"in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area."

What is meant by that?

Mr. Welles: I think it would be perhaps more desirable, Senator, for you to get Mr. Hull to explain the language which he himself dictated, because this represents his own thinking at that time.

Senator Ferguson: What was your understanding as to his meaning?

Mr. Welles: My understanding is that what he had said here arose from the warning given to the Japanese Government by the President on August 17. If the Japanese Government undertook to continue its policy of conquest and expansion, the United States would be obliged, in its defense and safety, to take such steps as it considered necessary, and, obviously, those steps envisaged the possibility of military action.

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Senator Ferguson: In other words, did you understand that the note of, - the parallel note that I referred to this morning of August the 17th committed us to the action that he is now mentioning in this note and at the same time they expected this country in case of a Japanese outbreak to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area?

Mr. Welles: What I interpreted that note as meaning was that it envisaged the possibility that if Japan continued a policy of conquest and expansion in conflict with the legitimate interests of the United States the steps that this government would then have to take to preserve its own security might lead to some form of conflict with Japan.

Senator Ferguson: Now, so that there won't remain any misunderstanding about this in the record I will read the rest of the instrument. (Reading):

"And yet I said their Governments, through some sort of preoccupation in other directions, do not seem to know anything about these phases of the questions under discussion. I made it clear that I was definitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the lack of interest and lack of a disposition to cooperate. They said nothing except the Netherlands Minister who then replied that he had heard from his

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Government and that it would support the modus vivendi proposal. I then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and attitude of their Governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion.

"There were other details discussed but they were not of major consequence nor did they constitute anything new in the record."

And this is dated the 24th day of November 1941, a note or a memorandum of the conversation by Mr. Hull.

Could you give us the sequence of events which led to our position of being the negotiator with Japan in relation to this language used here?

Mr. Welles: As the statement presented to the committee by Mr. Hull on yesterday shows, the effort was commenced in the month of March of 1941 to find through direct negotiations between the United States Government and the Japanese Government some pacific solution of the crisis which was developing.

Those negotiations were interrupted when Japan moved into Indo-China and occupied it and were later resumed shortly after August 17th.

The United States Government was, therefore, in a position of already being a negotiator with Japan for a solution

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which, had it proved successful, would have solved all of the controversy arising in the Pacific area as an outgrowth of the militaristic policy of expansion and aggression upon which Japan had embarked.

The other countries involved, because of their vital interests in that region would under such circumstances, had the negotiations proved successful, found a solution of their difficulties as well. It, therefore, seems to me entirely logical that the United States should have been negotiating rather than other governments which were already participating in a major war.

Senator Ferguson: From then on would you say that we were receiving all of the information that the other governments, the A-B-C-D part, all the military information in relation to the Pacific was coming to us from those governments because we were doing the negotiating?

Mr. Welles: I should say that we were receiving the bulk of the intelligence and other information from our own naval and military authorities; that very frequently information of value as to developments was gained also from the British and Dutch and others of the governments primarily concerned.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not any of the other governments were breaking the Japanese diplomatic code?

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Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Mr. Welles: My recollection is that the British Government was intercepting the messages just as we were.

Senator Ferguson: So that the British Government had all the information from the intercepted messages that we would have?

Mr. Welles: That is my clear recollection.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Do you know whether any of the other governments, the Dutch government, was breaking the code? I mean by "breaking the code" intercepting the messages and translating them.

Mr. Welles: My recollection is not clear on that point but my assumption would be that such information as was being obtained was made available to the Dutch government by the British government.

Senator Ferguson: The British government, then, would be keeping the Dutch government informed?

Mr. Welles: That is my assumption.

Senator Ferguson: And do you have any knowledge on the Chinese government?

Mr. Welles: I am not informed on that point.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever hear of the "wind" message, so described?

Mr. Welles: I could not say that at that time I had any knowledge of it that I now recollect. As I said this

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morning, Senator, it is very difficult after four years --

Senator Ferguson: I appreciate that.

Mr. Welles: (Continuing) -- to recollect with any accuracy, particularly when you have been reading the newspapers, as I have, with regard to the hearings and with regard to the matters that are coming up for discussion.

Senator Ferguson: The word "wind" message or "windex" message, then, does not get a response?

Mr. Welles: I could not at this time say that I had ever seen it until I saw it in the press more recently.

Senator Ferguson: Well, you know what I am talking about when I speak of it?

Mr. Welles: Yes and --

Mr. Gesell: May I interpose, Senator?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: I do not suppose Mr. Welles could have seen the execute in the papers. The only discussion, or the only message released has been the code itself. The question of execute is something we are still --

Senator Ferguson: Working on.

Mr. Gesell: (Continuing) -- working on, right.

Senator Ferguson: Well, Mr. Welles, did you ever know that there had been an execute? In other words, if there had been a carrying out of the original message that they

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would indicate the break in diplomatic relations by using the direction of the wind.

Mr. Welles: To the best of my recollection, Senator, I did not.

Senator Ferguson: When did you first hear from any source that the Japanese Ambassadors in various places, for instance, here in Washington and in London, were destroying codes, or did you ever hear of it?

Mr. Welles: I recollect that shortly before December 7th an intercept gave an indication that the Japanese Embassy here was instructed to destroy its papers.

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall when that was?

Mr. Welles: Without referring to a record I could not give you the precise day or time.

Senator Ferguson: Was it prior to the 7th?

Mr. Welles: Prior to the 7th.

Senator Ferguson: What did that signify to you as a diplomat and Under Secretary of State?

Mr. Welles: That signified to me that the last stage had been reached.

Senator Ferguson: I did not catch that.

Mr. Welles: That signified to me that the last stage had been reached.

Senator Ferguson: Would you say it indicated war?

Mr. Welles: A rupture of diplomatic relations at the very least and under the circumstances then existing the probability of war.

Senator Ferguson: Did that help you to form your opinion on the percentage that you gave me this morning on the seventh?

Mr. Welles: That was decidedly one of the contributing factors.

Senator Ferguson: I am reading now from a memo that was given to us this morning. That is the telegram dated November the 30th, 1941, received at 1:28 P.M., sent by our Ambassador, Mr. Winant. Do you have a copy of that? That was given to us this morning.

Mr. Welles: Thank you.

Senator Ferguson: Now, in the text, this being the sentence, the last part of the sentence that I want to inquire about: (Reading)

> "We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours."

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Now, it is the part, "And in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours." What was he referring to?

Mr. Welles: The situation by November 30th had already reached such a point that it was very clear that the possibility of hostilities was imminent and in that event I would assume that the only construction that could be given to the sentence which you have read, Senator, would be that those arrangements to be synchronized with ours referred to naval and military operations.

Senator Ferguson: Had you ever heard of that synchronizing of our military operations as being known as the A-B-C-D block?

Mr. Welles: No, I did not.

Senator Ferguson: I asked you this morning if you recalled who were present at the Atlantic conference. I have a copy of the New York Times here and it lists the names and I wonder whether you would check it to see whether it refreshes your memory.

Mr. Welles: Certainly.

Mr. Murphy: May we have the date for the record, please?

Mr. Welles: The date is Sunday, August 17th, Mr. Congressman. Yes, Senator.

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Witness Welles: Questions by Sen.Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Will you give the names of those listed as being present to see whether it refreshes your memory?

Mr. Welles: General Marshall, General Arnold, General Burns, Colonel Bundy, Admiral Stark, Admiral King, Admiral Turner, Captain Sherman, Mr. Hopkins, Averell Harriman, General Watson, Captain Beardall and Dr. McIntire.

Senator Ferguson: Captain Beardall was naval aide to the President, was he not?

Mr. Welles: That is correct. Mr. Harriman had flown up with me at the time that I went.

Senator Ferguson: What was his position at the time, Mr. Harriman?

Mr. Welles: He was stationed, as I recall it, in London at that time in connection with Lend-Lease operations.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Hopkins' position? That was Harry Hopkins.

Mr. Welles: Harry Hopkins arrived some time after the Atlantic Charter conference had started. I think that he flew over with Lord Beaverbrook, who had come down to see Mr. Churchill. My recollection is that they arrived one day or perhaps two days before the meeting broke up.

Senator Ferguson: Did you have any conversation with

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Mr. Hopkins about this parallel promise?

Mr. Welles: None whatever.

Senator Ferguson: Was he present when you discussed it with the President?

Mr. Welles: As I said this morning, Senator, my recollection is that I was alone with the President at the time that our conversation on this point took place.

Senator Ferguson: Now, there is one other item in that book on the 24th that I have marked and I would like to have you read that item from the New York Times of the 25th. I have marked the paragraph there.

Mr. Murphy: The page?

Senator Ferguson: Would you identify the paper that you are reading from?

Mr. Welles: Yes. It is the New York Times, Monday, August 25th. The article is headed: "Text of Prime Minister Churchill's address on meeting with President." The marked paragraph is as follows:

"It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed,

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but this I must say, that if these hopes" -- there is a typographical error;, I think the word must be "fail" -- "that if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States."

That is the marked paragraph.

Senator Ferguson: Now, would you say that that would be, in effect, carrying out this parallel arrangement?

Mr. Welles: I should not, Senator. I should say that at that time that was a unilateral declaration on the part of the British Prime Minister.

Senator Ferguson: And had nothing to do,. in your opinion, with the parallel action?

Mr. Welles: I think the parallel action should be regarded as separate from this. In my judgment this is a unilateral declaration, a unilateral declaration which, of course, arose from the fact that the two governments had agreed on a parallel course of action.

Senator Ferguson: This was a radio broadcast to the world, was it not, this particular language?

Mr. Welles: The heading of it as I read it, as I remember it, says, "Text of Prime Minister's address."

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Welles: I do not remember whether it was or not.

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Senator Ferguson: You would not say, then, that that was the carrying out of the British side of the parallel actbon?

Mr. Welles: I should not. I should interpret the British side of the parallel action as being a warning delivered to the Japanese Government by the British Government of the same character as the warning delivered by the President to the Japanese Government.

Senator Ferguson: And it would be an exchange of diplomatic notes rather than a radio address?

Mr. Welles: Most decidedly, in my judgment.

Senator Ferguson: Will you look at "Peace and War" -- United States Foreign Policy -- and see whether or not there are any notes between the date of the delivery of the note of August the 17th and their reply of the 28th?

Mr. Welles: I want to get your question clear, please, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: I want to know what diplomatic relations we had, as far as notes were concerned, between the 17th, Sunday, when the President returned, on August 1941, and the date of the reply of Japan to that note on August the 28th, if I am correct on my date of the reply, the 28th.

Mr. Welles: There is nothing published here between August 17th and August 28th, except for the message of the President to the Congress.

Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: That is the message of August what?

Mr. Welles: August 21st, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: 21st?

