

S/S

June 21, 1949

Dear General MacArthur:


On returning from Paris, I found your letter of June 16, 1949, awaiting me and I hasten to let you know that I much appreciate your thoughtfulness in giving me your views on the regime of control in Japan. I had anticipated, with the Conference of Foreign Ministers out of the way, being able to give additional attention to the problem of Japan and consequently your letter is most timely. I hope shortly to be able to reply to your letter and in the meantime accept my best thanks.

Sincerely yours,

~~WALTER~~ ACHESON

General Douglas MacArthur,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
Tokyo, Japan.

FE:WWButterworth:mss
6-24-49



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 27 1949
THE UNDER SECRETARY DIRECTOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
S/P

June 27, 1949

FE - Mr. Butterworth

Walt:

Will you let me know if you have
any comments on this letter to General
MacArthur?

To G.F.K.
George F. Kennan

Many thanks - this seems
just right to me
WMB

Attachment:

1. Incoming letter from
General MacArthur
2. Reply



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

POLICY PLANNING
STAFF *File*
6/23/49
GFK: smk
JUN 22 1949
Department of State

Tokyo, Japan
16 June 1949

Dear Kennan:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have just written Secretary Acheson, against the possibility that his present preoccupation with European affairs might preclude his giving his immediate personal attention to this sector of the globe. The letter is self-explanatory and my concern so grave that a hasty and ill-considered decision might be taken or seriously considered, that I felt it desirable to discuss the matter with you as well, but saw no need to go over the identical details separately with both.

I have no doubt but that, as with Secretary Acheson, many of the things I have pointed out are well known to you and am sure that my conclusions in general parallel those of your own, gained from your intensive on-the-ground survey conducted last year. It will be a source of great comfort to me, however, to feel that you are alert to the dangers to our Far Eastern position inherent in any relaxation or suggestion of relaxation from our purpose firmly to hold--and that you are alive to the disastrous psychological impact any move or serious suggestion of a move capable of being so interpreted would have upon the oriental masses.

I hope that it will be possible for you again to visit Japan in the not too distant future. You may be sure of a hearty welcome when you can do so.

Most cordially,

Douglas MacArthur
DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

181037

Inclosure: Copy of letter to
Secretary Acheson

The Honorable George F. Kennan
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

vy
at

JUL 22 1949

FILED

CS/H

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/6-1649

740.00119 Control (Japan)
16-1649

Tokyo, Japan
16 June 1949

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have been rather disturbed recently over recurrent Washington dated press dispatches reflecting a trend of thought in official circles that a change in the regime of control in Japan, patterned after the plan now being implemented for the United States Zone of Germany, would not only be a desirable development but susceptible of accomplishment with no less difficulty. This trend of thought either fails to understand or ignores the structural set-up which, largely under your skillful guiding hand, was fashioned in Moscow during late 1945 and the basic distinctions which otherwise exist between the situation in Germany and that existing in Japan.

I know that you are deeply preoccupied with the difficult European problems which confront you and have probably prevented much thought being given to this relatively quiet sector in Japan, but against the possibility that the Japanese problem might suddenly be brought up for serious consideration I thought that I should give you my views and estimates thereon. Much of what I have to say will be well known to you but it is difficult to discuss so broad a subject piecemeal without showing the connections between inter-related parts.

Here there is no military government functioning in the administration of Japanese civil affairs, as throughout the Occupation I have permitted the Japanese civil government in all of its branches and sub-divisions to function, subject only to the close observation and inherent authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to intervene at any time as in his judgment necessary to support Allied objectives. No military government has been established here which, incidentally, eliminated the call upon United States manpower which otherwise would have been required. Such United States personnel as are required to carry on the civil phase of the Occupation consist for the most part in specially qualified civilians recruited in Washington. Thus, in the SCAP Headquarters organization, out of 2,798 persons on duty, 2,443 are civilian.

The situation here is thus entirely different than that prevailing in the United States Zone of Germany where Mr. McCloy is about to enter upon his duties as High Commissioner. There the American forces have actually

-2-

governed through an established and functioning military government, with a civil German government only just about to be inaugurated. In addition, the United States has maintained unilateral control over policy and administration from the start in its zone of Germany. Here in Japan, to the contrary, such unilateral control was yielded at the Moscow Conference in late 1945 when an Allied set-up was agreed upon by the United States, in concert with the other major powers, for the administration of the Occupation. This set-up embodied a civilian agency, termed the Far Eastern Commission, composed of representatives of the eleven Pacific powers, sitting in Washington, to formulate policy; the Allied Council for Japan, composed of the United States, British Commonwealth, China and the Soviet, sitting in Tokyo, to act as an advisory and consultative body to the Supreme Commander; and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, acting as the sole executive authority for the Allies in Japan. Since then the international character of the Occupation has expanded through the organization of the Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan, the Reparations Technical Advisory Committee, and other Allied civilian agencies, in the implementation of Far Eastern Commission policy. For general security purposes the Supreme Commander has under him American Occupation Forces, under the immediate command of CINCFE, the British Commonwealth Forces, and all Allied ground, Naval and Air Forces in Japan.

The United States could, with respect to the American zone of Germany, alter the regime of control at will, but by the express terms of the Moscow Agreement, any change in the regime of Occupation control in Japan there agreed upon was specifically reserved to the Far Eastern Commission. It so happens that the CINCFE is also the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, pursuant to agreement reached among the four major Allied powers in consultation at the time of the cessation of hostilities. While such action was taken before the regime of control was determined upon at Moscow and the eleven Pacific nations vested with the policy-making power, specific confirmation at such conference was given to the appointment and authority of the Supreme Commander. Change in that regime of control to permit the State Department to assume a position in Japan analogous to that it is about to assume in Germany would, in accordance with the terms of reference of the Moscow Agreement, require the consent of a majority of the Far Eastern Commission, including the United States, Britain, Russia and China, each of which possesses the veto power on that body. It is most unlikely that such an agreement would be forthcoming as the nations involved would thereby be required to partially yield their influence in the future orientation and control of Japan. By no stretch of imagination, moreover, could such a change be regarded as a transfer from a military to civil administration. It is merely an incident that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers here is a military officer. He has functioned entirely as the executive head of a civilian administration. The few military personnel which SCAP has borrowed from CINCFE are merely to supplement the paucity of civilian personnel otherwise available to him.

-3-

But apart from this, and of infinitely greater importance, no move could be more calculated to destroy the remaining prestige of the United States in the Far East than a serious effort toward such a change. Nothing would give greater impetus to the Communist drive to bring all of Asia under control. Oriental reactions differ widely from occidental reactions, and a drastic readjustment in the regime of control here would certainly be interpreted as indicative of an Allied weakening in their determination to further the objectives enunciated in the surrender terms. It could not fail to be regarded as a decisive step toward yielding in the face of Communist successes in China and as a tacit acknowledgment of our inability to maintain our position, support our responsibilities and defend our rights and interests in the Far East. This is no mere conjecture. I have seen the convulsions here which accompanied every serious suggestion which has been made with any color of authority that American policy might be reoriented toward a weakening of the American position in the Pacific, such as former Secretary Royall is reported to have made on his trip to Japan and as has frequently been the purport of press dispatches from Washington, mostly speculative, but some bearing the stamp of seeming official authenticity.

The United States has emerged through three and a half years of a predominantly American Occupation to occupy a unique position in the hearts of the Japanese people. It is a position of respect bordering on reverence and veneration. This has largely been brought about by the character of the Occupation and its guiding philosophy. It has been a military Occupation only in a formal sense and because inherent in it lies the ultimate authority of military force. Essentially it has been administered along civil lines. To some Japanese the presence of troops, with its connotations of order and discipline, has had greatest appeal and most far-reaching influence. But to most, the benign qualities of the Occupation policy and administration, the bestowal and safeguard of human rights, and the social reformation to enhance individual dignity have made a penetrating and lasting impression. But the combination of both has brought to the great masses of the Japanese people a sense of confidence and faith and a feeling of complete security in the American effort and purpose. This is the strong spiritual front which has been erected here in Japan against the Communist advance in Asia.

To speak of civilianizing the Occupation is to speak in riddles. It is, and always has been, civilianized. It is merely incidental that its chief administrator came from the military ranks. On the other hand, experience has clearly demonstrated that even public speculation of such a change is widely interpreted in the oriental mind as pointing to a relaxation of the firm anti-Communist stand we have taken here, with the view of an ultimate withdrawal from our position in the Far East. This but fertilizes the field for Communist conversion and expansion and tends to undermine and sabotage our efforts at this and other strategic Pacific areas to contain the Communist advance and preserve a front safe for democratic growth, without offering the slightest basis for hope that advantage might result from such a change, even if possible of implementation.

-4-

I cannot too strongly urge that, pending developments with the Soviet which would make a peace treaty possible, every effort to effect a change in the regime of control such as has been suggested, foreshadowing a weakening of our purpose to maintain invincibly our position, be sharply resisted. The scales are far too delicately balanced recklessly to experiment with doubtful change in an area from which has emerged a pattern of general success. To tamper unduly with such a situation is but to prejudice the security of our position and hazard every gain made in the course of the Occupation and otherwise invite catastrophic consequences throughout Asia.

The estimate I have made is so conclusive in evidentiary support that I earnestly hope that before any such change becomes a potential reality you will advise me in order that I may lay my views before you in much fuller detail, as well as before the President.

We are still hoping that the burdens upon you from Europe will abate sufficiently to permit you a visit to this area of the world. I cannot but repeat that such an eventuality would have a profoundly beneficial effect upon the morale of the Asian peoples.

Faithfully yours,

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

The Honorable Dean Acheson
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

AIR MAIL



REGISTERED
NO. 0219473

The Honorable George F. Kennan,
Director, Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.



AIR MAIL

SM. FRANCISCO, CALIF. U.S. ARMY
 JUN 18 1949
 A.P.M.

U.S. ARMY POSTAL SERVICE
 JUN 18 1949
 7 000 A.P.M.

WASHINGTON, D.C.
 REGISTERED
 JUN 22 1949

SM. FRANCISCO, CALIF. U.S. ARMY
 JUN 18 1949
 A.P.M.

RECEIVED
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JUN 29 1949 REGISTERED

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 6-1649

Dear General MacArthur:

I have received your letter of June 16 and appreciate your thoughtfulness in letting me have a copy of your letter to Secretary Acheson of that date.

I have discussed this with the Secretary, and he is giving the most careful consideration to the views you put forth, the importance of which he fully appreciates. I am sure that you will hear from him in the near future. I am personally very glad that you were good enough to let him have your views directly on this matter. We are moving into a new and difficult phase of foreign policy not only in Asia but in Europe as well; and there is need for the utmost in contact and understanding between all of those who share the tremendous burdens of outstanding responsibility in the handling of our Government's affairs abroad.

I need not say that I continue to look back on my visit to Tokyo with gratitude for the hospitality I was shown and with satisfaction over the help which the visit gave to all of us here in understanding your problems. I do indeed hope that I may be able to visit the Far East again before too many months have passed; but I doubt that it could be before next winter.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Handwritten signature of George F. Kennan

George F. Kennan
Director, Policy Planning Staff

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
Tokyo.

S/P:GFKennan:dmh:vh

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JUN 28 1949 P.M.

740.00119 CONTROL (Japan) / 6-1649
CS/H

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 6-1749
Telegram No. 99
 Date 17 Jun 49
 From Wellington, NZ
 To State

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
- Otherwise Restricted Information

New Zealand
Authority

Jul 78 GAB
Date

*Army Dept
To*

CONFIDENTIAL

RM/R

June 17, 1949

Executive Officer, GAD
Attention: Colonel Hendricks
NA - Mr. Lory

Japanese Participation in International Relations.

*xr
794.00*

Per my telephone conversation with you attached is a draft cable to SCAP with respect to the above subject.

I would appreciate it if you would inform me when Army concurrence has been obtained.

This Document Must Be Returned to
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Central
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740.00119 CONTROL

AlDunning, Ext. 4681

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*740.00119
CONFIDENTIAL FILE*

*740.00119
CONFIDENTIAL FILE
6-17-49*

CONFIDENTIAL

SCAP

ACTION

PO:OUSA:CAD:State

FROM CS/CAD. GITE ROOM

State and Army suggest that you may wish to utilize defeat admission Jap Government Delegation to Paris Conference ITU to impress upon Jap Govt and people directly or indirectly and by whatever means you consider ^{ed} appropriate and effective for maximum benefit US interests following points:

(1) It was USSR in FEO on Feb. 25, 1949 that was responsible for initiating challenge legality Japan's adherence International Telecommunications Convention, Atlantic City, 1947 and SCAP's approval thereof; Soviet satellites, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Hungary protested in similar vein to Secretary General, ITU; Soviet satellites, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Albania in course discussions Paris objected strenuously to admission Jap Govt Delegation; (Information contained in Paris unnumbered red indicating Soviet bloc surprisingly quiet applies only to time of voting.).

(2) Aside from Soviet inspired opposition Japan faces great difficulty in resuming participation in international relationships in view hesitation on part majority other member governments FEO to agree Japan resume participation in international relationships.

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(3) In contrast, US supports increased participation Japan in international relationships; has made every effort to combat Soviet position and obtain support other governments including non-FEC governments; and intends pursue question full recognition Japan's membership at Administrative Council session August.

WMB
AD
FE:NA:ALDunning:lk
6/17/49

*Cleared with Miss
70 Jeffrey by phone
AD* *JFE*

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/6-1749

FILE NO.

