















REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES  
AND  
CIVIL LIFE  
OF  
GENERAL WILLIAM HULL;

PREPARED FROM HIS MANUSCRIPTS,

BY HIS DAUGHTER,

MRS. MARIA <sup>Freeman</sup> CAMPBELL:

TOGETHER WITH THE

HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812,

AND

SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT,

BY HIS GRANDSON,

JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE.

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## TO THE READER.

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IN arranging and collating this manuscript, my desire is not to take more credit to myself, than common industry can claim ; neither would I render my father responsible for my failures, when I have been obliged to speak in other language than his own.

General Hull left behind him Memoirs of his Revolutionary Services, in MS., which he had written for the gratification of his children and grandchildren. These memoirs are the basis of the present work. His spirit pervades the whole, and my endeavour has been, that it should not be obscured. The facts are in substance precisely as he has related them. But as his MS. was not prepared for the press, it was necessary, to a certain extent, that the arrangement of the work, and sometimes the style, should be changed. When General Hull is spoken of, it will be noticed throughout the book, that the first and third persons are indiscriminately used.

In the chapter concerning Captain Hale, I have more fully unfolded sentiments expressed by my father in his last interview with that noble young man. In the work generally, I have introduced remarks not found in the MS., but which were familiar to my re-

collection from our frequent interchange of thought, as he always conversed with his children, as though they were his equals. He rarely spoke of himself, of his sufferings, or of his services rendered to his country. It was at the earnest entreaties of his children, that he took up the pen. The feelings of the soldier gave alacrity to the work, and it was completed. He wrote without view to publication, and directed his family to look for the connecting links of the narrative, in the histories of the Revolution.

The death of General Hull took place before the "Writings of Washington," by JARED SPARKS, were published; but the faithfulness of his memory is exhibited in comparing his MS. with the authentic documents of that most valuable work.

EDITOR.

*Augusta, Georgia, 1845.*

*Copy of a Letter from Jared Sparks, Esq., to the  
Rev. James F. Clarke.*

SALEM, July 31st, 1847.

DEAR SIR,—I have perused the manuscript which you sent to me, relating to the Revolutionary Services and Civil Life of General Hull. The whole appears to me to be written with close attention to the facts of history ; and it derives great value from the circumstance of its containing a record of the observations of General Hull himself on numerous public events in which he took a part, or with which he was personally acquainted. Having been an officer in the army during the whole war of the Revolution, engaged in many actions, and highly estimated for his military talents and character, he was necessarily connected with stirring incidents, which are well described in this work.

I have also read, with a lively interest, the chapters on the Campaign of 1812. ✓ The narrative is clear and full, and whatever judgment may be formed of the result, the particulars here set forth, give evidence of having been drawn from the highest sources ; and they are exhibited in such a manner, as to present the controverted points in a just light.

These are my impressions, upon a hasty perusal of the manuscripts, and I doubt not they would be sustained by a more careful study.

I am, dear sir,

Respectfully and truly yours,

JARED SPARKS.



## P R E F A C E .

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IF principle be of any value, its power will be felt and exhibited in the hour of adversity. Weak is the man, who, after having laid down to himself a rule of virtuous action, is diverted from it, by the frustration of his plans and the disappointment of his hopes. But when amidst the painful vicissitudes of life, he keeps his onward course, exhibiting the same candour, dignity, and strength, which marked him in more prosperous days, we learn the useful lesson, that there is a sustaining power in our nature which, co-operating with that from above, gives peace to the soul amidst its severest trials.

Many an individual more highly distinguished than General Hull, has descended to the grave without a record of his public services or private worth. But the manœuvring of the Politician will sometimes fix, with more distinctness and permanency, the laurel on the brow which his hand was raised to destroy. Had it not been for a persecution as severe as it was unmerited, the zeal, the ability, the faithfulness and the patriotism of General Hull in his country's service, might never have been made public, to sustain him in the hearts of the American people.

And so trusting, so satisfied is conscious innocence, in the approbation of a higher Power ; so modest in its claims to notice, that perhaps not even this would have been done, had not children, in the warmth and respect of filial love, urged and claimed the boon.

*Political necessity* is the plea ever offered for transferring the errors of an administration to an individual, however innocent : and the sacred rights of character are thus sacrificed on the altar of popular feeling. If such be the practice of an enlightened, Christian government, who can expect, in the hour of adversity, the justice to which services and virtues are entitled ? Even Washington, with all the high perfection of his character, did not escape, when faction and interest judged his conduct.

The heart sickens, while contemplating suffering, produced, not by the depravity of one man, who would blush to do the deed alone, but from the insensibility of the many, when acting together. The laws of morality cease then to operate ; and hence, as has ever been the case, individuals have been sacrificed, to shield depraved or imbecile governments.

How different would have been the fate of Admiral Byng, whose sad history “ is the deepest stain on the memory of Chatham, and the deepest disgrace of George II. and his Ministers,” had the administration, generously and with moral courage, shielded him from calumny and outrage, under the first burst of a nation’s disappointment !

✓ When General Hull left Washington, in 1812, to take the command of the Northwestern Army, he

was assured by the Government, that a naval force would be placed on Lake Erie, to keep open his communication with his country, and that his army would be reinforced, before war was declared. Having arrived at Urbana, in the State of Ohio, where his army had assembled, he cut a road from that place through the wilderness, for nearly two hundred miles, and reached the river Miami, seventy-two miles below Detroit. Here he availed himself of the water communication to send on the sick, with his military stores and baggage. By mistake, a trunk containing the papers of General Hull was put on board the same vessel. After she had sailed, General Hull received a letter, announcing that on the 18th of June war had been declared. Thus *fourteen days* had passed before he was apprised of a fact so important to the safety of his army, while the British at Fort Malden had four or five days previously, been possessed of the information. The vessel was captured, and the consequent possession of this portion of the papers of General Hull was made the ground on which the charge of treason was predicated.

After the surrender of the fortress of Detroit, when General Hull was taken a prisoner to Montreal, he judged it best to commit his remaining papers, with other valuable articles, to the care of his daughter, Mrs. Hickman, who, with her family, was shortly to take her departure for her paternal residence, in Newton, Massachusetts. The brig Adams, in which they sailed, was an American vessel, but had been captured by the British. The brig arrived in the

evening near Buffalo, and Mrs. Hickman was put on shore, assured by the captain that her baggage would be sent to her in the morning. In the course of the night, the brig was attacked by our sailors, under the command of Captain Elliott, and in the contest was burnt. By this event, the remaining papers of General Hull were destroyed.

In the public offices at Washington, there were duplicates of letters and other papers, sent by General Hull to the different Departments, while Governor of the Michigan Territory. To possess copies of these documents, was necessary to his justification. Previously to his trial, he made application for them. They pointed to the necessity of a naval force on Lake Erie ; and for troops, required for the garrison of Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Chicago, to enable the army to maintain a defensive position, or successfully to carry on an offensive war against the British and Indians. But the exertions of friends, joined to his own efforts to obtain copies of these papers, were unavailing.

When the trial of General Hull closed in 1814, he yet hoped to give to his fellow-citizens a detailed history of the Northwestern Campaign. Anterior to that period, he had published nothing in his defence, persevering in a dignified silence, while constantly assailed in the public prints, with contumely and the grossest falsehoods. So exaggerated was the abuse, that to every reflecting mind, it carried with it the materials for its own refutation. Again and again were his hopes crushed by a failure in procuring

copies of these important documents. Finally, he yielded, without temper and without recrimination, to these last acts of injustice, which the rulers of the nation, at this critical period of their power, considered expedient, if not necessary to their safety.

At the expiration of nearly twelve years, the Honourable John C. Calhoun was appointed Secretary of War. General Hull made one more effort, and on his application to that officer, most of the papers, previously applied for, were immediately forwarded to him.

As soon as he became possessed of these documents, he gave to the public a Memoir of the Campaign of the Northwestern Army—and in the confidence of innocence and truth, appealed to his countrymen for a reversal of a sentence which could be viewed as no less cruel than unjust.\*

These Memoirs have been before the public for more than eighteen years, and those of his fellow-citizens who have read them, have risen from their perusal satisfied that the cause of failure in the unsuccessful invasion of Canada, was not to be imputed to the commanding officer, but to an administration that had rushed into war without foresight or preparation. Almost every engagement pledged by the Government for the support of their army was violated. General Hull was sent forth with a band of brave, but undisciplined yeomanry, most of whom had seen

\* General Hull was sentenced to be shot, under the charge of cowardice, but pardoned by the President, under the recommendation of the Court Martial, on account of his Revolutionary services.

no service, to contend with the numerous and well-trained army of Britain, aided by her savage allies, not only unsupported, but deserted by his Government.

But under all these untoward circumstances, General Hull could have sustained his post at Detroit, had not an armistice, now a portion of history, been entered into with the enemy by General Dearborn, to the exclusion of General Hull's army, and without his knowledge. It was this, together with previous neglect on the part of General Dearborn to concentrate troops at Niagara, which enabled General Brock, with an overwhelming force, suddenly to come against and overpower him.

General Dearborn was Commander-in-chief of the American forces. He was stationed on the Niagara river, two hundred and fifty miles below Detroit. His orders were to keep the enemy in check, or to act offensively, as occasion might offer, and *to co-operate with the army of General Hull.*

Instead of obeying these orders, he agreed to a suspension of hostilities with Sir George Prevost, the Commanding General of the King's forces, *and stipulates that it is to the exclusion of General Hull's army;* the very point to be gained by his wily adversary.

The period of five days allowed ample time for the British to ascend the Lake and capture the American forces at Detroit. A *ruse de guerre*, creditable to the acuteness of the enemy, but a sad reflection on the military genius of the Commander-in-chief of the American army.



General Hull received no official information of this arrangement between the two hostile armies, until twelve days after it had taken place, and four days after his army had surrendered to General Brock; from whom he first learned the astounding fact.

Among other papers for which application was made at the seat of Government, General Hull asked for a copy of this fatal armistice; none was ever furnished, but the fact is recorded, and its disastrous effects on the issue of the campaign can no longer be gainsayed by the most prejudiced mind.

At the period of the late war, Mr. Jefferson had retired from office, but his pen was still exerted to support the measures of his party, and the Administration of 1812. He was familiar with the character of General Hull, in the military, civil, and social relations of life; and he generously testifies to his merit in a letter to Colonel Duane, at the first intelligence of the surrender of the Northwestern Army. He writes:

“The character of General Hull, as an officer of skill and bravery, was established on the trials of the last war, and no previous act of his life had led to doubt his fidelity.”\* Yet it is not long before we perceive, in another letter, that *political necessity* obliges this distinguished individual to speak a different language.

In a letter to General Dearborn, the negotiator of the armistice, he writes:

\* Jefferson's Memoirs, Vol. IV., page 181.

“ After the disasters produced by the treason, or the cowardice, or both, of Hull, and the follies of some others,”\* &c., &c.

But his first communication, uninfluenced by the bias of political necessity, and while yielding to the sober dictates of truth, with a full recollection of faithful services, was but a just tribute to a man, on whose public and private life, a steady and unclouded light had rested for forty years, eight years of which period he had served to gain our Independence.

Finally, at the age of sixty-one, General Hull was summoned before a court martial to answer to crimes, of which the thought had never entered his mind. His appointed judges were men high in military rank and titles, but many of whom had obtained that elevation and distinction without having rendered any service to their country.

In the defence before the court martial, while animadverting upon the testimony of some of the witnesses introduced on the part of the prosecution, General Hull says: “ It seems extraordinary that there has not been a witness examined on the part of the prosecution, who has not been promoted since he was under my command. A great majority of the young gentlemen, who have been called by the Judge Advocate, have appeared, decorated with their epaulets; these have been bestowed, and sometimes with the augmentation of a star, upon gentlemen who began their military career with my unfortunate campaign. By what services many of these gentle-

\* Jefferson's Memoirs, Vol. IV., page 258.



men have merited such rapid promotion, I have not learned. But if it all arises out of their achievements while under my command, I must say, that it appears to me, my expedition was more prolific of promotion, than any other unsuccessful military enterprise I ever heard of.”\*

Without counsel to speak in his defence, he stood before the court unaided, except by his own vigorous mind and a clear and calm conscience.

In the following narrative of the Revolutionary services of General Hull, there will rarely be found allusion to that act of his life, which was at once his *glory* and his *shame*;—*the surrender of the fortress of Detroit to the British arms*. It was his *glory*, because he had “dared to do his duty.”† It was his *shame*, because the epithets of traitor and coward were attached to a name, that had remained untarnished for more than half a century. It had stood the test of temptation, in the dangerous hours of prosperity—in the possession of wealth, and in the acquisition of much honourable distinction, in public and private life. Prosperity did not elate, nor did adversity depress; the same virtues shone, equally bright, in both estates.

The thirteen years that succeeded his changed fortunes, were spent in the peaceful pursuits of agriculture; in the calm of a quiet conscience, in the possession of the affection and respect of virtuous friends; blessed by the happiest relations of the do-

\* General Hull's Trial, page 64. his wife, respecting the surrender

† Extract from the first letter to while a prisoner at Montreal.

mestic fireside, and surrounded by a numerous progeny of affectionate children and grandchildren, each striving to cheer his declining years, and all cherishing, with filial reverence, the virtues of their patriot sire.

To the latest moment of his life, when aware he was on the verge of eternity, in the full possession of his mental powers, General Hull still breathed his thanks to his Heavenly Father, that he had been the instrument of saving from the cruelties of a savage foe, a people who expected and demanded protection at his hands.\*

One generation since that trying hour has grown into manhood and imbibed the poison of falsehood from our school-books, while studying the history of the Northwestern Campaign. Another promising band is now receiving the same distorted views, over which it is hoped truth will sooner or later triumph.

Such are the returns rendered to a soldier of the Revolution, who, through long and trying years of severe service, aided to secure the sweets of liberty and all its associated advantages of moral and religious education.

To my interesting and beloved young countrymen, the present work is dedicated; and when the youthful student learns what the soldier of 1776 performed, he will more readily be convinced by truth and facts, that he was altogether innocent of the charges of which he was accused in 1812.

\* General Hull was the Governor well as Commander of the army at of the Territory of Michigan as this time.

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## ERRATA.

Page vii. l. 1, for <i>wil</i> read <i>will</i> .
" 18, l. 25, for <i>Housatonnuc</i> read <i>Housatonic</i> .
" 28, l. 21, and p. 76, l. 20, for <i>Thatcher</i> read <i>Thacher</i> .
" 45, l. 5, for <i>close</i> read <i>Clove</i> .
" 54, 55, for <i>Brunz</i> read <i>Bronz</i> .
" 74, l. 3, for <i>withia</i> read <i>within</i> .
" 76, l. 1, for <i>thai</i> read <i>that</i> .
" 80, l. 19, for <i>Ganesvoort</i> read <i>Gansevoort</i> .
" 306, l. 24, for 17th read 14th.
" 317, l. 24, for <i>regular times</i> read <i>regulations</i> .
" 319, l. 24, after <i>could</i> read <i>not</i> .
" 389, bottom line, for <i>Note 2d</i> read <i>Note 3d</i> .
" 410, close, for <i>has at last illuminated</i> read <i>will at last illuminate</i> .

# REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL LIFE

OF

## GENERAL WILLIAM HULL.

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### CHAPTER I.

EARLY LIFE OF WILLIAM HULL.—HE JOINS THE ARMY OF WASHINGTON AT  
CAMBRIDGE, IN JULY, 1775.

1775.

WILLIAM HULL was born at Derby, Connecticut, 24th June, 1753. His great-grandfather, Joseph Hull, emigrated from Derbyshire, England, and settled in Derby, Connecticut. His grandfather, Joseph Hull, survived *his* father but a few years.

Joseph Hull, the father of the subject of these Memoirs, while following the agricultural pursuits of his ancestors, was likewise engaged in the councils of his country.

He was elected a member of the State Legislature for many successive years. His immediate descendants, consisted of six sons and two daughters. Joseph was the eldest. In early life, he engaged in

the West India trade. At the commencement of the war of the Revolution, he received the appointment of Lieutenant of Artillery, and was made prisoner at the capture of Fort Washington, on York Island, in 1776.

In defence of this Fortress, he is reputed to have behaved with great gallantry. He remained in captivity two years. At length he was exchanged, and his unbroken spirit was once more given to the service of his country.

Shortly after, he was appointed to the command of some boats on Long Island Sound, formerly used in the whale fishery, but now fitted out to annoy the enemy, as opportunity might offer. In this limited but dangerous sphere of action, he gave earnest of a mind and spirit, which under other circumstances would probably have developed more important results.

On one occasion, a British armed schooner was lying in the Sound. She was engaged in transporting provisions from the country to New-York, where the British army was then stationed. Lieutenant Hull proposed to some of his companions of the town of Derby to go out and capture the schooner.

Derby stands on the Housatonnuc river, about twelve miles from its entrance into the Sound. On the evening appointed, twenty men, placing themselves under the command of Lieutenant Hull, embarked in a large boat, similar to those used in carrying wood to the city of New-York. The men lay concealed in the bottom of the boat ; and the dusk



of the evening favouring the deception, it had the appearance of being loaded with wood. As they approached the vessel, the sentinel on deck hailed them.

Lieutenant Hull, who was steering, answered the call, but continuing his course, came quite near the vessel, without exciting suspicion, when, by a sudden movement, he drew close along side of her. His men, well armed, sprang to her deck. The commander of the schooner was sleeping below, and aroused by the firing of the sentinel, he made an attempt to gain the deck, but was instantly shot dead.

The Americans immediately fastened down the hatches, took possession of the vessel, and carried her in triumph up to the town.

This gallant soldier was the father of Commodore Hull, who, by his coolness and intrepidity, was the first to give to America the knowledge of her naval superiority, as exhibited in his celebrated escape from a British squadron and afterwards by his victory over the "*Guerrier*."

Samuel Hull served as a Lieutenant a part of the war, and was reputed a brave man. Isaac passed his life in agricultural pursuits. Levi died young. Elizabeth married a respectable farmer, and settled in Vermont. Sarah married in Derby, and soon after died. David was too young at the period of the war, to be enrolled with his brothers, in the service of his country. He graduated at Yale College, and became a distinguished physician, in Fairfield, Connecticut, where he settled and died. He married the

daughter of Andrew Elliott, D. D., of Boston. Doctor Hull passed his life in extensive professional usefulness, respected and beloved by a large circle of his fellow-citizens. He died, a faithful disciple of his Saviour, in the spring of 1834.

William, the fourth son, and the subject of this Memoir, was sent at an early period to reside with his grandfather Hull. He attended a New England school, and was instructed in the common branches of English education. Residing on a farm, he worked daily in the fields, and here he acquired that taste for agricultural pursuits, which was his solace, when the dark and heavy clouds of adversity gathered thickly around the gray hairs of declining years. In this employment he strengthened a naturally good constitution, which secured the enjoyment of uninterrupted health. It may here be remarked, that a vigorous body and sound mind are often united through a long life, when the early years of childhood are given to active and healthful employments, and the mind is not hurried into premature cultivation.

It being decided that William should receive a liberal education, his father sent for him to return home. His grandfather remonstrated, for he could not sympathize with the more enlarged views of another generation. He loved the affectionate and industrious boy, and his old heart grieved to part with him. "Billy," he said, "is a *pure* boy to work: it is a shame to take him to College."

But the young plough-boy soon proved that he had mental as well as physical strength. He studied

with the Rev. Mr. Leavensworth, a highly respected divine, and entered Yale College at the age of fifteen years. At the expiration of four years, he graduated with honour. The English oration was assigned him at Commencement, and his College life, as well as his performance on this occasion, gave satisfaction to his friends and all who were interested in his youthful career, now opening with such fair promise.

His first occupation after leaving College was the charge of a school. He has often been heard to say, that "this was among the happiest years of his life." But his parents anxiously desired that he should become a clergyman. Without the fixed bias for this profession, which he deemed essential, he commenced the study of Divinity, rather from motives of filial affection, than from a conviction of religious duty. He studied for a year with Dr. Wates, subsequently Professor of Theology in Yale College. But he was too deeply impressed with the sacred trust devolving on a minister of the gospel, to assume its responsibilities without a single eye to the glory of God, and a distinct call from the Holy Spirit. He therefore withdrew from these studies, though with reluctance, inasmuch as he disappointed the hopes his parents had cherished in reference to the clerical profession. After this decision, he attached himself to the celebrated Law School in Litchfield, Connecticut, and was admitted to the bar in 1775.

The war with Great Britain was now the subject of universal interest, and with others of his countrymen did the young barrister sympathize in views

and feelings, which soon gave a new direction to his mind. But he maintained a reserve in regard to his inclinations, which he foresaw would soon ripen into action.

His father returned one evening from a meeting of the citizens of Derby. He said to his son, "Who do you suppose has been elected Captain of the company raised in this town?" He named several. His father replied, "It is yourself." He hesitated not in accepting the appointment, so unexpectedly offered by his townsmen; and prepared himself to join the regiment of Colonel Webb, then being raised by the State. At this interesting moment, his father was seized with a severe illness, which soon terminated his useful life.

By his will, the property, respectable for the times, was bequeathed to his widow and children. William refused to receive any part of it. He said, "I want only my sword and my uniform." With a full, but resolute heart, he left his peaceful home, and his afflicted family, to give his services to his country, then contending for rights which neither remonstrance nor patience, but force only could obtain. His company immediately joined the regiment which marched to Cambridge, the head-quarters of General Washington.

The first incident recorded by Captain Hull, on his arrival in camp, is a striking illustration of the deficiency of military order, discipline and etiquette, with which Washington had to contend throughout the war. A body of the enemy landed at Lechmere's

Point, on the main land. It was expected an attack would be made on the American lines. The alarm was given, and the troops ordered to their respective stations. When the regiment of Col. Webb was formed for action, the captains and subalterns appeared, dressed in long cloth frocks, with kerchiefs tied about their heads. Captain Hull was the only man in uniform. The officers inquired "why he came out in full dress;—that the regiment was going into action, and that he would be a mark for the enemy's fire." He replied, "that he thought the uniform of an officer was designed to aid his influence and increase his authority over his men—and if ever important in these points, it was more particularly so in the hour of battle." They referred to their experience, remarking that "in the French war it was not customary, and they had never worn it." Captain Hull yielded to age and experience, sent his servant for a frock and kerchief, and dressed himself after the fashion of his companions. His company was in advance of the British lines. While at this station, General Washington and suite, in the course of reviewing the troops, stopped at the redoubt and asked "what officer commanded there." "With feelings of inexpressible mortification," says General Hull, "I came forward in my savage costume, and reported that Captain Hull had the honour of commanding the redoubt." As soon as General Washington passed on, Captain Hull availed himself of the first moment to despatch his servant with all possible speed to bring him his uniform. As he put it on, he quiet-

ly resolved, never more to subscribe to the opinions of men, however loyal and brave in their country's service, whose views were so little in unison with his own. After the troops had waited four or five hours in expectation of an attack, the enemy returned to his encampment, having no other object in making the descent than to procure provisions.



## CHAPTER II.

SIEGE OF BOSTON.—WASHINGTON TAKES POSSESSION OF DORCHESTER HEIGHTS.  
—EVACUATION OF BOSTON BY SIR WILLIAM HOWE.

1776.

IN October, General Gage was recalled and General Howe appointed in his place, to take command of the troops in Boston. On the land side, the town was blockaded by the Americans. The eyes of the whole country were upon Washington and expectation at its highest pitch. It was believed that he had an army adequate to every emergency, and that the British General would soon yield to the force of his arms. But faint were the hopes of the American General of such an issue. Yet, trusting in an overruling Providence, his strength rose in proportion to his difficulties.

In a letter to a friend, he says:—"I know the unhappy predicament in which I stand; I know that much is expected of me; I know that without men, without arms, without ammunition, without any thing fit for the accommodation of a soldier, little is to be done; and what is mortifying, I know that I cannot stand justified to the world, without exposing my own weakness, and injuring the cause, by declaring my wants, which I am deter-

mined not to do, farther than unavoidable necessity brings every man acquainted with them. My situation is so irksome to me at times, that if I did not consult the public good more than my own tranquillity, I should long ere this have put every thing on the cast of a die. So far from my having an army of twenty thousand men, well armed, I have been here with less than half that number, including sick, furloughed, and on command; and those neither armed nor clothed as they should be. In short, my situation has been such, that I have been obliged to use art to conceal it from my own officers.”\*

A resolution had been passed in Congress which Washington viewed as an expression of their wishes, that he should make an attack on Boston. To this he was fully inclined, and he begged Congress to do him the justice to consider that circumstances, not inclination, occasioned the delay. He says, “It is not in the pages of History to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musket shot of the enemy, for six months together, without ammunition, and at the same time to disband one army and recruit another, within that distance of twenty odd British regiments, is more than probably ever was attempted. But if we succeed as well in the latter as we have hitherto done in the former, I shall think it the most fortunate event of my whole life.”†

Such were the difficulties which embarrassed the

\* Sparks' Life and Writings of  
Washington, Vol. I., page 170.

† Marshall's Washington, Vol. II.,  
page 340.



movements of the Commander-in-chief. The short enlistment of the troops furnished no opportunity for their improvement in discipline. The officers were unable to establish their authority, and insubordination and misrule prevailed. General Washington says in one of his letters to Congress: "To make men well acquainted with the duties of a soldier, requires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination, not only requires time, but is a work of great difficulty; and in this army, where there is so little distinction between officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. To expect, then, the same service from raw and undisciplined recruits, as from veteran soldiers, is to expect what never did, and perhaps never will happen." \*

To dislodge the enemy from Boston, before they received reinforcements, was an object of the highest importance. To effect this, four or five thousand troops were enlisted in Massachusetts, but a council of war decided almost unanimously against the attack, principally on the ground of the want of ammunition,—and to General Washington's great regret the measure was abandoned.

It has been a question why General Howe, with a force of ten thousand men, did not attack the besieging army; and it is supposed to have resulted, either from ignorance of its weakness, or from the express orders of his government, to put nothing to

\* Marshall's Washington, Vol. II., page 345.

hazard. As the attack on Boston was abandoned, Washington decided to take possession of Dorchester Heights, which lie east of the town and entirely command it. This step, if successful, would force the British to evacuate. To deceive the enemy and facilitate the execution of the plan, a heavy bombardment and fire was kept up from Lechmere's Point, Cobble Hill and Roxbury, together with other positions in the neighbourhood of the enemy. This took place on the second of March. On the night of the fourth, immediately after our firing began, a body of American troops, under the command of General Thomas, in which was Captain Hull's company, marched from Roxbury to the Heights, and having prepared fascines, for the construction of the works by hand-labour, at morning light a barrier had been raised to screen them from the enemy. A severe but ineffectual fire was directed by the British against our works, and General Howe deemed it necessary to dislodge our troops from their position, or he could no longer hold the town. Dr. Thatcher, in his *Military Journal*, who was a witness of what he narrates, gives a lively description of these events.

Here Washington showed the genius and resolution of the soldier. In one night he made himself master of ground that left no alternative to his adversary, but to fight or evacuate the town. The plan was bold, and in the execution of it he was nobly sustained by the brave and virtuous yeomanry of New England. His ranks were filled; the munitions of war were brought to his aid, and the spirit of so many

heroes supplied, for the time, the deficiency of discipline ; while his single word moved the congregated multitude to act with one voice and one heart.

Napoleon, when addressing his army, just before the battle of Moscow, as the sun arose, said, with the tact of one who well knew the human heart—‘ *This is the Sun of Austerlitz.*’ Washington, at the moment when he expected to be engaged in a severe conflict with the enemy, exhorted his troops “ *to bear in mind the fifth of March,*” when the first blood of their countrymen was shed in the sacred cause of liberty. He has been called the American Fabius, it being said, “ that the art of avoiding battle, of baffling the enemy, and of temporizing, was his talent as well as his taste.” But we have seen at this period, his fixed purpose, to make an attack on Boston, in the hope, that it would result in the destruction of the British army. In this he was disappointed ; for after the decision of three successive councils of war, he was obliged to abandon a plan, in the prosecution of which he was sanguine of success. Washington combined the two indispensable ingredients which form the character of the soldier, and when we arrive at the stirring scenes of Trenton and of Princeton, when he took an offensive position and won two battles in less than twenty-four hours, we shall find it difficult to admit the assertion that ‘ avoiding battles, baffling the enemy, and temporizing, was his talent as well as his taste !’

Again, in his new position on the Heights, he challenges his adversary to battle, and carries out his

plans of offensive operations. In the full expectation of an assault on Dorchester Heights, his intention was, either during or after the battle, should a favourable moment offer,\* “to embark from Cambridge four thousand chosen men, who, rapidly crossing the arm of the sea, should take advantage of the tumult and confusion, to attempt the assault of the town.”

Upon General Washington's taking possession of Dorchester Heights, General Howe was compelled either to attack him immediately in this new and strong position or to evacuate the town. For many reasons he judged the latter course preferable, and accordingly abandoned Boston to the Americans. The details of these transactions may be found in Botta, and in other histories of the Revolution.

\* Otis's Translation of Botta's History, Vol. II., page 39.

## CHAPTER III.

EXECUTION OF CAPTAIN HALE AND MAJOR ANDRE.—PARALLEL DRAWN BETWEEN THESE TWO OFFICERS.

1776.

THE successful termination of the siege of Boston rendered the presence of the American army no longer necessary ; and New-York being now the object of the enemy, General Washington removed the troops to the defence of that city. To obtain this position, was highly important to the British, as it would, by means of the Hudson, open their communication with Canada, and enable them to co-operate with the troops in that quarter.

General Howe sailed from Boston to Halifax, where he received reinforcements from England. He then bent his course southwardly, and took possession of Staten Island, near New-York.

The Americans had been engaged under General Greene in fortifying the Heights of Brooklyn. This officer was obliged from illness to retire from command, and General Sullivan succeeded him. General Putnam was finally sent over, and on him the command devolved, four days before the battle commenced. The British army, soon after, passed over to Long Island, between the Narrows and Sandy Hook. A

severe action took place. The force of the Americans was about five thousand—that of the British, fifteen thousand men. Lord Stirling's division consisted of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware troops. They fought with great bravery. General Sullivan's corps was attacked on both sides, and after an obstinate resistance for three hours, he was compelled to surrender. The courage and good conduct of all the troops were universally acknowledged. Their loss was between eleven and twelve hundred, more than a thousand of whom were captured.

General Sullivan and Lord Stirling were among the prisoners. In the midst of this sanguinary battle, General Washington crossed over to Long Island with a part of his army and took possession of Brooklyn Heights. The regiment of Colonel Webb, to which Captain Hull was attached, was in this division. We saw the carnage of our brave countrymen. The soul of Washington seemed bursting with anguish at an event so unexpected and distressing. To hasten to the succour of his gallant troops, was his first wish; but prudence denied this relief, which he had too much reason to apprehend could only be secured by the sacrifice of his remaining brave soldiers. Besides those with him, he had at command the troops in New-York, which he might have ordered into the battle. But sensible of his inability to contend with the powerful army of the British, in the spirit of his usual wisdom and self-command he restrained the desire, and turned his attention to the best mode of making a retreat. "A council of war was called. No time



was lost in deliberation. It was resolved to withdraw the troops from Long Island. Boats were collected and other preparations were made without delay. On the morning of the thirtieth, the whole army, amounting to nine thousand men, the military stores, nearly all the provisions, and the artillery except a few heavy cannon, were safely landed in New-York.

“With such secrecy, silence and order was every thing conducted, that the last boat was crossing the river, before the retreat was discovered by the enemy, although parties were stationed within six hundred yards of the lines.

“This retreat, in its plan, execution, and success, has been regarded as one of the most remarkable military events in history, and as reflecting the highest credit on the talents and skill of the Commander. So intense was the anxiety of Washington, so unceasing his exertions, that for forty-eight hours he did not close his eyes, and rarely dismounted from his horse.”\*

It was evident, that the superior force of the British, would soon give them possession of New-York. The Commander-in-chief, therefore, took a position at Fort Washington, at the other end of the Island. To ascertain the further object of the enemy, was now a subject of anxious inquiry with General Washington. He communicated his wishes to Colonel Knowlton, who made it known to Captain

\* “Writings of Washington,” by Sparks, Vol. I., page 192.

Hale and other officers of his regiment. Captain Hale had recently been transferred from the regiment of Colonel Webb to that of Colonel Knowlton. There existed a warm friendship between himself and Captain Hull. They were of the same age, and had been classmates at Yale College. Two years after they graduated, the war commenced. They heard of the battles of Lexington and Bunker Hill. Their names were soon enrolled under the standard of their country, and they marched in the same regiment, to join the army of Washington at Cambridge, shortly after his arrival in camp.

Captain Hull had every opportunity to learn the true character of his much loved associate, nor can it be supposed, that there was a want of discrimination in the warm expression of his sentiments. He says in his MSS. Memoirs: "There was no young man who gave fairer promise of an enlightened and devoted service to his country, than this my friend and companion in arms. His naturally fine intellect had been carefully cultivated, and his heart was filled with generous emotions; but, like the soaring eagle, the patriotic ardour of his soul 'winged the dart which caused his destruction.'

"After his interview with Colonel Knowlton, he repaired to my quarters, and informed me of what had passed. He remarked, 'That he thought he owed to his country the accomplishment of an object so important, and so much desired by the Commander of her armies, and he knew of no other mode of obtaining the information, than by assuming a disguise



and passing into the enemy's camp.' He asked my candid opinion. I replied, that it was an action which involved serious consequences, and the propriety of it was doubtful; and though *he* viewed the business of a spy as a *duty*, yet, he could not officially be required to perform it. That such a service was not claimed of the meanest soldier, though many might be willing, for a pecuniary compensation, to engage in it; and as for himself, the employment was not in keeping with his character. His nature was too frank and open for deceit and disguise, and he was incapable of acting a part equally foreign to his feelings and habits. Admitting that he was successful, who would wish success at such a price? Did his country demand the moral degradation of her sons, to advance her interests? Stratagems are resorted to in war; they are feints and evasions, performed under no disguise; are familiar to commanders; form a part of their plans, and, considered in a military view, lawful and advantageous. The tact with which they are executed, exacts admiration from the enemy. But who respects the character of a spy, assuming the garb of friendship but to betray? The very death assigned him is expressive of the estimation in which he is held. As soldiers, let us do our duty in the field; contend for our legitimate rights, and not stain our honour by the sacrifice of integrity. And when present events, with all their deep and exciting interests, shall have passed away, may the blush of shame never arise, by the remembrance of an unworthy, though successful act, in the

performance of which we were deceived by the belief that it was sanctified by its object. I ended by saying, that should he undertake the enterprise, his short, bright career, would close with an ignominious death.

“He replied, ‘I am fully sensible of the consequences of discovery and capture in such a situation. But for a year I have been attached to the army, and have not rendered any material service, while receiving a compensation, for which I make no return. Yet,’ he continued, ‘I am not influenced by the expectation of promotion or pecuniary reward; I wish to be useful, and every kind of service, necessary to the public good, becomes honourable by being necessary. If the exigencies of my country demand a peculiar service, its claims to perform that service are imperious.’

“He spoke with warmth and decision. I replied, ‘That such are your wishes, cannot be doubted. But is this the most effectual mode of carrying them into execution? In the progress of the war, there will be ample opportunity to give your talents and your life, should it be so ordered, to the sacred cause to which we are pledged. You can bestow upon your country the richest benefits, and win for yourself the highest honours. Your exertions for her interests will be daily felt, while, by one fatal act, you crush for ever the power and the opportunity Heaven offers, for her glory and your happiness.’

“I urged him, for the love of country, for the love of kindred, to abandon an enterprise which would

only end in the sacrifice of the dearest interests of both.

“ He paused—then affectionately taking my hand, he said, ‘ I will reflect, and do nothing but what duty demands.’ He was absent from the army, and I feared he had gone to the British lines, to execute his fatal purpose. In a few days an officer came to our camp, under a flag of truce, and informed Hamilton, then a captain of artillery, but afterwards the aid of General Washington, that Captain Hale had been arrested within the British lines, condemned as a spy, and executed that morning.

“ I learned the melancholy particulars from this officer, who was present at his execution, and seemed touched by the circumstances attending it.

“ He said that Captain Hale had passed through their army, both of Long Island and York Island. That he had procured sketches of the fortifications, and made memoranda of their number and different positions. When apprehended, he was taken before Sir William Howe, and these papers, found concealed about his person, betrayed his intentions. He at once declared his name, his rank in the American army, and his object in coming within the British lines.

“ Sir William Howe, without the form of a trial, gave orders for his execution the following morning. He was placed in the custody of the Provost Marshal, who was a Refugee, and hardened to human suffering and every softening sentiment of the heart. Captain Hale, alone, without sympathy or support, save that from above, on the near approach of death asked for

a clergyman to attend him. It was refused. He then requested a Bible ; that too was refused by his inhuman jailer.

“ ‘ On the morning of his execution,’ continued the officer, ‘ my station was near the fatal spot, and I requested the Provost Marshal to permit the prisoner to sit in my marquee, while he was making the necessary preparations. Captain Hale entered : he was calm, and bore himself with gentle dignity, in the consciousness of rectitude and high intentions. He asked for writing materials, which I furnished him : he wrote two letters, one to his mother and one to a brother officer.’ He was shortly after summoned to the gallows. But a few persons were around him, yet his characteristic dying words were remembered. He said, ‘ I only regret, that I have but one life to lose for my country.’ ”

Thus terminated the earthly existence of a man, whose country mourned the loss of one of her fairest sons, and whose friends wept, in the bitter recollection of his untimely fate.

The Provost Marshal, in the diabolical spirit of cruelty, destroyed the letters of his prisoner, and assigned as a reason, “ that the rebels should not know that they had a man in their army who could die with so much firmness.”

The sentence was just, according to the laws of war, but the manner of its execution must ever be deplored.

There is a similarity in the fate of Major André and that of Captain Hale ; the former of whom excited so lively an interest in both armies, while the

latter has been rarely alluded to by the historians of the Revolution.

Major Andrè was the Adjutant General of the British army. He possessed a cultivated mind, genius in the fine arts, and was the charm of society wherever he was known.

Sir Henry Clinton, who in Sept. 1780 was commanding in New-York, placed the highest confidence in his abilities and patriotism. For eighteen months, an anonymous correspondence had been held between the British Commander and General Arnold, when finally Arnold made himself known, and offered to deliver to the enemy of his country West Point and the neighbouring fortresses in the Highlands, then under his immediate command.

Sir Henry Clinton proposed to Major Andrè to ascend the Hudson in the Vulture sloop of war, and have an interview with General Arnold, that they might settle upon a plan, which, if successful, they hoped would strike a fatal blow to the liberties of America, and thus put an end to the war.

Andrè, it was believed, possessed the talent and the tact to negotiate this delicate business. He was promised promotion and pecuniary reward. In a fatal hour he consented to go; to meet a traitor; a man low in every thing but military genius: and by thus descending, brought ruin on himself, and injured the cause, for which he was making such immense sacrifices. They met. Their plan was settled; was committed to paper, together with the drawings of the fortifications; all of which were given to Major Andrè.

The Vulture sloop of war having been fired upon by the Americans, had dropped down the river, but soon after returned to her station.

Joshua Smith, the only person that could be employed by Arnold to take Andrè back to the vessel, became alarmed, it is supposed, on account of the firing, and refused to go. This man was perfectly ignorant of the nature of the transaction. He believed he was acting for his country's interests, and, as appeared on his trial, was completely duped by Arnold.

The only alternative for Andrè was, to return by land. This was full of danger, but the danger must be met.

Major Andrè received the pass of General Arnold, took off his uniform, assumed the name of John Anderson, and crossing the Hudson at Stony Point, commenced his perilous journey. He felt his situation extremely critical when within the American lines, and stopped at their outposts: but the pass of Arnold still carried him on with safety.

At length a guide was no longer necessary, and Smith left him and returned home. Andrè went on, until he arrived within half a mile of Tarrytown. Here he was stopped by three men. Their names were John Paulding, David Williams, and Isaac Van Wart.\* One of them said, "There comes a gentlemanlike looking man, who appears to be well dressed,

\* For a most interesting account of the circumstances attending the capture of Andrè, the reader is referred to Sparks' Life of Benedict Arnold, from which some of the above particulars are taken.



and has boots on, and whom you had better step out and stop, if you don't know him."\*

“On that I got up and presented my firelock at the breast of the person, and told him to stand; and then I asked him which way he was going. ‘Gentlemen,’ said he, ‘I hope you belong to our party.’ I asked him what party. He said, ‘The lower party.’ Upon that I told him I did. Then he said, ‘I am a British officer, out of the country, on particular business, and I hope you will not detain me a minute;’—and to show that he was a British officer, he pulled out his watch. Upon which, I told him to dismount. He then said, ‘Well, I must do any thing to get along,’ and seemed to make a kind of laugh of it, and pulled out General Arnold’s pass, which was to John Anderson, to pass all guards to White Plains, and below. Upon that, he dismounted. Said he, ‘Gentlemen, you had best let me go, or you will bring yourselves into trouble; for your stopping me will detain the General’s business;’ and said, he was going to Dobb’s ferry to meet a person there and to get intelligence for General Arnold. Upon that, I told him, that I hoped he would not be offended; that we did not mean to take any thing from him; and I told him, there were bad people who were going along the road, and I did not know but perhaps he might be one.

“We took him into the bushes,” said Williams,

\* This was a part of the testimony given by his captors, eleven days after André was taken. See Thatcher’s Journal, page 261, for Resolution of Congress, in a Note.

“and ordered him to pull off his clothes, which he did ; but on searching him narrowly, we could not find any sort of writings. We told him to pull off his boots, which he seemed to be indifferent about ; but we got one boot off, and searched in that boot and could find nothing. But we found there were some papers in the bottom of his stocking, next to his foot, on which, we made him pull his stocking off, and found three papers wrapped up. Mr. Paulding looked at the contents, and said he was a spy. We then made him pull off his other boot, and there we found three more papers, at the bottom of his foot, within his stocking. Upon this, we made him dress himself, and I asked him, what he would give us to let him go. He said, he would give us any sum of money. I asked him whether he would give us his horse, saddle and bridle, watch, and one hundred guineas. He said yes, and told us, he would direct them to any place, even if it was that very spot, so that we could get them. I asked him if he would not give us more. He said he would give us any quantity of dry goods, or any sum of money, and bring it to any place that we might pitch upon, so that we might get it. Mr. Paulding answered, ‘No, if you should give us ten thousand guineas, you should not stir one step.’

“I then asked the person, who had called himself John Anderson, if he would not get away if it lay in his power. He answered, ‘Yes, I would.’ I told him, I did not intend he should. While taking him along, we asked him a few questions, and



we stopped under a shade. He begged us not to ask him questions, and said, when he came to any Commander, he would reveal all.

“In a few hours, we delivered him up to Lieutenant-Colonel Jameson, who commanded at North Castle, with all the papers that had been taken from his boots.”\*

The papers were of great importance, and had the plot succeeded, would have given to the enemy an advantage, productive of the most serious consequences. Major Andrè, aware that his papers had been sent to General Washington, and not to General Arnold, as he had hoped, wrote to the Commander-in-chief, a full confession of his name, rank in the British army, and his object in coming within the American lines. After he had written this letter, it was remarked by Major Tallmage, who now had charge of the prisoner, that he seemed more cheerful, entered into conversation, in his own delightful and peculiar way, and greatly interested all around him, by the vivacity and beauty of a well-stored intellect.

In a communication to Mr. Sparks, Major Tallmage writes : “When we left West Point for Tappan, early in the morning, as we passed down the Hudson river to King’s Ferry, I placed Andrè by my side, on the after seat of the barge. I soon began to make inquiries about the expected capture of our fortress, then in full view, and begged him to inform me, whether he was to have taken a part in the military

\* See Sparks’ Life and Treason of Benedict Arnold, page 226.

attack, if Arnold's plan had succeeded. He instantly replied in the affirmative, and pointed me to a table of land on the west shore, which he said was the spot where he should have landed, at the head of a select corps. He then traversed, in idea, the course up the mountains, into the rear of Fort Putnam, which overlooks the whole parade of West Point. This he did with much greater exactness than I could have done; and as Arnold had so disposed of the garrison, that little or no opposition could be made by our troops, Major André supposed he should reach that commanding eminence without difficulty.

“In such case, that important key of our country would have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and the glory of so splendid an achievement would have been his. The animation with which he gave the account, I recollect, perfectly delighted me, for he seemed as if he were entering the fort, sword in hand.

“To complete the climax, I inquired what would have been his reward, if he had succeeded. He replied, that military glory was all he sought: and that the thanks of his General and the approbation of his King were a rich reward for such an undertaking. I think he further remarked, that if he had succeeded (and with the aid of the opposing General who could doubt of success?) he was to have been promoted to the rank of a Brigadier-General.

“After we disembarked at King's Ferry, near Ha-

verstraw, we took up our line of march, with a fine body of horse, for Tappan. Before we reached the close, Major Andrè became very inquisitive to know my opinion, as to the result of his capture. In other words, he wished me to give him candidly my opinion, as to the light in which he would be viewed by General Washington and a Military Tribunal, if one should be ordered.

“This was the most unpleasant question that had been propounded to me, and I endeavoured to evade it, unwilling to give him a true answer.

“When I could no longer evade his importunity, I remarked to him as follows :—‘I had a much loved classmate in Yale College, by the name of Nathan Hale, who entered the army in the year 1775. Immediately after the battle of Long Island, General Washington wanted information respecting the strength, position, and probable movements of the enemy. Captain Hale tendered his services, went over to Brooklyn, and was taken prisoner, just as he was passing the outposts of the enemy on his return.’

“Said I with emphasis, ‘Do you remember the sequel of this story?’ ‘Yes,’ said Andrè, ‘he was hanged as a spy. But you surely do not consider his case and mine alike?’ I replied, ‘Yes, precisely similar, and similar will be your fate.’

“He endeavoured to answer my remarks, but it was manifest he was more troubled in spirit than I had ever before seen him.

“The day after his arrival at Tappan, a Board of Officers, of six Major-Generals and eight Brigadier-

Generals, were appointed to examine his case. General Greene was the President. The names of the officers constituting the Board were read to him.

“General Greene told the prisoner that he might be at liberty to answer or not the questions put to him, and to take his own time for recollecting and weighing what he said.

“He was asked, if when he came on shore, he considered himself under a flag. He answered, it was impossible for him to suppose he came on shore, under the sanction of a flag, and added, that if he came on shore, under that sanction, he certainly might have returned under it.

“During his examination, he was dignified and manly, and answered with frankness and truth every thing that related to himself, and used no words to explain or defend any part of his conduct. So delicate was he in regard to other persons, that he scrupulously avoided mentioning names, or alluding to any particulars, except such as concerned himself.

“After the most careful examination of his case, to which he offered no defence, he was, by the laws of war, sentenced to die as a spy.

“His fate created great interest and sympathy, not only in the British, but in the American army. On both sides, the desire was to save him. But trying as it was to the feelings of General Washington, yet justice demanded the sacrifice.

“Efforts were made to save him. Captain Ogden, an American officer, was sent to the British lines, under a flag of truce, with a packet of letters from

General Washington. He was directed to obtain further orders from General La Fayette. The General told him to arrange his visit in such a way, as to make it so late at night that he would be invited to remain. That in the course of conversation, it might probably be asked, by the officers, if there was any way in which Andrè could be saved. That he should reply, yes, that there was a way; which was, if Sir Henry Clinton would deliver up Arnold and take Andrè in exchange, the prisoner would be set at liberty. Captain Ogden was asked if he had authority for such a declaration. He replied, ‘I have no such assurance from General Washington, but I am prepared to say, that if such a proposition were made, I believe it would be accepted, and Major Andrè set at liberty.’

“The commanding officer immediately went to Sir Henry Clinton. On his return, he told Captain Ogden that such a thing could not be done; that to give up a man, who had deserted from the enemy and openly espoused the King’s cause, was such a violation of honour and every military principle, that Sir Henry Clinton would not listen to the idea for a moment.”

Major Andrè asked of General Washington the privilege of being shot, but this request could not be granted, according to the strict laws of war. General Washington made no reply to his application.

Dr. Thatcher, in his *Military Journal*,\* says: “At

\* *Journal*, page 273.



the moment, therefore, when suddenly he came in view of the gallows, he involuntarily started backward and made a pause. ‘Why this emotion, sir?’ said an officer by his side. Instantly recovering his composure, he said, ‘I am reconciled to my death, but I detest the mode.’ While waiting and standing near the gallows, I observed some degree of trepidation; placing his foot on a stone, and rolling it over, and choking in his throat, as if attempting to swallow. So soon, however, as he perceived things were in readiness, he stepped quickly into the wagon, and at this moment he appeared to shrink; but instantly elevating his head, with firmness he said, ‘It will be but a momentary pang;’ and taking from his pocket two white handkerchiefs, the Provost Marshal with one loosely pinioned his arms, and with the other the victim, after taking off his hat and stock, bandaged his own eyes, with perfect firmness, which melted the hearts and moistened the cheeks, not only of his servant, but of the throng of spectators. The rope being appended to the gallows, he slipped the noose over his head, and adjusted it to his neck, without the assistance of the awkward executioner. Colonel Scammel now informed him that he had an opportunity to speak, if he desired it; he raised the handkerchief from his eyes and said, ‘I pray you to bear me witness, that I meet my fate like a brave man.’ The next moment life was extinguished.”

Major André is described as being possessed of personal attraction, and was highly accomplished. A likeness of him is preserved, taken by himself with

a pen, on the morning of his execution, while seated at a table in the guard-room.\*

A parallel has been drawn by historians between Andrè and Hale ; and it may be admitted, without a bias in favour of our countryman, that Hale was influenced by nobler and purer motives than Andrè : for his death marked the Patriot and the Christian.

But if we consider how different were their early condition in life, as well as their official stations, we would find abundant cause for this difference. Unhappily, men are more governed in their conduct by the circumstances in which they are placed, than by principle. The influence which surrounds them involuntarily becomes an element in action, and their motives are often worldly and selfish in their character.

Andrè and Hale both possessed a high sense of moral rectitude, elevated tastes, and pure habits. Had their positions in life been changed, we are not sure but that Andrè might have exhibited the qualities of Hale, and Hale those of Andrè. The country of Hale was poor and feeble, contending for its rights, under circumstances of great disadvantage, and deep depression. Its defenders were disciplined by suffering, and rather felt for her than themselves.

Andrè belonged to the most powerful nation of the earth : a nation whose armies were victorious in every quarter of the globe. To contend for her, was to contend for the enlargement of her borders

\* The original drawing is now in the Trumbull Gallery of Yale College.

and the increase of her pride. To combat for suffering America, was to combat for liberty, for home, for virtue.

Where is the man whose feelings and opinions would not be affected by such a discipline, and would not in the hour of death feel more for his country's interests than his own personal reputation? André said, "I pray you to bear me witness, that I meet my fate like a brave man." The words of Hale were, "I only lament, that I have but one life to lose for my country." The one, in the event of success expected promotion and pecuniary rewards; the other, looked only for the unspeakable happiness of having done what he deemed his duty.

André engaged in the enterprise without the thought or view of danger. Protected by the power and influence of Arnold, and his retreat from our shores secured by a British armed vessel in the river, he had nothing to apprehend; while animated by the prospect of almost certain success in viewing the advantage presented by the defection of Arnold.

On the contrary, Hale went to the enemy's lines in the very spirit of self-devotion, resolved to achieve his work, or meet death, which he knew was the certain alternative.

In the solemn hours preceding the approach of eternity, André sought relief in intellectual enjoyments, in the works of genius, and left to the world a drawing of his own person, taken in his guard-room, from which he was soon to pass to the scaffold. He asked that he might die the death of a



soldier, and not by the hands of the common hangman.

Hale thought not of the mode of his death. He felt like the virtuous Raleigh; when inquired of by the executioner which way he should lay his head, replied, "No matter, so that the heart is right."

In the near view of death, Hale sought the consolations of religion. He asked for a Bible and a clergyman, to assist him in his preparation for the eternal world. Though denied them both, yet we may be permitted to believe that the wish of his heart was blessed, and that the Spirit of God became his Teacher.

The memory of Andrè is enshrined in monuments of art, that of Hale in the hearts of his countrymen.

## CHAPTER IV.

BATTLE OF CHATTERTON HILL, AT THE WHITE PLAINS.

1776.

THE British army being in possession of New-York, General Washington took a strong position on the heights about Kingsbridge, at the eastern end of the island. The main body of the enemy advanced to a narrow part of the island, near his position, their right extending to the East River, and their left to the Hudson, near Bloomingdale. Between these lines partial engagements took place, which were honourable to the American arms. The gallant manner in which the troops of Washington fought, together with the strength of his position, were undoubtedly among the reasons which prevented the British Commander from hazarding a general action. Even if Washington had been beaten on this ground, he had two lines of defence across the Island, and a very strong position at Kingsbridge, which would have enabled him to have retreated with safety, and preserved his communication with his country.

Under these circumstances, General Howe made a movement, the object of which was to compel General Washington to abandon his position on

York Island and at Kingsbridge, or suffer his communication to be entirely obstructed. For this purpose he embarked his army on the East River, in flat-bottomed boats, passed Hellgate, and landed on Frog or Throg's Neck, a suitable point from which to march his army across the country, attain the rear of the Americans, and communicate with a part of the British fleet in the Hudson, which had passed forts Washington and Lee, notwithstanding their fire and the obstructions placed in the river to oppose their passage.

The American Commander perceiving the object of this movement, determined, though with reluctance, to abandon his position on York Island, and march the left of his army to the White Plains; the right extending in the first instance to Kingsbridge.

It was soon apparent that General Howe was concentrating his whole army at Frog's Neck and its vicinity, excepting a small body left in New-York for its defence. Washington therefore moved his right division from Kingsbridge to the White Plains.

So anxious was he, however, to retain a footing on York Island, especially for the purpose of obstructing the navigation of the Hudson, that he left a garrison of between two and three thousand men at Fort Washington, under the command of Colonel McGaw, of Pennsylvania.

While the American General was marching the right wing of his army from Kingsbridge to the White Plains, General Howe commenced his march from Frog's Neck towards the same point. On the

march, the left wing of the British and the right wing of the American army were very near each other.

When the left wing, under the command of Major-General Charles Lee, arrived at the White Plains, General McDougal's brigade was directed to take possession of Chatterton's Hill, about a mile in advance of the White Plains, on the right of the American army. The river Brunx ran in the low grounds, at the foot of the hill, and about one hundred yards in front of McDougal's brigade.

Colonel Webb's regiment, in which was Captain Hull's company, belonged to this brigade, which consisted of about fifteen hundred men.

"Early in the morning," says General Hull in his MSS., "having taken our position, we discovered at a distance the approach of the British army. Its appearance was truly magnificent. A bright autumnal sun shed its full lustre on their polished arms; and the rich array of dress and military equipage, gave an imposing grandeur to the scene, as they advanced, in all the pomp and circumstance of war, to give us battle.

"When the columns arrived within a small distance of our line, on the opposite side of the Brunx, they halted; their field artillery was advanced, with which they commenced a heavy fire. We had but three or four pieces of artillery.

"They returned the fire, until the whole of them were dismounted. The enemy then made a nearer approach, and with chain and grape shot, continued the cannonade for more than an hour.

“ General Howe, finding that he could not dislodge us from the hill with his artillery, formed three columns of infantry, which passed the Brunx, one against our centre, and the other two against each flank.

“ At this moment Colonel Webb received orders from General McDougal to move and take a position further to the left, to prevent the enemy from turning his left flank. This was promptly done, and with much order and regularity. After a sharp conflict, the object was completely attained. Our whole line sustained the attack with persevering bravery, for a considerable time, but at length, overpowered by numbers, the right and the centre first retreated in some disorder. Colonel Webb’s regiment maintained the conflict for a time, after the other part of the brigade had abandoned the field, and it had the honour to receive the particular thanks of Washington for its bravery and orderly retreat.”\*

The loss of the Americans in killed, wounded,

\* Extract from a letter of General Brooks, to the President of the Court Martial, held at Albany, for the trial of General Hull, dated February 4th, 1814, touching the battle at the White Plains. It will be perceived, that General Hull does not mention the fact, that he was the officer detached from the line by his Commander, to oppose the enemy on the left.

General Brooks says, “ In the month of September, 1776, at White

Plains, General Hull acted under my immediate orders, and was detached from the line, to oppose a body of Light Infantry and Yagers, advancing upon the left flank of the American army. His orders were executed with promptitude, gallantry, and effect. Though more than double his number, the enemy was compelled to retreat, and the left of the American line thus enabled, by a flank movement, to pass the Brunx.”

and prisoners, was about two hundred and fifty. The British loss nearly the same.

General Howe did not pursue the advantage he had gained. A general action was expected the next morning, but a violent storm of rain was probably the cause which prevented it. When the storm ceased, General Howe changed his mode of operations, and made a retrograde movement to Kingsbridge, for the purpose of reducing the garrison at Fort Washington, on Long Island.

The historians of the Revolution give an account of the reduction of this fortress, and the retreat of General Washington in November and December, through New Jersey, and over the Delaware. Captain Hull was not a witness of these events. The MSS. continues :

“ Our regiment formed a part of the division under Charles Lee, and was stationed in the Highlands, on the Hudson.

“ General Lee was ordered to march through the upper parts of New Jersey, and join, as speedily as possible, the army of Washington. During the march, at a halt in Morris county, he went one night to lodge at a farm-house, three miles distant from the camp. The British, by some means, obtained information of this step, and Colonel Harcourt, with a body of cavalry, made a forced march in the night, and early in the morning surrounded the house. The troops fired into the windows, and General Lee was made prisoner, before he suspected that an enemy was near.



“They mounted him on a horse in great haste, without cloak or hat, and carried him in triumph to New-York. It is impossible to describe the excitement produced by this event.

“General Lee was second to Washington in command. He had held a high rank in the British army, and had seen much military service. The country deplored his loss. Washington felt it to be a severe misfortune, and the army considered that, next to Washington, Lee was the sinew and soul of their strength.

“General Sullivan, of New Hampshire, was the next officer of rank in the division. He marched it with great rapidity to the Delaware, and about the 20th of December joined the main army in Pennsylvania. Here we remained inactive but a few days. General Washington deemed it necessary to make some bold effort to rouse the desponding spirit of the country, which at this period had sunk into the deepest gloom.”

Although the enemy had abandoned for the present, the idea of proceeding to Philadelphia, on account of the severity of the season, and the difficulty of passing the Delaware, yet Rhode Island and New-York were in their possession; a great part of New Jersey was conquered, and a spirit of disaffection prevailed in Pennsylvania. The patriotic feelings that pervaded every part of the country at the commencement of the contest, appeared now to be nearly extinguished.

## CHAPTER V.

BATTLE OF TRENTON.—CAPTAIN HULL ACTS AS FIELD OFFICER IN THE ABSENCE OF MAJOR BROOKS.

1776.

GENERAL WASHINGTON having been reinforced by the division under General Sullivan, and by a part of the northern army which had served under General Gates, formed the bold design of passing the Delaware, and attacking the different posts of the enemy on its eastern shore. At Trenton there were stationed three regiments of Hessians, consisting of fifteen hundred men, besides a troop of light-horse.

Other detachments were at Burlington, Bordentown, Mount Holly, and Black Horse. General Cadwallader was appointed to attack these posts, and directed to cross the river at Bristol, while Washington would cross above Trenton, and General Ewing below, and unite in the attack on the Hessians in that place.

Early in the evening of the twenty-fifth of December, the troops were put in motion, and commenced crossing the river. The army consisted of two thousand four hundred men, and twenty pieces of artillery.

It crossed the Delaware about ten miles above



Trenton. The evening set in with a violent storm of hail and snow, which continued during the night. The weather was intensely cold, and the ice floated down the river in such quantities, that the passage of the troops was not completed until three o'clock in the morning. They were then formed into two columns. The right marched on a road near the river, under General Sullivan; and the left on a road a little distant from it, towards the east. Both of these roads entered the town of Trenton, and the distance to be marched was about the same. General Greene led on the other column, but Washington commanded in person. Colonel Webb's regiment formed a part of it. At daylight the columns halted, but the men were not permitted to leave their ranks. During the halt, Captain Hull was sent for by his Commander, who informed him, that his Lieutenant-Colonel was absent, and that Major Brooks, overcome with fatigue, had returned to the encampment; that he had no field officer with him, and desired Captain Hull to give the command of his company to his Lieutenant, and assist him as a field officer in the general command of the regiment. This order was promptly obeyed.

When the columns were ordered to resume the march, the fatigue of the troops was so great that nearly one half of the men were asleep, and those awake passed by, leaving them standing on their posts. It was with difficulty they could be roused and the order of march resumed. According to the plan, both columns arrived at the point of attack with-

in a few minutes of each other. Notwithstanding the severity of the weather, the elements raging around us, the moment the firing commenced by the outguards of our columns, and the outguards of the enemy, the whole corps was animated with new spirit, and advanced with a firmness and impetuosity, which bore a striking contrast to the drowsy attitudes they exhibited a few moments before. The firing of the advanced parties having given the alarm to the enemy, the commanding officer, Colonel Rhall, immediately prepared for battle. He formed his line on ground, then an orchard, on the right of the road leading to Philadelphia, and facing to the northwest.

The column led on by General Washington pressed with such irresistible force on the right and centre of the enemy, while the column on the left acted with equal spirit, that the British force, after a short struggle, was compelled to surrender. Some of the British attempted to retreat on the Princeton road, but were prevented by a detachment from our left column. In a short time, nearly the whole body were either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners; and all their artillery, magazines, and military stores, were in our possession.

A small part of the enemy retreated to Bordentown and Burlington, which they could not have done had it been possible for the detachment under Ewing and Cadwallader to have crossed the Delaware, below Trenton, and at Burlington above, as was the intention. Among the killed was the com-

manding officer, Colonel Rhal, a truly brave man, and nearly one thousand officers and soldiers were made prisoners.

General Washington, with all possible speed, commenced his march back to the same ferry where he had crossed the Delaware, taking his prisoners, cannon, arms, and military stores.

It occupied a part of the second night to recross the river, so great were the difficulties, increased by the accumulation of ice. The operation was not completed until three o'clock in the morning. "Six brass field-pieces and a thousand stand of arms, were the trophies of victory. Colonel Rhal, the Hessian commander and a gallant officer, was mortally wounded. Six other officers and between twenty and thirty men were killed. The American loss was two privates killed and two others frozen to death. Captain William Washington, distinguished as an officer of cavalry at a later period of the war, and Lieutenant Monroe, afterwards President of the United States, were wounded in a brave and successful assault upon the enemy's artillery. The fact that two men died by suffering from cold, is a proof of the intense severity of the weather. It snowed and hailed during the whole march. The ice had formed so fast in the river, below Trenton, that it was impracticable for the troops under Cadwallader and Ewing to pass over at the times agreed upon. Cadwallader succeeded in landing a battalion of infantry, but the ice on the margin of the stream was in such a condition, as to render it impossible to land

the artillery, and they all returned. If Ewing had crossed, as was proposed, and taken possession of the bridge on the south side of the town, the party that fled would have been intercepted and captured. And there was the fairest prospect that Cadwallader would have been equally fortunate against the detachment below, or have driven them towards Trenton, where they would have met a victorious army.”\*

Captain Hull writes: “To give you some idea of the excessive fatigue of the troops engaged in this enterprise, I relate the following anecdote respecting myself. It was between two and three o’clock in the morning of the second night, when my company recrossed the Delaware. I marched them to the house of a farmer, and halted to obtain refreshments and rest. After my men were accommodated, I went into a room where a number of officers were sitting around a table, with a large dish of ‘hasty pudding’ in its centre. I sat down, procured a spoon, and began to eat. While eating, I fell from my chair to the floor, overcome with sleep, and in the morning, when I awoke, the spoon was fast clenched in my hand.”

\* Sparks’ Life and Writings of Washington, Vol. I., page 228.

## CHAPTER VI.

CRITICAL STATE OF THE COUNTRY.—WASHINGTON'S EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE TROOPS FROM RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES.—PROMOTION OF CAPTAIN HULL.—BATTLE OF PRINCETON.

1777.

NOTWITHSTANDING the success which attended our arms at Trenton, the situation of the army and country was extremely critical.

The time for which the best troops from the northward had engaged, would expire in a few days. The recruiting service in every part of the country was attended with little success. It was with great difficulty that the militia could be called into active service, and a spirit of despondency every where prevailed. There was no period of the war more gloomy and discouraging than the close of the year 1776. Had General Washington now retreated into winter quarters, the whole of New Jersey would have remained in possession of the enemy; and as soon as the ice had formed on the Delaware, the British would have marched to Philadelphia without opposition. The state of the army and the circumstances of the country required bold and decisive measures.

Of this Washington was sensible. After recruiting his army for two or three days, he recrossed the

river to Trenton. The British garrison below, at Bordentown and Burlington, after our victory at Trenton, had retreated to Princeton and Brunswick, and Generals Ewing and Cadwallader had recrossed the Delaware with the militia under their command, and taken possession of the posts vacated by the enemy.

The year was drawing to a close, and the most effective part of the army, in a few days, would be entitled to a discharge. At this critical moment Washington received information that a part of the British army, under Lord Cornwallis, was advancing from New-York to retrieve the misfortunes which had attended their arms at Trenton. General Washington immediately ordered the troops from the Highlands into New Jersey, with all the militia that could be collected, to press upon the rear and right of Lord Cornwallis's division, to retard their movements as much as possible. He likewise ordered the militia from Burlington and Bordentown to join him at Trenton.

Washington made a solemn appeal to that part of his army whose term of service was now expiring. He spoke of the fidelity with which they had served, and acknowledged their just right to a discharge. He begged them, however, to consider what would be the situation of the country, if they availed themselves of that right. He reminded them of their gallant conduct a few days before, on the very ground on which they were then standing; how honourable it had been to them, how advantageous to their country, and how



mortifying to the enemy. That if they now returned to their homes, all the advantages gained by us would be lost, and there would be no army to oppose the progress of the enemy, wherever he was inclined to march; and asked them to consider what would be his situation under circumstances like these. He then urged them to engage for six weeks, and as an inducement, offered a bounty of ten dollars.

