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Arturs Leonids Brombergs¹

Prior to World War II Leonids Brombergs served in the Latvian Army and the Riga police department. From July 1941 to July 1943 he served as a policeman in the 12th precinct of the Riga police force, eventually attaining the rank of lieutenant. At that time Latvia was part of the German Reich Commissariat Ostland, with its headquarters in Riga.

During the early months of the German occupation German killing units (Einsatzgruppen) and specially recruited Latvian auxiliaries repeatedly massacred groups of Jews. In mid-August 1941 German occupation authorities ordered the establishment of a Jewish ghetto in the southeastern section of Riga. Shortly afterwards the regular Latvian police carried out a systematic search of all dwellings in the city, looking for Jews and arresting those who did not bear the required Jewish star on their clothing.² In October 1941 the Riga ghetto was sealed. Liquidation of the Riga ghetto began on November 30, 1941, and in the course of the next eight days nearly 25,000 Jews from the Riga ghetto (and a small number of German Jews deported to Riga) were shot by Germans and Latvian auxiliaries in the Rumbuli forest, five miles southeast of Riga. By 1943 only a few thousand Jews were left alive in the Riga ghetto. The regular Latvian police thus served as part of a force which captured and extinguished most of Riga's Jews.

In the summer of 1943 Brombergs was transferred to the *SS-Freiwillige-Division*, where he served as a First Lieutenant (*SS-Untersturmführer*). In 1944 Brombergs served with the 15th SS Division.

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¹ The Berlin Document Center records give Brombergs' name as Leonids Brombergs, while the IWG list has the name as Arturs Leonids Brombergs

² Latvian State Historical Archives, P-1376, O-1, F 63.

SECRET

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Arturs Linde:

Functionary of Sweden Contacts Group of the Latvian Resistance Movement; born in Latvia of a farmer's family; served in the Latvian National Army; studied agriculture at Latvian University; dismissed from military service in 1936; officer of Riga police; good marksman and sportsman; after the first Soviet occupation of Latvia he joined the Latvian Resistance Movement; in 1943, during the German occupation of Latvia he was mobilized into Latvian Legion and participated in fights on Eastern Front at Ostrov; "realizing the Germans were sacrificing Latvian youth for their own ends", he and his detachment deserted the front and joined the Latvian guerrillas in Kurzeme.

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Lebenslauf.

Ich bin Arturs Brombergs, geb. 1914. den 31. August in Riga als Sohn des Eisenbahnenbeamten.

Von August 1920. bis Mai 1926. habe die 2. Städtische Grundschule in Tukums besucht und beendet. In dieser Zeit wohnten meine Eltern in Tukum, Lielá ielá 28-1 und Vater war angestellt als Beamter im Bahnhof Tukums II.

Und von August 1926. bis Juni 1930. besuchte ich und absolvierte das 1. Städtische Gymnasium Rigas, wohnhaft in dieser Zeit in Riga, Marijas ielá 8 (die Wohnungsnummer erinnere ich mich nicht) Während Sommer wohnte ich bei meinen Eltern in Tukums.

In der Zeit von September 1930. bis November 1931. habe ich die Wehrpflicht im 6. Infanterieregiment Rigas ausgeübt. In dieser Zeit habe ich die InstruktorKompanie (Unteroffiziersausbildungseinheit. Übersetzer.) und erweiterte Kurse für Offiziersanwärter, in welchen die Offiziere für Kriegszeit vorbereitet wurden, absolviert.

Vom November 1931. bis August 1932. wohnte ich bei Eltern in Tukums und habe mich vorbereitet für die Konkursprüfungen zur Aufnahme in der Universität Lettlands.

Vom August 1932. bis Mai 1934. studierte ich in der landwirtschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Lettlands in Riga und wohnte auch in Riga, aber die Adresse erinnere ich mich heute nicht mehr weil ich wohnte in mehreren Wohnungen, die ich oft wechselte. In Folge von materiellen Schwierigkeiten bin ich im 8. Mai 1934. wieder in 6. Infanterieregiment Rigas eingetreten als Offiziersanwärter im Dienst und habe dort gedient bis Juni 1937. In dieser Zeit habe ich alle Schulen und Kurse absolviert, welche die Infanteristen Lettlands damals hatten, wie Chemischen Dienst, Nachrichten-, Pionier-, Physische Erziehungs-, Spreng-, Snaiper-, Ski-, Aufklärungs-, Topographie-, Fortifikationskurse und andere, welche zwischen den Einberufungen der Rekruten und den Sommerlager stattfanden.

Von 1934. bis 1935. habe ich noch teilweise fortgesetzt meine Studien in der Universität Lettlands.

Im Juni 1937. bin ich von der Armee zum Polizeidienst übergegangen. Kurz danach bestand ich auch als Extern die Reserveleutnantprüfungen bei der Kriegsschule Lettlands. Im Polizeidienst war ich bis zum Einbruch der Kommunisten, d.h. Herbst 1940. In dieser Zeit wohnte ich in den Polizeidienststräume der Präfektur Rigas und teilweise auch privat in Riga, Brivibas gatve und Indranu iela (Nr. vergessen). Während des Polizeidienstes habe ich die Polizistenschule und die Polizeioffiziersschule beim Innenministerium beendet. Als Polizeioffizierbeamter habe ich zum größten Teil im Dienst der Ordnungspolizei gewesen, aber kürzere und längere Periode bin ich auch der inneren Aufklärungskommando der Präfektur Rigas, der politischen Polizei und in einzelnen Angelegenheiten auch der Kriminalpolizei zugeteilt gewesen. Kurz vor dem Einbruch der Kommunisten wurde ich in der ersten Stufe der lettischen Polizei (Aufseher) befördert.

Im Jahre der kommunistischen Besatzung, bis Januar 1941., war ich arbeitslos, denn als gewesener Polizeibeamter wurde ich von den Occupanten verfolgt. Nur seit Januar 1941., nachdem ich ein gefälschtes Pass bekam, ist es mir gelungen in einer Wäsche Rigas, Riga, Ventspils iela (Nr. weiß ich nicht) als Wäscher die Arbeit zu finden. Dort habe ich gearbeitet bis 1. Juli 1941., als Riga von der deutschen Armee erobert wurde.

1. Juli 1941. bin ich wieder in mein Polizeidienst zurückgetreten und wohnte in Riga, Indranu iela Nr. 8 und 1943. nach der Gründung der Lettischen Legion, bin ich dorthin zugeteilt. In der Legion war ich bis Herbst 1944., als ich desertierte und nach Wege suchte um illegal nach Schweden zu kommen. In dieser Zeit war ich tätig als Ausbildungskraft- Leutnant in der Unteroffiziersschule der Legion in Riga, als Zugführer- Lektor in der Offiziers- und

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Unteroffiziersschule der Legion in Bolderaja(bei Riga), und drei Monate in der Front in Volchov und bei Velikaje Luki. In dieser Zeit wurde ich zum Kapitän befördert und mit II und I Stufe des Eisernen Kreuzes ausgezeichnet. Im April 1944. als Kontusierter und Leichtverletzter kam ich nach Riga zurück und nach Genehmigung bis zur Desertierung kommandierte ich die Wachkompanie in Jelgava. Nach der Desertierung im August 1944. wohnte ich illegal im Walde und in Bauernhöfe an der Küste Kurlands. Kurze Zeit, ungefähr 3 Wochen wurde ich gezwungen eine deutsche Waldsäuberungskommando zu führen, aber gleich danach desertierte ich zum zweiten Male und setzte mein illegales Leben fort. Nach Schweden ist es mir gelungen zu kommen nur in der Zeit der Kapitulation, den 10. Mai 1945., als ich in einem Fischerboote zusammen mit anderen 57 lettischen Flüchtlingen in Schweden eintraf.

In Schweden verbrachte ich die Zeit vom 10. Mai bis Juni im den Lager, aber nachdem bis 28. Oktober 1948. arbeitete ich ohne Unterbrechung im Torfmoor und in Waldarbeiten in der Umgebung von Vänersborg. Das Dorf, wo ich wohnte, hieß Longedale.

Vom November 1948. bis November 1949. arbeitete ich in der Läderfabrik in Falkenberg und wohnte in den Arbeiterwohnungen der Fabrik.

Vom November 1949. bis 22. Februar 1951. arbeite ich und wohnte in der Lederfabrik "Oskaria" in Alingsås. In diesen Jahren habe ich angelernt und beherrsche völlig das Ledergerben.

Verwandte: Vater gestorben um Jahre 1930. Über die Mutter keine Nachrichten, der Gerüchte nach auch gestorben. Bruder im Winter 1945. in der Front in Preußen gefallen.

Dokumente: Taufschein und alle Schulzeugnisse sind in der Universitätskanzlei geblieben. Lettlands Innlandspass und der schwedische AuBländerpass ist in Schweden. Schwedens Reisepass ist abgegeben.

DRAFT:

ANDY was born 31 August 1913 in Tukums (aprinkis), Latvia. Father's father wealthy land-owner in Kurzeme; had two sons, JANIS and _____, born 1866 in Kurzeme; studied at Riga Polytechnic to become a highway engineer. Employed on state railroad Riga and Tukums. Good financial condition. Met wife in Riga, the divorcee of Janis Gulbes. Born 1868 in Aluksne, Latvia; one of a family of about ten. Maiden name, ISAKS. She completed high school in Riga and established stocking factory in Riga. Married about 1911. First child born about 1912, a girl who died at birth. Mother had son by previous marriage, ALEKSANDERS GULBES, born about 1896 who studied at Moscow, Helsinki, Stockholm, completing the University at each. Was fluent in eight languages. Was a captain of infantry in the Czar's army. Was the last commandant at Pleskov; captured and killed by revolutionaries after World War I.

At time of marriage, ANDY's mother liquidated her factory in Riga, father left railroad work and went to the country in the vicinity of Tukums, where they bought a large home from the former owner (add.).

ANDY was born in this home. The farm consisted of about 400 acres and had numerous residents and field hands (add). Until the time of ANDY's father's death, it was a well-paying enterprise, devoted to general farming and also including a gypsum quarry. The family was considered as one of the most well-to-do in that area.

Mother was chairwoman of the Ladies' Auxiliary of the local church after World War I for a period of about seven years.

During World War I, father and his brother were officers in the Russian (Czarist) Transport Corps, serving in the Riga-Tukum area. Both were wounded. After World War I, when both the German and Russian armies were driven out of Latvia, the Russians attempted to effect the annexation of the New Latvian republic through means of organized bands of Russian partisans which operated quite actively in the forests of Latvia, causing ~~the~~ disorders, ~~robber~~ robbery and murder. In order to combat this threat to the Government, the Latvians

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countered by organizing so-called "AIZSARG" units as a means of self-protection. ANDY's father headed one such unit which operated in the forests of Kurzeme, engaging in numerous battles over a period of several years; was wounded twice, and finally had his health ruined. Inasmuch as ANDY's father was the leader of these "AIZSARG" for his particular area, the house was used as a headquarters and ANDY grew up amid military-like atmosphere. His father was engaged in this activity in the years following World War I until about 1920, when the country was finally secured. His father returned to a peaceful land-owner's existence with a crippled leg and ruined health and in 1925 ~~his~~ died from pneumonia.

ii. *Father was member of the board of the local bank, Red Cross, & Church leaders.*

Father's Politics:

Was a member of the "ZEMNIEK SAVIENIBA", an organization of a somewhat right-wing orientation, founded by ULLMAN immediately after World War I and considered one of the largest political parties of that time. Was not, however, especially active politically. During German occupation World War I, was appointed as "PAGASTA VECAIKAIS" (village elder), roughly corresponding to a Country Manager. Following the German occupation, was elected for several terms and served as VECAIKAIS 3-4 years. He then retired from all active political life due to a variety of reasons--~~his~~ his desire to rebuild his farm properties, ailing health, and probably a feeling--real or imaginary--that the people resented him for his collaboration with the Germans. He was a firm anti-communist, tending to be somewhat oriented toward the Balt-Deutsch circles. However, in the initial growing pains of the Latvian republic, he supported the Ulman faction rather than the Balt-Deutsch Niedre (group). During this period political discussions in the home were frequent as was commonly the case in all homes at this time. After relinquishing his VECAIKAIS position, he became completely inactive politically and displayed no further interest. His mother was quite active socially, but took no firm stand on any political question and appeared to be completely disinterested.

Mother:

After father's death in 1925, the farm was liquidated and divided into various

portions which were rented out to managers. Comparatively excellent financial circumstances. She continued residing in the house and directed all her activities toward social welfare work. Was ~~was~~ active in the Red Cross and the Lutheran Church (very). She remained at this farm through the first Russian occupation, and although all land and homes were nationalized, she was not harmed or forced to leave her home. Remained at same place during German occupation without harm and also during second Russian occupation. As far as is known by ANDY, she was still living and occupying the same home in 1948.

ANDY's Personal Politics:

Has never belonged to any political party or organization. Was 20 years old in 1934 when Ulman established his power by coup ~~nextat~~ d'état and outlawed all political parties. Has never taken any active part in politics. Considers Ulman's dictatorship proper and appropriate for those times (The government was ineffective and severely weakened by political strife among approximately 100 different political parties.). Admires the demoractic form of ~~ngovernment~~ government providing the political parties are limited to the extent where an ~~effeak~~ effective government is possible. Considers present-day France and Italy as horrible example of political disorganization. Is extremely anti-communist and tends to lean somewhat toward fascism. Sympathizes somewhat with the PERKONKAUSTS (Swastika League) in pre-war Latvia but only in the sense that he admires their anti-communist activity. Considers their role and aims as a political force as ridiculous.

Organizations:

Belonged to the Latvian Boy Scouts from agets 10 to 16. Belonged to the local (Tukums) Soccer League ages 14 to 19 and took an active part in intra-mural competition as well as social activities under the sponsorship of the league. In Riga at age 15 joined the LATVIGAS VOLSTS KARAGA APVIENIBA (LVKA)^A, ~~axpe~~ sports organization active in all ~~farmsef~~ of athletic ~~competitiex~~ competition. ANDY competed in ~~xxxxxxx~~ track events, boxing, soccer, basketball and chess until the age of 17. From age 17 to 24 belonged to the Latvian Army Sport Club (ASK) in

connection with his army service. At age 24-27 belonged to the Police Sport Club (PSK) and competed in track events and target matches from 1937-1940 up to the time of the first Russian occupation. During German occupation in 1941 was member of the VEF factories Sport Club for one year.

In approximately 1935 joined the student fraternity "LIVONICA". This is an apolitical fraternal organization where membership is considered to last for life.

Was a member of the Swedish YMCA for one ~~year~~ year in 1948. Is presently a member of YMCA in the U S. joining in 1953.

ANDY's earliest recollections go back to his life in the country at about the age of 4 during 1917 when the front between Czarist Russia and Germany extended in the near vicinity. ANDY's home was being utilized as quarters for Russian officers his mother cooking and feeding. An amiable relationship was maintained and ANDY recalls with pleasure his good treatment at their hands. He learned fluent Russian at this time through the close association that prevailed. His father was an officer in Russian Transport Corps and the family was in excellent circumstances until finally the Germans advanced their front and overran the area. The family was not harmed but most of their food and livestock were requisitioned by the Germans whom ANDY remembers unpleasantly as thieves and robbers. During this advance the family was forced to take refuge in Riga ~~to~~ *Surmala* where they remained about 6 months until the advancing front passed them again and they were then able to return to their former home. ANDY's father had managed to conceal his role as a semi-army officer under the Russians, and being ~~xxxxxx~~ somewhat oriented toward the Germans was able to exist peacefully. Returning to the farm the family found the Germans had used the house to stable their horses. This event still rankles in ANDY's memory. During this period, ANDY's father occupied the position of "VECAKAIS" under German sponsorship and the family led a comparatively uneventful and quiet life. ANDY made himself generally useful around the farm-shepherding flocks of geese and ~~xxxx~~ ducks about. ANDY had a normal and happy childhood, the most unpleasant aspect which he can recall being that beginning at age 5 until he was 9 his education was begun at home, his parents and a tutor

instructing him in all the rudiments of a primary education. Starting at about age 9, ANDY was taken out on hunting expeditions in the area and "broken in" to hunting and handling guns by his father who normally preferred to hunt out of season or illegally. ANDY followed in his father's footsteps and did considerable hunting on his own, as a rule illegally, in order to increase the "sport" and as a result at age 10 was almost apprehended by a game-warden who fired twice after ANDY in an effort to halt him.

At age 9, ANDY was enrolled in the regular primary school entering the third grade on the basis of his home education although he was 2 years under the ~~normal~~ accustomed age for this grade.

The school was situated about 3 km. from home and ANDY was able to return home each day. The school director and also chair master was PETERIS KALNINS, a bachelor who lived in the "pagast" (county) seat building. The history teacher was JURIS BIRZNIKS, a bachelor. Natural Science and Geography were taught by KARLIS VEINBERGS, married, father of one son who completed Riga University in Natural Science. VEINBERGS was an accomplished photographer and although married engaged in a notorious affair with a local farmer's wife. In the primary grades there was a female schoolteacher, Mrs ANDERSON, who married Mrs TINTE--at that time a court stenographer--the both of them leaving the area about 1926. They moved to Riga where TINTE rose to the position of the director of the Riga "Audum" (textile) factory, also director of the company's factory in Kaunas. During the first Russian occupation, the owner of this factory, KARLIS HIRSCH, fled to the U.S. and TINTE took over the operation of this factory. He was recognized as such by the Russians and during the Germany occupation also retained this position. He was deported to Russia in 1946.

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Attended this school at 3, 4, 5/ grades. During attendance in fifth grade, ANDY's father died and his mother was forced with the problem of maintaining the large farm with only an 11-year old as head of the household. The argument was raised by their acquaintances that ANDY should quit school and run the farm with all the neighbors helping, but his mother finally decided that it would be best for him to finish high school at least, and, if possible, also college. All the equipment and livestock were thus sold and the farm rented out in portions, the family only retaining their individual living quarters and a horse and carriage. Through the rentals received from the ~~farm~~ farm, ANDY's mother was able to continue existing quite comfortably.

ANDY completed his primary education at this school at the age of 12½ in May 1926. He spent the summer at home on the farm/and among other things wrote up items of folklore--some 20 in number--which were sent to Prof. BERZINS at the Teachers' Institute in Riga, who was compiling a collection and had advertised for contributions in order to preserve such items from extinction.

In the fall, he went to Riga to attend the Riga City High School. While enrolled, he lived with his father's brother, JANIS, a bachelor who was chief of the State Telegraph agency and lived common-law with one of his co-workers in Pardaugava. She had a son by a previous marriage, KARLIS, about 9 years old at the time. He spent the next five years in school studying the usual array of general subjects and living with his uncle during the school semesters. The summers were spent on the farm with his mother where his entire time was occupied with repairing the buildings, fixing fences and renovating, in general. The following were teachers: Inspector fnu SPERE (now in Australia) who taught higher mathematics; teacher of languages, KURMIS (now in Sweden); mathematics, fnu LERCHS (died in Germany); art teacher, fnu MIESINIEKS (died in Latvia) and fnu PETERSONS; physical and military instruction by fnu BERNSONS; German language, Dr. ECHE (deceased); natural science, Mrs. RITINS; natural science and history, Miss BLUMENTHAL; physics, fnu BUMBIERIS; chemistry, fnu ABALTINS and fnu RACENS;

classical literature and Latvian grammar, from RAMANS foreign classic literature, Augusts GIEZENS. Former classmates, Longins VICS--very close friend; sister GITA; son of the director of the Riga board of education--mother and father deported in 1941. GITA died in Germany; LONGINS finished war college (LT) and eventually emigrated to the U.S.

Zigurds KAKTINS, son of the opera singer, Adolf KAKTIN, the latter now in the U.S. and still active in music. Completed primary and interim education and law school, later served as court secretary, now emigrated to the U.S. (Boston) and married. Nikolajs NONACIS, son of some prominent government official. After World War II was an UNRRA official in Germany; now in U.S.

Leonids BAHARAVS, son of a government official. Repatriated to Germany in 1939; no further knowledge. Janis VEVERS, who eventually studied agriculture, and completed it, had a very large farm in Zemgale; no further knowledge.

The school was considered to be the elite of the city and was attended by most all prominent persons' children, such as the sons of CAKSTE, KVIESIS, etc. The tuition rates were as high as 100 lats per semester. ANDY was a so-called "prefect" during his school years. This was a type of school monitor who was held responsible for and enforced all discipline in his class. ANDY was very active in sports during his school years, competing in basketball, volleyball, soccer and all track events. During his second year, he joined the "Latvian Valts Karag Sports", one of the most active athletic leagues in the city.

While in the third year class, ANDY participated in a demonstration which resulted in widespread publicity. He organized the entire student body of his high school as well as two other schools, and ~~led~~ with a force of about 1000 youths, led them on an attack on a notoriously left-wing high school which had reached the height of provocation that day by displaying placards on its building front deriding various national and patriotic figures. The demonstration which was well covered by news photographers eventually turned into a riot and resulted in much school property being damaged and a company of mounted police was required to restore order. This incident had widespread and long-lasting reverberations and led to

investigation commission which held hearings about a year in order to fix respnsibility. The only concrete results, however, were that several notoriously red teachers and students of the victimized school were expelled and the public in general was aroused to the awareness of the communist threat.

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After graduation in May 1930 (age 17) spent the usual summer at home.

Was much more active in sports than formerly and at the same time attempted to prepare for his entrance exam to the Latvian University Agricultural faculty. The requirements were such that on the average one out of every three and a half candidates was admitted. ANDY was not able to attain a sufficiently high grade to be among the ones accepted. Having no definite plans for the future in mind, ANDY remained in Riga for a few days and among other things met his former acquaintance First Lt. Valdemar BAUMANS, who was coaching the Latvian Army basketball team, On his instigation, ANDY decided to enlist in the Army and since he had just turned 17 was able to enter service. He was assigned to the 6th Riga Infantry Regiment, machine gun company and after 6 weeks was assigned to an instructors training unit. Regimental commander was Col. KLINSONS, Battalion Commanders were at various times Lt. Col. ABELES, Lt. Col. GEPLITIS; company commander was Eapt TARTO. Second in command was 1st Lt. BISKAPS. The training lasted 3 months.

The instructor school was commanded by Capt. BERZINS. ANDY's company was directed by 1st Lt. FREIBERGS and W. O. DORAFYEVS, a communist party member. W. O. PUCHKO was another instructor. First sargeant was BERZINS, 1st Lt. of the company was SPANDAKS; the third co. was 1st Lt. ZAMUELS the fourth co. 1st Lt. ¹ KK KUZE. ANDY was trained as a machine gunner and graduated training school as a ~~corp~~ corporal. He returned to his Co. under Capt. TARTO, and almost immediately was sent to reserve officers training school at the Riga War College. The director was Col. KRIPANS, under him Col. BALODIS, Capt. ~~EE E~~ BOGOSLOVSKIS, Capt. ZABATSKIS. The training was very stringent and lasted 7 months. ANDY graduated with high honors and the rank of sargeant in late August. He then took the entrance exams to the Riga University and passed; although he was required to complete his one year service in the Army, he began attending the University as well as fulfilling his obligation with the Army, being released 17 September 1932.

He then studied agronomy and lived with his uncle JANIS as previously until

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late April 1934, when his money gave out in connection with the depression in Latvia, and he was forced to leave school. The dean was Fritzis ADAMOVICH, assistant dean Julijs AUSKAPS, head of agriculture faculty Prof. fnu VARSBERGS, chemistry instructors, Alexanders LIEPINS, Bruno JIRGENSONS (now in University of Texas), Arnolds J. (South Africa), Oscars J., Dr. A. TAURINS, chemistry; physicist ~~physicist~~ Fredericks GULBES (after capitulation Baltic University director at Pinneburg); his assistant fnu SIKSNA. Minerologist Prof. Boris POPOVS. School mates were Agrinam VEVERS, KREICBERGS, Augusts KALNINS, Voldemar PUTNINS; foresters fnu SMITS, VILKS, Sipolis, ~~KREIKS~~ KRUMINS, AND Miss ZEMITE, the daughter of BALDERAJAS Police chief Alberts KRAMSTEINS, and fnu KRONBERGS, agronom fnu VARNA, agrinom Karlis STAKS. Forestry Valdemars DIDRIKSONS (now in Chicago).

Due to the depression in Latvia at the time at the end of the semester, there was not enough funds available to continue the studies and there was no work readily available. ANDY met 1st Lt. Voldemar BAUMANIS at this time who urged him again to join the army ~~where~~ where he would be able to earn 100 Lats a month, a comparatively good amount for those times. There ~~was~~ were only 2 vacancies in the army at this time and ANDY while still attending college applied for admission and was admitted. Before he was able to complete his college semester he was suddenly ordered to duty and entered active service as a W.O. The officers of the regiment had not changed except ~~from~~ for Capt. TARTO who had been replaced by Capt. Janis PURINS, who studied medicine at the same time at Riga University and during German occupation was a Lt. Col. in charge of all medical officers in the Latvian Legion.

On 14 May 1934, the company was instructed to prepare for night ~~at~~ maneuvers in the woods, using live ammunition. That night when all preparations were ready the true orders ~~was~~ were revealed which were to march to Riga to support ULMANIS' coup d'etat. In connection with this, ANDY and W.O. PARUPS were given special assignments under Capt. OSINS which consisted of surrounding and immobilizing the Latvian Parliament "SAEME". The entire action was carried out successfully, without

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a shot being fired and JIMANIS already president, was able to imprison or otherwise suppress all his opposition. The first summer in service was spent in guarding the parliament and other government ~~buildings~~ buildings. The following winter, while still in service, ANDY attended the university during all his free time. He attended between the winters of 1935 and 1936. During this period, he joined the corporation "LIVONICA". ANDY attended college during the evening being able to fill only 3-4 hours each night. He studied until the fall of 1936, all the while remaining in service. He learned then that it was not permissible to attend school while in the service without authorization from the highest level and inasmuch as the new semester was already started, it would be impossible to secure such authorization in time to be of any use. He found also that the strain of study and army duties were too much of a load and therefore left school Christmas ~~1935~~ 1936.

In all, he had 3 years of army service during this tour leaving May 1937. During this tour he was engaged in training recruits, two batches for 3½ months each, in the intervals between training programs he for the most part attended service schools. Completing a 4-month course in sniping and front-line patrol work. ~~AND~~ A 6-weeks' course of chemical warfare. A 4-month course in communications which took up all forms of army commo except W/T. A 4-month course in sappers school (demolition and explosives). A 6-week course of physical training, which qualified him as an instructor in the new Nils. Buk system of physical culture.

Instructors in ANDY's unit were Corp. Antans RIBAKS, Sgt. fmu SKULTE, Instructor BOLISLAVS PATALAVSKYS, first sgt. infantry weapons co., fmu ANSONS, 1st sgt. KRESLINS, 1st Lt. KVALBERGS battery commander first Lt. Eriks ~~SPARUPS~~. First sgt. SOULITIS, Capt. AVOEINS, ~~1st 1st~~ lt. fmu PAULS. Capt. of Commo co. LINDINS, 1st lt. ZAGERS assist. Sgt. STRAUTINS.

ANDY was stationed during his service at Aiviekstes iela between Moskavas and Savarina iela. On Moskavas iela at Jana Varti (a small square)--about 1 block distance from ANDY, there was the Vidzemes Division Communications training group which trained all commo personnel and W/T men for the Latvian Army. The instructors

and officers of this division having no club of their own were in the habit of visiting ANDY's company's club and thereby ANDY became well-acquainted with almost all the personnel. Among some of these personnel were Capt. Otto KARKLINS, Sgt. ZIVERTS, 1st Lt. Oscars ZALITIS.

Having reached the highest ~~rank~~ rank possible (W.O.) he could attain without the War College education required (3 years), he decided to leave the Army to find work with a better future. There was work available in his field--in agriculture and forestry conservation. However, it was comparatively low paid. ANDY's uncle also died at this time. Having heard there were good opportunities in the city police department and comparatively good salaries, ANDY applied and entered service at the lowest rank in May 1937. ~~He~~ He worked 24 hours on, 24 off. He spent all his ^{spare} time for the next few months in firing

footnote
Capt. LUMANIS was also assigned to ANDY's company and was ~~secretly~~ secretly the officer responsible for the ~~the~~ political reliability of the men. ANDY later met him at the police training school where he was in charge of instructing in military matters, and at the same time was assigned to the General Staff in the intelligence section.

practice during the day and engaging in sports during the evening. At the city-wide Riga Police Dept^s annual firing competition, the end of June, he finished first in the pistol match setting a new record and also finished first in two other courses of competition with pistol and rifle. Besides receiving the gold cup, he received several other prizes which were considered quite valuable for those times and as a result began his career as a policeman who was already widely known and well thought of throughout the department. Andy enjoyed police work greatly and even went out to help other officers on various assignments during his free time. He was well thought of by his superiors and was sent for training to the Police Academy after serving only 4 months instead of the required 12. He was trained here in all related police techniques and finished as the first in his class after 3 months. His instructors:- the school director Inspector KISELIS, lecturer ILZINS, Judges Berzins, Puscepur, Lumanis, Stiglites (head of the Political Police), Inspector Biedrins.

He returned to the routine police duties and in the spring of 1938 was assigned to controlling the registered prostitutes in Riga. As such he was comparable to a head of a vice squad and was responsible for enforcing the registration of prostitutes as well as identifying suspected prostitutes and having them declared so by the city commission. He continued this work until the fall of 1938 when the Police Officers Academy began accepting candidates (this occurred once every 3 years) and Andy was sent to this training which lasted 6 months. The instructors were the same as the Police Academy with the addition of Biehins, Dr. Kocers, Dr. Cakurs; Narcotics, Ozalins; alcohol test board, Salnais, and many specialists who lectured on various criminal and civil laws and regulations, sanitation commission and all other government departments.

Leonid Benfzins finished first of his class. Andy and Innenberg were tied for second place, classmates were Karlsons, Petersons, Kazaks, and Agruns. The class graduated in the spring of 1939. Andy intended that now that he had completed all the police traing available, he dedided to complete his college having had 3 1/2 years total education. In order to continue any further education, the regulations required that he have a certain amount of practical experience in his field (agriculture) before he could become eligible to receive further courses. Having accumulated sufficient annual leave to take employment in his specialty, he decided to spend the summer working elsewhere.

These plans were interrupted however, when Andy was suddenly informed that his prefect had promoted him to seargent and there was an opening for him at the 12th precint. Due to the large difference in pay, Andy decided he couldn't pass up this opportunity and rejected completing his college studies in favor of his police career. (The normal tour of duty before being considered for promotion was ordinarily from 5 to 6 years). He reported for duty at his precent and was assigned to a section with no Lt. available and thereby became acting Lt. The section under his responsibility was the Ciekurkalnarajons and for a time also the Mezaparksrajon.

This was the time (summer 1939) when the Russians occupied military bases at Ventpils and Liepaja, and Hitler started repatriating to Germany, all Latvians with any German background in their ancestry. During this fall the college was moved from Riga to Jelgava and became an Academy.

In the winter a Lt. Liepkalns was assigned to Andy's section, however, Andy considered him overly unintelligent and since he was also in the habit of accepting bribes, Andy exposed this and the Lt. was discharged from the service. (After 30 years experience)

In May 1940 Andy was summoned to the Chief of Police Kiselis, Director Ansmits office and offered the position of Lt. in Latzale which Andy declined citing his lack of knowledge of Russian. He was then offered the same position in Ance or Krustpils. He chose Ance since this was near his college and also was the first place where he could gain his practical work experience in order to complete his education. The director then promised to put the promotion through the channels which would take about 2 weeks. Before the time arrived, however, on 17 June 1940 all available policemen were hurriedly summoned to the main Prefecture at Riga where they found the Russians had begun to occupy the country and tanks were already rolling through the streets. The population as a whole were indoors with only reds and sympathizers rioting and demonstrating through the streets. Though greatly outnumbered the police finally restored order and cleared the streets suffering several casualties as well as inflicting several. It was on this day that Andy first deliberately and consciously killed (he had previously killed one in connection with his police service) accounting for about 10 or better during the day.

After order was restored, the following days were spent in investigations by a special commission in order to identify the participants. Through good fortune Andy was not identified and continued as a policeman at the 12th precinct. The uniforms were abolished and only arm-bands were permitted. It was at this time that Bruno Kalmins arrived from Sweden and assumed the position of "Poliltruk" or head of political police of the Latvian Army, thereby, also assuming a certain responsibility for the political "reliability" of the police. Kalmins first assignment was to clean out the army from "fascist" elements and those nationals who couldn't be educated to be politically acceptable. Thus, the majority of the army leaders and officers were liquidated on Kalmins recommendation. At this time a civil militia or "police assistant" was

initiated, consisting for the most part of communist sympathizers and criminal elements. Kalmins' recommendation or the C P's was required to be an official of this militia. Events were tense and unsettled but Andy was able to retain his position until the fall of 1940 when he was replaced by a Russian, Kožemats (C.P. member) and ordered to turn in his gun and credentials. Kazemats assistant was Jaundzeņis, a member of B. Kalmins SSS party and was personally recommended by him for this post. (Spalans, Jāndzems and the Grundes brothers were so active in liquidating nationalist and anti-communist elements of the Latvian population during this period that they were rewarded with being sent to MVD school in Moscow).

Prior to his discharge, Andy met his old ~~friend~~ friend Janka

After turning in all his police gear and credentials ANDY went to the Interior Ministry and requested his credentials for promotion to Lt. which had previously been ordered by the police commission. He did not report to his new assignment in ~~Alce~~, however, and merely retained the credentials for use later during the German occupation when they proved very valuable.

He remained in the same ¹⁵ appointment since he decided not to flee and leave his mother behind and, feeling reasonably secure, began seeking other ~~other~~ employment. Work was very hard to find since all employers who learned of his police history were afraid to hire ANDY. He made no effort to conceal his ~~his~~ background and ^{filled out} made numerous detailed true application blanks with various prospective employees. ANDY attempted to get work in the VEF factory where his good friend and former team-mate PETERSONS was employed in the payroll section. PETERSONS also was the coach of the factory athletic club and was very anxious to secure ANDY's services for that reason as well as their former friendship. PETERSONS pleaded ANDY's case for employment all the way to the highest level within the factory and even the C.P., however, this attempt was also unsuccessful.

ANDY then went to the Ciekurkain station and began day work unloading wood. He was paid on a piece-work basis and was able to earn a large amount daily, even considering the currency "reform" recently instituted which exchanged 1 ruble for 1 ^{Lat} a depreciation of approximately 10 times. After about 2 weeks of work here, the manager of the station discovered who ANDY was - a former police official- and immediately ordered him to leave.

He was now out of work until he met an old acquaintance who informed him that in connection with the nationalization of all private buildings, the Russians were hiring a great number of apartment managers, each one to be responsible for 3 nationalized buildings. The pay was 400 rubles ^{per month} with no application blanks or questioning. ANDY applied and was put to work supervising

3 large apartment buildings and collecting all rentals for the state. ANDY, however, applied all money he received toward renovating the buildings and putting in various improvements, with the thought in mind that rather than give the Soviets the profits he would put them into the buildings so that in case things ever changed, the owners would reap the benefits. All went well for about 3 months until, that part of the city in which his buildings were located was ~~xx~~ assigned to a central H.Q. located in Ciekurkaln, his old ~~precinct~~ precinct. He was only able to make two ~~business~~ business calls to his new HQ before he was recognized and informed that his services were no longer required. (Jan, 1941)

At about this time there occurred many workers demonstrations wherein the workers demanded ~~the~~ death sentences for all former policemen, and it became very evident what was planned as a fate for these persons. Toward the end of Jan, all known former policemen were arrested and deported during the night. ANDY was at home this night and had not yet realized the precariousness of his position. About 2 AM while in the Apt with the lights out, someone began pounding his door. ANDY remained quiet, however, ~~he~~ still ~~hadn't~~ ^{not} recognizing his danger, refusing to open the door only because ^{of} a girl in the Apt. ^{who} would have been embarrassed if found.

The next day he traveled freely about the city, not realizing what had happened. The light finally dawned however, and he hurriedly changed apartments, forged a new passport and contacted his friend JANKA whom he was able to persuade to provide ANDY with a pistol.

Although he had been discharged from his position as house manager, he still belonged to a social club he had joined during this period whose members consisted solely of government officials. (beginning of Feb. '41) One night he met another member here, hitherto unknown, who during the course of their conversation, upon learning ANDY was unemployed offered him a position in the Steinick laundry on Ventpils iela of which he was

the director. ANDY accepted and the next day went to work there with the official title of "norm" supervisor (efficiency expert) but actually engaged in all aspects of laundry labor as well. The laundry employed some 300 women and 5 men including ANDY. The second month ANDY worked here he was able to put one of his former police members (KARKLIN) to work at the laundry bringing the total to 6. The workers here were, besides the Director; ANDY; the fireman, BANKINS; electrician, SURVELIS; and a bookkeeper, name unknown.

He continued working here and in April due to his excellent work was proposed as the director of another laundry-- The Peterson-- he was forced to reject this invitation, however, claiming incompetence, since such a position would involve filling out a detailed biographic questionnaire. Toward the end of April, he made the acquaintance of a female com., Mrs KRUSMANIS, (a high rayon committee director), and she, having taken an interest in ANDY, proposed him for the Labor Inspector of the Pardaugavas rayon. He was forced to reject this also on account of the detailed PRQ required. She however, decided to appoint him to that post and despite his objections informed him one day that he was now officially the Labor Inspector. Although he was officially a gov't official, his place of employment remained the same and in connection with the coming summer tourist season in Riga ~~and~~ ^{JURMALA} A. was able to provide himself (APP ATTACH.)

That night while walking the streets of Pardaugava, all streets were sealed off by the Germans, the women sent on their way and all men found were taken to Bismuiza. Finally the roundup ended with about 10,000 men placed in a clearing and guarded with machine guns. Not far off was a large, freshly dug pit and piles of freshly shot communists and Jews. The men were kept here all night and finally a troop of Germans arrived who all spoke perfect Latvian and it became evident that these must have been that group of Latvians who had repatriated to Germany as late as Jan. 4/ They now broke the mass of people into about 10 groups for easier handling and then called upon the assembly first to throw out into the open all Jews, then all C.P. Members, this was done and a

little more than 100 men were produced. The next call was for all former policemen. ANDY held back, since it was evident the foregoing persons were about to be shot. When he saw however, that his former Chief, STIGLITIS was coming forward, as well as another policeman he recognized ~~FRIEDE~~ he also came forward. In all, the Germans wound up with 4 of them. These 4 were instructed to organize the remaining men into columns and march back to Riga carrying Latvian flags. They ~~xxx~~ reached as far as the ^{DAUGAVA} Danzava and then crossed in makeshift rafts and boats into Riga and dispersed. The 100 that remained were all shot and buried in the ditch. ANDY walked to his laundry and reassured his friends who didn't know what his fate had been. On the way to Riga, as ANDY and the other 3 police were marching the band, STIGLITIS offered ANDY a position with the Latvian Riga prefecture of which ^TSTIGLITIS indicated he was already slated to be the head. ANDY was undecided whether to return to his old precinct or join STIGLITIS with whom he would have had every opportunity for rapid advancement to the top. On the toss of a coin, ANDY decided he would rather return to his old 12th precinct and retrieving his uniform (July 1941), went back to work. At about this time the German SD (Political Police) were organized and an experienced leader was required to head the group, the duties of which would mainly be the liquidation of Jews and Commys, the two being synonymous in most Latvian's minds. The post was offered at first to KARLIS APINIS, a prominent member of ANDY's fraternity who, however, refused. Several other Latvian officers were approached, but unsuccessfully. ANDY was approached by a group of "Perkenkusts" - Prof SCHILDE, SHVEDE, CABULIS, OTTMANIS and examined as to his experience and urged to accept the position; when he learned of the proposed liquidation, the unit would be ^{en}gaged in, he refused. They seemed to be at a loss for candidates and questioned ANDY as to the qualifications of ARAJS who was then a former Cpl. of the Latvian Army. ANDY was well acquainted with the latter, and although he was known to have collaborated during the Russian occupation, ANDY gave his endorsement of the man. Shortly thereafter ARAJS was placed in charge of the unit and commissioned a ^{Major} ~~Colonel~~ of the

German SD. His unit was engaged solely in liquidating a Jews and Commies and usually appropriating all of their material possessions for their own use. In the early period 1941/42 they were made up for the most part of men who had a serious grievance against the Comm^{UNISTS}, having personally suffered at their hands. Although very poorly disciplined, for the most part they were only interested in revenging their families who had been destroyed during the Russian occupation. During the latter part of 1942 ^{however} and increasingly so in the following years, ^{this} these type men left the unit to join the Legion and their places were taken by criminal types who were only interested in pillaging, raping and murder.

