

(4)

Formosans.

Now that the Ministry has decided to adopt
As your instructions, after the policy for
the collapse campaign of National
I feel that we should, the above four pages
Government agreed in Ministry. When we
publish the four pages Chinese paper as our
organ grandly, ~~Hongkong~~, In view of the
acts the frequent traffic of ^{the important offices} authorities, though a
HONGKONG, the contents of your paper will gradually
slow way, the organs will be carried into
flem into CANTON, and although slowly, we shall
Kangtung and it is supposed that we shall
be able to attain our object.

(According to the wireless from America-Maru,
Telegraph
Wales Sec.)

③ 1938

5301 (Code)

Sent. afternoon. 24th Feb. from Hongkong
Arrived. night. 24th Feb. To Foreign Ministry
To Foreign Minister Hirota
From ~~Council~~^{Counsel} General Nakamura

(2) of # 234 (with account)

Especially, the war situation (news) of the
today the war news of the Central News Agency
Central Communication in the Chinese Press
published in the Chinese press have today lost
recently ^{have} lost its public confidence entirely
faith of even the Chinese people and the quantity
even among Chinese peoples and also
has also greatly diminished, moreover
diminished quantity, and the guidance of

The Central Propaganda Section ^{is often not in order} is going out
and has not been determined.

of order remarkably and so it is seemed

I feel it necessary to inform the Chinese people
to be disadvantage that towards Chinese

at this time
of our activities in MANCHOUKHO and NORTH CHINA
people, let them know our activities that is
as compared to the maladministration of the
going on in Manchuria and in North China
National Government, and patiently continue with
compare to the maladministration of National

Government and ^{to} continue the promotional
policy of supporting the National Government,
policy for the collapse with perseverance
especially as the war has tended to prolong and
is to be considered the most important
the military operation in SOUTH CHINA consists of a
in view of the situation, long term
stand still at present.

opposition and on the occasion of military

operation in Southern China is in at a stand

still.

In view of the above situation
On this point, we ^{would} like to have your
instructions ^{on the publication of a Chinese newspaper} about the publishing policy

of the Chinese Press.

For your information:

In the past, the National Government have

been used ^{offering} to offer \$2000 bribe per month

to the official censorship ^{to be better in making} of anti-Japan
^{remarks} ~~propaganda~~, but the censorship officials
since the fall of NANKING the official censor have
come to us asking for ^{the same amount} ~~the same~~ bribe from us on condition

that they will control
~~of~~ managing the anti-Japan articles for

the bribes were stopped since Nanking
fell.

(According to ^{TAINAN} wireless from Wengking-Mann
Telegraph Sec.)

1939 13093 ^{code} cipher from Amoy ^{after May 1} ^{received}
Received at Ministry ^{after May 1} received

To ARITA, Foreign Minister

From UCHIDA, Consul

No. 98 (Top Secret)

Concerning the third article of your wire

No. 8/2 (Re the important points on the temporary

administration of ^{the} Hainan Island),

it is considered the most effective ^{in dealing} as for the

management of the ^{with the Overseas Chinese} "Kakyo" (the Chinese residing out

of China) to absorb their capital and to ^{have} establish

a close economic relationship with Japan.

However

there are not so many worthwhile enterprises in Amoy ^{that would} attract ^{them} the "Kakyo". According to

the changes of the current situations, the consequent investment of the "Kakyo" would probably be seen

in the Continent of Fukien.

However they have hesitated to invest

^{because of} due to the insecurity of political situations

as well as anti-foreign ideals on the part of the

local people in spite of the fact that

there are quite a few who have recognized

the value of investments with their own

Fukien Lineage because those Fukien
will be flowing in together with the investments, and as
people are as gentle ^{people} that it would be more
easier for us to ~~manage~~ ^{convenient} them for the our
administrative purposes in ^{the} future.

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Document # 1841

HISAKO FUJIWARA
April 24, 1939

Re. Important Points on the Temporary Administration
of Hainan Island.

