

Security Clearance
Procedures *12-A*

CONFIDENTIAL

P
Sec clearance
procedures.

JAN 19 1948

Dear Mr. Skinner:

Receipt is acknowledged of your recent letter with further reference to security clearance of Department of Interior personnel.

A review of the Security Advisory Board files on this matter reveals that your letter of September 17 was answered on September 23, 1947. The letter of September 23, 1947 did not specifically state whether the procedure outlined by the FBI was satisfactory to the Board since this is not within the province of the Board, but it did suggest an expeditious means of securing the desired clearances on the 56 individuals in question.

As you know, the Security Advisory Board's responsibilities and authority are of a purely advisory nature and the degree to which an agency complies with SAB 3, or any other recommendation of the Board, has always been a matter for determination by the agency concerned. Accordingly, the SAB is not in a position to pass on any arrangements which any agency may make for the checking or clearance of its personnel for security.

Very truly yours,

Shanette G. Blake
Secretary

Mr. Carlton Skinner,
Security Officer,
Department of the Interior,
Division of Information,
Washington 25, D. C.

CON:SGBlake:rh 1-9-47

5GB
601-2

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
DIVISION OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON


December 12, 1947

Mr. Hamilton Robinson, Chairman
Security Advisory Board
State-War-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
Room 711515 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Robinson:


The attached letter has been sent to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation covering clearance of persons of the Department of the Interior having access to top secret and secret information. In view of the fact that no reply was received to my letter of September 17 to you asking if the procedure suggested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation was satisfactory. I have assumed that the Security Advisory Board did not object to it.

Sincerely yours,



Carlton Skinner,
Security Officer

Attachment



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

My dear Mr. Hoover:

This will respond to your letter of September 3, 1947 advising of your recommended procedure for checking names of persons who are to have access to classified information. In fulfillment of the requirements of Executive Order 9835, copies of Standard Form No. 84 of the Civil Service Commission have already been submitted on the employees in this category as well as others.



Since your investigation is already scheduled under the Employee Loyalty Program, it would appear that such investigation is adequate for compliance with the requirements of SAB 3 of the Security Advisory Board. Therefore, your suggestion that duplication of work be eliminated is accepted and the Department will await the report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the normal course on Standard Forms No. 84.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of the Interior

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
DIVISION OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS



Mr. Hamilton Robinson, Chairman
Security Advisory Board
State-War-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
Room 711, 515 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.

~~SRG~~ 496-3
~~HR~~
Mrs Blake

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
DIVISION OF INFORMATION - 3171
WASHINGTON

File
Interior

September 26, 1947


Mr. Hamilton Robinson, Chairman
Security Advisory Board
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
Room 711, 515 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Robinson:

Thank you for your letter of September 23. I find that the Standard Forms No. 84 for this Department have either been transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or have been collected and are about to be sent over. Any segregation of the ones in which I am interested at this time would be difficult and inadequate. I think the most practical arrangement would be to let them go through in the normal course of events and when the reply comes from the F.B.I. I will enter it on my records. In the meantime the certification of Bureau directors and of myself should be adequate.

I should like to discuss the general problem with you at some convenient time in the future. Will you give me a call at Interior on extension 3171.

Sincerely yours,



Carlton Skinner,
Security Officer.

Placed Skinner
10/6/47.

481-13

September 23, 1947

Dear Mr. Skinner:

Receipt is acknowledge of your letter of September 17, with enclosures, with respect to your desire to have the names of 56 of your employees checked against the F.B.I. subversive files for purposes of making Top Secret and Secret information available to them.

Mr. E. G. Fitch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has advised the Board that your request for a check on these 56 individuals should be submitted on Standard Form No. 84 but that it need not be held in abeyance for submission with the balance of the Forms No. 84 on Interior employees. If you will submit these 56 forms, together with a covering memorandum explaining the need for special handling, Mr. Fitch will attempt to secure an expeditious report on these 56 individuals.

The Forms No. 84 should be addressed to the attention of Mr. E. G. Fitch, Foreign and Domestic Coordination Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Room 4519, Justice Building, Washington, D. C.

Sincerely yours,

Hamilton Robinson
Chairman

Mr. Carlton Skinner
Security Officer
Department of the Interior

A true copy of
the signed original

428-11
BlakeUNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
DIVISION OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1947

Mr. Hamilton Robinson, Chairman,
Security Advisory Board,
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
Room 711, 515 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.


Dear Mr. Robinson:

In accordance with SAB 3 of the Security Advisory Board, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Secretary of the Interior transmitted to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the names of personnel to whom authority was proposed to be given to have access to top secret and secret information addressed to the Department of the Interior. The letter of the Secretary transmitted to the F.B.I. is attached as is the reply of the Director of the F.B.I.

SAB 3 clearly provides that a check of F.B.I. subversive files must be "favorably reported before the person is given Top Secret and Secret information for the first time." If the Department must delay until these names are checked in accordance with the general employee loyalty program, the procedure of SAB 3 can not be followed.


Will you advise me if it is satisfactory with the Security Advisory Board to follow the procedure outlined by the Director of the F.B.I. If it is not, I trust that the Security Advisory Board will make some direct arrangement with the F.B.I. and so advise this Department.

Sincerely yours,



Carlton Skinner,
Security Officer.

Attachments



C
O
P
Y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

September 3, 1947

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to your letter of August 28, 1947, attaching a list of 56 names to be checked against FBI files in accordance with SAB 3 of the Security Advisory Board, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

Executive Order 9835 which prescribes procedures in connection with the Employee Loyalty Program requires that the names of all incumbent employees in the Executive Branch of the Federal Service be submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Standard Form No. 84 was drafted by the Civil Service Commission for this purpose and must necessarily be submitted in connection with each employee in your department.

Inasmuch as the information which you have furnished at this time in connection with each of the 56 names in this list is insufficient to enable us to make a thorough check of our files, it is suggested that a duplication of work might be eliminated if you will at this time resubmit these names on Standard Form No. 84. In this manner you will be assured of a thorough and exhaustive search of our files and at the same time will fulfil the requirements of Executive Order 9835 with respect to these individuals.

Sincerely yours

Signed/ J. Edgar Hoover

C
O
P
YTHE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1947

My dear Mr. Hoover:

In accordance with SAB 3 of the Security Advisory Board, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, it is requested that a check of F.B.I. subversive files be made on the attached list of employees of the Interior Department who have been designated to have access to top secret and secret information received by the Interior Department.

Sincerely yours,

Signed/ J. A. Krug

Secretary of the Interior.

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover,
The Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D. C.

August, 1947.

PERSONNEL OF THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT HAVING ACCESS TO
TOP SECRET AND SECRET INFORMATION

- ARNOLD, Edwin G., Director, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Room 4105; Home Address: R.F.D. 2, Fairfax, Va.
- BALL, Max W., Director, Oil and Gas Division, Room 6653; Home Address: 1734 P Street, N.W.
- BARR, Mason, Chief, Caribbean Branch, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Room 4116; Home Address: 49 Juniper Lane, Falls Church, Va.
- BRADLEY, Wilmot H., Chief Geologist, U. S. Geological Survey, F.W.A. Bldg., Room 4241; Home Address: 115 West Thornapple Street, Chevy Chase, Maryland.
- BURRILL, Meredith F., Director, U. S. Board on Geographical Names, Room 5360; Home Address: 5503 Grove Street, Chevy Chase, Md.
- CATTELL, R. A., Chief, Petroleum and Natural Gas Division, Bureau of Mines; Room 4412; Home Address: 7717 14th Street, N.W.
- CHAPMAN, Oscar L., Under Secretary of the Interior, Room 5116; Home Address: The Westchester Apartments, Apartment 622B.
- DAVIDSON, C. Girard, Assistant Secretary of the Interior; Room 6132; Home Address: 3497 O Street, N.W.
- DAY, Albert M., Director, Fish and Wildlife Service, Room 3156; Home Address: 7206 Cobalt Road, Wood Acres, Maryland.
- DAY, Robert E., Assistant to Secretary of the Interior and Alternate Top Security Control Officer, Room 3156; Home Address: 4843A 28th Street, South Arlington, Virginia.
- FENTRESS, Carroll D., Special Assistant to the Director, Oil and Gas Division, Room 6624; Home Address: 3905 West Leland Street, Chevy Chase, Md.
- FIELDNER, A. C., Chief, Fuels and Explosives Branch, U. S. Geological Survey, F.W.A. Bldg., Room 6243; Home Address: The Cosmos Club, Chevy Chase, Md.
- FITZGERALD, Gerald, Acting Chief, Topographic Branch, U. S. Geological Survey, F.W.A. Bldg., Room 6243; Home Address: 6603 Summit Avenue, Chevy Chase, Md.
- FLAKNE, Joseph T., Chief, Alaska Branch, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Room 4125; Home Address: 3039 Macomb Street, N. W., Apartment 16.

FRIEDMAN, Robert E., Assistant Director and Chief Counsel, Oil and Gas Division, Room 6637; Home Address: 522 20th Street, N.W.

HAVELL, Thomas C., Assistant Director, Bureau of Land Management, Room 5658; Home Address: 3425 Patterson Street, N.W.

HEUSER, Mathilda C., U. S. Board on Geographical Names; Room 5356; Home Address: 1915 Calvert Street, N.W.

JACKSON, Fannibelle, Secretary to Director, Bureau of Land Management, Room 5660; Home Address: 4848 Crescent Place, Crestview, D. C.

JAMES, Milton C., Assistant Director, Fish and Wildlife Service; Room 3156; Home Address: 516 Goddard Road, Bethesda, Maryland.

JOHNSON, Fred W., Director, Bureau of Land Management; Room 5660; Home Address: The Chastleton Apartments, 1600 16th Street, N.W.