TEL. 99 FROM WELLINGTON

NOV 23 1949

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE—DIVISION OF ~~COMMUNICATIONS~~ AND RECORDS
8-H DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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1949 JUN 17 AM 10 37

Control 7174

Rec'd June 17, 1949
4:44 a.m.

FROM: Wellington ^{DC/R} RECORDS BRANCH
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 99, June 17, Noon
DEPCIRTEL April 22, 9 a.m.

Following summarizes External Affairs note June 16.
Text airmailed.

New Zealand Government appreciate accumulating difficulties SCAP and FEC and desirability giving Japanese chance greater cultural contact other peoples than at start occupation, but has always assumed they could not take up wide international responsibilities such as now proposed until peace treaty concluded under which Allies would secure important long term guarantees in exchange for release of Japanese from many of present disabilities.

Accordingly New Zealand suggests time has come to re-new effort bring about meeting FE belligerents to begin treaty negotiations since New Zealand convinced peace settlement only satisfactory way advancing US objectives which New Zealand largely shares. New Zealand also thinks long-run success in holding Japanese outside Communist group depends primarily on terms of settlement and economic factors.

Pending treaty New Zealand cannot accept US proposal in present form believing it would create more problems than it would solve. Pre-treaty participation Japanese mainly political arrangements unacceptable New Zealand Government and even at more technical international conferences full voting rights for Japanese would create anomalous situation. Moreover New Zealand Government feel would be inappropriate and beyond intent Moscow

agreement

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-2- #99, June 17, Noon from Wellington.

agreement December 27, 1945, for Allies to delegate to SCAP full discretion over Japan's future international relationships.

New Zealand appreciates heavy US financial and other burdens but assumes US does not intend give Japanese all the privileges which proposed policy would make theoretically possible and hopes US will agree less extensive arrangement will meet situation.

Mindful US views, New Zealand prepared consider in FEC proposals for Japanese adherence technical agreements when agreed be generally advantageous. If not possible define precisely such agreements New Zealand prepared consider each case on merits. Also sympathetic any arrangement which will appreciably reduce financial burden Jap fy twu* promotion.

Since FEC decision October 21, 1948, provided for travel Japanese "commercial representatives", New Zealand before agreeing to principle wants more data on benefits expected from establishment consular arrangements.

SCOTTEN

* As received. Verification on request.

JJM:MW

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 740.00119 CONTROL
CJAPAN/6-1749

Date 17 June 1949

From AMEMBASSY, Wellington, S. cotten

To Sec State

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

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New Zealand/1949
Authority

30 June 1978
Date
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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

FORM DS-322
7-1-48

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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Department of State

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JUN 20 1949

FOR DC/T USE ONLY

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,

Tokyo,

271

Info: Army Chief of Staff,

For Acting Political Adviser.

SUBJ is Summary Steering COMITE MTG, JUN 14, 1949.

Fishing and Aquatic Industries in JAP (SC 271/17)

US amendment to PARA 1 that phrase QTE to the maximum extent consistent with proper conservation measures in order obtain fish for domestic consumption and export UNQTE be substituted for QTE to the maximum extent possible UNQTE accepted without objection.

UK, AUSTRAL and NZ members stated CLD accept US proposal to delete last sentence PARA 2b and that their GOVTs considered US understanding of PARA 2b satisfactory. CANAD and CHI members stated they were still awaiting INSTRS. Trade Marks, Trade Names and Marking of Merchandise in JAP (SC 332/5)

NETH REP stated that PARAS 1 and 3 had been framed in relation to date of outbreak of hostilities between JAP and various countries concerned. However, for several member countries possibility of communication with JAP had been either impossible or impeded during that period of time after outbreak of hostilities with GERM that countries had been occupied. Therefore, in many cases there had been no possibility of either renewing trade-mark rights or

filling trade mark applications for a substantial period of time preceding date outbreak of hostilities. He proposed that PARA 1 and 3 be so amended that for those countries which were actually impeded in their communications

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) 6-2049

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FORM DS-322
7-18-48

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Department of State
Washington

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-2-

with JAP as result of enemy occupation, the date of outbreak of hostilities (PARA 1) and effective date of loss (PARA 3) may be moved backward to meet exigencies of respective allied nations concerned.

US member stated he CLD support UK proposal to add at end PARA 2 sentence reading, QTE No fees SHLD be required for reinstatement. UNQTE.

Replacement of Lost Cultural Objects (SC 272/12)

SC 272/12 approved and forwarded to COMM by vote 8 favor, 1 opposed (US) with 2 abstentions (AUSTRAL, USSR).

JAP Assets in Neutral Countries (SC 295/6)

US member stated that he had no INSTRs on FR suggestion, supported by PHIL, that US handle marshalling of assets.

Removal of Aircraft and Private Munitions Plants from JAP (SC 312)

No consideration.

Webb acting (min)

WEBB

DC/I
ACCEPTANCE DESK

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CR CLEARANCE

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JUN 20 1949


THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA

ACTION is assigned to

National Baptist Convention
Northern Baptist Convention
Church of the Brethren
General Council of Congregational Christian Churches
Czech Moravian Brethren
International Convention of Disciples of Christ
Evangelical and Reformed Church
Evangelical United Brethren Church
Five Years Meeting of Friends in America

Methodist Church
African Methodist Episcopal Church
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church
Colored Methodist Episcopal Church in America
Moravian Church
Presbyterian Church in the U. S.
Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A.
Protestant Episcopal Church
Reformed Church in America
Romanian Orthodox Church of America

Religious Society of Friends of P and Vicinity
Russian Orthodox Church of North America
Seventh Day Baptist General Conference
Syrian Antiochian Orthodox Church of North America
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America
United Church of Canada
United Lutheran Church (Consultative)
United Presbyterian Church in N. A.



PUBLIC AFFAIRS OVERSEAS PROGRAM STAFF
Japan Branch

POST

JUN 28 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Handwritten notes:
Forwarded to Mr. Cavert
for action
4/9
Keller in
Dr. Cavert

DIVISION OF
297 FOURTH AVENUE NEW YORK 10, NEW YORK
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
Telephone: GRAMERCY 5-3475

JUN 27 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE June 21, 1949

File *OK*

Honorable Dean Acheson
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Through friends in the German Church in whom I have full confidence I have learned that the building of the German Evangelical Church in Tokyo was included among the properties taken over by the American Army of Occupation. I write to express the earnest hope that our Government may see its way clear to restore the building soon to the German Protestant Community in Tokyo. According to the information which comes to me, the property had been used for ecclesiastical purposes only, and was acquired by voluntary gifts made by German-speaking members of the community. Unless there are weighty reasons not known to me, I believe that the release of this property to its former owners would be conducive to the interests which our Government has in mind and would be a valuable symbol of goodwill.

I shall appreciate any information which you may feel free to give about the matter. I am sure I voice the judgment of many that the historic American policy of observing the sanctity of private property in time of war is a sound one and that it is especially desirable, in the case of a church, that the property should be restored to its owners at the earliest possible date.

Very sincerely yours,

Samuel McCrear Cavert
Samuel McCrear Cavert
General Secretary

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JUL 19 1949

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/6-2149

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Form DS-14 6-21-45	DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON
INTERDEPARTMENTAL REFERENCE	
DATE June 29, 1949	
RESPECTFULLY REFERRED TO Civil Affairs Division, Department of the Army. Attention: Mr. Gulick	
RE: Letter from Dr. Samuel McCrea Cavert, The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, dtd June 21, 1949, re status of German Evangelical Church building in Tokyo.	
WRITER <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HAS <input type="checkbox"/> HAS NOT BEEN INFORMED OF THIS REFERENCE	
COMMENTS: The attached copy of letter from Dr. Cavert is referred to you for action as per our telephone conver- sation.	
SIGNATURE Ernest Kroll, Japan Branch, Public Affairs Overseas Program Staff	

JUL 1

JUN 21 1949

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 6-2149

My dear Dr. Cavert:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of June 21, 1949, to the Secretary of State, which has been referred to this office for reply. In your letter you state you have been informed that the German Evangelical Church building in Tokyo was included among the properties taken over by the American Army of Occupation and you express the hope that this Government may take steps to restore the building to the German Protestant Community in Tokyo.

As the Department of State does not have jurisdiction in such matters in Japan, I am forwarding your letter to the Civil Affairs Division of the Department of the Army, the responsible agency in this case, with the request that you be informed at the earliest date of the present status of the German Evangelical Church building and that your wishes be made known to the Occupation authorities should the building prove to be among those taken over by the Army.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Morrill Cody, Acting Chief
Public Affairs Overseas Program Staff

The Reverend
Samuel McCrea Cavert, D.D.,
General Secretary, The Federal Council of
the Churches of Christ in America,
297 Fourth Avenue,
New York 10, N. Y.

CR
JUN 30 1949 P.M.

EK
POS/J:EKroll/rk 6/29/49

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740.00119 Control
Japan / 6-2149
CS/H



Handwritten: A2D, Control 4513, July 19.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Handwritten: [Signature] → POS/W Scholer

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

740.00119 Control (Japan)/6-2149

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Tokyo, June 21, 1949. *DC/R*

Handwritten: 4 XBS
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JUN 29

No. 404

JUL - 5 1949

Handwritten: July W. & C. NA

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION
FE ENC

Action Assigned to *NA*

INFO
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UNA

Subject: Personal Status Problems of Japanese Abroad.

Action Taken *reply in letter drafted to USPOLAD, Tokyo, July 19, 49*

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OVERSEAS PROGRAM STAFF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OVERSEAS PROGRAM STAFF
Japan Branch

The Honorable
Secretary of State,
Washington.

JUL 25 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Handwritten: NA, M Green, file, reaction to DC/R

C

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch no. 170 of March 22, 1949, forwarding a study prepared by this Mission recommending that General Headquarters authorize communication between the Japanese Government and persons abroad in regard to Japanese personal status matters and requesting the Department's comments on the advisability of allowing Japanese officials to proceed abroad in a consular capacity. In this connection there are enclosed ten copies of a directive to the Japanese Government (SCAPIN 2015 of June 9, 1949) authorizing communication between the Japanese Government and persons abroad in regard to personal status matters, and five copies of another directive (SCAPIN 1900/10 of June 9, 1949) making necessary revisions in Japan's international postal regulations to permit such communication. An appendix to SCAPIN 2015 lists the formal acts relating to personal status concerning which communication is now authorized. These acts include communication in regard to renunciation of nationality as well as recording of birth, death, marriage, divorce, and similar matters.

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2/

Handwritten: XR 894.012, 894.044, 894.7100, XR 702.9400

Officials of the Japanese Government have indicated their appreciation of this permission by Headquarters but have indicated that permission to despatch consular officials abroad would be a far more efficacious method of dealing with personal status matters. These officials are accordingly gratified that the United States Government has proposed to the Far Eastern Commission that steps be taken to permit greatly increased participation by Japan in international activity, including consular operations.

This Mission notes that the United States representative on the Far Eastern Commission at the Commission's one hundred fifty-fifth meeting on May 26, 1949, stated that "If any country desired to receive Japanese consuls and invited consular arrangements under the terms of the proposed policy SCAP would have discretion, if he considered it to be in the interest of the Occupation, to permit Japan, subject to his continued control, to enter such arrangements". In view of the strong opposition being raised against the United States proposal, there is some concern here that increasing Japanese participation in

international

Handwritten: [Signature]
CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION COPY

RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) /6-2149

PT, ED

FAP

SEP 12 1949


Tokyo's despatch no. 404,
June 21, 1949.

- 2 -

international relations, including consular activity, will not be approved by the Commission and may be postponed to the indefinite future. The Department's comments on the specific problem of Japanese consular activity as well as on the general problem of how Japan's foreign relations may be expanded in spite of considerable Far Eastern Commission opposition would be appreciated so that this Mission and the Japanese Government will be able as far as possible to anticipate future developments. In this connection a report is being prepared by this Mission on the basis of information submitted by the Japanese Foreign Office in regard to Japanese consular and commercial representation abroad; this report will be forwarded the Department as soon as it is completed.

This Mission in its capacity as the Diplomatic Section is now preparing a further recommendation to General Headquarters which will permit the Japanese Government to communicate by postal or telecommunication services to any place outside of Japan on any subject subject to restrictions by Headquarters on specific matters. The Department will be kept informed of the progress of this recommendation.

Respectfully yours,


Cloyce K. Huston
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosures: *att.*

- gwm*
- ✓ 1. Ten copies of SCAPIN
2015 of June 9, 1949.
 - ✓ 2. Five copies of SCAPIN
1900/10 of June 9, 1949.

221/531

RBFinn:gnd

Parchment Mat to the Department

cc: American Consulate General, Yokohama
American Consulate, Kobe

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 404
dated June 21, 1949, from the Office
of United States Political Adviser
for Japan, subject "Personal Status
Problems of Japanese Abroad".

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
APO 500

9 June 1949

AG 311.1 (9 Jun 49)DS
SCAPIN 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT: Communications between Japanese Government and Persons
Abroad in regard to Personal Status

1. Reference: AG 091 (28 Jan 46), CS, 29 January 1946, SCAPIN 677,
subject: Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying
Areas from Japan.

2. Definition: Personal status is defined as those matters, listed
in the inclosure hereto, which relate to the application of the Japanese
Nationality Law, Family Law, Family Registration Law, and Succession Law.

3. The Japanese Government or any agency thereof is hereby authorized
to communicate by international postal or telecommunications service with
persons outside of Japan in regard to matters involving the personal status
of Japanese nationals or former Japanese nationals, and to record charges
by the Japanese Government will be subject to all applicable restrictions.
All documents pertaining to personal status are mailable to and from Japan,
including papers of legal procedure and documents drawn up by Ministerial
officials.

