

THE

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THE

PHILEBUS OF PLATO

EDITED WITH

INTRODUCTION, NOTES AND APPENDICES

BY

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PREFACE.

To attempt a new edition of the *Philebus* would scarcely seem to need apology. So far as I know, English scholarship has produced but three editions of this dialogue in the present century—two from the pen of Dr C. Badham, the third by Mr E. Poste; and none of these can be pronounced satisfactory. Nor do I know of any foreign scholar who has dealt with the *Philebus* in an adequate manner. The Daniel is not yet 'come to judgment.'

The way, then, lies open for anyone who will devote himself to the arduous task of completing a final and exhaustive edition of this most difficult of Platonic writings. The aim of the present effort is less ambitious; it is little more than to make a slight contribution, and to collect some of the outlying material, which may aid in the accomplishment of that desirable end; for in no degree can it claim to be exhaustive or final.

The difficulties which beset an editor of the *Philebus* are twofold—material and formal, or philosophical and textual; and sometimes the two interlace. As regards the text, I have taken as my basis the Teubner recension of Hermann-Wohlrab; and so my text is eclectic, nor do I pin my faith on the Bodleian manuscript (which I have specially re-examined for the present dialogue), or on any other particular manuscript; and occasionally I have admitted emendations wholly

conjectural. The explanatory Notes are mainly concerned with the text and grammar rather than with the philosophic subject-matter, to which I have devoted the Introduction. To the Appendices I have relegated both one or two critical matters which seemed too extensive for the Notes, and some material designed to illustrate or expand the philosophical discussions which seemed too bulky to insert in the Introduction. But in both departments, of philological and of philosophical elucidation, I must confess that my main task has been to collect, sift and record the *dicta* of earlier critics and commentators, rather than to propound novelties of my own origination.

It remains then to mention, with an acknowledgment of my debt to them, the names of the chief authors whom I have consulted.

God. Stallbaum ('Platonis Philebus rec., proleg. et comm. illustr.,' Gothae, 1842).

Ch. Badham ('The Philebus of Plato, with Introd. and Notes,' ed. 1, 1855; ed. 2, 1878).

Ed. Poste ('The Philebus of Plato, with a Revised Text and English Notes,' Oxford Univ. Press, 1860).

F. A. Paley (Translation of Plato's Philebus, with Notes).

H. Jackson ('Plato's Later Theory of Ideas, 1. The Philebus, etc.' in *J. of Phil.* x. pp. 253 ff.).

R. D. Archer-Hind (Introduction, pp. 24 ff., in his ed. of the *Timaeus*).

F. A. Trendelenburg ('De Platonis Philebi Consilio,' Berlin, 1837: 'Platonis de Ideis et Numeris Doctrina,' 1826).

R. Hirzel ('De Bonis in fine Philebi enumeratis,' Lips. 1868).

G. Schneider ('Die Ideenlehre in Plato's Philebus,' 1880: 'Das materiale Princip der Platonischen Metaphysik,' 1872).

J. A. Kilb ('Platons Lehre von der Materie,' Marburg, 1887).

F. Tocco ('Del Parmenide, del Sofista e del Filebo,' 1893).

In addition to these special treatises I must mention the larger works of Zeller ('Plato and the Older Academy,' Eng. Tr. 1876), Susemihl ('Die genetische Entwicklung der Plat. Philos.,' Lips. 1858), Teichmüller ('Studien z. Gesch. d. Begriffe,' 1874), Ribbing ('Genetische Darstellung d. Plat. Ideenlehre,' 1863), Michelis ('Die Philos. Pl.,' 1860), Peipers ('Ontologia Plat.'), Bäumker ('Das Problem d. Materie in d. Gr. Philos.,' 1890), Horn ('Platon-Studien,' 1893), Bénard ('Platon,' 1892), Fouillée, Tannery and Huit.

The present publication had its origin in some studies undertaken during my tenure of a Bp Berkeley Fellowship at the Owens College, Manchester. For the generosity of the Council of the College in facilitating my work, and for the help and sympathy received from Professor S. Alexander, my best thanks are due. It is also a pleasing duty to acknowledge my debt to my early instructors, Dr Henry Jackson and Mr R. D. Archer-Hind, who first taught me to feel that amongst the masters of thought "Plato mihi unus instar est omnium." To Dr Jackson I further owe especial thanks for the assistance he has given me with the proofs, and for many valuable suggestions. Some of these will be found in the "Additional Notes," to which I would here invite the reader's attention. I am also indebted to Mr G. E. Moore, of Trinity College, Cambridge, and to Mr A. E. Taylor, of the Owens College, for kindly communicating various notes and criticisms. Lastly, I must mention my brother, Prof. J. B. Bury, who has helped me in many ways.

R. G. B.

INTRODUCTION.

I. INTRODUCTORY.

THE *Philebus* might be compared to a gnarled and knotted old oak-tree, abounding in unexpected humps and shoots, which sadly mar its symmetry as compared with the fair cypress-trees and stately pines by whose side it stands in the 'grove of Academe': but yet it contains as much of sound timber as the best of them. Beneath the difficulties of expression and the peculiarity of form which mark this dialogue there is a sound core of true Platonic thought.

That it is harsh and rugged in style none can deny; that it is jagged and distorted in composition is equally indisputable. But though it lacks alike the dramatic graces of such dialogues as the *Protagoras* and *Euthydemus*, the mature richness of the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, and the epic dignity of the *Timaeus*, its difference, and even inferiority, in style and form is very far from giving ground to suspect its authenticity. On the contrary, the very style itself—bold and dry and harsh as it is—shows just this, that the work is one of the latest of Plato's productions, perhaps the very latest, except only the *Laws*. And this is now the verdict of most of the recent critics.

But though we refuse to agree with Schleiermacher in regarding the *Philebus* as an early work, preparatory to both the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*, yet we may be tempted to deny its unity and to view it as rather a congeries of discordant fragments than a rationally ordered whole[1]. This too would be a mistake, as it will be one of the purposes of the following

[1] Cp. Poste, *Philebus*, p. 105 (n. on 55 A): "we assume the Philebus to have arisen from a boldly executed junction of two originally separate dialogues."

pages to show. And to this end,—to indicate the cohesion as well as variety, the unity in multiplicity, of the dialogue,—I will here begin by a brief review of the main lines of the discussion, and a statement of the order in which I propose to deal with the chief subjects of which it treats.

The main object of the discussion, which governs the course of the whole dialogue and holds it all together, is to examine critically the rival ethical doctrines which we may term Hedonism and Intellectualism, of which the former is the creed of the Cyrenaics, here represented by Philebus, and the latter that of the Megarics, represented initially by Socrates[1].

Accordingly, we begin at once (11 B—12 B) with the question, Is Pleasure or is Intelligence the Supreme Good or Ethical End? But this presently leads on to an account of Division or Logical Method, which further involves reference to the Epistemology of Idealism (12 B—20 D): for no thorough discussion of any subject can ultimately dispense with this method. Still for the moment it is dispensed with, and three characteristic marks are disclosed—Desirability, Adequacy, Perfection—which necessarily attach to the Supreme Good, but in regard to which both Pleasure and Intelligence, when weighed, are found wanting. Hence it follows that neither Intelligence nor Pleasure is the Supreme End of Life. Such is the solution of the first problem (20 B—22 E).

But here emerges a second problem: Which of the two claimants, Pleasure or Intelligence, is most nearly akin to whatever is the Supreme Good? And again a third problem: If the Supreme Good is a Mixed thing, what are the laws of its mixture? The answer to these questions involves a manifold discussion, which combines with the ethical and dialectical elements already introduced further physical, metaphysical and psychological elements. First we have the physico-metaphysical exposition of the four great Classes of Being, by which the superiority of Intelligence to Pleasure, in its abstract character, is decided (23 C—31 A). This is followed by an examination and classification of Pleasures and of Intellectual Objects, with a view to their forming part in the Final Mixed

[1] For another suggestion as to the party-allusions see *Introd.* II. n. *ad fin.*

Good (31 B—59 D); after which the constitution of that Mixed Good is determined (59 D—64 E). And then the dialogue winds up with an ethico-metaphysical classification of the rival 'goods' in the order of their relation to the Supreme Good, as determined by the threefold character of Truth, Measure and Beauty.

At first, perhaps even at second, sight there may appear a perplexing incoherence about the arrangement our author here adopts; the puzzling intricacy of the argument may incline us to lament the loss, as well as to admire the theme, of Galen's treatise *περὶ τῶν ἐν Φιλήβῳ μεταβάσεων*. But further consideration should show that there is more method and meaning in the order than may at first sight appear. A more close and careful enquiry should lead us to agree with Trendelenburg that this is, after all, a well-knit, skilfully-wrought dialogue.

The logical discussion is not otiose, because it is practically illustrated in psychological investigations to follow. The mention of the Ideal Theory is not out of place because the whole subject under discussion has for its climax and crown the Idea of Highest Good. To determine the characters of the Mixed Good is important, as the motive which governs the whole of that most lengthy part of the dialogue which deals with Pleasures and Sciences as possible constituents of that Mixed Good. To discuss the Classes of Being is of value as bringing the immediate ethical question into line with the larger questions of universal truth, with which idealistic philosophy is conversant. Lastly, the concluding scheme of Goods forms the ground where the various threads of the discussion are picked up and woven together so as to form a complete solution of the original problem.

We may re-echo with confidence the sentence of Mr Poste, that "Speculations on the End of Life, on the Method of Science, on the laws of the Universe, in which we may trace the impulsion of Socrates, of the Megarians, and of the Pythagoreans, are all fused into one philosophic system, and presented in an harmonious artistic form. And this triple thread of speculation is the badge of Plato's most perfect dialogues. In this respect the Philebus may claim to be classed with the Republic and Timaeus." (*Introd.* p. ix.)

For the purposes of elucidation I shall treat the chief topics with which the dialogue is concerned in the following order:

(1) Pleasure: (2) Science, its Kinds and Methods: (3) Being, its Kinds and Causes: (4) The Good: (5) The Ideas.

II. PLEASURE.

The main theme of the *Philebus*, to judge by the traditional title (ἡ περὶ ἡδονῆς), as well as by the space occupied in its discussion, would appear to be the character of Pleasure and its claim to be regarded as the proper end of human action. A brief analysis of the course of the argument in so far as it deals directly with this subject may conveniently precede any further comments on Plato's ethical position with regard to it.

i. *Analysis of the Argument.*

11 A. Philebus' thesis that Pleasure and Enjoyment (χαίρειν, ἡδονή, τέρψις) is for animals universally Good.

12 C—E. Socrates points out that Pleasure (or 'Aphrodite' in loose parlance) is not a simple unity but manifold (ποικίλον). Though One in name (ἀκούειν), in nature (φύσις) pleasure differs widely from pleasure: there are pleasures of continence and of incontinence, of wisdom and of foolishness. Yes, rejoins Protarchus, as the effects of different causes pleasures may be said to differ; but for all that, Pleasure is pleasure, and its similarity to itself cannot be denied.

12 E. You mistake, returns Socrates, through confusing generic with specific quality. Colour, for instance, is always colour when regarded generically (γένει), and yet white differs from—nay, is the very opposite of—black; and such, I suspect, is the case with Pleasure.

13 A, D. Well, how would that affect our argument? asks Protarchus.

In this way: you call a mass of different things by the single name of Pleasure: next, you identify the Pleasant with the Good, and thus you designate all this heterogeneous mass of pleasures, some good and some bad, indifferently by the name of Good. What then, I ask, is the common element existing in good and bad pleasures alike in virtue of which you call them Good?

But I cannot allow that any pleasures are bad, objects Protarchus.

You admit, however, that pleasures vary in quality.

Not *qua* pleasures.

If you retract your former admission, retorts Socrates, the discussion must inevitably come to a dead-lock: and further, we shall expose ourselves to ridicule as stupid tiros (φαυλότατοι...νέοι) at dialectic, since it will be open to me to adopt an equally pig-headed style of answer.

[13 E—18 E contain an exposition with illustrations of the proper dialectic method: first, Socrates shows that Science is not uniform but multiform: next, he discusses the paradoxes of the One and Many, and explains the value of the One and Many (Generalisation and Analysis) for scientific procedure: which procedure is illustrated by the examples of Music and of the Alphabet. After this digression the original subject is resumed thus:—]

18 E—20 B. Our original argument concerned the claims upon our choice (αἱρετέον) of Wisdom (φρόνησις) and Pleasure respectively. Each of these we termed a Unity. Now after our foregoing discussion of Scientific Method, we must ask how each of these Unities is a 'One and Many' (ἓν καὶ πολλά), and what Number belongs to each of them so as to preclude each from becoming at once an Infinity (ἄπειρα).

You mean, Socrates, that we should investigate the number and quality of the species (εἴδη) into which Pleasure and Wisdom divide, if they do so divide?

To fail in such investigation were indeed to exhibit utter incapacity, replies Socrates.

Well, says Protarchus, you have promised to argue the question out, and we shall keep you to your promise. Choose your own method, and either disjoint into species Pleasure and Science or not as you please.

Your coaxing persuades me! laughs Socrates.

20 B—22 E. The question may be solved without employing the scientific method if we consider that The Good possesses the three attributes of Perfection (τέλεον), Sufficiency (ἱκανόν), Desirability (αἱρετόν); and that, judged by these three conditions, neither Pleasure alone nor Wisdom alone is found satisfactory. Consequently the best life for man must be better than either, and combine the good of both (ὁ κοινὸς βίος). Hence we must restate our problem thus: Is Pleasure or Thought (νοῦς) more nearly allied to the principle of Goodness in the victorious life?

[23 B—27 C: metaphysical discussion of the fourfold nature of Being—πέρας, ἄπειρον, μικτόν, αἰτία; after which the thread is resumed thus:—]

27 C—31 A. The object of our discussion has been to determine whether it is to Pleasure or to Wisdom that the second place belongs.

For the first place we assigned to the Mixed Life, and this evidently belongs to the third of the Four great Classes of Being just distinguished; and we have now to apply the same classification to our two competitors. First, we shall assign Pleasure to the Second Class, as 'unlimited'; then we must carefully consider the kinship of Wisdom. The ruling spirit of the Universe is Thought (νοῦς), whence it follows that Thought is akin to Cause, the Fourth Class.

31 B, C. The next step, proceeds Socrates, is to determine the sphere in which, and the conditions under which, Pleasure and Science become actualised.

We take Pleasure first, and it cannot be disjoined from Pain for the purposes of our investigation. It is evident that the sphere of the realisation of these two is the Third or Mixed Class (τὸ κοινὸν γένος).

31 D, E. Further, we see that the condition of the appearance of Pain is the dissolution of the Natural Harmony of an animal. Contrariwise, the process of becoming harmonised and returning to the natural state constitutes Pleasure. E.g., Hunger is a dissolution and a pain, while Eating is a fulfilling and pleasure: and similarly with the feelings of thirst and of chill, and their opposites. And so in general, the opposite processes of deviation from and restoration to the normal state (τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν) of a compound (ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος) animate being form respectively Pain and Pleasure.

32 C. A *second* kind of feeling is that of *Expectation*, which when its object is pleasant is called Pleasure, but when its object is grievous, Pain or Dread. And this kind of pleasure and pain is proper to the soul alone, in isolation from the body.

32 E—33 B. Furthermore, when a creature is at the neutral or normal point of condition, unaffected by either dissolution or restoration, it is free alike from both pain and pleasure. Which fact is of importance for our estimate of the value of Pleasure. And the life of pure thought, as already described, is marked by this absence of both affections—as is the Divine life: which matter may be resumed by-and-bye.

33 C. Again this second (non-corporeal) class of Pleasures (viz. of Expectation) involves as its means *Memory*, the nature of which we must therefore explain.

33 D—34 A. Of bodily affections some are quenched before they reach the soul, while others permeate soul as well as body and cause a commotion of both at once as well as of each in turn: the latter we

may term *conscious* (τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ λανθάνειν), the former *sub-conscious* (λανθάνειν τ. ψ.) processes. But sub-consciousness must not be confounded with *forgetfulness* (λήθη), for the latter is a loss of memory (μνήμης ἔξοδος), whereas in the former there can be no loss, since the object has never emerged into being. So, to avoid confusion between λανθάνειν and λήθη, we may vary the term and call that state in which the soul is unaffected by bodily disturbances *non-sensation* (ἀναισθησία), while the opposite state, where the same affection moves body and soul together, we may term *sensation* (αἴσθησις). We can now define Memory as *preservation of sensation* (σωτηρία αἰσθήσεως).

34 B. Memory, again, is to be distinguished from *Reminiscence* (ἀνάμνησις). For reminiscence is the re-handling (ἀναλαμβάνειν) by the soul alone of affections which it formerly experienced in conjunction with the body: and we call the recovery of a memory, whether of a sensation or of a mental acquisition, a reminiscence[1].

34 C, D. Now the object of here making these distinctions is to enable us to grasp more clearly the nature of psychical, non-corporeal, Pleasure, and also that of *Desire*. For an exposition of the character and sphere of Desire is necessary to the completeness of our examination of the form and genesis of Pleasure.

34 E—35 C. Let us, then, see why we apply in common the name Desire to such various affections as Hunger, Thirst, and such like. Thus, thirsting is growing empty, and thirst is a desire for fulfilling by means of fluid, so that the thirsty man desires the opposite of his present affection. Fulfilment, then, is the object laid hold of in thirst,—but by the soul, since the body is occupied with the opposite, and through Memory. Hence we conclude in general that Desire is a non-corporeal function, that its object is the opposite affection, and that it involves Memory.

35 E—36 B. Again, physical pains and pleasures may be associated with mental: (1) the pain of physical dissolution may be accompanied by the memory of pleasant things which would give relief, so as to form in combination a medium state of mingled pain and joy; or (2) the physical pain may be accompanied by a mental state of despair, there being no hope of future relief, so as to produce a state of twofold pain.

[1] ἀνάμνησις, as Michelis notes, is here used in its ordinary psychological sense, and not (as Susemihl supposed) in the peculiar sense it bears in relation to the Ideal Theory.