LEE, Rex H., Assistant Director, Division of Territories and Island Possessions; Room 4116; Home Address: 9204 Old Bladensburg Road, Silver Spring, Maryland.

MARKWELL, Kenneth, Assistant Commissioner of Reclamation; Room 7646; Home Address: 4607 Four Mile Run Drive, Arlington Va.

McCRILLIS, William H., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Top Secret Control Officer; Room 5142; Home Address: 9000 Greentree Road, Bethesda, Maryland.

McGRATH, J. S., Chief, Foreign Minerals Division, Bureau of Mines; Room 3410; Home Address: 3227 Adams Mill Road.

McPHAIL, Harvey F, Director, Power Utilization Division, Bureau of Reclamation; Room 7615; Home Address: 2900 30th Street, S.E.

MILLER, Thomas H., Assistant Director, Bureau of Mines; Room 4612; Home Address: 6501 Barnaby Street, N.W.

MOFFETT, Lieze S., U. S. Board on Geographical Names; Room 5358; Home Address: 4856 Chevy Chase Boulevard, Chevy Chase, Md.

MOON, L. B., Chief, Mining Branch, Bureau of Mines; Room 4309; Home Address: Prospect Hill, Barnesville, Md.

MOSBY, Leonard, Acting Chief Information Officer, Bureau of Reclamation; Room 5311; Home Address: 9102 Eton Road, Silver Spring, Md.

MURPHY, Neill C., Jr., Chief of Files, Division of Territories, Room 4012; Home Address: 2212 Eye Street, N.W.

NELSON, Wesley R., Assistant Commissioner of Reclamation; Room 7653;
(NOTE: Mr. Nelson has just been appointed to this office and has not moved to Washington).

NOLAN, Thomas B., Assistant Director, U. S. Geological Survey, F.W.A. Bldg., Room 5240; Home Address: 2219 California Street, N.W.

PEHRSON, E. W., Chief, Economics and Statistics Branch, Bureau of Mines; Room 3610; Home Address: 1573 44th Street, N.W.

PROVINSE, John H., Assistant Commissioner, Office of Indian Affairs, Room 4159; Home Address: 215 Spring Street, Chevy Chase, Md.

RALSON, O. C., Chief, Metallurgical Branch, Bureau of Mines, Room 4043; Home Address: 4333 Clagett Road, Hyattsville, Md.

RECKORD, Gordon E., U. S. Board on Geographical Names; Room 6544; Home Address: 3102 Martha Custis Drive, Alexandria, Va.

RITTER, Colin, U. S. Board on Geographical Names; Room 6543; Home Address: 600 Bashford Lane, Alexandria, Va.

SCHROEDER, W. C., Chief, Synthetic Liquid Fuels Branch, Bureau of Mines; Room 4352; Home Address: R.F.D. 1, Box 196, Clinton, Md.

SILVERMAN, Irwin W., Chief Counsel, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Room 4132; Home Address: 3920 Southern Avenue, S.E.

SKINNER, Carlton, Director of Information and Departmental Security Officer, Room 7216; Home Address: 2229 Bancroft Place, N.W.

STRAUS, Michael W., Commissioner of Reclamation; Room 7652; Home Address: Linnean Hill, Klinge Road and Porter Street, N.W.

TAYLOR, T. W., Administrative Officer, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Room 4147; Home Address: 3729 Lyons Lane, Alexandria, Va.

SWANSON, Edward B., Assistant Director, Oil and Gas Division, Room 6631; Home Address: 2512 Que Street, N.W.

WARNE, William E., Assistant Secretary; Room 6616; Home Address: 805 Enderby Drive, Beverly Hills, Alexandria, Va.

WRATHER, William E., Director, U. S. Geological Survey; Room 5244, F.W.A. Bldg., Home Address: 20 Dalocarlia Drive

ZIMMERMAN, William, Jr., Acting Commissioner, Office of Indian Affairs, Room 4159; Home Address: 4713 North Rock Spring Road, Arlington, Va.

BOYD, James, Director of Bureau of Mines; Room 4614; Home Address: Jefferson Hotel, 1200 16th Street, N.W.

DOTY, Dale, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Interior; Room 5116; Home Address: 4311 N. Pershing Drive, Arlington, Va.

GOLDY, Daniel, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of the Interior; Room 6132; Home Address: 705 North Wayne Street, Arlington, Va.

PRICE, Reginald C., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior; Room 6616; Home Address: 4319 2nd Road, North, Arlington, Va.

RAMSEY, Margaret F., Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Interior; Room 6151; Home Address: 2943 McKinley Street, N.W.

DOUGHERTY, W. J., Deputy Security Officer for the Department, Room 7210; Home Address: 3722 Livingston Street, N.W.

DEMARAY, A. E., Associate Director, National Park Service; Room 3105; Home Address: 612 Pickwick Lane, Chevy Chase, Md.

DRURY, Newton B., Director, National Park Service, 1139-B Merchandise Mart, Chicago, Illinois.

TOLSON, Hillory A., Assistant Director, National Park Service; Room 3104; Home Address; TheCosmos Club.


JAMES, Roy E., Acting Chief, Pacific Branch, Territories and Island Possessions; Room 4244; Home Address: 1210 South Barton Street, Arlington, Va.

E. G. Fitch
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
DIVISION OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

*Superior,
2000 Don Card. Sect: 762.
4519 - Justice Bldg.*



PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID



Mr. Hamilton Robinson, Chairman,
Security Advisory Board,
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee,
Room 711, 515 22nd Street, N.W.,
Washington 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 740132



DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

File
Pres. Air Pol. Com.
Sec cho

August 22, 1947


Mrs. Shanette G. Blake
Secretary, Security Advisory Board
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
515 - 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Blake:

We are in receipt of a request from Harold A. Merrill, Administrative Officer, President's Air Policy Commission, to arrange for a security check to be made on the members of the Commission and its staff.

In confirmation of your telephone conversation with Mr. J. S. Webster of this Office, we are referring the request and attached case analyses to you for appropriate action.

Very truly yours,


J. C. Green
Security Officer

Encl.

*Merrill is handling direct
with Hatcher of C.W. Sec. Comm.*

President's Air Policy Commission

Members and Staff

COMMISSIONERS1. Henry Ford, II.

President and Director, Ford Motor Company
Director, Ford Motor Company of Canada
Graduated Hotchkiss School, Lakeville, Conn., in 1936
Student at Yale University 1936-40
Lieutenant, U.S.N., 1941-43

2. Palmer Hoyt

Born in Roseville, Illinois, March 10, 1897. Educated at the University of Oregon, where he received his A.B. degree in 1923.

Mr. Hoyt served as Sgt. Major, U. S. Army, AEF, during World War I. He has been a newspaper man throughout his business career. From 1923 to 1926 he was sports and telegraph editor of the East Oregonian, Pendleton, Ore., after which he transferred to the Oregonian, in Portland. He served in successive posts and became publisher in 1938. For a time during World War II he was Director, Domestic Branch, Office of War Information. Mr. Hoyt is now publisher of the Denver Post, Denver, Colorado, and a member of the Board of Directors of the Associated Press. He is a Republican.

3. Thomas K. Finletter

Born in Philadelphia in 1893, Mr. Finletter was educated at the University of Pennsylvania, where he took his LL.B. in 1920. He is a member of the Pennsylvania and New York bars, and has practiced law since 1920. Served as captain in U.S. Army, 1917-19. Special assistant to the Secretary of State, 1941-44, and served as consultant to the U. S. delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945. Author of several books on corporation organization and government. Resident of New York City.

4. George P. Baker - *Investigated - cleared by State in Aug. 1945.*

Born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, November 1, 1903. Mr. Baker was educated at Harvard University and received his Ph.D. in 1934.

From 1940-42, Mr. Baker was a Member and Vice-Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board. He served in the Army from 1942-45 as Colonel, General Staff Corps, and was assigned to Air Staff, as Chief, Industrial Demobilization Division, Special Projects Office 1944-45.

Mr. Baker was Director of the Transport and Communications Policy Division, State Department, in 1945-46 and is now James J. Hill Professor of Transportation at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.

- 2 -

5. Arthur Dare Whiteside (From Who's Who)

Pres. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.; b. East Orange, N.J., Sept. 15, 1882; s. Newton Elkanah and Elizabeth (Hankins) W.; ed. Princeton U. (class of 1904); m. Edith E. Davidson, Feb. 12, 1909; 1 dau. Joan Dare. Organized Nat. Credit Office, 1912, pres. same until 1931; also pres. Wool Inst. 3 yrs.; directing head R. G. Dun & Co., 1931, and since consol. with Bradstreet, pres. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. With War Trade and War Industries bds. during World War; with Peace Conf. at London and Paris. Advisor, later mem. NRA Bd. until Mar. 1935; apptd. dir. civilian supply div., WPB, Apr. 1943. Clubs: Princeton, Union League, Manhattan, Merchants; Pequot Yacht (Southport, Conn.). Office: 290 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

STAFF

- 6 S. Paul Johnson, Executive Director - *Serial # 80442*
Business Address - Institute of Aeronautical Sciences
He is Director of the Institute
Served as Captain in the Navy from June 1944 to December 1945
- 7 Mrs. Ruth H. Huddleston, Secretarial Assistant
Home Address - 1721 Newton Street, N. W.
Present Employment - Air Policy Commission
Next Previous Employment - Air Transport Command, War Department
- 8 C. G. Williamson, Assistant to Secretary of Commerce
Department of Commerce. Served as Colonel in U.S. Air Force
- 9 Edward Sumner Prentice, Specialist - *Investigated & cleared by State in Sept. 1946.*
Present Address - 1126 S. Wakefield Street, Arlington, Virginia
Present Employment - Aviation Division, Department of State
Next Previous Employment - Fiscal Division, Budget Division,
Executive Office of the President.
- 10 David G. Sprague, Research Analyst - *Investigated & cleared by State in May, 1946 with further clearance in April 1947*
Present Address - 16 Danbury Street, S. W.
Present Employment - Department of State
Next Previous Employment - U. S. Naval Officer
- 11 Richard Francis Cook, Specialist - *Investigated & cleared by State in 1944 with further clearance in May of 1947.*
Present Address - 1711 Otis Street, N. E.
Present Employment - Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State, Department of State
Next Previous Employment - U. S. Naval Reserve