Mr. Welles: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, at this place I would like to insert where I referred this morning, or we can do it right here, I would like to insert in the record the message of the President to Congress on the 21st, being the only paper in this book between those dates.

The Chairman: Do you want it inserted as a part of the transcript?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, as part of the transcript. It is a short message; it is only several pages.

Mr. Gesell: May I interpose, Senator? While Mr. Welles has been looking at one book I have been looking at the other.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. I want to get your help.

Mr. Gesell: And I see in Volume 2, Japan, Foreign Relations with the United States, refers to several conwersations which were held with the Japanese Ambassador on various subjects, particularly a rather lengthy one I haven't read, "Memorandum by the Secretary of State on August 23rd of his talk with the Japanese Ambassador."

Senator Ferguson: That is what I want to get in the record.

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Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Mr. Welles: My volume, Senator, is entitled, "Documents". There probably is a distinction made in the publication between conversations and documents.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I have the message from the President inserted?

The Chairman: Without objection it will be inserted at this point in the transcript here.

(The message above referred to is as follows, to-wit:)

"Message of President Roosevelt to the Congress, August 21, 1941, Embodying Text of the Atlantic Charter.

Over a week ago I held several important conferences at sea with the British Prime Minister. Because of the factor of safety to British, Canadian, and American ships, and their personnel, no prior announcement of these meetings could properly be made.

At the close, a public statement by the Prime Minister and the President was made. I quote it for the information of the Congress and for the record:

"'The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, have met at sea.

"'They have been accompanied by officials of their two Governments, including high-ranking officers of their military, naval, and air services.

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"'The whole problem of the supply of munitions of war, as provided by the Lease-Lend Act, for the armed forces of the United States, and for those countries actively engaged in resisting aggression, has been further examined.

"'Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Supply of the British Government, has joined in these conferences. He is going to proceed to Washington to discuss further details with appropriate officials of the United States Government. These conferences will also cover the supply problems of the Soviet Union.

"'The President and the Prime Minister have had several conferences. They have considered the dangers to world civilization arising from the policies of military domination by conquest upon which the Hitlerite government of Germany and other governments associated therewith have embarked, and have made clear the steps which their countries are respectively taking for their safety in the face of these dangers.

"'They have agreed upon the following joint declaration:

"'Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United King-

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dom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

"'First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

"'Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

"'Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

"'Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

"'Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security;

"'Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance thatall the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

"'Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

"'Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.'

"The Congress and the President having heretofore determined, through the Lend-Lease Act, on the national policy of

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Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Ferguson

American aid to the democracies which East and West are waging war against dictatorships, the military and naval conversations at these meetings made clear gains in furthering the effectiveness of this aid.

"Furthermore, the Prime Minister and I are arranging for conferences with the Soviet Union to aid it in its defense against the attack made by the principal aggressor of the modern world--Germany.

"Finally, the declaration of principles at this time presents a goal which is worth while for our type of civilization to seek. It is so clear-cut that it is difficult to oppose in any major particular without automatically admitting a willingness to accept compromise with nazi-ism; or to agree to a world peace which would give to nazi-ism domination over large numbers of conquered nations. Inevitably such a peace would be a gift to nazi-ism to take breath--armed breath--for a second war to extend the control over Europe and Asia, to the American Hemisphere itself.

"It is perhaps unnecessary for me to call attention once more to the utter lack of validity of the spoken or written word of the Nazi government.

"It is also unnecessary for me to point out that the declaration of principles includes, of necessity, the world need for freedom of religion and freedom of information. No

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society of the world organized under the announced principles could survive without these freedoms which are a part of the whole freedom for which we strive."

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Senator Ferguson: Now, will counsel put in at least a memo on what the documents are between those dates?

Mr. Gesell: These are memos of conversations; they are not documents.

Senator Ferguson: They are not documents.

Mr. Welles, there were no exchanges of documents between those dates?

Mr. Welles: According to the publications I have, there were nc exchanges of documents between those dates.

Senator Ferguson: Now I will ask counsel to see whether or not we intercepted any messages during that period.

Mr. Gesell: You mean translated, Senator?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: Yes, there were a number of messages translated in that period.

Senator Ferguson: Do they relate in any way to this document?

Mr. Gesell: Senator, I haven't had an opportunity to read them. They begin with the message on page 15 of Exhibit 1, and they run through to -- let me see, what date I was going to; the 28th, is it not?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, up to the 28th.

Mr. Gesell: Well, with one or two that do not seem to be on that point, they run to page 21. I have not read them

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all. Then there are several in volume 2 that relate to espionage activities in that same period.

Senator Ferguson: I notice in the one instance on page 17, Mr. Welles, it is from Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, August 16, 1941, which would be before this message was given, and part of it says: "That this sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree."

Now, that was sent prior to the 17th. Had you ever heard whether or not Japan was intercepting our messages?

Mr. Welles: I had no reason to think so at that time.

Senator Ferguson: Did the State Department, to your knowledge, know that Japan knew we were intercepting their diplomatic messages?

Mr. Welles: The Department had no reason to think so. We were doing everything on earth, of course, to prevent such knowledge being obtained by them.

Senator Ferguson: As far as you knew, they did not know that?

Mr. Welles: So far as I knew, there was no chance that they did.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Do you recall any messages intercepted between the delivery of that note and the reply?

Mr. Welles: I do not offhand recall, Senator. I would

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have to refresh my memory by reading these messages here.

Senator Ferguson: Now I would like to go to the 6th of December, 1941. You were in your office on that particular day, as you told me this morning, is that correct?

Mr. Welles: Yes, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: And on that day, will you relate from memory, unless you have some book or record, what occurred? I notice you stated once that you had a private file, that you obtained a paper from a private file. Did I understand you correctly?

Mr. Welles: When I left the Department of State, Senator, all of my documents that related to official business became part of the archives of the Department of State, and I retained only copies of memoranda or conversations, and a small amount of personal correspondence.

Senator Ferguson: But the originals of those copies of memoranda or conversations should be in the State Department?

Mr. Welles: They are all on file in the State Department.

Senator Ferguson: So we would be able to find in the State Department anything that you have and there would be no need of going over your file?

Mr. Welles: Absolutely. The originals of everything I had were left in the Department of State.

Senator Ferguson: Have you anything relating to the 6th?

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Mr. Welles: I have no dairies, as I said before, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: I mean any memo of conversations.

Mr. Welles: I am afraid the files of the Department will have to be searched to find memoranda of conversations which I had on that day. I remember that the day was unusually rushed. At that particular moment I was exceedingly concerned with regard to the situation in the Western Hemisphere, and a good deal of my thought, time, and attention was given to that phase of the world problem. At the same time, as I said this morning, I think I had received information which was brought to the Secretary of State, in his office, when I was present, with regard to the Japanese troop movement, with regard to Japanese naval movement, all of which added to the gravity and burden of the day.

Senator Ferguson: So that was a very important day in the history of the United States, as far as the State Department was concerned?

Mr. Welles: In every sense of the word.

Senator Ferguson: You had received the message from Ambassador Winant at 11:40. I will ask you when you first knew that Japan was replying to the note of the 26th. What time on the 6th did you know that they were replying to Mr. Hull's note of the 26th?

Mr. Welles: I could not attempt to give you the precise

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hour.

Senator Ferguson: Can you give it near the hour?

Mr. Welles: What you have in mind, I assume from your question, is when I had knowledge of intercepts which showed that the Japanese were replying.

Senator Ferguson: That is correct. When did you first know or get information that the Japanese were replying?

Mr. Welles: My present recollection is that I had no knowledge of it until the Sunday, not on the Saturday.

Senator Ferguson: Even though the Army or Navy, or both, were getting parts of the message during the day, you do not recall now any information on that?

Mr. Welles: The best of my recollection, Senator, is that I knew nothing of that until the following morning. But it is not very surprising that I should not have received any such message. Mr. Hull himself, as I said before, was in charge of that particular question. It was occupying practically all of his time and attention, and I, since the Department of State had to continue operating notwithstanding, was doing the best I could to handle any important or difficult urgent problems which were coming up, and consequently my own feeling is that it was very natural that information of that important character should have been communicated directly to Mr. Hull and to the President and not to myself.

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Senator Ferguson: Now will you state to us the important matters that you were handling on that day?

Mr. Welles: I should have to go to the records of the Department in order to give you an accurate answer.

3 Senator Ferguson: Could you do that?

Mr. Welles: I think undoubtedly the records of the Department will show it.

Senator Ferguson: They were at least relating to the Far East, that is, the Pacific area there, were they not?

Mr. Welles: The matters that I was handling, Senator, at that particular time, as I have attempted to indicate, had to do primarily with the very grave situation which we were confronting in the Western Hemisphere, a grave situation in view of the fact that in the world situation as it then was, it was to the highest degree necessary and desirable that the closest kind of cooperation and understanding be maintained between the United States and the other American republics. That, in my judgment, was one of the foundations of our own security.

Senator Ferguson: And if war came, you felt it was necessary that we get the cooperation of the South American and Central American republics at once?

Mr. Welles: I regarded them as of the most vitally important to the security of this country.

Senator Ferguson: That would be true because of the

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Panama Canal, if for no other reason?

Mr. Welles: If the United States was faced with the possibility of war on both oceans, which had been overshadowing all of our minds for weeks, it certainly was of the highest importance that we should not be faced with the possibility of any Axis machinations in the New World.

Senator Ferguson: But the record shows, and parts of the testimony indicate, that parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 would be in Washington. I am talking now about the reply on the 26th at 11:49, Washington time. That was a. m. But you do not recall now any information about that particular message until Sunday?

Mr. Welles: I do not recall any specific information in regard to it until Sunday morning.

Senator Ferguson: And you would think that that kind of message, that kind of information that we were receiving their reply, would go directly to Mr. Hull and to the President?

Mr. Welles: That is my understanding. It seems to me the logical thing under those conditions.

Senator Ferguson: Now, on Sunday do you know what hour of the day you had heard that we had intercepted their message or their reply?

Mr.Welles: I remember that I was informed in the early morning on Sunday when I reached my office that an appointment

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had been requested by the Japanese Ambassadors with the Secretary of State, at approximately the same time, my understanding was, that they were going to deliver the reply which was coming through. I did not see Mr. Hull that morning, I did not see him until after he got through, to the best of my recollection, with his interview with the Japanese Ambassadors. The first knowledge, as I think I said this morning, which I had of the attack upon Pearl Harbor, came through a telephone conversation which the President had with me when he gave me the information.

Senator Ferguson: Now I will ask you to give us what the President of the United States said to you in that telephone conversation.

Mr. Welles: It would be very hazardous for me to attempt to give you anything that approached a textual version of what the President said to me on the telephone, and I would not attempt it.

Senator Ferguson: Would you give us the substance of what the President said?

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Mr. Welles: The gist of what he told me was the fact that the attack on Pearl Harbor had taken place, and that he wished me to come over to the White House at some time which he fixed that afternoon.