4. The Japanese Government is also authorized to transmit to appro-
priate agencies and individuals outside Japan information suitable for
publication concerning Japanese personal status laws and regulations.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

1 Incl
List of Formal Acts
Relating to Personal
Status

R M Levy
R. M. LEVY,
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General.

Various formalities for the notification and application by Japanese abroad concerning the laws of personal status.

I. Notifications and Applications concerning Nationality Law.

1. Notification for retaining nationality. (Attached to the notification of birth).
2. Notification of renunciation of nationality. (Annexed with a family-register, a certificate of birth, a certificate of nationality and a written consent).
3. Application for renunciation of nationality. (Annexed with the above-mentioned papers).

II. Notifications and Applications concerning Family Registration Law.

4. Notification of loss of nationality.
5. Notification of birth.
6. Notification of death.
7. Notification of disappearance.
8. Notification of recognition of child.
9. Notification of marriage.
10. Notification of annulment of marriage.
11. Notification of divorce.
12. Notification of annulment of divorce.
13. Notification of adoption.
14. Notification of annulment of adoption.
15. Notification of dissolution of adoptive relation.
16. Notification of annulment of dissolution of adoptive relation.
17. Notification to determine the parent having parental power.
18. Notification to change the parent having parental power.
19. Notification of adjudged forfeiture of parental power (or right of management).
20. Notification of annulment of adjudged forfeiture of parental power (or right of management).
21. Notification of resignation of parental power (or right of management).
22. Notification of recovery of parental power (or right of management).
23. Notification of commencement of curatorship.
24. Notification of change of curator.
25. Notification of termination of curatorship.
26. Notification of assumption of supervisor of guardian.
27. Notification of change of supervisor of guardian.
28. Notification of termination of supervisor of guardian.

29. Notification for resuming surname.
30. Notification of termination of matrimonial relation.
31. Notification of disinheritance of presumptive successor.
32. Notification of annulment of disinheritance of presumptive successor.
33. Notification for entry into family-register.
34. Notification of separation from family-register.
35. Notification of altered surname.
36. Notification of altered given name.
37. Notification of transferred registered-locality.
38. Notification of establishment of family-register.
39. Application for rectification of family-register.
40. Notification of complement of first notification.

III. Various certificates relative to laws concerning Personal Status.

41. Certificate of acceptance of notification or application.

Enclosure No: 2 to Despatch No. 404
dated June 21, 1949, from the Office
of the United States Political Adviser
for Japan, subject "Personal Status
Problems of Japanese Abroad".

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
APO 500

AG 311.1 (28 May 48)CCS
SCAPIN 1900/10

9 June 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT: International Postal Service

1. Reference is made to the following memoranda for the Japanese Government:

a. File AG 091 (28 Jan 46)GS, SCAPIN 677, dated 29 January 1946, subject: Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan.

b. File AG 311.1 (28 May 48)CCS, SCAPIN 1900, dated 28 May 1948, subject: International Postal Service.

c. File AG 311.1 (9 Jun 49)DS, SCAPIN 2015, dated 9 June 1949, subject: Communications Between Japanese Government and Persons Abroad in Regard to Personal Status.

2. Paragraph 3 of reference 1b above is amended by the addition of sub paragraph "d" as follows:

"d. Messages to and from the Japanese Government or any agency thereof, except as provided in SCAPIN 677, dated 29 January 1946, subject: Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan, and except that messages relating to personal status of persons residing abroad, as defined in SCAPIN 2015, dated 9 June 1949, subject: Communications Between Japanese Government and Persons Abroad in Regard to Personal Status, are mailable to and from Japan."

3. Paragraph 4c of reference 1b above is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

"c. All papers of legal procedure, except the following, which are mailable to and from Japan:

- (1) Commercial papers and documents which relate to applications by Japanese or residents of Japan for the return of their property which has been vested in the Alien Property Custodian of the United States.
- (2) Documents and papers of legal procedure which relate to personal status of Japanese Nationals or former Japanese Nationals residing outside Japan (see paragraph 3d above)."

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

R M Levy
R. M. LEVY,
Colonel, AGD, 6
Adjutant General.

OC/R

July 21, 1949

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044
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894.71

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bill:

cong/6-21

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7029400

Reference is made to your Mission's dispatch No. 404 of June 21 requesting the Department's comments on the specific problem of the resumption of Japanese consular activities and on the general problem of how Japan's foreign relations may be expanded in the face of considerable FEC opposition to the United States proposal on this subject.

Our thinking, which has not advanced very far on this subject, is perhaps best summarized in the Department's telegram No. 342 of July 19 to your Mission and in three NA memoranda, copies of which are forwarded herewith. In pursuing our present studies on the timing and precise nature of Japanese consular representation abroad it would be very helpful for us to receive as soon as possible the report on this subject which, according to the dispatch under reference, is being prepared by your Mission.

Any comments and suggestions on our memoranda will be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Signed

Niles W. Bond

WJ
CC

Enclosures:

Copies of NA memoranda of June 3, June 13, and July 6, 1949.

The Honorable
William J. Sebald,
Acting United States Political Adviser
for Japan.

FE:NA:MGreen/pm

CONFIDENTIAL

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 6-2149

740.00119 Control (Japan)
6-2149

A true copy of the signed original.
P. Bond

CS/H

EDWIN C. JOHNSON, COLO., CHAIRMAN
 ERNEST W. MC FARLAND, ARIZ. CHARLES W. TOBEY, N. H.
 WARREN G. MAGNUSON, WASH. CLYDE M. REED, KANS.
 FRANCIS J. MYERS, PA. OWEN BREWSTER, MAINE
 BRIEN MC MAHON, CONN. HOMER E. CAPEHART, IND.
 HERBERT R. O'CONNOR, MD. JOHN W. BRICKER, OHIO
 LYNDON B. JOHNSON, TEX.
 ESTES KEFAUVER, TENN.

EDWARD S. JARRETT, CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

June 21, 1949

ACTION is assigned to



DIVISION OF
 NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
 JUN 24 1949
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCK

Honorable Dean Acheson
 Secretary of State
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Attached is a letter from Dr. Charles E. Pegg, Jr., an overseas employee of the Department of the Army, who desires information about the Public Health (veterinary) program of our government for the Far East, particularly Japan where he is employed.

Kindly favor me with a reply in duplicate for him and return his letter for my file.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

E. C. Johnson

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 6-21-49

5
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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1949 JUN 24 4 21 PM

HCJ:ES Enclosure

Encl. rec'd 6/22/49 OK

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740.00119 Control (Japan)

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HEADQUARTERS
Kanagawa Military Government Team
APO 503

10 June 1949

The Honorable Edwin C. Johnson
United States Senator (Colorado)
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Johnson;

I have viewed the recent development in the European Theater with great concern since the proposed State Department control of that sector has transgressed to reality; moreover, the establishment of a precedent - followed by adoption of operational control patterns in similiar governmental interest percipitates the quiry as to what will be the Public Health (veterinary) program if and when such action is adopted in the Far Eastern Theater.

I am very much interested in the veterinary activity in this area and would like to remain here for as many years as possible in order to assist in establishing a sound program of control and assistance; consequently, I would appreciate any information which might be let regarding the veterinary status under proposed State Department control. Perhaps I am attaching too much significance to our European activity; nevertheless I feel that department control will be found to be the expedient choice in this area.

I also take this opportunity to ask your opinion as to possibility of obtaining and the procedure to be followed in applying for civil service grade permanency. You, of course, are aware of the fact that I now hold a permanent grade with the agency which resulted from prior service before entering the Armed Forces. If it is possible for temporary to permanent transfer to be effected, I would appreciate any information which might be conveyed as to procedure.

With best wishes to both you and family, I remain

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Charles E. Pegg Jr.

CHARLES E. PEGG JR.
DVM KMGT

CEP/yn

to files

JUN 28 1949

In reply refer to
NA

My dear Senator Johnson:

Your letter of June 10 to the Secretary, enclosing a letter from Dr. Charles E. Pegg on the subject of this Government's future veterinary program in Japan, has been referred to me for reply.

It is noted that Dr. Pegg specifically requests information regarding "the veterinary status under proposed State Department control" in Japan. There is no present intention for the State Department to assume control in Japan as it has ^{is preparing to assume} in Germany. Consequently, the State Department has no program or plan for the type of activity in which Dr. Pegg is interested.

Dr. Pegg's letter is herewith returned, a copy having been made for the Department's files.

Sincerely yours,

Ernest A. Gross
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:
Letter from Dr. Pegg,
dated June 10, 1949.

The Honorable
Edwin C. Johnson,
United States Senate.

JUN 28 1949

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6/27/49

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/6-2149

CS/IC /6-2149

740.00119 Control (Japan)



Johnson

EE

MAG

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

TOP SECRET*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: June 22, 1949

TO : S - The Secretary
 THROUGH : S/S
 FROM : FE - Mr. Butterworth

SUBJECT: NSC 49, "Current Strategic Evaluation of the U.S. Security Needs in Japan".

In response to the Acting Secretary's request contained in a memorandum to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council on May 23, 1949, (copy attached at Tab A), the Department has now received a report (NSC 49, copy attached at Tab B), prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject, "Current Strategic Evaluation of the U.S. Security Needs in Japan," forwarded by the Secretary of Defense.

This paper is of great help to our studies of the "Japan problem", but does contain some obscurities. The JCS state that Japan is of "high strategic importance to United States security interests in the Far East" because of the location of the Japanese islands, of Japanese manpower and industrial potentials and of proved Japanese ability to wage "both aggressive and defensive war". The JCS state not only that it is necessary to deny Japan to the USSR, but also, in the event of war, to have available for use by the United States Japanese bases as "strategic outposts" and as "staging areas from which to project our military power to the Asiatic mainland and to USSR islands adjacent thereto". The JCS also envisage that "Japan can be expected, with planned initial United States assistance, at least to protect herself and, provided logistic necessities can be made available to her, to contribute importantly to military operations against the Soviets in Asia." The JCS conclude that "from the military point of view, the ultimate minimum United States position in the Far East vis-a-vis the USSR . . . requires at least our present degree of control of the Asian offshore island chain."

In short, the JCS believe that the Japanese main islands must not only be denied to the Soviets, but must be kept "on our side" as a potential ally in the event of war.

If war comes, with Japan as an ally, the United States could presumably utilize any base facilities in Japan and make maximum use of Japan's potentialities and resources. If the JCS evaluation is accepted by the United States Government, it then becomes essential from a security standpoint that our policies and actions in the coming period be such as to make Japan a potential ally of the United States.

In response

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740.00119 Control (Japan) / 6-2249

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

In response to the Acting Secretary's question regarding the essentiality of military bases in Japan, the JCS consider that arrangements for the continued use of Yokosuka as a base are of major importance." In line with their more fundamental requirement that Japan, in the event of war, be on the side of the United States, the JCS go on to state that "to provide against future contingencies, the peace treaty should not be such as to preclude bilateral negotiations for base rights in the Japanese main islands". It is, however, significant that Yokosuka Naval Base is the only base specified by the JCS and, subject to clarification with them, is presumably the only base we require short of the time when other bases may be needed for war or threat of war with the USSR.

The JCS also state that, assuming "that events permit a peace treaty to be worked out that adequately safeguards a western orientation of Japan" (presumably a friendly, potential ally), "the position regarding bases set forth in paragraphs 5 and 6 of NSC 13/3 is still satisfactory from the military viewpoint." These paragraphs provide that the NME shall develop military bases on the Ryukyus on the assumption that these islands will remain on a long-term basis in United States possession, that the Navy should shape its policy toward Yokosuka (naval base near Yokohama) in a way to favor continued use of facilities there on a commercial basis in the post-treaty period, but that the retention of a naval base at Yokosuka is not precluded providing United States political objectives and the prevailing international situation at the time of a peace treaty make such retention desirable. (Pertinent excerpts from these paragraphs are attached at Tab C.)

The JCS state unequivocally, in answer to our specific question, that "bases on Okinawa or other islands of the Ryukyus along with other United States bases in or near the Pacific would not meet our essential needs" without bases on the Japanese main islands. The JCS add that if, however, bases on Japan are not obtained under a peace settlement, retention of the United States base system in the western Pacific would still be of the utmost strategic importance and the strategic need for friendly control of Formosa would be increased. It seems clear that the JCS are referring to United States needs in the event of war and therefore their position on the question of adequacy of bases at such time coincides with their requirement that Japan must become and remain a potential ally.

The JCS, in addition to their specific comments, put forward some general discussion to the effect that the situation in Asia "makes it vital that, with or without a peace treaty," Japan's

friendly

TOP SECRET

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- 3 -

friendly disposition toward the United States be assured; that economic and political pressures "may well cause the problem" of achieving and maintaining such assurance "to become very great indeed"; that Japan's internal security and capacity for self-defense are of the utmost importance; and that the JCS are of the opinion, from the military point of view, "that a peace treaty would, at the present time, be premature". The JCS, having gone on record that, from the military standpoint, peace negotiations would be premature, apparently feel that should political or other considerations dictate an early peace settlement they must point out what they consider to be vital "safeguards":

"a. There should be prior assurance of Japan's economic, psychological, and political stability, and of her democracy and western orientation;"

Comment: It should be apparent that no one is able to give without qualification the sweeping assurances which the JCS stipulate. No matter whether the occupation continues, or ends with a peace settlement, the uncertainties of Japan's economic, psychological and political situation will endure and its future orientation will continue to require the most serious attention and effort. The JCS apparently assume that continued, direct United States control in Japan would guarantee that the Japanese people would side with us in the event of a U.S.-USSR conflict. It can be strongly argued, on the other hand, that we are more likely to make Japan a friend and potential ally through a peace settlement than through continued occupation.