- 3 -

- ✓ 12 Mrs. Giulietta Metcalf, Research Analyst
Present Address - 1453 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.
Present Employment - Air Policy Commission
Next Previous Employment - Civil Aeronautics Administration
- 13 Charles Herbert Colvin, Specialist
Present Address - Egbert Hills, Morristown, New Jersey
Present Employment - Air Policy Commission
Next Previous Employment - Office of Scientific Research and Development
- 14 John Cooper, Consultant
Business Address - Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey
No. Present Employment - Institute of Advanced Study
Next Previous Employment - Pan American Airlines
- 15 Harold Arthur Merrill, Administrative Officer
Present Address - 5700 - 32nd Street, N.W., Washington 15, D. C.
Present Employment - U. S. Bureau of the Budget, on detail to the Commission
Next Previous Employment - Nat'l. Resources Plan'g. Bd., Exec. Off. of the President
- 16 Frank A. Jackson, Assistant Administrative Officer
Present Address - 3205 Commonwealth Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia
Present Employment - U. S. Bureau of the Budget, on detail to this Commission
Next Previous Employment - Public Buildings Administration, Omaha, Nebraska
- ✓ 17 Martha Elizabeth McCleskey, Stenographer
Present Address - 2426 - 19th St., N. W.
Present Employment - Air Policy Commission
Next Previous Employment - Compliance Division, Office of the Housing Expediter.



Mr. R:

I spoke to Mr. Meloy, Chairman of Civil Service Loyalty Board this morning. He feels quite strongly that all such requests should be referred directly to the Commission. In some instances, of which the Commerce request may be one, it may be necessary to turn it over to FBI since Civil Service makes only a record check and all field investigations are made by FBI. However, he states that Hatcher maintains constant close liaison with FBI and that it is important to funnel all requests for investigation into one place - preferably to Hatcher who can either handle them directly or turn them over to FBI.

Have cleared reply with Blakeney and Gunther on the phone.

B
SGB

P. S. You might be interested to know this is a case previously sent back to C.A.D. in war with the suggestion they make their request for investigation directly to M.D.W. instead of through us.

B

Form DS-10 Department of State Date
6-1-45

REFERENCE SLIP

To:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Advise | <input type="checkbox"/> Note & Return |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Approve & Return | <input type="checkbox"/> Note & File |
| <input type="checkbox"/> As You Requested | <input type="checkbox"/> Per Telephone Talk |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Attention | <input type="checkbox"/> Previous Correspon. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Attach File | <input type="checkbox"/> Priority Action |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Comment & Return | <input type="checkbox"/> Reconsider |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Consider | <input type="checkbox"/> Recommend Action |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Copying | <input type="checkbox"/> Record |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Correct | <input type="checkbox"/> Reply |
| <input type="checkbox"/> File | <input type="checkbox"/> Return to Sender |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Follow-up | <input type="checkbox"/> Rewrite |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hold | <input type="checkbox"/> Signature Required |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Initials Needed | <input type="checkbox"/> See Me |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Investigate & Report | <input type="checkbox"/> Take Action |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Instruct | <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Justify | <input type="checkbox"/> Type |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Keep Me Advised | <input type="checkbox"/> Verify |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Legal Matter | <input type="checkbox"/> Reply for Signature of |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Memo Required | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not Interested | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Note & Destroy | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Note & Forward | |

REMARKS:

*Return to
Blake, please*

From

Serial No. 559

September 9, 1947

Dear Mr. Short:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 25 requesting that the Security Advisory Board take necessary action to the end that the War Department might be advised that one of your employees had or had not been cleared for security purposes by the Board.

While the Board is always anxious to assist federal agencies in handling any security problems which arise, it is not in a position to make determinations as to the responsibility of an employee from a security standpoint. For a time, the Board was able to act as a channel for presenting requests for investigations to appropriate investigating agencies, but at no time has it had either authority or requisite facilities for issuing so-called security clearances.

If the Department of Commerce does not now have facilities for making investigations which will meet the requirements of the War Department, it is suggested that the problem be presented to the Civil Service Commission, attention Colonel James E. Hatcher, Chief, Investigations Division, for assistance or advice as to procedures which might be followed in this and similar cases.

Sincerely yours

Hamilton Robinson
Chairman

*cleared by
phone
with Blahney
" Justice
9/9/47*

Mr. Oliver C. Short,
Director of Personnel,
Department of Commerce,
Washington 25, D. C.

450-2

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CON - Mrs. Blake

DATE: September 2, 1947

FROM : CON - G. H. Steuart, Jr. *GHS*

SUBJECT:

The attached communication, ^{from} Mr. Short, Director of Personnel, Department of Commerce, to Mr. Robinson implies that Mr. Short is misinformed as to the functions to be performed by the Security Advisory Board. Just before he left Mr. Robinson suggested that you prepare an appropriate reply and explain to Mr. Short that the Security Advisory Board is not in business to give security clearance on individuals.

Attachment:
As stated above.

Populchess
Inter. div. 6-2-47
6-2-47
6-2-47
6-2-47
6-2-47

450-2
C45

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON 25

August 25, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Hamilton Robinson
Chairman
Security Advisory Board
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

WRS Blake reply
SAB: not in
this business
2-42
OFFICE OF CONGRESS
AUG 28 1947
Don: R. Kelly and
Reply drafted
and mailed
9/9/47
SGB

Dear Mr. Robinson:

This is to request a security clearance of one Mr. James Franklin Vance, Liaison Officer, CAF-11, \$4500 per annum, Occupied Areas and Reparations Staff, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce, who is designated to represent the Department of Commerce, as alternate Liaison with the Information Management Group, Civil Affairs Division of the War Department.

The following information concerning Mr. Vance is given:

Name: James Franklin Vance
Date of Birth: December 31, 1917
Place of Birth: Texarkana, Arkansas
Present Residence: 2015 New Hampshire Avenue N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Employment Records:

1935 - 1938, Part-time employment with father, Judge T. B. Vance, Municipal Court, Texarkana, Arkansas;
June 1938 - August 1939, skilled helper, Bureau of Printing and Engraving, Treasury Department, Washington, D. C.;
August 1939 - June 1941, Stenographer, Security Exchange Commission, Washington, D. C.;
June 1941 - January 1944, Administrator of Export Control, Foreign Economic Administration, Washington, D. C.;
January 10, 1944 - April 14, 1946, Commissioned as Ensign, U. S. Naval Reserve January 10, 1944. Released from active duty on April 14, 1946. Serial or file No. 556528;
April 1946 to present, Liaison Officer, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce.


-2-

In addition to the above information, Mr. Vance was previously rated eligible by the Civil Service Commission on suitability on April 5, 1945, as a result of a character investigation. Preliminary inquiries of personnel records of the Navy Department and the Treasury Department disclose nothing derogatory.

In view of the fact that such inquiries did not establish sufficient authoritative information to meet the requisite qualifications for processing classified material, it will be appreciated if the Security Advisory Board will make the necessary clearances so that the War Department may be advised that Mr. Vance has been or has not been cleared for security purposes by the Security Advisory Board.

Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,


Oliver C. Short
Director of Personnel

Felt

July 3, 1947

Memorandum for the Record:

Subject: Name checks for personnel detailed as Liaison with Information Management Group of CAD.

After receipt of 11 June report from Colonel Forney on Frederick L. Brooks, discussed with Colonel Blakeney the possibility that CAD might get better service on its investigations by going direct to G-2 instead of sending request to us for transmission to War Member who in turn had to send to Security Group from whom it went to investigative units; also reports are forwarded by G-2 to SAB which must, in turn, either relay a clearance to CAD or show representative of CAD copy of derogatory information (or paraphrase it for him) as a basis for a decision in CAD as to whether the individual is suitable.

Colonel Blakeney suggested I discuss matter with Colonel Chard, which I did. Colonel Chard stated it seemed advisable for them to go direct and that he would have Col. Miter phone me for more details.

Colonel Miter, in our first telephone conversation, stated he would discuss matter with Colonel Blakeney and Colonel Forney and let me hear further from him.

On July 3, I phoned Colonel Miter to determine whether he had made any decision on future handling of these cases and advised him that I was still holding, without action, his request for clearance on a Mr. Vance.

Colonel Miter said he had talked with Colonel Blakeney who referred him to MDW where he was informed they could, of course, handle his requests, but that ~~they~~ CAD investigations would be very low priority and considerable time might be involved in reporting back to CAD. Colonel Miter agreed that the priority and time involved was probably no greater in cases where CAD would send requests direct to MDW than when they came through SAB with the additional channels involved.

After talking further with Colonel Chard on July 3, Colonel Miter again phoned and advised me that CAD had decided to ^{names of} send a letter to all member agencies of the IMG stating that heretofore, representatives of member departments had been referred to SAB for information on which to base a decision as to their acceptability but that SAB was no longer able to secure FBI investigations and that therefore, "the following information" would be required on all personnel to be assigned as liaison with IMG.