36 C—38 A. Now are these pains and pleasures *True* or *False*? Here Protarchus objects that these terms are inapplicable to such things as Pleasure, Fear, Expectation, though applicable to Opinion. Socrates admits that the question is difficult, but proceeds thus: It is generally agreed that in cases of madness or delirium we may have the appearance without the reality of pain and of pleasure. Let us examine this belief. An opinion really *is* an opinion whether it be right or wrong, and a feeling of pleasure *is* a pleasure whether it be right or wrong. How then can Opinion be both False and True but Pleasure only True? Is it not obvious that Pleasure and Pain admit of quality (ποιώ τινε), as well as Opinion; for we have already specified them variously as 'great' and 'small' and 'intense'? And so too we may call them Bad (πονηράν) or Right (ὀρθήν) if badness or rectitude attach to them. And as an Erring (ἁμαρτάνουσαν) opinion is a Wrong opinion, so too a pleasure or pain which errs concerning its object is Wrong or Bad. Further, Pleasure is often yoked to False Opinion, and then differs widely from that yoked to Right Opinion.

[38 B—39 E. Opinion is the product of Memory and Sensation: in the distance one object may be mistaken for another; this is a case of false opinion when the judgment is unuttered, of false statement (λόγος) when it is uttered. The function of Memory in such judgments of sense is to write statements, as it were, on the soul, as on a slate, which when true form true Opinion, when false, the opposite. Memory discharges also the function of a painter, when the images of such opinions or statements connected with sense-impressions are reproduced for the mind's eye (ἐν αὑτῷ ὁρᾷ πως); and such images are true or false according as the original opinions are true or false. Also, we experience this of future, as well as of past or present, objects, even as we saw that Pleasure and Pain sometimes have future reference; and these we term hopes.]

40 A—41 A. *Hope* is common to good men and bad alike, but as the good are Heaven's favourites their hopes and imaginings are more likely to come true. And so with imagined pleasures, those of the good are generally true, those of the bad false. Now False Opinion was, we found, real opinion about unreal objects in past, present or future: and Falsity in Pleasures and Pains must be regarded as analogous. [Similarly, we must conclude that Fears and Wraths and all such affections are sometimes false.] Now in the case of Opinion, Badness (πονηράς) means Falsity, and the same holds for Pleasure.

41 B. Here Protarchus objects that the Badness of pleasures is

mostly independent of their Falsity; which objection Socrates postpones answering, and proceeds to adduce a further proof of the frequent existence of Falsity in pleasures.

41 C. In the afore-mentioned case of Desire, when the body and the soul are oppositely affected by pain and pleasure (the body feeling pain, but the soul anticipating pleasure, or *vice versa*), this simultaneous presence of opposite affections produces an effect similar to the optical illusion produced by variations of distance: for our judgment of the comparative magnitude or intensity of pain or pleasure beside pleasure or pain is misled by the effects of the various juxtapositions. Hence we must add or subtract, as the case may be, from the amount of the false apparent pleasure to arrive at the true value of the pleasure.

Thus we see that pleasures *in themselves* may be false, besides such as are false through attaching to False Opinion.

42 D. Again, as we have frequently remarked, physical dissolution and depletion bring Pain, and restoration and repletion bring Pleasure, while the normal or neutral state is marked by the absence of both feelings.

43 A—44 A. Yet how can we speak of such a neutral, motionless state if we admit the Heraclitean doctrine of the ceaseless Flux of all things? We may escape the dilemma by again distinguishing conscious from sub-conscious processes, and by amending our statement regarding physical pleasures and pains to this:—pleasures and pains are produced in us by large changes, while small or moderate changes produce neither. We now see how the middle or neutral life is distinct alike from that of pleasure and from that of pain,—just as a third metal is distinct from both gold and silver,—so that it is incorrect to term it either pleasant or painful: and yet this mere freedom from pain is often mistaken, in good faith, for actual enjoyment, which opinion is clearly false if we are right in distinguishing Painlessness from Pleasure.

44 B—47 D. But, we may ask ourselves, *are* we right herein? Or is the truth with those shrewd and severe Physicists who deny the existence of Pleasure in any other form than that of relief from pain? In my judgment the Physicists are wrong: yet we may treat them as not ignoble, though unscientific, diviners, who through their hatred of the potency and hollowness of Pleasure proclaim its very enticements a snare and delusion. And we may at least follow them when they argue that as the specific character of anything is best discovered by observation of the object in its highest degree; so too with Pleasure, its real nature will become most evident if we investigate the keenest and

most intense pleasures. Now such pleasures are those of the body when in an unhealthy state, as appears when we consider that the keenest pleasures are those preceded by the keenest desires, and that such desires are those that are felt in fevers and similar diseased conditions. The greatest pleasures, then, are those of disease—meaning by 'greatness' intensity (τὸ σφόδρα). Now incontinence (ὕβρις) brings more intense pleasures than continence (σώφρων βίος)—intense even to ecstasy; so that this intensity belongs to Badness (πονηρία) of both soul and body. Itching, with its remedy in rubbing, is an instance of the diseased condition which breeds unseemly pleasures: and it is evidently a mixed affection of both pain and pleasure. Of these mixed conditions some are bodily, some psychical, while some affect both body and soul. (1) Of the bodily kind we have an example in the simultaneous feeling of Heat and Cold, which involves a strange bitter-sweetness; and in any such feeling the proportions between the pain and the pleasure may vary, sometimes pain, sometimes pleasure predominating, while in either case the presence of its opposite adds an edge to the dominant affection. Of these morbid pleasures, such as those of incontinence, we may say 'That way madness lies,' and yet the incontinent consider him happiest who oftenest enjoys such pleasures. (2) Of the mixed condition affecting both body and soul we have already remarked that it combines bodily pain of depletion with mental hope of repletion.

47 D—50 E. There is then left for us to consider (3) the mixture of pain and pleasure which belongs purely to the soul. This is found in such emotions as Anger, Fear, Regret, Lamentation, Love, Jealousy, Envy and the like, which though a kind of pains yet contain pleasures. Similarly Tragic Spectacles cause tears as well as enjoyment, and even in Comic Spectacles pain is mingled with pleasure. But as the affection induced by Comedy is somewhat obscure, it needs further explanation involving the discussion of Envy and of the Ludicrous. Envy is a kind of psychic pain, accompanied also by pleasure at another's evils: now ignorance and stupidity are evils: and this leads us up to the discovery of the nature of the Ludicrous (τὸ γελοῖον). One species of Badness (πονηρία) is Self-ignorance, and of this affection there are three varieties —over-estimation of one's wealth, of one's physical beauty or stature, of one's moral virtue. And of this last and most common form of this affection, the indiscriminate claim to Wisdom in especial conduces to contentious and false sophistry (δοξοσοφία ψευδής). Now every such affection is an evil: but if we would see how Envy is a mixture of

pain and pleasure, we must subdivide again into two parts. Those who foolishly hold a false opinion respecting themselves fall into the two classes of the Powerful and the Weak; of these the Weak are Ludicrous, but the Powerful in self-defence Dangerous and Dreadful. Now we define Envy as a kind of unjust pain and pleasure; but since joy over an enemy's evils is neither unjust nor envious, and ignorance is an evil, it is joy over ignorance in a friend which must constitute Envy: and when this is of a ludicrous rather than hateful kind, the pain of Envy is mingled with pleasure. Thus we see how in the tragedies and comedies both of real life and of the stage Pain and Pleasure are mingled together.

We have now discussed the nature of those psychic affections known as Lamentation, Envy and Anger: countless other species remain, but seeing that we have examined the obscure species of mixed pain and pleasure in Comedy, the rest of the species (Fears, Loves, and the like) we may fairly take for granted, and content ourselves with restating that a mixture of Pain and Pleasure is found alike in all three classes of affections—the purely corporeal, the purely psychical, and the psycho-corporeal.

50 E—51 B. Next in natural order after the mixed we come to the *unmixed* pleasures. For, as I have already said, I do not agree entirely with those Physicists who deny the existence of true pleasures, though I readily concede that many apparent pleasures are unreal, and that many others turn out to be compounds of pains and stoppages of pains. Of True or Pure pleasures, then, there are three kinds. Of these some attend on fair Colours and Figures, and on Sounds, others on Smells, others again on any affection in which the feeling of want is inappreciable and painless while the fulfilling is appreciable, pleasant and free from pain.

51 C, D. (1) By Figures which are beautiful I mean not those of animals or portraits but geometric figures—line, circle, plane, solid, etc.—whose beauty is not relative to any outside thing but absolute: and such Figures and Colours bring with them peculiar pleasures. Similarly, clear and pure Tones bring their peculiar pleasures.

(2) Smells are a less divine class; yet in so far as they are not conditioned by pain we may rank them with the foregoing.

52 A, B. (3) Lastly, we have the Intellectual pleasures. The desire for knowledge involves no natural pain, nor yet the loss of knowledge—though the latter may, through reflection (λογισμός), cause pain indirectly. This third class, then, is, like the rest, naturally painless and pure, but attained by the fewest of men.

52 C. We have now sufficiently distinguished the two classes of Pleasures, the Pure and the Impure, and may assign them each to its Genus—the impure or excessive to the Limitless (ἄπειρον), the pure to the Measured (ἔμμετρον).

52 D—53 B. Next, what relation does the Pure Class and the Excessive or Intense bear to Truth (and Beauty): we must enquire into this with a view to our final decision on the Mixture of pure Pleasure with pure Science. Take the case of White Colour: it is most True and Beautiful when most Pure and Unalloyed, not when largest in extent. Similarly with Pleasure—a mild and small pleasure, when painless and pure, is more Pleasant, True and Beautiful than an intense and large pleasure which is impure.

53 C—55 B. There is a doctrine which teaches that Pleasure is always a Becoming (γένεσις), never a Being (οὐσία). To fully appreciate it we must discuss these terms. They are correlates, as end to effort, object of desire to subject, absolute to relative; so that the process of Becoming is always subordinate to the state of Being as Means to End. If, then, Pleasure is a Becoming, it must be relative to some form of Being; and this, as End, comes under the category of the Good, whereas Pleasure, as subordinate Means, cannot be so ranked. Thus, according to the doctrine stated, it is absurd to identify Pleasure with Good, and absurd to make the End of life lie in such processes as the satisfaction of physical needs. Reason compels us to prefer the third or neutral life to that of Becoming or of its opposite (φθορά), especially as it allows free play to the pure activity of Intelligence. It is absurd to deny that there is anything Good or Beautiful outside of the soul, or in the soul except Pleasure—thus setting aside not merely corporeal conditions but mental, such as courage, continence, thought and the like; and it is absurd also to measure moral qualities by the standard of Pleasure, calling a man Good when he enjoys pleasure, Bad when he suffers pain.

[55 C—59 D contains a similar, though more concise, review of the various species of Science.]

[59 D—61 C summarises the position of the argument with regard to the original question of the respective claims of Pleasure and Science to be considered as the Good: both were found wanting in point of Sufficiency (ἱκανόν), so that we must look for the Good in the Mixed Life.]

[61 C—63 C. We must compound a potion of Pleasure, as honey, with Wisdom, as water. Only the Truest portions of Pleasure must be

used (though, on second thoughts, all kinds of Science), in addition to such as are Necessary. For Reason itself (63 C, D) refuses to associate with any pleasures other than the True and Pure and those which attach properly to itself or to Health and Virtue, since vicious and morbid pleasures are dangerous both to Reason and to the quality of the Mixture.]

[64 A—65 A. The Threefold Cause of Good,—Beauty, Symmetry, Truth.]

[65 A—66 C. By the standard of these Three we decide the place of Pleasure and of Reason. Firstly, judged by Truth, Pleasure is of all things the most deceitful: next, judged by Moderation (μετριότης), it is of all things most immoderate: lastly, judged by Beauty, it is foulest and most ludicrous—and this applies above all to the greatest pleasures.

Hence we cannot rank pleasures above the fifth place, and there only such as are pure and painless, whether accompanying sciences or sensations.]

[66 D—end. Recapitulation of the argument. The final result is that, so far from being first, Pleasure only comes fifth: such is the verdict of the Philosophic Muse, however much kine and swine may prophesy falsely to the contrary.]

ii. Comments and Illustrations.

The first point to notice about the above discussion is the manner in which Socrates both illuminates and enlarges the narrow and vague application of the term Pleasure as used by the younger disputants in the earlier part of the dialogue. To them it suggested mainly the coarser and more primitive affections of sense, but beneath the keen dissecting-knife of the logician, species after species of more subtle emotions is laid bare in its distinct character.

At the opposite poles of its specific nature are placed the purely bodily and the purely intellectual affections, between which lie the various kinds of combinations of mixed pains and pleasures of mind and body. The result is to show how far from exhausting the content of the term is the vulgar view of the nature of pleasure, which neglects the mental elements which are so frequently and subtly involved in many of its manifestations.

It is in connection with the *mental* side of Pleasure that Socrates digresses to discuss Sensation, Memory, Desire, Hope, Imagination, Opinion; and it is in connection with this side,

too, that the question is raised as to the *Truth* of the various kinds of Pleasure.

This question is attacked from several points of view—after Plato's fashion. Thus it is shown how we may speak of the pleasures of Hope as False, if the pleasurable hopes fail of fulfilment; and how an expected pleasure may prove otherwise in the actual experience; and how proximity in time or the juxtaposition of pain may give a false impression of positive pleasure. In all such cases of pleasurable mental affections which involve mental error, we may say that there exists a False pleasure. But as it may be objected that it is not the pleasure *as such*, but rather the mental affection upon which it is based, to which the term False properly applies, we can scarcely suppose that Socrates is quite in earnest about his use of the term in such cases. We should rather take him as expounding here the looser and wider usage of the phrase than as defining its technical connotation. The pleasures described are incidentally, though not essentially, false, and so, from the point of view of Truth, the examination of them is but the prelude to the final determination of the *essentially* True or False in the nature of Pleasure *in itself*. What the Truth of Pleasure, as of any simple object, consists in is, we are finally told (53 B), Purity and Unity—freedom from all foreign admixture.

The value of this doctrine, and its consistency with Plato's general conception of Truth, I shall presently have occasion to discuss at length[1]: it is sufficient to remark here that the reader should not be over-hasty in accusing his author of unsound or illogical reasoning, or in condemning the whole discussion of the subject of False Pleasures as either fantastical or feeble. Certain modern critics, as we shall see, have dealt most hardly with this portion of the argument; but in doing so they have not been careful to bear in mind the point of view and intention of the writer. For we must remember, that Pleasure in its specific variations is examined not merely for its own sake but for the sake of the final decision which

[1] See *Append.* F, pp. 206 ff.

requires that it shall be reduced, as it were, to the same common denominator as Knowledge and The Good.

It is this subordination of the discussion of Pleasure to the main thesis of the dialogue which explains also the purpose of those digressions which result in classifying Pleasure as 'Unlimited' and as 'Becoming.' And here it is interesting to observe how carefully Plato eschews the extreme view of some of his contemporaries, who pronounced pleasure to be wholly an illusion, and denied that it contains any reality or truth. In confuting this view Plato achieves his remarkable definition and classification of pure or real pleasure. And he achieves another dialectic victory when he employs the acute theory of a neutral or mean state to evade the results of an extreme Heracliteanism. This theory of the 'mean,' which plays so important a part in the *Philebus* may recal the use made of the analogous principle in regard to time (τὸ ἐξαίφνης) in the *Parmenides* (156 D).

Another interesting point touched on in the discussion of Pleasure is that which concerns Plato's Aesthetic Theory. I know of no more masterly account in English of the main characteristics of Plato's views of Art and Beauty than that presented in Mr Bosanquet's *History of Aesthetic* (*cc.* 3, 4), from which I take the liberty of borrowing the following observations.

"The relation of whole to part—a slightly more concrete expression for unity in variety—has never been more perfectly elucidated and more justly appreciated than by Plato and Aristotle, and it is in recognising the satisfaction afforded to the mind by the sensuous or imaginative embodiment of the relation that they make a first step in genuine aesthetic analysis."..."The relation of the one to the many or of the part to the whole is represented in comparative purity by geometrical figures, or again by rhythms or spatial intervals that bear numerical relation to one another. And for this reason Greek philosophy is inclined to select mathematical form, ratio, or proportion, as the pure and typical embodiment of beauty." Then, after citing Ar. *Metaph.* 1078 a (on the relation of the mathematical sciences to Beauty[1]), and *Phil.* 64

[1] Cp. *Append.* E, p. 200.

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"And if we bear in mind that architecture and decorative ·nament, of the severe though refined type congenial to Greek vilisation, fell outside the frontier of imitative reproduction, ·e may better understand how a Greek theorist might be ontent with a plain curve as a type of beauty, and how such . type might really involve a degree of delightful refinement vhich later ages have not again attained by such simple neans."

In dealing with "Plato's attitude towards true aesthetic interest"—as distinguished from any form of 'practical interest,' whether moral or sensuous—Mr Bosanquet notes that it is to be looked for "within the region of pleasurable presentation, as conceived by Plato, and in the contrast between pure and impure modes and conditions of such presentation." "In the *Philebus*," he observes, "it is assumed, and in the *Gorgias* (pp. 501, 502) implicitly denied, that pleasure is at least an essential element of the characteristic impression for which beauty ought to be valued. But in the passage in which this is assumed, the pleasure in question is strictly limited with reference: (i) to the kind of sense-perception which can give rise to it—the perceptions of eye and ear only, with a doubtful inclusion, on a lower level, of the sense of smell; and (ii) to the cases in which these sense-perceptions can give rise to the characteristic pleasures of formal beauty; cases that are free from the uneasiness of desire, and are distinguished by their symbolic character....The doubtful inclusion of smell most emphatically illustrates the genesis of the distinction (viz. between 'aesthetic' and 'non-aesthetic' senses, as drawn in *Hipp. Maj.*) in Plato's mind. If we judge by 'purity' in Plato's peculiar meaning, viz. as freedom from the intermittent uneasiness of desire, the pleasures of smell are pure; if we judge by purity in the sense of significant unity or concentrated energy as revealed in the expressive character of a presentation, the pleasures of smell are not

and 51, the writer proceeds thus: "The exclusion of life and pictures of life, in this passage, from the realm of absolute beauty, to which regularity and unity are essential, is a striking case of the limitation which we have seen to be inherent in Greek aesthetics. The concrete individual unity which underlies the apparent disorder of the beauty of life was not likely to be appreciated until after the same principle had been recognised in the more abstract or formal cases and conditions of its embodiment."

"And it is plain that formal beauty, as recognised in such passages as these, of which all Greek philosophy is full, is constituted by a symbolic relation—a presentation to sense of a principle which is not sensuous."