STIGLITIS who was head of the Latvian Police Prefecture was being gradually stripped of all power by the Germans who considered him to be overly nationalistic and ^{therefore} took away various functions of his department putting them under German control and merely leaving him with a title.

During the following months ANDY witnessed many atrocities committed by ARAJSS group and became thoroughly disgusted with the whole operation. He was even called upon from time to time to preserve order as the civil ~~and~~ police representative when this group was preparing for an action. ANDY continued in command of the precinct and was also assigned the command of the adjacent DOBELES precinct. In Jan 1943 all experienced policemen were drafted into the ranks of the German-organized Police Battalion. This was secretly done in order to establish a cadre and it was not until April 1943 that volunteers were solicited. Failing to get sufficient numbers, the Germans began drafting all men of the appropriate age. (which was >)

The Germans gave Lt. Col. WEISS the assignment of establishing their so-called Police Battalions.

The assignments of these Police Battalions were to guard duty and anti-partisan (CIC) activity inside the USSR. They were formed originally from those persons who applied for police service and couldn't be used, and those who volunteered from within police ranks. ANDY sent all his ~~extra~~ ^{excess} applicants for duty with the police dept. to the Battalion for duty. ANDY remained in command of the 12th precinct and engaged in normal police work. Although ^{nominally} under the same director (WEISS) as the Battalions were, ANDY was not ^{actually} a part of them and had different duties. During this period ANDY was engaged in training new police recruits inasmuch as most all former police members had been liquidated.

In April 1943 ANDY was drafted into the Latvian Legion according to the law which required all officers under 30 years of age to be drafted. He was commissioned Lt. and assigned to the command of a squad of about 50 men "Otra Rigas ~~Sarga~~ rotas, trīsais vada komandieris" (C.O. of third squad, Riga's second guards company). This was a ^{training} ~~instruction~~ company ^{also used in} and fulfilling elite guard functions. Company Commander was 1st Lt. SARMA, other squad commanders were; (1st. squad) Lt. ^{from} BLUMBERGS; 2nd squad, W.O. ^{from} LELINEVSKIS; 4th squad, 1st Lt. ^{from} MAJOR JAMORS, also Lt. ^{from} ZIVETS, Lt. ^{from} PRIEDITS. After two months of getting his squad in shape, ANDY was transferred to the faculty of the freshly created Latvian Legion war school "Legiona BOLDERAJAS KARA SKOLA" as one of the head instructors. He instructed in all military subjects as well as delegated assignments to his squad of instructors. After 4-5 months of this activity ANDY requested and finally received an assignment to the front. ANDY arrived at the time (winter '43) the Legion was retreating before VALCHOV and falling back to Veliki Luki. He was assigned to Col. KRIPANS regiment, to a squad of the first Co., Co. Commander Capt. LIDUMS. Inasmuch as ANDY was the only officer in the company besides the C.C., and ^{the latter} he was partially disabled due to his ulcers, ~~then~~ ANDY usually was ^{acting} the ~~actual~~ C.C.

Usual front line duty.

In April/May 1949 was injured by artillery shell receiving shrapnel wounds

in the shoulder and leg and mild concussion and was dispatched to a hospital in Germany. He got off the hospital train disregarding orders and went to the Latvian Legion Hospital in Riga. He spent 2-3 weeks here, and fully recovered, was sent to Jelganas which was a rehabilitation area also a staging area for the forming 3d Division (2 Divisions at the front). Here he was given the command of the 12th Heavy Weapons Company which at this time was only on paper and ANDY had the task of picking recruits, training and forming a company. In June 1945, before the Company was yet up to strength, the Russians broke through on the Polish frontier and ANDY was ordered to Lithuania with his company at half strength (100 men)

This front was in a state of chaos, the Germans being completely demoralized, and although ANDY's company fought some engagements, there was no organization and the Russians by-passed them and took JELGAVA in their rear. Seeing their hopeless situation and the low morale of his men (they had been informed of the German's departing atrocities in Jelgava) ANDY gathered his men and gave them three alternatives -- they could attempt to fight their way through the Russians to JELGAVA, they could attempt swimming the Liduepe to join up with the German line or they simply disperse and attempt each to make his own way and evade the Russians. The vote for the latter proposed was unanimous, inasmuch as it had become obvious Latvia had begun to fall and they were reluctant to continue fighting merely to provide the Germans an opportunity for a safe withdrawal. They agreed to meet at one of two points in either Vidzeme, ^{or} Kurzeme, depending on which province would be the first to fall and all went their separate ways after the provisions and documents were distributed. ANDY commandeered a motorcycle with sidecar and instructed the driver to head for Jelgava. Approaching Jelgava they found the Russians had taken the city and gone on to Tukums leaving the city very lightly secured. They had no difficulty getting through and by traveling back roads entered Riga where the Germans and Russians were fighting in the outskirts, the bridges had not yet been destroyed and the Germans being

in command of them, the two were able to drive into Riga without any serious incident. Arriving here ANDY stayed with friends (his wife and the entire hospital were she worked already having been evacuated to Germany). Changing his uniform for civil garments, ^{he} falsified his documents (having cached some blanks previously in his apartment). The Russians had Riga encircled but were showing no signs of any action. ANDY spent about a month in Riga waiting to see which way the Russians front would move. ANDY lived by expedients, doing no work of any kind and decided to wait for the opportune time to move, when the Germans drove to Tukums and liberated the city, with ANDY following ^{ed} the advancing columns and reaching ^{ed} Kurzeme after caching his weapons. He went to his mother's farm and helped there and in other neighboring farms ^{with} in taking in the harvest. There were many German army units moving and retreating through the area and ANDY, in about Sept. 44, left his farm and headed for North Kurzeme - Lonaste Apkorte. Here he met his former Legionnaires- about 40 out of the original 100- and began living in the woods. Other refugees, about 150 more in number, flocked to ANDY and looked to him for leadership and support. He registered all his candidates and deciding it was senseless to attempt any large scale actions inasmuch as the woods were full of various types of bands, very strong, Russian ^apartisan bands, German-Latvian deserters, and Latvian refugees, and ^{he} concentrated mainly on providing sustenance to his men and attempting to assist their escape to Sweden or Germany, ^{He} succeeding ^{ed} in about 30 cases. Food was very scarce in the woods and several ~~members~~ members returned to the front ^{or} to those police battalions still in existence. ANDY finally, remained with about 150 hangers-on and merely existed. One day while in a farm house eating he was surprised by a German Major KRAUSE who recognized ANDY at once and ^{apparently} ~~apparently~~ was well aware that he was a Legion deserter. They had an ~~incoherent~~ ~~incoherent~~ innocuous conversation and KRAUSE finally offered ANDY the position of commanding a Jagdverband (anti-partisans) unit, stating that he and his men would be provided food and

a limited amount of uniforms, the major being acquainted with the fact they were ~~all~~ already well-armed. The strength of the unit was to be 80 men and ANDY readily accepted, feeling that he would be able to at least feed his men and perhaps furnish assistance to others as well. He was appointed a Capt. of the SS and sent a weeks rations for 80 men and about a dozen uniforms ^{to} in the woods, and informed ^{was} the same ^{that}, plus a portable field kitchen would arrive the following week. When these did not arrive on time, ANDY went to Ventspils to inquire from the major as to what was wrong. Official inquiries produced only suspicious stares and finally ANDY learned that Major KRAUSE had disappeared without trace and was ~~rumored~~ to have been arrested for an unknown reason. ANDY returned to his unit and after a few days the kitchen and provisions were delivered. The unit remained without orders or supplies for approximately another 2 weeks and ANDY finally disbanded the men and burned all of the uniforms (Nov 1949) All the men were dispersed and ANDY and two others (Cpl. Augusts SALINS and KLAVINS) all in civilian clothes- having heard that in Ventspils a Dr. Gintens had a large sea evacuation organized, went to see what their chances of participating were. They were unsuccessful in making contact with GINTENS, however, and were informed through round about channels that GINTENS was not accepting any former Legionnaires or any officers and decided this whole operation was political and not worth attempting to enter into. ANDY learned from some friends in Ventspils that a good friend of his - VALDEMAS LINDE- was on GINTENS's list for evacuation but had, however, escaped to Germany without anyone being aware of the fact. As was customary during these times, evacuees were considered and routed as small groups of about 10 when a leader responsible for them.

LEFT WOODS BEGINNING DEC 1949

ANDY learned that LINDES' group leader was Col. ALBERTS and falsifying his own documents arrived at the house of the former, presented himself ^{as} and LINDE and was accepted as such. During this period, the Germans were rounding up all able bodied men in Ventspils and putting them on forced labor fortifying

the city, ALBERTS decided to remove his group to the country - Edoles apkartne.

The group remained here 2 months until mid Feb. 1945. The sea-coast was jammed with refugees among them many women and children, all of them suffering greatly from the lack of available food. Inasmuch as A. felt responsible for the group that had adhered to him and was already active in providing them with provisions, he decided to also do whatever he could for the starving refugees.

ANDY worked as a helper on a truck transporting food products from the countryside to the beaches in order to feed the hundreds of refugees who were gathered at the beaches. He spent about two months operating in the woods near the beach gathering food products and evading the German patrol actions and Latvian jōgdverbands who, besides their regular duties, i.e., cleaning out the woods, were also in particular looking for him. During this time he had many narrow escapes and skirmishes with these groups, but managed to evade capture. In the latter part of Jan '45 during a house search designed to capture Dr. Gintēns (he was captured but succeeded in escaping the same night) Col. ALBERTS was caught and imprisoned by the Germans who had taken an interest in suppressing the refugee traffic to Sweden. Inu Weiss the former vice-president of the Riga Dairy was staying at the house where Col ALBERTS was captured and was one of his group of evacuees. His true status was not proven and he was offered to head up and organize the destroyed Ventspils dairy. It was obvious the war was drawing to a close (Russians were at the outskirts of Berlin) and their eventual fate would either be evacuation to Sweden or the consequences of total capitulation. WEISS and ANDY reached the decision to go to Ventspils and begin this undertaking, not because they considered this course of action made any sense, but so that they would be able to legalize themselves and their trucks (the Germans refused to issue any licenses or gasoline for them and they had to operate completely black in the course of their providing food for the evacuees) and so that they would be able to get next to a source of food so that their evacuees could be fed. The driver of the truck was ROMANOFFS, with ANDY ^{as} the mechanic. Arriving at the dairy, they found it completely destroyed. They moved into a small 3 room house in the ~~country~~ courtyard and set to work repairing and fitting it out for living quarters. WEISS rounded up the necessary dairy machinery and began operating the dairy, all the machines, however, being hand-driven. In a short period the dairy became a hive of activity and ANDY was employed in the mornings delivering and picking up milk and dairy products. ~~XIXIX~~ A great many

people were continually coming and going and among them of Dr. GINTERS' group who checked in at ANDY's house for supplies and instructions. In March a boat arrived for GINTEN^{r's} and about 100 persons were evacuated with ANDY, transporting a portion of them to the landing area, among them^s being the MVD (SMERS) 1st Lt. Janis BAUSKA, "UPSALA". This proved EVENTUALLY TO BE THE LAST BOAT UNDER Dr. GINTEN^s's auspices. Meanwhile ANDY and ROMANOFFS sensing that Dr. GINTEN^s had so many other big-shots and people to worry about evacuating, decided it was senseless to hope for a successful escape by that means and began seeking independent means of escape. They located an old fisherman whose boat had been impounded by the Germans, since he was too old to fish anymore and was being held available for any able bodied fisherman to purchase. ANDY and ROMANOFFS made a deal with the old man and agreed to take him along when they escaped and went to the civil court to apply for the purchase of the ~~ship~~ boat -- about 25 ft, open, 4 HP motor. GINTEN^{r's} had his people in this court and the purchase was approved and registered in proper fashion without a penny being paid. The two then set about preparing the craft for the difficult voyage. Meanwhile they learned of another ship (wooden) which was sitting idle in the harbor and available but lacking any motor. They eventually located a steamroller engaged on a road rebuilding project and left on the job at night. With the help of 6 men they removed the diesel motor and transported it to the harbor in the dairy truck and placed it in the ship during the night. The ship mechanics then took over and began installing the motor but this work progressed so slowly that the ship never was able to get out of the harbor before the capitulation and by then the Germans had sealed off the entrance to the channel.

The dairy director WEISS had meanwhile made connections with the Germans through his wife and had been promised a berth on a German ship which was to leave with all high-ranking officials in the final days. Feeling that ANDY was not needed, since being a deserter was a hazard to WEISS and since with all his activity mostly directed toward preparing the boats for escape, WEISS began to

GA. was not properly carrying out his job at the dairy for which there were innumerable other applicants,

attempt getting him out of the dairy and the quarters he had established even going so far as to threaten to denounce him if he didn't leave. A German patrol arrived suddenly one night at 5 A.M. and surrounded the dairy trapping ANDY and several refugees who were spending the night there. Quickly appraising the situation, ANDY thanked them for waking him on time, showed them documents calling for his departure on the morning train and, quickly dressing, walked out before the patrol could collect its wits. He lived in various different houses using different names and documents following this incident.

Through a chance meeting on the streets of Ventpils, he ran into his good friend and former comrade in arms Corp. Alkermis. The latter informed him that he had been assigned by the Germans as the Captain of a fairly large coastal ship, with the mission of exfiltrating German parachutists and partisan units from the rear of the Russian lines in Vidzeme province. He related that they had already completed three such missions successfully. Inasmuch as the Russians had already secured Vidzeme and there were no further German ^{assets} ~~assets~~ remaining, the two reached an agreement to utilize this ship for their own and the other refugees' evacuation.

On 10 May 1945 they left the port of Ventspils and reached Gottland after 18 hours where they were interned under the auspices of the Refugee Commission of Sweden. Among some of the 57 persons aboard was ROMANOFF, ALKSMIS and Dr. GINTEN^{AS}, Georges KLAMINS, Dr. BALODIS (female). They were interned in the refugee camp for about a month at "Katamarsweek" and were then transported to Freidheim - a camp north of Stockholm. Here they were held another 2 weeks, given physical examinations and finally given the prerogative of voluntarily accepting work. ANDY took on a job on the peat bogs at Vargön at the south end of Verner Lake. Here he worked the summers of 45, 46, 47 until 1947. During the winter of 45 he worked in the textile factory in south Sweden.- Kristjan factory.

THE LATVIAN LEGION

-USSR-

[Following is the translation of an unsigned article in Latvju Enciklopedija (The Latvian Encyclopedia), Vol 34, Stockholm, 1952, pages 1288-1322.]

[Note: All portions contained within brackets are the comments of the translator. German terms were used for ranks, names of places and individuals have been "de-Latvianized". However, it was not possible to use German terms for military units below Divisional level. The German numeration for regiments, battalions, etc., was given only for a few units out of the many mentioned, therefore, for the sake of consistency, Latvian numeration is used, indicating, where appropriate, that it is Latvian and not German.]

The Latvian Legion (Lettische SS Freiwilligen Legion). After the 13/14 June 1941 deportations [of Latvians by Soviets], former officers and noncommissioned officers of the Latvian army, as well as former policemen and aizsargi [reference to Latvian army auxiliary] sought refuge in the forests; there, partisan units of various sizes were formed. Some of these units were sizable -- as for example, the one operating in the vicinity of Gulbene -- and consisted of deserters from the territorial corps [following the annexation of Latvia by the USSR, the former Latvian army was included as a territorial corps in the Red Army]. The partisans attacked NKVD forces, and, after the beginning of the Russo-German war, also retreating units of the Red Army; thus, the Russian rear was made insecure, and their retreat speeded up. In such a manner, further deportations, robbing, and destruction of houses was avoided.

The partisans established contact with German army units; next to the German Kommandantura's the Latvians established also their own. In the beginning, the latter carried out all the tasks of the uniformed police. However, this collaboration ceased immediately after the arrival of German Sonderfuehrer's, Generalkommissar Drechsler, and the commanders of the SS police forces. The chief of the latter in July, 1941 abolished all Latvian units, forbade the wearing of Latvian

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- 1 -

Approved for Release
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uniforms, and ordered, on pain of death, all arms to be turned in. The Latvian Kommandantura's were reorganized: Police prefectures were reestablished in the cities of Riga, Daugavpils, and Liepaja, and district [police] chiefs were appointed.

The Germans formed a 500-man Rekrutierungsreserve, ostensibly for guarding important objects in Riga. These officially recognized Latvian companies were then united into the 16th Police Battalion. A verbal order was issued, to the effect that the battalion should be prepared to be sent to the front "to fight Bolshevism." Thereafter, two more battalions were formed, one in Riga and one in Liepaja. There was no lack of volunteers, since the people hated the Bolsheviks; the relatives of those deported and tortured to death in prisons during the Year of Horror [reference to Soviet occupation of Latvia in 1940-41] sought revenge. On 22 October 1941, the 16th Police Battalion, commanded by Lt.-Col. Mangulis, was sent to the Eastern Front. Initially, its task was to guard the Dno-Staraya Russa railroad; however, soon one company and several platoons were assigned to German front-line units. Meanwhile, the formation of two additional battalions in Riga was ordered.

On 16 February 1942, general Jeckeln, chief of the Ostland SS and police, ordered the formation of 11 additional Police Battalions. The Internal Affairs Directorate of the Latvian Local Authority [reference to Landeseigene Verwaltung, a Latvian agency with limited administrative powers] participated in this action through establishment of a "Chief Committee of the Latvian Volunteers Organization," headed by Gustavs Celmins. The Latvian police headquarters in Riga (located in Anna Street) supervised the formation of these battalions. These poorly trained and ill-equipped battalions were sent to distant sectors of the front, scattered through German army units from the Finnish Gulf to the Black Sea. Although nominally these battalions were under Latvian command, in practice, their actual commanders were German liaison officers.

The flow of volunteers ebbed already during the second half of 1942, because Nazi activities in Latvia differed little from those of the Bolsheviks: The [Communist] nationalization decrees remained in force, persecution of Latvian patriots continued; as regards food, supplies, wages, and other rights, Latvians were considered to be on the level of the so-called "Eastern" peoples. The [Nazi] Party and civilian authorities did not hide the fact, that after the war the Baltic States would be colonized by Germans.

Although the police battalions were formed for the ostensible purpose of securing order in Latvia, they were sent to Russia and were not released after the decreed one year of service. Until March, 1943, the formation of Latvian units was "voluntary;" in practice, this term had the same connotations as in the Bolshevik jargon. The German authorities decreed, that all aizsargi were to be subordinated to the police; they were named "Type C Auxiliary Police." They were first gathered together in each district; then, their ranks were augmented by policemen on independent duty in towns and the countryside; finally,

it was announced, that for "training purposes" all were assigned to a police battalion. Many of the men mobilized in such a manner were ill and unfit for military duty. Including reserves, a total of 38 such battalions were formed in 1941-1944. Later, some of the battalions, decimated in battles, were united. 11 battalions were assigned to police regiments, and 9 --to the Latvian Legion.

The Latvians for the first time went into battle as a closed unit in June, 1942, when the 21st Police Battalion (formed in Liepaja) went into action in the Leningrad front sector. The battalion, though ill-equipped and lacking antitank weapons, on 28 July 1942, after bitter fighting, repulsed a Red Army attack launched with strong artillery and tank support. Himmler, on a visit to the Leningrad front at the end of January, 1943, ordered that the international 2nd SS brigade (which included 2 Latvian police battalions) be reorganized into a Latvian brigade. These battalions (the 19th and 21st) which had valiantly fought in the preceding battles, in German staff reports were named as "belonging to Germanic peoples." The 21st battalion was directly subordinated to the commander of the Dutch legion. Both battalions were withdrawn from the front lines and transferred to the Krasnoye Selo region. On 4 February 1943, the 16th battalion, commanded by Maj. Kocins, also was moved there. All three battalions were renamed: The 21st became the 1st battalion of the Latvian Legion [1/Lett. Legion], the 19th--the second battalion of the Latvian Legion [2/Lett. Legion], and the 16th --the 3rd battalion of the Latvian Legion [3/Lett. Legion].

The Latvian Local Authority was officially informed about the establishment of the Latvian Legion only on 27 January 1943. On that day general Schroeder, chief of the SS and police in Latvia, invited for a meeting all General Directors [of the Local Authority], Col. Silgailis and Col. Veiss, as well as the Latvian Sport Chief R. Plume. Schroeder demanded, that the Latvian authorities aid in the voluntary formation of the Legion. On 29 January, another meeting was called -- by Generalkommissar Drechsler. On this occasion, the Local Authority pointed out, that all efforts to gather volunteers would be fruitless, unless Germany gave the following guarantees: That the Legion would fight for a free and independent Latvia; that the properties [nationalized by Soviets] would be reprivatized; and that the persecution of Latvian patriots would cease. As a result of the meeting Drechsler decided to abolish the volunteer principle. In spite of this fact, on 10 February 1943 there followed an order signed by Hitler and Himmler (the text of which the Latvians obtained one year later), stating: "I order the establishment of a volunteer Latvian SS Legion. The size and structure of this unit is to depend on the number of Latvian men available." According to some reports, Hitler had intended to set the strength of the Legion only at 10,000 men; however, Drechsler increased this number.

Immediately afterwards, the German authorities ordered all officers and NCO's of the former Latvian army to register in police precincts. An SS Ersatzkommando Ostland was established in Riga on

orders of the Berlin general staff of the SS. Drechsler, on the basis of a 19 December 1941 decree by minister A. Rosenberg, on 23 February 1943 ordered all [Latvian] employment centers to call up for military service all men born between 1919 and 1924, a total of some 58,000. It was intended to divide this number as follows: 25,000 men were to be assigned to army auxiliaries [Hilfswillige, or HiWi's], 16-17,000 were to be included in the Legion, 10,000 in militarized labor units, and 6,000 to strengthen the police battalions. These were the first "full years" following the Latvian War of Liberation, which included the youth grown up during Latvia's independence [apparent reference to increase in birth rate following World War I].

Such a proposed dispersal of Latvians among German units caused a wave of great unease in the nation and forced the Local Authority to agree to the formation of the Latvian Legion in order to at least partially secure Latvian interests. The Local Authority, after discussing the situation, on 23 February 1943 forwarded a memorandum to Reichskommissar Lohse, Drechsler, and Jeckeln. [The memorandum] pointed out the illegality of the proposed mobilization, and emphasized that the attitude of the Latvian authorities would depend on German acceptance of the following minimum demands: (1) General R. Bangerskis to be appointed as commander of the Legion, with Col. A. Silgailis as the chief of his staff, (2) Each mobilized Latvian citizen, born 1919-24, to have the right to choose a particular type of service, without the use of compulsion, (3) The Legion must undergo at least six months of training in Latvia. Only then is it to be put at the disposal -- as a single, closed unit -- of the German commander-in-chief, (4) The Legion shall fight only in the Northern sector of the Eastern Front, (5) The Legion is to receive the same food, provisions, clothing, pay, and rights existing in the German army. Knowing, that the people opposed the illegal mobilization, and not wishing that it suffer total failure, the Germans delayed their answer. On 2 March, it was announced, that General Hansen, empowered to settle the matter of the Legion, was to arrive from Berlin. The latter announced, that appointment of Bangerskis as commander of the Legion had been approved; yet, the appointment was delayed. On 20 March, it was found that Bangerskis had been appointed commander of only the 1st Division. Finally, on 31 March it became known that even this had been a misunderstanding -- the divisional command would be German.

General Bangerskis was informed that he had been named Inspector General of the Legion; on 31 April [sic] 1943, Col. A. Plensners was appointed chief of his staff. Col. A. Silgailis became infantry commander of the 1st (German numeration, 15th) division [of the Legion]. In a special instruction it was promised to delineate the rights and duties of the Inspector General; this, however, never took place, and until the very end of the war his position in regard to representation of Latvian units, was quite unclear and restricted, General Bangerskis was indirectly subordinated to Himmler, and directly to Jeckeln. As formation of the Legion had already begun, and the Local Authority had already issued the corresponding appeals to the people,

it now had no choice but to submit to these German directives. The tasks of the Inspector General were: Mobilization of citizens of Latvia (as of 15 November 1943); furthering national culture and ideological leadership of the Legion; inspection of Legion units; handling of funds donated to the Legion; supplementary aid to wounded and ill legionaries, and care of the relatives of those killed in action; representation of the interests of the Legion to the SS and German Army commands; supplementation of the Legion with officers, NCO's and medical personnel; in addition, as of 20 February 1945 he was also President of the National Committee.

As already stated, the first compulsory mobilization was ordered by German authorities. It was carried out by the following agencies: [Mobilization] for labor service and army auxiliaries -- by the staff of the commander-in-chief, Ostland; for the Legion -- by SS Ersatzkommando Ostland. On 26 March the Local Authority had empowered the leadership of the Legion to send out individual mobilization "orders,"; the employment administration boards could take steps against those who refused to obey. The men slated to serve in labor units and as HiWi's, were mobilized immediately, but mobilization for the Legion was delayed until late autumn, 1943; a part of the mobilized men were assigned to police battalions.

The [SS] Ersatzkommando [Ostland] ordered the draft boards to assign 25% of the men to the Legion; the rest were assigned individually to German units or police battalions. The 1919-1924 age group, totaling some 27,000 -- the army auxiliaries (HiWi's) -- was the most unprotected; they were scattered all over the Eastern front. The some 10,000 men assigned to labor units for the most part became HiWi's.

In a breach of promise, the Germans already on 30 March 1943 sent 1,000 Latvian youths to the Krasnoye Selo region; these, drafted only a few days previously, had no training whatsoever, and lacked Latvian officers and NCO's. They were the first supplement to the Latvian brigade forming there. The rest of the men assigned to the Legion, some 14,000 in number, were sent to Paplaka in Courland, where on 23 March 1943 the formation of the 1st Division was begun. Lack of housing and weapons (for example, in Paplaka at times there were 200 rifles per 1,800 recruits) greatly hindered the formation of the 1st Division. However, the chief obstacle was constituted by the fact, that the [division's] trained recruits were sent to the 2nd Brigade, which stood at the front. An 8 November 1943 order renamed the brigade "2. Lettische SS Freiwilligen Brigade;" and the 1st and 2nd Regiments were officially named the 42nd and 43rd volunteer SS grenadier regiments.

Structure and Formation of the Legion. The legionaries were required to take an oath, stating, that in the struggle against Bolshevism they would unconditionally obey the supreme commander of the German army, i.e., Hitler. The weapons, clothing, and food of the Legion were comparable to that issued to German units. The legionaries wore the following insignia: Besides the insignia denoting rank (the ranks were those of the German SS), on their left sleeves were sewn badges in the colors of the Latvian national flag, topped by the

inscription "Latvija." Instead of the SS collar insignia, members of the 15th Division (Latvian numeration, 1st) wore the Latvian rising sun emblem, but those of the 19th Division (Latvian numeration, 2nd), the Latvian fire cross emblem. Border guard units had black insignia. On the whole, pay corresponded to that prescribed by German army regulations. Each soldier received only combat pay (Wehrsold); the basic pay was sent directly to his family, or deposited in a bank account. Until October, 1944 the bank accounts were located in Riga, thereafter in Prague.

The medical personnel of the Legion consisted of Latvians. The wounded and sick soldiers convalesced, for the most part, in Latvia. The Latvian trade unions donated 50,000 Reichsmarks and 250 beds to the Legion, enabling the establishment of a first-class Latvian Legion hospital in Riga on 13 December 1943. In the fall of 1944, it was evacuated to Germany -- first to Mecklenburg (in Schwerin), then to Luebeck; there, renamed Latvian Hospital, it continued to serve Latvian refugees and invalids as late as 1951.

Pursuant to a 1 May 1943 order of [General] Dankers, the Latvian Soldiers Aid (LSA) was set up. Its chief was Bruno Pavasars, the secretary general -- Evalds Andersons. The task of this organization was to further the national culture. It financed the Legion's official newspaper Daugavas Vanagi [The Falcons of Daugava], provided a front-line theater, established rest homes, collected gift parcels (75,000 were collected in Christmas, 1943 alone), provided for supplementary care of the wounded and the sick, etc. Many other Latvian establishments, organizations, and individuals were engaged in similar work. LSA acquired its funds from donations and from revenues of various events.

Soldiers of the Latvian units were subordinated to German courts. A military court, headed by the divisional commander, was attached to each Latvian division. Where these courts did not exist, the accused were tried by the 16th SS and police court in Riga. Legionaries whose sentences exceeded 3 months imprisonment were sent to the Salaspils concentration camp, administered by Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Berlin. Those receiving light sentences were assigned to a special punishment company stationed in Jelgava, but as of 1944 -- to a special punishment battalion in Bolderaja (the so-called "Captain Meier's battalion"). The men arrested and held for court-martial were incarcerated in the Riga Central Prison (a total of some 500 men), or in the army prison in Riga.

A new stage in the formation of the Legion was officially inaugurated on 15 November 1943. General Dankers announced to a large assembly of Latvians gathered in the great hall of the University of Latvia in Riga, that henceforth the Local Authority would itself mobilize citizens of Latvia, under the draft regulations of independent Latvia; General Bangerskis would thus exercise the powers of Minister of War and Commander-in-chief of the Army [as outlined in the constitution of independent Latvia]. Since the Local Authority was not a government, but only an auxiliary organ to the German civil

authorities, then its announced mobilizations were just as illegal as the previous one. A special military court, headed by Gen. Bangerskis, was established to try draft-dodgers. Bangerskis also confirmed the verdict of the court, and could reduce or cancel sentences. This military court operated according to the regulations governing proceedings of military courts of [independent] Latvia.

By July 1944, the situation at the front was critical. Therefore, Jeckeln agreed to Bangerskis' proposal to free the soldiers interned in the Salaspils concentration camp, as well as those serving lighter sentences in prisons. From these Latvians, 6 construction battalions were formed; Captain Meier's battalion constituted the seventh. After their formation the battalions were placed at the disposal of the chief of Corps of Engineers. However, due to numerous desertions, the number of men serving in them rapidly decreased. It should also be noted, that in 1943 the Germans had formed two construction battalions from mobilized Latvian HiWi's.

Already on 29 November 1943, General Dankers, General Director for Internal Affairs [of the Latvian Local Authority] ordered the mobilization of all former Latvian army officers and NCO's, as well as the men born between 1915 and 1924. In January 1944, with the retreat of the German 16th and 18th armies from Leningrad, fear arose of a possible Red Army invasion of Latvia. In order to avert this danger, the Local Authority decided to form 6 border guard regiments. For this purpose, Dankers' 2 February 1944 order mobilized the men born 1910-1914, and that of 5 February 1944 -- the men born 1906-1909. However, already during the second half of March and the beginning of April, three of these regiments (1st, 2nd, 3rd) were sent to the front and placed at the disposal of the VI SS Corps; meanwhile, a new 2nd regiment was formed [in Latvia]. The men living near the Latvian-Russian border, being politically unreliable, were assigned to 2 construction battalions; the battalions were placed at the disposal of the commander of the Corps of Engineers. The remaining 4 [border guard] regiments were in training; however, already on 16 April the 2nd Regiment was sent to the front in the Drisa region [near the Latvian-Russian border]. The other regiments went into action in the beginning of July in the vicinity of Daugavpils. There, they suffered heavy losses. The regiments then were withdrawn from the front. The 2nd and 5th regiments were merged into a single regiment, the 7th; this unit, renamed the 106th grenadier regiment, then was assigned to the VI SS corps. The remnants of the remaining 2 [border guard] regiments were either assigned to the 19th Division [of the Latvian Legion], or sent to Germany.

On 14 February 1944, Jeckeln liquidated SS Ersatzkommando Ostland. It was replaced by SS Ersatzkommando Lettland with Bangerskis as chief. However, actual direction of the mobilization remained in German hands. Bangerskis repeatedly protested to Jeckeln and Drechsler, pointing out the illegal and disorderly acts which the German authorities committed by the virtue of their position and the incorrect mobilization systems; the aim of these [Germans] was to

reduce the authority of the Inspector General. In the course of mobilizing the men born between 1915 and 1924, only 3,500 out of a total of 9,200 were assigned to the Legion; the rest had either not registered, or received the so-called "UK cards," which exempted one from military service. Therefore, on 18 March 1944 Bangerskis forwarded the following memorandum to Jeckeln: "It is well known, that the recent mobilization of men born between 1910 and 1924 has created much unrest. The orders of the various German institutions, exempting a number of enterprises from the mobilization, created a situation where the employers themselves decided which employees were to receive UK cards and which ones weren't; thus, they could exempt their friends and relatives. As a result of such measures, in the countryside, the land proprietors were exempted, and the workers and the poor were mobilized." In a 21 March 1944 meeting Jeckeln admitted, that bribery had existed in the district draft boards, and that only the poor had been mobilized. Bangerskis then pointed out, that if only 32,000 men were to be mobilized, it had been unnecessary to require 120,000 to register; the boards could thus draft only every fourth individual -- and the decision was entirely up to them [which one]. The Inspector General received bitter letters, pointing out, that "instead of youths, pieces of bacon were mobilized." As the results of the mobilization of the men born between 1906 and 1924 (total: 181,439) came in on 10 June 1944, it turned out, that a total of 43,223 men -- serving in the police, as prison guards, border guards, or in the railroad service -- had either not been required to register, or had received exemptions. Mobilization was postponed for 50,500 of the men examined; 18,772 were judged unfit for military duty; 23,000 were assigned reserve status; some 7,000 were given sick leave; and 4,774 were turned over to doctors for further examination. Thus, this mobilization gave only 34,000 men for active service.

In order to augment the ranks of the 15th Division, Dankers on 21 June 1944 ordered all men born in 1925 and 1926 to be mobilized; in addition, towards the end of that summer, youths and students born in 1927 and 1928 were mobilized. The latter measure the Germans had already demanded previously. The agencies holding joint responsibility for the last-mentioned mobilization were the German aviation commission and the Latvian Youth Organization; the youths were assigned to German anti-aircraft and searchlight units. At the time of the German surrender, there were some 600 such "air force auxiliaries" in the city of Liepaja (Courland) alone. Approximately 2,500 were sent to Germany, where they were taken prisoner. The Germans suffered great manpower losses in the summer of 1944. Subsequently, all [Latvian] ground crews of airfields were placed at the disposal of the Germans; they were replaced by non-combatants and persons judged able to work (the so-called "av" category). Jeckeln demanded that the Local Authority assign to air force auxiliaries all the men born between 1909 and 1926 who held either draft status mentioned [in the previous sentence]. After extended talks, Dankers yielded, and issued the necessary mobilization order in August 1944. These draftees were either sent to Germany

to serve as airfield crews, or assigned to German parachute units. A part of the Latvian "air force auxiliaries" were sent to various airfields in Italy; there, they eventually became prisoners of war and for the most part returned [to Soviet-occupied Latvia] after the war.

In September 1943, the Germans began to form a Latvian aviation unit named ENO, and established fighter pilot schools in Liepaja and Grobina (Estonian pilots were trained there also). The 3-month long training program began in October, 1943. All former Latvian Army Air Corps pilots, as well as those of the Aizsargi and civil aviation, were assigned to ENO. This organization also accepted students from technical and trade schools. Altogether, three classes were graduated; from these, two night fighter squadrons, each having 18 planes, were formed. In September 1944, the 1st and 2nd night fighter squadrons were merged into the night fighter group no. 12, and that unit received the name Aviation Legion "Latvija." Its task was to conduct low-level operations in the immediate rear of the enemy. Lieut.-col. Rucelis was named commander of the Aviation Legion. However, already on 27 September 1944 the Aviation Legion was transferred to Stettin. The planes were taken away, and the men sent to Denmark for parachute training. Nothing came of this. In December 1944, the Latvian flyers were transferred to Koenigsberg for anti-aircraft training. There, in January of 1945, they were captured by the Russians.

Concurrently with formation of the 15th Division [of the Latvian Legion], a training and reserve unit for it was also set up. It was located in Cekule (near Riga) under the command of Lt.-Col. Jansons. Later, it was transferred to Jelgava and renamed the 15th Training and Reserve Battalion. Its sole task was to take care of convalescing legionaries. When the 15th Division left for the front, the battalion was responsible for providing replacements for both divisions [of the Latvian Legion]. In beginning of 1944, the battalion was enlarged into a brigade. Its commander was a German and it consisted of 19 units. In July 1944, during the sudden Red Army attack on Jelgava, these units were thrown into battle at Janiski, Lithuania, and lacking weapons, suffered heavy losses and were completely scattered. The remnants were transferred to Berendt, East Prussia, where a new 15th SS Grenadier Training Battalion was formed. Its task again was to re-train convalescing legionaries. Towards the end of January, 1945 this unit was sent to the Danzig region, where, like the other units of the 15th Division left in that particular area, it was captured by the Russians.

When the Red Army reached the Baltic Sea at Memel (September, 1944), Latvian police units and remnants of other units of a military nature were sent to Germany and placed at the disposal of the 15th Division. Among these men there were many who due to age or health were unfit for front-line duty; therefore, they were assigned to construction units. A total of 3 construction regiments were formed. At the end of 1944, the SS command unified them into the Latvian Field Replacement Depot, whose commander, as well as all of the staff, were Germans. The task of this unit was to gather all Latvian police

employees and members of military units sent to Germany. After examinations by doctors, a part of these men were sent to the front; the majority, however, were detailed to construct fortifications. These were the so-called "ditch diggers of Torn." In the beginning of 1945, the 1st and 2nd construction regiments were working in the Torn region, the 3rd - North of Neustettin. The food, clothing, and weapons these men were supplied with was of exceptionally poor quality. This created much bitterness. The soldiers were not even provided with housing. Towards the end of January, 1945, with the Red Army approaching West Prussia, these units retreated westward. The retreat became a catastrophe. The men were completely unarmed, without food, and without transportation. Russian tank columns several times cut the roads, scattering the [Latvian] units and causing them considerable losses. However, most of the men succeeded in avoiding capture, and reached Stettin in the beginning of March; there, they again were put to work digging trenches. In the second half of March, the so-called "Captain Rusmanis' group" (2,500 men) was sent back to Kurzeme [Latvia]. At the end of April, with the Red Army approaching Stettin, the construction units again retreated westward. This time also, Russian tanks cut the retreat routes several times, taking prisoners and causing losses to the units. In the beginning of May 1945, the remnants of these units surrendered to the British and Americans near Wismar.