Pr. No.	198
S. No.	15039
Sack No.	7
Item No.	8B-11

(Hoi-hao)
(Hainan)

To: Secretary MASATANI

(Haitow)
MASATANI Secretary
(No. 8. (Top secret.))

from ARITA, Foreign Minister

A plan on the administration of
Hainan Island had been discussed
between the Army, Navy and Foreign
Ministries. However, we obtained
the plan for "Important points on the
administration and management of Hainan

- 2 -

Island ^{which will be sent to you} as seen by separate wire,

and on the 21st of April, the plan was ^{carried} authorized
by the three ministers. Please ^{get the details by} acknowledge receipt
^{separate wire} of the details sent by separate wire.

The three ministries will ^{also} arrange to notify
unofficially the ^{Bureau of Affairs (KOA IN)} China Affairs Board of its
relationships with the ~~case~~ matter.

At the same time, we have wired separately
to Canton, Hongkong, Shanghai, Amoy,
Nanking and Peking.

April 24, 1939

Re Important Points on the Temporary Administration
of Hainan Island

To Secretary MASATANI in Hoi-ho

Haikow

To MASATANI, Secretary
(No. 9 Top Secret)

from ARITA, Foreign Minister

(1) Policy

In view of ^{the purpose of an occupation of the HAINAN Island} occupancy, the temporary management
of ^{the} political affairs in ^{these} Hainan Island is ^{to} be

focused on the execution of military operations

as well as on the maintenance of public

peace. In accordance with the policy,

we should ^{endeavor to investigate and acquire} the acquisition and investigation for

important resources ^{which are in} should be taken so as ^{to} correspond to the urgent demand for our lacking resources.

(II) Important Items

(1) Organs in charge of political affairs

The management of political affairs in Hainan Island is to be carried out by the Army and Navy administrative organs located in the Island as well as by ^{Hai-Hao} Haikow Liaison Conference ^{consisting of} the Army and Navy administrative organs in the island and ^{organized} ^{by the} Foreign Ministry. Dispatched organ.

(2) Political guidance will be given for the time being

(A) To rear the association for maintaining public peace

(B) To ^{conform} lead the political organs in Hainan Island ^{into} as a local political system which ^{with} has no direct connection with the western and southern local regimes ^{which will} to be established in future.

(3) Economic guidance

(A)

The various ^{economic} measures concerning economics ^{should be taken for} should aim at conciliating and rehabilitating the Island people and also ^a supply at the Island

-6-

should be ^{arranged} carried out as much as possible on the Island and be carried out.

(B) The investigation for various resources ^{national} necessary to defence and economics ^{should} be accelerated to the utmost and in regard to ^{insufficient} ~~insufficient~~ resources ^{which are in} responding to the urgent demand, we aim at their acquisition.

The ^{special} special resources necessary to national defence should be taken into consideration so that they might be guaranteed ⁱⁿ the future.

(C) ^{Taking into} In consideration of local situations of the Island, the important points of finance, trade, administration of tariff, communication, aviation and marine transportation should be

~~connected~~ at the earliest opportunity, and the important
connected directly with Japan, when an
~~opportunity~~ should be connected directly with Japan
opportunity time arrives.

Concerning the ^{financial counter measures} maintenance of military currency
~~immediately~~ ^{immediately} adopt necessary measures to maintain the
value in the counter - move of finance, we
^{value of the military currency}
must swiftly adopt necessary measures.

(Reference)

Under the circumstances of inadequate materials
^{are insufficient to permit} in Hainan Island, ^{measures should be taken to limit the} who desire to visit there
and lodgings, passengers, for the purpose of
investigation and inspection should be
limited in various places unless they are
demanded by the Island.

Copy of telegram

1841

(Strict Secrecy)

8B-9

32766 (Code)

1938

Sent from SHANGHAI on the afternoon of 7th November.

Arrived at the Foreign Ministry on the night of 7th

No. 3328 (Strict Secrecy)

Proj. No.	198
S. A. No.	15039
Sack No.	
Item	8B-9

To Foreign Minister ARITA

Consul General HIDAKA

FROM Consul General HIDAKA
RE STATEMENT OF
~~From~~ Councillor MORISHIMA

Concerning the conduct of the present incident,

it is a question requiring immediate attention

that the anti-Japanese thought among the intelligent people in China should be converted.

