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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

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- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - Bland
- 1 - RW Smith
- 1 - Wannall
- 1 - Rushing
- 1 - Branigan

W. C. Sullivan

6-30-64

W. A. Branigan

1 - Whitson

TRAVEL OF PRESIDENT IN THE U. S.
AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

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Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan 6-24-64 pointed out when Bureau first drafted its procedure for the Security Index (SI) it was recognized there would be subjects involved in espionage whom it would not be desirable to apprehend in an emergency. The Director indicated that he did not recall any such understanding.

SAC Letter #23(c), series 1951, dated March 3, 1951, pointed out that espionage subjects are maintained in the Special Section of the SI when apprehension in the event of an emergency would destroy chances of penetration and control of an operating espionage parallel or would destroy known chances of penetration and control of a "sleeper" parallel. This SAC Letter relating to the Special Section of the SI is attached for information. Pertinent references to espionage subjects appear in paragraph 3, page 1, and the last paragraph on page 3. The SAC Letter points out the necessity for protecting our double agents, sources of information and informants. (c)

Mr. Tolson has expressed the opinion that all SI subjects should be furnished to the Secret Service, and the Director has agreed.

It is believed the Director would want to know some of the details of the problems we face. [Set forth below are some specific examples from the 16 cases now contained in the Espionage Special Section of the SI, which have not yet been given Secret Service.] (c) A distinction must be drawn between limited dissemination at a high level strictly for the purpose of information or for the handling of a limited lead by another agency and dissemination to the Secret Service where we do not control their further dissemination to other Government agencies or local authorities.

Smutny - Smutny has been identified by our high-level penetration of Czech intelligence as a Czech illegal agent. He has been in the U.S. since July, 1959, and is currently employed by the (5)

Enc.

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Memo Transmitted to Sullivan
 re: TRAVEL OF PRESIDENT IN THE U.S.
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Boeing Company in Seattle, Washington. The only contact made with this illegal by Czech intelligence in the U.S. was by our informant. Our informant is now back in his native country and is expected to continue to furnish to the U.S. high-level intelligence information. (S)

An inadvertent interview of or physical restraint placed upon Spatny by another agency of the Government or by local authorities could jeopardize the safety of our Czech informant. (S)

Jared Ulver - Ulver has likewise been identified by our high-level penetration of Czech intelligence as a Czech illegal agent. He entered the U.S. in August, 1958, from Norway. He is currently employed as a traveling salesman out of New York City selling religious articles throughout the Middle West. According to our Czech informant, Ulver has notified Czech intelligence that he was ready to begin operations, but our investigation indicates he has been traveling extensively in pursuit of his employment and has yet to take any action indicating he is filling an intelligence assignment. Inadvertent action by another agency of the Government or by local authorities pursuant to a request by Secret Service would unquestionably alert Ulver and make it extremely difficult to cover his subsequent movements. He might be replaced by an illegal we know nothing about and our Czech informant now in his native country would be under suspicion. (S)

Vladimir Pavlecka - Pavlecka is an outstanding mechanical and electrical engineer currently employed at the Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation, Canoga Park, California. Our high-level informant in Czech intelligence has identified Pavlecka as a paid Czech source of information. Here again, our Czech informant was in actual contact with Pavlecka and since our informant's return to his native country, Pavlecka has not been in a meeting with other Czech intelligence representatives. He has sent a signal letter to Czechoslovakia signaling for a meeting with Czech intelligence, in California. Here again, inadvertent action by other Federal or local authorities could disrupt our entire coverage of this case and would certainly jeopardize our Czech informant. If the two other Czech espionage agents mentioned above and Pavlecka were the subject of overt attention by local or Federal authorities, most certainly the finger would be placed on our informant. (S)

Jose Carbonell Marrero - Marrero is a Castro-Cuban agent presently residing in New York City. He had a background of Communist Party membership up to 1950. The identification of Marrero as a Castro-Cuban agent grew out of information developed by Communications Intelligence through the National Security Agency, which information

