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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
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INTERROGATION NO: 372
(Jap Intell No 25)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 15 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Organization and Operation of TOKUMU KIKAN in MANCHURIA.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Lt. Col ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army.

Army Academy: 1937

1938-1940: 4th Section North China Area Army Headquarters

1940-1943: 2d Department Army General Headquarters

1943-1945: Army Attache in Moscow

1945 (May): 2d Department, Army General Headquarters

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR.


Interpreter: Major J. C. PELZEL, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY:

During the War Lt. Col ASAI, Isamu, was attached to Army General Headquarters in TOKYO and also served as Military Attache in Moscow. Through his experience in Headquarters he became familiar with the organization and operation of TOKUMU KIKAN in MANCHURIA, although never a member of the organization himself. On the basis of his experience and information he estimated, after the Potsdam Conference, that RUSSIA would attack JAPAN early in November. TOKUMU KIKAN was the intelligence section of the Kwantung Army and obtained information on Soviet strength, movements and intentions through espionage, observation along the border, interrogation of Russian spies, communications interception, and analysis of news and captured documents. While there was no connection between this organization and Headquarters in TOKYO, Headquarters received from the Kwantung Army weekly and monthly reports of the organization and sent requests for information to the Army which were turned over to the organization for action when in its field.

Personnel for TOKUMU KIKAN were selected from young officers in the Academy and from units of the Kwantung Army.



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Interrogation of Lt. Col ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army.

Q.1. You have been referred to us as one familiar with the organization and operation of the TOKUMU KIKAN (Special Service Organization).

A. Yes, I understand.

Q.2. In what way were you connected with TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. I was not in the organization at all, but I grew familiar with it through my position in the 2nd Section in the Army General Headquarters in TOKYO. While in the 2nd Section, I neither supervised the TOKUMU KIKAN nor worked with it, but indirectly I did learn of its organization and procedure in MANCHURIA.

Q.3. Tell us what you know about the organization in MANCHURIA.

A. The name, TOKUMU KIKAN, was the name of the organization about three years ago. Then the name was changed to JOHOBU. Its central office was in Harbin, with branch offices at CANTO, KEIMEI (BOTSURI), TOAN, JAMUS, KOKYA, HAIRAR (3 sub-divisions), KOAN, and APAKKA (across the border in MONGOLIA).

Q.4. I understand the organization you have just described was the intelligence unit for the Kwantung Army.

A. Yes.

Q.5. What was the connection between the organization in MANCHURIA and the Army General Headquarters in TOKYO?

A. None.

Q.6. Did the organization operate in areas other than MANCHURIA? South CHINA and The PHILIPPINES for instance?

A. I don't know. When I was in northern CHINA in 1938-40 there was an organization known as TOKUMU KIKAN, but I knew nothing about it.

Q.7. Who is familiar with the organization in the PHILIPPINES?

A. Lt. Col. OYA. I am familiar with the organization in MANCHURIA, Lt. Col YAMAZAKI with it in CHINA and Lt. Col. OYA with its operation in the Southern Areas.

Q.8. How many people did the organization use in MANCHURIA?

A. Fifty Officers and non-commissioned officers and 150 civilians in the central office and 35 Officers and 30 civilians in the branch offices.

Q.9. What training have you had in intelligence?

A. As in the case of all members of my class at the Academy, I had 20 hours in intelligence indoctrination. However, I feel that my three years with Army General Headquarters in TOKYO from 1940 to 1943 and again from May 1945 to the end of the War qualified me for work in this field. I worked extensively with intelligence reports. My particular job during each period with Headquarters was intelligence, especially military intelligence, concerning the Soviet. During my second period with Headquarters beginning in May 1945 I was concerned with economic and political questions as well as military intelligence relating to the Soviet.

Q.10. Were any directives or orders given directly to TOKUMU KIKAN by the TOKYO Headquarters?

Interrogation of Lt. Col ASAI, Iseamu, Japanese Army (contd).

A. Absolutely none. If I had a request for a certain type of information concerning RUSSIA, I would transmit it to the Kwantung Army. It, in turn would get the answer from the organization or any other unit that might have the particular information requested.

Q.11. What was the relation between the organization and the intelligence section of the Kwantung Army?

A. The organization was the intelligence section of the Kwantung Army. Special surveys might occasionally be made under G-2 by others regarding particular matters.