It seems that the

fact that the establishment of a new order in
East Asia was advocated in the statement issued
by the Imperial Government on the third, has
given ^{impetus} ~~a suggestion~~ to the young men of China
who are suffering from the ideological dead-
lock caused by the defeat in the war. CHOU HSIEN
NEN whom we had been trying ~~to persuade,~~
^{absolute} in ^{secret} to start a new ideological movement to
cope with the new situation through SEIJUN
YAMAZAKI who is on familiar terms with them.
After the statement was announced CHOU HSIEN
NEN has become very ^{interested,} ~~much interested.~~ with the announcement of
the statement. He told

YAMAZAKI on the strength of his determination
that he was going to CHUNGKING soon, and after obtain-
ing an understanding of his friends, (supposed to
be the party of CHEN-LI-FU) he would go to SHANG-
HAI to gather his friends to start a new ideological
movement for the formation of an East Asia
leading unit. If we emphasize this ideology
and develop the thought movement from now
on, we consider that we shall be able to lead
these men and bring about some effect in
promoting our political campaign. We inform
you of this for your information. As to the

relations between CHOU-HSIEN NEN and our side,

We hope they will be kept absolutely in secret.

This telegraph has been ~~forwarded~~^{sent} to PEKING.

It is requested that this letter should be forwarded

to HONGKONG.

Copy of telegram

(Strict Secrecy)

33699 (Code) 1938

Sent from SHANGHAI on the morning of 16th November.

Arrived at the Foreign Ministry on the afternoon of 16th.

No. 3445 (Strict Secrecy)

To Foreign Minister ARITA

Consul General HIRAKA

In connection with the former telegraph no. 3328.

Chou has met very often ever since with

YAMAZAKI and exchanged views ardently. As

The result of consultation with his friends, more

than ten in number, he has made up his mind

to begin practical movements. He sent telegrams three times to CHUNGKING (to CHEN-LI-FU) as was given in the former telegram), and a few days ago, a reply came from CHUNGKING. It says that although there is no objection to starting the ideological movement of the principle stated, the following points were to be made clear. (1) The contents of the so-called new structure in East Asia. (2) The plans to carry out the movement. (3) The actual power of this kind of movement in Japan. CHOU answered

ed these questions properly by wire. He is

3

disadvantage of causing a trouble with Japan

3 A cry for the solution of North China problem which

has been urged ~~by~~ ^{by} China now has become ^{an unanimous} voice

^{approaching the coming} will of Kodama and his party's appearance ^{to} in China

Originally the ideology possessed by the ruling class is rather

sensible, and it is ^{it} this class that many of our men of

influence come in contact with

However it would be ^{to give the real situation} the gross miscalculations may be attributed to the ^{poor} ^{change from the main opinion of the people} ^{obtained} ^{judgement} which our influential men ^{from the opinions}

of this class.

Viewing ^{from} the ideological intensity of Anti-Japanese ^{sentiment} I now
The trend of the lower and weaker to ^{become the}

4 and ~~strives~~ quite strong in China at present
find a remarkable trend in which the lower class is

taking an initiative of the anti-Japanese movement leading

the upper classes

Therefore, so long as Japan's attitude towards China
remains conservative, it will be next to impossible to

~~strive for~~ the adjustment of diplomatic relations with
China by ^{considering certain} ~~the~~ concessions in North China problem.

They will not refuse to suck a toffee offered by us because

it is sweet, but by such a gift, Japan would find her

self ^{position} no better than before.

Especially ^{since} ~~when~~ ^{the} Tien-Tsin and Pei Ping area ^{could} ~~came~~

5

~~is~~ under the influence of ^(FR) Wanling regime, the ~~formid~~

~~able~~ ^{its far reaching} propagation of ~~its~~ effects upon Manchoukwo would be

more than what we ~~expect~~ ^{can imagine} it to be.

4. The intellectual elements in the Chinese government are

paying a sharp attention to the internal state of affairs in

Japan, and it is an undeniable fact that their unjust

and presumptuous attitude towards Japan is based on ^{mainly}

their confidence that they have perceived ~ Japan's

weak points, even if we admit ^{the} unskillfulness ^{of} our

representative officials in the diplomatic negotiations.

In this respect, ^{I feel that we should carefully reflect upon} ~~I would~~ ~~would~~ like to call upon atten-

tion on our part. ourselves.

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5. The unification of China is making headway ^{led by the} ~~with~~ ^{the}

stream of the anti-Japanese movement, and the ideologies

of unity and self-help ^{government are strongly supported} finds the enthusiastic supporters

~~to~~ the younger generation.