"b. Japan's internal security forces must be adequate not only for maintenance of order but for protection against sabotage of vital installations. This may involve stronger internal security forces than were thought to be essential prior to the current overrunning of China;"

Comment: This seems clearly necessary and logically flows from our present policy (NSC 13/3) calling for strengthening of the Japanese police.

"c. Since there can be no guarantee in the present world situation of the sovereignty of a defenseless Japan, there should be plans, as previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for limited Japanese armed forces for self-defense to be effectuated in war emergency, and, in any case, unless the general situation makes it clearly unnecessary, prior to the departure of occupation forces from Japan;"

Comment:

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- 4 -

Comment: The JCS do not make clear whether the Japanese are to have "limited armed forces for self-defense" prior to actual outbreak of war. This "safeguard" may pose political problems in the negotiation of a multilateral peace settlement should one or more of the parties to that settlement insist upon a prohibition against future Japanese armed forces even for self-defense.

"d. No definite time should be set in the peace treaty for withdrawal of occupation forces. Rather, they should be phased out gradually and occupation should be terminated only after it has been determined and agreed that conditions are sufficiently satisfactory to justify termination."

Comment: This "safeguard" as expressed by the JCS seems to reflect a desire to avoid a commitment for withdrawing United States forces before we can know the conditions which will prevail following a peace settlement. This matter requires further discussion with the NME.

The basic security requirements of the United States, as set forth by the JCS, would seem to pose the following important political problems:

How to develop and maintain friendship between the United States and Japan at a level assuring that Japan will become and remain a potential ally; and particularly, whether this objective can be better achieved through a peace settlement or through indefinitely continued occupation.

The JCS requirement that nothing in the peace settlement preclude "bilateral negotiations for base rights in the Japanese main islands" would almost surely emerge in the course of multilateral negotiations or discussions, and would bring serious difficulty with the USSR and Communist China and perhaps with other powers unless the latter could be persuaded by some acceptable security formula regarding Japan to accept our position.

We have these problems and ancillary problems affecting our relations with other countries under urgent study. I plan to make an effort to clarify through oral discussions some of the obscurities of the JCS paper. We expect momentarily a reply from Secretary Johnson to the Acting Secretary's request for full information on the implementation of NSC 13/3. This will be of material assistance to our studies.

FE:NA:^{MWB}MWBishop/pm ^{mg.}
FE:NA:RAFearey;MGreen

RR

TOP SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

TOP SECRET*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: June 22, 1949

TO : FE - Mr. Butterworth

FROM : NA - Mr. Bishop

SUBJECT: NSC 49, "Current Strategic Evaluation of the U.S. Security Needs in Japan".

There is attached a draft memorandum to the Secretary in which there is attempted an analysis of NSC 49, "Current Strategic Evaluation of the U.S. Security Needs in Japan".

It is apparent that there needs to be further clarification of the views of the JCS and considerable discussion of those views in the light of political and economic factors and of the best means to attain the basic objective on which I assume we are in agreement with the NME. There is attached a list of the principal obscurities as we see them. It may be that discussion and exchange of views could be handled through the National Security Council staff.

The attached memorandum has been coordinated with Mr. Hamilton and Miss Bacon.

MWB

FE:NA:MWBishop/pm

TOP SECRET740.00119 Control (Japan) / ~~Hamilton~~ 6-22-49

TOP SECRET

OBSCURITIES IN NSC 49 REQUIRING CLARIFICATION

I Clarification of Base Requirements in Japan

1. Exactly what arrangements are required at Yokosuka-- a naval base under full U.S. control or commercial arrangements with the Japanese? (Para 6a)

2. In stipulating that a treaty should not preclude bilateral negotiations for base rights in the Japanese main islands, do the JCS anticipate that we might wish to acquire such rights (a) during more or less normal conditions in peacetime, (b) if the international situation worsens materially but in advance of the outbreak of war, or (c) only after war has begun? In light of the reply to this question, would the requirements of the JCS be met if a treaty left the door open to the acquisition of bases only after war began? (Para 6a)

II Self-Support and Garrison Status of U.S. Forces in Japan

The Acting Secretary's question on this point appears not to have been fully understood by the JCS, with the result that the question will require further discussion. (Para 6c)

III JCS "Safeguards" Should an Early Peace Treaty be Concluded

1. The sweeping assurances regarding Japan's "economic, psychological, and political stability, and democratic and western orientation" which they require as a precondition of a peace settlement are clearly beyond the power of anyone to give. (Para 10a)

2. The JCS does not make clear whether the Japanese should have "limited armed forces for self-defense" prior to the actual outbreak of war, or whether there should merely be "plans" for such forces in existence before the departure of the occupation forces from Japan which would be implemented only with the outbreak of war. (Para 10d)

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

June 23, 1949

RM/R

Executive Officer, CAD

NA - Mr. Lory

Possible visit of KATO to England

Attached hereto is a draft cable to SCAP regarding the above subject. This is a State Department originated cable and is self-explanatory.

I would appreciate it if you would inform me when Army concurrence has been obtained.

HGreen, Ext. 5861

CONFIDENTIAL

RM/R
Central Files
Document Must Be Returned to

740-00119 CONTROL
(JAPAN) / 6-2349
CONFIDENTIAL FILE

OS/S

*740,00119 Control
(Japan) / 6-2349*

6/23/49

CONFIDENTIAL

SCAP

ACTION

FROM GS/CAD. CITE EGON

US Delegation to ILO meeting Geneva informs us KATO, Etsuo, expected to be invited to visit England by Secretary-General TUC and asks if US has any objection. Possibility KATO's visit arose after Hepler departed Geneva.

We recommend permission be granted if invitation extended as such a trip under TUC auspices should strengthen KATO's prestige and knowledge of trade union techniques and aid him considerably in his fight against extreme elements in his union.

Hepler arriving Washington tomorrow. If you agree will arrange details with him.

ILS:PBSullivan/pa

NA

CONFIDENTIAL

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

file DC/R

ACTION COPY

Office of
FAH EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 23 1949
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
Department of State

9

Action: FE
Info:
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CIA
POS
PA
EURX
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DIVISION OF PLAIN
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
JUN 23 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Control 9803

Rec'd June 23, 1949
11:24 a.m.

FROM: Moscow
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1597, June 23

Victor Kudriavtsev writes 2-1/2 column (campaign against democratic rights Japanese people) for IZVESTIYA June 23. MacArthur began campaign with July 22, 1948 directive (demanding government deprive government workers right strike, bargain collectively.) This (glaring violation) Potsdam Declaration. Law demanding workers organizations give 72 hour notice intention hold demonstration (scandalous violation) Potsdam, Japanese constitution, FEC decisions replying Derevyanko letter June 11 MacArthur (called white black terming activities Japanese government example democracy highest type). (Japanese reaction protected by American occupation authorities organizing police terror against democratic organizations Japanese people order destroy foundation Japanese democracy.)

Repeated Tokyo 28.

CSB:McC

KOHLER
Action Assigned to *NA*
Action Taken *no action*

Date of Action -----
Action Office Symbol *NA*
Name of Officer *M. Green*
Direction to DC/R *file*

PLAIN

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/6-2349

HH FILED

AUG 2 1949

PERMANENT RECORD COPY: THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DMR *NA*
AG

IN REPLY REFER TO

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 24 1949
DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
JUN 24 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

23 JUN 1949

Mr. W. Walton Butterworth
Director for Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State

Dear Mr. Butterworth:

With reference to your letter of 5 April and my reply of 15 April 1949 concerning the release of St. Luke's International Medical Center in Japan and other facilities of the Protestant Episcopal Church Mission in that country, a reply has come from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers setting forth the situation as regards these properties.

Inclosed is a copy of the letter which is being sent to the Right Reverend Henry K. Sherrill, Presiding Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States.

In view of General MacArthur's reply the Army will not direct General MacArthur to return this hospital to the Protestant Episcopal Church at this time. It is felt that the matter must be left to the best judgement of General MacArthur.

Sincerely yours,

Tracy S. Voorhees

Tracy S. Voorhees
Assistant Secretary of the Army

1 Incl
Ltr to Bishop Sherrill
(copy)

THIS Document Must Be Returned to

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
16-2349

CS/S

740.00119 Control
(Japan) 16-2349

23 JUN 1949

Mr. W. Walton Butterworth
Director for Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State

Dear Mr. Butterworth:

With reference to your letter of 5 April and my reply of 15 April 1949 concerning the release of St. Luke's International Medical Center in Japan and other facilities of the Protestant Episcopal Church Mission in that country, a reply has come from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers setting forth the situation as regards these properties.

Inclosed is a copy of the letter which is being sent to the Right Reverend Henry K. Sherrill, Presiding Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States.

In view of General MacArthur's reply the Army will not direct General MacArthur to return this hospital to the Protestant Episcopal Church at this time. It is felt that the matter must be left to the best judgement of General MacArthur.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) TRACY S. VOORHEES

Tracy S. Voorhees
Assistant Secretary of the Army

1 Incl
ltr to Bishop Sherrill
(copy)

23 JUN 1949

The Right Reverend Henry K. Sherrill, D.D.
Protestant Episcopal Church in the United
States of America
Office of the Presiding Bishop
201 Fourth Avenue
New York 10, New York

Dear Sir:

With reference to your letter of 30 March and our interim reply of 21 April 1949 concerning the release of Protestant Episcopal Church property to the Church Mission in Japan, a communication has come from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan regarding the release of the facilities mentioned, from which the following is quoted for your information:

"1. The release of the facilities mentioned in Bishop Sherrill's letter is not feasible at this time nor can an approximate date of release be given for the following reasons:

a. St. Luke's Hospital

This facility is the only hospital available to the Far East Command with the space, facilities and equipment necessary for a medical center. The normal capacity of this installation, including the annex, which is not owned by St. Luke's Hospital, is 1099 beds; emergency capacity is 2100 beds. Patients are evacuated to it from all areas within the command. A replacement facility is not available and if the hospital were released construction of a new installation would be necessary. Such construction would not be in consonance with the policy to reduce to a minimum the impact of occupation costs on the Japanese economy.

b. St. Luke's Apartments

This facility is presently utilized to house dependent families of occupation force personnel. There is a critical shortage of dependent housing

The Right Reverend Henry K. Sherrill, D.D.

in Japan and as a result many families are housed in resort hotels at some distance from the head of the family. Therefore it is essential that all dependent housing now available to the occupation forces be retained in order to avoid further aggravation of a critical situation. These apartments were formerly occupied by personnel of St. Luke's Hospital, therefore until the hospital is released the need for the apartments is not apparent.

c. St. Paul's University Residences

Retention of these residences is necessary for the reasons advanced in paragraph lb above. One of these houses was released from procurement in April 1949. Four are still in use by the occupation forces.

"2. It has been the policy of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to facilitate the restoration of Christian missionary and education work in Japan to its pre-war degree of activity. To this end the release of facilities required for these activities has been accomplished wherever possible. The requirement for the Episcopal Church facilities mentioned above will be subject to periodic review and they will be released as soon as the requirement for them ceases to exist or whenever it appears feasible to consolidate activities now carried on therein in other occupation force facilities."

As mentioned in our interim reply, housing is critical in Japan, and as much as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers desires to encourage the activities of Christian missions, it is necessary to provide housing and hospital services for the occupying forces and their dependents. There is, unfortunately, no alternative. If there were, General MacArthur would be the first to accede to your justified desires.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Gordon Gray

Gordon Gray
Secretary of the Army

na Jules
St Luke's Medical
Center

April 19, 1949

My dear Bishop:

Thank you for your letter of March 17, 1949. It was good to hear from you again. Immediately upon receipt of your letter we took up the question of St. Luke's International Medical Center with the Army and have now received a reply from them that they will press the matter with General MacArthur and that they are confident that he will release the facilities unless they are absolutely required by the Army. You may rest assured that we will do all that we can to get them released and will follow the matter closely. When Bishop Sherrill officially asks for the release we will give it all practicable support.

With warm personal regards in which Cita joins,
I am

Yours sincerely,

Max W. Bishop
Chief
Division of Northeast Asian Affairs

The Most Reverend
C. S. Reifsnider,
2333 Paloma Street,
Pasadena 7, California.

FE:NA:MWBishop/pm

16 APR 1949

Mr. W. Walton Butterworth
Director for Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State

Dear Mr. Butterworth:

This will acknowledge your letter of April 5, 1949, concerning the release of St. Lukes International Medical Center in Japan.

I am entirely in sympathy with your feelings in this matter and, likewise, I am sure the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers would be willing to release St. Lukes International Medical Center provided there are other medical facilities adequate to fill the needs of the Army.

A query has been dispatched to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers regarding the release of the facilities referred to above. I shall advise you of his comment at the earliest opportunity.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

ROBERT R. WEST
Deputy to
Assistant Secretary of the Army

April 5, 1949

Dear Mr. Secretary:

With reference to our recent conversation on the importance of establishing cultural and scientific contacts between Japan and the democratic world, I am enclosing excerpts from a letter which a member of my Office just received from Bishop Reifsnider, former presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Tokyo.

This Office fully supports the request made in Bishop Reifsnider's letter for the release of St. Luke's International Medical Center which is a Rockefeller-endowed institution, internationally famous before the war for its pioneering in modern hospital care, nurses training, and public health in Japan. While the Army's requisitioning of the St. Luke's buildings in 1945 was fully understood as a military necessity, there are now compelling reasons, almost four years later, for their release.

