

Exhibit 2673

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

A\_F\_F\_I\_D\_A\_V\_I\_T

I, MATSUMURA Tomokatsu, have replied to Mr. Blakeney's questions on 1 November 1946, in Tokyo, as follows:

- Q. State your duties and the period of your service in the Kwantung Army.
- A. I assumed my post at the Kwantung Army in August 1943, as chief of the 1st Section. Later I became vice-chief of staff and was continually in charge of matters related to operations.
- Q. State the period of time you served under the Commanders-in-Chief Umezu and Yamada.
- A. I was under the command of General Umezu from August 1943 to July 1944, and after that I was under General Yamada.
- Q. What were your relations with General Umezu during the time you served under him?
- A. I saw him often and talked with him on all operational and other matters.
- Q. Did you often hear his opinion on the subject of the attitude of the Kwantung Army towards the Soviet Union?
- A. Yes. I did.
- Q. Did you hear him state his opinion in both official and private capacities?
- A. Yes. I did.
- Q. What were his views?
- A. He often said that his chief policy was to keep peace with the Soviets and to prevent in advance the occurrence of disputes which might irritate the Soviets or hamper the peaceful relations. However, he made operational preparations for defense, such as the construction of fortifications.
- Q. What measures did General Umezu adopt to carry out this policy?
- A. He gave instructions many times at Army Commanders Conferences which I attended, so that this policy be thoroughly carried out.
- Q. Are you familiar with the "Border Guard Regulations"?
- A. Yes.
- Q. For what purpose were they created?
- A. They were made in order to prevent the occurrence of border disputes.



Q. When were they put into effect?

A. They had already existed when I assumed my post. Later I came to know from documents that they had been enacted after the Nomonhan Incident.

Q. State the contents of the "Border Guard Regulations".

A. Though they varied according to the topographies of the border regions, "non-fortified zones" in which fortification and troop movements were to be strictly prohibited, were to be set up within Manchuria.

Q. Were they made by a Russo-Japanese agreement?

A. They were made by the Kwantung Army alone.

Q. How were the Kwantung Army's operations plans made?

A. They were made on the basis of the instructions of the central Army authorities.

Q. Were they made during your tenure of office?

A. In 1943, the plan for 1942 was simply followed, as there was no instruction that year; but in 1944 and 1945 they were prepared on the basis of the instructions from Tokyo.

Q. Would you say that none of the operations plans was made by the Kwantung Army alone?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the contents or nature of the operations plans changed each year?

A. In 1942, it was planned in the event of hostilities to take the offensive with the main forces against the Maritime Province. The plan of 1943 simply followed that of 1942. In 1944 the plan for making an offensive was abandoned and that of defense at the border line was adopted. In 1945, to check the Soviet offensive with gradual retreats into Manchuria and to use the mountain district of southeastern Manchuria as the last line became the plan for that year.

Q. What was the reason for adopting the strategy of the offensive against the Maritime Province?

A. I do not know about its reason as no explanation was given by the central Army authorities but our duty was to paralyze their air bases by occupying the Maritime Province.

Q. Was general operations scheme against the Soviet Far Eastern territory shown in the instructions of the operations plan?

A. No over-all operations plan for the Soviet Far Eastern territory was indicated to us.

Q. Were the operations plans shown to units under the command of the Kwantung Army?

A. The commanders-in-chief of the various armies were shown only the excerpts of the matters connected with them. They were forbidden to show them to the units under their command or other units.



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- Q. Did a divisional commander know matters in his charge?
- A. Nothing concerning the operations plan was shown to divisional commanders.
- Q. Was utilization of White Russians contemplated in the operations plans?
- A. Absolutely not.
- Q. How was the time for commencement of operations stipulated in the instructions regarding the operations plan?
- A. The instructions for operations showed only plans and preparations and contained no mention as to the time for commencement of operations.
- Q. Could the Kwantung Army start an operation of its own accord?
- A. No, it could not start an operation by its arbitrary decision. Everything was to be done on instructions from the central authorities.
- Q. What was to be done if it was attacked by the Soviet forces?
- A. We were to fight in self-defence; but the principle was that instructions from the central authorities were to be awaited concerning the carrying out of operations plans.
- Q. Was the Soviet attack on 9 August 1945 previously known?
- A. Not at all.
- Q. How did you come to know of the Soviet Union's entry into the war?
1. Reports were received that Hsingking had been suddenly attacked from the air at 2 o'clock on 9 August and that many districts along the frontier were also under Soviet attack. Later, hearing a broadcast reporting the Soviet entry into the war, we realized that this was not merely a border clash but a real war.
2. What did the Kwantung Army do upon this?
- Headquarters at 3:30 on 9 August ordered all units under its command to defend themselves and to get ready for the execution of the operations plans.
- When was the carrying out of the operations plans ordered?
- It was ordered on the night of the 9th.
- What was your estimate of the Soviet Far Eastern Army's strength while you were there?
- Sniper Divisions 20 - 30  
Tanks 1,000 - 1,200  
Planes 1,000 - 1,500

Strength of the troops 700,000 - 800,000 men. It was estimated that it would be increased to from 30 to 40 divisions if and when war came (according to the information in the hands of the Second Section of the Kwantung Army).



- Q. What was the military strength of the Kwantung Army during your tenure of office?
- A. At the time of summer, 1943, its strength was as follows: Divisions, 13. Tank divisions, 2 (about 900 tanks). Air divisions, 2 (about 700-800 planes). Strength of the troops, about 600,000 officers and men. Since the autumn of the same year the numbers of tanks and airplanes decreased remarkably.
- Q. What was the state of the replenishment of the personnel of a division and its strength?
- A. The fixed number of men and horses in a division was about 70-80 percent of the war-time strength and was far from being adequate. Since the autumn of 1943 the crack divisions were gradually transferred to the south and only newly-formed divisions of inferior quality were left.
- Q. What was the military strength of the Manchoukuo Army?
- A. The Manchoukuo Army was increased from the former 80,000 to about 100,000 by virtue of the 1945 plan, but it was difficult to increase further as there was a serious shortage of arms.

I, Matsumura Tomokatsu, having read all questions and answers covering 17 pages, hereby swear that all of my answers are true.

5 November 1946

Tokyo

MATSUMURA Tomokatsu



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The above affidavit was subscribed and sworn to by Major-General Matsumura Tomokatsu before me, the undersigned authority, this 5 November 1946, at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tōkyō.

/s/ Donald S. Van Meter  
D. S. Van Meter,  
Capt. CMC  
Marshal, IMTFE