Q.12. What type of information did the organization send back to TOKYO?

A. The most important information was the order of battle, disposition of Soviet forces, and the strength of their forces. In addition it would supply intelligence on the internal situation in RUSSIA. Outside of these categories nothing else was sent.

Q.13. Was such information supplied on the basis of particular requests or on a continuing basis?

A. The reports supplied to Headquarters were of two types:

- A.
- (1) Emergency radio reports from the Kwantung Army Headquarters in response to my directives or on the basis of information gathered independently by the organization itself.
 - (2) Printed reports - (a) weekly and (b) monthly. Prior to the worsening of relations with RUSSIA, there was no weekly report but instead a 10-day report.

Q.14. You say that from time to time you made requests to the Kwantung army. What was the nature of these requests?

A. Outside of the requests I've already mentioned, I know of none. For instance, I would ask for information of the situation in a particular area or for a general type of information regarding, say, the air force. I did not send out requests going into details.

Q.15. Was the information you received through the Kwantung Army from this organization satisfactory?

A. No, it was not nearly satisfactory. That was because the problem was extremely complicated, especially as conditions with RUSSIA grew worse. The information received was too incomplete on which to base plans.

Q.16. What system was used by the organization in collecting intelligence?

A. My knowledge is generally limited to the system used by the organization prior to the time I was sent to RUSSIA three years ago. However, the methods have remained pretty much the same. They may be summarized as follows:

- (1) Espionage, (sending agents into the Soviet). The operations of our agents became restricted almost totally to areas on the MANCHURIAN side of the Border. We could not send agents into RUSSIA because of the dangers involved.
- (2) Observation. At high points along the borders there was a series of observation posts. Since the railroad ran close to the border, we could easily determine the movements of the Soviet troops. We could also observe the

Interrogation of Lt. Col. ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army (contd).

harbor close to VLADIVOSTOK. Such sources of information were often considered sufficient on which to form a judgment as to Russian intentions.

- (3) Interrogation of Captured Russian Spies. For instance, in the summer of 1941, one hundred were taken and from these and other spies captured from time to time it was possible to assess the situation of the Soviet Army pretty clearly.
- (4) Communication Interception. This was the function of a special communication unit and not of the organization. It was the most reliable source of information. Garrisons along the border, particularly along the borders of the Maritime Province, were able to intercept almost all messages to Soviet units in their areas.
- (5) Newspapers, Magazines, Captured Documents. The analysis of these was done at Headquarters in SHINKIO.

Q.17. Did the agents of this organization work in or out of uniform?

A. It varied according to the situation. Civilians never wore them. Military personnel did or did not depending on their job at the time.

Q.18. Tell us what you know of the BORYAKU.

A. There were none in MANCHURIA. Some were in CHINA. I have had no dealings with them. They were probably operatives for the NANKING Government doing special intelligence work. Both Chinese and Japanese operatives were attached to the Chinese Government. The agents attached to the NANKING Government were called SEIJIBO and ones attached since 1940 were called GUNJI BO.

Q.19. Are you familiar with the BUNKAN?

A. The BUNKAN were Japanese hired by the army and paid by the Army. They might or might not have officer ranks.

Q.20. On what basis were personnel chosen?

A. Two bases:

- (1) Selection of young officers from the Academy.
- (2) Selection of young officers, captain or below, from units of the Kwantung Army in response to directives. Qualifications were general intelligence and knowledge of Soviet affairs. Final selection was made by personnel officers at the Kwantung Army Headquarters, and the candidates were trained at SHINKIO (Headquarters of the Kwantung Army).

Q.21. Do you know that there was a school at AKASAKA KU (TOKYO) for training of Special Service Personnel?

A. No.

Q.22. Was there any organization similar to TOKUMU KIKAN in the Navy?

A. It is likely but I have never heard of it.

Q.23. Who among your Naval Officer friends would know?

A. I don't know, but perhaps the Third Department could tell you.

Q.24. When and on what sources did you estimate the Soviet would go to War against JAPAN?

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Interrogation of Lt. Col. ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army (contd).

A. In the early part of November 1945. I reached this estimate right after the POTSDAM Conference on the basis of developments at that Conference and on the movements and disposition of Soviet troops along the border. I thought that a blow would come North of VLADIVOSTOK and that they had 5,800 aircraft available for use against us.

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