After some discussion, Colonel Miter agreed to leave SAB out of his letter since, as was explained to him, our arrangements for securing name checks were strictly informal, we had no investigative resources of our own (as his draft of the letter implied) and ~~since~~ the loyalty program when it gets underway would presumably provide the source of the clearances he requires.

The information he planned to request was substantially as follows:

- a. That a loyalty investigation has or has not been made. If made, name of organization or agency which made it.
- b. Salient points revealed by the investigation:
 - 1) Whether or not individual ever participated in any activity or organization whose interests were opposed to those of the U. S. Government.
 - 2) Whether or not individual was ever previously cleared to handle classified material.
- c. A positive statement that the organization avouches that subject individual is reliable from the security standpoint to handle material up to and including secret.

Once all reference to SAB was removed from Miter's proposed letter, I could see no reason for commenting upon the requirements he proposed to establish and therefore did not do so. It is, after all, the responsibility of CAD to make the final determination as to the acceptability of representatives on IMG and they must, therefore, determine their own standards.

Miter plans, if the answer to question a above is negative to ask MDW direct for the necessary investigation. He will, therefore, submit no more requests to SAB unless the reply from the agency indicates that the name of an individual was previously submitted to SAB, in which case he will ask us to make available whatever information we have in our files.

It was agreed that I would return to Colonel Miter, without action, Colonel Chard's memorandum of 19 June asking for information on Vance.

CONFIDENTIAL
Serial No. 182
RCB/mf

CONFIDENTIAL

December 10, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR

State Member, SAB
War Member, SAB
Navy Member, SAB

Subject:

Security Checks

References:

- a. Minutes SAB 11th Meeting
- b. Serial No. 169

1. Since the termination of our arrangement with the FBI, it should be pointed out that the Board is faced with the problem of finding a solution to the problem of securing investigative checks for certain agencies vitally concerned with War and Navy work. It has been suggested that War and Navy Members of the Security Advisory Board might be able to effect some arrangement with their respective departments by which checks might be made until 1 February 1947 on personnel of civilian agencies working with highly classified War and Navy Department material. It is requested that the War and Navy Members of the Board investigate this possibility and any other possible solution to this problem which may be discovered.
2. This is also a problem that concerns the State Department in its distribution of Secret and Top Secret information to nonmilitary agencies not serviced by the FBI, and the State Member may wish to explore the possibility of securing checks on personnel in other agencies which receive Secret and Top Secret material.
3. This matter will be discussed at the next meeting of the Security Advisory Board.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**
Serial No. 182
RCB/mf

December 10, 1946

MEMORANDUM FORState Member, SAB
War Member, SAB
Navy Member, SAB**Subject:**

Security Checks

References:

- a. Minutes SAB 11th Meeting
- b. Serial No. 169

1. Reference is made to the directive from the Security Advisory Board at its 11th meeting that the Secretary, in view of her personal acquaintance with Mr. A. Devitt Vanech of the Department of Justice, informally discuss with him the problem which the Board is facing as a result of the termination of the services of the FBI to the Board.

2. In discussion with the SWNCC Secretariat of this directive, it has been pointed out that the Secretary is not of a sufficiently high level to approach the Chairman of the new inter-agency commission created by the President. It is further felt by the SWNCC Secretariat that the Security Advisory Board problems on personnel security should not be brought up informally but should be presented to the commission either through one of its members or in an official manner by the Board.

3. The Secretary requests your consideration of the objections expressed above. If the Board, upon further consideration of this matter, agrees that it is unwise for the Secretary to consult with Mr. Vanech at this time, it should be pointed out that the Board is faced with the problem of finding a solution to the problem of securing investigative checks for certain agencies vitally concerned with War and Navy work. It has been suggested that War and Navy Members of the Security Advisory Board might be able to effect some arrangement with their respective departments by which checks might be made until 1 February 1947 on personnel of civilian agencies working with highly classified War and Navy Department material. It is requested that the War and Navy Members of the Board investigate this possibility and any other possible solution to this problem which may be discovered.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. This matter will be discussed at the next meeting of the Security Advisory Board.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton

Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ✓~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial No. 178
RCB/mf

December 10, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Nathaniel Goodrich
Security Officer
Office of War Mobilization and
Reconversion

Subject: Security Checks

Reference: SAB No. 3

1. In SAB No. 3 the Security Advisory Board recommends that a check of FBI subversive files on an individual be favorably reported before the person is given Top Secret or Secret information for the first time. Because of difficulties encountered by your agency in obtaining these checks the Security Advisory Board has been conducting checks with the FBI on your behalf. In view of the fact that FBI checks are no longer available to the Security Advisory Board, it is deeply regretted that the services of the Board in this connection must be terminated.

2. A recent request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Security Advisory Board that name checks be made directly for the Security Officers of civilian agencies and departments has been refused. At the same time, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has terminated the arrangement by which the Board was able to obtain name checks for these agencies.

3. This matter is presently under consideration by the Security Advisory Board, particularly as it concerns the revision of SAB No. 3. It is hoped that the findings of the new inter-agency commission, created by the President to determine means by which personnel disloyal to the Government may be removed from office, will be of substantial aid in solving the problem of personnel security. It is urged that you continue to make every effort to conform with other provisions of SAB No. 3 in clearing employees of your agency for highly classified work.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 740132
By AS/Sm NARS, Date JAN 12 1979~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. In view of the urgency which you attached to the 4 names recently submitted to the Security Advisory Board, the Board is conducting checks of sources still available to the Board. The Security Advisory Board is not presently in a position to continue checks of other sources after these 4 checks have been completed.

5. You will be advised if any arrangement is completed by which the Board is able to continue this service for your agency.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial No. 179
RCB/mf

December 10, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Robert S. Walleigh
Acting Administrative Officer
Bureau of Standards

Subject: Security Checks

References: SAB No. 3

1. In SAB No. 3 the Security Advisory Board recommends that a check of FBI subversive files on an individual be favorably reported before the person is given Top Secret or Secret information for the first time. Because of difficulties encountered by your agency in obtaining these checks, the Security Advisory Board has been conducting checks with the FBI on your behalf. In view of the fact that FBI checks are no longer available to the Security Advisory Board, it is deeply regretted that the services of the Board in this connection must be terminated.

2. A recent request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Security Advisory Board that name checks be made directly for the Security Officers of civilian agencies and departments has been refused. At the same time, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has terminated the arrangement by which the Board was able to obtain name checks for these agencies.

3. This matter is presently under consideration by the Security Advisory Board, particularly as it concerns the revision of SAB No. 3. It is hoped that the findings of the new inter-agency commission, created by the President to determine means by which personnel disloyal to the government may be removed from office, will be of substantial aid in solving the problem of personnel security. It is urged that you continue to make every effort to conform with other provisions of SAB No. 3 in clearing employees of your agency for highly classified work.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. In view of the fact that work had already been begun on the checks which you submitted to the Board on November 21, 1946, these checks will be completed. It will not be possible, however, for the Board to complete the check on the proposed employee listed in your letter of December 3, 1946.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial No. 177
RCB/mf

December 10, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. James J. Kelly
Security Officer
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

Subject: Security Checks

Reference: SAB No. 3

1. In SAB No. 3 the Security Advisory Board recommends that a check of FBI subversive files on an individual be favorably reported before the person is given Top Secret or Secret information for the first time. Because of difficulties encountered by your agency in obtaining these checks the Security Advisory Board has been conducting checks with the FBI on your behalf. In view of the fact that FBI checks are no longer available to the Security Advisory Board, it is deeply regretted that the services of the Board in this connection must be terminated.
2. A recent request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Security Advisory Board that name checks be made directly for the Security Officers of civilian agencies and departments has been refused. At the same time, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has terminated the arrangement by which the Board was able to obtain name checks for these agencies.
3. This matter is presently under consideration by the Security Advisory Board, particularly as it concerns the revision of SAB No. 3. It is hoped that the findings of the new inter-agency commission, created by the President to determine means by which personnel disloyal to the government may be removed from office, will be of substantial aid in solving the problem of personnel security. It is urged that you continue to make every effort to conform with other provisions of SAB No. 3 in clearing employees of your agency for highly classified work.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. The name checks which you have already submitted to the Board for processing will be completed in view of the fact that the majority of them had been handled prior to the notification of termination of the arrangement with the FBI.

For the Security Advisory Boards:

Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial No. 180
RCB/mf

December 10, 1946 ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Alvin W. Kremer
Security Officer
Library of Congress

Subject: Security Checks

Reference: SAB No. 3

1. In SAB No. 3 the Security Advisory Board recommends that a check of FBI subversive files on an individual be favorably reported before the person is given Top Secret or Secret information for the first time. Because of difficulties encountered by your agency in obtaining these checks the Security Advisory Board has been conducting checks with the FBI on your behalf. In view of the fact that FBI checks are no longer available to the Security Advisory Board, it is deeply regretted that the services of the Board in this connection must be terminated.
2. A recent request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Security Advisory Board that name checks be made directly for the Security Officers of civilian agencies and departments has been refused. At the same time, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has terminated the arrangement by which the Board was able to obtain name checks for these agencies.
3. This matter is presently under consideration by the Security Advisory Board, particularly as it concerns the revision of SAB No. 3. It is hoped that the findings of the new inter-agency commission, created by the President to determine means by which personnel disloyal to the government may be removed from office, will be of substantial aid in solving the problem of personnel security. It is urged that you continue to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

make every effort to conform with other provisions of
SAB No. 3 in clearing employees of your agency for highly
classified work.

For the Security Advisory Board:

**Ruth C. Barton
Secretary**

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial No. 169

December 3, 1946 ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR State Member, SAB ✓
War Member, SAB
Navy Member, SAB

Subject: Security Checks

Reference: a. Serial No. 144

Enclosure: a. Copy letter from Director, FBI
b. Draft of Letter to Interested Security Officers

1. Enclosed is a copy of the reply to Serial No. 144, forwarded to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, from the Security Advisory Board on November 20, 1946.