Captain Hull communicated the proposition of the Commander-in-chief to his company, and used every argument in his power, in addition to what his General had urged, to induce them to comply. He was happy to return every man of them for the next six weeks. A large proportion of the army complied with the wishes of their Commander.

The state of the country had now become so distressing, and the dangers impending so alarming, that Congress confided to General Washington extraordinary powers, in relation to appointments in the army, requisitions on the State for militia, and resources for their support, but limiting these powers to the period of six months.

The day before the army marched from Trenton to Princeton, Captain Hull was informed that the Commander-in-chief wished to see him at head-quarters. He was introduced to General Washington, who observed to him that he understood that he was a Captain in the Connecticut line; that there was no vacancy in that line, but there was a vacancy in the Massachusetts line; that if Captain Hull was willing



to be transferred to another regiment, he was authorized and disposed to give him promotion.

Captain Hull expressed his grateful feelings, and replied, "I am a soldier for my country, and it is immaterial in what particular line of the army I serve." Shortly after he received a commission as a Major in the eighth Massachusetts regiment.

About the first of January, Lord Cornwallis advanced from Princeton. General Washington directed a small body of troops to observe his motions, and by skirmishing with his advanced parties, to impede his progress.

On this service Captain (now Major) Hull was ordered. The Americans met the guard of the British about three miles from Trenton, and skirmished with light parties of them, retreating at the same time towards the town. This continued during the afternoon, until the main body of the enemy reached Trenton, a little before sunset.

Unimportant as this skirmishing may appear to one who knew not the secret design of Washington, yet it had a strong bearing on the future success of the American arms. His plan was well matured, and to retard the approach of the British until night was necessary to its execution. It was this delay which led to his escape from Lord Cornwallis at Trenton, and his subsequent victory at Princeton.

On the approach of the enemy General Washington retired over the Assanpink, a creek which

runs through the southern part of Trenton, and empties into the Delaware. Here he formed, with the creek in his front, his left extending to the Delaware, and his right as far on the creek as his numbers would admit.

Lord Cornwallis was on the other side of the creek, his right extending to the Delaware and his left towards Maidenhead.

The American force, including militia, did not exceed five thousand men. The British were double the number. They commenced a cannonade, which was briskly returned, until darkness put an end to the contest. Both armies were without tents, and kindled fires for the night. The sentinels were stationed on the borders of the creek, and could hear each other's heavy tread, as they moved up and down its banks. The Delaware was so full of ice that a retreat seemed impossible. Lord Cornwallis expected, by a general action the following morning, to destroy this remnant of the American army.

Here, amidst a choice of difficulties, Washington, with consummate foresight, adopted an expedient which not only saved his army, but added fresh laurels to it. New Jersey was relieved from the presence of the enemy, and Philadelphia freed from the danger with which it was threatened.

In the middle of the night Washington ordered his fires to be re-kindled; "fires which were a light to the Americans, but darkness to the British;" the outguards to remain on their posts, and men to dig so near the enemy's line, that the turning up of the

earth could be distinctly heard by their sentinels. He then silently drew off his army to the right, and made a circuitous march to Princeton. On approaching the town between daylight and sunrise, we met two British regiments, which had commenced their march, to join Cornwallis at Trenton. An action immediately commenced with these regiments, by the vanguard of our column, in which the enemy at first had the advantage ; but, on the arrival of General Washington, with a superior force, they were dispersed, one part towards Trenton, the other towards Brunswick. A third regiment, near the Colleges, had formed ; it was immediately attacked, and the remnant of it, after much loss, retreated to Brunswick. About one hundred of the enemy were killed, and three hundred made prisoners.

Lord Cornwallis had no knowledge of this movement, until it was announced to him by the firing at Princeton. It was doubtful what course he would pursue. The possession of Philadelphia, the capital of America, had seemed a favorite object. Now that the road was open, he was not disposed to avail himself of the occasion to gain that point, but immediately commenced a rapid march, to attack us at Princeton.

As soon as General Washington had collected the prisoners, he advanced about three miles on the road leading to Brunswick, and after passing Millstone Creek, filed off to the left, and directed his march to Morristown, where he established his winter quarters.

Lord Cornwallis, supposing that Washington had

gone in the direction of Brunswick, and anxious for the fate of the garrison, as well as for the protection of a large sum of money deposited there, pushed directly to that place.

During these operations, in the midst of winter, our army was destitute of the necessary articles of clothing. This circumstance, and the extreme fatigue it had endured, prevented General Washington from proceeding to Brunswick, where in all probability he would have gained another complete victory.\*

It was the fortune of Major Hull to be in the severest parts of the memorable battles of Trenton and Princeton. The classical and eloquent Italian historian of the war, Charles Botta, after describing these transactions, adds: "Achievements so astonishing, acquired an immense glory for the Captain General of the United States. All nations shared in the surprise of the Americans; all equally admired and applauded the prudence, the constancy, and the noble intrepidity of General Washington. An unanimous voice pronounced him the saviour of his country: all extolled him as equal to the most celebrated commanders of antiquity; all proclaimed him the Fabius of America. His name was in the mouth of all; he was celebrated by the pens of the most distinguished writers. The most illustrious personages of Europe lavished upon him their praises and their congratulations. The American General therefore, wanted neither a cause to defend, nor occasion

\* See Appendix No. I.—Colonel Simcoe, respecting Washington's Hull's conversation with Governor escape from Cornwallis at Trenton.

for the acquisition of glory, nor genius to avail himself of it, nor the renown due to his triumphs, nor an entire generation of men perfectly well disposed to render him homage.”\*

In a former chapter, the reader was informed that the regiment of Colonel Webb left the Highlands, under the command of General Lee, to reinforce the army of Washington in Pennsylvania. The march commenced about the beginning of December. Major Hull writes :

“ In recounting the hardships and fatigue which my company encountered, and the patience and fortitude with which they endured them, you will have a representation of the situation and conduct of the whole American army at that time. I relate nothing but what I was in the best possible situation to know, and what I personally witnessed.

“ When we left the Highlands, my company consisted of about fifty, rank and file. On examining the state of the clothing, I found there was not more than one poor blanket to two men : many of them had neither shoes nor stockings ; and those who had, found them nearly worn out. All the clothing was of the same wretched description.

“ These troops had been almost a year in service, and their pay which was due, remained unpaid. Yet their privations and trials were only equalled by their patience. They knew the resources of their country did not admit of their being more comfortable ; yet,

\* Otis's Botta, Vol. II., page 227.

in a noble spirit of patriotism, they served her in her greatest need without compensation, and almost without the hope of more prosperous days.

“In this condition, during the inclement month of December, we marched through New Jersey, slept on the cold ground, until we joined the army of General Washington in Pennsylvania. Here we remained a few days, but found no relief from our sufferings, unless it was relief to join companions in similar distress.

“In the attacks at Trenton and Princeton we were in this destitute situation, and continued to sleep on the frozen ground, without covering, until the seventh of January, when we arrived at Morristown, New Jersey, where General Washington established his winter quarters. The patient endurance of the army at this period, is perhaps unexampled in this or any other country.”



## CHAPTER VII.

RETREAT OF GENERAL ST. CLAIR FROM TICONDEROGA.

1777.

WHEN the army was established in winter quarters in New Jersey, Major Hull was ordered to repair to Boston and assist in recruiting the eighth Massachusetts regiment. Michael Jackson, Esquire, was the Colonel of the regiment, and John Brooks, Esquire, afterwards Governor of Massachusetts, was the Lieutenant-Colonel.

Colonel Jackson had not recovered from his wounds, received at Montessor's Island, near New-York, in the second year of the war, and was unable to perform duty. Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks had been active in recruiting the regiment, and several companies had been sent to rendezvous at Springfield, on Connecticut River. Major Hull was ordered to that place, to take the command of them, and attend to their discipline. Here he remained until the month of April, when about three hundred men had been recruited, and he was directed to march them to Ticonderoga, to reinforce the army at that station, under the command of Major-General St. Clair. Major Hull arrived early in May at Ticonderoga. His troops were posted at the old French lines, and



were employed in strengthening the works, until the latter part of June, when General Burgoyne approached with his army from Canada, and commenced an investment of the place.

Ticonderoga is a neck of land, situated on the west side of Lake Champlain, and surrounded on all sides by water, excepting where the French lines were established. Mount Independence is on the eastern side of the lake, opposite to Ticonderoga. The two posts were connected by a bridge. Mount Independence was fortified, and a part of St. Clair's army stationed there for its defence. The Americans had no naval force on the lake. The British army came up in boats, and several armed vessels. It had been joined by a great number of savages.

General Burgoyne commenced operations by landing his forces on both sides of the lake, about three miles above Ticonderoga. His right wing took possession of Mount Hope. This was an eminence in front of the French lines, and extended to the outlet of Lake George.

His taking this position, entirely cut off our communication with Lake George, and completely invested Ticonderoga on the west side.

The Germans, under the command of General Reidesel, landed on the east side of the lake, about three miles from Mount Independence; they commenced cutting a road and advancing to a position, so as to form an investment of that place.

The armed vessels took a station across the lake, a small distance from Ticonderoga. On the south

of the fort is a hill, called Sugar-loaf Hill, which overlooks both Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, and within a point blank shot of both of these places.

Between this hill and Ticonderoga, is a narrow bay, into which is the outlet, running from Lake George.

General St. Clair frequently spoke of the importance of fortifying this hill; but remarked, that it would be improper to do so, until the garrison was reinforced; for he had not at that moment a sufficient number of men to defend the works already established, and that by extending them he should weaken his post.

General Burgoyne, perceiving the advantage of this position, with great labour surmounted the difficulties of its almost perpendicular ascent, and commenced preparing a battery on its summit. General St. Clair was now convinced that the loss of his army would be inevitable, if he persevered in defending the fort.

On the sixth of July, he summoned a council of war, and the unanimous opinion was to retreat, before the investment was completed, which would have taken place the following day.

That evening the baggage and stores were put on board the boats, and at an early hour in the night the troops silently retired from Ticonderoga, over the bridge, to Mount Independence. The intention was to move quietly, that the enemy would have no information of the retreat until the next morning. Unfortunately, the barracks of General Fournay took fire, and the whole of Mount Independence was illu-

minated. By this disaster, the enemy were apprised of the projected retreat, before our march was commenced ; and they immediately prepared for pursuit.

A brigade of troops under the command of Colonel Long, proceeded with the baggage by water, to Skeensborough. The main body of the army, under the command of General St. Clair, marched through a wilderness to Castletown, in Vermont, about thirty miles from Ticonderoga. A large body of the enemy, under the command of Generals Frazer and Reidesel, pursued, and the morning after the retreat attacked the rear-guard, consisting of about thirteen hundred men, commanded by Colonel Warner. The guard had been much increased by a large number of troops falling out from the main body through fatigue and other causes. It was impossible to avoid this irregularity, as the march was through a thick wilderness, in a path but just wide enough for two men to walk abreast.

Colonels Warner and Francis were the principal officers who commanded in this trying and perilous situation. They made great exertions, and for some time successfully resisted. But when the main body of the enemy was brought into action, our gallant troops were compelled to retreat. At this time Colonel Francis was killed ; and the loss of killed, wounded, and prisoners, was probably five or six hundred.

It was the intention of General St. Clair to have marched to Skeensborough ; but at the same time that the rear of his army was defeated, he received

information that Colonel Long had retreated from that place. As his object in quitting Ticonderoga was to save his army for future operations, he changed his line of march, and proceeded by the way of Rutland and Manchester in Vermont, to Fort Edward on the Hudson, and there joined the forces commanded by General Schuyler.

The clamour against General St. Clair was excessive. Even the army which he had saved from destruction joined in the popular cry against him. It was asserted that he had sold the key of the country; and many of his own troops were made to believe that they were guarding him and his treasure to a place of safety. A public inquiry was made into his conduct, and he was honourably acquitted. Had he remained a few days longer at Ticonderoga, there is not a doubt but that his whole force would have been captured, and the result of the campaign of a very different character.

Dr. Thatcher, who was with the army of General St. Clair, remarks in his military journal :

“ It is predicted by some of our well-informed and respectable characters, that this event, apparently so calamitous, will ultimately prove advantageous, by drawing the British army into the heart of the country, and thereby place them more immediately in our power.”

The wisdom that deduces good from evil is often rewarded by the event. It was made apparent in the close of the campaign, and the prophecy exactly fulfilled.

When the army of St. Clair was ordered to retreat, boats were in readiness to receive the cannon, baggage and military stores. Major Hull, like the rest of the officers, lost every thing but the clothing he had on. Some valuable books, a good military library for that period, and his camp furniture, were captured by the enemy at Skeensborough.

Trying as was their situation, and humbling to the feelings of the army, yet from the first, the expediency of the retreat was apparent to Major Hull, and he did every thing in his power to convince those of his brother officers who joined in the prejudice against St. Clair, of the necessity of the step. Major Hull availed himself of the first opportunity that offered, to communicate his views to the public, that he might justify his commander.

At a halt of the army, not far from Fort Edward, he addressed a letter\* to the Honourable Judge Mitchell, of Wethersfield, Connecticut—the stump of a tree serving him for a table—stating all the circumstances connected with an event, the author of which was so severely censured by his countrymen. About the fifteenth of July General St. Clair joined General Schuyler's army at Fort Edward. General Burgoyne did not prosecute the advantage he had gained at Ticonderoga. He lost some weeks at Skeensborough and Fort Ann, in bringing forward his heavy artillery and supplies.

\* See Appendix, No. II., for a copy of this letter, which was published by Judge Mitchell, in "The Hartford Courant," of date July 17th, 1777, together with other letters prefixed in the Appendix in relation to it, from the Honourable Horace Binney, of Philadelphia.



General Schuyler availed himself of this delay to recruit his army, but retreated when General Burgoyne advanced towards Fort Edward, not being sufficiently strong to defend the position he had taken. He crossed to the west side of the Hudson above Saratoga. Major Hull commanded the rear-guard in this retreat.

When the troops halted in the evening near Saratoga, Major Hull was directed to remain two miles in the rear, during the night. His command consisted of about three hundred continental troops; the remainder were militia. He formed his plan early in the evening, placing the continental troops on the right, extending to the river; and on the left, as far from the river as the numbers would admit.

In front of his lines he stationed small patrols of observation; one up the river, one on his left, and a third between these two parties; with directions to proceed as far as they could, and if no enemy appeared, to return early in the morning.

Soon after daylight, the patrols returned without having made any discoveries. About sunrise, the advanced guards were seen retreating. An officer was despatched to ascertain the cause. He was informed that a large body of the enemy was advancing, and very near to our troops. Major Hull immediately formed the line, and shortly after, the enemy appeared, formed in his front, and commenced a fire. The fire was returned, which gave a temporary check to the assailants.

In a few moments a body of regular troops and savages attacked the left flank, which, being com-

posed of militia, gave way and retreated in some disorder. The enemy then advanced, discharged a heavy fire on the centre and right; being unsupported by the left, and the numbers opposed greatly superior, Major Hull ordered a retreat. As soon as it commenced, the enemy pursued with great rapidity, pouring upon them an incessant fire, while the savages, like so many demons, were sounding their hideous yells in our ears.

After retreating three quarters of a mile, some rising ground was perceived on the right, and it was determined to form and make a stand. Major Hull was now in the rear of his troops. He rode full speed past the retreating line, towards the front, and pointing to the hill, informed each officer, as he passed, that it was his intention to take possession of that ground. When the detachment came opposite to the hill, the officer most in advance was directed to wheel his men to the right and march up the hill.

To prevent any of the men from continuing to retreat, an officer was posted in the road, with a small guard, with orders to stop them at all events.

In a short time the line was formed, and the enemy advanced with great violence to break it. They were met with a heavy fire, and the position was sustained until a reinforcement arrived, and compelled them to retreat with considerable loss.

In this little rencontre, one officer was killed, two wounded, and about twenty men killed and wounded. Major Hull received the thanks of General Schuyler for his conduct on this occasion.



## CHAPTER VIII.

GENERAL ARNOLD MARCHES TO THE RELIEF OF FORT STANWIX.—TRIAL OF BUTLER.—RETREAT OF GEN. ST. LEGER.

THE day following the events related in the preceding chapter, Major Hull was ordered to march his detachment to Albany, to join the residue of the regiment, the command of which now devolved on that gallant officer, Colonel Brooks.

Fort Stanwix was at this time besieged by a large body of British troops and savages. *Our* regiment was ordered to join the detachment of General Arnold, appointed to march to its relief. The name of this fort was now changed to that of Schuyler. It was situated on the Mohawk river, about one hundred miles from Albany, on the site of the present town of Rome. It was garrisoned by one continental regiment, a company of artillery, and a small body of infantry, consisting in all of about six hundred men, and commanded by Colonel Ganesvoort. The Americans had established this post for the protection of the western settlements against the predatory incursions of the British soldiers, loyalists, and savages. General Burgoyne, considering the occupation of the country on the Mohawk river would be of great importance in his plan of operations, previously to his descent upon Ticonderoga sent a detachment against

the fort, of about fifteen hundred men, consisting of regulars, loyalists, and savages. As soon as the fort was reduced, the troops were to co-operate with him in his expedition on the Hudson.

Shortly after St. Leger invested the fort, the militia of Tryon county assembled under the command of General Herkimer, for the purpose of raising the siege.

St. Leger, receiving the information of Herkimer's approach, detached a portion of his regulars and all his savages, and formed an ambuscade on the route they were marching, within about four miles of the fort. The plan completely succeeded. The militia were attacked on each flank, before they knew that an enemy was near. Being thrown into disorder by the first fire, the Indians rushed upon them with tomahawks and scalping knives, and a horrible slaughter ensued. More than four hundred fell victims to the fury of the savages; among them were many of the most respectable citizens of New-York.

After the defeat of General Herkimer, the division of continental troops, under General Arnold, consisting of about fifteen hundred men, marched in separate bodies, and assembled at the German Flats, on the Mohawk, then the most westerly settlements of the State of New-York. Here they remained a few days, waiting the arrival of the whole body and the necessary supplies.

General St. Leger continued indefatigable in pressing the siege, and made his approaches to within a very small distance of the fort; but the brave

Gansevoort constantly repelled the summons to surrender.

During this state of things, General St. Leger despatched a subaltern officer by the name of Butler, to treat with the inhabitants ; expecting that after so severe a demonstration of his power against General Herkimer, they would be induced to take protection under his standard. The party sent out consisted of some influential loyalists, with a number of armed savages ; it went forth under a flag of truce. Butler proceeded down the southern side of the Mohawk, until he came opposite General Arnold's encampment. He had with him large bundles of General Burgoyne's and St. Leger's proclamations. They were addressed to the inhabitants only, and he was directed to have no communication with any civil or military officer.

As soon as General Arnold received information of the progress of this party, he detached Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks with one hundred men, with orders to make prisoners of them. As Brooks approached, Butler paraded his men, as if he intended to give battle, though with his flag of truce flying before them. Colonel Brooks ordered him to lay down his arms. Butler refused. Brooks directed his men to advance with the bayonet, when the party immediately surrendered. General Arnold appointed a board of officers to report to him in what character Butler should be considered, and what punishment should be inflicted. The Board reported that his business was not with the civil officers of the State, nor with the officer commanding the American forces, and

therefore the flag was no protection to him. That as he was taken in our territory, and near the army, his object must have been, under the cover of a flag of truce, to have ascertained and informed the enemy of our situation and strength; and that he ought to be considered a spy, and executed according to the laws of war.

The sentence was not carried into execution. General Arnold sent him a prisoner to Albany. He was committed to jail, from which he shortly made his escape.

It may be questioned whether the opinion of the court was correct. There was a difference between his situation and that of *Andrè*. They both came within the American lines in full uniform. Both performed their business in their uniforms. *Andrè* put off his to favour his escape; when taken he was without it. Butler wore his uniform, believing that he was acting under the only proper authority, that of the King, and when exposed to arrest, assumed no disguise. Major Hull was present at the trial. Butler conducted himself with great fearlessness. When the charges were read to him, and when asked whether guilty or not guilty, he replied to the Board, that he was a British officer, and acted under the authority of the King; and that he would not answer their questions until they showed by what authority they acted. He further said that he was then in the King's dominions, and was amenable to no other power than what was derived from his sovereign.

The Court admonished the prisoner of his impru-

dence, and apprised him of the consequences of his not answering to their questions. He then remarked, that he could not be considered as a spy, as he appeared without disguise, and his business was with the inhabitants of the country, whom his General and himself viewed as his Majesty's subjects.

Among the loyalists taken with Butler, was a man by the name of Schuyler, sometimes by historians called Cuyler. His family was respectable, and resided in the neighbourhood of the German Flats.

The father of Schuyler applied to General Arnold for the pardon of his son. General Arnold asked him, if he would be answerable for the fidelity of his son, if he intrusted him with a message to St. Leger. He replied, he would. Arnold then sent for the young man, and in the presence of the father informed him of the sentence, and probable fate of his companion, Butler; that he was equally implicated, and his fate must be the same. He then asked Schuyler whether he was personally acquainted with General St. Leger, and whether St. Leger had confidence in him. To both questions he replied in the affirmative. General Arnold said, "To save your life, are you willing to go to the fort and inform St. Leger that Butler and his party were made prisoners; that Butler had been tried as a spy, and was condemned to be executed; that, expecting the same fate, you had succeeded in making your escape, at the peril of your life?\*"

\* Sparks, in his life of Benedict friendly Indian, wily by nature and Arnold, page 110, relates, "that a skilled in artifice from habit, pro-



“General St. Leger will naturally inquire of you, the strength of the force brought against him, and other particulars relating to our plans and future movements.

“You must inform him, that my army consists of three thousand continental troops, with ten pieces of artillery. That it was to commence its march the next morning, and must be then very near the fort. Are you willing to go with this message?” Schuyler answered that he was.

General Arnold then turning to the father, said, “Are you prepared, if your son proves false, to receive his punishment?” He promptly replied, “Yes.”

The father was then secured, and the son proceeded to the camp of St. Leger. On his arrival, the General received him most cordially, and requested him to give him all the news. Schuyler informed him of the manner in which they had been captured; of Butler’s fate, and what his fate would have been, had he not made his escape; and that General Arnold was marching on with three thousand continental troops, supported by ten pieces of artillery, and he would be before the fort in a few hours. General St. Leger, on receiving this information, immediately ordered a retreat, leaving his camp all standing, his provisions, intrenching tools, and other valuable equipage, behind.

Our army arrived the following day, and found every thing as has been described.

posed that bullets should be shot to his story; which was accordingly through Schuyler’s coat, which done.”  
would give the greater plausibility

Schuyler remained, delivered himself up to General Arnold, and related the circumstances of his interview with the British commander.

General St. Leger retreated down Wood Creek to Oswego, thence to Montreal, and proceeded up Lake Champlain to join General Burgoyne. But it was too late. General Burgoyne with his whole army, were at that moment prisoners to the Americans. General Arnold marched back, and joined the main army on the Hudson.



## CHAPTER IX.

GENERAL SCHUYLER SUPERSEDED IN COMMAND OF THE NORTHERN ARMY BY  
GENERAL GATES.

GENERAL SCHUYLER, who had commanded the Northern Army up to this period, was now to be superseded by General Gates, an arrangement wounding to the feelings of the former, who had been indefatigable in preparing the way for the brilliant successes which he was confident were soon to gladden the drooping hearts of his countrymen. But faithful to his country's interests, this good citizen, and gallant soldier, for nearly three weeks previous to the arrival of General Gates in camp, was unremittingly active to repair the evils, and meet the exigencies of his difficult situation.

Already, as we have seen, his efforts had not been fruitless, and victory now inclined in his favour.

He feelingly complained to General Washington, that the course of his fortune was interrupted, and that the reward of his toils was now to be given to another, who would enjoy that victory for which he had prepared the way.

But it was the desire of Congress to place at the head of an army, dismayed by its reverses, a general celebrated for his achievements : moreover, the troops of the Northern Army were principally from the

Eastern States, in which part of the country General Gates held an unrivalled popularity. Both wings of Burgoyne's army had now been cut off. The detachment at Bennington had met with a total defeat, and the retreat of St. Leger was equally fatal to the interests of the British General.

The discerning mind of Washington had anticipated these events, so favourable to the American cause. He thus writes in reply to General Schuyler, who had informed him of the plan of General Burgoyne's campaign, which was to act in detachments. "Though our affairs for some days past have worn a dark and gloomy aspect, I yet look forward to a fortunate and happy change. I trust General Burgoyne's army will meet sooner or later an effectual check ; and, as I suggested before, that the success he has had will precipitate his ruin. From your accounts he appears to be pursuing that line of conduct which, of all others, is most favourable to us—I mean acting in detachments. This conduct will certainly give room for enterprise on our part, and expose his parties to great hazard. Could we be so happy as to cut one of them off, supposing it should not exceed four, five, or six hundred men, it would inspirit the people, and do away much of their present anxiety. In such an event, they would lose sight of past misfortunes, and urged at the same time by a regard for their own security, they would fly to arms, and afford every aid in their power."\* "Meanwhile

\* Washington's Writings, Vol. IV., page 503.

General Burgoyne continued in his camp on the left bank of the Hudson, where he used the most unremitting industry and perseverance, in bringing stores and provisions from Fort George. Having at length, by strenuous efforts, obtained about thirty days' provisions, he resolved on passing the river with his army, in order to engage the enemy, and force a passage to Albany. As a swell of the water, occasioned by great rains, had carried away his bridge of rafts, he threw another of boats over the river, at the same place. Towards the middle of September, he crossed with his army to the right bank of the Hudson, and encamped on the heights and in the plains of Saratoga; Gates being then in the neighbourhood of Stillwater, about three miles below. The two armies faced each other, and a battle was expected soon to follow. This measure of passing the Hudson, was by many greatly censured. It was considered the principal cause of the unfortunate issue of the campaign. Some were of opinion, that, after the affairs of Bennington and Stanwix, Burgoyne would have acted more wisely, considering the daily increase of the American army, if he had renounced the project of occupying Albany, and made the best of his way back to the lakes. It appears, however, to us, but just to remark for his excuse, that at this time he had not received intelligence, either of the strength of the army left at New-York, or of the movement which Sir Henry Clinton was to make or had made, up the North river towards Albany. He calculated upon a powerful co-operation on the part of that General.

Such was the plan of the Ministers, and such the tenor of his own peremptory instructions. And to what reproaches would he not have exposed himself, if, by retiring towards Ticonderoga, he had abandoned Clinton to himself, and thus voluntarily relinquished all the advantages that were expected from the junction of the two armies?

“But though we think Burgoyne committed no error, in resolving to prosecute his expedition, it nevertheless appears that he ought not to have passed the Hudson. By continuing upon the left bank, he could retire at will towards Ticonderoga, or push forwards towards Albany. It was evidently more easy to execute this movement, while having between himself and the now formidable army of Gates, so broad a river as the Hudson.”\*

The success which had attended the American arms at Fort Stanwix and Bennington, reanimated the spirit of the country, and reinforcements of militia were daily joining the army. General Schuyler was beloved, and his military character was highly appreciated. Yet the appointment of General Gates to the command gave great satisfaction. He took a position on Bemis's Heights, about eight miles below Saratoga. Here we commenced a line of fortifications, the right extending to the Hudson, and the left in a westerly direction on high grounds, about a mile from the river. Our time was divided between hard labour and attending to the discipline of the troops.

\* Otis's Botta, Vol. II., page 305, 6, 7.

It was at this period that General Burgoyne prepared a bridge of boats, on which he crossed to the west side of the Hudson. He fortified the heights of Saratoga, advanced and took a position about two miles in front of our line of fortifications. Here he established works for the security of his encampment. His left extended to the river, and his right about the same distance to the west, as our line extended. He had about thirty days' provisions, and having abandoned his communication with Canada, he depended on the success of a battle for his future progress, in forming a junction with Sir Henry Clinton, who was advancing up the North river with the strength of the British army.

## CHAPTER X.

BURGOYNE'S CAMPAIGN.—BATTLE OF THE NINETEENTH OF SEPTEMBER.

1777.


ON the nineteenth of September, about twelve o'clock in the morning, General Burgoyne selected the best part of his army, which he commanded in person, and advanced towards the left wing of the American lines. At three quarters of a mile from our position his advance guards were met by a regiment of riflemen, led on by Colonel Morgan, and a detachment of rangers under the command of Major Dearborn. These parties of Burgoyne were repulsed by Morgan, who gave three cheers, which were heard in the camp, and greatly animated our troops.

General Burgoyne then brought his effective force into action, when Morgan in his turn was compelled to retreat. But he was soon reinforced by a number of regiments from the left wing of the army, commanded by General Arnold, and about one o'clock the action was renewed with great obstinacy. On that day, Major Hull commanded a picket-guard in front of the left line of the camp, about half a mile from the ground where Morgan commenced the action. His position being on elevated ground, it was considered important, and two regiments were imme-



# THE SURRENDER OF GEN BURGOYNE IN 1777

*Battle of 19<sup>th</sup> September exhibiting a view of the operations of Maj. Hull's Volunteer Corps against a part of the British Army*







diately sent to reinforce him, when the first firing was heard.

As soon as the action had recommenced, General Arnold rode to the ground which was occupied by the guard of Major Hull. He called the officers around him, and inquired what number of men was at that post. He was informed that it consisted of the guard of two hundred and fifty men, and two regiments. General Arnold then said, that three hundred volunteers, to be commanded by a field officer, must immediately reinforce the troops which were engaged. He repeated, that he wished them all to be volunteers. As none of the field officers offered their services, Major Hull observed to him, that he commanded the guard on that day, by an order from the Adjutant-General, but if he could be excused from that duty, he would be happy to command the detachment. General Arnold replied, that *he* would excuse him, and directed the colonels of the two regiments to call for three hundred volunteers and a suitable number of captains and subalterns to command them. In a few moments, the number required was paraded and formed into four companies, with the officers assigned to them. We at once commenced our march to the centre of the engagement. Major Hull was directed to receive his orders from General Poor of New Hampshire, who commanded troops then closely engaged with the enemy. He marched the detachment in columns of eight platoons. When it arrived near the line of fire, General Poor perceiving the reinforcement, sent his

Brigade-Major, who informed Major Hull that the line was well supported in the centre and to the left, but that a body of militia were hard pressed on the right, and the General wished the detachment under his command to march to their support. On arriving at the ground, Major Hull found the militia retiring, and the enemy preparing a body of troops to attack the right of General Poor's brigade.

On the right of the brigade was an open field of about eight or nine acres of ground, and nearly in the centre of it stood a log-house. There were a number of large dry trees scattered over the field, in which wheat had been cultivated. On the south side was rising ground, on which was a thin growth of wood. The east and north sides of the field were covered with thick wood; but the west, where the right of General Poor's brigade was engaged, was more open. It was from this position that the militia had retreated. After viewing the ground for a few moments, and perceiving a line of the enemy a short distance beyond the north side of the field, within the wood, Major Hull marched his detachment, and formed on the rising ground, at the south side of the field; his right extending to the wood, and his left towards the right of General Poor's brigade.

Behind the log-house, and near the wood, were two pieces of field artillery, which were not perceived until the line had been formed for battle. These pieces were immediately turned upon us, while the infantry of the enemy were preparing to advance. The distance between the two lines was about thirty rods.

Major Hull directed his officers not to fire until he gave the word of command. When the order was given, every man was directed to fire as low as the enemy's knees, it being descending ground on which they stood. As their artillery had little effect, their infantry advanced, extending from the right to the left of the field, and keeping up a heavy fire, which killed and wounded some of our men. When they reached the centre of the field, Major Hull ordered his troops to fire. Many of the enemy fell, and their line became partially disordered. They did not retreat, but slowly advanced, still continuing an incessant fire. We returned it as rapidly as our men could load, and with such effect as checked their advance and created considerable disorder in their ranks. The distance at this time between the two lines was not more than ten rods.

The detachment of Major Hull had not moved from the ground it first occupied. He now ordered it to make a rapid advance and charge with the bayonet. The enemy immediately retreated in confusion to the woods. We pursued, and the field was literally covered with the dead and wounded. As the left of Major Hull's detachment approached the log-house, he directed the men to advance and secure the pieces of artillery. When near, they were fired on from the house. The officer in command marched up to the door, forced it open, and brought out a sergeant-major and nineteen privates. During the operation of storming the house and receiving the prisoners, the pieces of artillery were removed into

the woods to which the enemy had retreated. Being thus covered, it was deemed inexpedient to advance, and the detachment fell back to the ground on which it had first formed. Major Hull here collected the wounded, which, together with the killed, amounted to nearly one hundred men. He sent the wounded, with about twenty prisoners, into camp. Captain Allen, a brave officer from Pittsfield, Massachusetts, was killed. Lieutenant John Clapp, who acted as adjutant, was shot dead at the moment that Major Hull was giving him an order to communicate to the troops.

The enemy now moved around to the east side of the wood, in order to assail the right flank of our corps. Major Hull, perceiving this movement, changed his position. The contest was renewed, and on this ground, which was covered with wood, they fought the remainder of the afternoon. It was a sharp conflict, but very equal in point of strength. Sometimes our troops gave ground, and sometimes those of the enemy. The battle continued until near the dusk of the evening. Major Hull now observed a body of troops on their march. He sent to inquire if General Poor, or any officer superior to himself in rank was present, as he would be happy to receive his orders,—that his detachment was fatigued, and its ammunition nearly exhausted. Colonel Cillery, of General Poor's brigade, was at the head of this corps. He replied, that he was marching into camp, and directed the troops under Major Hull to join him. Our men drew off from the field of battle, and the

enemy made no pursuit. Of the three hundred men who commenced the engagement, one-half were either killed or wounded.

In this action Major Hull held a separate command. The eighth Massachusetts regiment, of which he was the Major, was led on in another quarter by Colonel Brooks. It was distinguished for its bravery, and the gallant conduct of its leader, and was the last to leave the field.

This battle of the nineteenth of September commenced between twelve and one o'clock, and continued, with not more than half an hour's intermission, until nearly dark. There was a remarkable equality in the opposing forces, and it has justly been considered by historians, as the most obstinate that took place during the war.

From the commencement of the campaign, there had been much skirmishing and sharp fighting; but this was the first contest that was held with the main body of Burgoyne's army, and his troops fought with almost unexampled bravery.

General Burgoyne claimed the victory, because his army retained and slept on the field of battle. We claimed it, because he had entirely failed in his object, which was to force our camp, and compel us to abandon our position; and because we had met him, entirely checked his progress, defeated his object, and retired to our camp without being pursued.

The able historian, Judge Marshall, thus writes: "With reason, therefore, this action was celebrated throughout the United States, and considered as the



precursor of the total ruin of the invading army. Every where the utmost exultation was displayed; and every where the militia were stimulated to fly to arms, and complete the work which was begun.”\*

\* Marshall's Life of Washington, Vol. III., page 288.

## CHAPTER XI.

BATTLE OF THE SEVENTH OF OCTOBER.—SURRENDER OF THE BRITISH ARMY  
UNDER BURGoyNE.

1777.

AFTER the battle of the nineteenth of September, no operations of importance took place, until the seventh of October. General Burgoyne was in daily expectation of being informed that Sir Henry Clinton was ascending the Hudson for the purpose of co-operating with his army. As the forces of General Gates were continually augmenting by an accession of militia, he considered this delay favourable; being well assured, that no immediate relief was at hand to extricate Burgoyne from his present critical situation. The interval was occupied by increasing the strength of our works, and disciplining the troops.

The prospects of that formidable army which had advanced into our country with so much splendour and parade, now appeared gloomy and almost desperate.

The provisions for its support were nearly exhausted, and the communication to the lakes was so interrupted, that no further supply could be obtained from Canada. Disappointed in not receiving that co-operation on which he had based his calculations,

there seemed nothing left to General Burgoyne to extricate himself from the difficulties by which he was surrounded, than a resolute appeal to the intrepidity and strength of his troops.

The very subsistence of his army now depended on forcing General Gates from his position, and thus opening his way into the country, to obtain the necessary supplies. He took this desperate step on the seventh of October. In the afternoon of that day, he selected fifteen hundred of his most effective troops, with the addition of his grenadiers, light infantry, provincials, and savages. With this force he took the field, having with him ten pieces of artillery, consisting of twelve-pounders, six-pounders, and howitzers. He formed on the right of his encampment, and was assisted in command by Generals Frazer, Reidesel, and Philips. His object was, to possess himself of rising ground on the left of General Gates's position, and from that eminence, with his artillery to enfilade his line of defences and under cover of as near a cannonade as could be made, to storm with his columns of infantry the whole left of the American encampment. To favour this operation, he detached a small body of regulars, loyalists and savages, to make a *détour* around our left, and take a position in the rear of our encampment, and attack the left as soon as he commenced his operations on the flank.

On this day, Major Hull again commanded the advanced guard in front of the left wing of the American army. His guard consisted of about two hundred and fifty men. He was in a situation to ob-



Fort commanded by Col. Brevint,  
 attacked & carried by Col. Brevint  
 at the termination  
 of the action.

Gen. Burgoyne's Fortified Camp

His Left Wing

Corps of Col. Morgan  
 and Maj. Dearborn

Gen. Frasers  
 Corps of  
 Reserve

Advance Guard of 250 men  
 Com<sup>d</sup> by Maj. Hill afterwards annexed  
 to the Left wing of Arnold's Division

1<sup>st</sup> Position of  
 Maj. Hulls Adv. Guard


Lincolns wing & a part of Arnolds engaged  
 with the British Left

Arnolds Wing

Lincolns Wing

Gen. Gates' Fortified Camp

Some British Regulars



serve the enemy's movement, and sent frequent intelligence to General Gates, that every disposition of the enemy's forces indicated a serious attack that afternoon on our left.

About twelve o'clock, General Burgoyne commenced his march from his encampment. A part of Arnold's wing and Morgan's corps of riflemen were ordered to meet and attack him. The other part of Arnold's wing, with a part of the right, commanded by General Lincoln, were ordered to advance towards the enemy's lines and endeavour to cut off the communication between Burgoyne and the remainder of his army, which had been left for the security of his encampment, and likewise to repel any bodies of the enemy advancing from that quarter.

As General Burgoyne approached, he passed the guard commanded by Major Hull, at the distance of about a quarter of a mile. The three regiments of Arnold's division had advanced within a small distance on the left of Major Hull's position. He received orders from General Arnold to form on the right of these regiments.

When General Burgoyne had nearly reached the ground he intended to occupy, he was furiously attacked by Morgan's regiment of riflemen, and Arnold's three regiments, including the guard commanded by Major Hull. It was not long after the action commenced, before the British line began to give way. At this moment, General Frazer came up with a second line, which had been held in reserve. He was immediately attacked by Arnold's three regi-



ments, Morgan's riflemen, and the guard of Major Hull. The impetuosity of the assault, and the valour and intrepidity with which it was met, soon thinned the ranks, and many fell on both sides. Burgoyne was compelled to retreat to his encampment; he was fiercely pursued, and says in his account of the action, "we retreated, hot pressed, but in good order."

As soon as the retreat commenced, Major Hull was ordered to take his station where his guard had been first posted, and assist in removing the prisoners, the wounded, and the artillery and arms which had been left on the field of battle.

The British General being now driven from his position, was hotly pursued by Arnold and Morgan. The termination of the battle, as described by Charles Botta, is taken from the translation of George Otis, Esquire.

"Upon this occasion Brigadier-General Frazer was mortally wounded; an officer whose loss was severely felt by the English, and whose valour and abilities justified their regrets.\* Their situation now

\* Professor Silliman, in a journal of his travels over the battle-ground, says,—“Frazer was the soul of this battle of the seventh of October, and was just changing the disposition of the troops, to repel a strong impression which the Americans had made and were still making on the British right, when Morgan called together three of his best marksmen, and

pointing to Frazer, said, ‘Do you see that gallant officer? That is General Frazer. I respect and honour him: but it is necessary that he should die.’ This was enough. Frazer immediately received his mortal wound, and was carried off the field.” High praise is certainly due to this noble officer, but it may be a question, whether it should be

became extremely critical: even their camp was threatened; the enemy emboldened by victory was advancing to storm it, and if he arrived before the retreating detachment, there could be little hope of defending it. Philips and Reidesel were ordered to rally with all expedition those troops which were nearest or most disengaged, to cover the retreat of the others, while Burgoyne himself, fiercely pursued by Arnold, retired with precipitation towards the camp. The detachment at length, though with extreme difficulty, regained the intrenchments, having left however upon the field of battle a great number of killed and wounded, particularly of the artillery corps, who had, with equal glory to themselves, and prejudice to the enemy, displayed the utmost ability in their profession, along with the most undaunted resolution. Six pieces of cannon also remained in the possession of the Americans.

“But the business of the day was not yet terminated. The English had scarcely entered their camp, when the Americans, pursuing their success, assaulted it in different parts with uncommon fierceness; rushing to the lines through a severe fire of grape-shot and small arms, with the utmost fury. Arnold especially, who on this day appeared intoxicated with the thirst of battle and carnage, led on the attack against a part of the intrenchments occupied by the light infantry, under Lord Balcares. But the Eng-

bestowed so entirely at the expense of Burgoyne, whose military ability and undaunted resolution effected

every thing that was possible, under circumstances of such disadvantage.

lish received him with great vigour and spirit. The action was obstinate and sanguinary. At length, as it grew towards evening, Arnold having forced all obstacles, entered the works with some of the most fearless of his followers. But in this critical moment of glory and danger, he was grievously wounded in the same leg which had been already shattered at the assault of Quebec. To his great regret, he was constrained to retire. His party still continued the attack, and the English sustained it with obstinacy, till night separated the combatants.

“The royalists were not so fortunate in another quarter. A republican detachment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, having succeeded by a circuitous movement in turning the right wing of the English, fell, sword in hand, upon the right flank of their intrenchments and made the most desperate efforts to carry them. This post was defended by Lieutenant-Colonel Breyman, at the head of the German reserve. The resistance at first was exceedingly vigorous; but Breyman being mortally wounded, his countrymen were damped, and at length routed, with great slaughter. Their tents, artillery and baggage, fell into the possession of the assailants. The Americans established themselves in the intrenchments. General Burgoyne, hearing of this disaster, ordered them to be dislodged immediately. But either in consequence of the approach of night, or from the discouragement of his troops, he was not obeyed, and the victors continued to occupy the positions they had gained with so much glory. They

had now acquired an opening on the right and rear of the British army. The other American divisions passed the night under arms, at the distance of half a mile from the British camp. The loss in dead and wounded was great on both sides, but especially on the part of the English, of whom no few were also made prisoners. Majors Williams of the artillery and Ackland of the grenadiers, were among the latter. Many pieces of artillery, all the baggage of the Germans, and many warlike stores, fell into the hands of the republicans, who needed them greatly. They were impatient for the return of day to renew the battle.

“ But deplorable and perilous beyond expression was the situation of the British troops ; they bore it, however, with admirable temper and firmness. It was evidently impossible to continue in their present position, without submitting to a certainty of destruction on the ensuing day. The Americans, invigorated and encouraged, would certainly have profited by the access they had already opened to themselves on the right, and of other untenable points, to carry every part of the camp and completely surround the British army. Burgoyne therefore determined to operate a total change of ground. He executed this movement with admirable order, and without any loss. During the night he silently drew off his troops, artillery and camp furniture, and occupied the heights higher up the river.”\*

\* Otis's Botta, Vol. II., pages 315, 16, 17.

Although Major Hull had a separate command on this momentous day, and acted not an unimportant part in the battle, yet he remarks: "I always regretted, that as I was the Major and then second in command to Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks in the eighth Massachusetts regiment, that, by the routine of duty, I was absent from it at the time when it stormed and entered the intrenchments of the British on the right.

"This was a brilliant close to the achievements of the seventh of October. Some historians of the Revolution have stated that the regiment was led on by Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, and myself as Major, having thus given me credit to which I am not entitled. The fact not being founded in truth, I feel a pleasure in contradicting it. My situation has been precisely stated."

The fate of General Burgoyne's army seemed now decided. We had gained a complete victory over the most effective portion of his troops, commanded by himself in person, and assisted by his best Generals. We had advanced to his lines, and by the force of the bayonet, obtained possession of the most commanding part of them. All the artillery which he had carried into the field, and those in the works, had fallen into our hands. We had taken between two and three hundred prisoners, and killed and wounded more than that number, and all with comparatively a small loss on our part. General Gates declined giving battle the next day, sensible that nothing should be risked under his present superior advantages. He felt assured that there were other



and less expensive means of reducing his foe, than by blood and carnage. The impossibility of his escape from a vigilant and ever-increasing army; the want of provisions; the want of the munitions of war, of which defeat had greatly deprived him; and above all, the want of that co-operation, upon which he had reasonably relied, closed every avenue of hope to the British, while it opened the brightest prospects for the final success of the American arms.

“General Burgoyne,” says Major Hull, “commenced his retreat to Saratoga on the evening of the eighth of October. The following day it rained incessantly; we continued in our tents until morning, when orders came to begin the pursuit. General Gates had in the mean time taken measures to advance parties in front of the enemy on both sides of the river, to obstruct his retreat to Lake George. At Saratoga, the British halted, and took possession of the fortifications, which they had erected on their march downwards.

“The brigade to which our regiment was attached, was commanded by General Learned, and consisted of three regiments. It was directed to pass a creek, on which General Schuyler’s mills were established, and which was much swollen by the rain, to take a position on the west side of Saratoga. While in this situation and near the fortifications, a deserter came from Burgoyne’s camp and informed General Learned, that the whole British army had retreated to Fort Edward, and that only a small guard was left in the fort.

The brigade was immediately ordered to attack



the fort ; it advanced to within a very small distance, when General Wilkinson, who was Adjutant-General of the army, rode up and ordered an immediate retreat. At this time not a gun had been fired on us by the enemy, and in a few minutes more we should have been up to their breastworks. They rose from behind them, and commenced a tremendous fire upon us of grapeshot and musketry. We lost a few men, but soon took a position out of the reach of their guns. The pretended deserter disappeared. It was believed that he was employed by General Burgoyne to give this false information. Fortunately, General Gates had been apprised, before it was too late, that the whole British army was at Saratoga, and sent the counter orders, which saved us from impending destruction. We remained watching the enemy, and lying constantly on our arms."

At this juncture the historian Botta thus writes :

"It exceeds the power of words to describe the pitiable condition to which the British army was now reduced. The troops, worn down by a series of hard toil, incessant effort, and stubborn action ; abandoned by the Indians and Canadians ; the whole army reduced by repeated and heavy losses of many of their best men and most distinguished officers, from ten thousand combatants to less than five thousand effective fighting men, of whom little more than three thousand were English ; under these circumstances, and in this state of weakness, without a possibility of retreat, they were invested by an army of four times their own number, whose position extended

three parts in four of a circle round them; who refused to fight, from a knowledge of their condition; and who, from the nature of the ground, could not be attacked in any part. In this helpless situation, obliged to lie constantly on their arms, whilst a continued cannonade pervaded the camp, and rifle and grapeshot fell within every part of their lines, the troops of Burgoyne retained their ordinary constancy, and while sinking under a hard necessity, they showed themselves worthy of a better fate. Nor could they be reproached with any action or word which betrayed a want of temper or of fortitude. At length, no succour appearing, and no rational ground of hope of any kind remaining, an exact account of the provisions was taken, on the morning of the thirteenth, when it was found that the whole stock would afford no more than three days' bare subsistence for the army. In such a state, it was alike impossible to advance or to remain as they were; and the longer they delayed to take a definitive resolution, the more desperate became their situation.

“Burgoyne, therefore, called a council of war, at which not only the generals and field officers, but all the captains of companies, were invited to assist. While they deliberated, the bullets of the Americans whistled around them, and frequently pierced even the tent where the council was convened. It was determined unanimously to open a treaty, and enter into a convention with the American General. This was accordingly done, and by the articles of convention, the captured army was allowed to march out

with the honours of war, and pile their arms without the camp.”\*

General Gates with the utmost delicacy withdrew his troops, while his gallant foe was performing this humiliating duty. Major Hull writes: “I was present when they marched into our camp; and words cannot describe the deep interest felt by every American heart; nor was there wanting sympathy for those, who had so bravely opposed us in the contest. A general rejoicing of our country was now to take place, and scatter the gloom which but a few months back had deeply settled upon it. Dangers seemed past, and a bright future opened to our view. We were cheered by the hope that an overruling Providence was guiding our destinies, and leading us to a glorious termination of our long endured trials.”

Sir Henry Clinton did not arrive in the Highlands on the North river, until the fifth of October, when he debarked his troops at Stony Point, marched through the gorges of the mountains, and stormed Forts Clinton and Montgomery, which were commanded by Governor Clinton of the State of New-York, and General James Clinton, his brother. After the reduction of these forts, all the positions in the Highlands were abandoned by General Putnam, who commanded on that station, and the British fleet and army proceeded up the river as far as Esopus, and burned that flourishing village. This took place about the time that General Burgoyne surrendered.

\* Otis's Botta, Vol. II., pages 324, 5.

Had Sir Henry Clinton early in October, after taking possession of the Highlands, advanced to the relief of Burgoyne, the fortunes of his army might have been very different. The probability is that the two armies would have formed a junction, and made a strong establishment in the Highlands. This would very much have interrupted the communication between the Eastern and the Southern States, and have afforded great facilities to the operations of Sir William Howe in Pennsylvania.

How long they could have continued in possession of this important communication, would have depended on the spirit, the energy, and the patriotism of the New England States.

Sir Henry Clinton not having sufficient force to retain his conquests in the Highlands, returned to New-York; and his retreat every where exhibited the most wanton marks of plunder, burning, and desolation.

## CHAPTER XII.

VALLEY-FORGE.—SUFFERINGS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY.

1777-8.

AFTER the close of the successful campaign at the northward, the eighth Massachusetts regiment was ordered, with other troops of General Gates's army, to march to Pennsylvania and reinforce the army under General Washington, at Whitemarsh. "When the order was communicated to our regiment," says Major Hull, "a feeling of disappointment was apparent. It was now November, the usual season for the troops to enjoy the comforts of winter-quarters. They felt that they had done enough for one campaign. The regiment had early in the spring marched from Boston to Ticonderoga; had retreated through a wilderness from that place to the Hudson; had marched to the relief of Fort Stanwix, on the Mohawk; had returned, and been engaged in all the battles that were fought with General Burgoyne's army.

"After this severe service, by which the most important advantages had been rendered to their country, they expected to rest from their toils. Many hoped to be indulged in a visit to their friends, and realize the pleasing anticipations of relating to them

the wonderful scenes through which they had passed—their ‘hair-breadth ’scapes,’ and the glorious results of their efforts; to show their honourable scars, and to sympathize with the friends of those who had fallen around them in battle. But a sense of duty checked these natural feelings, and without a murmur, with cheerful submission to orders, they marched, at this inclement season, to afford aid to their companions, and gratify the wishes of the beloved leader of the armies of his country.

“It was shortly after the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, in which the Americans had been repulsed, that the interesting meeting of the two armies took place. One had encountered defeat in its operations; the other had triumphed in victory. Yet if skill, bravery, and resolution could command success, the troops of Washington had richly deserved it. But no presumption was exhibited on the one side, nor envy on the other. The kindest feelings mutually prevailed throughout the camp.

“A few days after the junction of the two armies, General Howe marched out from Philadelphia with his principal force, and took a position about two miles in front of the American lines.

“From this movement, it became apparent that his object was a general engagement. A strong position had been taken by Washington, which he deemed it expedient to retain. He was diligent in reviewing his troops; expressed the conviction that a general action was now to take place, and his confidence that it would result in victory to the American arms.



He suggested every consideration that could excite the ambition and animate the spirit of his army. He first addressed himself to those he had commanded in person during the campaign, and informed them, that an opportunity was now presented, and he was assured that nothing else but such an opportunity was wanting, to demonstrate that they were equal in patriotism and valour to the conquerors from the north, who were now to fight by their sides. To the northern troops he said, that they would now have it in their power to add fresh laurels to those they had gathered with so much honour to themselves and glory to the nation. He then called on all, as they regarded the freedom and independence of their country, the fame of its arms, and its future happiness and prosperity, to decide on the manly resolution of meeting death or victory in the impending conflict. The earnestness, the energy, and the ardour with which he spoke; the self-devotion which his whole manner expressed, had an effect which it is impossible to describe. Every man believed himself a hero, and perhaps the opportunity was only wanting, to prove that his thoughts were not far from the truth.

The first day, the enemy appeared to be reconnoitering our right, and making demonstration, as if to commence an attack on that quarter. They then changed their position, and moved their principal force to our left, where the northern troops were stationed, and advanced within less than a mile of it. Not a doubt now remained, but that the attack would be made in that quarter the following morning. Mor-

gan's corps of riflemen, with some Pennsylvania militia, were engaged with light parties of the British, between the lines of the two armies. Major Morris, a brave and valuable officer, who had served in the northern campaign, was killed, with many of his men. As General Washington did not think proper to reinforce these troops, and thus risk a battle on that ground, Morgan was obliged to retreat. The enemy made no further advances, but returned to Philadelphia. Every disposition of their forces on this occasion indicated, that it was the intention of Sir William Howe to bring the Americans to a general engagement. He was probably deterred by the strong position General Washington had taken, and likewise from a knowledge of the fact, that his army had been reinforced by troops from the north.

“It must have been evident to the British General, that the American Commander had no desire to avoid an action, provided he was attacked in the position he had taken.

“General Washington now marched towards the Schuylkill, and on the twelfth of December crossed to the west side of the river, and halted at Valley Forge, about twenty miles from Philadelphia.

“The ground selected for the encampment was covered with woods, and bounded on one side by the Schuylkill, on the other by ridges of hills. General Washington informed the army, that this was the place for their winter quarters. There were no houses, nor materials provided to build barracks. Axes were furnished to fell the trees, and in a little time log huts were erected to shelter the troops.

“Not a murmur or complaint was heard; all cheerfully engaged in the labour, and soon the army was comfortably established. The huts were generally fourteen by sixteen feet. Twelve privates were allowed a hut, and the number of officers according to their rank. A General was entitled to a hut by himself. The encampment was regularly laid out; the streets ran in parallel lines; neatness and order prevailed; and in viewing it from the hills, it had the appearance of a little city.

“To render the condition of the soldiers more like home, General Washington directed that regiments from the same State should occupy a certain street or division of the camp. The whole of the location was surrounded by intrenchments, and a bridge was thrown over the Schuylkill, to preserve the communication with the country, and to afford facilities to supplies for the army.

“Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks united with me in preparing our new home.

“The hut we occupied consisted of one room. This was dining-room, parlour, kitchen, and hall. On one side, shelves were put up for our books, having been so fortunate as to purchase a part of a circulating library that had been brought from Philadelphia. On another stood a row of Derby cheeses, sent from Connecticut by my mother; a luxury of which the camp could rarely boast, and with which visitors to the hut were often regaled. To give an air of greater comfort, we mixed some clay and water, and with this preparation painted the domicil, which our neighbours now declared to be quite an

elegant mansion." Mrs. Washington was with her husband a part of the winter. She writes thus to a friend; "The General's apartment is very small, he has had a log cabin built to dine in, which has made our quarters much more tolerable than they were at first."

But while endeavouring to afford to their situation and that of others, every possible alleviation, famine and its natural consequence, mutiny, were threatening the army with dissolution.

At this moment General Washington received information that Sir William Howe had crossed the Schuylkill with a large body of troops, and advanced as far as Darby, to collect a quantity of forage, between the American camp and that place.

The possession of the forage was so important to the British, that it was expected that General Washington would detach a superior force, to prevent its being obtained.

His trying situation is best described by his letter to Congress at that time.

"Yesterday afternoon, receiving information that the enemy, in force, had left the city and were advancing towards Darby, with the apparent design to forage and draw subsistence from that part of the country, I ordered the troops to be in readiness, that I might give every opposition in my power; when behold, to my great mortification, I was not only informed, but convinced, that the men were unable to stir on account of provisions, and that a dangerous mutiny began the night before, and which, though with difficulty suppressed by the spirited exer-

tions of some officers, was still much to be apprehended, for the want of this article. This brought forth the only Commissary in the purchasing line in this camp; and with him, this melancholy and alarming truth, that he had not a single hoof of any kind to slaughter—and not more than twenty-five barrels of flour! From hence, form an opinion of our situation, when I add, that he could not tell when to expect any. All I could do under these circumstances was, to send out a few light parties, to watch and harass the enemy, whilst other parties were instantly detached in different ways to collect, if possible, as much provision as would satisfy the present pressing wants of the soldiery. But will this answer? No, sir; three or four days of bad weather would prove our destruction.”

Extracts from two letters, received by General Washington on the twenty-second of December, will be enough to show the grounds upon which these statements are made.

“I received an order,” writes General Huntington, “to hold my brigade in readiness to march. Fighting will be far preferable to starving. My brigade is out of provisions, nor can the Commissary obtain any meat. I am exceedingly unhappy in being the bearer of complaints to head-quarters. I have used every argument my imagination can invent, to make the soldiers easy, but I despair of being able to do it much longer.”\*

The next is from General Varnum—“ Accord-

\* The Writings of Washington, Vol. V., page 197.



ing to the saying of Solomon, hunger will break through a stone wall. It is therefore a very pleasing circumstance to the division under my command, that there is a probability of their marching. Three days successively we have been destitute of bread. Two days we have been entirely without meat. The men must be supplied or they cannot be commanded. The complaints are too urgent to pass unnoticed. It is with pain I mention this distress. I know it will make your Excellency unhappy, but if you expect the exertion of virtuous principle, while your troops are deprived of the necessaries of life, your final disappointment will be great, in proportion to the patience which now astonishes every man of human feeling.”\*

General Washington finding himself unable to do more, now sent out small detachments to reinforce Morgan’s riflemen and Lee’s cavalry, with some Pennsylvania militia, who were advanced on the west side of the Schuylkill.

Major Hull was directed to march on this service, with three hundred men, and receive his orders from Colonel Morgan.

During the week the British were engaged in collecting forage, we hovered around, availing of every opportunity to annoy and harass them. The weather was intensely cold; the troops were twenty miles from the camp, and directly in the face of the enemy. They were in almost constant motion, and at night

\* The Writings of Washington, Vol. V., page 193.



could keep no fires or light of any kind lest they should be discovered by the enemy. Their safety depended on their vigilance. They rarely entered a house, and only kept from freezing by activity, and incessant marching from one point to another.

Frequent rencounters with light parties of the enemy occurred, which usually terminated favourably to the Americans, and in the capture of prisoners. When Sir William Howe returned to Philadelphia, we followed in his rear for some distance; but the necessity for further effort ceasing, we retired to the encampment, and found our hut a very agreeable exchange for the exposed condition which the peculiar service had required.

But though the army was now relieved of an outward enemy, there was an internal foe more difficult to combat, more insufferable in its demands on their remaining strength: it was famine. Day after day passed and no provisions were issued.\* At first the privation caused a little excitement and inquiry from the soldiers as to the cause. They were informed by the officers that the provisions were exhausted, and the heavy rains having rendered the roads almost impassable for the wagons, the supplies had not arrived, but were hourly expected. This satisfied them at first, but day after day passing without any relief, their complaints became louder and more serious.

\* Much of this distress was occasioned by Congress having ordered a change in the Commissary's department. An arrangement, which had been opposed by General Washington, who foresaw the danger, but was unable to convince others of its reality.

They began to assemble, first by regiments, to consult as to the measures they should adopt; the excitement soon extended to Brigades and Divisions of the army. The officers made no attempt to exercise their authority, but only used advice. The soldiers were told that General Washington was their best friend; that he perfectly knew their situation, and deeply sympathized in their sufferings, and was doing every thing in his power to relieve them. He informed them that provisions would soon arrive in the camp, and in the meanwhile, insubordination on their part, would only lead to unhappy consequences.

The soldiers replied that they perfectly knew the impropriety of such a step in ordinary cases, but to prevent actual starvation, something must be done for their relief. They had been told some days before, that provisions were expected, but this did not satisfy the cravings of hunger. They then communicated to us the plan on which they had decided, and in which most of the army concurred. Their determination was, to march in an orderly manner into the country, collect sufficient provisions, wherever they were to be found, to supply their present necessities, and to give certificates as to the quantity and value, to those from whom they were taken. They would then return to the cantonment and their duty. The troops were desired to suspend this movement for an hour, until their distressed condition was again represented to their General. They consented. When the officers made this communication to General Washington, he was deeply affected. He said, that

he well knew the sufferings of his faithful soldiers ; that he admired their forbearance and moderation, and would now assure them that if by such an hour the wagons did not arrive, he himself would lead the troops into the country, and supply them with provisions wherever they might be found.

The soldiers agreed to wait : the provisions arrived within the time, and the settled dissatisfaction which so generally prevailed, and which foreboded such fatal consequences, was quieted for the present.

But afterwards the same distress recurred. The army was sometimes a week without receiving meat of any kind.

Another letter from General Washington, written at a subsequent period, will show the miserable destitution of that army, which was appointed for the defence, and looked to as the protector of the nation.

“For some days past there has been little less than a famine in the camp. A part of the army has been a week without any kind of flesh, and the rest three or four days. Naked and starving as they are, we cannot enough admire the incomparable patience and fidelity of the soldiery, that they have not been ere this excited by their suffering to a general mutiny and dispersion. Strong symptoms, however, of discontent have appeared in particular instances ; and nothing but the most active efforts everywhere can long avert so shocking a catastrophe.”\*

\* Letter to Governor George Clinton, February 16, 1778. “Writings of Washington,” Vol. V., page 239.

“Such was the scarcity of blankets, that many of the men were obliged to sit up all night by the fires, without covering, to protect them while taking the common refreshment of sleep. Although the officers were better provided, yet none were exempt from exposure, privations, and hardships. Notwithstanding this deplorable condition of the army, there were not wanting those who complained of its inactivity, and insisted on a winter campaign. When the encampment was begun at Valley Forge, the whole number of men in the field was eleven thousand and ninety-eight; of whom two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight were unfit for duty, being barefoot, and otherwise naked.”\*

In the midst of these calamities, the small-pox broke out in the camp. Those who had never taken the infection were innoculated. Destitute of the comforts so much needed in this dreadful disease; lodged in huts illy calculated for sickness; without a proper supply of blankets, and the necessary articles of clothing to shield the unhappy sufferers from the cold, the camp exhibited a scene of misery which it is not in the power of language to describe.

Had Sir William Howe attacked our army under this accumulation of wretchedness and want, he would have forced General Washington from his cantonment; the sick and the feeble must have become prisoners, and in retreating to the back part of Pennsylvania, to which step necessity would have com-

\* Sparks' Life and Writings of Washington, Vol. I., page 277.

pelled him, he could have carried but little more than the shadow of an army.

But while so direful a calamity was averted by an overruling Providence, a new trial awaited General Washington in his perilous and difficult course.

A faction was forming, the object of which was, to make an impression on the public mind that he was not equal to the important duties of his station. This faction was composed of several officers of the army, of high rank, some members of Congress, and a few persons of political distinction in the different States. General Conway, a foreigner, was conspicuous in this cabal. To create a prejudice against Washington, his retreat from New-York into Pennsylvania, his retreat from the head of Elk, his defeat at the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, with other circumstances of his conduct, represented in the most unfavourable colours, were circulated with great industry. General Gates was designated to succeed him. He was represented as a great and consummate commander. The splendid victories of the north, by which a great army had been captured, were owing to the wisdom of his arrangements; and that were he the Commander-in-chief, the war would be conducted by the same wisdom, and the same glorious results would be produced.

The address and talents of the leaders of this faction, made little impression on the public mind; and the momentary mist cleared away, like the morning dew before the splendour of the sun. Even the northern army, which had been commanded by Ge-

neral Gates, and from which he had great hopes of support, was indignant, and steadily adhered to their old and beloved Commander.

Some time after, General Conway was wounded in a duel. He believed he was dying. In that solemn hour, ambition ceased to be the ruling passion of his soul; and, sensible of his injustice, he thus wrote to General Washington:

“ I find myself just able to hold my pen, during a few minutes, and take this opportunity of expressing my sincere grief, for having done, written or said any thing disagreeable to your Excellency. My career will soon be over, therefore justice and truth prompt me to declare my last sentiments. You are in my eyes, the great and good man. May you long enjoy the love, veneration, and esteem of these States, whose liberties you have asserted by your virtues.

“ I am, with the greatest respect, &c.

“ THOMAS CONWAY.”\*

Other letters have been published, which give the details of this abortive attempt to darken, if not destroy the fame of the leader of our armies.

It was evident to all, that General Washington felt more concern on account of the public evils which must ensue, by creating divisions in the army and country, than from any effects by which he might be personally implicated.

\* Writings of Washington, Vol. V., page 517.



## CHAPTER XIII.

BARON STEUBEN APPOINTED A MAJOR-GENERAL IN THE ARMY.—LAFAYETTE SENT WITH A DETACHMENT TO WATCH THE ENEMY.—HIS ESCAPE FROM THE BRITISH ARMY.—MAJOR HULL IN THE DETACHMENT SENT TO REINFORCE HIM.—MEETING OF LAFAYETTE AND GENERAL HULL IN 1824.

1777-8.

SOON after the establishment of the cantonment at Valley Forge, Baron Steuben was appointed by Congress a Major-General in the army. General Conway had resigned his situation of Inspector-General, after the defeat of the faction in which he had been a leader, and his office was now filled by Baron Steuben.