Himmler, in an order issued on 24 May 1943, specified that the term "Latvian Legion" was to be a comprehensive denomination for all Latvian units serving in the Waffen SS and police forces. Therefore, Latvian battalions which previously had been called gendarmerie, were renamed Latvian Police Battalions. The formation and training of these battalions since 1942 was entrusted to Lt.-Col. R. Osis, whose chief of staff until November of 1942 was Lt.-Col. K. Lobe. The volunteers had to sign a contract for one year of service.

In addition, the order by Himmler just mentioned contained the following provisions: a) Major Gen. von Scholz was appointed commander of the 2nd Latvian SS brigade; b) Count von Pueckler was appointed commander of the 15th Latvian SS division; c) henceforth, Latvian soldiers were to be decorated with German medals instead of the Ostmedaille; these were to be awarded by Jeckeln. Himmler also issued an order authorizing the sending of the Latvian police battalions to the front. As already mentioned, at first there were 30 such battalions; together, they were equal to one infantry division. They were scattered all along the Eastern Front, from Leningrad to the Black Sea. Poorly trained and ill-armed, they were thrown into battle not only against the regular Russian army, but also against partisans in Lithuania, Poland, Belorussia and the Ukraine; they were also utilized to guard POW camps. Repeated protests by Bangerskis were of no avail. On 1 August 1943, four of the police battalions were united to form the 1st (Riga) Police Regiment; its commander was Lt.-Col. Meija. Since December 1942, these 4 battalions, containing many old and sick men, had lost 683 men; the regiment had only 42 officers and 980 men. Only in March 1944, was this regiment withdrawn from the front and sent back

to Latvia. In addition, in the beginning of February 1944, the 2nd and 3rd Police regiments were also formed. All three regiments were thrown into battle in July 1944 in the Daugavpils region. They suffered heavy losses. In the course of the fighting, one regiment was surrounded in the Vilnius area. Breaking out, it was decimated: When on 16 August 1944 the battalion arrived in Riga, it contained only 5 officers, one doctor, and 42 men. After the retreat from Daugavpils the [police] regiments were stationed in Bulduri. In the second half of August, all three regiments were merged. In October, this unit was transferred, first of all to Dundaga, then to Germany, where it joined the Latvian Field Replacement Depot.

The Latvian Legion was subordinated to the VI SS Corps, the leadership of which, with the exception of 1-2 Latvian interpreters, was German. The commanders of both Latvian divisions were also Germans; however, the divisional infantry commanders were Latvians (15th Division-- Col. Arturs Silgailis; 19th Division-- Col. Voldemars Veiss, later Col. Karlis Lobe). They were the highest service commanders of all Latvian soldiers, and therewith, advisers of the divisional commanders in questions of national welfare [Comment; untranslatable -- meaning of term can also include culture and ideology] and training. During battles, the infantry commanders were entrusted with operative leadership of various battle groups. They also had a small staff, consisting of 2 officers and several clerks.

The German command of the Latvian divisions attempted, as much as possible, to ignore the infantry commanders. From the regimental level down, all leadership was in Latvian hands; however, at first each police battalion, construction battalion, and frontier guard regiment had a German liaison officer attached to it. These usually considered themselves to be the direct superiors of the Latvians. Such a situation caused numerous incidents, which sometimes ended with the Latvian officers' being relieved of command, and even with their being court-martialed. Thus, Capt. Praudins, commander of the 19th Police Battalion, was sentenced to death, ostensibly for having committed acts hostile to the Germans.

Bangerskis, in a 21 March 1944 meeting with Jeckeln, protested that the Latvian frontier guards, minus their officers and NCO's, had been sent to Poland to fight guerrillas. The position of the Inspector General was, to say the least, unenviable; often he could not even inspect the regiments. The Latvian regimental commanders were forbidden to give official reports to Bangerskis; they could only contact him privately.

The Latvian Divisions in Battle: Russia. In April 1943, all three police battalions were located in the Krasnoye Selo region, where they were merged into the 1st Latvian Infantry Regiment; its commander was Col. Veiss. Col. Lobe, who arrived there shortly afterwards, began to form the 2nd Latvian Infantry Regiment (nicknamed the "Imanta" regiment). To form the latter, the 18th, 24th, and 26th [Latvian] Police battalions were merged (it should be noted, that the 18th battalion was only sent to the regiment in June 1943, when the

regiment already held a sector of the front near Volkhov). Simultaneously with the infantry, Capt. Gravelis began to form the artillery section. Formation of other units was also begun.

After a month of training, the brigade was sent to the Volkhov front sector, to hold the position Terenitse Kurlyandskaya - Spaskaya Polist. This position was in a swampy vicinity and was almost completely unfortified. Within a short period of time, our soldiers transformed it into an exceptional fortified position. The brigade made several local attacks, the biggest of which was the 3 September 1943 assault on the Spaskaya Polist hill, designed to improve the battle line. The assault was successful and our losses small. Because of the great tactical importance of the hill, the Russians attempted to recapture it during the following days. In the heavy fighting that followed, the brigade, despite considerable losses, retained the hill. As of 5 October 1943, the brigade was commanded by Schuldt.

In 1944, the Russians began their great offensive in the Leningrad front. On 14 January, they broke through the German front some 4-5 km south of the positions of the 2nd Brigade. The enemy planned to encircle the German forces which stood in the Volkhov front sector south of Lake Ladoga. In order to relieve the pressure on those German units engaged at the site of the breakthrough, the brigade formed a battle group, consisting of 1st Battalion of the 1st Regiment (commander, Capt. Jansons), and the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment (commander, Maj. Stipnieks). Its task was to attack the enemy flank from the North. The battle group, commanded by Col. Veiss, successfully carried out the assigned task, freeing a corridor through which two surrounded German divisions could retreat. The battle group had to fight particularly bitterly near Nekochoy on 17 January 1944. Col. Veiss, for his courageous and able leadership, was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross -- the first Latvian to receive that decoration.

Due to the generally deteriorating situation on the Northern Front, the 2nd Brigade, on 19 January 1944, had to leave the positions it had built with difficulty and defended with gallantry, and to begin to retreat southeast, towards Gorenko. The retreat took place in great cold, deep snow, through a swampy and roadless region. Finding it impossible to break through towards Gorenko, the brigade changed directions and turned towards Pinev - Luga, where it took up a defensive position in the Gusi-Pyatiletsy region, some 10 km south of Pinev-Luga. This position was defended until 31 January. On 1 February the brigade retreated further southwest, through Orodezh and Bol'shie Sokol'niki. On 7 February, the brigade attacked Velasheva Gora, in order to lessen enemy pressure on the neighboring division. Having accomplished this task, the brigade during the following days retreated through Dubrovka - Antipov - Mal. Utorgosh - Podubyi - Romanovichi to Pskov. During this time (19 January to 25 February 1944), the brigade was incessantly battling both the advancing enemy and partisans, who attempted to block its retreat. During the heavy fighting near Zabolotye, the brigade lost Capt. Skraujs and Capt. Grants, commanders of the 2nd

Battalion of the 2nd Regiment. From Pskov, the brigade was transferred to positions on the river Velikaya, where it was ordered to hold a section of front next to and immediately north of the 15th Latvian Division.

The 15th Division, the formation of which had already begun on 23 March 1943, was sent to the front in mid-November 1943. The Division contained the following units [Comment: Latvian numeration]: The 3rd Infantry Regiment (CO, Col. Kripens), the 4th Infantry Regiment (CO, Col. Janums), the 5th Infantry Regiment (CO, Col. Apsitis), the 1st Artillery Regiment (CO, Col. Skaistlauks), the 15th Fusilier Battalion (CO, Capt. Lapainis), the 15th Sapper Battalion (CO, Capt. Klavins), the 15th Antitank Battalion (CO, Capt. Trezins), the 15th Antiaircraft section (CO, Capt. Bergs), the 15th Liaison Battalion (CO, Dostmann), and the 15th Field Reserve Battalion (CO, Maj. Smits). Many units were undermanned by as much as 25 percent. The regiments had only 2 battalions each. The 1,500 recruits of the 3rd Regiment had had only two weeks' training. Units of the division received their battle equipment only a few days before leaving for the front, or even on the very day (as for example, the 5th Regiment). There were either no boots, or they turned out to be too small. There was a shortage of horses, cars, and other equipment. The reason for such hurry was the Russian breakthrough at Nevel; the German army command had already in November 1943, decided to withdraw also the Northern front to previously prepared positions on the river Velikaya. Due to a lack of reserves, the 15th Division was ordered to defend those positions. After their arrival at Novo Sokol'niki, the Latvian units were ordered to continue training and to finish construction of defensive fortifications in the rear. In order to give the new soldiers battle experience, small groups of them were assigned to German front-line units in a rotating order. When in January began the Russian offensive, these Latvian soldiers were thrown into battle and thus were lost to the Division. The same must be said about the soldiers engaged in constructing fortifications; they, too, were drawn into rear-guard action. All protests by the Latvian commanders about such dispersal of Latvian units were of no avail. Even more -- during the continuing battles, the 15th Division was repeatedly forced to send individual units to German divisions. For example, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Division was assigned to the 69th German division, and the 2nd Battalion -- to the 83rd German division. Moreover, the 2nd Battalion was broken up into companies: One company was assigned to the 457th German infantry regiment, two more -- to the 275th regiment; finally, the last company was split into squads and assigned to various German units. The Latvian regimental commander and his staff remained in the rear with nothing to do; the battalion staffs also could not command their companies, and thus they likewise had no tasks which to fulfill. The Germans also took the light and heavy machine guns belonging to the men of the 15th Division which had been killed or wounded.

Finally, in the beginning of February, 1944, the 15th Division was ordered to proceed to the Belebel'ka region, some 45 km southwest

of Staraya Rusa, and to take up positions on the river Redya. On the way to the Loknya railroad station, where the Division was to board trains, the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Regiment, and a part of the 15th Fusilier Battalion were suddenly [taken from the main body of troops and] thrown into battle in order to liquidate a Russian breakthrough. The battle lasted from 5 - 10 February, at which time the breach was contained and the Division could resume its march to the Loknya railroad station unmolested. In this battle the Latvian units were led by col. Kripens.

The sector assigned to the Division was approximately 30 km wide; due to such width, the Division's right flank consisted of a number of defensive points, with spaces in between. The Russians utilized this fact. During the night of 14/15 February 1944, under cover of a snowstorm, one of their ski battalions, and the 638th Russian Assault Regiment (totaling some 400 men), crossed our battle line south of Sokolye, at a location where the distance between our defensive points was 3 km. Having spent the day in the depths of the forest, the Russians on the night of 16/17 February attacked a point in our line simultaneously from the front and from the rear. The attack was directed against the junction of the 4th Regiment and the 15th Fusilier Battalion; therefore, the inner flanks of these units soon found themselves in a very dangerous position. Local reserves, organized by a regimental commander, counterattacked successfully. The Russians in our rear were encircled, and, after a battle lasting until the evening of 18 February, almost completely annihilated; only some 30 were taken prisoner.

However, the 15th Division did not long remain in this position. Already on 17 February it was ordered to start retreating (during the night of 20/21 February) to the so-called "Panther line" positions on the western bank of the river Velikaya. On that day the Division's commander, general von Pueckler-Burghaus, was replaced by the police officer Heilmann, a timorous man with little knowledge of military matters. Since the Division's route of retreat led through a swampy area, it was decided to utilize the single usable road Belebel'ka - Dedovichi. The 4th Regiment and a company of the 1st Sapper Battalion, on the other hand, had to secure the Division's main column from the South; thus, it had to proceed westward in a separate column, straight through 70 km of swamps and forests. The retreat succeeded as planned. On 21 February, the Division's main column reached Aleksino, 30 km south of Dedovichi. On 22 February, the 15th Division was ordered to speed up the pace of the retreat. Since artillery and motorized units could not proceed in the direction indicated, they made a forced march along the Belebel'ka-Dedovichi road and then through Novorzhev to the river Velikaya. The rest of the Division reached its destination on 28 February, after 6 days of extremely difficult marches in great cold and snowstorms, through forests 30 km deep, finding directions often by compass alone, threatened by the advancing Red Army and partisans. The 3rd Regiment, which covered the Division's rear, had to also beat off repeated enemy attacks.

Due to a technical difficulty, the radio did not work; thus,

it was impossible to relay the order about increasing the pace of the retreat to Col. Janums group [i.e., the 4th Regiment, proceeding separately]. Attempts to establish contacts with its patrols failed; they were destroyed by partisans. Meanwhile, Col. Janums battle group, having beat off partisan attacks, reached the river Polisto only on 22 February, after a difficult cross-country march. Having received no orders, Col. Janums on the morning of 25 February continued to retreat along a country road. At this time, it became apparent that the battle group was surrounded deep within the rear of the enemy. In the afternoon of 26 February, in the village of Bulingina, Col. Janums ordered his men to prepare for a breakthrough. All equipment -- except weapons, ammunition, and food -- was discarded. Avoiding roads and finding directions by compass, the group first headed due South, then West, through primeval forests. Already at the beginning of this march it was attacked by Russian cavalry; all vehicles were destroyed. Under cover of darkness, our exhausted soldiers during the night of 26/27 February broke through the envelopment and reached German lines near Novorzhev at noon of the 27th.

After their arrival in the "Panther line," the 2nd Brigade and the 15th Division were subordinated to the VI SS Corps, commanded by the Police General von Pfeffer - Wildenbruch. The assigned line of defense was 22 km wide. The line began at Voronichi, then went along the southern shore of the river Sorota until its junction with the river Velikaya, then along the western shore of Velikaya to Terekhov. The right flank of this position was defended by the 15th Division, the left -- by the 2nd Brigade. Tactically, the position was ill-chosen: The western bank of Velikaya was much lower than the eastern bank; thus, the enemy could see deep within our rear and command it with his fire. Following a proposal of col. Veiss, it was decided to move the line of defense to the heights of the eastern bank. This could be done only opposite the position occupied by the 15th Division and the 2nd Brigade, since only here the Russians were yet not in close contact with the line of defense. Of course, this action was immediately followed by determined enemy counterattacks. A bitter and prolonged struggle, lasting from 4 to 19 March 1944, now began; it was started by a Russian attack on the Seredniye-Slepnyi village. One of the most bitter battles took place from 16 - 19 March, for possession of hill 93,4. The hill, on the eastern bank of Velikaya, commanded the entire river valley in the 2nd Brigade sector; if the hill were lost, the entire position on the eastern bank of Velikaya would have been endangered. During the three-day battle the hill changed hands several times. Finally, in the evening of 18 March, after a counterattack supported by German assault guns and bombers, it remained decisively in our hands. This was the only battle in the entire war, when both big Latvian units fought jointly and under Latvian command; in their sector, the Russians utilized 11 divisions.

During this time, the right flank and center of the 15th Division was not engaged in any large-scale battles; however, reconnaissances in force did take place. In this respect, the most successful

were the attacks by the 4th Regiment near Zhelezov (13 March) and Sizovka (14 March). Here, the first reinforcements arrived from Latvia, and our units could partly replenish the gaps in their ranks. The units which had been left attached to German formations near Novo Sokol'niki, also arrived. In mid-March, the 6th Regiment 2nd Brigade was assigned and was renamed the 19th Division.

Now, the Latvian units were named as follows: 15. Waffen-Grenadier Division der SS (Latvian no. 1), and 19. Waffen-Grenadier Division der SS (Latvian no. 2). The regiments of the 19th Division were named 42. Waffen-Grenadier Regiment der SS (Latvian numeration: 1st Regiment), 43. Waffen-Grenadier Regiment der SS (Latvian numeration: 2nd Regiment), and 44. Waffen-Grenadier Regiment der SS (Latvian numeration: 6th Regiment). The 1st Regiment was commanded by Maj. Galdins, the 2nd -- by Col. Lobe, and the 3rd -- by Lt.-Col. Kocins. Col. Veiss was named the infantry commander of the 19th Division.

On 15 March Schuldt, the commander of the 19th Division, was killed in action. The command was temporarily taken over by Bock; finally, on 13 April 1944 generalleutnant Streckenbach assumed permanent command. In view of our past manpower losses, the three recently formed Latvian frontier guard regiments were placed at the disposal of the VI SS Corps during the second half of March. The men of the 1st and 2nd Frontier Guard Regiments were used to replenish the ranks of the 15th and 19th Divisions; the 3rd Frontier Guard Regiment, together with the 15th Field Replacement Battalion, were placed in villages near Krasnoye (some 18 km East of the Latvian border), thus setting up something like a training and replacement center.

During the second half of March, 1944 it became known that the Russians were gathering forces for an offensive. On the morning of 26 March, they opened a very heavy artillery barrage on our positions along the river Velikaya. In a short space of time all of our heavy weapons had been destroyed. Around 7:30 AM the enemy attack began; it was directed mainly against the 5th Regiment. Having crossed the frozen river, the Russians already before noon had achieved a deep salient, reaching up to the regimental headquarters at Strezhnevo. This breakthrough was then rapidly widened towards Southwest and South. Therefore, the 4th Regiment, which defended a sector South of the river Sorota, was forced to withdraw its left flank and to take up positions on the eastern bank of the river Velikaya. The 3rd Regiment, since it stood to the left of the 4th Regiment, was also obliged to withdraw its right-flank. Counterattacks, in which besides some units of the 4th Regiment and the 15th Fusiliers Battalion, also some German units took part, succeeded (with help of assault guns and support aircraft) in stopping the Russians; however, the former positions could not be regained. When darkness fell, the battle died down. The enemy held a 3 km deep and 4 km wide bridgehead on the western bank of the river [Velikaya]. All Russian attempts to enlarge it during the following day were unsuccessful; so were also the German efforts to regain it. As the 15th Division had suffered heavy losses during the battle, it

was replaced by German units (with exception of the 4th Regiment, which remained in position until 16 April, at which time it was transferred to Bardovo). The [4th] Regiment defeated several Russian attempts to cross the river Sorota, taking enemy prisoners and equipment.

Unable to increase their bridgehead towards Southwest and South, the Russians increased pressure against the right flank of the 19th Division. To defeat their attack, it was necessary to call in the 3rd Regiment (just withdrawn from the battleline) and some German units. During the attack of 7 April 1944, Col. Veiss was mortally wounded. He died in Riga on 16 April.

A second powerful Russian thrust, aimed at enlarging their bridgehead towards Northwest, took place on 11 April. After 30 minutes of very heavy artillery fire, the enemy attacked on a 2 km wide front running from Telechino to Aluferovo. The German units holding this sector began to retreat in disorder. The situation was saved only by a counterattack of our 2nd Regiment. In spite of their numerical superiority, the Russians were forced to retreat. When darkness fell, our previous positions had been largely regained, with exception of the Novyy Put' heights, which proved impossible to regain. After this engagement, there were no major operations in the sector held by the 19th Division for the time being.

During the second half of April 1944, the VI SS Corps was gradually transferred to the so-called Bardovo-Kudevere positions, some 50 km East of OPOCHKA. As the spring thaw had begun, the transfer was difficult to accomplish. The sector which the corps had to defend was about 46 km wide; out of that distance, lakes constituted 20 km. The right flank (the so-called Bardovo position) was defended by the 15th Division; the left (the so-called Kudevere position) - by the 19th Division. As the Russians were not too active in this sector, both Divisions began intensive training; various courses were organized. In addition, formation of the 2nd Artillery Regiment [attached to the 19th Division] was begun; the rest of our artillery units were at this time being formed in Vainode [Latvia]. In the middle of May 1944, Col. Plensners (transferred from the staff of the Inspector General to the front by order of Jeckeln) took over the command of the 2nd Regiment; its former commander, Col. Lobe, was named infantry commander of the 19th Division. Col. Silgailis replaced Col. Plensners as the chief of staff of [Inspector General] Bangerskis.

The quiet period in the VI SS Corps sector was suddenly shattered by a Russian assault on height 228,4, lying in the extreme right flank of the 15th Division, and which was later nicknamed "Jani Hill." At 8 AM on 22 June 1944, the enemy opened a heavy artillery barrage against the hill, defended by the 3rd Regiment, and stormed it. Counterattacks, made with regimental reserves, were unsuccessful. Further attempts by the 15th Division, utilizing the 5th Regiment, the 15th Fusiliers Battalion, and units of the German 23rd Division, were likewise unsuccessful; the heights could not be regained. On 26 June, the Russians even managed to extend the breach somewhat, surrounding the 3rd Regiment and some units of the 5th Regiment. However, our surrounded forces broke out during the night, suffering only small losses. This battle had brought about a conflict between

Col. Kripens, (commander of the 3rd Regiment) and divisional commander Heilmann. Kripens requested that he be relieved of command. The request was granted, and on 26 June Lt.-Col. Aperats took over command of the regiment.

Towards the end of June 1944, superior Russian forces, supported by artillery, attacked height 261,1 (the so-called "Gruzdova height") in the 19th Division's sector. Their attacks were repulsed. On 22 June 1944, the Russians began a general offensive in the Vitebsk region, which resulted in the German line being broken through. In the beginning of July, the Red Army was rapidly approaching Vilnius; therefore, the German command was forced to pull back also their forces east of Oepochka. On 9 July, preparations for the retreat began; our service organs, transports, and ammunition reserves were being pulled back. The Russians, whose observation planes often flew over our rear, found this out (or, partisans operating in the German rear could have given the Russians that information). On the morning of 10 July 1944, the Russians opened a concentrated barrage by artillery, mortars, and antitank weapons on a broad front; the fire was chiefly directed against the main roads [in our rear]. Many of our heavy weapons were destroyed before they could begin to return the fire. Thus, when the enemy, supported by tanks, began his assault, our troops began to retreat in a number of locations. The few rounds remaining for our weapons meant that the enemy could not be fought successfully. Regimental and battalion commanders hurriedly attempted to organize resistance in the lines to which the troops were supposed to have retreated, and tried to halt the Russian assault by counterthrusts. These attempts were frustrated by pincer movements of Russian tank forces.

There were many dramatic moments in the course of the Corps' retreat. The brunt of the enemy attack on 10 July was borne by the right wing of the 4th Regiment, holding a sector North of lake Ostriye. Here, Russian tank columns had penetrated deep into our positions. The tanks threatened to outflank us towards the Southwest (in the direction of Krasnoye), and to cut the single route of retreat for the units of the 15th Division (3rd Regiment, 5th Regiment, 15th Fusiliers Battalion), standing South of the lake just mentioned. These units were also threatened by Russian tank forces which had penetrated into the sector held by the German 23rd Division, and were approaching Krasnoye from the Southeast. However, our units managed to retreat behind the river Alolya; that this could be done, was partly due to a counterattack by the 3rd Regiment, and partly to Russian losses and fatigue.

In the 19th Division's sector, the brunt of the Red Army's attack was directed against the 1st Regiment, i.e., immediately North of lake Kudevere. Already at noon the Russians had penetrated 3 km into our lines and reached our artillery positions; there, they were halted by concentrated artillery fire, and our units were thus permitted to retreat. The defense was also aided by a heavy fog. In the sector held by the 2nd and the 6th Regiments (South of the lake), our lines held; the only exception was the extreme right wing of the

6th Regiment, where the Russians managed to break through and imperil that regiment's right flank.

Despite the disorganization caused by the general Russian offensive, both divisions retreated without being surrounded, and early in the morning of 11 July took up new defensive positions (on the western bank of the river Alolya, near Vodobeg, and further on the line Berezovskoye - Dukhnov). Of course, this position, hurriedly manned with disorganized units, could not stem the pursuing enemy. Already on 11 July, the front was broken through in several places; yet, we frustrated Russian efforts to surround our units. Fighting a continuous rear-guard action, the 15th Division during the night of 11/12 July retreated across a narrow neck of land between lakes, near Panov.

The Russians penetrated into the 19th Division's sector through the junction between the 19th and 15th Divisions South of Dukhnov. The 2nd section of the 19th [Latvian numeration: 2nd] Artillery Regiment found itself in a particularly dangerous position. Its route of retreat had been cut by enemy tanks; the unit's antitank guns had no ammunition; simultaneously, the unit was under artillery fire from the rear. Suffering heavy losses, the unit at last broke out. The 15th Artillery Regiment, which retreated together with the 19th Division, also suffered heavy losses. Near Dukhnov, Col. Plensners had an incident with the commander of a VI SS Corps rear guard company, a German lieutenant. Accused of having disobeyed orders, Plensners was arrested and turned over to a military field court. However, the court found that the charges against Col. Plensners were untrue, and released him.

On the morning of 12 July both divisions took up a new position on the line Chernoye - Zvoni - Laptev, some 10-15 km East of OPOCHKA. But already around noon the Russians broke through this position; the fighting lasted all through 12 and 13 July. During the night of 13/14 July our units retreated to the Western shore of the river Velikaya. The retreat was difficult, because there were only two bridges-- near OPOCHKA and Krasnogori; the latter had been prematurely blown up by the Germans. The river was high and the current rapid. Many of our units had to wade across shallows, swim across, or cross the river on improvised rafts. On the Western side of the river Velikaya the Latvians fought until 15 July, when all units were obliged to retreat.

The retreat of the 3rd Regiment was particularly tragic. The regiment (including the 1st Battalion of the 4th Regiment and a company of the 15th Sapper battalion), had 500 men, as well as a German battalion of 240 men. The regiment, commanded by Lt.-Col. Aperats, on 15 July started to retreat in the direction of Pokrovskoye (near Zilupe, east of Karsava, on the Latvian-Russian border). The German battalion, which headed the march, lacked maps, and, instead of Pokrovskoye, reached Kopin on the river Isa, around midnight on 15 July 1944. Since the bridge across the river had been destroyed, the force had to swim across, and -- at the same time -- beat off attacks by strong partisan forces. On the morning of 16 July the group had crossed the river and continued to march North. At Stolbov the exhausted soldiers

rested, and at 1 PM, continued to move North, in the direction of Mozuli. At a crossroads the group surprised a Russian battalion (the battle school, as it turned out, of a Russian division), and totally annihilated it, capturing weapons, horse-drawn transport and motorized transport. Having reached Peski, the battle group met renewed resistance and again attacked the enemy. Then, suddenly, 40 Russian tanks appeared over the crest of Mozuli hill; simultaneously, the enemy attacked the group from the rear. After a desperate battle lasting five hours, Lt.-Col. Aperats' battle group was destroyed: 22 Latvian and 6 German officers, and 300 men, were killed; some 300 were taken prisoner. According to reports, the critically wounded Lt.-Col. Aperats shot himself. Posthumously, he was awarded the German Knights Cross of the Iron Cross. As the battle died down, the wounded Maj. Hazners could only gather around him 4 wounded officers and about 60 men. On the night of 16/17 July, 40 men succeeded in breaking through, and, utilizing swamps and forests, they moved West. It was found, that Aperats' battle group had been in the rear of an entire Red Army corps. Our soldiers, having gone several days without food, ill-armed, and lacking ammunition, had tied the enemy down for an entire day, thus aiding the retreat of the German units, including that of the VI SS Corps. On 17 July, both Latvian divisions crossed the Latvian-Russian frontier East of Karsava.

The retreat organized by the VI SS Corps had been poorly planned. The infantry was asked to do too much. Within the space of 24 hours, the soldiers had to take up more than two defensive positions; the unavoidable consequence of this was the mixing up of units and the lowering of their capacity to resist. The organization of the rear was unbelievably bad. For example, a section of the 19th Division's staff took over the direction of the regiment's supply vehicles. Due to incorrect orders, the vehicles were pulled back too far and could not fulfill their assigned tasks. The field kitchens of some battalions were in Karsava, Rezekne [Latvia], and even near Riga, while our forces were still fighting at Oepochka and Krasnoye. The February, March, and April battles on the banks of the river Velikaya, Southeast of Ostrov, had caused us heavy losses, particularly as regards cadres. The replenishments of the gaps in our ranks (i.e., from the frontier guard regiments), could not replace the losses of officers and NCO's -- neither in a tactical and technical sense, nor in morale. During the stabilization period in the Kudevere position, the best NCO's and soldiers were sent to officers schools and NCO courses; they had yet not returned. This explains the relatively poor performance of the Latvian units during the retreat.

The 19th Division's battles in Vidzeme province, Latvia. On 18 July 1944, general Streckenbach, the divisional commander, met with his regimental commanders in order to decide the fate of the 19th Division. From the Latvians, Col. Lobe (divisional infantry commander), Col. Skaistlauks, Lt.-Col. Taube, Lt.-Col. Kocins, and Maj. Galdins took part in the meeting. In the discussion of organizational questions it became clear, that the division could not be reconstituted on the

lines existing before the 10 July Russian offensive, when each regiment had consisted of three full battalions; the manpower losses were too great. Gen. Streckenbach announced, that for re-forming and training purposes it had been decided to transfer the 15th Division to Germany. The fate of the 19th Division, he said, was an open question; a decision would have to be made. The Latvian commanders should first decide whether their units wanted to participate in the defense of their homeland at all. To the last question, the Latvian commanders unanimously gave affirmative answers. Lt.-Col. Kocins proposed to leave small, heavily armed units in Vidzeme, which, if it came to the worst, could continue a guerrilla war. Col. Lobe stated, that the 19th Division should remain as it was; new reinforcements were needed. The divisional commander agreed, that the divisional form should be nominally retained; the regiments should consist of as many companies as could be handled by the remaining officers. In order that the units would receive tactical tasks commensurate with their true battle strength, the army and corps were advised that the 19th Division had been reduced in strength and for the time being would call itself Kampfgruppe Streckenbach. In order to facilitate the regrouping, the units of the 19th Division were pulled further back (the 1st Artillery Regiment, however, remained in position to support German units). On 20 July, the Division began the march and on 23 July reached the Lubana-Dzelzava region. In a week the regroupment had been accomplished. The regiments were renamed battle groups. The 1st Regiment [Latvian numeration] -- Kampfgruppe-bataillon 42. [German numeration]; the 2nd Regiment [Latvian numeration] -- Kampfgruppe-bataillon 43 [German numeration]; the 6th Regiment [Latvian numeration] -- Kampfgruppe-bataillon 44. [German numeration]. In official documents the units retained their former names. In reducing the infantry regiments, a part of the men were assigned to the 15th Division; the 15th Artillery regiment and the 15th Sapper Battalion, in turn, were now assigned to the 19th Division. The remainder of the 15th Division, including a small nucleus of officers and NCO's, was moved to the Valmiera - Limbazi region; later, during the second half of August, 1944, they were shipped via Riga to Germany, to be utilized as cadres for the new 15th Division forming there. At this time, changes also took place in the command of the VI SS Corps and the 15th Division took place: Generalleutnant Treuenfeld, who had commanded the Corps only since June, was replaced by SS General Krieger; von Obwurzer replaced the 15th Division's former commander General Heilmann.

On 27 July, the 19th Division was ordered to take up positions on the northern shore of Lake Lubans and the forests lying north of the lake. The German units had been pushed back all along the front and were so frightened, that they actually expected the Russians to cross Lake Lubans itself to attack them.

The 19th Division's strength was as follows. Infantry: 1st Regiment (CO, Maj. Galdins) -- six assault companies, a headquarters company, a heavy company with mortars, an antitank platoon; 2nd Regiment (CO, Maj. Stipnieks) -- 4 assault companies, a headquarters company, a heavy company; the divisional reserve battalion (CO, Maj.

Laumanis) -- 3 assault companies and a heavy company; 6th Regiment (CO, Lt.-Col. Kocins) -- 4 assault companies, a heavy company, a headquarters company. Artillery: 1st Artillery Regiment (CO, Col. Skaistlauks) -- 3 light and 1 heavy sections. This force arrived on 8 August, during the time of the Aizkuja - Cesvaine battles. The 2nd Artillery Regiment (CO, Maj. NN), with 2 light sections, arrived only in the beginning of September, when the Division stood at Tirza. Technical units: The 15th Sapper Battalion (1st Lt. Ijabs, CO); the 19th Communications Battalion (CO, maj. Gosepath); the 19th Sapper Battalion (CO, Lt.-col. Saulitis) -- arrived from Czechoslovakia during the second half of August; finally, the 19th Antitank and 506th Antiaircraft units.

Already on 28 July 1944, the 19th Division took up a 40 km wide position on both sides of lake Lubans, on the line Aizkarkles - Ikaunieki - NW shore of lake Lubans - Zvidziena - Lielpurvi - Licagals - Roznieki; the right flank was manned by the 6th, center -- by the 2nd, and left flank -- by the 1st Regiment. On 30 July the Russians attacked our left flank and penetrated to Roznieki, defended by German units. The Germans could not halt the enemy; therefore, the 4th company of the 1st Regiment was sent there. It counterattacked and threw the enemy back. On 1 August, the line held by the 19th Division was extended to Barkava. Between companies now there were 0.5 - 1 km wide gaps of stands of unharvested crops. On 3 August, the Russians broke the resistance of the German divisions, took Varaklani and Barkava, and in the afternoon also Aizkraukles and Licagals. The enemy superiority was enhanced by our artillery's complete lack of ammunition. On 4 August, the Russians, after strong artillery preparation, penetrated into the gaps between the companies of the 6th Regiment. Since the enemy had penetrated into both flanks of the Division, it was ordered to retreat to the left bank of the river Aiviekste during the night of 4/5 August. On 5 August, the Russians began to cross the river and established a bridgehead by capturing a bridge defended by a German punishment battalion. Near Meirani, enemy infantry attempted to cross Aiviekste on rafts; our 6th Regiment destroyed them with bazooka fire. Strong enemy infantry and tank forces now assaulted the flank and rear of the 6th Regiment, coming from across the bridge, from the locality of Ubani, along the Western bank of the river Aiviekste; the enemy was attacking in the direction of Meirani and the town of Madona. Utilizing the deep Meirani forest on its right flank and the Olga swamp behind it, it was possible to patch up the Division's exposed flank after a difficult forest battle. Unable to crush the 1st Regiment's defenses at Licagals, the Russians tried to go around lake Lubans, by forest paths, from the North; they hoped to cut the Lubans - Cesvaine highway on the left flank of the 19th Division -- and that was the only supply road for the entire division. Although the 1st Regiment repulsed a Russian attack along the highway, the enemy, moving by forest paths, went around the left flank of the 19th Division and reached Dambisi (some 3.5 km North of Lake Lubans). On 6 August, the 2nd Regiment, thrown over there by auto transport, and supported by artillery, after a battle lasting seven hours defeated 2 Russian regiments from 2 different divisions.

Still, on the afternoon of 6 August the 19th Division's situation was not good. Our units securely held the positions on the river Aiviekste. The Russians, however, had concentrated strong forces near Cepurites (5 km Northeast of Dambisi) and began a new attack. In order to cut the 19th Division's rear communications, the Russians -- continuing their push against Dzelzava and Madona -- on 6 August threw 2 divisions North; thus, they hoped to bypass the Lubans forest from the West and take the towns of Cesvaine and Dzelzava. Since neither the [German] 16th Army nor the VI SS Corps had any reserves to throw against both of the Russian wings attacking the 19th Division from the North and the South, the situation could only be saved by a retreat from the river Aiviekste position.

Already on 6 August the 2nd Regiment was ordered to pull back to the Cesvaine region. For this move, the Division had only a single road -- the Cesvaine-Lubans highway. Since the 6th Regiment was near Meirani, it had to first get to the highway, skirting the Olga swamp, where its motorized columns bogged down several times. On 7 August 1944 the 19th Division took up new positions on the line Dalgi - Silenieki - Aizkuja - Ataugas - Dravenieki. There, especially in the right wing, began a battle with the Russians, who were attacking on a broad front. Our regiments were placed as follows: Right wing -- 2nd, center -- 6th, left wing -- 1st. Already in the evening of 6 August the 2nd company of the 2nd Regiment came into contact with superior Russian forces near Poteri. When both sides received reinforcements, on 7 August began a struggle on both sides of the road, North and South of Poteri. Both flanks of the 2nd Regiment were exposed. In order to improve the situation, Maj. Stipnieks launched an attack designed to create an unbroken front line. A company commanded by 1st Lt. Butkus took Lejasbulatas. In the afternoon the enemy broke in the forest east of Gaitnieki and Silenieki. An immediate counterattack, led by 1st Lt. Butkus, partly cleared the forest. The 6th Regiment was ordered to attack in the direction of Aizkujas and Silenieki. The attack began on 8 August. The only tie between the 6th and 1st regiments was at Pietnieki; therefore, the brunt of the Russian assaults was directed against this juncture. 1½ Latvian companies were attacked by an entire Russian regiment, supported by artillery. Kalnabulatas also changed hands several times in bitter fighting; yet, the 2nd Regiment managed to retain them. The 6th Regiment took Priednieki, Lejiesi, and Abolkalns, but having suffered heavy losses, could penetrate no further; artillery support was lacking. The commander of the 2nd Regiment, in view of his exposed right flank, in the evening of 8 August decided to pull back to new positions West of Bikseri. With this, ended the so-called "Lubans battles." On 9 August, the 6th and 1st Regiment were also pulled back to new positions; on the whole, the front line now stood along the railroad [running between the towns of] Plavinas and Cesvaine. Already on 9 August, the Russians had penetrated to the Cesvaine railroad station, but were thrown back again.

During the "Lubans battles" the Latvian units achieved the

impossible. No matter how the Russians tried, the Latvian forces could not be surrounded; indeed, they beat the attacker at the southern end of Lake Lubans (6th Regiment), and at Dambisi and Valgi (2nd Regiment). The battles at Dalgi, Aizkujas, and Priednieki frustrated the enemy's effort to take the town of Cesvaine, which, if taken, would have let the Russians to (1) surround the Latvian forces in the Lubans area, and (2) open up the road to the city of Cesis -- this would have meant that Vidzeme province would have been cut in two, and a wedge driven between the German 16th and 18th Armies (the latter was still fighting in Estonia).

On 10 August, the Russians, supported by strong tank forces and using a hitherto unequalled concentration of multiple guns (the so-called "Stalin organs"), attacked the 2nd Regiment. The regiment repulsed the attack, but the German sapper battalion on its right flank buckled under the pressure. The Russians broke through the main line of defense and threatened to envelop the right flank of the 2nd Regiment. Panic threatened to break out in its ranks, and only through the energetic leadership of Maj. Stipnieks were the units rallied and stopped the enemy.

On 12 August, a new defensive position was formed on the line Cesvaine - Ciplisi - Kurpnieki - Nesaule hill. After the retreat to these positions there was a lull in the fighting, which the Division utilized to replenish losses suffered in the preceding battles. The Field Reserve Battalion, which had taken part in all actions, was renamed the 19th Fusiliers Battalion and sent to Jaunpiebalga for training. Col. Lobe (the infantry commander of the 19th Division) was first sent to Zosen to supervise the training of reserve units, and then to Torn [Germany] as second in command of Latvian construction regiments. There, already on 16 December 1944 he was turned over to a field military court, being accused of collaboration with the Latvian resistance movement.