"Such 'presentation,' in default of a more precise term, may sometimes be called an 'imitation'; but it is impossible to 'imitate' a non-sensuous principle in a sensuous medium. Of such symbolism or presentation we find the following principal cases to have attracted the attention of Plato or Aristotle. (i) There is no more obvious type of unity appealing to sense than is to be found in the self-identical quality of a *colour* extended in space, or of a *tone* extended in time. These (see *Phileb.* 51, *Tim.* 80 B) Plato recognised as beautiful, and...for the reason here suggested, namely as sensuous presentations of unity...."

"The same observation upon the beauty of pure colours and sounds as types of unity in diversity is made by Kant.... Mr Ruskin's account (*Mod. Painters*, vol. ii.) of 'Purity as the type of divine energy'...presents a wonderful analogy with the idea as it first dawned on Plato."

(ii) "*Elementary geometrical forms*, even the straight line, and more particularly certain triangles, are set down as absolutely beautiful. We have interpreted this to mean that they are among the purest examples of unity in the form of simple regular or symmetrical shape."

"Strange as this assertion may appear to our aesthetic perception, which demands a more varied and concrete revelation of order or unity, I do not think that it can justly be denied. There is a degree of beauty belonging to every shape

or structure which in any way affects perception with a sense of regularity or symmetry, that is, of the unity of parts in a whole as it displays itself where the whole is lacking in highly concrete differentiation."

"And if we bear in mind that architecture and decorative ornament, of the severe though refined type congenial to Greek civilisation, fell outside the frontier of imitative reproduction, we may better understand how a Greek theorist might be content with a plain curve as a type of beauty, and how such a type might really involve a degree of delightful refinement which later ages have not again attained by such simple means."

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pure, but are as mere occurrences in the way of pleasurable sensation."

"If, then, in the passage from the *Gorgias* referred to, the fault ascribed to art were nothing more than that what it aims at and generates is pleasure, we should find a discrepancy between the two passages. But the aim ascribed and condemned in the *Gorgias* is pleasure *as such*, which means, as Plato seems rightly to insist with all his force, pleasure at any price and in anything (*Gorg.* 501 A). 'Cookery,' he says (it is cookery with which poetry and music are being ironically compared, as equally forms of "flattery," *i.e.* mere provision of the pleasant), 'in attending upon pleasure *never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she devotes herself*, nor ever considers nor calculates anything.' This comparison shows that the satisfaction of real desire is not far from Plato's mind as the ground to be alleged against the nobleness *of the concrete arts*..."

"The conclusion must be that Plato has a clear view of aesthetic as distinct from real interest only in so far as he recognises a peculiar satisfaction attending the very abstract manifestations of purely formal beauty. In those concrete forms of representation, which we think the higher arts, he was unable to distinguish the pleasure of expressiveness from the practical interest of morality, which he desired to see predominant, and from the pleasure of realistic suggestion, which he utterly condemned."

These observations, of especial value as the opinion of so distinguished an expert in the subject as Mr Bosanquet, form an interesting comment on the latter part of the discussion of Pleasure as analysed above, and sufficiently testify to the importance of our dialogue for a complete estimate of Plato's aesthetic position. The problem of the One and the Many is virtually that with which the *Philebus* opens, and the same problem constitutes also the core of the discussion of Beauty and of the objects of Art—the alpha and omega of Aesthetic as of all other branches of philosophic inquiry.

A word should be added regarding other Platonic discussions of Pleasure. They are mainly concerned with combating

Sophistic and Cyrenaic Hedonism, which was closely related to the Protagorean theory of Relativity; and so their conclusions are mainly negative. Thus the *Gorgias* emphatically maintains that, so far from pleasure being the highest good or right object of universal pursuit, it is, on the contrary, better to suffer the pain of injury than to inflict injury, and better to suffer the pain of just punishment than to escape unpunished and unreformed. And a similar purely hostile tone to the claims of Pleasure is observable in the discussion in *Republic* IX. (580 D ff.), which deserves close comparison with that in the *Philebus*, as emphasising the fleeting, illusory, and impure character of most kinds of pleasure (esp. 583—4), and ascribing the best and truest kind to the philosophic life of contemplation (586 E). But the examination of the subject in the great dialogue is conducted with much less of patience and completeness, with much less sympathy, one might say, for the opponents' position, than in the *Philebus*; the explanation being that in the one place Plato is combating merely the Hedonistic extreme, while in the other his attack is directed equally against both extremes of Hedonism and Antihedonism[1].

In the *Protagoras* (pp. 351 ff.) also there is an interesting discussion of Pleasure, with reference to the inconsistency of the popular and Sophistic views on the subject. It is quite clear that nothing that is said there is in conflict with Plato's ethical doctrine elsewhere, since the whole argument is of the nature of a *reductio ad absurdum*, by which the right view is only hinted at indirectly. The general result is to show that, if we equate Good with Pleasure and Evil with Pain, then the art of living will consist in rightly estimating the proportions of Pleasure and Pain—whether present or future—which result from our actions. Consequently, Virtue is to be found in Metretic Science as applied to pains and pleasures[2]. From which we deduce the conclusion that an outside criterion, the intellectual factor, is necessary in order to render Pleasure an intelligible object of life's pursuit. Thus, so far as it goes, the indirect

[1] For a detailed comparison of the statements regarding pleasure in the two dialogues, with a view to show the posteriority of the *Philebus*, see Dr H. Jackson's valuable essay in *J. of Philol.* XXV. pp. 73 ff.

[2] See *Append.* E, p. 196.

argumentation of the *Protagoras* points in the same direction as the direct demonstration of the *Philebus*, though by failing to analyse the notion of Pleasure it forms a less mature contribution to ethical doctrine than even that of the *Gorgias* or that of the *Republic*.

Again, in the *Laws* (especially 667 ff., 733 ff.) we find similar statements as to the limitations of Pleasure regarded as a criterion of right-living, or as a right object of life; which, although stated in a more loose and popular way, serve to confirm the argument of our dialogue.

For thoroughness and completeness in its critique of Pleasure the *Philebus* certainly stands alone among pre-Aristotelian writings, and, as Apelt justly remarks, it presents clear testimony that Plato was the first of the Greeks who recognised the existence of a pure, *disinterested* form of Pleasure (51 C, 52 A), akin to the Kantian 'Gefühl des Schönen[1].'

[1] I may here call attention to an interesting paper by Mr A. Benn on "The Idea of Nature in Plato" (*Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos.* IX. 1. 24 ff.). He maintains that the Sophists were divided, as regards their ethics, into two camps, of which the one, led by Protagoras and supported by Gorgias, made νόμος their philosophic principle, while the other, founded by Hippias and supported by Prodicus, maintained the opposite principle of φύσις (after the Heraclitean manner). Thus, in Plato's time, contemporary Greek thought on Ethics and Politics was divided between the conflicting tendencies of Naturalism and of Conventionalism. Socrates was inclined to the latter view, and eschewed Physical and Physiocratic theories; and so in the earlier dialogues of Plato little account is taken of φύσις. "With Plato the more frequent use of the expressions κατὰ φύσιν and παρὰ φ. is a mark of increasing lateness....The *Philebus* is unquestionably late; here the occurrences are seven and the distinct usages five in number (22 B, 27 A, 32 A, 32 B, 50 E). A perceptible advance towards Stoicism may be found in the very pointed distinction drawn between 'natural' pains (φύσει ἀλγηδόνες) and those superinduced by reflection (λογισμός 52 A)." Hippias, as the founder of the *Natur-recht* principle, was followed successively by Antisthenes and the Cynics, the Stoics, and the Roman Jurists. Mr Benn's view, besides affording a useful criterion for the ordering of the Platonic dialogues, suggests that in the *Philebus* we find an echo of the controversy between Conventionalism (*Homo Mensura*), as represented by Socrates, and Naturalism (*Animal Mensura*), as maintained by Philebus: while Protarchus, the disciple of Gorgias, mediates between the opposing views (cp. 67 B, *n.*). Plato himself transcends the antithesis by taking a new higher and deeper view of φύσις: and to the Platonic φύσις, as Benn well says, "the sense of supreme and absolute reality belongs in a much higher degree than to the Nature of modern or even of Aristotelian philosophy." Cp. *Append.* B, p. 174.

III. Science: its Kinds, and Methods.

i. *Classification of Arts and Sciences.*

In 55 C. ff. we have that class of objects denoted as Thought and Science (*νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη*) submitted to examination in order to ascertain what part of them is *naturally purest* (*ὅ τι καθαρώτατόν ἐστ' αὐτῶν φύσει*) for mixing with the *truest* parts of pleasure (*τοῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς μέρεσιν ἀληθεστάτοις*) as already determined (pp. 31—54). Accordingly *ἡ περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμη* is found to divide into (1) *τὸ δημιουργικόν*, i.e. technical sciences, of the artist and craftsman, and (2) *τὸ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν*, or the science of education.

55 D. Then, with regard to the former of these classes (*τὸ δημιουργικόν*), it is stated that the handicrafts (*χειροτεχνίαι*) are more or less pure (*καθαρώτεραι...ἀκαθαρτότεραι*) according as they involve more or less science (*ἐπιστήμη*). And what this means appears more clearly when we proceed to notice that the methods of the various Arts vary according to the degree in which they are based on (*a*) Arithmetic, Metrics, and Statics, or, failing such grounds, on (*b*) conjecture and empirical method (*τὸ εἰκάζειν καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καταμελετᾶν ἐμπειρίᾳ καί τινι τριβῇ,—αἱ τῆς στοχαστικῆς δυνάμεις*).

Taking, then, this distinction between the empirical and the scientific method as our ground of division, we may group the former class of Arts, in order of scientific value, in two sub-sections, thus:—

56 C. (*α*) Architecture, and the kindred arts of greater precision (*τὰς τεκτονικῇ ξυνεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις πλείονος ἀκριβείας μετισχούσας*).

(*β*) Music, and the kindred arts of lesser precision (*τὰς μουσικῇ ξυνεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλάττονος ἀκριβείας μετισχούσας*)[1].

[1] For a less exact enumeration of *ἐπιστῆμαι*, see *Theaet.* 146 C, D, where *γεωμετρία*, *ἀστρονομία*, *ἁρμονία*, *λογισμοί* are distinguished from *σκυτοτομική τε καὶ αἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν τέχναι*, but all classed under the head of *ἐπιστήμη* by Theaetetus—to which Socrates replies *τὸ δέ γε ἐπερωτηθέν, ὦ Θ., οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὁπόσαι τινές. οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμῆσαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἠρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν* (146 E), i.e. *mere* enumeration does not constitute *γνῶσις* or knowledge: so here in our passage we have given the *διαφοραί* of the *εἴδη* of *ἐπιστήμη*—not a mere catalogue (*ὁπόσαι*).

The leading example of the second group (*β*) is, be it noticed, Music, and its inferior position with regard to scientific value is due to the extent of its merely empirical character, to its dependence on mere conjecture and experiment, to its lack of a fixed standard, and to the vague and provisional nature of its results (*τὸ ξύμφωνον ἁρμόττουσα οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῷ—ὥστε πολὺ μεμιγμένον ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, σμικρὸν δὲ τὸ βέβαιον*)[1]. And the same holds good also of such arts as Medicine, Agriculture, Navigation, Strategy.

The position of Architecture (*ἡ τεκτονική*), on the other hand, at the head of the first group (*α*) is due to the fact that it makes most use of *measuring*-instruments (*πλείστοις μέτροις τε καὶ ὀργάνοις χρωμένη...κανόνι καὶ τόρνῳ κτλ.*), and consequently can attain to a higher degree of *exactitude* (*ἀκρίβειαν*) in its results.

But all the Arts above described, from Architecture to Music, being branches of *demiurgic* or applied science, are more or less *impure*, as depending on the *mixed* method which uses Conjecture (*στοχασμός*) as well as Measurement (*μέτρα*), and so never attain to full precision (*ἀκρίβεια*). In so far then as they are merely *empirical* or *conjectural* in their methods, all these Arts are *non*-scientific; and, as said, all the *scientific* value they possess accrues to them from their dependence on *Arithmetic*, *Metrics*, *Statics*, or applied Mathematics. Consequently, if we abstract the empirical element, we have left as the scientific side of the Arts these three—numeration, mensuration, and weight-determination.

These three, then, deserve to rank as the *ἀκριβέσταται* (or *ἡγεμονικαὶ*) *τέχναι*. So that from the particular arts we pass on thus to the consideration of the general scientific element in Art as a whole; i.e. we return from our second to our first main division of Science.

56 D ff. But here again we must be careful to distinguish two classes of Arithmetic, Metrics, etc. For they divide into:—

(*α*[1]) Popular Arithmetic (*ἀριθμητικὴ τῶν πολλῶν*) which employs units of all sorts and sizes (*οἱ μὲν γὰρ μονάδας ἀνίσους*

[1] For what constitutes musical science (*σοφὸς τὴν μουσικήν*) see 17 C ff.

καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμῶν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάντων μέγιστα).

(*α*²) Popular Logistic and Metretic (*λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ ἡ κατὰ τεκτονικὴν καὶ κατ' ἐμπορικήν*).

And set over against these cruder forms of applied Science, we find:

(*β*¹) Philosophic Arithmetic (*ἀριθμητικὴ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων*) which is definite and consistent in its use of terms—(*οἱ δ' οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μυρίων ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει*).

(*β*²) Philosophic Geometry and Logistic (*ἡ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρία τε καὶ λογισμοί*).

And in both of these two divisions of Mathematics, clearly the science of the philosopher far excels, in point of lucidity and purity (*τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ καθαρόν*), that of the artisan or tradesman. So that, in fine, with regard to the scientific value of the various grades of Arts, we conclude that not only is this first class (containing Arithmetic, Metrics and Statics) as a whole far superior to the second, or Demiurgic class, but further that the philosophic division of the first class is superior to the popular division of the same class in the essential features of exactitude and truth (*ἀκριβείᾳ τε καὶ ἀληθείᾳ περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμούς*).

58 A—59 B. After this discussion of the lower grades of Science (i.e. *τέχναι*), we finally arrive at the highest grade, which is Dialectic (*ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις*). The truest knowledge is that of permanent and eternal Being. Wherefore Dialectic, as having *true Being* for its sole object, excels all other *ἐπιστῆμαι* in point of truth. For the crowd of inferior Arts (*αἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι*) are based on Opinion (*δόξα*), as is also *physical* investigation, which has for its object the productions and affections of the visible world (*τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπῃ τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπῃ πάσχει τε καὶ ὅπῃ ποιεῖ*). So that Physics and the Arts, which deal with the changeful *γιγνόμενα*, which never remain constant or consistent (*κατὰ ταὐτά*), must necessarily lack clear truth and certainty in their

results. Hence no Science which deals with the variable objects of sense can attain to perfect truth.

59 C. The object of a perfectly true and stable science must be uniformly true and invariable (*ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα*).

Accordingly, the subject to this object, i.e. the faculty of soul which deals with it, must deserve to have assigned to it the titles of highest honour (*τιμιώτατα*) and the fairest (*κάλλιστα*) names: which are those of Thought (*νοῦς*) and Wisdom (*φρόνησις*).

This determination concerning *νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις*, that they are the psychic faculties or energies conversant with Absolute Being and exhibited in the formation of notions of Absolute Reality (*ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὂν ὄντως ἐννοίαις*), marks the conclusion of that section of the dialogue which treats of the specific varieties of Pleasure and of Thought.

For the immediate purpose of the dialogue the value of the above classification of the Sciences and Arts is apparent enough, that purpose being to discover how far the various kinds of Science have a claim to be represented in the Good Life. But there are further points of interest in it. In the first place, the attention here paid to the Demiurgic Arts reminds us of the fact that the Universe is the work of a Divine Artificer (*δημιουργός*), whose science, being manifested in visible products (*ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις*), thereby ranks as Art; and it also reminds us of the allusion made in this dialogue (59 E) to the ethical scientist as a *δημιουργός* who combines notions such as Knowledge and Pleasure, and of the description of his scientific discourse as a 'spiritual universe' (*κόσμος τις ἀσώματος*, 64 B). But besides such echoes of thought which mark the Platonic unity of the *Philebus*, it is still more important to notice the two *criteria* of Knowledge which are stated in this passage. True science is approved to be such both by the character of its *object* and by the nature of its *method*.

ii. *The Object of Science.*

The proper object of Science is the True, the Exact, the Pure, the Absolute, the Measured: this follows from the whole

course of the discussion sketched above, and is expressly stated in 59 C. The value of the science varies directly with the reality of its object, and this again involves proportional variation in the method of investigation: an absolute Science must deal with absolute Being and employ an absolutely precise Method. The Platonic usage of the terms (truth, purity, measure, etc.) thus applied to the objects of Science will be more fully discussed in *Appendices* E. F.

iii. *The Method of Science.*

A second characteristic of ἐπιστήμη proper lies in its Method. Not only has Science for its object the Real, the Absolute, and the True (which also is the formally Beautiful), but also it possesses a determinate and exact method.

We have already seen (55 C ff.) that the scientific value of the Arts was determined by the degree in which they made use of μέτρα καὶ ὄργανα, i.e. instruments for measuring and weighing; and also that the highest of the Arts are those of Numeration and Mensuration, those which deal wholly with μέτρα and ἀριθμοί. Consequently, it would seem that no kind of Science can be entitled to rank as exact (ἀκριβής) which does not make use of these means for guiding its processes.

The foregoing passage, when compared with other Platonic texts (cited in *Appendix* E), will have made it sufficiently evident that Plato insisted on the use of a μέτρον or mathematically determined unit of measurement as the indispensable *organon* for any exact science. If, then, such an instrument is needful for the subordinate sciences, and forms in fact that precise element in virtue of which they deserve to be called Sciences, will not the queen of sciences, Dialectic, which treats περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα (59 C), be also distinguished by the possession of a like *organon*, and of a like mathematical method? For the answer to this question we must next proceed to review that difficult portion of the dialogue (14 C ff.) in which the logical method is expounded.

Early in the course of the discussion (p. 13) Socrates had

convinced Protarchus that both Pleasure and Knowledge, though ostensibly single notions, were yet each a combination of many diverse particular kinds—πολλαὶ μὲν ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γιγνέσθων, πολλαὶ δ' ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ διάφοροι. Each of the rival claimants for the place of 'the Good' was thus seen to be at once ἕν and πολλά.