This officer had served a number of campaigns in the armies of the King of Prussia, and came highly recommended to this country. He was perfectly familiar with the military tactics of the Prussian King, and established the same in our army as far as they would apply to its circumstances and organization. They were simple and uniform. He considered no part of the manual exercise essential, except to handle the firelock in such a manner as to have the entire control of it, to load, take good aim, and fire as fast as possible. He likewise taught one uniform mode of forming column, and drawing up in a line in any direction the situation of the enemy rendered expe-

dient; either in front, to the right flank, the left flank, or the rear.

Major Hull, among other field officers, was appointed to assist him in these duties, and from his teachings they received much valuable instruction.

The advantages of the system soon became apparent. Under the simple and beautiful exercises he introduced, the army moved like a great machine, whose various parts unite to form a perfect whole.

On questions of military discipline, Steuben is appealed to, and his authority viewed as decisive. His system has been adopted in the training of the militia, our great national defence, and has been a powerful means of rendering it efficient. As long as his cotemporaries live, his talents and exertions will be remembered, while his name and his works will descend to posterity, among other great instruments which gave peace, independence, and prosperity to our country.

Baron Steuben was amiable and intelligent, and highly respected by all who knew him. On the establishment of peace, he retired to the western part of the State of New-York, and resided in the town of Steuben, named in honor of him. In this chosen spot he spent the residue of his days.

General Washington having received information which indicated an intention on the part of the British to evacuate Philadelphia, selected about twenty-five hundred of his best troops, giving the command of them to Major-General Lafayette.

On the nineteenth of May this detachment crossed

the Schuylkill to the east, and proceeded down the river, about eleven miles towards Philadelphia. General Washington's instructions to Lafayette were, "The detachment under your command, with which you will immediately march towards the enemy's lines, is designed to answer the following purpose, namely: to be a security to this camp, and a cover to the country between the Delaware and Schuylkill, to interrupt the communication with Philadelphia, to obstruct the incursions of the enemy's parties, and to obtain intelligence of their motions and designs."

Sir William Howe having been advised of this movement, and of the situation of the Marquis, formed the design of capturing the whole detachment. To effect this he divided his army into three bodies, the right commanded by General Grant, the left by General Grey, and the centre by himself and Sir Henry Clinton. He directed General Grant, whose force consisted of five thousand men, to take the Delaware road, make a circuitous march to White-marsh, and at daylight in the morning, to take a position directly in the rear of the Marquis. General Grey was ordered to proceed up the road, on the east of the Schuylkill, and halt directly in front; and the centre division, under his own command, to occupy ground on the left flank of the Marquis's detachment. These movements having been executed by the enemy, the Marquis at once saw his danger; his little army was surrounded on three sides, and each body of the enemy superior in numbers to his whole detachment.

With the most perfect calmness and intrepidity, which inspired his officers with confidence in his skill and power to extricate himself, he immediately ordered a retreat to Matson's ford, as the road to Swede's ford was then occupied by the enemy. A wood separated him from the division of General Grant. Lafayette masked his retreat by sending out small parties into the wood, that they might show themselves as heads of columns moving against the front of Grant's division.

This *ruse de guerre* succeeded admirably; for, while the attention of the enemy was distracted and their progress delayed, Lafayette made good use of the time, gained the ford, crossed the river, and posted himself in a strong position on the western side. General Washington received information of the advance of the British army before the Marquis retreated. Alarm guns were fired in the camp, and a detachment sent to reinforce him. Major Hull was with this detachment. It arrived and met the retreating troops near the ford, just after they had crossed the river. The British were on the opposite bank; they soon, however, returned to Philadelphia, without having gained their expected prize.

Some skirmishing took place, while the detachment was crossing the river. The loss on our part was not more than nine or ten men. Two of the enemy's light-horse were killed, and several wounded. Lafayette was taken by surprise; but the surprise is no reflection on his foresight or military skill. It was owing to the negligence of a body of six hundred

militia, stationed at Whitemarsh, to give information of the movements of the enemy. They had abandoned their post of duty, without the Marquis's orders or knowledge. This enabled General Grant to advance and gain his rear, from which dangerous situation the youthful General extricated his detachment by his calmness, skill, and celerity, in the critical moment of impending capture.

The Marquis de Lafayette was a young nobleman of one of the most ancient and respectable families of France. Under the age of twenty-one years, a Captain in the armies of his country, ardent for military fame, and before an alliance had been formed with this nation in 1776, he offered his services to the American Commissioners, then in Paris. He considered the cause of America as just ; that she was contending for her rights ; importuned for years before, in a spirit of loyal forbearance, touching to every generous heart. His sympathies and his love of republican principles were enlisted in her behalf. At first his offer was accepted ; but shortly after, intelligence of new misfortunes arrived ; and so dark was the cloud which then hung over the destinies of our country, that all hopes of success in the Revolution seemed extinct, and the Commissioners generously endeavoured to dissuade him from his purpose. "No," replied the noble Lafayette, "this is the very moment to serve your cause."

Nor was his ardour damped when they were "obliged to acknowledge to him the humiliating fact, that they possessed not the means nor the credit suffi-

cient for procuring a single vessel in all the ports of France. ‘Then,’ exclaimed the youthful hero, ‘I will provide my own!’—and it is a literal fact, that when all America was too poor to offer him so much as a passage to her shores, he left, in his tender youth, the bosom of home, of happiness, of wealth, and of rank, to plunge in the dust and blood of our inauspicious struggle.”\*

As a volunteer he arrived among us. He first distinguished himself in the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, where he was twice wounded. In 1777, he was appointed by Congress a Major-General. Lafayette was amiable, modest, industrious, and skilled in his profession. His fortune was expended in our service, and he successfully employed every talent, to perform his duties, and reward the high confidence which had been reposed in him. He was beloved and greatly respected in the army; nor were these feelings less lively, nor less sincere, among a long list of old officers whom he had superseded in rank. But his services were not confined to military duty. He returned to France, and by his representations, his zeal and influence, he not only aided in procuring for us arms, clothing, and loans, but was instrumental in convincing the King and his ministers, of the advantage of forming an alliance with America, and assisting her with her fleets and armies. His name is identified with the glorious triumph of

\* Oration of Edward Everett, before the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Cambridge, Mass., August 27, 1824, General Lafayette being present.



the Revolution ; he is viewed as one of the founders of our national existence ; and his memory lives in the heart of every true American.\*

\* When General Lafayette was in Boston in 1824, it was the happiness of General Hull, to receive, by General Lafayette's appointment, a visit from his old companion in arms. The venerable warriors met. The recollection of the past crowded on their minds, and the scene was one of touching solemnity. But the youth of two generations were before them, and their warm sympathies soon flowed into the channel of present enjoyment. The children and the grand-children of General Hull were honoured with the attention of Lafayette ; and who that ever witnessed his warm reception of the friends of his youth, and his affectionate manner to children, can be insensible to the feelings of that hour, in which the interests of three generations were concentrated !

## CHAPTER XIV.

## THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH.

1778.

ON the seventeenth of June, the British army evacuated Philadelphia, under the command of Sir Henry Clinton, and passed into New Jersey. General Washington was then at Valley Forge. His force numbered rather more than that of the British. As the enemy slowly advanced up the Delaware, he manifested an intention of marching to New-York. It was however difficult to ascertain the route he would take. General Washington called a council of officers to deliberate, whether it was expedient to march and take a position on his front or his flank, so as to bring on a general action, or only to harass his flank and rear with light parties. General Lee, who had been exchanged, was one of the council. Being next to Washington in rank, and possessing great military experience, his opinion had much weight. He contended that, under the circumstances, the Fabian policy was expedient. He urged that the alliance with France rendered our independence certain, and the possibility of failure in a general battle, ought not to be hazarded. A majority of the officers coincided with him. Washington held oppo-

site views, and was sustained by many of his officers, among whom were Generals Lafayette, Steuben, Greene, and Wayne. He remarked, that in an open country, a pursuing army had the advantage of one retreating; that the British were incumbered with invalids and baggage; that the most direct road to Amboy was a long march; and concluded by saying, that so favourable an opportunity for attack, ought not to be lost.

Sir Henry Clinton having commenced his march through New Jersey, General Washington detached General Maxwell's brigade, in conjunction with the militia of that State, to impede and interrupt his progress; that time might thereby be afforded to the army under his command to come up with them, and take advantage of any favourable circumstances that might be presented.

Washington crossed the Delaware at Coryell's ferry, and from thence detached six hundred men, under Colonel Morgan, to reinforce General Maxwell. Brigadier-General Scott was sent with fifteen hundred chosen troops to join those in the vicinity, and to annoy and delay the march of the British.

General Washington having ascertained that the enemy were advancing towards Monmouth Court House, despatched one thousand men, under the command of General Wayne, and sent the Marquis Lafayette to take the command of the whole detachment, including Maxwell's brigade and Morgan's light infantry. His orders were, to avail himself of the first opportunity to attack the enemy.

General Lee, dissatisfied probably that his counsel had been rejected, refused to take the command of these troops, and voluntarily yielded his claims to General Lafayette.

The following day, however, he addressed a letter to Washington, in which he expressed regret at what he had done, and that he would now be gratified to have his command restored. Washington, ever conciliatory, when consistent with duty, and desirous of rendering justice to his country, by securing to its services all the talent that was at command, acceded to the wishes of General Lee.

As the enemy had now made a change in the disposition of their troops, placing the strength of their army in the rear, it became necessary to increase the advanced corps. General Washington availed himself of this circumstance, and despatched General Lee with two brigades, to join the Marquis Lafayette at Englishtown. The command of the whole then devolved on General Lee, he being the senior officer. But he was directed to render every assistance in his power to Lafayette, should he find him engaged in any plan or enterprise against the enemy. At the same time he wrote Lafayette, acquainting him with the circumstances, trusting to his usual generosity to be governed by the good of the cause, rather than by personal interest.

Sir Henry Clinton, observing the movements of General Washington, and that he was preparing to attack his flanks and rear, ordered all the baggage to his front, protecting it with a body of his German

troops. He then formed the remainder of his army in the rear of the baggage, on the high hills of Monmouth, under the command of Lord Cornwallis and himself.

The next morning, at daylight, the baggage of the enemy was discovered to be in motion. General Washington sent directions to General Lee, to commence the attack, "unless there should be very powerful reasons to the contrary." He was to order the troops on both flanks to attack at the same time; Morgan on the right and General Dickinson on the left, and that he would closely follow to his support.

The British descended from the heights into the plain: Lee advanced to meet them. As soon as the firing was heard, General Washington directed the main body to throw off their packs, and he advanced as rapidly as possible to their support. This firing was between the advanced guards of Lee and the rear guards of the enemy.

Sir Henry Clinton, finding that both his flanks and his rear would be attacked, halted his army and advanced on the front of General Lee's division. This movement was perceived by Lee; and ignorant whether General Washington was sufficiently near to support him, and aware that his force was unequal to contend with the whole British army, he ordered a retreat to the high grounds. He was met by Washington, who expressed marked disapprobation of his conduct; and directed him to form his troops and oppose the progress of the enemy. "Your orders," replied Lee, "shall be obeyed, and I will not

be the first to quit the field.”\* Washington then came up with the main body, and proceeding to the rear of the corps, he found it closely pressed by the enemy. He writes: “I proceeded immediately to the rear of the corps, which I found closely pressed by the enemy, and gave directions for forming a part of the retreating troops, who, by the brave and spirited conduct of the officers, aided by some pieces of well-served artillery, checked the enemy’s advance, and gave time to make a disposition of the left wing and second line of the army upon an eminence and in a wood a little in the rear, covered by a morass in front. On this were placed some batteries of cannon by Lord Stirling, who commanded the left wing, which played upon the enemy with great effect, and, seconded by parties of infantry detached to oppose them, effectually put a stop to their advance.”†

The eighth Massachusetts regiment was attached to this division of Lord Stirling. It was commanded by Major Hull. He was the next officer in rank to Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, who was appointed during this day to act as Adjutant to General Lee. “Lord Stirling,” says Major Hull, “took an advantageous position on elevated ground, directly in front of the enemy’s right. They formed on the opposite side of a hollow, ready to receive us. A severe cannonade was commenced from our division, during which a demonstration was made on the right of the

\* Ramsay’s History of the United States, Vol. II., page 260.

† Writings of Washington, Vol. V., page 425.



enemy's line, and the whole division advancing at the same time on the front of their right wing, they were compelled to retreat.

General Greene and General Wayne successfully opposed the progress of their right wing, and compelled it to retreat to the heights, from which it had marched in the morning. They afterwards made several attempts on our left, which were as often repulsed. In the evening, the whole British army took a strong position, and could only be approached through a narrow pass. General Washington made an effort to move round on their right and left, and directed the artillery to assail them in front. But so many impediments were in the way that night came on before these operations could take effect. The troops remained on the ground near the enemy with the intention of attacking them at daylight, and the whole army continued lying on their arms on the field of battle, prepared to support them.

General Washington, wrapped in his military cloak, passed the night in the midst of his soldiers. About twelve o'clock the enemy silently moved off, and though the Americans were so near, they had not the slightest intimation of their retreat. They took with them a large proportion of their wounded, but left four officers and forty privates, whose situation was too dangerous to permit of their removal.

The intense heat of the weather and the great fatigue of the troops, forbad a pursuit; and besides, it would have been fruitless, as the British had gained upon them a march in the night.

Major Hull writes : " I went over the field of battle the next morning, and discovered a large number of dead bodies without any wounds, who probably died from heat. We buried four officers and two hundred and forty-five privates, and more must have been killed, for there were a number of new-made graves."

Perhaps a complete victory might have been won by the Americans in this battle, had not the retreat of General Lee in the very onset, with a force of between five and six thousand men, given to the enemy a decided advantage. Yet, notwithstanding this movement, so calculated to damp the ardour of soldiers, there was a spirit, a skill, and an undaunted resolution manifested in the trying scenes of that day which was the earnest of still more successful effort. The officer and the soldier as he lay on his arms throughout the night, looked to the morning dawn, in the hope that a contest so equal and so severe, would then be decided in favour of his beloved country.

The British fought with their usual coolness and intrepidity; and felt, not for the first time, that they had a foe to grapple with, which required all the energies, the experience, and the skill of their warlike profession to sustain them.

General Washington in his report to Congress writes : " Were I to conclude my account of this day's transactions, without expressing my obligations to the officers of the army in general, I should do injustice to their merit, and violence to my own feelings. They seemed to vie with each other, in manifesting

their zeal and bravery. The catalogue of those who distinguished themselves, is too long to admit of particularizing individuals. I cannot, however, forbear mentioning Brigadier-General Wayne, whose good conduct and bravery through the whole action, deserves particular commendation. The behaviour of the troops in general, after they recovered from the first surprise, occasioned by the retreat of the advanced corps, was such as could not be surpassed. All the artillery, both officers and men, that were engaged, distinguished themselves in a remarkable manner.”\*

General Lee, at his own request, was tried before a Court Martial. The charges were :

1st. Disobedience of orders, in not attacking the enemy, agreeably to repeated instructions.

2d. Misbehaviour before the enemy, by making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat.

3d. Disrespect to the Commander-in-chief, in two letters, dated 28th June and the 1st of July.

The Court sat for some weeks, when it declared General Lee guilty of all the charges, and sentenced him to be suspended from any command in the armies of the United States, for the term of twelve months.

A majority in Congress approved of the sentence. The word *shameful* was struck out of the second charge. With respect to the correctness of the sentence of the Court Martial, military men have dif-

\* Writings of Washington, Vol. V., page 427.

ferred in opinion. But the language and letters of General Lee to General Washington, met with universal disapprobation.

The question, whether under his instructions and the circumstances of the case he was authorized to retreat, without fighting, need not now be discussed. But it must ever be regretted, that the division under Lee's command, did not or could not perform the duty to which it was assigned. Had there been no retreat, the results of that day, honourable as they were to the troops engaged, would doubtless have had a much more important bearing on the interests of the American arms.

## CHAPTER XV.

MAJOR HULL'S COMMAND ON THE LINES.

1779.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKS having obtained leave of absence, the command of the regiment devolved on Major Hull. He was directed to march it to Poughkeepsie, at that time the seat of government for the State of New-York. As soon as it arrived, the men were employed in erecting barracks, and hauling wood for the winter.

As this was a pleasant and fertile part of the country, both officers and men were pleased with the location, and made great exertions to complete their accommodations for the winter. But their happiness was short-lived; for scarcely were they established in their comfortable abodes, when Major Hull received an order from General McDougall, who commanded at Peekskill, to march the regiment the next day, and take his station on the lines near Kingsbridge. The order produced some disappointment. Poughkeepsie being the seat of government, the Governor and other civil officers of the State resided there, besides many pleasant families, which had withdrawn from the city.

Major Hull communicated the order to the regi-

ment, and gave directions to be prepared to march the next morning at eight o'clock. He passed the evening at the house of Governor Clinton. When he returned to his lodgings, he perceived a large roll of paper lying on the step of his door. He found it to be a remonstrance, signed by all the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the regiment. They stated how much they had endured in the last campaign, and how hard they had laboured to build their barracks, procure their wood and other necessary comforts; and that under these circumstances, they did not expect to be ordered to serve another campaign that winter.

Major Hull immediately sent for the officers of the regiment, and communicated to them the contents of the paper. The officers informed him that they had no knowledge of the paper, but had that evening observed unusual appearances and symptoms of discontent, and that they feared the men would refuse to march the next morning. They suggested to Major Hull whether it would not be expedient to send an express to General McDougall, stating the circumstances, and wait his orders.

He replied, that this insubordination must be checked at once, and prepared to use the authority he possessed, which he believed would be sufficient, rather than appeal to a higher power. The troops might view this latter measure as an expression of weakness; and from thence would result greater difficulty in the exaction of strict obedience in the remote station to which they were now ordered.



Major Hull requested the officers to obtain all the information relating to what had passed, and endeavour to ascertain if there was not some self-interested mischievous person, who had influenced the men to take this stand.

It was soon discovered that a sergeant of artillery had obtained leave of absence from his regiment, and had procured a small room in the neighbourhood, with the expectation of selling groceries and other articles that the troops wanted.

In the morning when the hour to assemble had arrived, Major Hull and the officers only were present; none of the troops appeared. Major Hull directed the officers to go into the barracks, and at all events to parade their companies. A few men from each company came forth; the number soon increased, and in a short time the whole regiment was formed. Major Hull then stated, that he well knew how unpleasant it was to them to leave their comfortable quarters, and not only regretted it on their account, but likewise for his officers and for himself; that they were very pleasantly situated, and had hoped to pass the winter in Poughkeepsie. But he observed to them, obedience to orders was the first duty of a soldier. He then pointed out, in strong terms, the impropriety of their conduct; that he feared, from information obtained, they had been unhappily influenced, and strong suspicions rested on the man whom they perceived was brought on parade under arrest.

A Court Martial was at once ordered to sit in the

presence of the corps. The sergeant was tried, and found guilty of the charges brought against him. He was sentenced to receive severe punishment, which was immediately inflicted in the presence of the troops. The troops then commenced their march to the White Plains, where they arrived early in December. "Colonel Burr, afterwards Vice-President of the United States," writes Major Hull, "had commanded for several months on this station, from which duty I was now ordered to relieve him. He remained a few days, and furnished us with necessary and important information with respect to the situation of the enemy, the different routes leading from Kingsbridge, and the position he had taken for the security and defence of his corps. In justice to his military character, it must be said that his plans were highly judicious.

"Our duties having now commenced, the advanced parties were directed to reconnoitre every day, within a few miles of the enemy at Kingsbridge; while the position of the main body, consisting of about four hundred, was seven or eight miles from that post, and eighteen miles in advance of any of our stations above. Being in the face of the whole British Army, without fortifications for defence, our safety depended on unceasing vigilance."

Several detachments had been recently cut off. The country between the Highlands and New-York, and between the North and East rivers, depended on this small body of troops for protection ere it could be reinforced from the cantonment of General

McDougall. Major Hull had his main body compactly posted, occupying a central position between the rivers, at and below the White Plains ; but frequently changing its locality, and generally this change took place in the evening. Small parties were constantly on duty, patrolling to the right, above and sometimes below Dobbs' Ferry, and to the left, as far as the Sound at Mamaroneck, and below.

Major Hull was aided by guides, selected from the most active, intelligent, and well-disposed inhabitants, who were familiar with every part of the country. These persons received remuneration, were furnished with horses, and proved faithful and exceedingly useful in the service.

Many families remained on their farms, and it was important to know their true characters. Major Hull therefore had the names of all the inhabitants registered between Kingsbridge and Croton river, and between the North and East rivers. The character of each individual was described by ciphers, the object being to prevent injury to those who were well disposed, should the book fall into the hands of the enemy. The commanding officer held a species of civil as well as military jurisdiction, as the situation of the country between the hostile armies was such, that the laws of the State could not operate. A conflict existed between the civil and military enactments, the decision of which was necessarily assumed and enforced by the strongest power.\* But

\* See Appendix, No. III., with several subsequent letters to Major Hull, commanding on the Lines.

whenever cases of improper or irregular impressment occurred, recompense was made to the owners, and the teams, horses, &c., were returned. But it will be seen by reference to the Appendix that such was the state of things, that certain acts of the Senate and Assembly of New-York in relation to the impressment of horses, teams, &c., were entirely superseded by martial law, and the power to seize and send to head-quarters all suspicious persons or any guilty of theft or other crimes, was lodged in the hands of the officer then commanding. Indeed this portion of the country, infested by a roving banditti equally cruel to all parties, was a scene of terror and suffering throughout most of the years of the war. The Cow-boys and Skinners ravaged the whole region. The first, called Refugees, ranked themselves on the British side. They were employed in plundering cattle and driving them to the city: their name is derived from their occupation. The latter, called Skinners, while professing attachment to the American cause, were devoted to indiscriminate robbery, murder, and every species of the most brutal outrage. They seemed, like the savage, to have learned to enjoy the sight of the sufferings they inflicted. Oftentimes they left their wretched victims, from whom they plundered their all, hung up by their arms, and sometimes by their thumbs, on barn doors, enduring the agony of the wounds that had been inflicted, to wrest from them their property. These miserable beings were frequently relieved by our patrols, who every night scoured the country from river to river. But unhap-

pily the military force was too small to render the succour so much needed ; although by its vigilance and the infliction of severe punishment on the offenders, it kept in check, to a certain extent, this lawless race of men. The command on the lines covered an extensive section of country, and there were many roads leading from Kingsbridge to the different stations, which were occupied by the detachment. It was therefore necessary to avail of the friendly inhabitants to obtain intelligence of the first movement of the enemy. Those who resided below the lines, being entirely in the power of the British, were obliged to feign an attachment they did not feel.

Major Hull selected a certain number of families on whose fidelity he could rely, and formed a line of them, extending from Kingsbridge to his most advanced guards. He requested these persons to come to him at night, that he might communicate to them his plan of securing information, which he said would depend on their good faith, alertness, and secrecy. He told the man who lived nearest Kingsbridge, that whenever he perceived any extraordinary movement, or whenever the enemy passed the bridge, to take a mug or pitcher in his hand, and in a careless manner go to his neighbour who composed one of the line, for some cider, beer, or milk, and give him notice, and then immediately return home. His neighbour was to do the same, and so on, until the information reached the station of Major Hull. Every individual thus employed was faithful to the trust reposed in him.

The enemy could make no movement, without the detachment being informed and prepared to meet or avoid them. Major Hull rewarded, as he was authorized, these good people, who could not, in their situation, perform a duty of this nature, without much personal risk. Yet they ceased not to exhibit the virtues of patriotism and constancy, by a faithful devotion to their country's interests, while exposed to imminent danger and surrounded by hardships and privation.

By the laws of the State of New-York, if they refused to take the oath of fidelity to the State, their property was liable to confiscation. The country they occupied was fertile and populous, and the land well cultivated. Any person who took the oath, would instantly find the Cow-boys robbing him of his all; and to offer defence, was at the peril of life. Such as did not take the oath, were left to the tender mercies of the Skinners, who, taking the law into their own hands, branded them as tories, confiscated their property, and went off secure, in the possession of their booty.

In this condition of the social state, the innocent and guilty equally suffered.

The descendants of these people, many of the present inhabitants of Westchester, and its neighbourhood, who are now living in the happy enjoyment of liberty, and the protection of law, have reason to feel a generous pride in the virtue of their ancestors, who so nobly stood the test of these trying times.



Major Hull, at this period, was about twenty-five years of age, and blessed with a good constitution. He remarks, while speaking of this service, "In a command so responsible, I adopted a system, to which I steadfastly adhered; nor did storms, cold, or the darkness of the night, ever interfere with its performance. Early in the evening, without taking off my clothes, with my arms by my side, I laid myself down before a fire, covered only by a blanket, and gave directions to the sentinel to awake me at one o'clock in the morning. My adjutant, or some other officer was with me; and one or two of the faithful guides, who have been mentioned. The troops were ordered to be paraded at the same hour I was called, and a portion to remain on parade until my return. After the whole were assembled, one half of them were permitted to go to rest, and the other half were formed into strong guards, which patrolled in front and on the flanks of the detachment until sunrise. This force was in addition to the small parties which were constantly patrolling with the guides. After making this arrangement, I rode with my adjutant and one or two guides, as far as my patrols were directed to proceed, across to the North river, and then back on the line of my patrols, toward the East river, and continued riding in different directions, until sunrise. While on this duty, I visited a number of my confidential line of inhabitants, to ascertain the movements of the enemy. I generally rode about twenty miles at night, and nearly the same distance during the day. This service on the lines was so severe,

that two hundred men, with officers, were sent from the army every ten days, to relieve one half of the detachment, while the half best fitted for duty remained. As civil law was suspended, I was directed to preserve as much peace, security, and good order among the inhabitants as possible; and particularly cautioned to prevent supplies being carried to the enemy. The country was fertile, and the people were required in due proportion to supply the troops with provisions, for which I gave them certificates. These various duties employed all my time, excepting the first part of every night given to sleep. The enemy made many attempts to surprise and destroy the detachment; but by the precautions taken, his plans were invariably defeated. In all the little rencontres which took place, the advantage was on our side; and the country, in a great degree, was protected, both above and below my station, from cruel depredations. Only those families suffered who resided nearest to the British lines."

In the latter part of May, it was evident preparations were making for some important expedition, in which the strength of the British army was to be employed, aided by the co-operation of their navy. Major Hull wrote to General McDougall, that appearances indicated that the enterprise was to be directed against the army in the Highlands, and that the detachment on the lines would be the first object of attack. General McDougall having received similar intelligence, directed Major Hull, in case the enemy advanced in force over Kingsbridge towards

the White Plains, to retreat before they came so near as to compel him to action; to observe their movements up the river, and to proceed in such a manner as not to be in the rear of the fleet, as in such case, his communication might be cut off from the army in the Highlands.

About the last of May, Major Hull received information from his faithful line of inhabitants, that a large column of the enemy had passed Kingsbridge, and was marching towards the White Plains. His detachment, excepting some small patrols, were assembled in a compact body in that place. Previous to this, he had given notice to the inhabitants of the movements of the enemy, and of his intention to retreat to the Highlands. Many of them removed their families and fled to a more peaceful region.

When the enemy had arrived within about two miles of the White Plains, Major Hull called in the patrols and marched to the road on the North river. He soon perceived the fleet, which was but a small distance below his position. As he advanced slowly up the river, he was informed that the column which had passed Kingsbridge, was making a forced march on his right, with a view to gain his front and cut off his retreat. He hastened his march, and crossed the Croton river, where he halted. The enemy approached him by land, and he perceived their troops debarking from the fleet. He then made a rapid march to Peekskill, and joined the forces under the command of General McDougall. The British army proceeded up the river, and took possession of Stony and Ver-

plank's Points. Works had been erected by the Americans at these places, but when the enemy approached the workmen retired. A small garrison at Verplank's Point surrendered.

From the preparations of Sir Henry Clinton, it was expected that he would attack West Point, and the other fortresses in the Highlands.

General Washington, considering the Highlands of great importance, concentrated a large part of his army for their defence. Major Hull was ordered to West Point. His detachment erected a fort on the summit of a hill which overlooked and commanded the other works established at that place. The object was to defeat the plans of the enemy, should he attempt to march by a circuitous route, through the gorges of the mountains, to obtain possession of this eminence.

Sir Henry Clinton, however, after establishing garrisons at Stony and Verplank's Points, returned to New-York. His object, it was believed, in ascending the river, was, to possess himself of all the fortresses in the Highlands; but the prompt and wise measures taken by General Washington, in recalling the troops from New Jersey, and concentrating his strength in their defence, defeated the plans of his adversary.

Sir Henry Clinton then changed his mode of operations, but with a view to the same object. He commenced a predatory warfare on the Sound, and the defenceless inhabitants of Connecticut experienced, in a war of extermination, the horrors and brutal cruelties of an unlicensed soldiery.

By this course he hoped to draw off Washington from his strong-hold in the Highlands, and thus secure to himself their complete possession. But in every part of his plan, he was defeated by the sound judgment and superior skill of the American Commander.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## CAPTURE OF STONY POINT.

1779.

IT is a darkened view of the human mind that induces the belief that outrage and cruelty will command submission, sooner than a generous and just appeal to the better feelings of man. The spirit may bend under oppression, but not break, while, by its reaction, it acquires new strength for resistance.

The study of our own hearts, and the example of Him, in whom there is no variableness, would furnish safer and more kindly views. God endeavours to win by love and by persuasion ; when these fail, he sends a severe, healthful, but not an irritating discipline, dictated equally by wisdom and mercy.

During our contest with Britain, plunder and devastation overspread our beautiful southern land ; while at the north, fire laid waste our peaceful dwellings, and the sword did its work on the defenceless inhabitants of the sea-coast. What the enemy could not effect by contest in the open field, he vainly thought could be done by sweeping from the earth every vestige of home and domestic peace.

But the earth and man were left ; and the Spirit of the Almighty, guiding the destinies of America,



overruled, to her final good, the violence of her enemies, and the sufferings of her children.

The head-quarters of General Washington were now at New Windsor, a short distance above West Point. The troops he had drawn from New Jersey, were stationed on both sides the river below, to give check to the enemy should he again ascend the Hudson. "But their plan of devastation and plunder on the sea-coast was vigorously pursued. About the beginning of July, a detachment of two thousand six hundred men, under Governor Tryon, sailed from New-York into Long Island Sound. They first landed at New-Haven, plundered the inhabitants indiscriminately, and burnt the stores on the wharves. This being done, they embarked and landed at Fairfield and Norwalk, which towns were reduced to ashes. Dwelling-houses, shops, churches, school-houses, and the shipping in the harbours were destroyed. The soldiers pillaged without restraint, committing acts of violence, and exhibiting the horrors of war in some of their most revolting forms.

"It does not appear that there were troops, magazines, or public property in either of the towns. The waste and distress fell on individuals who were pursuing the ordinary occupations of life. The people rallied in self-defence, and a few were killed; but the enemy retired to their vessels, before the militia could assemble in large numbers. The British Commander hoped that this invasion of Connecticut would draw away the American army from the Highlands, to a position where he might bring on an

engagement under favourable circumstances. Washington's habitual caution guarded him against allowing such an advantage. On the contrary, while the enemy's forces were thus divided, he resolved to attack the strong post at Stony Point. The necessity of doing something to satisfy the expectations of the people, and reconcile them to the defensive plan which he was obliged to pursue; the value of the acquisition in itself, with respect to the men, artillery, and stores, which composed the garrison; the effect it would have upon the subsequent operations of the campaign, and the check it would give to the depredations of the enemy, were, as he said, the motives which prompted him to the undertaking. He reconnoitered the post, and instructed Major Henry Lee, who was stationed near it with a party of cavalry, to gain all the information in his power as to the condition of the works, and the strength of the garrison.

“The enterprise was intrusted to General Wayne, who commanded a body of light infantry in advance of the main army, where he was placed to watch the movements of the enemy, to prevent their landing, and to attack separate parties whenever opportunities should offer.

“Having procured all the requisite information, and determined to make the assault, Washington communicated general instructions to Wayne, in writing and conversation, leaving the rest to the well-tried bravery and skill of that gallant officer.”\*

\* Sparks' Life and Writings of Washington, Vol. I., page 223.

The regiments which formed the corps of General Wayne, were commanded by Colonels Webb, Febiger, and Butler. The detachment which Major Hull marched from the White Plains, when Sir Henry Clinton ascended the Hudson, and established posts at King's Ferry, was stationed on the high grounds about West Point, and employed in building several forts, which at this period were nearly completed.\*

On the morning of the fourteenth of July, Major Hull was ordered to march to Sandy Beach, and to unite his corps to that of General Wayne.

Two companies of North Carolina light infantry, commanded by Major Murfee, were directed to join the troops at Sandy Beach. These were placed in the detachment of Major Hull, whose command now consisted of about four hundred men.


At eleven o'clock on the morning of the fifteenth of July, the march was commenced over rugged and almost impassable mountains, and continued for fourteen miles, when the detachment arrived, a little before dusk in the evening, within a mile and a half of

\* The Editor is indebted to Benjamin Russel, Esq., of Boston, for the following facts: "Four forts were building. Their names were, Fort Webb, Fort Willis, Fort Arnold (afterwards called Fort Clinton), and Fort Hull. The highest was Fort Hull, a point of *look-out*. It was three miles from Fort Clinton." Mr. Russel was one of the

gallant captors of Stony Point. Though only a *private*, during the war, he was among the faithful supporters of his country's rights, and ready to use his energetic mind and strong arm in the struggle for her independence. After the war, he was for thirty years Editor of "*The Boston Sentinel*," a paper well conducted and highly respectable.



# Verplanks Point




HUDSON

RIVER


*Kings Ferry*

# Stony Point



- A. Fort
- B. Wayne's Right
- C. Wayne's Left
- D. Fort Lafayette

SCALE OF HALF A MILE



Stony Point. Here it halted. General Wayne, with his principal officers, reconnoitred the works, and now, for the first time, was communicated to his troops the object of the enterprise.

He stated that the attack was to be made on Stony Point at twelve o'clock that night. That the detachment was to be divided into two columns; to advance with unloaded muskets, and depend entirely on the bayonet; that it was his determination to persevere, until in complete possession of the fort; and that if any man attempted to load his piece, leave his station, or retreat, he was instantly to be put to death by the officer or soldier next him.

General Wayne then gave in detail, the disposition of the troops. The column on the right was to consist of Febiger's and Meigs' regiments, and Major Hull's detachment, and to be led on by General Wayne himself.

The column on the left, was to consist of Colonel Butler's regiment. Major Hull was directed to detach Major Murfee's two companies, to form in the centre of the two columns, and to advance near to a part of the fort that was not to be assailed, and keep up a constant fire, with a view to distract and draw off attention from the real point of attack.

Lieutenant Colonel Fleury and Major Posey, to command a corps of one hundred and fifty volunteers, to precede the column on the right; and Major Stewart, with one hundred volunteers, to precede the column on the left. *A forlorn hope* of twenty men was attached to each column: one led on by Lieutenant



Gibbon, the other by Lieutenant Knox. Their duty was, to remove the abattis and other obstructions in the way of the troops. After the orders were communicated, Major Hull recollected that there was a captain in his detachment, to whom cowardice had been imputed, on account of his conduct in the battle of Monmouth. He sought the young man and requested him to walk aside for a few moments, having something to communicate. When alone, he said, "It is a subject of much delicacy, my dear sir, of which I am about to speak, and my motive to serve you, must be my apology for the liberty I take. You are aware that reports, injurious to your character as a soldier, have been in circulation since the battle of Monmouth; as no inquiry has been made into your conduct on that occasion, your brother officers still view you, as wanting in bravery. You have, no doubt, a distinct recollection of the nature of your feelings at that time, and if conscious that there was a want of fortitude to meet the dangers to which you were then exposed, you must be sensible that in the duties now to be performed, they are of a character much more imposing; but that they are so, is favourable, as you are furnished, in the hazardous enterprise before us, with a better opportunity to eradicate impressions for which no just cause may exist. But whatever might have been the truth, I leave you to decide whether to return to the camp, and give your company to the command of your Lieutenant, or to lead it yourself." Captain \* \* \* \* replied, "I thank you, sir, for your consideration and candour, and hope

to prove myself worthy of it. Wait a few moments, until I return." He came, accompanied by his Lieutenant, and related to him, in the presence of Major Hull, the conversation which had just taken place. Then, with a calm but resolute expression of countenance, said: "I request you to observe my conduct during the assault, and if I do not acquit myself with the bravery which my rank and the occasion demands, I beg you to kill me on the spot." The Lieutenant assured him his request should be complied with.

So gallantly did Captain \* \* \* \* acquit himself in the assault, that from that time his courage was never questioned.

After the orders were communicated, both officers and men appeared inspired with a spirit that no danger could appal, and no barrier keep from the prize before them. Before giving an account of the action, a description of the grounds on which the fortifications were erected may be desirable.

"Stony Point is a commanding hill, projecting far into the Hudson, which washes three-fourths of its base. The remaining fourth is in a great measure covered by a deep marsh, commencing near the river, on the upper side, and continuing into it below. Over this marsh there is only one crossing place; but at its junction with the river, is a sandy beach, passable at low tide. On the summit of this hill was erected the fort, which was furnished with a sufficient number of heavy pieces of ordnance. Several breast-works and strong batteries were advanced, in front of the principal works; and about half way down

the hill, were two rows of abattis. The batteries commanded the beach and the crossing place of the marsh, and could rake and enfilade any column which might be advancing from either of those points, towards the fort. In addition to these defences, several vessels of war were stationed in the river, so as in a considerable degree to command the ground at the foot of the hill. The fort was garrisoned by about six hundred men, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson.”\*

“About half past eleven o’clock,” writes Major Hull, “the two columns commenced their march in platoons. The beach was more than two feet deep with water, and before the right column reached it, we were fired on by the out-guards, which gave the alarm to the garrison. We were now directly under the fort, and, closing in a solid column, ascended the hill, which was almost perpendicular. When about half way up, our course was impeded by two strong rows of abattis, which the forlorn hope had not been able entirely to remove. The column proceeded silently on, clearing away the abattis, passed to the breastwork, cut and tore away the pickets, cleared the chevaux-de-frise at the sally-port, mounted the parapet, and entered the fort at the point of the bayonet. All this was done under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, and as strong a resistance as could be made by the British bayonet. Our column on the other side, entered the fort at the same time.

\* Marshall’s Life of Washington, Vol. IV., page 122.

Each of our men had a white paper in his hat, which in the darkness distinguished him from the enemy ; and the watchword was, ‘ *The fort’s our own.*’

“ Our troops reached the area of the garrison not having fired a gun, the enemy still firing on us. The men made free use of the bayonet, and in every direction was heard, ‘ *The fort’s our own.*’ We were compelled to continue the dreadful slaughter, owing to the fierce and obstinate resistance of the enemy. They did not surrender until nearly one hundred men were killed and wounded ; after which their arms were secured and they were assembled under a strong guard in an angle of the fort, until morning. Major Murfee acted his part with great address, keeping up an incessant fire between the two columns ; thus diverting the attention of the assailed from the point of attack. His two companies were the only American troops that fired a gun. In ascending the hill, just after he had passed the abattis, General Wayne was wounded in the head by a musket-ball, and immediately fell. He remained on the spot, until the British surrendered, when some other officers and myself bore him into the fort, bleeding, but in triumph. Three loud and long cheers were now given, and reverberating in the stillness of night, amidst rocks and mountains, sent back, in echo, a glad response to the hearts of the victors. They were quickly answered by the enemy’s ships of war in the river, and by the garrison at Verplank’s Point, under the fond belief that the Americans were repulsed.

“ Our troops lost no time in collecting the cannon

of the garrison, and turning them against the shipping in the river. The officer of the British artillery was requested to furnish the keys of the powder magazine; he hesitated, and said that he only received his orders from Colonel Johnson. He was informed that Colonel Johnson was superseded in command, and that there must be no delay, or the consequences might be unpleasant. The key was produced, the pieces of ordnance loaded, and the news of what had happened sent to the shipping from the mouths of the cannon. Duplicates and triplicates were sent, which appeared to excite a good deal of agitation. They made no return to our fire, and the tide being strong, they slipped their cables and were carried down by the current.

“ In the same manner, the intelligence was announced at the fort at Verplank’s Point, but no reply was made.

“ Soon after the surrender, a Lieutenant of my detachment informed me, that he had killed one of the men, in obedience to orders, and that he regretted it, more than he could express. He said, that as the column was ascending the hill, the man left his station and was loading his musket. His commander ordered him to return and desist from loading. He refused, saying, that he did not understand fighting without firing. The officer immediately ran him through the body. I replied, ‘ You performed a painful duty, by which, perhaps, victory has been secured, and the life of many a brave man saved. Be satisfied.’

“ Colonel Johnson remained in his marquee until



morning, with others of our officers. I was frequently with him during the night. It was intimated by some one, that the garrison had been surprised. Colonel Johnson observed, that we certainly should not do ourselves or him the injustice to say, that he had been surprised. He begged the gentleman who made the remark, to recollect the fact, that the firing commenced before we passed the marsh; that all his men were at their stations, with their arms, and completely dressed, before our columns began to ascend the hill. That an incessant fire had been kept up, until we entered the works and the garrison surrendered. The officer explained, that he did not mean exactly as was understood. Colonel Johnson replied, that his works were too extensive; that they were planned for a much larger number of troops than Sir Henry Clinton had left for their defence, and that he was perfectly satisfied that his men had done their duty.

“Yet it has been represented by some historians of the Revolution, that the British were taken by surprise. But the distance from the fort, from which our columns were fired upon; the incessant roar of musketry and artillery, while we were ascending the precipice; the condition of the troops when the garrison surrendered, are facts which show that success was owing to the valour, perseverance, and superior physical strength of the assailants. Fifteen Americans were killed, and eighty-three wounded.

“Colonel Johnson, in his return, reports twenty killed of the British, including one officer, and sixty-



eight privates wounded. The prisoners amounted to five hundred and forty-three.

“The following day we were employed in burying the dead. I had two narrow escapes. One ball passed through the crown of my hat, another struck my boot.”

Chief Justice Marshall, in his account of this enterprise, says: “The humanity displayed by the conquerors was not less conspicuous, nor less honourable, than their courage. Not a single individual suffered after resistance had ceased. All the troops engaged in this perilous service manifested a degree of ardour and impetuosity, which proved them to be capable of the most difficult enterprises; and all distinguished themselves, whose situation enabled them to do so.

“Colonel Fleury was the first to enter the fort, and strike the British standard. Major Posey mounted the works, almost at the same instant, and was the first to give the watchword, ‘*The fort’s our own.*’

“Lieutenants Gibbon and Knox performed the service allotted to them, with a degree of intrepidity which could not be surpassed. Out of twenty men who constituted the party of the former, seventeen were killed or wounded.”\*

Major Hull writes: “The following day General Washington came to the fort, and the interesting scene of his arrival is perfectly fresh in my remembrance. I recollect how cordially he took us by the hand, and the satisfaction and the joy that glowed in his coun-

\* Marshall, Vol. I., page 325.

tenance. I attended him, with a number of other field officers, General Wayne being prevented by his wound.

“Washington minutely viewed every part of the fortifications. His attention was particularly drawn to those places, where the two columns ascended the hill, mounted the parapets, and first entered the works. He expressed his astonishment, that we had been enabled to surmount the difficulties, and attain our object, with so inconsiderable a loss. And here he offered his thanks to Almighty God, that he had been our shield and protector, amidst the dangers we had been called to encounter.”

Sparks, in his “Life of Washington,” says: “The action is allowed to have been one of the most brilliant of the Revolution. Congress passed Resolves, complimentary to the officers and privates, granting specific rewards, and directing the value of all the military stores taken in the garrison to be divided among the troops, in proportion to the pay of the officers and men. Three different medals were ordered to be struck, emblematical of the action, and awarded respectively to General Wayne, Colonel Fleury, and Colonel Stewart. Congress also passed a vote of thanks to General Washington, ‘for the vigilance, wisdom, and magnanimity, with which he had conducted the military operations of the States.’”

Among other things, Major Hull received a complete camp equipage. A marquee, with a mattress, bedstead, curtains, a large pair of horse canteens,

bottles, plates, and furniture of every kind, sufficient for a small table.

This marquee, bed, &c., he could carry on a single horse, during a march. When the army halted, in a very short time he had a good room and a bed, closed on all sides with curtains.

General Wayne received many complimentary letters on this occasion.

Major-General Charles Lee thus writes: "What I am going to say to you, will not, I hope, be considered as paying my court, in this your hour of glory; for as it is my present intention to leave this continent, I can have no interest in paying my court to any individual. What I shall say, therefore, is dictated by the genuine feelings of my heart. I do most sincerely declare, that your assault on Stony Point is not only the most brilliant, in my opinion, throughout the whole course of this war, on either side, but that it is the most brilliant that I am acquainted with in history. The assault on Schweidnitz, by Marshal Landau, I think inferior to it."\*

It was the intention of General Washington, in the event of success at Stony Point, immediately to have attacked the garrison on the opposite shore. For this purpose, he had ordered a brigade to advance from Peekskill, under the command of General McDougall, and take a position near Verplank's Point,

\* Life of General Anthony Wayne, by John Armstrong, in Sparks' American Biography, Vol. IV., page 47.

so as to make the attack as soon as he was informed that Stony Point was reduced. The messenger sent to General McDougall, by some accident, failed to deliver the letter, which prevented the attack at the time appointed. General Washington then changed his plan, by augmenting the number of troops, and giving the command to Major-General Howe. He likewise ordered a number of heavy pieces of artillery to make a breach in the works. From some neglect in the Ordnance Department, unsuitable cartridges were sent. This delay gave the enemy time to increase the means of defence, and place the garrison in entire security.

Had there been a sufficient number of boats to have transported the conquerors across the river, the reduction of this fort would have been almost certain. The number of men at the two posts was about the same, but the fort at Verplank's Point was inferior in point of strength.

The object, however, of General Washington was accomplished ; for he had compelled Sir Henry Clinton to abandon his desolating system in Connecticut, and ascend the Hudson for the protection of his garrison at Verplank's Point.

The works of Stony Point were so extensive, that a sufficient number of troops could not be spared for its defence ; besides, the enemy possessed the advantage of commanding the water.

The American General, therefore, decided to abandon the post. Every thing was carried off but one heavy cannon.

In a few days the British again took possession, strengthened the fortifications, and established a numerous garrison for its defence.

Late in the autumn, both of these forts were evacuated, and came into the possession of the Americans.

## CHAPTER XVII.

PROMOTION OF MAJOR HULL TO THE RANK OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL.—HE IS TRANSFERRED FROM THE EIGHTH TO THE THIRD MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT.—APPOINTED A COMMISSIONER TO PRESENT A PETITION TO THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS, FOR THE RELIEF OF THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS.—APPOINTED INSPECTOR IN THE ARMY, UNDER BARON STEUBEN.\*

1779.

DURING the remaining part of this campaign, the light infantry, under the command of General Wayne, was stationed in different parts of New Jersey, to extend protection to the inhabitants, who were exposed to frequent inroads of the enemy from New-York. Our troops had frequent rencontres with these parties, but none of sufficient importance to render a detail of them necessary. Late in the autumn, the detachment of Colonel Hull returned to West Point, and was established in winter quarters.

From the commencement of the Revolution, a period of nearly five years, the American army had been paid in continental bills of credit. No provision was made for their final redemption. Two hundred millions of dollars in these bills were in circulation. The army had not only been paid, but its supplies of every kind were purchased with them. When first

\* General McDougall refers to this appointment in his letters to Major Hull, while commanding on the Lines.



issued, in 1775, they passed current, and were considered equal in value to silver and gold. To refuse them, was considered a want of patriotism, and still more, a disaffection to our cause. Every month, new emissions were made to meet the expenses of the war, and the amount in circulation was thereby continually increased. The most patriotic citizens became alarmed and distrustful of them. Gold and silver began to be preferred, and at first the Government-paper passed secretly at a small discount. The depreciation increased. The price of the necessaries, as well as the luxuries of life, was augmented. Congress and the Legislatures of the States adopted various expedients to support the credit of the paper currency, and the bills were made a legal tender for the payment of all *bonâ fide* debts which had been or should be contracted. But the poverty of the country rendered it impossible to provide the basis of a solid fund, which would have ensured a faithful redemption of the bills.

Although the officers and soldiers depended on these bills to provide for the support of themselves and their families, and suffered more than any other class of citizens from their continual depreciation, yet they were the last who hesitated to accept them, or to complain under the difficulties and privations to which they were subjected. The whole pay of an officer or soldier could not furnish him with comfortable clothing. A month's pay would not purchase a pair of shoes. Such was the state of things, when a meeting was held by the officers of the Massachu-

setts line of the army, to consult on the subject. The discussion was temperate and patriotic. It resulted in preparing a petition to the Legislature, stating the circumstances and praying for relief, in such manner as their wisdom and justice should dictate. Before it was sent, it was submitted to General Washington, and by him approved. He was requested to permit three officers, chosen for the purpose, to repair to Boston and present the petition. Lieutenant-Colonel Hull was selected as one of the Commissioners.

When the petition was presented, a disposition was manifested to do the most perfect justice ; but there was no money in the treasury, and only promises could be given. A Committee of the Legislature was appointed to confer with the Commissioners, and it was admitted that gold and silver was the standard on which the pay of the army had been established ; but owing to the depreciation of the bills of credit, the army had not been paid according to the original intention.

It was advised that the Legislature should establish a scale of depreciation, to regulate the value of the bills which at different times had been paid to the troops. The Committee admitted that such balance as was due ought to be paid. As there was no money in the treasury, it was finally decided that the Treasurer should give to each officer and soldier a certificate, bearing interest on such sums as were actually due. The prices of the most necessary articles, such as corn, beef, wool, and sole-leather, were made

the standard by which their value was to be determined. This plan being reported to the Legislature, it was adopted, the accounts settled, and the certificates issued.

Great efforts were made to give credit to these certificates; notwithstanding which, they considerably depreciated in value. This was owing to the necessity the officers and soldiers were under, of offering them in market, to procure necessaries for the support of themselves and their families.

These certificates were afterwards paid, according to the nominal value expressed on the face of them; and those who had purchased and held them at the time they were funded and paid, received the benefit.

When Colonel Hull returned to the army on the Highlands, he made a report to the officers, who expressed their approbation and tendered their thanks to the Commissioners, for the manner in which the trust committed to them had been executed.

During the campaign of 1780, the attention of Colonel Hull was devoted to the discipline of the division of the army commanded by Major-General Howe, of which he was appointed Deputy Inspector under Baron Steuben. These duties were peculiarly interesting to him, and he remarks: "Could any thing have induced me to have left this department at that time, it was an appointment then offered me.

"General Parsons called one morning, and informed me, that he was requested by General Washington to inquire, if it would be agreeable to me to

come into his family, as one of his aids, and if so, the appointment would be made.

“ I replied to General Parsons, that I felt deeply impressed for this proof of confidence placed in me by the Commander-in-chief, and that I would give an answer the following day. I mentioned to Baron Steuben the appointment offered, and that I had but one objection to its acceptance; the regret I should feel in leaving his department. He kindly observed, ‘The regret would be mutual.’ He said, that he was sensible of the honour of the station to which I was invited, but hoped I would see fit to continue in my present situation. That the discipline of the army had commenced on a new system, and great progress had been made, and he soon hoped to render it as perfect as the discipline of the European armies. That we should soon be called to act with the French under Count Rochambeau; and that it was his ardent desire, that our army should not be found inferior to his in the knowledge and application of military tactics. That I had been associated with him since the commencement of his duties; was acquainted with his system and mode of teaching it. That if his assistants were constantly changed, it would be impossible to bring the system to that degree of perfection which he believed would finally insure success to the American arms, and terminate, on our part, so distressing a war. He concluded by saying, that I would be more useful in the office of Inspector than in any other situation, and hoped that such consideration would influence my decision.

“ I replied, that I had not pledged myself, and when I considered the subject, I felt it a duty to remain where I could be of most service, however much I might desire distinction, or however great my attachment to the Commander-in-chief.

“ Baron Steuben then remarked, that if I had no objection, he would himself see General Washington, and state to him his views.

“ When General Parsons called for my answer, I informed him of the conversation which had passed between Baron Steuben and myself, and his wishes in regard to the arrangement; that if it was true, that I could do more for my country in the discharge of my present duties, I felt compelled to decline the honour of an appointment, so gratifying to my feelings, and so well calculated to elevate me in the eyes of my countrymen.

“ I requested, that when my answer should be given to General Washington, that all my views should be stated to him. I then observed to General Parsons, that he knew the character and situation of our mutual friend, Colonel Humphreys; that he had served as Aid-de-camp to General Putnam, who on account of age and bodily infirmities would not again be called into active service. That Colonel Humphreys still ranked as a Captain, and would now return to the command of his company. Being satisfied with his qualifications, I would take the liberty to recommend him to General Washington for the appointment with which he had intended to honour me.

“Colonel Humphreys was appointed and remained in that situation until the end of the war. I have been induced to narrate the circumstances of this transaction, because I perceived in a newspaper, after the death of Colonel Humphreys, a statement made, which was not founded in truth. In the article to which I allude, it is mentioned, that Major Alden and Colonel Hull were candidates with Colonel Humphreys for the appointment, and that the preference was given to Colonel Humphreys.”

The whole of this campaign of 1780, Colonel Hull continued with the main army, a part of the time in the Highlands, performing the duties of Inspector. It was at this period that the distressing events of General Arnold's treason and the capture and execution of Major Andrè took place. The histories of the Revolution have recorded these transactions.



## CHAPTER XVIII.

STATE OF THE CURRENCY.—MUTINIES IN THE PENNSYLVANIA AND JERSEY LINES.—EXPEDITION OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL HULL AGAINST MORRISSANIA.—MARRIAGE OF COLONEL HULL.

1781.

LATE in the autumn of 1780, the main body of the army was concentrated at West Point and its vicinity in the Highlands, for winter quarters.

The Pennsylvania line, under the command of General Wayne, was stationed at Morristown, and the Jersey troops at Pompton, in New Jersey. When this arrangement was made, Lieutenant-Colonel Hull was ordered with a detachment of four hundred men towards the White Plains, to form the most advanced post of the army and protect the country lying between the Highlands and the enemy's post at Kingsbridge. His principal station was on the right bank of the Croton river, near Pine's bridge. He established the same regulations and encountered the same arduous duties, which he had performed in the winters of 1778 and 1779.

The condition of the army at this time was truly distressing. The continental bills of credit, which had been the funds, not only to pay the troops, but to furnish them with subsistence and clothing, had become almost entirely worthless. They had depre-

ciated in such a manner, that it was no uncommon thing to give a month's pay for a breakfast.\* The country was inundated with these bills, and they were of so little value, that Congress had ceased to make further emissions, and had called on the Legislatures of the States, to furnish specific articles for the subsistence and clothing of the army. The States were slow in complying with these requisitions, and the soldiers suffered all the calamities which cold, hunger, and nakedness could produce. Both officers and men severely felt their wretched condition, and complaints were heard from every quarter. Each successive day increased the excitement, and a fearful crisis seemed approaching.

The most fatal consequences were predicted, and the States adopted no measures to prevent the evil. On the first of January, 1781, the Pennsylvania regiments at Morristown, under the command of General Wayne, rose in a state of mutiny.

They assembled under the directions of their non-commissioned officers, for the purpose, they declared, of marching to the seat of government, to obtain redress of their grievances.

General Wayne and the officers attempted to exercise their authority. In making the effort, Captain Billing was killed, and several officers wounded. So great was the fury of these men, that had not Gene-

\* Copy of a receipt, found among the papers of General Hull:—

“Boston, March 16, 1781—Received of Lieutenant-Colonel Wil-

liam Hull, eleven thousand two hundred and fifty dollars, for a chaise, with a double harness.

(Signed) JONATHAN FOWLE.”

ral Wayne desisted, the sacrifice of himself and his officers would most probably have been the consequence.

The excitement increased, and the mutineers marched to Princeton. They were followed by General Wayne, and a number of the most influential officers, who did all in their power to dissuade them from their purpose. Their efforts were unavailing. A Committee of Congress, the President and Executive Council of Pennsylvania, immediately repaired to Princeton, and opened a treaty with the mutineers.

When General Washington, who was at West Point, received information of this revolt, he deliberated what course it was expedient to take. He was sensible that there was too much truth in the grievances complained of, and that the whole army was in the same unhappy condition, in equal want of the necessaries of life. As, however, the civil authorities of the State had opened a negotiation, he determined not to interfere, but leave the adjustment of the business with that body.

The Committee of Congress shortly retired, and the non-commissioned officers negotiated with the authorities of the State.

Sir Henry Clinton considering this defection as a most auspicious event, immediately sent three persons as spies, from New-York, with instructions to invite the disaffected to march within his lines, and to offer them the most liberal rewards. But American blood rose at these degrading propositions; the emissaries were made prisoners, and the men de-

clared that they had no intention of deserting the standard of their country. After the terms of accommodation were settled, they removed to Trenton, delivered up the spies, who were tried and executed.

The negotiation ended in a discharge of all who had enlisted for three years or during the war, and had actually served three years.

The indefinite manner in which the enlistments were expressed, to serve for three years or during the war, left the soldier at liberty to demand his discharge at the end of three years, while the officer claimed his services to the end of the war.

Another source of discontent arose from the fact, that such soldiers as were not bound by previous enlistments, received great bounties; while those who had served three years, were required to continue without a bounty; neither had they been remunerated for the services they had already rendered. Under all these irritating circumstances, insubordination became ascendant, and the mutineers obtained, with arms in their hands, every thing they demanded.

A part of the Jersey line, stationed at Pompton, perceiving how easily the Pennsylvania troops had succeeded in the attainment of their object, followed their example, and at once arose and asserted their rights.

Sir Henry Clinton detached a part of his army into New Jersey, under the command of one of his Generals, to invite the Jersey troops to join the British standard; endeavouring to seduce them from their allegiance, by rewards similar to those which he

had proffered to the Pennsylvania line. But they exhibited the same patriotic indignation as their brethren, and turned with disdain from his insidious proposals.

General Washington, though extremely mortified at the result of the proceedings of the Pennsylvania line, was yet fully aware, that the Executive Council could make no better terms. He, however, viewed the example as extremely dangerous; and on the rising of the Jersey troops an opportunity was given him to act with that energy and decision, which, while it sustained military authority, convinced the enemy and his country, that disaffection and mutiny had not pervaded the whole of the American army.

A detachment was immediately formed under the command of Major-General Howe, with orders to march against the mutinous troops, and, by force, to reduce them to submission.

The prompt and able manner with which General Howe performed the duty assigned him, by the execution of several of the ringleaders, crushed the threatened mutiny, and every effort of the British General to encourage and increase it, was thereby entirely defeated.

Colonel Hull, with a detachment of four hundred men, was at this time at his station on the right bank of the Croton river, for the protection of the inhabitants in the county of West Chester.

When the mutiny of the Pennsylvania line commenced, he was directed to obtain all possible information respecting the enemy's posts at and about

Kingsbridge, on the east side of Harlem river, and as low down as Morrissania. General Washington was not only anxious to suppress this spirit of insubordination, but also of striking a blow which would give a new direction to public opinion, and awaken the enemy to a more just appreciation of American patriotism.\* After obtaining all the information in his power, Colonel Hull made a communication to General Heath, in which he described the fortifica-

\* General Washington to Major-General Heath:—

“*New Windsor*, 7th January, 1781.

“DEAR SIR—You will be pleased to observe, on the subject of your letter of last night, that although I am not very sanguine in my expectation of the success of the enterprise proposed, yet I think, in our present circumstances, it will be advisable to encourage it. Colonel Hull may therefore have permission to make the attempt, in conjunction with the militia: but I would not advise the destruction of any houses, except the temporary huts, built by the Refugees. Colonel Drake may be supplied with five thousand cartridges for the militia: he to be accountable for the expenditure of them.

“By a letter from General Wayne, I am informed the Pennsylvania line still continued in the same state at Princeton, and that he had received intelligence, that the enemy were preparing to make a movement into Jersey. Their attention being drawn

that way, may possibly make the plan in contemplation, more practicable. I wish the guard-boats to keep a vigilant look-out, and the officers to give you the earliest information of any movement below. Colonel Hull and the militia Colonels should be strongly impressed with the idea, that the whole success depends absolutely upon the secrecy and rapidity of the movement. It will also be well, to give a reinforcement of an hundred men, from the New Hampshire line.”

Note by Jared Sparks: “Colonel Hull was now stationed at Pine’s bridge, near the lines, and the plan referred to, was, that of an attack upon the Refugees of Delancey’s corps at Morrissania, in conjunction with a party of militia under Colonels Drake and Crane. The project had been communicated by Colonel Hull to General Heath, with a request to be favoured with his opinion.”—*Writings of Washington*, Vol. VII., page 356.



tions on the east and north side of Kingsbridge, and the number of troops which formed the garrisons. Likewise a fortification four miles below, on the east side of Harlem river, established for the purpose of protecting a pontoon or floating bridge, to preserve the communication with Fort Washington.

He expressed the opinion that the parapets of these works were so high, the ditches so deep, and the pickets so strong, that they could not be stormed without a great sacrifice, and this could only be avoided by taking them by surprise. He further stated, that there was a British post four miles below the pontoon bridge at Morrissania, in which was a force consisting of about four hundred and fifty men, commanded by Colonel Delancey. That it was composed of barracks, without regular fortifications. Delancey had also a company of about forty men, stationed farther east, at Frog's Neck; a point of land projecting into the East river, near West Chester, and not far from that part of the river Bronx, over which a retreating party must pass.

This post at Morrissania had been in that situation for several years, and being eight miles in the rear of the fort at Kingsbridge, and four miles in the rear of a large part of the British army stationed at and about Fort Washington, no enterprise had ever succeeded against it. To break up such an establishment, was an object of much importance: it being garrisoned by a partisan corps, which was constantly committing depredations on the inhabitants between the two armies, and likewise in the State of Connecticut.

It was suggested, that a body of men might be marched to Morrissania in the night, and be successful in the attack, but the difficulty would be in the retreat, as the firing would give the alarm at Forts Washington and Independence, and the other British posts in the neighbourhood. To obviate this, so as to retard the approach of the enemy, he stated that the pontoon bridge might be cut away by the assailing party, and thus prevent the British advancing from Fort Washington. Finally, in covering the retreat of the troops, it would be necessary to have a strong detachment posted at East Chester, or on the road leading from Kingsbridge to that place.

After this report was made to General Washington, he expressed great doubts as to the success of the enterprise. If the detachment should reduce Morrissania, the troops would be exposed to great hazard in retreating; as the distance from Fort Independence to East Chester was four miles, and the distance from Morrissania was eight; and the American corps would be also greatly fatigued, after a march of thirty miles, while the British would be fresh from their post. He considered, however, that the crisis called for decisive action; that in justice to the great body of the army he commanded, still faithful and unrelaxing in duty, an opportunity should be embraced by which they might manifest their patriotism and their bravery, both to their friends and their enemies.

As soon therefore as the revolt took place in the Jersey line, he determined to make a simultaneous

movement against the mutineers on his right, and the enemy's post at Morrissania on his left. The success obtained by Major-General Howe, has been related. It now remains to give a narrative of the enterprise against Morrissania. The plan suggested by Colonel Hull having been approved, the execution of it was committed to that officer. His detachment, consisting of four hundred men, was reinforced with one hundred, under the command of Major Maxwell, and by a company of militia cavalry, consisting of nearly one hundred more, from New-York, commanded by Captain Hunnewell. General Washington ordered likewise a small body of cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Humphreys, his Aid-de-camp, to join these troops; but the state of the ice would not permit their crossing the Hudson.

The twenty-second of January was the day appointed to commence operations, at the same time that General Howe marched into New Jersey to reduce the mutineers to submission. Three regiments from the army under General Parsons were ordered to take a position at East Chester, at daylight on the twenty-third; to observe the motions of the enemy, and cover the retreat of the American corps.

On the twenty-first there was a very heavy rain, which continued during the night. The morning of the twenty-second was fair, and about sunrise the line of march was formed. The distance to Morrissania was thirty miles, and the intention was to arrive there a little before daylight the following

morning. The roads were excessively bad, and the small streams were swollen in such a manner that it was difficult to pass them.

The troops marched in one column. Hunnewell's cavalry in front and on the flanks ; to secure the inhabitants from giving information to the enemy. Two companies of New-York militia had previously been despatched from the country, to take possession of Williams' bridge, over the Bronx ; the object of which was to prevent the British from passing in that direction to East Chester. They were commanded by Captains Dennit and Benton.

About one o'clock in the morning, the detachment had, undiscovered, passed Fort Independence and Kingsbridge, and reached a point, as low down as Fort Washington, which covered the pontoon bridge over Harlem river. Here it halted, when the detachment was first made acquainted with the object of the expedition.

Arrangements were then made for the plan of attack. Major Maxwell, with one hundred men, was to approach a little before daylight, as near the fort which covered the floating bridge as possible, and the moment he heard the firing at Morrissania, to rush down, under the walls of the fort, and cut away the bridge in such a manner that it would float down the stream. The intention here was, to obstruct the enemy's passage from Fort Washington, and oblige them to go round by Kingsbridge. After this duty was performed, Major Maxwell was directed to march and take a position on the road, leading from


Morrissania to Delancey's bridge, over the Bronx, and there remain, until the main body returned from Morrissania.

On the route he was to take, there was a small compact fort, garrisoned with sixty men; and it was left to the discretion of Major Maxwell, to attempt to carry it by storm, should the circumstances in which he was placed seem to justify such an assault.

Two other detachments were formed; one under the command of Captain Pritchard, of sixty men, was ordered to proceed to Frog's Neck, and attack the company at that place. He was directed not to make the assault until he heard the firing at Morrissania, or until daylight. The other of thirty men, commanded by Captain Williams, was to take possession of Delancey's bridge, over the Bronx, and to maintain it, until the main body returned from Morrissania. Each party now commenced the march to its appointed destination. The main detachment, commanded by Colonel Hull, was reduced to a little over four hundred men.