The Army has acquired the former Japanese Naval Hospital and has built other hospital facilities which are reported to be adequate for the Army's needs. Meanwhile, St. Luke's is faced with a serious deterioration of morale among its staff and with insuperable financial difficulties, its income being restricted to the proceeds of a 30-bed as opposed to the original 1000-bed hospital. A State Department official in Japan has expressed the view that, so long as the Army retains the St. Luke's buildings, it is only a matter of another year or two before the St. Luke's traditions and standards, built up so carefully over the past fifty years, will be "utterly lost".

Anything you could do toward effecting the release of at least some of the St. Luke's buildings would be a real step forward in accomplishing the objectives we discussed at luncheon the other day.

Sincerely yours,

Wgd

W. Walton Butterworth
Director for Far Eastern Affairs

Enclosure:

Excerpts from letter.

The Honorable

Tracy S. Voorhees,

Assistant Secretary of the Army.

FE:NA:MGreen/br:lk
3/30/49

C O P Y

Excerpts from Letter Dated March 17, 1949 from Bishop Reifsnider

By the way, Douglas Overton told me also that the Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church, the Most Reverend Henry K. Sherrill, D.D., was about to make representations to the War Department or the Department of State, asking if it would not be possible to release from Occupational control the residences at St. Paul's University, Ikebukuro, Toshima Ku, Tokyo, and St. Luke's Hospital—the Hospital itself and the College of Nursing (i.e., the main building) and also the buildings on block No. 2 across the street from the Hospital; or if the main Hospital building and the College of Nursing could not at this time be returned to St. Luke's, could not block No. 2 and the buildings thereon be returned to the Hospital? As you will remember, block No. 3 on the Sumida River was not taken over by the Occupation Forces and St. Luke's Hospital has, on a very small scale, been carrying on there. The College of Nursing, however, having no buildings at its disposal has been working in cooperation with the Japanese Red Cross Hospital and occupying part of their buildings for the nurses training and clinical work and as dormitories for some of the nurses. The effect upon St. Luke's College of Nursing has been to lower considerably the nursing standards upon which St. Luke's has always prided itself (the most outstanding Nurses Training Center in Japan). Block No. 2, as you may remember, is not necessary to the welfare of the Occupational Forces and its administrative efficiency. The buildings on this middle, or second block, are simply being used for officers' clubrooms, a fiction library, and perhaps quarters for some of the technicians and junior officers.

*** It is a tremendous handicap to missionary effort to be denied the use of these buildings. We have no housing facilities for additional education missionaries that we are ready to send to St. Paul's, nor for the American missionary technicians and educationalists the Episcopal Church is prepared to send to St. Luke's as soon as housing and hospital facilities are available.

You will understand that I am not writing officially as I have been retired, and only because of my former and continued interest in St. Paul's and St. Luke's and my former responsibility for the same, that I venture to place before you this need which becomes increasingly evident as we attempt to intensify our missionary efforts in Japan. If you can do anything to assist us to bring the above request to realization, I shall be more than grateful. You will remember that St. Luke's is no longer the 42nd Base Hospital, but is now the 49th General Hospital and is used for the care of the civilian occupation personnel. The residences at St. Paul's and the No. 2 block at St. Luke's

-2-

is the minimum to advanced missionary efficiency, so that even if the main Hospital and College of Nursing cannot be returned at this time, the No. 2 block at St. Luke's and the residences at St. Paul's would enable us to make a more advanced and effective demonstration for democracy and Christianity in Japan.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, June 23, 1949.

G. DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

JUL - 8 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Action Assigned to NA

Action Taken no action

No. 409

UNCLASSIFIED

Number of Action -----

Office Symbol NA

Officer W. J. [unclear]

Subject: Eighty-ninth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan,
June 22, 1949.

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The Charge d'Affaires ad interim has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch no. 369 of June 9, 1949, and to previous correspondence in regard to meetings of the Allied Council for Japan, and to forward as enclosures five copies each of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the eighty-ninth meeting of the Council held on June 22, 1949.

As there were neither procedural nor official matters on the Agenda, there was no discussion and the meeting adjourned after approval of the minutes of the eighty-eighth meeting. Mr. G. I. PAVLYCHEV was introduced as replacing Mr. N. I. GENERALOV in his capacity as Political Adviser to the Soviet Member.

Enclosures: att

1. Five copies of Agenda, Eighty-ninth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, June 22, 1949.
2. Five copies of Corrected Verbatim Minutes, Eighty-ninth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, June 22, 1949.

310

RBFinn:gmd

- cc: American Embassy, London.
American Embassy, Nanking.
American Embassy, Moscow.
American Embassy, Canberra.
American Embassy, New Delhi.
American Embassy, Wellington.

Parchment Mat to the Department

RPM

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION COPY

RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

JUL 20 1949

740.00119 CONTROL(JAPAN)/6-2349

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
89-622

AGENDA
for the
EIGHTY-NINTH MEETING
ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

To be held in the Meiji Building, Tokyo,
Wednesday, 22 June 1949, at 1000 Hours

- I APPROVAL OF THE CORRECTED VERBATIM MINUTES OF THE
EIGHTY-EIGHTH MEETING (1 Session, numbered 88-608).
- II PROCEDURAL MATTERS
None held over or submitted as subjects for this Agenda.
- III OFFICIAL MATTERS
None held over or submitted as subjects for this Agenda.

By Direction of the Chairman:


THOS. G. DOBYNS
Colonel, U.S.A.
Secretary-General

17 June 1949

89-622

CORRECTED
VERBATIM MINUTES
of the
EIGHTY-NINTH MEETING
ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

Meiji Building, Tokyo, Wednesday, 22 June 1949, at 1000 Hours

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Cloyce K. Huston, Chairman pro tempore and representative
of the Member for the United States

Lieutenant General Chu Shih-ming, Member for China

The Honorable Patrick Shaw, Member representing jointly the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India

Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko, Member for the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics

SECRETARY-GENERAL

Colonel Thos. G. Dobyms

Office of the Secretariat
Allied Council for Japan
22 June 1949

THE CHAIRMAN: The meeting will please come to order.

The Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the Eighty-eighth Meeting have been circulated among the Members and in the absence of objection (Pause) are approved.

The Members will regret to note today that General Derevyanko's Political Adviser and assistant on the Allied Council is no longer with us, but we are very happy to welcome in a similar capacity as General Derevyanko's assistant, Mr. Pavlychev who is with us today for the first time.

Are there any procedural matters? (Pause)

There are no official matters on the agenda, that would appear to conclude the meeting.

The meeting is adjourned.

(The meeting adjourned at 1001 hours.)

INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

MB Summary of Commitment for 72
AG
RAF
HM

Action Assigned to NA
Action Taken no action
AIRGRAM
DIVISION OF 1120
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Office of
Public Affairs
JUL 8 1949
Department of State

JUL - 8 1949

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M
ACTION:FE
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SCF/A
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Date of Action -----
Action Office Symbol NA
Name of Officer M Green
Direction to DC/R
file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dated: _____
Date of mailing: _____

USPOLAD, Tokyo.
June 24, 1949.
Received: July 8, 1949, 10:07
Pike DC/R

Secretary of State,

Washington.

A-161, June 24, 1949.

The following is text of a GHQ, SCAP, press release dated June 21, 1949, announcing that the term "Military Government" will be changed to "Civil Affairs" commencing July 1, 1949.

The Military Government Sections and Military Government Teams of Eighth Army will be redesignated Civil Affairs Sections and Civil Affairs Teams, respectively, effective July 1, 1949, it was announced today by General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

The announcement stated that the term Military Government has always been misleading in that it implied that direct Military Government has been exercised in Japan in a manner similar to that in other occupied areas. From the beginning the Japanese Government has been charged with carrying out Occupation directives and Military Government, in the accepted sense of the term, was never established in Japan. The mission of the so-called Military Government Sections and Teams is one of surveillance and reporting upon performance.

It was pointed out that, in keeping with the changing aspect of the Occupation, the term Civil Affairs will be adopted as being more nearly descriptive of the true functions of the Occupation agencies.

This change represents a further step by Headquarters in its program of conferring more authority upon the Japanese Government and in redefining the role of the Occupation. It is not expected, however, that the functions of Civil Affairs agencies will be materially diminished by this change in title.

HUSTON

1949

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) /6-2449

FILED HH

PERMANENT RECORD COPY.—This copy must be returned to DC/R central files with notation of action taken.

RESTRICTED

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Please keep in folder A/D
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

file - Jap Participation in Int. Rel.

TO : NA - Mr. Bishop

DATE: June 24, 1949

FROM : NA - Mrs. Dunning *A/D*

SUBJECT: Progress in Committee 4 on FEC 339, Japanese Participation in International Relations.

This morning the Committee agreed to refer the specific question of Japanese participation in technical international organizations to a sub-committee composed of the United Kingdom, Chinese, French, Australian and United States members. While those members who have received instructions from their governments have expressed opposition to the broad policy introduced by the United States, it is becoming increasingly evident that the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, India and the Netherlands might go along with a policy decision providing for Japanese adherence to and participation in technical international organizations.

I think it is now advisable to give the United States member in the sub-committee further guidance as to the extent he could go along with such a proposal. I would suggest that the United States member be instructed

- 1) to make it very clear that the U.S. Government believes that SCAP already has ^{sufficient} discretionary power in the field of Japan's external relations either as sole executive authority for the Allied Powers or on basis of existing policy decisions,
- 2) to inform the other members that the U.S. can agree to a policy providing for Japanese adherence to and participation in technical international conferences, as indicating leadership on the part of the FEC member governments in welcoming Japan back into international society, but ^{does not consider} such a policy to be exclusive or to estop SCAP from authorizing the Japanese Government to participate in other international relationships (consular arrangements, etc.).

*970-00119
Control (Japan) / 6-24-49*

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CONFIDENTIAL

FILED
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SUBCOMMITTEE DRAFT

6 June 1949

The FEC decides as a matter of policy that SCAP, subject to his discretion and ~~continued~~ ^{continued} control, should permit Japan to participate with other nations or groups of nations in such international agreements and conferences of a technical character as Japan may be invited to enter into, accede to, attend or participate in, and as SCAP shall consider to be in the interests of the occupation.

SCAP should inform the FEC of each case of accession to technical agreements or participation in technical conferences by the Japanese Government which he may authorize.

The Supreme Commander should direct the Japanese Government to fulfill any international obligations which it may assume in accordance with the provisions of this policy.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FE 002612
June 27, 1949

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 6-2749

Memorandum for: Secretary of State

From: The President

Enclosed is the letter to Steve Early from
General MacArthur. After you have read it, I'll discuss it
with you and Secretary Johnson.

Harry Truman

Encl.

DCR NE Unit

not att. m
87-51

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SECRET FILE

SECRET

DM/R

CAD - Executive Officer

Asst Sec of Army

June 28, 1949

NA - Mr. Lory

For Seals

The attached cable is transmitted for approval and despatch to SCAP.

I would appreciate your informing me when action on the cable has been taken.

195 n

71

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/6-2849

SECRET FILE

*740.00119 Control
Gordon/CJC / 6-2849*

Green
DM

SECRET

FE:NA:RAFearey (ext. 3763)

Northeast Asian
Affairs Division

NA:RAFearey, ext. 3763
HLory, ext. 2092

SECRET

BCAP

Action

PO:OUSA:CAD:STATE

FROM CA/CAD. CITE ECON.

US GOVT concurs all 21 fur seal pelts and skulls
collected be sent to the US Department of Interior as
suggested your TEL No. CX50802, June 16.

FE:NA:RAFearey:db
6/28/49

FORM DS-322
7-1-48

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

5 P.M.

INDICATE
Collect

Department of State

~~FORUM~~

CONTROL

Charge Department X

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

7637

Charge to

JUN 28 1949

FOR DC/T USE ONLY

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,

Tokyo,

295

Info: Army Chief of Staff,

Office of

For/Acting Political Adviser.

Suggest that US authorities in JAP may wish to utilize defeat admission JAP GOVT DEL to Paris Conference ITU to impress upon JAP GOVT and people directly or indirectly and by whatever means considered appropriate and effective for maximum benefit US interests FOL points:

XR 572-1A1

XR 574 WTC

(1) It was USSR in FEC, FEB 25, 1949, that was responsible for initiating challenge legality JAP's adherence INTERNATL Telecommunications Convention, Atlantic City, 1947 and SCAP's approval thereof; SOV satellites, BULG, CZECH, YUGO, and HUNG protested in similar vein to SYG, ITU; SOV satellites, BULG, CZECH, YUGO, HUNG and Albania in course discussions Paris objected strenuously to admission JAP GOVT DEL; (INFO contained in Paris unnumbered RAD indicating SOV bloc surprisingly quiet applies only to time of voting.).

(2) Aside from SOV inspired opposition JAP faces great difficulty in resuming participation in INTERNATL relationships in view hesitation on part majority other member GOVTs FEC to agree JAP resume participation in INTERNATL relationships.

(3) In contrast, US supports increased participation JAP in INTERNATL relationships; has made every effort to combat SOV position and obtain support other GOVTs

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) /6-2849

740.00119 Control (Japan) /6-2849 CS/K

DISTRIBUTION DESIRED (OFFICES ONLY)

Handwritten initials

including non-FEC GOVTs; and intends pursue question full recognition JAP's membership at Administrative Council session AUG.

PLS consult with appropriate SCAP officials. Keep DEPT informed JAP reaction.