2. With the refusal of the FBI to conduct name checks for certain civilian agencies, either directly or via the SAB, some civilian agencies now have no channel for securing personnel investigations. The SAB must accordingly notify those people for whom it has been making such checks that this service will no longer be available to them and SAB 3 should probably be revised if it is to remain of current interest.

3. The attached letter to those Security Officers for whom the SAB has been making security checks is submitted for approval by the SAB. This letter, together with any further action necessary by the SAB in this connection, will be discussed at the next meeting of the Security Advisory Board.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton
Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

~~Confidential~~

Serial No. _____

December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. James J. Kelly, NACA
Mr. Nathaniel Goodrich, OWM & R
Mr. Robert S. Walleigh, National Bureau of Standards
Mr. Alvin W. Kremer, Library of Congress

Subject: Security Checks

Reference: a. SAB 3

1. A recent request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Security Advisory Board that name checks be made directly for the Security Officers of civilian agencies and departments has been refused. At the same time the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has terminated the arrangement by which the Board was able to obtain name checks for these agencies.

2. Since other investigative sources were being checked only when derogatory information was found as a result of FBI name checks, these sources are similarly closed to the Security Advisory Board.

3. It is therefore deeply regretted that the Security Advisory Board can no longer make name checks on behalf of your agency. The problem is presently under consideration by the Board, particularly as concerns the revision of SAB 3. It is hoped that the findings of the new inter-agency commission, recently created by the President to determine means by which persons disloyal to the government may be removed from office, will be of substantial aid ⁱⁿ solving this problem. Meanwhile, it is urged that you make every effort to conform with other provisions of SAB 3 in clearing employees of your agency for highly classified work.

For the Security Advisory Board:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DRAFT~~Confidential~~
Serial No. _____

____ December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. James J. Kelly, NACA
Mr. Nathaniel Goodrich, OWM & R
Mr. Robert S. Walleigh, National Bureau of Standards
Mr. Alvin W. Kremer, Library of Congress

Subject: Security Checks

Reference: a. SAB 3

1. A recent request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Security Advisory Board that name checks be made directly for the Security Officers of civilian agencies and departments has been refused. At the same time the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has terminated the arrangement by which the Board was able to obtain name checks for these agencies.

2. Since other investigative sources were being checked only when derogatory information was found as a result of FBI name checks, these sources are similarly closed to the Security Advisory Board.

3. It is therefore deeply regretted that the Security Advisory Board can no longer make name checks on behalf of your agency. The problem is presently under consideration by the Board, particularly as concerns the revision of SAB 3. It is hoped that the findings of the new inter-agency commission, recently created by the President to determine means by which persons disloyal to the government may be removed from office, will be of substantial aid ⁱⁿ solving this problem. Meanwhile, it is urged that you make every effort to conform with other provisions of SAB 3 in clearing employees of your agency for highly classified work.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

John Edgar Hoover
Director

COPY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 26, 1946

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
Security Advisory Board
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

Reference is made to your inquiry of November 20, 1946, relative to the possibility of this Bureau furnishing directly to various Government agencies name checks on personnel who are to have access to secret or top secret information.

For reasons already set forth in your letter of reference, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has found it necessary to curtail activities of this type. However, as a special concession to the Security Advisory Board an agreement was reached whereby approximately 200 name checks would be made with the proviso that information furnished would be afforded complete security. I regret, therefore, that it is not possible for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assume the added burden which you have now proposed. It is also felt that security considerations make it inadvisable for us to deal directly with agencies concerning the officers of which we would have no knowledge. Then too, this Bureau is not in position to appraise the needs of other agencies for individuals to handle secret or top secret documents.

*S. O. done
been checked
I A B did not
submit directly
irrelevant*

The fourth paragraph of your letter makes reference to the fact that the Security Advisory Board is prohibited from making recommendations to an agency on any employee of that agency. You further pointed out that the actual responsibility for determining the eligibility of an individual to receive classified information will be that of the Security Officer of each agency or department. It appears that this procedure will undoubtedly result in lack of uniformity among various agencies administering this program.

*contrary -
see SAB 3*

In view of these considerations and in accordance with your suggestion that name checks no longer be submitted to you, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is discontinuing this service and terminating this program.

*SAB did
not suggest
this.
7 B I is trying
to put words
in SAB mouth*

Very truly yours,

/s/ J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

COPY

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

November 26, 1946

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
Security Advisory Board
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:


Reference is made to your inquiry of November 20, 1946, relative to the possibility of this Bureau furnishing directly to various Government agencies name checks on personnel who are to have access to secret or top secret information.

For reasons already set forth in your letter of reference, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has found it necessary to curtail activities of this type. However, as a special concession to the Security Advisory Board an agreement was reached whereby approximately 200 name checks would be made with the proviso that information furnished would be afforded complete security. I regret, therefore, that it is not possible for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assume the added burden which you have now proposed. It is also felt that security considerations make it inadvisable for us to deal directly with agencies concerning the officers of which we would have no knowledge. Then too, this Bureau is not in position to appraise the needs of other agencies for individuals to handle secret or top secret documents.

The fourth paragraph of your letter makes reference to the fact that the Security Advisory Board is prohibited from making recommendations to an agency on any employee of that agency. You further pointed out that the actual responsibility for determining the eligibility of an individual to receive classified information will be that of the Security Officer of each agency or department. It appears that this procedure will undoubtedly result in lack of uniformity among various agencies administering this program.

In view of these considerations and in accordance with your suggestion that name checks no longer be submitted to you, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is discontinuing this service and terminating this program.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial No. 144

November 20, 1946

The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

On June 26, 1946, the Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee issued a memorandum to civilian agencies and departments of the federal government which set forth minimum standards for security clearances of personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your information.

Certain federal departments and agencies, in an attempt to follow the advice of the Board, were confronted with a refusal by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct checks of FBI subversive files, enumerated in SAB Memorandum No. 3 as a basic essential for clearance of personnel. It is understood that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's refusal in this instance was occasioned by a lack of funds and personnel to conduct such checks.

The Security Advisory Board, in an attempt to obtain security checks for agencies which did not have previous liaison arrangements with the FBI for this service, made an arrangement with the FBI by which a limited number of such checks would be made on behalf of these agencies through the medium of the Security Advisory Board.

The Security Advisory Board feels that it would be a more satisfactory arrangement if the FBI could service these agencies directly on name checks for personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. Because of the fact that the Security Advisory Board is an advisory board only and because it is not created by an executive order or similar authority, it is not possible to enforce any recommendation which it might make to a civilian agency. Furthermore, a recent interpretation of the terms of reference of the Security Advisory Board prohibits it from making recommendations to an agency on any employee of that agency. The service of the Board in this connection is therefore limited to channeling the results of name checks from investigative sources to the civilian agency or department requesting such checks. The determination of the eligibility of an individual

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 740132
es/kml JAN 12 1949
NARS, Date

- 2 -

to receive classified information is still the responsibility of the Security Officer of the agency or department, which determination he makes on the basis of paraphrased information shown to him by the Board.

In view of the difficulties inherent in the present arrangement, the Security Advisory Board respectfully recommends that the FBI perform the service which it is presently rendering for the Board directly for agencies and departments which will be handling Top Secret and Secret information, reserving the right to refuse requests from agencies not working with classified information and to request from the Security Officer in each instance a certification that the persons whose names are submitted will have access to Top Secret or Secret information. In any instance when the Federal Bureau of Investigation considers the requests from any agency unreasonable, the Security Advisory Board will be glad to survey the situation to determine if the requests are justified.

It will be appreciated by the Security Advisory Board if a decision on this matter can be given as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

E. T. Anderson
State Member, SAB

Charles C. Blakeney
Colonel, GSC
War Member, SAB

L. W. Gunther
Comdr. USN
Navy Member, SAB

Enclosure
Copy No. 91 of SAB 3

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial No. 144

SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 19, 1946

Noted

The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Changed by
Col. Jorney 11-19-46
Bois

Dear Mr. Hoover:

The Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee issued on June 26, 1946, a memorandum to civilian agencies and departments of the federal government which set forth certain minimum standards for security clearances of personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your information.

Certain federal departments and agencies, in an attempt to follow the advice of the Board, were confronted with a refusal by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct checks of FBI subversive files, enumerated as a basic essential for clearance of personnel in SAB Memorandum No. 3. It is understood that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's refusal in this instance was occasioned by a lack of funds and personnel to conduct such checks.

The Security Advisory Board, in an attempt to obtain security checks for agencies which did not have previous liaison arrangements with the FBI for this service, made an arrangement with the FBI by which a limited number of such checks would be made on behalf of these agencies through the medium of the Security Advisory Board.