And this at once lands us in the much-debated question regarding the relations in general of these two notions—the One and the Many.

14 C—15 C. "Do you mean such a case as this," asks Protarchus, "when a man says of me that while I am one as a naturally produced substance (ἓν γεγονότα φύσει), I am also a number of opposite *mes*, inasmuch as I am at once great and small, and heavy and light, and a thousand other contradictory things in the same person?"

To which Socrates replies: "No, such a union of many and opposite qualities in a single substance is a paradox which is now no paradox but a commonly acknowledged fact, and no better than a puzzle for children.

"Nor yet do I refer to the union of a multiplicity of parts in a single whole, as when you divide a man, in discourse, into a number of limbs and members[1]."

"What then is the mysterious form of paradox to which you do refer?" enquires Protarchus. To which Socrates answers in the following noteworthy way:

"The examples above referred to concerned objects of Becoming and Perishing—the unity of the substance or of the whole was that of a sensible or phenomenal thing, and the plurality too was that of sensible qualities or parts. But the real difficulty arises when we attempt to divide such Monads (or Henads) as Man, Ox, the Beautiful, the Good, and the like. For here we are faced by several perplexing problems. In the first place ought we to conceive that there are any such Monads possessed of real existence? And further, how are we to suppose that these Monads, which are each a unity eternally self-identical and admitting of neither generation nor destruction, should each at once retain this

[1] Here should be noticed the contrast of tone regarding these two forms of the One and Many paradox between this passage (14 C, D) and that in *Rep.* VII. 523 A—526 B, where they are treated, not contemptuously as δεδημευμένα and παιδαριώδη, but as useful propaedeutic means to induce νόησις. Cp. Jackson on the *Philebus* (*J. of Ph.* X. 263).

permanent unity of Being and also reside in objects which are becoming and unlimited, whether (*a*) as rent in sunder and reduced to a plurality, or (*b*) as whole in itself apart from itself, so that, most inconceivably of all, it should thus come to exist as a unity both in One and in Many."

Here we have a concise statement of the difficulties of the Ideal Theory (*τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα, ὁ θαυμαστὸς λόγος*). For the present I defer further discussion of this passage, which is both important and difficult (see n. *ad loc.*). It is enough to remark here (1) that the problem is stated as a logical one: (2) that it is implied that it is soluble, that is to say that the Monads or Henads in question can really be subjected to *διαίρεσις* and are at once *ἓν καὶ πολλά*: (3) that the solution is meant to be conveyed in the following portion of the dialogue.

Accordingly we proceed to sketch briefly the course of the argument which follows after the statement of these problems.

15 D—17 A. "It lies in the nature of discourse that the same thing should be spoken of and conceived as at once One and Many: this is *τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν*—a necessary subjective affection, or law of our understanding. But the untrained youth, when he first discovers this fact, as it were a new-found treasure-trove of wisdom, sets madly to work in unifying and dividing notions and terms, making himself a nuisance to himself and every one about him: for in the madness of his enthusiasm there is no *method*."

"What then is 'the better way'?" asks Protarchus.

"No better way is there," Socrates replies, "than that whereof I am ever a lover, though ofttimes already it hath escaped me and left me destitute and in despair. And it is a way which, though easy to point out, is most hard to follow in practice; for it is the way which has led to the discovery of all such things belonging to Art as have ever yet been found out.

"This method, I believe, is a gift of the gods unto mankind brought down from Heaven by some Prometheus, together with a fire most brilliant; and the men of old, being mightier than we and dwelling more nigh unto the gods, did hand down this revelation—that the things which are ever said to be are from One and from Many, and possess innate within themselves Limit and Unlimitedness. Wherefore, these things being thus ordained throughout, we must assume each time one Form for each thing, and so search: so shall we find the Form

which is inherent. If then we grasp this Unity, we must next look for two, if haply there be two, or else three or some other number; and so likewise must we do with each of these Unities, until we can perceive not only that the prime One is One and Many and Unlimited, but also how many it is. And the Form of the Unlimited should not be attached to the Plurality until the whole of its number that lies between the Unlimited and the One has been surveyed: only then is it proper to commit to the Unlimited, and cease to deal with, each unit of the whole series.

"The gods it was, as I said, who revealed to us this manner of enquiring and learning and teaching one another: but the wise men of the present day make One in whatsoever manner may chance and Many more quickly or more slowly than is needful, and after the One, an Unlimited immediately; while the middle terms (*τὰ μέσα*) escape them: whereby is distinguished eristic from dialectical discussion."

The above passage is beset with difficulties textual and other—as will be seen by the note *ad loc.* And we shall have to return to it presently. Meanwhile I merely call attention to the fact that the scientific method herein described involves *numeration:* the investigator must determine regarding the One its exact numerical value (*ὁπόσα ἐστί*)—and regarding the Plurality he must likewise determine *τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός*: and these numbers are described as middle terms (*τὰ μέσα*).

Socrates next proceeds to illustrate the method expounded by means of some familiar examples.

17 B—18 D. Tone (*φωνή*) is at once One and an Unlimited Plurality (*ἄπειρος πλήθει*). But we are not expert linguists (*σοφοί, γραμματικοί*), we cannot be said to have a thorough knowledge of what Tone is, if we can state no more about it than merely this, that it is One and it is an Indefinite Plurality. We arrive at a scientific knowledge of it only when we are able to *define* it as regards both *quality* and *quantity.* And the same is the case with *φωνή* as the object of musical science: in its universal aspect it is single, but it is also triple as comprising *βαρύ, ὀξύ, ὁμότονον.* But in order that a man should be a musical expert (*σοφὸς τὴν μουσικήν*), he must know more about Tone than this: he must know also the musical 'intervals' (*διαστήματα*) and their exact number and quality (*ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμόν...καὶ ὁποῖα*), also the distinction between these intervals (*τοὺς ὅρους τῶν διαστ.*), and the 'systems'

or 'harmonies' which arise from combining these elements in various proportions. And so, generally,—to perceive only the Indefinite Plurality in things (ἄπειρον πλῆθος ἐν ἑκάστοις) does not constitute knowledge, but makes the man guilty of an incalculable lack of calculation and culture (ἄπειρον τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδ' ἐνάριθμον, ἅτ' οὐκ εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδέν' ἐν οὐδενὶ πώποτ' ἀπιδόντα, 17 E).

Socrates then briefly sums up the (double) logical method thus:—"When dealing with a Unity it is improper to attend forthwith to its Indefinity (ἐπ' ἀπείρου φύσιν), and likewise when compelled to begin with an Indefinite (τὸ ἄπειρον) one should first seek for some mediating Number as a needful preliminary to final Unification (ἕν)" (18 A, B).

In illustration of this, Socrates returns to the case of Tone. When some divine person, such as Egyptian Theuth, first noticed that φωνή is ἄπειρος, in this ἄπειρον he distinguished the vowels (τὰ φωνήεντα), as a plurality (οὐχ ἓν ὄντα ἀλλὰ πλείω), and another group of sounds, the liquids (φωνῆς μὲν οὔ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος), which also were a plurality with a definite numerical value (ἀριθμόν τινα): and as a third species, or distinct plurality, he separated the mute consonants (τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων τὰ...ἄφωνα). This was the first process—the division of the One into the fixed Number, of the *summum genus* φωνή into the three species (εἴδη), φωνήεντα, μέσα, ἄφωνα.

The next step was to divide the three species into their component letters until the exact number of each—consonants, liquids and vowels—was completely determined. This done, the total series of numbered sounds as well as each unit of the series was summed up under the single name of "Element" (στοιχεῖον).

The object of applying this one common term to denote each and all of these various sounds or letters was to show that it is impossible to know any one of them by itself and apart from its fellows (ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν): under this single generic name they are all unified as the objects of one and the same science of Grammar (18 D).

We notice here that the pioneer of grammatical science began with ἄπειρον—with the scattered and as yet indefinite number of particular sounds. Consequently his method was of *necessity* (cp. ἀναγκασθῇ) the inductive (ὁδὸς ἄνω) or empirical, proceeding from the ἄπειρον through the three species, each of which might be termed an ἀριθμός, as μέσα, in relation to the ἕν which comprises them all.

Also it is to be remarked that the Unity here—the Whole

formed of *ξύμπαντα τὰ γράμματα*—is such as to form the object or matter for a single science—*γραμματικὴ τέχνη*[1].

The application of the logical method to the cases of *ἡδονή* and *φρόνησις* in order to discover the number and quality of their *εἴδη* is the immediate interest for the disputants in the *Philebus*; and of this enough has been already said. I will only add here a few general remarks concerning Plato's dialectic.

In its account of the Dialectic Method the *Philebus* is more closely akin to the *Sophist* and *Politicus* than to earlier dialogues. Thus in the *Phaedrus* (265 D ff.) the complementary methods of Generalisation (*συναγωγή*) and Division (*διαίρεσις*) are applied merely 'to the discovery of Socratic definitions with a view to consistency in the use of debatable terms'; while the dialectician is described as the man who is 'skilful in discerning One and Many in Nature,' making his divisions at 'the natural joints of the organism.' A similar use of Division is made in the earlier part of the *Sophist* (218 B ff.) to arrive at provisional definitions; but in a later passage of the same dialogue (253 B ff.) the subject of dialectical science is stated to be "Division into kinds, whereby we perceive one form pervading many particulars, and many forms, differing from one another, embraced by a single form external to them; and again, one form pervading many forms or ones-in-many, and many forms separate from one another: and to effect Division into kinds is the function of the Philosopher." Similarly in the *Politicus* 285 C ff. the function of Division becomes magnified in importance. The object of the whole discussion there is said to be the attainment of greater skill in Dialectic, since that skill means ability to discover truth about the Real, the Incorporeal, the Noumenal; and it is the discovery of the interrelations—the likenesses and differences—of these (*τὰ ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα*, 286 A) which constitutes Knowledge[2].

[1] Cp. *Theaet.* 202, 203 for discussion of *τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλαβάς*, with its conclusion: *μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἡ συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἔν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν*—where *letters* are similarly used as an example of the *elements of composition* in general: cp. also *Tim.* 48 C *στοιχεῖα...οὐδ' ἂν ὡς ἐν συλλαβῆς εἴδεσι.*

[2] For the substance and renderings in the above paragraph I am indebted to Dr H. Jackson's tract on the *Politicus* (*J. of Phil.* XV. 280 ff.).

We conclude, then, that classificatory method was especially valued by Plato in these later dialogues as an organon for reaching truth[1].

But in noting the broad similarity of doctrine on this point between the *Philebus* and other late dialogues, we should remark that some slight deviations may also be traced. This is especially noticeable in the increased stress laid upon the *quantitative* side of Division in the *Philebus*, in the emphatic demand that the enumeration of kinds should be accurate and exhaustive[2]. And I think we should not be unduly pressing this point if we were to find in it a confirmation of the view that the *Philebus* is the latest of the late dialogues, except only the *Laws*.

IV. Being: its Kinds and Causes.

i. *Analysis of the Argument.*

The discussion of the Scientific Method (14—18) having been followed by some remarks on the ethical topic of the dialogue, in which Socrates affirmed that νοῦς is more nearly related than ἡδονή to the αἴτιον τοῦ κοινοῦ βίου, we find ourselves, in the third place, confronted with the Ontological problem and launched into a fresh enquiry—that, namely, into the nature of what *is*.

23 B. If, says Socrates, we are to contend for the second prize on behalf of νοῦς, we shall need new engines of war, dialectical 'slings and arrows,' others than those already furnished: the way of discourse will be long and hard. We must begin with care.

23 C. Let us divide in two, or rather in three, all the contents of the universe (πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντί).

Next, let us take up again some of our recent λόγοι (cp. 16 C), in which we said that God had revealed two classes of Being, the Unlimited and the Limit (τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας). Then, establishing these as two εἴδη, as a third let us

[1] Cp. *Laws* 965 B ff.

[2] E.g. in *Soph.* 253 B we read merely ποῖα ποίοις συμφωνεῖ καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται, and similarly in 254 C πρῶτον μὲν ποῖα ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ἔπειτα κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως: but in *Phileb.* 17 B, C πόσα τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖα: 19 B εἴδη...ὁπόσα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα. Cp. the remarks on 'Metretic' in *Append.* E.

assume a kind formed by their commingling (τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἕν τι ξυμμισγόμενον).

23 D. But there is a fourth γένος which must not be forgotten: it is the *cause* of the commingling (τῆς ξυμμίξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα αἰτία). At present, at least, no fifth kind will be needed.

23 E ff. Having thus indicated the four classes of Being, Socrates next proposes to take two of them, τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πέρας ἔχον, and try by συναγωγή to unite their plurality and divided condition into a single Unity, and so to discover in what way each of them was ἓν καὶ πολλά.

Taking first τὸ ἄπειρον, as πολλά,—of which an example is θερμότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον, or indeterminate temperature—its characteristic is found to lie in its exclusion of, and incompatibility with, anything of the form of termination (πέρας, τέλος, τελευτή, ποσόν, μέτριον). Hence, comprehensively, the *genus* ἄπειρον contains all things which are subjects of More and Less, Excess and Defect, and the like (24 E), so that ἡ τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσις may be defined as τ' τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένη φύσις (25 C).

25 A—E. The second kind of Being is τὸ πέρας. It is described as that which contains such things as do not admit of the More and Less, but do admit their contraries—the Equal, the Double, and the like determinate mathematical relations. And this being so, we arrive at the definition of ἡ τοῦ πέρατος, or ἡ τοῦ περατοειδοῦς, γέννα as the product "of the Equal and Double and whatever makes incongruous relations cease, and produces, by implanting number, concordant and symmetrical relations[1]."

26 D ff. As our third class of Being we have that formed by the mixture of the first two (τὸ μικτὸν ἐκ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν). Its unity as a *genus* comprises all the offspring of πέρας and ἄπειρον; and it may be described as a mixed and 'become' Being (μικτὴ καὶ γεγενημένη οὐσία). As examples of it we have Health, Music, the Seasons, and so forth. Also to it belongs the 'Mixed Life,' which has already been affirmed to constitute the human Good (27 D).

26 E ff. The fourth class is that of the Cause of the Mixture. For all things which come into existence, or 'become,' must have an active cause to account for their motion. This fourth kind of Being is τὸ δημιουργοῦν, being distinct both from the third which is composed of τὰ γιγνόμενα, and from the first two which constitute the elements of Becoming (ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα).

[1] See further in *Append.* A, D.

Then follows (28 A—31 A) a discussion of νοῦς, which results in its determination as closely related to the *genus* Cause (νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν ξυγγενὴς καὶ τούτου σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους).

This brief sketch of the line of enquiry shows us that the present section of the dialogue deals with a large and important philosophical subject—the Theory of *Being* in general, which we may divide into the two sub-sections, Ontology and Aetiology, for convenience of exposition.

ii. *Exposition of the Ontology.*

The Ontology proper, in which πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντί are divided into the three classes of πέρας, ἄπειρον and μικτόν, is contained in 23 C—26 E.

From 16 C ff. we have learned already that the order of thought corresponds to the order of existence—that in each we must distinguish three grades or stages, namely πέρας, ἀπειρία, and τὸ μικτόν. This third class is that spoken of as τὰ ἀεὶ λεγόμενα εἶναι—ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν. This primarily refers to *phenomena*, or external objects of perception. These combine in their nature unity and multiplicity, or determination (πέρας) and indetermination (ἀπειρία). Both these elements are innate (ξύμφυτα) in things: the world of natural existences must contain both in accordance with the order of its constitution (οὕτω διακεκοσμημένα) by the Artificer of the Universe. Consequently our thought, if it is to reflect existence correctly, must observe this distinction of matter and form. That is, we shall discern in the given phenomenon, by logical process, the genus, as ἕν, the species as ἀριθμός or εἶδος, and as ἄπειρα the multiplicity of further particular or peculiar qualities which attach to the object observed over and above the determinate (i.e. generic and specific) qualities. When we have done this we *know* the object in question, in so far as it can be known, for knowledge in the true sense is only of the εἶδος, not of the ἄπειρα, or particulars, as such. Socrates, for example, can be scientifically defined, or known, in so far as he is a specimen of the εἶδος Man—but beyond that science refuses to consider his properties and accidents. Such is the theory as stated in its *in*tensive aspect, when we commence by observing the individual phenomenon. From the

*ex*tensive side, the One or genus is not to be immediately superordinated to an indefinite multitude of particulars, but must first be carefully subjected to division (dichotomy) into its species, until we come to such as refuse to be further subdivided, ἄτομα εἴδη, after which the individual specimens need not be further dealt with. Here the εἴδη are the ἀριθμοί or ποσά which mediate between the One and the Many, and combine πέρας and ἀπειρία. They are the objects of definition, the logical middle terms; and they are the νοητά and the matter of dialectic.

This, then, is the (twofold) subjective aspect of the theory, already expounded as a logical theory in 16 C ff.[1] The other, ontological or objective, aspect, set forth in 23 C ff., is that which now concerns us.

The first notion is that of πέρας. It is the term used for the genus or abstract principle—subordinated to which we have as ἡ τοῦ πέρατος, or ἡ τοῦ περατοειδοῦς γένεα, the equal and the double and mathematical (arithmetical or geometrical) relation in general. It is the principle to which things owe their *definite* characteristics as *quanta* and *qualia*. The special property of the members of this genus is that they refuse to admit of their opposite, the 'More and Less,' that they put an end to infinity and indefiniteness. The opposite genus is τὸ ἄπειρον. This means simply the 'unlimited,' the 'continuous.' It may be used in two senses, (1) of *quantitative* infinity, or *ex*tensive continuity, or (2) of *qualitative* indefinity, or *in*tensive continuity. This genus may also be termed the 'Great and Small,' in the first or strictly mathematical sense, when used of spatial magnitudes; and the 'More and Less,' or 'Excessive and Defective,' when used of things in the qualitative or intensive aspect[2]. Hence, as examples of ἄπειρα we may take all kinds of sense-impressions, as such,—indefinite size, sound, heat, hardness, sweetness, etc. Such sensations, simply as sensations, tell us nothing definite about their objects or causes. They convey no knowledge in themselves. The phenomena are ἄπειρα, and as such indeterminate and non-intelligible (τὸ ἄπειρον ᾗ ἄπειρον ἄγνωστον)—ἃ δεῖ μεθέντα χαίρειν ἐᾶν.

