council. In response thereto, I received the following:

(Reads letter of 14 November to Secretary General from Colonel Beznosikov, attached as Appendix B)

(Reads letter of 14 November from Secretary General to Colonel Beznosikov, attached as Appendix C)

Copies of these communications were sent to the other members.

LT. GENERAL DEREVYANKO: MR. CHAIRMAN, in reply to the letter which you have just quoted, I have sent you another letter and I ask your permission to...

THE CHAIRMAN: May I read it? I have a translation.



SOVIET INTERPRETER: We also have an English translation of this letter.

THE CHAIRMAN: Very well, you may read it.

SOVIET INTERPRETER: December 5, 1949, To Mr. Sebald, Chairman and United States Member, Allied Council for Japan from Lt. General Derevyanko, Soviet Member, Allied Council for Japan. Dear Mr. Chairman: With reference to the letter of the Secretary General addressed to the Office of the Member, Allied Council for Japan from the USSR, dated 14 November 1949, I consider it necessary to state, that your refusal to call a meeting of the Allied Council and discuss the question presented by me concerning anti-democratic measures of the Japanese Government is a violation of the procedure of discussion of questions existent thus far in the Allied Council.

(Interpreter continues to read letter, attached as Appendix D)

THE CHAIRMAN: I would like to interrupt. I would like to point out the difference in the subjects. In the second letter it says concerning "anti-democratic measures of the Japanese Government". The Japanese Government was not mentioned in the first subject.

LT. GENERAL DEREVYANKO: I ask you MR. CHAIRMAN, not to interrupt my interpreter and let him finish the reading of the letter.

SOVIET INTERPRETER: That is all sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: As CHAIRMAN, I rule that this subject is not properly on the agenda in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. Under official matters, we have today the problem of Japanese repatriation.

LT. GENERAL DEREVYANKO: I ask you, MR. CHAIRMAN, to



give me the floor.

THE CHAIRMAN: I have made a ruling.

LT. GENERAL DEREVYANKO: But I would like to say a few words in connection with the procedure of the meeting.

THE CHAIRMAN: The General has had full opportunity to say what he wishes to say. I see no point in further discussing the matter of procedure. I have ruled that his subject is not on the agenda of today's meeting. In his letter the General has said that he intends at a forthcoming meeting to submit his subject. He has not done so. He has not complied with the Rules of Procedure.

LT. GENERAL DEREVYANKO: I repeat that I regard the unilateral ruling on the part of MR. CHAIRMAN as unfounded and that this ruling constitutes a violation of the established rules of procedure and the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council. I regard your ruling and your reply to my letters as unsatisfactory.

THE CHAIRMAN: The General is entitled to his opinion. We will now go on to the official matter of today's meeting.

LT. GENERAL DEREVYANKO: In connection with your proposed subject, I would like to say a few words.

THE CHAIRMAN: I have the floor. The General is out of order.

LT. GENERAL DEREVYANKO: (Interrupts)

THE CHAIRMAN: The General is out of order.

LT. GENERAL DEREVYANKO: I do not deem it possible for me to take part in the discussion at this meeting of the question which is not within the scope of the Allied Council and I reserve the right to return to these questions.

THE CHAIRMAN: Very well, I will now proceed with the business of today's meeting.



(LT. GENERAL DEREVYANKO and his staff leave at 1025 hours.)

THE CHAIRMAN: At the 44th meeting of the Council, held on October 29, 1947, I made a report to the Council on the problem of repatriation. During the intervening two years this problem has continued to be one of considerable complexity, not only for the SUPREME COMMANDER and his General Headquarters, but also for the Japanese Government and people. In my report given at the 44th meeting, I stated that for practical purposes repatriation from all areas, other than those controlled by the Soviet Union, had been completed. This situation has remained unchanged and, in consequence, the discussion which follows must necessarily and unavoidably be limited to the repatriation problem with respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilians in areas under the control of the Soviet Union.

You will recall that at the 44th meeting reference was made to the provision of the Potsdam Declaration, which states: "The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to live peaceful and productive lives."

Reference was also made during the discussion at that meeting to the fact that the Japanese Government accepted the Potsdam Declaration, and that Japanese acceptance was written into the terms of the Instrument of Surrender of September 2, 1945. It was also pointed out that the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan specifically state, inter alia, that the Council was established for the purpose of consulting with and advising the SUPREME COMMANDER in regard to the implementation of the Terms of Surrender and other matters. Under these Terms of Reference the



Council can not escape the necessity of again considering the broad issues of this problem of repatriation, which not only is of vital importance to the Japanese people but weighs heavily among the many responsibility of the SUPREME COMMANDER.

During the past two years the SUPREME COMMANDER, through the competent officers of his Headquarters, has made repeated approaches to the SOVIET MEMBER of the Allied Council, with a view to increasing the rate of flow of repatriates from Soviet-controlled areas. Irrespective of what the SOVIET MEMBER may have done to point out to his Government the continued efforts of the SUPREME COMMANDER in this regard, the facts remain that during the months from December 1, 1947 to April 30, 1948, a total of only 3,676 Japanese were repatriated. During the months from May 1, 1948 to April 30, 1949, a period of one year, a total of approximately 280,000 Japanese were repatriated, or an average of some 23,300 per month. From the period May 1, 1949 to date, a total of approximately 95,000 Japanese were repatriated, or an average of some 13,500 per month. I mention these monthly averages primarily to contrast them with the offer made by the SUPREME COMMANDER at the 44th meeting of the Council to repatriate 160,000 Japanese per month, or within five months of the date of that meeting, October 29, 1947, to return to Japan every Japanese then in Soviet-controlled areas. To date, more than two years later, no reply has been received to these offers, although they have been repeated time and again in correspondence with the SOVIET MEMBER, as well as in public announcements released by General Headquarters, SCAP. I might reiterate that these offers have never been withdrawn and still stand.



Aside from the rate of flow of repatriates from Soviet-controlled areas, the best available statistics (to which I shall refer later) indicate that as of today, a total of 316,617 Japanese remain to be evacuated from Soviet-controlled areas, including Dairen, Karafuto, the Kuriles, and Siberia, but not including Manchuria, which is statistically charged with 60,312 unrepatriated Japanese. As of May 20, 1949, this number would necessarily have been increased by the totals which have been repatriated since that date, namely, 94,973, of whom some 10,000 were not prisoners of war but ordinary Japanese civilians. I mention the date May 20, 1949, in view of a Tass press release made in Moscow on that date to the effect that only 95,000 former Japanese troops remained to be repatriated. To summarize: As of May 20, 1949, a total of 471,902 Japanese were unaccounted for. Since that date, 94,973 have been repatriated, leaving some 376,929 still unaccounted for today.