On 20 August the Russians again attacked the Division's right wing, defended by the 2nd Regiment. A heavy struggle, with luck favoring alternatively both sides, now began. After an extremely heavy artillery barrage the Russians on 21 August continued their attack; the center and the left wing of the 2nd Regiment could not stand the pressure and started to retreat North. The attack also hit the right flank of the 6th Regiment, whose 3rd company also started to retreat. Utilizing this breakthrough, the Russian forces rapidly moved in the direction of Karzdaba. However, thanks to a concentrated curtain of fire from our [depressed] antiaircraft guns, personally directed by the divisional commander Gen. Streckenbach, we surprised the Russians and forced their remnants to retreat. The enemy, because of heavy losses, broke off the attack, and there was another lull in the fighting. Thus ended the so-called Cesvaine-Karzdaba battles. During this time all three battle groups received new battalions and discarded the title Kampfgruppe. The grenadier regiments were now 2 battalions strong, had an artillery battery, and sapper and communications platoons. The so-called "Ulrich regiment," consisting of

a German battalion and Lt.-Col. Birzulis' police battalion, was also tactically subordinated to the division.

On 19 August 1944, a Russian tank force had penetrated from Madona to Ergli, threatening to surround all German forces North of the river Daugava. A counterattack by German mechanized units completely defeated this armored wedge at Ergli, and the threat to Riga was averted. The Red Army, which on 1 August had penetrated to the city of Tukums, was thrown back to the city of Jelgava and Siauliai [Lithuania] by General Schoerner's successful counterattack, begun on 16 August. In the second half of August, the front line in Vidzeme province was: Ergli - Skriveri - Liezere - Karzdaba - Cesvaine - Dzelzava - Gulbene - Lejasciems - [The river] - Gauja. Thus, from Liezere to Lejasciems there was a "sack" towards the East; in it, together with other formations of the VI SS Corps, also was the 19th Division.

Knowing, that the enemy would try to pinch off the neck of the "sack," [the army command] mobilized civilians and had them dig a new line of defense on the banks of the rivers Kuja and Tirza, the so-called "Tirza position." During this time, the commander of the 2nd Regiment, Major Stipnieks (who was ill) was replaced by battalion commander Rubenis; the latter was later killed in action in Pomerania in 1945. Awaiting a new Russian attack, the commanders of the VI SS Corps decided to straighten out the front during the night of 11/12 September; this involved a retreat to the "Tirza position." This was a part of a general retreat maneuver, the aim of which was to leave Vidzeme province. For the units retreating frontally, the 20-km march was comparatively easy; both of the pivoting flanks, however, had a much more difficult time. The Russians initially did not notice this maneuver, and even during 12 September opened fire on our empty trenches. Only the 6th Regiment, in the Division's right flank, had to beat off heavy attacks by the pursuing Red Army. The brunt of the attack was directed against the 1st Battalion, commanded by private Praudins. This man, a former captain of the Cesis Regiment [of the independent Latvian army], in the summer of 1942 commanded the 19th ("Latgale") [police] battalion in the Leningrad front. Following a denunciation, a German court-martial sentenced him to death. However, after 3 months of imprisonment in the Riga Central Prison, on intercession of Latvian authorities the sentence was cancelled, and he was sent back to the front as a private. There, the commander of the 6th Regiment ordered him to take charge of a battalion, even though still having the rank of a private. Only on 30 January 1945 was he promoted to major.

During the night of 12/13 September, the 3rd company of the 6th Regiment also left the Karzdaba heights; this rear guard, already surrounded, had still managed to hold all road junctions. On 15 September, the Corps took up positions on the line Liezere - Dobuli - Tospavari - Kujpapieni - Kaulaci - Murani - Kempji - Grote. Already in the late afternoon the Russians were gathering for an attack on the [19th] Division's center, but were defeated already in their own

trenches. The enemy attacks during the days immediately following were also unsuccessful. During this time, Col. Osis replaced Maj. Rubenis as commander of the 2nd Regiment; the latter was sent to the 15th Division in Germany.

In mid-September, the 18th German army was being rapidly evacuated from Estonia. It passed by the rear of the 16th Army to Riga, and from there to Kurzeme [Courland]. Therefore, the Russians tried to break through the front held by the 16th Army, in order to reach the Gulf of Riga, frustrate the evacuation which was proceeding as planned, and destroy at least a part of the German forces in Vidzeme. In this situation, the 19th Division was not destined to remain in the "Tirza position" for long. Fighting rear-guard actions on previously prepared positions near Ranka, Jaunpiebalga, Vecpiebalga, Drusti, Sermuksi, Skujene, and Nitaure, the Division reached the so-called "Sigulda position" during the night of 24/25 September. There, it manned a sector between Silini (3 km North of More), and Purlauri (3 km North of Kartuzi). Two regiments were placed in battle positions: The 6th Regiment to the right, the 1st -- to the left. On 26 September 1944, the Russians, supported by tanks, launched a powerful thrust in a comparatively narrow front sector, in the direction of Nitaure - Sigulda. The brunt of their attack hit the 1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment, where that battalion's 3rd Company defended Mazratnieki. That day the 1st Battalion was attacked by 4 Russian battalions; on 27 September 1944, it was attacked by 9 Russian battalions. Since the Latvian artillery ran out of ammunition, the Russians broke in Mazratnieki six times, but each time were thrown out by counterattacks. With the aid of 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment, the enemy breakthrough was liquidated in the bloodiest close combat ever experienced by the 19th Division. The Russians thrown out of our trenches during the day, tried to attack again during the night of 27/28 September. However, on the morning of 28 September our artillery received ammunition and thus could lay down a curtain of fire on the enemy infantry already in its own positions. Our trenches in the Mazratnieki region had to be filled up -- they were overflowing with Russians killed in close combat, including a regimental commander. In the afternoon of 28 September the Russians attacked the 1st Regiment's position Northeast of Kartuzi. Yet, the regiment, supported by 6 German assault guns, regained its positions on 29 September. With this, the "More battles" came to a close; they were the last ones for the 19th Division in the Vidzeme province of Latvia. The Division not only held its sector against an enemy nine times stronger, but even defeated it, notwithstanding the fact that the Russian infantry attacked supported by artillery, mortar, antitank gun, and tank fire. During the night of 6/7 October 1944 the 19th Division left Sigulda and started to move towards Kurzeme province. On 10 October, it crossed the river Daugava near Mazjumprava, and, bypassing Riga from the South, continued its march towards Dzukste, [in Kurzeme], which it reached on 11 October. Only the 15th Artillery

Regiment, together with German batteries, still had to fight from 8 - 13 October 1944 near Ropazi and Rumpmuiza, in order to relieve the increased Russian pressure on Riga along the right shore of Daugava. During this time our batteries used up more ammunition than ever before. During the night of 13/14 October the artillery regiment crossed the Ramava army bridge across Daugava, and proceeded by highway to Bitskepi (some 30 km South of the town of Tukums) in order to take part in further battles of the 19th Division.

In their retreat from Latgale province, and -- particularly -- from Vidzeme province, the German armies continued the "scorched earth" tactics pursued in Russia. The rural population was driven out from their homes to dig trenches; the buildings, not excepting churches, were set on fire and destroyed, even those which were of no military significance whatsoever. Only when general Bangerskis protested against these actions, did general Schoerner, commander of Army Group North, point out in a special bulletin to his troops, that: Latvia was not enemy territory; it was forbidden to destroy crops and to senselessly slaughter cattle, rob, and requisition property without authorization, particularly the property of refugees. In this connection, it was said that most complaints were directed against the units composed of volunteers of Russian nationality who had lived in Latvia, and members of the Todt organization.

As regards evacuation of the population, there was no agreement among either Latvian or German authorities. One day it was announced that Riga would be held at any cost and that Vidzeme would not be evacuated; the second day this announcement was cancelled. It was clear, that for technical reasons alone it was impossible to totally evacuate the 500,000 inhabitants of Vidzeme -- the roads were clogged with retreating army units. Kurzeme could not support that many evacuees. Jeckeln, the police chief, stated in a conversation to Bangerskis on 19 September, that only the families of soldiers would be evacuated. The rest of the population was contained in a 15-20 km deep strip in back of the front line, and forced to dig fortifications -- a completely senseless task. The Latvian policemen on independent duty (some 2,000 men) were gathered in Riga for transportation to Germany. Russians [i.e., citizens of Latvia of Russian nationality] were appointed in their place. The Russian civilians evacuated from Russia, as well as the Russian prisoners released for farm work -- these, too, now began to reveal their true colors. In Riga, Generalkommissar Lohse was replaced by Koch, the former boss of the Ukraine; Koch ordered the liquidation of the [Latvian] Local Authority. He also ordered that no one be left in Riga and Vidzeme whom the Russians could use as a soldier or as a worker. On 27 September, Jeckeln told Bangerskis about this decision. In order to hasten voluntary evacuation, a special Evacuation Headquarters was established at the Generaldirektorium for Internal Affairs [reference to a department of the Latvian Local Authority]; it was headed by J. Niedra. On 6 October, by order of Jeckeln, people were literally hunted down in the streets of Riga for transportation to Germany. When

Bangerskis objected to such deportation methods, Jeckeln answered, that Germany needed all men who could bear arms, and that Germany was not Siberia. The removal of the inhabitants of Riga took place mostly by night, in ships escorted by German naval units, sailing from Daugavgriva. The Russians often bombed the refugee ships with incendiaries, sinking several vessels. The rural population proceeded to Kurzeme by horse transport. Riga fell to the Russians on 13 October 1944.

The 19th Division's battles in Kurzeme province: See Latvju Enciklopedija, under entry "Kurzemes Cietoksnis" [Fortress Courland].

The 15th Division's battles in Germany. After its arrival in Gotenhaven and Danzig, the remainder of the 15th Division at the end of August 1944, was shipped to the West Prussian training area between Bietow and Behrendt. Here, the Division's ranks were augmented with men born in 1925 and 1926 (part of these Latvians were already in Germany, having been drafted into the Reichsarbeitsdienst, or RAD). Unfortunately, training was hampered by lack of weapons and other battle equipment. The Division was not yet ready, when on the night of 21/22 January 1945 it was ordered to move South via Konitz and to organize a line of defense along the Oder - Vistula canal; the 15th Division's left flank was to be in contact with the German garrison of the city of Bromberg.

On 12 January, the great Russian offensive had begun. Having broken through the German front, the Red Army rapidly pushed westward, simultaneously also widening the breach towards the Northwest. Already in the second half of January it was approaching West Prussia and Pomerania.

Going into battle, the 15th Division had only 58% of the required vehicles and 64% of the required horse transport. Due to lack of fuel, the Division already in the first days of fighting lost many heavy weapons -- there simply was no way to move them. The soldiers had no winter clothing, and their boots and uniforms were badly worn. Many lacked helmets. The 15th Artillery Regiment had started to form late; only in December 1944, did it receive cadres from the Latvian artillery units stationed in Kurzeme. The Division had to reorganize its regiments from 3 to 2 battalions within the space of a few hours; instead of a whole artillery regiment, only one unit with 4 batteries could be set up.

The 15th Reconnaissance Battalion was the first one to be sent to the front; it arrived there by motor transport on 22 January. Already on 23 January, it met Russian resistance. Our troops took Immenheim by storm; there, they freed some 1,000 construction regiment soldiers from captivity. On 24 January, the 3rd Regiment, together with the 15th Sapper battalion, took the town of Nackel. Street fighting there lasted until the morning of 25 January. The rest of divisional units arrived peacemeal and took up positions East of Nackel. The 15th Division could not completely accomplish its assigned task, since the Russians had already taken Bromberg, and their motorized units threatened the Division's open left flank.

Simultaneously, the Russian frontal pressure against the 15th Division increased. On 25 January, they broke in the Hochenberg area, completely scattering the 15th Reconnaissance battalion.

On 26 January, the commander of the 15th Division, von Obwurzer, was reported to be missing in action. The units of the 15th Division managed to break out of the encirclement, but at cost of heavy losses. Only the 4th Regiment, after bitter fighting, on 26 January managed to frustrate Russian efforts to envelop the Division's left flank. During the night of 26/27 January this regiment retreated to a new position, and later, to a neck of land between the Weilensee lakes. On 27 January, our dispersed units could not resist the enemy. Enveloping the open left flank of the Division, the Russians cut the Immenheim - Wandsburg road, i.e., the Division's route of retreat. Since Russian tanks had also been spotted between Wandsburg and Konitz, the Division retreated West, towards Flatow. On the morning of 28 January the remnants of the Division took up a new defensive position on both sides of the Wandsburg - Wilkenschwald highway. With this, ended the so-called "Nackel battle" which caused heavy losses to the Latvian soldiers. Yet, although lacking proper clothing and weapons, in great cold and snowstorms, our young men tenaciously fought against an enemy much stronger in numbers and equipment. Only 2 Latvian batteries took part in the fighting (they had been motorized on the way to the front), while the other two, horse-drawn, arrived only on 27 January, when the 15th Division was already retreating. Moreover, our artillery was handicapped by lack of ammunition.

Already on 29 January, Russian forces, supported by tanks, attacked the Wilkenschwald position and forced the units of the 15th Division to retreat to Kujan creek during the day; in the afternoon, Russian tanks once more pushed back the dispersed and exhausted units. Moving cross-country, our troops reached Flatow on the morning of 30 January; there, they took up positions about 2 km East of the town. During the night of 30/31 January the remnants of the 15th Division retreated to Jastrow. There, it was found out, that Russian mechanized forces had already encircled the Division, and that the ring was constantly growing tighter. The Division had lost its anti-tank guns during the previous battles; our motorized transport capacities, already reduced, were overtaxed with more than 500 wounded. The 15th Division's battle strength had been sharply reduced: For example, in Jastrow the 4th Regiment could only form a company each from 2 battalions.

During this time, the divisional commander was an incapable old gentleman who lacked will power. He ordered, that while breaking through the encirclement, the 4th Regiment be assigned to German units at Jastrow. The 5th Regiment, together with the remnants of the 3rd Regiment, were ordered to proceed to Flederborn. Approaching it, the 5th Regiment on the evening of 31 January 1945 ran into Russian forces. Attacking the Russians from the rear, the regiment defeated them, capturing 3 antitank guns and 150 Polish prisoners from the Sikorsky and Kosciuszko divisions. The Russians, however, were still

blocking the Division's route of retreat by holding it under artillery fire from the Jastrow heights. The 15th Reconnaissance battalion was ordered to attack these heights. The battalion, at the cost of heavy losses, carried out its task, capturing quantities of weapons. As the enemy ring was progressively growing tighter, the divisional commander ordered the units to retreat to Flederborn and from there to Landeck (except the 4th Regiment, which was to remain in Jastrow as rear guard). Reaching the village of Flederborn during the late afternoon of 2 February, our columns bunched up on the road 3-4 rows deep, since [up ahead] the Russians had cut the road to Landeck. In the evening, the 4th Regiment also retreated from Jastrow. The Russians, having approached from Flederborn, opened concentrated fire from all arms from a distance of 1 km, from both sides of the road, on our bunched-up troops. Immediately they scattered; each sought to escape on his own, running towards Landeck. The losses were extreme. A few kilometers before Wallachsee the mixed-up units of the Division again bunched up on the road, several rows deep, under enemy artillery fire. The battle for the possession of the road lasted 11 hours. Finally, at noon of 3 February the road was cleared and the march could proceed. However, 1.5 km South of Landeck the Russians once more blocked the road. The divisional column bunched up within a space of 1.5 km, which was under direct enemy artillery fire. Throwing our still remaining soldiers into battle, the 15th Division finally broke through the encirclement. In this battle, Maj. Rubenis, commander of the 3rd Regiment, Capt. Eglitis, commander of the 15th Artillery Regiment, the commander of the liaison battalion, and many others, were killed. These were the 15th Division's bloodiest days during the entire Pomeranian campaign.

The remnants of the Division were already on 4 February ordered to take up positions on the northern shore of Dobrinka, between Landeck and Pruetzenwald. Here, the 3rd Regiment was dissolved; its remaining personnel was assigned to the 4th Regiment. With the help of replacements sent by the Latvian Field Replacement Depot, the 4th and 5th Regiments were brought back up to the strength of 2 battalions each. The remnants of the 15th Artillery Regiment formed 2 batteries. On 10 February, the Division moved to the Kamin area, where it received one more artillery battery. Already on 11 February a Russian attack forced the 5th Regiment to retreat North, and the 4th Regiment to bend back both flanks towards Kamin, where on 13 February the Russians encircled it. But the 4th Regiment broke out, and, as ordered, reached the rendezvous point at Klausfeldt; there the 15th Division stood in reserve until 18 February. On 15 February, Burk was appointed as divisional commander. On 18 February, he ordered the 15th Division to proceed back to Landeck and to man the same Dobrinka positions which had been left on 10 February. As on 24 February the Russians attacked to the left of the 15th Division and penetrated further and further towards the Northwest, the Division during the night of 24/25 February was ordered to retreat to new positions. Unable to effect contact with the French "Charlemagne" division fighting on its left, the 15th Division left this position

during the night of 25/26 February, because the Russians -- utilizing the wide gap between the ["Charlemagne" and 15th] Divisions -- started to encircle the left flank of the 15th Division; on the morning of 26 February enemy tanks had already reached Kl[eine] Kuedde, site of the divisional headquarters. Having beaten off all Russian frontal attacks, the Division in the evening of 26 February retreated to Kl[eine] Kuedde, which already on 27 February was taken by the Red Army. On 27 February, our forces (still small in numbers, since stragglers were yet arriving) gathered in Wurchow. On 28 February, the Division was ordered to man the position Bahnhof Elfenbusch - Kussow; this it held until 3 March 1945. On that day the Russians began a general offensive on the Pomeranian front; its objective was to destroy the German forces East of Stettin. This offensive split the Division into three parts. The headquarters service unit, together with the divisional supply units and the 15th Liaison Battalion, were surrounded in Kolberg. The rest of the service units, together with wagons transporting regimental equipment, managed to break through the encirclement near Swinemuende, and to reach the Neu - Brandenburg area on 6/7 March.

The Russians, aided by large artillery and tank concentrations, started their assault on the 15th Division on 3 March. Although the defenders fought doggedly, they were forced back step by step. Having fought desperately in a number of positions taken up one after another, the 15th Division on 4 March stood on the line Damen - Zadtkow. On that day the leadership told the unit commanders, that the Russians had broken through the Pomeranian front, and that enemy tanks had reached the seacoast in two locations -- near Kolberg and Kamin (East of Swinemuende). Thereby, the German III Corps (the so-called Tetow corps), which besides the 15th Division also included 3 German divisions and the French "Charlemagne" division, had been surrounded. The corps had planned for each division to retreat separately, unite East of Stettin, and then break out together. The 15th Division on 5 March began to retreat along the Lutzig - Witznitz road. The "Charlemagne" Division retreated to the North of the 15th Division, and the 3 German ones -- to the South. The retreat was very slow, since infantry, motorized columns, and horse-drawn vehicles moved in a single column. The march proceeded by little side roads, where cars often sank into mud and delayed progress; in that case, they were simply pushed into a ditch and abandoned. Long columns of refugees, proceeding by the same route, caused huge traffic jams. Fortunately, the Red Army did not disturb the movement of the 15th Division, with the exception of some aerial attacks. On the evening of 6 March, the Division reached the vicinity of Witznitz, where, by order of the Corps command, it destroyed all of its heavy weapons, cars, wagons, etc., so as not to hamper the breaking out of small units. However, the 4th Regiment, which formed the rear guard and was not in contact with Divisional headquarters, did not receive this order. On the evening of 7 March, the Division retreated Northwest along the Broitz - Zadtkow road; on 9 March it retreated further to the seacoast at Fischerkatzen - Horst. Having reached the seacoast,

the Division now was the corps' formation which stood furthest to the East; therefore, it was ordered to secure the retreat for the rest of the Corps' units along the coast. To fulfill this task, the 4th Regiment took up defensive positions near Zedlin, and the 5th Regiment -- positions a few kilometers East of Horst. On 10 March, both regiments after bitter fighting repulsed several Russian attacks, which were carried out with support of tanks. The Division's situation was desperate. The soldiers, having fought uninterruptedly for weeks, suffering great hunger, were close to collapse. During the last weeks they had been obliged to live off the country. But, since thousands of soldiers and refugees had crossed this area before them, there was nothing left to eat. On the evening of 10 March, the 15th Division was also permitted to retreat West along the coast, in order to slip through the encirclement by passing through a neck of land between a lake and the seacoast. The Red Army attempted to bar the route of retreat, and had to be repeatedly beaten off. The fighting at Hof on 10 and 11 March 1945 was particularly bitter; there, the 15th Artillery Regiment excelled with its heroism. On 12 March, the 15th Division (minus the 4th Regiment) crossed the bridge across the narrows at Diewenow. The 4th Regiment, which served as the rear guard for the entire Corps, crossed over only during the night of 13 March. With this, ended the battles in Pomerania. Here, Col. V. Janums in particular had showed great coolness of judgment and able leadership; for this, he was awarded the German Cross in gold.

The Latvian forces surrounded in Kolberg were transported to Swinemuende by the German Navy, on 17 March. However, those units of the Division which remained in the West Prussian training area (CO, Lt.-Col. Rebergs), had to retreat to Danzig and Gotenhaven, where eventually they were taken prisoner by the Russians. Only 176 soldiers managed to escape to Bornholm. After a brief internment, the Swedish government turned them over to Russia.

Having escaped encirclement, the 15th Division now stood some 15 km West of Swinemuende. It was ordered to turn over its weapons to German battle units. This created much dissatisfaction, since the Latvian soldiers had not discarded their weapons, but had carried them out on their backs. During this time our troops were literally starving. The Division received its first food, and even that in inadequate quantities, on 16 March. On 20/21 March, the Division was transferred to the Neu-Brandenburg area, where the soldiers rested somewhat. Since our troops had no weapons, the higher German commands wanted to break the Division up and assign our soldiers to German units, piecemeal. With the intervention of gen. Bangerskis, this fate was avoided.

On 27 March, arrivals of troops from the Latvian Field Replacement Depot allowed the 3rd Regiment to be reconstituted. On 30 March the Division was transferred to the Fuerstenberg - Lichen area (20-25 km from Neu-Strelitz). The unarmed soldiers were alarmed, since on 11 April began the Russian offensive against the Oder position; at the same time, the German plan to transport the 15th Division back to

Kurzeme [Latvia] became known. The Latvian commanders decided, that in the latter case they would not obey the order; rather, under the leadership of col. Janums, the Division would proceed West and surrender to the Anglo-Americans. The Inspector General interceded again and managed to secure the [German] command's promise to leave the 15th Division in Germany, and, in case of capitulation, to do everything possible to prevent the Latvian soldiers' being captured by the Russians.

Suddenly, on 19 April, the Division was ordered to set up one battle regiment consisting of 3 battalions. It was to consist of the 15th Reconnaissance Battalion and a battalion each from the 3rd and 4th Regiments. Col. Janums was named commander of this regiment. Only shortly before its departure did it become known, that the regiment was to proceed to Herzfeld, 15 km East of Berlin, to participate in the defense of that city. The 15th Reconnaissance Battalion, which left separately, by motor transport, got lost on the way; no concrete information about its subsequent fate has been found. On 20 April, the rest of the regiment arrived in Herzfeld. Realizing, that remaining in Berlin would mean the end of the regiment, Col. Janums decided to proceed West. He ordered the battalion commanders to avoid unnecessary engagements; in case of Russian attack, the troops were to retreat, bypassing Berlin from the South. The regiment reached its previously determined rendezvous point at Blankenfeld during the night of 21/22 April. On 22 April, the regiment, after a 65 km march, arrived in Fichtenwald. On 23 April, Russian tanks broke in Fichtenwald, cutting off the regimental headquarters from the body of the troops. In accordance with previous instructions, the units retreated to Freienthal, where on the evening of 23 April the regiment was united again. Moving from one forest to another, the regiment reached Lindau on 26 April. There, it was found that American forces were in Gueterglueck, where the regiment then laid down its arms on 27 April 1945.

On 28 April, when Russian tank columns were already closing in on Neu-Strelitz, the 15th Division was ordered to proceed to Malchiner See, which it reached in the afternoon of 29 April. Fearful of being surrounded, the units of the 15th Division began to retreat westwards, towards Schwinz, on their own. Here for the last time the 15th Division was ordered to take up defensive positions on the line Goldberg-Nienhagen. However, since the commander of the 15th Division knew of the Latvian decision to surrender to the Anglo-Americans, he permitted the order to be disregarded. On 2 May 1945, almost all divisional units had gathered in Schweriner Forst, when it became known that American forces were approaching Schwerin. Having established contact with the Americans, the soldiers of the 15th Division at 6 P.M. that day laid down their arms and began the road to the prisoner-of-war camp. On 2 May 1945, British forces took Luebeck, site of headquarters of the Inspector General of the Latvian Legion.

Numerical strength of the Latvian Legion and other Latvian units.

According to data available to the Inspectorate General [of the Latvian Legion], on 1 July 1944, the following number of citizens of

Latvia were under arms and fighting Bolshevism:

<u>Type of unit.</u>	<u>Number of men.</u>
(1) In the Latvian Legion:	
15th Division	14,241
19th Division	12,298
"Jelgava" brigade	4,907
Subtotal: 31,446	
The five Frontier Guard regiments	12,118
Police regiments and gendarmerie battalions	14,884
On independent police duty	5,240
"C group" auxiliary police (<u>aizsargi</u>)	22,262
Aviation Legion <u>Latvija</u>	628
Various other units	972
Total no. of men in Legion:	87,550
(2) Outside the Latvian Legion:	
German army auxiliaries (<u>HiWi's</u>)	12,159
In units consisting of citizens of Latvia of Russian nationality	7,671
The German Navy	900
<u>Sicherheitsdienst</u> (SD)	847
<u>Todt</u> organization, etc.	1,167
Total no. of men outside Legion	22,744
(3) Losses of the Legion to 1 July 1944:	
Killed or died	3,367
Missing in action	2,417
Wounded	7,305
Total losses:	13,089
(4) Supplementary mobilization from 1 July to 18 August 1944:	
For front-line service (mainly from categories previously exempted)	15,684
For airfield crews	3,543
For anti-aircraft and searchlight crews	4,000
Total supplementary mobil.:	23,227
<u>GRAND TOTAL:</u>	<u>146,610</u>

Of course, the above data is only approximate. Actually, the above-mentioned total, constituting 8 percent of the population of Latvia of that time, should even be greater. This is because the Inspectorate

General had no data about the citizens who immediately after 1 July 1941 voluntarily joined German battle formations and other units of a military nature (for example, the so-called Brandenburg Regiment). As usual, the number of men who were killed in action cannot be accurately determined; another source gives it as 3,914 (to 1 July 1944). It should be remembered, that Latvian gendarmerie and police units were scattered all over Russia and attached to German units in small groups. It is impossible to determine the number of men killed, wounded, or missing from 1 July 1944 to 8 May 1945; that number is estimated to be around 50-60,000. The names of those killed in action appeared in the newspaper Nedelas Apskats [Weekly Review], organ of the B[altic] C[entral] C[ouncil], which from 1946 to 1949 was published in Detmold, Germany.

National Welfare. Since May 1943, Karaviru Palidziba [Soldiers Aid] was the organization responsible for caring for the Latvian soldiers' cultural needs; it operated a front-line theater, arranged concerts, and financed the Legion's newspaper Daugavas Vanagi [The Falcons of Daugava]. Since 1944, the Inspectorate General published a monthly called Nakotne [Future]; it was financed by the main administration of the SS. During the battles in Kurzeme [reference to 19th Division's battles, not discussed here], Latvijas Kareivis [Soldier of Latvia], and other front-line materials were published. Since November, 1944 the Latvian administration in Berlin twice a week published a paper named Latvju Balss [Latvian Voice]. With the aid of the Ostministerium, in beginning of December, 1944 a theater troupe, consisting of 26 of the best actors of the "Nacionalais," "Dailes," and "Daugavpils" theaters, was set up; K. Veics was its director.

Next to these more or less officially sponsored agencies, cultural events were spontaneously organized in the separate units of the Legion, as soon as they were withdrawn from the battle lines. Thus, for example, the 1st ("Riga") Construction Regiment (stationed in barracks in Pozemsdorf, Germany in 1944) had an orchestra under the direction of Lt. P. Banders, and a men's choir conducted by R. Zuika -- these two musical sections had been established while the Regiment was still in Latvia. The "Kurzeme" Construction Regiment, stationed in Torn, had a men's choir too (conductors: P. Dreimanis, A. Tulgis, T. Kenins). A. Lindbergs, the violinist, also gave performances. Moreover, the "Riga" regiment published a monthly Riga dimd [reference to Latvian folk song] (2 issues), and the "Kurzeme" Regiment -- a weekly entitled Kurzemnieks [The Courlander], of which 6 issues appeared. On 20 January 1945, when the retreat battles began, these activities ceased.

They were again renewed in the prisoner-of-war camps. Already in the beginning of May 1945, a Culture and Educational Section of the 15th Division was established at Camp Hagenau; it was headed first by Rev. A. Kraulis, later by Capt. Vevers. Trade and language courses were set up in individual units, and a whole series of lectures on various questions were held.

Division-wide lectures were held in an open space (formerly a

target practice area for tanks). There, issues of the day were discussed by Col. A. Kripens, Col. K. Lobe, P. Lazdins (a former lecturer at the Latvian State University), the writer K. Dzilleja, etc. The actors K. Dzelzitis and A. Mitrevics were guests at literary events. Wood carving, art, and fine arts were actively represented; a total of 7 shows, with over 100 art objects, 40 paintings and drawings, were exhibited.

When the 15th Division was transferred to [the prisoner-of-war area] in the hilly seashore forests near Putlos, the soldiers began to construct huts and entire villages from planks, branches, reeds, etc., the vicinity of which was decorated with seashells, stones, and so forth. In these camps, Lt. R. Zuika reestablished his choir, and gave 23 concerts. The choir took first place in the German divisional competition with J. Straume's song "By the Baltic Sea." In the German divisional competition for original works, the composer L. Bastiks took first place with 2 songs for men's choirs. The 15th Division also had a 17-man brass band, conducted by Garoza; the band also had a group of 8 singers.

Moreover, musicians and soloists from nearby Latvian Displaced Persons camps often visited the Latvian soldiers (for example, L. Marsalka, K. Bidina, J. Franks, H. Luse, T. Brilts, O. Ilzins, A. Teichmanis, J. Medins, A. Kalnins); so did the "Kokle" choir from Luebeck (conductor, E. Marsans) and the choir from DP camp in Geesthacht (conductor: E. Brusubarda).

Already on 10 May 1945, an Information Bulletin began to appear in Camp Hagenau; with its 50th issue, it became a daily newspaper named Laika Griezoz [In the Cross-Currents of Time]. This publication requested the soldiers to write diaries and send in information about those killed and wounded; in such a manner, a list of over 1,000 names was made up. Ten additional publications were issued by units of the 15th Division, two of which enjoyed division-wide distribution. One of these was Nameja Gredzens [symbolic reference to Latvian independence], the other -- Sporta Vestnesis [Sports News]. In addition, the regiments, and even companies, issued a number of typewritten and handwritten publications: Saucejs [The Crier], Atskabarga [The Splinter], Staburags [The Cliff of Staburags], Trimdnieka Gaitas [In Exile], Svesas Takas [Along Foreign Paths], Letins Gusta [The G.I. Prisoner], Vecie Puikas [Old Boys], Pie Baltijas Juras [By the Baltic Sea], etc.; here, the young writers and artists found full expression for their talents. The 5th Regiment gathered the texts and melodies of 180 Latvian soldier songs; the committee which gathered them included R. Zuika, J. Sakss, R. Berzins, K. Skuja.

In September 1945, the soldiers of the 15th Division were transferred from Putlos to a prisoner-of-war camp in Zedelghem, Belgium; here, they were also joined by Col. Janums' group. 11,160 Latvians were interned in this camp; most of them came from the Riga, Valmiera, Valka, and Liepaja districts of Latvia; the smallest number was from Ilukste district. Since the supplementary mobilization for the 15th Division had taken place in July and August of 1944, at which time the

Russians had already occupied Zemgale and Latgale provinces, then a smaller number of soldiers of the 15th Division stemmed from these two provinces. The supplementary mobilization of the summer of 1944 accounted for 30 percent of the interned soldiers; about 50 percent had been in the war since 1943. Most of the soldiers (4,934) were farmers and farm laborers; in addition, there were 1,776 craftsmen, 1,158 employees, 1,052 high school and college students, 1,144 workers. The main age groups were: 18-20 year olds -- 2,172; 21-25 -- 3,639; 26-30 -- 1,675; 31-35 -- 1,984; 36-40 -- 1,302. The relatives of a number of soldiers in Camp Zedelghem had remained in Latvia: For 8,759 -- their parents, for 2,259 -- their wives, and for 1,767 -- even their children. They could do nothing to save their relatives from abroad. This explains the circumstance why 218 of the soldiers in Zedelghem were repatriated to Soviet-occupied Latvia; the insufficient food handed out to the prisoners was also a contributing factor. In order to improve the situation, Latvian Red Cross sections in Brussels and Luebeck sent gift parcels and medicines to the sick and invalided soldiers, who [after capitulation] had been transferred from the divisional reserve battalion in Denmark [to Zedelghem].

The daily newspaper Laika Griezios and the monthly Nameja Gredzens continued to appear, as did the satirical monthly Atskarbarga. A men's choir (conducted by Mikelsons) was active, and a variety show gave about 50 performances. High school extension courses, headed by P. Kalnins, were set up: One section (250 participants) was for high school graduates, the other (450 participants) -- for persons having a grade-school education. A college extension section and various language and trade courses also were conducted. Artists decorated the barracks with Latvian ornaments, maps of Latvia, and the coat of arms of Latvia. A shop section made furniture from wooden boxes.

The Latvian War Veterans society Daugavas Vanagi [The Falcons of Daugava] was founded in Zedelghem.

By order of the headquarters of the British Rhine Army, 8,500 of the Latvian soldiers interned in Camp Zedelghem were transferred to the British Zone of Germany (7-27 March 1946) and distributed among 8 military camps, while 156 ill soldiers were sent to German military hospitals. The remaining 3,000 soldiers were transferred from Belgium to Germany from 11-28 May 1946. The men were released from prisoner-of-war camps. All -- with the exception of Baltic Germans -- were given Displaced Persons status without individual screening. This was due to a cardinal decision of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Great Britain, to the effect, that "the soldiers of the Latvian Legion are not to be considered [Nazi] collaborators, except in cases where it can be proved that they had served voluntarily." All in all, British organizations dealt with the question of Baltic prisoners-of-war with a correct understanding of their tragic fate.

The freeing of Latvian soldiers from the American prisoner-of-war camps proved to be much more difficult; there, they were dispersed among the large (10,000-man) German camps, especially in Bavaria

(Regensburg, Dachau, Babenhausen, Heilbronn, etc.). Latvian organizations had to first contact them, make up name lists, and then to try to have them assigned to separate Baltic units. The Americans first freed [the men serving in] units of the German Wehrmacht; however, they considered the soldiers of the Waffen SS, as soldiers of the [Nazi] Party voluntary forces; therefore, they were classified as war criminals. Later, the classification was made less stringent; however, it was added, that only the SS soldiers mobilized in 1944 would be freed; as for the rest, the NCO's (beginning with rank of sergeant) and all officers would remain for individual screening in civil internment. Following this decision, the camps holding SS men began to empty slowly. For example, from 26-29 June 1946, 641 Latvian soldiers were freed from Camp Regensburg, but 30 officers and NCO's were retained. Since the documents of the men freed were marked with the notice that they had been Waffen SS soldiers, then they automatically were excluded from Displaced Persons camps and care by UNRRA. Only after repeated explanatory memoranda forwarded to the headquarters of the American 3rd Army by the Latvian Red Cross, the Latvian Central Committee, and Archbishop T. Grinbergs [of the Lutheran Church of Latvia], did those headquarters in July and August 1946 order the documents of the released Latvian soldiers to be marked to the effect that they had been in "the Latvian Legion of the Wehrmacht," or simply Wehrmacht members. At the same time the release of Latvian officers held in civil internment (for the most part in Darmstadt), was begun. All in all, this action had ended by September, 1946.

In July of 1945, a total of about 20,750 Latvian soldiers were in British prisoner-of-war camps: In Putlos (Col. Kripens' group) -- 9,700; in Vesterboro (Col. Osis' group) -- 4,000; in the Heide-Hussum area (Lt.-Col. Viksnins' group) -- 2,500; in Neuengamm (Lt.-Col. Veckalnins' group) -- 1,200; in Belgium (Col. Janums' group) -- 1,550. When the soldiers held in American and French camps are added to the above number, the total number of Latvian soldiers in Western Europe at the time of [German] capitulation increases to about 25-30,000.

LIST OF PHOTOGRAPH CAPTIONS APPEARING IN THE SOURCE, BUT NOT REPRODUCED FOR THIS REPORT:

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1289	"A Latvian police battalion leaves for the front, 1941."
1290	"The 10 February 1943 order, signed by Hitler and Himmler, concerning the formation of the Latvian Legion."
1292	"A Latvian legionnaire in Volkhov, October 1943."
1293	"Latvian youths drafted in German army auxiliaries."
1294	"A flier of the Latvian Aviation Legion."
1294	"Machinegunners in street battles in Jelgava."
1295	"Street fighting in a city in Latgale province. A German tank moves through the rubble."
1295	"Men of the construction regiments digging a defensive

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	position near Pozemsdorf (Torn), December 1944."
1296	"A bunker of the legionnaires of the 19th Division in Volkhov."
1296	"A group of Latvian legionnaires in Volkhov, October 1943."
1297	"The funeral of the first Latvian legionnaire killed in Volkhov, N. Mastickis, on 3 May 1943. Col. Veiss, commander of the 1st Regiment, stands at the grave."
1297	"Legionnaires being transported along narrow-gauge railroad, the Volkhov front."
1297	"The main road (the so-called 'Erika' road) from the headquarters of the 19th Division to the forward positions."
1298	"Forward positions in Volkhov, August 1943."
1298	"In capt. Skrauja's advanced headquarters in Zaklinye village, 4 February 1944, From the left, Capt. Skrauja, Capt. Stipnieks, Col. Lobe."
1299	"The so-called 'Imanta house' in Volkhov, August 1943. Third from the left -- Col. Veiss; Fourth -- Col. Lobe."
1299	"In an underground bunker in Volkhov, just before battle."
1300	"Command point of the 'Imanta' regiment on the banks of the Velikaya, March 1944. Regimental commander col. Lobe and his aide-de-camp Capt. N."
1301	"Proceeding to forward positions with full battle equipment."
1301	"Col. Kocins walking along a timber-paved road, Volkhov."
1302	"The commander of the 19th Division, general Streckenbach, and Col. Lobe -- just having been decorated."
1302	"Observing new enemy positions in Russia."
1303	"The Inspector General visits the front (the Imanta regiment command point), June 1944. Left -- Gen. Bangerskis; right -- regimental commander Col. Plensners."
1303	"Col. A. Silgailis, chief of staff of the Inspector General of the Latvian Legion (right), in Hela peninsula, not far from Danzig. Fall, 1944."
1304	"3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the Latvian Legion, near lake Kudevere."
1304	"On an improvised raft, across the 40 m wide Ushochka river, South of Vetrino, 19 April 1944."
1305	"Firing at Russian planes."
1306	"Assault on a height near the Latvian border."
1306	"15th Division's regimental commander lt.-col. K.