ACHESON

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FE:NA:ALDunning:lk
6/24/49

Handwritten signature: Acheson (mms)

JUN 28 1949 P.M.

Corrections made on this original MUST be made on all copies before delivery to Telegraph Branch.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, June 29, 1949.

No. 419

RESTRICTED

G DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

JUL 11 1949

REC'D
JUL 7

ACTION
FE ENC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: SCAP Staff Memorandum Directing Change of Term
"Military Government" to "Civil Affairs".

INFO
DCR
OLI ENC

The Charge d'Affaires ad interim has the honor to refer to this Mission's airgram no. 161 of June 24, 1949, transmitting a press release issued by General Headquarters announcing change of the term "Military Government" to "Civil Affairs" and to enclose five copies of Headquarters staff memorandum no. 26 of June 21, 1949, formalizing this change in designation. As stated in airgram no. 161, it is not anticipated that this change in title will immediately result in any change in the functions of civil affairs agencies.

Enclosure: *att.*

Five copies of Headquarters staff memorandum no. 26 of June 21, 1949.

Action Assigned to *WPA*
Action Taken *No action*
Date of Action _____
Action Office Symbol *NA*
Name of Officer *W. Green*
Direction to DC/R *file*

S 420

RBFinn:gmd

Parchment Mat to the Department

RESTRICTED

ACTION COPY

RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 6-2949

DWR

JUL 22 1949
FILED

D-419 Tokyo

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
AND
FAR EAST COMMAND

AG 323.3 (20 Jun 49)DCS

APO 500
21 June 1949

STAFF MEMORANDUM)

NO.....26)

(SCAP & FEC)

CHANGE IN DESIGNATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTIONS AND TEAMS


1. The functions of the Military Government Sections of the various headquarters in the Eighth Army and the Military Government Teams are such that the title "Military Government" is a misnomer. These designations have given the general impression that direct military government is exercised in Japan as in other occupied areas.

2. In keeping with the changing aspect of the Occupation, it is considered propitious to change these designations to titles more nearly descriptive of the real functions of these agencies. Accordingly, Military Government Sections and Military Government Teams of Eighth Army will be redesignated as Civil Affairs Sections and Civil Affairs Teams, respectively, effective 1 July 1949. The term Civil Affairs will be used to describe the functions heretofore referred to as Military Government.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

EDWARD M. ALMOND,
Major General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:


R. M. LEVY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
AND
FAR EAST COMMAND

AG 323.3 (20 Jun 49)DCS

AFPO 500

21 June 1949

STAFF MEMORANDUM)

NO.....26)

(SCAP & FEC)

CHANGE IN DESIGNATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTIONS AND TEAMS


1. The functions of the Military Government Sections of the various headquarters in the Eighth Army and the Military Government Teams are such that the title "Military Government" is a misnomer. These designations have given the general impression that direct military government is exercised in Japan as in other occupied areas.

2. In keeping with the changing aspect of the Occupation, it is considered propitious to change these designations to titles more nearly descriptive of the real functions of these agencies. Accordingly, Military Government Sections and Military Government Teams of Eighth Army will be redesignated as Civil Affairs Sections and Civil Affairs Teams, respectively, effective 1 July 1949. The term Civil Affairs will be used to describe the functions heretofore referred to as Military Government.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

EDWARD M. ALMOND,
Major General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:


R. M. LEVY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ACTION is assigned to

FE

No. 421

Office of the U. S. Political Adviser for Japan

Tokyo, June 30, 1949

~~SECRET~~

(For Department Use Only)

DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
JUL 11 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Proposed Transfer of Liaison Functions from G-2 to Office of United States Political Adviser in its Capacity as Diplomatic Section, GHQ-SCAP.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED
AUG 1 1949
OFFICE OF LIAISON AND ATTACHE GENERAL

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith for the Department's information a memorandum on the above subject prepared by Foreign Service Officer David M. BANE, who for the past six months has been in immediate charge, under my supervision, of the International Liaison Division of this Office in its capacity as Diplomatic Section of GHQ-SCAP. This memorandum sets forth the background in which "Diplomatic Section" functions within General Headquarters here, with particular reference to proposals recently put forward by G-2 contemplating the transfer to this Office of certain liaison functions hitherto performed by the Foreign Liaison Sub-Section of G-2.

XR
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124.94

This Mission has long been aware of the drawbacks and weaknesses of a system under which the foreign missions in Japan have plural lines of approach to General Headquarters and its various staff sections. Despite its reluctance to absorb additional functions of a largely message-center character, it prepared a study last year embracing a general recommendation that the liaison functions be centered in this Mission (see attachment no. 3 to enclosed memorandum), but the proposal was rejected by G-2 on the practical grounds that "Diplomatic Section is not equipped to handle such a volume of correspondence". Being now obliged to reduce its personnel, G-2 has recently decided to liquidate its Foreign Liaison Sub-Section and proposes the transfer of most of that Sub-Section's functions to this Office.

Following several discussions of the problem thus posed with the officers of this Mission who are chiefly concerned, I have now asked General WILLOUGHBY, Chief of G-2, to prepare a breakdown of the functions in question in order that it may be considered with a clearer understanding of the personnel and office space factors involved. When this additional information becomes available it will be examined with a view to determining the manner in which Headquarters relations with the foreign

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority NND 760035
By CD/SR NARS, Date 22 AUG 1975

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE DIVISION
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Tokyo's Despatch no. 421
June 30, 1949.

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
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missions can be best served, as well as to discovering the most beneficial means of utilizing this opportunity to improve the status of this Mission and the performance of its functions under Occupation conditions.

Of the three solutions to the problem presently envisaged, the second plan set forth in the attached memorandum would probably be the most desirable from the point of view of the Department and of this Mission, for the reason that by bringing political advisory functions to the forefront it would serve to remove this Office further away from the operating machinery of General Headquarters into a position more nearly approximating that of an independent Mission. It is clear, however, that this proposal is also likely to meet the strongest opposition in Headquarters. The third suggestion would also serve, though in a somewhat less marked manner, to give this Mission an identity of its own by creating two separate entities, i.e., "Diplomatic Section" which would become an integral part of Headquarters, and the Office of United States Political Adviser which would stand on its own feet, but would have the disadvantage of necessitating the division of the Mission's staff into two groups. It may accordingly develop that the only feasible adjustment will be the one envisaged in the first suggestion outlined in the memorandum, i.e., general concurrence in the G-2 recommendation subject to satisfactory provision of space and personnel, in which case the Mission will seek to have a good share of the message-center and other routine functions transferred to AG, thus reducing the volume of work to be shifted to this Office and leaving it the functions in which it can be most helpful and will have the greater interest. The possibility is not excluded, of course, that no definite organizational change will result from G-2's proposals and that the functions from which G-2 is seeking release will be absorbed into other Headquarters Sections by natural processes of informal adjustment without a positive or officially sanctioned reassignment.

Such further developments as may occur in this connection will be communicated to the Department.

Respectfully yours,


Cloyce K. Huston
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure:

Memorandum by FSO Bane on
subject of despatch.

120.1/400
CKHuston:cs

copy in NA
In triplicate to the Department

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 421 dated June 30, 1949, from the Office of the U.S. Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, entitled: "Proposed Transfer of Liaison Functions from G-2 to Office of United States Political Adviser in its Capacity as Diplomatic Section, GHQ-SCAP".

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(COPY)

Tokyo, June 30, 1949.

Proposed Transfer of Liaison Functions From G-2
to Office of United States Political Adviser
in its Capacity as Diplomatic Section, GHQ-SCAP

1/ As a matter of man-power economy, Major General C. A. WILLOUGHBY, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, has recommended to the Chief of Staff, by a Memorandum for Record dated June 16, 1949 (copy attached), that, with the exception of certain intelligence functions, the functions presently performed by the Foreign Liaison Sub-Section of G-2 be transferred to this Mission in its capacity as the Diplomatic Section of Headquarters and that the officers (ten United States Army officers) and administrative and clerical personnel (believed to be four in number at present) be absorbed into other sub-sections of G-2 to replace personnel returning to the United States.

Current Headquarters' directives (enclosed with the above-mentioned Memorandum for Record) provide in substance that foreign missions are to conduct all official business relative to diplomatic matters connected with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, including Japanese Foreign Office relations with foreign governments, through Diplomatic Section, and all other matters (except commercial, in which the channel is through the Economic and Scientific Section) through the Foreign Liaison Sub-Section of G-2. Although no definite pattern is followed, past practice indicates that an appreciable part of the foreign missions' correspondence with Headquarters, particularly that dealing with clearance and administrative matters, flows through the Foreign Liaison Sub-Section, G-2, to the Headquarters section concerned rather than through Diplomatic Section. Upon completion of necessary action on correspondence flowing through the G-2 channel, a Headquarters memorandum to the mission is prepared by the action section for the signature of the Adjutant General, after which it is despatched to the mission through the G-2 mail room. In regard to substantive matters, however, the foreign missions for the most part correspond with Headquarters through this Mission and, to a lesser degree, utilize this channel for clearance and administrative matters. When a Headquarters position or decision is taken in regard to a piece of correspondence which has come from a foreign mission through the Diplomatic Section channel, a Diplomatic Section note or memorandum is prepared in diplomatic form for transmission to the mission.

Additionally, primary liaison with the Office of the Soviet Member, Allied Council for Japan (not an accredited foreign mission), is maintained by the Foreign Liaison Sub-Section, G-2, and it is understood that this activity, in conjunction with certain intelligence activities, requires the time of about half of its personnel.

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Although it may be argued logically that the maintenance of liaison between Headquarters and the foreign missions, as well as the Office of the Soviet Member, should be concentrated in one section of Headquarters in order to eliminate duplication, and that the section best prepared to handle these functions is the Diplomatic Section, if the G-2 proposal is approved by the Chief of Staff it will pose immediate as well as long-term problems for this Mission.

Firstly, the transfer of the functions of the Foreign Liaison Sub-Section to this Mission without the simultaneous transfer of personnel, officer and secretarial, would not be feasible or desirable from an operational standpoint. It is doubted whether Headquarters would, in the final analysis, provide sufficient personnel to carry on these functions, thereby necessitating the assignment of additional Foreign Service personnel to these duties which may be described for the most part as functions benefiting Headquarters only. The International Liaison Division of this Mission is charged, in the main, with the Section responsibility for the maintenance of official contact between Headquarters and foreign missions. This Division, consisting at present of three Foreign Service Officers, one United States Army Lieutenant, and two secretaries, is not in a position to handle an additional workload without a proportionate increase in personnel.

2/ In view of the above considerations, and in order to provide an opportunity to study the G-2 proposal thoroughly, this Mission, by intra-Headquarters check sheet of June 28, 1949, to G-2, (copy attached) took the position that it would be undesirable for Headquarters to take a decision in the premises without reference to the personnel problem posed by the G-2 recommendation. In the check sheet G-2 was requested to prepare a breakdown of the functions presently performed by G-2 Foreign Liaison with a view to determining the number of officers and administrative personnel required to carry on the foreign liaison functions now performed by G-2 Foreign Liaison, including the number of foreign language specialists that would be required. Once such a breakdown is prepared, this Mission has suggested that some indication be made by the appropriate sections of Headquarters regarding the availability of personnel for a assignment to Diplomatic Section to carry on these functions as well as the availability of additional space.

Secondly, in the event that Headquarters, or alternately the Department, is prepared to furnish this Mission with sufficient personnel to carry on the foreign liaison functions now performed by the Foreign Liaison Sub-Section, the problem presents itself as to whether greater participation by this Mission in Headquarters activities is considered to be a desirable development at this time. Without reference to the practical problems of personnel and space, three possible courses of action in taking a final position upon the G-2 proposal are here suggested.

(1) As a first possibility, this Mission in its capacity as the Diplomatic Section might concur in the G-2 recommendation subject to the qualification that the G-2 Foreign Liaison functions not be transferred until satisfactory provisions have been made regarding additional personnel and space. Such a course of action would be in line with the recommendation

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Enclosure to
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June 30, 1949.

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made by this Mission in an intra-Headquarters check sheet to the Chief of Staff dated February 4, 1948 (copy attached) to the effect that all correspondence addressed to foreign missions by General Headquarters (except on commercial matters) be either processed through Diplomatic Section for redrafting in the form of a diplomatic note or memorandum, or be coordinated with Diplomatic Section prior to despatch. In this connection, it is of particular interest to note that the G-2 Section, in commenting (at the request of the Deputy Chief of Staff) upon Diplomatic Section's recommendation stated in a check note of February 21, 1948 (enclosure 3) that it did not agree with Diplomatic Section for the reason that it did not feel that the Diplomatic Section had "the background, other than phraseology, to control letters to Foreign Missions, reflecting policies or practices of other staff sections", and further that it did not consider that the Diplomatic Section was equipped to handle the volume of correspondence that would result from the implementation of such a proposal.

(2) On the other hand, it is believed that any step which would increase the Mission's participation in Headquarters would be undesirable. A second possible course of action, therefore, would be to use the G-2 proposal as the basis for suggesting to the Supreme Commander that it would be desirable at this time to consider limiting the activities and functions of the Mission, within the Headquarters framework, to those of a political advisory nature only, and to relinquish those functions now performed by this Office as a special staff section of Headquarters. Such a proposal, if approved, would probably entail the dissolution of the "Diplomatic Section", the integration of its functions (largely those now performed by the International Liaison Division) within the Adjutant General's Section, and the emergence of the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan, not as an independent or separate entity, but, in the initial phase, as an entity within the Headquarters framework, with the primary purpose of advising the Supreme Commander in regard to high-level political considerations.