In connection with these unaccounted-for Japanese, repeated efforts have been made by the SUPREME COMMANDER to obtain precise information from the Soviet authorities regarding deaths of Japanese internees. These efforts have been uniformly abortive. I should point out in this connection that the Soviet repatriation authorities not only have refused to allow other repatriates to carry back to Japan the ashes of the dead, but at no time have they permitted the transmittal of even approximate rosters of deceased internees. Requests to the SOVIET MEMBER FOR vital statistics showing deaths from disease or other cause, or for information regarding the state of health and whereabouts of these Japanese, have remained unanswered. This has made necessary the compilation of death lists by



the Japanese authorities through exhaustive and time-consuming interviews with individual internees. (Under this system no Japanese has been listed officially as dead until the exact date, place, and cause of death have been substantiated by at least two witnesses.)

As I have already said, repeated attempts have been made to obtain from the SOVIET MEMBER lists of Japanese prisoners of war and other internees who have died in Soviet-controlled areas. Entirely aside from the efforts made by General Headquarters, SCAP, in this regard, it would appear that the dictates of international law, not to mention ordinary considerations of simple humanity, and a desire on the part of the Soviet authorities to assist the SUPREME COMMANDER in this important matter, would impel the Soviet authorities to furnish such lists voluntarily. To the best of my knowledge, no such effort has been made. Parenthetically, I might add that thousands of petitions have been received by General Headquarters, as well as by the members of this Council, from the hundreds of thousands of Japanese individuals who are affected by the disappearance of their nearest of kin. The SOVIET MEMBER undoubtedly is aware of this, and I can only presume that he has duly notified the Soviet authorities of the considerations involved. In order that there might be no misunderstanding regarding these petitions, I have requested the Secretary-General to display to the members and to our spectators here today a part of the total number of petitions, letters, and postcards received to date. Will the Secretary-General kindly bring in some of the petitions?

(Secretary-General brings in petitions)



THE CHAIRMAN: You might place them over there. How many bundles of that size do you have?

SECRETARY-GENERAL: There remain 102 more bundles similar to each of these four.

THE CHAIRMAN: Very well, you may remove the petitions. You have those bundles in the other room?

SECRETARY-GENERAL: I do.

THE CHAIRMAN: In light of the aforementioned considerations, it has become desirable, in fact necessary, to explain to the Japanese people the reasons for the wide discrepancy between the figures to which I have previously made reference and the announcement by Tass News Agency concerning the number of Japanese who remained to be repatriated as of May 20, 1949. Any exposition that might attempt to explain away this discrepancy must necessarily be a long one, and I hope the members of the Council will bear with me for the time involved in touching upon the major aspects of this problem. The story is not a happy one.

In determining the probable number of Japanese internees who have died in Soviet-controlled areas since the end of hostilities in August 1945, various approaches and cross-checks were made. For example, a list of 125 prisoners of war camps in Soviet areas, giving the number of prisoners and number of dead, was compiled in January 1947, based on numerous interrogations, oral and written, of repatriates. Of 209,300 prisoners of war in these camps, 51,332 were reported to have died of malnutrition and communicable diseases. The mortality rate was 24.5%. It must be remembered, however, that this cumulative percentage deals with the first years after the end of hostilities, when treatment of prisoners and general camp conditions were



admittedly at their worst. It should also be recognized that living and labor conditions subsequently improved somewhat. I will comment upon this later.

Another list, prepared in September 1947, revealed possible amelioration of conditions in 53 prisoner of war camps and a death rate of 10.7%. The report stated, however, that the percentage might be as high as 15%, since the tabulations did not include deaths in hospitals or while enroute to Soviet areas.

Among the many interrogation reports pertaining to different areas, those given by returned repatriates from the Amur area were especially gruesome. Of a total of 11,000 internees in some 20 camps, 3,000 dead were reported; the number of dead buried in the Kuibyshevka Special Hospital Area, from a count of the graves, along totaled some 1,500. At a hospital in Blagoveshchensk, 500 prisoners of war died. Numerous other examples could be cited. Even if an improvement in living conditions is accepted for later years, i.e., 1948 and 1949, the cumulative death rate still represents an average of 27%.

The reports are full of pitiful statements. To cite a few typical cases, one says: "Half of our number who were physically weak died one after another from the shortage of food and the cold"; another states: "Most of the prisoners of war in July 1947 suffered from malaria, malnutrition, or lung trouble"; again: "Prisoners even though sick were forced to work eight hours daily on farms"; and still again, "Ticks, fleas, and lice were abundant in summer. Many people suffered from fever, skin diseases, pneumonia, tuberculosis..." I could go



on and on, but suffice it to say that the combined effects of disease, exposure, malnutrition, and fatigue, together with a callous disregard for the welfare of prisoners of war and civilian internees in the attempts to maximize their labor, resulted in a terrific toll of lives.

I wish to emphasize that the statistical record relating to this problem is based upon detailed records of the numbers of Japanese citizens abroad, both military and civilian, compiled over a period of many years by the Japanese Government. Such records have proved to be of surprising accuracy in all other areas of the world, and I have no reason to doubt that they are similarly accurate for the areas under discussion. Further study of the records indicates an evaluated conclusion on the part of General Headquarters that the number of Japanese in areas presently controlled by the Soviet Government, at the close of hostilities in August 1945, was as reported in the official Japanese Government tabulation.

The Japanese Government has already issued death notices of Japanese deceased in Soviet-controlled areas to some sixty thousand families in Japan. These notices are based upon attestation of death by two or more witnesses in each case. No combat fatalities, no civilians, and no deaths occurring in Manchuria are included in these notices. It is therefore probable that the actual number of Japanese internees who have died while in Soviet custody amounts to several times the stated number, an estimate which is made credible by the many thousands of reports to which I have previously alluded. These reports tell of long marches in bitterly cold weather from Manchuria into Soviet



territory where the prisoners were imprisoned and forced to work under unspeakably harsh conditions. Poorly clothed, with inadequate shelter and sorely deficient rations, the repatriates have reported that large numbers of their fellow prisoners died early in the period of captivity. Furthermore, lack of adequate medical and sanitary facilities in the prison camps, malnutrition, epidemics, and the necessity to work under the so-called "norm" system quickly took the toll of thousands of lives. On the basis of these interrogations we find such factual accounts of internees being forced to scavenge from the countryside to supplement their deficient diet. Repatriates tell of almost total unpreparedness on the part of the Soviet authorities to care for the large numbers of prisoners; of camps located far from human habitation and totally unfit as living quarters because of poor construction and overcrowding. Some repatriates reported that it was not unusual for prisoners to be herded into buildings in such numbers that it was almost impossible for them to lie down. One repatriate has reported ". . . spent two years at hard labor felling trees and receiving harsh treatment which slaves, coolies, and even cattle had never experienced". We see such typical reports as this: "Approximately twenty-six thousand Japanese civilians were camped in an area around Hungnam in May 1946. Seven thousand died from exposure and starvation". The concensus is that during this period conditions were so bad that only the strong survived.