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cannot be included in communications prepared for dissemination. His Castro-Cuban agent activities have so far been the furnishing of data relating to anti-Castro individuals and organizations. He uses letter drops in Cuba and Mexico, employing secret writing. Inadvertent action on the part of other Federal or local authorities would alert Marrero to the fact that he was currently under suspicion. He would no longer use communications channels which we are covering and we would lose the benefit of our current coverage with no assurance, particularly if Marrero was replaced by the Cubans, of being able to cover his replacement. (S)

Arthur Meyer Brandel - Brandel is a native-born citizen residing in Washington, D. C. He is a former "New York Times" correspondent, currently a free-lance writer and a member of the Overseas Press Club. He is a paid source of the Yugoslav Intelligence Service whose Yugoslav principal is our informant. Any inadvertent interview or physical restriction of Brandel by another Government agency or local authorities would be extremely detrimental to our Yugoslav informant and might, of course, raise the question of administrative pressure on news media representatives. (S)

Joseph Patrick Bonner - Bonner is a native-born citizen who is Vice President in Charge of Foreign Operations for Daco Instrument Company, Brooklyn, New York. He is a paid source of Yugoslav intelligence. Until March 30, 1964, he had been an engineering division chief of the Agency for International Development (AID). He resigned from AID when confronted with data that he apparently had "two wives" only one of which was legal and that he drank on the job. His connection with Yugoslav intelligence was not brought out by AID in connection with his resignation. Since his morals would not place him on the SI or cause concern in connection with the protection of the President, any inadvertent contact with him by other Government agencies or local authorities would serve to alert him that he was under suspicion of espionage. This would be bound to get back to the Yugoslavs and jeopardize the safety of our Yugoslav intelligence informant, particularly if Brandel, mentioned above, had been inadvertently approached. (S)

Dr. Alexis Von Volborth - Von Volborth has been identified as a Soviet agent from information furnished by our FEDORA informant. He is an KGB illegal of Russian-Finnish background who came to this country in 1955 and has a petition for American citizenship pending. He is a mineralogist employed at the University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada. We are aware of one clandestine meeting with a KGB agent, Ivan Belov, in San Francisco's China Town in February, 1963. Belov

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has returned to the USSR and we do not know the identity of Von Volborth's new Soviet principal. Any inadvertent interview or restraint of Von Volborth by another Federal agency or local officials would alert the KGB to the fact that there is a penetration of their New York Residency since Von Volborth was handled from that residency and only a limited number of persons there were aware of his existence. The KGB has been particularly alert to the situation as it affects the residency in New York ever since the arrests in the Butenko case in the Fall of 1963. Any further alarm generated by the uncovering of Von Volborth would serve to throw suspicion on our FEDORA informant, particularly if five other sources of the KGB whose identities have been furnished to us by FEDORA and who are listed in the Special Section of the SI, were likewise interviewed or placed under restraint by other Federal agencies or local authorities. (S)

The same is true in the case of four espionage agents serving the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) whose identities were given us by our TOPHAT informant who is now in the USSR. If one of them was inadvertently notified of Government interest, it might be considered accidental by the GRU. If four of them were inadvertently alerted, we would have placed our TOPHAT informant's life in jeopardy. (S)

OBSERVATIONS:

As long as the Bureau maintains a tight grip on the investigations of these espionage agents and controls the activities of other agencies regarding them, furnishing only that information which is necessary for the covering of leads or for the alerting of top-level officials of our Government, we can choose the appropriate time to move in on the subjects and their principals looking toward prosecution on the one hand and persona non grata action on the other.

When we release the facts to the Secret Service to handle as they will whenever the President travels, we can no longer control the day-to-day operations or take necessary steps to protect our informants, without which our coverage of bloc intelligence would be severely restricted.

ACTION:

It was believed that you would want to know the true facts and details regarding these cases. If the Director still wants to disseminate these 16 sensitive espionage cases to the Secret Service, it will be done. This Division feels the Director would want to know the problems involved and the possible harm which would come through such blanket dissemination.

OK-H. I think OK not
 to disseminate data on
 these 16. T 7/1

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