On the other hand, however, I hear the rumours even in ~~this~~

Nanking that the plot for the coalition government in North

China is going on, or Liu Shiang in Su-Tsuan is

acting against the Nanking government and etc.

Of course I take them as groundless rumours, but with the

very circulation of these rumours, I perceive a ^{weak point} delicate

situation

in the unification of China.

7.

After all, they are overestimating their ^{own} real ability.

Though we must recognize the general trend ^{for} of unity in

China, it will be advisable for the Japanese not to hold

a torch towards this trend.

813-117

Proj. ... 198
S. A. No. 15039
Sack No.
Item No. 8B-7

1841
June

...
T. Vice-Chief of Staff and
Chief of Staff of Kuangtung Army
9 June 1937

The telegram directed to the military v

the vice-chief of the general staff, June 9th, 1937.
from the chief of the staff of Kuangtung Army.

I. Judging the present situation in China from the ~~strategic~~
point of view, against Soviet Russia, I am con-
vinced that we should deliver a blow upon the Nanking
regime first of all to get rid of the menace at our back,
our military power permitting.

If our military power cannot afford to take such a step,
I think it proper that we deal with the Chinese
government with a ~~trabussing~~ ^{with} ~~trabussing~~ ^{trabussing} & watching attitude which

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does not ^{lay a single hand on} permit to touch our ~~existing~~ ^{present} undertakings in China

even ~~with~~ a finger until the completion of our national defence system, ^{in completed} we will then wait for

urging ^{the} reconsideration on the side of

the Chinese government to reconsider

Our one-sided persuasion in the adjustment of diplomatic

relations ^{with} ~~towards~~ the Chinese government, ^{NANKING} lacking in

sincerity for the reasonable settlement would calm

Japan, ^{forgetting} ~~forgetting~~ from their national character

such a step will only ^{their} attachment to one's finger, aggravating ^{their} disdainful

attitude towards Japan.

2. As for Japan's policy towards China, we are entirely

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of the same opinion ~~as~~ that stated in the telegram from
Shanghai (No. 121) and Hanking (No. 159) ^{we} the Kwantung
Army are entirely of the same opinion.
For further particulars, I shall report you myself when
I come up to Tokyo.

But I hope for the present, ^{that} a deliberate scrutiny will
be added to the practical plan towards China and the
leading policy in North China which were made public
at the ^{time} the Cabinet was changed some time ago.

Doc # 1841-
8B-7

Translated by Agite

Copy Very Secret

Supervision: Chief of Information Section

Person in Charge: Chief of the 3rd Section

Drafted: February 8, 1941

To: Consul-General OKAMOTO in SHANGHAI

Consul-General NAKAMURA in HONGKONG

From: Minister HIROTA

Subject: Matters pertaining to Propaganda Work for

the Destruction of the Nationalist Government.

(Coded): Gō No 560

As an aid in hastening the
self-dissolution of the Nationalist Government,

2

this Ministry has heretofore been making various propaganda leaflets and pamphlets which aims at the disintegration ^{within} 'the enemy's' army and the alienation of the peoples' minds.

These propaganda matters have been

scattered in various important areas

by navy aircrafts and subs. In view

of the fact that there seems to ^{have been} frequent

outbursts of internal dissensions in the

CANTON, SZECHWAN areas for the past

few days, it is thought that this might

be the appropriate time to ~~to~~ hasten the

disintegration and destruction by aggravating the domestic discord through the reinforcement of this type of project, without losing the opportunity. Therefore, since this type of work necessitates timeliness, in the future, as regards, matters which require immediate planning, it is requested that your offices also make appropriate leaflets and pamphlets, or give consideration to the completion of the work through means such as radios and newspapers.

Furthermore, as an outline for the immediate propaganda work, we feel that the following methods are necessary.

1. From olden times in SZECHWAN

Province, there is an idea to the effect that SZECHWAN should be ruled by the SZECHWAN people. We must

emphasize this idea more strongly and at the same time help the SZECHWAN

Army unite against CHIANG Kai Shek.

2. In the CANTON area, we must

observe the relationship between YU HAN-MOU,
CHEN CHAI-TANG, and NANKING and
spur the internal disintegration.