The reports indicate that work was theoretically assigned according to three physical classifications: the strong, the less strong, and those fit only for light work. Work projects, according to the reports, included



lumbering, loading and unloading rail cars, mining, road or railroad repair, construction work, excavation, stevedoring and other labor requiring heavy exertion. The norm system to which I have previously referred reportedly was based upon the number of individuals in each labor group regardless of physical condition. Theoretically the prisoners worked a minimum of eight hours each day; it was rare however that prisoners were able to complete their norm in such a short time. The amount of food allotted to the prisoners was contingent upon the percentage of norm accomplished. Enervated prisoners who were unable to complete their norm were thus further weakened when food was denied. It is interesting to note, also, that the reports speak of discrimination against so-called "reactionaries" who were allegedly placed in camps where the worst living conditions existed. Discrimination was exercised in favor of those prisoners of war and others who were considered politically sympathetic.

The reports further revealed a systematic approach by the Soviet authorities to the question of political indoctrination of those Japanese who had withstood the rigorous treatment during their years of captivity. The indoctrination program has all the earmarks of a vast machine designed to reconstruct the lives and political future of the selected candidates. It was skillfully adapted to the Japanese habit of thought; carefully phased to the prisoners' current circumstances and to each stage of his development until the program itself became an integral part of the prisoners' lives and thoughts. The Soviet authorities were assisted by Japanese communists, usually early converts to communism



through conviction or expediency, working under Soviet direction.

I will not attempt to trace in detail the campaign of indoctrination. Suffice it to say that with the candidates in a state bordering on complete prostration, psychologically upset through sudden and final defeat, weakened by grueling work and subsistence on semi-starvation-level rations, resistance became understandably low. Their one lifeline was hope of early repatriation. A so-called "Anti-Fascist" group known as the Friends Society (Tomonokai) was encouraged among the prisoners and was utilized to urge those interested in political and social problems to join discussion groups, inducement being offered in the form of somewhat improved living conditions. Positive indoctrination was also undertaken by undermining the foundation of the Japanese social structure with a view to an eventual proletarian revolution in Japan. The Japan News (Nippon Shimbun), a Japanese newspaper published under the auspices of the Soviet authorities, published a series of inflammatory editorials designed to destroy the morale of the prisoners.

With the beginning of repatriation at the end of 1946 and early in 1947, the systematic indoctrination of the prisoners of war was increased. Promising students and potential group leaders were excused from manual labor, given clothing, and in general placed in a preferred status. Anti-occupation propaganda was stressed, courses were given in theoretical communism and pressure maintained to convince the prisoners of war that their only hope of a true reconstruction of Japan lay in an alliance with the USSR and the eradication of all Anglo-American policies and influences.



It is obvious that this program was carefully built upon the long experience of Russian communism in dealing with this problem. The indoctrination program was rounded out by sending selected and tried converts to undergo special courses in four important training centers, namely, the Moscow Indoctrination School, the Democratic School, the Youths School, and the Political School. Finally, at the port of Nahodka, the prisoners of war and civilian internees were given an intensive indoctrination period known among themselves as the "finishing school". Here were rehearsed community singing of the Internationale and "The Red Flag" and communist slogans were learned.

This entire unnerving special procedure then usually ended with a great rally at which trained orators urged the repatriates to "stem the Americanization of the Japanese people". Finally, at the highest point of inducement, an official appeared with pledges to join the Japan Communist Party.

I will not dwell further upon the results of this program which unfortunately it has become necessary to relate. We are all familiar with the end result of this long period of training and indoctrination in mass tactics as evidenced by the recent arrival at Japanese repatriation centers of thoroughly indoctrinated and organized bodies of repatriates.

I have digressed somewhat from the main thesis in the presentation of this problem to the Council in order that we might have a rounded picture of what transpired in the lives of the Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in Soviet-controlled areas. I shall <sup>now</sup> not revert



to our reconstruction, from available information, of the discrepancy between the implied finality of the Tass report of May 20, 1949, and the estimates of Japanese still unaccounted for to which I have previously made reference.

If we strike an average of the statistical death rates applied for the three winters of 1945 to 1947 inclusive, with variable camp conditions, we arrive at an annual rate of approximately 7%. During the year 1948, which we shall call the period of indoctrination, the percentage of losses is estimated at 2%. We therefore arrive at an estimated hypothetical statistical number of deaths as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Losses</u>
1945	Worst Winter	10.0	272,349
1946	Slight Improvement	7.0	77,816
1947	Improvement	3.7	19,668
1948	Indoctrination	2.0	<u>4,208</u>
	Aggregate		374,041

I wish to emphasize, however, the figures that I mentioned are a hypothetical statistical number of deaths.

Thus, if we were to accept in all their gruesomeness the full implications of these ghastly accounts of disease, malnutrition, inadequate housing, physical abuse, and all the callous cruelties of slave labor conditions, combined with an apparent lack of even elementary medical care and facilities--if all these unbelievable accounts of disregard for humanity are indeed true--we can arrive at the heart-rending conclusion that 374,041 Japanese formerly in Soviet hands are now dead and will never return to Japan. Can this be true? Are we to believe that of the 376,929 Japanese still unaccounted for only two or three thousand remain alive?



We can only guess at what may have happened behind the curtain of silence that has shut off these hapless Japanese from their homeland and their people for the past four years. We can only surmise the motives of the Soviet Union in refusing to fulfill the pledge given in the Potsdam Declaration and in failing to release repatriates to fill the abundant ships that the SUPREME COMMANDER has held ready and waiting at all times to bring them back to Japan. We must resort to pure speculation and conjecture to find any explanation for the Soviet desire to hold the Japanese prisoners of war in their own hands all these years, for dealing with them so brutally, and for ~~coldly~~<sup>coldly</sup> ignoring all representations by the SUPREME COMMANDER and all the piteous pleas of the Japanese people. But even surmise and conjecture fail us in seeking to discover any possible justification for the Soviet failure--or refusal, or inability--to provide even the most meager information regarding the names and location of the prisoners held, or any form of vital statistics to show losses by death. Can it be that the Soviet authorities did not know how many of these unfortunate Japanese were in their hands, or where they were located, or what was happening to them? Does the Government of the Soviet Union wish us to believe that it maintained no records in its prison camps, no rosters of internees, no lists, no record of deaths?

It is incumbent upon the SOVIET MEMBER to give us the answers to these simple but vital questions. Not only GENERAL MACARTHUR and his Headquarters, not only the Japanese people, but the entire civilized world is anxious to know the facts.



I also hope that the other members of this Council will give all possible assistance to the SUPREME COMMANDER and his General Headquarters in the urgent and vital task of tearing the veil from the ugly countenance of the repatriation problem that should have been resolved long since, and of discovering the secrets which have been hidden from us for so long, to the end that we may know the number and names of Japanese prisoners of war and civilians who have died during their captivity in Soviet-controlled territory and thus be enabled to hasten the return of those who still remain.

Do any of the other members of the Council wish to make any comments?

MR. HODGSON: Yes, MR. CHAIRMAN. MR. CHAIRMAN, about the point raised by the SOVIET MEMBER in regard to the original question. I was not clear whether you, as CHAIRMAN, had also ruled out the second question as being out of order. You admitted you had ruled the question in the first letter as being out of order, but you yourself indicated that the question in the letter of December 5th was differently framed. As that question did not appear on this agenda, I would like to know, did you definitely also rule that out of order?