Senator Ferguson: It was a very short conversation?

Mr. Welles: It was a very short conversation.

Senator Ferguson: Did you go to the White House?

Mr. Welles: I went to the White House at the time that the President fixed. I should say it was about 3 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know whether or not the President had conferred with anyone Sunday morning?

Mr. Welles: I could not undertake to answer that question, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: From what he had said --

Mr. Welles: The President did not tell me with whom he had spoken on the telephone.

Senator Ferguson: Did you then talk about the attack on Pearl Harbor, Sunday afternoon at 3 o'clock?

Mr. Welles: In the first conversation which I had with him at that time he gave me certain reports which were reaching him. I remember that some of the reports gave the impression that the Japanese were attempting to undertake landings on the Islands, reports which were later disproved. At that time, as I remember it, he had no detailed or full information

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whatever as to the extent of the attack.

Senator Ferguson: Was there anyone present other than you and the President?

Mr. Welles: He was sitting alone in his office on the second floor of the White House. There was nobody with him.

Senator Ferguson: He was receiving messages on the attack?

Mr. Welles: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And it was solely on the attack that you were discussing, the Pearl Harbor incident?

Mr. Welles: I remember, even in the first conversation -- I think I had three with him that day -- he discussed the need for him at the earliest possible moment either to appear before the Congress or to send a message to the Congress.

Senator Ferguson: Did you help him to prepare the message to Congress?

Mr. Welles: He asked me to undertake to help him take care of that message, yes.

Senator Ferguson: Did you help him prepare that message?

Mr. Welles: I helped to prepare the original draft, yes.

Senator Ferguson: That was delivered on Monday morning, was it?

Mr. Welles: I would have to have my memory refreshed

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Witness Welles Questions by: Senator Ferguson

on that.

Senator Ferguson: That was the 8th?

The Vice Chairman: Monday noon.

Mr. Welles: Monday noon.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know when Congress recessed the time before, that is, before the 8th? Do you know whether they recessed on the 4th? I think my able colleague, the Senator from Illinois, moved that it recess until Monday morning, or until Monday noon. Did you know that it had recessed?

Mr. Welles: On what day?

Senator Ferguson: On the 4th.

Mr. Welles: On December 4?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Welles: I undoubtedly knew it at the time. I cannot at the moment say /just when I knew it, or more about it, other than the fact that I did know it at the time.

Senator Ferguson: Had you worked on the message that is now in your file, that has been offered in evidence, but never delivered to Congress?

Would you show it to him, Mr. Congress?

Mr. Welles: I do not know exactly what message you have in mind, Senator.

Mr. Gesell: That is Exhibit 19, Senator.

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Senator Ferguson: Exhibit 19. Will you just review Exhibit 19 and see whether you had any part in it?

Mr. Welles: I had no part in the drafting of that message whatever.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not, or did you know, that the President had in mind the delivery of a message such as we have here now in evidence?

Mr. Welles: The draft which is dated November 29, 1941, is that the one you have in mind?

Senator Ferguson: Or any message prior to the 7th, to the day of the attack, on the Japanese Far Eastern question.

Mr. Welles: I have no knowledge whatever of the preparation of this draft which you have just asked me to refer to.

Senator Ferguson: Were you consulted on any draft prior to Pearl Harbor in relation to our Far Eastern question?

Mr. Welles: I do not remember that I was consulted with regard to any other draft.

Senator Ferguson: Were you consulted with relation to the draft of the message to Congress on the 21st of August, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter message?

Mr. Welles: I had no part in the preparation of that draft, as I recall it. I remember that the President told me that he intended to deliver such a message to the Congress at the first opportunity, but I had nothing whatever to do

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Witness Welles: Questions by: Senator Ferguson

with the preparation of the text.

Senator Ferguson: Was the Atlantic Charter in writing and signed by the President and by Mr. Churchill, as indicated in the message?

Mr. Welles: The Atlantic Charter, Senator, was a joint communique issued by the heads of two governments. As is very often the case, it was not a signed agreement, simply an agreement on a public release by the chiefs of the two governments in order to indicate what their respective policies were and what the objectives were which they sought for a better and more decent world at the end of the war.

Senator Ferguson: It was what you would call, then, in the nature of a press or public release?

Mr. Welles: I should say it was technically, if you will permit the use of the word "technical," it was technically a joint communique, which is a joint release to the public opinion of the world.

Senator Ferguson: And that may account for the fact that in the document now published in the address to Congress it indicates that it was signed by the authors of the communique?

Mr. Welles: They both agreed upon it. I remember, just before Mr. Churchill left, since he left before the President did, a final text was gone over, one or two slight changes

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were made, and it was then sent by the President to be retyped in order that it could be transmitted by radio to Washington.

Senator Ferguson: And was so transmitted, in your opinion?

Mr. Welles: It was so transmitted to the White House.

Senator Ferguson: No press release or communique was given in relation to the parallel action that we have discussed earlier?

Mr. Welles: No press communique was given in regard to that, because, in my judgment, the President's feeling must have been that it was impossible to conceive of any successful negotiation with the Japanese if it was publicly stated that we were delivering a warning to the Japanese.

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Witness Welles — Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Did you discuss that with the President?

Mr. Welles: I do not remember discussing that phase of it.

Senator Ferguson: So that is your conclusion at the present time?

Mr. Welles: That is my conclusion, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: As to why no release would be given?

Mr. Welles: That is merely my conclusion.

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, just in connection with the Senator's insertion in the record of one paragraph of the New York Times on the speech of Mr. Churchill, the first sentence that the Senator had read was, "It is certain that this has got to stop." I think, in order to show what was being referred to in the previous paragraph, certainly it ought to be incorporated, because Mr. Churchill talked about the menace to the Philippine Islands under the protection of the United States.

Senator Ferguson: I will be glad to have that paragraph inserted in the record.

The Chairman: Why not let the whole speech go in?

Mr. Murphy: It should go in.

(The text of Prime Minister Churchill's address referred to is as follows:)

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TE T OF PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL'S ADDRESS
ON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.
(The New York Times, August 25, 1941)

Following is the text of Prime Minister Winston Churchill's Address yesterday as recorded by THE NEW YORK TIMES:

I thought you would like me to tell you something about the voyage which I made across the ocean to meet our great friend, the President of the United States.

Exactly where we met is a secret, but I don't think I shall be indiscreet if I go so far as to say that it was somewhere in the Atlantic. In a spacious, land-locked bay which reminded me of the west coast of Scotland, powerful American warships; protected by strong flotillas and far-ranging aircraft, awaited our arrival and, as it were, stretched out a hand to help us in.

Our party arrived in the newest, or almost the newest, British battleship, the Prince of Wales, with a modest escort of British and Canadian destroyers. And there for three days I spent my time in company, and I think I may say in comradeship, with Mr. Roosevelt, while all the time the chiefs of the staff and naval and military commanders, both of the British Empire and of the United States, sat together in continual council.

President Roosevelt is the thrice-chosen head of the most powerful State and community in the world. I am the servant of King and Parliament, at present charged with the principal direction of our affairs in these fateful times. And it is my

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duty also to make sure, as I have made sure, that anything I say or do in the exercise of my office is approved and sustained by the whole British Commonwealth of Nations. Therefore this meeting was bound to be important because of the enormous forces, at present only partially mobilized, but steadily mobilizing, which are at the disposal of these two major groupings of the human family, the British Empire and the United States, who, fortunately for the progress of mankind, happened to speak the same language and very largely think the same thoughts, or anyhow, think a lot of the same thoughts.

Meeting Was Symbolic

The meeting was, therefore, symbolic. That is its prime importance. It symbolizes in a form and manner which every one can understand in every land and in every clime, the deep underlying unities which stir and, at decisive moments, rule the English-speaking peoples throughout the world.

Would it be presumptuous for me to say that it symbolizes something even more majestic, namely, the marshaling of the good forces of the world against the evil forces which are now so formidable and triumphant and which have cast their cruel spell over the whole of Europe and a large part of Asia,

This was a meeting which marks forever in the pages of history the taking up by the English speaking nations, amid all this peril, tumult and confusion, of the guidance of the

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fortunes of the broad toiling masses in all the continents, and our loyal effort, without any clog of selfish interest to lead them forward out of the miseries into which they have been plunged, back to the broad high road of freedom and justice. This is the highest honor and the most glorious opportunity which could ever have come to any branch of the human race.

When one beholds how many currents of extraordinary and terrible events have flowed together to make this harmony, even the most skeptical person must have the feeling that we all have the chance to play our part and do our duty in some great design, the end of which no mortal can foresee. Awful and horrible things I have seen in these days.

Barbarism Plus Science

The whole of Europe has been wrecked and trampled down by the mechanical weapons and barbaric fury of the Nazis. The most deadly instruments of war science have been joined to the extreme refinements of treachery and the most brutal exhibitions of ruthlessness and thus have formed a combine of agression, the like of which has never been known, before which the rights, the traditions, the characteristics and the structure of many ancient, honored States and peoples have been laid prostrate and are now ground down under the heel and terror of a monster.

The Austrians, the Czechs, the Poles, the Norwegians, the Danes, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Greeks, the Croats and the

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Serbs, above all the great French nation, have been stunned and pinioned. Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria--have bought a shameful respite by becoming the jackals of the tiger. But their situation is very little different and will presently be indistinguishable from that of his victims. Sweden, Spain and Turkey stand apalled, wondering which will be struck down next. Here then is the vast pit into which all the most famous States and races of Europe have been flung and from which, unaided, they can never climb.

But all this did not satiate Adolf Hitler. He made a treaty of non-aggression with Soviet Russia, just as he made one with Turkey, in order to keep them quiet until he was ready to attack them.

And then, nine weeks ago today, without a vestige of provocation, he hurled millions of soldiers with all their apparatus upon the neighbor he had called his friend with the avowed object of destroying Russia and tearing her in pieces.

This frightful business is now unfolding day by day before our eyes. Here is a devil who, in a mere spasm of his pride and lust for domination, can condemn two or three millions, perhaps it may be many more, of human beings to speedy and violent death. Let Russia be blotted out. Let Russia be destroyed. Order the armies to advance. Such were his decress. Accordingly, from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, six or seven millions of soldiers are locked in mortal struggle.

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Russia Not So Easy

Ah, but this time it was not so easy. This time it was not all one way. The Russian Armies and all the peoples of the Russian Republic have rallied to the defense of their hearths and homes. For the first time Nazi blood has flowed in a fearful flood. Certainly a million and a half, perhaps two millions of Nazi cannon-fodder, have bit the dust of the endless plains of Russia. The tremendous battle rages along nearly two thousand miles of front. The Russians fight with magnificent devotion. Not only that, our generals who have visited the Russian front line report with admiration the efficiency of their military organization and the excellence of their equipment.