3. In the HSI-CHOW area, we must
plan the estrangement of the local army
and the Central Army.

4. We must plan to cause and promote
anti-communistic movements in all
areas.

From SHANGHAI.

Request wire be relayed to PEIPING as reference.

Dorsey Station

Copy of Telegram

[Handwritten initials]

K. Hasegawa

1939

Ultra
Strictly Secret

8B-10

Despatched from Harbin, Received at the Ministry
6th April ~~from Harbin~~, 7th April ~~at Harbin~~.

To Foreign Minister ARITA,

Consul General SUZUKI,

NO. 76-1, (Ultra
Strictly Secret)

Proj. No.	198-5039
S. A. No.	<i>[initials]</i>
Sack No.	
Item No.	8B-10

Referring to the Despatched telegram No. 76-1 (Ultra
Strictly Secret)
(Concerning
Yunnan Incident)

Following message of Lung Yun has been ^{relayed to} ~~sent~~ HASHIMARU

through SAKI, by Lt-General Yangfu ^{Hsiao} ~~fan~~, Commander
of Air Defence Corp, who arrived at Haiphong on 3 inst.,
from Yunnan to investigate the air defence facilities.

" (Lung Yun)
I am going to answer your letter now through

my reliable friend Commandant ~~Yang~~ Yang.
Your stipulation for despatching of delegates has been
1. As for the delegates which you mentioned was

my long cherished desire."

Success of our objective is possible, ^{just} by my own
1. "Properly speaking I believe I can realize the purpose
strength is my belief. Inspectors have been
~~by myself for there has been despatched~~ some inspectors
despatched from Kwantung to ~~to Kwantung from the government~~ but
those inspectors

have no ^{power} ~~abilities~~ to control the Yunnan government and
if I so desire, I can operate whenever I wish.

~~I can have my own way,~~

whether you can get ~~our~~ information

1. "I would like to know privately about the Japanese
Government's intension ^{on} how ^{they will order me in case} to help my campaign
make a move later.
supposing I made a disturbance here."

^{gave}
I made an answer through HASHIMARU that I will
send a wire to the government. I think the act of

INTERNATIONAL PROCEEDINGS

Doc. No. *1841*

Date *8 June 1946*

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: *File of Telegrams*

Date: *1937* Original (Copy () Language: *Jap.*

Has it been translated? Yes () No (

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of _____:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: *Foreign Ministry*

PERSONS IMPLICATED: *SATO, NAKANE, ARINO, KATO, ARITA
HIDAKA, SUZUKI, HIROTA, NAKAMURA, MASATANI*

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: ~~WAR~~

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

File contains following telegram

(1) *SB-1. Telegram to Foreign Minister SATO from NAKANE, Representative of Consul to CHANCHIA KOW on 20 April 1937.*

(a) *"China Japan's aggressive act toward China will only place Japan at a disadvantage and will endanger her future from the viewpoint of international relations."*

(b) *Foreign Minister SATO agreed with WANG, Chief of the Chinese diplomatic section, on abolition of the consular jurisdiction of each*

Analyst *2ND Lt. Kobayashi*

Doc. No.

BAKASHI (over)

country in China.

(1) Japanese Embassy at Peking announced strict control of contraband of copper by Japanese and Korean adventurers.

(2) ^{8B-2} Telegrams to Foreign Minister SATO from Consul-General ARINO, Deputy Consul NAKANE and Secretary KATO. 29, 30 April 1937.

(a) Telegram from Consul-General ARINO, dispatched from TSINAN on 30 April submitting for SATO's reference a gist of an article from a Chinese daily newspaper, "MINKUEO JIHPAO" entitled "To the Highranking Prominent Japanese."

(1) "Japan is reported to have displayed at the Nagoya Exposition such articles as greatly insulting China and placing her on the footing of a colony side by side with Manchuria and East Hopei"

(2) "Japan has made false organizations conducted propaganda attacking the Republic of China."

(b) Telegram from Deputy-Consul NAKANE, dispatched from CHANG CHIAKOW on 30 April 1937 containing a gist of an article entitled "Japan's Future Policy Toward China," from the "SINYUAN JIHPAO" newspaper. 2 April 1937.