The Security Advisory Board feels that it would be a more satisfactory arrangement if the FBI could service these agencies directly on name checks for personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. Because of the fact that the Security Advisory Board is an advisory board only and because it is not created by an executive order or similar authority, it is not possible to enforce any recommendation which it might make to a civilian agency. ~~The only recourse which the Board has is to close the main sources (State, War, Navy) of classified information to an agency. This cannot be considered wholly effective since no single distribution point is employed in any of these departments and since classified information might conceivably come from other sources.~~ Furthermore, a recent interpretation of the terms of reference of the Security Advisory Board prohibits it from making recommendations to an agency on any employee of that agency. ~~Consequently,~~ the determination of the eligibility of an individual to receive


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 740132By CO/emb NARS, Date JAN 12 1978

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial No. 140STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

November 14, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR State Member, SAB 
War Member, SAB
Navy Member, SAB

Subject: Security Checks

References: a. Serial No. 128
b. Minutes 9th SAB Meeting

Enclosure: Proposed Draft of Letter to Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

1. In order that the Security Advisory Board may be able to devote more time to documentary and related security matters, it would seem advisable to make an effort to secure agreement from the FBI to conduct checks of FBI subversive files directly for civilian agencies and departments. The administrative work involved in handling security checks for these agencies has for the past week been taking the majority of the Secretary's time. While admittedly the use of the Board as a channel for making these checks can be justified as a temporary measure, it seems to me that it can be justified only if an effort has been made to secure these checks directly for agencies and departments.
2. Enclosed is a draft of a letter to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, recommending that the FBI make these checks directly for the agency concerned and suggesting certain precautionary steps which the FBI might take before making checks for any new agency.
3. It is requested that the Board members consider the enclosure in the light of the statement made in para. 1 above.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton
Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 740132
By ed/kmb NARS, Date JAN 12 1978

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Serial No. _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November __, 1946

The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

The Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee issued on June 26, 1946, a memorandum to civilian agencies and departments of the federal government which set forth certain minimum standards for security clearances of personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your information.

Certain federal departments and agencies, in an attempt to follow the advice of the Board, were confronted with a refusal by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct checks of FBI subversive files, enumerated as a basic essential for clearances of personnel in SAB Memorandum No. 3. It is understood that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's refusal in this instance was occasioned by a lack of funds and personnel to conduct such checks.

The Security Advisory Board, in an attempt to obtain security checks for agencies which did not have previous liaison arrangements with the FBI for this service, made an arrangement with the FBI by which a limited number of such checks would be made on behalf of these agencies through the medium of the Security Advisory Board.

The Security Advisory Board feels that it would be a more satisfactory arrangement if the FBI could service these agencies directly on name checks for personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. Because of the fact that the Security Advisory Board is an advisory board only and because it is not created by an executive order or similar authority, it is not possible to enforce any recommendation which it might make to a civilian agency. The only recourse which the Board has is to close the main sources (State, War, Navy) of classified information to an agency. This cannot be considered wholly effective since no single distribution point is employed in any of these

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

departments and since classified information might conceivably come from other sources. Furthermore, a recent interpretation of the terms of reference of the Security Advisory Board prohibits it from making recommendations to an agency on any employee of that agency. Consequently, the determination of the eligibility of an individual to receive classified information is still the responsibility of the Security Officer of the agency or department, which determination he makes on the basis of paraphrased information shown to him by the Board.

As a result of the difficulties inherent in the present arrangement, the Security Advisory Board respectfully recommends that the FBI performs the service, which it is presently rendering for the Board, directly to agencies and departments who will be handling Top Secret and Secret information, reserving the right to refuse requests from agencies not working with classified information and to request from the Security Officer in each instance a certification that the people whose names are submitted will have access to Top Secret or Secret information. In any instance when the Liaison Section considers the requests from any agency unreasonable, the Security Advisory Board will be glad to survey the situation to determine if the requests are justified.

It will be appreciated by
The Security Advisory Board ~~requests that~~ ^{if} a decision in this matter ^{can} be given as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

ET Anderson
State Member, SAB

CC Blakeney
Colonel, GSC

IW Gunther
Comdr., USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

TO		DATE 7 Nov 1946
OFFICE	1. Security Advisory Board	BUILDING New WD Bldg
ATTENTION	Mrs. Ruth C. Barton, Sec'y	ROOM 2027
2.		4.
3.		5.
REMARKS		
The attached file is being forwarded for your information per Colonel Blakeney's request.		
FROM:	<i>W. T. Sandalls</i>	Security Gp, ID
NAME	Major W. T. Sandalls	OFFICE Info Control Br
PHONE	71994	BUILDING The Pentagon
		ROOM 2E 841A

Rm 2027 WD BCDG

MID 350.0511

Exec Dir, ID

Release of Classified Information by Civil Affairs
Division to Governmental Agencies
Ch, Security Grp 10/28/46 1
Maj Sandalls/lep/71994

1. The Civil Affairs Division, WDSS, has been delegated the responsibility for disseminating classified Civil Affairs and Military Government information to Federal agencies, and has also been authorized to make direct request upon other War Department agencies in connection with obtaining release to the Information Management Group of materials containing a definite CA/MG relationship which are of primary interest to another War Department agency.

2. There are indications that the Information Management Group is making classified information available to governmental agencies not having a primary interest therein, and that all such information is not related to CA/MG matters. Further, certain material of a purely intelligence nature has been listed on CAD accession lists as available to the representatives of governmental agencies outside the War Department. For these reasons, it is considered necessary to establish a definite security policy for the guidance of the Civil Affairs Division in the dissemination of classified matter. The attached Memorandum to the Chief of Staff lists certain security requirements which are believed essential in the preparation of accession lists and in the release of classified information by CAD.

3. It is recommended that the attached Summary Sheet be signed and dispatched.

1 Incl
S/S for sig w/incl

/s/ Charles C. Blakeney
CHARLES C. BLAKENEY
Colonel, GSC
Acting Chief, Security Group

C O P Y

WAR DEPARTMENT
SUMMARY SHEET

FOLD OVER PAPERS AND CLIP

TO	x	CAD	G-4	OPD	FOR	2	APPROVAL	F	OFFICE OF PREPARATION			
		G-1								R	WDGID/Security Group	
		G-2									O	GRADE-SURNAME-PHONE
		G-3										M Maj W.T. Sandalls - 71994
	2	CHIEF OF STAFF										

FILE NO.	SUBJECT	DATE
MID 350.0511	Release of Classified Information by Civil Affairs Division to Governmental Agencies	

SUMMARY

1. The responsibility for disseminating classified Civil Affairs and Military Government Information to Federal agencies has been delegated to the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff. The Civil Affairs Division has also been authorized to make direct request upon other War Department agencies in connection with obtaining release to the Information Management Group of materials containing a definite CA/MG relationship which are of primary interest to another War Department agency. This authority is subject to such restrictions as may be imposed by the Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff.

2. It is believed that under the present operating procedure within the Civil Affairs Division, the Information Management Group is making classified information available to governmental agencies not having a primary interest therein, and that all such information is not related to CA/MG matters. Further, it is desired that the Intelligence Division remain the sole agency to determine the release of classified material dealing with intelligence matters. For these reasons, it is considered necessary to establish a definite security policy for the guidance of the Civil Affairs Division, WDSS, in the dissemination of such classified matter.

RECOMMENDATION

That future accession lists furnished by the Civil Affairs Division Information Management Group to governmental agencies such as the Navy Department, Department of Commerce, APC, Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board, SWNCC, Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, FEC, Department of Labor, USCS, Library of Congress, Agriculture (OFAR), and Department of State, be made to conform with the proposed recommendations in the attached memorandum to the Chief of Staff. It is further recommended the security measures proposed in paragraph 7, attached memorandum, be adopted as a guide to govern the release of classified material by Civil Affairs Division.

COORDINATION

Concur - CAD

C O P Y

WDGID/Security Group
Major Sandalls/73934/dm

WID 350.0511

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Release of Classified Information by Civil Affairs Division
to Governmental Agencies

DISCUSSION

1. The Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, has been delegated the responsibility for disseminating classified Civil Affairs and Military Government information to Federal agencies, and has also been authorized to make direct request upon other War Department agencies in connection with obtaining release to the Information Management Group of materials containing a definite CA/MG relationship which are of primary interest to other War Department agencies. This authority is subject to such restrictions as may be imposed by the Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff.

2. In order to discharge its responsibilities, the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, relies upon such Federal agencies as the Department of State, Treasury Department, Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, the Alien Property Custodian, United States Commercial Company, and the Federal Reserve Board. To effect formulation of certain CA/MG policies, the CAD maintains liaison with these agencies and has developed a mutual exchange of information. Release of CA/MG related information has been implemented through the Information Management Group (IMG). Such information has been in the form of classified and unclassified reports, cables and correspondence.

3. At the present time, IMG is publishing at frequent intervals an accession list containing reports and other documents related either totally or in part to CA/MG interests, available for scrutiny by interested government agencies. Classifications of the items listed range from UNCLASSIFIED up to and including SECRET. As an example, some of the documents which appeared on the 20 - 27 September 1946 accession list included the following:

<u>Author</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Classification</u>
I. Germany, Austria and Italy		
HQ USFET	Theater Commanders Weekly Staff Conference No. 39, dtd 17 September 46	SECRET

MID 350.0511

SUBJECT: Release of Classified Information by Civil Affairs Division
to Governmental Agencies

<u>Author</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Classification</u>
HQ USFET	Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 60, dtd 5 September 1946	SECRET
	* * *	
HQ British Troops Berlin	Intelligence Summary No. 42, dtd 30 August 1946 (1 copy)	SECRET
	* * *	
II. Japan and Korea		
	* * *	
HQ USAFIK	G-2 Periodic Reports Nos. 323 - 327, dtd 7 - 12 September 1946 (1 copy)	CONFIDENTIAL
	* * *	
Intel Div WDGS	Intelligence Review No. 32, dtd 19 September 1946 (1 copy)	SECRET

4. The aforementioned accession list received the following distribution outside the War Department: Navy Department, Department of Commerce, APC, Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board, SWGCC, Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, FEC, Department of Labor, USCS, Library of Congress, Agriculture (OPAR), and Department of State.

5. Under the present arrangement, it appears that ING is making classified information available to governmental agencies not having a primary interest therein, and that all such information is not related to CA/NG matters. In particular, it is desired that it remain an Intelligence Division function to release material of an intelligence nature to interested governmental agencies. For these reasons, it is considered necessary to establish a definite security policy for the guidance of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, in the dissemination of such classified matter.