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1307	Aperats, recipient of the Knight's Cross." "A group of Latvian cadets of the Bad Toeltz military academy in Bavaria, leaving for ski training in the Alps, 8 March 1944."
1308	"An antitank gun being pulled into position."
1309 (map)	"The Dalgi-Aizkuja battles."
1310	"The 19th Division's company commander lt. Butkus, recipient of the Knight's Cross."
1311	"Ruins of the destroyed Ergli village."
1312	"Red Army prisoners digging a canal for floating timber, Ugale area, summer 1942."
1312 (map)	"The battle of More."
1313	"Riga on fire, 13 October 1944, View from across Daugava."
1315	"Soldiers of the 15th Division near Tichow, Pomerania, being told that they are encircled by the enemy."
1316	"In Horst, near Swinemuende, under Russian artillery fire; the 15th Division is breaking through enemy encirclement on 10 March 1945. All around are seen men killed in action."
1317	"Latvian soldiers in Schwerin forest on 2 May 1945, one hour before becoming prisoners of war."
1318	"The Putlos prisoner of war camp, 27 July 1945. Col. Lobe is addressing the legionnaires; further back is seen R. Zuika's choir."
1319/top left/	"Latvian soldiers surrendering to the British, Putlos."
1319/top right/	"The POW camp near Hagenau, beginning of May, 1945."
1319/mid. left/	"Prisoners receiving their daily rations."
1319/mid. right/	"Waiting for dinner, Danau village, Putlos."
1319/lower left/	"A house built by Latvian soldiers in Putlos, summer 1945."
1319/lower right/	"Food gathered by 'private enterprise' being prepared."
1320/left/	"A heatless and lightless barrack of the 'Ditch-diggers of Torn'; there, 30-40 Latvian soldiers had to live in fall of 1944."
1320/right/	"A prisoner of war's hut, made from branches and reeds, Putlos."
1321/left/	"Gathering soldier songs, Putlos."
1321/right/	"A church built from ammunition boxes, in the upper floor of the Latvian camp, summer 1946."

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WING INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
KEESLER AIR FORCE BASE, AND
3380TH TECHNICAL TRAINING WING
KEESLER AIR FORCE BASE, MISSISSIPPI

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REPORT ON FOREIGN POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

1. Attached are unevaluated letter reports on foreign positive intelligence forwarded to the Intelligence Division, 3380th Technical Training Wing by Pfc Umberto RAFAELS, AF-16309878, 3404th Training Squadron, Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi.

2. RAFAELS voluntarily forwarded the first letter report (Inclosure 1) to this office on 11 August 1950, apparently to get aid for his friends in the Baltic States. Additional reports were forwarded on request of the undersigned. In an attempt to evaluate the source, a local record check was accomplished and 1st Lt John J. Morley, Jr., Commanding Officer of the 3404th Training Squadron, was contacted.

a. Pfc RAFAELS was born in Jelgava, Latvia on 9 March 1931. He moved to Germany in October 1944 and to the United States in 1949. He enlisted in the USAF at Chicago, Illinois on 17 April 1950 and was assigned to the Radar Mechanic Airborne Equipment Course after completion of basic training.

b. Lt. Morley stated that RAFAELS has been a good soldier but very reticent. When Lt. Morley engaged RAFAELS in Russian language conversation, RAFAELS relaxed and became more voluble, telling about his life in Latvia under both German and Russian rule.

3. In English language conversations with RAFAELS, the undersigned was told that attempts to give information on Eastern European countries to Intelligence personnel at Lackland AFB were unsuccessful. This officer informed RAFAELS that all information would be forwarded to proper authorities. This officer learned that RAFAELS speaks Russian, Latvian, Polish and German and found that RAFAELS appears bitter about Russian rule.

4. According to the informant, the Underground desires to use short wave radio to a greater extent in passing information across the zonal boundary. The informant requested permission to utilize the Keesler Amateur Radio Club radio facilities to establish contact between this base and New York and Europe.

5. In addition to the requests for supplies for the Underground and permission to establish radio contact, RAFAELS desires assignment in Europe so that he may make personal contacts.

6. Contact with RAFAELS will be maintained by the Intelligence

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Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003 / 2005

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FOR COORDINATION WITH USAF

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Wg Intell Office, KAFB & 3380 TTW, KAFB, Miss, Report on Foreign Intell.

Officer and supplemental information forwarded as received.

3 Incls

1. Ltr Rpt 11 Aug 50
2. Ltr Rpt 17 Aug 50
3. Ltr Rpt 21 Aug 50

ORVAL H. MICKELSON, Intelligence Officer, 3380th Tech Tng Wing, Keesler
AFB, Mississippi

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11 Aug 50

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To: Intelligence Officer, Keesler A.F.B. Miss.
From: Pfc. Umberto Rafaels, AF 16 309 878
3404th Tng. Sq. (Radar), Box 240
Keesler A.F.B. Miss.
Subject: Underground movement in Latvia (Baltic States).

Sir:

There are established secret communication lines between Latvia and Germany. These communication lines are operated by Latvian underground movement which is fighting against communist occupation forces.

I believe USAF Intelligence Division will be interested in fact that the Red Army's military installations include submarine bases, V-weapon stations, new-build fortifications, air fields, etc. The Baltic States are declared as "super-security zone".

In the time being we are in possession of information about:

- a) air fields in Latvia,
- b) fortification descriptions along the Baltic Sea,
- c) new build roads,
- d) staff maps, etc.

All that information was brought to Western Europe by members of Latvian underground movement. The communication lines are dangerous and expensive. We could do more effective work in cooperation with USAF Int. Div. I hope that the above mentioned kind of information will be of great importance according to the political situation.

Underground representatives contacted CIC in Germany but received replay in which CIC refuse to give any assistance because of lack of money. A short time ago there was sent a report to FBI but we do not have the replay yet. I personally contacted the USAF Int. Div. in Lackland A.F.B. San Antonio, Texas. I was informed that this case is out of their authority.

How far I know USAF needs information about Russian installations. It is possible for us to get it. If the only reason why it is impossible to cooperate, is finance and law (persons doing intelligence work must be American citizens), we could do the work on other bases.

For items we could receive from USAF we could pay in cash (radio, machine guns, etc.). USAF will have no responsibility but you will receive all the information it will be possible for us to get. In case of emergency you will know that we have armed partisan units which can be put in action anytime. We have men with good experience in partisan war who will do the work.

J.A. 039791

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Umberto Rafaels
Pfc. USAF # 6135

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17 Aug 50

To :Intelligence Officer Keesler A.F.B.,Miss.
From:Pfc.Umberto Rafaels,AF 16 309 878
3404th Tng.Sq.(Radar) Box 240
Keesler A.F.B.,Miss.

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Sir:

This report is made according to your request about my personal background and general information on conditions in occupied Latvia.

I was born on March 9,1931 in Jelgava,Latvia.The first years of my life I spend about 15 miles from Jelgava in county of Vircava where my father was district physician.After few years we moved ~~1/2~~ back to Jelgava where my father died Oct. 1935.He was an officer in Latvian army during World War I.After my father's death we moved to Bulduri(apr.12 miles west from Riga at the Baltic Sea) where we lived till 1944.

In time between the years 1940/41 Latvia was under the first Russian occupation.During this time we lost 2% of our population.I used to spend myself some nights in forest with my relatives because of the fear of deportation.My uncle was deported and I received a message short time ago he died in Soviet forced labor camp.

During the month of June/July 1941 Reds was driven back by Germans.I saw the demoralized communist units which left behind their heavy and light armament, disordered, full of fear from the German "Blitz Krieg".There was a panic.For example I saw the Reds blowing up a railroad bridge across the river Lielupe but after 30 minutes there came a full loaded train with ammunition,guns and robbed civilian property.This train was captured by Germans because of the destroyed bridge.

In the year 1944 communists occupied Latvia the second time.I left for Germany Oct.1944 over Latvian sea-port Liepaja.In Germany I used to live in Luerzzuschlag(Austria),Wangen, Wurzach i/A (French Zone),Memmingen and Esslingen a/N (US Zone).

In the time I spend in Germany I get a contact with men working in interest for Latvian underground movement.During that time there came out a book:"The Baltic States the First Victims of Communist Brutality".Half of this book is completed by me.Going through this book you should get a general idea on conditions in Latvia under Red occupation uptill 1948.The above mentioned book is enclosed to this report.

The Latvian underground movement and partisan units are fighting against the Reds from 1944.They do not get any help.They use the captured weapons and equipment.They need good equipment to do their work more efficient(modern automatic weapons,radio equipment,medical supply,etc.).There are members of underground movement living with legal documents,some are even employed by Russian secret police; they give a valuable information.

The partisan units generally consist of people who are on the "black list" of NKVD.They have only two choices either to be killed in NKVD chambers or to fight till the last round of ammunition.It is the last time to give them some assistance, at least moral because the communist pressure grows stronger.

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If you will give some cooperation you will receive very valuable information about Russian military instalations. In case of war or emergency there are men who will be glad to carry out orders-to make the life hard for communist occupation forces.

The men who operate our secret communication lines are working between Latvia and Germany. If you would give me a chance to work in Germany (official as a AP special investigator, or other) I will keep contact between Latvian underground and USAF Intelligence Div. In case it will be necessary for action I will be ready to go over to Latvia myself. I know the country and the language; besides Latvian I also speak German.

Umberto Rafaels
Pfc. USAF

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21.Aug.50

To: Intelligence Officer, Keesler A.F.B., Miss.
From: Pfc. Umberto Rafaels, AF 16 309 878
3404th Tng, Sq. Radar, Box 240, Keesler A.F.B., Miss.
Subject: Latest information received from Latvia.

1. New Soviet troops enter Kurzeme and Zemgale (south west Latvia). Mainly infantry, artillery and armoured formations. The operation is scheduled, every week soldiers, weapons and tanks are brought from Leningrad direction during nights..

2. Coast artillery, naval forces are strengthened in Kurzeme, coast defense line building is carried on. Every movement of a person arriving at Liepaja and Ventspils is followed by MGB. Harbour and workshop areas completely off limits for civilians.

3. Great-volume fuel tanks are constructed to every MTS (Machine-Tractor Station) all over Latvia. So at Sece, near the former Pastorage, now MTS, at Daudzeva near Daudze Estate, at Nereta and Lielzalne MTS are tanks ca 4 meter high and 3 meter diameter. They are painted camouflage, but, nevertheless well-observable in great distance. It seems that the Russians store up greater amounts of fuel for war purposes.

4. Guarding of military objects is stronger in all Russian garrisons in the last time. Sentries are doubled near ammunitions, fuel and food stores.

5. Horse transport is still employed with the Russian artillery and supply units. The supply units are composed mostly by Asiats and older veterans, who are not yet demobilized. The Russian army is still insufficient supplied with food. Main provisions - potatoes and cereals. Uniforms often ragged and dirty. Only the officers are better clad.

6. It seems that the Russians have reinforced their Air Force units in the airports near Riga. You can observe frequently air force formations over Riga flying across the rail station to the NW.

7. Kolchoze workers had to carry out transport of gravel for highway and street repair from April 5 - 30. In order to avoid delay in the fields, the kolchoze workers had to work also on sundays. The repair of the bridge across the Iecava (Jelgava - Krustpils) was carried out also on sundays.

8. Lately acute shortage of accommodation has arisen due to increase of Russian troops. Often a flat of 3 rooms is inhabited by 2 - 3 families. It is especially so in big towns. The policy of MGB is to put a Russian family among Latvian families in every flat.

9. Shortage of seeds in the country. Kolchoze administration mainly Russians. Latvian peasantry is noticeably unsatisfied.

10. The Russians have started ruthless persecution against all Latvians in more or less significant positions. They are discharged and Russian agents put in their place or are submitted to all-time control. As the MGB tries to perfect its network of agents, the Latvians have grown extremely cautious. MGB has very successfully arranged its information apparatus, and it is difficult to avoid it even by frequent changes of residence and towns. Clerical work must be left even by persons who only once a year have exchanged letters with abroad.

HH #3 and 3 of 239791 SECRET

#6135

-2- SECRET

239791 -7

11. Russification policy is carried on. The schools are bound to teach the idea of Pan-Russia and to fight religion. The only change in the situation is that the Russians more earnestly consider the qualification of the Communist officials and teachers.

SECRET

6135

Extract from XAAZ-27013, 16 Nov 1950
74-6-3 Series 59

Latvian Resistance and Emigre Activities

Pages 28 and 34

BROMBERGS, Artur alias ~~INE~~ LINDE

~~"Military Affairs officer, inner ring, Latvian Contact Group; served in
Latvian army and Riga police; joined Latvian resistance, 1940; mobilized into
Latvian Legion, 1943; deserted with detachment and joined Latvian guerrillas in
Kurzeme."~~

LINDE, Arturs alias BROMBERGS

~~"Member for military affairs, inner ring of Latvian Contact Group; born in
Latvian farmers' family; served Latvian National Army; studies agriculture at
Latvian University; officer of Riga police; joined resistance during first
Soviet Occupation; mobilized into Latvian Legion in 1943 and fought on Eastern
front; deserted with detachment and joined Latvian guerrillas in Kurzeme."~~

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003, 2005

7 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE II

SUBJECT: Arturs Linde alias Arturs Brombergs

REFERENCE: Your request for clearance
dated 22 January 1951.

1. In view of the information and recommendation contained in a memorandum from the Chief, Special Security Branch, Inspection and Security Staff dated 28 June 1951, an Operational Clearance is hereby issued which will permit the utilization of Subject's services as an agent and organizer of an operational group operating out of Germany and/or Sweden into Latvia under project ZRLYNCH. This Clearance is granted on the condition that the results of any contemplated filed check will be furnished to this office for transmittal to I&SS.

2. This Clearance is for the particular services for which it was requested. If at a later date it is decided to utilize Subject in a different capacity or otherwise change his status, the matter must be brought to the attention of this office without delay.

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

[] []
Acting Chief, Cover and Security Branch
CAL/PT/OPC

Distribution:

Copy 1 - Addressee

Copy 2 - PT/CS

Copy 3 - Registry

PT/CS/JBB/

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003, 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

S-E-C-R-E-T

AECOB 3/1/51

*WASH
BA ~~WASH~~*

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DEC 6 - 1951

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PAGE No.

To: MUNICH, FRANKFURT, KARLSRUHE
From: OPC/OSO
Confirmation: OPC (1-9)
Information: AD/SO (10), OPS (11), PLANS (12), FDS (13-14), FDM (15), S/C (16-17-18), DDP (19)

ROUTINE

5 DEC 51

OUT 92232

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (I) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 17842

TO: MUNIFG

INFO: FRANG, KARLF

CITE: WASHFG

REDSOX/AECOB/ZRLYNCH

RE: WASH 11890 (OUT 82976); MUNI 5921 (IN 43881)

SUBSTITUTE FOR RNP ILLOW, USE MV NO. 15
AND FORWARD DETAILS AS REQUESTED PER FIRST REF.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

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FWB EOM JG MPH

RELEASING OFFICER

ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

1626Z 5 DEC 51

TOD:

SECRET

COPY No. 14

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SECRET

DESENSITIZED

X REFERENCE

RNPILLow

NO. M HAA - 207

DATE 16 Feb '52

SUBJECT: Transmittal of PRQ Para II

FILED: original filed []

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

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(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PRQ PART II

7 February 1952

MGAA-207

36. RHPILLOW
37. Was developed through [] contact with [], June 1950 on, but was not met by us until met by [] in March 1951, in Sweden.
38. Now handled by AECOB Case Officers. Could be handed over to anyone associated with the project.
39. Desires to help achieve Latvian freedom and to return to a Latvia freed from the Russians.
40. F.O.C. See clearance files.
41. Controlled by AECOB Case Officers.
42. American Intelligence Service. Thinks that info goes to highly placed, responsible officials.
43. None
44. Not giving information - used as a trainer and recruiter on AECOB Project.
45. Being used as Chief Trainer, Recruiter AECOB Project.
46. He is learning as he teaches; tradecraft, enemy security organizations, etc.
47. Unapplicable
48. 700 DM a month, Housing and food when living with students.
49. No
50. No
51. Upper middle class, former police and army officer.
52. No vices observed. Very stable.
53. Character: Earnest, Assiduous, efficient; somewhat headstrong and spoiled, but can be persuaded.
Reliable: Once his word is given
Security: Inclines toward action rather than security when choice is offered, but otherwise security is good.
54. Any western power that could contribute materially to freeing Latvia.
55. Police and Army officer - could be used in training a para-military group.
- V. Subject filled out ZACACTUS PRQ himself.
See AECOB Dispatches

3 March 1952

SUBJECT: Latvian Operational Plan

A. Agents:

1. [] 3 - the leader, has the best all around ability for a mission of this type. He will remain in Courland to direct and control [] 1 and 2 and also to act as chief radio operator and reserve.
2. [] 2 - will operate into the Riga area. He has poor commo aptitude but good potentialities for clandestine work. He will attempt to contact the underground and legalize himself in Riga.
3. [] 1 - will contact and remain with a partisan group in Courland. His two main jobs will be to assess the Latvian partisan movement and to secure operational intelligence on the Baltic Coast.

Ruman

m-Ruman

m-Ruman

B. Mission

1. [] 3 - to remain in Kurzeme forest and be the w/t base. Will control [] 1 and 2 outside activities and their efforts to gain assistance from local population.
2. [] 2 - will contact a support point in the village of Piltene.
3. [] 1 - will contact a support point in the village of Talsi.

Comment: Both points are provided by principal agent []. Both points are related to the [] operation in Estonia.

4. [] 2 and 1 will try to gain assistance for the legalization of all three. They will proceed independently on their contact mission but will always clear their activity with [] 3 at the black base in Kurzeme forest.
5. All three will endeavor contact suitable individuals for fall or spring sea exfiltration. The agents are proposed to remain in Latvia indefinitely.

C. DZ Area and Dispatch Date:

1. DZ N lat 57° 7' long 22° 5', - 5km southeast of Lake Usmas. 40 km from point in Baltic coast south of Ventspils. Located in heart of Kurzeme's largest forest area. Open swampy land.
2. Dispatch date: *First part May* Last week of April, 27 April or after. C-47 with extra tanks. Approximate flight distance from Germany to DZ 1100 miles one way (2200 miles round trip).

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

D. Documentation

Supporting documentation from Petrozavodsk

RSFSR passports from Leningrad and Moscow. Considered inadequate for operations in this area but are the best we can do.

E. Communication

W/T, S/W, VOA broadcasts.

Security

SECRET
Security Information

25 April 1952

TO : [] []
FROM : [] []
SUBJECT:

The following observations are offered with a complete awareness by the writer that his acquaintance with the case under scrutiny is slight. For this reason, everything which follows should be treated as suggestion or reflection rather than as conclusion, for that is the writer's intention.

It seems likely that this case is known to, i.e. penetrated by SIS. The entire history of the operation points in that direction. []'s original contact with, and prospective employment by the Swedes established his identification with them. His use of the [] channel (X) (even though he says that he used it for his own purpose); his presence when the Swedes suggested a Latvian operation with US support; the fact that the Swedes were parties to the competitive bidding for []'s services before he was assumed by [] (at which time it became apparent that the Swedes had an established operational plan while that of [] was tentative and experimental) (X); as well as the fact that [] left Sweden through normal channels with normal clearance, and, it must be assumed, with the knowledge of [] [] compels to believe that SIS knew [], knew when and where he was going, under whose auspices, and at least generally, what he was going to do. With respect to []'s leaving Sweden, one gains the impression that there appeared to be initial difficulties with respect to his departure, (3)(4) such difficulties as to invite suggestion of clandestine exit-----after which the difficulties seem to have disappeared. (X) It would be good to know just what the course was of []'s request to leave Swedish territory. Finally, there is a direct statement, capable of limited interpretation, that the future activities of []'s group will "include maintaining proper relationship with the official Swedish agency in order to keep track of the possibilities which might be opened". (X) To the writer, it would appear that the foregoing facts indicate that SIS knew something about the operation in its early stages, and may have been kept au courant later. Whether this penetration ever reached the point of supervision or control is not yet apparent.

3. To reject this possibility on the basis of any man's moral sense would be unwise. Although it is not the purpose of this paper to examine hypothetical motives, it might be wise to suggest that an occasional report from [] to the Swedes could be rationalized on the grounds that the interests of the United States and those of Sweden are not too far apart, while any interest by the Swedes

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by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date:

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3 (b)
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Security Information

in []'s operations on behalf of the United States is entirely justifiable in professional counter-espionage. I should say even that an IO or a CEO who did not endeavor to maintain contact with someone he knows working in another service would be lacking in perception.

4. Where such contact or penetration is conducted by a friendly power, it represents only an extension of security, in which it becomes additional to reassure one's self of the security maintained by the unexpected recipient. In this case, the situation could be complicated by the fact that Swedish interest would be exercised by their Baltic States Division, wherein the Latvian responsibility is discharged by [] himself a native of Latvia.

The important question, it seems to me, is whether [] is or is not keeping the Swedes informed of our operations and personnel; and we must bear in mind the fact that while such possibility is disturbing from the point of view of good security, it need not be construed as reprehensible. To resolve this question the following action is suggested:

1. Information should be planted on []---information which is fictitious, but of such nature that it would be of great interest to SIS. A reflection of such information in Stockholm would indicate the existence of a channel of communication.

2. An informal conference by one of our people in Sweden with a case officer of SIS, in which there would be buried some direct statement that "old []---you know him, he was connected with you at one time-----has been doing some work for us. Sadly enough, we've learned that he has been passing operational information to someone outside our own show. We don't know to whom, but were going to give him a thorough examination and find out. How do you regard him?" Especially if a specific time not too far distant were mentioned for the interrogation, SIS might take the protective step of warning []. A complete surveillance of the subject for a few days (until the specified date had passed) would include interception of all communications to him. This, too, might be productive.

3. A carriage test for [] might be run in with motion picture tests of the same type for other or all personnel in his branch as a "periodic routine security measure". Such a test might include such questions as the following: (It is recognized that these questions would have to be re-phrased)

1. Did you know that your letters to Sweden are being photostated and translated?

2. What Swedish officials did you see prior to your departure? What did they say to you?

3. To what extent do you believe that the interest of Sweden and the US, with respect to intelligence, are compatible?

Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

4. Is ^{PA} PILLOW or ²⁷ [] in communication with the SIS?
5. Are you in communication with SIS?
6. How Much information to []
7. Revelation to Emigre groups as an influence wedge

B.S. [unclear]
In concluding, there are one or two other points which make this case unusual. The story, early in the file, that the operator sent to Latvia has lost all his crystals invites scrutiny. The story that ~~the British~~ had withdrawn their support from a proposed operation because one man, who was to pilot the plane, refused to provide finances, certainly should be run to ground. There must have been some reason for this action. Did ~~the British~~ regard the proposed operation as insecure? If so, why? Finally, it seems that []'s summaries of his correspondence may not have been comprehensive. It is recommended that the photostats of his letters be read in detail, and be compared with the summaries which he submitted.

STOC

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Security Information

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 JUNE 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

N 13693

ROUTING	
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TO: OPERATIONS

FROM: FRANKFURT

ROUTINE

MUNICH

0046Z 24 JUN 52

INFORMATION: SR (1-2-3), RI (4-5-6), AD/SO (7), OPS (8), AD/PC (9), CAL (10),
EE (11-12-13), S/C (14-15-16), STG (17), DDP (18)

FRAN 4102

TO: MUNIFG INFO: WASHFG CITE: FRANFG

REDSOX/AECOB/CAMBARO 2

FOLLOWING SENT FOR

1. USING PERSONALITY INFO ON ID CARD, COVER FOR CAMBARO 2 ARRANGED BEGINNING 1 JULY AS

2. AREA OF REPRESENTATION CAN BE EASILY CHANGED.

3. ARRANGEMENTS COMPLETED WITH GERMAN OFFICIALS, AND MUST PAY APPROX 75 DM MONTHLY TAXES ON OSTENSIBLE 350 DM SALARY. SAID WOULD REIMBURSE END JULY FOR FIRST MONTH.

4. INFORMED HIS CONTACT THAT FROM MUNICH WOULD WRITE TO TELL HOW HE CAN REACH BY PHONE AND MAIL IN CASE INQUIRIES MADE RE CAMBARO 2.

5. COURIER BRINGING FIRMS' STATIONERY AND BUSINESS CARDS.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(C) Foreign Relations

**FILE CLASSIFICATION
CHANGE REQUEST**

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

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74-6174-43
INTELLIGENCE
JUN 27 1952
RECORDS
ABSTRACT
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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

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SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

9 July 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, Cover Division

FROM: Chief, SR/Ba

SUBJECT: Establishment of Cover for Arturs BROMBERGS

1. In accordance with the discussion held 2 July 1952 between [] of Cover Division and [] of this office, it is requested that a cover be established for subject as follows: When subject applies for a visitor's visa to the United States, he will list as his reason for travel that he will be engaged in discussions regarding purchase of leathergoods from an American firm engaged in that business.

2. A firm on the Eastern Seaboard is needed which will, on demand, supply a questioner with the following story: Mr Brombergs will be (or has been) in contact with this firm regarding purchase of some leather goods with us. He is now, I believe, travelling to another city in search of other firms from which he could purchase leather goods.

3. Subject is a Latvian national now residing in Germany. His Covert Security Clearance will be established prior to his entry into the United States. He is now ostensibly employed at [] However, this information should not be disclosed to a cooperating firm here since subject is employed at [] under another name. In reality he has been engaged in training Latvian nationals for operational work, and will continue the same work in the United States.

4. Subject is a man of pleasing personality, quite intelligent and very shrewd. He is six feet one inch tall and weighs approximately 225 pounds. He has a round face and brown hair. His front teeth are gold capped. His manner is soft spoken, though emphatic, and he can be quite humorous. He will depart Germany approximately 20 August, arriving in the United States 22 August 1952. Cover should be finalized by 1 August 1952, in order that any checks made by Immigration will be backstopped. The cover should last until 1 June 1953. As far as can be foreseen, no one else must be convinced of subject's ostensible employment, although the possibility of inquiries from friends or relatives should not be discounted.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
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Date: 2005

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

22 July 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, Special Contracts Office
Attn:

THROUGH: Chief, Plans Division
Attn:

FROM: Chief, SR/Baltic

SUBJECT: Establishment of Bank Account for Arturs Bronsbergs

1. In reference to the conversation between of Special Contracts and of this office, it is requested that a paragraph be inserted in subject's contract to the effect that neither he nor his heirs will have access to any portion of the \$1500 bank account which will be established by the Government in his name.

2. Your attention in the matter is appreciated. For any further details needed, please contact , extension 3582, Room 2502 "J" building.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 JULY 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 92812

TO: MUNICH FRANKFURT M H DESLOR SR 2538

FROM: SPECIAL OPERATIONS ROUTINE

SE (1-4),

0141224 JUL 52

INFORMATION RI (5-6), AD/SO (7), OPS (8), EE (9-10), S/C (11-12-13),
DDP (14)

WASH 11598

OSR/Center of Conv. Gen. of matters

TO: MUNIF INFO: FRANF CITE: WASH

REDSOX AECOB

1. UNABLE GIVE DESIRED COVER TO GAMBARO 2. DYCLOCK CANNOT LOCATE DEFINITE LEATHER GOODS FIRM IN US WHERE GAMBARO 2 AN OFFICIAL VISITOR.

2. THEY SUGGEST FOLLOWING COVER:

A. WAS LEFT INHERITANCE OF \$1500 BY RELATIVE IN US.

B. PROMISES REIMBURSE HIM COMMISSION BASIS ANY

BUSINESS FOUND IN US.

C. ALWAYS WANTED VISIT US AND HOPES EVENTUALLY SETTLE PERMANENTLY

WITH FAMILY.

3. DYCLOCK WILL PROVIDE LIST LEATHER GOODS FIRMS EASTERN SEABOARD SOONEST.

WITH NAMES SALES AND PURCHASE MANAGERS.

4. ADVISE SOONEST.

AN
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

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CS COPY

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ABSTRACT	X	INDEX	
DATE 29 AUG 1952			

EE/SO

SR/SO

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

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Security Information
SECRET

MEMORANDUM

29 July 1952

TO: [] 7AECCE/REDSOX
FROM: [] J/MO
SUBJECT: Medical Report - "Cambaro 2" (A-O-273)
ATTN: [] []

This man underwent the routine medical examination on 21 July 1952.

- a. History: Said to have some old lung disease on an x-ray obtained in 1950. Grenade fragment wounds of left leg and right shoulder.
- b. Physical Examination: One carious tooth - moderately large left varicocoeal - decreased hearing in left ear.
- c. Laboratory Studies: Urinalysis and Wasserman all within normal limits. Chest x-ray reveals tuberculosis of the left upper lung. The disease appears old.
- d. Disposition: Temporarily disqualified pending evaluation activity of tuberculosis. Please contact this office regarding further studies.

Sincerely,

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

ENH/mnc

Distribution: Original and 2 - Addressee
1 - []
1 - Medical File

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

SECRET

Security Information

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTC-1036

TO : Chief, SR/EA

FROM : Chief, Cover Division, PLANS/OSO

SUBJECT: List of Leathergoods Firms

DATE: 4 August 1952

1. Per your request, there is attached herewith a list of U. S. firms engaged either in the processing of leather or in the manufacturing of finished leather goods.

2. Confirming a conversation with , it is our understanding that when details of the cover story to be used for Mr. Brombergs have been coordinated with the field, a memorandum covering same will be submitted to this Division for approval.

Attachment

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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5 AUGUST 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 95401

TO: SR REP GERMANY:
(LUBI) (FRAN)

SR 8547

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

SR (1-4)

0100Z 6 AUG 52

INFORMATION: RI (5-6), CFI (7), OPS (8), EE (9-10), STC (11), S/C (12-13-14)

Handwritten signature/initials

WASH 13280

TO: SRUBI

INFO: SERAN

CITE: DIR

REISOL ABCOB

REF: LUBI 9405 (IN 23772)

Handwritten signature

1. ANTICIPATE TWO WEEK DELAY IN MAKING SW FLIGHT ARRANGEMENTS. PREFER CALBAROS PROCEED BY REGULAR COMMERCIAL FLIGHT. 66 LBS PERSONAL AND 100 LBS EXCESS BAGGAGE PER PERSON AUTHORIZED. CARRY OFFICIAL POUCH UNDER COURTESY LEGISLATION ON GALE OR SEPARATE FLIGHT AS APPROPRIATE. SHIP REMAINDER PERSONAL BAGGAGE BY SEA OR AIR FREIGHT.

2. CABLE CALBAROS AND FAMILY MEDICAL REPORTS. NO FURTHER FIELD TRACKS REQUIRED.

3. RE REF PARA 1D. CALBAROS WILL BE MET BY STAFF AND DETAILED OFFICERS AND CONVEYED TO WASH HOTEL. SAFERHOUSES NOT AVAILABLE FOR CONTRACT AGENTS OR CONSULTANTS. THEIR IMMEDIATE FUTURE PLANS WILL DEPEND ON CASE OFFICER RECOMMENDATIONS.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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DATE 9 AUG 1952		

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

7 AUG 52

IN 25813

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING	
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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP MUNICH ROUTINE
SR (1-5) 1956Z 7 AUG 52

INFORMATION: RI (6-7), CFI (8), OPS (9), EE (10-11), STC (12), -
S/C (13-14-15)

MUNI 9517

TO: DIR **INFO:** SFRAN **CITE:** SMUNI

REDSOX/AECOB

REF: DIR 13280 (OUT 95401)

1. FIT EXCEPT TEETH.
2. HOLDING CAMBARO 2 REPORT PENDING XRAY COMPARISONS
DUE OLD LUNG SPOT. WILL CABLE RESULTS.
3. AWAITING FAMILY REPORTS.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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Security Information
SECRET

MEMORANDUM

8 August 1952

TO: /AECOB/REDSOX
FROM: /NO
SUBJECT: Medical Reports - (A-O-288), (A-O-289)
ATTN:

The above two dependents of an ^{CAMBARD-2} indigenous agent underwent routine medical examinations on 29 July 1952:

1. (A-O-288):

History: No significant history was noted.

Physical Examination: Functional pulmonic systolic murmur. (A pelvic examination was not included).

Laboratory Studies: Chest x-ray, urinalysis, and serologic test for syphilis were all within normal limits.

Disposition: Physically fit.

2. (A-O-289)

History: Scarlet Fever, November 1951, no apparent residual.

Physical Examination: No abnormalities were noted.

Laboratory Studies: Urinalysis, chest x-ray, and serologic test for syphilis were all within normal limits.

Disposition: Physically fit.

Both received immunizations against Smallpox.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Sincerely,

Distribution: Original and 1 - Addressee
1 - tt
1 - Medical Files

ENH/ans

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(C) Foreign Relations

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AUG 14 1952

13 AUG 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 27435

ROUTING	
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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR REP MUNICH ROUTINE
 SR (1-5) 0156Z 14 AUG 52
 INFORMATION: RI (6-7), CFI (8), OPS (9), EE (10-11), S/C (12-13-14),
 STC (15)

MUNI 9578

TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN CITE: SMUNI

REDSOX/AECOB

REF: DIR 49726 (OUT 89916) *file* MUNI 9517 (IN 25813)

1. CAMBARO-2 PHYSICALLY FIT. (ALSO RCVD) EVAL:
 PULMONARY TUBERCULOSIS, MINIMAL, OBSOLETE. ENTIRELY ASYMPTOMATIC
 AT PRESENT. NO RESTRICTION OF ACTIVITY RECOMMENDED. COMPARISON
 XRAYS MARCH 1950 AND AUGUST 1952 SHOWS NO CHANGE MINIMAL FIBROTIC
 LESION WITH LEFT APEX.

2. CAMBARO 2 AND THEIR FAMILIES THEREFORE ALL
 PHYSICALLY FIT. IMMUNIZATIONS BEING COMPLETED.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 (2)(A) Privacy
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 (2)(C) Foreign Relations

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 4

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ROUTING	
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AUG 14 1952

13 AUG 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 27434

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP MUNICH ROUTINE
SFRAN 0156Z 14 AUG 52

INFORMATION: SR (1-5), RI (6-7), CFI (8), OPS (9), EE (10-11), STC (12),
S/C (13-14-15), DDP (16-17)

MUNI 9577

TO: SFRAN INFO: DIR CITE: SMUNI

REDSOX/ AECOB

FOR 1

file

REF PARA 1: LOCAL DYMAROON OFFICIAL STATES ACCRUED TIME CAN-
CELED BUT REINSTATED ON RETURN IF VISIT IS EMERGENCY. WILL ACCEPT
MUNI DYCLAIM STATEMENT AS TO EMERGENCY. CAMBARO-2 NEVER APPLIED
AND NOT AFFECTED.

PARA 2. CURRENTLY PLAN DOCUMENT IN LIEU OF PASSPORT FOR
STATELESS PERSONS, ISSUED AND BACKSTOPPED IN BERLIN WITH GERMAN
RE-ENTRY VISA. AVAILABLE ABOUT 20 AUGUST.

PARA 3:
A. CAMBARO-2 WILLING. WILL DISCUSS WITH
ANTICIPATE AGREEMENT BUT DESIRE RETURN SWEDEN NOT GERMANY. CURRENT
SWEDISH DOCUMENTS EXPIRED.

B. DYCLAIM MUNI WILL APPLY THRU LIAISON CHANNELS TO
DYMAROON MUNI WHICH WILL ISSUE VISAS ON DYCLAIM ASSURANCE MATTER
CLEAR. WASH DYMAROON AND DYMAIDEN. HQ SHOULD ADVISE MUNI WHEN
MATTER CLEARED.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEP 9 1952

ROUTING	
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09 SEPT '52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 3421 2

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

SR REP MUNI

ROUTINE

SR 6

1329Z 09 SEPT '52

INFORMATION:

CFI, OPS, STC, EE 2, RI 2

MUNI 9927

TO: DIR

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: SMUNI

REDSOX/AECOB

file

1. WHEN APPLYING VISITORS VISA CAMBARO 2 WILL USE ONLY "LEONIDS" FOR FIRST NAME. AT BIRTH FIRST NAME ARTURS, MIDDLE NAME LEONIDS. BY CLERICAL ERROR ARTURS DELETED. CORRECT BIRTH DATE 31 AUGUST 1913.

2. REQUEST INFORM DYMAROON SO AS TO BE UNIFORM WITH MUNI CONSULATE.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECRET

16 September 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: SR/DB
FROM: Chief, SR/2
SUBJECT: Cover for CAMBARO 2

1. The following is the proposed cover for [] 2, as discussed by [] of OO/Cover Division and [] of this office on 11 September 1952.

2. [] is immigrating legally to the United States. Subject will need a letter of credit from a German Bank for credit purposes here. It is proposed to give subject a legal research or research cover of a type to necessitate frequent change of office, so that he may only be reached at home.

3. CAMBARO 2 is entering the United States on a temporary visitor's visa. His cover, as proposed, is as follows:

a. Subject has been left \$1,500 by an uncle who had emigrated to the United States.

b. Subject is on leave-or-absence from [] (a German leather goods firm) for several months. While in the U.S.A., subject will contact leather goods firms on the Eastern seaboard, and is to be reimbursed on a commission basis by [] for any orders he receives.

c. Subject will explain his presence in the Washington area as follows: Subject and [] knew each other in Latvia and in DP camps in Europe. As subject does not know English, it is only natural for him to make [] home his headquarters.

4. To backstop the proposed cover stories, SR will have to provide:

a. []
(1) Letter of credit from a German Bank.

b. CAMBARO 2
(1) A deposit of \$1,500.00 in an American Bank.

5. For further information, please contact [] 2504 J, extension 3962.

SECRET

[]

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Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 (2)(A) Privacy
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SEP 19 1952

16 SEPT 1952

SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 55091

ROUTING	
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TO: SR REP GERMANY:
(MUNICH)(FRANKFURT)

F 1 SR 2538

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

SR 6

2010Z 17 SEPT 52

*SM
PH*

INFORMATION: DDP 2, CF1, OPS, EE 2, RI 2

DIR 19469

TO: SMUNI

INFO: STRAN

CITE: DIR

REISOX AECOB

1. SUGGEST FOLLOWING RE COVER CALBARO 2

A. TEMPORARY STAY IN U.S. ON BUSINESS. DOCUMENTED VISITOR'S VISA, ISSUED MUNI DYLARON.

B. COVER FOR STAY WASH AREA: KNOWS [] [], ENGLISH POOR, SO NATURAL LAKE THIS HIS HDQRS WHILE IN U.S.

C. DUE FACT SUBJ PRESENCE HERE MAY AROUSE INTEREST LATVIAN LEGATION, PROPOSE SUBJ ENTER U.S. REGULAR COMMERCIAL FLIGHT.

2. COMMENT SOONEST.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

EE/FT

SR/PI

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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9 (44)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 SEP 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 37699

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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR REP MUNICH
 SR 6

ROUTINE
 0141Z 20 SEP 52

INFORMATION: DDP 2, CFI, OPS, EE 2, RI 2

MUNI 0114

TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN GITE: SMUNI
 REDSOX/AECOB

- 1. REF PARAS DIR 19469 (CUT 55091)
 - A. AS PLANNED.