The agressor is surprised, startled, staggered. For the first time in his experience mass murder has become unprofitable. He retaliates by the most frightful cruelties. As his armies advance, whole districts are being exterminated. Scores of thousands, literally scores of thousands of executions in cold blood are being perpetrated by the German police troops upon the Russian patriots who defend their native soil. Since the Mongol invasions of Europe in the sixteenth century there has never been methodical, merciless butchery on such a scale or approaching such a scale. And, this is but the beginning. Famine and pestilence have yet to follow in the bloody ruts of Hitler's tanks.

We are in the presence of a crime without a name.

But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and

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devastated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as if it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about the vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now, they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They snatch Indo-China from the wretched Vichy French. They menace by their movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and menace the Philippine Islands under the protection of the United States.

Japan Must Be Halted

It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.

And thus we come back to the quiet bay, somewhere in the Atlantic, where misty sunshine plays on great ships which carry the White Ensign or the Stars and Stripes.

We had the idea when we met there, the President and I,

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that without attempting to draw final and formal peace aims, or war aims, it was necessary to give all peoples, and especially the oppressed and conquered peoples, a simple, rough-and-ready wartime statement of the goal toward which the British Commonwealth and the United States mean to make their way and thus make a way for others to march with them on a road which will certainly be painful and may be long.

There are, however, two distinct and marked differences in this joint declaration from the attitude adopted by the Allies during the latter part of the last war and no one should overlook them.

The United States and Great Britain do not now assume that there will never be any more war again. On the contrary, we intend to take ample precaution to prevent its renewal in any period we can foresee by effectively disarming the guilty nations while remaining suitably protected ourselves.

The second difference is this: that instead of trying to ruin German trade by all kinds of additional trade barriers and hindrances, as was the mood of 1917, we have definitely adopted the view that it is not in the interests of the world and of our two countries that any large nation should be unprosperous or shut out from the means of making a decent living for itself and its people by its industry and enterprise.

Far-Reaching Changes

These are far-reaching changes of principle upon which all

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countries should ponder.

Above all, it was necessary to give hope and the assurance of final victory to those many scores of millions of men and women who are battling for life and freedom or who are already bent down under the Nazi yoke.

Hitler and his confederates have for some time past been adjuring and beseeching the populations whom they have wronged and injured to bow to their fate, and to resign themselves to their servitude and, for the sake of some mitigation and indulgences, to collaborate--that is the word--in what is called the new order in Europe.

What is this new order which they seek to fasten first upon Europe and, if possible--for their ambitions are boundless--upon all the continents of the globe? It is the rule of the Herrenvolk--the master race--who are to put an end to democracy, to parliaments, to the fundamental freedoms and decencies of ordinary men and women, to the historic rights of nations, and give them in exchange the iron rule of Prussia, the universal goose-step and the strict efficient discipline, enforced upon the working classes by the political police, with the German concentration camps and firing parties, now so busy in a dozen lands, always handy in the background. There is the new order.

Napoleon in his glory and genius spread his empire far and wide. There was a time when only the snows of Russia and the white cliffs of Dover with their guardian fleets stood between

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him and the dominion of the world. Napoleon's armies had a theme. They carried with them the surges of the French Revolution-Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. That was the cry. There was a sweeping away of outworn, medieval systems and aristocratic privilege. There was the land for the people, a new code of law. Nevertheless, Napoleon's empire vanished like a dream.

But Hitler--Hitler has no theme, naught but mania, appetite and exploitation. He has, however, weapons and machinery for grinding down and for holding down conquered countries which are the product, the sadly perverted product, of modern science.

Hope for the Conquered

The ordeals, therefore, of the conquered peoples will be hard. We must give them hope. We must give them the conviction that their sufferings and their resistances will not be in vain. The tunnel may be dark and long, but at the end there is light. That is the symbolism and that is the message of the Atlantic meeting.

Do not despair, brave Norwegians; your land shall be cleansed not only from the invader but from the filthy Quislings who are his tools.

Be strong in your souls, Czechs; your independence shall be restored.

Poles, the heroism of your people, standing up to cruel oppressors, the courage of your soldiers, sailors and airmen shall not be forgotten. Your country shall live again and resume its

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rightful part in the new organization of Europe.

Lift up your heads, gallant Frenchmen. Not all the infamies of Darlan and of Laval shall stand between you and the restoration of your birthright.

Stout-hearted Dutch, Belgians, Luxembourgers, tormented, mishandled, shamefully cast away peoples of Yugoslavia, glorious Greece, now subjected to the crowning insult of the rule of the Italian jackanapes, yield not an inch. Keep your souls clean from all contact with the Nazis. Make them feel even in their fleeting hour of brutish triumph that they are the moral outcasts of mankind. Help is coming. Mighty forces are arming in your behalf. Have faith, have hope, deliverance is sure.

There is the signal which we have flashed across the waters and if it reaches the hearts of those to whom it is sent they will endure with fortitude and tenacity their present misfortune in the sure faith that they, too, are still serving the common cause and that our efforts will not be in vain.

You will, perhaps, have noticed that the President of the United States and the British representative in what is aptly called the Atlantic Charter have jointly pledged their countries to the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny. That is a solemn and grave undertaking. It must be made good. It will be made good. And, of course, many practical arrangements to fulfill that purpose have been and are being organized and set in motion.

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The question has been asked: "How near is the United States to war?" There is certainly one man who knows the answer to that question. If Hitler has not yet declared war upon the United States it is surely not out of his love for American institutions. It is certainly not because he could not find a pretext. He has murdered half a dozen countries for far less. Fear, fear of immediately redoubling the tremendous energies now being employed against him is no doubt the restraining influence. But the real reason is, I am sure, to be found in the method to which he has so faithfully adhered and by which he has gained so much.

What is that method? It is a very simple method. One by one--that is his plan. That is his guiding rule. That is the trick by which he has enslaved so large a portion of the world.

Three and a half years ago I appealed to my fellow-countrymen to take the lead in weaving together a strong defensive union within the principles of the League of Nations, a union of all the countries who felt themselves in ever-growing danger. But none would listen. All stood idle while Germany rearmed.

"One by One"

Czecho-Slovakia was subjugated. A French Government deserted their faithful ally and broke a plighted word in that ally's hour of need. Russia was cajoled and deceived into a kind of neutrality or partnership while the French Army was being annihilated. The Low Countries and the Scandinavian countries, acting with France and Great Britain in good time even after the war had

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begun might have altered its course and would have had at any rate a fighting chance. The Balkan States had only to stand together to save themselves from the ruin by which they are now engulfed. But one by one they were undermined and overwhelmed. Never was the career of crime made more smooth.

Now Hitler is striking at Russia with all his might, well knowing the difficulties of geography which stand between Russia and the aid which the Western democracies are trying to bring. We shall strive our utmost to overcome all difficulties and to bring this aid. We have arranged for a conference in Moscow between the United States, British and Russian authorities to settle the whole plan. No barrier must stand in the way. But why is Hitler striking at Russia and inflicting this suffering on himself, or rather making his soldiers suffer this frightful slaughter?

It is with the declared object of turning his whole force upon the British Islands and, if he can succeed in beating the life and strength out of us, which is not so easy, then is the moment when he will settle his account, and it is already a long one, with the people of the United States and generally with the Western Hemisphere.

One by one--there is the process. There is the simple dismal plan which has served Hitler so well. It needs but one final successful application to make him the master of the world.

I am devoutly thankful that some eyes at least are fully

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opened to it while time remains. I rejoice to find that the President saw in their true light and proportion the extreme dangers by which the American people, as well as the British people, are now beset.

Importance of U. S. Fleet

It was indeed by the mercy of God that he began eight years ago that revival of the strength of the American Navy without which the New World today would have to take its orders from the European dictators, but with which the United States still retains the power to marshal her gigantic strength and, in saving herself, render an incomparable service to mankind.

We had a church parade on Sunday in our Atlantic bay. The President came onto the quarter-deck of the Prince of Wales where there were mingled together many hundreds of American and British sailors and marines.

The sun shone bright and warm while we all sang the old hymns which are our common inheritance and which we learned as children in our homes. We sang the hymn founded on the psalm which John Hampden's soldiers sang when they bore his body to the grave and in which the brief precarious span of human life is contrasted with the immutability of Him to whom a thousand ages are but as yesterday and as a watch that is passed in the night.

We sang the sailors' hymn "For those in Peril," and there are very many in peril on the sea. We sang "Onward, Christian

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Soldiers, " and indeed I felt that this was no vain presumptian, but that we had the right to feel that we were serving a cause for the sake of which a trumpet has sounded from on high.

When I looked upon that densely packed congregation of the fighting men of the same language, of the same faith, of the same fundamental laws, of the same ideals and to a large extent of the same interests and certainly in different degrees facing the same dangers, it swept across me that here was the only hope but also the sure hope of saving the world from merciless degradation.

And so we came back across the ocean waves uplifted in spirit, fortified in resolve. S ome American destroyers, which were carrying mails to the United States Marines in Iceland, happened to be going the same way, too, so we made a goodly company at sea together.

And when we were right out in mid-passage one afternoon a noble sight broke on the view. We overtook one of the convoys which carry the munitions and supplies of the New World to sustain the champions of freedom in the Old. The whole horizon - the whole broad horizon - seemed filled with ships. Seventy or eighty ships of all kinds, sizes, arrayed in fourteen lines, each of which could have been drawn with a ruler, hardly a wisp of smoke, not a straggler, but all bristling with cannon and other precautions on which I will not dwell, and all surrounded by

their British escorting vessels, while overhead the far-ranging Catalina airboats soared, vigilant, protecting eagles in the sky.

And then I felt that hard and terrible and long drawn out as this struggle may be, we shall not be denied the strength to do our duty to the end.

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Witness Welles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson
Mr. Keefe

Senator Ferguson: I would like to put to Mr. Welles one more question.

Do you have anything that you want now to state in the record, that may have been suggested or not suggested by any of my questions?

Do you want to make any explanation whatever on the record so that we will have all of the facts?

Mr. Welles: I thank you for that opportunity, Senator. I do not at this moment think of anything that I wish to add to what I have said this morning and this afternoon.

The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Welles, I want to get clear in my mind the facts with reference to the so-called Atlantic Charter. As I understand your testimony, and will you correct me if I misstate it, you assisted in drafting the memorandum which is known as the Atlantic Charter.

Mr. Welles: That is correct, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe: This memorandum resulted from the conversations held at sea between the President and Mr. Churchill?

Mr. Welles: That is correct, but may I interject and amplify in parentheses there?

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Mr. Welles: The President had been considering such a statement of policy for some time before and had been seeking

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Witness Welles Questions by: Mr. Keefe

for an opportunity to make such a statement of policy. When we arrived at Argentia we found Mr. Churchill had some specific suggestions with regard to the statement of policy, and the Atlantic Charter contained both the President's original ideas as well as some of the original ideas which Mr. Churchill had brought with him. I make that statement in amplification of my reply.