THE CHAIRMAN: No, sir, I did not. No subject was filed in accordance with the rules of procedure. The Secretary-General can answer that question. Colonel Dobyms, have you received in accordance with the usual procedure a subject to be placed on the agenda for today's meeting submitted by the SOVIET MEMBER?

SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have not.



THE CHAIRMAN: I think that answers your question.

MR. HODGSON: Yes, I wasn't quite clear and from the letter there may be still a doubt as to how any question should be properly framed. And while I am on this question of placing items on the agenda, it does seem surprising to me, sir, that the first thing I or my Mission learned that this particular question was on the agenda was through press men and through newspapers. I do not know if that is the customary manner for this Allied Council for as far as my Mission is concerned, if we have an item for the agenda we will communicate it first to the Secretary-General and to the members of the Council before there is any press notification.

Now, sir, this morning's was the second walk-out I have seen, the first one was Mr. Gromyko walked out of the Security Council on the question of Persia and in both cases I think the action was completely unjustified. In his statement this morning, the MEMBER for the USSR again stated that this particular subject was not within the jurisdiction, within the competence of this Council. Now I have carefully examined the whole of the correspondence and the documents right back to the Potsdam Agreement where it is clearly laid down that one of the responsibilities of the Allied Powers is the disarmament and the early repatriation of these prisoners of war to their homes and that was incorporated in the Terms of Surrender, which were accepted by Japan. In the Moscow Communiqué, December 1945, the Terms of Reference state that the Council should be established to consult and advise the SUPREME COMMANDER on all matters regarding the implementation of



the Terms of Surrender. Therefore, you have a very clear chain of responsibility established from the time of Potsdam for this Council to discuss fully this question. Then we heard this morning the statement that this was just a matter of propaganda on the part of the militarists of the United States allied with the reactionaries of Japan to create hostility against the Soviet Union. Well, you can put Nazism and Fascism in place of reactionary Japan, but I have heard that same statement made in ten times better manner by Mr. Vishinsky and others. It signifies nothing because it is not true. Now in my Mission alone, we have received countless petitions, documents, deputations from returned soldiers and other bodies. They didn't see the light of day. We didn't make propaganda out of them. These organizations of returned soldiers were not out to make propaganda to give to the press. It was from genuine humanitarian motives to try to do something to remove the sorrow and distress from thousands of Japanese homes. One thing surprises me, sir, I have read the documents; I have noted the offers which were submitted to this Council at the 44th Meeting. I also note your own letter, sir, dated 25th of April where you asked the representative of the Soviet Union to ask his Government to submit certain information relating to the numbers, the names, the units, the location, the deaths of these prisoners of war. That was only a reasonable request, necessary to carry out arrangements in regard to transportation, movement and disembarkation accomodation. In addition to that, as I see it, it was the SUPREME COMMANDER'S duty and responsibility as Chief Executive authority for



the Allied countries to obtain that information, and, as I see it, to say the least, for the representative of the Soviet Union not even to acknowledge that communication was a gross discourtesy to the SUPREME COMMANDER, and, assuming it was transmitted to the Soviet Government, and I have no doubt it was, then the failure or refusal to reply appears to indicate a callous indifference on the part of the Soviet Government to the fate of these prisoners of war.

Sir, we are here to give advice and recommendations to the SUPREME COMMANDER, but such advice can only be given on a just and impartial consideration of ascertained facts. In this problem we are confronted with the fundamental difficulty that there is an apparent conflict of facts. When the matter first came before this Council there were still something like 800 thousand prisoners of war to be repatriated. Now those figures were carefully compiled and checked from every available source and so far as I can ascertain they were never challenged. They were never challenged by the Soviet Government or its representatives, and the only conclusion we can reach is that at that time those figures were substantially correct and accepted as such. We are now confronted with the position that the other day a spokesman of the Soviet Mission stated that with the 95,000 prisoners of war returned between May and November of this year repatriation was completed. Now what I want to know, sir, and I would have liked the Soviet representative to have been here, but he will get the record of this meeting, (and this is a vital factor) I want to know



whether that spokesman was speaking with the authority of the head of the Mission or whether that statement was authorized by the Soviet Union that the repatriation has been completed. It might possibly be that the two statements are not in conflict. It is possible that the figures can be reconciled, but only on the tragic and awful assumption that over 370,000 of these prisoners have died while in the hands of the detaining power. However, sir, the strange thing so far as I can ascertain is that there has not been one notification of death. Now, the Soviet Union, under International Law and International Conventions which then existed and to which the Soviet Union had subscribed, as I shall indicate later, was bound to inform of such deaths. Well, sir, in the absence of the clarification of these figures, how can we give positive advice or recommendations to the SUPREME COMMANDER? You yourself, sir, have not indicated in any way whatever what this Council should do. The SUPREME COMMANDER has now placed the problem before us and it is up to us to try to give some positive and constructive advice or suggestions. As I see it, in the absence of ascertained facts, we cannot give advice or recommendations, but with your permission, sir, I will advance some suggestions.

During the early part of the war, the Soviet Union accepted my country, Australia, as a protecting power in regard to the Poles who had been removed from Eastern Poland. Unfortunately, we were not very successful in our efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of tens of thousands of Poles. We were not supplied with much information. We were not allowed to visit places of internment as we



are entitled to do under the Prisoners of War Convention of 1929. However, the Soviet Union did recognize that convention and did recognize us as a protecting power. I would remind you, sir, that the Soviet Union was represented at the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva this year when her delegates took an active part in drawing up the Four Red Cross Conventions, one of which related to the treatment of prisoners of war. All we did in fact was to revise it. Now several articles were strenuously resisted by the Soviet Union, but still with a net result that the Soviet Union was one of the countries which eventually signed the convention on the 3th of December, and is, therefore, morally bound by its provisions. Some of these provisions impose unilateral responsibilities on the detaining power. They provide that certain notifications of sickness and deaths shall be made. They provide for all kinds of medical attention, for classes of work in which prisoners of war shall not be engaged, for humane conditions at all times and in all circumstances. From the statements we have heard on this matter, the evidence we have heard and have in our archives, it would seem clear that a prima facie case has been made out that not only are the provisions of this convention not being observed, but there have also been violations of the Prisoners of War Convention of Geneva, 1929, and further, the evidence indicates that there has also been a violation of the Declaration of Human Rights subscribed to in 1948 unanimously by the whole of the United Nations including the Soviet Union. As you yourself indicated this morning, a prima facie case has been made out for a breach of the Potsdam Declaration. Therefore, sir,



the concrete suggestion I make is this: The original repatriation agreement was worked out between SCAP and the Soviet Union in December 1946. Why cannot an agreement be suggested or worked out whereby some of the provisions of the Geneva Convention could be immediately put into force? During the course of the conference at Geneva there was a representative of GHQ, Colonel Carpenter, who will be conversant with the principles relating to agreement as to the protecting power for the other humanitarian organizations such as the International Red Cross. Why could not we suggest that the SUPREME COMMANDER invite the Soviet Government to accept, say, the Swiss Government, as a protecting power, or as an alternative, ask the International Red Cross to come in to assume the responsibility of a protecting power. Then their representatives can ascertain exactly what is the position, the extent of the truth of these allegations, statements of ill treatment and explain apparent discrepancies. Give us definite figures with the cooperation, we hope, of the Soviet authorities, and information of the outstanding prisoners to be repatriated. If there is nothing to hide, then surely the Soviet Union would welcome such a proposal. If it does not agree, then no doubt world public opinion will place the worst construction on the refusal. But as I see it, sir, this present subject has now come to this Council. I take it the SUPREME COMMANDER expects us to make some concrete proposals. In spite of the difficulties before us, such as the walk-out with which we are confronted this morning, there is still a task to be done. Let us explore every avenue with patience and let us trust still with some hope. Thank you, sir.