B. ACQUAINTANCESHIP NEVER OVERT.
 ENGLISH ALSO POOR. CAMBARO 2 PROBABLY ARRIVING PRIOR
 WHAT IS COVER FOR WASH AREA?

C. AS PLANNED. ETD 2 WEEKS AFTER DIR NOTIFIES MUNI STATE AND INS CLEARANCE.

- 2. VISAS DUE NEXT WEEK BUT DUE WIFE'S FEAR AIR TRAVEL MAY BE 8 NOVEMBER BEFORE SAILING, SEES NO DRAWBACK LATE ARRIVAL AS SPECIALITIES NOT USED UNTIL LATER TRAINING STAGES.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

74	10
EXTRACT	INDEX
DATE 3	1952

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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25/9/52

SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 57143

TO: SR REP GERMANY:
FROM: (MUNICH)(FRANKFURT)
DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE 8547

SR 6

2055Z 25 SEP 52

INFORMATION: CFI, OPS, EE 2, RI 2

copy to ...

DIR 20848

TO: SMUNI

INFO: GERMAN

ORIG: DIR

REDSOX AECOB

REF: A. MUNT 114 (IN 37699) B. DIR 18006 (OUT 52794)

1. CONCERN NOT REVEAL ACQUAINTANCESHIP
2. DETAILS COVER PENDING. WILL ADVISE SUBJ OF ARRIVAL.
3. RE REF B PARA 3. BACKSTOP COVER ON WAY WASH. SUGGEST YOU CONTACT AND ARRANGE ANY LETTERS OR QUERIES RE CAMERON 2 ADDRESSED TO FIRM BE FORWARDED BY TO YOUR LETTERING OP.

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Date: 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
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COPY FILE

79	6/24	220
ABSTRACT	INDEX	
DATE 8 OCT 1952		

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RE/PI

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

29 SEPT 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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TO: DIRECTOR CIA
 FROM: SR REP, MUNICH
 SR 6
 INFORMATION: CFI, OPS, STC, EE 2, RI

ROUTINE
 1433Z 29 SEPT 52

MUNI #219

TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN CITE: MUNI

REDSOX AEGOR

REF DIR 25848 (OUT 57143)

1. WOULD PREFER BRIEF ON MATTER BEFORE DEPARTURE WITH COVER TO CONCUR LATER DCB COVER BUT UNDERSTANDING THAT WILL DO BEST POSSIBLE.
2. REF PARA 3: IF DOBLET DOES NOT ALREADY HAVE LETTER DROP, SUGGEST WRITE REFERRING TO ALBANIA AND TRAVELING TO/ FROM DROP TO AVOID UNNECESSARY CSOB CONTACT.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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 Date: 2005

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

COPY FILE

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74	11	11	11
ABSTRACT	INDEX		
DATE 16 OCT 1952			

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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35-82

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 SEPT 1952

SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 58437

ROUTING
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TO: SA REP GERMANY (MUNICH) (FRANKFURT)

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

SR 6

ROUTINE

2220Z 1 OCT 52

INFORMATION: RI, OPS, STC, EE 2, RI 2

Handwritten notes and signatures

DIR 21656

TO: MUNI

INFO: SEAN

CITE: DIR

REDSOX ABCOB

REF: MUNI 219 (IN 40026) PARA 2

REQUEST PHONE NUMBER AND ADDRESS FOR MAIL 1952 TO BE USED BY

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

COPY FILE IN

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14	134	2	22
ABSTRACT		INDEX	
DATE 16 OCT 1952			

RI/PL

SECURITY INFORMATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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3 OCT 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

N 41491

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA
SR REP, MUNICH

ROUTINE

1425Z 3 OCT 52

SR 6

INFORMATION:

CFI, OPS, STC, EE 2, RI 2

MUNI 0306

TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN CITE: SMUNI

REDSOX AECOB

RE: DIR 21656 (OUT 58437)

1. ADDRESS []

2. PHONE NUMBERS BEING CHANGED. WILL ADVISE WHEN PERMANENT,
BUT 1-DAY MAIL SHOULD MAKE UNNECESSARY.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

COPY FILE IN []

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74	6124	2	200
ABSTRACT	/	INDEX	
14 OCT 1952			
DATE 14 OCT 1952			

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

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SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

Chief, Staff C
Attention: Staff C/SPB
Chief, Special Security Division

29 OCT 1952

JG-2876
#47281

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 8 July 1952 requesting a covert security clearance to utilize Subject in a contract capacity in the United States under Project AECOB. Subject is to be used as an instructor.
2. This clearance is contingent upon assurance given by SR Division that:
 - a. Subject and his family enter the United States on the strength of an Immigration visa issued under authority of the Displaced Persons Act, and,
 - b. That all responsibility for the Subject and his family while in the United States - financial and otherwise - be assumed by the SR Division.
3. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's memorandum of 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances", a covert security clearance is granted for the covert use of the Subject as described in your request as set forth in Paragraph 1 above.
4. The Subject is not to represent himself as, nor is he to be represented as, an employee of CIA.
5. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-9. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.
6. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

Bromberg
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

31 OCT 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 119305

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP MUNICH

ROUTINE

SR 6

1412Z 31 OCT 52

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, EE 2, FI/RI 2

Handwritten initials/signature

SMUNI 0766

TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN CITE: SMUNI

REDSOX/AECOB

RE DIR 25591 (OUT 61687)

Handwritten note: 2 ambkano 2

ETA NEW YORK 4 NOV 1315 PANAMA FLIGHT 671.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

4 NW 52

TO : Chief, Staff C
ATTENTION : Staff C/SPB
FROM : Chief, Special Security Division
SUBJECT : JG-2876
 #47281

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 8 July 1952 requesting a covert security clearance to utilize Subject in a contract capacity in the United States under Project AECOB. Subject is to be used as an instructor.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's memorandum of 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances", a covert security clearance is granted for the covert use of the Subject as described in your request as set forth in Paragraph 1 above.

3. The Subject is not to represent himself as, nor is he to be represented as, an employee of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-9. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information

Date: 4 November 1952

Mr. Lyman M. Hemeret

Dear Mr. Hemeret:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a covert associate for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of \$5000 per annum. Upon your arrival in the United States you will be entitled to receive \$250. This additional compensation is for services performed during the first year of this agreement only. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. No taxes will be withheld from these amounts, and it will be your responsibility to report such income under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations.
2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such domestic travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government. This will include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel while away from Washington, D. C. You will be required to account for such expenses in substantial compliance with applicable Government regulations.
3. Operational Advance. A sum of \$1500 will be deposited in an account in a bank, in the United States, of which you will be the alleged owner. However at no time may you withdraw any portion of this money, and neither will it be awarded at anytime to you or your heirs. You agree to execute any such document as the Government may require to establish the true ownership of this account.
4. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.
5. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.
6. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing or training are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein to the extent that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms thereof.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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SECRET
Security Information

7. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

8. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 November 1952, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two years unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

- (a) By 30 days actual notice to you from the Government or
- (b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year each upon notice from the Government accepted by you. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY: JLB
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Lyman M. Hemeret

APPROVED:

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

5 November 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: I & S
Attention: Alien Affairs Officer

FROM : Chief, SR/FI/DB

SUBJECT : Entry of Arturus Brombergs

file

1. Reference is made to the unexpected difficulties encountered by this Division in conjunction with the subject's arrival at Idlewild Airfield on 4 November 1952 and to the cooperation and assistance rendered us by the Office of the Alien Affairs Officer in straightening out this matter.

2. It is realized that the above-mentioned individual entered the United States on a visitor's visa and that he is therefore bound to comply with all the laws and regulations. His visit in this country will therefore be strictly in accordance with the existing laws and regulations.

[]

SR/DB/E - J ad

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Addressee
- 2 - Hdqts.
- 2 - Liaison Office ✓

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

S E C R E T
SECURITY INFORMATION

TO SR/PP/Baltic

6 Nov 1952

FROM : FI/CD/SPB/JWA/mh

SUBJECT: Arturs Bromburgs

1. Your request for clearance to use Subject dated 7 Jul'52 was processed and transmitted to the Chief, Special Security Division, for final action.
2. The results of this action are attached.

Attachment: Memo dtd 4 Nov'52

S E C R E T
SECURITY INFORMATION

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
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Date: 2005

AIR

SECRET

13 November 1952

Chief of Station,

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

REDSOX/AECOB

Mailing of CAMBARO 2 Letters

1. It is requested that the two attached letters, written by CAMBARO 2, be mailed anywhere in . These letters are intended to cover his visit to the U. S.
2. Copies of the original Latvian texts are attached for Headquarters only.

APPROVED:

-
- Distribution:
- 1 - EE w/o att.
 - 2 - Stoc w/1 att.
 - 2 - SR w/1 att.
 - 3 - COM w/o att.
 - 2 - MOB w/o att.

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Date: 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Security Information

SECRET

RI COPY

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SECURITY INFORMATION

file

18 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: CAMBARO 2's Arrival in the U.S.

1. Pursuant to receipt of a cable from CSOB informing of subjects arrival at the Idlewild International Airport on PANAM flight 671 on 4 November 1952, the undersigned proceeded to N.Y. on 4 November 1952 for the purpose of meeting the subject and escorting him to Washington.

2. Prior to departure from Headquarters, the undersigned requested that DOB arrange with immigration officials at Idlewild for the undersigned to act as interpreter and greeter. The immigration officials were to be informed that a Mr. Charles P. Dexter of a U.S. leather firm would arrive to meet a LEONIDS BROMBERGS who is a representative of a German Leather goods firm. Mr. Dexter's firm in the U.S. is interested in engaging in an import/export enterprise with Mr. BROMBERGS firm. Prior to departure the undersigned was informed by DOB that the above had been arranged with the Immigration and Naturalization Service; the undersigned was instructed to contact the senior I&NS representative at Idlewild, Mr. John Adams.

3. Arrangements had also been made with CFD that \$1,500.00 would be deposited in a New York bank which would credit the subject with this sum and furnish him a letter of such credit through the undersigned. The deposit to this bank was ostensibly made by a Charles P. Dexter, []
[] Md. A cleared CFD covert contact in this bank [] was instructed not to reveal the above leather firm and its address to anyone outside the bank, unless he was pressed for it. In case of need to reveal this, he would inform CFD as soon as possible. Moreover, the bank would not send any correspondence to this address.

4. Upon arrival at Idlewild it was found that Mr. Adams, the Senior I&NS representative has been away for 2 weeks and was not expected to return for another week. In his absence, the undersigned was welcomed by Inspector Olsen who promised to cooperate, as he had been instructed by his Washington Headquarters to extend all courtesy and cooperation to a Mr. Baxter who would be meeting a Mr. Leonhard ROMBERG. Mr. Olsen was informed that the correct names were LEONIDS BROMBERGS and DEXTER. Mr. Olsen was curious regarding the subjects business and was informed of the aforementioned export/import interest. In addition he also asked whether or not the subject was married, when the undersigned had last seen him, and how long the undersigned had known him. He was informed that the undersigned last saw the subject approximately a year ago and had known him for approximately 9 (nine) months prior to last seeing him. Since the undersigned had no way of knowing whether or not the subjects German travel documents revealed that he was married, Mr. Olsen was informed that as far as could be recalled, the subject was married, though the undersigned could not recall this definitely as he had met many members of subjects firm while on a business trip in Europe.

5. When subject arrived, Mr. Olsen questioned him in a very routine manner with the undersigned acting as interpreter. During the questioning

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Date: 2003

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 (2)(A) Privacy
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

Olsen remarked that the documents indicated subject is single; the undersigned pointed out that he had not been certain of subjects marital status. Concluding the interview Mr. Olsen stated that he would consult with his N.Y. office as to whether or not a bond would be required for subject. Having made his query, Mr. Olsen informed that the N.Y. office had contacted Washington Headquarters I&NS. Since Washington had no record of any firm being interested in subject ("MR. BROMBERGS") the N.Y. office instructed Mr. Olsen to use his own judgement in this case. Mr. Olsen felt that subject should be no exception and requested a \$500.00 bond; he stated that in most cases where large U.S. concerns sponsor foreigners on visitors visas, a bond is posted. The undersigned expressed surprise because he was led to believe by his firms legal department that I&NS Headquarters in Washington had been informed of this case and had stated that no bond would be required. Mr. Olsen was told that it would be very embarrassing to the undersigned's firm should CAMBARO 2 be subjected to Ellis Island confinement; it was impossible to procure the necessary funds to post the required bond, as being Election Day all banks were closed. Mr. Olsen expressed regret, but felt dutybound to insist upon a bond; until this was furnished subject would be detained at Ellis Island.

6. In view of this Mr. Olsen was requested to delay subjects transfer to Ellis Island until the undersigned called his firms legal representative in Baltimore. Mr. Olsen very readily obliged whereupon the under signed contacted Maj. Gagarine of DOB, informed him of the situation, and suggested he get in touch with Mr. Christiansen of I&S who is a personal friend of Mr. Farrel, Assistant Commissioner of Immigration. Shortly thereafter Mr. Olsen informed the undersigned that he had had a call from his N.Y. office which stated that Headquarters Washington had informed that Mr. BROMBERGS may enter the U.S. without the necessity of posting a bond. According to Washington there had been a misunderstanding and subject's name had been incorrectly filed under "R" instead of under "B". This, according to Olsen, accounted for the original Washington "no record" statement; the error having been corrected, Washington had found a record under "B".

7. Without further complications Mr. Olsen admitted the subject to the U.S. and appologized for the inconvenience and embarrassment. CAMBARO 2 commented that, having heard so much about Ellis Island, he is sorry that he cannot get to see this famous place.

8. The remainder of the afternoon and evening was spent in sightseeing. CAMBARO 2 was quite impressed with N.Y. particularly with all the activity caused by the election returns. He was somewhat disappointed by the American bars and felt that the German bars offered more entertainment and activity.

9. The following morning CAMBARO 2 signed his contract, pseudonym acknowledgement forms, and secrecy agreement. He was instructed in the difference of security in the U.S. and Germany. Subsequently subject and the undersigned entrained for Washington where the subject was quartered in Hotel 1440 (1440 Rhode Island Ave.). A double room at this hotel had been procured by [] on 31 October.

10. CAMBARO [] 2 are at present residing in this hotel.

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

C. E. []
[]

file 2
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

REQUEST FOR COVERT COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING

TO: Office of Communications DATE OF REQUEST
11/26/52

FROM: **SR/2 via SR/DOB**

PSEUDONYM OF AGENT CAMBARO C 2	CASE OFFICER C J	ROOM NO. AND BLDG. 2504-J	TELEPHONE x-3582
--	----------------------------	-------------------------------------	----------------------------

OPERATION AND COUNTRY TO WHICH AGENT IS ASSIGNED U.S. at present	AGENT'S ASSIGNMENT (RADIO OPERATOR, ETC.) Agent Instructor	LANGUAGE TO BE USED IN OPERATION Latvian
--	--	--

HAS PROJECT BEEN APPROVED? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	HAS COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT FOR OPERATION BEEN DISCUSSED WITH OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
---	---

IS AGENT SUFFICIENTLY FLUENT IN ENGLISH TO PERMIT TRAINING TO BE DONE IN THAT LANGUAGE? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO If "No", what language? Yes, but they are not as fluent as the trainees and should not impede the progress of trainees	CHECK CLEARANCE POSSESSED BY AGENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Operational - Covert Security <input type="checkbox"/> Provisional <input type="checkbox"/> No clearance, but PRQ or equivalent has been submitted.
---	--

TRAINING REQUESTED

NOTE: Final decision as to amount and type of training will be made by Office of Communications. Approval of request is predicated upon project approval and clearance possessed.

Clandestine Cryptographic: Given only to personnel who will be involved in clandestine cryptographic operations. A cryptographic clearance can be waived, under certain conditions, subject to the approval of the Chief, Communications Security Branch.

A. SPECIFIC COURSE: (140 hours) gives student an understanding of cryptographic communications systems, procedures and security precautions used for a specific clandestine field operation. Enables student to perform cryptographic duties for the specific operation for which training is furnished.

B. BASIC COURSE: (100 hours) gives student an understanding of basic cryptographic communications systems, procedures and security precautions used for clandestine field operations. Enables student to follow written instructions for a specific cryptographic clandestine operation.

Clandestine Radio: Given only to personnel who will be involved in clandestine radio operations.

A. TRAINING COURSE: (Time required subject to student's ability and background.) Includes Morse Code (slow speeds), minor maintenance of agent radio equipment, basic radio theory, and communications procedures. Enables student to establish radio communications as required for his assignment.

B. BRIEFING COURSE: Familiarizes student with communications security problems, radio equipment and procedures.

Material covered depends on requirements of the operation. Does not qualify student to perform radio communications.

DATE STUDENT AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING	TRAINING MUST BE COMPLETED BY	MAY TRAINING BE GIVEN AT HEADQUARTERS? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
-------------------------------------	-------------------------------	---

JUSTIFICATION FOR TRAINING OUTSIDE HEADQUARTERS
In accordance with SR/DOB requirements.

Remarks:
It is felt that the instructors should take the course along with the trainees to prepare them for the crucial day, at which time it is expected that they will be engaged in active operations overseas.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 (2)(A) Privacy
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency Foreign Division Chief
SECRET Date: 2005 (45) (OVER)

Air

Account

Security Information

WMA-2513

SECRET

Chief, EE (Att. Chief, SR)

17 December 1952

Chief of Base, Munich

RECSOX/ARGOB

Transfer of Funds for [] and GAMBARO-2

Ref: MUNI-1539

1. Upon their departure from CSOB, GAMBAROs [] 2 were owed various sums, as follows:

[] Received in advance, July-Sept. Turned in accounts totalling Difference, owed [] Owed as per diem Personal DM balance turned over to us Total DM owed []	2100.00 D.M. <u>2102.45</u> 202.45 225.00 740.00 <u>3270.90</u>
Divided by 4.20 Reimbursement for telephone bill Personal MPC and foreign money	\$ 277.97 6.00 <u>283.97</u>
*Less advance, 3(?) Oct. 1952 Final amount owed []	\$ 305.49 113.00 <u>\$ 192.49</u>

*The accountability for this advance has been transferred to [] In view of the fact that the advance is accounted for above, the T/A should be ignored. If [] has already repaid this advance, he should, of course, be paid \$305.49 instead of \$192.49.

<u>GAMBARO-2</u> : Personal DM left at CSOB Divided by 4.20 Personal MPC left at CSOB Total owed GAMBARO-2	869.00 D.M. <u>8206.90</u> 2.95 <u>\$209.85</u>
---	--

2. The German Marks left by the GAMBAROs were changed into Military Payment Certificates by various private individuals in MOB at the rate of 4.20 DM = \$1. The official rate is 4.19 DM = \$1 but 4.20 is the rate normally used for convenience in such transactions. Since accounting for the DM has already been turned in by [], this amounts to a personal transaction; DYCLAIM merely effects the transfer of funds.

3. In view of the apparent difficulty of sending this amount through

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Security Information

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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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74-624-1-157

Security Information

SECRET

ECMA-2513

official channels, the sum of \$402.34 has been sent to Identity 2 of Paragraph 12 of the attachment to ECMA-10574, from an alias.

Approved:

Distribution:

- 2 - SR
- 1 - FE
- 3 - GOM
- 3 - CSOB (1 copy for Finance)

elw

Security Information
SECRET

SECRET

7 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR : SR/DOB/HQ
ATTENTION : [] OR
 [] []
SUBJECT : Leonids BROMBERGS

1. Alien Affairs called us with reference to above. Please see our memo of this date for the other name involved.

2. Last fall, we secured an extension of stay for him at the request of [] []. Extension was granted to 28 January 1954.

3. It is now necessary that this individual leave the country before above expiration date or a new extension be secured.

4. It will be appreciated if your wishes are made known to us as soon as possible, in order that Alien Affairs will have sufficient time to make proper arrangements.

[] [] [] [] []
SR/DOB/LN

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

SECRET

27 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/DOB Ops
FROM : SR/DOB ABCOB Project Case Officer
SUBJECT : Apparent Security Breach

1. On 17, 18, and 19 April 1953, [] attended the annual Congress of the American Latvian Association (ALA) in Grand Rapids, Michigan. In addition to procuring sufficient information for PRQ Part I on several prospective spotters, []

[] was also instructed to mingle among the attending delegates for the purpose of keeping the case officer informed of current thinking, planning, and activities of the Latvian emigres.

2. In the course of carrying out his assignment, [] was approached by an acquaintance who inquired whether [] had met a man by the name of Linde, who resides in Washington, had met a man by the name of Linde, who has recently moved there. Since []'s reply indicated that he knew no such person, he was advised by this acquaintance that it would be wise to meet Linde because the latter is getting to be very influential, as he is working for CIA, has an annual salary of \$7,000 and will no doubt emerge as a leading Latvian personality. According to this same acquaintance, Linde had originally been offered the sum of \$5,000 per annum, but (according to Linde's statements) he had held out until CIA agreed to pay him \$7,000 a year.

3. [] subsequently had some numerous other acquaintances and friends who told him that Linde is employed by CIA. In addition, remarks were also made that Linde does some translations and that prior to his employment with CIA he had been so thoroughly investigated that his entire home town had been deluged by "secret personnel", who were engaged in checking him. This "secret personnel" was alleged to have had people surveille Linde, check on everyone who knew him, and investigate everything very thoroughly.

4. The impression that [] carried away from this Congress was that the fact that Linde is working for CIA at the aforementioned salary is an "open secret" within the Latvian emigres.

5. Upon receipt of this information on 25 April, the undersigned immediately informed Chief, SR/DOB, verbally. The Chief, SR/DOB suggested the following action:

- a. That the undersigned submit a detailed report of this security breach.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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b. That Linde be subjected to a Polygraph interrogation.

6. In a discussion with Chief, DOB Training Section, it was agreed that suggestions made by Chief, SR/DOB would be honored, with the exception that prior to the Polygraph interrogation, Linde would be interrogated by [] and the undersigned. Subject interrogation may provide an admission from Linde which would preclude the Polygraph test.

7. This report is forwarded for your approval and comments.

SR/DOB/MPH:cm

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - Chief, SR/DOB
- ✓2 - Originator
- 1 - Chrono

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

-9. Juni 1953

Chief, EE (ATTN: Chief, SR)

Attn: []

Chief of Base, Munich

REDSOX/ Operational

AKCOB/ Medical Report

Attached is Medical Report for [AFCAM BAROS/21.]

[]

8 June 1953

Distributions:

- 2 - SR w/1 att.
- ✓ 1 - EE w/o "
- 3 - COM w/o "
- 2 - MOB " "

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Security Information

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74-6/34-2775

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

17 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR : Alien Affairs Office
ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : Application to Extend Time of Temporary
Stay, Leonids BROMBERGS

1. Request that action be taken to extend temporary stay in the United States of subject, Leonids BROMBERGS. Subject arrived in the United States on 30 October 1952 and extension of this stay was granted to 28 July 1953.

2. In support of this request, there are attached the following documents:

1. Form 1-539, U. S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Application to Extend Time of Temporary Stay." (triplicate)
2. Passport, Leonids Brombergs, issued by Latvian Legation, London, England. (Visitors Permit #V1351301 attached).
3. Money Order, \$10.00, payable to Treasurer of the United States.

 Chief, SR/DOB

SR/DOB/C :bms

Distr:

- 0 & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - Admin
- 2 - Chrono

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Security Information

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SECURITY INFORMATION
APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME OF TEMPORARY STAY

(Read instructions before filling out application)

TO: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

1. My name is **Leonide** **Brosberg**
2. My mailing address(es) in the United States pending my receipt of notice of the decision on this application will be **721 Denison St., Baltimore 17, Maryland**
3. I am attaching my temporary permit N **2173113** and my passport issued by **Latvian Legation** on **1 September 1952** at **London**, which will expire on **22 July 1953** at **London**, (Country) **England**, which will expire on **22 July 1953** at **London**, (Country) **England**, (Your passport must be valid at least 6 months beyond the expiration date of the extension requested in this application)
4. I have also been known by the following names (include maiden name if a married woman, professional names, nicknames, and aliases) **Karl Theodorstrasse, Munich, Germany**
5. My foreign residence is **London, England**; I resided there from **December 1951** to **August 31, 1952**
6. I was born at **Kandava, Kurland, Latvia** on **August 31, 1913**
7. I am a citizen or subject of **Latvia**
8. I arrived in the United States at the port of **New York**
9. I was admitted for a temporary period of **670** months. I came as a **migrant visa No. 670** issued on **1 September 1952** at **Munich, Germany**
10. I am **not** in possession of return passage or ticket
11. My occupation is **see letter**
12. I **have not** been employed or engaged in business since entering the United States. If answer is in affirmative, complete the following:
I **was** employed or engaged in business as **see letter** at **see letter** My employment or engagement in business began on **see letter** and ended on **see letter**
13. My monthly income from employment or business **was** **see letter**
14. (If not employed or engaged in business in the United States, describe fully the source and amount of your income abroad and how supported while in the United States.) **see letter**
15. My marital status is **married**
16. (If married) Name and present address of my **husband** is **Alga Brosbergs, Larus, Folklandwarden**
17. The names, ages, present address, and alien registration numbers of my children are **Ingrida Brosbergs, Larus, Folklandwarden, Sweden**
18. (See paragraph 5 of instructions.) Attached hereto is the written statement of **Charles P. Dexter** dated **1952**, in support of my application. The contents thereof are made a part of this application as if fully set forth herein and I believe the statements to be true.
19. (To be filled in by the sponsor or friend) I am **Charles P. Dexter** **friend** of **Leonide Brosberg** residing at **721 Denison St., Baltimore 17, Maryland**

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

July 26, 1953

- 20. I have secured one extension, the last extension to expire on July 26, 1953.
- 21. I desire to secure one extension of one (6) month to my present temporary period of admission and submit herewith in detail the reasons why I cannot depart at the time as originally fixed or as previously extended.
- 18. I certify that all statements in this application are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated at Washington, D.C., this 15th day of July, 1953

(Signature of applicant)

APPLICANT WILL NOT WRITE BELOW THIS LINE

- 10. Denied
- 10. Temporary stay extended to _____, upon the following conditions: _____

INSTRUCTIONS

- 1. If you are an alien admitted to the United States for a temporary period as a nonimmigrant and desire to remain in this country beyond the date which has already been authorized you should fill out this form and take it or mail it to the immigration office having jurisdiction over the place where you are staying in the United States. A separate application must be executed for each alien applying for an extension even though part of a single family unit.
- 2. A fee of \$10 must accompany each application except that no fee is required from alien nonimmigrant students or from alien attendants, servants, personal employees, and members of their immediate families, of certain foreign government officers and employees. Any such attendant, servant, personal employee, and members of his immediate family who are uncertain as to whether they are exempt from the payment of this fee may inquire at any office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The remittance should be drawn in favor of the "Treasurer of the United States." However, in Guam, remittances should be drawn in favor of the "Treasurer of Guam" and in the Virgin Islands in favor of the "Commissioner of Finance, Virgin Islands."
- 3. Submit with this application your passport which must be valid for at least 6 months beyond the expiration date of the extension requested, and your temporary entry permit (Form 257a or I-94C).
- 4. Submit this application as soon as you are aware that you will be unable to complete the purpose of your stay within the period authorized but in no event less than 15 days prior to the end of such period.
- 5. The requirements for the statement referred to in question number 18 are as follows:
 - (a) THE ATTENDANT, SERVANT, OR PERSONAL EMPLOYEE AND MEMBERS OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILIES, OF OFFICERS mentioned in paragraph No. 2 shall submit a written statement from the employing official describing the current and intended employment of the applicant.
 - (b) An alien specified in section 201 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended, who has been admitted as a nonimmigrant, shall submit a written statement from his sponsor or employer showing the terms of the applicant's present and intended work or employment, the period of extension desired, and the reasons for the extension.
 - (c) A STUDENT shall submit a statement from a responsible official of the school which he is attending setting forth—
 - 1. The period of attendance at school.
 - 2. The courses and number of semester hours carried in the previous semester and whether in day or evening classes.
 - 3. The courses successfully completed and the courses failed during the previous semester.
 - 4. The semester hours now being carried.
 - 5. Whether satisfactory arrangements have been made for the continued attendance of the applicant at school.
 - 6. Any known employment of the applicant.
 - (d) A TREATY TRADER must submit a Form I-126, properly executed, with such additional documents as are required by that form.
 - (e) THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A FOREIGN PRESS, RADIO, FILM, OR OTHER INFORMATION MEDIA shall submit a statement from his employer establishing that the applicant is a representative of foreign information media in the United States and setting forth the applicant's current and intended activities and the reasons for the extension.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-47964-4

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

1 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/DOB

SUBJECT : Request for Special Training

1. It is considered desirable that CAMBARO/2 be furnished certain specialized courses of instruction in order to increase their proficiency as instructors. A further consideration is the possibility that CAMBARO/2 may be utilized on an action-type mission in the summer or fall of 1954.

2. It is requested, therefore, that you provide a suitable safehouse or apartment and arrange for the procurement of instructors qualified in the following subjects:

- a. Secret Writing (one system and one developer)
- b. Document Falsification
- c. Russian-language Instruction

JA/sjs

Chief, SR/2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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(2)(B) Methods/Sources
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SECRET
INFORMATION

SECRET

13 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Alien Affairs Office
Attn: []

SUBJECT : Application to Extend Time of Temporary Stay,
Leonids BROMBERGS

1. It is requested that action be taken to extend the temporary stay of subject, Leonids BROMBERGS, for a period of six (6) months. Subject arrived in the U.S. on 30 October 1952, and extensions of stay have been granted to 28 July 1953, subsequently to 28 January 1954.

2. In support of this request, there are attached the following documents:

- a. Form 1-539, U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Application to Extend Time of Temporary Stay." (triplicate)
- b. Passport, Leonids Brombergs, issued by Latvian Legation, London, England. (Visitor's Permit #V1351301 attached).
- c. Money Order, \$10.00, payable to Treasurer of the United States.

3 Attachments
As noted.

JA/sjs

[]
Chief, SR/2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
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Date: 2005

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
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APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME OF TEMPORARY STAY

(Read instructions before filling out application)

TO: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

1. My name is Leonida Bronbergs
2. My mailing address(es) in the United States pending my receipt of notice of the decision on this application will be 724 Denison St., Baltimore 29, Maryland
3. I am attaching my temporary entry permit No. V1351 301 and my passport No. 22131 LS issued by Latvian Legation on September 2, 1952 at London, England, which will expire on _____, (Your passport must be valid at least 6 months beyond the expiration date of the extension requested in this application)
4. I have also been known by the following names (include maiden name if a married woman, professional names, nicknames, and aliases) none
5. My foreign residence is 73 Karl-Theodorestrasse, Munich, Germany from December 1951 to date; I resided there
6. I was born at Kandavas Kurland Latvia, on August 31, 1913
7. I am a citizen or subject of Latvia
8. I arrived in the United States at the port of New York on November 4, 1952 by Pan American Airways
9. I was admitted for a temporary period of three months.
10. I came as a nonimmigrant II with nonimmigrant visa No. 670 issued on October 30, 1952 at Munich, Germany
11. I am not in possession of return passage or ticket.
12. My occupation is See letter
13. I have have not been employed or engaged in business since entering the United States. See letter.
If answer is in affirmative, complete the following:
I am was employed or engaged in business as _____ at _____
by _____ at _____
My employment or engagement in business began _____ and ended _____
My monthly income from employment or business { is } See letter { was }
14. (If not employed or engaged in business in the United States, describe fully the source and amount of your income abroad and how supported while in the United States.) See letter
15. My marital status is married
16. (If married) the name and present address of my husband wife is Ilga Bronbergs, Lerum, Folktaidsgarden, Sweden
17. The names, ages, present address, and alien registration numbers of my children are—
- | Name | Age | Address | AR No. |
|--------------------------|----------|---------------------------------------|--------|
| <u>Ingrida Bronbergs</u> | <u>5</u> | <u>Lerum, Folktaidsgarden, Sweden</u> | |
18. (See paragraph 5 of instructions.) Attached hereto is the written statement of _____ dated _____, in support of my application. The contents thereof are made a part of this application as if fully set forth herein and I believe the statements to be true.
19. (To be filled in only by a temporary visitor for business or pleasure.) I am visiting the following persons in the United States:
- | Name | Relationship | Address |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <u>Zigards Kaktins</u> | <u>high school friend</u> | <u>754 Parker St., Roxbury, Mass</u> |
| <u>Charles P. Dexter</u> | <u>cousin</u> | <u>724 Denison St., Baltimore,</u> |
| <u>Fred Lounsbury</u> | <u>friend</u> | <u>5304 59th Ave., Riverdale, Md</u> |

123 20202

20. I have secured two extensions, the last extension to expire on January 26, 1953
(Number) (Month) (Day) (Year)
21. I desire to secure an extension of six (6) months to my present temporary period of admission and submit
(Time desired)
herewith in detail the reasons why I cannot depart at the time as originally fixed or as previously extended

See Letter

I certify that all statements in this application are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated at Washington, D.C., this 15th day of January, 1954
(Place) (Date) (Day) (Month) (Year)

(Signature of applicant)

APPLICANT WILL NOT WRITE BELOW THIS LINE

- Denied
 Temporary stay extended to _____, upon the following conditions:

(Place)

(Date)

(District director)

INSTRUCTIONS

1. If you are an alien admitted to the United States for a temporary period as a nonimmigrant and desire to remain in this country beyond the date which has already been authorized you should fill out this form and take it or mail it to the immigration office having jurisdiction over the place where you are staying in the United States. A separate application must be executed for each alien applying for an extension even though part of a single family unit, except that accompanying children under age of 14 whether documented on parent's passport or holding individual visas may be granted same extension as parent, both on single extension application and with single fee.

2. A fee of \$10 must accompany each application except that no fee is required from alien nonimmigrant students or from alien attendants, servants, personal employees, and members of their immediate families, of certain foreign government officers and employees. Any such attendant, servant, personal employee, and members of his immediate family who are uncertain as to whether they are exempt from the payment of this fee may inquire at any office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The remittance should be drawn in favor of the "Treasurer of the United States." However, in Guam, remittances should be drawn in favor of the "Treasurer of Guam" and in the Virgin Islands in favor of the "Commissioner of Finance, Virgin Islands."

3. Submit with this application your passport which must be valid for at least 6 months beyond the expiration date of the extension requested, and your temporary entry permit (Form 257a or I-94C).

4. Submit this application as soon as you are aware that you will be unable to complete the purpose of your stay within the period authorized but in no event less than 15 or more than 30 days prior to the end of such period.

5. The requirements for the statement referred to in question number 18 are as follows:

(a) THE ATTENDANT, SERVANT, OR PERSONAL EMPLOYEE AND MEMBERS OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILIES, OF OFFICERS mentioned in paragraph No. 2 shall submit a written statement from the employing official describing the current and intended employment of the applicant.

(b) An alien specified in section 201 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended, who has been admitted as a nonimmigrant, shall submit a written statement from his sponsor or employer showing the terms of the applicant's present and intended work or employment, the period of extension desired, and the reasons for the extension.

(c) A STUDENT shall submit a statement from a responsible official of the school which he is attending setting forth—

1. The period of attendance at school.
2. The courses and number of semester hours carried in the previous semester and whether in day or evening classes.
3. The courses successfully completed and the courses failed during the previous semester.
4. The semester hours now being carried.
5. Whether satisfactory arrangements have been made for the continued attendance of the applicant at school.
6. Any known employment of the applicant.

(d) A TREATY TRADER must submit a Form I-126, properly executed, with such additional documents as are required by that form.

(e) THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A FOREIGN PRESS, RADIO, FILM, OR OTHER INFORMATION MEDIA shall submit a statement from his employer establishing that the applicant is a representative of foreign information media in the United States and setting forth the applicant's current and intended activities and the reasons for the extension.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-47004-5

14 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, STC/SPB

SUBJECT : Request for Clearance for Arturs BROMBERGS

1. Appropriate security clearance for the use of subject as an action agent on a penetration mission to the Latvian SSR is requested. Subject has previously received Covert Security Clearance #47281, dated 4 November 1952.

2. The following facts are brought to your attention inasmuch as they may have a bearing on your final decision:

- a. BROMBERGS is knowledgeable of the true names of three agents whom he has recruited, trained, and whom we have dispatched in 1952--[]'s 1, 2 and 3. [] /1 has never been heard from and is presumed dead. [] /2's last name is as common as the name Smith. BROMBERGS claims that he has completely forgotten [] /2's true first name; this, no doubt, is quite logical because [] /2 has never been referred to by BROMBERGS or anyone else by his true first name. (It was always a training alias which was used and which is quite different from his actual first name.) BROMBERGS knows the true name of [] /3. This agent is known to be captured.
- b. BROMBERGS also knows the true name of [] dispatched in Spring 1953, never heard from, and presumed dead. BROMBERGS also knows the true identity of [] /1 (who will be utilized under Project AEMARSH). In addition, he also knows the true identities of the following agents, all of whom have been disposed of: [] /11, [] /12, [] /8, [] /9, and [] /10. Subject does not know the true identities of any of the staff personnel with whom he has been in contact. BROMBERGS knows the installation, Kaufbeuern, Germany, that was utilized for the training of the [] as well as the safehouse in Kempton and Steinberg which was utilized for the same purpose. In the U.S., subject does not know any of the installations of this Agency other than one safehouse which was utilized for the training of [] BROMBERGS has an extensive knowledge of our methods pertaining to the training of agents, many of our weaknesses and a good deal of our operational know-how.

3. It is believed that subject can withstand a great deal of physical and mental torture. When weighing all factors, i.e., whether or not to grant permission for utilization of subject, it should be kept in mind that

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

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it is the case officer's considered opinion that the benefits gained by dispatching as qualified an individual as BROMBERGS far outweigh the detriments we would face from a security point of view.

4. It is believed that the facts, as enumerated above, represent the sum total of BROMBERGS' knowledgeability. This opinion is based on the fact that, upon being closely questioned regarding the extent of his knowledgeability, subject submitted a detailed and lengthy report on the matter, such report involving an obviously great degree of painstaking recollection on his part. The agent volunteered the statement that he would gladly submit to a technical interview in order that his veracity be determined.

5. For any further information regarding this matter, please contact [] 1, Room 2504 "J" Building, extension 2538.

JA/32

Chief, SR/2

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. 7704

TO: Chief, SR/2

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of Arturs BROMBERGS.

"This Operational Clearance will expire upon Subjects return to the U.S."

LIMITATIONS: To be used as stated in memo dated 14 Jan 1954. This clearance is based upon a (covert investigation) check of (non-derogatory) (negative) files available to headquarters and (non-derogatory) (negative) results of field traces. It should be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that disqualifying derogatory information was not developed during the course of the inquiry outlined above. The extent of headquarters checking and the basis for this clearance should be conveyed to the field station concerned.