ACTION RECOMMENDED

6. It is recommended that future accession lists conform with the following:

MID 350.0511

SUBJECT: Release of Classified Information by Civil Affairs Division
to Governmental Agencies

a. Reference will be made to classified documents or portions of classified documents only when the material contained therein pertains to CA/MG matters.

b. No material will be listed which bears a classification higher than SECRET.

c. No documents of an intelligence nature will be listed. This includes all intelligence summaries, reports, reviews, and cables.

d. Theater Commanders' Weekly Staff Conference reports and similar reports of staff meetings will not be listed.

e. Security Group, Intelligence Division, WDCS, will be included on the distribution list of all accession lists.

f. It is further recommended that the following security measures be observed by CAD:

a. All persons who are to receive classified information through IMG will first be properly certified by the governmental agencies they represent to the Secretary of the Security Advisory Board, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, who will grant clearance in accordance with Security Advisory Board requirements.

b. No documents of an intelligence nature will be made available through IMG. This includes intelligence summaries, reports, reviews and cables.

c. Classified material of CA/MG relationship will be made available only to those governmental agencies having a primary, official interest therein.

d. No classified information will be released which pertains to other than CA/MG matters.

e. In instances where only a portion of a classified document contains a matter of CA/MG relationship, such information will be made available to interested government agencies in extract form. Conversely, a classified document dealing principally with CA/MG matters will have all non-pertinent portions excised.

f. General access to the IMG files and library will not be granted to any representative of an agency outside the War Department. All

MID 350.0511

SUBJECT: Release of Classified Information by Civil Affairs Division
to Governmental Agencies

requests by such representatives must be for specific items, the release
of which will be governed by the foregoing security measures.

CONCURRENCES

CAD ()

Confidential
Serial No. 128
RCB:reb

CONFIDENTIAL

TO BE DECLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED

7 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR

State Member, SAB
War Member, SAB
Navy Member, SAB

Subject:

Personnel Security

Reference:

A. Minutes SAB 8th Meeting

Enclosure:

Draft on Subject

1. Pursuant to directive at the 8th Meeting of the Security Advisory Board, there is enclosed herewith a proposed draft of a paper to be submitted to SWNGC.

2. In view of the urgency of this paper, it will be considered at a meeting of the Board at 1000, 8 November 1946, Room 2029, New War Department Building.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIALENCLOSUREPERSONNEL SECURITY IN CERTAIN FEDERAL AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTSReport by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Security ControlTHE PROBLEM

1. To determine whether the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Security Control (Security Advisory Board) may properly act as a medium for the handling of personnel security checks between investigative agencies and non-military federal departments and agencies, when such agencies and departments are unable to secure such checks through their own channels.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. It is essential in the interest of our national security that civilian agencies and departments have some form of security clearances on personnel who must have access to highly classified information;

b. Since limited budgetary appropriations for investigative agencies has resulted in their inability to handle requests for security checks from all federal departments, it is necessary that one central office be established to transmit the results of security checks (not necessarily the information which might be received) to the Security Officers of the agency or department concerned;

c. The Security Advisory Board is the logical group to act as such a transmitting channel because of its liaison with Security Officers of civilian agencies and departments on security matters.

CONFIDENTIALEnclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that, upon approval by SHCC of the Conclusions in para. 4 above, the additional function stated in Appendix "C" be added to the Revised Terms of Reference of the Security Advisory Board as approved by SHCC, 4 November 1946.

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIALAPPENDIX "A"FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. During the existence of the Security Advisory Board under the Office of War Information, the military departments often found it necessary to make available to civilian agencies and departments certain highly classified information. Since the Security Advisory Board was the liaison agency between the War and Navy Departments and civilian agencies, the two military departments (including certain Joint Chiefs of Staff committees) often requested that the Security Advisory Board obtain security clearances on civilians in non-military agencies to have access to classified military information. While under the Office of War Information, it was the policy of the Security Advisory Board to request such clearances from the Security Officer of the agency or department concerned, forwarding them, upon receipt, to the requesting office. There was no attempt made in any instance to decide on the merits of any individual from a security standpoint.
2. With the establishment of the Security Advisory Board as a Subcommittee of SSWCC, the services of the Board in obtaining security clearances on civilian officials were again requested by military offices. On 26 April 1946 the Security Officer of the Department of State requested that the Security Advisory Board establish a uniform standard for clearance of personnel having access to classified information. (See Annex A)
3. Following the approval on 14 June 1946 by the Board of a minimum investigative standard for civilians in non-military agencies to have access to secret and top secret information, liaison officers to the Board from thirteen government agencies and departments, handling a substantial amount of classified information, attended a meeting with the Board on 24 June 1946, at which the proposed minimum standard was discussed. There was substantial agreement on the provisions of the memorandum and SAB 3 was issued to federal departments and agencies on 26 June 1946. (See Annex B) Because of a shortage of personnel in many government agencies and departments, it later proved to be difficult for Security Officers to arrange

CONFIDENTIAL

for the details necessary in requesting criminal checks from FBI files, and the Board at a meeting on 3 October 1946 approved the elimination of this requirement from the minimum standards originally approved in SAB 3.

4. In an attempt to comply with the provisions of SAB 3, the Security Officers of several government agencies eventually approached the Federal Bureau of Investigation with requests for name checks. The FBI refused requests from any agency or department with which they did not already have liaison arrangements, in view of the fact that their personnel and funds had been substantially reduced. Exploration of the possibility of using MED and ONI services for civilian agencies proved equally futile, since these staffs had likewise been reduced and it had even become necessary for War and Navy to refuse to make security checks on personnel who were engaged in research projects of vital interest to both departments.

5. In an attempt to provide security checks for agencies which were concerned with highly classified work, the FBI agreed temporarily to make a limited number of security checks for the Security Advisory Board on behalf of these agencies and departments, and liaison arrangements were then made with the other investigative sources to provide additional checks on any name on which derogatory information was discovered, thus protecting the inviolability of all sources of information. The necessity for insuring the secrecy of any information received made it necessary that the Security Advisory Board agree that whatever information might be received at any time should remain in the possession of the Board.

6. To date, the Security Advisory Board has taken no action with respect to transfer of the results of these security checks to the interested Security Officer, but lengthy discussions have been held regarding the entire question of personnel security. It was originally proposed by the Security Advisory Board that any derogatory information received on any individual would not be discussed with the Security Officer until it became absolutely necessary, but that the Board would make recommendations to the Security Officer on the eligibility of

CONFIDENTIAL

the individual. It was later thought that the authority of the Board in this instance should be confined to securing the name checks for the agencies concerned and in the event of derogatory information received on any individual, a paraphrase of all available information should be made available for inspection by the Security Officer in the presence of the Secretary of the Board or the Board members. In this instance, it would be the responsibility of the Security Officer to make any determinations as to the security clearance of personnel in his agency.

7. At a meeting of the Board on 5 November 1946, it was determined that:

a. The Board did not have sufficient authority under its present terms of reference to make recommendations on the security eligibility of any individual, and that it is not sufficiently clear in its present terms of reference that the Board has the authority to act as a channel to secure a limited number of security checks for these agencies.

b. The necessary authority for the Board to act as a channel for this purpose should be written into the charter of the Board or other arrangements should be made for servicing government agencies in this connection.

CONFIDENTIALANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "A"

FC - Mr. Anderson

April 26, 1946

COB- Mr. Barnerman

Security Advisory Board

I have recently received a request for security clearance for certain individuals in the State Department to receive material up to and including Secret as distributed by the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. In the immediate future there will probably be requests for Top Secret clearance of such individuals.

I would appreciate being advised of what standards of investigation the Security Advisory Board requires, in order to determine whether or not an individual qualifies to handle Secret or Top Secret material. It is readily understood that there can be a wide interpretation of investigative findings in determining secret and Top Secret Control Officers, and I feel that this should be carefully outlined in a uniform procedure to apply to all Departments so that a Top Secret Officer of the State Department would have an equal standing with a Top Secret Officer of another Department. The standards should require a certain coverage of investigation and at the same time should specifically state that a person is entirely clear of all derogatory information and a general standard should be set as to what constitutes derogatory information.

I would appreciate any information on this subject.

COB:RIBarnerman:gl

CONFIDENTIALE N C L O S U R EMINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL
HAVING ACCESS TO TOP SECRET AND SECRET INFORMATIONMemorandum by the Security Advisory Board

1. The necessity for protection of highly classified material is considered of vital importance to the national security of the United States. The end of the war has necessarily decreased the amount of Top Secret and Secret information initiated and received by all agencies and departments of the federal government, but it has not lessened the necessity for giving to such information the protection its classification requires.

2. As a preliminary step in the protection of classified information, it is considered mandatory that personnel having access to such information be selected with care. Standards for clearances of such personnel have differed markedly among the departments and agencies, and in some instances have never been clearly defined. In order to further uniformity in this respect, the Security Advisory Board recommends that the following requirements be adopted as the minimum standard for personnel of non-military federal departments and agencies to have access to Top Secret and Secret information:

a. A check of F. B. I. subversive files of the individual.

This check should be favorably reported before the person is given Top Secret and Secret information for the first time. In the case of persons already working with and handling Top Secret and Secret information, this report should be secured as soon as practicable.

b. An investigative report on interviews with or questionnaires submitted to a sufficient number of previous employers or acquaintances of the subject as to provide an adequate knowledge of the subject's personal history, habits and affiliations. If, in the opinion of the Security Officer, the employment record of the subject with the agency constitutes an

CONFIDENTIAL

adequate knowledge of the subject's personal history, habits, and affiliations, a certification to this effect will be acceptable. In every such instance, however, the certification should state that this knowledge was the result of other than an investigative report.