THE CHAIRMAN: MR. AMBASSADOR, I wish to thank you for your very careful analysis of this problem, for the constructive and helpful comment and lastly for your positive advice and suggestions to the SUPREME COMMANDER. I can assure you that the SUPREME COMMANDER will give most careful consideration to the recommendations which you have just made.

MR. HODGSON: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: GENERAL CHU, do you care to make any comment?

GENERAL CHU: I am naturally very much interested in this subject because it so happens that I was the first one to introduce the question of repatriation to the deliberations of this Council more than two years ago. In a subsequent meeting, October 1947, the then MEMBER FOR CHINA stated that the Chinese Government had with only certain exceptions almost completely repatriated the Japanese nationals to their homeland. I have nothing to add to that statement except I want to strike out the word "almost". Now we have completely repatriated the Japanese Nationals which were in our hands after the war. Another small matter, I might - it is just a question I'd like to ask of the CHAIRMAN. I heard this morning that there was a second letter written by the SOVIET MEMBER to the CHAIRMAN of the Council. I don't remember ever seeing it; it might have been sent out and missed reaching me or it might have never been sent. If not, I would appreciate it if the CHAIRMAN could give an explanation for not sending the second letter.

THE CHAIRMAN: I have no explanation to make. It would, of course, have been desirable to send copies of



the letter to the other members of the Council; I might say that the letter itself, by its wording, does not call for response. It is merely an expression of an intention for something to be done in the future. The letter was addressed to me personally. I shall, however, see that you receive a copy.

GENERAL CHU: I will see it in the minutes of this meeting, I think. Will it be included in the minutes of this meeting?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, we can readily do that.

GENERAL CHU: Thank you.

MR. HODGSON: MR. CHAIRMAN, with reference to your own letter of the 25th of April, I would like to see this Council reinforce that letter by endorsing its contents and if the SUPREME COMMANDER does decide to adopt any of the suggestions I have made probably that letter could be repeated in some form, saying it is the sincere hope of this Council that the information requested shall be forthcoming as soon as possible. It did not come before this Council for consideration or discussion but I myself on behalf of my Mission would like to associate myself with the terms of it and ask if it may not be repeated in some form in a more positive and definite manner.

THE CHAIRMAN: MR. AMBASSADOR, in order that we may have the complete story before us I will see that a copy of that letter is made part of today's record.

(Letter of 25 April 1949 from Mr. Sebald to Lt. General Derevyanko, attached as Appendix E)

MR. HODGSON: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Do you wish to say anything further?



GENERAL CHU: No, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: MR. AMBASSADOR?

MR. HODGSON: No, thank you, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: That would appear to conclude the meeting for today. The meeting is adjourned.

(The meeting adjourned at 1120 hours)

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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND  
SUGGESTIONS FOR SCAP

ITEM I - "The Problem of Japanese Repatriation".

1. Ambassador W. R. Hodgson made the following recommendations: That an agreement be worked out whereby some of the provisions of the Geneva Convention could be immediately put into force. This might be accomplished by the SUPREME COMMANDER notifying the Soviet Government to accept either the Swiss Government as a protecting power, or, for an alternative, to ask the International Red Cross to assume the responsibility of a protecting power by having their representatives ascertain the extent of the truth of these allegations; the statements of ill treatment; the apparent discrepancies; and obtain definite figures and information of the remaining prisoners to be repatriated.

2. That this Council reinforce MR. SEBALD's letter, of 25 April 1949, to the SOVIET MEMBER (requesting data concerning deaths, status, and total number of Japanese prisoners of war retained in U.S.S.R. territory) by endorsing its contents and, in addition, stating that it is the sincere desire of this Council that the information requested be forthcoming as soon as possible.

END

-28-



ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN  
TOKYO  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

14 November 1949

MEMORANDUM:

TO: The Honorable William J. Sebald,  
Deputy for the Supreme Commander, Chairman  
and Member for the United States  
Allied Council for Japan

Lt. Colonel Nikolai A. Beznosikov and Mr. Aleksei Mamin,  
of General Derevyanko's staff, arrived at the Secretariat at  
0935 hours this date and made oral request on behalf of  
General Derevyanko for a Special Meeting of the Allied Council  
for Japan for 15 November 1949 to discuss an Official Matter:  
"The Violation of the Principles and Unfulfillment of the  
Problem of the Democratization of Japan".

(Signed) THOS. DOBYNS

THOS. G. DOBYNS  
Colonel, U.S.A.  
Secretary-General

APPENDIX A



ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN  
TOKYO  
Office of the Member  
for  
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Tokyo, 14 November 1949

Colonel Thos. G. Dobyms,  
Secretary-General  
Allied Council for Japan

Dear Colonel,

I am directed by Lieutenant-General K. N. DEREVYANKO to send you an item for discussion, proposed by the Member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to be included into the agenda of the special meeting of the Allied Council for Japan for the November 15, 1949, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure for the Allied Council for Japan (Article) 1c.

Sincerely yours,

On behalf of the USSR  
Member of the Allied Council  
for Japan

---

N. A. Beznosikov  
Lt.-Colonel

No. 1340  
Inclosure

APPENDIX B



- I AGENDA No. \_\_\_\_\_
- II PROPOSED BY: Lieutenant-General K. N. DEREVYANKO  
Member for the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics.
- III SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION: On violation of the  
principles and unfulfillment of the  
problems of the democratization of  
Japan.
- IV DATE PROPOSED FOR DISCUSSION: Tuesday, November  
15, 1949.

APPENDIX B



ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN  
TOKYO  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

November 14, 1949.

Lieutenant Colonel N. A. Boznosikov,  
Office of the Member for the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,  
Allied Council for Japan,  
Tokyo.

Dear Colonel Boznosikov:

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated November 14, 1949, stating that you have been directed by Lieutenant General K. N. Derevyanko, Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Allied Council for Japan, to give me notification of his desire to have placed on the Agenda of a special meeting which he proposes for November 15, 1949, in accordance with Article 1c of the Rules of Procedure of the Council, a subject for discussion entitled "On Violation of the Principles and Unfulfillment of the Problems of the Democratization of Japan."