[1] Cp. the remarks on the Method of Science above, pp. xxxiii ff.: also *Append.* F.
[2] Cp. *Append.* D.

Now on the *subjective* side we have seen that the way to arrive at true knowledge was by the process of logical mensuration—by induction from the ἄπειρα through the various grades of species (εἴδη) to the *summum genus*, or by the converse path of deduction. That was to be the process by which the soul, as subject, was to undergo its περιαγωγή from the chaos of confused sense-presentations to the ordered system and certainty of knowledge. And, on the other side, the world of natural existences, as object of the mind's activity, must undergo a similar process if it is to arrive at a state of system and order, if it is to proceed ἐκ γενέσεως εἰς οὐσίαν, if in short it is to be a κόσμος. And the process in this case, just as in the other, consists simply in the combination of πέρας with ἀπειρία,—in the determination of the undetermined, the limitation of the unlimited, the defining of the indefinite, the informing of the formless. All that is orderly, harmonious, beautiful and good is due to the entrance of this Formal and Formulating principle into the formless Many. It is because of this combination that 'this goodly Universe' is a rational and intelligible whole, observant of its times and seasons, obedient to fixed laws, subject to measure in space and in time. This is the manner of the constitution of the Universe as a systematic whole,—a κόσμος, an ἔμψυχον εἶδος or ζῷον.

And as in the Cosmos, so in man the microcosm—πέρας is the Goddess of harmony who effects in his soul νόμον καὶ τάξιν. Whence also the life best for man, his ἀγαθόν, is to be found where τὰ ἄπειρα are ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένα, in the perfect compound of good, where truth and symmetry and beauty have their place. And thus the Law of Mixture is seen to pervade the Physical and Ethical (or objective) sphere as well as the Logical (or subjective) sphere.

Now this view of the world without us as a Cosmos, or rationally ordered whole, supplies us at once with an object of *true* knowledge. We find outside of us no longer a mere confused mass of sensible objects, each of which appears as a mere individual phenomenon, so totally out of all relation or fellowship with other phenomena, that in regard to it we can go no further than to make identical statements—Socrates is Socrates, that stone is that stone. On the contrary, in a Cosmic Whole, we

see that everything is in relation to everything else, and in systematic, graduated, measurable relation. So that the particular phenomenon ceases to stand as a mere particular, and unites with its fellows to form the εἶδος, and so upward in ever-widening circles of interrelated being.

Such we may term the *ex*tensive aspect of the *ob*jective side of our Universe. In it the εἶδος *de*notes a group of particulars, and *con*notes certain specific qualities predicable of each one of these particulars, or in other words, the *Specific Form* is the *measure* according to which are tested and classified the plurality of individuals. While in *in*tensive aspect, with regard to any given particular existence, its εἶδος or formal quality, which constitutes it ποιόν τι, is the sum of the *specific* properties which inhere in it. In so far as its own qualification or quantification exceeds or falls short of this *normal* εἶδος, just in so far is the individual member evil and untrue (μὴ ὄν, ἄμετρον, κακόν, αἰσχρόν). The ultimate meaning of unreality, evil, falsehood is just *abnormality*, or departure from the type.

And thus the conclusions derived from the investigation of Being precisely correspond to those supplied by our examination of Science and Scientific Method.

iii. *The Aetiology.*

1. *Efficient Cause.*

The fourth principal class of things is stated in 23 D to be ἡ αἰτία τῆς ξυμμίξεως. It is the efficient cause of the combination of πέρας and ἄπειρον, and therein the cause also of γένεσις, since we cannot think of natural existences as uncaused (ἀναγκαῖον πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τιν' αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι), 26 E. Further, we may consider cause, which is an active power, as forming in itself a personal agent; we may identify τὸ αἴτιον with τὸ ποιοῦν, and τὸ γιγνόμενον with τὸ ποιούμενον, so that from the abstract categories of cause and effect we pass up to the higher and more vivid expressions, 'productive agent' and 'product,' or still more definitely 'artistic product' and 'artist' (τὸ πάντα ταῦτα δημουργοῦν, 27 B). And thus, as τὸ μικτόν in its Universal aspect is the Cosmos (τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον, 28 D, τὸ τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὄν, 30 A), so its cause is creative Absolute Reason or the Divine

Artificer and Ruler (*ἀληθινὸς καὶ θεῖος νοῦς*, 22 C: *νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν...διακυβερνᾶν*, 28 D: *κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα... σοφία καὶ νοῦς*, 30 C).

Reason is King and Lord of heaven and earth (28 C): and the product of this Artist bears to him the relation of slave to master (*ἡγεῖται τὸ ποιοῦν...τὸ δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ*, 27 A). In the universal Reason, then, or mind of Zeus, is to be found the efficient, or shaping and ordering, cause of the world as an intelligible Cosmos.

2. *Final Cause.*

To determine the conception of the Final Cause in the *Philebus*, at least in its Universal aspect, as cause of cosmic existence, we must pass on from 26 ff. to 53 D ff. There we find *τὰ ὄντα*, in the wide sense of the term, divided into two great classes—End (*τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα*) and Means (*τὸ ἕνεκά του*),—which contain all manner of existent things. The determinations in this passage may be thus formulated:

ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖρα	*ἄλλη μοῖρα*
1. *τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό*	1. *τὸ ἀεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου*
=2. *τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον ἀεὶ πεφυκός*	=2. *τὸ δ' ἐλλιπὲς ἐκείνου*
=3. *τὸ οὗ χάριν=τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα*	=3. *τὸ ἕνεκά του=τό τινος ἕνεκα*
=4. *ἡ οὐσία*	=4. *γένεσις (οὐσίας ἕνεκα)*
Ex. *παιδικὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά.*	Ex. *ἐρασταὶ ἀνδρεῖοι αὐτῶν.*

Thus to this kind of Cause belong the attributes of finality, eternity, desirability, reality: it constitutes the endless and changeless End of all change, the category of the Good.

But in addition to these two, it is convenient, after the Aristotelian method, to distinguish the two other classes of Cause termed Formal and Material.

3. *Formal Cause.* Clearly this is to be found in the *πέρας* Class as described in the *Philebus*; and we need not repeat here what we have elsewhere said regarding it.

4. *Material Cause.* This kind of Cause is obviously represented in the scheme of our dialogue by *τὸ ἄπειρον*, and it too is fully dealt with elsewhere.

If, then, we wish to combine these various determinations into a single and complete theory, we must conceive the matter

from the aspect suggested by the terms *ποιεῖν*, *δημιουργεῖν* in 26 ff., and by the reference to the artist's *ὄργανα* and *ὕλη* in 54 A. From these expressions, when compared with the teaching of the *Timaeus* and other dialogues, we see that the Universe is compared to an artificial product, or work of art. The factors necessary to the production of a work of art are (1) the artist, as efficient or dynamic, (2) materials *in* which or upon which he is to work, (3) tools or instruments, and (4) a model or plan for him to copy.

While the product upon which the craftsman is engaged is in *process* of manufacture, it is as yet only a *γιγνόμενον*, or 'in the making'; it is imperfect and incomplete and unfinished (not *τέλεον* or *ἱκανόν*). Consequently, at any stage of the process it is also *untrue*, as not yet presenting a faithful or exact (*ἀκριβές*) copy of its model. And further, we may say of the unfinished work that, in a sense, it *is* not as yet—it is not what it is meant to be, and what its name denotes; it is still a More or Less as compared with the due measure of its original, it is still *ἄμετρον*. Neither is such a work as yet *καθ' αὑτό*—it is nothing absolute in and for itself: it is a *ἕνεκά του*, whose final cause is still unattained; and all its reality of being and meaning lies in its approximation to that end, in its advancement towards completion.

Such, then, is the condition of the work while as yet in the intermediate stage of *γένεσις*, which lies between the two extreme states of absolute non-existence and of perfect existence, of which the former obtained before the artist set to work upon his material at all, while the latter will obtain after he has completed his work and turned out the finished product. In the first of these states we find the matter in the rough—simple *material* cause. This is *τὸ ἄπειρον*, the artist's *ὕλη* of 54 D. In the case of the human artist, of course, his material is already possessed of definite quality and quantity—it is not abstract matter, nor wholly indeterminate. Yet the analogy is not altogether astray even here. For, from the immediate point of view of the artist, and with reference to his precise end, the matter *is* *ἄπειρον*, indeterminate, formless and void. When, however, we refer to the Universal Artist, his material must be

ultimate matter, wholly and absolutely indeterminate—simple *continuity* and nothing more. And this is what Plato means at bottom both by the ἄπειρον of the *Philebus*, and by the ὕλη, or rather χώρα and ὑποδοχή, of the *Timaeus*.

But further, the human artist uses tools and measuring-instruments—ὄργανα and μέτρα. The purpose of these is to subdue the matter to the necessary form, and to compare the copy with the original—they are the *means* to the end: as the instruments of production in the physical sphere, they correspond to the Organon and method of cognition in the logical sphere. From his materials, which are ἄπειρα, as starting-point, the artist proceeds by regular systematic stages, guided by his measures and aided by his tools, in ever nearer approximations till he finally reaches the last stage, where the copy is one with its model: just as the dialectician ascends from ἄπειρα through εἴδη to the γένος. The 'rules' and 'measures' of the artist are τὰ πέρας ἔχοντα—they are external to the matter as such, and also to the resultant product. They possess no active power in themselves, no δύναμις, and so they do not come under the category of τἀγαθόν, which is reserved for the artist himself as efficient cause, and for the perfect product which is final cause. The ὄργανα, like the ὕλη, are merely necessary *data*, which possess no use or value in and for themselves, being entirely γενέσεως ἕνεκα.

Thus it appears that, in its ultimate aspect, as ἄπειρον is mere abstract hypothetical substratum, so πέρας is mere abstract hypothetical determination—neither possessing actual existence apart from the other.

Finally, in addition to the artist himself, his material, and his tools, we have to consider the model or original which he has to copy, imitate or represent. This model may be regarded either as an external natural object, combined of matter and form, or as merely a plan or idea existing in the mind of the artist. In any case the artist must apprehend it and know it if he is to copy it exactly. Accordingly the copy must really be a copy, or external representation, of an archetype which exists in the mind of the copyist—whether or not originated by him. In the work of manufacture the artist is simply attempting to give exact expression to a concept or mental picture of his own.

So that this concept is both the moving cause, which makes him begin the work, and also the final cause, as that for which and in view of which the work is done.

When we pass up from the human artist to the Divine Artist, or Demiurge, it is clear that the models in view of which he works cannot be outside his mind, which is Universal. The Ideas of God are the *παραδείγματα* towards which he works. It is clear also that the Divine Artificer needs no *ὄργανα* or *μέτρα*, in the material and external sense of the terms, for he is himself 'the measure of all things,' and his instruments of measure are his Ideas. Thus the tools and the models are both resolved into a process of thought; the *ὄργανα* or *πέρας ἔχοντα* being the mathematical relations of the universe, or in other words the laws of thought; and the *εἴδη* or *παραδείγματα* being the ultimate results of the thought-process as carried on by means of, and in accordance with, these laws,—which definite conclusions of the Divine *διανοεῖσθαι*, again, constitute Ideas.

Such appear to be the general results of Platonic thought with regard to the constitution of the World, in so far as it is viewed under the aspect of an artistic product. It is by no means implied, however, that this exhausts Plato's philosophising on the subject, or sufficiently explains the place of his Ideal Theory in the present dialogue. The latter point will be further discussed in a subsequent section.

I now append some parallels from other Platonic dialogues and from Aristotle, which may serve to illustrate the Ontology of the *Philebus*.

iv. *Illustrations.*

The parallelism between the human and the Divine, involving the conception of the World as an Artist's product, and the view that the Universal is the *παράδειγμα* of the particular, which is thus prominent in the *Philebus*, is among the most striking features of the philosophy of the *Timaeus*. We are told there, for instance, that the human soul, like the World-Soul, has *τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδους τὴν μὲν ταὐτοῦ, τὴν δὲ θατέρου*: that the human body has no elements of its own but derives them from the World-Frame (*δανείζεται ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου πυρὸς καὶ γῆς, ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος*

μόρια ὡς ἀποδοθησόμενα πάλιν). We are told there, too, that the visible Cosmos, like man the microcosm, is a Rational Animal (*ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*). We are told that its Artificer, or Composer (*ὁ δημιουργός, ὁ ξυνιστάς*), being all-good, willed a Product like himself, perfect in excellence; so that he set before himself, as his final cause, the production of a work of supreme beauty and goodness (*ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστον εἴη κατὰ φύσιν ἄριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος*). And his process of production, we are told, was Mixture—first blending indivisible and changeless Being with changeful and divisible Matter into a third kind of Being; and then re-mixing these three kinds of Being into a single whole (35 A). And this was done according to mathematical laws (31 B ff.).

In short, the visible Cosmos, as described throughout the *Timaeus*, is on the one hand a magnified model of Man, and on the other a copy of the Intelligible, Ideal Universe (*εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεὸς αἰσθητός*, 92 B). And in all these points, besides many verbal resemblances of detail, one finds that the elaborated doctrine of the *Timaeus* echoes the more condensed dogmas of the *Philebus*.

There are various places (esp. 903 B ff.) in the *Laws*, too, which bear the closest resemblance alike in thought and in expression to those we are dealing with in the *Philebus*, as well as to the *Timaeus* and certain parts of the *Politicus*. We find there the same view of God as the great World-artificer, the perfect artist (*δημιουργὸς σοφώτατος*); and there also, as in the *Philebus*, God is described as the Supreme Monarch (*ἡμῶν ὁ βασιλεύς*, 904 A). Next, we find that the Divine Artist works with a view to the realisation of the Universal Best (*τὸ κοινῇ βέλτιστον*); which is exactly the teleology of the *Philebus*. The particular and individual is always 'for the sake of' the general and universal: the end of ends, which all particular ends subserve, is the All (*τὸ πᾶν, τὸ ὅλον*).

Further, this Final End, the Cosmos or All, is represented as Being (*οὐσία*), and not as Being merely, but as a Living Activity (*τῷ τοῦ παντὸς βίῳ ὑπάρχουσα οὐσία*). In other words, to borrow the phrase of the *Timaeus*, the Cosmos is *τὸ αὐτοζῷον*, the Supreme Animal whose life is a blessed existence (*εὐδαίμων*

οὐσία)[1]. From this we see why it is that the Cosmos is the supreme End: it is because its state of being is supremely happy. As possessing *εὐδαίμων οὐσία* it is the natural object of all appetite, propension, desire. And as thus forming the object of universal desire it forms also the motive-force and stimulus which initiates all movement and all production. Accordingly, all *γένεσις* has for its aim the attainment of *οὐσία*.

But further, since the only principle of change is *ψυχή*, all *μεταβολαί* must be due to the soul's action *δι' ἑαυτὴν ἢ δι' ἑτέραν ψυχήν*: but the alternative cause is possible only in the case of a particular soul, for with the World-soul there is no *ἑτέρα ψυχή* to take account of. Consequently the Cosmos is a self-regulated, self-motived Being—the universal *ὄν* which is the sum-total of all particular *ὄντα* and *γιγνόμενα*. Its *ψυχή* is the Divine Will, in which Love and Reason meet together, and its *σῶμα* are the conditions of space and time under which that Will works out its own eternal purposes. So that the Cosmos thus regarded is both the End-*in*-itself and the End-*to*-itself; for its Body and its Soul, though distinguished, are not divided, being but different aspects, the material and the formal, of the single totality *τὸ αὐτοζῷον*.

Similarly, again, in the *Sophist*, the concrete synthesis of motion and rest, of means and end, of being and becoming, is shown to lie in the Cosmic Whole, i.e. in the Supreme God, Zeus, who combines in his single personality Life and Reason (248 E), which together go to make up Soul (249 A). It is expressly argued that this Whole, as Animate, involves the Heraclitean postulate of Motion as well as the Eleatic Rest (250 B, cp. the Aristotelian *βίος ἐν κινήσει*). But not only is the All thus personified and deified in the *Sophist*; but there too this Cosmic Divinity is conceived in his aspect as Artist, to whom as Efficient Cause the composition and order of the Universe is ascribed (*θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος*, 265 B, C). Moreover, in this connection, the parallel between the human and the Divine, the particular and the Universal, is emphasised (265 B—E).

From the foregoing illustrations of the doctrine of these dialogues it will be clear how unjust is the stricture passed upon

[1] Cp. *Tim.* 34 B *εὐδαίμονα θεὸν αὐτὸν* (sc. *τὸν κόσμον*) *ἐγεννήσατο*.

Plato's theory of Cause by Aristotle, when he asserts that Plato fails to postulate more than two causes, the formal and the material[1].

Such a criticism might be thought to have some weight as against the imperfect statement of Idealism in the earlier dialogues, though even in the *Phaedo*, for example, the teleological function is attributed to the Ideas, while the *Phaedrus* seems to invest them with the motive power of attraction; but it cannot be urged in the least against the later form of Idealism which we have before us in the present dialogues, for in them, as we have seen, both efficient and final causes are laid down with as much emphasis as by Aristotle himself.

And Aristotle's strictures appear doubly unfair inasmuch as in his own theories of physical causation we find the closest resemblance to the doctrine of Plato. Thus, in Aristotle's theory, we have mere *κίνησις* or *γένεσις*, as what lacks *πέρας* and *τέλος*, opposed to *οὐσία* or *φύσις* which is the perfected state, and the end to which nature works—just as in the *Philebus* *γένεσις* is opposed to *οὐσία*, and the *ἄπειρον* opposed to the informed *μικτόν*, and *φύσις* determined as the normal and perfect state[2]. Then again we have the *αἰτία*, or efficient cause, of the *Philebus*, which is synthesised with the formal and final (*πέρας* and *οὗ ἕνεκα*) in the unity of the World-Soul, corresponding to Aristotle's *ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις* which becomes identical in the case of *ψυχή* and of *φύσις* generally with the *οὗ ἕνεκα* and *εἶδος* or *οὐσία*.

And in Aristotle we find also the same analogy drawn between *φύσις* and *τέχνη*, and Nature conceived as the great World-Artist who directs everything to an end, so that the universe is a system of ends, while Nature, the directress, is in herself the totality of means and ends, of Being and Becoming.