TC/dea
FI/STC/SPB
TC/dea

Date 21 Jan 1954

Copy 1 of 2 copies

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 59-47
FEB 1953

(9)

SECRET

27 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/DOB

SUBJECT : Request for Partial Training for CAMBARO/2

1. General

It is requested that the subject-named agent be trained by SR/DOB for a REDSOX-type operation under Project AECOB. Training can begin immediately and must be completed prior to 1 April 1954. CAMBARO/2 has been granted a covert security clearance, #47281. Inasmuch as he is more intimately acquainted with very sensitive information than most other agents, additional operational clearance was requested and has been granted (#7704, dated 21 January 1954), permitting his utilization for this mission. When this latter clearance was granted, the question of whether or not this agent needs special CFI dispensation arose. In view of the fact that CAMBARO/2 was recruited in Sweden and has been in the United States on a visitor's visa for approximately one year, it was ruled that no CFI special dispensation is needed in this case.

2. Brief of Operational Plan

- a. The agent will be infiltrated either by means of normal air dispatch or by balloon dispatch; in either case, dispatch will be effected jointly with the AEBASIN agents with proper and standard compartmentalization procedures prevailing. It is expected that exfiltration will be overland.
- b. The mission will be of a tourist type and will require that the agent engage in tasks calling for a very thorough knowledge of tradecraft and current area reality. Little, if any, reporting in this mission is envisaged prior to exfiltration.
- c. The agent should receive instruction in the following technical and specialized fields:

S/W

Flaps and Seals
Document Falsification
Unarmed defense
Surreptitious Methods of Entry
Photography

In addition, the agent should be given two hours daily of receiving W/T. At the present time, he can receive eight words per minute.

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3. As already indicated verbally in prior meetings, this agent is well qualified in all field- and trade-craft subjects and consequently needs no training therein. Moreover, although he is also acquainted with the technical subjects (paragraph 2. above), he should be given "brush-up" type of training. Having trained two agent teams for this Agency and other agent personnel on his own, prior to his association with this Agency, he is quite capable of brining his physical condition to the desired peak without special supervision. Should dispatch be by balloon, he will have to be trained accordingly; should, however, dispatch be by air, he needs little further training, inasmuch as he has received such already and has qualified in jumping. The major training emphasis should be in the Russian language with which the agent is familiar but in which he needs a great deal of instruction.

4. The agent's training alias will be "Andy." The agent is forty years old; he is married, but lives separated from his wife because of marital difficulties. He is a Latvian citizen and is in the U.S. legally; his physical condition is excellent. He served in the Latvian Legion during World War II and rose to the rank of first lieutenant (prior to that, he served in the Latvian police which was a paramilitary type organization in Latvia). He was a leader of a partisan unit in Latvia and has been engaged in various operational schemes while in Sweden. The agent has a fluent command of Latvian, a fair command of German and Swedish, and a poor command of English and Russian. He is very skilled in weapons and his hobby is photography. His area knowledge is sufficient for this operation (see paragraph 5. below). The agent was last in his native country in 1945.

5. [] will be assigned to this training on a part-time basis for the purpose of instructing this agent in current reality. [] has a covert security clearance, #46004.

6. [] will be assigned as SR/2 project desk officer and will act as SR/DOB senior case officer. [] of this Branch will provide overall guidance and direction in mounting the operation. Because of the simplicity of the training program and because CAMBARO/2 needs no 24-hour supervision, it is felt that one DOB junior case officer (preferably Russian-speaking) will suffice. [] will also be the briefing officer. During this operation, [] will use the alias "John Adams."

7. In view of the foregoing, it is felt that no elaborate safehouse is required. Basically, the safehouse should have one bedroom, a living room, kitchen, and space for a photographic dark room. It would, of course, be preferable to have a house-keeping couple available; however, this is not absolutely necessary as CAMBARO/2 can cook well enough and is not adverse to cleaning his own quarters.

8. Your acceptance and comments are requested as soon as possible so that training may begin at the earliest possible opportunity.

MPH/sjs

[]
Chief, SR/2

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

REQUEST FOR COVERT COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING

TO: Office of Communications **DATE OF REQUEST**
3 February 1954

FROM: SR/DOB

PSEUDONYM OF AGENT Lyman T. Hemerett	CASE OFFICER 1 [] []	ROOM NO. AND BLDG. 2502 'J'	TELEPHONE 3582
--	----------------------------------	---------------------------------------	--------------------------

OPERATION AND COUNTRY TO WHICH AGENT IS ASSIGNED Project REDSOX/AECOB - Latvia	AGENT'S ASSIGNMENT (RADIO OPERATOR, ETC.) See remarks	LANGUAGE TO BE USED IN OPERATION Latvian
--	---	--

HAS PROJECT BEEN APPROVED? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	HAS COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT FOR OPERATION BEEN DISCUSSED WITH OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
--	--

IS AGENT SUFFICIENTLY FLUENT IN ENGLISH TO PERMIT TRAINING TO BE DONE IN THAT LANGUAGE? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO If "No", what language? German & Swedish - Fair Command English & Russian - Poor Command	CHECK CLEARANCE POSSESSED BY AGENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Operational <input type="checkbox"/> Provisional <input type="checkbox"/> No clearance, but PRQ or equivalent has been submitted.
--	--

TRAINING REQUESTED

[*NOTE: Final decision as to amount and type of training will be made by Office of Communications. Approval of request is predicated upon project approval and clearance possessed.*]

Clandestine Cryptographic: Given only to personnel who will be involved in clandestine cryptographic operations. A cryptographic clearance can be waived, under certain conditions, subject to the approval of the Chief, Communications Security Branch.

- A. **SPECIFIC COURSE:** (140 hours) gives student an understanding of cryptographic communications systems, procedures and security precautions used for a specific clandestine field operation. Enables student to perform cryptographic duties for the specific operation for which training is furnished.
- B. **BASIC COURSE:** (100 hours) gives student an understanding of basic cryptographic communications systems, procedures and security precautions used for clandestine field operations. Enables student to follow written instructions for a specific cryptographic clandestine operation.

Clandestine Radio: Given only to personnel who will be involved in clandestine radio operations.

- A. **TRAINING COURSE:** (Time required subject to student's ability and background.) Includes Morse Code (slow speeds), minor maintenance of agent radio equipment, basic radio theory, and communications procedures. Enables student to establish radio communications as required for his assignment.
- B. **BRIEFING COURSE:** Familiarizes student with communications security problems, radio equipment and procedures.

Material covered depends on requirements of the operation. Does not qualify student to perform radio communications.

DATE STUDENT AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING 8 Feb 1954	TRAINING MUST BE COMPLETED BY 13 Mar 1954	MAY TRAINING BE GIVEN AT HEADQUARTERS? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
--	---	--

JUSTIFICATION FOR TRAINING OUTSIDE HEADQUARTERS
Agent candidate to be trained for mission into a denied area.

Training to be conducted in safe house under SR/DOB control.

Remarks: Agent candidate to be trained in receiving only. Approximately 60 hours are available for this phase of training. Agent candidate's present receiving speed 8 WPM, additional time available approximately 1-10 April 1954 for Crypto and other briefing. Agent candidate identified as TU #226 in SR/DOB Training files. Case officer training alias: Mr. John Adams.

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[] [] CSR/DOB
Signature of requesting Foreign Division Chief

FORM NO. 51-123
MAR 1952

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)**
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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(45) (OVER)

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psycho

ASSESSMENT REQUEST*

DATE OF REQUEST (, MONTH, YEAR)

8 February 1954

One copy of this form will be forwarded to the Chief, Assessment Unit, before arrangements can be made to schedule an assessment.

NAME (LAST)	(MIDDLE)	(FIRST)
OR (BUT NOT BOTH) PSEUDONYM (LAST)	(MIDDLE)	(FIRST)
HERBERT	T.	LYMAN

AGE	SEX	MARITAL STATUS	OFFICE	DIVISION
40	Male	Separated		

FOR CONSULTATION CALL:

OFFICER SPONSORING APPLICANT	EXTENSION	BUILDING	ROOM NO.
E	2538	#JH	2504

STATION TO WHICH APPLICANT IS GOING

TYPE OF COVER (STATE, MILITARY, OR UNOFFICIAL)
Unofficial

TITLES OF PROJECTED ASSIGNMENTS

CIVIL SERVICE RATING	IS SECURITY CHECK COMPLETE?
GS-	Yes

WHAT WILL BE THE SPECIFIC DUTIES OF THE APPLICANT?

Covert Assignment

HOW MANY OTHERS WILL BE WORKING WITH THE APPLICANT?

WHO WILL DIRECT AND REVIEW THE APPLICANT'S WORK?
SR/2 Case Officer

WHAT WILL BE THE APPLICANT'S ADMINISTRATIVE - SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES?

N.A.

(OVER)

FORM NO. 51-83
NOV 1949

SECRET

*This form as such is SECRET.

TR 20228

22 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief/Operations, SR/DOB

SUBJECT: Weekly Progress Report, TU # 226, 15 March thru
21 March, 1954

This report covers the period of the first full week of operation of Phase II and is the second weekly report of the current phase. This phase will terminate, under present plans, on 8 April 54.

1. Arrivals, Departures, Telephone Calls:

There are no unusual visitors or callers to report. Plumbers have been called in to cope with a sewage problem at the tenant house. All other personnel were from the Agency and were properly admitted to do their duties at the safehouse. Such personnel are known to Andy by their training aliases only.

2. Psychological Problems

a. Andy revealed a feeling of dissatisfaction with his progress in the Russian language. He was positively upset and anxious at the limited time remaining for him to learn Russian. (See Project log notation for 19 March and 21 March.)

b. Andy is unhappy about the correspondence controls which we exercise over him. I informed him that he would be obliged to channel all his correspondence through to [] []. The matter at present rests between [] [] and Andy. Note: The correspondence in question was directed to Andy's wife in Sweden and concerned divorce arrangements between them.

c. Andy is required by me to submit a short written memo covering his unescorted activity in Washington when he goes in for rest and relaxation. As yet he has not done so because of "oversight". However, it is significant to report that he has told me that he will not reveal his girlfriends' names because he suspects they'll be checked. He informed me Saturday P.M. in this view while I was driving him in to Washington. He added confidentially that his principal girlfriend, whom he intends to marry some day, is still married to an Army officer. A

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divorce is imminent and Andy is apprehensive of potential harm to her situation.

d. Andy stated flatly that he expects to be free every Saturday evening and part of Sunday for the balance of this phase. This was stated categorically in the presence of [] and myself. Note: I request instruction on this matter.

e. I have been successful in eliminating Andy's original pre-disposition against Phase III at Ft. Bragg. He now is looking forward to the field exercise.

3. Morale: (See para 2, Weekly Progress Report, TU 226, dtd 14 March).

I believe there is a slight but noticeable drop from the high point of morale reported 14 March. This is not unexpected because of the nature of Andy's activity. He has been driving himself relentlessly. His only recreation during the week has been a few walks and a few games of chess with me and chats with Bruno. Despite the problems mentioned in para 3 above, my opinion is that his morale is basically very good. I submit that it is better for him to blow off a little steam irregularly than to keep his resentments and anxieties dammed up for a really serious explosion later. I have noticed that however pointed and apparent his objections and outbursts, there follows a period of readjustment and reconciliation with the hard facts.

4. Agent's Reaction to Program.

Andy's most serious reaction is his own feeling of inadequacy in learning Russian. He has expressed concern over the insufficient allotment of language instruction hours. When I suggested that he indicate what we should cut out of his program to replace with Russian, Andy looked helpless and said he couldn't cut out anything--but he needed more Russian just the same. This view, as expressed during the middle of the week, was modified at the end of the week. He also is concerned about the quantity of work yet to be done, arrangements yet to be made, and the rapidly approaching day of departure. On Saturday he was reassured by the document orientation he received from Hank and Ralph, and I think he has more confidence in our organization's ability to document him for his mission. He implied this to me.

5. Security Problem.

a. On two occasions, the name of a staff member, not currently assigned to this project, was mentioned in Andy's presence. On one occasion it is my opinion that Andy took note of the name. However, I have been informed that in all probability Andy already knew that name due to his long association with that person on previous projects. Both

incidents were unfortunate lapsus linguae and should be forgotten as such.

b. Due to a misunderstanding of operating instructions, the safehouse was left in sole charge of the housekeeping couple overnight. This couple is new at their duties, they are not bound by a contract as yet, and it is deemed inadvisable to leave them in sole charge over night. I assume responsibility for not sufficiently orienting a junior case officer with this fact.

c. The woman who occupied the tenant house on the safehouse property has vacated the house. See Weekly Progress Report dated 14 March.

d. The housekeeping couple continues to occupy quarters within the main house. This is a constant security problem to which there is no solution under present conditions.

6. Disciplinary Problems.

It is apparent that two problems of discipline are in sight:
(a) Andy's announced intention not to reveal his girl friends' names;
(b) Andy's announced intention to go to town for unescorted recreation every weekend. In view of his principal girl friend's marital status which poses a potential threat to Andy, certain decisions will have to be made by higher authority for our guidance on the project.

7. Additional Comments and Observations.

a. Housekeepers and Tenant House.

The tenant house will not be ready for occupancy by our housekeepers before the end of this training cycle. The house lacks septic tank and I expect it will be some time before one is installed. However, if this place is to be used by subsequent projects, the matter should be resolved as soon as possible. There is an acute sanitation problem existing due to the raw sewage which has overflowed the waste pit in the front yard. This is less than 150 yards from the front door of the main house and is located at a point above our water supply.

b. Personnel Problems.

The present strength of two DOB staff members on this project is an insufficient number. We can continue to fulfill our obligations to the project, however, it is fairly trying due to the distances to be travelled and the fact that every alternate night must be spent at the project by each of us.

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c. We continue to receive a gratifying degree of cooperation from all DOB staff sections and personnel from TSS. I would particularly like to cite the cooperation of [redacted] [redacted], the project commo instructor, who has fulfilled every single hour of instruction scheduled. In addition he has devoted extra time including a Saturday morning for additional commo instruction. In order for him to arrive at the safehouse for the scheduled morning hours he has had to get up at 0530 hours and drive sixty miles.

d. Summary of Progress.

It is my opinion that the project is progressing satisfactorily. Those psychological and morale problems noted in this report I do not consider unusual or unexpected due to the circumstances under which Andy is working. He is a hard worker and human enough to have occasional temperamental expressions of his feelings. Andy now occupies a room by himself since I had Bruno move his bed out into the bedroom used as a general dormitory.

Andy has asked on three occasions if I am going to accompany him to Germany. Apparently he wants me to go with him. I have not answered him directly due to the uncertainty of my position. Also I understand informally that I have been tentatively assigned to another project which may conflict with such a trip. I believe I have gained a firm hold on his good will despite the fact that we have been associated only a short time.

Note: Andy has submitted a typewritten report covering two periods of unescorted activity in Washington. (See para 2 c. above.)

This report ends as of 2400, 21 March 1954.

Attachment:

1 copy of Andy's report of Unescorted Activity, in Latvian (SR/2/[redacted] [redacted]).

SR/DOB/[redacted] [redacted]

Distribution:

- 0 - DOB/COPS
- 1 - SR/COP, C/SR/2
- 1 - c/o TU 226
- 1 - chrono

SECRET

Mr. Lyman M. Hemeret

Dear Mr. Hemeret:

Reference is made to your contract effective 1 November 1952 with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, for the purchase of information and services of a confidential nature.

Effective 25 April 54 said contract is hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto and in lieu thereof the following contract is substituted:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, the Government will pay directly to you an amount calculated at the rate of \$5,000.00 per annum. Commencing on the date you actually depart for your target area, the Government will deposit to an internal escrow account in your name this basic compensation and, while you are in the target area, an additional amount calculated at the rate of \$1,000.00 per annum. All funds deposited in said escrow account will be payable to you upon the successful completion of your assigned mission. In the event of your death as determined in the criteria set forth in paragraph 6 (b) below, the Government will pay to any person or persons designated by you in writing all funds deposited in your escrow account provided that at the time payments become due said person or persons are acceptable to the Government. In the event of your death if no person has been designated by you in accordance with this paragraph, all funds deposited to your escrow account will be paid to your estate for appropriate disposition. Although no taxes will be withheld from payments made to you pursuant to this paragraph, it is your responsibility to pay U. S. Federal income taxes on sums paid to you while in the United States.

2. Bonus. In addition to the compensation provided for in paragraph one (1) above, you may be granted a bonus not to exceed \$5,000.00 upon the successful completion of your mission in your target area. The granting of this bonus and the amount thereof shall be at the sole discretion of the appropriate representative of the Government.

3. Quarters. It is understood and agreed that quarters will be provided you by the Government while in training in the United States or any foreign country.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to accounting in substantial compliance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government. Such travel expenses shall include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of travel to and from your target area. You

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will be required to account for such expenses in substantial compliance with applicable Government regulations.

6. Benefits. (a) In the event you receive an injury or disability while engaged in the performance of this contract, you will be entitled to medical, surgical, hospital, services and supplies, transportation and disability benefits in such amount as in the sole discretion of the Government is proper, provided said benefits shall not exceed a total of \$10,000.00 for the same injury or disability.

(b) In the event of your death while directly engaged in the performance of services under this contract, the U. S. Government will pay to your designated beneficiary the sum of \$10,000.00 less any amount paid to you under sub-paragraph (a) above for the injury or disability which results in your death, provided that at the time payment is to be made, said beneficiary is acceptable to the U. S. Government. The death benefit indicated above will be paid when one of the following conditions exists: (1) adequate information is brought to the attention of the proper U. S. Government authorities indicating your demise; (2) no information regarding your existence is brought to the attention of the U. S. Government for two (2) years after the date of departure for your target area; or (3) no information regarding your existence is brought to the attention of the U. S. Government for two (2) years after the date of your last contact with appropriate Government representatives.

7. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of your cover service, you assume the custody of government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

8. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status, except as specifically enumerated herein.

9. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed through instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the representative of the Government executing this agreement. It is agreed that any revelation whatsoever of the above information will constitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement.

10. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing or training are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

11. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

12. Term. This contract is effective as of 26 April 54 and shall

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continue for a period of two (2) years or, until the provisions relating to benefits enumerated in paragraph six (6) (b) above are satisfied, unless sooner terminated upon actual notice to you by the U. S. Government at any time prior to your actual departure for your target area. Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any secrecy provisions contained herein. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Lyman M. Hemeret

signed 26 April 1954

APPROVED:

SECRET

Mr. Lyman M. Hemeret

Dear Mr. Hemeret:

Reference is made to your contract effective 26 April 1954 with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, for the purchase of information and services of a confidential nature.

Effective 26 April 1954, said contract is amended by:

(a) Adding a new sentence to paragraph three (3) entitled "Quarters" reading as follows:

"You will also be furnished quarters and subsistence while awaiting dispatch in your dispatch area." and

(b) Adding a new sub-paragraph (c) under paragraph six (6) entitled "Benefits" reading as follows:

"(c) During the period that you are awaiting dispatch in your dispatch area, the Government may at its discretion, provide certain recreation and entertainment not exceeding a total cost of \$250.00. Such entertainment and recreation must be authorized by the Government representative accompanying you."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY: _____

Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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14 June 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Control and Compromise Indicators Present
in CAMBARO/2 Message #1

1. The following indicators are present in subject message:

- a. In overt text date is written:
25/V.54
- b. In covert text, message concludes with "ARTUR."
- c. In covert text, date is written to the right of signature.
- d. In covert text, period is omitted after "ZNR."
- e. In the covert text, the first word of the third sentence begins with "A".
- f. In covert text, the period at the end of final sentence is omitted.

2. All of the above indicators show freedom from control. All indicators were correctly used and none was omitted.

Chief, SR/2

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MESSAGE NR. 1 (from CAMBARO/2)

(See attached memorandum for control and compromise indicators.)

I LANDED 1 KILOMETER FROM THE HIGHWAY IN THE DIRECTION KNOWN TO YOU ON A HARD FOREST ROAD. I BELIEVE THE HEIGHT WAS NOT THE ONE THAT WAS TOLD ME. I DID NOT SUCCEED IN ~~GETTING RID OF~~ ^{RELEASING} MY PACK ALTHOUGH I DID EVERYTHING WITH SPEED AND WITHOUT HESITATION. AS A RESULT, I SPRAINED MY RIGHT ANKLE AND SERIOUSLY INJURED MY RIGHT KNEE. HOWEVER, I WAS ABLE TO MOVE (travel). I MET MY FRIEND ON THE SECOND RENDEZVOUS. HIS NERVES ARE SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED AND HE HAS ACCOMPLISHED A FEW THINGS. FOR THE TIME BEING (temporarily) I DON'T THINK I WILL CONTACT ANY OF HIS PEOPLE. I GAVE OUR FRIEND 10,000 RUBLES AND THE DOCUMENTS. I DID NOT LISTEN TO THE FIRST DAY'S SIGNALS BUT HEARD YOUR TRANSMISSION ON 24 MAY. I WILL LISTEN TO YOUR BROADCASTS ON 12, 24 AND 30 JUNE, AND 6, 16, 28 OF JULY AND AUGUST. IF YOU NEED MORE FREQUENT TIMES, NOTIFY ME. (the) W/T STATION IS BURIED: RIGA-TUKUMS HIGHWAY KLM. POST 49 (RIGA 49) DIRECTION NORTH, DISTANCE 140 METERS TO A FIRE-LANE CROSSING WITH A POST KV.79 FROM THIS ON AZIMUTH BEARING OF 220° DISTANCE 17 METERS IS A CLUMP OF 7 BIRCH TREES. IT IS BURIED 1 METER FROM THE BIRCHES IN A DIRECTION TOWARD THE POST. CODE PADS: FROM THE DESCRIBED KV.79 POST AN AZIMUTH OF 230° DISTANCE OF 24 METERS TO ANOTHER CLUMP OF 7 BIRCHES. IT IS BURIED A DISTANCE OF 1 METER BACK IN THE DIRECTION OF THE POST. THE MONEY: RIGA-TUKUMS HIGHWAY KLM. POST 50 ON AN AZIMUTH OF 30°, DISTANCE 400 METERS A FIRE PATH CROSSING WITH A DRY (dead) FIR AND THESE NUMBERS WRITTEN ON A BOARD--66-67-77-78, FROM THIS (the fir) AN AZIMUTH OF 320°, DISTANCE 10 METERS, IS A PINE. IT IS BURIED 2 FEET FROM THE PINE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE FIR. I PERSONALLY FEEL GOOD. I WAIT (message) FROM YOU. I ~~HEAR~~ ^{HEAR} YOU GOOD.

ARTUR

25-5-54

SECRET

Aug. 1954

DIR 05018
OUT 54221

MESSAGE NO. 1 (to CAMBARO/2)

CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE INITIAL PART OF YOUR DIFFICULT ASSIGNMENT. WE ARE VERY SORRY TO HEAR OF YOUR INJURIES. IF YOUR LEG STILL BOTHERS YOU, SOAK IT IN VERY HOT WATER SEVERAL TIMES A DAY AND WRAP THE ELASTIC BANDAGES AROUND YOUR KNEE AND ANKLE. STAY OFF IT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. WHERE HAVE YOU BEEN STAYING? WHERE ARE YOU STAYING NOW? WHO SUPPORTS YOU? HAVE YOU CONTACTED ANYONE? WHO AND HOW? LET US HAVE ALL DETAILS OF YOUR CURRENT SITUATION. ATTEMPT TO WORK THROUGH [] AND NOT DIRECTLY WITH HIS PEOPLE. LAY LOW FOR THE TIME BEING. WE NOTE YOUR COMMENT ON [] S NERVOUSNESS. TRY TO DESIGN A PLAN IN YOUR MEETINGS WITH HIM IN SUCH A WAY THAT IF THE WORST EVER HAPPENS AND HE IS CAPTURED HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO LEAD THE ENEMY TO YOU. REMEMBER THAT YOUR PERSONAL SECURITY IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE TO OUR CAUSE. LET [] HAVE THE SEPARATE MONEY PACKAGE AND HAVE HIM SEND [] TO CACHE IT NEAR SIAULIAI, LITHUANIA. HE MUST NOT USE THE SAME DEAD-DROP AS LAST TIME BUT PICK A NEW SPOT. HAVE [] NOTIFY ME OF THE LOCATION DIRECTLY. HE OR YOU MUST NEVER AGAIN GO NEAR THE SPOT WHERE THIS PACKAGE WILL BE BURIED.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

CSR [] SR/COP [] SR/ []

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 2 (to CAMBARO/2)

IF THE PRESENT SITUATION IS SUCH THAT YOU WILL NOT ENDANGER YOURSELF BY ADDITIONAL ACTIVITY, YOU SHOULD CONSIDER THE DESIRABILITY OF ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH THE GROUP YOU WERE TOLD ABOUT. THE MAN'S NAME IS [REDACTED]. HE RECEIVES MAIL ADDRESSED TO [REDACTED], RIGA. BE VERY CAREFUL HOW YOU ESTABLISH CONTACT. REMEMBER THAT WE HAVE VERY LITTLE INFORMATION ON THIS GROUP AND IT MAY BE A RUSSIAN TRAP. PROCEED VERY CAUTIOUSLY AND ONLY IF YOU FEEL THAT YOU CAN DO THIS WITHOUT ENDANGERING YOUR POSITION. SUGGEST YOU SELECT A SAFE MEETING PLACE AND NOTIFY [REDACTED] THROUGH A CUTOUT OR BY MAIL TO MEET YOU THERE PERSONALLY. UNLESS YOU DEFINITELY RECOGNIZE [REDACTED] DO NOT REVEAL YOURSELF. IF YOU DO CONTACT [REDACTED] WARN HIM NOT TO REVEAL YOUR EXISTENCE TO ANYONE. DO NOT REVEAL ANYTHING ABOUT THIS TO [REDACTED]

This is the converted text of DIR 08217 (OUT 60667).

[REDACTED]

CSR [REDACTED] SR/COP [REDACTED] CSR/2 [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

SECRET

MESSAGE NR 3 (TO CAMBARO 2)

HAVE RECEIVED NO MESSAGE FROM YOU SINCE YOUR NR 1 WHICH TOOK 13
DAYS ENROUTE. WE ARE BECOMING WORRIED ABOUT YOUR SILENCE. REPORT
WHAT PROGRESS YOU HAVE MADE ON YOUR ASSIGNMENT AND ANSWER THE
QUESTIONS IN MY MESSAGES 1 AND 2. PLEASE LISTEN TO ALL YOUR
ASTERISKED BROADCASTS DURING AUGUST.

This is the converted text of DIR 11450 (OUT 66247). Transmitted to
field 6 August 1954.

□ □

CE □

CSR □ □

SR/COP □ □

CSR/2 □ □
for

SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 6 (TO CAMBARO/2)

RECEIVED YOUR W/T MESSAGE NO. 1. ONE WEEK BEFORE YOU BEGIN YOUR TRIP OUT PREPARE A BRIEF W/T MESSAGE GIVING:

1. THE DATE YOU EXPECT TO LEAVE RIGA AND
2. YOUR ITINERARY INCLUDING THE NUMBER OF DAYS YOU EXPECT TO BE ENROUTE.

DO NOT TRANSMIT ANYTHING ELSE VIA W/T AND CONFINE YOUR W/T MESSAGE TO THE TWO REQUESTED ITEMS ONLY. WE ARE NOW MONITORING EVERY SCHEDULED CONTACT. DID YOU MAKE ANY OTHER ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH W/T CONTACT? I HAVE RECEIVED RECENT INFORMATION THAT THE SECURITY FORCES ARE VERY EFFICIENT AT D/FING AND HAVE RECENTLY INCREASED THEIR ACTIVITY. DO NOT GET ON THE AIR EXCEPT FOR THE ONE REQUESTED MESSAGE OR IN CASE OF AN EXTREME EMERGENCY. I WILL CONTINUE THE ASTERICK SCHEDULED BROADCASTS DURING SEPTEMBER IN CASE SOMEONE IS LISTENING. SEND ANSWERS TO MY OTHER QUESTIONS BY S/W TO NEW YORK. BEST WISHES AND GOOD LUCK ON THE NEXT PHASE OF YOUR DIFFICULT MISSION

THIS IS THE CONVERTED TEXT OF DIR 13816 (OUT 70255)
TRANSMITTED TO FIELD 22 AUGUST 1954.

CSR SR/COP SR/2

SECRET

1 Copy of 2 Copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 8 (TO CAMBARO/2)

YOU APPARENTLY ARE PLANNING TO WALK BEGINNING AT MURMANSK. GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO ALL THE PROBLEMS AND RISKS INVOLVED BEFORE ABANDONING THE ORIGINAL PLAN AND EMBARKING ON SUCH A LONG AND DIFFICULT JOURNEY. HOPE YOU HAVE REGAINED YOUR HEALTH FOR THIS TRIP. WE WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT ALL POSSIBLE WILL BE DONE FOR YOUR HEALTH UPON YOUR RETURN, AT NO EXPENSE TO YOU. BEFORE YOU LEAVE INFORM [] THAT WE WILL MAIL A LETTER TO HIM INTERNALLY REPORTING YOUR SAFE ARRIVAL BY S/W. THE RIGA IN THE ADDRESS WILL HAVE []

[] IN FUTURE ALL LETTERS CONTAINING S/W WILL BE INSCRIBED WITH THIS INDICATOR. SO THAT SOMEONE I MAY SEND IN THE FUTURE TO CONTACT [] WILL BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH HIS BONAFIDES, THE FOLLOWING RECOGNITION SIGNAL WILL BE USED: MY MAN WILL MEET [] AND SAY, "YOU LOOK A LOT LIKE A MAN I KNOW NAMED [] COULD HE POSSIBLY BE YOUR RELATIVE?" [] WILL ANSWER "NO, I KNOW A [] BUT I'M NOT HIS RELATIVE EITHER." THIS IS TO BE GIVEN TO [] IN ADDITION TO ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENTS YOU MAY HAVE ALREADY MADE. MAKE SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS WITH ANYONE ELSE YOU CAN AND YOU FEEL IS SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE AND REPORT THIS BY S/W TO N.Y. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE BEFORE YOU LEAVE. IF YOU MISS YOUR CONTACT ON THE OUTSIDE AND ARE APPREHENDED OR SEEK ASYLUM AT THE U.S. EMBASSY, STATE THAT YOUR NAME IS [] REPEAT []

THIS IS THE CONVERTED TEXT OF: DIR 16110 (OUT 74391) 7 Sept 54

CSR [] [] SR/COP [] [] SR/2 [] []

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ copies


NR. 19. JUSU ZNR 39 UN 42 SANEMU. PIRMA SATURS MANI PARSTEIDZA. ATRODU
KA NOLAISANAS LAUKUMA JAUTAJUMA PACELSANA TIKAI TAGAD, KAD VISAM VAJADZEJA
BUT JAU KARTIBA, RADA ZINAMAS AIZDOMAS UZ NOPIETNIBAS TRUKUMU. APSTAKLI
SPIESTS JUSU ZNR TOMER NEMU NOPIETNI UN NUPAT ATGRIEZOS NO APGABALA
APSKATES. ZIEMAS NOLAISANAS LAUKUMS TAGAD NAV LIETOJAMS, JO TAS IR UZ
(enciphered part begins)
PURVAINAS PLAVAS. IZSKIROS PAR SEKOSU VIETU. KARTE 1:75000/SALDUS 19.
KOORDINATES 22.21. - 56.30.10. PUNKTS 43.2 NO KURA SKREJCELS AZM 30 JEB
NO KURSISI AZM 225 ATTAL. 3 KIM. (enciphered part ends.) SI IR SAUSA
PLAVA, ZALE NOGANITA, PAMATS CIETS, BEZ GRAVJIEM, AKMENIEM UN CINIEM.
SKREJCELA GARUMS IR 680 M., PLATUMS 100 M., VIRZIENS AZM. 30°. ABOS GALOS
SKREJCELU NOROBEZO GRAVJI. ZIEMEJU GALA NO GRAVJA 250 M. APMERAM 15 M.
AUGSTS MEZA STURIS. DIENVIDUS VIRZIENA IR APSETI LAUKI BEZ KOKIEM APM.
500 M., KUR SAKAS MEZS AR KOKU AUGSTUMU 10-15 M. NO IEZIMETA SKREJCELA
UZ RIETRUMIEM IR VEL PLAVA UN SEJUMI. APVIDUS KLAJSS, BEZ KOKIEM. AUSTRUMU
PUSE PLAVA, APM. 200 M. UN TAD VISA CELA GARUMA APM. 15 M. AUGSTS MEZS.
SKREJCELA D. GALA, R. MALA UN ARI Z. GALA IR PA VIENAI 10 M. AUGSTAI EGLEI,
KURAS UZNESU US SEMU UN ATSTASU KA ORIENTIERUS. KOKI IR ARPUS SKREJCELA UN
NETRAUCE. VISPAREJALS STAVOKILIS AP SKREJCELU UZNESTS UZ SEMU. TUVUMA
ESOSAJAS MAJAS DZIVO NEKAITIGI LAUKU CILVEKI, KAS NAV BISTAMI UN ARI
TELEFONA NAV. MILITARISTI VAI MILICIJA TUVUMA NAV. VIETU UZSKATU KA
SEVISKI LABU. RADIO BAZEI VIETA SAMEKLETA. MANS IETEIKUMS AKCIJU IZVEST
PEC IESPEJAS DRIZ, JO NEVAR ZINAT CIK LIETAINS BUS RUDENS. NAKSU GARUMS
JAU PASREIZ IR PILNIGI PIETIEKOSS. SKREJCELA D. GALA UZ KARTI REDZAMA
TUVAKA MAJA DABA NAV. ZIEMELRIETRUMOS ESOSAS MAJAS NO LAUKUMA NAV

REDZAMAS. KA ORIENTIERI DER (enciphered part begins) PAMPALI AR TA
EZERU UN PLATS TAISNS CELS STARP KURSISI UN PAGASTA VALDI. (enciphered
part ends).

RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGES NOS. 39 AND 42. THE CONTENTS OF THE FIRST MESSAGE SURPRISED ME. I FEEL THAT THERE MAY BE SOME DOUBT AS TO YOUR SERIOUSNESS IF YOU BRING UP THE QUESTION REGARDING THE LZ ONLY NOW WHEN EVERYTHING SHOULD BE IN COMPLETE ORDER. HOWEVER I AM FORCED BY CIRCUMSTANCES TO TAKE YOUR MESSAGE SERIOUSLY AND I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM AN INSPECTION OF THE AREA. THE LZ SUGGESTED IN THE WINTER IS NOT USABLE NOW AS IT IS ON A SWAMPY MEADOW. I HAVE DECIDED ON THE FOLLOWING PLACE: [MAP 1:75000 SALDUS-19. COORDINATES 22.21. - 56.30.10. POINT 43.2 FROM WHICH THE RUNWAY IS AT AN AZIMUTH OF 30, OR FROM KURSISI AT AN AZIMUTH OF 225, DISTANCE 3 KLM. THIS IS A DRY MEADOW, WHICH HAS BEEN USED AS PASTURE, THE GROUND IS HARD, WITHOUT DITCHES, STONES AND MOUNDS. THE LENGTH OF THE RUNWAY IS 680 METERS, THE WIDTH IS 100 METERS, THE DIRECTION IS AZIMUTH 30°. AT BOTH ENDS THE RUNWAY IS BORDERED BY DITCHES. AT THE NORTH END, ABOUT 250 METERS FROM THE DITCH, ARE SOME 15 METER HIGH TREES (ON THE EDGE OF A FOREST). IN THE SOUTHERN DIRECTION ARE CULTIVATED FIELDS WITHOUT TREES, EXTENDING FOR ABOUT 500 METERS, AFTER WHICH THE FOREST BEGINS WITH 10-15 METER HIGH TREES. WEST OF THE RUNWAY SHOWN ON THE SKETCH IS ANOTHER MEADOW AND PLANTED FIELDS. THE AREA IS EXPOSED, WITHOUT TREES. ON THE EAST SIDE IS A MEADOW EXTENDING FOR ABOUT 200 METERS AND THEN, ALONG THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF THE ROAD, THERE IS A FOREST ABOUT 15 METERS HIGH. AT THE SOUTH END OF THE RUNWAY, ON THE WEST SIDE, AND ALSO AT THE NORTH END, THERE IS ONE 10-METER HIGH SPRUCE TREE AT EACH POINT, WHICH I HAVE DESIGNATED ON THE SKETCH AND

WHICH MAY SERVE AS LANDMARKS. THE TREES ARE OUTSIDE OF THE RUNWAY AND ARE NOT IN THE WAY.] THE GENERAL SITUATION AROUND THE RUNWAY IS SHOWN THE SKETCH. THE HOUSES NEARBY ARE INHABITED BY HARMLESS ~~PEOPLE~~ FARMERS, WHO PRESENT NO DANGER AND DO NOT HAVE A TELEPHONE. THERE ARE NO MILITARY OR MILITIA UNITS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD. I CONSIDER THE PLACE EXTREMELY SUITABLE. A PLACE FOR THE RADIO BASE HAS BEEN FOUND. I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE OPERATION BE CARRIED OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AS ONE NEVER KNOWS HOW MUCH RAIN THERE WILL BE IN THE FALL. THE NIGHTS ARE SUFFICIENTLY LONG AT THIS TIME. THE NEAREST HOUSE SEEN ON THE MAP AT THE SOUTH END OF THE RUNWAY IS NOT THERE IN REALITY. THE HOUSES IN THE NORTHWEST CANNOT BE SEEN FROM THE LZ. [THE FOLLOWING LANDMARKS MAY BE USED: PAMPALI WITH ITS LAKE, AND A WIDE, STRAIGHT ROAD BETWEEN KURSISI AND THE "PAGAST" CENTER.]

SKETCH INCLUDED IN CAMBARO/2's MESSAGE.



Security Information

SECRET

Addenda to Memo of 14 August regarding CALBARO-2:
1954

This is the way [] chose to interpret Lt. Williams's note. The cable of 13 August from MUNI, however, used the actual words of the Lieutenant: "Pulmonary tuberculosis, minimal, obsolete." The significant fact is that comparison of an xray taken in Sweden in March 1950 with one taken by the Munich Army Hospital in late July showed "no change in a minimal fibrotic lesion within the left apex." Lt. Williams also went so far as to say that from what he knew of medical examinations for US immigration, CALBARO-2 would certainly pass any such exam, since the immigration authorities require only one year between xrays showing no change, whereas in this case two years and four months had elapsed.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

DIR

Security Information
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 1 (W/T) (FROM CAMBARO 1)

(See attached memo for control and compromise indicators)

I RECEIVED ALL YOUR MESSAGES INCLUDING NO. 5. MY LETTERS 2 AND 3 WERE SENT TO GERMANY. A DUPLICATE LETTER - NO. 4 WAS SENT TO NEW YORK ON 17 AUGUST. WE ARE WAITING FOR OUR FRIENDS RETURN FROM THE RECONNAISSANCE TRIP TO THE NORTH. THE PREPARATIONS FOR EXFILTRATION ARE COMPLETED. EVERYTHING WILL HAPPEN AS WE DISCUSSED.

(This is the converted text of RHMN 1526 (IN 38718))

~~SECRET~~ ~~Copy~~

~~SECRET~~

1 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Control and Compromise Indicators present
in CAMBARO 2's Message No. 2

1. Following indicators are present in subject message:
 - a. Date written 27/VI 54.
 - b. Date written to right of signature.
 - c. Message signed ARTUR (misspelled).
 - d. Third sentence of text begins with A.
 - e. Period omitted from final sentence.
2. All of the above indicators were correctly given to indicate freedom from control.