I am now directed by the Chairman of the Council to advise you that, in as much as it can only be assumed from the title of your proposed subject for discussion that it involves the review of action taken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers under a directive issued to him in conformity with a policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission, it cannot be considered as coming within the purview of the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council. The Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission as established by the Moscow Agreement provide, inter alia, that:

"A. The functions of the Far Eastern Commission shall be:

"1. . . . .

"2. To review, on the request of any member, any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission."

From the above it will be noted that the power of review is specifically reserved to the Far Eastern Commission and that such power has not been delegated to, and is not within the Terms of Reference of, the Allied Council for Japan.

The Chairman has further directed me to inform you that,

APPENDIX C



the proposed subject being unsuitable for discussion under the Terms of Reference of the Council, it is not considered appropriate to call a special meeting of the Council as proposed by the Soviet Member.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) THOS. DOBYNS

Thos. G. Dobyms  
Colonel, U.S.A.  
Secretary-General

cc: Chairman, ACJ  
BCOM Member  
Chinese Member

APPENDIX G



ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN  
TOKYO  
Office of the Member  
for  
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

TO: MR. V. SEBALD, CHAIRMAN OF THE ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

Dear Mister Chairman:

With reference to the letter of the Secretary General addressed to the Office of the Member, Allied Council for Japan from the USSR, dated 14 November 1949, I consider it necessary to state, that your refusal to call a meeting of the Allied Council and discuss the question concerning anti-democratic measures of the Japanese Government is a violation of the procedure of discussion of questions existent thus far in the Allied Council.

Your assertion, that discussion of the question presented by me "Cannot be considered appropriate under regulations pertaining to the Allied Council" is without basis, as, in bringing the indicated question to consideration by the Allied Council, I acted specifically in accordance with Regulation I pertaining to the Allied Council, which foresees presentation of advice to the Supreme Commander by the Allied Council on matters relative to terms of the capitulation, occupation and control over Japan, as well as matters relative to compliance with directives supplementing these terms.

In presenting this question for discussion, I intend to include for consideration by the Allied Council recommendations for the Supreme Commander, the right for inclusion of which by representatives of governments of the Allied Council is foreseen by the very Agreement on the Allied Council.

In connection with the above, I anticipate, that the question presented by me will be included in the Agenda of the bi-weekly meeting of the Allied Council for Japan.

Respectfully,

MEMBER OF THE ALLIED COUNCIL FOR  
JAPAN FROM THE U.S.S.R.

General-Leytenant

/s/ K. Derevyanko  
/t/ K. Derevyanko

5 Dec 49  
No. 1349

APPENDIX D



Diplomatic Section

Tokyo, 25 April 1949

Lieutenant General K. N. Derevyanko,  
Soviet Member,  
Allied Council for Japan,  
Tokyo.

Dear General Derevyanko:

Reference is made to discussion on the problem of repatriation at the forty-fourth meeting of the Allied Council for Japan on October 29, 1947. Specifically, your attention is invited to those remarks pertaining to appropriate information concerning records of death, disappearance, or serious illness of Japanese prisoners of war.

It is a matter of grave concern to the Supreme Commander in his implementation of the Terms of Surrender and, by reference, of the Potsdam Declaration, that the Japanese people be kept informed concerning matters of vital importance to them, such as the pertinent data mentioned above. As you are no doubt aware, there has at no time been any report whatsoever from the Soviet authorities concerning Japanese prisoners of war held in the Soviet Union, nor is it apparent from information available to the Supreme Commander that any effort is being made by the Soviet authorities so to apprise the Supreme Commander as the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan. Such information would be of interest not only to the Japanese people and particularly to the families of the individuals concerned, but, it is believed, also to the member nations of the Far Eastern Commission charged with the formulation of policy pertaining to the Occupation of Japan.

It is therefore requested, in conformity with the normal dictates of international law, that you approach your Government with a view to obtaining all available information concerning vital statistics of Japanese prisoners of war, with especial reference to names, units, and/or last recorded places of domicile or residence, nearest relatives, date and place of decease or serious illness, and such other information and data as might be of interest to the families of the individuals concerned.

Sincerely yours,

W. J. Sobald

APPENDIX E





THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*FE*

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Office of the United States  
Political Adviser for Japan

NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

JAN - 4 1950

Tokyo, December 23, 1949.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 900

Subject: Discussion of Japanese Repatriation in Allied Council;  
Walkout of Soviet Delegation.

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The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington,

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to unclassified despatch no. 897 dated December 23, 1949, transmitting the corrected verbatim minutes of the 102nd meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, as well as to my telegram no. 579 dated December 21, 1949, and subsequent telegrams and despatches relating to the discussion of the problem of Japanese repatriation from Soviet territory at the meeting of the Council on December 21, in the course of which the Soviet delegation left the Council chamber after protesting that the subject of repatriation was not within the Council's competence.

Both this Mission and the Supreme Commander have realized for some months that no concrete results in the form of information from the Soviet authorities or positive developments in the repatriation program were likely to be obtained through further requests or representations to the Soviet Member of the Council, particularly in view of the announcement in Moscow last May that the release of 75,000 prisoners-of-war, who have since been returned to Japan, would complete the repatriation program. In view of the fact that the Soviet Government has at no time since the termination of hostilities provided any vital statistics or other information with respect to the number and location of Japanese prisoners in territory under its control, and in as much as the continued failure of the Japanese people to receive any accounting for over 300,000 countrymen whom they believe still to be in Soviet hands has been steadily building up resentment and consequent pressure for action, we have felt that it was becoming more and more necessary to give this important question a thorough public airing, not only as a means of clarifying the status of any Japanese still remaining in Soviet hands, but also to make clear to the Japanese people the American interest and effort in the problem of Japanese repatriation and to indicate beyond all doubt where the responsibility lies for nonfulfillment of past commitments in this connection. General MacARTHUR accordingly gave instructions to the G-2 Section of General Headquarters to assemble and coordinate

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Tokyo's Despatch No. 900,  
December 13, 1949.

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all information which had become available from intelligence sources, interrogations of repatriates, censorship, and other sources, with a view at an appropriate time to utilizing such material to inform the Japanese people and world opinion of the facts involved. G-2 accordingly has brought together a great mass of material on this subject, from which it prepared a series of press releases for possible use at General MacArthur's direction. Meanwhile, the General had indicated to me that it might prove desirable to have the question aired in the Allied Council.

Decision was finally taken as to the means of bringing the repatriation problem before the public as a direct consequence of the proposal contained in the Soviet letter of November 14, 1949, asking that a special meeting be called the following day to discuss the subject: "On Violation of the Principles and Unfulfillment of the Problems of the Democratization of Japan". Despite the obvious intention of the Soviet Member to launch an attack for propaganda purposes against the Supreme Commander, General Headquarters, and other Occupation authorities, as well as presumably against the Japanese Government, I was fully prepared to meet such an attack in the Council with the abundant material lying available in Headquarters to refute the various baseless and unfounded charges and accusations that he was likely to make. General MacArthur, however, being incensed at the wording of the proposed subject and the obviously hostile motives inspiring the Soviet Member to request a special meeting for its discussion on such unreasonably short notice, directed me to prepare a reply along the lines of the letter signed by the Secretary General and dated November 14, 1949, (copy included in the minutes) which stated that the proposed subject was unsuitable for discussion under the terms of reference of the Council and that it was accordingly inappropriate to call a special meeting of the Council for its discussion. A subsequent letter from the Soviet Member dated December 5 indicated that he intended to include an item for discussion relating to "antidemocratic measures of the Japanese Government", but no specific wording was given the subject and it was considered that the item had accordingly not been finally proposed.