And lastly, we find Aristotle borrowing from Plato the notion that the relation of the Prime Mover to the object moved, of Absolute Being to Becoming, or of God to the world, is that

[1] Ar. *Met.* A. 6. 988ᵃ 7 Πλάτων μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ζητουμένων οὕτω διώρισεν· φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι δυοῖν αἰτίαιν ἐστὶ μόνον κεχρημένος, τῇ τε τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην· τὰ γὰρ εἴδη τοῦ τί ἐστιν αἴτια τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ' εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν. On which see some good remarks by Schneider, *Ideenlehre in Pl. Philebus*, p. 22.

[2] Cp. *Phys.* II. 3, 7: *Met.* Δ. 2, 4; Z. 7; Θ. 6, 8: *De part. an.* I. 5, IV. 8, 10, 12, etc.

of the object of love or desire to the subject[1]. This is surely near enough to plagiarism! Only it is to be observed, that Aristotle is here a less consistent philosopher than his Master, since he lapses into dualism when he speaks of his *ἀΐδιος οὐσία* as *κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν*, and when he divorces Thought from Soul, as something self-complete. For why should there exist a world at all if it is to be a mere accidental appendix to the self-worshipping God? In such a system either God or the world must come in as merely *ἐπεισοδιῶδές τι*. But in lapsing thus from Pantheism into Deism, Aristotle has had, at least, a respectable following—witness Fichte and Schelling.

V. THE GOOD.

Having already examined the doctrine of the *Philebus* respecting the secondary questions of which it treats—whether ethical, logical, psychological or ontological—we now come to the main subject, concerning the nature of The Good.

This main subject is at once ethical and metaphysical, the Platonic Ethics always resting on the ultimate basis of Platonic Idealism. And this ethico-metaphysical discussion forms, as it were, the centre to which all the subsidiary lines of argument converge: it forms the main river into which, as it sweeps towards the ocean of Ideal Forms, the many tributary streamlets pour their tides. Or we might compare those subsidiary lines of discussion—concerning Being, Science and Art, Pleasure and the Emotions—as so many threads in the total web of the dialogue whose warp is formed by the guiding lines of argument which deal with The Good.

To gather up into a single view the statements which concern this main subject, we must once more review the whole course of the dialogue.

i. *Analysis of the Argument.*

11 B. Here we are plunged at once *in medias res* with a statement by Socrates of the point under discussion. What is it that is Good? Is it, as Philebus (after the Cyrenaics) maintains, Enjoyment, Pleasure, Delight and their congeners—good for all living beings? Or is it—the

[1] Cp. *Met.* Λ. 7, 9.

Socratic position—Reflection, Thought, Memory, and their kin, Right Opinion and True Reasoning; which are superior to Pleasure, and full of benefit, to all who can attain to the possession of them?

We may notice here a disparity between the antagonistic positions,—the one being concerned with the Good for all animals (*πᾶσι ζῴοις*), the other with the narrower Good of humankind (*τοῖς δυνατοῖς*). As we shall find, the argument is directed by Socrates (as an ethical, not naturalistic, thinker) in accordance with the latter view.

11 C. Immediately after this provisional statement of the problem, Socrates restates it thus: Our common task is to declare what state or disposition of soul is capable of making life happy for mankind (*ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν*[1] *ἀποφαίνειν τινά...τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαίμονα παρέχειν*).

Here we notice a difference: for *πᾶσι ζῴοις* is substituted *ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι*, which is necessary for Socrates' purpose, since it would be absurd to attribute to all *animals* the intellectual functions wherein he claims the Good to consist. As *τἀγαθόν* is the *ethical* end, it can be such for Man only of all animals: so that *ἄνθρωποι* must be opposed to, rather than confused with, *ζῷα* in general, for the purpose in hand[2].

But further, *τἀγαθόν* is here announced as *ἕξις ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσις*, and such a 'state or condition' of soul as is able to furnish to men universally a *happy life*, i.e. as a *δύναμις*. So that here, apparently, *τἀγαθόν* as *δύναμις* is distinguished as efficient cause from *εὐδαιμονία*, or *εὐδαίμων βίος*, as its effect[3].

In 19 C ff. the object of discussion is restated once more, this time by Protarchus. Addressing Socrates he says that the express object of their present conference is to determine on the best of human possessions (*πρὸς τὸ διελέσθαι τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἄριστον*).

Here observe that 'the Good' is the Good for *man* (as in 11 C)—that it is regarded as a *κτῆμα*, a possession and the *best* of possessions—and lastly, that it is to be determined by *διαίρεσις* on the scientific method. We shall find these remarks important

[1] See n. *ad loc.*

[2] Cp. 67 B *οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τἆλλα ξύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν.*

[3] For *τἀγαθόν* as *δύναμις* cp. 64 E: also what is said below on 22 C and 61 B.

when we come to discuss presently the difficulties of the final ordering of the Good[1].

20 D ff. In explanation of his assertion, on superior authority, that τἀγαθόν is neither ἡδονή nor φρόνησις, Socrates proceeds to describe the characteristics of the Good.

τἀγαθόν is (1) τέλεον (20 D); (2) ἱκανόν (20 D); (3) πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζῴοις αἱρετόν (22 B). Using these as tests—perfection, sufficiency, and universal desirability—it is easily seen that the Good for man is to be found neither in the life of mere pleasure—apart from thought, memory etc.—nor yet in the purely intellectual life which is παράπαν ἀπαθής, quite devoid of pleasurable, or other, emotion.

Hence, as the Good for man there is proposed a third life which shall combine both these elements, neither of which, as appears, can be dispensed with by man (ὁ ξυναμφότερος, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμμιχθεὶς κοινὸς γενόμενος, sc. ἡδονῆς καὶ νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως, 22 A). And if any man chooses any other life instead of this he will be guilty of an ethical blunder (παρὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἱρετοῦ βίου 22 B).

This Mixed Life, being thus identified with the Good for man we are in quest of, gains the victory (νικητήρια) over both the rival competitors which had appeared first in the lists.

22 C ff. This description of the (human) Good as the Mixed Life having thus disposed of the claims both of ἡδονή and of (human, individual) νοῦς, all that remains for either of them to compete for is the right to *second* place, as constituting the *cause* of the goodness or desirability of that Mixed Life which holds the first place (τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ κτλ.).

Here we see that the ground of the discussion is shifted, so that the point henceforward is, not to discover τἀγαθόν, but to discover τὸ αἴτιον. But as this *causal* element (condition or end) may also be termed τἀγαθόν, we must be careful to distinguish these two meanings of the term.

It is to be observed also that in this passage the rival to ἡδονή is termed, not φρόνησις or ἐπιστήμη as before, but only νοῦς. And further that, although Socrates admits defeat for *human* νοῦς, he does not do so for *divine* νοῦς (τάχ' ἄν, ὦ Φίληβε, ὅ γ' ἐμός· οὐ μέντοι τόν γ' ἀληθινὸν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον οἶμαι νοῦν, ἀλλ' ἄλλως πως ἔχειν).

Concerning this divine Reason we shall hear more presently.

[1] See *Append.* B.

23 B ff. The attempt to resolve this new problem, whether it is *νοῦς* or *ἡδονή* that is to occupy the second place, the place of the Cause, launches us into a new inquiry—that into the kinds of Being, which has already been commented on. For the ethical question in hand, the main interest of this ontological inquiry lies in its determinations regarding the Cause, and its distinction of the classes to which belong respectively *ἡδονή* and *νοῦς*, and also *ὁ μικτὸς βίος*.

27 C ff. Here Socrates, having recapitulated the results of the ontological enquiry, proceeds to state its importance for the ethical subject of discussion (*τί ποτε βουληθέντες εἰς ταῦτα ἀφικόμεθα;*). The question was, he reminds his hearers, to discover whether the second prize (*δευτερεῖα*, cp. 22 C) should be given to *ἡδονή* or to *φρόνησις*. And now the ontological *διαίρεσις* which has preceded enables us to complete our decision regarding the place of these competitive goods (*τὴν κρίσιν πρώτου πέρι καὶ δευτέρου*).

First, then, concerning the *Mixed Life*, we can now state its genus and specific character (*ὁρῶμεν τίς τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποίου γένους*). Clearly it belongs to the third, or Mixed, genus (*οὐ γὰρ δυοῖν τινοῖν ἐστὶ μικτὸν ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλὰ ξυμπάντων τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων, ὥστ' ὀρθῶς ὁ νικηφόρος οὗτος βίος μέρος ἐκείνου γίγνοιτ' ἄν*, 27 D). Next, *Pleasure* is determined as belonging to the second class (*οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἄπειρον ἐτύγχανε πεφυκὸς καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον*, 27 E). And finally, *Reason* (28 A ff.) is determined as the governing and ordering principle in the Cosmos, so that it belongs to the fourth class, being of kin to the Cause (*νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν ξυγγενὴς...ἡδονὴ δ' ἄπειρός τ' αὐτή κτλ.* 31 A).

Thus the digression with which pp. 23—30 are mainly occupied turns out to have solved our problem, as Socrates says (*τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ ζητήσει πεπορικὼς ἀπόκρισιν*, 30 E), since it has made clear that the right of second place belongs to *νοῦς* and not to *ἡδονή*—to Socrates' god instead of to Philebus' goddess.

31 B ff. So far then we have, in accordance with the logical method, assigned both Reason and Pleasure each to its appropriate *genus* (viz. *ἡ αἰτία* and *τὸ ἄπειρον*); we have discovered their universal aspect and the places they hold in the total scale of Being (*οὗ γένους καὶ τίνα ποτὲ δύναμιν κέκτηται*, 31 A). This is, so to say, to have determined the *formal* cause of these two objects; it now remains to discover their

material and *efficient* causes, or the sphere *in* which and the condition or affection *because of* which, they come into being (δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τέ ἐστιν ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ διὰ τί πάθος γίγνεσθον, ὁπόταν γίγνησθον, ἰδεῖν ἡμᾶς, 31 B).

Here we see that we are about to enter upon a new sphere of discussion embracing the conditions of phenomenal existence. That is to say, the argument which follows, instead of being logical or metaphysical, becomes psychological in its reference, passing on from ὄντα to γιγνόμενα, from notions to sensations[1].

59 E ff. Having completed the classification of the various kinds of Knowledge and of Pleasure, the next step is to mix them—using them as artists (δημιουργοί) use their materials (ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι)[2].

Now while Philebus asserts that Pleasure is the universal object of pursuit (σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν πᾶσι ζῴοις) and so the Universal Good (τἀγαθὸν ξύμπασι), and thereby identifies, not merely in name (ὄνομα) but in essence (φύσις), the Good with the Pleasant, Socrates on the contrary maintains the essential difference of Good and Pleasure (τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν ἔχειν), and asserts that Wisdom is more nearly akin to the Good than Pleasure (μᾶλλον μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, 60 B, cp. 11 B, C).

60 C. Now the essential characteristics of the Good (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις) are, as we saw above (20 B ff.), three—viz. τὸ τέλεον (61 A), τὸ ἱκανόν (60 C), τὸ πᾶσιν αἱρετόν (61 A). And these three can only be found in the Mixed Life, since either of the unmixed lives—φρόνησις ἄνευ ἡδονῆς or ἡδονὴ χωρὶς φρονήσεως—is found to fail in respect of the second characteristic, τὸ ἱκανόν, 'sufficiency.'

[1] Cp. Michelis, *Phil. Plat.* II. p. 84 "Bis hierhin (31 B) bildet das metaphysisch-dialektische (wenn wir wollen, das dogmatische) Element das vorschlagende in der Entwicklung; von hier an bis zum Schlusse, der wieder auf jenes zurückgreift, das psychologisch-moralische, obwohl beide auch im Begriffe durchaus nicht klar auseinander gehalten sind." *Ibid.* p. 89 "Dieser Begriff (des absolut Guten) nicht mehr ein rein dialektisch-metaphysischer, sondern wesentlich auch ein moralischer ist," and so in the *Philebus* we have an "unklare Vermengung des metaphysischen und des moralisch-psychologischen Momentes, die trotz aller herrlichen Entwicklungen nach allen Seiten hin den Grundcharakter dieses Dialogs ausmacht."

[2] Cp. *Polit.* 286 D ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς δημιουργοῦσιν: also, for ἐν ᾧ, *Tim.* 49 E, 50 C, D, E, 52 A, B, C (of space, as ultimate ὑποδοχή); and for ἐξ οὗ, Ar. *Pol.* I. 3 λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἐξ οὗ τε ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἷον ὑφάντῃ μὲν ἔρια, ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ χαλκόν. Cp. also, for artist's ὕλη, *Phil.* 54 C and *Tim.* 69 A οἷα τεκτόσιν ἡμῖν ὕλη παράκειται κτλ.

[This fact regarding the Good for man is also to be found stated, it should be observed, in 20 C, D and 67 A[1].]

61 B ff. Hence we conclude that the Mixed Life is, as it were, the dwelling-place (οἴκησις) of the Good, and there we must look for it.

At this point, it should be noticed, the signification of the term τἀγαθόν appears to change. For hitherto the Mixed Life has apparently been identified with the Good, whereas now a distinction is made between the Mixture and certain qualities, properties or conditions of it, to which as *Cause* the term τἀγαθόν seems more properly to belong (cp. 11 C and 22 B).

We have already classed, according to their degrees of *Truth*, the various species of ἡδονή as well as of ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη. How many of these, then, will be required as ingredients in the Mixed Life which is the Good? In determining this, we must have regard not merely to Truth (τὸ ἀληθές), but also to Sufficiency (τὸ ἱκανόν), which, as we have already seen more than once, is an indispensable mark of the human Good. Hence it will not be enough to make use merely of the purest segments or species (τὰ ἀληθέστατα τμήματα) of Pleasure or Knowledge; for if we so confined our choice we should be in danger of not completing the most desirable and satisfactory form of human life (τὸν ἀγαπητότατον βίον).

62 A ff. For example, if a man should possess the highest intellectual gifts, and the deepest scientific knowledge—a dialectician able to define the essential nature of Justice or of the Heavenly Sphere,—yet were he ignorant withal of the things of this world, of the circumstances of human life and the objects immediately about him,—clearly the mental condition (διάθεσις) of this man would be ridiculous.

And this shows us the necessity of adding to pure Knowledge and abstract Science something of the impure knowledge which deals with concrete objects of sense (τὴν οὐ βεβαίαν οὐδὲ καθαρὰν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον κοινῇ καὶ συγκρατέον). In fact, we thus find ourselves unable to exclude *any* form of Knowledge or of Art, since these, though they differ in degree, do not differ in kind, and are not, like pleasures, discordant (ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις).

62 E—64 A. With regard to the amount of Pleasure to be admitted, the decision is not so easy. Clearly it would not be safe at once to admit *all* pleasures: we must discriminate.

We admit then, first, such pleasures as are indispensable (ἀναγκαῖαι): also, such as are beneficial, or at least harmless, for us all to enjoy

[1] Further remarks regarding these qualities will be found in *Append.* B, G.

(*συμφέρον τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἀβλαβὲς ἅπασι*, 63 A): and such, too, as, being pure and genuine (*ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαραί*), naturally harmonise with *νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις*, to which they are appropriately attached (*σχεδὸν οἰκεῖαι*) as concomitant with Health, Temperance and Virtue in general (*μεθ' ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν καὶ δὴ καὶ ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς*). Whereas, on the contrary, it would be irrational to combine with Reason the pleasures which accompany Unreason and Vice (*τὰς μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἑπομένας*); that is, if we really wish to produce a perfectly harmonious and beautiful Mixture wherein we may divine the real nature of Good, human and universal (*ὅτι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην μῖξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πειρᾶσθαι, τί ποτε ἔν τε ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναί ποτε μαντευτέον*).

64 B. Further, in addition to these elements of Knowledge and Pleasure, we must put Truth in the Mixture, to ensure that it *truly* comes into being and *truly* exists (*ᾧ μὴ μίξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τοῦτο ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδ' ἂν γενόμενον εἴη*).

With this final addition the compound is complete—our argument, like the cosmic power of the soul over the body, has at last wrought it into a perfect product (*ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερεὶ κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται*).

64 C. Hence we may say rightly that now we have arrived at the very threshold of the abode of our object, the Good (*ἐπὶ τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις*).

Here again should be noticed the distinction drawn between *τἀγαθόν* and the *μικτὸς βίος* which is *τἀγαθοῦ οἴκησις* (cp. on 61 C above).

64 C. Thus we have, as it were, tracked the lion to his den—pursued the Good home to its final lurking-place. The next step is to discover what it is that makes this state of existence (*διάθεσις*) universally desirable—what is the *Cause* of the Mixed Life appearing to us as our Good (*αἴτιον...τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφιλῆ*)—what is the most honourable and respected (*τιμιώτατον*[1]) feature in it. When we know this, we can then pronounce as to whether this Causal factor in it is—universally and cosmically, by Nature's laws—more nearly allied to Pleasure or to Reason.

64 D. The Cause of the Mixture as a whole, and of every mixture, to which it owes its unique value (*δι' ἣν παντὸς ἀξία γίγνεται*), is found

[1] For *τἀγαθόν* as *τίμιον* cp. Ar. *Eth. Nic.* A. 12. 1102ᵃ 1, cited in *Append.* G, *ad fin.*

to lie in Measure and Symmetrical Nature (*μέτρον καὶ ἡ ξύμμετρος φύσις*), without which no conservation either of the whole compound or of its constituent parts is possible.

64 E—65 A. Accordingly, the Good disappears into the Beautiful: for Moderation and Symmetry result in becoming Beauty and Virtue. Now Truth has already been inserted in the Mixture; so that, if not with one, at least with these three Forms to help we may discover the Good—namely, with Beauty, Symmetry and Truth, the union of which we may call, as One, the Good and the Cause of the Goodness of the Mixed Life.

65 A ff. The Cause of the Goodness of the Mixture having thus been discovered—though not as a single object, but rather a trinity in that unity termed *τἀγαθόν*—we are now in possession of a criterion which will enable us to decide as to the positions of Pleasure and Wisdom respectively in the moral hierarchy (*ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν τοῦ ἀρίστου ξυγγενέστερόν τε καὶ τιμιώτερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέ ἐστι καὶ θεοῖς*). We shall adjudge the dispute between these rivals by applying to them both in turn, as our moral standard, each of the three forms of the Good—Beauty, Truth, Moderation (*καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν τριῶν...κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος*).

