

No. 2489



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DEF DOC # 225

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL.

VERSUS

ARAKI, SADA0 ET AL.

AFFIDAVIT UNDER OATH (No. 2)

In accordance with the formula employed in our country,  
I, after having taken an oath as set forth in the accom-  
panying paper, hereby depose as follows:

KAWABE, Torashiro,  
Affiant.



DEF DOC # 225

Translated by Defense  
Language Section

AFFIDAVIT  
OF  
KA'ABE, TORASHIRO



As I, KANABE Torashiro, was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army from August 1934 to March 1936, I shall state what I know about the position of the Kwantung Army in regard to various problems which arose in North China and Inner Mongolia resultant from the then prevailing conditions of Manchuria.

1. General Condition of the Kwantung Army and Manchuria at the time

As the problems of North China and Inner Mongolia, of which I shall speak later on, are related to the condition of the Kwantung Army and Manchuria at the time, I shall first summarize the conditions which prevailed during my term of office.

(1) Leading officers of the Kwantung Army and the business in my charge.

In August 1934, when I arrived at my post, Commander of the Kwantung Army was General HISHIKARI, Takashi; Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General NISHIO, Toshizo; and Vice-Chief of Staff, Major-General OKAMURA, Yasuji. But in December the same year General MINAMI, Jiro was appointed Commander and Major-General ITAGAKI, Seishiro became Vice-Chief of Staff.

For a year after taking up my post (when I was Lieutenant-Colonel) I was chiefly in charge of affairs relating to operations and defense, and for about eight months (when I was Colonel until I left the office was a sectional chief in charge of information.

(2) Condition of Manchoukuo.

A. Foreign relations.

At that time there were some foreign countries which gave official, or at least de facto, recognition of



Manchoukuo as an independent state. For instance, the Vatican recognized her in September 1934, and the Dominica Republic in April 1935, while the transfer of the North Manchurian Railway was signed between the Soviet Union and Manchoukuo in March 1935.

As for the relations with China, the Tangku Truce Pact had been concluded between the Kwantung Army and the military regime in North China in May 1933, the year preceding my arrival at my post, and all-round diplomatic relations had not yet been established between China and Manchoukuo. However, at the so-called Dairen Conference held in July 1933 a mutual agreement was reached as to the means to avoid <sup>^</sup>Sino-Japanese clash in North China, and since then agreements were concluded in succession between China and Manchoukuo, e.g. in regard to railways in July 1934, concerning customs tariff in December <sup>^</sup>the same year, and regarding mail in February 1935, while with the rise of the tendency to restoration and enhancement of friendship between Japan and China the relations between China and Manchoukuo also gradually improved and China showed an attitude to virtually recognize the independence of Manchoukuo in large measure.

B. Internal condition of Manchoukuo.

After the declaration of independence of Manchoukuo in March 1932, the pseudo-troop bandits who numbered near 300,000 under the command of former war-lords in various provinces were for a time rampant throughout her territory but they were for the most part suppressed in the course



of 1933. Just as in many parts of China, Manchuria was infested by bandits before the founding of Manchoukuo and even after the suppression, the remnants were still active in some localities. Their number was estimated at about 30,000 at the time when I arrived at my post. Those bandits may be classified into several groups, e.g. gangs of regular robbers, those of a political nature resisting Japanese and new Manchurian power, and bandits imbued with communist ideas. Moreover, not all of those bandits were natives of Manchuria. There were many who made their way from North China, Shantung Province or Korea, while some Koreans and Manchurians living in the districts of the Russian Littoral Province adjacent to Manchoukuo stole in across the border. Among the above classified bandits those who were imbued with some ideology, especially those who had their bases of activity outside Manchuria were most difficult to deal with.

The peace and order of new Manchuria was considerably disturbed by those bandits and its healthy growth as a state was much hampered. But as a result of the strenuous efforts on the part of the Manchoukuo Government and people and the assistance extended by the Kwantung Army in accordance with the principle of joint defence as stipulated in the Protocol between Japan and Manchoukuo, the independence of Manchoukuo gradually took definite shape, particularly as her relations with China and other countries were more and more improved. On the frontiers, however, troubles still occurred frequently.