When it was found that no Soviet item had been properly entered on the agenda, General MacArthur and I agreed that it would be in any case desirable and opportune to give the repatriation problem a full airing in the Council. Our resolution in this respect was fortified a few days later, when Prime Minister YOSHIDA called on me to present a letter to the Supreme Commander, together with copies of resolutions adopted by both Houses of the Diet, expressing the pleas and prayers of the Japanese people for information and action on the repatriation issue. In the meantime, considerable spontaneous pressure for action regarding the repatriation problem was building up among the Japanese people of all walks of life, in the press, and among Diet Committees. I accordingly found it opportune to inform Mr. Yoshida when he called on me that General MacArthur had some days previously authorized me to place this subject on the agenda of the next meeting of the Council. My statement, which, together with the text of Mr. Yoshida's letter, was immediately made public, was warmly received and the entire problem of repatriation has since that time been given unprecedented prominence in the press and in popular discussion.

It seemed

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CONFIDENTIALTokyo's Despatch No. 900,  
December 23, 1949.

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It seemed obvious that the strategy of the Soviet Member at this meeting of the Council, where he realized he would be faced with all the embarrassment and humiliation inevitably bound up with any recital of the sorry story of the Japanese repatriation from Soviet territory, had been determined in advance with a view to preparing his departure by an exhibition of remonstrance and anger on the procedural issue with a view to walking out, with his staff, prior to my presentation of the case against the Soviet Union on the repatriation program. This was fairly good strategy on his part, as he probably would not wish to risk the charge of not fulfilling his functions by refusing to attend the meeting, nor could he have been expected to look forward with relish to sitting at the Council table and listening to a long indictment of his Government on a subject with respect to which it was especially vulnerable and on which he could hardly hope to put up an impressive defense.

Prior to the meeting of the Council, and upon receiving General MacArthur's approval to my suggestion in that regard, I had shown the new Commonwealth Member, Ambassador W. R. HODGSON, the text of my proposed statement, and he at that time intimated that in view of his belief that the Council should seek to find some means of taking constructive action in the matter he was thinking of invoking the Prisoner-of-war Convention recently concluded at Geneva. Although his proposal will probably prove to be impracticable in view of the attitude of the Soviet Government and the likelihood that it will refuse to accept an investigation commission or to afford any other form of cooperation, it has been well received and indeed has some value as a concrete and constructive suggestion to meet the growing demand for definite action toward clarifying the problem of the Japanese prisoners and bringing the repatriation program to an end. It also may be useful as a contribution to the general pressure that is being brought to bear on the Soviet Union in this regard.

As reported in my telegram no. 585 dated December 22, 1949, the Japanese press has given great prominence to the Council's treatment of the repatriation problem, and I believe that the discussion, even though it may cause some shock to the Japanese by making them realize the probable extent of deaths and the likelihood that only a relatively few remain to be repatriated, has served a useful purpose, not only by reason of the information afforded the Japanese and the pressure exercised on the Soviet Union, but also as a means of making clear the position of the United States Government and SCAP's Headquarters on the general problem.

Respectfully yours,

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W. J. Sebald

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: Dec. 24, 1949

SUBJECT: Japanese Peace Treaty

PARTICIPANTS: Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
Maj. Gen. J. H. Burns representing Under Secretary of  
Defense Early,The Secretary, Mr. Rusk, G, Mr. Butterworth, FE,  
Mr. Howard, S, Mr. Hamilton, FE.

COPIES TO:

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The Secretary said he asked General Bradley and General Burns to come in in reference to the situation confronting us incident to the receipt of Secretary of Defense Johnson's letter of December 23 on the subject of the essential security requirements of the United States in a peace settlement with Japan. The Secretary commented that he did not want to discuss the letter this morning but before passing to another aspect of the situation would simply state his reaction to one feature of the JCS memorandum enclosed with Secretary Johnson's letter. In the JCS memorandum there was set forth the JCS's estimate of military requirements, postulating the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan and in various islands. Those requirements we could appreciate. At another point the JCS memorandum contained the statement that an acceptable peace treaty with Japan must include both the USSR and the de facto government of China as parties to the document. In view of these two conclusions, the view expressed by the JCS that negotiations leading toward a peace treaty with Japan are premature represents, in the Secretary's opinion, a masterpiece of understatement. The Secretary said that the JCS view really described a long-term, not a temporary situation. The Secretary continued that we would want to discuss this feature of the JCS memorandum and all its implications. This morning, however, he was merely calling attention to it.

The Secretary also pointed out that the JCS memorandum referred to one sentence in NSC 13/3 to the effect that this Government should not press for a treaty of peace at this time. The Secretary said he would like to read the whole paragraph in which this statement appeared. The Secretary then read paragraph No. 1 of NSC 13/3 as follows:

"1. Timing and Procedure. In view of the differences which have developed

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developed among the interested countries regarding the procedure and substance of a Japanese peace treaty and in view of the serious international situation created by the Soviet Union's policy of aggressive Communist expansion, this Government should not press for a treaty of peace at this time. It should remain prepared to proceed with the negotiations, under some generally acceptable voting procedure, if the Allied Powers can agree among themselves on such a procedure. We should, before actually entering into a peace conference, seek through the diplomatic channel the concurrence of a majority of the participating countries in the principal points of content we desire to have in such a treaty. Meanwhile, we should concentrate our attention on the preparation of the Japanese for the eventual removal of the regime of control."

The Secretary said that what we were doing was to follow out the procedure set forth in the above quoted paragraph. When Mr. Bevin was here in September, he and the Secretary had discussed the question of the Japanese peace treaty. As the procedure was so closely connected with the content of the treaty, it had been agreed that they would work toward an exchange of views on the content of a possible treaty. If they found that they could agree on the principal points of content, a procedure under which voting would be by two-thirds or by a simple majority might be feasible. This might eliminate the need for considering the veto. A conference might even proceed along pre-war lines where each country would be free to accept the conclusions of the conference or not to accept them. The British, Australians, Canadians and others have consistently advocated an early peace treaty with Japan.