The British force at Morrissania, under Colonel Delancey, consisted of about the same number, including the company at Frog's Neck. The expectation was, to take the enemy by surprise; but an unexpected obstacle interposed, within a small distance of their cantonment. The heavy rain, the day before, had so greatly swollen a small creek, that the passage of it could only be effected by mounting the infantry behind the cavalry. This required time; and it was daylight before the whole body advanced





Gen. Parsons

East Chester

Capt. Denny & Benton  
Williams Br.

Fort Independence

Fort Independence  
Kings Br.

Pontoon Br.

Fort Lee

Washington

Halt of Hulls  
Detachment

Bronx River

Church  
Jail

Delaware's Br  
Capt. Williams

Capt. Bitchard

Frog's or  
Throg's Neck

Col. Hull's Detachment

Morrisania EAST RIVER

Med Gate

HUDSON RIVER

ISLAND

Harlem  
Harlem R.

MANHATTAN OR  
WORK

RIVER

NEW YORK CITY

Blomberg  
dale

Col. Hull's Line of march from





from the creek.\* A rapid march was then made in column, but the assailants were fired on by the out-guards, at some distance from the barracks.

As the enemy were preparing to receive them, Colonel Hull ordered the line to be formed, with the cavalry in its rear. A firing commenced, which lasted but a few minutes, before the enemy retreated. The cavalry were directed to charge, and the infantry to advance to their support. The Americans were soon masters of the field, the loyalists flying in every direction. Fifty-two prisoners were taken, and a number of beef cattle; and as the enemy, being partly cavalry, had not time to mount their horses, sixty of them fell into the hands of the victors.

Without waiting to pursue the fugitives, fire was set to the barracks, and to a great quantity of forage, which had been deposited there for the army in New-York. After collecting the prisoners, horses and cattle, a retreat was commenced on the road to Delancey's bridge.

When the firing commenced at Morrissania, there followed a tremendous roar of cannon and musketry from the fort, near the pontoon bridge. As the flames ascended from the barracks, the alarm guns were fired from Fort Washington and New-York; and sky-rockets were sent in quick succession from all the

\* In the maps of Marshall's Life of Washington, two creeks are laid down and Morrissania between them. I think that my father directed me to put *two* on the accompanying map. If there was but *one*, the detachment must have come down on the eastern side, crossed to Morrissania, and re-crossed, after the assault.—EDITOR.

enemy's posts. The detachment, with all its incumbrances, now forded the creek on the eastern side of Morrissania. Colonel Hull directed a halt for a few minutes to refresh his troops. They heard the roaring of the enemy's cannon, while the sky-rockets, flaming through the air, were furiously though vainly spending their rage on the too successful little band, which had scattered devastation and desolation where, but a few hours before, quiet and security reigned. Sublime and imposing was the scene, yet it was too replete with danger to leave room for enjoyment.

These gallant troops had marched thirty miles, through deep and heavy roads—had bravely faced and subdued the foe. For twenty-four hours, they had neither rest nor sleep, and at this moment were four miles in the rear of the main body of the British army, which was then exerting its strength to wrest the wreath of victory from their brows. Incumbered as they were with prisoners, horses, and cattle; and knowing that they must contend over eight miles of ground, for every step of the way, while a fresh and ever-increasing foe was assailing their rear and flanks; it seemed beyond human power to escape the perils which on every side threatened their destruction. But victory had crowned their efforts, and stimulated to renewed exertion; they resolutely prepared to persevere and surmount the yet greater dangers, which stood between them and safety. Surely they must have felt that a blessing rested on their arms, and that a merciful Providence was their shield and their strength.

After advancing a short distance, the detachment

was joined by Major Maxwell. He reported, that he had completely effected his object, and that the bridge was floating down the river, and it was impossible for the enemy at Fort Washington to pass at that station.

As the corps proceeded, a fire of musketry was heard in the direction of Delancey's bridge. Colonel Hull rode forward to the high ground, and perceived Captain Williams and the enemy contending for the bridge. He made a disposition of the troops to assist him. The enemy soon retreated towards Fort Independence, after sustaining some loss. The fugitives were about twenty in number, but this was no time to pursue them. The march continued for a short time without interruption, until the head of the column arrived near a stone church and a jail. Our troops were fired on from the windows of the church.

Major Maxwell's detachment having a number of axes, used in cutting away the bridges, Colonel Hull ordered him to form a column, with his axemen in front, and open a passage for the troops to enter with the bayonet. This he did, but the enemy retreated from the windows on the other side of the building. The jail was then broken open, and thirty-two American prisoners released, who had been captured by Delancey's regiment, and there confined. A number of other prisoners, belonging to the British, were set at liberty, who were confined for different crimes.\*

\* There was among the American prisoners, a negro man, by name *Tillo*. He rushed from the jail to Colonel Hull, whom he perceived to be the commander of the corps, and falling on his knees, said,

Here the main body was joined by Captain Pritchard, who had fought hard with the enemy at Frog's Neck ; had been successful in routing him, and taken a number of prisoners. Ensign Thomson of his company was killed, and five or six men killed or wounded. The stores and forage collected at that station were destroyed.

The different detachments being united, there was a weary and hazardous march to perform, before we could expect to meet the reinforcement under General Parsons, to cover our retreat. The fatigue of the men was so great, having had neither rest nor sleep for thirty hours, that it seemed almost impossible to advance further. Colonel Hull urged upon them the necessity of proceeding. He told them, if they now came to a halt, the whole corps would inevitably be cut to pieces or made prisoners ; but by advancing a few miles farther, they would be reinforced and soon find the relief they so much needed.

"Massa, save my life and I'll serve you forever." Colonel Hull told him not to fear, they were all safe. The man continued faithful in the service of his chosen master, until the end of the war, when he retired to his small farm in West Chester, and gave his young son *Tillo*, a boy of six years of age, to Mrs. Hull, to retain until he was of age. The young *Tillo* proved equally faithful, as his father had been, though not possessed of such bright talents. He was always kind and willing. General Hull informed him, when he

became of age, that he was then at liberty to hire himself into any other family, or go wherever he pleased. But the simple-hearted fellow preferred never to leave General Hull or his family, so long as they would keep him. He has remained with them ever since the war of the Revolution, and is now, in 1845, at the old homestead, in Newton, Massachusetts, the grounds of which were first occupied by the ancestors of Mrs. Hull in 1630, and are still in possession of her descendants.

They persevered ; and never did men bear a trying situation with more firmness and a better spirit.

As an attack was apprehended before a junction could be formed with the covering party, Colonel Hull selected one hundred and fifty of the strongest and least fatigued men, and formed them in the rear and on the flanks, taking the command himself. He ordered Major Maxwell to march on with the main body, the prisoners, cattle, and other incumbrances.

After advancing about a mile, light parties of the enemy appeared in the rear and flanks, and commenced a loose and scattering fire. They were soon reinforced, and their fire increased. Colonel Hull formed a solid body of the rear guard, and directed the officer, if the horse charged on him, when they arrived very near to give one well-directed fire, and then to remain in a solid body and depend on the bayonet. The cavalry, observing this disposition of our troops, did not advance to the charge.

As the infantry of the enemy were increasing in the rear, it was apparent that they had proceeded from Fort Independence, having been reinforced from Fort Washington. Instead, therefore, of passing directly to East Chester, over Williams' bridge, they had filed to the right, and crossing the river Bronx at Delancey's bridge, had gained the rear of the American troops in that direction.

A heavy fire had now commenced by the enemy, but was constantly returned from our rear and flank guard, without the least disorder, though still moving



on their march as fast as their fatigued condition would admit.

When about a mile and a half from the station where General Parsons awaited the arrival of the retreating corps, Colonel Hull received from him a message by his aid-de-camp, saying that a column of the British were advancing from Kingsbridge, and urged Colonel Hull to hasten his march.

He replied, that he would proceed as expeditiously as possible. The enemy were now pressing on him with increased force ; but meeting the same resolute resistance from the rear and flanks, a temporary check was given to their movements.

Thus situated, another message came to Colonel Hull from General Parsons, pressing him to march with more celerity, as a large body of the enemy were rapidly approaching, and he feared that both detachments would be cut off. Colonel Hull replied, that it was impossible for him to move with more rapidity ; that if he attempted it, his detachment would be thrown into confusion, and its capture would be inevitable ; that should General Parsons consider the risk too great to remain, he had better retreat and save his troops ; while his own detachment, if overtaken, would make the best defence it could.

Colonel Hull now ordered a hundred men to reinforce his rear and flank guards, by which means the fire was increased, and the enemy fell back a little, but soon returned to the charge, and the conflict became extremely severe.

At this critical moment, Colonel Hazen, who commanded a regiment under General Parsons, came to Colonel Hull, and informed him, that his regiment was advanced, and lay concealed behind a long stone wall, which ran along the road on both sides. The front of the corps had then almost reached the wall where the men were posted. Colonel Hazen immediately rode forward, and gave orders to his regiment when to rise and fire. Colonel Hull, in his turn, directed the detachment to march on, until the rear was near the wall, and then to cease firing, and retreat with as much rapidity as possible. The plan succeeded. The British pressed on; when reaching the wall, the regiment rose up, on each side of it, and poured upon them such a volley of musketry, that they instantly retreated. In a short time, and without further molestation, the detachment joined the troops at East Chester, and the command of the whole then devolved on General Parsons. The number of his troops, including our detachment, did not exceed two thousand.

This insulated corps was more than thirty miles distant from any post of the main army, or any other support; and both officers and men were worn down with the fatigue and hardship they had already encountered.

A large body of the enemy were near, and all the British army stationed at Fort Washington, and at the north part of York Island, distant not more than five or six miles.

Under these circumstances, and the object of the

expedition having been obtained, General Parsons did not think proper to pursue the advantage which had been gained by Colonel Hazen's regiment, or to oppose the column that was advancing from Kings-bridge.

His position was so critical, that it was unsafe to halt a sufficient time to give the troops refreshment ; and under a severe storm of hail and snow, he commenced his march on the Mamaroneck and New Rochelle road, and continued it until twelve o'clock at night, when the troops halted on the borders of Connecticut, after advancing twenty miles from East Chester.

The storm, which beat heavily on our path, was a new source of gratitude for an escape from so many dangers. It was viewed as a merciful interposition of Providence, to shield our weary and nearly exhausted band from the superior strength of an enemy, who, fresh and eager in pursuit, might soon have overpowered us, and in their turn have become the conquerors. The rain, as it fell in torrents, was like the wall of waters in the Red Sea, standing between the Egyptians and the Israelites. General Parsons stopped one day at Horseneck, in Connecticut, to refresh the troops. He then marched them to their cantonment in the Highlands.\*

Colonel Hull proceeded to his former station on the Croton river. He made his official report to General Washington. The Commander-in-chief, in his general orders, expressed his thanks to Colonel Hull

\* See Appendix, No. IV.—Extract of a letter from Mrs. Hull to one of her daughters.

for the judicious arrangements which he had made in planning the expedition, and for the gallant and intrepid manner in which it was executed.

General Washington reported to Congress the circumstances and success of the enterprise, and Colonel Hull received the thanks of that body, for his good conduct on that occasion.

The troops under the command of Colonel Hull, being established in their quarters, he applied to General Washington, in February, 1781, for permission to pass the residue of the winter in Boston.

He had now served in the war six years, and this was the first time that he had asked leave of absence. The six preceding campaigns, he had been constantly at his post, excepting while attending on public duty in the Legislature of Massachusetts.

During three winters he was in the field, commanding the most advanced station towards the enemy, and constantly exposed, at that inclement season, to fatigue, hardships, and dangers. So severe was the duty, that it is seen by the original orders, that half of his detachment was exchanged every fortnight. His fine health and energetic spirit enabled him to meet every exposure, uninjured; and there was not a day that sickness disabled him from the performance of duty. He had taken an active part in all the battles which were fought, where he was present, and they were numerous, obstinate, and bloody.

He says: "At this distant period (1822) all my recollections are alive on the subject; and I should do

violence to the best feelings of my heart, were I to omit to offer the warmest and most fervent expressions of gratitude to the Supreme Disposer of human events, that during this highly interesting epoch, my health was enjoyed, amidst numerous dangers, while so many of my brave companions in arms were constantly falling by my side."

Colonel Hull having obtained leave of absence for the remainder of the winter, he repaired to Boston, and was shortly after married to the only daughter of the Honourable Judge Fuller, of Newton, Massachusetts.

In referring to this connexion, he writes: "It was a reward for all the toils and dangers which, for six years, I had encountered. It has continued for nearly forty years, and my beloved companion has not only sailed with me down the stream of life, enjoying its prosperous gales, but has steadily and affectionately supported me in gloomy periods, as well as in the last most trying storm, which, by faith in an overruling Providence, I have met and borne in all its fury."

## CHAPTER XIX.

COLONEL HULL DESPATCHED BY GENERAL WASHINGTON TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.—PLAN OF ATTACK ON NEW-YORK AND OTHER POINTS.—CHANGE OF THE SCENE OF OPERATIONS FROM NEW-YORK TO YORKTOWN.—CAPTURE OF THE ARMY OF CORNWALLIS.—WASHINGTON TAKES LEAVE OF THE ARMY.

1781.

IN July, the French army, under the command of Count de Rochambeau, arrived in the western part of the State of Connecticut, on its way to join General Washington, then at Peekskill on the North river.

At this time Colonel Hull received a message from the Commander-in-chief, to repair to his quarters, that he might explain to him his plan of attack on the enemy, and give him orders as to the part he was to perform, in carrying it into execution.

It was the intention of General Washington to commence operations the following morning at daylight. His object was to take by surprise the enemy's posts on the north end of York island, at Kingsbridge and Morrissania.

General Lincoln, with a strong body of troops, was to proceed down the Hudson, below Spuyten-devil creek, land, and attack the works at and about Fort Washington, and the Duke de Lauzun, with his regiments of horse and infantry, consisting of



about six hundred men, joined by Colonel Sheldon's regiment of cavalry, and a detachment from the lines, under General Waterbury, to attack Delancey's regiment at Morrissania.

If General Lincoln succeeded, General Washington with the main body of the army, joined by Count de Rochambeau, would assail the forts on the east and north side of Kingsbridge. These divisions were to make a simultaneous attack, at daylight, the next morning. Should circumstances prevent General Lincoln from landing on York island, near Fort Washington, he was directed to land above Spuytendevil creek, to prevent the enemy from passing Kingsbridge and attacking the right flank of the Duke de Lauzun at Morrissania.

General Washington despatched Colonel Hull to Count de Rochambeau, who was then at Bedford, for the purpose of explaining to him their situation, and the plan of operations, and directed Colonel Hull to attend the Duke de Lauzun in his attack on Morrissania.

Colonel Hull was received by Count de Rochambeau with that easy politeness and courtesy, the uniform characteristic of the Frenchman, whatever be his birth or circumstances in life.

After the Count had read his letters, he remarked, that he was extremely happy that General Washington had sent one of his officers to attend him, and especially one who was acquainted with the country, and the enemy's position. He then remarked, that his troops were very much fatigued by their long

march from Newport ; that the weather was extremely warm, and he had then halted to refresh them ; and that it would be necessary to cook the provisions, before the march was resumed. Colonel Hull stated to him the distance he then was from Kingsbridge and Morrissania, and that it was necessary to march at a certain time, to arrive at those points at the hour General Washington had designated. The Count laid his maps on the table, when Colonel Hull explained to him the whole plan of operations, as General Washington had that morning communicated them to him.

Count de Rochambeau seemed revolving the subject, and continued to ask a great number of questions. He then sent for the Duke de Lauzun, who shortly after an introduction requested Col. Hull to attend him to his quarters. The Duke was very particular in his inquiries. He was informed of the distance he had to march, and how important it was for him to arrive at Morrissania by daylight in the morning. He replied, that both his men and horses were exceedingly fatigued, and that they must have a little time for refreshment. Colonel Hull urged, as much as politeness would permit in his situation, the necessity of marching earlier. But the fatigue of the troops and the heat of the weather prevented the line being formed until sunset. Colonel Sheldon had joined them, and General Waterbury was waiting at the White Plains, when the corps arrived about one o'clock in the morning.

At this point Colonel Hull wrote to General Wash-

ington, by the Duke's desire, stating the time of their arrival, and that he could not reach Morrissania until after sunrise, unless he should proceed with his cavalry alone and leave the infantry to follow him. That such proposition had been made to him, but he had objected to it, as, should the attack prove unsuccessful he could not justify himself for so doing.

General Washington, it was supposed, was at that time equally as far advanced on the North river road. The Duke de Lauzun made a halt at the White Plains, and shortly after Count de Rochambeau joined him. The Duke then proceeded rapidly, with both cavalry and infantry. When arrived within a short distance of Delancey's bridge, he observed to Colonel Hull, that as it would soon be daylight, and they were so near the point of attack, he would proceed with his cavalry, and the infantry would be able to march in time to his assistance. He then made a rapid advance, but it was after daylight before he reached Delancey's bridge, which was about a mile and a half from the enemy's post.

A heavy fire of musketry was now heard. The Duke de Lauzun ascended the high ground, and perceived General Lincoln's division and the enemy in full view and closely engaged. The Duke halted. A regiment was seen advancing to reinforce the British troops. Colonel Hull said to the Duke, "that he knew them by their uniform; that it was Delancey's troop from Morrissania." The Duke asked, "What course do you think I had best pursue?" Colonel Hull replied, "that as he was a little in the

rear of the right flank of the enemy, perhaps he was in a good situation to make an attack in that quarter." He answered, "that General Lincoln was his superior officer, and he did not think himself justified in doing it without his orders." Colonel Hull said, "that if the Duke would furnish a small escort of cavalry, he would pass round the right flank of the enemy, and inform General Lincoln of his situation, and obtain his orders." To this he consented. When Colonel Hull met General Lincoln, the enemy had been reinforced, and were pressing hard on him. He stated the situation of the Duke, and that it was altogether favourable to advance on the right flank of the enemy and co-operate with him. General Lincoln replied, "that the Duke de Lauzun had received his orders from General Washington, and was not under his command." Colonel Hull answered, "that the senior officer in the field commanded, of course." General Lincoln said, "not to countermand the orders of the superior." Colonel Hull then remarked, "that the enemy had left Morrissania, and reinforced the troops he was now engaged with; that consequently there was no force for the Duke to act against. Will you, sir, give your advice under the circumstances?" General Lincoln replied, "that he should not in any way interfere with the orders of the Commander-in-chief."

Colonel Hull returned to the Duke de Lauzun, and informed him of the result. He said "he would immediately send an express to General Washington for orders." The Commander-in-chief directed him

to join the main army, which having now reinforced General Lincoln, the enemy was compelled to retreat over Kingsbridge.

When General Washington heard the circumstances, he highly applauded the spirit and strong desire the Duke de Lauzun had manifested, to participate in the action, but at the same time expressed his opinion, that General Lincoln had conducted on strictly military principles.

Both enterprises having failed, and Count de Rochambeau being yet some distance from the American army, it was advised that he should halt several miles from Kingsbridge, and refresh his troops. General Washington marched to Dobbs' Ferry, and here a junction was formed, for the first time, between the American and French armies. But the theatre of the war was now to be changed from the north to the south, by the determination of the Count de Grasse to sail for the Chesapeake instead of Sandy Hook. He was at this time in the West Indies, and wrote General Washington, in August, that he should sail immediately, and be prepared to co-operate with his army. His land troops consisted, he said, of three thousand two hundred men, besides his naval armament, but that he would not be able to remain longer than the middle of October.

The siege of New-York was therefore abandoned, and Yorktown and Gloucester in Virginia, where Lord Cornwallis commanded, became the object of the united strength of the combined armies. About two thousand Americans, and all the French troops



under Count de Rochambeau, were ordered to march southwardly.

Sir Henry Clinton, ignorant that the Count de Grasse had arrived in the Chesapeake, could not penetrate the designs of Washington, who still endeavoured to keep up the idea that New-York was the point of attack. He therefore sent troops down towards Staten Island, had houses for forage erected, and baking ovens built on the Jersey shore. Letters were intentionally written to fall into the hands of the enemy, and keep up the deception: and so well did the feint succeed, that the main body of the army had arrived at Philadelphia before Sir Henry Clinton suspected the designs of the American Commander.

Twenty regiments were left in the Highlands under the command of General Heath, for the protection of the northern posts. The third, to which Lieutenant-Colonel Hull was attached, was included.

It had been the fortunate lot of the Massachusetts regiments, to be employed against the army of Burgoyne; and as they had shared in the glory of an event, with which an overruling Providence had favoured the American cause, and likewise in the battles of Trenton, Princeton, and Monmouth, the assault on Stony Point and other fortunate occasions, it was but just that the present opportunity, which presented prospects of the most brilliant success, should devolve on that part of the army whose fortunes in the south had been less auspicious than those of their northern brethren.



General Washington had, with reason, the most unshaken confidence in the troops which he selected for the southern campaign; and the issue of their meeting with Cornwallis showed, that their zeal and ability were equal to any and every emergency.

Colonel Hull was now appointed Adjutant and Inspector-General of the army at West Point, and the neighbouring posts in the Highlands. The duties of these offices he performed until the summer of 1783, when General Washington had returned from the south, after the capture of the army of Lord Cornwallis, and resumed his command in the Highlands.

At this period, the preliminary articles of peace were signed, and hostilities between Great Britain and America ceased. Colonel Hull was ordered to repair to West Chester, with the command of eight companies of light infantry, as the civil government had not as yet been organized. The object of this corps was, to protect the inhabitants from the predatory incursions of the Refugees, which were made with the authority of the British commander.

The presence of a military force was therefore necessary for the safety of this people, who had for so many years been the victims of suffering, from the Skinners and Cow-boys.

Colonel Hull remained on this station, until Sir Guy Carleton announced to General Washington that he was prepared to embark and deliver up to him the city of New-York.

On the 22d of November, General Washington, accompanied by General Knox, Governor Clinton,

and a large number of civil and military officers, arrived in the neighbourhood of Kingsbridge. General Washington directed Colonel Hull to march his detachment of light infantry the next morning, at daylight, to the heights, near Kingsbridge, and take possession of the forts, as soon as they were evacuated by the British. Before the sun arose, the American troops were in motion, and as they advanced the British troops retired. Having proceeded below Harlem, Sir Guy Carleton gave notice, that he would not be able to complete his embarkation until the next day. On that day it rained incessantly, and the British were not prepared to evacuate until the following day.

On the memorable morning of the 25th November,\* when the corps of light infantry commanded by Colonel Hull was paraded to escort the Commander-in-chief into the city, he rode up in front of the troops, and remarked, that he felt peculiarly happy in witnessing the excellent appearance and high state of discipline of that part of his army which was appointed to attend him in the last interesting moments of his military command. Colonel Hull had commanded this corps for five months, and anticipat-

\* The 25th of November has ever since continued a day of National Jubilee in the city of New-York. For nearly thirty years after this period, whenever General Hull happened to be in the city on that day, he was invited to the public dinner, and received distinguished

honours, being seated on the right of the Mayor.

It is not certain, that any historian of the Revolution mentions the fact, that Colonel Hull commanded the troops on this occasion. But the grateful New-Yorkers never forgot it.

ing the satisfaction of performing so grateful a service, he, with the faithful co-operation of his officers and men, had devoted constant attention to make it as perfect as possible, in the very qualities which General Washington had commended.

To render this service to their beloved Commander ; to hear his approving words ; to gather, for the last time, in military array around his honoured person, was a full reward for our long, severe trials. The countenance of every officer and soldier was lightened up by the liveliest expressions of joy, and, for the moment, the thought of a final separation from the object of our love, respect, and gratitude, was forgotten. As the procession advanced, crowds of citizens met us, hailing our approach and welcoming our entrance into their city. Vast bodies of patriots, who for seven years had exiled themselves from their homes, were now re-occupying their deserted dwellings, and the streets, the tops of houses, and the windows, were filled with men, women and children, waving plumes and garlands of greens and flowers, and cheering our path with every expression of joy and gratitude, to which the occasion gave rise.

Colonel Hull was directed, on the fourth of December, to form his detachment of light infantry at the hotel near Whitehall, where a barge was prepared to receive the Commander-in-chief, to convey him to Paulus Hook. The corps was formed, its right wing at the hotel, the left extending to the barge.

The last affecting interview between General

Washington and his officers, is thus described by Chief Justice Marshall and referred to by Colonel Hull, as a correct and touching description of that interesting scene.\*

“ At noon, the principal officers of the army assembled at Francis’ tavern ; soon after which their beloved Commander entered the room. His emotions were too strong to be concealed. Filling a glass, he turned to them and said : ‘ With a heart full of love and gratitude, I now take leave of you : I most devoutly wish, that your latter days may be as prosperous and happy, as your former ones have been glorious and honourable.’ Having drank, he added : ‘ I cannot come to each of you to take my leave, but shall be obliged to you, if each of you will come and take me by the hand.’ General Knox, being nearest, turned to him. Incapable of utterance, Washington grasped his hand and embraced him. In the same affectionate manner, he took leave of each succeeding officer. In every eye was the tear of dignified sensibility ; and not a word was articulated, to interrupt the majestic silence and the tenderness of the scene.

“ Leaving the room, he passed through the corps of light infantry and walked to Whitehall, where a barge waited to convey him to Paulus Hook. The whole company followed, in mute and solemn procession, with dejected countenances, testifying feelings of delicious melancholy, which no language can describe.

\* Marshall’s Life of Washington, Vol. IV., page 677.

“Having entered the barge, he turned to the company, and waving his hat, bade them a silent adieu. They paid him the same affectionate compliment, and after the barge had left them, returned in the same solemn manner to the place where they had assembled.”

## CHAPTER XX.

DISBANDING OF THE ARMY.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOCIETY OF CINCINNATI.  
—MISSION TO QUEBEC.

1784.

BEFORE General Washington retired from his command, he was authorized by Congress to disband the whole army, excepting one regiment and a corps of artillery. This regiment was composed of such officers as he should designate, and with that description of soldiers which had enlisted for three years, and whose term of service had not yet expired. Colonel Hull was selected by the Commander-in-chief as the Lieutenant-Colonel of the regiment, and accepted the appointment.

These troops were stationed at West Point, during the winters of 1783-4, and now composed the whole of the peace establishment; General Heath being first in command, and Colonel Hull second.

Previous to disbanding the army, the officers formed a Society, which they denominated "The Society of the Cincinnati." The objects of the institution were to commemorate the great events which gave independence to the United States of North America, for the laudable purpose of inculcating the duty of laying down in peace arms assumed for public defence; and



of uniting in acts of brotherly affection and bonds of perpetual friendship, the members constituting the same. Each officer deposited a month's pay, for the establishment of a fund, the interest of which was to be applied to the relief of such unfortunate officers and their families, whose necessities should require it.

General Washington was elected, and accepted the appointment of President of the Society. Besides the Parent Society, the officers of each State were formed into a separate Society, as a branch of the Parent Society, and it was decided that once in three years, each State Society should choose delegates, to meet in Convention, to regulate the concerns of the general Society; and that the President of the Parent Society should, *ex officio*, be a member of, and preside at the general conventions.

The first general meeting was held at Philadelphia, in May, 1784. General Knox, Colonel Hull, and Major Serjeant, afterwards Governor of the Mississippi Territory, were appointed delegates to attend the meeting. After the interesting business which had called them together was finished, Colonel Hull returned to his station at West Point.

By the definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, which was ratified in the year 1783, the boundary line was drawn and described between the British dominions and the United States. The forts Niagara, Detroit, Michilimackinac, and several smaller posts, garrisoned by British troops, were situated within the limits of the United States. It was stipulated in the treaty that

these forts should be delivered into our possession, without unnecessary delay, not specifying any particular time.

A year had passed, and they were still garrisoned by British troops. The possession of these posts being of great importance to the United States, Colonel Hull was commissioned by the Government to repair to Quebec, and, by virtue of the treaty, to make a formal demand of the Governor-General of that province, that they should be surrendered.

In the event of a compliance with the demand, he was directed to visit each of them, and authorized to negotiate for the cannon and munitions of war which they contained, for an equal quantity in value, to be delivered to the British Government, on the seaboard, or on any navigable waters, where it would be convenient for delivery to both parties.

Colonel Hull writes : “ On my arrival at Quebec, I was received by General Haldimand with great politeness. After communicating to him the object of my mission, under the authority of my Government, he invited me to a conference. He stated that he had received no instructions from his Government to comply with my demand. I inquired if he had received the definitive treaty of peace, ratified by his Government. He answered, that he had not, but expected every day the arrival of a ship from England, which probably would bring it. In the course of a few days the ship arrived. He then invited me to another conference, in which he stated that he had received the treaty, but no instructions to deliver up

the posts. I asked him whether the treaty was not sent to him officially, and ratified by his Government. He replied, it was. I again asked whether, as the representative of his Government, he did not consider that it was his duty to execute such regulations and stipulations as had been made, and such as it might be considered he was delegated to carry into effect. His answer was, not without particular instructions. I then observed, that my views of the subject were different. That I could imagine no reason why his Government should send him the treaty, without an intention of his carrying into effect that part of it which related to his province. That treaties were considered as laws, and were to operate as such; that it was contrary to the practice of all nations, after laws were made and published, with all the formalities attending them, for the framers to give particular instructions for their execution; it became at once the duty of the judicial and executive officers to see them carried into effect; that if any regulation on the subject of the Indian Department, or the commerce of the province was officially sent to him, duly authenticated, he certainly would consider that it was his duty to carry it into operation, without waiting for particular instructions on the subject.

“I concluded by saying, that it was of great importance on our part, that the stipulations of the treaty, with respect to the posts within our territory, should be carried into effect, and I was bound to say, that I could see no good reason why there should be

further delay, consistent with that good faith which characterized his nation.

“The Governor replied, that this reasoning did not satisfy him that it was his duty to deliver up the posts. That if it had been the intention of the British Ministers that he should do so, they would have given him specific instructions for the purpose; that he was a military officer and a foreigner, adopted into the British service; and the rule of his conduct ever had been, and would continue to be, to follow the clear and particular orders of the Government he had the honour to serve.

“Perceiving there was not the least prospect of accomplishing the object of my mission, I expressed my regret and apprehension that disagreeable consequences might result; and that my continuance at Quebec would be of no further use; I had only to demand my passport to return through the province to the United States. I proceeded to Philadelphia and made my report to the President of Congress. As the regiment to which I had been appointed was discharged, I now returned to enjoy the tranquil and happy scenes of civil and domestic life.

“From information obtained in Canada, I was satisfied that it was not the intention of the British Government at that time to deliver up these posts.”

As soon as the manner in which the boundary line established between the United States and the Canadas was published, very strong remonstrances were made by the members of the Northwest Fur Company, and other influential characters in those prov-

inces. It was stated, that a vast region had been ceded to the United States, to which before they had no claim, and to which they had obtained no title by conquest; that this country comprehended the best soil for cultivation and settlement; was situated in a temperate climate, inhabited by numerous tribes of Indians; where the Northwest Company had established their trading houses, and from which their principal wealth was derived. It was further added, that the British Commissioners who made the treaty were either ignorant of the immense value of the country, and its importance to the Canadas, or were not disposed to pay that attention to the interests of his Britannic Majesty's subjects residing in those provinces, which the spirit and loyalty they had manifested during the war had merited.

Another view given was, that the numerous tribes of savages, who inhabited those extensive regions, were equally dissatisfied, and were determined not to submit to the superintendence of the United States, or suffer their traders to come into their country. It was asserted that the Ohio and Alleghany rivers ought to have been the boundary, and that this could now be effected by encouraging the Indians to hostility. This policy was adopted; the posts were retained, and the tragical wars which subsequently took place, were carried on by the Indians, at the expense of the British Government.

This state of things continued, until the hostile tribes experienced a total defeat by our army under General Wayne in 1793. The following year, the

posts were surrendered, after the ratification of a new treaty with England, made by Mr. Jay. The British Government never admitted that the object of holding these posts was to aid the Indians in the prosecution of their wars. Other causes were assigned, such as legal impediment in the payment of debts due to British subjects, confiscation of the property of loyalists, and prosecuting them for the part they had taken during the war.



## CHAPTER XXI.

SHAYS' REBELLION.

1786.

THE regiment to which Colonel Hull was attached, on the peace establishment, being disbanded, he retired from the army, and established his residence in Newton, Massachusetts. He commenced the practice of the law, and was engaged in the performance of such public duties as from time to time fell in his way, and, as a public-spirited man, gave him pleasure to perform. In politics he held enlarged views. He neither contended alone for sectional interests, nor for the exclusive advancement of a particular party, but solely for such principles as he believed to be consistent with the genius, and would most promote the happiness of a people just emerged from the thralldom of monarchical systems, and who had severely struggled to obtain their rights.

Before the Constitution was adopted, in 1789, like many others, he feared there was a tendency to form a government of a more consolidated character than was necessary, and which would prove unacceptable to the people at large, by producing that inequality of rights observable in European States.

To oppose this, his talents and his influence were

exerted ; and no persecution or ill treatment from the men whom he had assisted to elevate to power, could betray him into inconsistency of conduct, involving a compromise of principles, for which he had ever and earnestly contended. The same policy marked his conduct in the suppression of Shay's rebellion, fifteen years previous to the elections of 1801, when he urged and assisted to exact obedience to the powers that be, and a patient waiting for the only legitimate mode of redress, the elective franchise.

Though he went with a party on leading principles, he did not deem it necessary to bend every man to his own views, to obtain office, but conferred appointments wherever he found talent and merit to deserve them. Such was his practice while Governor of the Michigan Territory. He never admitted the doctrine, that because there existed a difference of political sentiment, a man was therefore disqualified, however honest and able, from the performance of public duty. In the commencement of the war of 1812, he was authorized by the Government to nominate such persons as his judgment approved, for appointments in the army. He only desired to be informed if the candidate was a faithful supporter of the Constitution of his country, and qualified to serve her interests. He asked not whether he was a republican or a federalist.

Soon after peace was established, a disaffected spirit was perceptible among the people. The commerce of the colonies, previous to the war of the Revolution, having been almost exclusively with Eng-

land, large debts were due to her merchants. From the years 1775 to 1784-5, no part of these debts had been paid. The treaty of peace provided, that there should be no legal impediment to their collection. Notwithstanding this provision, the Legislature of Massachusetts had passed laws which protected the debtors from paying the interest which had accrued during the war. This being justly viewed by the British Government as a violation of the treaty, and represented to Congress as such, these laws were repealed, and the course of justice was open. British agents were sent over, for the purpose of collecting these debts. The merchants who had imported goods, being called on, were under the necessity of calling on the traders in the country, to whom they had sold them on credit. The traders, in their turn, were compelled to demand payment of the people, who had been the consumers of the goods. The consequence was, that lawsuits were multiplied beyond all former example. In addition to this, taxes were very heavy; specie was scarce; and *that* alone was received in payment. Much real distress was produced by this state of things. As the difficulties daily increased, the excitement became great, and the oppressed felt that it was necessary to examine the cause, and make exertion for relief. It was impossible for them to be unmindful how cheerfully they had devoted their personal services, and the fruits of their industry, to the support of the war. That having thus aided in securing the blessings of peace and independence, they hoped and expected to

have participated in the enjoyment of them. In their new situation, they experienced nothing but embarrassment, oppression, and distress. Such reflections convinced them, that there was some radical defect in the Government. From individual complaints, neighbours began to assemble, to discuss their grievances. These small bodies were increased to town meetings, and then into county conventions. There the oppressive system was painted by their leaders in the most gloomy colours. In August, 1786, the selectmen of Newton, Massachusetts, received a letter, signed by Captain John Nutting, chairman of a committee from the towns of Groton, Pepperell, Shirley, and Ashley, inviting the town to send delegates to a county convention at Concord, to discuss their grievances, and devise measures for obtaining redress. In these meetings, it was represented, that the difficulty was the want of a circulating medium; that this evil could easily be removed by issuing paper money, and making it a legal tender for the payment of debts and taxes; that the courts of justice ought to be closed, until the circulating medium could be increased, and facilities thus furnished for the relief of debtors. Courts and lawyers were denounced as the instruments of oppression, and they shared largely in the popular resentment. A pamphlet had been written with great art and address, and circulated under the signature of "*Honestus*." It was read and commented on in the public meetings, and contributed much to inflame the minds of the people. Even moderate and substantial men began

to think that evils existed in the Government, and the spirit of disaffection was spreading, more or less, over every part of the State. The malcontents, trusting in their strength, from the increase of their numbers, and the unanimity of their views, felt that the time for action had arrived ; and the first step taken was, to prevent in the several counties the sittings of the Courts.

In the autumn, the period having arrived for the Courts of Common Pleas to hold their sessions, the insurgents assembled in arms, and took possession of the court-houses. When the judges went to take their seats, bayonets were presented to their breasts, and they were informed, that it was the will of their sovereign lords, the people, that the Courts should be adjourned *sine die*. No force having been ordered for the support of their authority, they were obliged to comply, and the sittings were prevented. Such were the violent and lawless proceedings that took place in the counties of Berkshire, Hampshire, and Worcester, that the rebels succeeded in expelling the lawyers and judges from their seats in the General Court. Encouraged by this success, and the partisans of the cause continually increasing, they formed the bold design of calling a general convention, for the purpose of overturning the Government, and establishing a new one on its ruins.

There were now three parties recognized, the friends of the Government, the wavering, and the insurgents.

Governor Bowdoin, of Massachusetts, was in



favour of taking strong and decisive measures. Previously to the meeting of the Court in Concord, it was known to be the intention of the insurgents to oppose by arms their proceedings. The Legislature not being in session, the Governor invited the representatives of Boston, and some gentlemen from the country, into his Council.

Colonel Hull was a member of this Council. The question was considered, whether it was expedient to call out the militia to protect the Court in its sessions at Concord. A large majority was in favour of sustaining the civil powers by a military force. The Governor accordingly gave orders to General Brooks, who commanded the militia of the county, to march a detachment, the day before the Court met. Some of the judges and influential characters hearing it was the intention of the Governor to send a military force to sustain the civil authority, repaired to Boston two days before the session of the Court. They made such a representation of the temper and feelings of the people, as induced him to countermand his orders to the militia.

At the same time the expedient was recommended of sending expresses to the different towns; desiring them to send delegates to meet in Convention, on the morning of the session of the Court. The object was to open a negotiation with the insurgents, and endeavour to dissuade them from their purpose.

On the morning of the assembling of the Court, the judges, the lawyers, and other constituent members of the Court, with the members of the Conven-



tion and the insurgents, were all proceeding by different routes to the town of Concord. A short time previously to the meeting of the Court, a body of armed insurgents arrived from the north, took possession of the court-house, and instead of negotiating with the Convention, which had assembled in the meeting-house, made its members prisoners.

Soon after, a reinforcement arrived from the west, and formed a junction with their brethren from the north. The judges had met at the hotel, and were preparing to proceed to the court-house.

Colonel Hull and some other gentlemen were present. It was not long before a body of armed men, with several officers, came to the house, and inquired for the judges. The officers informed the judges that they were a committee from the great body of the people in arms, and were instructed to inform them that they had taken possession of the court-house, with a determination to prevent the session of the Court.

An attempt was made to reason with them. They replied, that they had no authority to enter into discussion, but only to deliver their message. They then returned to the main body. It was decided, under the circumstances, to adjourn, and the judges, and their associates in public duty, returned to their homes.

The insurgents remained in the town until the following morning, and after the adjournment of the Court, released from prison the members of the Convention.

Late in the autumn the Legislature met. Finding that the imprisonment of a number of the insurgents had been of no avail, and the utmost efforts of the civil authority were in vain exerted to crush the spirit of rebellion rapidly spreading over the land, it was now resolved to take strong measures. A body of militia, consisting of four thousand four hundred men, rank and file, were ordered to be ready to act in January. Major-General Benjamin Lincoln was appointed Commander-in-chief. General Rufus Putnam and Colonel Hull accompanied him, as volunteers. General Shepherd, with a detachment of militia, consisting of between eleven and twelve hundred men, was ordered to Springfield, for the protection of the arsenal.

The insurgents had chosen for their leader a man by the name of Daniel Shays, who had served as a captain in the war of the Revolution. He had risen to that rank in the ordinary routine of promotion; but had never performed any service that gave him distinction as an officer. Before the war ended, he was obliged to leave the army, for some dishonourable conduct. The force collected by Shays amounted to about two thousand men. When he heard of the approach of General Lincoln's army, he decided to attack General Shepherd, before he could be reinforced by General Lincoln. General Shepherd had thrown up some slight redoubts on the rising ground, for the security of the arsenal. On these he placed several pieces of cannon. When the insurgents advanced, an aid-de-camp was sent by General Shep-

herd, to inquire the object of their movement. Shays replied, that they intended to take possession of the arsenal, and continued to advance. They were warned to stop, or they would be fired upon. This having no effect, General Shepherd ordered a few shot to be fired over their heads. Instead of taking the alarm, they advanced with still more pertinacity. The column was now near, and the batteries were ordered to be opened upon it. Several were killed, some wounded, and the whole body was thrown into confusion. Without attempting to rally, they immediately retreated up the Connecticut river, and took a position on the opposite bank, at West Springfield.

General Lincoln having arrived, formed his detachment, and gave to General Putnam the command of the right and Colonel Hull the command of the left wing. We immediately passed the river on the ice, but before we could come in contact with the insurgents, they retreated. We pursued, until darkness arrested our progress. We took a number of prisoners. They retreated as far as the town of Hadley, where they fell off to the right, and took a position in the defiles of the mountains at Pelham, twelve miles from East Hadley. General Lincoln advanced as far as this place, where he halted a few days. While here, many of Shays' adherents came in, and availed of the pardon General Lincoln was authorized to grant. The main body still continued with Shays, in a strong position at Pelham.

General Lincoln commenced the pursuit in the evening, and making a forced march through a violent

snow-storm, surprised the insurgents in their camp; who fled in every direction. No lives were lost, but more than one hundred men were taken prisoners. The residue retreated; some into the State of Vermont, others into the back part of the State of New-York; while many returned to their homes, and asked the clemency of the Government.

On the tenth of March, the General Court appointed three Commissioners; General Lincoln, the Honourable S. Philips, Jun., and the Honourable S. A. Otis, to proceed to the western counties, for the purpose of granting amnesty to the insurgents, on their making submission and taking the oath of allegiance. Seven hundred and ninety persons took the benefit of the commission. Shays, Wheeler, Parsons, Luke, Day, and a few others, were excepted. Fourteen were arrested, and convicted of high treason. They received the sentence of death, but were all ultimately pardoned.

## CHAPTER XXII.

THE SPIRIT OF DISAFFECTION CONTINUES.—INSTRUCTIONS TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TOWN OF NEWTON, MASSACHUSETTS, PREPARED BY COLONEL HULL.

1787.

NOTWITHSTANDING all opposition to the Government had been put down by the force of arms, yet an uneasy and dissatisfied spirit among the people was still apparent. The policy adopted was, to classify the citizens, and each class was required to furnish a recruit at the enormous expense of three or four hundred dollars. This regulation involved many in debt, and, among other causes, was a source of the present embarrassment. At the ensuing election for Governor, Mr. Hancock was a candidate, in opposition to Mr. Bowdoin, and was elected by a large majority. In the choice of Senators and Representatives great efforts were made to select persons favourable to the plans of the insurgents, which were successful in many instances.

In Newton, where Colonel Hull resided, there was a manifest disposition to oppose the Government. The people succeeded in electing a man, by name Edward Fuller, who had openly justified the conduct of the insurgents. When this choice was announced at the town meeting, some surprise was expressed,

and it was moved, that the town should give him instructions, and a committee be appointed to prepare them. This motion was carried. Colonel Hull was a member of the committee, and was requested to prepare the instructions. It was accordingly done, and the report was handed in and was accepted by a large majority. It is curious to remark the inconsistency of this proceeding of the people, who had elected a man professing sentiments entirely opposite to those contained in his instructions, as follow :

“*March 18, 1787. Instructions to Captain Edward Fuller, Representative for the Town of Newton.*”

“SIR—Chosen to represent this town in the next Legislature at this solemn period of our public affairs, you will soon be called on to reflect and decide upon principles and measures, on which will depend the happiness, the dignity and the perpetuity of our government. As the part you are to act is of such importance, and as we are deeply interested in the result of your deliberations, we think it our duty to furnish you with every information in our power for the regulation of your conduct..

“We must, in the first place, take upon ourselves to observe to you, that the office of legislation is an elevated trust, in which the general good should be the sole object of attention. As the influence of passion, of private interest, or party views, would be contrary to your oath, and subversive of the very design of your appointment, we must expect, in matters that may come before you, that you will inquire



with candour, think with coolness, and decide with sobriety, firmness, and magnanimity.

“ On taking a view of the several important acts of the Legislature of the past year, you will find that a late unnatural and unprovoked rebellion, which has convulsed the country, has been the subject of their particular attention ; and that their adoption of decided measures has arrested its progress, and restored to the country the blessings of peace.

“ These measures we consider to have been necessary to the salvation of our country. But while we congratulate you on the wisdom which suggested, and the success which attended them, we are constrained to say, that much remains to be done. The same energetic arm must fall on the untamed spirit, or it will be found that the interests of the best members of the community will fall a sacrifice to the lawless views of the worst. That this will be the case, the rise, progress, and present state of our civil commotions, afford the most unequivocal proof.

“ Although the object of the rebellion was, at first, thought by many to be the total destruction of our present Government, yet the Legislature, imputing to delusion what we have since had reason to believe was the result of a most malignant spirit of faction, gave a general pardon to characters whose crimes, under an administration less mild, would have destined them to an ignominious death.

“ That the great body of the people at this period, suffered real grievances, is as true as that the measures they adopted to obtain redress were improper

and unjustifiable. During a long war, their commerce had been cut off, and their fishery, a great source of their wealth, annihilated. The most healthy and able young men had been taken from agriculture and attached to the army.

“The last years of the war, the bills of credit having entirely failed, the people had been classed, to furnish the military service. They had paid heavy taxes each year of the war, and in addition to this, they had sustained their proportion of loss, of about two hundred millions of dollars, by the depreciation of paper money, which had sunk to nothing in their hands. Now, when peace was restored and military duty ended, they found their resources exhausted; but, nevertheless, they were required to pay their taxes in specie, and likewise their debts, which had been nearly doubled by the accumulation of interest during the war.

“Men who had considered themselves independent, were now oppressed by poverty and debt. But deplorable as their condition was, they lived under a government of their own choice, and should have considered, that violent and unlawful measures would only recoil on themselves.\*

\* The authority to govern and the duty to obey, are directly taught by Revelation. Government is not of man's invention; it was given by God. That it receives the sanction of religion, gives wisdom and energy to its acts. Certainly the very men, whose sufferings and passions over-

ruled for a time their reason and their sense of duty, must in the end have been thankful, that there was a strong arm in the land, that could stay them from the excesses and ruin into which they were plunging.  
—EDITOR.

“Law was necessary to the protection of their persons and their property. They chose their legislators for a short period, and could dismiss them at the proper time, if they believed them unworthy of their confidence. Reluctantly did the rulers of the State draw the sword, as the last resort. But its energy and decision, no less than the conciliatory course pursued by the Commander-in-chief of its army, crushed the insurrection, and peace was restored without the horrors and bloodshed incident to civil war.

“The virtue of the higher classes preserved the State, perhaps the Union. A feeling of irritation existed among the people, which, had it been fostered, and their cause sustained by men of talents, influence, and military experience, would have produced incalculable misery, and long hindered a restoration to peace and order, which was so happily and speedily established. But in the true spirit of depravity, mercy was construed to be weakness; and the flames of insurrection spreading with accelerated fury, the courts of justice were interrupted, the laws laid prostrate, the rights of property put afloat, and all personal security at an end.

“In this state of things, a military force was the only alternative. Called to act at a most timely period, and exercised with a happy combination of mercy and severity, coolness and spirit, opposition from the rebels ceased, and, apparently, order and good faith were restored. The arm of mercy was again extended. But what appears to be the conse-

quence? Not a return to their allegiance, but still cherishing the spirit of rebellion, threaten hostilities, and triumph in their escape from justice. This spirit must be subdued. The measures adopted by the last Legislature, have met our highest approbation; and we expect that you will exert your influence to secure their permanency, so long as the necessity exists.

“Much has been said, of late, in regard to the emissions of paper money, to relieve the burthens, or, in the language of the factious and disorderly, to redress the grievances of the people. We must say to you, sir, that the measure would not only be productive of certain ruin to individuals, but to the community.

“Money being the representative of transferable property in every part of the world, to which the use of it extends, the precious metals, which the whole commercial world has adopted as a medium, in the principles of their circulation resemble a fluid, ever striving for an equilibrium. When money is scarce, property at market will ever be cheap. Cheapness of markets will always bring purchasers, and purchasers, cash. When money is too plenty, prices will rise in proportion, and purchasers will send their money to other markets, where similar articles will be bought at a cheaper rate. Long experience has established the truth of this position, that money cannot long, in any place, be too plenty or too scarce, but, in commercial countries, must bear the same proportion to the property at market.

“The evils, therefore, which we now experience,

in the nature of things must work their own cure. Patience and industry, united to honour and integrity in our dealings, are the only remedies to be applied.

“To seek relief by paper money, would be a political empiricism, founded in fraud, which would involve individuals in ruin, and eventually beggar our country. However paradoxical it may seem, the injury the State would receive from a paper medium, would be in proportion to its credit. The reason is obvious. If we now have a deficiency of specie, and that deficiency is supplied by bills of credit, no specie will come in. Should we extend the emission, so as to occasion a surplusage, compared with other commercial places, that part of the medium which can, will leave us, until the level is restored.

“Gold and silver being general in their credit, in their credit would only forsake us. In case, then, of a foreign invasion, where would be our resources? The paper money would at once fall to the ground, and we should find ourselves poor and wretched in the extreme, without supplies, without money, and without credit.

“A paper bill can be of no value, but as it represents specie. The notes of the Massachusetts Bank, for instance, circulate freely, because it is believed they will always be redeemed at sight, while the State securities are sold at a large discount, as the time and manner of their payment is totally uncertain.

“Thus it is with the bank bills of England; they circulate at par; at the same time, the paper of their public funds is sold at a discount of twenty-five to

thirty per cent. That our bills, if emitted, would not be a representative of specie, is certain, since the want of it is the only reason for the emission. The value of such a medium, therefore, must be, at the moment it is issued, less than it promises. How, then, shall it obtain circulation? Shall we tread in the footsteps of Rhode Island, and discharge with it our public debt, and then make it a tender in all private contracts? Shall we then bury, in one common grave, public and private credit? Would not this render our country infamous to a proverb? And here, sir, we may be permitted to express our belief, that a government which suffers the rights of property to be thus sported with, cannot long retain its tranquillity or its freedom.

“The hard earnings of industry, are almost as dear as life itself; and no one who has the feelings of a man about him, will ever yield them up without a struggle.

“The first article in our Bill of Rights declares, ‘that all men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, unalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the rights of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; and that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property.’

“As the discharging of debts by a paper medium would be a high invasion of the rights of property, the preservation of which is among the principal objects of legislation; it is plain, that an act, authorizing a measure of this kind, would be a violation of delegated trust, and tend to the dissolution of the Govern-



ment. It is therefore our most serious opinion, that whenever legislators attempt to take away or destroy private property, allegiance is no longer a virtue ; and the people are again thrown upon their natural and reserved rights.

“But we regret to remark, that our present convulsed state of society takes its rise from a principle of opposition between debtors and creditors ; between the rich and the poor : a source from whence has arisen most of those civil wars, which, after having drenched in blood a greater part of the ancient and many of the modern republics, have occasioned the ruin of them all.

“Objections will always exist to the *Laws of Tender*, and all other expedients which interfere with private contracts. The moment a government assumes the power of authorizing a debtor to discharge his debts in a manner different from his engagements, all private confidence is lost, and credit is at an end. The money-holder will not only withhold his loan, but send it to some foreign country, where the rights of property are held more sacred. It is our opinion, that the present scarcity of specie, which was at first partial, but now universally prevails, is principally occasioned by the very measures intended as a remedy.

“You will therefore use all your endeavours to prevent a continuance of the Law of Tender, and all others interfering with private engagements.

“It is a misfortune, that corporate bodies will frequently sanction acts, which in their individual capa

cities they would blush to avow. But we wish you to bear in mind, that justice is invariable in all her laws. Should an attempt be made to stamp a depreciation on the public securities, and thereby to defraud those who, in a day of public distress, advanced their property and devoted their lives to the service of their country, we conjure you, in the most solemn manner, to oppose such legislation. As we revere the principles of justice and the feelings of gratitude, let the idea never obtain in our councils; let the thought never find utterance, that we are members of a community, where ingratitude is countenanced by authority; where injustice is sustained by law. We are alike subject to internal commotions, as exposed to external invasion. The safety of our country may again call for public credit and public services; it is therefore important that laws be enacted, to secure confidence in the faith of our Government.

“Placing the subject on the broad basis of national policy, a firm reliance on the integrity of Government should never be shaken. Debt ought never to be cancelled until fully paid.

“Before the expiration of the present year, the attention of the Legislature will probably be called to consider the report of the Federal Convention, now sitting in Philadelphia. Experience has taught, that the powers of the present confederacy are inadequate to the great objects of its institution. We look to the happiest results from the integrity and ability of the characters who compose this august assembly. They are men who have uniformly been distinguished

as the firm patriots of our country, and the illustrious Washington is one of their number. Should this body present to the Legislature, as we doubt not they will, a system which promises a firm, efficient Federal Government, founded on the equal principles of civil liberty, you will not hesitate to vote for it.

“ You will consider, sir, that government is instituted for the benefit and happiness of the people. You will therefore avoid attempting to lay any other burthens, excepting those which a solemn regard to public faith and public justice render necessary. In your inquiries on these points, we think you will find that taxes on lands and on polls are too high. Use your endeavours, therefore, to draw the necessary revenue from a different quarter ; a much larger proportion, we conceive, should be derived from impost and excise on the luxuries of life. By adhering to such a system, the burthens will lie on those who are able and willing to bear them, and afford support and encouragement to the temperate and frugal.

“ As the public burthens and embarrassments are heavy, it is important that the greatest economy be introduced into every department of Government. We would wish to have the salaries of all public officers as low as is consistent with the dignity and honour of their station. If money has become more valuable than when the salaries were established, a reduction of them is not inconsistent with the original principle on which they were granted.

“ In fine, sir, you will use your constant endeavours, that a sacred regard should be had for public

and private faith ; that the rights of debtor and creditor be equally secured ; that justice be the pole-star of all your public movements ; in order that Government may find it easy to enforce it among our citizens. Let agriculture and manufactures be encouraged, and there cannot be a doubt but that we shall soon rise superior to present evils, and become a happy and prosperous people."

"*Voted*—That the foregoing proceedings and instructions be certified by the Town Clerk, and printed in some public newspaper."

## CHAPTER XXIII.

## PETITION TO CONGRESS FOR PAY OF OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

IN the formation of the Constitution of the United States, powers were granted to Congress to make provision for the public debt, contracted during the war.

The officers and soldiers of the Revolutionary Army were the last class of creditors who applied for that indemnity to which their well-earned services had entitled them. For a long time it was considered that no application was necessary. They relied on the justice of their claims. Their services, and the manner in which they had been remunerated, were inscribed on the Records of Congress. Not more than one-eighth part of the consideration-money had been paid them. Under these circumstances, they felt assured the satisfaction of their claims would have been among the first objects of the Government. They were disappointed. Waiting three years after the organization of the Constitution for a disbursement of their claims, the officers could wait no longer, without a dereliction of duty they owed themselves and the soldiers who had served with them during the war.

They called a meeting to consult on measures for

relief. It was determined to present a petition to Congress, and to prepare a circular, to be addressed to the officers of the other States, to invite their cooperation in the measures that had been adopted.

By the wish of the officers of Massachusetts, Colonel Hull was requested to repair to Philadelphia, then the seat of Government, to explain and enforce their petition.

On his arrival in March, he found no agents from any of the other States, and believing that a united application would have more effect, than from one State alone, he did not present the petition to Congress.

For the purpose of uniting all the influence of those who were interested, he addressed a letter to the senior officer of each State, of which the following is a copy :

CIRCULAR.

*Philadelphia, April, 1792.*

SIR—In conformity to an appointment and instructions from the officers of the Massachusetts line of the American army, I have attended at the seat of Government from the 20th of March to the present period. The object of my commission was to obtain a decision on a memorial, which they had heretofore presented to Congress, on the subject of further compensation for themselves and the soldiers who served during the war. Although in the first instance, similar applications were expected from those in the different States who were interested, yet expectation was defeated by a delay of the communication, con



tained in the Circular Address of 23th February, and an idea that an earlier adjournment of Congress would have taken place.

Finding myself thus situated, and considering that the officers and soldiers through the United States were equally interested in the question, I deemed it a mark of respect and attention, due to them, not to propose a consideration of the subject, until they had an opportunity of becoming applicants in the measures we had adopted, and of affording us the aid of their advice and assistance.

As a proper investigation and decision of this question, is of the highest importance ; affording relief to a large number of our companions of the war, whose distresses are only equalled by their patience ; and as a union of sentiment and measures will be most likely to effect the object of our reasonable wishes ; I have particular instructions from the officers of Massachusetts, to request a co-operation of the officers of your line, at the opening of the next session of Congress. They will attend at that time by their agent or agents, and a final decision will doubtless be obtained. As my brother officers in Massachusetts have intrusted this business to my care, and as I have devoted some attention to the consideration of the subject, I flatter myself you will not deem it improper in me, in this communication, to make some general observations thereon. The claim of the army on the public, is so fixed in the unalterable principles of justice, that they ought to feel the fullest confidence of success.

The people of America know, and the public records will ever perpetuate a recognition of the services which have been rendered, and the manner in which they have been remunerated. An attempt to prove that a demand of the most sacred nature still remains uncanceled, would be only to show that a part is less than the whole.

The case in point, indeed, is stronger than any that can be adduced in its support; and the feelings of every honest heart will overcome every argument which sophistry can devise or ingenuity invent, in opposition to the claim.

Were I to attempt an investigation of the subject, it would appear, from the most authentic documents, that the public engagement to the army was for a specific sum in specie. That certain military services were to be rendered in consequence of this engagement. That there has been a full acknowledgment on the part of the United States, that the services have been faithfully performed. That the public neither discharged the demand in specie nor in other property, equivalent to specie. That the certificates being unsupported by funds, had no other value than what was stamped on them by public opinion. That this value was sanctioned by the uniform adjudication of the Courts, throughout the United States, in causes relating to this kind of property. That the same principle has been recognized by the Legislatures of the different States, in a variety of instances. That Congress itself, under the Confederation, was impressed with the same sentiments, particularly in

the instance of the sale of the lands in the Western Territory, for a price greatly enhanced, in consequence of payment being made in certificates.

From these facts, it most conclusively follows, that the claim of the army is not chimerical, but founded in justice. From these facts, and the conclusion which follows, what possible reason can be given, why we should not, in a manly manner, ask for our rights? The present Government is not only endowed with the ability, but was formed for the express purpose of establishing justice. While the services of those men, who cheerfully endured every toil, hardship, and danger, which are incident to a military life; who persevered in the service of their country, until peace and happiness were restored, remain unrewarded, it can never be said that this object has been attained.

The pleasure which every honest American must feel, from a reflection on the present prosperous state of his country, must necessarily be impaired by the consideration, that those services are unrewarded, which modesty need not blush to say, greatly contributed to that public felicity which is now enjoyed. Nor is this all. Many of the men who performed these services, are, from the want of the just compensation which was promised them, now pining in indigence, languishing in jails, or compelled to seek a subsistence in the neighbourhood of savages, upon the frontiers of the United States; while every thing they eat, drink, or wear in their distressing situations, is taxed, to pay the difference between the former

low and present high value of their certificates, to the present holders of them.

To show that those persons who are entitled to the public consideration, can easily be distinguished ; that a further compensation can be made, by paying only the debt which actually existed at the time when the funding system was adopted ; and that in doing it, no new debt will be created ; and that the purchasers of alienated securities, will not be affected, or any interference be made with any systems which have been adopted ; I beg leave to present the following statement.

The army may be divided into four classes :—

First. Those whose term of service expired first January, 1776.

Second. Those whose term of service expired first January, 1777.

Third. Those who enlisted in the year 1777, for three years or during the war. The term of service of those who enlisted for three years, expired in 1780.

Fourth. Those who enlisted in 1780.

The first and second classes have no well founded claims, because there was no depreciation of the money at the time they were paid. The fourth class perhaps have no claim in equity, because the large bounties they received were a full equivalent for their services. The third class, with the officers, remain only to be considered. They depended wholly on the stipulations of Congress. This class, having served during the principal part of the war, received certificates in payment, the value of which has been con-

sidered. They returned home under the disadvantages of having the habits of their former occupations impaired by their military pursuits; their property and connexions deranged and lost, and their families involved for a necessary support. Thus circumstanced, necessity compelled them to dispose of their certificates for the current price in the market. After the present Government was established, provision was made for these certificates, wherever they were found. By that provision, the purchasers received an immense advantage. The public, however, saved a part of the debt, which was originally due, two per cent. for ten years on the principal of the whole debt, and half the interest which had accumulated. This remnant now remains, and in paying it, no more than the original debt will be discharged.

The rival pretenders to this remnant, will be the original holders, who earned the whole by the sweat of their brow, and the present holders, who have already received seven or eight hundred per cent. on the money which they advanced.

In the name of justice, equity, and good conscience, which claim is to be preferred? Every man will answer, that of the *soldier*, unless his feelings are steeled against the principles of honour, good faith, and gratitude.

This remnant, therefore, so far as it extends to our own original claims, may be appropriated with great propriety, to relieve the sufferings of the foregoing description of men. In addition to this, there can be no doubt but Congress will be disposed to

make a liberal grant of land in the Western Territory, for the same purpose ; for, it is not to be forgotten that those vast possessions, on which has been founded the pleasing expectation of sinking the whole of the public debt, are the fruits of those toils which the Government is now called upon to compensate. I have only, sir, to request you to take the earliest opportunity to make this communication known to the officers of your line, and I sincerely hope, at the opening of the next session of Congress, they will think proper to make this application.

I am, with sentiments of respect, in behalf of the officers of the Massachusetts line of the late army, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

WILLIAM HULL.

Washington writes to Thomas Jefferson, in 1788: "I feel mortified that there should have been any just ground for the clamour of the foreign officers who served with us ; but after having received a quarter of their whole debt in specie, and their interest in the same, for some time, they have infinitely less reason for complaint than our native officers, of whom the suffering and neglect have been equalled only by their patience and patriotism. A great proportion of the officers and soldiers of the American army, have been compelled, by indigence, to part with their securities for one eighth of their nominal value ; yet their conduct is very different from what you represented the French officers to have been."\*

\* Lafayette was not one—he came as a volunteer, and served without compensation ; besides often supplying, from his own private fortune,



Colonel Hull was elected the agent to attend the next Congress, in the year 1793.

Agents had assembled from a number of the States, but not from the whole, with petitions similar to the one from the officers of the Massachusetts line.

After an interesting debate in the House of Representatives, it was resolved, that the prayer of the petitioners should not be granted.

In the discussion, little was said against the justice of the claims; the arguments were rather in favour of them. But the leading members of the majority in Congress thought it necessary, from motives of policy, and to preserve their consistency, to oppose the claim.

A system had been adopted for funding the public debt. In its operation, it was contended that it was not founded in equity. It was opposed by great talents and profound reasoning.

The system was, in addition to the present duties on imports and tonnage, to provide by duties on wines, distilled spirits, including those made in the United States, teas and coffee, a fund to cancel the national debt, both foreign and domestic.\* The debt of the American officers and soldiers was not included.

The preservation of the new Constitution, at this early period of its operations, was highly important; and this system, by which to discharge its obligations,

necessaries for the soldiers. He stow it on suffering America.—ED- never asked for remuneration. His ITOR.

fortune was ample, and it was lux- \* Hamilton's Report on Public ury, to his generous heart, to be- Credit.—"Federalist," Vol. I., p. 43.

was viewed as essential to its existence. To have admitted other claims, not provided for at first, would have proved a dangerous precedent, and been considered an acknowledgment of the defects of the system, which would have caused its destruction, and with it, have endangered, if it had not produced the dissolution of the Government.

The rejection of the petition produced much excitement, and not a little indignation. It was considered as discarding claims which the country was bound to provide for, by every principle of justice, equity, and gratitude. The services which were the foundation of these claims, were, "the price of liberty, without which the nation itself could never have attained an independent existence."

Even the illustrious Washington, then President of the United States, did not escape censure. It was thought by many, that he had not on that occasion redeemed the solemn pledges he had given at the disbanding of the army. A number of anonymous essays were published in the Philadelphia papers, containing severe strictures on his conduct.

Colonel Hull being the principal agent in the application to Congress, was supposed by some to be the author of these essays. But he writes :

"I have mentioned this circumstance for no other purpose than that the truth may be known, that I was not the author, and had no agency or knowledge whatever, either in writing or publishing them. During my attendance on Congress, I had frequent conversations with the President, on the subject of my

mission. He observed: 'I know the claims of the army to be just, and I regret they have not been provided for. When the petitions were presented, it was considered by a majority as an unfavourable time. To grant them, would interfere with the arrangements which had been made to cancel the public debt. It is, however, a business of legislation, and does not belong to my department; but I hope the time will come, when the claims of the army will be discharged; and, while I live, they shall always have my support.' "

The subject has since been frequently brought before Congress, but no definite measures adopted. An act of charity has been passed, granting an annuity to a certain description of officers and soldiers attached to the revolutionary army. It extended only to those who were paupers by misfortune, idleness, or intemperance. This class must have been supported at the public expense, had they never have rendered any service to their country.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

INDIAN WAR.—COLONEL HULL APPOINTED A COMMISSIONER TO UPPER CANADA, TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A TREATY WITH THE INDIANS.—INTERVIEW WITH GOVERNOR SIMCOE.