With respect to the above proposal, it is envisaged that correspondence initiated by foreign missions, addressed to Headquarters, would be received by a designated Division or Branch of the Adjutant General's Section and routed by it to the proper staff section of Headquarters for appropriate action. After completion of necessary action, the section concerned would prepare a Headquarters Memorandum in reply to the Mission, and would submit it to the Adjutant General for signature and despatch, in the manner of correspondence currently handled by G-2 Foreign Liaison. In regard to personal contacts, it would appear that there is little necessity at this time to require heads of foreign missions to contact Headquarters through a specified channel such as "Diplomatic Section". In as much as the foreign missions are accredited to the Headquarters, it would seem reasonable to permit the head of a mission to call the Chief of Staff, his Deputy (who might be designated with that special responsibility), or the chief of a staff section and request an appointment to discuss a particular problem. As a matter of fact, this is a generally accepted practice at present and is not the exception to the rule. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the ten United States Army officers currently

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assigned to G-2 Foreign Liaison could be utilized to form the nucleus of such a Foreign Liaison Division or Branch of the Adjutant General's Section. Additionally, it is believed that Department of Army civilians could be obtained easily to assist in carrying on these liaison functions, many of which are routine in nature and of a type which would not be handled under normal circumstances by the Foreign Service establishment at Tokyo.

Furthermore, there seem to be good grounds to support the view that the Mission should, rather than increase its participation in Headquarters, consider formulating plans which will result in relieving its officers of the burden of those routine duties arising from assigned Headquarters' responsibilities in order that they may be given a greater opportunity to participate in high level political advisory functions, and a greater opportunity to view objectively and thereby project more effectively the future course of events in Japan; nor would the immediate accomplishment of this desired objective lie only in the establishment of an independent mission in Japan. It is obvious that objections are likely to be raised if the Mission should propose the establishment of an independent mission here at this time. It is felt that the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan can carry on its originally conceived functions within the Headquarters framework without the necessity of being burdened with the performance of Diplomatic Section functions, many of which, as indicated above, are of a routine nature and absorb a part or all of the time of the majority of officers assigned to this Mission. The Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan would exist as an office within the GHQ of the SCAP to advise the Supreme Commander in regard to matters of important political concern, and would normally respond only to requests emanating from the Supreme Commander, his Chief of Staff, or the Deputy Chief of Staff, and not to formal or written requests emanating from section chiefs, although informal contacts would be permitted.

The limitation of functions performed by this Mission to those of a high-level policy advisory nature should facilitate its preparation for the eventual assumption of greater responsibilities, tend to increase its prestige, influence, and importance, and concomitantly would relieve the officers of the Mission of the burden of routine Headquarters duties and enable them to devote more of their time to those duties which would be handled under normal circumstances by an independent mission.

(3) A third possible course of action would involve a separation of present functions and a physical separation of the present Mission's staff, one group carrying on the Diplomatic Section title and functions with a senior Foreign Service Officer as Chief and located in the Dai Ichi Building (GHQ, SCAP Headquarters), the other assuming the title and functions of the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan while continuing to operate as an entity, separate and distinct from the Diplomatic Section, within the Headquarters framework and in the Mission's present quarters. This would permit a division of functions along the lines indicated in previous paragraphs but would not involve the dissolution of the Diplomatic Section or affect the continued direction of its

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functions

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functions and activities by Foreign Service representatives. The senior Foreign Service Officer in charge of the Diplomatic Section would be the person who, on behalf of the Supreme Commander, would receive chiefs of the foreign missions on necessary occasions of high contact between those missions and Headquarters. Organizationally, the two Foreign Service establishments within the Headquarters would be independent of each other, the one not subject to the direction of the other.

David M. Bane
Foreign Service Officer

Attachments:

1. Copy of Memorandum for Record dated June 16, 1949, (together with its enclosures).
2. Copy of Intra-Headquarters check sheet to G-2 dated June 28, 1949.
3. Copy of Intra-Headquarters check sheet to Chief of Staff dated February 4, 1948.

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Attachment no. 1 to Enclosure to Despatch no. 421 dated June 30, 1949 from the Office of the U.S. Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, entitled: "Proposed Transfer of Liaison Functions from G-2 to Office of United States Political Adviser in its Capacity as Diplomatic Section, GHQ-SCAP".

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
16 June 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Dissolution of G-2 Foreign Liaison

TO: Chief of Staff

1. A reappraisal of the duties performed by G-2 Foreign Liaison has resulted in the belief that this unit can be dissolved as a matter of man-power economy. Those functions which are of a diplomatic character could be assumed by the Diplomatic Section and those functions of an intelligence nature shifted to other sections of G-2.

2. The Foreign Liaison Sub-section of G-2 was organized in Manila on 15 August 1945. Its purpose was to assist representatives of foreign countries in their contacts with General Headquarters. Since that time the Diplomatic Section has been organized and is performing many functions previously performed by G-2 Foreign Liaison. However, Foreign Liaison continues to perform many duties which I believe are correctly Diplomatic Section functions and in some cases AG or SGS responsibilities. These duties are as follows:

- a. Foreign Liaison now acts as a message center for official and unofficial communication between the foreign missions and General Headquarters. This duplicates the existing AG routing and file channel.
- b. Contracts between sections of General Headquarters and Foreign Missions are arranged through Foreign Liaison. This duplicates Diplomatic Section action.
- c. A representative of Foreign Liaison is present at the arrival and departure of foreign Diplomats and military personnel. This duplicates Visitors Bureau and Diplomatic Section action.
- d. The numerous

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Attachment no. to
Enclosure to
Tokyo's 421,
June 30, 1949.

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- d. The numerous requests and problems of Foreign Missions are coordinated with other sections of GHQ by Foreign Liaison. This is properly a function of Diplomatic Section.

3. The transfer of duties, presently performed by Foreign Liaison, to the Diplomatic Section, necessitates a revision of Staff Memorandum No. 20, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, 28 May 1948 (Tab A) and Memorandum for Chiefs of Foreign Missions (Tab B). The changes proposed (Tab A and Tab B) are in substance as follows:

- a. The foreign missions will conduct all official business, other than commercial matters dealing with international trading operations, through the Diplomatic Section.
- b. No member of a foreign mission will be received in a staff section of General Headquarters unless prior arrangements have been made by the Diplomatic Section.

4. The dissolution of Foreign Liaison would result in a reduction of G-2 overhead; the personnel presently assigned to Foreign Liaison could be absorbed in other sub-sections of G-2 as replacements for officers returning to the Zone of Interior.

5. Recommend:

- a. That G-2 Foreign Liaison be dissolved.
- b. Approval of draft revision of Staff Memorandum No. 20 (Tab A).
- c. Approval of Memorandum for Chiefs of Foreign Missions (Tab B).

/s/
C.A.W.

3 Incls
Tab A - Draft revision of Staff Memo No. 20
Tab B - Draft revision of Memo for Chiefs
of Foreign Missions
Tab C - Current Staff Memos Nos 20, 4 &
Memo for Chiefs of Foreign Missions

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D R A F T

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
AND
FAR EAST COMMAND

AG 334 ()GB

APO 500

STAFF MEMORANDUM)

NO.) (SCAP & FEC)

OFFICIAL RELATIONS AND CONTACTS
WITH FOREIGN MISSIONS

1. a. Rescission. Staff Memorandum 20, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, 28 May 1948.

b. Reference. Circular 12, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 9 May 1948.

2. All official business with the Japanese Government, with staff sections of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, and with United States Occupation Forces will be conducted as prescribed below through the staff sections indicated and with the exception noted in subparagraph "a":

a. The Economic and Scientific Section relative to all commercial matters dealing with International trading operations, except that permission is granted foreign missions in Japan to deal direct with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry on commercial matters. However, all

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contractual agreements are subject to review and validation by the Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

b. The Diplomatic Section relative to diplomatic matters connected with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to Japanese Foreign Office relations with foreign governments.

3. Official business, whenever practicable, will be transacted in writing.

4. Members of the Allied Council for Japan will continue to submit their requests for information through the Secretary General thereof, who will use the facilities of the Diplomatic Section.

5. The Chief, Diplomatic Section, will take appropriate action on all communications received from foreign missions, except correspondence on commercial matters dealing with international trading operations addressed to the Economic and Scientific Section.

6. No representative of a foreign mission will be received in a staff section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or Far East Command, unless prior arrangements have been made by the Diplomatic Section except that no prior arrangements by the aforementioned staff sections are required for such representatives calling on the Economic and Scientific Section

relative

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relative to commercial matters dealing with international trading operations.

7. No member of a group operating in Japan from a government other than the United States will be assigned, attached to, or authorized to be employed in any staff section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or Far East Command, without the approval of the Chief of Staff in each case.

8. No magazines, books, motion pictures, news and photograph releases, or other instruments of mass information received from a foreign agency will be disseminated in Japan, except under the provisions of Circular 12, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 9 May 1948.

9. Information given to foreign missions will be only that which is unclassified, has received complete staff action where appropriate, and has the concurrence for such release of all interested staff sections.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

Originator, G-2 /s/ _____
C.A.W.

Concurrence (DS) _____

Concurrence (ESS) _____

Concurrence (CIE) _____

Concurrence (G-1) _____

Concurrence (AG) _____

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D R A F T

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
APO 500

AG 334 ()GB

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of Foreign Missions in Japan

SUBJECT: Official Relations and Contacts with the Japanese Government, with Staff Sections of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, and with United States Occupation Forces.

1. Rescission: Memorandum for Chiefs of Foreign Missions in Japan, AG 334 (28 May 48)GB, subject as above, 28 May 1948.

2. All official business with the Japanese Government, with staff sections of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, and with United States Occupation Forces will be conducted as prescribed below through the staff sections indicated and with the exception noted in sub-paragraph "a".

a. The Economic and Scientific Section relative to all commercial matters dealing with international trading operations, except that permission is granted foreign missions in Japan to deal direct with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry on commercial matters. However, all contractual agreements are subject to review and validation by the Chief, Economic and Scientific Section,

General

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General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

b. The Diplomatic Section relative to diplomatic matters connected with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to Japanese Foreign Office relations with foreign governments.

3. Official business, whenever practical, will be transacted in writing.

4. Members of the Allied Council for Japan will continue to submit their requests for information through the Secretary General thereof, who will use the facilities of the Diplomatic Section.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

Originator, G-2 _____
C.A.W.

Concurrence (DS) _____

Concurrence (ESS) _____

Concurrence (CIE) _____

Concurrence (G-1) _____

Concurrence (AG) _____

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
 AND
 FAR EAST COMMAND

AG 334 (28 May 48) GB

APO 500
28 May 1948

STAFF MEMORANDUM)

NO. 20) (SCAP & FEC)

OFFICIAL RELATIONS AND CONTACTS
 WITH FOREIGN MISSIONS

1. a. Rescission. Staff Memorandum 79, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, 22 September 1947.

b. Reference. Circular 12, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 9 May 1948.

2. The following instructions are being issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the chiefs of foreign missions in Japan by a memorandum, AG 334 (28 May 48) GB, subject, "Official Relations and Contacts with the Japanese Government, with Staff Sections of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, and with United States Occupation Forces," 28 May 1948:

"1. Rescission: Memorandum for Chiefs of Foreign Missions in Japan, AG334 (9 Jun 46)GB, subject as above, 9 June 1946.

"2. All official business with the Japanese Government, with staff sections of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, and with United States Occupation Forces will be conducted as prescribed below through the staff sections indicated and with the exception noted in subparagraph "a":

"a. The Economic and Scientific Section relative to all commercial matters dealing with international trading operations, except that permission is granted foreign missions in Japan to deal direct with the Japanese Board of Trade (Boeki Cho) on commercial matters. However, all contractual agreements are subject to review and validation

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by the Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

"b. The Diplomatic Section relative to diplomatic matters connected with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to Japanese Foreign Office relations with foreign governments.

"c. The Foreign Liaison Sub-section, G-2 Section, relative to all other matters.

"3. Official business, whenever practicable, will be transacted in writing.

"4. Members of the Allied Council for Japan will continue to submit their requests for information through the Secretary General thereof, who will use either the facilities of the Diplomatic Section or of the Foreign Liaison Sub-section, G-2 Section, as indicated."

3. The Chief, Diplomatic Section or the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 will take appropriate action on all communications received from foreign missions, except correspondence on commercial matters dealing with international trading operations addressed to the Economic and Scientific Section.

4. No representative of a foreign mission will be received in a staff section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or Far East Command, unless prior arrangements have been made by the Diplomatic Section or G-2 Section, except that no prior arrangements by the aforementioned staff sections are required for such representatives calling on the Economic and Scientific Section relative to commercial matters dealing with international trading operations.

5. No member of a group operating in Japan from a government other than the United States will be assigned, attached to, or authorized to be employed in any staff section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or Far East Command, except the International Prosecution Section, without the approval of the Chief of Staff in each case.

6. No

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6. No magazines, books, motion pictures, news and photograph releases, or other instruments of mass information received from a foreign agency will be disseminated in Japan, except under the provisions of Circular 12, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 9 May 1948.

7. Information given to foreign missions will be only that which is unclassified, has received complete staff action where appropriate, and has the concurrence for such release of all interested staff sections.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MACARTHUR:

PAUL J. MUELLER,
Major General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ R. M. Levy

R. M. LEVY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
 AND
 FAR EAST COMMAND

AG 680.2 (16 Nov 48)GA

APO 500
10 January 1949

STAFF MEMORANDUM)

NO.....4) (SCAP & FEC)

CLEARANCES - ENTRY AND EXIT

1. a. Rescission. Staff Memorandum 11, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, 10 March 1948.

b. References.