Mr. Keefe: The result was there was a clean typed document prepared, as you have indicated?

Mr. Welles: There was a final clean copy made, Mr. Congressman, and that clean copy was then rushed to the radio operator so that the copy could be sent immediately to the White House for further release or for future release.

Mr. Keefe: But that actual document, in whatever form it was, in the clean typed form that you indicated, as finally agreed upon, was not signed by either the President or Mr. Churchill?

Mr. Welles: The revised text had been approved in detail by each of them and it was after that that the clean copy was made and then sent to be radioed to Washington and to London.

Mr. Keefe: Of course there never was any signature of either of the parties to that document.

Mr. Welles: There was no signature in that sense. There was full approval, of course, given by both of them to the

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Witness Welles Questions by: Mr. Keefe

final text.

Mr. Keefe: So that the interpolation of the signatures in the message of the President to the Congress, which appears on page 717 of the volume, "Peace and War," that I have before me, results from what he did that got into the document?

Mr. Welles: As an indication that both of them had given the document their official approval as representing the respective policies which they desired to pursue and achieve.

Mr. Keefe: So that there is actually not in existence a historice document known as the Atlantic Charter bearing the signatures of Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt?

Mr. Welles: Not in the sense that it is an agreement between the two governments signed and sealed, but I may say to you, Mr. Congressman, as you undoubtedly know, very often heads of governments in a joint communique, after a meeting, announce their agreement upon certain policies which their respective governments are going to attempt to carry out. If you will permit this addition, I do not regard the Atlantic Charter as any less valid because it did not have the actual signatures or any official seals put upon it. It had been approved in every syllable by both Mr. Churchill and the President and was released upon their instruction as containing the policies of their two governments.

Mr. Keefe: And that which appears in the President's

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Witness Welles Questions by: Mr. Keefe

speech to the Congress under date of August 21, 1941, is that identical agreement?

Mr. Welles: That is the text as agreed upon at Argentia.

Mr. Keefe: Did you have any part in the drafting of the October 17 proposed message to the Emperor of Japan?

Mr. Welles: May I refer to the text of that before I answer you, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. Gesell: That is Exhibit 20, Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: I just said that so we would keep the record straight.

Mr. Keefe: Yes, Exhibit 20.

Mr. Welles: I remember the draft very well now that I have had a chance to look at it again. I do not think I actually had any part in the preparation of it, either.

Mr. Keefe: Were you consulted by Mr. Hull or anyone else in the State Department?

Mr. Welles: I think I must undoubtedly have sat in on the conference in Mr. Hull's office in which this was under consideration.

Mr. Keefe: In the memorandum to the President under date of October 17, which is part of the same exhibit, there appears this language:

"There is attached a redraft of your proposed

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message to the Emperor of Japan."

I call your attention to the word "redraft".

"In view of (a) the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister here in a two-hour conversation last evening with Mr. Welles and myself," and so forth.

Now, this letter of transmittal indicates that there was a prior draft of the proposed message. Do you recall that?

Mr. Welles: I recall the fact that there had been several, at least one other if not more, drafts prepared. Whether the redraft was undertaken because the President desired it changed, or whether it had been undertaken because Mr. Hull had decided to undertake a redraft, I could not at this moment say.

Mr. Keefe: Well, did the suggestion of the despatching of the message direct to the Emperor result from this so-called 2-hour conversation held on the evening of October 16?

Mr. Welles: That 2-hour conversation, Mr. Congressman, as I think I indicated in my testimony of yesterday evening, was one of a series of conversations which I had with the Minister Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Wakasubi, which was the only direct participation, as I said yesterday, in the Japanese negotiations, and this conversation took place in Mr. Hull's office. As this memorandum to the President shows, the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister, indicating that the Japanese Government desires to continue its exploratory

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conversations, coupled with the fact that the Japanese Minister, at his request, is coming to call again "this afternoon for a further extended discussion and various other considerations," Mr. Hull told the President that he was inclined to the view it was premature to send the proposed message to the Emperor, pending further clarification of the situation in Japan, and probably the attitude of the new government.

Mr. Keefe: May I ask you on that point, had there been discussions between the State Department and the President prior to the 17th of October, 1941, as to the possibility of making some direct address to the Emperor of Japan?

Mr. Welles: If there were any conversations on that point, Mr. Hull would be the individual who had those conversations with the President.

Mr. Keefe: Did you have any knowledge of any such discussions yourself prior to the 17th of October, 1941?

Mr. Welles: I find it very difficult to say "Yes" or "No" categorically. I can only take it for granted, in view of the fact I was having these conversations with Mr. Wakasubi, that I must have been familiar with the general purport of the Secretary of State's conversation with the President.

Mr. Keefe: I am now addressing you as a very experienced man in the diplomatic field, as an expert, and I would like to have your opinion on this. Was it ordinary or customary in

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Witness Welles Questions by: Mr. Keefe

crises such as were developing at this time in October, for the head of a government, such as the President of the United States, to address the message direct to the Emperor of Japan, or was that a departure from established diplomatic relations?

Mr. Murphy: The gentleman said "October." Do you mean December?

Mr. Keefe: I mean October, 1941.

Mr. Welles: There was nothing unusual, Mr. Congressman, about a chief of a state sending a personal message to another chief of state. You will recall that after the so-called Panay incident the President sent a message directly to the Emperor of Japan.

Mr. Keefe: Well, what was there in the situation that suggested the despatching of a message such as the one that had been suggested here, direct to the Emperor?

Mr. Welles: What was in the situation, Mr. Congressman, was the fact that both the President and Mr. Hull were determined to leave no stone unturned to try to find some means of obtaining a pacific solution of the difficulties, to try to persuade the civilian elements particularly in Japan of the possibility of a pacific solution, and, beyond everything else, to avoid war, and if that proved impossible, to put off war to the last possible moment. That was the reason undoubtedly for the decision to consider any form of communication with

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any form of individual in the Japanese Government which might possibly be useful for those purposes.

Mr. Keefe: Now, this message was not in fact sent. You are aware of that, are you not?

Mr. Welles: Yes, it was not sent.

Mr. Keefe: And matters drifted along until finally the exhibit indicates that another message was prepared, which bears the date of December 6, 1941, a message from the President to the Emperor of Japan.

Mr. Welles: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: Did you have any part in the drafting of that message?

Mr. Welles: I had no part in the actual drafting of it, that I remember. I remember, however, knowing that it was to be sent.

Mr. Keefe: Well, was it drafted in the State Department?

Mr. Welles: My recollection is it was drafted under the supervision of the Secretary of State himself, but it may be possible that the President made the original draft himself, in view of his deep interest in the matter, and that that original draft of the President was later revised in the State Department. I could not attempt now to say, but I am quite sure Mr. Hull will be able to tell you.

Mr. Keefe: Would there be any record in the State

Witness Welles

Department that would indicate at what time on the 6th day of December, 1941, this second appeal or message to the Emperor was prepared?

Mr. Welles: Was prepared or sent, Mr. Congressman?

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Witness Welles Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Was prepared.

Mr. Welles: I do not believe that there would be any indication as to what hour the draft was completed, no.

Mr. Keefe: The record indicates that a dispatch was sent from the State Department to Tokyo to the American Embassy at 8:00 P.M., indicating that "an important telegram is now being encoded to you containing for communication by you at earliest possible moment text of message from the President to the Emperor." That bears the time imprint of 8:00 P.M. The State Department papers indicate that the message was sent at 9:00 P.M. on the 6th.

Mr. Welles: That is not necessarily responsive to your question, Mr. Congressman. A draft might have been completed earlier in the afternoon.

Mr. Keefe: What I am getting at is that indicates at least it was reaching the point so that the message went to the Embassy in Tokyo, that the message was being encoded at 8:00 P.M.

Mr. Welles: That is undoubtedly true.

Mr. Keefe: And later at 9:00 when it was dispatched.

Mr. Welles: That is undoubtedly correct.

Mr. Keefe: Would there be any record in the State Department to show when that message was actually completed?

Mr. Welles: I think it is possible that Mr. Hull's

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records would show that he had an appointment with the President that afternoon, at what time that appointment was had, and also that he would remember whether or not, if such appointment was had by him with the President, the final draft of this proposed message to the Emperor was approved by the President.

Mr. Keefe: As far as you are concerned, you were not called into the conference, as I understand, by either the President or Mr. Hull on the final drafting of this message which was actually sent.

Mr. Welles: Not with regard to that message, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe: But you believe Mr. Hull could, from records in the State Department, furnish that information?

Mr. Welles: I should think it is very likely.

Mr. Keefe: When a message such as the one of October 17, 1941, or the message that was finally sent on the 6th of December, is being drafted and under consideration, is it the custom of the State Department to call in the responsible heads of the Army and Navy to go over the matter before final action is taken?

Mr. Welles: Mr. Hull at that time, Mr. Congressman, was having conversations with the Secretaries of War and Navy. He was also in constant communication with them, and I should

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think it in the highest degree probable that he would tell you, if you ask him the question, that he had consulted with them in regard to these two messages to which you refer.

Mr. Keefe: Would there be any records in the State Department to show whether or not such consultations were had, aside from Mr. Hull's own memory?

Mr. Welles: I think that he might have records showing the matters that he discussed with the Secretaries of War and Navy, but of that I am not certain. He would have to tell you that.

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Witness Welles Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Gesell: Congressman Keefe, may I interpose for a moment?

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: To call attention to Appendix A to Mr. Hull's statement showing telephone calls made by him with representatives of the Army and Navy on the 6th. That perhaps is in part the record that you are looking for.

Mr. Keefe: Yes, I am aware of that, but I am aware also that Mr. Hull further stated that he was not at all sure that this was all inclusive of the telephone conversations or appointments which he had.

Mr. Gesell: Right.

Mr. Keefe: I note in this exhibit that we have been referring to, Mr. Welles, a written memorandum on White House stationery reading:

"Dear Cordell:

"Shoot this to Grew. I think can go in gray code. Saves time. I don't mind if it gets picked up. F.D.R."

That would indicate, would it not, that the final drafting and final word on the matter came from the President himself to Mr. Hull?

Mr. Welles: I think that is entirely clear from this file which I have before me.

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Mr. Keefe: Now, unfortunately that bears the stamp of the Secretary of State, December 6, 1941, with the word printed "Noted", but there is no time stamped on it to show when it was noted or when it was received. Is that customary in the State Department?

Mr. Welles: This question of stamping, Mr. Congressman, I think varies in many of the offices of the Department. I think it is an indication that the Secretary of State's office received this from the White House and that it was immediately given to the Secretary of State. There is no kind of stamping in either his office or mine, so far as I know, certainly not in mine, which indicated the precise hour when the document from the White House would have been received.