IN the years 1792-3, a savage war desolated the frontiers. It was conducted with unusual cruelty and barbarity. The prisoners taken in battle were tortured and doomed to a lingering death. More than fifteen hundred persons, men, women, and children, while emigrating to the western country, fell under the tomahawk, or were taken prisoners by the savages. In two campaigns, the first under General Harmar, the second under General St. Clair, misfortunes attended the American arms.

In the battle of the Miami, where St. Clair commanded, thirty-eight officers were killed, and between five and six hundred non-commissioned officers and soldiers were killed and missing. General Butler, of Pennsylvania, whose valour we witnessed at Stony Point, was among the slain.

General St. Clair retreated with the remnant of his army to Fort Jefferson. He was labouring under a painful disease, and could not mount or leave his horse without assistance. But his orders during the action were delivered with coolness, intrepidity, and judgment.

In the commencement of the engagement, sixty of the militia ran away. A regiment was sent in pursuit of them, that others might be deterred from following their example. These troops were all absent during the engagement, which greatly reduced the force of St. Clair. The contest was severe, and the lives of the officers were sacrificed in their persevering efforts to preserve order, and compel the militia to the performance of duty; so great had been the panic at the first onset.

“General St. Clair requested that a Court Martial should sit on his conduct. But this request could not be granted, because there were not in the American service, officers of a grade to form a Court for his trial on military principles. A Committee of the House of Representatives was appointed to inquire into the causes of the failure of the expedition, whose report, in explicit terms, exculpated the Commander-in-chief. More satisfactory testimony in favour of St. Clair, is furnished by the circumstance, that he still retained the undiminished esteem and good opinion of General Washington.”\*

It would have been impossible for the Indians to have kept the field with success, without the aid of the British Government; as they cannot exist in a body but for a short period, unless furnished with provisions and the munitions of war. These were, it was well understood, supplied by the British. They erected forts within our territories to favour their

\* Marshall's Life of Washington, Vol. V., page 398.

plans, and still retained and occupied the posts on the northwestern frontier, which had been ceded to the United States, in direct opposition to our treaty with England. All this was considered a sufficient ground for a declaration of war on the part of the United States; but such was the condition of the country, that Congress was desirous of doing what could be done by negotiation, without having recourse to arms. The savages were contending for what they deemed their rights, and in the spirit of compassion for that unfortunate race, the Government exercised toward them a pacific temper; anxious to put an end to the contest otherwise than by the sword. That such happy results might be realized, Mr. Jay, our Minister at the Court of Great Britain, was authorized and instructed, if possible, to negotiate and settle all differences existing between the two Governments, and to enter into a treaty by which the posts held by the British within the territories of the United States, should be surrendered. This object was effected. In the mean time, preparations were made, in case the war with the savages should be continued; which, from appearances, seemed most probable. An army of five thousand men was raised, and the command given to General Wayne; General St. Clair having resigned.

While these preparations were making, a renewed effort was made to terminate the war, by a direct communication to the Indians of the pacific views of the United States.

Colonel Harden and Major Trueman, worthy cit-



izens and excellent officers, were sent as envoys into the Indian country, with propositions of peace. They were both murdered by the savages, though in general they respect the rights of public messengers as much as civilized nations. The families of "these valuable citizens who had thus fallen victims in their country's service, were, on the recommendation of the President, provided for by the National Legislature.

"Intelligence that the pacific overtures from the United States had been rejected by the Indians, did not arrive till September, 1793. It was then too late to prosecute the objects of the expedition. General Wayne advanced no farther than the ground on which St. Clair had been defeated. There he erected a Fort, to which he gave the name of *Recovery*."\*

In January, 1793, Colonel Hull was appointed, under the authority of the Government, a Commissioner, to make arrangements with the British Government, for a treaty with the Indians in the Western country, with whom the United States were then at war. His instructions were, to explain to Governor Simcoe, then Governor of Upper Canada, the manner in which the savages were supplied with the munitions of war, provisions and clothing, by the Agents of Indian Affairs, and the commanding officers of the British garrisons at Detroit, Michilimackinac, and other places conveniently situated for the purpose. He was likewise authorized to hold treaties with the

\* Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. III., page 58.

Indians, and inform them that the President of the United States would appoint Commissioners the next summer to meet them at Sandusky or any other convenient place, with full authority to settle all differences and to bury the hatchet. He was further directed to make arrangements with Governor Simcoe, that there should be no impediment in the passage of the Commissioners over Lakes Ontario and Erie, with the supplies for the treaty.

These preliminaries were necessary, as the British armed vessels commanded the waters and the posts on the borders of the Lakes, within the territories of the United States, which had not been surrendered.

On the arrival of Colonel Hull at the seat of Government in Upper Canada, he was received with marked attention and politeness. Every thing was done, both in a public and private manner, to express the respect that was entertained for the nation he represented.

After communicating the object of his mission, the Governor observed, that it gave him great pleasure to see him, and particularly to act with him in the business to which he had referred; and that he would do all in his power, for the accommodation of the American Commissioners, and the accomplishment of the treaty, according to the wishes of the Government of the United States. That so far from any impediment in their passage and in the transportation of the necessary supplies, he would furnish them with British vessels and boats, if desired. He further observed, that if his presence at the treaty

could be of any use, he would cheerfully attend the Commissioners, and make use of all his influence in the attainment of the object. Colonel Hull replied, that he was gratified with the favourable disposition expressed by the Governor, and thanked him for his kind offers in affording the aid of his influence in the treaty. That as to his attending with the Commissioners, he had no authority on the subject. That the Commissioners on their tour would probably call and pay their respects to him, when they would make such arrangements as their instructions should embrace. Colonel Hull then remarked, that truth and plain dealing were the safest as well as the wisest basis on which to rest a cause, and that, authorized by his Government, he should express the views held by it, in relation to the objects of his mission. That the Governor had promised more than was asked or even desired.

He then observed, that the President of the United States, from the necessity of the case, was obliged to make a request of the British Government in regard to a movement on his part, where our rights were unequivocally established. By the treaty of peace, the line ran through the centre of the Lakes, which gave our country an equal claim to the navigation of them. We had been for ten years deprived of this privilege. At the present moment, to possess it was essential to our success in carrying out the wishes of the Government, in meeting the proposition of the Indians, to hold a treaty at Sandusky. Lake Erie was the only channel of commu-

nication by water to that place, by which the necessary supplies could be forwarded. Colonel Hull was therefore instructed by his Government, to obtain a definite answer to the question, *whether there would be any impediment thrown in the way of the American Commissioners, treating with the Indians, while in the execution of their duty.* He was now happy to reflect, that a satisfactory reply had already been given by the Governor, and on which he should rely without further remark. With regard to the posts, it was not necessary to enter into any discussion, as a negotiation was then pending at the British Court, and it was hoped it would terminate in giving to our country peaceable possession of them. Colonel Hull continued to observe, that in justice to his Government, no motives of delicacy should operate in a full disclosure of facts, too well established to be withheld in his present communication. That it was generally understood, to enable the savages to carry on the war, they had been supplied, by Indian agents and commanding officers of the garrisons in the province where Governor Simcoe commanded, with small-arms, swords, hatchets, scalping-knives, powder, ball, clothing, provisions, and all other necessaries. Further, it was observed, that not only the old forts, guaranteed to us by the treaty of peace in 1783, had been held, but a new one had been erected on the Miami, far within our territory, and in a favourable situation to supply the Indians and aid them in their military operations. That it was known, that these

Indian agents and British officers were under his superintendence, and acted by his orders.

In reply to these plain statements of facts, Governor Simcoe remarked, that the British Government made annual presents to the Indians, in consideration of lands which they had ceded. That it furnished them with such articles as were most useful and necessary. As their principal support is derived from hunting, guns, powder and lead were most important. That the articles named, had only been furnished in the usual quantity, and for the purposes which he had stated.

It was answered, that whatever the *intention* was, when the articles were delivered, the *manner* in which they were used was well known. That it was a settled axiom of the laws of nations, that for a neutral to supply a belligerent with warlike stores, was a violation of neutrality. The British Government well knew that it was impossible for the Indians to carry on the war without its assistance; and the United States was well informed that this assistance was rendered, and was now the only impediment to peace.

Governor Simcoe then said, that Lord Dorchester was the Governor-general of all the British provinces in North America, and Commander-in-chief of the King's forces, and was likewise Superintendent-general of Indian affairs. That whatever had been done in the military or Indian departments, had been done by his orders. That he himself, in his own

province, was independent of those departments, and they acted by his authority. He concluded by remarking that he presumed the authority of Lord Dorchester had been exercised in a correct manner, and there could be no well-founded ground of complaint on the part of the United States.

The negotiation here terminated. The pledge received from the Governor, that it would afford him pleasure to extend accommodation to the United States to aid them in the prosecution of the treaty with the Indians, was deemed sufficient.

The events of the year were highly favourable to the condition of American affairs. The happy termination of the treaty with the British Government, so ably negotiated by Mr. Jay, by which the posts were surrendered, together with the complete victory over the Indians by General Wayne, gave permanent peace to our borders.

Governor Simcoe was a man of talent and enterprise. He had served as a partisan officer, during our Revolutionary war, and was highly distinguished. He had various plans for internal improvement; and looked to the extension of his province in their operation. He laid out a city in Upper Canada, to which he gave the name of London; intending to make it the seat of Government. He formed the project of a canal from Lake Ontario through a lake, to which he gave his own name, to unite with Huron. From all the information obtained, it appeared that his intentions were, to extend the boundaries of his province from Lake Erie to the upper branches of



the Alleghany river, and down that river and the Ohio, to the Mississippi, which was to form his western boundary.

One means of effecting this great object was, by retaining the posts and providing the means of continuing the war between the savages and the United States. This vast territory, being principally unsettled, he entertained the wild opinion, that the United States would be willing to abandon it, and give it in exchange for peace with the savages. The surrender of the posts, and peace with the Indians, destroyed these visionary schemes. He resigned his government and returned to England.\*

\* See Appendix, No. V.—Ex-tracts from a Journal of Colonel Hull, while a Commissioner to treat with the British, under Governor Simcoe, and also with the Indians.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

COLONEL HULL VISITS EUROPE.—ADDRESS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, JOHN ADAMS, AND HIS ANSWER, IN RELATION TO THE MILITIA OF THE COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX.

1798.

THE winter was passed by Colonel Hull in London, and the spring spent in France. In the latter country he witnessed the Legislative Assembly, and the Revolutionary Tribunals of that ill-fated country; visited its armies, and returned to America with a just pride in the superiority of his own country, in virtue, patriotism, and moderation.

Soon after his return, he was appointed by the Governor and Council, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, and elected by the third division, in the place of General Brooks, to whom he had been second in command many years, both in the Revolutionary army and in the militia.\* He was likewise elected Senator in the Legislature of Massachusetts. He was annually elected Senator, and continued in other public situations, until he voluntarily resigned

\* Biographical Notice of General Hull, by his son-in-law, Doctor Samuel Clarke. In 1787 he was appointed to the command of first brigade of this division. At that time he was active in exerting his influence in the promotion of the Federal Constitution. In 1789 he was chosen to succeed his fellow soldier, General Lincoln, commander of the "Ancient and Honourable Artillery."

them, on being appointed Governor of the Michigan Territory.

During this period, a strong party-spirit prevailed, and it was well understood that his political sentiments were not in accordance with the Government of the State.

In speaking of the third division, he writes: "I cannot, without doing injustice to my feelings, and to the officers and soldiers whom I for so many years had the honour to command, omit to express the strong attachment which to this moment I feel towards them, for their unceasing and laudable exertions to co-operate with me in every measure for their improvement in military discipline.

"The public records of our State, and the remembrance of many, now on the stage, will bear testimony to the elevated rank of this portion of our militia, its high state of discipline, and the applause it received.

"The division consisted of about six thousand men, with the requisite proportion of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Although the men were not furnished with uniforms by the Government, and there was no compulsion by law for their being thus equipped, yet every non-commissioned officer and soldier of the division appeared, at their own expense, in complete cloth uniform, and every way equipped for active service.

"The annual reviews were visited by the public officers of the State, and vast numbers of citizens, not only from every part of the Commonwealth, but from the neighbouring States.

“ The high commendation which both officers and soldiers received from the Commander-in-chief, and from all ranks and classes of their fellow-citizens, gratified their ambition and rewarded their exertions.

“ In this division, amidst the rage of parties, there was but one political sentiment: the defence of the country against any of its enemies, and the support of the Constitution under any administration chosen by the people. I considered it of the highest importance to inspire the officers and soldiers with these sentiments; and that military discipline without them, would be worse than useless. As an evidence of this fact, I will close these remarks by the following unanimous address of one brigade of the division, to the President of the United States, then being at his residence at Quincy, and that part of his answer which relates to the division. It must be observed that this took place when the political opinions of a large majority of the country to which the division belonged, were in direct opposition to those of President Adams.”

*To John Adams, President of the United States of America:—*

SIR—In reviewing the history of our country, and comparing it with the convulsed state of Europe, we find the strongest reasons to rejoice in the local destination assigned us by Providence. We feel a pride in the name and character of Americans. It is our glory to be the descendants of ancestors who purchased freedom and independence by their wisdom and valour; and some of whom, on this spot,\* ex-

\* Lexington, Massachusetts.

hibited to the world an example of the unconquerable spirit of freemen. May we be inspired with firmness to imitate their virtues, and maintain the inheritance purchased by their valour. It is impossible sufficiently to estimate the Government under which we live. It has been established by our consent, and administered by our choice. We ought to make it the polestar of our conduct, and it will prove the ark of our safety. It claims our reverence, and demands our support. With the keenest sensibility we feel the insults it has experienced, and as American soldiers, in the presence of our standard, we here solemnly declare, that we will ever be ready to be the guardians of its rights and the avengers of its wrongs.

And having sworn, when we accepted our commission, to defend the Constitution of the United States, we now, on this memorable ground, renew to you, sir, and our country, the sacred oath.

We offer to you, agreeably to act of Congress, our individual services, and pledge our lives and all that is dear to us, for the support of the Government and the defence of the Country.

That you may long live an ornament to the land which gave you birth, and a blessing to the world, is our sincere wish.

We are, in behalf of the officers of the first brigade and third division of the militia of Massachusetts,

Your most obedient servants,

WILLIAM HULL, *Major-General.*

J. WALKER, *Brigadier-General.*

Lexington, Massachusetts, October 2, 1798.

*To the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the Militia of Massachusetts:—*

GENTLEMEN—I have received from Major General Hull and Brigadier-General Walker, your unanimous address from Lexington, animated with a martial spirit, and expressed with a military dignity, becoming your character and the memorable plains on which it was adopted.

An address so animated, and from the officers commanding two thousand eight hundred men, composed of such substantial citizens as are able and willing, at their own expense, completely to arm and clothe themselves in handsome uniform, does honour to that division of the militia, which has done so much honour to their country.

While our country remains untainted with the principles and manners which are now producing desolation in so many parts of the world; while she continues sincere, and incapable of insidious and impious policy, we shall have the strongest reason to rejoice in the local destination assigned us by Providence. But should the people of America once become capable of that deep simulation towards one another, and towards foreign nations, which assumes the language of justice and moderation, while it is practising iniquity and extravagance, and displays in the most captivating manner the charming pictures of candour, frankness, and sincerity, while it is rioting in rapine and insolence, this country will be the most miserable habitation in the world. Because we have no government, armed with power, capable



of contending with human passions, unbridled by morality and religion.

Avarice, ambition, revenge and licentiousness would break the strongest cords of our Constitution, as a whale goes through a net. Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.

Oaths in this country are as yet universally considered as sacred obligations. That which you have taken, and so solemnly repeated on that venerable ground, is an ample pledge of your sincerity and devotion to your country and its government.

(Signed) JOHN ADAMS.

Quincy, 11th October, 1798.

In 1805, General Hull was appointed by Congress, Governor of the Michigan Territory. The term of service was for three years. He was re-appointed two successive terms by his Government to this office, the duties of which he performed.

## APPENDIX.

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### I.

*Colonel Hull's conversation with Governor Simcoe, respecting Washington's escape from Cornwallis, at Trenton, New Jersey.*

In the year 1793, I was employed by the Government of the United States, to hold treaties with the Indians, and at that time became acquainted with General Simcoe, who was Governor of the Province of Upper Canada. At his table, in the presence of a number of British officers, the subject of the Revolutionary War was introduced. General Simcoe was a Lieutenant-Colonel at the time referred to. He commanded a partisan corps, and was with Lord Cornwallis at Trenton. I stated the situation of the American army at that time; described the position we had taken, and our full expectation of being immediately attacked; that in such case, we had no alternative but to risk a general battle or retreat down the river to Burlington. If the latter had been adopted, the enemy being in the best possible situation for pursuit, it is probable that we should have been overtaken and forced into an engagement. On the other

hand, if we had been compelled to meet the enemy in a general battle in the first instance, the superiority of their numbers would have given them such advantages as almost to have insured a victory, which would have nearly annihilated our army.

The conversation seemed very interesting to the young British officers, who were present, and had not been actors in the scenes described, and in which both General Simcoe and myself were personally engaged. The feelings of the Governor were aroused by past recollections, and with much animation, rising from his chair, replied, that as soon as the American army retreated and took position on the south side of the Assanpink, and the British army came into possession of the principal part of the town, and the grounds on the north side of the creek, he inquired of Lord Cornwallis, whether it was not his intention immediately to make a general attack.

His Lordship answered, that he should not; that his troops were fatigued by a long march; that he wished to give them all the comforts he could that night, and should defer until morning any further operations.

Governor Simcoe remarked, that there was then more than an hour of daylight; that by crossing the creek high up on General Washington's right, he might force him to a general action, and the event would probably put a close to the war.

In answer to this, it was urged, that the American army could not pass the Delaware, and he should be sure of it in the morning.

Simcoe closed by remarking to Lord Cornwallis,

that in some way Washington would escape from him ; and that his only chance of a victory, was to make the attack that evening.

“Thus,” observed the Governor, “was lost an opportunity of putting an end to the war, in which case both countries would now have been happy, in forming one great and powerful nation.”

Governor Simcoe was an officer of high distinction in the British army. He was Governor of Upper Canada, and was afterwards appointed Governor-general in the East Indies. He died, when on the point of embarking for that important command.

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## II.

*Letter from the Honourable Horace Binney, of Philadelphia, to a daughter of General William Hull.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., January, 1835.

MY DEAR MADAM,—I need not dissemble the pleasure it would give me, if it were in my power to supply you with any facts, that would assist your father’s family in their contribution to the biographical work, of which you do me the favour to write. My boyish and youthful recollections of him are so agreeable, and my impressions at a later day so strong, of the injustice done to him, in a principal event of his life, that it will give me a very high degree of satisfaction, to see his actions and character described as I have always thought they deserved to be.

Personally, however, you will be aware, that I know little that can enter into such a work, when I bring to your recollection, that I removed from his vicinity upon leaving College, at the time when the great political parties of our country first took a decided shape, and that for several years, with occasional exceptions of a short visit to Watertown, I saw little of him, and thought much less of political movements and changes then in progress, than of acquiring the profession by which I was to live. It is possible, that on my return to Philadelphia, I may have my recollection refreshed by a recurrence to letters and other papers which I have there, and I will immediately communicate any thing which they may furnish.

There is one anecdote of his military life in the Revolution, which the late Dr. Rush told me at the time when the intelligence of the surrender of Detroit first reached our city, that I will give you, as soon as by reference to my papers it can be given with accuracy. It recorded an effort on his part, made under circumstances in which a generous mind alone would have thought of making it, to stem the current of prejudice, then setting against a gallant though unfortunate officer, the late General St. Clair, after the defeat of Ticonderoga.

You may perceive that Dr. Rush repeated it in sympathy with the then similar situation of your father.

I beg to be assured of the respect and friendship of, dear madam, yours truly,

HORACE BINNEY.

MRS. CAMPBELL.

*Honourable Horace Binney to a daughter of General Hull.*

PHILADELPHIA, April 10th, 1835.

MY DEAR MADAM,—It is with unfeigned regret that I do not find among my papers a memorandum of the anecdote communicated to me by Dr. Rush in regard to your father, General Hull; and without such a guide, I cannot so repeat it as to make it fit for introduction into an authentic account of his life. The substance was this:

Your father, I understood, was with General St. Clair at Ticonderoga. The evacuation of that post by General St. Clair, upon the approach of General Burgoyne, was the occasion of almost universal surprise to the country, and of bitter reproaches against General St. Clair. The feeling extended even to General Washington, as his letters now disclose, though his great prudence prevented him from imparting it to any, but persons worthy of confidence. The excitement, I learned from Dr. Rush, was greater than in the affair of Detroit.

It was as the army under St. Clair's command was retiring, that General Hull was seen, during a halt, writing a note or letter on the stump of a tree; and being asked by a friend upon what he was employed, he replied: "I am writing a paragraph for a newspaper, to arrest the progress of unfounded censure already begun, against a brave officer who has done his duty, and to whom the resources placed at his disposition by the country, and the character of the works he had to defend, left no alternative but to retire. I cannot be happy until I have contributed



my mite, to defend and save the honour of a brave and accomplished officer, who has been unable to do what his country wished, and thought without reason that he had the means of effecting.”

This was the substance of Dr. Rush's communication. It may be interesting to you to hear of it, as it was to me, particularly from the coincidence between your father's situation and that of General St. Clair, and the beauty of such an incident in the life of one who was doomed to experience the injustice which he laboured to avert from his commander.

I am, dear madam, your faithful friend,  
HORACE BINNEY.

MRS. CAMPBELL.

*Letter from the Honourable Horace Binney to a daughter of General William Hull.*

PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 27th, 1844.

MY DEAR MRS. CAMPBELL,—I have received your letter of the 23d February, and the newspaper containing Mr. Clarke's animadversions upon Mr. Rush's letter in favour of General Cass. Considering what the main topic of that letter is, it is quite a coincidence, to recall to me the anecdote I had from his father. I recollect it more vividly than if it had been told me a year ago.

I give you free permission to use the extracts from my two letters of January and April, 1835. It appears to be extracted from one only, and not having kept copies, I am unable to inform myself.

With Mrs. Binney's regards, and my compli-

ments to Mr. Campbell, I remain, my dear Mrs. Campbell, very respectfully and sincerely, yours,

HOR. BINNEY.

MRS. MARIA CAMPBELL.

From the Connecticut Courant (Hartford), July 28, 1777.

*Extract of a letter from an officer of distinction in the Northern Army, dated July 17, 1777, at Moses' Creek (about four miles from Fort Edward, on the Hudson, fifty miles north of Albany).*

“The retreat from Ticonderoga will be a matter of speculation in the country, and the accounts different and confused. A true state of facts will, therefore, be very satisfactory, without doubt.

“We were deceived with respect to the strength of the enemy and our own reinforcements: the enemy have practised a piece of finesse which has too well answered their purpose; they have so conducted, that all hands in the United States believed they had drawn their forces from Canada to the southward, and designed only to garrison their posts in the northern world. The consequence of this belief has been, the ordering of eight regiments, destined for Ticonderoga and its environs, to Peekskill; and little attention has been paid to this department. The enemy's condition in Canada has been represented as miserable, confused, scattered, and sickly. This has been the general opinion in camp and country, and our situation has been thought perfectly safe. Our force consisted of about 4000, including the corps of artillery and artificers, who were not armed; a considerable part of which were militia. We could bring about 3000 fit for duty into the field.

“ General Burgoyne came against us with about 8000 healthy, spirited troops ; with a lake force, consisting of three fifty-gun ships ; a thunderer, mounting eighteen brass twenty-four pounders, two thirteen-inch mortars, a number of howitzers, several sloops, gun-boats, &c. Their strength being so very superior to ours, obliged us to tamely sit still, and see them erect batteries all around us, without hazarding a sally. Two batteries were erected in front of our lines, on higher ground than ours. Within half a mile on our left, they had taken post, on a very high hill, overlooking all our works. Our right would have been commanded by their shipping and batteries they had erected on the other side of the lake, so that our lines at Ticonderoga would have been of no service, and we must have inevitably abandoned them in a few days, after their batteries opened, which would have been the next morning. We then should have been necessitated to retire to Fort Independence, the consequence of which, I conceive, would have been much worse than the mode adopted ; for, the moment we had left Ticonderoga, they could sail their shipping by us, and prevent our communication with Skeensborough ; then the only avenue to and from Fort Independence would have been by a narrow neck of land, leading from the Mount to the Grants. To this neck, they had almost cut a road ; a day more would have completed it. A few troops stationed at Ticonderoga would have prevented our communication with Lake George, as our own works would have been against us. Their shipping would have destroyed our connexion with Skeensborough,

and their main body might have been placed on this neck of land, which, by a few works might have prevented all supplies and reinforcements. We might have staid at the Mount as long as our provisions would have supported us. We had flour for thirty days, and meat sufficient only for a week. Under these circumstances, General St. Clair on the 6th instant called a council of war, and an evacuation was unanimously agreed upon, as the only means of saving the army from captivity. It was necessary, also, that our retreat should be precipitate, as the communication was almost cut off, and they would soon be apprised of our design. It was therefore determined to send the baggage and sick in boats to Skeensborough, and for the army to march by land from the Mount to Skeensborough, being forty miles. At the dawn of day we left Fort Independence, and I cannot say the march was conducted with the greatest regularity.

“The front, which was the main body, marched thirty miles to a place called Castle-town, about twelve miles from Skeensborough; the militia halted three miles in rear of the front; and the rear-guard, commanded by Colonel Francis, being joined by Colonels Warner and Hale, halted at Hubbart-town, about a mile and a half in rear of the militia. As the march was severe, the feeble of the army had fallen in the rear, and tarried at Hubbart-town with the rear-guard. This body in the rear might consist of near a thousand men. Before I proceed farther, it may be necessary to give you the enemy's dispositions, after they were advised of our retreat. A large

body, at least two thousand, were detached, to pursue our main body and harass our rear. All the gun-boats and some of the shipping, were sent after our baggage, and came up with it at Skeensborough and took it. The ninth regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hills, was ordered to run down South Bay, and land and march a by-road to Fort Ann, and take that before our troops could reach it. The remainder of the army went on to Skeensborough, except a garrison at Ticonderoga. The body of the enemy sent to harass our rear, came up with it the next morning at Hubbart-town, which was commanded by Colonel Warner. By the exertions of the officers, our little army formed and gave them battle, which continued about twenty-five minutes, very severe, when our party were overpowered with numbers, and gave way. The loss on both sides was considerable; as our people took the woods and are daily coming in, it is impossible to ascertain our loss. Colonel Francis, a worthy and brave officer, after signaling himself, was shot through and expired instantly. Colonel Hale is missing. It is natural to ask, Why was not Colonel Warner reinforced? Let me tell you. Orders were sent to Colonel \* \* \* \* \* who commanded the militia, to go to the assistance of the rear-guard, but before they arrived the action was over and our people dispersed. Our main body being now twelve miles from Skeensborough, and hearing that a large body of the enemy had arrived there, and knowing that a large body was in our rear, the General imagined, if we pursued our route, that we must engage both in front and rear, under

great disadvantage ; and to pursue his plan in first retreating, which was to save the army, he thought it prudent to file off to the left, and before we reached Hudson river, we marched 150 miles. In this march we picked up about thirty prisoners, part British, part Waldeckers, and part Canadians. The party of our men who were at Skeensborough, retreated to Fort Ann. They were twice attacked by the ninth regiment, and both times repulsed them. They took a Captain Montgomery and a Doctor, and would probably have taken the whole regiment, had their ammunition held out. This is a candid state of facts, and for this conduct we are told our country calls us either knaves or cowards. I conceive they ought to be grateful to our General ; for had we staid, we very certainly should have been taken ; and then no troops to have stood between the enemy and the country. Our affairs now are not desperate in this quarter, as they certainly would have been. We have destroyed Fort George and its appendages, and shall soon be able, I hope, to make head against our enemies, as we are gathering strength and re-collecting ourselves.”

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### III.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PEEKSKILL, March 11, 1779.

SIR—I received last night a letter of yours, without date. It is my intention, when Lieutenant-Colonel Burr leaves the lines, you are to command,



and to remain there as long as the duties of your office of Inspector will permit, with all the power with which Colonel Burr was invested. These I wish you to exercise in their full extent. Previous to his leaving you, I beg him and you to digest in order all those directions I gave him, and what has appeared to him necessary to answer the objects of his command, which I desire may be observed by you, till I can revise them, if that should be found necessary.

I am, sir, your humble servant,

ALEX. McDOUGALL.

To MAJOR HULL, at the Lines.

*“Warrant to Major Hull, commanding on the Lines.*

“Whereas a certain act of the People, Senate and Assembly of the State of New-York, entitled An Act for the regulating Impresses of Teams, &c., in the said State, passed the second of April in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-nine, cannot be put in execution on and along the American lines in the County of West Chester, through the inability of the civil officers to execute the same; and whereas also the public service does require immediately, that a number of Teams be employed on and along the Lines aforesaid, and the impossibility of obtaining the Impressure of Teams as aforesaid, pursuant to the said Law is Impracticable. These are therefore to authorize and Impower you to Impress so many Teams from Time to Time as the Publick shall demand of and from Disaffected Persons, if so many Teams can be pro-

cured from them, otherwise from the other Inhabitants also (they being also to be included) as far North, on an East and West Line, as to the North Castle Church. And you are to give the Owner or Owners of such Teams a Certificate, specifying the Time of Service, and to direct him or them to call for the Discharge of the same. You are to see that the Owners and Teams be well used, and to make the Service as easy as possibly you can, by calling for the Teams on the owners in rotation. Given under my Hand and Seal this Twenty-Eighth day of March, In the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-nine. Done at Head-Quarters, Peekskill.

“ALEX. McDUGALL, M. General.

“To MAJOR HULL, or the Officer commanding on the Lines }  
in the County of West Chester, for the time being.” }

*General McDougall's Reply to Major Hull, in reference to the subject of Justice Sherwood's letter respecting impressment, &c.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, PEEKSKILL, April 13, 1779.

SIR—When I wrote you on yesterday, your favour of the 7th was overlooked in my drawers.

I approve your conduct in ordering the horses stolen to be returned to the well affected, on salvage. This will endear the army to the distressed inhabitants.

As to your intended position, I own I am not clear on its expediency, especially if the troops on your left do not advance. If a superior force to your command should surround the houses of your advanced pickets, they will be lost. However, if your intelligence is *good* and *frequent*, I have no objection

to your taking it. In a little time you can change your position so frequent in barns, that it will be extremely difficult, with alertness, for the enemy to surprise you, or any of your parties.

The Carolina Infantry I intended to relieve. One of Nixon's parties, and one from Poor's is ordered to-day to relieve the other from that brigade. These reliefs are designed to facilitate a review of Nixon's brigade, so that I desire every officer and man from it may be sent up, when Poor's detachment reaches you. I shall do every thing in my power for the exchange of the citizens in the hands of the enemy.

I am, in haste, your humble servant,

ALEX. McDOUGALL.

To Major HULL, Commanding on the Lines.

WEST POINT, April 19, 1779.

DEAR SIR—I received your favour enclosing some York papers, for which I return you my hearty thanks. Agreeable to General McDougall's order, received last evening, send you Captain Drew, who I think is an officer calculated for an advanced corps. Also send a sub. from General Patterson's brigade, to relieve Lieutenant Morton, of the first Massachusetts regiment, as the company he belongs to is destitute of an officer. Colonel Bailey desires that Lieutenant Haywood would stay for the present, there being now an officer to that company.

Your transmitting to this garrison the York papers when there is an opportunity, will much oblige, sir,

Your humble servant,

L. BAILEY.

Major HULL, Commanding on the Lines.

WEST CHESTER COUNTY, }  
 SING SING, April 28th, 1779. }

Agreeable to the law and acts of the Legislature, in the State of New-York, for the impressment of any teams, horses, carriages, or drivers, are not to be made on any pretence whatever, without the leave of the law of this State; and as perpetual complaints are made from time to time, of unlawful taking of teams and horses, contrary to the law, I do therefore desire these or such unlawful practices may be stopped; and as they have an evil tendency to subverting good order, I am in the next place to desire, that your Honour will be pleased for to return the horses taken from Jacob Rider and Robert McCord; I ask this on account that these horses and teams of Rider and McCord have served at the bridge and in carting forage to that part of the army, and as the season of the year is come that something must be carried on in the field, and the team of McCord is taken from the plough, and the team of Rider, to my knowledge, was going to Fishkill for to carry something to his son, and inasmuch as these teams have not been granted at any time from the service, I ask the return of these horses, and desire for the future your Honour will be pleased to take the steps of the law, whenever there shall be occasion for an impress of horses, teams, or drivers, which will afford the same supplies and stop the clamour of the people, and create good order and do honour to ourselves and country.

I am, sir, in all respects,

Your very humble servant,

SOLOMON SHERWOOD, Esq.

*Justice of the Peace.*

To Major HULL, on the Lines.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PEEKSKILL, Feb. 29, 1779.

SIR—Your three favours of the 27th inst., and one of 28th, have been received. I am sorry to hear of Dykeman's illness—hope he will soon recover. I approve your plan of altering your position in the manner you mention on the 27th. You need not send up the express every day, unless you have advices of the enemy's movement, either by land or by water, on the river, or some very important intelligence. Colonel Greaton's regiment will be sent down to cover your left as soon as it can be got ready. In the mean time, cover the country as well as you can. Your letter to the Commander-in-chief shall be forwarded with the other papers.

Your humble servant,

ALEX. McDOUGALL.

Major HULL, Commanding on the Lines.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PEEKSKILL, April 30, 1779.

SIR—Colonel Greaton's regiment will march from Crompond to-morrow, for the Purchase. I wish you to consult and arrange with the commanding officer as to the best mode of covering the country. Let him have half of your guides and horsemen, best acquainted in that quarter. That regiment, or any other which may relieve it, is to retire by forced marches to these posts, whenever the commanding officer shall *be advised from you*, of the enemy appearing in force on the North river. You will therefore please to give him information when that event happens.

When Colonel Lorin is settled and fixed in his position, send up the detachment from Poor's brigade, as they are to march from hence the eighth of next

month. I have directed Colonel Bailey to send you as many of the light infantry as can be well shod, to relieve the like number of Patterson's and Learned's with you.

I am, sir, your humble servant,

ALEX. McDOUGALL.

MAJOR HULL, Commanding on the Lines.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PEEKSKILL, May 22, 1779.

SIR—I duly received your two favours of yesterday. I think it very probable the enemy intend an attack on your parties, or a movement out in pursuit of stock. If it is the former, he will make a disposition to attack both, at the same time, and at night or very early in the morning. I wish you, therefore, to advise Major Oliver of the enemy's movements, and desire him to be very alert. I need not repeat the necessity of having things in train for a quick movement. If the enemy move in such force, as that you have reason to conclude he has a greater object in view than that I have mentioned, it will therefore be expedient that the whole command on the lines, except the militia parties, retire in such manner as will give the enemy every prudent opposition in the route to join their corps. The inhabitants should be advised of the position of the enemy, to be prepared to remove their cattle. When the enemy is in motion, drop a line of advice, if you can, to General Nixon, and keep me advised every day, till further orders.

I am, sir, your humble servant,

ALEX. McDOUGALL.

MAJOR HULL, Commanding on the Lines.



*Letter from John Nixon, B. G., to Major Hull, Commanding on the Lines.*

COLLABURG, May 22, 1779.

DEAR SIR—I received your favour of last evening at nine o'clock, in which you inform me of the approach of the enemy as far as Courtlands. I immediately forwarded your letter to General McDougall. Should be glad you would let me know by bearer, whether the enemy has advanced any further since you wrote me last evening, and if they have, which road, and in what direction.

I have the honour to be, with the truest esteem,  
Sir, your very humble servant,

JOHN NIXON, B. G.

MAJOR HULL, Commanding on the Lines.

#### IV.

RELATIVE TO THE ASSAULT ON MORRISSANIA.

*Extract of a letter from Mrs. Hull to one of her daughters.*

NEWTON, Massachusetts, April 12, 1822.

“We have been reading the *Spy*, with a good deal of interest. It brought to your father's recollection the days of yore. The scenes were laid on ground he had often travelled over; and that part of the book in relation to the *Skinnners*, is no fiction. Your father has no recollection of the families the author mentions, although he knew almost every individual in that part of the country, for twenty or thirty miles around. He commanded on the lines, be

tween our army and the British, for three winters; and a hard time he had of it, he says; for he made it his constant rule, never to take off his clothes at night, but merely to lay down and take a nap, and be called at one o'clock, and mount his horse and reconnoitre the country till morning.

“The author begins his history in 1781. It was an interesting year—it was the year we were married. Your father applied to General Washington for leave of absence: the General replied, it was necessary for a scouring party to go down to West Chester; and as *he* had been there, and was acquainted with the grounds, he wished *him* to go; after that, he would give him leave of absence till the opening of the spring campaign. Previous to this, he wrote me that he should be here early in January. I, not knowing of the secret expedition, nor hearing a word from him, a long month passed, in wonder to me, you may well think; but after he had scoured the grounds around West Chester, and brought off *old Tillo* (whose history you have heard long ago); he came, and we were married. I returned with him to the army. There I met Dr. Thomas, a surgeon of the regiment. He congratulated me on my arrival, and gave me the history of the engagement at Morrissania, which was a pretty warm one, he said. He was on the top of a hill, where he had a full view of the manœuvres; and his whole thoughts were on me; and knowing that I hourly expected your father, and what I expected him for, he trembled at what might be the events of this day.

“The closing scene of the history was affecting

to us ; it ended in Lundy's Lane, where your unfortunate brother was killed.\* Thus, beginning on the ground where your father fought, and ending where your brother fell."

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## V.

### TOUR TO UPPER CANADA.

*Extracts from a Journal of Colonel Hull, while Commissioner to treat with the British and hold Treaties with the Indians.*

January 27, 1794. This day I rode through the Oneida country. Here is a large Indian settlement, with an extensive tract of land for their use. They are perfectly civil and well disposed towards the United States. They form a part of the Six Nations. They have a mill near their castle, and a blacksmith, who is paid by the United States; a schoolmaster, who constantly instructs the children, and a clergyman, who officiates among them. God grant, that the avarice of this country may never disturb these native proprietors, but that they may long live to enjoy their innocent customs, be enlightened, and made respectable and happy.

At night arrived at Canandaigua. General Chapin, the Superintendent of Indian affairs, resides here. I was invited to attend a Council of about thirty Seneca chiefs and warriors. At ten in the

\* Captain Abraham Fuller Hull was killed in the battle of Lundy's Lane, in the war of 1812.

morning, the council fire being built, the chiefs and warriors were paraded in the most solemn order. One of the chiefs arose and made a long speech, with a belt of wampum in his hand, to which he referred, while speaking.

This belt, over which he had studied his matter, now aided to remind him of the thoughts he wished to communicate. General Chapin made a short reply, informed them who I was, and the nature of my business to Niagara; which was, he said, to make arrangements for a general peace with the hostile Indians.

I then made a speech to them, to which they replied in a handsome and very interesting manner. They seemed much pleased, especially when I informed them that I should leave a sum of money to be applied to their entertainment.

*January 28.* To-day I passed through a country but thinly settled; a poor looking building perhaps in ten or fifteen miles met the eye. Excellent land, and will no doubt become a most important part of America. At evening arrived at a small house on the banks of the Cayuga Lake.

Here I met Colonel Seth Reed and his son, who reside at Geneva, about fifteen miles from this place. I had dismissed my sleigh and horses procured at Schenectady, and was about engaging another, when Colonel Reed, without any solicitation on my part, offered me his sleigh and horses, and his son to attend me to Niagara. I accepted the offer.

About twelve o'clock I commenced my journey to the Geneva river; accompanied by Colonel Taylor

and Mr. Reed. Here we had arrived to the extent of our settlements, and between this and Niagara is only a small foot-path, and two Indian settlements, the Tonawantas and the Tuscaroras.

*February 1.* This morning Colonel Taylor, Mr. Reed and myself, mounted our horses and rode about eight miles over an entire flat country. On this flat, near the river, is a small Indian settlement. We fully expected to have slept in the woods this night. After riding twenty miles without making a stop, we arrived at a good fire, which the Indians had only just left. Here we refreshed ourselves for about fifteen minutes. We then proceeded on through the little path, which was very deep and miry. Night overtook us about four miles from Tonawanta. I was inclined to stop, but my companions thought best to proceed to the village. About eight o'clock we arrived at the river opposite to the village. It was frozen about half over, and quite deep. We called, and an Indian soon came to the opposite bank. He could not speak English, and we could understand nothing he said. We finally broke away the ice and plunged in with our horses. The water was up to the saddles. The Indian guided us to his wigwam. It was not long before a great many of the Indians assembled. I spoke to them in the most friendly terms possible, and continued to speak until exhausted by fatigue, I fell asleep, and did not awake until daylight. In this wigwam there were as many as fifty bushels of corn, and a considerable quantity of wild meat. The corn was hung upon poles, and the meat upon strings. Before I left, I gave them money

enough to make the whole village happy. I told them to drink the health of Honontagalios, the Indian name of General Washington. I told them we were going to make peace with all the nations, and that they must not suffer any of their warriors to join the hostile nations. They appeared to be very happy and very thankful.

“*Feb. 2.*—At sunrise began our journey; took some of these Indians as our guides, and in the evening arrived at the Tuscarora village, ten miles from Niagara. Here the Indians assembled to meet me. I had a talk with them, and said every thing in my power to convince them of the friendship of the United States.

“I told them we wished for peace, and should have it; and they must not suffer their people to join the nations who were carrying on war with the United States. I urged upon them the importance of all the chiefs going to the Sandusky Treaty. When I took leave, I gave them money, and told them to drink the health of their Father and friend, General Washington.”

Colonel Hull gives a description of the Falls of Niagara; of his reception by Governor Simcoe; of the company assembled to meet him; of the rare accomplishments of Mrs. Simcoe; her exquisite drawings; her maps like copper-plate. He says:

“Indeed, she sustains a most excellent character, and the Governor seems to be the idol of the people.” After dinner, Colonel Hull retired with the Governor, to converse on the subject of his mission.

He continues: “On my account the Governor



ordered supper in his canvas-house, which he brought from Europe. It was joined to his dwelling-house. It is a room twenty-two feet by fifteen, with a floor, windows, and doors, and warmed with a stove. It is papered and painted, and you would suppose you were in a common house. The floor is the case for the whole of the room. It is quite a curiosity. About eleven o'clock I was conducted to my chamber. Perceiving me so much pleased with the canvas-house, the Governor ordered breakfast in it. After breakfast, I had another long conversation with him respecting the business of my mission."

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812,

AND

SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT.



# HISTORY

OF THE

CAMPAIGN OF 1812,

AND

SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT.

BY

JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE.

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## P R E F A C E .

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THE preceding portion of this volume contains the history of General Hull's Revolutionary services and civil life from 1775 to 1805. This, which was mostly written by himself, was prepared for the press by his daughter, Mrs. MARIA CAMPBELL, wife of EDWARD F. CAMPBELL, Esq., of Augusta, Georgia. It was a favourite and cherished object of this lady to erect this monument to the memory of her father, and her life was spared by a kind Providence just long enough to enable her to complete it. Amid painful sickness and the languor of disease, she laboured diligently until it was finished. This labour of love seemed to sustain her failing strength, and when she reached its termination she could say, "Lord, let me now depart," and the daughter passed into the spirit-land, to meet the parent whom she had so tenderly loved.

But another labour yet remains to be performed. Mrs. Campbell did not attempt the history of the Campaign of 1812, and Surrender of Detroit; for though well qualified to write it, from an acquaintance with all the facts and arguments which justify, to any unprejudiced mind, the surrender of Detroit;



and though deeply convinced that her father deserved praise, and not blame, for his share in this transaction, yet she shrank from a work which she feared might involve her in angry controversy, and prevent the simple narration of her father's Revolutionary labours from being appreciated. She left to another hand, and another time, this part of the work.

Still it has been thought best that the account of General Hull's Revolutionary services should be accompanied with at least a brief statement of the facts and reasons which refute the charges so long ignorantly brought against the memory of this much injured servant of his country.

This task has been committed to the present writer, who, with no qualifications except a strong conviction of the justice of the cause he advocates, founded on careful study and examination, joined with an earnest wish to be candid and conscientious, has undertaken the work. He is indeed about to defend a grandfather, and one whom he remembers with mingled feelings of affection and respect. From his earliest childhood he recalls the image of a venerable white-haired old man, living in the midst of his children and grandchildren; employing in the peaceful pursuit of agriculture the last years of a life, the first part of which had been spent in public employment and honours. All outward disgraces seemed to have fallen upon his head, yet all were borne with cheerful equanimity. A soldier, he had been branded as a coward; a patriot, he was esteemed a traitor; loving the approbation of his fellow-men, he was an

object of universal censure ; naturally fond of public life, and ambitious of public usefulness, he was under a sentence of irrevocable ostracism. But how cheerful, how happy were these declining years of his life. Happy in his affections, in the love of relatives, in the esteem of wise friends, in the inward consciousness of having done right, to him it might be said,

“Thou hast been  
As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing,  
A man that fortune's buffets and rewards  
Hast taken with equal thanks.”

No peevishness, no complaint, no querulous reference to a nation's ingratitude, ever fell from his lips. Remembering this, I cannot but feel a strong desire to do full justice to his cause, yet I feel also, that if his spirit could now communicate to me his wishes, he would charge me to use no art but that of truth, not to overstate his side of the question, nor to understate that of his opponents ; to extenuate nothing, and set down nothing in malice. And I shall endeavour to conform to this rule and write in this spirit. I will not, if it can be avoided, use a harsh word, even toward those from whom he has received the most cruel injuries. He has gone where nothing can touch him further. His enemies still live and are in pursuit of public honours, and are liable to be injured by the exposure of their past errors. But this injury, I have no desire to inflict, except where it becomes necessary to defend General Hull's memory, by stating the simple truth.

After the Court Martial in 1814 had closed, General Hull returned to his farm in Newton, which he

had inherited through his wife, and there passed the last years of his life in the pursuits of agriculture. While the public, misguided by false rumours, was accusing him of having sold his country for "British gold," of having built a splendid palace, and having married his daughter to General Brock;\* he, with difficulty, supported his family by farming. In removing to Detroit, he had expended much of the small property he had previously accumulated. He had also paid out money of his own, for his army, while on its march, which was never repaid him, because the vouchers had been destroyed in the destruction of the Adams, when she was burnt by Capt. Elliott. But his active mind devoted itself to experiments in practical agriculture, many of which he communicated to the magazines devoted to that science. So passed his years until the time arrived when the clouds which rested on his fame, were partially dispersed, and his setting sun shone forth for a brief space in a serene sky.

In the year 1824, General Hull published a series of letters in defence of his conduct during the campaign of 1812. These letters, first printed in the "American Statesman," a Boston newspaper, and copied into many other papers, of both political parties, and afterwards reprinted in a collected form, exercised great influence on the public mind, wherever they were read. The North American Review, in a notice of these letters, understood to have been written by Jared Sparks, said, "that from the public

\* Such reports have been widely circulated.

documents collected and published in them, the conclusion must unequivocally be drawn, that General Hull was required by the Government to do, what it was morally and physically impossible that he should do."\* Many other periodicals throughout the Union expressed the same opinion.

A public dinner was given in Boston to General Hull, by citizens of both political parties. He also received very gratifying letters from various quarters, particularly from old companions of the Revolutionary army, expressing their pleasure at his having vindicated so completely his conduct and his character.†

General Hull did not live long after these events. He, however, had the pleasure of meeting Lafayette, in 1825, who paid him a visit, when in Boston during that year. He was present at the celebration of the Battle of Bunker Hill, and afterwards visited his mother in his native town of Derby, in Connecticut, the citizens of which gave him a public dinner. Returning home, he was attacked by a disease which soon proved mortal. On his death-bed he declared, in the most solemn manner, his conviction that he had done right in surrendering Detroit, and expressed his happiness that he had thus saved the lives of the peaceful citizens of Michigan from being needlessly sacrificed. He died in Nov. 1825, in the 73d year of his age.

It was not, however, to be expected, that a prejudice so deeply rooted and widely spread, as that which held General Hull to be a coward or a traitor,

\* See Appendix, Note 1.

† See Appendix for some of these letters.

would be immediately overcome. Men love their prejudices too well—they hug them to their hearts, as their dearest treasures. General Hull had been made the scape-goat for the sins committed by the Administration and war party, in precipitating hostilities before the country was prepared for them, and for the faults of those who ought to have aided him, and co-operated with him. To admit that General Hull was an injured man, was, with many persons, to admit that they themselves had committed great errors or faults. Few are capable of a magnanimity like this. Accordingly the old charges continue to be repeated in various shapes, though all respectable writers have abandoned the worst accusations. Few are yet able to rise to the platform of impartial history, and say with Mr. Sparks, that under the circumstances in which General Hull was placed, there was no possibility of his effecting what was required of him. Yet we find now a very general admission, that others were, at least, as much to blame as he, for the failure of the Canada campaign.

Thus General Armstrong, one of the most bitter and vindictive assailants of the character of General Hull, is obliged to admit, that the Administration was in error, in not acquiring previous knowledge of the forces to be encountered in Canada ; in not recalling the garrisons of the remote and indefensible posts ; in not transmitting to General Hull information of the declaration of war, until long after the British in Canada had knowledge of it ; in not following General Hull's repeated and urgent suggestions, that a fleet

be constructed on Lake Erie and a large co-operating force assembled at Niagara ; and finally, in not furnishing a sufficient number of troops to General Hull, to accomplish the objects of his expedition.\*

Recent writers, therefore, who have written on the history of the last war, or had occasion to refer to its events, while they have been obliged to admit that the main cause of the failure of the invasion of Canada and the surrender of Detroit, was to be found in the unprepared state of the country, the errors of the Administration, and the absence of an American fleet on Lake Erie, have nevertheless continued to accuse General Hull of military faults, in a greater or less degree. Some ignorantly repeat the sweeping and contradictory charges of treason and cowardice. One writer speaks of "the surrender of a large force with the important post of Detroit by General Hull, *under circumstances which made it almost certain, that he had been purchased by the British.*"†—This sentence is in a biography published only four years ago, when the writer possessed every opportunity of knowing that there was not the shadow of evidence to be found in support of such an accusation. Loose charges of this kind are so often made, that they have their effect on public opinion. The errors of one writer are copied by another, and

\* Armstrong's "Notices of the War of 1812," Vol. I., pp. 46-51: "Had the Government invited Governor Shelby of Kentucky or Governor Meigs of Ohio, to follow in Hull's track, with two thousand gun-men and Winchester's Brigade

of Infantry, how different would have been the issue of the campaign!"

† From a Memoir of Henry Clay, prefixed to Clay's Life and Speeches. Greeley & McElrath, 1843, p. 71.



even the writers of history, instead of recurring to the original sources, are accustomed to repeat, without examination, what is asserted by previous writers of no authority. It is to be hoped that the present work will correct some of these popular impressions. The sources from which I derive the facts and statements herein contained, are as follows :

Certified copies of public documents, referring to the campaign of 1812, from the office of the Adjutant-General at Washington. Forbes' Report of the Trial of General Hull, by a Court Martial at Albany, containing the testimony of the witnesses on that trial. Hull's Memoirs of the Campaign of the Northwestern Army, collected and published, Boston, 1824. Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, London, 1845. Dawson's Life of Harrison. Lanman's History of Michigan. Histories of the War of 1812, by McAfee, Ingersoll, James, &c. Christie's War in Canada. Armstrong's Notices. Private papers, files of letters, &c., left by General Hull, and referring to his administration while Governor of the Territory of Michigan.

The Appendix will contain some documents and letters, illustrating the history of the campaign of 1812.

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# HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812,

AND

## SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT.

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### CHAPTER I.

WILLIAM HULL APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN.—EVENTS OF HIS ADMINISTRATIONS.—INDIAN SETTLEMENTS IN MICHIGAN.—TREATIES WITH THE INDIANS.—TROUBLES.

IN 1805, March 22d, William Hull received from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, the appointment of Governor of Michigan, which had been erected into a separate territory by Act of Congress, January 11th, of the same year. The Legislative power of the territory was vested in the Governor and Judges, who were authorized to adopt and publish its laws from the codes of the original States. William Hull was also appointed Indian Agent, an office which was then connected with that of Executive Magistrate.

The duties of Indian Agent were not the least considerable of those belonging to the office of Governor. The white inhabitants of Michigan, collec-

tively, amounted six years after this time to only 4860 persons ; four-fifths of whom were French, and the remainder Americans, with a few British. But the Indian settlements within the territory were numerous. They consisted of the Pottawatamies, who inhabited the upper branches of the river Raisin, Huron, &c. ; the Miamis, Wyandots,\* Chippewas, Winnebagoes, Ottawas, and others, whose villages were scattered through the region between the present States of Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan, and within the peninsula itself. These were the tribes who were afterwards united with Tecumseh and the Prophet against the United States, and as allies of England, as they had formerly been united under Pontiac against the English and as allies of France. They felt that the people of the United States were their natural enemies because their lands were perpetually encroached upon by them. Just so they had before felt that the English were their enemies, so long as it was from the English that they apprehended the loss of their lands. General Hull, as Indian Agent, had in view two objects, which he communicated to the President, in letters to General Dearborn, Secretary at War, dated January 10th and 17th, 1806.† ✓

The first object was, to extinguish gradually and regularly the Indian title ; the second, to instruct the tribes in farming and the mechanic arts. At this time the Indian title in Michigan had been extinguished only in the following tracts :

\* Most of the Wyandots were on the Upper and Lower Sandusky. † Copies from General Hull's private papers, in possession of the writer.

First, at the post of Detroit, and a district adjacent, bounded north by Lake St. Clair, south by the river Raisin, and west by a line six miles distant from Detroit river.

Secondly, the post of Michilimackinac, (now Mackinaw,) and the island itself, and the mainland adjacent, extending six miles on Lake Huron, and three miles back, and the island De Blois Blanc.

The Indian title was also extinguished in north-western Ohio, at the Rapids, and at the mouth of the Maumee, and on Sandusky bay.

Thus it will be seen, that except a strip of land, all of Michigan was in possession of the Indians. Meantime American settlers were anxious to come in. Governor Hull, therefore, was strongly desirous of making some satisfactory treaties with the Indians. He says, in his communication of January 14th, 1806:

“ I should think it would be expedient to purchase all the land in the territory, south of a line drawn due west from the most westerly point of Saganaw bay to Lake Michigan. In that case, probably some small reservations for the Indians might be necessary; one probably on the river St. Joseph, which empties itself into the southerly part of Lake Michigan, where many of the Pottawatamies now reside, one on the upper branches of the river Huron, which empties into Lake St. Clair, and one on the Saganaw river, which falls into Saganaw bay.” He goes on to mention other reservations, and adds, that “ the Pottawatamies and Chippewas are the proprietors of the country. Some of the other tribes, probably by com-



pact or understanding among them, may consider themselves as having other rights, by which they may claim some part of the compensation, and consequently it may be necessary to make them parties to the treaty."\* ✓

Pursuing this plan, in 1807 Governor Hull entered into a treaty, at Detroit, with the Ottawa, Chippewa, Pottawatamie, and Wyandot tribes, by which they ceded to the United States an extensive territory on the southeastern side of Michigan, bounded south by the river and bay of Miami; west by a line running north and south, through the middle of the territory, nearly as far north as Saganaw bay, and north by a line running from this point to White Rock in Lake Huron. In payment for this land, annuities were given to several tribes.†

This cession was not accomplished, however, without difficulty and opposition. Among Governor Hull's papers, is a letter dated June 10th, 1807, from Captain Dunham, commanding at Michilimackinac, in which he speaks as follows: "Immediately on the receipt of your Excellency's favour of April 29th, I summoned together the chiefs of the Chippewa and Ottawa tribes, and laid before them the subject of your letter, respecting the council or treaty to be held at Detroit. They decided instantly and unanimously *not to attend the council*, nor to have any thing to do with alienating their lands. They say 'our brethren

\* Copy of a letter to Hon. H. Dearborn, Secretary at War, dated January 14, 1805.—*Hull's papers*.

† Lanman's History of Michigan, page 183.

below are forgetting their children ; if they are fools enough to throw away their hunting grounds, let them do it ; we, however, in this quarter, will do no such thing—and we hope, my brother, that you will not think of taking away one hand's breadth of our lands, for we have not so much to spare.' In short, they appear to be much alarmed on the subject, and indicate a disposition by no means friendly. I believe they have been tampered with, and I suspect some unauthorized individuals of a neighbouring nation are endeavouring to throw obstacles in the way of the intended treaty." \*

This last suspicion was quite unnecessary, though perhaps natural. It needed no suggestion from the French or British to make the Indians reluctant to give up their territory. It was owing to natural and inevitable causes, that the Indians grew more and more hostile to the Americans, and ever more friendly to the British. Those who wanted their lands, were their natural enemies ; those who could assist them to retain them, were their natural allies. These causes had but a few years before made them friendly to the French and hostile to the English ; they now made them friendly to the English and hostile to the Americans. The flood of American immigration was beginning to flow into northwestern Ohio and Indiana, but no such emigration was taking place toward the west of the British possessions. The Americans were farmers, and would occupy the lands perma-

\* Copy of Captain Dunham's letter, in Hull's papers.

nently. The only British who came near them, were hunters, like themselves, or traders to buy their furs. These deep-lying and permanent causes of a state of things, which no wisdom nor energy on the part of the territorial government could alter, had already begun to produce that confederacy against the United States, of the Indian tribes, of which the Shawnee Prophet was the head, and his brother Tecumseh both head and hand.

As early as 1806, the Prophet commenced his operations. His object was to unite all the north-western Indians against the progress of the American settlements. The Prophet affirmed, that he had seen the Great Spirit; and that he was his agent. He said that the Americans were intending to push the Indians into the Lakes, as they had driven them from the sea-coast; that the Indians must take a stand where they were, and drive the Americans to the other side of the Alleghany mountains. This effort of the Prophet excited great interest through all the tribes, and produced manifest effects on the tempers of the Indians. From all quarters Governor Hull was informed of the hostile spirit which began to be manifested. The first notice of the Shawnee Prophet which appears in Governor Hull's correspondence, is contained in a letter addressed to the Governor, by William Wells, from Fort Wayne, dated September 5, 1806.\* He says, "that a number of Shawnee Indians have settled at Greenville, on lands

\* Hull's papers.

belonging to the United States. They have a man among them that pretends to be a prophet. This fellow is well calculated to lead the Indians astray, and it appears that it is his determination to do so."

But the most remarkable evidence of the Prophet's sagacity and influence, is found in a speech, delivered on the 4th May, 1807, by an Indian named Le Maigouis, or the Trout.\* This speech was delivered at the entrance of Lake Michigan (Le Maiouitinnong,) and a full account of it was transmitted to Governor Hull by Captain Dunham, from Mackinaw, with a letter, from which we make the following extracts :

" FORT MICHILIMACKINAC, May 20, 1807.

" SIR,—I have thought it my duty to state to your Excellency, that there appears to be an extensive movement among the savages of this quarter, which seems to carry with it a good deal of the dark and mysterious. Belts of wampum are rapidly circulating from one tribe to another, and a spirit is prevailing by no means pacific. What I have been able to learn, through sources to be relied on, leaves little room for conjecture as to the object of their hostile intentions ; and the enclosed *talk*, which has been industriously spread among them, and which seems to have had considerable effect on their minds, needs no comment.

" It ought to be observed, that this Talk is com-

\* Called by Lanman, Le Mar- manuscript it is always spelt Mai-  
quois : probably a misprint, as in the gouis.

municated in open council, where old and young of both sexes are allowed to assemble. There is, however, another Talk, known only in the private council of the chiefs and warriors. From the letter and spirit of the former, we may easily infer the complexion and views of the latter. There is certainly *mischief at the bottom*, and there can be no doubt in my mind, but that the object and intention of this great *Manitou*, or second Adam, under pretence of restoring to the Aborigines their former independence, and to the savage character its animal energy, is, in reality, to induce a general effort to rally, and to strike somewhere a desperate and decisive blow.

“ I cannot say that I apprehend an immediate attack. Perhaps my character as a soldier might be called in question, were I to suppose the possibility of a thing which some would deem so improbable. But, aware as I am of the insidiousness and treachery of this people, I have thought it no more than a dictate of prudence to watch their motions, and to be in constant readiness to receive them, either with the olive branch or the bayonet, as circumstances might require.

“ Many fabulous and foolish stories are circulated, to impress the idea of their great progenitor’s divinity and mission ; but whether he is really the envoy of heaven, or only an emissary from the Cabinet of St. Cloud, I will not presume to say. He is represented as being seen only on an elevated scaffold, sitting or kneeling on a cross, and in a constant attitude of devotion. It is even said, that he can fly ; and that the

multitude of his disciples who visit him, are miraculously fed by a profusion of wild animals, which are thronging about him for that purpose. All this is eagerly swallowed; and the severe denunciations of his penal code, terrify them at once into an adoption of his creed. His system is so artfully interwoven with their ancient superstitions and their modern prejudices, that they receive the whole with a religious enthusiasm.

“How long this frenzy may last, or whether the Indians immediately in this vicinity may eventually come in to the extent of the measure, I cannot say. The herald of this new religion, *Le Maigouis*, is a brother of the principal chief at *Arbre Croche*. He is now gone to Lake Superior, to initiate the savages of that quarter into its mysteries.

“I have the honour to be your Excellency’s obedient and humble servant,

(Signed)

J. DUNHAM.”

Substance of a talk delivered at *Le Maiouitinong*, entrance of Lake Michigan, by the Indian Chief *Le Maigouis*, or the Trout, May 4th, 1807, as coming from the first man whom God created, said to be in the *Shawnese* country, addressed to all the different Tribes of Indians.

*Le Maigouis*, holding in his hand *eight strings of old wampum*, four white and four blue, said :

“Brothers,—These strings of *wampum* come from the *Great Spirit*. Do not despise them, for he knows every thing. They are to go all around the



earth, till they are lost. They were sent to you by the *first man* he created with these words :

“ Children,—I was asleep, when the *Great Spirit* addressing himself to another Spirit said, I have closed my *book of accounts* with man, and am going to destroy the earth : but first I will awaken from the Sleep of the Dead, the first man I created ; he is wise. And let us hear if he has aught to say. He then awoke me and told me what he was about to do.

“ I looked around the world and saw my *Red children* had greatly degenerated, that they had become scattered and miserable. When I saw this, I was grieved on their account, and asked leave of the *Great Spirit* to come to see if I could reclaim them. I requested the *Great Spirit* to grant, in case they should listen to my voice, that the world might yet subsist for the period of *Three full Lives*, and my request was granted.

“ Now, therefore, my children, listen to my voice, it is that of the *Great Spirit* ! If you hearken to my counsel and follow my instructions for four years, then will there be *two days of darkness*, during which, I shall tread unseen through the land and cause the animals, such as they were formerly, when I created them, to come forth out of the earth. *The Great Spirit* bids me address you in his own words, which are these :

“ My children,—You are to have very little intercourse with the whites. They are not *your Father*, as you call them, but your brethren. *I am your Fa-*

*ther.* When you call me so, you do well. I am the *Father of the English, of the French, of the Spaniards, and of the Indians.* I created the first man, who was the common Father of all these people as well as yourselves ; and it is through him, whom I have now awakened from his long sleep, that I now address you. But the *Americans*, I did not make. They are not *my children, but the children of the Evil Spirit.* *They grew from the scum of the great water, when it was troubled by the Evil Spirit, and the froth was driven into the woods, by a strong east wind. They are numerous, but I hate them. They are unjust. They have taken away your lands, which were not made for them.*

“ My children,—*The whites* I placed on the other side of the *Great Lake*, that they might be a separate people. To them I gave different manners, customs, animals, vegetables, &c., for their use. To them I have given cattle, sheep, swine, and poultry, for themselves only. You are not to keep any of their animals, nor to eat of their meat. To you I have given the deer, the bear, and all wild animals, and the fish that swim in the rivers, and the corn that grows in the fields, for your own use ; and you are not to give your meat or your corn to the *whites* to eat.

“ My children,—You may salute the whites when you meet them, *but must not shake hands.* You must not get drunk. It is a great sin. Your old men and chiefs may drink a little pure spirits, such as comes from Montreal : *but you must not drink*

*whisky*. It is the drink of the Evil Spirit. It was not made by me; but by the *Americans*. It is poison. It makes you sick. It burns your insides. Neither are you on any account to eat *bread*. It is the food of the whites.

“My children,—You must plant corn for yourselves, for your wives, and for your children. And when you do it, you are to help one another: but plant no more than is necessary for your own use. You must not sell it to the whites. It was not made for them. I made all the trees of the forest for your use, but the maple I love best, because it yields sugar for your little ones. You must make it only for them; but sell none to the *whites*. They have another sugar, which was made expressly for them; besides, by making too much, you spoil the trees and give them pain, by cutting and hacking them; for they have a feeling like yourselves. If you make more than is necessary for your own use, you shall die, and the maple will yield no more water.

“If a white man is starving, you may sell him a little corn, or a very little sugar, but it must be by measure and by weight.

“My children,—You are indebted to the white traders, but you must pay them no more *than half their credits, because they have cheated you*. You must pay them in skins, gums, canoes, &c. But not in meat, corn, and sugar. You must not dress like the *whites*, nor wear hats like them, but pluck out your hair, as in ancient times, and wear the feather of the eagle on your heads. And when the weather is not severe,

you must go naked, excepting the *Breech-cloth*. And when you are clothed, it must be in skins or leather, of your own dressing.

“My children,—You complain that the animals of the forest are fled and scattered. How should it be otherwise? You destroy them yourselves, for their skins only, and leave their bodies to rot, or give the best pieces to the *whites*. *I am displeased when I see this, and take them back from the earth*: that they may not come to see you again. You must kill no more animals, they are necessary to feed and clothe you, and you are to keep but one dog: *because by keeping too many you starve them*.