(c) Telegram from Secretary KATO dispatched from Peking on 30 April 1937, containing a gist of an article entitled "Farewell to Ambassador KAWAGOE" from the "Peking Chen Pao" of 28 April 1937.

(3) ^{8B-3} Telegram to the Chiefs of the Diplomatic establishments in PEIPING, SHANGHAI, TIENTSIN, TINGTAO, TSINAN, HANKOW, FU-CHOW, CANTON, CHANG, CHIANG, AMOY, HONGKONG, MANCHURIA from Foreign Minister SATO. 6 May 1937.

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(a) The foreign minister decided to put off for the time being political problems such as the establishment of the TOKUSEIKAI (Special Political Association), the self-government of the five powers in North China, the conclusion of the Anti-Communist military agreement, and the conclusion of the Japan - China military alliance.

(b) It was decided to carry out entirely the present cultural and economic campaign with the main purpose of retaining close cooperation between Japan and China.

(c) Establish an inseparable economic relation between Japan and China.

(d) Attached to this telegram are two plans (A+B) which contain policy for cultural and economic campaign for China.

(4) 48-4. Telegram to the Japanese Diplomatic Heads in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Russia, America, Brazil, Turkey, and Geneva, from Minister SATO 6 May 1937.

(a) Concerning Japanese ^{over} policy towards China. No

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serenity will be added to the practical plan towards China."

(8) PB-8 Telegram to Foreign Minister ARITA from Consul General NAKAMURA. 21 Feb. 1938

Nakamura considered Hirota's instruction on making propaganda for the collapse of the National Government of China suitable and essential for the present situation of long term opposition, but stated that it will have to be practiced according to various circumstances.

(9) PB-9 Telegram to Foreign Minister ARITA from Consul General HIDAKI. 7 November 1938

concerning statement of Councillor MORISHIMA. He states that the anti-Japanese thought among the Chinese should be converted.

(10) PB-10. Telegram to Foreign Minister ARITA from Consul-General SUZUKI 6 April 1939 concerning the YUNAN Incident.

(11) PB-11 Telegram to Secretary MASATANI from Foreign Minister ARITA. 24 April 1939.

concerning important points on the temporary measures taken on the administration of the

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(a) The foreign minister decided to put off for the time being political problems such as the establishment of the TOKUSEIKAI (Special Political Association), the self-government of the five powers in North China, the conclusion of the Anti-Communist military agreement, and the conclusion of the Japan - China military alliance.

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(4) 48-4. Telegram to the Japanese Diplomatic Heads in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Russia, America, Brazil, Turkey, and Geneva, from Minister SATO 6 May 1937.

(a) Concerning Japanese ^{over,} policy towards China. No

material concerning policy included. It states that a separate message will be sent.

(b) Sato express his desire that the new policy mentioned in his message No. 653, 6 May 1937 be carefully investigated.

(c) Guidance of HOPEH and SHANGTUNG self-government.

(5) 8B-5. Telegram to the Vice - Minister and Deputy Chief of Staff (Army) from the Military Attache of the Shanghai Embassy stating that the independent policy concluded by the former cabinet to adjust diplomatic relation shows sign of taking a favorable turn; but the main anti-Japanese movement has not change. 6 June 1937

6) 8B-6 Telegram to Vice - War Minister and Vice - Chief of general Staff from a Naval Officer at NANKING, 8 June 1937, regarding agreement of the view and opinion in the telegram (No. 741) from the Vice - War Minister and Vice - Chief of General Staff.

7) 8B-7. Telegram to Vice - War Minister and Vice - Chief of general Staff from the Chief of Staff of the Kwangtung Army 9 June 1937.

(a) "Judging from the present situation in China from the point of view of military preparation against Soviet Russia, I am convinced that if our military power permits it, we should deliver a blow just of all upon the Nanking regime to get rid of the menace to our back."

(b) "We should not take the initiative to become friendly with the NANKING government. I hope for the present that a deliberate

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- 3 -

sovereignty will be added to the practical plan towards China."