Mr. Keefe: I notice another part of this exhibit is a letter from the Department of State under date of December 6, 1941 which says, "Memorandum for the President".

It says further:

"There is attached your message to the Emperor of Japan with page 3 of the message amended to take care of the point with regard to which I spoke to you on the telephone. If you approve the draft as it now stands we shall see that it gets off to Grew at once."

Initials "C.H."

Then on the bottom of this letter, in the handwriting of

the President, appears "O.K., send the amended page 3 to the British Ambassador and send copy to me. F.D.R."

That would indicate that the final draft of this message was being prepared in the State Department as a result of telephone conversations between Mr. Hull and the President, would it not?

Mr. Welles: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: Did you participate in or were you consulted in any manner in connection with the drafting of this final message to the Emperor?

Mr. Welles: As I think I have stated, I had no part in the actual drafting of it, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe: Did you know that it was going on in the Department?

Mr. Welles: I knew such message was under contemplation and under preparation but, as I have said before, it was not always possible for me, in view of the volume of work which I myself was handling, and the urgency of this work, to sit in every conference which had to do with the situation in the Pacific. I doubt if I was able to sit in more than a very few of them, a very small proportion of them.

Mr. Keefe: I have been trying to fix in my own mind, for specific purposes, the time when the message was actually finally completed as a result of the conversations between the

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President and Mr. Hull. Is there any record that you know of or could volunteer to me in the State Department that would fix that time?

Mr. Welles: I wish it were possible for me personally to give you the information you want, Mr. Congressman, but if Mr. Hull's recollection or records don't give you this information I should think it highly possible that some of the officials of the Far Eastern Division, such as Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine, would be able to give you the information that you want, since they undoubtedly sat in in all of the conferences which had to do with the preparation, the drafting and the re-drafting of this message.

Mr. Keefe: When was the notice, official notice from the State Department, given to American Nationals advising them to leave the Orient, issued?

Mr. Welles: I again in that case would have to refer to the records of the Department to give you that information, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe: Do you recall there was an official notice issued by the State Department warning all American Nationals to leave the Orient?

Mr. Welles: As the situation became more and more dangerous it was a matter of very necessary precaution on the part of the Department of State to safeguard the lives of our Nationals

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who were still in those areas and instructions were sent progressively during the autumn months from one point to another to our Consuls instructing them to advise our Nationals to leave, but I couldn't give you the full list without referring to the records of the Department of those instructions issued to our Consuls or the dates when the instructions were sent.

Mr. Keefe: I have the press releases as of October 9 of 1941 and as early as October 1940, all during that period, the first press release emanating October 9, 1940, and into the fall of 1941.

Were those formal releases issued through our Consuls and diplomatic representatives in various parts of the Orient which would be published in the newspapers advising the Nationals to leave?

Mr. Welles: In certain cases the Consuls, as I recall it, were instructed to see the Nationals and explain the situation to them and give them the advice required.

In other instances I think the Consuls were instructed to take all measures necessary in their judgment to insure that our Nationals would be warned of the situation and of the need in our judgment for them to remove themselves.

Mr. Keefe: The reason, Mr. Welles, that I have been endeavoring to locate some information through your testimony this afternoon arises from the statement that Mr. Hull himself

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made when he was a witness when he said this:

"It seemed to me that we were all very much like a family. We were seeing, talking among and with each other, making things known to each other in any way or another most of the time, and we made it a point to make known to each other whatever the other person might think of things that would be desirable to communicate. So at all times I think it is accurate to say that each of us in the State House have always tried to impart to the other with reasonable diligence anything new that we learned that would be of interest."

He made that general statement, and you were the Under Secretary of State, and it now appears from your testimony that there were many things transpiring in relation to the Far Eastern situation that you were not personally involved in.

Mr. Welles: I think that is a perfectly easy thing to explain, Mr. Congressman.

During the autumn of 1941 the world situation was such that the interests of the United States were affected in every quarter of the globe. It was utterly impossible for Mr. Hull to take personal charge and supervision of the negotiations with the Japanese Government and the general situation in the Pacific which required all of his strength, all of his time and all of his abilities, and at the same time attempt to handle

questions relating to what, in my judgment, was of the utmost moment to this country, and that is inter-American affairs, the maintenance and preservation of inter-American solidarity, and the assurance that the United States would be safeguarded on account of its completely friendly and loyal relations with other American Republics, and at the same time attempt to handle the innumerable questions coming up in regard to the countries of Europe, and it was necessary for some high official, consequently, to undertake that other part of the heavy burdens involved.

It fell upon my shoulders to attempt to handle that other part of the work. For that reason it was physically impossible for me to be receiving a great number of Ambassadors and Ministers and other foreign representatives and representatives of our own Government, representatives of other Government Departments, all day long, morning, noon and very often the afternoon and evening, and at the same time sit in on conferences in the office of the Secretary of State or in the White House which had to do solely with Far Eastern affairs.

I made it a practice and a point of familiarizing myself through memoranda of conversations of the talks which the Secretary of State was having with regard to the Far Eastern situation, and Mr. Hull very frequently would talk to me about the developments in that field.

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The reason why I am not able to give more precise information to you with regard to these detailed questions that you ask me, Mr. Congressman, is on account of the circumstances I have just endeavored to indicate.

Mr. Keefe: I can well appreciate that, Mr. Welles.

Mr. Welles: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Do you recall, Mr. Welles, where you were on the evening of the 6th of December?

Mr. Welles: I think when I left the Department of State I went straight home to my own house, was there all night, and came in early the following morning to my office in the Department.

Mr. Keefe: What time did you leave the Department of State that evening, if you now recall?

Mr. Welles: I couldn't give you the exact time, but I should think undoubtedly it was fairly late in the afternoon.

Mr. Keefe: Did you receive any telephone calls at your home that night with respect to the receipt of the reply by the Japanese?

Mr. Welles: I did not.

Mr. Keefe: At what time did you get to the State Department the next morning, Sunday morning?

Mr. Welles: I should think probably a little before ten o'clock.

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Mr. Keefe: Was there a conference in progress there that Sunday morning?

Mr. Welles: To the best of my recollection, and on this I may be wrong because my memory is not clear on this point, to the best of my recollection I did not see Mr. Hull that morning before he saw the Japanese envoys, but I want to emphasize that I am not clear on that.

Mr. Keefe: Did you have any conferences with anybody that morning?

Mr. Welles: I had several conferences with the officials of the Department, all of them, I think, relating, however, to inter-American or European affairs. I remember that I went out to lunch with Dr. Burley, then Assistant Secretary of State, and it was upon my return to the State Department, my office at the State Department, that the President telephoned me, as I have already explained to Senator Ferguson.

Mr. Keefe: Then you knew nothing about the intercept of the Japanese reply that morning?

Mr. Welles: To the best of my belief I knew nothing of the Japanese intercept until Sunday. What exact time on Sunday I learned of it I could not say. It may have been at the time when I knew that the Japanese had requested an audience, an interview, with the Secretary of State. It may have been subsequent.

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Witness Welles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Do you know from whom you got any information at all with respect to the Japanese intercept that morning?

Mr. Welles: I couldn't at this time endeavor to tell you. I think the officials in the Far Eastern Division were undoubtedly busy in Secretary Hull's office and I know that I had that morning some very urgent matters which had to do with the Western Hemisphere and I couldn't say now precisely when I learned of it nor from whom.

Mr. Keefe: Can you advise, for the purpose of the record, how the Atlantic Conference originated?

Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield before he proceeds to that phase?

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: I want to suggest that the gentleman had asked about the Japanese intercept on Sunday and there will be evidence of several intercepts on Sunday and it is not clear which he was referring to or about which the gentleman was answering.

Mr. Keefe: I think the record will show what I was referring to. The Japanese intercept which was a reply to the message of the 26th.

You so understood, Mr. Welles?

Mr. Welles: That was my understanding.

Mr. Murphy: All right.

Mr. Keefe: Since the witness and counsel understand, why, it is unfortunate that one member of the committee does not.

The Chairman: Proceed.

Mr. Keefe: Will you proceed in answer to my last question?

Mr. Welles: Will you restate your question, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. Keefe: How did the Atlantic Conference originate?

Mr. Welles: I am unable to give you the precise background. The first I knew of it was when the President sent for me approximately a week or several days before the time of the meeting and told me that he had arranged to meet with Mr. Churchill, that Mr. Churchill was not taking Mr. Eden with him, but was taking the permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the British Foreign Office with him, and that consequently the President desired me to accompany him, since I was the corresponding number in our Government to the Under Secretary from the British Government.

Mr. Keefe: Were you advised that the military and naval staffs were going to be in attendance at this meeting?

Mr. Welles: The President gave me no information when he told me of his plans and his desire that I go with him as to what the precise nature of the conversations were to be; nor, so far as I was concerned, were there any agenda. If there were any they did not come to my cognizance. He did

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tell me General Marshall and Admiral Stark and General Arnold were going to be at the meeting.

Mr. Keefe: Well, as I understand your answer then, there was no agenda prepared prior to your going to the meeting?

Mr. Welles: So far as I was concerned. What I wanted to make clear is the fact that if there was any agenda with regard to other matters taken up at the Atlantic Charter meeting other than the drafting of the Atlantic Charter itself I was not aware of it nor did I see it.

Mr. Keefe: So far as you know, as the Under Secretary of State, and the one designated to accompany the President, you had no prior notice that such a meeting was to be held until you were advised by the President of his desire to have you accompany him?

Mr. Welles: None until the President called me to his office to tell me of it.

Mr. Keefe: Did the President prior to your leaving advise you as to what the meeting was called for or what it was proposed to discuss?

Mr. Welles: The President had during preceding weeks told me of his thought that in view of the increasingly serious world situation, in view of the spread of the war in Europe, that nothing would be more valuable from the standpoint of keeping alive in a very quickly darkening world some principles

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of international law, some principles of moral and human decency, than for him to make some kind of a public statement of the objectives in international relations in which the Government of the United States believed.

(4) He discussed that with me upon several occasions and when he told me of his plan to meet Mr. Churchill at Argentia, he informed me that he thought it would be an extremely desirable thing for such a statement to be made upon his return from that meeting. He did not at that time indicate to me that he had in mind a joint statement, but what he did say, and my memory is very clear, is that he felt the time would be very appropriate upon his return for him to make such a statement.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. Keefe: It does.

Now, do you have any knowledge as to whether or not the message to Emperor Hirohito which was dispatched at nine o'clock, according to the memorandum of the State Department, by the President, was released at that time to the press?

Mr. Welles: The records of the Department will show when it was released, but my very clear understanding would be that such a message would not be released until we had been informed by our Ambassador in Tokyo that the message had been received by the Emperor.