“My children—Your women must not live with the Traders or other White men, unless they are lawfully married. But I do not like even this; because my White and Red children were thus marked with different colours, that they might be a separate people.”

Here follow certain regulations respecting courtship and marriage, &c., which are too minutely detailed to be repeated. The Great Spirit also directs them to bathe every morning, to wash away their sins. Upon the observance of which regular times they are to be pardoned four times for the same offence; such as stealing, getting drunk, or the like—but the fifth time, says the Great Spirit, “*you shall surely die.*”

“Your wise men (or conjurers) have bad medicine in their bags. They must throw away their medicine-

bags, and when their medicine is in blossom, collect it fresh and pure. You must make no feasts to the Evil Spirits of the Earth, but only to the Good Spirit of the Air. You are no more to dance the *Wabano*, nor the *Poigan* or *Pipe-dance*. I did not put you on the Earth to dance these dances. But you are to dance naked, with your bodies painted, and with the *Poigan mangu*m (war club) in your hand. You must all have this weapon and never leave it behind you. When you dance this, I shall always look on with pleasure. You are to make yourselves *Paka tonacas* (or crosses) which you must always carry with you, and amuse yourselves often with that game (a kind of bat-ball, common among the savages, which requires great agility). Your women must also have handsome *Passa quanacles*, that they may play also: for I made you to amuse yourselves, and I am delighted when I see you happy. You are, however, *never to go to war against each other*: but to cultivate peace between your different tribes, that they may become one great people.

“My children,—No Indian must sell rum to an Indian. It makes him rich, but when he dies, he becomes very wretched. You bury him with all his wealth and ornaments about him, and as he goes along the path of the dead, they fall from him. He stops to take them up, and they become dust. He at last arrives almost at the place of rest, and then crumbles into dust himself. But those who, by their labour, furnish themselves with necessaries only,

when they die, are happy. And when they arrive at the land of the dead, will *find their wigwam* furnished with every thing they had on earth."

(Thus far the Great Spirit.) "Now my children," said the first created man, "listen to what I am about to add :"

"The Great Spirit then opened a door, showing me a Bear and a Deer, both very small, and very lean, and said, 'Look here, my son. These are the animals that are now in the Earth. The red people have spoiled them, by killing them too young and by giving their meat to the whites, and also by greasing themselves with their fat, which is very wrong. The women, when they grease their bodies or their hair, should do it only with the fat of the smaller animals, of Racoons, of Otters, of Snakes,' &c.

"The Great Spirit then opened another door and showed me a Bear and a Deer, extremely fat, and of a very extraordinary size, saying, 'Look here, my son. Those are the animals placed on the Earth when I created you.' Now my children, listen to what I say and let it sink into your ears—it is the orders of the *Great Spirit*.

"My children,—You must not speak of this Talk to the whites. *It must be hidden from them.* I am now on the Earth, sent by the Great Spirit, to instruct you. Each village must send me *two or more principal chiefs* to represent you, that you may be taught. The Bearer of this Talk, will point out to you the path to my wigwam. I could come to the *Arbre Croche* myself, because the world is changed from what it



was. It is broken and leans down, and as it declines, the *Chippewas* and all beyond will fall off and die. Therefore you must come to see me and be instructed, in order to prevent it. Their villages which do not listen to this Talk and send me two deputies will be cut off from the face of the Earth."

In a subsequent letter of Captain Dunham, dated July 23d, 1807, he repeats his belief that the savages were combining with hostile intentions against the Americans. "It seems," he says, "a very extensive league is forming, which is to include all the different tribes north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi. They have avowed their object to several of the most respectable traders. They complain much of the Americans having deprived them of their lands. They say that if they unite they shall be strong; that they are taking each other by the hand, for the purpose of forming a great circle; that this circle is nearly completed, there being now only two or three gaps; that when these are filled, the circle will extend itself rapidly and crowd off every white man that now dares to set foot on their ground."—Such were the communications received by General Hull as early as 1806, in respect to the great confederacy under the Prophet and Tecumseh. Similar alarms and rumours concerning the hostility of the Indians continued, up to the battle of Tippecanoe and the breaking out of the war in 1812.

The cause of this Indian hostility was one which could not be removed. It was their natural dread of losing all their hunting grounds, by the encroachment of the whites.

In a Council held with General Harrison in 1811, near Vincennes, Tecumseh declared that "the system which the United States pursued, of purchasing lands from the Indians, he viewed as a *mighty water*, ready to overflow his people, and that the confederacy which he was forming among the tribes, to prevent any tribe from selling land without the consent of the others, was the *dam* he was erecting to resist this *mighty water*." In pursuit of this object, Tecumseh visited all the Indian tribes, and urged upon them this plan of combination.

In addition to these Indian troubles, General Hull had many more difficulties, external and internal, to contend against, in the administration of his Territory. In the first place, the difficulty of communication was no trifling one. To get from Albany to Niagara, in 1805, with his family, General Hull found it was best to go in boats up Lake Ontario, and then to wait till a vessel should be sailing from Buffalo to Detroit, an event which occurred only occasionally. The State of New-York, which is now traversed from east to west in twenty-four hours, by three trains of railroad-cars each day, was then, in many places, an unbroken forest. The ports on Lake Erie, which are now visited many times a day by steamers, bound up and down the lake, were then entered only once in many days by a lonely vessel. Northern Ohio, filled at present with thriving villages and prosperous cities, was then a wilderness. Again, when Governor Hull reached Detroit, he found that a large part of the place had recently been destroyed by fire, and there

was not a house in which he could be properly accommodated. He was obliged to build himself a house. There were no public offices, no council-house for the Indian Department; and he even had to write to the Secretary at War for a boat, with which to communicate with the distant Indians.\* The inhabitants of the Territory wanted the titles to their lands secured, and the Governor must urge this matter at Washington. There was no printing-press at Detroit, and the Governor must correspond with printers at Herkimer, to induce them to come to Detroit, which they apparently did not do, as after this time he sends his public orders to Washington, to be printed there. Laws were to be made and put in operation. A militia system was to be established, a matter of no small difficulty, though of great necessity. Colonel Anderson, of the second regiment of militia, writes many letters from the river Raisin, complaining of his officers, because they will not get their uniforms. The poor Colonel at last wishes to resign his commission, for "the French gentlemen, headed by the Lieutenant-Colonel, will not get their uniforms; and the troops, the more I exercise them, the less they learn." "Out of twenty French gentlemen, officers, only five that have any uniform." Driven desperate, the Colonel, on June 26, 1806, writes that he has arrested his officers; and they write to the Governor, demanding a court-martial, "as they wish to know their fate."

While at Washington, in December, 1805, Gov-

\* Hull's files of private papers.

ernor Hull receives letters and affidavits, giving an account of an affray between the citizens of Detroit and some British officers from Malden, who, with the assistance of some of the American officers from the fort, attempted to arrest a deserter. Governor Hull must write to Archbishop Carrol, to request him not to remove from Detroit a useful and much-loved Catholic priest. Mr. Badger, a Presbyterian minister, missionary to the Indians at Sandusky, writes to the Governor that he can put his finger through the blankets sent to the Indians in payment of their annuities, and that he must send new ones.

Great difficulties arise concerning the assignment of donation-lots to the inhabitants of Detroit, and here the Governor is obliged to differ from Judge Woodward, from which an alienation ensues. It is well known, that the seat of a territorial government is very apt to be the scene of constant contention, strife, and party-spirit. The offices under such a government are so numerous, in proportion to the inhabitants, that almost every body thinks he has a claim, or at least a chance, to obtain one. Money is usually scarce, and this enhances the value of an office, the salary of which is regularly paid in cash. But all cannot have offices, and those who are disappointed, become the enemies of the more successful, or of those whose influence secured them the appointment.

Governor Hull seems to have had his share of these embarrassments, and occasionally friends were turned into enemies, by his opposing their opinions

or their interests. Yet he appears to have been popular with the people generally, and when his term of office expired, was re-appointed by Mr. Jefferson; a proof, at least, that his proceedings were approved at Washington.

## CHAPTER II.

WAR OF 1812.—GOVERNOR HULL APPOINTED BRIGADIER-GENERAL TO LEAD THE TROOPS FROM OHIO TO DETROIT.—MARCH TO DETROIT.—INVASION OF CANADA.—FALL OF MICHILIMACKINAC, AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS.

IN February, 1812, Governor Hull being at Washington, received accounts from the Territory of Michigan, that the Indians were becoming hostile to the defenceless inhabitants of that exposed frontier.\* He urged upon the administration the expediency of providing a force for their protection. War with Great Britain was imminent: Congress was augmenting the army, and messages had been sent by the British officers in Canada to all the powerful tribes of the Northwest; accompanied with presents of arms or clothing, urging them to take part with Great Britain, their natural ally. Accordingly, the President called upon the Governor of Ohio to detach twelve hundred militia, and prepare them for actual service. These militia were to be joined by the 4th United States regiment, then at Post St. Vincennes. After these arrangements were made, the Secretary of War, Mr. Eustis, stated to Governor Hull, that it was the wish of the President to appoint him to the command of these troops, with the rank of Brigadier-General, in order that he should march them to Detroit.

\* Hull's Memoirs of the Campaign of 1812, page 15.



Governor Hull declined the appointment in the most unqualified manner, stating that it was not his wish to receive any military appointment. Colonel Kingsbury was then ordered to Washington, to take command of these troops, and to receive his instructions to that end. He fell sick on his arrival, and became thus unable to perform the duty. The proposition being again made to Governor Hull, he finally consented to accept any military appointment, either that of Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, or Brigadier-General, which would give him the command of the troops, and enable him to lead them to Detroit. He was immediately nominated Brigadier-General, and accepted the appointment with reluctance, and with no other object, he says, than to aid in the protection of the inhabitants of Michigan against the savages.\* He was to retain his office of Governor of Michigan, and received orders to perform his civil duties as usual.

In his anxiety for the safety of the people of the Territory, Governor Hull here committed an error, which a more selfish man would have avoided. The people of the United States generally were expecting the conquest of Canada. It had been stated repeatedly on the floor of Congress, that in case of war with Great Britain, Canada would at once be over-

\* Hull's Memoirs of the Campaign, &c., page 16. Also Hull's Trial (reported by Col. Forbes), Appendix, page 3. "Interrogatories put by Wm. Hull to Wm. Eustis,

late Secretary at War, with his answers, under oath." In these answers, Governor Eustis confirms what is stated in the text.

run and conquered by the armies of the United States.\* Governor Hull knew and had repeatedly represented to the Government the difficulties in the way of such an enterprise. The Lakes were in possession of the British; the Indians were on their side, and the militia of Canada numbered twenty to one of the militia of Michigan. In three separate memorials, addressed to the War Department in April 1809, June 1811, and March 1812, he had urged the necessity of a fleet on Lake Erie. Again, after his appointment as Brigadier-General, he urged the same thing in a memorial to the President. In a conversation with the President and Secretary at War, he insisted on the same course of conduct so strongly, that Commodore Stewart was actually ordered to Washington, to receive the appointment of Navy Agent on Lake Erie, and orders concerning the building of a fleet on that Lake.†

General Hull well knew, and had earnestly stated, that to conquer Canada, or even to preserve Michigan,

\* Speeches in Congress in 1812 by Eustis and Henry Clay. "We can take Canada without soldiers. We have only to send officers into the Provinces, and the people, disaffected toward their own Government, will rally round our standard." "It is absurd to suppose, that we shall not succeed in our enterprise against the enemy's provinces. We have the Canadas as much under our command as Great Britain has the ocean, and the way to con-

quer her on the ocean, is to drive her from the land. I am not for stopping at Quebec or any where else, but I would take the whole continent from them and ask them no favours. We must take the whole continent from them. I wish never to see peace till we do." Thus spake Henry Clay in 1812: but better advised in 1814, he signed, as Commissioner, the Treaty of Peace at Ghent.

† See Appendix, Note 2d.

it was necessary either to have command of the Lake, by means of a fleet superior to the British, or to invade Upper Canada with two powerful and co-operating armies at Detroit and Niagara. He therefore believed that the Government, in case of war, would adopt one or both of these measures. He did not think that he should be expected to conquer Upper Canada with an army of fifteen hundred men, four-fifths of whom were militia, while the British held the Lakes with their ships, and the forests with their Indians. He depended on efficient support both by water and land. But while *his* object was the protection of Michigan and its inhabitants, the object of the Government and people was the conquest of Canada. *He* regarded himself as Governor and Protector of the Territory; he was regarded by the nation as general of an invading army, which was shortly to overrun the whole of Canada. A selfish man, therefore, foreseeing the impossibility of meeting the expectations of the Government and people, would have persisted in refusing this appointment of Brigadier-General. But hoping to protect the inhabitants from immediate Indian hostilities, and confiding that the Government would support him in case of war, he accepted the appointment, and went to Dayton, Ohio, to take command of the troops.\*

\* In the 10th No. of his Memoirs of the Campaign of 1812, General Hull thus speaks of his position at this time: "In leaving Washington, in April, 1812, to take command of the forces assembled in the State

of Ohio, I felt a very deep interest in the object of my mission. The consideration that I was clothed with the authority and furnished with the means of affording safety and security to the frontier inhabitants.

On the 10th May, 1812, General Hull arrived at Cincinnati, in Ohio. Here he met Governor Meigs, who had made great exertions in collecting the

of the country; and particularly to those of the Territory of Michigan, of which I was Governor, was soothing to my feelings and animating to my exertions. Although about thirty years had then elapsed since my sword had lain useless in its scabbard, and time had necessarily enfeebled my strength and constitution, yet it was impossible for me to see a country in which from my situation, I was so particularly interested, exposed to the fury of the savages without raising an arm for its safety. Convinced that the forces intrusted to my command were sufficient for the protection of the frontier settlements and the security of the Territory while we were at peace with Great Britain; and knowing that I had communicated what measures, in my opinion, would be indispensably necessary, in the event of war, which communications had been received as official documents and approved by the Government, and feeling a generous confidence in the justice and honour of the administration, I had little anxiety with respect to any consequences which might have attended my command.

“If it were to be my fortune to protect the defenceless inhabitants of our country, against the cruelty of savages, and prosperity was to at-

tend the exertions of the army, the satisfaction of having promoted the cause of humanity would have been an ample reward. But if, after honestly discharging my duty, in the best manner I was capable, misfortune was to be my lot, I believed that a generous government and a generous people would at least have shielded me from censure and reproach. At that time, indeed, I considered there was little or no hazard. It was a time of peace with England, and while that remained, there was no danger, excepting from the savages. Some excitement then existed, through the influence of the British Agents, in preparing them for events which they anticipated might take place. In the event of war, I considered that such arrangements would have been made, as would have enabled the army I commanded to have operated with success against the enemy. As the Government continued me in command of the Northwestern army after the declaration of war, I had a right to believe, that such measures would have been adopted, as I had stated were deemed by me essential to success. The measures to which I alluded in the event of war, I have mentioned, were a navy on Lake Erie, sufficient to preserve that communication; and an army of suffi-

twelve hundred militia which had been ordered by the President. Their rendezvous was Dayton. Although officers and men seemed to be animated with zeal, yet they were without discipline, and destitute of proper arms and clothing.\* The three militia regiments elected their field officers at Dayton. Duncan McArthur was chosen Colonel, and James Denny and William A. Trimble Majors, of the first regiment; James Findlay, Colonel, and Thomas Moore and Thomas Van Horne Majors, of the second regiment; Lewis Cass, Colonel, and Robert Morrison and J. R. Munson Majors, of the third regiment.

On May 25th, General Hull was invested with the command of the militia, and made them an address. On the first of June, the army marched to Staunton; on the 10th, they were joined, at Urbana,

cient strength in co-operation with the one I commanded, to make a conquest of Canada.

"In all these communications, I gave it as my opinion, that unless we had the benefit of this co-operation, the posts of Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Chicago, would inevitably fall into the hands of the enemy."

\* "Their arms were totally unfit for use, the leather which covered their cartouch boxes was rotten, and no better security to the cartridges than brown paper; many of the men were destitute of blankets and other necessary clothing; no armorers were provided to repair the arms; no means had been adopted

to furnish clothing; no public stores to resort to, either for good arms or suitable clothing; and no powder in any of the magazines fit for use. And what is more extraordinary, no contract, nor any measures adopted, to supply these troops with the necessary articles of provisions during their march through a wilderness of more than two hundred miles, until they arrived at Detroit. On my own responsibility, I sent to powder-mills in Kentucky and purchased powder, collected a few blankets and other necessary clothing from the inhabitants of Ohio, and employed private armorers at Cincinnati and Dayton, to repair the arms."—Hull's Memoirs, page 34.



by the fourth United States regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, consisting of about three hundred effective men. From this place, which was then a frontier town, the distance to Detroit was more than two hundred miles, through a wilderness. Here the want of discipline of the militia appeared, in some of them refusing to march, and other signs of insubordination.\* In marching from Urbana to Detroit, a road was to be cut by the army, through the forest. The difficulties and labours were great, of opening a road, building bridges and causeways; but were borne with patience by the army. Four block-houses were built on the route, for the convenience of reinforcements, and security of convoys. The army marched first to the Scioto; then to Blanchard's Fork, which is a branch of the Maumee; then to the Rapids of the

\* The Ohio Volunteers were militia just called into the field, and were deficient in discipline, and some of them were frequently disorderly. "Generally speaking the Ohio Volunteers and Militia were insubordinate: one evening at Urbana, I saw a multitude, and heard a noise, and was informed that a company of Ohio Volunteers *were riding one of their officers on a rail*. In saying that the Ohio Volunteers were insubordinate, witness means that they were only as much so as undisciplined militia generally are. Some thirty or forty of the Ohio militia refused to cross into Canada at one time, and thinks he saw one hundred who refused to cross when the troops were at Urbana. When

the troops left Urbana, Captain Hull came to Colonel Miller in his official capacity and informed him that there was another mutiny among the Ohio Volunteers, and wished a halt to take place. After a short halt, General Hull rode up and said to Colonel Miller, 'Your regiment is a powerful argument; without them I could not march these men to Detroit.' One soldier was shot in a quarrel. There were companies among them who were under better discipline than others."—Lieutenant Bacon's testimony (4th Regiment). Minutes of the Court Martial for the Trial of General Hull, from the files of the War Office, Washington. See also Forbes' Report of the Court Martial, page 124.



Maumee, which was reached about the end of June.\* War was declared on the 18th of June; but General Hull received no information of it until July 2d, fourteen days after, though the British officer at Malden had heard of it, officially, two days before.† In consequence of this delay in transmitting to him this most important intelligence, a vessel was taken, on which he had shipped important baggage, stores, and the invalids of the army. General Hull gives the following account of this transaction :

\* McAfee's History of the late War. Hull's Memoirs.

† "Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812." General Armstrong, late Secretary of War, an opponent of General Hull, thus speaks of this transaction, page 47-8. "We have seen that General Hull lost his own baggage and that of the army, the whole of his hospital stores and intrenching tools, and sixty men, in consequence of the ill-judged and tardy manner employed in transmitting to him the declaration of war. A fact so extraordinary in itself and so productive of injury to the public, calls for more development than has yet been given to it. It will be remembered that a declaration of war was authorized on the 18th June, 1812. On this day Secretary Eustis wrote two letters to General Hull. In one of these no mention was made of this important event; in the other, it was distinctly and officially announced. The former of the two, was carefully made up and expedited

by a special messenger, who arrived in the General's camp on the 24th of June: while the latter was committed to the public mail as far as Cleveland, and thence through a wilderness of one hundred miles, to such conveyance as '*accident might supply.*'

"The result was, that the declaration did not reach its destination until the 2d of July, *two days after it had been received by the enemy at Malden.* On this occasion, the British Government was better served: Provost received notice of it on the 24th of June, at Quebec; Brock on the 26th, at Newark; St. George on the 30th, at Malden; and Roberts on the 8th of July, at St. Joseph's. But a fact still more extraordinary than the celerity of these transmissions is, that the information thus rapidly forwarded to Malden and St. Joseph's, was received, under envelopes, franked by the Secretary of the American Treasury."

“ On the 2d day of July I received a letter from the Secretary of War, dated the 18th of June, informing me of the declaration of war. It was in these words :

“ ‘ Sir,—War is declared against Great Britain. You will be on your guard ; proceed to your post with all possible expedition ; make such arrangements for the defence of the country as in your judgment may be necessary, and wait for further orders.’ ”

“ The day before this letter was received, the Quarter-Master had been directed to hire a small vessel, at the foot of the Rapids of the Miami, to transport the invalids and the baggage, &c., not wanted on the march to Detroit. The horses being worn down on the march, rendered this measure, in my opinion, expedient. At this time I had received no information of the declaration of war, and did not consider there was any hazard in the measure. On the 24th of June I received a letter from the War Department, dated in the morning of the 18th of June, directing me to march to Detroit, with all possible expedition. In that letter, not one word was said respecting a declaration of war.

“ The British garrison at Malden having a number of days before received the information, this vessel was taken in passing that fortress. The court-martial could not find any ground to censure me for employing that vessel, as I had no information of the declaration of war, and was *obliged* to acquit me of the charge growing out of that event. The circumstances of this transaction are particularly related in

my defence. Thus it appears, that I did not receive information of the war, until fourteen days after it was declared; that the British garrison had official knowledge of it four or five days sooner; that it is proved to demonstration, that I might have received it eight days earlier, as I actually did receive a letter from the Secretary of War, on the 24th of June, dated on the same day, viz. the 18th of June, in the morning, which gave no information of the declaration of war. The person who brought me this letter, announcing the war, informed me he was employed by the Postmaster of Cleveland, in the State of Ohio, and that it was brought in the mail to that office. In time of peace with England, there could have been but one opinion, with respect to engaging this vessel, in the manner it was employed. Having no information of the declaration of war, I must necessarily have believed it was a time of peace, and consequently no blame could be attached to me. The following is the opinion of the court-martial on this subject:

“ ‘ The evidence on the subject having been publicly given, the Court deem it proper, in justice to the accused, to say, that they do not believe, from any thing which has appeared, that Brigadier-General William Hull has committed treason against the United States.’ ”

On July 5th, the army under General Hull arrived at Detroit. A few days were then occupied in cleaning and repairing arms, and in giving the soldiers rest from the fatigues of the laborious march. The enemy were then erecting fortifications on the

opposite bank, and an impatience prevailed among the officers and men of the American army, to cross the river, and commence offensive operations. General Hull called a council of the field officers, and informed them that he had as yet received no authority to invade Canada, and requested them to restrain the impatience of their men. After this council was dismissed, on July 9th, the following letter was received from Washington :

“WAR DEPARTMENT, June 24th, 1812.

“SIR,—By my letter of the 18th instant, you were informed that war was declared against Great Britain. Herewith, enclosed, you will receive a copy of the Act, and of the President’s Proclamation, and you are authorized to commence offensive operations accordingly. Should the force under your command be equal to the enterprise, consistent with the safety of your own posts, you will take possession of Malden, and extend your conquests as circumstances may justify.

(Signed)

WILLIAM EUSTIS.”

On the same evening that this letter was received, the following answer was given :

“DETROIT, July 9th, 1812.

“SIR,—I have received your letter of 24th June. The army under my command arrived here on the 5th of July, instant. Every effort has been, and is still making by the British, to collect the Indians under their standard. They have a large number. I am

preparing boats, and shall pass the river in a few days. The British have established a post directly opposite this place. I have confidence in dislodging him, and being in possession of the opposite bank. I have little time to write: every thing will be done that it is possible to do. The British command the water and the savages. I do not think the force here equal to the reduction of Amherstburg (meaning the fort at Malden), you therefore must not be too sanguine.

(Signed)

WILLIAM HULL."

HON. WM. EUSTIS.

In consequence of this communication, General Hull crossed into Canada, July 12th, as soon as boats could be collected for that object, in such a manner as to deceive the enemy, and cause him to withdraw his forces, so that the American troops landed without opposition.

The reasons for invading Canada were, first, the expectations and orders of the Government, for the phrase "you are authorized to commence offensive operations," contained in the Secretary's letter, was equivalent to an order. Secondly, the enemy was erecting fortifications on the bank opposite Detroit, which, being higher than the American side, would have seriously annoyed the army and town, when completed. Thirdly, the impatient spirit of the army made it desirable to give them active employment. Fourthly, it seemed likely that the Canadians and Indians would be kept neutral, and prevented from joining

the British standard, by a display of American force on both banks of the river. Fifthly, it was desirable to obtain forage and provisions from the river Thames, and cut off the supplies from that region to Malden. The provisions in Detroit and Michigan were not sufficient for the inhabitants and army; and had it not been for supplies obtained in Canada, would have fallen short before the capitulation.\*

General Hull, as is well known, issued a proclamation to the Canadians upon entering their country. In it he declared, that he came to bring no injury to the peaceable and unoffending inhabitants, but offered them protection, peace, and security. He tells them to remain at their homes, and pursue their occupations. He tells them he does not ask nor need their aid, but will accept it if they tender their services voluntarily. He threatens them with retaliation, if they adopt the Indian mode of warfare, and fight by the side of savages, who scalp and tomahawk their prisoners.

There are some curious circumstances connected with this proclamation. It has been praised as a spirited and strong paper, and condemned as pompous and improper. *After General Hull's death*, the authorship of it was claimed for General Cass, then a Colonel of militia. Up to that time, that is, for fifteen years, no one even suggested, that it was written by any other than General Hull himself. General Hull's family, in all that they had heard and read

\* Hull's Memoirs, page 44.



about the proclamation, had never before received the suggestion that General Cass was the author. As the matter now stands, whenever the proclamation is condemned, General Hull is treated as the author—when it is praised, it is said to have been written by General Cass.\* This proclamation was approved by the President in a letter to General Hull, from the War Department, of August 1st,† and was declared by the American Commissioners at the Treaty of Ghent, to have been unauthorized and disapproved by the Government.‡ General Hull has been

\* “—heralded by pompous and threatening Proclamation.—‘Hull’s vapouring Proclamation.’—Ingersoll’s History of the War.

“Here he issued his Proclamation, which was an impressive and energetic paper,”—“this bold and eloquent document was from the pen of Governor Cass.”—Lanman’s Michigan.

Mr. Tupper, the author of the “Life of Brock,” (published London, 1815,) considers it able, and assigns its authorship to some one at Washington, which is of course an impossibility. “General Hull issued the following insidious but able Proclamation, which was doubtless written at Washington.”

† Hull’s Memoirs, page 49.—“On the 13th of July, the day after it (the Proclamation) was published, a copy of it was sent to the Government. The paragraph of the letter is in these words: ‘Enclosed is a copy of a Proclamation to the in-

habitants, which I hope will be approved by the Government.’

“Answer:

“‘War Department, August 1, 1812.

“‘Sir—Your letters of 13th and 14th, together with your Proclamation, have been received. Your operations are approved by the President.’”

‡ As regards that part of the Proclamation which promises protection to the Canadians. General Hull thus speaks (“Hull’s Memoirs,” pp. 47, 48): “Before I proceed to any particular explanations, I ask you to bear in mind the situation in which I was placed by the orders of the Government. I was in an enemy’s country, with the command of a small body of militia and a few regulars, nearly three hundred miles from any magazines of provisions, munitions of war, or reinforcements. The enemy with which I had to contend, was all the British troops in Upper Canada, all

condemned for that part of the proclamation which declares that no quarter would be given to those who should be found fighting by the side of the Indians,

the militia of that Province, and the Northern and Western Indians, both in the Territory of Canada and the United States, together with the strength and resources of the wealthy and powerful Northwest Company. Placed in this insulated situation, with but a small stock of provisions on hand, and no possibility of obtaining a further supply, as the Lake was commanded by a British naval squadron, and the only communication by land, a wilderness of more than two hundred miles, filled with hostile savages, I saw no possibility of even sustaining my situation, unless the militia could be prevented from taking a part in the war and joining the British standard.

“A large portion of the people of that province had emigrated from the United States. They had been educated with the principles of freedom and independence; and some of them and many of their fathers, had fought and bled in defence of our Revolutionary contest. They were situated more than three thousand miles from the country to which they were subjected, and had no participation or interest in the measures it adopted. Having for a number of years lived in their neighbourhood, I had often heard them express their sense of the injustice they suffered, and their natural

right and strong wishes to participate in the same freedom and independence which their brethren of the United States enjoyed, and under which they were so prosperous and happy. They were informed that the force I had, was but the vanguard of a much greater. I considered that I had solid grounds to make this declaration.

“In the first place, it will be seen that I was authorized to pledge the faith of the Government, that they should be protected in their persons, property, and rights. Could I have believed that the Government would have authorized me to make this pledge without furnishing the means of redeeming it? I beg you, my fellow-citizens, to look back and consider what took place before I left Washington, on this subject. In my official communications to the Government, I stated that in the event of war with Great Britain, it would be necessary to command the waters of Lake Erie, by a naval force superior to that of the enemy; to provide reinforcements to secure the communication through the wilderness I was to penetrate, and a powerful army to co-operate from the States of New-York and Pennsylvania, which border on the east part of the lake; that without these measures, it would be impossible for me to sustain my situation; and

and announces to those who practice the Indian mode of warfare, of killing women, children, and prisoners, that a system of retaliation will be pursued. But how can General Hull be condemned for this, when it is well known that the Governments, both of Great Britain and the United States, adopted, in this very war, the same principle of retaliation, and threatened to put to death, in cold blood, prisoners innocent of any crime. If it be justifiable, on principles of civilized war, to hang prisoners taken in a fair field, for offences committed afterwards by their own government, it surely must be allowable, on the same principles, to warn those who have not yet enlisted, that if they shall be taken fighting in company with those who give no quarter, no quarter will be extended to themselves. On Christian principles, both proceedings are wrong, but those who defend the conduct of their respective governments in the one case, show either hypocrisy or extreme prejudice, in condemning the declaration of General Hull in the other.

This proclamation, therefore, has had the singular fate of being approved by the Government when first issued, and disavowed by the same Government at the close of the war,—of being considered a vapouring and weak paper, when ascribed to General Hull, but becoming an able and bold document, when as-

the posts of Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Chicago, would fall into the possession of the enemy. I hope, and indeed believe, you will

be satisfied there were sufficient grounds on my part for making this declaration."

cribed to the Government, or to General Cass; and, finally, of confusing military ethics so far as to make it cruel and unjust to threaten retaliation as a punishment for acts which may be performed by individuals themselves, which it is just and merciful to threaten, and partially execute against them, for the actions of their Government, with which they have nothing to do.

General Hull having crossed into Canada (July 12th), immediately proceeded to fortify his camp with a breast-work; despatched a reconnoitering party under Captain Ulry, towards Malden, who brought back word, that there were many Indians in the neighbourhood, and detached Colonel McArthur to pursue the Indians (July 14th), and to go to the river Thames or French for provisions. He returned on the 17th, with two hundred barrels of flour, and military stores, having penetrated sixty miles. Meantime, on July 16th, Colonels Cass and Miller were detached with two hundred and eighty men towards Malden, and took possession of the bridge over the Aux Canards; the British picket-guard flying at their approach. Thinking it desirable to retain this bridge, they sent a message to General Hull, asking permission to do so. But General Hull was not yet prepared to attack Malden, for want of cannon, and considered that the distance of the bridge from the camp, and its proximity to Malden, rendered it too great an undertaking to be maintained by a small detachment. Colonel Cass therefore returned to camp.

The officers and soldiers of the army being impa-

tient to be led to the attack of Malden, General Hull called a council of officers, and explained to them his reasons for postponing an attack. This council was held two days after the invasion of the enemy's territory. General Hull explained to them, that the Indians and Canadian militia had begun to desert, and that by waiting a little time, the force at Malden might be materially weakened; that at present he considered that fort too strong to be carried by his own force, especially until heavy artillery could be procured for making a breach in the defences; and that all the artificers who could be procured, were then at work in mounting cannon. Nevertheless, he informed the council, that as there was so much anxiety expressed for the attack on Malden, he was willing to lead the army to storm the fort with the bayonet, provided they should advise this step, and were of opinion that their troops could be depended upon.

Colonel Miller said that *his* regiment of regulars could be relied on, but the three militia colonels very wisely declined giving any such assurance for the soldiers under their command; and a majority of the council, therefore, decided against an immediate attack on Malden.

Meantime, events were occurring which threatened to make the position of the American army a very dangerous one. These were, first, the fall of Mackinaw, or Michilimackinac; second, the interruption of General Hull's communications with Ohio; third, the armistice, signed by General Dearborn and Sir George Prevost.

First.—The British officers in Canada had, as we have seen, early intelligence of the declaration of war. Sir George Prevost heard of it at Quebec on June 25th, and it was known on the 24th, both at Montreal and Fort George, in Upper Canada.

While General Brock, the Governor of Upper Canada, was thus made acquainted with the war in six days after it was declared, General Hull did not receive this information till the 2d of July, or fourteen days after the declaration. The news was immediately communicated to the British officer posted at St. Joseph's, in the neighbourhood of Michilimackinac, and at Fort William, on Lake Superior. On the 16th of July, Captain Roberts set out with a flotilla of boats and canoes, containing 45 men of the Royal 10th, 180 Canadians, and 400 Indians, and landed next day at Michilimackinac, which fort, commanded by Lieutenant Hanks, with a garrison of only 61 officers and men, immediately surrendered by capitulation. The Indians were encouraged by this event to unite in open hostility against the Americans, and the way was opened for the whole body of northern Indians, and all the forces of the British Northwest Company, to march upon Detroit.\* The character and amount of this force will appear more particularly from the following extracts from General Hull's Memoirs, pp. 58, 59, 60 :

\* "A quantity of military stores and 700 packs of furs were found in the fort, and its surrender had a very favourable effect upon the Indians, a large number of whom now joined in open hostility to the Americans."—Life of Brock, page 207.



“Information had now been received that the fortress at Michilimackinac, situated on the navigable waters above me, and which the enemy commanded, had fallen into the possession of the British and savage forces which surrounded it. The news of this event was accompanied with information which cast a shade over my prospects, and greatly encouraged and strengthened the force of the enemy opposed to me.

“Immediately after the fall of Michilimackinac, messages were sent by the Indian chiefs, who attended the British troops in the reduction of that place, and who inhabited the adjacent country, to all the villages south, as far as Miami, informing them that they had joined the British standard; that Michilimackinac had fallen into their hands; that Chicago was invested, and that they were all preparing to proceed to Malden; that they expected there to meet all their warriors, and assist in the reduction of Detroit; that an express had likewise been sent to General Brock, informing him of the event, and that the Canadians and savages were coming to join the army at Malden. About the same time, viz. 4th August, I received information that Captain Chambers, of the British army, with a detachment of regular soldiers, and brass field pieces, had landed on the west part of Lake Ontario, had penetrated as far as the river Le French, and was collecting all the Canadian militia and savages of that part of Canada, to lead them against my army. At this time I likewise received information that Colonel Proctor, of the British army, had arrived from Fort Erie by water, with reinforcements, at Mal-

den. As their reinforcements were guarded by an armed vessel, I had nothing to oppose to them, to prevent their junction at Malden. Indeed, the advantage to the enemy of commanding the Lake became every day more apparent. Both reinforcements and supplies could be transported with facility from one post to another, whenever it became necessary.\*

“At this time I had intercepted a letter from a Mr. McKenzie, a member of the Northwest Company, at Fort William, to a Mr. McIntosh, of Sandwich, the principal agent of that Company in Upper Canada, dated July 19th, 1812. The genuineness of this letter was proved on my trial, and admitted in evidence. It affords such clear evidence of the force on the borders of the lakes above me, and that it was to be directed against me, that I shall here recite the following extracts from it :

““ The declaration of war reached us on the 16th instant (July), but we are neither astonished nor alarmed. Our agents ordered a general muster, which amounted to twelve hundred, exclusive of several hundred of the natives. We are equal in all to sixteen or seventeen hundred strong. One of our gentlemen started on the 17th instant, with several

\* The statement concerning Major Chambers, which is contained in the extracts above from General Hull's letters, is confirmed by the following extract from an official letter of General Brock, of July 25. Life of Brock, page 197. “I have received information of the enemy having made frequent and extensive inroads from Sandwich, up the river Thames. I have in consequence been induced to detach Captain Chambers with about 50 of the 41st regiment to the Moravian town, where I have directed 200 militia to join him.”

light canoes, for the interior country, to rouse the natives to activity, which is not hard to do on the present occasion. We likewise despatched messengers in all directions with the news. I have not the least doubt but our force, in ten days hence, will amount to five thousand effective men. Our young gentlemen and engagées, offered most handsomely to march immediately for Michilimackinac. Our chief, Mr. Shaw, expressed his gratitude, and drafted one hundred. They are to proceed this evening to St. Joseph's. He takes about as many Indians. Could the vessel contain them, he might have had four thousand more. It now depends on what accounts we receive from St. Joseph's, whether these numerous tribes from the interior, will proceed to St. Joseph's or not.'

“At the time I intercepted this letter, its contents were confirmed by the information I received from Lieutenant Hanks, Doctor Day, and Mr. Stone, who had arrived at Detroit from Michilimackinac, prisoners on parole. They stated, that before they left Michilimackinac, a number of boats and canoes had arrived, in which several gentlemen came passengers, who, they were informed, were agents of the Northwest Company, and had come from Fort William, after the news of the declaration of war had been received there, and that they gave the same account of the Canadian and savage force, and its destination, as is contained in Mr. McKenzie's letter. They further stated to me, that a large body of savages were collected at the outlet of Lake Superior, and that two thousand savages, according to the best estimate they

could make, were at Michilimackinac, prepared to proceed and join the British force at Malden. Lieutenant Hanks was killed in the fort at Detroit, which deprived me of his testimony. Doctor Day and Mr. Stone, who were both at Michilimackinac, and present when Lieutenant Hanks made the communication to me, in their testimony on my trial, fully confirmed the statement here made.”

Second.—Another and more important source of danger and difficulty in the position of General Hull, was, the interruption of his communications with Ohio, by the British and Indians. This source of embarrassment, its cause, and the fatal results to which it led, cannot be better stated than in General Hull’s own language. We therefore give the following extract from the eighteenth letter of his Memoirs on the Campaign of 1812, pp. 67, 8, 9.

“ On the 18th of June, after war was declared against Great Britain, the Secretary of War wrote me a letter, in which he informed me of the event (which letter was not received until 2d July), and ordered me to march the army I commanded to Detroit, with all possible expedition. At the time this order was given, the President of the United States well knew that no preparation was made to build a navy on Lake Erie, and that the enemy commanded it with a number of armed vessels and gun-boats. When, therefore, these fatal orders were given, those by whose authority they were given well knew, that the communication through the Lake would be closed against us, and that no reinforcements or supplies of

any kind could be obtained for the army through that channel. They well knew, that the State of Ohio was the nearest part of our country from which the necessary supplies could be furnished. They well knew, that the distance from any magazines where these supplies could be obtained, to the point where they ordered the army, was more than two hundred miles; and to the other posts, was more than five hundred miles. They also knew, that this distance was almost entirely a wilderness, filled with savages, who, in the event of war, would probably become hostile, and that the supplies could only be carried on pack-horses. The Administration also knew, that in three separate statements which I had made to the President, through the Secretary of War, I had observed, that, in the event of war, a navy on Lake Erie, superior to the British, was essential to success; and that without preserving the water communication, an army could not be supported at Detroit; and that Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Chicago, would inevitably fall into the hands of the enemy. Near the Miami of the Lake, I received the order which has been referred to, informing me of the declaration of war, and to march to Detroit. Had I not received this order, and the operations had been left to my discretion, I should not have marched to Detroit, eighteen miles in rear of the enemy, from a different quarter. I had served under General Washington from the commencement to the end of the Revolutionary war. I had observed how cautious he was in all his movements, to preserve a communication with his magazines.”



Colonel Proctor had arrived with reinforcements at Malden, and taken the command. One of his first acts was, to throw a detachment across the river to Brownstown, consisting of a small number of the 41st and of Indians, under Tecumseh, to occupy the woods and prevent provisions from reaching General Hull's army, along its communications. General Hull at the same time received intelligence, that a party of volunteers from Ohio had arrived at the river Raisin, escorting some cattle, destined for the supply of the army. General Hull detached two hundred men, under Major Vanhorne, with orders to proceed to the river Raisin, and guard these cattle safely to the camp. Major Vanhorne's party was suddenly attacked by the Indians, and entirely defeated.

Brock's biographer says, that but seventy Indians were engaged, and no British, and adds, that "in this affair, General Hull's despatches, and the correspondence of his army, fell into the hands of Tecumseh, and it was partly the desponding nature of their contents, which afterwards induced Major-General Brock to attempt the capture of the American army." \*

\* "On this occasion the force of the enemy was greatly exaggerated, as it was in many other instances. Major Vanhorne, though a gentleman and a soldier, was certainly not entitled to the praise bestowed upon him by some of his countrymen. Being warned of his danger, he should have taken care to prevent a surprise, and had he done so, he would doubtless have been victorious.

The enemy had a great advantage in the ground, but in point of numbers, he was not superior. I do not wish to detract from the real merit of Vanhorne, but at Detroit in Oct. 1813, I was informed by an American gentleman of high standing, who had made particular inquiry, that the force of the enemy in this case, did not exceed 40 British and 70 Indians, and this statement is cor-



Neither Major Vanhorne nor his troops appear to very great advantage in this affair. Vanhorne, in his testimony, says, that when they were attacked he ordered them to retreat to the edge of the wood, instead of attempting to charge; that he imagined from the number of guns fired, the enemy to be most numerous; that the men retreated a quarter of a mile before they could be got into line, and that even then, though no enemy was in sight, and the firing had ceased, he ordered them to retreat again—whereupon, it seems, they ran away in disorder, and the loss was 18 killed, 12 wounded, and 70 *missing*. Yet Major Vanhorne was one of the officers who afterwards testified, on General Hull's trial, that his Commander was, in his opinion, under the influence of fear at the time of the surrender. General Hull's communications were now effectually cut off, and this was the second source of difficulty in his situation.

Third.—It will be remembered that, according to the plan of the Northwestern Campaign, advised by General Hull and approved by the Secretary of War, it was determined that Canada should be invaded by two co-operating armies. From two points, Detroit and Niagara, armies were to march simultaneously into Upper Canada. The charge of one had been confided to General Hull, and he had thus far performed all that had been required of him. He had

roborated by the fact, that the main army was still in Canada, and the British being in daily expectation of an attack on Malden, would not send

a large detachment to the American side." See McAfee's History, page 75.

cut a road through the wilderness, and with an energy and celerity, to which even the British bore testimony,\* had reached Detroit, and invaded Canada. He did this, fully relying on promised co-operation and support. He had so often and so urgently represented the necessity of a fleet on Lake Erie, co-operation at Niagara, and reinforcements from Ohio, that he had depended on his Government for this support. He was disappointed in all. All these measures were seen and admitted to be important, but their execution was delayed, until the fate of his army was sealed.

Large reinforcements were ordered from Ohio and Kentucky, but not soon enough to open General Hull's communications, or afford him any relief. A fleet was placed on Lake Erie, but it was not till a year after the surrender of Detroit. Forces were at last assembled at Niagara, but not until General Hull's army had been captured.

As early as June 26th, Major General Dearborn was ordered to proceed to Albany and prepare the force to be collected at that place, for *actual service*.† In this letter it was said, "Preparations, it is presumed, will be made to move in a direction for Niagara, Kingston, or Montreal." This was in accordance with a plan of the campaign submitted to the

\* "Should General Hull be compelled to relinquish his operations against Amherstburg, it will be proper that his future movements be most carefully observed, as his late march exhibits a more than ordi-

nary character of enterprise."—Sir George Prevost's letter of July 31st to General Brock.

† See appendix for the official correspondence of General Dearborn and the Secretary of War.

Secretary of War by General Dearborn himself, by which Canada was to be invaded from Detroit, Niagara, Sacket's Harbour, and Lake Champlain—the two last armies being destined for Kingston and Montreal. But owing either to the want of preparation in the country at large, to the dilatory proceedings of the Administration, the negligence of General Dearborn, or all these causes united, the result was, that General Hull's army was the only one which was able to invade Canada at all, till long after this time. Indeed, so great was the confusion and want of plan at Washington and Albany, that General Dearborn did not even know whether or not he was to have the command of the troops at Niagara. The Secretary of War writes to him July 26th, telling him of General Hull's arrival at Detroit, and saying, "*arrangements should immediately be made by you for co-operating with him at Niagara.*"

But General Dearborn meantime writes to the Secretary of War from Albany, July 28th, asking "*who is to have the command of the operations in Upper Canada? I take it for granted, that my command does not extend to that distant quarter.*"\* No troops being collected at Niagara, and it being very apparent to General Brock that there was no attack to be feared in that quarter, he was able to send troops to reinforce Malden.† No troops being collected at Sack-

\* Defence of General Dearborn by his son, Boston, 1824. "My last to your Excellency was dated the 12th inst., since which

† Letter of General Brock to Sir George Prevost, July 20, 1812: nothing extraordinary has occurred in this communication. The enemy

et's Harbour, and no movement being made on Lake Champlain, Sir George Prevost was able to send troops to Upper Canada.\* Nor was this all: Instead of co-operating with General Hull, General Dearborn acceded to an armistice, proposed by Sir George Prevost, by which he agreed that the troops opposed to each other at Niagara should act on the defensive only: thus allowing General Brock to send reinforcements to Malden, while he deprived himself of the power of aiding General Hull by demonstrations on the Niagara frontier.

General Hull found himself therefore entirely deprived of the assistance on which he had depended.†

has evidently diminished his force, and appears to have no intention of making an immediate attack. \* \* \* \* Should the communication between Kingston and Montreal be cut off, the fate of the troops in this part of the province will be decided. \* \* \* It is evidently not the intention of the enemy to make any attempt to penetrate into the province by this strait, unless the present force be diminished."

\* "You may rely on every exertion being made to preserve uninterrupted the communication between Kingston and Montreal, and that I will also give all possible support to your endeavours to overcome every difficulty. One hundred effective of the Newfoundland, and fifty picked men of the Veterans, left this in boats on Thursday; they were intended to reinforce the garrison at

Kingston. I am glad to find that the new arrival of the Royals, expected at Quebec to-morrow, will give you the reinforcement of the 49th Regiment, which, with the detachment of the Newfoundland and Veterans, and gun-boat No. 7, will add something to your present strength. I shall order Major Ormsby, with three companies of the 49th Regiment, to proceed from Montreal to Kingston, to be disposed of as you may find necessary." Letters to General Brock from Sir George Prevost and his officers at Quebec, from 31st July to 2d August.

† "Those who are most severe in their condemnation of General Hull admit the injury inflicted on him by these measures of the Commanding General. Thus Armstrong (Notices, &c., Vol. I. p. 97)

He is told by the Secretary of War (June 24), which letter was not received until the 9th of July, that "an adequate force cannot soon be relied upon for the

speaks as follows: "We have already stated, that to lessen the pressure on General Hull and to reinstate the ascendancy he had lost on the Detroit, Major General Dearborn, who, in the distribution of service for the year 1812, had been assigned to the command of the Northern army, was directed to make such movements against the British posts in his front, as would have the effect of preventing them from reinforcing the garrison of Malden; or otherwise altering the relations as to strength, which had hitherto existed between Hull and Proctor. But for this service, the Major-General had made no preparation, and appeared to have little relish,\* as on the very day on which

\* In the General's letter of the 8th August, we find an apology for this inaction, quite as unjustifiable as the inaction itself. "*Till now,*" he says, "I did not consider the Niagara frontier as coming within the limits of my command"—an assertion directly contradicted by the armistice entered into between him and Prevost, and utterly inconsistent with the orders he received from the 26th of June to the 1st of August. For these orders, see Appendix No. 10 to Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, as follows:

"Orders given to General Dearborn by the Secretary of War, in relation to the Niagara frontier.

"June 26, 1812. Your preparations (at Albany), it is presumed, will be made to move in a direction for Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal.

"July 15. On your arrival at Albany, your attention will be directed to the security of the *Northern frontier by the Lakes*. July 20th. You will make such arrangements with Governor Tompkins as will *place the militia, detached by him for the Niagara and other posts on the Lake, under your control*. July 29th. Should it be advisable to make any other disposition of these restless people (the warriors of the Seneca Tribe of Indians), you will give orders to Mr. Granger and the *commanding officer at Niagara*. August 1st. You will make a diversion in favour of him (General Hull) *at Niagara and Kingston*, as soon as may be practicable." How, we would ask, is it possible for the General, with these orders in his Portfolio, to believe that the Niagara frontier had not been within the limits of his command? And if he did so believe, by what authority did he extend the armistice (entered into between him and Prevost), to that frontier? As, however, the inaction which enabled Brock to leave his posts on the Niagara undisturbed and unmenaced, and even to carry with him a part of his force to Detroit, and there to capture Hull, his army and territory, was not noticed by any kind of disapprobation on the part of the Government, the inference is fair that it (the Government) was willing to take the responsibility on itself.

No. 11 of Armstrong's Notices in the Appendix, is the following. "Extract of a letter from Sir George Prevost to General Brock, dated 30th of August, 1812:

"I consider it most fortunate, that I have been able to prosecute this



reduction of the enemy's posts below you." From the north he hears of the fall of Michilimackinac and of the approach of 2000 hostile Indian warriors and 1200 employées of the Northwest Company. In front of his own army, he finds reinforcements continually arriving, of regulars and militia, to strengthen the British troops at Malden. On the Lake, his communications were cut off by the British fleet; on the south, by land, his communications were cut off by the Indians, and an attempt to restore them by Vanhorne's detachment, had been unsuccessful. Within his own army, ignorant and incapable of understanding this state of things, there was a spirit of insubordination and mutiny, fostered and encouraged even by the militia officers themselves. In this state of affairs, on the 7th of August he received letters from General Hall and General Porter, commanding at Niagara and Black Rock, informing him that a large number of boats filled with British troops had passed over Lake

he was thus instructed by the Government, (though sufficiently apprised that detachments had been sent to Malden, and that the situation of Hull was becoming more critical every moment,) he did not hesitate to enter into an armistice, by which he completely disabled himself from giving any aid to that officer; either

by vigorously assailing the British posts in his front, (now rendered comparatively weak by the absence of Brock and the troops carried with him,) or by extending to him and his army the benefits of the temporary suspension of hostilities into which he had entered."

object of the Government (the armistice), without interfering with your operations on the Detroit. I have sent you men, money, and stores of all kinds." See Life and Services of Sir George Prevost;—a *ruse de guerre*, as creditable to the shrewdness and sagacity of Sir George Prevost, as it was disreputable, for the obtuseness or treachery of General Dearborn.‡



Ontario to the west part of it, and were directing their course to Malden; and likewise that the British forces, with the Canadian militia and savages, on the opposite side of the Niagara river, were moving by water to the same point; and what was more decisive still, General Hull was informed by the same letters, that no assistance or co-operation would be afforded from that quarter to the troops under his command.

Under these circumstances to attack Malden, even if the attack were successful, would have been useless. To take Malden, would not open the Lake nor the forest; would bring no supplies to his troops, and it must soon have fallen again for want of them. The first thing to be done was, to re-open the communication through the wilderness to Ohio. For this purpose, General Hull re-crossed with his army to Detroit on the evening of the 7th of August, leaving a sufficient body of troops intrenched and fortified on the other bank, to enable him to regain the British shore, as soon as his communications were clear.

The afternoon of the day in which the army completed crossing the river, Colonel Miller of the 4th regiment was detached with a body of 600 men, consisting of the effective men of his own regiment and a selection of the most effective of the militia. They took with them a company of artillery, with a six-pounder and a howitzer, and a company of cavalry.

About fourteen miles from Detroit, at Maguago, they met a body of British soldiers and Indians intrenched behind a breastwork of logs

The British were commanded by Major Muir of the 41st, and the Indians by Tecumseh.

Notwithstanding the advantages of their position, Colonel Miller was enabled, by a gallant charge, to break their line, and force them from it at the point of the bayonet. The British and Indians retreated, and were pursued about two miles.

The communications with the river Raisin were now opened, and the distance from the battle ground was only sixteen or eighteen miles, and yet, instead of marching on, Colonel Miller and his troops returned to Detroit. The reasons assigned were, that the troops had thrown down their knapsacks of provisions at the beginning of the action, which were lost; that they had to wait till provisions could be sent from Detroit the next day; that they did not get these provisions till late the next day, and they were only sufficient for one or two meals, and that Colonel Miller sent for a further supply, and a storm of rain coming on, they were ordered back to Detroit.\*

\* "It is plain," says Armstrong, "that Col. Miller should have marched on, even if it had been necessary to carry him in a litter, for he was not more than twenty-two miles" (Miller says in his testimony, sixteen or eighteen) "from Col. Brush, who had 150 men and plenty of provisions. If he had been too sick to proceed in any manner, one of the other Colonels should have been sent in his place, without waiting for more supplies from Detroit. The detachment having beaten the

enemy, could have reached the river Raisin in a day, and without suffering much from the want of provisions."

It seems evident either that Miller was to blame for not going on, or that the difficulties of the road along the river were so great that it could not be kept permanently open by any force. Gen. Hull was able to employ. As Colonel Miller has always shown himself an able and gallant officer, the last supposition is no doubt the true one.

General Hull's account of this transaction and his subsequent steps, is as follows :

Extract from Hull's Memoirs, page 73: "As soon as I received an account of the action, a reinforcement of one hundred men, with a supply of provisions under the command of Colonel McArthur, was ordered to join Colonel Miller's detachment at Maguago. As soon as the detachment had recruited from its fatigue, my intention was, that it should have proceeded on the expedition to the river Raisin. A severe storm of rain intervened, and the troops were exposed to it, without any covering. I therefore thought it expedient, on account of their great fatigue, to order them back to Detroit, and make an arrangement by another route to open the communication.

"The road to the river Raisin, which passed through the Indian village of Brownstown, being principally on the margin of the Detroit river, both troops and convoys could easily be annoyed by the gun-boats and armed vessels of the enemy. Besides, in its course, there was only the river which separated it from the enemy's principal post at Malden. Being thus situated, it was almost impossible to secure it in such a manner as that convoys could pass with any kind of safety. After Colonel Miller's return to Detroit, therefore, seeing the indispensable necessity of obtaining the supplies which had arrived at the river Raisin, and being informed of a circuitous route, distant from the river, I thought it expedient to make the attempt in that direction. I communicated my intentions to Colonels McArthur and Cass,

and they not only fully approved of the measure, but offered their services as volunteers, on the expedition. I likewise communicated to them a letter from Captain Brush, who commanded the escort of provisions, informing me that he should take the back road, and should have occasion for support. I authorized Colonels McArthur and Cass to select the most healthy and effective men of their regiments, and directed the Quarter-Master to furnish pack-horses to carry provisions for them during their march. On the 14th of August, they commenced their march, under the command of Colonel McArthur, attended by Colonel Cass.”

## CHAPTER III.

SITUATION OF GENERAL HULL.—BROCK'S ARRIVAL AT MALDEN.—SURRENDER OF DETROIT.—ITS REASONS.—STATE OF COMMUNICATIONS, TROOPS, PROVISIONS.

WE have seen that General Hull made three attempts to open his communications to Ohio. The first was on August 4th, by means of Major Vanhorne's detachment of 200 men, which was defeated by a small body of British and Indians. The second was on August 8th, by Colonel Miller's detachment of 600 men, who defeated the enemy, but returned to Detroit without effecting their object. The third was by means of McArthur and Cass's detachment, which set out August 14th, to go by a back route.

While these operations were taking place in the American camp, Major-General Brock had been making energetic efforts to reinforce and relieve Malden. He had sent Colonel Proctor, an officer in whom he placed much confidence, to take the command in the place of St. George. Reinforcements had been sent with him, and previously some militia were ordered to proceed to Long Point, on Lake Erie, where General Brock soon followed. He left York on the 6th of August,\* taking with him a body

\* Life of Brock, page 224.

of 250 militia from that place; on his way he held a Council with the Mohawks on Grand river, who promised him a reinforcement; and embarked at Long Point on Lake Erie, with about 300 militia, besides his regulars, and proceeded by water to Amherstburg or Malden. He reached Amherstburg on the 13th of August, and had an interview with Tecumseh, and held a Council, which was attended by 1000 Indian warriors. They expressed their joy at General Brock's arrival, and their determination to assist him to the last drop of their blood. On the 15th of August, he sent a summons to General Hull, calling on him to surrender the fort.† General Hull answered that he had no other reply to make, than to say, that he was prepared to meet any force at his disposal, and any consequences which might result from the exercise of it.

\* Life of Brock, page 228. The number here incidentally given, shows the actual Indian force at Detroit, to be much greater than was afterwards stated. Indians love war, and these were inflamed with animosity and hope of plunder. It is not likely that any of this thousand were absent at the time of the attack, nor is it probable, that all the Indians were present at the Council.

† General Brock's letter was as follows: "The force at my disposal, authorizes me to require of you the immediate surrender of Fort Detroit. It is far from my intention to

join in a war of extermination; but you must be aware that the numerous bodies of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops, will be beyond my control, the moment the contest commences. You will find me disposed to enter into such conditions as will satisfy the most scrupulous sense of honour, Lieutenant-Colonel McDonnell and Major Glegg are fully authorized to conclude any arrangements that may lead to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood.

(Signed) ISAAC BROCK,  
*Major-General.*"



That afternoon a fire was opened upon Detroit, from a battery erected opposite, at Sandwich, and the cannonade was returned by an American battery of 24-pounders. General Hull immediately sent word to Colonels McArthur and Cass to return to Detroit, with their detachment. Early the next morning General Brock crossed the river about five miles below Detroit, having sent over a large force of Indian warriors the night before, to protect his landing, which was also made under cover of two ships of war. According to his own official account, his forces consisted of 330 regulars, 400 militia, and 600 Indians, or 1330 in all; but no doubt it exceeded this number, as we have seen that 1000 Indians met at the Council two days before, and that commanders are very apt, even when meaning to tell the truth, to exaggerate the enemy's forces and underrate their own. General Brock certainly did the one, in estimating General Hull's force at 2500, since there is no possible mode of making it amount to one-half of that number. Colonel Cass, whose object evidently was to make Brock's force as small, and Hull's as large as possible, and who estimates the former at 300 less than General Brock's own estimate, does not make General Hull's effective force more than 1060 in all. We shall see, hereafter, that it was much less than this.

General Brock's intention in crossing the river was, to wait in a strong position the effect of his force, displayed before the American camp; but hearing of Colonel McArthur's absence with 500 men,

he decided on an immediate attack.\* He therefore advanced toward the fort, and was preparing for an assault, when General Hull determined to surrender; an act which, condemned as it has been, we cannot but consider, on maturest reflection, the bravest and noblest action of a life, hitherto universally regarded as that of a brave and patriotic man.

It would have required very little courage to fight. General Hull had been in many battles of the Revolution. There probably was not an officer or soldier in his whole army, who had seen half as much of war as himself. He had led a column of seven companies at the taking of Stony Point with the bayonet, under General Wayne; for his conduct in which action he received the thanks of Washington, and promotion in

\* General Brock's despatch of 17th of August. General Brock knew very well what he was about. He knew the weakness of the American camp and the difficulties with which they were surrounded. He knew that they were probably in want of provisions, for he had expressed the opinion in a letter to Sir George Prevost, that this want had induced General Hull to invade Canada: "I doubt whether General Hull had instructions to cross on this side the river. I rather suspect he was compelled by want of provisions" (*Letter of Brock, July 29th*), and he knew that his supplies had been since cut off for a long time. General Brock thus speaks in a letter of Sep. 3d: "Some say that nothing could

be more desperate than the measure; but I answer, that the state of the province admitted only of desperate remedies. I got possession of the letters my antagonist addressed to the Secretary of War, and also of the sentiments which hundreds of his army uttered to their friends. Confidence in their General was gone, and evident despondency prevailed throughout. I crossed the river, contrary to the opinion of Colonel Proctor, &c., it is therefore no wonder that envy should attribute to good fortune, *what in justice* to my own discernment, I must say, proceeded from a cool calculation of the *pours* and *contres*." Brock's Life, page 267.

the service. He was in the midst of the battle of White Plains, and was there wounded.

He was in the battles of Trenton and Princeton, and was promoted for his conduct in those engagements. He fought at Ticonderoga, at Bemis' Heights, in the battle of October 7th, at Monmouth, Morrissania, and other places, and led regiments and battalions in most of these actions. Now the courage which can engage in a battle is very much a thing of habit. Many men are cowards in their first battle; almost all men are brave in their tenth. Is it likely, therefore, that General Hull should have been the only man in his army, disabled by fear, from fighting General Brock? Is not this supposition an absurdity? What then were his reasons, as given by himself? General Hull was now in the position in which, as he had stated before the war to the Administration, Detroit must fall. His communications to Ohio were cut off by the Indians in the woods; his communication by the Lake, by the British vessels; and he had no co-operation below, at Niagara. Under these circumstances, the fall of Detroit was inevitable. If he should fight a battle and defeat the British army, this result would not be less inevitable, for a victory would not re-open his communications. Besides this, his forces were vastly inferior to those of the enemy; his provisions were nearly exhausted, and there was no possibility of obtaining a supply from any quarter. If he were to fight, he would save his own reputation, but could not save the army or territory, and he would be exposing the defenceless inhabitants of

Michigan to all the horrors of Indian warfare, without a reason or an object. Under these circumstances, it would be the part of a selfish man to fight; it was the part of a brave and generous man, to hazard the sacrifice of his own reputation as a soldier, and his own selfish feelings, to his duty as a Governor and a man. General Hull did the last—and to the time of his death, never regretted it for a moment. In disgrace; condemned to death as a coward; believed to be a traitor by the ignorant; seeing the success of his calumniators, who built their fortunes on the ruin of his own; he was always calm, tranquil, and happy. He knew that his country would one day also understand him, and that history would at last do him justice. He was asked, on his death-bed, whether he still believed he had done right, in the surrender of Detroit—and he replied, that he did, and was thankful that he had been enabled to do it.

The defence of General Hull rests mainly on the following propositions :

1. An army in the situation of that of General Hull, August 16th—cut off from its supplies, and with no adequate means of opening its communications—*must inevitably fall.*

2. That in this situation, to fight, would have been a useless expenditure of life, and would have unnecessarily exposed the inhabitants of the Territory to Indian cruelties.

3. That this situation was not his fault, but that of the General Government, of General Dearborn, and of circumstances for which no one is perhaps responsible.

4. That the troops of General Hull, on August 16th, were much inferior in number to General Brock's.

5. That the provisions of the army were nearly exhausted, and no further supplies could be obtained.

We will now advance the arguments and facts which will establish these propositions.

I. An army in the situation of that of General Hull, August 16th, must inevitably fall.

This appears from the following considerations. General Hull was posted twenty miles in the rear of the enemy's principal fortress. He was between two and three hundred miles distant from the base of his operations, from which all his supplies were to be drawn. His communication with those supplies was through a wilderness, filled with hostile Indians, and for seventy-five miles along a river and lake, exposed to the cannon of the British ships. This communication was now completely cut off, and two attempts at re-opening it had failed. The Lake was in the enemy's power, and could not be taken from them. He was informed that no diversion was to be made in his favour at Niagara, to draw off the enemy's troops from before him. If he should fight, and destroy the army in his front, the enemy's ships and Indians would still remain controlling the line of his communications.

No proposition in military affairs is more universally admitted than this, that an army separated from its supplies, must fall. History is full of instances in support of it—and one of the main efforts of strat-

egic art, is always to protect one's own communications from the approach of the enemy, and to cut off his. The line between an army and its magazines is its most vital and tender part.

Every thing in fact goes to show, that the power which held the Lake, must also keep possession both of Detroit and Malden. When General Harrison had advanced with a large army in September, 1812, to the neighbourhood of Detroit, he first proposed to take it by *coup de main*. He then relinquished this plan as impracticable, and formed a second, which was to accumulate large supplies of men and provisions at the Rapids of the Miami, and then to move forward from that point in October. But he found it necessary to relinquish this project also, and next determined to accomplish the same result by a winter expedition. But he was finally obliged to wait a whole year, until Perry's fleet was built, and the naval victory of September, 1813, gained, which gave the control of Lake Erie to the Americans. As soon as this event took place, the British Commander evacuated Detroit and Malden, without even waiting for the American forces to appear. Detroit and Malden fell naturally into the power of the United States, almost without an effort, the moment that Lake Erie was under its control.

II. It has been frequently said that supplies of provisions might have been procured by General Hull from the Territory itself. This statement was first made by Colonel Cass, in his celebrated letter of September 10th, 1812, and has been repeated after



him by a multitude of writers, none of whom have taken pains to examine whether there was any foundation for it or not. Colonel Cass's words are: "The state of our provisions has not been generally understood. On the day of surrender we had fifteen days' provisions of every kind on hand. Of meat, there was plenty in the country, and arrangements had been made for purchasing and grinding flour. It was calculated we could readily procure three months' provisions, independent of 150 barrels of flour, and 1300 head of cattle, which had been forwarded from Ohio, and which remained at the river Raisin, under Captain Brush, within reach of the army."

If this statement is correct, of course the surrender of General Hull's army cannot be defended on the ground of a want of provisions. We shall show hereafter, that it was impossible that fifteen or even five days' provision should have been on hand at the time of the surrender, and that Colonel Cass had no means of knowing it, and no ground for making the statement. As to the cattle and flour at the river Raisin, "within reach of the army," we have seen, that before General Brock crossed the river, Major Vanhorne and Colonel Miller had both attempted to reach it, the one with 200 and the other with 600 men, and that both had failed. Was it more attainable now, when General Brock's regulars and militia, and a thousand Indians, at least, under Tecumseh, were between it and Detroit? In the statement, that three months' provisions could be obtained in the country, Colonel Cass gives no authority. He cau-

tiously says, "It was calculated." Who made the calculation does not appear. But it is very remarkable, that only one month before the date of this letter, and four days before the surrender, Colonel Cass should have made quite a different statement to Governor Meigs.