- (8) 83-8 Telegram to Foreign Minister HIROTA from Consul General NAKAMURA. 21 Feb. 1938
Nakamura considered Hirota's instruction on making propaganda for the collapse of the National Government of China suitable and essential for the present situation of long term opposition, but stated that it will have to be practiced according to various circumstances.
- (9) 83-9 Telegram to Foreign Minister ARITA from Consul General HIDAKI. 7 November 1938
concerning statement of Councillor MORISHIMA. He states that the anti-Japanese thought among the Chinese should be converted.
- (10) 83-10. Telegram to Foreign Minister ARITA from Consul-General SUZUKI 6 April 1939 concerning the YUNAN Incident.
- (11) 83-11 Telegram to Secretary MASATANI from Foreign Minister ARITA. 24 April 1939
concerning important points on the temporary measures taken on the administration of the
(over)

"The Key ^{to} of the Peace is the International relation."

A Representation of ^{Wang} Wen Tsung-Yao to AR. I. T. A. Minister
of Foreign Affairs.

The reason why Wang Ching-wei advocated ~~the~~ peace seems

to me that ^{Chiang} Chen-Kai-shih and his group admitted ^{that} the

"Konoys declaration" is a chance not to be ^{lost} ~~passed~~.

Every one ~~has~~ ~~been~~ ~~wondering~~ ~~for~~ ~~years~~ ~~but~~ ~~the~~

~~It is the truth, they all wished to make a peace~~

~~trouble lies in that they could not seize it,~~

~~in most heart heart still they cannot ~~do~~ ~~it~~.~~

~~although the incident had~~

~~In spite of the incident had already reached the~~

~~peace negotiation stage and yet there is~~

~~step of the conclusion yet has no hope of it, ~~and~~~~

~~Reason being, the International relationship is it's~~

~~the relation of International problems checked this up in~~

~~barrier~~

Unless this is solved completely, realization for peace
~~my point of view the amicable solution of International~~
~~is difficult~~
~~relation is the only the key to establish a peace between~~

~~The aim of Support of Chiang Kai Shek by~~
~~Supporting to Chiau Kai Shek of U.S.A., ^{England} Britain, and France~~
~~lies in their fear~~
~~is based on the anxieties of ^{loss} their ^{interests in China} lapse of rights ^{by} Japanese~~
~~and~~
~~as they believe that~~
~~their own~~
~~faces and the Chiang's defeat means their own defeat~~
~~Therefore even~~
~~so even if Chiang himself wishes to stop the war those~~

Countries wish ~~to be~~ ^{for} a long war, and Chiang nothing
do ~~at~~ nothing,
can be done and follows their orders.

Amicable settlement

The way of development of the International relation ^{is} ^{to} explain
to England, United States and France
and get their understanding that Japan has no ideas ~~to~~

of infringe on their rights and ~~other hand~~ stop their support-
ing activities for Chiang-Kai-shek, ^{with the stipulation} under the condition

that after the war, when ~~the~~ new order has been established

there will be no ^{changes} affects on the third countries' rights
& interests ^{of the} ~~for~~ ^{during the early} ~~certain~~ years until the restoration of New China has
been ^{completely} established.

^{with removal of the rights and interests}
The collections of the third countries rights and interest
in China should be ~~start~~ ^{and some} gradually after the matters

are quite settled, ^{and} by ~~the hand~~ of the New government,

and the Foreign Affairs ^{Europe should} ~~Authority~~ ^{by themselves} negotiate, ~~to those third~~
^{with the third} countries and explain that ^{the} New government ^{will} is also

respect, ^{all} established treaties, ^{just} rights and interests as well as ^{the} Chiang governments, ^{had some} and ~~make them at ease~~ of those nations. Plans for denunciation of treaties should firstly, ~~denunciations of treaties will be the last con-~~ be made after all these had been completed considerations.

Although Szechwan, Yuen Nan and Kuanghsi ~~are~~ among the districts not captured yet, are the districts the most influenced districts ^{by the} of Korozye declaration as their relations with ~~in the "not occupied districts"~~ they have close connections with British and French, ^{are very close} it is impossible ~~to get their approach to us without having the British and French understandings.~~ ^{to get their approach to us without having the British and French understandings.}

As I have stated so far in the text, the key ~~The above mentioned opinion is my idea about the solution~~ to peace lies in the solution of International

relationship. Therefore, I believe that the
of International relation, and I think this is the
best step to take in its solution is by from this
best and only the way to make a peace in Asia,
direction first.