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Mr. Keefe: The telegram to our Ambassador indicated that the press was being informed that the President was dispatching a message to the Emperor. Do you know as to what information was given to the press, if any?

Mr. Welles: The records of the Department will unquestionably show that in complete detail. I think probably the intention was to show that the President was doing everything in his power by communicating directly with the Emperor to prevent any deterioration of the situation, but just now much was said to the press I, of course, do not now remember.

Mr. Keefe: You were not at the White House at any time the 6th of December?

Mr. Welles: To the best of my recollection I was not.

Mr. Keefe: That is all.

The Chairman: Does counsel have any further questions?

Mr. Gesell: One or two short questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Welles, what did the President ask you to do when he mentioned at the Conference the preparation of a note to be handed to the Japanese Ambassador?

Mr. Welles: What did the President ask me to do?

Mr. Gesell: Yes.

Mr. Welles: You are speaking of the meeting at Argentia?

Mr. Gesell: Yes.

Mr. Welles: He asked me to see to it that the Secretary

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of State was immediately given his ideas with regard to the communications to be made to the Japanese Ambassador and asked me myself to see to it that the Ambassador should be called to the White House to meet with the President as soon as possible after his return.

Mr. Gesell: Did you understand that the text that you were to prepare was to be final or that the text was to be worked out in collaboration with other Government officials?

Mr. Welles: My very definite recollection is that the text was to be regarded in no sense as final but simply as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Gesell: What was your understanding of the parallel action to be taken which was agreed upon at this conference?

Mr. Welles: My understanding of the parallel action was that a warning would be issued by the President to the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington in more or less the terms in which the warning was finally conveyed, and that at the same time, acting in a parallel way, the British Government through similar methods would give a similar warning to the Japanese Government.

Mr. Gesell: In other words, each Government would give some warning but the exact text of the warning was to be worked out by this Government and the British Government, to use your phrase, unilaterally?

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Witness Welles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell
Mr. Gearhart

Mr. Welles: That is entirely my understanding.

Mr. Gesell: One further question.

With respect to this draft on the stationery of the Prime Minister concerning which we have had discussion today, do I understand your testimony to be that you do not know whether or not this specific draft or parallel communications as proposed here was agreed upon by the President and the Prime Minister?

Mr. Welles: Your question isn't very clear to me.

Mr. Gesell: I am afraid it isn't.

Do you know whether this specific suggestion as drafted by the Prime Minister was sent in those precise terms by the President?

Mr. Welles: I have no reason whatever to think so. On the contrary, my understanding is that the President gave me the very clear impression when he talked with me about it that he would give a warning to the Japanese Government, that no agreement had been reached as to the phraseology of such warning, but that the promise which he had made to Mr. Churchill was limited to the fact that a warning would be given.

Mr. Gesell: That is all.

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Welles, the press disclosed that late

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in November of 1941 the President left Washington and went to Warm Springs for a rest. It also appeared in the press on or about the 29th day of November, while the President was attending a belated Thanksgiving dinner with the patients at that institution, that Mr. Hull called him on the long distance phone and conveyed to him a very urgent message, a message which the President received and returned to the table and announced that he was immediately leaving for Washington, arriving here by December 1st, if I remember correctly.

I was wondering if you had any consultation with Mr. Hull prior to the placing of this emergency call?

Mr. Welles: I recollect no prior conversation with Mr. Hull with regard to his telephoning the President. My recollection, of course, however, is clear that the situation was becoming more and more serious, from all of the information coming to us, and that Mr. Hull very naturally telephoned the President, on account of that, that he had better return to Washington.

Mr. Gearhart: But you don't remember of having overheard or participated in any conversations with Mr. Hull and other officials of the State Department in which the necessity or recalling the President to Washington was discussed?

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Witness Welles: Questions by Mr. Gearhart

Mr. Welles: My recollection is that it had to do with the information with regard to the increasing number of Japanese troops that were being sent to Indo-China and that the President's memorandum to me of December 2nd, instructing me to communicate that message to the two Japanese Ambassadors, was one of the reasons why the situation was regarded as so urgent.

The Chairman: Is that all?

Mr. Gearhart: No.

Now, wasn't there a message intercepted between the Japanese on November 28th, translated on the same day, which indicated that the Japanese were considering military action?

Mr. Welles: The date of that, Congressman Gearhart, is November 28th?

Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

Mr. Welles: I have it now before me. That undoubtedly is another one of the factors which gave the impression, if not the assurance, that the situation was in the highest degree grave.

Mr. Gesell: That is the message on 195 of exhibit 1? Is that the one you are referring to, Mr. Welles?

Mr. Welles: Yes.

Mr. Gearhart: You saw the President immediately upon his return, did you not?

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Witness Welles: Questions by Mr. Gearhart

Mr. Welles: I do not remember exactly when I saw the President after his return. I was trying to remember that this morning when Senator Ferguson was asking me and I cannot now remember.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, when you did you see the President did you discuss with him as to why he had returned so unexpectedly, so precipitously?

Mr. Welles: The instructions given me by the President to communicate the memorandum he had sent me to the two Japanese Ambassadors was one of the reasons, in my judgment at that time, as it is now, which required the President's return in order that he himself could take charge of the communication.

Mr. Gearhart: Was it not the prevailing opinion among all the leaders of the State Department at that time that war was just a matter of days, or perhaps hours?

Mr. Welles: I think, Mr. Congressman, I really answered that in my replies to Senator Ferguson this morning. I said that as the time passed towards the beginning of December the one in a thousand chance which I had thought still obtained for maintaining peace had become about one chance in a million.

Mr. Gearhart: That is all.

The Chairman: Any further questions?

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Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Lucas

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas: I desire to ask just a few questions.

Mr. Secretary, were you in the room yesterday when Secretar Hull testified?

Mr. Welles: I was here a part of the time, Senator Lucas, not all of it.

Senator Lucas: Have you had an opportunity to read his narrative and analysis of what happened in this country's relations with Japan?

Mr. Welles: I have read the full statement which was presented in testimony yesterday morning.

Senator Lucas: You are familiar with the table of contents contained on the second page and the annexes, A, B, C and D?

Mr. Welles: I think so, Senator Lucas, yes.

Senator Lucas: Do you agree with Secretary Hull in this statement that he made to the committee?

Mr. Welles: I agree with Mr. Hull completely in the statement which he has made to the committee.

Senator Lucas: Let me ask you, Mr. Welles, how long have you been connted with the government of the United States?

Mr. Welles: I entered the foreign service in the year

Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Lucas

1915, Senator Lucas. I retired from the service in 1925. I came back when the President appointed me in 1933 and resigned in the late summer or early autumn of 1943.

Senator Lucas: Now, during that time it is obvious that you drafted and saw many diplomatic messages over that period of years and I desire to call or direct your attention again to exhibit 22, which is the so-called draft of parallel communications to the Japanese government by Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of England, and specially call your attention to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this exhibit which has been referred to as the agreement, promise, discussion, suggestion.

At the risk of repetition, - I think you fairly and thoroughly explained it, but at the risk of repetition I wish you would again at this point state for the record just what you understand this to be?

Mr. Welles: I understand that this document was a suggestion made to the President by the British Prime Minister as to parallel action to be taken by the British and United States governments and possibly by the Dutch government and possibly by the Soviet Union.

Senator Lucas: Well, there was no agreement at the time between the President of the United States and Winston Churchill upon this question?

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Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Lucas

Mr. Welles: The only agreement reached at Argentia with regard to this question, so far as I know, was that the President made the promise to Mr. Churchill that the government of the United States in its own words and in its own way would issue a warning to the Japanese government of the character which actually was made by the President on August 17th.

Senator Lucas: Exactly so and that is what he did?

Mr. Welles: That is what he did.

Senator Lucas: Now, I should like also to direct your attention to the paragraph 1 of that exhibit which says:

"Any further encroachment by Japan in the South West Pacific would produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and Japan."

Much has been said about that paragraph. What do you understand again, for the record, that Churchill was talking about when he was referring to the "United States Government"?

Mr. Welles: That the Government of the United States would issue a warning to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese persisted in the policy of conquest and military expansion the Government of the United States would find itself compelled to take such steps as in its own judgment were necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the

Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Lucas

American people and the safety of the United States.

Senator Lucas: Now, one further question that I want to ask you about relates to exhibit 24, which is the memorandum that was sent to our Ambassador by Winston Churchill on November 30, 1941, which states as follows:

"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences."

Now, did that come after the declaration was issued to Japan by this government with respect to Mr. Hull's ten points?

Mr. Welles: This came four days after the note of November 26th to which you referred had been delivered by Mr. Hull to the Japanese Ambassadors.

Senator Lucas: Now, what was this government doing at that time in so far as continuing of negotiations were concerned with the Japanese government?

Mr. Welles: This government at that time was waiting for some reply from the Japanese Government to its communication.

Senator Lucas: Did that reply come? If so, when?

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Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Lucas

Mr. Welles: That reply came, as we all of us remember, on December 7th, at the time that Pearl Harbor was attacked.

Senator Lucas: You were interrogated about the conversation that took place between Admiral Richardson and Secretary Knox in 1940 with respect to the patrol that was discussed from Hawaii to the Philippines to Singapore, as I recall. You stated very clearly that you had discussed this with the President and that the President considered that only as a plan or a project at that particular time and I presume it goes without saying that such a plan or project was in line with what you have been testifying to here all along; that is, it was such a plan or project that was definitely in the interest of the safety and the security of this nation?

Mr. Welles: That unquestionably was the President's intention when he was considering that plan.

Senator Lucas: That is right. And the plan did not, of course, materialize after he had talked to the Secretaries of Navy and War and Admiral Richardson?

Mr. Welles: It did not materialize.

Senator Lucas: When you spoke about the Atlantic Charter being adopted and that it might be applied to all the world after the war, obviously you were referring at that time to the European war?

Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Lucas

Mr. Welles: After the termination of the European war.

Senator Lucas: One other question: Do you know from the records what time the message that was sent by the President on the night of December the 6th was received by the Emperor of Japan?

Mr. Welles: Ambassador Grew, Senator Lucas, would be able to give you that reply with complete precision.

Senator Lucas: All right, sir. That is all.

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Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Brewster

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: The Senator from Maine.

Senator Brewster: I want to address one or two questions which I think may be within the purview of this inquiry but that have not been covered heretofore. They might possibly not be thought to be within the scope of the Resolution but in my judgment they may be. While the Chairman introduced it with respect to Pearl Harbor, I take it while it has the aspect of a post mortem in determining what transpired, we are finally and fundamentally concerned with the future and with this as a prologue to avoid difficulties and I have been impressed with your experience in the State Department for something like twenty years and your qualifications, therefore, as an expert.

It struck me in your testimony that your opposite number to the Under Secretary was a permanent Under Secretary of State in Britain, indicating the difference in the conduct of our affairs.