65 C ff. Then we find that:

(1) judged by *ἀλήθεια*, while *ἡδονή* is *ἁπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον*, a huge impostor, *νοῦς* on the contrary is *ἤτοι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἀλήθεια ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον*:

(2) judged by *μετριότης*, nothing is of its nature *ἀμετρότερον ἡδονῆς*, while, contrariwise, nothing is *νοῦ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρότερον*:

(3) judged by *κάλλος*, while *ἡδονή* is often accompanied by *τὸ γελοῖον* or *τὸ πάντων αἴσχιστον*, no one has ever thought *φρόνησις καὶ νοῦς* to be in any way *αἰσχρόν*.

66 A ff. Finally, if we arrange the results of our philosophical enquiry regarding the Good in a fivefold scheme, Pleasure must come last, outstripped by Reason and its congeners[1].

ii. *Comments and Illustrations.*

Reviewing the course of the argument as sketched above we see that it is rendered intricate and perplexing because of the frequent change in point of view; and that this perplexity is only enhanced by the oracular obscurity in which the final ordering of Goods is involved. Some further observations may aid in setting clear the leading lines of thought.

[1] For a discussion of this fivefold scheme of Goods, see *Append.* B, and F (p. 209).

To begin with, it is obvious that our determination of The Good will depend upon the subject to which it is related. Is it to be the Good for Man alone, or that for all Animals, or that for the Universe in general[1]?

The Good as maintained by Philebus is that for all animals; whereas the Good proposed first by Socrates can only form an object for the rational species of animals. And so, to arrive at a common ground of debate, the subject is narrowed in 11 C ff. (cp. 19 C) to the question as to the Good for Man, the best human acquisition (κτῆμα), the end of ethical conduct. But even in deciding on this narrower issue a larger consideration is involved, with some apparent inconsistency; for one of the three marks of the Good is stated to be Desirability for *all* plants and animals (22 B). This I take to be a subtle indication that the question of the Universal Good is bound up with the narrower question as to the Human Good. However, the ostensible conclusion of the discussion in its narrower aspect, which might serve almost as the end of the dialogue, is given in 22 B, where the Mixed Life of blended Thought and Pleasure is decided to be the Good for Man.

But now the discussion opens out afresh, with what is, apparently, a quite different question. What is the Cause that this Mixed Life is the Good, what is the responsible element in the Mixture? And how are Pleasure and Thought respectively related to that Causal Element? Here the notion of the Good is regarded in its more essential and inward aspect. And to solve the new question as to its nature, the argument diverges again into the wide subject of universal Ontology, by the analogy of which it is determined that Reason is practically identical with the Cause in question. Thus the second branch of discussion seems finally settled by the decision that the second place in order of merit rightfully belongs to Socrates' champion, Reason, by virtue of its identity with τἀγαθον in its second aspect as τὸ αἴτιον (30 E).

The third branch of discussion deals with the classification of the various actualised forms of Pleasure and of Science, with a

[1] Cp. Jackson's article, as cited on p. xxvii n., where the argument regarding τἀγαθὸν in the *Philebus* is compared with that in *Rep.* 505 B ff.

view to their ultimate combination in the Mixed Life; and so we may say that here (31 B ff.) the earlier topic is resumed, and that we are attempting to determine more closely the constitution of the Good in its aspect as the concrete Good Life. But here, again, the matter is complicated by a seeming distinction between the Good as a Mixed Whole and the Good as a Causal Factor (cp. 61 C, 64 C). The wider notion of the Good is described as the dwelling (οἴκησις) wherein is hidden the active reality of that intrinsic cause which is The Good. Consequently, when we have for the second time described the Good which is the Mixed Life, we must also for the second time search out the underlying Cause of its Goodness, which is in a deeper sense The Good. And after this Causal Good has been discovered in the threefold notion of Beauty-Symmetry-Truth, then we must apply these notions to determine for the second time the comparative merits of the defeated claimants Reason and Pleasure.

Thus it would appear that the whole discussion is reduplicated. The three allied questions concerning (*a*) the Good Life, (*b*) The Good as Cause, and (*c*) the relations of Reason and Pleasure thereto, are first discussed in the earlier portion of the dialogue (11 B—31 A); and then discussed all over again in the same order in the later portion (31 B to end)[1].

For a clear view of the doctrinal results, it is specially important to observe that throughout both these parallel lines of argument the two views of Good (as Cause and as Mixed Effect), and also the two spheres of observation (the Human and the Cosmic), are almost inseparably blended. In this connection we should observe a point already touched on in the preceding analysis (22 C), namely, the alternating and somewhat confusing way in which the terms Reason (νοῦς) and Wisdom (φρόνησις) are used, either together or apart. The latter term is proper to the human (ethical) side; the former may equally express the Divine or Cosmic side of Intelligence.

Another point to notice is the threefold sign by which the Good as Ethical End, i.e. the Mixed Life, is distinguished—Perfection, Sufficiency, Desirability. This sign is emphasised by repetition (20 B, 60 C). And corresponding to it we have the

[1] Cp. Michelis, *Phil. Plat.* II. pp. 84 ff.

similar threefold sign which characterises τἀγαθόν in its aspect as primary Cause (μέτρον, συμμετρία, ἀλήθεια)[1].

Analogous to the distinction between the two aspects of τἀγαθόν, is that between δύναμις and φύσις. Our previous remarks on 11 C and 64 E will have drawn attention to this piece of terminology; and it may be further illustrated from 24 C, 25 E, 29 B, *Rep.* 477 B ff., *Tim.* 74 D, *Soph.* 247 C ff. As I have elsewhere[2] explained "δύναμις is the common denominator to which all reality, all causal relation, whether outer or inner, spatial or non-spatial, is reduced," while "the φύσις of a thing may be said to be its compound union of both form and matter": "so in general, φύσις is to δύναμις as effect to cause, result to agent, subordinate to superordinate: the ὃ ἀπεργάζεται, whereby the otherwise incomprehensible δύναμις is conditioned and determined, appears as actual ἐν φύσει. This distinction is set forth as that between the human and the Divine in *Laws* iii. 691 E: φύσις τις ἀνθρωπίνη μεμιγμένη θείᾳ τινὶ δυνάμει κατιδοῦσα κτλ."

Thus the Metaphysical core which underlies the Ethical discussion throughout the dialogue must be steadily kept in view if we would avoid serious confusion.

There is an express reference to the Ethical conclusions of the *Philebus* in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*[3]. Aristotle has just been insisting on the multiplicity of the

[1] These notions will be found illustrated in *Append.* B, G.

[2] See my note "On the use of δύναμις and φύσις in Plato" in *Class. Rev.* VIII. 7. pp. 297 ff. Of φύσις in Plato Benn remarks, "it transcends the limits of space and time and embraces the necessities of ideal existence," and he speaks of Plato's "idea of Nature as a universal order or norm": which is true of its positive aspect. Cp. *Append.* B.

[3] Ar. *Eth. Nic.* A. 4. 1096ᵃ 19 ff. τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός τι (παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος)· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτων ἰδέα. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οἶκος καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἕν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετο ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν, μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγική, ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρική, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρική ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική. Cf. *ib.* 1096ᵇ 25 οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι <καὶ> κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν.

notion of the Good: there is a Good, i.e. a final end and aim, for every art and every action; the term may be predicated under every category, and *τἀγαθόν*, therefore, is coextensive with *οὐσία* in the variety of its meaning. Thus, in point of *substance*, God or Reason is the Good; in point of *quality*, the virtues; in point of *quantity*, *τὸ μέτριον*; *relatively*, the useful; *temporally*, *καιρός*; and so on. Consequently, he argues, the Good which is thus manifold cannot be, as Platonists assert, a single Idea; for were it an essential Unity, it must belong to one Category and one only.

Besides, he proceeds, of what use is it to postulate an Idea (an *αὐτοέκαστον*) at all, if the essential notion (*λόγος*) of the Idea and that of the particular are identical? And by calling the Good 'eternal' (*ἀίδιον*) we get no further, for it is none the more *good* because of its duration[1].

Another objection put forward by Aristotle to what he describes as the Idealists' view of the Good is that the Ideal Good is beyond the sphere of human practice and acquirement[2].

[1] *Eth. Nic.* A. 4. 1096ᵃ 34 ff. *ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἕν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ᾗ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ᾗ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲν τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου.*

These words immediately succeed in the text those cited above (*τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν...γυμναστική*). But they present serious difficulty if the reading is right, as it would seem out of place here to bring in a discussion of *αὐτοάνθρωπος*. Consequently Noetel transposes them to ᵃ17, and Christ suggests "videntur ab Aristotele ad v. 16 sq. in margine esse adjecta."

But I distrust such methods, and would suggest instead a slight alteration of the text, retained in its present order. The case of *αὐτοάνθρωπος* is brought in merely to illustrate that of *αὐτοάγαθον*: hence neither *οὐδ' ᾗ ἀγαθόν* nor *ἀίδιον* nor *ἀγαθὸν ἔσται* should refer to *αὐτοάνθρωπος* nor to *αὐτοέκαστον* but to *αὐτοάγαθον* (to which *ἀίδιον must* refer as recalling the *ἀίδιος φύσις* of *Phileb.* 66 A). *ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* is *ἄνθρωπος ᾗ ἄνθρωπος*, which is the same in the particular as in the Idea: but this proves nothing regarding *ἄνθρωπος* (or *ἕκαστον*) *ᾗ ἀγαθόν*. Hence Aristotle could not argue *εἰ δ' οὕτως οὐδ' ᾗ ἀγαθόν*. But it does prove something regarding *τἀγαθόν ᾗ ἀγαθόν*. The essential notion of the Good, *qua* good, is the same in the universal, ideal *αὐτοάγαθον* as in the particular *ἀγαθά*. Hence I would write *ᾗ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν. εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδὲ <τἀγαθὸν> ᾗ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι κτλ.*

Then *τἀγαθόν* will resume its proper place as the main topic of discussion, and there will be no need of changing the position of the passage.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* A. 4. 1096ᵃ 32 *εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἕν τε καὶ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται.*

What benefit will it be, he asks, to the weaver or the carpenter, so far as his particular craft is concerned, to know the Ideal Good: or how will a man be a better doctor or general for having viewed the Idea? It is the particular and not the Universal which concerns the artist or scientist[1]. But, Plato would reply, the *true* scientist, and the true artist also, is the philosopher and *he* is concerned with the Ideal and with the particular just in so far as it 'partakes of' Ideality. In short, while Aristotle insists here that the Idea cannot be *κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ*, the business of the *Philebus* is precisely to show how the Idea may be a *κτῆμα* (cp. 66 A).

VI. The Ideas in the Philebus.

In what has been said above, I have carefully avoided touching on the vexed question concerning the place of the Ideas in the doctrine of the *Philebus*. But it is so important a question for the Platonist that it cannot be wholly set aside.

Four main views have been held. The first is that of the separatist critics, such as Schaarschmid[2] and Horn, who contend that there is no genuine Idealism to be found in the dialogue, from which they argue its spurious character; though here it is possible to suspect that it is the critics' desire to prove its spuriousness which leads them to deny its Idealism. The second view is that taken by Brandis, Steinhart, Susemihl, Rettig, Teichmüller[3], which makes the Ideas reside in the First Class of the four stated in 23 C ff., i.e. in the *πέρας*. The third view is that of Zeller, according to which the Ideas are identical with the highest cause (*ἡ Αἰτία*) which constitutes the Fourth Class. While, lastly, there is the view propounded by Dr Jackson that the Ideas are to be found in *τὸ μικτόν*.

[1] *Eth. Nic.* A. 4. 1097ᵃ 8—13.

[2] See "*Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften*," p. 301: "Wie weit sich der Philebus vom Geiste der platonischen Philosophie entfernt, zeigt sich ferner bei Betrachtung der Weise wie er der platonischen Ideenlehre gedenkt," u.s.w. *Ibid.* p. 297 "Letztere (die Ideenwelt) ist mit einem Worte in unserem Dialoge zu kurz gekommen, ein hinlängliches Zeichen, dass Plato nicht dessen Verfasser war, da dieser ja das grösste Gewicht immer auf die Ideen legt." Also Horn, *Platonstudien*, pp. 382 ff., as cited in *Append.* F.

[3] See esp. Teichmüller, *Studien z. Gesch. d. Begriffe*, pp. 255 ff.; and cp. Maguire as cited in *Append.* B, and in *Hermath.* II. p. 447. Cp. also Michelis, *Phil. Plat.* II. p. 81.

Thus all four Classes, with the exception only of τὸ ἄπειρον, have important advocates to claim for them the honour of furnishing us with Ideas. Only two further interpretations would seem to remain open—however wanting in plausibility—viz. that which should see the Ideas in the ἄπειρον Class, and that which should discover them not in any one of the four classes but in a combination of two or more of the Four. But neither of these possibilities calls for serious consideration.

Neglecting, for the present, the scepticism of those who deny the Platonic authorship of the dialogue as a view which conflicts with external, if not internal, probabilities, I proceed to consider the rival explanations of Brandis, Zeller, and Jackson.

(1) If the Ideas are identified with the πέρας ἔχοντα, we have to meet the following objections: (*a*) this does not remove the difficulty raised in 15 B, since "the idea still exists at once by itself, apart, and distributed amongst a multitude of particulars" (Jackson *l.c.* p. 282): (*b*) if αἰτία or the Deity is to be identified with τἀγαθόν or the head Idea, it is improbable that Plato would have put the rest of the Ideas in a separate class: (*c*) the field of the Ideas is in no way limited to numerical and metrical determinations: (*d*) the objects of νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη, i.e. the Ideas, are not likely to be placed in a lower sphere than these faculties themselves, which are classed with αἰτία. These last three objections are specially urged by Zeller; and whatever weight we may be inclined to attach to them, they may at least justify us in refusing to accept without further explanation the view of Brandis and his followers.

(2) But when Zeller himself bids us see the Ideas in the αἰτία τῆς μίξεως, we must ask whether this view sets us free from all perplexity. Is the difficulty raised in 15 B thereby removed, or is it quite easy to reconcile this identification with the author's method of describing the αἰτία? And if not, there is some ground for agreeing with Dr Jackson when he expresses his dissatisfaction with the Zellerian hypothesis.

(3) The view that the Ideas are discoverable in the μικτόν is closely bound up with Jackson's peculiar theory of the evolution of Platonic thought. He maintains that what we have to look for in the *Philebus* is not the Platonic Idea as ordinarily

conceived but the Idea of 'later Platonism,' the 'paradeigmatic' Idea. And this later conception of the Idea he finds embodied in certain 'fixed types' which he discovers in the *μικτόν*—"types resulting each from the union of the appropriate *ποσόν* (i.e. *τὸ μέτριον*) with the *ἄπειρον* in question." This view may be best elucidated by explaining how it affects the relation of the Idea to the particular: "Whereas in the *Republic* and the *Phaedo* a particular is what it is by reason of the presence of the idea, so that the idea is its cause, in the *Philebus* both the idea and the particular come into being through the conjunction of two elements, an indefinite matter and a limitant quantity. The indefinite matter is the same for the idea and for the particular. The limitant quantity of the particular differs from, but at the same time more or less approximates to, the limitant quantity of the idea; and the more nearly the limitant quantity of the particular approximates to the limitant quantity of the idea, the more closely the particular resembles the idea. Thus the relation of the particular to the idea is now no more than resemblance to a type, the causal function of the idea, as conceived in the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*, having been transferred to the two elements into which the particular, in common with the idea itself, has been analysed." The author of this view endeavours to support it by a comparison of *Phileb.* 27 B with *Parmen.* 132 C, and also by an original interpretation of Arist. *Met.* A. 6. But our verdict on his interpretation of the *Philebus* must largely depend upon our estimate of his theory as a whole, in its application to the series of later dialogues.

My general opinion of that theory I have indicated elsewhere[1]: it may suffice for the present to cite a few of the objections which may be raised to its present application. If the Ideas are absolute, independent principles, how can we place them in the *μικτόν* which, of all the four Classes, possesses in the least degree the character of a principle? If the Ideas are *οὐσίαι* and *ὄντως ὄντα*, how can we fairly refer them to the Class described as *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν* (26 D), or *μικτὴ καὶ γεγενημένη οὐσία* (27 B)? Can we, moreover, elicit from Plato's language

[1] See my article on 'The Later Platonism' in *J. of Philol.* XXIII. (pp. 164 ff., 200); where more details of Tocco's views also are given.

any clear statement of the supposed distinction between 'appropriate' and 'inappropriate' *ποσά*, of which the former only is Ideal; and if not, what becomes of the whole theory which rests upon the validity of this distinction?

Possibly these objections are not all unanswerable; but until fully answered they may well shake our confidence in the *μικτόν* theory[1]. Meanwhile, I proceed to the consideration of another view, which is more closely akin to that propounded by Zeller.

(4) Schneider finds the Idea in the *αἰτία*; though he warns us that the two must not be directly identified, since the latter is directly identified with *νοῦς*. Now the Idea, in his view, is *νοητόν* or *νόημα*, and as such forms the content of *νοῦς*, which is *τόπος εἰδῶν*, 'the seat of Ideas': so that Reason and the Ideas are mutually complementary. Hence, though in strictness it is Reason that is the *causa efficiens*, yet the Ideas too are given in the notion of Cause, as being implicit in Reason. Thus it is to their location in the (Divine) Reason that the Ideas owe their character as 'efficient' causes: in their own right they are rather 'formal' principles (cp. Ar. *Met.* A. 6). But if so, ought they not to belong rather to the *πέρας* Class; and shall we not otherwise find ourselves saddled with a double set of 'formal causes'? Not so, replies Schneider, if we see that only one of these 'formal' kinds is ultimate and absolute. And such is the case here. The Limit is not an ultimate notion, but depends on the Idea. Limits, measures, mathematical relations, are what cause sense-objects to resemble Ideas as their *παραδείγματα*: it is these limitants which enter into matter and determine it, an operation impossible for the unity of the transcendental Idea. Thus the Class of the *πέρας* contains not so much the ultimate Ideal principles of form as those mathematical determinants which Aristotle speaks of as a mediating element, in Platonic theory, between Ideas and sense-objects[2].