In a letter to Governor Meigs, dated August 12th, and signed by Colonel Cass, he says: "The letter of the Secretary of War to you, a copy of which I have seen, authorizes you to preserve and keep open the communication from the State of Ohio to Detroit. *It is all important that it should be kept open. Our very existence depends upon it. Our supplies must come from our State. This country does not furnish them.* In this existing state, nothing but a large force, of 2000 men at least, will effect the object.\*

But this was not the only letter in which Colonel Cass expressed his opinion. On General Hull's trial, Willis Silliman, a brother in-law of Colonel Cass by marriage with his sister, testified, that he had received a letter from Colonel Cass, dated August 12th, which said: "Our situation is become critical. If things get worse, you will have a letter from me, giving a particular statement of this business. *Bad as you may think of our situation, it is still worse than you believe.* I cannot descend into particulars, lest this should fall into the hands of the enemy."

Silliman testified, that he had another letter from Colonel Cass, dated 3d August, in which he urged him to use his exertions to hasten the march of troops.

\* McAfee, page 83.

from Ohio; and said, that men and provisions were both necessary, and would be necessary; and that “*provisions are or would be necessary for the existence of the troops.*” Two other witnesses, who had read these letters, confirmed Silliman’s testimony.\* Colonel Cass as we have seen, in his letter of September 10th, declares, that “three months’ provisions” could easily be procured in Michigan, for the supply of the army. As a witness on General Hull’s trial, he testified to the same effect, under oath. General Hull was on trial for his life, and Colonel Cass swore, “that his opinion, founded on the opinion of the inhabitants and upon experience, was, that provisions might have been procured there, sufficient for the support of the army for three or four months.”

It was very improper that an *opinion* should be received as evidence on a trial for a capital offence; and yet this opinion, we have seen, was in contradiction to his previous statements to Governor Meigs and Mr. Silliman. Colonel Snelling also testified on General Hull’s trial (Forbes, page 41), that *he did not know* of any scarcity of provisions.

\* Hull’s Trial, Forbes’ Report, p. 135. Silliman’s testimony, and that of *Peter Mills* and *Daniel Conyers*. Also of Public Records, War Office, Washington. If many such letters as this were written by the officers of General Hull’s army, we can understand how those taken by Brock should have encouraged him to attack Detroit. In the “Life of

Brock,” it is said, that at the defeat of Vanhorne’s detachment, “General Hull’s despatches and the correspondence of his troops, fell into the hands of Tecumseh, and it was partly the desponding nature of their contents which afterwards induced Major-General Brock to attempt the capture of the American army.” Page 223.

Captain Baker (page 35) said, on the same trial, "*I am of opinion*, that there was plenty of cattle and grain in the country."—But of any *facts* on which he grounded that opinion, he was wholly silent. On the other hand, what was the testimony of those who had a knowledge of facts, and something else besides a vague opinion to adduce? It was proved by competent witnesses, that so far from there being a surplus of cattle and grain in the country, to support the army for three months, the country had never produced enough for the supply of its own inhabitants in time of peace.\*

Captain Maxwell (Forbes' Report, p. 128) testified on Hull's trial, that he had lived thirteen years in Ohio, and had been engaged every year in driving cattle and hogs from thence to Detroit market; from 1000 to 1500 hogs annually, and from 150 to 200 head of cattle.

Captain Dyson, of 1st artillery, testified (Hull's Trial, page 134) "that he, witness, was in command at Detroit from 1805 to 1808; that a great number of cattle and hogs were driven thither from Ohio; that the contractors got the principal of the pork by that means; that the inhabitants could buy cheaper than they could raise them, and *there was not enough raised to subsist the inhabitants*; that the Canadian people were not industrious in cultivating their farms."

\* "The population of Michigan at this time, was about 5000 souls. Most of those who cultivated the land, were Canadians. They were miserable farmers, and depended chiefly on hunting, fishing, and trading with the Indians, for their support."—Hull's Memoirs, page 76.

Colonel Watson testified (Hull's Trial, page 148) that he had lived in the Territory of Michigan six years, up to the time of the surrender; that in 1810 he had taken the census, and found the number of inhabitants in the whole Territory 4762, of which the district of Detroit, which extended 35 miles along the river, contained 2227; that in taking the census he had particularly inquired of the heads of families as to the produce of the country, and that into Detroit district "great quantities of flour and whisky were brought from New-York and Pennsylvania, and of cattle and hogs from Ohio; these last are purchased by the inhabitants for their consumption, and in times of peace, they are also purchased by the British agents, and carried to Malden. The cattle and hogs were consumed by the inhabitants."

We have, then, on the one side, the opinions of Colonel Cass and others, *after* the surrender of Detroit, founded on vague impressions, conversations with persons unknown, and upon ignorance of any thing to the contrary, that there was provision enough in the country to last an army of 1500 men two or three months. On the other hand, we have the written opinion of Colonel Cass *before* the surrender, that supplies must come from Ohio, for that Michigan did not furnish them; and testimony to prove that the inhabitants did actually purchase provisions for their own consumption, from Ohio and elsewhere.

If anything more is needed to show that no supplies could be procured in Michigan, we have an incidental proof in General Brock's letters. Before the surren-

der, we have seen, that he supposed that General Hull had been driven into Canada by want of provisions. And in a letter, dated September 9th, 1812,\* he writes thus to Sir George Prevost :

“ It appears evident the enemy meditates a second attempt on Amherstburg. The greater parts of the troops which are advancing, marched from Kentucky, with an intention of joining General Hull. How they are to subsist, even *for a short period, in that already exhausted country, is no easy matter to conceive.* This difficulty will probably decide them on some bold measure, in the hope of shortening the campaign. If successfully resisted, their fate is inevitable.”

If it be suggested, that if General Hull had defended himself, supplies would have been brought from Ohio for his army, accompanied by a force sufficiently large to open the communications, and keep them open, we answer this, by referring again to General Harrison's vain attempts to reach Detroit in the fall and winter of 1812. He had ample means both in men and supplies, but he writes, (October 22d, 1812,) “ to get supplies forward, through a swampy wilderness of near 200 miles, in wagons or on pack-horses, which are to carry their provisions, is absolutely impossible.”†

If it be said that General Hull might have saved his army by a retreat to the Miami, the answer is this: He suggested this measure to his officers, when the army re-crossed the river from Canada, and was

\* Life of Brock, page 286.

Armstrong, Notices, &c. Vol. 1,

† Harrison's letter, quoted by page 59.



told that if he did this, the militia would desert to a man. Nor was a retreat at that time absolutely necessary, for there were still hopes of the communication being opened by Miller's detachment. When General Brock arrived, it was too late to retreat, as General Hull shows, in the following passage of his *Memoirs of the Campaign*, pp. 98 and 99 :

“ I must ask you, in this case, to examine some general maps of the country, from Detroit to the foot of the Rapids of the Miami of Lake Erie. The distance is about seventy miles. The only road through which I could have retreated, runs from Detroit as far as Brownstown, on the banks of the Detroit river, about twenty miles, and from Brownstown to the foot of the Rapids, about fifty miles ; in some places on, and in others near the borders of Lake Erie. This road was very difficult to pass, a great part of it being through a wilderness, and had only been opened by an army, when advancing to Detroit. Its course, for seventy miles, being on the margin of a navigable river and the Lake ; and General Brock with his army being opposite to Detroit, with a number of armed vessels, gun-boats, and a sufficient number of flats, to move his troops on the water ; he would have had such an advantage in attacking a retreating army, especially when aided by his numerous tribes of savages, that I then thought, and I now think, that an attempt of the kind would have resulted in the total destruction of the army. With his boats, protected by his armed vessels and gun-boats, his troops might have been moved on those smooth waters, with the great-

est celerity, and landed in the front, rear, or on the flank, and harassed my march in such a manner, that it would have been impossible to have effected it: besides, we must have encountered the difficulty of passing a number of rivers, without boats, and over which there were no bridges. The only places where some of these rivers could have been crossed, were near the navigable waters, commanded by the enemy's naval armament, and no boats could have been provided for the purpose. There would have been no other mode of effecting the passage, but by swimming or constructing rafts, in the face of the enemy."

General Hull might, no doubt, have taken measures which would have conduced to his personal advantage, far more than those which he adopted. If he had had less reason and judgment, he might have attempted to take Malden by storm, with his militia and the 4th regiment.

No one who knows the conduct of our militia in all the battles in which they were engaged in 1812, can doubt, that, in attacking without cannon, a fortified place, defended with artillery, they would have been repulsed with disgrace and serious loss. There would have been a useless waste of life on the part of the army, but General Hull would have had the credit for courage and energy, and his soldiers would have been made more cautious by the lesson. Then, when General Brock attacked Detroit, if General Hull had been a less disinterested man, and had acted in reference to his own military credit, he would have attempted to defend himself. But General Hull

had long since, during the war of the Revolution, established his character as a man of courage, and a soldier skilled in the science of war. He considered that it devolved upon him to protect the inhabitants of Detroit from the tomahawk of the savages, and he therefore assumed the responsibility of a capitulation, leaving to his officers and troops the safe glory of boasting what they would have done, had they only been permitted to fight.

We will now show what was the state of the provisions at Detroit, at the time of the surrender, and we think it will appear by documentary and unquestionable evidence, that they must have been nearly exhausted at that time.

Here also we have, on one side, bold, repeated assertions, unsupported by any facts; and on the other side, we have arguments and proofs. It has been asserted over and over again, and continues to be repeated, that there were ample supplies of provisions at Detroit, at the surrender; and yet the testimony of the Government witnesses themselves, goes to prove the contrary.

Colonel Cass, in his testimony (Hull's Trial, page 23), asserts, "that the situation of the army in respect to provisions, was a subject of frequent conversations between General Hull and the officers—that *he never knew or understood, that the army was in want, or likely to want.*" Yet we have seen above, that he wrote to Governor Meigs, that the *very existence of the army depended on supplies being sent from Ohio*; and to his brother-in-law, Silliman, that pro-

visions were, or would be, necessary for the existence of the troops.

Colonel Cass, in giving this account of his conversations with General Hull, evidently means to convey the impression, that the fear of wanting provisions, was an afterthought with General Hull himself, and intended merely to justify his surrender. But a letter of General Hull to the Secretary of War,\* dated July 10th, only five days after the arrival of the army at Detroit, speaks in the strongest manner of the want of provisions which must ensue, if the communication with Ohio is not kept open by troops sent from that State. "The communication must be secured, or this army will be without provisions. This must not be neglected: if it is, this army will perish with hunger." It is certainly extraordinary, that when General Hull spoke thus strongly to the Secretary of War, of the probable wants of his army, that he should never, "in the frequent conversations," which Colonel Cass says he had with him on this sub-

\* Hull's Trial, Appendix, page 9.  
"Sir,—Mr. Beard, Augustus Porter's agent here, informed me, that in consequence of the Lake being closed against us, he cannot furnish the necessary supplies of provisions. I have therefore authorized Mr. Jno. H. Platt of Cincinnati (now here) to furnish two hundred thousand rations of flour, and the same quantity of beef. I have engaged to give him 5 per cent. on the amount of purchases, and pay his necessary expenses of transportation: he will

either hire or purchase pack-horses to transport the flour. I shall draw on you for the money necessary for the purpose. The communication must be secured, or this army will be without provisions. Troops will be absolutely necessary on the road to protect the provisions. This must not be neglected: if it is, this army will perish by hunger.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) WILLIAM HULL."

Hon. Wm. Eustis.

Detroit, July 10, 1812.

ject of provisions, have suggested that the army was even likely to be in want. It seems singular, that they should have talked so frequently on the subject, if there was no possible danger of want. Why did they talk about provisions at all, if they were in no danger of wanting them ?

The whole evidence which exists upon the state of provisions in Detroit, at the time of the surrender, is contained in the testimony given upon General Hull's trial. This evidence cannot be better summed up than in General Hull's own language, in his *Memoirs of the Campaign of 1812* :

“ Augustus Porter, of the State of New-York, was the contractor for furnishing this army. David Beard was his agent, and was present at Detroit. Mr. Beard was not only the agent, who did all the business at Detroit, but, I understood from him, had some share in the profits of the contract. He could have no motive to have diminished the quantity, because the United States must have paid for all that was on hand at the time of the capitulation. It will appear from the minutes of the trial, that his testimony was the last before I made my defence. By the contractor's agent's certificate, it will appear that, on the 9th of July, 1812, there was at Detroit 125,000 rations of flour, and 70,666 rations of meat ; and that on the 28th of July, there was 70,000 rations of flour, and 21,000 of meat.

“ Mr. Beard has certified that this statement was handed to me, containing the provisions in the contractor's store, and signed by him, as will appear by

the proceedings of the Court Martial on my trial. By this return, it will be seen what quantity was consumed from the 9th to the 28th of July, what quantity remained on hand the 28th of July—and by observing the same rule of consumption, it will appear what quantity would have been in store on the 16th of August, the day of the capitulation.

“By the data here given it will be shown, that if a ration of meat had been issued, the meat would have been exhausted on the 6th of August, ten days before the capitulation. And if, during those ten days, after the meat was exhausted, an additional quantity of flour had been issued, to make up the ration, as was the case, the whole of the flour would have been exhausted on the 16th of August, the day of the capitulation. It appears by the return of the contractor, that from the 9th to the 28th of July, 5334 rations of flour more than of meat were issued, and that practice was continued, in about the same proportion, until the 16th of August.

“Perhaps it may be asked by those unacquainted with my situation and the practice of armies, why so many more rations were daily issued than the number of effective men which composed the army? I will give the answer. It will appear by the foregoing memoirs, that the officers and soldiers from Michilimackinac had arrived at Detroit, prisoners on parole, and they had no other means of subsistence, but to receive rations. It likewise appears, that a large number of old Indian chiefs and sachems daily visited our camp, and were fed from the public stores, by order of the Government.”



III. We will now examine more particularly the number of troops under the command of General Brock and General Hull, respectively, at the time of the surrender of Detroit.

The most erroneous accounts have been given and repeated upon this point; one writer copying another, and no one going back to examine the evidence on either side. General Hull's troops have been exaggerated to numbers far greater than even the Government witnesses testified as composing his army, at the surrender. General Brock's troops have, in the same way, been reduced below the number which he himself admits to have crossed the river with him to the attack. Sometimes writers have contradicted themselves as well as the facts. Thus Mr. Charles J. Ingersoll, the latest historian of the War, says (page 81), that Brock crossed "the straits from Sandwich to Detroit with some 1200 men;" and presently after (page 82) says, "when Brock crossed the straits to attack Detroit, his whole force, white, red, and black, was but 1030." Meantime Brock himself, in his official report of the surrender, which Mr. Ingersoll might have found in half a dozen histories, admits his force to have been 1330, and specifies the number of regulars, militia, and Indians.\*

\* General Hull's force has been thus variously estimated by different writers;—

In "Defence of General Dearborn," by his son, at 2465.

General Brock (Off. Rep.), 2500.  
Colonel Cass (Letter September 10th, 1812), 1060.

Ingersoll (History of Second War, page 82), 1350.

General Brock's account of his troops, as contained in his official report to Sir George Prevost, dated August 17th, 1812, states his forces to have been as follows (Brock's Life, p. 250) :

“The force which I instantly directed to march against the enemy, consisted of 30 artillery, 240 of 41st regiment, 50 Royal Newfoundland regiment, 400 militia, and about 600 Indians, to which were attached three six-pounders and two three-pounders.”

General Brock's numbers then, by his own account, which he led to the attack of Detroit, were at least 1330. But he does not profess to give the number of the Indians with accuracy, and the probability is, that it was much greater than is here stated. By a statement of Captain Glegg, General Brock's aid-de-camp, it appears, that three days before, a thousand Indians attended a Council; and that these were warriors, appears from his saying, that their equipment was generally very imposing.\* Moreover, Lieutenant Forbush, an American prisoner at Malden, testified, on General Hull's trial,† that he counted, on 15th of August, six hundred warriors, passing up (that is to say, from Malden to Sandwich), some on horseback and some on foot. But a large body of Indians had attended General Brock's army, the previous day, from Malden to Sandwich, and were seen by hundreds of persons from the opposite bank. Now, as Sandwich is 18 miles from Malden, the 600 Indians whom Forbush counted at Malden, on the 15th, must have

\* Brock's Life, p. 228.

† Forbes' Report, p. 146.

been exclusive of the hundreds who were at Sandwich that very time. General Brock, then, had with him probably at least 1600 or 1700 men, when he attacked Detroit. Let us now see how many General Hull had with him at the same time.

By a letter of the Secretary of War, dated April 9th, 1812, the number of troops\* originally put under his command were, 1200 militia from the State of Ohio, and the 4th United States regiment, consisting of 300 men. By a return dated Fort Findlay, June 26th, while on his march, General Hull's army at that time, amounted to 2075. But this included all those on the rolls of the regiments, whether absent or present. It also included a number of straggling volunteers, who were not under General Hull's command, because unauthorized by the President's order to Governor Meigs; it included also the wagoners, pack-horse men, and other camp attendants, whose names must be in the returns, in order that they might draw rations. Thus the number of the 4th regiment is stated in this return at 483, whereas its actual number was much less.

Captain Snelling states that it had not more than 320 effective men, and in the aggregate about 400.† Colonel Miller states the effective force of the regiment on 16th August, at 250 or 260.‡

The troops originally put under General Hull's

\* Hull's Memoirs, page 55.

† Snelling's testimony, Hull's Trial, page 42.

‡ Colonel's Miller's testimony, Hull's Trial, p. 111. Ques. "What

was the strength of the 4th regiment on the last day of July, or the first of August, including the detachment of the first?" Ans. "I cannot say precisely, about 300,

command, consisted of 1500 men. To these are to be added the garrison of Detroit, consisting of 50, the volunteers who remained with the army amounting to perhaps 100, and the militia of Michigan. The whole population of Michigan consisted of 5000 souls, and was scattered along the shores of the lake and river, and was exposed to Indian depredations and attacks. Few of the militia, therefore, could be spared from the defence of their homes. Major Jesup states the number of Michigan militia at 400, but this includes those absent from Detroit.

The only testimony to the number of militia actually present on the 16th of August, is that of Colonel Watson (Trial of Gen. Hull, p. 149), who states the number under Colonel Brush on that day, at 150, he being himself with them at the time. The whole number of troops under General Hull's command from the beginning of his march until the surrender, was therefore,

1. Ohio Militia, . . . . .	1200
2. 4th United States regiment, . . . . .	300
3. Michigan Militia, . . . . .	150
4. Garrison at Detroit, . . . . .	50
5. Ohio Volunteers, . . . . .	100
	<hr/>
	1800

From this number, we must subtract those left behind killed, missing, detached, &c., namely :

principally in good health." Ques. were about 250 or 260, effective for  
 "What was its force on the morning duty."  
 of the surrender?" Ans. "There

1. Three Block-houses, built and garrisoned, say, *	( <sup>1</sup> )	30
2. Fort on the Miami, garrisoned,	( <sup>2</sup> )	30
3. Made prisoners on vessel,	( <sup>3</sup> )	50
4. Left sick at River Raisin,	( <sup>4</sup> )	25
5. Killed, wounded, &c., 4th August,	( <sup>5</sup> )	75
6. Do. do. 8th do.	( <sup>6</sup> )	80
7. Detachment under McArthur,	( <sup>7</sup> )	350
8. Sick,	( <sup>8</sup> )	200
		<hr/>
		840

Subtract 840 from 1800 leaves 960.

We will now give other testimony as to the number of General Hull's troops.

\* (1) Ten men for each block-house is certainly not a large allowance. (2) A subaltern officer and 30 men were left at this place, by order of the Secretary of War. (Hull's Memoirs, p. 119.) (3) Forbush's testimony. "Dr. Edwards was directed to take chief part of the hospital stores, and as many of the men, most sick, as the vessel could carry." Cass's testimony, Trial, p. 17. "About 40 or 50 men, invalids, his (witness's) own servant, and part of his baggage, were in the vessel." (4) Hull's Memoirs, p. 119. (5) Vanhorne's testimony, Hull's Trial, page 70. Hull's Memoirs, p. 119. (6) Colonel Miller's testimony, Hull's Trial, p. 108. "The loss in the battle, in killed and wounded was 81: he thinks 17 killed on the ground and 64 wounded. (7) Hull's Trial, Cass's testimony, p. 23. "Colonel Cass then

said, that he left Detroit on the 14th August, in the evening, with a detachment of about 350 men, under Colonel McArthur. (8) As the hospital stores and medicines had been taken in the packet by the British, the sick were numerous. We estimate them at 200, for the following reasons. Captain Eastman, of 4th U. S. regiment, testified on Hull's Trial, p. 99, that "the grand aggregate of that regiment, including a small detachment of the 1st, then unfit for duty, and the sick, was 345, on 15th August. Colonel Miller testified p. 111, that on the morning of August 16, there were about 250 or 260 effective for duty," consequently there must have been nearly 100 men disabled and sick in this single regiment. We cannot therefore estimate the number of sick in all four regiments at less than 200 men.

1. General Hull, in his official despatch giving an account of the surrender, says: "At this time the whole effective force at my disposal at Detroit, did not exceed 800 men."

2. Major Jessup's testimony is more particular. In Forbes' Report of Hull's Trial, it is as follows: "He stated also that he had received a report from different adjutants of different corps, estimating the men fit for action, and thinks that the amount (as stated in General Cass's letter) exceeded 1000 men, including the Michigan militia of 400, and the detachments absent with Colonels Cass and McArthur; perhaps this estimation includes the Michigan legion.

\* \* \* \* There were also some 30 or 40 armed wagoners."—Hull's Trial, p. 94. If we subtract from 1060 the 350 men absent under Cass and McArthur, and add the 40 wagoners, the whole number of troops present, according to Major Jessup, would be about 750.

3. Major Jessup, in his testimony on the trial, page 96, furnishes us with another estimate of the number of General Hull's troops on 16th of August, which makes it considerably larger than that just given. During his cross-examination by General Hull, he was asked, "Do you recollect the paper now presented, and in the words 'effective aggregate of the three regiments, about 700'?"

*Answer.* "It is in my handwriting, and was handed by me to General Hull, on the evening of August 15th. The wagoners of the regiments, I believe, were included in the estimate, but the 4th regiment



was not ; it was only what remained of Cass and McArthur's, and the whole of Colonel Findlay's regiment, and so explained at the time."

Major Jessup evidently included in this estimate all the effective force, except the 4th regiment, even to the wagoners. He makes it about 700 : add the effective of the 4th, (by Colonel Miller's testimony, 250 or 260 men,) and we have, as the total effective force under General Hull's command at the time of the surrender, about 950 men. But as he says "about 700 men," he may have exaggerated the numbers. We have then the following estimates of General Hull's troops :

1. Calculation of the numbers originally under his command, by subtracting those killed, detached, sick, &c.	960
2. General Hull's own statement,	800
3. Major Jessup's first statement,	750
4. Major Jessup's second estimate,	950
5. Colonel Cass's estimate in his letter of Sept. 10, makes the number	1060

But Colonel Cass was absent at the time, and Major Jessup tells us that the estimate in Colonel Cass's letter was derived from himself. Now, according to Forbes' Report of the Trial, Major Jessup's testimony, given under oath, makes the number 300 less. Almost all subsequent writers, in giving the number of General Hull's troops, have followed Colonel Cass, and made it amount to 1060, instead of recurring to the testimony, which would have shown it to be much less. If we take the average of the

first four estimates, which is 865, we shall probably have the number of General Hull's effective force, as nearly as it can now be ascertained.

IV. We have shown, that an army destitute of provisions, and cut off from its supplies, and which cannot re-open its communications, must inevitably fall; that General Hull's army was thus destitute, and thus incapable of opening its communications. We have shown that to succeed in the enterprise intrusted to General Hull, there was necessary the command of Lake Erie; ample reinforcements from Ohio, to keep open the road through the wilderness, and to support his army in its movements; and co-operation at Niagara. We have seen that he had no reinforcements from Ohio, that the Lake was under the control of the British, and from the absence of co-operation at Niagara, and the armistice of Dearborn, Prevost and Brock were enabled to accumulate troops at Malden and Sandwich. We have seen that by the fall of Mackinaw, the Indians and British from the Northwest were thrown upon Detroit: finally, we have endeavoured to prove, that at the time of the surrender, General Hull's effective force could not have exceeded 865, while those of Brock must have amounted at least to 1600 or 1700 men; besides large numbers of Indians near at hand, ready to reinforce him.

It only remains for us now to prove, that this condition of things was not the fault of General Hull, but was owing to the neglect, ignorance, errors, or inability of the Administration at Washington, and of the Commander-in-chief, General Dearborn.

1. It was certainly not General Hull's fault, that the British had the command of Lake Erie, for we have shown that in 1809, 1811, and 1812, he addressed official communications to the American Government, urging upon them the importance of gaining the control of the Lakes.

2. It certainly was not the fault of General Hull that his communications through Ohio were intercepted. It could not possibly be expected that with an army of less than 1200 men, he should stretch back along a line of two hundred miles, through a wilderness filled with savages, while he was at the same time defending himself against a superior force in front. He made three separate attempts to re-open his communications, one of which, though victorious, did not succeed in penetrating twenty miles.

3. It certainly was not General Hull's fault that he was not reinforced from Ohio, for as early as July 5th he wrote to the Secretary of War, that "troops would be absolutely necessary on the road, to protect provisions." On July 29th he wrote to Governor Meigs of Ohio, Governor Scott of Kentucky, and to the Secretary of War, requesting an immediate reinforcement of 2000 men. And before assuming the command of the army, he informed the Secretary of War that three thousand men would be necessary.\*

4. It certainly was not General Hull's fault that there was no co-operation at Niagara. According to the plan of the campaign, as understood and agreed

\* Gen. P. B. Porter's testimony, mode of supplying them, and then Hull's Trial, page 127. "Gen. proposed 3000 men." Hull talked of provisions, and the

upon between General Dearborn and the Secretary of War, Canada was to be invaded simultaneously by four armies, one at Detroit, one at Niagara, one at Sacket's Harbour, and one at Lake Champlain. If any thing like this had been attempted, there is no doubt that it might have been easily accomplished, and Canada must have fallen. All the preparations should have been completed before the declaration of war. But in fact General Hull's army was the only one which was ready for action. Yet even then, by a vigorous effort, forces might have been accumulated at Niagara and at Sacket's Harbour, which would have made it impossible for Prevost or Brock to send any reinforcements to Malden. But nothing could excuse the dilatoriness of Government in its preparations and movements. It was not till eight days after war was declared, that the Secretary wrote to General Dearborn, to tell him that *after he had made the necessary arrangements* for the defence of the seaboard, he was to go to Albany and make preparations to move in the direction of Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal.\* In this letter he is told to "take his own time," as though a little delay might be of service, and the danger to be apprehended, was that, of too great despatch.

On the 9th of July, *thirteen* days after this, the Secretary of War remembers, that there was some plan for invading Canada, and writes to General Dearborn, telling him, "the period has arrived, when

\* Note 2d in Appendix.

your services are required in Albany," and orders him *after* he shall have placed the works on the sea-coast in the best state of defence, to "order all the recruits not otherwise disposed of, to march immediately to Albany."\* The principle of the worthy Secretary evidently was, one thing at a time. First arrange every thing on the sea-coast, and then it will be time enough to think about Canada. As to General Hull's army, that is a good way off, and we have not heard any thing about it yet, and we can leave that to take care of itself just now. July 20, that is, *ten days after this*, the Secretary begins to wonder what has become of General Hull's army, and to think, that a little co-operation would be desirable. He therefore writes to General Dearborn, that he is in daily expectation of hearing from General Hull, who probably arrived at Detroit on the 8th instant. "You will make such arrangements with Governor Tompkins, as will place the militia detached by him for Niagara and other posts on the Lakes under your control, and there should be a communication, and if practicable a co-operation throughout the whole frontier." By this time, it seems, the Secretary has come to think a co-operation in the movements of his armies a desirable thing, though not very practicable. But after reflecting upon it *six days longer*, he writes to General Dearborn, on July 26th, telling him that he had heard of General Hull's arrival at Detroit, and says, "arrangements should be immediately

\* Records of War Office, Vol. 6, Folios 15 and 16.

made by you to co-operate with him at Niagara,"—co-operation he evidently now believes to be practicable, as well as desirable.

While these reflections were passing through the mind of the Secretary of War, how was General Dearborn occupied? Pursuing the wise and military maxim of 'one thing at a time,' he was busily engaged in dividing his recruits among the forts along the sea-coast, putting twenty men in one and fifty in another, as might be necessary.

After this important business was settled, the Commander-in-chief goes to Albany, to carry on the campaign against Canada. One thing, however, rather puzzles him—"Who has the command at Niagara?" On the 20th July, some three weeks after General Hull's arrival at Detroit, he writes to the Secretary of War to ask, whether it was he himself or some one else, who was in command of the operations in Upper Canada.\* One would think it was about time for him to know. Finding by the Secretary's letter of July 20th and 26th, that it was actually himself who was to command on the frontier, he proceeds, not without due deliberation apparently, (for it is *eighteen* days after the date of the Secretary's first letter, and *seven* days after the *receipt* of the second at Albany,) to order troops toward Niagara. Probably this delay of a week in issuing his orders

\* Extract from a letter from General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated Greenbush, July 20th, 1812. "Who is to have the command of the operations in Upper Canada? I take it for granted that my command does not extend to that distant quarter."



after he had received the Secretary's letter of the 26th, containing the most unequivocal instructions to make a diversion on the Niagara, was owing to his being aware, that it would be too late to be of any service. For he says in his letter of August 7th to the Secretary, after speaking of the reinforcements which he had ordered to Niagara, "I trust they will move soon, but too late, I fear, to make the diversion in favour of General Hull, which is so desirable." However, on the 7th and 8th August General Dearborn did at last begin to order troops to Niagara, to effect a diversion in General Hull's favour. But on the 9th he concluded an *armistice*, by which he bound himself to act solely on the defensive, thus allowing General Brock to take all his troops from Niagara, if he chose, and carry them to Detroit, to act offensively there, while he prevented himself from making any attack at Niagara. The course of General Dearborn in all this affair, is really most extraordinary.

On July 20th he writes to know who has the command at Niagara. On July 31st he receives the Secretary's letter, telling him that he has the command, and instructing him to co-operate with General Hull immediately, by offensive movements at Niagara. August 7th and 8th he proceeds to obey these instructions, by ordering troops and artilleries to move without delay to Niagara. And August 9th he signs an armistice, by which he prevents himself from making any offensive demonstrations at Niagara or any where else, but allows General Brock to march

all the troops in Upper Canada against General Hull. The terms of the armistice were, that the troops on both sides should confine themselves to defensive operations, except at Detroit, but that General Hull was to be left at liberty, either to accede to the armistice or to continue offensive operations. After depriving himself of all power for aiding General Hull by offensive movements, the next best thing for General Dearborn to have done, would have been, to have given General Hull an immediate opportunity of deciding whether to come into the armistice or not. A communication might have been sent by express, and have reached General Hull in six or seven days. If this had been done, it would have prevented the surrender of Detroit: for the letter would have arrived there on or before August 15th, and the orders of Sir George Prevost for a cessation of hostilities, which were imperative, might have been communicated to General Brock. But instead of sending this important communication by express, it was actually *nine* days in going from Albany to Lewistown,\* travelling at the rate of about 35 miles a day! General H. A. S. Dearborn, in his defence of his father, argues, that the armistice concluded by him with Sir George Prevost, could not have been injurious to General Hull, because General Brock says in a letter, dated August 25th, that he did not hear that a cessation of hostilities had been agreed upon, until his return to Fort Erie from Detroit.† It may be

\* Note 4th in the Appendix.

† Defence of General Dearborn by his son.

true that General Brock did not hear that the armistice had been actually concluded, before his departure for Detroit, but there is every reason to believe, that he knew it was in contemplation. General Brock did not leave York till the 6th of August,\* and on the 2d of August, Sir George Prevost wrote to him express from Quebec, informing him of the proposed arrangement, and also that he had ordered reinforcements to proceed to Upper Canada.† But even though General Brock had not heard of the armistice before his return from Detroit and Niagara, this does not justify General Dearborn in agreeing to it, to the exclusion of General Hull. He ought to have known, that its effect would be to enable General Brock to move with his whole force against Detroit. And there is no doubt that General Brock would never have ventured to leave Niagara with so large a body of troops, had he not been satisfied that no movement of hostile aggression would be made by the Americans from that point. For this want of cooperation, General Dearborn or the Administration is certainly answerable. We do not wish to speak with undue severity of either. General Dearborn had probably no other motive in all his operations than to fulfil his duty, but the effect of his supineness in action, and his unjustifiable armistice, were as fatal to General Hull as though there had been a determination to sacrifice him by inaction, or by connivance with the enemy in entering into the armistice.

\* Life of Major-General Brock, † Note 5th in Appendix.  
page 224.

No doubt the Administration carried on the war in as efficient manner as its means and ability permitted. But no reflecting person who studies the history of the war can avoid the conclusion, that our failures and misfortunes in the first campaign, were owing almost exclusively to the want of sufficient preparation before war was declared, and the want of co-operation and celerity of action after it had commenced. For neither of these can blame be attached to General Hull.

Some may blame him for not fighting. 'Tis true, that by pursuing an opposite course, he would have rescued his reputation from the imputation of cowardice, but a man who had fought *nine* battles during the Revolutionary War, and had twice been promoted for his bravery and gallant conduct, did not feel himself called upon, unnecessarily to expose to the ruthless tomahawk of unrelenting savages, men, women, and children, who had fled to the fort for protection, merely to shield a reputation, which many years before had been severely tried, and had established for itself a character for unquestioned courage.

General Hull cannot justly be blamed for the fall of Detroit, and the surrender of his army, for both must have occurred, however he might have acted. Want of preparation and co-operation on the part of the Government and General Dearborn, with the armistice of the latter, made these events inevitable.

## CHAPTER IV.

THE COURT MARTIAL.—HOW CONSTITUTED, AND ITS CHARACTER.—ITS DECISION AND SENTENCE.—CONCLUSION.

WE now pass to speak of General Hull's Trial by a Court Martial, and to show what influences were used against him, and by what means the public mind became possessed with the belief that he was either a traitor, or a coward, or both.

We have mentioned the extravagant expectations which had been entertained by great numbers of the people, at the commencement of the war, of the ease with which the Canadas would be conquered by the armies of the United States. Men of more wisdom and experience, however, who knew the real difficulties of such an enterprise, had formed quite a different opinion. Among these was General Harrison, who, as will be seen from the following extracts from his letters to the Secretary of War, early foresaw the probable defeat of General Hull's army, and the fall of Detroit. In a letter of August 6th, 1812,\* he says: "The information received a day or two ago from Detroit, is of the most unpleasant nature: the loss of Mackinaw will probably be followed by the capture of Fort Dearborn (or Chicago); and the suspension of

\* Dawson's Life of Harrison, p. 275.

offensive operations by General Hull's army will, I fear, give great strength to the British party among the Indians. \* \* \* It is my opinion, that it will be the object of the British, to draw as many of the Indians as possible towards Malden, to cut off the supplies from, and ultimately to capture, General Hull's army." In a letter of August 10th, he thus speaks: "If it were certain that General Hull would be able, even with the reinforcement which is now about to be sent to him, to reduce Malden and retake Mackinaw, there would be no necessity of sending other troops in that direction. But I greatly fear, that the capture of Mackinaw will give such éclat to the British and Indians, that the Northern Tribes will pour down in swarms upon Detroit, oblige General Hull to act on the defensive, and meet and perhaps overpower the convoys and reinforcements which may be sent to him. It appears to me, indeed, highly probable, that the large detachment which is now destined for his relief under Colonel Wells, will have to fight its way. I rely greatly on the valour of those troops, but it is possible that the event may be adverse to us, and if it is, *Detroit must fall*—and with it every hope of re-establishing our affairs in that quarter, until the next year. I am also apprehensive that the provisions which are to be sent with Colonel Wells, are by no means equal to the supply of the army for any length of time, increased as it will be by this detachment. They must then depend upon small convoys, which can never reach their destination in safety, if the British and Indians think proper to prevent it. Com-



manding as they do the navigation of the Lake, the British can, with the utmost facility, transfer their force from the one side of it to the other; meet our detachments and overpower them, if they are small, while performing a laborious and circuitous march through a swampy country, at any point they think proper. To prevent these disasters, or to remedy them should they occur, a considerable covering army appears to me to be the only alternative: for should any of my apprehensions be realized, it is out of the question to suppose that troops could be collected time enough to render any essential service.”\*

It will be seen how exactly General Harrison points out all the difficulties in the way of General Hull's army, and how clearly he anticipated the probability of its overthrow. These views, however, were shared by very few persons in the United States. Ignorant of the real state of things, it was universally supposed, that General Hull was to capture Canada with scarcely any opposition, and the news of the surrender of Detroit came upon the country without any warning. The party opposed to the war very naturally made use of this disaster to show that their views had been correct, and threw the blame upon the Administration and the opposite party, who had plunged the country into war without adequate preparation.

At first the Administration scarcely attempted to defend itself.† But it soon found a man ready and

\* Note 6th in Appendix.

† Note 7th in Appendix.

willing to assist it to throw the whole blame of the disaster upon the unsuccessful General. Colonel Cass, having by the terms of the capitulation liberty to return home, went to Washington, and wrote his celebrated letter of September 10th, 1812, which has been the principal source of all subsequent charges against General Hull, and was even received as evidence on his trial. The object of this letter was, to convince the public that the whole blame of the surrender was chargeable to the Commander—that he wanted neither men nor supplies of any kind, and that the British might have been defeated with perfect ease, but for the cowardice of the General. His letter was not without its effect on the public also, who did not know that Colonel Cass had written to Governor Meigs and to his brother-in-law, only a few days before the surrender, that the army was in want of every thing, and must perish unless soon assisted.

As soon as General Hull was exchanged and returned to the United States, he was placed under arrest, and the Administration exhibited charges for capital offences against him. A Court Martial, of which General Wade Hampton was President, was summoned to assemble at Philadelphia, when General Hull appeared, and was ready for his trial. But this Court Martial was dissolved by the President, without giving any reason for its dissolution. After General Hull had been another year under arrest, a new Court Martial was summoned, of which General Dearborn was appointed President.

It was at Albany, January 3d, 1814. A majority of the officers were young men, Lieutenant Colonels, lately promoted to that rank, some of whom had been the aids of General Dearborn, and had been introduced into the army by his patronage. General Hull made no objection to the manner in which the Court was constituted, for he was anxious for his trial. Special and very able counsel were employed by the Government to assist the Judge Advocate, but General Hull's counsel was not allowed to address the Court in his defence. Although this exclusion of the prisoner's counsel has been an established custom of foreign Courts Martial, there appears no good reason why it should have been followed in this country; especially as it conflicts with the provision of the Constitution, which declares that in all *criminal prosecutions* the accused shall have the assistance of counsel for his defence.

Charges of treason, cowardice, and neglect of duty, were exhibited against General Hull, under the following specifications.

The specifications under the charge of treason were:

First.—“Hiring the vessel to transport his sick men and baggage from the Miami to Detroit.”

Second.—“Not attacking the enemy's fort at Malden, and retreating to Detroit.”

Third.—“Not strengthening the fort of Detroit, and surrendering.”

The specifications under the charge of cowardice were:

First.—“Not attacking Malden, and retreating to Detroit.”

Second. "Appearances of alarm during the cannonade."

Third. "Appearances of alarm on the day of the surrender."

Fourth. "Surrendering Detroit."

The specifications under the charge of *neglect of duty*, were much the same as the others.

As regards the charge of *treason*, the decision of the Court was, that it had no jurisdiction of the offence, "but the evidence on the subject having been publicly given, the Court deem it proper, in justice to the accused, to say, that they do not believe, from any thing that has appeared before them, that General William Hull has committed treason against the United States."

The Court found the accused guilty of the second and third charges, and sentenced him to be shot to death; but on account of his revolutionary services and advanced age, earnestly recommended him to the mercy of the President.

The President approved of the sentence of the Court, but remitted the execution of it.

It is impossible to read the report of the trial, and not feel that Hull was sacrificed to the necessity of preserving the Administration from disgrace and ruin. Some victim was necessary, and the unsuccessful General was the one upon whom the public indignation could most easily be directed. He therefore became the scape-goat for the President and his party.

The argument which influenced many, consciously or unconsciously, was like that of Caiphaz: "It

is expedient that one man perish, rather than the whole party be destroyed.”

A political expediency made the destruction of General Hull inevitable.

The constitution of the Court was singular. The President, the Commander-in-chief, General Dearborn, was taken from his duties at an important period of the war, and he was the man, who, of all others, had perhaps the greatest interest in the conviction of General Hull. If the fall of Detroit was not owing to the incapacity of General Hull, it was owing, in part, to the errors of General Dearborn, in not co-operating at Niagara, and in concluding the armistice with Prevost, to the exclusion of General Hull and his army. The acquittal of General Hull would be the condemnation of General Dearborn. A man with so deep a personal interest would not be permitted to sit as juror in a matter of dollars and cents; but General Dearborn was brought from his duties at the head of the army, in time of war, to be made President of the Court which was to decide on the life or death of General Hull.

The principal witnesses on the trial gave their testimony, like men arguing a cause. They evidently evinced an anxiety throughout, to show that General Hull was to blame in all that occurred. They remembered every thing that made against him—nothing that could tell in his favour. This strong determination to do their commander all the mischief in their power, whether arising from prejudice or a worse motive, deprives their testimony of the weight

it might otherwise possess. Thus in General Cass's testimony, we find a very remarkable power of recollection in regard to some matters, and an equally remarkable forgetfulness as to other things. If any question is asked, the answer of which might benefit General Hull, he finds it impossible to remember any thing about it. He remembers that the defences at Malden were poor, and "was of opinion that the works were not defensible," but he "does not recollect about the guns or gun-carriages at Detroit," and is not very sure that the enclosures and platforms were defective, though he rather thinks they were. Though his memory thus fails him in regard to the defective guns and enclosures, he distinctly recollects the good picketing at Detroit—"it was in remarkably good order, and as good as he ever saw." He cannot recollect, within four days, the time of crossing from Detroit to Canada—it was "on the 12th or 16th (he could not be precise about the time)"—he cannot even remember whether Colonel Miller's detachment went to Brownstown, before or after the evacuation of Canada. Yet his testimony is positive to his conversation with General Hull, in which he recommended more active measures, and in his letter of Sept. 10th he recollects facts which occurred in Detroit *during his absence* from that place, such as that of 500 of the Ohio militia shedding tears because they were not allowed to fight. The testimony of Snelling, McArthur, Vanhorne, and some other officers, is still more strongly marked by this evident predetermination to say as many things as they can



to injure General Hull, and as few as possible in his favour. Very possibly they might not have been conscious of this bias, but it is none the less apparent on the face of their testimony.

One peculiarity in this trial was, that the *opinions* of the witnesses in regard to military measures, were constantly received as evidence. This is justly regarded as very improper by all writers on Courts Martial. It is the business of the witnesses to testify to actions and conduct; that of the Court, to form an opinion as to their force and application.

O'Brien, in his late work on American Military Courts, says: "When it is a question of military science, to affect the officer on trial, questions of opinion are inadmissible. For it is obvious, that the Court has met for nothing else, than to try that question, and they have before them the facts in evidence, on which to ground their conclusions. Courts Martial should be very cautious in receiving evidence as to opinion, in all instances; and the opportunities and means of the witness for forming an opinion, should be made to appear."

The witnesses all gave in evidence *their opinions* that General Hull ought to have retained the bridge Aux Canards; ought not to have evacuated Canada; ought to have sent a larger number of troops with Vanhorne; ought to have exercised his troops more; &c., &c. Subtract that part of their testimony which is made up of their opinions, and the bulk is much reduced.

General Hull was acquitted of the charge of trea-

son, because the principal fact on which this charge was based, would have proved the Secretary of War guilty of treason, rather than the General. This fact was, his sending a vessel by the lake, after war was declared, containing his invalids and hospital stores. But when he sent the vessel, he had received no notice of the declaration of war, though notice might easily have reached him, if proper measures had been taken to expedite so important a document. Meantime the British at Malden had received notice of the declaration of war, in a letter *franked by the Secretary of the Treasury*; in consequence of which they attacked and took General Hull's vessel.

General Hull was found guilty on the charge of cowardice. The principal evidence under this charge, was that of the militia officers, derived from his personal appearance on the 15th and 16th August. They testified that he looked frightened, that he chewed tobacco, and that he sat against a wall, as they supposed to protect himself against the cannon shot. Other officers, with quite as much experience as these militia gentlemen, saw no evidence of fear in the conduct of General Hull. Thus Major Vanhorne, Captain Baker, Major Jessup, Captain Fuller, Captain McCormick, and especially Captain Snelling, testified that they thought General Hull under the influence of fear; that he seemed agitated; that his voice trembled, &c., &c. But other officers saw nothing of the kind—or rather, seeing the same appearances, they interpreted them more justly and generously. They knew that General Hull had endured much fatigue and exposure; that he had hardly slept for sev-

eral nights; that he had much responsibility on his mind; and they attributed to those causes any appearance of depression, or any physical infirmity which they noticed. Brave men do not suspect others of being cowards, on such slight grounds. Colonel Miller could not be brought to say that he thought his General under the influence of personal fear.\* Lieutenant Bacon did not suspect that any such alarm existed in the mind of his commander.† Captain Maxwell, who had been in twenty-three battles, in three wars, saw nothing like fear in the General's manner.‡ Major Munson gave a similar testimony.§ So did Captain Dyson and Colonel Watson.||

The charge of cowardice rests, then, upon certain personal appearances, which a part of the witnesses supposed to arise from fear of bodily harm, and which another part ascribed to fatigue of body and anxiety of mind.

Which of these interpretations is most probable? Is it probable that, amid an army of heroes, General Hull was the only man who was a coward; that while the militia, who had never been in battle, were shedding tears because they could not fight, he who had fought bravely in nine pitched battles was trembling with terror? Is it probable that while those who were exposed in the open field were calm, he whose duty required no such exposure was agitated with personal fear; and that he who had shown in

\* See Note 8, in Appendix.

† See Note 9, in Appendix.

‡ See Note 10, in Appendix.

§ See Note 11, in Appendix.

|| See Note 12, in Appendix.

the midst of danger a daring courage, should be in an agony of terror when no danger was near? The supposition is entirely absurd, and we may safely predict, that the judgment of history will so determine. If, then, it be said that the Court Martial found General Hull guilty, and that therefore he was so, we reply—The Court, by its constitution and situation, was under a bias, that made it almost impossible for it to do justice to the prisoner. The public mind had been excited against him, from one end of the land to the other, by the whole force of the Administration presses and of the war party. Scurrilous pamphlets, filled with the grossest abuse of his conduct, were hawked about for sale, at the very doors of the house where he was being tried. The President of the Court had a personal interest in his condemnation. All those who testified against him had been rewarded beforehand with promotion in the service—several of them without having been in any other campaign, except that with General Hull; and it was therefore very evident, that the way to favour and rank was to be found in taking the same side.\*

The prosecuting officer was assisted by special counsel, while General Hull's counsel was not allowed to speak. The *opinions* of witnesses against him were freely admitted, as evidence concerning military operations; and hearsay testimony was also received, under circumstances not dissimilar.

In reviewing the history of this campaign, it seems

\* Note 13, in Appendix.

to us that the following points may be regarded as fully established :

*First.*—That so long as Lake Erie was commanded by the British, and the woods by hostile Indians, and by the fall of Mackinaw the Northern Indians were let loose against General Hull, and no co-operation or diversion in his favour was attempted at Niagara—it was impossible for Detroit to be preserved from falling into the hands of the British.

*Second.*—This state of things was not the fault of General Hull, but that of the Administration, in not making adequate preparations in anticipation of war—of General Dearborn, in not affording the expected co-operation—and of the condition of the country, and the inherent difficulties incident to the genius and policy of our government.

*Third.*—The charge of treason was dismissed, as wholly groundless, by the Court Martial; and the charge of cowardice, when examined, becomes incredible and absurd.

The only questions, therefore, which can now be raised by reasonable men, are these: Did not General Hull err in judgment in some of his measures? Might it not have been better to have attacked Malden? and was the surrender of his post at Detroit, without a struggle for its defence, reconcilable with his situation at that time?

The reason assigned for not attacking Malden, we have seen, was the deficiency of suitable cannon for that purpose, and a want of confidence in the militia, as acknowledged by the officers in command, to storm the works at Malden, which were defended



by cannon batteries, while reliance on the part of the Americans, was on militia bayonets almost entirely.

In considering the conduct of General Hull in surrendering Detroit, we ought always to bear in mind that he was Governor of the Territory as well as General of the army—that he accepted the command of the army, for the express purpose of defending the Territory, and that though in compliance with the orders of the Government, he had invaded Canada, a principal object was still the defence of the people of Michigan. If therefore his situation was such, that even a successful temporary resistance could not finally prevent the fall of Detroit; had he any right to expose the people of Michigan to that universal massacre which would unquestionably have been the result of a battle at Detroit?

It must also be remembered, that at the time of the surrender the fort was crowded with women and children who had fled thither for protection from the town, which tended still more to embarrass the situation and move the sympathies of their Governor.

If therefore some persons, with whom military glory stands higher than humanity and plain duty, may still blame General Hull for not fighting a useless battle, and for not causing blood to be shed where nothing was to be gained by its effusion, we are confident that all high-minded and judicious persons will conclude, that to sign the surrender of Detroit was an act of greater courage and truer manliness on the part of General Hull, than it would have been to have sent out his troops to battle.



Such has already been the verdict given by thousands throughout the land. In the Appendix will be found letters from some of these, men of the highest distinction ; accompanied by other letters from the associates of General Hull during the Revolution. Their testimony is valuable as showing the opinion entertained of him by his companions, and it shows what will be the judgment of posterity, when temporary interests, passions, and prejudices shall have passed away.

To that ultimate tribunal the friends of General Hull confidently appeal. They call upon future historians of the war of 1812, to rise above the influence of prejudice and to render justice to the memory of their fellow-citizen. If his feelings can no longer be comforted by this tardy recompense for the unmerited abuse and calumnies from which he suffered ; the truth of history may at least be vindicated. He sleeps in his tranquil grave, and can never hear that his countrymen have at last understood him. But our country itself will be honoured, if it can be shown, that though, like other republics, it is sometimes ungrateful to its servants, yet that it will at last do justice to their memory ; and that though clouds of misrepresentation may long overshadow the name of an upright man, that the sun of truth has at last illuminated it.

“*Respexit tamen, et longo post tempore venit.*”

## APPENDIX.

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### NOTE 1.

*Extract from a Notice of General Hull's Memoirs of the Campaign of 1812, from the North American Review.*

“Memoirs of the Campaign of the Northwestern Army of the United States, A. D. 1812, in a series of Letters addressed to the citizens of the United States, with an Appendix, containing a brief sketch of the Revolutionary services of the author. By WILLIAM HULL, late Governor of the Territory of Michigan; and Brigadier-General in the service of the United States. 8vo. pp. 240. Boston: True & Green: 1824.’

“Most of our readers remember the principal events of the disastrous campaign to which this work relates, and the decision of the court martial by which General Hull was tried. This officer has always considered his case as standing in a very unfair and partial light before the public, and has at last brought forward what he deems a correct detail of all the transactions pertaining to his connexion with the army.

“We have no disposition to take any part in the controversy between General Hull and his opponents,

nor to revive a subject which, for the credit of the country, had better be forgotten than remembered; yet, if we were to judge simply by the public documents collected and published in these Memoirs, we must draw the conclusion, unequivocally, that he was required by the General Government to do, what it was morally and physically impossible that he should do—that he was surrounded by difficulties which no human agency could conquer; and in short, whatever may have been his mistakes of judgment in any particular movement, he deserved not the unqualified censure inflicted on him by the court martial.

“The trial was evidently conducted without a full knowledge of all the testimony in his favour; important documents in the public offices he could not then obtain; they are now published, and throw new light on the subject.

“The precipitancy with which war was declared, —the total want of preparation, and the deficiency of means, afford an apology, no doubt, to the General Government, for not providing an immediate and adequate defence for the northwestern frontier; but it is an extremely hard case, that an officer should suffer in consequence of the neglect of higher powers.

“General Hull has no right to complain, that his orders were not sufficiently clear and explicit; but he has a right to complain, that he was ordered to defend a long line of frontier, and invade an enemy’s possessions, without being provided with means to effect such an enterprise; and above all, has he a right to complain, that he was formally condemned by a grave

military tribunal for the issue of unfortunate events, as mortifying to him in themselves, as they could possibly be to any other person less interested, and over which he had no control. We aim not to defend General Hull; his defence must rest on his book; let it be conceded that he was guilty of mistakes—the question still recurs, and it is one of vital consequence to the party accused, whether these mistakes may not, in the main, be very easily traced to his circumstances—to his confident expectation of aid from government, which he never received, and of co-operation with other branches of the army, which never took place, and without both of which there was no possibility of his effecting what was required of him. The public documents and letters published by him, answer this question decidedly in the affirmative, and ought to produce an impression, on the public mind at least, far different from that left by the decision of the court martial.

“ In addition to their personal bearing, these Memoirs contain many facts of historical value, relating to the last war. The appendix speaks of the author’s services in the Revolution.”

*North American Review, January, 1825. Vol. XX.*

#### NOTE 2.

*Memorials by General Hull, recommending a fleet on Lake Erie.*

The following extracts from memorials by General Hull, concerning a fleet on Lake Erie, show how early he drew the attention of the Government to

this important subject, and with what arguments he urged it upon their attention :

Memorial of April 3d, 1809.—“ I would suggest for consideration the expediency of building some armed vessels on Lake Erie, for the purpose of preserving the communication ; consider you have three military posts to the north and west of these waters, and no other communication with them.”

Hull's Memoirs, p. 19.—Memorial of June 15, 1811 : “ From the present state of our foreign relations, particularly with England, I am induced to believe there is little prospect of a continuance of peace. In the event of a war with England, this part of the United States (meaning the Michigan Territory) will be peculiarly situated. The British land forces at Amherstburg and St. Josephs, are about equal to those of the United States at this place and Michilimackinac. The population of Upper Canada is more than twenty to one, compared to this territory. That province contains about one hundred thousand inhabitants, while our population does not amount to five thousand. A wilderness of near two hundred miles separates this settlement from any of the States. Besides, the Indiana Territory and States of Ohio and Kentucky are thinly inhabited, have extensive frontiers, and their own force will be necessary for their own defence. With respect to the Indians, their situation and habits are such that little dependence can be placed on them. At present they appear friendly, and was I to calculate on the profession of their chiefs, I should be satisfied that they would not

become hostile. Their first passion, however, is war. The policy of the British Government is to consider them their allies, and in the event of war, to invite them to join their standard. The policy of the American Government has been to advise them, in the event of war, to remain quiet at their villages, and take no part in quarrels in which they have no interest. Many of their old sachems and chiefs would advise to this line of conduct. Their authority, however, over the warriors would not restrain them. They would not listen to their advice. An Indian is hardly considered as a man, until he has been engaged in war, and can show trophies. This first and most ardent of all their passions will be excited by presents, most gratifying to their pride and vanity. Unless strong measures are taken to prevent it, we may consider, beyond all doubt, they will be influenced to follow the advice of their British Father. This then appears to be the plain state of the case: the British have a regular force equal to ours. The province of Upper Canada has on its rolls a militia of twenty to one against us. In addition to this there can be but little doubt, but a large proportion of the savages will join them: what then will be the situation of this part of the country? Separated from the States by an extensive wilderness, which will be filled with savages, to prevent any succour, our water communications entirely obstructed by the British armed vessels on Lake Erie, we shall have no other resource for defence but the small garrisons, and feeble population of the territory. Under these cir-



cumstances it is easy to foresee what will be the fate of this country.

“It is a principle in nature, that the lesser force must give way to the greater. Since my acquaintance with the situation of this country, I have been of the opinion that the government did not sufficiently estimate its value and importance. After the Revolution, and after it was ceded to us by treaty, the blood and treasure of our country were expended in a savage war to obtain it. The post at this place is the key of the Northern country. By holding it, the Indians are kept in check, and peace has been preserved with them to the present time. If we were once deprived of it, the Northern Indians would have nowhere to look, but to the British government in Upper Canada. They would then be entirely influenced by their councils. It would be easy for them, aided by the councils of the British agents, to commit depredations on the scattered frontier settlements of Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, &c. They would be collected from the most distant parts of their villages, where the English factors have an intercourse with them, and would become numerous. Under these circumstances, if there is a prospect of war with England, what measures are most expedient? In my mind there can be no doubt. *Prepare a naval force on Lake Erie, superior to the British, and sufficient to preserve your communication.*”

*Hull's Memoirs*, pp. 19–20.

Memorial of March 6, 1812 :—“If we cannot command the ocean, we can command the inland lakes

of our country. I have always been of opinion, that we ought to have built as many armed vessels on the Lakes as would have commanded them : we have more interest in them than the British nation, and can build vessels with more convenience.”

*Hull's Memoirs*, p. 21.

### NOTE 3.

The following letter is from the Secretary of War to General Dearborn :

“WAR DEPARTMENT, 26th June, 1812.

“SIR:—Having made the necessary arrangements for the defence of the seaboard, it is the wish of the President that you should repair to Albany, and prepare the force to be collected at that place for actual service. It is understood, that being possessed of a full view of the intentions of the Government, and being also acquainted with the disposition of the force under your command, you will take your own time, and give the necessary orders to the officers on the sea-coast.

“It is altogether uncertain at what time General Hull may deem it expedient to commence offensive operations. The preparations it is presumed will be made, to move in a direction to Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal. On your arrival at Albany, you will be able to form an opinion of the time required to prepare the troops for action.

“To Major-General DEARBORN.”

*Hull's Memoirs*, p. 173.—*Records of War Office*, Vol. V., folio 458

## NOTE 4.

“LEWISTOWN, August 19th, 1812.

“In the night of the 17th I received your letter of 8th inst. The inclosures have been delivered to Lieutenant-Colonel Myers, commanding at Fort George, who has since acknowledged the receipt of the letters, and pledged himself strictly to observe the terms of the armistice.

“I am, &c.

S. VAN RENSSELAER.”

## NOTE 5.

*Letter from Sir George Prevost to General Brock.*

“AUGUST, 2, 1812.

“Last evening an officer of the 98th Regiment arrived here, express from Halifax, the bearer of despatches to me dated on 22d ult., from Mr. Foster, who was then in Nova Scotia. I lose no time in making you acquainted with the substance of this gentleman’s communication. He informs me that he had just received despatches from England, referring to a declaration of Ministers in Parliament, relative to a proposed repeal of the ‘Orders in Council’—provided that the United States Government would return to relations of amity with us, the contents of which may possibly induce the American Government to agree to a suspension of hostilities, as a preliminary to negotiations for peace. \* \* \*

As I propose sending Colonel Baynes immediately into the United States, with a proposal for a cessation

of hostile operations, I enclose for your information, the copy of my letter to General Dearborn, or the Commander-in-chief of the American forces. \* \* \* A report has been made to me that a frigate and six transports, with the Royal Scots (1st Battalion) on board, from the West Indies, are just below Bic; in consequence of this reinforcement I have ordered the company of the 49th Regiment sent to Kingston, to remain there; and in addition to the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, and a detachment of an officer and fifty veterans, most fit for service, now on their route to that station, I shall order Major Ormsby, with three companies of the 49th Regiment to proceed from Montreal to the same post, to be disposed of as you may find it necessary."

Life of Brock, p. 214.

#### NOTE 6.

Mr. Charles J. Ingersoll, with much naiveté, narrates his own expectations, and how they were cooled by the opinions of a man of military experience. In his *History of the War of 1812*, pp. 85-87, he thus speaks:

"My first doubt or uneasiness was the suggestion of an old soldier, whose residence I sometimes visited in the summer season. This gentleman raised a full company of a hundred hardy mountaineers, on the first outbreak of the war of the Revolution, and marched them, before even the Declaration of Independence, through the trackless wilds of a northern

winter, to join Montgomery, whose army he did not reach till the day after his defeat and death before Quebec. From that time throughout the war he was every where, as the hardest service called, from Long Island to Georgia, conspicuous in every battle, at Long Island, Monmouth and Yorktown, closing seven years of constant and arduous, yet, to him, always cheerful and pleasant campaigning, at the last action of the war, the siege of Savannah ; from Quebec to Savannah, never off duty, foremost in all encounters, a soldier in every qualification.

“ It was from this veteran soldier, meeting him at the chief town of his county, that I heard with incredulous annoyance, the first doubts of Hull’s success. I had no doubt that he was in full and triumphant march from Malden to Queenstown. General Craig expressed his apprehensions of the reverse. He knew the difficulties, the chances, the obstacles in the way ; had attentively read all the newspaper accounts of the expedition, could estimate probabilities of Indian enmity ; had experienced the force of English armies : shook his head at my confidence, and advised me not to be too sanguine. Not from any disparagement of Hull, but from the inherent mishaps of military proceedings ; the fortune of war : this Nestor of another war, questioned the success of our outset, and disturbed my dreams of triumph.”

## NOTE 7.

The following letter from the Records of the War Office (Vol. VI. page 253) shows that the Secretary of War expected at that time to bear the blame of the misfortunes of the campaign, which he seemed to think might perhaps have otherwise rested on the Commander-in-chief.

“WAR DEPARTMENT, Dec. 18, 1812.

“SIR,—Your letter of the 11th is received. Fortunately for you, the want of success which has attended the campaign, will be attributed to the Secretary of War. So long as you enjoy the confidence of the Government, the clamour of the discontented should not be regarded. You are requested to make an exchange of General Hull as soon as possible.”

(Signed)

WILLIAM EUSTIS.”

“To Major-General DEARBORN.”

## NOTE 8.

“Witness cannot say whether the agitation proceeded from personal alarm or from a consideration of the heavy responsibility in which he was involved; and he does not know whether at the time he formed any decided opinion on the subject.”—Miller’s Testimony, Trial, p. 110.

## NOTE 9

“General Hull appeared engaged as usual, and agitated more than usual, on the morning of the 16th,



but witness does not know the cause; he had no suspicion that it proceeded from personal fear; neither did he hear any of the officers at the time express the opinion that it did."—Bacon's testimony, p. 124, Hull's Trial.

#### NOTE 10.

"I saw General Hull riding on horseback, and cast my eye upon his countenance; his voice appeared cool and collected; I saw him ride off; I saw nothing like agitation; my reason for looking particularly at the General's countenance was, because there was a clamour that he was intimidated."—Captain Maxwell's testimony, Hull's Trial, p. 128.

#### NOTE 11.

"The General's situation was a critical one. He had a great deal of responsibility, and great care on his mind, if he had any feelings. I saw nothing in his conduct but what might be accounted for without recurring to personal fear."—Major Munson's testimony, Hull's Trial, p. 131.

#### NOTE 12.

Question by General Hull to witness—"How did I appear on that morning (of the surrender)?"

*Answer.* "You appeared perfectly tranquil and collected."—Testimony of Colonel Watson, Hull's Trial, page 149.

## NOTE 13.

The following account of the Court Martial is by General Hull. "Young General Dearborn has published the names of the officers who composed the Court Martial, with his father at the head, as President. It required two-thirds only of the members to pronounce the sentence. It is very certain that it was not unanimous, as it is said, 'two-thirds of the members agreed to it.' Had it been unanimous, it would have been so stated. It must be evident that a part of the Court were opposed to it. I should be happy, indeed, were it in my power to designate the characters who were only influenced by disinterested and honourable motives.

"I have stated the reasons why I did not object to the President or any of the members of this Court Martial. I had been much more than a year a prisoner in arrest; was conscious of having faithfully done my duty, and in my official communication to the Government requested an investigation of my conduct. It had been delayed in an unprecedented manner, during this long time, and I believed, had I made objections to the President, or any members of the Court, it would have caused further delay. Besides, most of the members of the Court were strangers to me; men whom I never before had seen, and whose names I had never heard, excepting General Dearborn, General Bloomfield, Colonel Fenwick, Colonel House, and Lieutenant-Colonel Conner. By examining the list, published by young General

Dearborn, you will perceive the other members belonged to new raised regiments, which did not exist during the campaign of 1812. They were appointed to regiments numbered from thirty-two to forty-two. They had no military rank at that time.

“It is well known that officers were selected to form these additional regiments, from the most violent partisans of the Administration, and this alone was a sufficient qualification. Officers of this description constituted a majority of the Court. They were pledged to any measures which the Administration, my persecutors, wished. With respect to General Dearborn, the President, the deep interest which he had in the issue of the trial, has been presented to you. General Bloomfield was a meritorious officer of the Revolution, and served with credit to himself. He was an amiable and much respected citizen at the termination of the Revolutionary war, and I believe retained the esteem of society to the close of his life. Colonel Fenwick and Colonel House, I have ever believed, were governed by the purest and most honourable motives, and were under no other influence than a sense of duty. Lieutenant-Colonel Conner received his commission about the time that General Dearborn was appointed the first Major-General. He was in his family, and one of his Aids. But a short time before the Court Martial was ordered, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, by the same patronage, and selected as a member of the Court for my trial. To the President of the Court Martial he owed both his first appointment and his sudden promotion.”

## NOTE 14.

Major Bannister's letter to General Wade Hampton (the latter having been appointed, in the first instance, the President of the Court Martial on the trial of General Hull, to convene in 1813; but the Court did not meet, it having been superseded by another Court, with General Dearborn as President, which met in February, 1814, at Albany—Hull's Trial, Appendix, page 1) is as follows:

“BROOKFIELD, February 17th, 1813.