Would you express an opinion as to whether the development of a permanent secretariat in our State Department hierarchy than has heretofore existed might be a constructive step?

Mr. Welles: I believe that it would, Senator Brewster, although I think it is fair to say that it is inconceivable that any President or any Secretary of State would be able to

Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Brewster

operate with success if permanent officials of that character were no in accord with the policies which they wished to follow.

Senator Brewster: How do the British overcome such a possible conflict?

Mr. Welles: Well, as you remember, Senator Brewster, the British Foreign Office has two Under Secretaries. One is the parliamentary Under Secretary, who changes with the government and who appears on the floor of the House of Commons to answer questions if the Foreign Minister is not available, with regard to foreign policy. The other is the permanent Under Secretary who is a member of the British Civil Service and who does not change.

If you will permit me to express my opinion, I have often wished, as I say now, that there were some method by which either the Secretary of State or the Under Secretary of State could appear on the floor of the Senate or on the floor of the House in order to afford the members of the Congress a far greater continuing measure of information than has previously been available to them.

Senator Brewster: That brings me to my next question.

In the past few years a special sub-committee of the Senate composed of eight members of a bipartisan character, four on a side, were actively associated with the develop-

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ment of the United Nations charter, in almost constant consultation, we have understood, with the State Department and apparently working out very fruitfully. This was to constitute, we understand from recent reports, a more or less continuing arrangement.

To what extent do you feel a liaison of that character with representative members of the committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that have constitutional responsibilities may in some measure accomplish the integration of the Executive and Legislative branches of the government which sometimes seems to be required?

Mr. Welles: I think, Senator Brewster, that it would contribute tremendously to the objectives which I have in mind. I think that any continuing commission of that kind can do a great deal of work but it does not cover the entire field, of course, to the extent which a representative of the State Department appearing on the floor either of the Senate or of the House and subjected to questions from the members of the Congress would achieve.

Senator Brewster: To what extent, now coming nearer to the event, would it have been at all feasible during this very critical period in the last three or four months of the Japanese situation if such a committee had been kept in any degree constantly informed as to the situation? Would it

have been feasible do you feel as a diplomatic matter?

Mr. Welles: I think it would have been both feasible and in the highest degree useful.

Senator Brewster: Would it not be possible if eight members of the Senate were informed continuously in detail from week to week and told that they could furnish all pertinent and appropriate information that might be desired by the Senate and thus by the country, answering in substantial measure the purposes which would bear properly upon it?

Mr. Welles: I think it would certainly accomplish a very great deal in that direction.

Senator Brewster: That is all.

The Chairman: The chair would like to ask a question or two if other members are through.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I have just a few but I am perfectly willing to follow the chair.

The Chairman: Oh, no, the chair will wait.

Senator Ferguson: At the time that these negotiations were going on during 1941 was there any liaison officer between the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Department of State such as Senator Brewster mentioned?

Mr. Welles: My recollection is that Secretary Hull himself endeavored to keep in touch with the Foreign Rela-

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Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Ferguson

tions Committee and to inform the members of the committee of the developments in the situation, but that matter was in his hands and not in mine.

Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar on the 24th of November with a statement by Senator Pepper in Boston that the United States had fixed -- this was in 1941 -- the United States had fixed a line in the Pacific and if the Japs crossed that line the American Navy would start shooting without paying attention to the technicality of a declaration of war?

Mr. Welles: I do not at the present moment recollect that statement of the Senator.

Senator Ferguson: Would you check it and see whether or not the Department of State show such a statement and would you look, Mr. Welles, for counsel whether or not there was any such information in the State Department?

Mr. Welles: This was a statement, Senator Ferguson, which you tell me Senator Pepper made in Boston, which appeared in the --

Senator Ferguson: Yes, on the 24th of November 1941.

Mr. Welles: Which appeared in the press?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Welles: Unquestionably then it was seen in the State Department.

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Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: And do you know whether there was any foundation in the State Department for that statement?

Mr. Welles: I endeavored during my testimony this morning and this afternoon as well, Senator Ferguson, to make it clear that I know of no such arrangements as those indicated by Senator Pepper.

Senator Ferguson: Would the instrument or the parallel action, taking the document and the oral statement of the President to the Japanese Government on the 17th of August 1941, be such a statement?

Mr. Welles: In my judgment decidedly not.

Senator Ferguson: Now, Senator Lucas asked you in relation to exhibit 24 and he read to you:

"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences."

Do you know of anything in the State Department, any record indicating that any such message was given, either secret or public?

Mr. Welles: I know of no such message having been given.

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Witness Welles: Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: You would not consider the message from the President of the United States to the Emperor on the night of the sixth or the morning of the seventh, whatever the facts will show later as to when Mr. Grew gave it, would be such a message as I have indicated?

Mr. Welles: In my interpretation not. I think the message from the President to the Emperor was in every sense of the word an attempt to avert war and not to bring it on.

Senator Ferguson: But at that particular time the ships were on the way to the Kra Peninsula, were they not, to our knowledge?

Mr. Welles: We had that information, of course, on December 6th.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Welles: My strong impression is that the President regarded his message to the Emperor as the last possible appeal which could be made and I think I have attempted to bring that out in the testimony.

Senator Ferguson: Would you say that the message to the Emperor was a change in the nature of the 26th by Mr. Hull?

Mr. Welles: I should not.

Senator Ferguson: Doesn't the nature of the sixth one relate to the withdrawal from Indo-China and the message of

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Witness Welles: Question by Sen. Ferguson

Mr. Hull goes much further? Would you just refer to the language of the sixth? I am talking about the note to the Emperor.

Mr. Welles: This message from the President in its final form says:

"There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

"I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area."

Senator Ferguson: Now, isn't that the only requirement that the President mentions in the instrument?

Mr. Welles: That is the only specific requirement.

Senator Ferguson: And that is not as broad as the language on the 26th?

Mr. Welles: On the other hand, Senator Ferguson, in my judgment the President's message can only be interpreted as a most urgent appeal to the Government of Japan to cease

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Witness Welles; Questions by Sen. Ferguson

in its policy of aggression and while the specific request was limited to the withdrawing of Japanese troops from Indo-China, the whole spirit of the message, I think, can only be interpreted correctly as meaning a cessation of a policy of aggression.

Senator Ferguson: Did you read in the State Department records there where Colonel Stimson, Secretary of War, and the Secretary of State had counseled with the President about sending such a message to the Emperor?

Mr. Welles: I have read it. I have not, however, got it at hand.

Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar with the fact that there had been such a conference?

Mr. Welles: I do not now recall the fact that I was familiar at the time.

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

The Chairman: Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say that the State Department took note of the fact that Senator Pepper made a speech in Boston on the 24th?

Mr. Welles: I did not attempt to say, Mr. Chairman, that the State Department took note. I said that a press report of that character would unquestionably have been brought to the attention of the Secretary of State.

The Chairman: You do not mean thereby to intimate that

Witness Welles: Questions by The Chairman

the State Department had any advance information in regard to such a speech?

Mr. Welles: Certainly not. I am very glad that you made it clear.

The Chairman: Well, would such a speech made by Senator Pepper or any other Senator in Boston or anywhere else have had any binding effect upon the President or the State Department or upon Congress?

Mr. Welles: In my judgment it would not.

The Chairman: With reference to the message, the personal appeal of the President to the Emperor and the suggestion that it was an unusual course for the head of one state to pursue with reference to the head of another state, do you know whether it is true that President Roosevelt appealed in the same way to Hitler prior to the outbreak of war in 1939 to avert war and bloodshed that might involve large areas of the world?

Mr. Welles: That is entirely true, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Did he also make the same sort of an appeal to Mussolini?

Mr. Welles: Upon several occasions to both of them.

The Chairman: Is it true that the President sent you as a Special Ambassador to Europe to undertake to avert war prior to its outbreak in 1939?

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Witness Welles: Questions by The Chairman

Mr. Welles: That is entirely true, Mr. Chairman. I was sent for the purpose of reporting to the President, after interviews in the four capitals, whether there existed any chances whatever for the negotiation of a just and decent peace.

The Chairman: At the time of the suggested parallel messages which, as I understand it, were to be sent separately in the individual capacity of each government in 1941, Congress had some time theretofore passed a Lend-Lease Act under which the President was authorized to give aid to any nation whose survival in his opinion was essential to the security of the United States?

Mr. Welles: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: And the President was executing that law not only in the Far East but in European regions?

Mr. Welles: He was, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Yesterday in reply to the Senator from Maine you suggested that, - I will quote your answer. Probably I should quote the question. (Reading):

"Senator Brewster: If you were to come to the conclusion that the Fleet were not ready for war, as a result of Admiral Richardson's testimony, then the keeping of the Fleet at Hawaii, in a condition not ready for war, would have some aspects of having your diplomatic position

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Witness Welles: Questions by The Chairman

exceed your military power, would it not?

"Mr. Welles: It seems to me almost impossible, Senator Brewster, to divorce in a critical condition as existed at that time, the diplomatic from the military, because the military is a very essential part of the diplomatic picture."

In his testimony Admiral Richardson stated that in his conversation with the President on the 8th day of October 1940 the President indicated not only that he felt that the Fleet in the Hawaiian area would act as a deterrent against Japan, but, according to Admiral Richardson, he used the expression, "I know that it has already exercised a deterrent influence upon Japan."

Did you have any conferences or conversations with the President about that time in relation to that phase of keeping the Fleet in the Pacific?

Mr. Welles: Mr. Chairman, when I saw the published text of Admiral Richardson's testimony my attention was drawn to that specific remark of Admiral Richardson with regard to the fact that the President had told him that the stationing of the Fleet at Hawaii had had a deterrent effect and I could not at the moment and I do not now remember the exact facts that the President had in mind when he made that statement to the Admiral, but I am quite confident that members of

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Witness Welles: - Questions by The Chairman

the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State or Ambassador Grew or Mr. Hull could give you the information that you ask for.

The Chairman: Well, in view of the fact that the President did feel at that time that the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii had had a deterrent effect upon Japan, in view of the fact that Japan did not actually attack until fourteen months thereafter, in December of 1941, would you be willing or feel able to express any opinion as to whether if the Fleet did exercise a deterrent influence in October 1940 that it continued to exercise such an influence during the remaining fourteen months prior to the actual attack?

Mr. Welles: I can only emphasize, Mr. Chairman, what I have said before in the course of my testimony and that is my very definite belief that if the Fleet had been withdrawn from Hawaii the Japanese military lords would have unquestionably interpreted that withdrawal as an indication that the United States was acquiescing in the spreading domination of the entire Pacific and Asiatic region by Japan and would have begun an increasing encroachment upon the legitimate rights of this country.

The Chairman: In other words, your view is that whether up to October 1940 it exercised by its presence a deterrent effect, or whether it during the following fourteen months