NO. 10571.
Despatched
Arrived

1936.
6th April ^{from} ~~Despatched~~ Hansi
7th " Am. ~~Arrived~~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs

To Foreign Minister ARI TA From General ~~Conf.~~ ^{Conf.}

NO. 76-2. ^{Ultra} Strictly Secret.

To parallel General Policy with that of Kwang
I think it is the best way to carry the ~~Yuan~~ ^{Yuan} ~~name~~ ^{name} ~~policy~~ ^{policy}.
Policy is the best plan in my estimation.
~~pace with Kwansi policy, Pai Chang-hsi, seems revolted~~
~~holding Kwansi, seems to have revolted~~
against Chiang Kai-shek in ~~having the hegemony of Kwansi,~~

and Pai-Chang-hsi has visited Lung, ^{and it appeared} naturally they must
that they
have reached some understanding ^{with} each other. (A word is not

Therefore, with Pai's staff already won over, plans
(clear) ~~He already winning Pai's staffs over to make Pai-Chang-hsi~~
~~for making Pai make his moves are in progress~~ ^{it was told that}
~~still in his position.~~ On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek

is entertain ^{accord between} years of ~~incooperation~~ of Li Tsung-jen & Pai-

Chang-hsi and trying to check this movement with all

NO. 10571.
Despatched
Arrived

1936.
6th April ^{from} Despatched Hanoi
7th " Am. ~~Arrived~~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

To Foreign Minister ARITA From General Consul SUZUKI

NO. 76-2. ^{Ultra} Strictly Secret.

To parallel Yunnan Policy with that of Kwansi
I think it is the best way to carry the Yunnan policy
Policy is the best plan in my estimation.
pace with Kwansi policy, Pai Chang-hsi, ~~seems revolted~~
holding Kwansi, seems to have revolted
against Chiang Kai-shek in having the hegemony of Kwansi,

and it appears
and Pai-Chang-hsi has visited Lung, naturally they must
that they

have reached some understanding ^{with} each other. (a word is not
Therefore, with Pai's staff already won over, plans
^{clear}) He already winning Pai's staffs over to make Pai-Chang-hsi
for making Pai make his moves are in progress it was told that
still in his position. On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek

is entertain ^{around between} years of incooperation of Li Tsung-jen & Pai-

Chang-hsi and trying to check this movement with all

In the future starts his
his might. ~~Some day when Lung Yuen~~ ~~himself~~
movements ~~he~~ ~~ought~~ have
to action, let Pai-Chang-hai helps him, and ~~other~~ ~~hand~~
Lung yuen call on SIKANG and Kwei how ~~to~~ district
to make ^{a coordinated move,} ~~a connection~~ with Hoikang, Kweichow faces.
Yunnan and Kweichow district, and they make plans to
that will finally ^{embroider} ~~make~~ Szechwan ^{district} ~~embroider~~ in war.
However it is questionable to what degree the above
But it is quite a question how much the plan
plans can be relied upon and judgment on it can
of Lungyuan has reliability just now, but if the
not be given immediately.
Home Office have some definite idea to help Luyuan,
then ~~can be called here and by~~
call his envoy ~~and I may both~~ deliberation
with them, we can
matters ~~and~~ confirm his plan ^{to} ~~on~~ some extent.
As a report and as a reference this report
Despatch this telegram to your ~~reference~~
is despatched
~~well as a report.~~

The actions of Lung yun is very important in view
Lung has very important influence to have Chian Kai Shek's
of its effect upon the Southwest operation, and also
life in his power for the scheme to check up the route
it controls Chiang Kai Shek's power by cutting off lines
of delivering armaments and political tactics for the South
armament delivery route. Therefore I hope to have a
West Chinese authorities. I hope to hear from your
definite answer after due consideration after consulting
definite answer after the sufficient consultation with
the Army,
army office.

(Learn with

(Kadomatsu & Yamada Co., has been already effected
concluded)
connection).

(Telegram follows -). (Continued)

DEFENSE CHARGER OUT SLIP NO. 1

Date _____

Description of Material:

IPS Doc. No. _____

I, the undersigned representative of the Defense Panel have withdrawn the material listed above. It is agreed that this withdrawal is temporary and for the purpose of inspection only, and that the complete material will be returned not later than seven (7) days from this date.

Signature

1841

Remained for return
to Fort Win.

4.6.49