- (1) Circular 19, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 23 June 1948.
- (2) Circular 27, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 13 August 1948.
- (3) Staff Memorandum 23, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, 2 July 1948.

2. General. a. This staff memorandum establishes procedures to be followed by staff sections of General Headquarters in the clearance of individuals, aircraft, and surface vessels entering and leaving the Far East Command.

b. Whenever possible, because of the time factor involved in obtaining clearances from other headquarters, staff sections initiating requests for the entry or exit of any individual, aircraft, or surface vessel will submit such clearance requests to the responsible general or special staff section (see paragraphs 3 and 4) at least 10 days prior to the date on which clearances are desired.

c. The

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c. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, will be furnished copies of all data on persons cleared for entry or exit, other than United States military personnel, Department of the Army civilian personnel, and Red Cross personnel.

3. Clearance of Individuals. Staff action on all requests for clearance for entry or exit of individuals into and from the Far East Command is the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, except as follows:

a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is responsible for:

- (1) Members of the Allied Council for Japan.
- (2) Personnel assigned to the staff of a member of the Allied Council for Japan.
- (3) Military, naval, and air attaches of foreign missions in Japan.

b. The Chief, Diplomatic Section, is responsible for:

- (1) Accredited members of foreign missions except those listed in paragraph 3a(3).
- (2) Foreign diplomatic officials in transit.
- (3) Personnel of the United Nations or agencies thereof on official United Nations business.

c. The Public Information Officer is responsible for all news correspondents including those departing the Far East Command who desire to enter the United States or another command.

d. (1) When clearance is within established policy:

- (a) The Chief, Civil Information and Education Section, is responsible for missionaries.

(b) The

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(b) The Adjutant General is responsible for military and Red Cross personnel and their dependents departing from the Far East Command on leave.

(2) Requests for clearances not within establish-policy and denials of entry to missionaries will be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, with recommended action.

4. Clearance of Aircraft and Surface Vessels. a. All requests for entry into or exit from the Far East Command of aircraft or surface vessels, including crew members, will be cleared as follows:

(1) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, is responsible for:

(a) Combatant naval vessels, except those being sent to Japan for repair.

(b) Combat aircraft.

(2) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, is responsible for:

(a) Aircraft other than combat aircraft.

(b) Combatant and noncombatant naval vessels being sent to Japan for repair.

(3) The Chief, Civil Transportation Section, is responsible for all surface vessels, except combatant naval vessels and naval vessels being sent to Japan for repair.

b. Responsibility for clearance for entry or exit of individuals other than crew members, aboard aircraft and surface vessels, is prescribed in paragraph 3.

5. Concurrences. General and special staff sections charged with staff action under the provisions of this memorandum (see paragraphs 3 and 4) will obtain necessary concurrences of interested staff sections prior to final action on the entry or exit clearance of any individual, aircraft, or surface vessel.

6. Notification

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6. Notification of Processing Agencies. Staff Sections charged with clearance responsibilities under this memorandum will notify appropriate processing agencies of all clearances granted.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

PAUL J. MUELLER,
Major General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ R. M. Levy

R. M. LEVY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
APO 500

AG 334 (28 May 48)GB

28 May 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of Foreign Missions in Japan

SUBJECT: Official Relations and Contacts with
the Japanese Government, with Staff
Sections of General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers and Far East Command, and
with United States Occupation Forces.

1. Rescission: Memorandum for Chiefs of Foreign
Missions in Japan, AG 334 (9 Jun 48)GB, subject as above,
9 June 1948.

2. All official business with the Japanese Govern-
ment, with staff sections of General Headquarters, Su-
preme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Com-
mand, and with United States Occupation Forces will be
conducted as prescribed below through the staff sections
indicated and with the exception noted in sub-paragraph
"a":

a. The Economic and Scientific Section rela-
tive to all commercial matters dealing with internation-
al trading operations, except that permission is granted
foreign missions in Japan to deal direct with the Japanese
Board of Trade (Boeki Cho) on commercial matters. However,
all contractual agreements are subject to review and vali-
dation by the Chief, Economic and Scientific Section,
General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers.

b. The Diplomatic Section relative to diplomatic
matters connected with the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers and to Japanese Foreign Office relations with
foreign governments.

c. The Foreign Liaison Sub-section, G-2 Section,
relative to all other matters.

3. Official

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3. Official business, whenever practicable, will be transacted in writing.

4. Members of the Allied Council for Japan will continue to submit their requests for information through the Secretary General thereof, who will use either the facilities of the Diplomatic Section or of the Foreign Liaison Sub-section, G-2 Section, as indicated.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ George R. Connor

GEORGE R. CONNOR,
Colonel, A. G. D.
Asst Adjutant General.

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Attachment No. 2 to Enclosure to Despatch No. 421 dated June 30, 1949 from the Office of the U.S. Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, entitled: "Proposed Transfer of Liaison Functions from G-2 to Office of United States Political Adviser in its Capacity as Diplomatic Section, GHQ-SCAP".

CONFIDENTIAL

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

DS/CKH/DMB/bk

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No. S 420/120 Subject: Dissolution of G-2 Foreign Liaison.

Note From: DS To: G-2 Date: 28 June 1949.
No. Info: C/S

(1) 1. Reference is made to the attached G-2 Memorandum for Record of 16 June 1949, to the Chief of Staff, which proposes that, with the exception of certain intelligence functions, the functions presently performed by G-2/FL be transferred to DS and the personnel presently assigned to the Foreign Liaison Sub-Section of G-2 be absorbed into other sub-sections of G-2 as replacements for officers returning to the Zone of the Interior.

2. G-2 will appreciate that, prior to any final action being taken in the premises, DS desires to determine the source of personnel for assignment to DS to carry on the additional duties which would result from approval of the G-2 proposal. DS is unaware of the percentage of time now devoted by the staff of G-2/FL (which DS understands from its Diplomatic List consists of ten U.S. Army officers in addition to administrative and clerical personnel) to intelligence functions as distinguished from those of a foreign liaison character. DS International Liaison Division (4 officers and two secretaries) is not in a position to handle an additional work load without a proportionate increase in personnel. It is recalled that G-2 opposed a similar step in a check note to O D C/S (SCAP) of 21 February 1948 on the grounds that DS neither had "the background, other than phraseology, to control letters to Foreign Missions, reflecting policies or practices of other staff sections", nor was it "equipped to handle such a volume of correspondence".

3. In view

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Attachment No. 2 to
Enclosure to Tokyo's
421, June 30, 1949.

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3. In view of the considerations presented in paragraph 2 above DS assumes that Headquarters will not decide upon any transfer of functions to DS without at the same time giving consideration to a solution of the personnel problem posed for DS by the absorption of such additional functions.

4. DS suggests that G-2 prepare a break-down of the functions presently performed by G-2/FL with a view to determining the number of officers and administrative personnel required to carry on the foreign liaison functions now performed by G-2/FL, including the number of such foreign language specialists as would be required. Once such a break-down is prepared, DS suggests that the appropriate sections of Headquarters indicate the availability of personnel for assignment to DS to carry on these functions, as well as the availability to DS of space occupied by G-2/FL.

5. In this connection, DS would like to raise for exploratory consideration the possibility of having certain types of Mission correspondence of a routine character flow through AG to the appropriate action section of Headquarters rather than through DS or G-2/FL.

Incl:
Memorandum for Record
of June 16, 1949 and
sub-incls.

- - - - -C. K. H. - - - - -

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Attachment No. 3 to Enclosure to Despatch No. 421 dated June 30, 1949 from the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, entitled: "Proposed Transfer of Liaison Functions from G-2 to Office of the United States Political Adviser in its Capacity as Diplomatic Section, GHQ-SCAP".

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(COPY)
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET DS/WJS/RAP/rab

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

S 701 Correspondence with Foreign
File No: A 300.6 Subject: Diplomatic Missions.

Note From: DS To: C/S Date: 4 February 1948.
No.

1. 1. Reference is made to Staff Memorandum No. 79, 22 September 47, subject, "Official Relations and Contacts with Foreign Missions", which prescribes that foreign missions must conduct official business with GHQ through either Diplomatic Section or G-2/General Liaison Sub-section.
2. Staff memorandum 79 does not prescribe that staff sections of General Headquarters must, in turn, conduct official business with foreign diplomatic missions through Diplomatic Section or G-2/General Liaison. In consequence, staff sections frequently draft correspondence addressed directly to diplomatic missions, which is signed by AG and dispatched through G-2/GL message center. This practice is followed most frequently when staff sections initiate correspondence with foreign missions and when correspondence is written in reply to communications from foreign missions submitted through G-2/General Liaison, which usually follows the practice of forwarding such communications to the staff section having primary interest in the subject-matter concerned by means of a brief check sheet requesting that necessary action be taken and that the staff section concerned reply directly to the foreign mission, with an information copy for G-2.
3. On the other hand, it has been the practice of Diplomatic Section, when processing correspondence from a foreign mission in which another staff section is primarily interested, to forward such correspondence to the staff section concerned, with comments or recommendations if required, and with a request that the staff section concerned provide Diplomatic Section with information on which to base a reply to the mission. The staff

section

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section concerned then takes whatever action is required and supplies Diplomatic Section with the necessary information by check sheet, on the basis of which a diplomatic note or memorandum is drafted and signed by Diplomatic Section and dispatched to the mission through G-2/GL message center. In some instances, where Diplomatic Section is not satisfied with the reply, the matter is referred back to the staff section concerned for reconsideration or to the Chief of Staff for final decision before a reply to the mission is dispatched.

4. Communications addressed directly to foreign missions by staff sections of GHQ, as indicated above, are frequently prepared and dispatched without consultation with or the concurrence of Diplomatic Section, and Diplomatic Section has been increasingly concerned about the content, and, especially, the language of some of these communications. The language is often needlessly peremptory and abrupt, especially when dealing with a refusal or restriction of some kind. The Diplomatic Section is aware that such language may be customary and appropriate in military correspondence addressed to subordinate commands, but submits that such language is not appropriate in addressing diplomatic representatives of foreign governments. The Diplomatic Section has become increasingly aware of a growing resentment among foreign missions in Tokyo caused by such communications, and of the fact that such communications, together with the number of restrictions and regulations governing normal activities of foreign missions and their personnel in Japan, are resulting in increasingly bad relations between General Headquarters and the foreign missions in Japan.

5. In view of the obvious need by the United States Government for support of FEC nations both in the Far Eastern Commission and in the consideration of the forthcoming treaty of peace negotiations, as well as in normal political relationships and particularly because of the current world-wide split between Soviet Russia and the Democracies, Diplomatic Section cannot over-emphasize the importance of maintaining cordial and friendly relations with Allied and neutral missions and other representatives in Japan. DS therefore believes that all possible steps should be taken to prevent further deterioration of these relations.

6. Diplomatic

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6. Diplomatic Section therefore strongly recommends that all correspondence addressed to foreign missions by General Headquarters (except for purely commercial and CPC matters) be either processed through this Section for redrafting in the form of a diplomatic note or memorandum, or be coordinated with Diplomatic Section prior to dispatch. It is recommended that all general and special staff sections of General Headquarters be so instructed.

-----W. J. S.-----

2. From: O D C/S (SCAP) To: G-2 Date: 6 February 1948.

Request that a revision of Staff Memorandum No. 79, 22 September 1947, incorporating the recommendations of the Diplomatic Section, be prepared in draft form for the consideration of the Chief of Staff.

-----P. E. P.-----

3. From: G-2 To: O D C/S (SCAP) Date: 21 February 1948.

1. Reference is made to Check Note No. 1, Diplomatic Section to Chief of Staff, 4 February 1948.

2. G-2 does not agree with the recommendations made by the Diplomatic Section in their Check Note. Staff Memorandum 79 requires no change at this time. The interests of the Diplomatic Section are amply covered: "All official business with . . . will henceforth be conducted through either the Diplomatic Section or the Foreign Liaison Sub-section, G-2 Section, of this headquarters." Letters received from Foreign Missions by G-2, Foreign Liaison are translated, if necessary, then screened to see what staff section has primary interest. The letter is then sent to the section concerned for action, who has all the background, knows GHQ policy in effect, etc., and prepares the answer. The correspondence in most cases is of a military nature and follows policies set down by the Chief of Staff.

G-2

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Fell Japan
June 30, 1949

THROUGH : S - The Secretary DA
S/S
FE- Mr. Butterworth

Mr. Voorhees' Statements Before Senate Appropriations Committee Regarding Continued Army Control in Japan.

During the discussion before the Senate Appropriations Committee yesterday on the GARIOA funds for the Army, the press picked up a statement by Mr. Voorhees which according to the transcript was as follows:

"The Army has this job in the occupied areas. We hope it will not have it soon in Germany, but it appears it will have it a long time in Japan."

This occurred during a discussion of Army responsibility in the early part of the hearings yesterday. Almost at the end of the hearings in this same connection Mr. Voorhees made the following statement:

"I do want to say this. This is not an Army task. It is four years after the war. The Army has never wanted to do this job. It has tried to do the best it could. It has always taken the position that it was not building any empire to itself, that it wanted it turned over. We have arranged to turn it over to the State Department and to ECA in Germany. We cannot do it as to Japan yet. We would be glad to do it any time."

The press have taken Mr. Voorhees' statements to indicate that the present conditions will continue for a "long time". In view of the policy considerations involved I felt that you would want to have quotations from the transcript.

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