(3) General policy of the Kwantung Army at the time.

Under the principles set forth in the Protocol, it was the duty of the Kwantung Army to undertake the defence of Manchuria in cooperation with the Manchoukuo Government. In view of the existing condition of the country, the Kwantung Army, especially after the commander, General MINAMI's arrival at his post, adopted as the two main objects of its policy, (1) establishment of public order in the interior of Manchoukuo and (2) maintenance of peace and quiet in the border regions. In order to accomplish the first object, the entire strength of the Army was dispersed widely over the country so as to contribute to the maintenance of local peace and order, even at the disadvantage and inconvenience that might be caused thereby to the training in proficiency essential to an army. For the second object, the Army made it its principle to avoid the use of armed force as much as possible and to ensure the enjoyment of mutual benefit through prudent measures taken by neighboring countries among themselves, through parleys and negotiations held by the Manchoukuo Government or the Kwantung Army at its discretion with China, the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia and others.

II. Doihara-Chin Te-chun Agreement.

It was in the regions on the border between Manchuria and Chahar Province, China, that the troubles referred to above occurred most frequently. Among them may be mentioned the insult to the Japanese military officers and Foreign Office clerks at Changpei by Sung Che-yuan troops on October 16 1934, intrusion into Manchoukuo of a unit of Sung Che-yuan troops on January 24 1935,



second intrusion and firing of a Sung Che-yuan unit upon the Japanese border garrison. Fearing that such frequent troubles on the borders might lead to more untoward affairs between China and Manchoukuo or Japan, the Commander of the Kwantung Army deemed it proper to enlarge the scope of application of the Tangku Truce Agreement, and under instructions from the highest military authorities at home despatched Major-General DOIHARA, Kenji, who was on the staff of the Kwantung Army and Chief of the Special Service Agency at Mukden, to carry on negotiations with the Chahar Province authorities in China. The reason why Major-General DOIHARA was entrusted with this mission was (1) because those troubles had arisen within the area for which he was in charge of information and DOIHARA was well versed in the actual facts of the affairs, and (2) because his character was best suited for negotiating with the Chinese on those sundry affairs and settling them in a friendly, peaceful way.

As a result of his negotiations the Doihara-Chin Te-chun Agreement was signed on June 27, 1935. It stipulates the dealing with the responsible persons and the units concerned, the suppression of anti-Japanese agitations in Chahar Province, the area where cessation of hostilities was to be effected, etc. By this agreement the Chinese demilitarized zone was extended to part of Chahar Province, and peace and order could be anticipated in this part of the borders.

A few days after the conclusion of the agreement, when Major-General DOIHARA came to the Kwantung Army Headquarters to make a verbal report on the negotiations to the Commander, I was in



attendance and could listen to it. From his report and also from what was told by a member of the staff who accompanied the Major-General, I gathered that the negotiations had been carried on in a very friendly manner.

III. The Kwantung Army's Concern about Inner Mongolia.

A considerable part of the western borders of Manchoukuo abuts on Inner Mongolia, while in Hsingan Province and the Jehol area in Manchoukuo there lived many Mongolians who constantly intercommunicated with similar tribes in Inner Mongolia. To the Kwantung Army which was responsible for the defence of Manchuria, therefore, it was a matter of grave concern as well as an important focus of attention in collecting information about the condition of Inner Mongolia, how it would affect Manchuria, and in particular whether Red influence would be exerted on Manchuria. The Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, who had harbored antipathy against the Chinese, were given impetus from the independence of Manchoukuo and were striving to establish a self-governing machinery of their own with Prince TE, an influential figure among them, as the leading spirit. The Kwantung Army was aware that Prince TE made it an important aim in his policy to prevent Inner Mongolia from turning Red. While I was at my post in the Kwantung Army, the relations between Manchuria and Inner Mongolia were amicable with no trouble arising between them. In December 1935 a skirmish occurred near Manchoukuo borders between a unit under Prince TE's command and Chinese troops. We feared lest it should lead to some trouble in Manchoukuo, but it was settled in a short space of time before it developed into a serious matter.