In the light of Secretary Johnson's letter of December 23, we are obviously not going to be able to meet the time schedule contemplated when the Secretary talked with Mr. Bevin in September. Some ten days ago Mr. Bevin had telegraphed the Secretary asking whether the Secretary could not give him some indications of the U.S. position on the treaty. The British Ambassador had also been in to see the Secretary. The British Government was obviously embarrassed by the lack of information from us in connection with the forthcoming Ceylon meeting. If we furnish the British nothing by way of information, the result is certain to be that the United States would be blamed by some of the Commonwealth Governments for dragging its feet. This was quite likely to become a matter of comment in the press. It would get to Japan and would have an unfavorable reaction upon the Japanese people, who are eager for a treaty, and consequently upon occupation. This point was mentioned in the last paragraph of Secretary Johnson's letter of December 23. Thus, if we do nothing, the result would pretty certainly be unfortunate. The Secretary therefore had in mind asking the British Ambassador to come in and reading to him a statement which had been drawn up for that purpose. Copies of the statement were passed to General Bradley and General Burns. The Secretary then read aloud the proposed statement. The Secretary then said he would like to have the benefit of General Bradley's and General Burns' views as to the proposed procedure and statement. General Bradley said he thought the statement expressed the situation very well and would be useful to pass on to the British Ambassador for Mr. Bevin. General Burns said he also liked the statement and fully concurred in the proposed course of action.

The Secretary said he was glad to know that their views coincided with

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ours and he would proceed as planned and ask the British Ambassador to come in, at which time he would read the statement to the Ambassador and perhaps hand him a copy, not as a formal communication but as an informal record of what the Secretary had said.

The Secretary explained that we hoped by this statement to get the Commonwealth Governments to appreciate the security problems confronting the United States and to become really concerned about these problems which had a direct bearing on their own security.

During the interchange of comment, General Bradley remarked that they of course wanted a peace treaty with Japan as soon as feasible. A military occupation began to run down hill after two or three years. At present there were many uncertainties in the military situation in the Far East both on the mainland and in reference to Taiwan. Possibly in six months or a year the situation would change in such a way that we would know better where we stood.

General Bradley referred in passing to the fact that it would probably be necessary at some time to let Japan have armed forces and that it did not make any sense for an independent nation of 80 million people not to have an army to defend itself. He indicated agreement that at the present it was not feasible to permit Japan to rearm.

In the course of the conversation, the Secretary said that in the paper he proposed to read the British Ambassador there had been incorporated some of the thought underlying the Department of Defense's position. It was of course possible that something regarding the U.S. position would get in the press from the Ceylon meeting or from some of the attending governments. One of the reasons why the Secretary had asked General Bradley and General Burns to meet with him that morning was that he might acquaint them with that possibility. If some publicity resulted, the Secretary desired to have their concurrence in the procedure so that the Department of State would not be charged later by the Department of Defense with responsibility for a leak.

The Secretary thanked General Bradley and General Burns for coming in.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: December 24, 1949

SUBJECT: Japanese Peace Treaty

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador  
The Secretary  
Mr. Butterworth, Assistant Secretary, FE 043

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Following my talk with General Bradley and General Burns, I asked the British Ambassador to come to see me. I explained that in view of the imminence of Mr. Bevin's departure by boat for Ceylon, I wished to discuss with him what could be explained to Mr. Bevin about the nature of the problems with which we were faced in considering a possible Japanese peace treaty. I read him the prepared statement and emphasized its informal nature and the fact that it was addressed to him. I pointed out the adverse repercussions which would flow from any publicity emanating from the Ceylon Conference to the effect that the United States was holding back on proceeding with a Japanese peace treaty; that it was in all of our interests that it should be fully appreciated by everyone, including the Japanese, that it was the predatory and uncooperative attitude of Soviet Russia that was at the root of our difficulties. It was essential that the Japanese should understand this clearly and not be misled by any contrary propaganda. I also pointed out the undesirability of Mr. Bevin becoming at the Ceylon Conference the spokesman of the American point of view as defined in this memorandum. To all this the British Ambassador readily assented. He volunteered to send a telegram to Mr. Bevin explaining the whole situation to be followed by a letter enclosing the memorandum, it being understood that the memorandum

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was given to the British Ambassador personally and on the condition its use would merely be for Mr. Bevin's background and as guidance to him in leading the discussion at the Ceylon Conference into constructive channels. Sir Oliver Franks indicated he was sending the memorandum by mail so that it would not pass through the normal distribution channels and would merely be a personal communication from him to his Secretary of State.

Sir Oliver Franks went on to say that he thought the memorandum was a very helpful document and should be much appreciated by Mr. Bevin. He felt it would be useful in assisting Mr. Bevin in his conduct of the discussions at the conference; he felt he should say personally regardless of the trouble to which one went, in the last analysis how well the Ceylon Conference determinations went depended a good deal upon Mr. Bevin's state of health and vigor at the moment a matter over which he, of course, had no control.

I told him of my desire to apprise Ambassador Wrong for transmission to Mr. Pearson of the contents of this memorandum for Mr. Pearson's background. Sir Oliver Franks felt this was a desirable thing and perceived no objection to the procedure.

As he was leaving, the British Ambassador asked whether he could put this memorandum in the context of a remark that the U.S. conceived its interest in that area of the world as an arc which stretched from Japan through to India and that our interest was not merely a line so to speak drawn from California through Japan to China. I said that the arc concept fitted other discussions that we had had and at my invitation Mr. Butterworth elaborated by pointing out that some thought had been given in the Department to the desirability of discussing more precisely how that arc was made up in terms of the community of interests between the British Empire and the United States. /In terms of that community of interests in the Japanese and Philippine area of that arc, we found ourselves bearing the major responsibility. We were likewise prepared to give a helping hand in Indonesia but that in the area north of Singapore, in Burma in particular, in a lesser degree in Thailand, and to some extent in French Indochina, the physical location of power points, custom, knowledge and circumstance made this area of primary United Kingdom and Empire concern; that however was not to suggest that the U.S. was not prepared to play a helpful role. Mr. Butterworth pointed out that perhaps at times the situation in that area of the arc suffered from the fact that there might be an inadequate realization on the part of the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth or the U.S. as to the role of the other.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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Central  
Files  
1949

Tokyo, December 27, 1949

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and SECRET

Dear John:

With reference to your letter of December 13, 1949, regarding the exchange of telegrams between General MacArthur and Mr. Webb, I do not have an official copy of either the Department's no. 580 or no. 584 (other than the copies which were forwarded as enclosures with your letter). I did not see General MacArthur's message to Mr. Webb prior to its dispatch, nor at any time until a copy was received with your letter under reply.

On November 29, as intimated in the postscript of my letter to you on that date, I was shown the Department's no. 584 by General Almond, the Chief of Staff.

I have discussed with General MacArthur the general question of the apparent withholding of State Department telegrams intended for this office. The General assured me in no uncertain terms that "there is not the slightest attitude or intention in Headquarters to suppress or conceal or control any communication whatsoever from any department of the Government to its agencies here." In the specific case under discussion, the General said that there must have been some inadvertence in the message center of GHQ, as the messages were sent directly to him (as the person directly involved) and, without appreciating the fact that the messages bore State serial numbers, he himself took action, "thus apparently creating the impression among those concerned with the distribution that the messages were of no interest to anyone else."

In view of General MacArthur's definite assurances to me that Department of State telegrams will

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John M. Allison, Esquire,  
Director, Office of  
Northeast Asian Affairs,  
Department of State  
Washington.

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