□ □
Acting Chief, SR/2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(E) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 2 (FROM CAMBARO/2)

(See attached memo for control and compromise indicators)

I RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE NO. 1 AND UNDERSTOOD EVERYTHING. I AM HAPPY TO RECEIVE THE FIRST MESSAGE, THANK YOU. I AM LIVING IN RIGA,

WITH A GIRL FRIEND FROM BEFORE THE WAR WHO IS DOCTORING ME. AT THE PRESENT TIME I MAINLY STAY WITH STRANGERS IN RIGAS JURMALA. I FEEL WELL. THE BLOW TO MY PHYSICAL CONDITION IS STILL HEAVILY FELT. AT PRESENT, (MY) RUNNING IS OUT OF THE QUESTION. I CONCEAL MY CONDITION FROM (). I HAVE DEBRIEFED () SEVERAL TIMES. HIS WORK LOOKS PRETTY PALE. I WONDER ABOUT THE REAL IMPORTANCE OF MY ASSIGNMENT. **OF HUMANITARIANISM?** IS IT MERELY LOVE ~~REVEALED~~ DUE TO MY ILLNESS, I ONLY NOW BEGAN PREPARING HIM FOR EXFILTRATION. ON ACCOUNT OF MY ACCIDENT, MY WORK HAS ALSO HAD WEAKER RESULTS. I READ IN "CINA" THAT TWO AMERICAN AGENTS WERE CAUGHT IN OUR AREA WHILE CROSSING THE BORDER (GALHIS AND CHROMCOUS). WHAT IS NEW IN CONNECTION WITH THIS INCIDENT. MANY (PEOPLE) WHO WERE SENTENCED IN 1940, 1946 ARE ^{RE} TURNING TO RIGA. A TELEVISION STATION WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN RIGA IN THE JELGAVAS THEATRE ON NCMETNU IELA. A LUXURIOUS AIRPORT HAS BEEN ERECTED IN THE RIGA AERODROME. IT IS RUMORED THAT AN AIR LINE WILL BE ESTABLISHED MOSCOW-RIGA-SWEDEN.

27 JUNE 1954

~~SECRET~~

~~Copy of 22-03-100~~

~~SECRET~~

1 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Control and Compromise Indicators present
in CAMBARO/2's Message No. 4.

1. Following indicators are present in subject message:
 - a. Date written 17/VIII.54. in overt text.
 - b. Date written 17/VIII.54 in S/W text.
 - c. Date written to right of signature.
 - d. Message signed Artur (misspelled).
 - e. Third sentence of text begins with A.
 - f. Period omitted from final sentence.
2. All of the above indicators were correctly given to indicate freedom from control.

[]
Acting Chief, SR/2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Jfk
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 4 (FROM CAMBARO/2)

(See attached memo for control and compromise indicators)

YOUR FOUR MESSAGES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD. MESSAGES NO. 2 AND 3 WERE SENT TO GERMANY IN THE END OF JUNE AND MIDDLE OF JULY WITH THE ANSWERS AND MY HELPERS NAME ENCLOSED. HE IS --- (encoded, being serviced) []

[] DURING THE WAR [] WITH THE POLICE BATTALIONS AND THE LEGION. I HAVE KNOWN HIM ALREADY SINCE 1940. HIS COVER NAME - [] [] CONTROL AND COMPROMISE INDICATORS - 1. MESSAGE WILL END WITH A QUESTION MARK.

2. MESSAGE WILL BE SIGNED [] [] (with two S's) AND 3. THE OVERT TEXT WILL END WITH THE SAME WORD THE COVERT TEXT BEGINS WITH. ~~I WILL TURN OVER TO HIM~~ **THE CHANGE-OVER WILL**

CCUR BEFORE EXFILTRATING. I CONTACTED ^{A MEMBER OF} THE GROUP ~~INDIA~~, HIS DEPENDABILITY IS LIMITED. ACCORDING TO "CINA" AGENTS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED IN LATVIA. UNPLEASANT. AT THE PRESENT TIME I AM AWAITING THE RETURN OF THE SCOUT. WE WILL EXFILTRATE AS AGREED. YESTERDAY I WENT ON THE AIR BUT DID NOT HEAR THE BASE. I LIVE : (encoded portion being serviced) WHO HELPS AND DOCTORS ME, AS I STILL DO NOT FEEL RIGHT. I KNOW HER SINCE THE WAR YEARS IN MY HOME POGAST. [] [] ACCOMPLISHMENTS WERE WEAK. HE DID NOT HAVE A REPLACEMENT. I GAVE HIM MINE. [] [] HAS BEEN GIVEN EVERYTHING AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED AND PREPARED. HE IS ALSO CAPABLE OF INDEPENDENT EXFILTRATION. THE MONEY PACKAGE WAS TURNED OVER TO HIM LONG AGO. I WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH THE QUESTIONS IN MESSAGE NO. 4 DUE TO LACK OF TIME AND KNOWLEDGE. I WILL BE ABLE TO DO SOMETHING HOWEVER. I PERSONALLY AM DRINKING SHNAPPS AND FEELING FINE.

17 AUG. '54

/s/

(Postmarked 18 Aug. '54 in Riga. Received from New York at Headquarters 1 September 1954)

Jfk
~~SECRET~~

~~Copy of [unclear]~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 4A (FROM CAMBARO 2)

(Enciphered portion of message No. 4)

(MY HELPER IS) [] ADDRESS []

[]

I LIVE AT [] WITH A FORMER []

AND AT [] BY A []

(WHO HELPS AND DOCTORS ME).

JH
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

2 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Control and Compromise Indicators Present in
CAMBARO/2's W/T Message No. 2

1. The following control and compromise indicators are present in subject message:

- a. Use of double "begin and end numbers" group in heading: 9999 2 9999
- b. Third sentence of text begins with letter "A."
- c. Omission of period from final sentence of text.

2. All indicators were given properly to show freedom from control. No constant indicator applicable to this message was omitted.

[J]
Acting Chief, SR/2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(C) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

~~Copy of a Copy~~

SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 2 (W/T FROM CAMBARO/2)

OUR SCOUT HAS RETURNED. ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION THE CACHETS
THERE (in the Murmansk area) HAVE BEEN CHANGED - THERE ARE ALSO
CONTROL POINTS. A CAR CANNOT BE USED. WE WILL TRY IT ON FOOT
ALONG THE ROAD. WE WILL BEGIN ON 10 SEPTEMBER. EXPECT TO ARRIVE
AT OUR GOAL 30 SEPTEMBER. HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE NO. 6.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

[

I

SECRET

8 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Message No. 9 to CAMBARO/2

As the text of the message itself indicates, this message is transmitted to CAMBARO/2 on the strength that he may not possibly have been able to leave Riga on the 10th of September as he had planned; it is also possible that he has been able to recruit a W/T operator with whom he has left his pads, ciphers, and commo plan. The message is specifically designed to prevent irresponsible and rash action on the part of CAMBARO/2's (or □ □ 's) recruits who may feel that they are in a position to act rather boldly now that their two stabilizing elements have departed. The entire message embodies in it our long range objectives for the recruited assets and is written in a tone indicative of future messages to these people.

□ □
Acting Chief, SR/2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(C) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

SECRET

SECRET

21 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
Attention: Alien Affairs Office

SUBJECT : Leonids BROMBERIS

1. It is requested that approval be granted to bring subject into the United States "black" by means of an HBELECTOR flight.

2. Subject has been granted Covert Security Clearance No. 47281 dated 4 November 1952, permitting his utilization in the U.S. as a contract agent.

3. In view of the fact that subject has most recently been involved in a very sensitive operation, he must be removed from Europe and brought to the United States as rapidly as possible. It is preferred that this be accomplished by an HBELECTOR flight so that no movement traces can be uncovered. The agent will undergo extensive debriefing in the United States by qualified Headquarters personnel. It is expected that this debriefing will last approximately eight weeks.

4. Subsequent to the agent's arrival in this country, his wishes regarding resettlement here or elsewhere will be obtained and action initiated accordingly. Should it develop that resettlement in the United States or elsewhere becomes too involved and too time consuming, the agent--subsequent to the completion of his debriefing--will be removed from the United States "black" by an HBELECTOR flight and held in Germany until such time as his resettlement is resolved.

Acting Chief, SR Division

JA:pw

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

SECRET

21 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Message No. 10 to CAMBARO/2

This dummy transmission is made in the attempt to conceal the fact that the agent is no longer present and listening.

⌈ ⌋
Acting Chief, SR/2

Attachment
Message No. 10
to CAMBARO/2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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SECRET

21 September 1954

MESSAGE NO. 10 (TO CAMBARO/2)
FOR TRANSMISSION TO FIELD 22 SEPTEMBER 1954

DUMMY TRANSMISSION

(36483)

This is the converted text of:
DIR 18101 (OUT 77954) 21 Sept. 54

□ □

SECRET

~~Copy of -- Copies~~

SECRET

5 October 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Message No. 11 to CAMBARO/2

Subject message is transmitted in the attempt to conceal the fact that the agent is no longer present or listening.

☐ ☐
Acting Chief, SR/2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 11 (TO CAMBARO/2)

83162 DUMMY TRANSMISSION

This is the converted text of DIR 20115
(OUT 81658) 6 October 1954

E I - per 898

A C n
CSR SR/COP SR/
hw *U*

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~~copy of 20 Conies~~

SECRET

16 October 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Control and Compromise Indicators in
CAMBARO/2's W/T Message Number 3

1. The following indicators were present in subject message:

- a. Use of conversion group "9999" before and after message number.
- b. Omission of period at end of text.

2. Both of the above indicators show freedom from control. An additional indicator should have been present in subject message: First word of third sentence beginning with letter "A". Due to the bad garbling of this message however, it can not be determined where the third sentence begins or even if there is a third sentence.

5 1
Acting Chief, SR/2

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MESSAGE NO. 3 (W/T) (FROM CAMBARO/2)

(See Attached Memo for control and compromise indicators)

WE WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL. WE WILL NOT TRY AGAIN. (GARBLES) LETTER
FOLLOWS.

SECRET

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 7 (FROM CAMBARO 2)

(See attached Memo for control and compromise indicators)

Continuation (of Message Nr. 6) (THE FOLLOWING ARE) SIX CONTROL AND COMPROMISE INDICATORS FOR (C 1)S/W MESSAGES. IN THE OVERT TEXT: THE SECOND OR THE THIRD SENTENCE MUST CONTAIN FIVE WORDS. IN THE COVERT TEXT THE SECOND OR THIRD SENTENCE MUST CONTAIN THE SYLLABLE "CI" (KEY INDICATOR). UPON RECEIVING THE CHALLENGE WORDS "LAIKRAKSTS" (NEWSPAPER) OR "SPEJAS" (ABILITY) HE WILL REPLY NONSENSICALLY. UPON RECEIVING THE CHALLENGE "ATTALUMS" (DISTANCE) HE WILL REPLY WITH A DIFFERENT LOCATION OR DIRECTION. IN THE EVENT A GENUINE QUESTION IS DESIRED, THESE WORDS WILL BE USED INSTEAD: "AVIZE" (NEWSPAPER) "DOTIBAS" (ABILITY) "DISTANCE" (DISTANCE) AND THE SIGNATURE (SPODRA) WILL BE MISSPELLED. I WILL SHORTLY BEGIN TRAINING (C 1) IN W/T. SEND ME A SIGNAL PLAN FOR HIS USE AND THE SCHEDULES AND FREQUENCIES OF THE GERMAN TRAINING STATION. AFTER RETURNING FROM THE EXFILTRATION ATTEMPT (C 1) WAS LEFT ONLY WITH THE REMAINDER OF HIS EQUIPMENT WHICH CONSISTS OF A RECEIVER AND HIS INTERNAL S/W INK NO. 2. I GAVE HIM MY SMALL SIGNAL-PLAN (LTWANOP), MY DECODE PAD NO. 67300 AND MY ENCODE PAD NO. 93335. I ALSO GAVE HIM MY HAMBURG ADDRESS-- IF THIS IS NOT SUITABLE FOR HIS USE, NOTIFY HIM AND GIVE HIM A NEW ADDRESS. I ALSO GAVE HIM 10,000 RUBLES. I MADE A COPY OF MY LTWANOP SIGNAL PLAN FOR NOVEMBER IN ORDER THAT NO MISUNDERSTANDINGS OCCUR. SHOULD I CONTINUE CONTACT WITH (C 1)? SINCE I HAVE GIVEN AWAY TWO OF MY LETTER-DROP ADDRESSES, SEND ME ONE TO REPLACE THEM. BECAUSE OF THE NOVEMBER CELEBRATION, I WILL DISAPPEAR FROM RIGA. I WILL BE AT THE LOCATION ALREADY KNOWN TO YOU AT PURE. FOR THE PRESENT, UNTIL I RECEIVE CONFIRMATION OF THE RECEIPT OF THESE LETTERS (MESSAGES 6 AND 7) I WILL LISTEN ON THE ASTERICK DATES ACCORDING TO BOTH SIGNAL PLANS. IN GENERAL, DURING THE WINTER I DON'T INTEND TO COME TO RIGA EXCEPT WHEN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EXFILTRATION I LEFT THE FOLLOWING RECOGNITION SIGNALS WITH (C 1) "DOES PETROVES WORK

~~TOP SECRET~~
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET~~

HERE?" HE WILL REPLY, "NO, HE LIVES ON GAUJAS IELA". I NOW LEAVE HIM
(L 3) AND DO NOT INTEND TO RECONTACT HIM BECAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH
THE PREPARATIONS FOR EXFILTRATION AND DUE TO MY LATER RETURN, HE HAS
BECOME TOO WITTING. HE IS A GOOD FELLOW WHO CAN BE UTILIZED BY SOMEONE
ELSE. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO QUESTION THAT HE WILL RECEIVE AND SUPPORT
ANYONE. FROM NOW ON I WILL BE LOCATED AT L 3 RIGA, C/O
L 3). IN CONNECTION WITH MY UNSUCCESSFUL EXFILTRATION AND
THE UNEXPECTED RETURN TO OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY, I HAVE LOST TRACK OF THE
CONTENT OF OUR MESSAGES, THEREFORE, GIVE ME QUESTIONS, CRITICISMS AND
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITY. IN CONNECTION WITH MY FINANCES I MUST
REPORT THAT AFTER OUR RETURN I GAVE (L 3) 10,000 MORE RUBLES, WHICH
TOGETHER WITH THE PREVIOUS AMOUNTS MAKES A TOTAL OF 28,000 RUBLES. I
HAVE EXPENDED 15,000 RUBLES MYSELF. I HAVE A BALANCE OF 26,000 RUBLES
LEFT. DO YOU APPROVE OF MY HOUSEKEEPING (IN LATVIA)?

/s/

23/X.54

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy of R. Oyster

SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 12 (TO CAMBARO/2) (for transmission to field 22 October 1954)

RECEIVED YOUR W/T MESSAGE NO. 3 IN BADLY GARBLED FORM. APPARENTLY YOU BOTH WERE ABLE TO RETURN SAFELY TO RIGA AFTER YOUR UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT. DO NOT TRY AGAIN THIS YEAR. WE HAVE REPORTS THAT IT IS SNOWING HEAVILY AND THAT WINTER HAS SET IN. YOU MUST BOTH NOW LIE LOW AND CONCENTRATE ON PRESERVING YOUR SECURITY UNTIL THE SPRING WHEN YOU CAN TRY AGAIN. LET THE PEOPLE YOU HAVE ALREADY RECRUITED CARRY ON WHAT WORK THERE IS TO BE DONE AND MAKE ALL NEEDED ARRANGEMENTS TO HAVE AS LITTLE CONTACT WITH THEM AS POSSIBLE. HAVE THEM CARRY ON DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH US. WE WILL SEND YOU ADDITIONAL ADDRESSES TO USE AS YOU SEE FIT. UPON RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER WITH FURTHER DETAILS, WE WILL ATTEMPT TO FIND A SOLUTION FOR WHATEVER DIFFICULTIES CAUSED THE FAILURE OF YOUR ATTEMPT AND GUIDE YOU ACCORDINGLY. DO NOT OVERLOOK THE NECESSITY FOR ALTERING YOUR LEGEND AND DOCUMENTS TO CONFORM TO YOUR PRESENT STATUS. LISTEN ON ALL ASTERICK SCHEDULES AND TELL (L []) TO DO THE SAME.

This is the converted text of
DIR 22164 (OUT 85269) 21 October 1954

[] []
per L&S

CSR []

SR/COP []

SECRET

SR/2 [] []

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~~TOP SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 13 (TO CAMBARO/2) (FOR TRANSMISSION TO FIELD 29 OCTOBER 1954)

FOR BETTER SECURITY AS WELL AS FOR THE PROTECTION OF THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE INVOLVED, IT IS CONSIDERED BEST THAT WE COMMUNICATE WITH THEM DIRECTLY, THEREFORE, GIVE () ONE ENCODE PAD MARKED QOREG 67/2153 AND ONE DECODE PAD MARKED QOREG 67/4665. INSTRUCT HIM IN DECODING AND CONVERTING MESSAGES. ESTABLISH A DEAD-DROP WHERE HE CAN PICK UP ANY MESSAGES MEANT FOR HIM. THIS PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY YOU AS AN ATTEMPT TO BY-PASS YOU OR TO INTERFERE WITH THE CONTROL YOU EXERCISE OVER YOUR PEOPLE. IT NOT ONLY GIVES YOU MORE PROTECTION BUT SERVES TO PROTECT ([]) AND WHATEVER RECRUITS HE MAY HAVE AS WELL. PLEASE FURNISH FULL DETAILS ON THE OUTCOME OF YOUR CONTACT WITH THE GROUP LEADER. TELL ([]) TO RESUME MONITORING HIS SCHEDULED BROADCASTS. IN OUR NEXT MESSAGE WE SHALL EXPLAIN HOW TO DECIDE WHICH MESSAGES ARE INTENDED FOR YOU AND WHICH ARE FOR (]

*This is the converted
text of: Div 23118
(Out 86997) 28 Oct 54*

per H. B.

CSR [] / SR/COP [] ACSR/2 []

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

30 October 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, SR Division

SUBJECT : Message No. 5 from CAMBARO/2

1. The subject message contains the following indicators:
 - a. In the overt text the date is written 16/X 54g in order to show freedom from control.
 - b. The message is signed "ARTUR", misspelled correctly, in order to show freedom from control.
 - c. At the conclusion of the S/W text the date is written to the right of the signature and in the proper form (16/X 54G) in order to show freedom from control.
 - d. The period after "NR" in the heading of the S/W text is omitted in order to show freedom from control.
 - e. The first word of the third sentence of the S/W text begins with "A" in order to show freedom from control.
 - f. The final period of the last sentence of the S/W text is omitted in order to show freedom from control.
 - g. A nonsensical reply to the challenge word "MORALE" sent in our message No. 5 shows freedom from control.
2. No control and compromise indicators applicable to this message were omitted. It is noteworthy that this agent indicates no control by seven different indicators.

Acting Chief, SR/2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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MESSAGE NO. 5 (FROM CAMBARO/2)

(See attached Memo for control and compromise indicators)

THE MISSION WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. WE ARE EXHAUSTED AND MY ANKLE IS OUT OF COMMISSION AGAIN. HOWEVER, WE ARE BOTH SAFELY BACK IN RIGA AGAIN, WHICH MAKES ME VERY HAPPY. IT COULD HAVE ENDED WORSE. WE MADE THE TRIP FROM RIGA TO MURMANSK WITHOUT ANY INCIDENTS FROM 13 TO 18 SEPTEMBER. IT HAD BEEN CLEAR EVEN BEFORE WE STARTED, ACCORDING TO OUR SCOUT, THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO AVOID THE CONTROLS, BECAUSE THE RECTANGULAR FRONTIER CACHET HAS DEFINITELY BEEN CHANGED. WE PLANNED TO GET OFF AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE FIRST CONTROL POINT AT TIKOUKA AND THEN CONTINUE ON FOOT. WHEN TRYING TO FIND OUT AT THE BUS STATION ABOUT SUCH A PLACE AND ABOUT TICKETS, (C...) UNDERSTOOD THAT IN CONNECTION WITH SOME INCIDENT NEAR THE BORDER, ALL BRIDGES AND ROADS WERE BEING CHECKED. WE DID NOT WANT TO TAKE ANY FOOLISH CHANCES, AND WE WALKED SOUTH ALONG THE TULOMA RIVER TO CHECK THE BRIDGES AND TO SEE IF WE COULD CROSS THE RIVER WITHOUT ANY BRIDGES. WE SAW THAT ON THE KOLA AND MURMASA (sic) BRIDGES CARS WERE ACTUALLY STOPPED BY INSPECTORS. THERE WERE NO PEDESTRIANS. WE WALKED AS FAR AS THE NARROW PLACE (40 KM) AS INSTRUCTED BY YOU (IN YOUR W/T MESSAGE). EVEN THERE WE COULD NOT CROSS THE RIVER. WE HAD NO BOAT OR ANY OTHER WAY OF CROSSING. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO SWIM, PARTICULARLY THIS TIME OF THE YEAR. WE WALKED ONLY BY NIGHT AS THE COUNTRYSIDE IS EASILY VISIBLE, EVEN THOUGH IT IS HILLY AND ROCKY. BEFORE WE REACHED THE NARROW PLACE, I SPRAINED MY FOOT AGAIN. WE SURVEYED THE RIVER FOR THREE DAYS AND HOPED THAT MY FOOT WOULD GET BETTER, BUT TO NO AVAIL. I TOLD (C...) TO WAIT FOR THE REMOVAL OF

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SECRET

- 2 -

THE CONTROLS AND TO GO ON ALONE. HE REFUSED TO GO ALONE OR TO LEAVE ME. WE DECIDED TO RETURN. WE MADE THE RETURN TRIP TO MURMANSK IN 7 NIGHTS. THE BRIDGES WERE STILL BEING CHECKED. WE RETURNED TO RIGA ON 5 OCTOBER. IT'S AN INEXCUSABLE DISGRACE THAT THE PROBLEM OF ((SCHWEINEREI)) EXFILTRATING AGENTS HAS NOT YET BEEN TAKEN CARE OF. WE SHALL NOT REPEAT THE ATTEMPT THIS FALL. I AM LIVING TEMPORARILY WITH MY HORSE-DOCTOR AND GETTING TREATMENT. I AM FEELING BETTER ALREADY. I WAS IN THE WOODS AFTER MY EQUIPMENT AND AT THE SAME TIME MADE MY (W/T) CONTACT. THE FIRST ATTEMPT (AT W/T) DID NOT SUCCEED. IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS I SHALL WRITE WHAT I HAVE DONE AND WHAT MY FUTURE PLANS ARE. TOO BAD I SHALL HAVE TO SPEND THE WINTER IN THIS "DUNG PIT". I AM LISTENING ON THE ASTERISK DAYS.

/s/

16 OCTOBER 1954

SECRET

~~Copy of a Copy~~

SECRET

3 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Message No. 14 to CAMBARO/2

1. Subject message is transmitted to attempt to elevate the state of morale of both agents.

2. This message further serves to reestablish direct contact with [] who no longer has his signal plan or code pads.

[]
Acting Chief, SR/2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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MESSAGE NO. 14 (TO CAMBARO/2) (see attached memorandum)

HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE NO. 5. YOUR HEROIC ATTEMPT TO EXFILTRATE YOURSELF AND YOUR BUDDY AND PARTICULARLY YOUR SAFE RETURN TO RIGA HAS IMPRESSED US AS BEING A ~~FETE~~ ^{FEAT} SELDOM EQUALLED. IT IS WITH THE DEEPEST REGRET THAT WE HEAR YOU WERE UNABLE TO MAKE IT. WE WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED IN ATTEMPTING TO EXFILTRATE YOU NEXT SPRING AND ARE ALREADY BEGINNING ALL NECESSARY PREPARATIONS. IF WE WERE NOW TOGETHER WE COULD DRINK A TOAST TO A COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL TRY THIS SPRING. PLEASE CONVEY THE ~~FOREGOING~~ PORTION TO ([]) QUOTING AS MUCH OF IT AS POSSIBLE.

([]) REPORTS THAT HIS SIGNAL PLAN RECEIVER AND CODE PADS HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER TO HIS REPLACEMENT. WE FEEL IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE ON SECURITY GROUNDS THAT HE RETRIEVE THEM. SINCE HE HAS ANOTHER RECEIVER AVAILABLE TO HIM, GIVE HIM YOUR WANOP SIGNAL PLAN AND PADS #67/2129, #67/2132, #67/2489, and #67/2510. YOU CAN RETAIN AND USE PADS #67/2137, #67/2157, #67/2511 and #67/2627 AND RECEIVE BLIND-BROADCASTS ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE ON PAGE 6 OF YOUR QOREG SIGNAL PLAN. WE WILL USE ASTERISK DATES ON BOTH PLANS. AFTER TRANSMISSION OF THIS MESSAGE, FUTURE BROADCASTS TO YOU WILL BE ACCORDING TO QOREG, SO THAT IF YOU ARE NOT ABLE TO COMPLY WITH THESE INSTRUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY, LISTEN FOR YOUR MESSAGES UNDER QOREG ANYWAY. NOTIFY US BY AIR MAIL TO THE U.S. AS SOON AS ([]) IS READY TO RECEIVE TRAFFIC. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER OSKAR AND ([])'S REPLACEMENT ARE IDENTICAL OR NOT.

CSR [] | SR/COP [] SR/2 []

This is the converted text of DIR 24096 (OUT 88731) 4 Nov. 54

SECRET

per []

SECRET


6 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Message Number 15 to CAMBARO 2

1. Subject message is sent to CAMBARO 2 in order to explain our repetition of the last third of our message number 14 to him.

2. The base station has reported an equipment failure during the transmission of the last third of our last message (number 14), and although the entire message was retransmitted some forty minutes later, it is doubtful whether CAMBARO 2 received the resumed transmission.


Acting Chief, SR/2

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MESSAGE NO. 15 (TO CAMBARO 2) (FOR TRANSMISSION 11 NOVEMBER 1954)

BECAUSE OF POWER FAILURE IN OUR TRANSMITTER THE PREVIOUS MESSAGE
TO YOU WAS INTERRUPTED DURING THE TRANSMISSION OF THE LAST THIRD.
WE ARE THEREFORE REPEATING THE ABOVE LAST THIRD IN ORDER TO INSURE
THAT YOU HAVE RECEIVED IT.

This is the converted text DIR 24422 (OUT 89288)
6 Nov. 1954

[

]

*per
L & S.*

CSR []

SR/COP []

SR/2 []

SECRET

1. Copy 2. 2. 2. 2.

DB 25418

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

8 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Message No. 6 from CAMBARO/2

1. The subject message contains the following indicators:
 - a. In the overt text the date is written 23/x 54 G in order to show freedom from control.
 - b. The covert message is signed "ARTUR" misspelled correctly in order to show freedom from control.
 - c. The period after "NR" in the covert text is omitted in order to show freedom from control.
 - d. At the conclusion of the covert text the date is written to the right of the signature and in the proper form (23/X 54 G) in order to show freedom from control.
 - e. The first word of the third sentence of the covert text begins with "A" in order to show freedom from control.
 - f. The final period of the last sentence of the covert text is omitted in order to show freedom from control.

2. It is noteworthy that the expressions used in, as well as the make-up of, this entire message are typical of CAMBARO/2. Although this would not necessarily be an unshakable indication that CAMBARO/2 is free from control, it does add further to the CE evaluation of this agent's status, i.e., if this fact is added to the above-outlined control and compromise indicators, it appears that there is hardly any doubt that this agent is free from control.

3. No control and compromise indicators applicable to this message were omitted.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Acting Chief, SR/2

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~~SECRET~~

9 NOVEMBER 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT: MESSAGE NO. 6 (FROM CAMBARO/2).

1. The following information was contained in the enciphered portions of Message No. 6:

- a. HIS ADDRESS [] (s) IS AS FOLLOWS - []
[]
- b. S/W LETTERS TO HIM SHOULD BE SIGNED "SPODRA" IN THE OVERT TEXT.
- c. HE WILL DEVELOP THE S/W USING THE SCORCH METHOD.
- d. IN THE END OF AUGUST AFTER A THOROUGH ASSESSMENT I RECRUITED
[] [] []
- e. HIS COVER NAME WILL BE "PETERIS".
- f. PRIOR TO EXFILTRATION I LEFT HIM MY S/W DEVELOPERS, 10,000 RUBLES AND MY CHICAGO LETTER-DROP ADDRESS, AND TRAINED HIM IN WRITING AND DEVELOPING S/W.
- g. YOU CAN THEREFORE WRITE TO HIM [] () USING THE S/W INK MEANT FOR ME AT THE ADDRESS KNOWN TO YOU ON DAUGAVPILS STREET.
- h. HE WILL WRITE S/W TO YOU USING THE ASPIRIN SYSTEM.
- i. AS RECOGNITION SIGNALS FOR ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH HIM I ARRANGED THE FOLLOWING WHICH IS STILL IN EFFECT: "WHERE YOU IN JELGAVA LAST WEEK TO SEE JEKABSONS?" PETER ([] []) WILL REPLY - "I WAS NOT IN JELGAVA BUT IN CESIS. HOW DOES HE FEEL?"
- j. THE CONTINUATION OF MY MESSAGE WILL BE SENT TO CHICAGO.

2. Attached hereto is a copy of Message No. 6 so that this information may be clearly and properly tied into the actual message text. It is requested that this copy be returned to this Branch following the incorporation of these corrections into SR/COP's copy.

1 Attachment
Message No. 6 from
CAMBARO/2

[] []
Acting Chief, SR/2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 6 (FROM CAMBARO/2) (See attached memorandum)

I STILL HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO RECONCILE MYSELF TO THE LACK OF SUCCESS OF OUR EXFILTRATION ATTEMPT. I MUST ALSO ADD THAT WITHOUT A FLUENT COMMAND OF RUSSIAN, SUCH (EXFILTRATION) OPERATION IS NOT FEASIBLE. ALL FOREIGNERS AND PERSONS WHO SPEAK BAD RUSSIAN ARE AUTOMATICALLY DETAINED NEAR THE BORDER DUE TO THE SOVIET'S FEAR OF THE FREE WORLD. SIMILARLY, EMPLOYMENT OFFICES FOR HIRING WORKMEN FOR NIKEL ARE LOCATED ONLY IN RUSSIA PROPER. THERE ARE NO SUCH HIRING OFFICES IN RIGA. IS THERE NOT SOME OTHER WAY TO ESCAPE FROM THIS "PARADISE"? YOU MUST BE BETTER INFORMED ON THE OVERALL POSSIBILITIES THAN I. I HAD WISHED THAT I COULD INFORM YOU PERSONALLY ON WHAT I HAVE ACCOMPLISHED; HOWEVER, SINCE THE EXFILTRATION WAS UNSUCCESSFUL, I AM FORCED TO WRITE INSTEAD. PRIOR TO MY EXFILTRATION I ARRANGED WITH BOTH RECRUITS THUS: THAT THEY WILL BE ACTIVATED WITH A LETTER FROM ME AND FAILING THAT, AFTER WAITING TWO MONTHS, THEY WOULD "REPORT FOR DUTY" BY WRITING DIRECTLY TO YOU. I GAVE THEM YOUR LIST OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND THE NECESSARY MATERIAL FOR COMMUNICATIONS. I AM DOUBTFUL WHETHER THEY WILL BE ABLE TO FULFILL YOUR REQUIREMENTS DUE TO THEIR LACK OF TECHNICAL TRAINING. THE REST OF MY EQUIPMENT IS AT THE LOCATION ALREADY REPORTED TO YOU. THE SITUATION IS NOW SUCH: [] 'S RECEIVER, SIGNAL PLAN, ALL OF HIS CODE-PADS, EXTERNAL S/W SYSTEM AND ALL HIS LETTER DROPS HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER TO (C []). (C []) AND (C []) HAVE NEVER MET EACH OTHER. (C []) IS TRAINED IN S/W, ENCIPHERMENT, CONSPIRATORIAL ACTIVITY, AND SOME W/T WHICH HE IS ALREADY ABLE TO COPY. HE WAS GIVEN 5,000 RUBLES. HIS ADDRESS IS AS FOLLOWS (enciphered, being serviced). S/W LETTERS TO HIM SHOULD BE SIGNED (enciphered) IN THE OVERT TEXT. HE WILL DEVELOP THE

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE S/W USING THE (enciphered) METHOD AND IT IS PREFERABLE THAT THE (S/W) MESSAGES BE ENCIPHERED. IN THE NEAR FUTURE I WILL CONTINUE TO TRAIN HIM IN W/T, AFTER WHICH, BY MEANS OF HIS FIRST LETTER, I WILL TURN HIM OVER TO YOU. HE IS AN ENERGETIC FELLOW WITH CONTACTS IN FORMER LATVIAN LEGIONNAIRE CIRCLES. IN THE END OF AUGUST AFTER A THOROUGH ASSESSMENT, I RECRUITED (enciphered). MY FORMER ACQUAINTANCESHIP WITH HIM WAS USEFUL. I AM CONVINCED HE IS COMPLETELY TRUSTWORTHY, VERY SECURITY CONSCIOUS; HE IS ORIENTED SLIGHTLY TOWARD THE GERMANS WHICH HOWEVER DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH OUR WORK. HE IS A PERSON WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG THE FORMER INTELLIGENTSIA AND OFFICER CIRCLES. HIS CLOSEST FRIENDS ARE NOT KNOWN TO ME; HE DID NOT DIVULGE THEM. PRIOR TO MY EXFILTRATION I LEFT HIM 10,000 RUBLES, MY S/W SUPPLIES, MY (enciphered) LETTER DROP AND TRAINED HIM IN APPLYING AND DEVELOPING S/W. YOU CAN WRITE TO HIM THEREFORE USING THE S/W INK MEANT FOR ME AT THE ADDRESS ALREADY KNOWN TO YOU(enciphered). AS RECOGNITION SIGNALS, I ESTABLISHED THE FOLLOWING WHICH IS STILL IN EFFECT: (enciphered).

/s/

23 OCTOBER 1954

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy of ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
JH

10 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Message Number ¹⁶ 15 to CAMBARO 2

1. Subject message is sent in order to:
 - a. Receipt for messages number six and seven from CAMBARO 2.
 - b. Commend CAMBARO 2 for a job well-done, thereby bolstering his morale.
 - c. Establish communications procedures for CAMBARO 2 and [] so that there will be no cause for confusion.
 - d. Answer CAMBARO 2's request for W/T training traffic.
 - e. Insure that he is in a position to bolster []'s morale.
 - f. Warn CAMBARO 2 against having any further contact with [] since the latter may possibly have some connection with a known British agent.
 - g. Furnish CAMBARO 2 with a new letter-drop and warn him against using the ones he has divulged to his recruits.

[]
Acting Chief, SR/2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

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JH
~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

[] []

~~TOP SECRET~~

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16

MESSAGE NO. 15 (TO CAMBARO 2) (FOR TRANSMISSION 13 November 1954)

(SEE ATTACHED MEMO)

RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGES NUMBER 6 AND 7. WOULD LIKE TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON THE PROFESSIONAL MANNER IN WHICH YOU HAVE ESTABLISHED VALUABLE ASSETS IN LATVIA IN SPITE OF ALL THE GREAT OBSTACLES YOU HAVE HAD TO SURMOUNT. SINCE YOU HAVE ALREADY TURNED OVER YOUR SIGNAL-PLAN AND TWO PADS TO ([]), DISREGARD THE INSTRUCTIONS IN OUR MESSAGE 13 AND 14 AND RETAIN THE PADS YOU NOW HAVE. FUTURE TRANSMISSIONS TO YOU WILL BE ON QOREG ([]) WILL RECEIVE TRAFFIC ON WANOP. WE DO NOT FEEL IT WISE THAT YOU SEVER ALL CONNECTIONS WITH ([]), IT IS PROBABLE THAT HE WILL AT LEAST NEED YOUR MORAL SUPPORT DURING THE DIFFICULT WINTER AHEAD. YOU SHOULD HOWEVER, HAVE NO FURTHER CONTACT (REPEAT) NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH ([]) FOR SECURITY REASONS. DO NOT USE ANY OF THE LETTER-DROP ADDRESSES YOU HAVE GIVEN AWAY. THE FOLLOWING IS A NEW ADDRESS FOR YOUR USE:

[]
] MASS.

THE TRAINING BROADCASTS YOU REQUESTED ARE--ON 5175 KCS (REPEAT) 5175 KCS AND 3348 KCS (REPEAT) 3348 KCS AND BEGIN AT 1915 DAILY. USE THEM FOR TRAINING ([]) NOT ([]) (REPEAT) NOT ([]). HAVE NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE LATTER AND MAKE CERTAIN THAT HE IS UNABLE TO CONTACT YOU OR ANY OF YOUR OTHER MEN.

This is the converted text of DIR 25135 (OUT 90532) 12 Nov 54.

CSR _____
 []

SR/COP _____
 []

[] []
 SR/2 _____
 []

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

22 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Finance Division
Attn: Payroll Section

SUBJECT : Increase in Salary - Lyman T. HEMERET

In accordance with the terms of Lyman T. HEMERET's contract, effective 1 May 1954, the date of subject's arrival in the target area, his salary should have been increased from \$5,000 to \$6,000 per annum. As stated in his contract this additional compensation is to be deposited to subject's escrow account. We will appreciate your making the necessary adjustments to reflect the above mentioned increase.

Acting Chief, SR/2

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MESSAGE NO. 17 (TO CAMBARO 2) FOR TRANSMISSION TO FIELD 25 NOVEMBER 1954
(SEE ATTACHED MEMO)

THE FOLLOWING IS ANOTHER ADDRESS FOR YOUR USE -- [

[CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, REPEAT -- [

[CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. FROM NOW ON FOR YOUR S/W

MESSAGES USE ONLY THIS ADDRESS AS WELL AS THE ONE IN OUR LAST MESSAGE.

IF AT ANYTIME YOU FEEL IT NECESSARY TO TURN ONE OF THESE DROPS OVER

TO ANY NEW RECRUITS, NOTIFY US WHO WILL BE USING IT, WHAT S/W SYSTEM

AND INDICATORS WILL BE USED, AND DO NOT USE IT ANY MORE YOURSELF. FOR

BETTER SECURITY IT IS PREFERABLE THAT WE GIVE ([73) AND ([74)

ADDITIONAL DROPS DIRECTLY WITHOUT GOING THROUGH YOU. IT IS NOT CLEAR

WHETHER THEY CAN RECEIVE EXTERNAL MAIL AT THE ADDRESSES YOU GAVE OR

ONLY INTERNAL. WE THOROUGHLY APPROVE OF YOUR "HOUSEKEEPING" IN LATVIA

AND CONGRATULATE YOU FOR A JOB WELL DONE. PREPARE 5,000 RUBLES FOR BUREAU

AND HAVE ONE OF YOUR HELPERS CACHE IT IN THE CESIS AREA. REPORT THE

LOCATION IN YOUR NEXT MESSAGE AND NEVER, REPEAT NEVER GO NEAR THIS

CACHE AGAIN.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

*This is converted
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