IV. The Kwantung Army's Concern about the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council.

Under the Tangku Truce Agreement, an area of North China adjoining the Manchoukuo borders had been designated as a demilitarized zone, where the Kwantung Army held the right of carrying out inspection as occasion demanded.

And after the conclusion of the said truce pact, Mr. YIN Ju-keng of China, on the recommendation of Mr. HUANG Fu, Chairman of the North China Political Affairs Adjustment Commission, became administrative inspector for 23 counties in the above-said demilitarized zone.

To the Kwantung Army it was naturally a matter of important concern whether the condition of the area was consistent with the objects of the truce pact, and whether the demilitarized zone would turn Red. Especially in the Jehol area, which adjoined the area in question, the activity of communist bandits had been incessant from former times, and so the Kwantung Army was making special efforts in collecting information about conditions in East Hopei. Mr. YIN Ju-keng, just referred to above, dissatisfied with the financial policy of the Nanking Government and in view of the fact that in the district under his control a peasants' agitation for self-government was started at the communists' instigation in October 1935, deemed it necessary to establish his political authority and carry out financial autonomy and anti-communism in the area. At last, in November 1935, he organized the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council under his chairmanship and declared the establishment of an autonomous



Previous to the declaration, about November 20, 1935 if I remember rightly, I had at the Kwantung Army Headquarters a visit from Mr. YIN's two envoys, who, revealing Mr. YIN's intentions, told me that as the area was one which under the Tangku Truce Pact had an important bearing on the Kwantung Army, they were desirous to learn the opinions of the leading officers of the Army regarding Mr. YIN's project. To this I replied that it was their own affair and none that the Kwantung Army should meddle in. I did not introduce them to my superior officers, nor take the trouble to ascertain the latter's views upon the matter.

About a week after the interview. I learnt by newspaper report of the declaration of the East Hopei Autonomous Government.

V. Position of the Kwantung Army in regard to the Formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.

After the conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement, there came into existence in North China a political machinery called the North China Political Affairs Adjustment Commission, with Mr. HUANG Fu as chairman and exercising control over the five provinces of North China. Such Chinese political machinery in North China had since undergone some changes. And with the growing improvement in the relations between Japan and China as well as between China and Manchoukuo as mentioned above, especially after the signing of the Doihara-Chin Te-chun Agreement in June 1935, which made wider arrangements for the maintenance of peace and order on the China-Manchoukuo borders, the Kwantung Army became aware of the fact that among the war-lords in North



China there was an inclination to form a new political structure as a bond between China and Manchoukuo, and hoped that it might take advantage of the inclination to devise some anti-communistic measures between China and Manchoukuo, promote intimate relations between the two countries, and secure the national defence of Manchoukuo. Deeming it a proper opportunity to despatch some envoy to explain to the war-lords in North China the position of Manchoukuo as well as of the Kwantung Army and quicken the realization of their intentions, the Kwantung Army, with the approval of the highest military authorities at home and after consultation with the command of the Japanese expeditionary forces in China, sent Major-General DOIHARA again to Peiping in November 1935, for he was regarded as best suited for such negotiations.

The position of the Kwantung Army with regard to the political machinery in North China and the reasons for the despatch of Major-General DOIHARA were as stated above. Pending the negotiations, the Major-General once returned to the Kwantung Army Headquarters towards the end of 1935. From what the Major-General himself and the staff officer who accompanied him told me at that time, I learnt that during his weeks' stay in Peiping, Major-General DOIHARA had held friendly talks with war-lords of North China, especially with Sung Che-yuan, and that well aware of the fact that Sung Che-yuan and others were keeping in close touch with the Nanking Government, the Major-General had been proceeding with the negotiations in a very friendly and peaceful manner.



In witness whereof I have hereunder set my seal and hand  
this 21st day of November, 1946, at Tokyo.

(Signed and sealed) KAWABE, Torashiro,  
Affiant.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of November,  
1946, at Tokyo.

(Signed and sealed) BANNO, Junkichi,  
Witness.



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WRITTEN OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the  
trust-adding nothing and withholding nothing.

(Signed and sealed) KAWABE, Torashiro.



Translation Certificate

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan  
Date 13 Jan 1947