“MR. PRESIDENT:—Having learned that my war-worn companion in arms, General William Hull, is called upon to answer to some of the highest charges which can be preferred against a military character, and that you, sir, are the President of the Court before whom he is to be tried, I take the liberty of addressing to you a few observations on the subject, which are dictated by the interest I feel for my country, as also the reputation and character of my friend, who stands highly criminated before you. My first acquaintance with General Hull was in times the most unfortunate—‘the times that tried men's souls.’ The services which he rendered to his country during the Revolutionary war, ought not to be forgotten. He was then young, active, brave and faithful; high in the estimation of his superior officers, and respected even by his enemies, for his fidelity to his country. I will not unnecessarily take up your time, in detailing the innumerable hardships, fatigues, privations and sufferings to which we were subjected, during

the worst of times. It is sufficient for my purpose on this occasion, to notice particularly the capture of Burgoyne, and the well known battle of Monmouth. In these two memorable events, where the ground was covered with the dead bodies of the slain, and the air resounded with the groans of the dying, Hull was unshaken. He bravely fought, and a grateful country acknowledged his bravery. I was then Brigade-Major to General Learned, in whose brigade General Hull was a Major, in Colonel Brooks's Regiment. The welfare of his country was apparently as dear to him as his life ; but if he has now fallen, he has fallen indeed. Having associated with him in times so interesting, and in no other character than that of a brave man, I shall be unhappy to learn that he has terminated his patriotic career by meanly acting the coward.

(Signed,            SETH BANNISTER.)

*General Heath's Certificate, Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 2.*

“I, William Heath, of Roxbury, in the county of Norfolk, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, having served as a General Officer in the American Revolutionary war, from the commencement of hostilities on the 19th of April, 1775, until peace took place in 1783, hereby certify, and on *my sacred honour* declare (and to which I am ready to make solemn oath), that in the said war William Hull, now a Brigadier-General in the army of the United States, served as an officer in various places, in all

of which he sustained the character of a *brave* and good officer—possessed the particular esteem and confidence of General Washington, who was *anxious* for his promotion, as will appear from extracts of his letter to this deponent on that subject, which are exhibited herewith. That this deponent being in the *immediate* command of the American troops in the Highlands of New-York, on Hudson river, in the month of January, 1781, an enterprise was contemplated against the enemy at Morrissania, the then advanced post of the British army, which enterprise was to be intrusted to the Lieutenant-Colonel Hull, now Brigadier-General Hull. The success of this enterprise was doubtful, in the opinion of General Washington, when it was communicated to him, as will appear by an extract of a letter from him herewith exhibited. But Lieutenant Colonel Hull, with the troops under his command, were successful. With great address and gallantry, they forced a narrow passage to the enemy, and with the loss of one subaltern, one drummer and ten privates killed, one captain, one sergeant and eleven rank and file wounded, completely defeated the enemy, and besides the killed took upwards of fifty prisoners, cut away the pontoon bridge, took a considerable quantity of forage, a number of cattle, &c., for which they were thanked in the public orders. This deponent during the Revolutionary war, having at different times had the honour to command the *State lines* of the army from New Hampshire to New Jersey, inclusive, and two brigades of more southern lines ;



Lieutenant-Colonel Hull sustained a conspicuous character as a *brave, faithful and good officer.*

(Signed) WM. HEATH."

"Roxbury, December 20th, 1813."

*Extracts of Letters from General Washington, to Major General Heath, mentioned in the deposition.*

"HEAD QUARTERS, MORRISTOWN, Dec. 13, 1779.

"The case between Major Hull and Major Cogswell is of more delicacy and very important. Major Hull was not appointed by the State to the Majority in Colonel Jackson's regiment; he was appointed by me at the intercession of several officers of the State line, and not without authority. He is an officer of great merit, and whose services have been honourable to himself and honourable to his country. I was then persuaded, as I still am, that a good officer would, and ever will be, an object of the State's regard; and there has been no injustice done to Major Cogswell. Perhaps by your representation you may be able to get matters put right, and I am sure you can scarcely render any more essential service than prevailing on the Honourable Assembly to preserve the arrangement inviolate, and to pursue the rules of promotion which have been established. In the case of Major Hull, he might, as I have been long since told, been arranged as Lieutenant-Colonel, on the Connecticut line, by the Committee of Congress at White Plains in 1778."

*On the Enterprise against the Enemy.*

“HEAD QUARTERS, New Windsor, Jan. 7, 1781.

“You will be pleased to observe, on the subject of your letter of last evening, that although I am not very sanguine in my expectation of the success of the enterprise proposed, yet I think in our present circumstances it will be advisable to encourage it. Colonel Hull may therefore have permission to make the attempt.”

“The foregoing are true extracts from the originals.

(Signed)

WM. HEATH.”

“*Roxbury, Dec. 20, 1813.*”

*Salmon Hubbell's Certificate, Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 6.*

“I, Salmon Hubbell, of Bridgeport, in the State of Connecticut, being duly sworn, do depose and say, that I was a Lieutenant in the 5th Connecticut Regiment of Continental Troops, and was acquainted with General William Hull, in the Revolutionary army, and always considered him a gentleman in every respect, as well as a brave and a good officer. He was in the attack on Stony Point, which took place in the morning of July 16th, 1779, under the immediate command of General Wayne; (the mode of attack now before me) wherein is ordered that Colonel Meigs will form next in Febiger's rear, and Major Hull in the rear of Colonel Meigs, which will be the right column. The result speaks in the highest language for the good conduct of each officer and soldier. This deponent further saith that he did

aid and assist in said attack on Stony Point, and was therefore knowing to the conduct of General Hull therein.

(Signed) SALMON HUBBELL."

" *Bridgeport, January 20, 1814.*"

" Sworn to before me, Joseph Backus, Justice of the Peace."

*Deposition of Adjutant Tufts, Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 1.*

" BOSTON, Feb, 3, 1814.

" *To the President and members of the General Court Martial, sitting in Albany, for the trial of General Hull.*

" GENTLEMEN—Having been solicited by the friends of General Hull to state my knowledge of his character and conduct during the Revolutionary war, I have the honour of submitting the following particulars. I was with him as Sergeant-Major of the 8th Massachusetts Regiment at Ticonderoga, and in the same regiment at taking Burgoyne's army, and was with the regiment he commanded in taking Stony Point, and his Adjutant.

" His character for courage and firmness on all these occasions was unexceptionable; and he was a good military man, and was universally esteemed by his brother officers, and beloved by his soldiers.

(Signed) FRANCIS TUFTS."

*Certificate of J. Brooks, late Governor of Massachusetts, Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 5.*

“BOSTON, Feb. 4, 1814.

“Having been requested by Brigadier-General Hull to state any information in my power to you, respecting his character as an officer, during the late Revolutionary War, I would observe, that I became acquainted with this gentleman in the month of February, 1776, and that from that time I was well acquainted with his character and conduct to the close of the war in 1783. During that period it fell to the General's lot frequently to meet the enemy in combat; and in every instance he acquitted himself much to his honour, and to the satisfaction of his superior officers. No officer of his rank (as far as my knowledge of that subject will enable me to speak) stood higher in the estimation of the army generally than General Hull; not only as a disciplinarian, and an officer of intelligence, but as a man of great enterprise and gallantry. I can add, that he possessed in a high degree the confidence of General Washington. Notwithstanding my long acquaintance with General Hull, as an officer, I never had an opportunity to witness his conduct in action more than once, although I have often seen him under circumstances of great danger from the fire of the enemy.

“In the month of September, 1776, at White Plains, he acted under my immediate orders, and was detached from the line, with a company he then commanded, to oppose a body of light infantry and Yagers, advancing upon the left flank of the American

army. His orders were executed with great promptitude, gallantry, and effect. Though more than double his number, the enemy was compelled to retreat, and the left of the American line thus enabled, by a flank movement, in safety to pass the Bronx.

“With great respect I am, sir, your servant,

(Signed)

J. BROOKS.”

“To the President of the Court Martial, Albany.”

*Certificate of Joseph McCaken, Hull's Trial, Appendix, page 6.*

“ALBANY, 17th February, 1814.

“To the Court Martial appointed for the trial of  
General Hull :

“I say, on my sacred honour, that I was a Captain, in the year 1777, in Colonel Vanscock's Regiment, of the State of New-York ; that I served with General Hull in the year 1777, in the expedition under General Arnold, which relieved Fort Stanwix ; that I likewise served with General Hull in the campaign of 1778, and was with him in the battle of Monmouth, when I was wounded, and lost my arm ; that there was no officer of General Hull's rank that stood higher in my estimation, and, as far as I knew, in the estimation of the army ; that he was considered as a brave and excellent officer.

(Signed)

JOSEPH McCAKEN,

A Major in the New-York line in 1778.”

*Letter from John Stacy, a Revolutionary soldier, to General William Hull.*

“HARVARD, 20th August, 1824.

“GENERAL WILLIAM HULL:

“SIR,—Permit a soldier of the Revolutionary war, who served six years previous to its close, and who is a native of the county of Middlesex, to congratulate you on the honourable testimony borne by General Heath and others, highly distinguished in that war, for your having acted so distinguished a part in our Revolutionary struggles. I am probably one of the few remaining who was under your command in the hazardous expedition at Morrissania, and I feel myself happy in living to this period, that I may witness to the gallantry and address with which the enterprise was effected; not only as it respects the assault on the enemy in that place, but on the morning after, in decoying the enemy some miles from its lines, without any material injury to our troops, and until it came in contact with our reinforcements, which immediately checked the enemy and drove it back with considerable loss. We were nearly forty hours from our quarters and the whole time on the alert, without any respite from duty. Well knowing the courage and enterprise of the commander on this occasion inspired every soldier with a noble ardour; animated every one to a prompt and cheerful performance of duty, and stimulated them to follow their leader, not knowing whither going or what the object.

“Would to God, Sir, I could add one mite, to have your character as an officer and soldier, placed on its



proper basis; and to have it entirely acquitted from what I consider, and I believe thousands of your fellow-citizens do also, the vile, wicked, and corrupt proceedings, that have been had against you, in consequence of the failure of the expedition against Canada in the late war, and that those who formed the scheme of your destruction, might soon feel the weight of their own iniquitous conduct.

“From an old soldier, who still feels the high value of a soldier’s reputation.

(Signed)

JOHN STACY.”

*Letter from Daniel Putnam, Esq., Son of General Putnam, to General Hull.*

“BROOKLYN, Ct., Sep. 25, 1824.

“MY DEAR SIR,—The renewal of a correspondence that has been suspended almost half a century, in all which time there has been little personal intercourse, is an awkward left-handed business, which one knows hardly how to begin.

“Like a mariner without a compass on the trackless ocean, who steers his bark by *guess*, and while he remembers where his home *was*, is ignorant of the course that will conduct him to it, so am I, alike uncertain whether *any* advance on my part can bring me back to your remembrance, with the kindness of olden time, and if any, how I shall set myself at work to make it most successfully.

“If I advert to the season of youth, when under the appellation of ‘*Rebels*,’ and, as it were, with halters about our necks, we were among the number

who opposed a powerful enemy and never *quailed* at his approach, why then, I know not how to associate a lofty spirit and a patriot heart with dishonour.

“ If I call to remembrance the laurels which then encircled your brow, and the deeds of renown which drew forth the thanks of Washington in general orders, and those of Congress inscribed on their journals, I recognize you as the gallant Colonel Hull, at the head of his partisan corps, and do not forget how I rejoiced in the well merited fame of my friend.

“ But when I heard of you in more advanced life as a general officer, at the head of an army destined for the conquest of an enemy’s province, I doubted the extension of your fame, and *feared* for the safety of that which had already been acquired ; not that your valour was questioned, but because you had embarked without adequate means, in an enterprise where success was so necessary to conciliate public favour, and so *indispensable* to preserve the public confidence, that disaster, however unavoidable, must be attended with certain ruin.

“ When the news of your capitulation reached us, and the epithets of ‘ *Coward,*’ ‘ *Traitor,*’ &c., were bellowed lustily from so many mouths, and rung long and loud in our ears, I thought, *as I now think* ; and when, after a long delayed trial, I read your defence before the Court Martial, and the cruel sentence of that Court, I marked you as the ‘ *scape-goat*’ on whose head the errors of others were laid, to divert the public indignation from their own ; but I never did believe your blood would be shed to expiate their sins ; it was a sacrifice too daring.

“ It is the property of narrow minds, when inflated with success, that they are commonly hurried on to deeds of arrogance ; and you have witnessed *another* attempt to consign *another name* to infamy. All that I can wish for you is, that yours may rise as far above the intrigues of your enemies, as that has done, above the imputations suggested by malice and envy.

“ It was thirty years after death, before the venomous dart was sped, and ere you shall have slept like time in dust, history will do you justice, and no recreant hand shall change the sentence.

“ Accept my best wishes for the peace and happiness of your remaining life, and believe me your friend,

(Signed) DANIEL PUTNAM.”

“ General WM. HULL.”

*Letter from Charles P. Sumner, Esq., to General Hull.*

“ BOSTON, March 11, 1825.

“ SIR,—I perceive by the publications you have made in the course of the year past, in the ‘ Statesman,’ and in your pamphlet, that you are desirous to dispel the clouds that for a while seemed to rest upon your name. I therefore feel it my duty to express to you my humble opinion, that your Memoirs have had and are having the desired effect, of reinstating you in the good opinion of impartial and disinterested men : this is the effect, wherever I have had an opportunity of hearing their opinion, and it is the effect on me, although I am one of those who had some degree of prejudice to your disadvantage.

“ There are Oates and Bedloes in more countries than England ; and in other times than those of Charles II. ; and you have afforded an instance of the truth of a remark of Charles J. Fox, in his history of a short period previous to the English Revolution ; that one of the chief evils attendant on times of high political excitement, is the facility it gives a dominant party, to brand their rivals with opprobrium, and make even the records of the history of their country speak the language of malice and falsehood, couched in the forms of law.

“ I am unknown to you, but there are thousands equally unknown, that are daily imbibing and recovering the most respectful sentiments towards you, and believe that your character will not suffer in the estimation of unprejudiced posterity by any comparison that can be instituted between you and any of your more successful cotemporaries ; two of whom have so recently bid farewell to the smiles or frowns of men.

“ Whoever may be your survivor, I sincerely hope your sun may set in a cloudless sky.

(Signed) CHARLES P. SUMNER.”

“ General WM. HULL.”

*Letter from Roger M. Sherman, Esq., to General Hull.*

“ FAIRFIELD, Ct., March 21, 1825.

“ DEAR SIR,—I cannot forbear expressing to you the great satisfaction I have derived from the perusal of your ‘ Memoirs of the Campaign of the Northwestern Army.’ So far as I know the public senti-

ment, they are deemed a satisfactory and unanswerable vindication. Your proofs are conclusive; and no mind, however prejudiced, accustomed to the weighing of evidence, can resist the inferences you make from them. This remark is extensively verified in the circle of my own observation. I am happy that you possessed such ample means of doing an act of justice to yourself, your friends, and your country.

“Please to accept from Mrs. Sherman and myself, and present to Mrs. Hull and your family, assurances of our very sincere esteem.

(Signed) ROGER M. SHERMAN.”

“General W<sup>M</sup>. HULL.”

*Letter from Dr. James Thacher (the historian) to General Hull.*

“PLYMOUTH, April 4, 1825.

“DEAR SIR,—I have perused your Memoirs with great satisfaction. It has confirmed my conviction, and I have no doubt but it has had the same effect on every candid and unprejudiced mind. I am decidedly of opinion, that justice and duty require that you should no longer estrange yourself from the society of your fellow-citizens and your compatriots, and I hope you will resume that standing with the public to which you are unquestionably entitled. I expected to have seen you in our ranks, at our interview with General Lafayette. Since the much lamented death of our excellent and amiable friend, General Brooks, I have suggested to several of our

brethren, that you ought to succeed him as President of our Society (Cincinnati). Some few have objected, and Dr. Townsend (our Vice-President) and Major Alden have been mentioned, and the result is uncertain.

“I understood that you have received a letter from General Lafayette, and should be glad to know the purport of it. He has promised me that he will visit this town before he leaves the country, and I shall wait on him immediately on his arrival at Boston. Being in Boston not long since, I was much gratified to learn, that you had written a Memorial to Congress, in favour of our Revolutionary claims. Some months ago, I addressed through the ‘*Centinel*,’ the surviving officers on the same subject, and wrote to General Brooks, requesting his opinion respecting a special meeting of our Society, to take the business into consideration, while the enthusiasm excited by the presence of General Lafayette was in operation. At no period have the surviving officers been held in higher respect and more grateful recollection than the present, and never perhaps was public money appropriated more to the satisfaction of the people, than that for pensions and the grant to General Lafayette.

“I cannot believe but Congress will be disposed to do justice to the few survivors, who are so fairly entitled to consideration, if a proper application should be made. I will thank you to forward to me a copy of your Memorial, if not too bulky for a mail letter, or inform me of the purport of it, and whether



you include the heirs of deceased officers and the soldiers.

“ I am your friend and very humble servant,

(Signed) JAMES THACHER.”

“ General W. M. HULL.”

*Letter from the Honourable Horace Binney of Philadelphia to Mrs. Maria Campbell, a daughter of General Hull.*

“ PHILADELPHIA, March 4, 1841.

“ MY DEAR MRS. CAMPBELL,—Your letter of 24th February gives me great pleasure, in the assurance that a grandson of General Hull is preparing himself to present to his countrymen that portion of our history which is particularly connected with the life and actions of his ancestor. It will be a worthy employment of his talents as a scholar, and an interesting record of his filial piety.

“ There are perhaps too many still living who are interested in sustaining the unjust sentence of the day, to permit us to hope for the universal acceptance of any work that shall bring it and them to reproach, by exposing the prejudices and party interests which led to it. But the truth, dispassionately told, and sustained by evidence, is sure to triumph, sooner or later. It is one of the common incidents of our condition, a state of war between evil and good, that its triumph is frequently too late for the happiness of those we respect and love.

“ You ask me what I think about asking the Government for a revocation of the sentence of the

Court Martial. As this is a question which involves the opinions and sentiments of others, rather than myself, I should of course think it best to leave a decision upon it, until the work you speak of shall have appeared, and had its effect.

“The want of regular and legal authority in any branch of the Government, to reverse such a sentence, will always be the refuge of such as may be opposed to the reversal, and can find no reasons against it in justice. Governments are, moreover, unwilling in general to record their own injustice, even when the injustice has been the work of party, and the party that perpetrated it has passed away.

“You must be familiar with the case of Admiral Byng—the deepest stain I think upon the memory of Chatham, and the deepest disgrace of George II. and his ministers. Byng was sacrificed, without a solitary reason in his own conduct or character, and with no motive, but to screen the incompetency of the ministers of that day. Posterity has reversed the sentence, fully and unanimously. But there has been no other reversal of it.

“After all, a reversal by the Government is a form. The true reversal is by the voice, and in the hearts, of the people. With those who know the case of General Hull, that reversal has, I think, been already pronounced. The thing to be desired by the personal friends of himself and his family is, to make that reversal the sentence of history.

“How much I shall be gratified to see, to *live* to see, I may say, all your wishes attained on this, a

subject among the nearest to your heart, I need not say.

“I am, my dear madam,

“With great regard, your friend,

(Signed)

HOR. BINNEY.”

*Letter from Colonel Trumbull to Mrs. Julia K. Wheeler,  
a daughter of General Hull.*

“NEW HAVEN, June 3d, 1841.

“MADAM,—I received in due time the letter of the 15th May, which you was pleased to address to me, accompanying the Memoir, written by your father, General Hull, which explains the events of the campaign of 1812. I am very much obliged to you for giving me this opportunity to know and understand the true history of that period, better than I did before.

“The declaration and conduct of that war, I have always regarded as one of the least honourable passages of the American history, but I now view it with increased disgust, as a most disgraceful period of the grossest ignorance and misconduct; and what is worse, a vile endeavour to divert public indignation from its authors and conductors, by a sacrifice of the reputation, and even life, of one of the bravest officers of the Revolution.

“I had not the pleasure of a personal acquaintance with your honoured father during the Revolution, as we were employed in quarters distant from each other, but I always regarded him as one of the ornaments of the service.

“With sincere respect, I have the honour to be,  
madam, your faithful servant,

(Signed)

JNO. TRUMBULL.”

“MRS. JULIA K. WHEELER.”

## NOTE 15.

*Robert Wallace's Account of the Surrender of Detroit.*

The following letter was published May 28th, 1842, in the Licking Valley Register, at Covington, Kentucky, and was written by Robert Wallace, a gentleman who was one of the Aid-de-Camps of General Hull. This testimony to the character of General Hull is valuable, because it was given voluntarily, without solicitation, and without communication with General Hull's friends, who did not even know that Mr. Wallace was still living. It is a graphic and evidently correct account of the principal incidents of the campaign and surrender.

The letter is here reprinted without alteration, except the omission of a single phrase, concerning Captain Hull, which might be misunderstood. All the remarks of Mr. Wallace upon General Hull's conduct, whether favourable or otherwise, are given without alteration or comment.

## "HULL'S SURRENDER.

"MR. R. C. LANGDON:

"SIR,—In compliance with your request, and the solicitations of several other friends, I have written out, from recollection, a brief detail of circumstances connected with the surrender of Detroit in 1812. My situation as Aid-de-Camp, afforded every opportunity for information, and I am satisfied that nothing

of any importance transpired in Hull's campaign without my knowledge of the motive.

“The prudence and despatch of our march through a wilderness, making our road through woods and swamps ; fortifying our camps, and guarding against a surprise from the Indians, inspired us with confidence in our old but experienced commander. His letters from the War Department urged him on, but our heavy wagons and constant rains retarded our progress. On reaching the rapids of the Miami river, we found an American schooner bound for Detroit. Anxious to comply with his instructions, General Hull directed our surplus baggage to be shipped, and set an example to his officers, by sending his own trunks on board. His son, Captain Hull, (who was also an Aid,) in executing this order, unfortunately shipped a small trunk, containing the papers and reports of the army, for which he was afterwards severely reprimanded by his father. This circumstance was since considered an evidence of treachery, but without the least foundation whatever. On the following night, in camp, we received the declaration of war. A council was immediately called, and an officer despatched with some men to intercept the schooner, at the river Raisin ; but the wind had been fair, and she had passed that river before our messenger reached its mouth. The British had received the news of war by the Lake, before it reached us, and the schooner was captured at Malden. She had on board the most of our baggage, our hospital stores, our intrenching tools, an officer and three ladies, belonging

to the 4th regiment, and a number of invalid soldiers. On the 4th of July we delayed at the river Huron to build a bridge for our wagons. We remained under arms all day, and in order of battle, being surrounded by Indians, and in sight of a British frigate full of troops. During that day it was remarked to me by several officers, that General Hull appeared to have no sense of personal danger, and that he would certainly be killed, if a contest commenced. This was said, to prepare me for taking orders from the next in rank ; and I mention it to show their opinion of him at the time.

“ We encamped that night on an open prairie, without timber to fortify, or tools to intrench. Our rear was protected by the river, our front and flank by fires at some distance from the lines. Picket-guards were posted, scouts kept in motion, and half the troops alternately under arms all night. All lights were extinguished in the camp but one that was for the use of the Surgeon, for we expected an attack before day. I give this as a specimen of vigilance, which could never have been taken by surprise ; our camp and line of march were always in order of battle.

“ The extent of General Hull’s instructions were, ‘ to protect Detroit.’ On our arrival there, most of our officers and men were eager to cross the line, which the General was not authorized to do, but on receiving permission, he moved over at the head of two regiments, and sent back his boats for the remainder. We looked for a warm reception, but a



feint towards Malden on the previous evening had induced the enemy to retire to that post in the night. Our camp was fortified immediately opposite Detroit, where a council was held on the propriety of attacking Malden without a battering train of artillery, which was not then in readiness. Some of our officers were willing to try the experiment, but a majority was opposed to the risk of assaulting a regular fort with raw troops, and without artillery to make a breach. Consequently it was determined that we should wait for the mounting of some heavy guns which lay at Detroit, and two floating batteries were prepared for their transportation by water.

“ This determination occasioned a delay of nearly three weeks, which proved most fatal to the results of the campaign. Had we been prepared for an immediate attack upon Malden, our campaign would have been as glorious as it was otherwise disastrous, and the name of General Hull would have been exalted to the skies.

“ During this unfortunate interval, we subsisted in a great measure upon supplies obtained in Canada. Our own stock would not have sustained us, and all communication with our country was cut off. The romantic policy of our Government, in refusing the aid of our own Indians, turned them against us, cut off our supplies by land, and increased the strength of the enemy.

“ A company of volunteers from Ohio, under Captain Brush, arrived at the river Raisin with some cattle and flour. Four hundred riflemen, commanded

by Major Vanhorne, were sent to escort them to Detroit. This detachment fell into an ambuscade of Indians, and was routed with serious loss. About this time we received intelligence of the surrender of Mackinaw and Chicago, the only American forts above us on the Lakes. Two vessels came down, loaded with furs and American prisoners, under white flags, and expected to pass us in the character of cartels; but they were captured and placed between our batteries at Detroit. Those surrenders let loose upon us all the Indians and Voyageurs of the upper Lakes.

“About the 4th of August our guns were ready; orders were given to prepare three days’ provisions, to remove all surplus baggage to Detroit, and the long anticipated movement on Malden was to have been made on the following day. Our troops conjectured that such was the intention, and were animated with the prospect of a decisive blow. But that night the unfortunate intelligence arrived, that a considerable force of British, Canadians and Indians, was coming upon our rear by an interior route.

“Here a ruinous error was committed. Instead of making the attack on Malden before the reinforcements of the enemy could arrive, General Hull ordered a retreat to Detroit, leaving a small and imperfect fortification with three hundred men, to hold his footing on the Canadian shore, and prevent the bombardment of Detroit. After two or three days occupation, this miserable concern was abandoned. General Hull’s instructions ‘to protect Detroit,’

seemed ever uppermost in his mind, but he lacked the energy necessary to accomplish that object by vigorous operations against the enemy. His policy was altogether on the defensive. After our return to Detroit, another detachment of about 800 men, under Lieut. Col. Miller, was despatched to meet Captain Brush. They met a superior force of British and Indians at Brownstown, and after a severe engagement, drove the British to their boats; but were too much disabled to proceed. At the solicitations of Colonels Cass and McArthur, those two enterprising officers were permitted to take the pick of their regiments and try the circuitous route of Wayne's old trace through the woods. They left Detroit on the 14th of August, whilst a movement was made down the river bank, to deceive the spies of the enemy, and the detachment escaped their observation. Our provisions were now a subject of serious concern, and these circumstances show what prospect we had to replenish them.

“When General Hull accepted the command of the Northwestern Army, he stipulated for the speedy possession of Lake Erie, and the most active operations at its lower extremity. In all his correspondence with the War Department, and with Generals Dearborn and Hall at the lower end of the Lake, he continued to urge those subjects, but our Government was unprepared at every point on the Lakes. At this important crisis in the situation of Detroit, Dearborn entered into an armistice with General Brock (commander-in-chief of the enemy's forces),

for thirty days, and excepted the command of General Hull from its operation.\*

“ In this manœuvre General Dearborn was entirely outwitted. Brock came up the Lake with every vessel, and all the forces he could muster; and the first intimation we received of his arrival was, a summons to surrender. On the morning of the fifteenth the messengers of Brock came over, and were detained some hours, under pretext of deliberation, but in reality to place ourselves in a better state of defence. Several attempts were made to recall the detachment under Cass and McArthur, which had marched the day before, but our spies reported the woods to be swarming with Indians, and they could not get out. The absence of Cass and McArthur, with perhaps 800 picked men, our deficiency of numbers to protect the city on all sides, and our limited supply of provisions, were circumstances deeply regretted. Nevertheless, a firm and decided answer was given in about these words: ‘ I am prepared to meet the forces under your command, and all the consequences attending.’ This reply had no sooner reached the opposite shore, than the batteries opened on both sides, and a scene ensued sufficient to astound

\* This statement of Mr. Wallace is in part erroneous. The armistice was entered into between Sir George Prevost and General Dearborn; the effect of which, however, was to enable General Brock, who was advised of the manœuvre of Sir George Prevost, at once to

cross Lake Erie and attack General Hull with his whole force, which, but for the armistice, would have been detained, in defence of the post, he was, under the circumstances, enabled temporarily to leave.

the senses of inexperienced troops. Still there was but little appearance of dismay. Steady determination appeared to be the expression of almost every eye. On removing a frame building directly opposite the fort, a bomb-battery was displayed, and its shells were showered upon us in abundant profusion. Chimneys and every other object above the walls of the fort, were levelled with despatch, except the flag of our country. The stars and stripes still waved amidst the smoke, a thrilling appeal to every American heart. Soon after dark the firing ceased, but was renewed with the dawn of day. Until the morning of the fatal 16th of August, I saw no flinching in the countenance of General Hull. I had been with him both in and out of the fort; his only apparent concern was to save our ammunition, for our long twenty-four pounders were consuming it very fast; and I was sent repeatedly to the batteries with orders 'to fire with more deliberation.'

"About nine o'clock in the morning Captain Hull found some straggling soldiers in the town. He ordered them immediately to their post; and seeing them disposed to hesitate, he pursued them on horseback, sword in hand, to their regiment. Their Colonel having given them leave of absence, was exasperated, and made his way to the General, demanding the arrest of his son. The Captain soon made his appearance, and challenged the Colonel to fight him on the spot. This circumstance produced the first agitation that I discovered in General Hull. He begged me to take care of his imprudent son,

and he was confined to a room in the officers' quarters.

“ Soon after this a more serious disaster occurred, which increased the General's agitation. A number of ladies and children, the families of officers on duty, occupied a room in the fort. General Hull's daughter and her children were among them. A ball entered the house, killing two officers, who had gone in to encourage their families. The ladies and children, many of them senseless, were hurried across the parade to a bomb-proof vault, which had been cleared out for them. The General saw this affair at a distance, but knew not whom nor how many were destroyed, for several of the ladies were bespattered with blood. Other incidents soon followed. Several men were cut down in the fort, and two other officers received a ball through the gate. All this time the General was walking back and forth on the parade, evidently in a very anxious state of mind. Several propositions were made to him, all of which, I believe, he rejected. For instance, Brigade-Major Jessup proposed to cross the river, and spike the enemy's guns. I think he replied, it was a desperate experiment, and as the enemy was advancing, he could not spare the men from their posts. Captain Snelling proposed to haul down one of our heavy guns, to annoy the enemy, then three miles below the fort. He replied, that the slender bridge below the town would not support its weight, and the gun would surely fall into their hands, and be turned against us; that the men were posted to the best advantage, and



he did not wish to move them. The gun alluded to weighed, with its carriage, about 7000 lbs.

“General Hull was then at least sixty-five years of age, and no doubt felt incapable of the bold exertions that his situation required.\* He appeared absorbed in anxious thought, and disposed to avoid all conversation. My duty required me to remain near the General, but seeing that he appeared to have no commands for me, I stepped across the parade to assist in the amputation of an officer’s limb. Whilst occupied in this unpleasant task, Captain Burton, of the 4th regiment, passed me with a table-cloth suspended to a pike. I inquired what that was for. He hastily replied, ‘It is the General’s order,’ and mounting one of the bastions, began to wave it in the air. I ran immediately to the General, and inquired the meaning of the white flag. ‘I ordered it, sir,’ was the reply; and facing about, he continued his walk. The firing soon ceased, and mounting the breast-work I saw two British officers, with an American officer, all on horseback, approaching the gate. Thinking their entrance improper, I informed the General, and he directed me ‘to keep them out of the fort.’ I met and conducted them to the General’s marquee, which was still in the open camp. General Hull, with Colonel Miller, of the U. S. Army, and Colonel Brush, of the Michigan militia, made

\* This conjecture of Mr. Wallace is incorrect. As General Hull was born on the 24th of June, 1753; on the 16th of August, 1812, the day of surrender, he would be only 59 years and not quite two months old.

their appearance. The articles of capitulation were then drawn up and signed by Miller and Brush on our part, and by the two British officers on theirs. It was reported to General Brock, who shortly entered the fort, escorted by his advanced guard. Brock was shown into a room, in the officers' quarters, where Hull was waiting, and after settling some details, the capitulation was ratified by their signatures. While these matters were progressing, Captain Hull, awaking from a sound sleep, discovered the British grenadiers in the fort. Breaking through a window, he ran up unarmed and without a hat, to the commanding officer, and demanded his business there 'with his red-coat rascals.' The officer raised his sword to cut him down, but I reached them in time, to stay the blow, by informing the officer that the gentleman was partially *deranged*. He instantly dropped his arm, and thanked me for the timely interference. This same Captain Hull afterwards fought a duel, in defence of his father's reputation, and was at last killed at the head of his company, in a gallant charge at the battle of 'Lundy's Lane.' I mention these particulars, in connexion with a remark since made to me by Commodore Hull, that 'he knew his uncle was neither traitor nor coward, for there was no such blood in the family.' General Hull, discovering that the British had been permitted to enter the fort before the surrender was completed, remonstrated with General Brock, who apologized for the indecorum, and ordered his troops to retire.

Our troops were then marched out, in gloomy silence, and stacked their arms on the esplanade. When the British flag was raised the Indians rushed in from the woods—a countless number—yelling, firing, seizing our horses, and scampering through the town like so many fiends. In addition to Tecumseh's band, and the Wyandotts, they had gathered in from all the regions of the northern lakes. The British regulars and Canadians, were about three thousand men; but the number of the Indians could not have been known by General Brock himself. Our effective force was probably fifteen hundred; about four hundred regulars, and the remainder volunteers and drafted militia.\* Most of them would have fought with desperation, for there was no possible chance of escape.

“We had every reason to suppose that the detachment under Cass and McArthur, was at the river Raisin, but to our surprise and mortification, they had returned of their own accord, having heard the cannonade at the distance of forty miles. They were

\* In representing the effective force of General Hull at the time of the surrender at “probably fifteen hundred,” the author of this letter, Robert Wallace, it will be perceived, evidently included the force to which he refers on page 449, as being absent with Cass and McArthur, in his computation, and also that of Captain Brush, for he says soon after: “This detachment, and the company under Captain Brush, were included in the surrender, for their preservation, as they might have been surprised and cut off by the Indians, of which we had no way to apprise them.” But Wallace does not undertake to be precise as to numbers, and speaks from general recollection.

close in the rear of the enemy, at the time of the surrender, but without any possible means of communicating their position to us. This detachment, and the company under Captain Brush, were included in the surrender, for their preservation, as they might have been surprised and cut off by the Indians, of which we had no way to apprise them. As it happened, two or three British subjects, who had gone out with us, unwilling to fall into the hands of their former masters, made a desperate escape through the woods, informed Captain Brush of our disaster, and his party made a rapid retreat to the settlements. Cass and McArthur were soon apprised of their condition, and marched to Detroit. Our meeting with them was truly distressing. Cheeks that never blanched in danger, were wet with tears of agony and disappointment. Yet I saw no ranting or raving, such as I have since heard described. I heard but one officer abuse the General indecorously, and he had been extremely quiet and useless throughout the campaign.

“ A circumstance which has often been cited, as a proof of treachery on the part of General Hull, took place on the river bank, just before the surrender. Lieutenant Anderson, of the U. S. Artillery, had drawn his guns from behind our lower battery, charged them with grape-shot, and pointed them down the road on which the enemy were approaching. When the first platoon of their column appeared, his men were eager to fire. Anderson forbid them, at the peril

of their lives, to touch a gun, without his orders, wishing to get the enemy in a fair raking position, before they should discover their danger; but the officer at the head of the column, perceiving the snare, gave notice to General Brock, who immediately changed the position of his troops, and advanced under cover of the thick orchards which stood between them and the fort. Anderson was said to have reserved his fire by the special order of General Hull, which I know to be false—for I had just delivered a different order, and was waiting by his side, to see the effect of his intended explosion. When the white flag was raised, this same Lieutenant broke his sword over one of his guns, and burst into tears.

“After the surrender, General Hull retired to his own house, where he had lived while Governor of Michigan. It was occupied by his son-in-law, Mr. Hickman, and his family. One of General Brock’s Aids suggested to me the propriety of a British guard, to protect the General’s house from the Indians; to which I assented without consulting General Hull, as they had already seized our baggage in the street. This British guard, was considered another strong ground of suspicion; but General Hull supposed it was sent to prevent his escape.

“General Brock took up his quarters at a vacant house on the main street; Tecumseh occupied a part of the same building, to whom I had the honour of an introduction. He was a tall, straight, and noble looking Indian; dressed in a suit of tanned buckskin,



with a morocco sword-belt round his waist. On being announced to him, he said through his interpreter, 'Well, you are a prisoner, but it is the fortune of war, and you are in very good hands.'

"On the 17th, General Hull with his staff and the officers and soldiers of the regular army, were ordered on board the 'Queen Charlotte,' a frigate of thirty-six guns. While sitting in the after-cabin with General Hull, alone, he suddenly addressed me to this effect: 'My young friend, I remember a promise I made to your relatives at Cincinnati, that if it was within my power, to return you safe to them, it should be done. You, as a volunteer, are entitled to your parole, and I think you had better claim it.' Having a desire to see the world and perhaps obtain some information that might be useful to my country, I declined the proposition, and told the General, I preferred to share his fortunes; that I had been with him in prosperity, and would not desert him in adversity. The General was deeply affected, but, in a few moments replied, 'that he regretted the necessity of our separation, but must redeem his pledge, and thought it inexpedient for me to remain a prisoner in my youth, perhaps for years, and the loss of time might be a serious disadvantage to me.' I was obliged to accede to his wishes. He then sent for Commodore Barclay, and claimed my privilege, to which that noble officer readily assented. He then wrote a certificate of my correct deportment, &c., while under his command, in the form of a letter; and when the boat was ready to convey me on board a merchant vessel,



bound to Cleveland, he pressed my hand for some moments, and then exclaimed, ‘ God bless you, my young friend !—you return to your family without a stain—as for myself, I may have sacrificed a reputation, dearer to me than life, but I have saved the inhabitants of Detroit, and my heart approves of the act.’ The Commodore insisted on a parting glass of wine, which we drank in silence, and I left the ship.

“ General Hull was a man of tender feelings and accomplished manners ; his hair was white with age, his person rather corpulent, but his appearance was dignified and commanding. In the army of the Revolution, he was esteemed a brave and gallant officer, which was attested by Washington and other distinguished men ; and while upon his trial, the letters of those who survived, poured in, in his behalf. The man who led the attack on Stony Point, could not well be a coward ; Wayne would not have selected one for that desperate assault ; nor can I ever believe he was a traitor,—no man of his age could have manifested more general devotion to the service of his country. What then (you would ask) was the cause of his surrender ? I can answer this question according to my own impressions.

“ First. It was the want of preparation when the war commenced. Had our guns been mounted, we should have taken Malden without delay, which would have kept the Indians quiet, and turned the whole tide of events in our favour. It was General Harrison’s opinion, that ‘ Hull’s army must be sacri-

ficed, for the want of communication with his country.' It was Perry's victory on the Lake, that captured Malden and restored Detroit.

"Second. It was the want of co-operation at other points, to prevent the concentration of the enemy at Detroit. The armistice of Dearborn was a finishing touch to us.

"Third. It was the want of that energy and enterprise which a man may have in the prime of life, but which is seldom retained, in civil life, at the age of sixty-five.

"Fourth. It was his fatherly attachment to the citizens of Detroit, whose Governor and protector he had been for years, and knew them personally, man, woman, and child.

"Hull might have defended the fort while his provisions held out, but whether the inhabitants of Detroit would not have been butchered, on the night of the 16th, is a question I cannot answer. Perhaps the more immediate cause of the surrender, was the absence of Cass and McArthur. He had the utmost confidence in Colonel McArthur, as a brave executive officer; and in Colonel Cass as an intelligent and able adviser. Had they been present with their men, or had we even known their position, there would probably have been no surrender at that time.

"The cry of traitor spread among the soldiers, and it became a popular cry through the country. But I have not met with a field officer of that army, who believed there was treason in the case. General Cass has since declared to me, that he thought the

main defect of General Hull, was ‘the imbecility of age,’ and it was the defect of all the old veterans, who took the field in the late war. A peaceful government like ours, must always labour under similar disadvantages. Our superannuated officers must be called into service, or men without experience must command our armies.

“It may be supposed, that I am a little partial to my old commander, who treated me with all the kindness of a father;—but he is long since dead, and I have no inducement to disguise the truth or to cover his defects. I was not examined at his trial, and I will state the circumstances that prevented me. When the trial was first ordered at Philadelphia, I attended, but it was postponed for ten or twelve months, and afterwards held at Albany, in New-York. Having changed my residence, my summons did not reach me until the trial had commenced, and I arrived there just in time to hear the closing speech of Mr. Van Buren, who was Prosecutor on the occasion. I remember his identical words in relation to the principal charge; viz., ‘The charge of treason is not only unsupported, but unsupportable, and from that charge General Hull is entirely acquitted.’ Hull was condemned for cowardice and sentenced to be shot, but recommended by the Court to the mercy of the President, on account of his Revolutionary services. The President remitted the sentence, but dismissed him from the army. He afterwards wrote a defence, which was so highly approved in Boston, that a public dinner was tendered him, as an evidence of their appro-

bation. My situation with General Hull was thrown up to me in a taunting manner, by a distinguished editor in Louisville, during the glories of 1840. I paid no attention to it then, but will now remark, that the appointment was eagerly sought for by older men than myself, of the first respectability, who would then have been proud to have taken my place.

“The result of the campaign was a sore disappointment; but I served my country faithfully, without pay or reward; lost my horses and equipage into the bargain, and have never regretted the sacrifice. If this brief sketch affords amusement to your readers, or adds one mite to the truth of history, I shall be satisfied.

“Respectfully yours,

(Signed) ROBERT WALLACE.”

#### NOTE 16.

*Letter respecting the destitution of the country in 1812, and the building of Perry's fleet.*

[The following letter has been kindly communicated by a gentleman who has resided for many years in Western Pennsylvania, and who was well acquainted with the transactions in that region in 1812. Its details concerning Perry's efforts to prepare his fleet, will be found to be especially interesting.]

“MEADVILLE, April 6, 1846.

“MY DEAR SIR,—You ask me to give you my recollections as to the state of destitution in which the country found itself, when it was so improvidently involved in war in 1812, and as to the mismanagement of matters during the continuance of the contest. This I will cheerfully do, premising, however, that, from my local situation, most of my information was necessarily derived from public papers, discussions in Congress, or from hearsay; and further, that I am speaking of matters which occurred upwards of thirty years ago. The facts, however, to which I shall advert, may perhaps be of use to you, in leading you to a more extended inquiry in regard to them.

“Seldom had a nation better cause for going to war than we had in 1812. Our seamen impressed; our commerce interrupted; our vessels captured and condemned, and one of our public vessels attacked, and some of the crew taken out of it; in one word, every injury and insult was offered us which a haughty, overbearing nation could offer to a weak and enduring one. England knew our national imbecility, and, presuming on that knowledge, thought that she could play the bully with impunity. This was one of the main causes which led to the war of 1812.

“Mr. Madison and his cabinet were fully sensible of the unpreparedness of the country, and wished to avoid war. They made no preparation for a coming contest, either by an augmentation of the army or navy, or by a repair of our forts, or by filling our



arsenals. It appeared as if the Government intended to keep down the war-spirit, by keeping the country in a state of utter destitution. If so, they were mistaken. It is said that the war party in Congress presented to the Administration the alternative either of war, or of their (the war-party) opposing the Administration, and Mr. Madison's re-election. Unfortunately Mr. Madison preferred his popularity; and we were hurried into a war in such a state of total unpreparedness, that the commercial portion of the community would not believe that such an act of insanity was possible, until war was actually declared. If Mr. Madison, even at the opening of the session of 1811-12, had recommended to Congress to prepare the country for war, and had refused to declare war until the country should be prepared for it, I feel confident that the war would have been avoided. England did not wish to go to war; she only presumed on our forbearance. The moment she found we were in earnest, she repealed her orders in council, one of the most objectionable of her aggressions.

“I shall now mention a few instances of the unpreparedness of the country, when war was declared, in 1812.

“During the administration of the elder Adams, a small navy was created, consisting of a few frigates, and some smaller vessels. On Mr. Jefferson's coming into power, two of the frigates (perhaps some other of the public vessels) were sold, and the public money was wasted in building gun-boats, a Jeffersonian



philosophical experiment, which proved worse than useless. I am not aware that a single shot was fired from one of these gun-boats (unless it were at or near New Orleans) during the whole course of the war. In 1804 our small naval force was still further diminished by the loss of the frigate Philadelphia (one of the finest in our navy), which was wrecked near Tripoli, and afterwards burned. None of these defalcations were supplied by the substitution of other vessels.

“ But I shall pass to the situation of the naval force on Lake Erie, as being more intimately connected with the object of your inquiry.

“ During the administration of the elder Adams, a vessel of war was built (bearing his name), which, at the time, gave us the command of Lake Erie. To judge of the importance of having the command of that Lake, we must take into consideration the situation of the country bordering on it. That was, previous to 1812, with few exceptions, an unbroken wilderness, yielding no supplies. All the provisions, and most of the warlike stores, for the forts on the Lakes, Detroit, Michilimackinac, Chicago, and I believe even Niagara, were drawn from the neighborhood of Pittsburgh, ascended the Alleghany river and French creek, and were shipped at the port of Erie for their several places of destination. The three first-named forts were totally dependent on the navigation of the Lakes for their supplies. That cut off, and these posts became, in a great measure, untenable. The Government appears to have been aware of this fact, but

no adequate measures were taken to secure the command of the Lakes. No new vessels of war were built there. The only thing done was to haul up the *Adams*, in order to have her lengthened, so as to render her better able to cope with the English war vessels on the Lake. But such was the improvidence of our Government, that the *Adams* was yet on the stocks when war was declared. She was, I believe, subsequently launched—fell into the hands of the English at the surrender of Detroit—was cut out from under Fort Erie, Upper Canada, by Captain Elliott, and was, on that occasion, wrecked on the rocks in the Niagara river. The English having thus the undisputed possession of Lake Erie, and the upper Lakes, the fate of the upper posts was sealed. There were then no roads connecting these posts with the settled parts of the country, by which supplies could be obtained. The communication with Detroit, (the only one of these posts which might be supplied by land,) was, by reason of intervening swamps, forests, and rivers, so difficult, as to be easily cut off by an enemy; and hence Messrs. Cass and McArthur, who, with a considerable force, were sent to bring provisions to the Fort, did not bring them, because the enemy would not let them. When in 1813, Harrison's army penetrated to Fort Meigs, it was with the utmost difficulty, and at an immense expense of money, that its most indispensable wants could be supplied, and yet the only existing obstacle arose from the badness of the roads and the distance of transportation. But the worst part of the road to

Detroit was situated north of the Maumee river; and that portion of the road, from its contiguity to the Lake and to Malden, was constantly liable to interruption by the enemy. Hence Harrison could never advance beyond the Maumee, until Perry's victory gave us the command of the Lakes. He then easily advanced—invasion Canada—defeated and captured the whole of the British force, and then stopped short in his career of conquest, having by that time probably become sensible, that the project of conquering Canada by the way of Detroit, was a most miserable military blunder.

“It is perfectly clear that all our early disasters on the upper Lakes were to be attributed to the English having the command of the Lakes; and that, if the Adams had been fitted out in time, and perhaps another vessel of war added, so as to give us the decided superiority on the water, the loss of Detroit and Michilimackinac, and the massacre of the garrison of Chicago, would not only have been prevented, but we should also have saved the enormous expenditures attendant on Harrison's campaign, and the fitting out of Perry's fleet on Lake Erie.

“To the gross error of not securing a naval superiority, was added the neglect of putting our military posts in a proper state of defence, and of furnishing them with ample supplies. I was told that the works of all these posts were in a state of dilapidation, and that even the gun-carriages at Detroit were unfit for service, and had to be repaired, or replaced by new ones, before the guns could be used. On

this point, the papers of General Hull will probably give you more correct information.

“ But a far more guilty piece of negligence, was the omission to give the commanders of the different posts timely notice of the intended declaration of war. Instead of getting the information of the declaration of war from their own Government, they learned it through the enemy; and the consequence was, that Michilimackinac was surprised before it was known that there was war; that a part of the baggage of Hull’s army was captured; and that the garrison at Chicago, which ought either to have been adequately strengthened, or withdrawn in time, was massacred by the Indians immediately on leaving the fort to fall back on Detroit, as they had been directed to do. The loss of Mackinaw and Chicago removed every check on the incursion of the western Indians, and their operations soon rendered the communication between Detroit and the settled portions of Ohio impracticable, and thus the fate of that post, and of Hull’s army, became unavoidable. The latter defeated the Indians at Maguaga; they might perhaps have beaten the English under General Brock, but this could only postpone their fate, not avert it. Cut off from all intercourse with those points from which their supplies were derived, they must either starve or surrender, there was no third alternative.

“ The impracticability of General Harrison’s penetrating beyond the Maumee, and the enormous expense incurred in supplying his army there, that he might cover that section of country against the

enemies, at length convinced the Government of the absolute necessity of obtaining the mastery of Lake Erie; and in the spring of 1813, the construction of a fleet was commenced at the port of Erie. This fleet was to consist of two brigs, carrying twenty guns each; three gun-boats, and an advice-boat. No previous preparation had been made for the building and equipment of this fleet. On the 1st of April, 1813, nearly all the timber used for the construction of this fleet, was still standing in the forest. This, however, was on the spot, but all the other materiel for this fleet, such as cordage, blocks, anchors, guns, ammunition, &c., had to be brought from a distance, most of it from Philadelphia. To form some idea of the trouble and expense attending the transportation of this materiel, you must recollect that at that time the turnpike from Philadelphia westward, extended only to Harrisburgh; that from thence to Pittsburgh, a distance of 200 miles, the road, particularly in the mountains, was very rough; and that from Pittsburgh to Erie, a distance of about 130 miles, the roads being common country roads, were very soon so cut up by the heavy hauling on them, as to become nearly impassable. To give some idea of the expense of transportation I would observe, that previous to the war of 1812, and after the close of it in 1815, the expense of transportation from Philadelphia to Meadville, might be computed at  $12\frac{1}{2}$  cents per pound. If we now add to this the 37 miles increased distance from Meadville to Erie, and make due allowance for the increased expense during a state of war, and take

also into consideration that in the hauling for the public there were no return freights, I think we shall not be far wrong in estimating the expense of transportation from Philadelphia to Erie at about 20 cents per pound.

The officer selected to superintend the construction of this fleet, and to command it, was Oliver H. Perry, a young man of about 27 years of age, and then a Master-Commandant in the navy. Happily for the West, a more judicious selection could hardly have been made. To a sound practical judgment, Perry joined an uncommon degree of energy, and an untiring industry, and these enabled him, with very inadequate means, to have his fleet ready for service in August, and to achieve, on the 10th September 1813, the memorable victory, which will hand his name down to posterity. Most people in this country know Perry only as the hero of the 10th of September. This is doing him great injustice. I, who was intimate with him, and was acquainted with the difficulties he had to contend with in the equipment of his fleet, always considered that he showed more real greatness by the courage with which he bore up under these difficulties, than by his victory. To form some idea of Perry's situation, you must know that, up to the end of August, he had under him but a single commissioned officer (the present Capt. Turner), then a young man without experience, and who had but recently been commissioned. The rest of Perry's officers were young midshipmen. Just previous to the action, Capt. Elliott (then a



Master-Commandant) joined the fleet, and this made three commissioned officers to a fleet of six vessels of war.

In point of men, Capt. Perry's means were still more deficient. The marines for the fleet, furnished by the Government from the Depôt at Washington, consisted of a Capt. or Lieut. (Brooks, killed in the action), and of a Sergeant, a drummer, and a fifer. Two or three men were recruited on the route to Erie, and the rest of the marines had to be recruited at Erie. As to sailors, Perry's means were also greatly deficient. By one of those arrangements so common during the war in question, the expediency of which it is difficult to reconcile with common sense, Perry was put under the orders of Chauncey, the Commander of the naval force on Lake Ontario, and all the supplies of men, intended for Lake Erie, wherever enlisted, were in the first instance sent to Sacket's Harbour. The consequences were such as might have been expected. So long as men could be used on Lake Ontario, to fill up the crews of the vessels there to their full complement, none were sent to Perry, and when any were sent, they were the refuse of the drafts. Captain Elliot stated subsequently, in my presence, that, serving at that time on Lake Ontario, he had himself had the picking of the men to be sent to Lake Erie, and that none were sent but the worst; and that if he could then have foreseen that he himself should be sent to Lake Erie, his selections would have been very different. Perry, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, expressed

some surprise that so large a portion of the prime New England sailors, enlisted in the cities, should be turned into negroes and mulattoes before they reached him; but acknowledged himself grateful for getting even such. And well he might be so, considering how alarmingly deficient he was in men. After the six vessels, built at Erie, were all launched, and while he was fitting them out, he had but about a hundred men, of which, from sundry causes, a large number were on the sick list. As all fit for duty had to work hard the whole day in fitting out the fleet, there were no spare men to row even a single guard-boat, to give notice of any night attack which might be made on the fleet. An English fleet of five vessels of war was at that time cruising off the harbour, in full view. That fleet might, at any time, have sent its boats, during a dark night, and the destruction of the whole American fleet was almost inevitable, for Perry's force was totally inadequate to its defence, and the regiment of Midland Pennsylvania Militia, stationed at Erie expressly for the defence of the fleet, refused to keep guard at night on board. 'I told the boys to go, Captain,' said the worthless Colonel of this regiment, in excusing himself for not sending a guard on board, 'I told the boys to go, but the boys won't go.'

“In this state of destitution Perry was left for weeks; and a more trying one cannot well be imagined. Intrusted with the command of an important squadron, for the safety of which he was held responsible, without being furnished with the means

to defend it, he never could go to sleep with the reasonable certainty that before morning his fleet would not be destroyed, and his reputation and professional prospects be blasted for ever ; for he knew well enough that, in case of any accident, he would be made the scape-goat.

“ Under these trying circumstances Perry constantly bore up with a constancy and fortitude which excited my admiration more than did his subsequent victory. I never knew his fortitude to forsake him except once, and then his despondency was only momentary. He had been promised that, by a certain day, Chauncey would be at the head of Lake Ontario, and land there the men necessary to man Perry’s fleet. Perry had sent an officer to receive this detachment, and to conduct it to Erie. He was elated with the prospect of having his wants at length supplied ; and it was when his officer returned, and reported that Chauncey had been at the head of the Lake at the appointed time, had received his letter, and had sailed again down Lake Ontario without landing a man, or sending any answer, that Perry’s fortitude, for a moment, appeared to give way, and that he complained bitterly to me of the state of abandonment in which his country left him.

“ When, ultimately, the vessels were ready to sail, Perry called on the militia for volunteers, to serve on board, while the vessels were getting over the bar at the mouth of the harbour, it being expected that he would be attacked during the slow process of getting the vessels over. After the vessels had

been got over, he again called for volunteers to make a short cruise with him to Long Point, and the lower part of the Lake, in quest of the enemy. How many volunteers he obtained I do not now recollect, but among them was a rifle company, consisting of 72 men from this neighbourhood. It was while Perry was absent on this cruise, that Elliott arrived at Erie with a reinforcement of 100 seamen. Thus reinforced, Perry sailed up the Lake to Sandusky Bay. Here he got an additional supply of about 60 sailors, from some of the regular regiments in Harrison's army, and a considerable number of volunteers to serve as marines. Notwithstanding all these reinforcements, Perry had, on the day of the action, on his own vessel, a crew of only 120 men, of whom about 20 were on the sick list.

“ From what I have said, it must not be inferred that Captain Barclay, Perry's opponent, was wanting either in courage or enterprise. He was a brave man, but placed, like Perry, under the orders of the commander on Lake Ontario, and, like his antagonist, treated in the most niggardly manner.

“ The mismanagement respecting the army was equally great. The officers appointed to the new regiments were, with some exceptions, totally ignorant of all military knowledge. Too many of them were young men of dissipated habits, unfit for civil pursuits or occupations; or political brawlers who had recommended themselves to the Government by their noisy patriotism. The common men were mostly enlisted in taverns and beer-houses. At first, the en-

listments were, if my recollection serves me, for three years, or during the war. As the difficulty of obtaining men increased, the bounty was increased, and the term of service shortened, until, at last, a heavy bounty was given to men who were enlisted only for nine months. A more ruinous system it would be difficult to conceive. As the recruiting stations were generally at a considerable distance from the scenes of action, and as at least a number of men must be collected at a *dépôt* before they could be sent off, the term of enlistment of these men was nearly, if not quite, expired, by the time they reached the army.

“On the breaking out of the war, it became necessary to furnish arms to the militia of this section of Pennsylvania. The Governor accordingly sent us a number of boxes filled with muskets, and their usual accompaniments from the State Arsenal. I was present at the unpacking of these guns, and never, I believe, in modern days, has such a collection been seen. In some, the touch-hole was so covered by the lock as to have no communication with the pan. In others, the touch-hole was half an inch above the pan when shut, and some had no touch-hole at all. Many of the barrels were splintered, or had other internal defects. In one word, the whole were useless until armourers were set at work on them, when a portion of them were rendered fit for service.

“The militia of this section of Pennsylvania were repeatedly called out to march to Erie, though the object of the call was not always obvious, unless it were to let the officers earn some money; for patriot-

ism then, as now, had a special care of number one. There never was a shot fired there. On some of those occasions the troops, on their arrival at Erie, were destitute of ammunition ; and on one occasion there were no flints. An Aid-de-Camp of the Major-General was sent off on horseback to Harrisburg to communicate this want to the Governor. The Governor went round among the stores in the town, and purchased what flints were to be had, putting them in his pocket as he purchased them. The Aid-de-Camp brought them in his saddle-bags to Erie. A supply might, in the same manner, have been obtained nearer Erie in one-third the time, and at half the expense.

“ In 1812, a brigade of Pennsylvania militia, of about 2000 men, partly drafted men, but mostly volunteer companies, were assembled at Meadville, destined to reinforce General Smyth’s army at Buffalo. I have seldom seen a finer collection of men, but they were rendered totally useless for want of proper officers. The troops *elected* here their own superior officers. The Colonels, with one exception, were totally inefficient, and the General, though I believe physically brave, was morally a coward, and dared not either to introduce proper discipline, or to enforce the few orders he issued. Hence that which might have been a fine, useful body of troops, was nothing but an armed mob. They remained lying here in camp for a couple of months, doing nothing. They were then marched to Buffalo, where they were left in the same state of inaction, until sickness broke out



among them, when some deserted, and the rest were dismissed, without any of them having seen an enemy. Smyth had abundant means of invading Canada (the object for which he was at Buffalo), but I believe he was deficient in personal courage. He was a mere braggadocio. He kept constantly proclaiming that he would cross the Niagara river forthwith. Two or three times the troops for the invasion were actually embarked, but were countermanded after remaining some hours in the boats. Once he appeared to have brought his courage to the right pitch. The troops were embarked in the evening. A party of sailors was sent over to storm the English battery. This was gallantly accomplished, though with some loss. Instead of crossing immediately, Smyth remained on the American side till morning. This gave time to the English to receive reinforcements from below. The few men who had crossed were overpowered, and Smyth disembarked his troops. He was one of Uncle Sam's hard bargains.

“If the military operations were badly managed, the fiscal affairs of the country were not managed better. Our fiscal system is defective, in that all our revenue is derived from import duties. The consequence is, that when at war with one of the large maritime powers of Europe, our revenue is diminished, because our importations are interrupted; and besides, this system does not admit of being extended so as to yield an increased revenue when wanted. It would be much better, both for the country and the revenue, to prohibit altogether the importation of all such ar-

ticles as we can manufacture ourselves in sufficient quantity to supply the wants of the country, and then to lay a tax on the home manufactures. Such a system of revenue would be unaffected by war, and admit of the necessary expansion when an increase of revenue was required. *This per parenthese.*

“When war was contemplated, Mr. Gallatin, then Secretary of the Treasury, endeavoured to cool down the war party in Congress, by representing that war would render it necessary to resort again to a stamp act and tax on whisky, taxes which, on account of former associations, were peculiarly unpopular. But the war spirits were not thus to be deterred. They declared that the money to carry on the war was to be raised, not by taxing but by borrowing; and Gallatin, who did not wish to risk his reputation as a financier on such a philosophical experiment, soon withdrew from the concern, and procured for himself a mission to France.

“He was succeeded by G. W. Campbell, an honest, well-meaning man, I believe, but destitute of all fiscal talents. He tried the borrowing scheme, forgetting that to borrow there must be lenders, and that people are not inclined to lend to government unless the regular payment of the interest be secured by a permanent revenue. The result of this experiment was a rapid declination of the credit of the United States. I do not now recollect what was the precise price of stocks in each particular year of the war, but I know it kept constantly decreasing. In 1811 United States stock was at 103 $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. In

1813, I took part in a loan at 83 $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. Stocks afterwards fell considerably lower, but I do not now recollect the worst terms on which money was borrowed, but I think it was 78 *a* 80 per cent. A single fiscal blunder will show Mr. Campbell's utter incapacity. He made a contract with Mr. Jacob Barker for a loan of several millions of dollars, I think at 85 per cent. but with a proviso, that if the Secretary, the next time he borrowed, had to give more advantageous terms to the lender, Barker was to have the same terms for his loan. Barker's loan was, of course, divided among the chief money lenders of that day, and when the Secretary was obliged to go next into the market for a new loan, these moneyed men had a direct interest to prevent his getting it, except on the most usurious terms. It has lately been stated in Congress, by Mr. Calhoun and others, that the United States borrowed money at, at least, 30 per cent. discount. The fact is literally true, though as nominally the United States did not issue \$100 scrip for \$70 in money, it may require some explanation. During the war, the southern and midland Atlantic ports were blockaded. The New England ports became thus the main ports of importation, and the foreign commerce of the country was through these ports. As our exports were greatly diminished, the goods imported had to be paid for in cash. This drained gradually, first the more distant parts, and afterwards those nearer to New England, of specie, and the consequence was a stoppage of all the Banks south and west of New-York. This suspension of

specie payments naturally caused a depreciation of their paper, and that depreciation was greater or less in proportion to the distance at which such Bank was situated from New England. Now it was in the depreciated paper of such suspended Banks that the United States loans were paid.

“During the progress of the war (I think chiefly after Campbell had left the Treasury), some direct and indirect taxes were imposed, but this return to common sense came too late, and was too inefficient to restore the fast sinking credit of the United States. In the latter part of 1814, we presented to the world the spectacle of a nation, whose resources were nearly untouched, and which was yet on the verge of bankruptcy, merely because its rulers had not had either the skill, or the moral courage, to call these resources into action. If the war had continued six months longer, the Government would probably have been in an open, declared state of bankruptcy.

“Believe me ever most truly, your friend.”

#### NOTE 17.

*Letter from William Sullivan, Esq., to a Daughter of General Hull.*

“BOSTON, July 27, 1835.

“DEAR MADAM,—I did not receive your letter of 27th April until last evening. I well remember your father, as a visiter of my father, when I was a youth, more than forty years ago. I always considered him to be a personal and political friend of my father, and

as belonging to the Democratic or Republican party of the times which followed the adoption of the National Constitution. You know that, from 1789 to the end of the late war, the citizens of the United States were divided into two great parties—and all persons who were of importance enough to belong to any party, belonged to one or the other of them.

“There were shades of difference among the members of these two parties, but not so distinct as to enable me to distinguish among individuals of that party, to which I did not belong myself.

“If I were asked whether General Hull belonged to the Jeffersonian or Republican party, I should answer, that I think he did. If I were asked whether he approved of National Policy in Mr. Jefferson’s time, in all respects, I should answer, that I had no opportunity of knowing that he disapproved of any of it. If I were asked whether he disapproved of National Policy in Mr. Adams’ time, I should say, I think he did, because that disapprobation was common to his party. What his peculiar views and opinions were in the time of Washington (1789–1797), I know not. In all these times there was little room for compromising as to opinions.

“The tyranny of party was as powerful then as it has been at any time since. Partisans on both sides were in full communion, and the neutral or the wavering were of no account. I think, therefore, that your father would be ranked among the distinguished men in Massachusetts, who were of the Democratic party, and thought and acted as they did : and what

they thought, and how they acted, is now matter of history. The precise line pursued by your father I cannot designate. I began to be in the Legislature in 1804. I do not remember to have met your father there. I saw him only when he came into Boston, and called to see my father in a friendly way, or on business. I have no remembrance of any conversation on these occasions, which would indicate any difference between your father's sentiments and those generally entertained by his party. I always entertained a high respect for your father, as he was always, in my view, a courteous and honourable gentleman. I regarded his trial and condemnation as a State affair—and was gratified in any opportunity of showing a personal respect for him.

“I have the honour to be, with great respect and esteem, your obedient servant,

(Signed) WILLIAM SULLIVAN.”

“To Mrs. MARIA CAMPBELL.”

### NOTE 18.

*Copy of a Letter from S. Hale, Esq. to Mrs. N. B. Hickman, a daughter of General Hull.*

“KEENE, New Hampshire, Sept. 27, 1847.

“MADAM,—I thank you for the ‘Memoirs of the Northwestern Army,’\* under General Hull, which

\* The “Memoirs of the North- of public opinion throughout the western Army,” above referred to, United States in favour of General were published by General Hull in Hull. 1825, and produced a great change



you were so good as to send me. That public sentiment has been unjust to him, I do not doubt, and have never doubted; and now, after having had my attention again fixed on the subject, and called to mind all I have read and heard, I am convinced that to others rather than to him, should the disasters of that campaign be attributed. I have no doubt of his patriotism, nor of his personal courage.

“ I am now convinced that the Administration of that day did not contemplate the conquest of Canada.

“ It is sad, my dear madam, to reflect how carelessly and unjustly praise and censure are often dispensed in this world.

“ Very respectfully, yours,

(Signed)

S. HALE.”

“ MRS. N. B. HICKMAN.

THE END.














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