This report can be obtained after the employment of the individual so as to avoid delay in initiation of work but should, whenever practicable, be secured before he is given access to Top Secret and Secret information.

c. A check of the service records or allied papers of ex-service personnel of World War II.

3. In addition to the above requirements for personnel having access to Top Secret and Secret information, the individual to whom such material is consigned shall be a citizen of the United States. This provision may be waived only with the consent of the agency or department transmitting such information.

4. Final determination of the suitability from a security standpoint of an individual to receive Top Secret and Secret information shall be the responsibility of the Security Officer of the department or agency, or other responsible official heretofore given that responsibility by the agency or department. Such determination should be based on an evaluation of the information secured from para. 2a, 2b, and 2c above.

5. It should be noted that the recommended requirements provide only a minimum standard. It would be advisable for each agency and department to adopt whatever additional requirements needed to:

a. Make more specific the general standard outlined in para. 2 above, in accordance with the requirements of the agency; and

b. Provide for such additional security clearances as are desired for the needs of the particular function or routines of the agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. It is requested that any implementation of this memorandum within the departments or agencies be forwarded to the Security Advisory Board, Room 2027, New War Department Building, for its information.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The question of personnel security has been one on which wide differences of opinion have been held by government agencies and departments since before World War II. The actual standards which should be met by individuals having access to classified information has created most of the controversy, since it has been generally agreed that any individual having access to classified information should receive some form of screening.
2. There was little uniformity among government departments and agencies during wartime on the standards required for personnel having access to classified information. It was the feeling of the Security Advisory Board while under Office of War Information that these standards should be determined by the agency or department, and as a consequence, the security clearances received from the agencies varied all the way from a personal opinion to an extensive four-way check.
3. The urgency at this time for establishing some minimum standard for security clearances and enabling agencies and departments to adhere to that standard will seem incongruous in view of the fact that such varied and heterogeneous clearances were accepted during wartime. It should be pointed out, however, that the end of the war brings a certain relaxation of security measures in all government agencies and departments. Any potential espionage agent would have much more opportunity to operate successfully in a government department now than during the war when the operations of almost every government office were attuned to security-consciousness. The awareness of a need for personnel security is praiseworthy regardless of when it is created.
4. Only about sixteen of the government agencies and departments who have liaison officers with the Security Advisory Board have sizable security problems. Of these sixteen, even a more limited number have an urgent need for security clearances of personnel. Some agencies, such as the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics or the National Bureau of Standards, are engaged in highly classified research projects and it is urgent that their personnel receive

CONFIDENTIAL

security clearances. If investigation of personnel in any government agency is worthwhile, it is worthwhile in all government agencies which are engaged in classified work.

5. A special House Judiciary Committee, assigned to investigate the case of the six persons accused in 1945 of having participated in the removal of hundreds of secret documents from State Department military and naval files, reported on October 23, 1946, that there had been a surprising carelessness in the guarding of secret Government documents during the war. It was the recommendation of this Committee that much greater caution should be exercised by Government agencies in the future, not only as to care of documents but also as to personnel having access to them.

6. It would, of course, be preferable if investigative agencies were able to make these checks directly for government agencies. Since this arrangement cannot be made, however, it is essential that one central group act as a transmitting channel for such checks. In view of the fact that the Security Advisory Board is the one such group which has close liaison with all other government agencies and departments on security matters, the Board would seem the logical channel for such checks. The Board would be able to review requests for security ~~checks~~ checks which are received and determine the urgency for having such requests submitted to investigative sources, since it is important that the Board stay within a "limited number" of such requests.

APPENDIX "C"CONFIDENTIALPROPOSED ADDITION TO THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

(To be added to the Revised Terms of Reference of the Security Advisory Board as set forth in Memorandum for Information No. 63 approved by SWNSC 4 November 1946)

g. Acting as the channel through which certain federal agencies and departments may, when necessary, obtain security checks from investigative sources on personnel having access to highly classified information.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial No. 78

October 8, 1946

Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. J. F. Doherty

Gentlemen:

The Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee at an informal meeting October 7, 1946 agreed that the following procedure should be adopted by the Board in the event derogatory information were found by the FBI on any individual being checked at the request of the Security Advisory Board:

1. Derogatory information furnished the Board by the FBI will be held in the files of the Security Advisory Board.

2. On the basis of this information, and available information from other sources, the Security Advisory Board will make recommendations to the Security Officer of the interested agency or department regarding the eligibility of the individual concerned to receive classified information.

3. In the event it becomes absolutely necessary that the Security Officer of the agency or department see the information, the following precautions will be taken:

- a. The Security Officer will be checked if such a check has not already been made.
- b. The Security Officer will be shown the information in the presence of one or all of the Board members or in the presence of the Secretary of the Board.
- c. The Security Officer will be warned regarding disclosure of such information to any other person.

Sincerely yours,

cc: Mr. Einar T. Anderson
Col. C. C. Blakensy
Comdr. Kelse Daly

Ruth Catlett Barton
Secretary, Security Advisory Board
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 740132
By es/kmb NARS, Date JAN 12 1979

13
76
(C)

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Security Clearance Procedures
12-A

Date 10/8/46

From Barton

To FBI Attn: Doherty

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
- Otherwise Restricted Information

FBI
Authority

1/24/76
Date
PCH

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation _____

 Date _____
 From _____
 To _____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
- Otherwise Restricted Information

Authority

Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Serial No. 75

October 2, 1946

Mr. Alvin W. Kremer
Security Officer
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Kremer:

Reference is made to your letter of October 1, 1946, in which you stated that the Library of Congress had been unable to secure the services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with regard to making name checks on personnel working with Secret and Top Secret information.

Following a previous notification of the FBI refusal of its services to a government agency, the question was discussed at length with FBI representatives. The FBI is continuing to make name checks on personnel for agencies and departments formerly serviced by it, but because of lack of funds, it has not been possible to handle new requests. The FBI has agreed to make a limited number of checks for the Security Advisory Board and requests from agencies not formerly serviced by the FBI will be handled through this office so far as possible. We will be glad to handle the checks on your personnel, if you will forward the list to us.

May I urge that in view of limited service which the Security Advisory Board can expect and the large number of agencies to be serviced, every effort be made to confine the list to those people who are actually working with Secret and Top Secret papers or who will be working with such papers in the near future.

To facilitate making name checks, please furnish the following information on each person:

- a. Full name
- b. Date and place of birth
- c. Color
- d. Present address.
- e. Home town
- f. Marital status
- g. Last two places where subject worked (where possible)

Thank you for your interest in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Ruth Catlett Barton
Secretary



THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF ASSISTANT LIBRARIAN

October 1, 1946

Dear Captain Catlett:

This is to inform you that we have not been able to have F.B.I. files checked in our efforts to abide by standards outlined in SAB No. 3, in obtaining security clearance of personnel. Except for that procedure our Personnel Office is doing its best to take the other measures, as outlined. I assume that you have had similar reports from other government units which have been unable to enlist the services of either the Civil Service Commission or the F.B.I. because of pressure of other work upon them.

Should you have any suggestions to offer us, I shall be glad to hear from you.

Very truly yours,

Alvin W. Kremer
Alvin W. Kremer
Keeper of the Collections

Captain M. Ruth Catlett
Secretary
Security Advisory Board
State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee
Room 2027
New War Department Building
Washington, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26 September 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject : ~~SAD~~ Clearances

Mr. Finney of CAD (War 73250) called this date and asked when the clearances they had requested would be over. I explained the situation as it had been existing and promised to get to him as soon as possible the ones which were available. He said that War Department Memorandum No. 380-5-2 had placed all responsibility for the dispensation of classified information in the hands of the Intelligence Division and that he believed that CAD's Information Management Group would be affected. He said, however, that he was making a staff study of the entire picture and hoped it would remain as it was. He mentioned that Col. Ray VanDiver, Executive for Control in Intelligence Division, was a little bit confused about our SAB 4, thinking that this listed all the people in federal government who could receive classified information. I called Col. VanDiver who was pleased and understood what the list was after explanation.

RCB

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
Washington 25, D.C.

UNCLASSIFIED
Serial No. 11
MUC/mbh

6 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR State Member, SAB
War Member, SAB
Navy Member, SAB

Subjects: Standards for Security Clearance of Personnel of
Non-Military Agencies and Departments

References: a. Serial No. 17, dated 29 April 1946
b. Minutes 1st SAB Meeting

1. At the first meeting of the Security Advisory Board, 6 May 1946, it was decided that an interim standard for the clearance of civilians in non-military federal departments and agencies to receive classified material should be established pending a later determination by the Board of the policy in this matter. At that time the Board agreed to accept as an interim standard the certification of the Security Officer as sufficient clearance for an individual in his department or agency to receive "Secret" or "Top Secret" information. It was then believed that the Board would be able to establish these standards within the next few weeks.

2. In view of the fact that there has not to date been any information submitted to the Secretary on which a policy regarding this matter could be prepared and in further view of the continued necessity for establishing such standards, it is respectfully requested that the members of the Security Advisory Board submit to the Secretary their opinions of what should constitute sufficient security clearance for civilian officials to receive "Secret" and "Top Secret" information. This information may be submitted to the Secretary by memorandum or if desired, may be brought to the next meeting of the Security Advisory Board and discussed orally at that time.

3. Determination of such standards will enable the Secretary to prepare a standard policy for security clearances which can be circulated to the Security Officers of non-military departments and agencies and become the criteria for security clearances in the future. It will also enable the Secretary to begin the revision of the list of those individuals in government departments and agencies who are entitled to receive "Top Secret" information.

For the Security Advisory Board:

M. RUTH CATLETT
Capt., WAC
Secretary