Now, though this view may not be wholly successful in clearing up the difficulties of the case, it appears to be plausible in

[1] Dr Jackson's view, as criticised above, was published in 1881 (*J. of Philol.* x. pp. 253 ff.): it is only fair to add that since then he has modified his view with regard to the ideality of *τὸ μικτόν*, though his revised theory has not yet been published in detail.

[2] Cp. *Append.* E.

several respects. But the varieties of view are not yet exhausted. I will but touch on one more—that of M. F. Tocco.

(5) He agrees with Jackson in classing the *Philebus* with the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*, as exhibiting a later stage of Plato's thought; but with regard to the nature of this later development he differs considerably. The chief novelty of this later Idealism, in Tocco's view, consists in the introduction of multiplicity into the Ideal sphere, from which it had been at first excluded; and it is this modification which explains the attribution to Plato by Aristotle of a theory of Ideal Numbers. The theme of the *Philebus* is, then, the inherence of multiplicity in the sphere of the Ethical Ideas. Granting this, we may deduce two considerations which have their bearing on some of the contested points already referred to: (*a*) it is rather to the dialogue as a whole than to the doctrine of the four Classes that we should look for an answer to the problems raised in 14 B; and (*b*) the Ideal mixture of unity with plurality is not to be confounded with the real mixture of the third Class, *τὸ μικτόν*.

Hence, concludes Tocco, although Jackson is on the right lines in looking for a non-simple Idea in the *Philebus*, yet he looks for it in the wrong place; and of all the rival identifications above described, that of Zeller is most near the truth, since the *αἰτία*, which is *νοῦς*, is in fact 'the totality of the Ideas' (30 C—31 A), and since (which is yet more important) the analogy of the *Sophist*, where the Ideas are regarded as operant forces and as the supreme cause of all order and of all beauty, confirms this interpretation.

The variety of these conclusions may well shake our confidence in the absolute correctness of any one of the interpretations here described. On the basis of the *Philebus* alone it is certainly difficult to extract any definite Ideal theory from the account of the four Classes, while if we go abroad for our fundamental notions of Plato's Idealism and try to square the metaphysics of the *Philebus* with that of other Platonic dialogues or with the Aristotelian account of the matter, we find ourselves faced at once with a host of perplexing problems, which it would require volumes to discuss exhaustively. We have to determine, for example, whether the Ideal Theory is

uniform and consistent throughout, or whether it was modified by its author from dialogue to dialogue; and then, whichever conclusion we come to, we have to define the exact character of that Idealism, whether in its single or varying form; and finally, if we admit variation in Plato's Idealistic views, we must decide upon the stage of development to which the *Philebus* belongs, and whether, for instance, we are to class it with the *Phaedo* or with the *Timaeus* or with the *Sophist.* Nor is this all: for outside the range of Plato's own writings, we ought to explain, or explain away, the account given by Aristotle of his master's doctrines, and determine how much or how little they relate in especial to the philosophy of the *Philebus.*

Now it would be perhaps impossible to frame a theory of Platonism which should answer at once all these problems in a wholly satisfactory way. To attempt the task is, at least, equally beyond my powers and my present purpose. It must be enough here to indicate the general lines of interpretation which approve themselves to my mind, and to make some scattered remarks.

In the first place, then, it seems fairly certain, on internal as well as external grounds, that the *Philebus* is one of the latest of Plato's writings, thus falling into line, for expository purposes, with such other books as the *Parmenides, Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus* and *Laws*[1]. To this extent I would agree with Jackson and Tocco. But it does not immediately follow from this that we are to find in these later dialogues an Ideal Theory which conflicts with, or is widely separated from, the Theory to be found in earlier dialogues, e.g. *Phaedrus, Phaedo, Republic.* Yet in view of the criticisms of Idealism with which both the *Parmenides* and *Philebus* open, we seem compelled to admit that in his later period Plato found it desirable to re-state and develope, if not actually to modify in any essential point, the Ideal Theory as already published. How far he was driven to such re-statement by mere self-criticism, or how far it was a result of the attacks of rival philosophers, or due to popular misconceptions, can hardly be determined. But it must, I think, be allowed that in form, if not in substance, the Ideal

[1] See also below, *Introd.* VII. ii.

Theory underwent modification in the later presentations of its author[1].

Now, if we grant thus far the thesis maintained in common by Jackson and Tocco, it remains for us to consider the direction which Plato gave to this modification or reconstruction of his Idealism. And here, as I think, these interpreters are right in invoking the evidence of Aristotle. Without trespassing far on the debatable ground of Aristotle's critique of Platonism, we may agree at least that some importance should be ascribed to the statements in such passages as *Met.* A. 6, M. 9 etc., where a Pythagorising tendency is noted as attaching to some phase, if not the whole course, of Plato's Idealism. However we may explain the statement that there are 'elements' in the Ideas, and that these elements are identical with those which compose the 'real' world, or the statement that Ideal Numbers were posited and derived from the One and the Indefinite Dyad, it is, I think, a fair supposition that such statements indicate the general direction of the later developments of Plato's thought. And such a view of the matter has the additional merit of helping to explain the further modification, ending in virtual dissolution, which the Platonic philosophy suffered at the hands of Plato's Academic successors.

Accordingly, it appears reasonable to follow those critics who find in later Platonism, if not in earlier, an express attribution of multiplicity to the Ideal, as well as Real, world. And we shall hardly go wrong if we acknowledge that the metaphysical core of the discussion in the *Philebus* is that announced in p. 15 A, namely the possibility of the co-existence of Plurality in the Ideal 'Henads,' or if we look for a result from the discussion which will square with that to which the *Parmenides*, starting from a similar problem (129 B), appears to point.

If this be so, we shall be justified in supposing that Plato was attempting, in the *Philebus* and its fellow-dialogues, to re-state or modify his Ideal Theory in such a way as should avoid the

[1] So Gomperz holds that in the later dialogues (including *Phileb.*) "der greise Denker vornehmlich seine Hauptlehren, die ethischen nicht minder als die politischen und Erkenntnis-Theorien, gegen eigene und fremde Einwürfe zu sichern und thatsächlich zu bewähren, aber eben darum auch vielfach einzuschränken und umzubilden bemüht ist." (*Zeitschr. f. Philos.*, Bd. 109, p. 175.)

inference that the Ideal Unity must necessarily suffer, through 'participation,' either division or multiplication. And as the result of a survey of the whole ground, we may venture to state summarily that the method adopted in all this later group of dialogues is the method of mixture (*μῖξις* or *κρᾶσις*).

The 'summum genus' under which come all objects of thought and sense is the category of 'Being' (*οὐσία*)[1]: in it we, and all things, live and move and have our being: all possible classes of things, ideas, mathematicals, sensibles, images, are necessarily subordinated to this supreme notion. But *οὐσία* is capable logically of further determination: it is the synthesis of opposite pairs. In the *Sophist* it is shown that there is no such thing as *absolute* *οὐκ-ὄν*—that *τὸ μὴ ὄν* is a relative notion, the notion of 'otherness' or relative negation. So that even *τὸ μὴ ὄν* possesses some measure of *οὐσία*, which explains the possibility of ignorance and falsehood—formerly a serious *crux* to the philosophers. And similarly in the *Timaeus* we find *οὐσία* compounded of *ταὐτόν* and *θάτερον*, Reality comprehending at once both Identity and Difference. When we come, then, to the *Philebus* we expect to find the Real explained, not as one member of an antithesis but rather, as a synthesis—a combination and realisation of two antithetic principles, which apart from their union would remain mere potentialities and empty abstractions.

Now such considerations as these, which serve to bring the *Philebus* into line with its fellows, may at first sight seem to favour the view which would find the Ideas in the Mixed Class; yet I do not think that this can be seriously maintained. For though it may be true that the Ideas do belong to a *μικτόν*, and are composed by a Mixture, yet it is hardly possible to connect the *μικτόν* described in the text with Ideal products. The connection is merely one of analogy—the analogy between the phenomenal world and the noumenal, and it is a mistake, as Tocco rightly remarks, to confound the two. Rather, if we would find the theory of Ideal Mixture in the *Philebus*, we must survey the dialogue as a whole, and especially the method in

[1] See *Append.* F, *ad fin.*

which the Idea of Good is therein developed as a trinity in unity (see esp. p. 64 E).

But if we deny the probability of this view of Jackson, we may equally deny that of Brandis. The πέρας does not contain the Ideas, but rather is the *summum genus* which comprises, as Schneider has told us, that class of ὄντα which we may call Mathematicals, or τὰ μεταξύ; though we may admit that the unique relation which these bear to Ideas proper (see Ar. *Met.* A. 6. 987^{b} 14) renders the confusion not unnatural.

Lastly, while we agree that the principle of αἰτία, or efficient cause, which is nearly (σχεδόν) identical with Reason, would form the most appropriate dwelling-place for the Ideas, we must yet bear in mind that this classification will suit but one aspect of Ideal existence; which leads us to conclude, in short, that the peculiar scheme of this fourfold division of ὄντα was not primarily devised for the purpose of accommodating Ideal so much as real objects.

It would thus appear to be unsafe to accept without very careful qualification any one of the identifications proposed by those who read Idealism into the account of the Four Classes, if we would avoid the blunder of either making a cross-division or unduly narrowing our conception of the Idea. Yet at the same time we seem bound to maintain that the Classification under discussion has a definite bearing on the Ideal Theory; and this not only from the emphasis laid upon it by the author and from its general relation to the course of the whole dialogue, but more especially from the important words with which it is introduced. For it seems to be expressly conveyed by these words (ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι) that the Classification is intended to cover the whole range of Being (οὐσία), using this term in its most comprehensive sense; so that, although primarily applicable to the sphere of concrete existence, we cannot exclude from its scope the objects of pure reason or the Ideal sphere. It is true that the sense of this expression is disputed: Schaarschmid, for instance, confines it to material and particular existences, while Schneider, on the contrary, by pressing the sense of λεγομένων (as implying inward λόγος), makes it refer solely to the objects of thought; but it

seems clear that neither of these narrow interpretations can be maintained, and that it is only by a combination of the two that we obtain a satisfactory explanation of the phrase[1].

The truth seems to be that the Classification starts with being universal and all-comprehensive in scope, intended to embrace all possible objects of all the sciences, but in the course of its development its immediate application and illustration is confined to the lower, or phenomenal, sphere. And an indication of this change of method, this narrowing of scope, may perhaps be discerned in the way in which the Fourth Class, the Cause of Mixture, is introduced into the discussion. For it appears distinctly as an after-thought, as something not provided for in the original scheme. Now if the scheme were originally intended to explain material existence only, the original omission of Cause would be indeed surprising; but if the original intention included the explanation of Ideal reality, in common with that of material existence, then it may be possible to see some grounds for the original omission of Cause. And such grounds would appear if we could establish that the Ideal sphere is wholly analogous to the Phenomenal sphere except that it is uncaused,—or, in other words, if we could show that precisely the same principles may be traced in the one sphere as in the other, with the single exception that we cannot ascribe the reality of the Ideas to any external cause.

Now, if this line of thought be justifiable, we arrive by it at a quite different standpoint from which to examine the Classification. Excluding the last Class (*αἰτία*), as inapplicable to the self-caused, self-governed, realm of the Ideas, we shall apply to it the scheme of the First Three Classes only. And then it will follow that the Ideas belong to the *μικτόν*, and are thus analysable into *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*: which conclusion will admirably square with the Aristotelian statements cited above. But it must be carefully noticed that this result, though legitimately extracted from the text, is not explicitly conveyed therein—that it depends on the analogy existing between the Ideal and Phenomenal spheres—and that it depends also on the exclusion from view of the last Genus, *αἰτία*: and consequently,

[1] Cp. *Append.* F, *ad fin.*, and Peipers' *Ontol. Plat.* pp. 89 ff., 285 ff.

the reader must be careful not to confuse the present speculation, whatever it be worth, with Dr Jackson's very definite identification of the Ideas with certain members of the *μικτόν* Class.

As the general outcome of the above considerations we may conclude that, while the four-fold Classification is not directly concerned with the Ideal sphere, it yet has an indirect bearing on that sphere and conveys important hints regarding its constitution; and that these hints may be taken to confirm the general purpose of the dialogue in exhibiting the combination of Multiplicity with Unity in a certain section of Ideas, i.e. in illustrating the method of Ideal *κρᾶσις* or *μῖξις*. But while recognising this bearing of the passage under discussion upon the later form of Idealism, we must refuse to identify the Ideas directly with any one of the four Classes, as foreign to the method pursued by the author; although we may admit that a certain aspect of Ideal reality may be discoverable in the last Class, when carefully interpreted.

It would not be compatible with the scope of this section to go deeper into the precise meaning, or meanings, of Plato's Ideal Theory, or to discuss at length his views as to the relation of Ideas to particulars. I must content myself here with the remark that Lotze's observations on the matter[1] seem to me to be, though inadequate, both luminous and suggestive, and that his distinction between the reality of 'validity' (*Geltung*), which belongs to the Ideas, and that of concrete existence, helps far to clear up the obscurity which attaches to the ambiguous term 'Being' and its Greek originals (*οὐσία, ὄντα*) as used in connection with the Ideal Theory.

For further suggestions as to the character of later Platonism, and its relations to contemporary thought, I may refer the reader to the appendices in this volume; and I would especially call attention to the traces of Anaxagorean influence, which appear to me much more important than the misty glimpses of Pythagoreanism.

[1] *Logic* (Eng. Tr.), pp. 440 ff.

VII. Concluding Remarks.

i. *Review of the Argument.*

If we glance once more over the contents of the *Philebus* as a whole, we may see that its meaning might be broadly reduced to an exposition and ethical illustration of a few main texts.

(1) Unity and Plurality are the principles of all Being—16 C *ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὑτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἐχόντων.*

(2) Knowledge is correlative to Being, object the counterpart of subject—16 D *δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν· εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν.*

(3) The Reality of Being lies not in the particular but in the Universal, not in the human but in the Divine—30 A *τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρ' οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν;...πόθεν...λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὂν ἐτύγχανε, ταὐτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα;* Cp. 29 C *σμικρὸν μέν τι τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενὲς καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλήθει τε θαυμαστὸν καὶ κάλλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει κτλ.*: 29 B *παρ' ἡμῖν... οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὄν.*

(4) Knowledge has for object not the particular but the Universal—58 A *τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς...μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν.* Cp. 58 C *τίς ποτε τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ.*

(5) The Universal is the type of the particular, and provides the standard of determination:—64 A *μαθεῖν...τί ποτε ἕν τε ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναί ποτε μαντευτέον.*

The preceding chapters will have served to expose the development of these leading thoughts and to display what we may call the universality of the dialogue. If it is a One, it is also indubitably a Many,—a mixture of many elements of thought, a web of complex material. It may be well, then, by way of conclusion, once more to distinguish, as briefly as may be, and to reunite in a single glance, the main strands of thought which have been disentangled.

First, then, the guiding thread is the ethical notion of the Good.

Next, we find that if there is to be an ethical science to deal with this notion, that science must adopt the method which is common to all sciences alike. And the characteristic of that method is Mensuration and Numeration. But in reaching the idea of Number, we find, first, that as a definite object of thought it is a synthesis of two opposite concepts, that of Unity or Limitation and that of Infinite Plurality; we find that Number is in fact, as Aristotle puts it, πλῆθος μεμετρημένον. And we find also that Number, as simple number, is a purely formal notion, entirely abstract. So that the scientific method, being the arithmetical, is marked by these two characteristics—Abstraction (from all non-essential, concrete qualities) or Generalisation, and Synthesis or combination of the two potential and fundamental opposites, Unity and Indefinity. This, then, is the method which the ethical philosopher must observe.

But there is a higher reason why Combination and Differentiation should mark the method of the mathematician and of the dialectician; for the same laws are found to govern the method of the Divine Artist. The objective side corresponds to the subjective, the laws of the objects of knowledge to the laws of knowledge itself. True Science and true Art follow in the tracks of the Universal Thinker and the Universal Maker.

That is the second great thought of the *Philebus*,—the correspondence, namely, not only between the methods and principles of all the branches of knowledge, as subjective, but also between subjective knowledge as a whole and the Universe as the rational object of knowledge. Thus we arrive at an assertion of the great axiom of Idealism, the identity of Being and Knowing, of thought and its object; the two sides of the One Reality being unified by virtue of the common antithetic principles which belong to both, Unity and Infinity. And in this we might say lies Plato's 'Philosophy of Nature,' held not less firmly than the pantheism of Schelling, which demonstrates the fundamental unity of the inward and the outward, of Matter and Mind. And the meetingplace and union of both is in Soul, in the total Reality of the World-Soul, which is Mind *plus*

Motion, possessing, like Spinoza's Absolute, the double attribute of thought and extension. Thus although, through his poetic manner of presentation, Plato's theology may savour of Deism, a closer view convinces us that it is a genuine Pantheism.

From this view of the nature of the Divine Being comes as a corollary the thought that the Good in its every aspect—as Truth the scientific end, as Beauty the aesthetic end, as Happiness the ethical end—is to be found in the Universal, seeing that God is the Universal Soul.

Hence, as we saw above, universality and abstraction from what is merely particular and individual characterise the objects of all exact Sciences, or the notions with which they deal. So that the highest of all Sciences are such as deal with the most abstract and formal concepts, for example, pure Mathematics or the Science of Numbers. For we may say that they deal with the Divine Form, which is pure Extension—the spatial purely as such. If, then, Dialectic is to be placed yet higher in the rank of Sciences, it can only be because it deals with a superior object. None such exists except the Divine Thought. Accordingly, the Divine Thought, or absolute Reason, is the object of Dialectic.

Thus the *Philebus* aims at classifying the Sciences, at explaining their method, and at illustrating that method by the discussion of the ethical End; while at the same time it points out the parallelism which everywhere exists between the human and the Divine, between the world of spirit and the world of matter, which are both included in the totality of Soul or Nature. Consequently, we may regard it as summing up the logical, physical, metaphysical, and ethical results of the previous dialogues, from the *Theaetetus* to the *Timaeus*, by a reduction of them all to a kind of common measure in mathematical terms, and so preparing the way for the mathematical treatment of political science which characterises the *Laws*.

In support of this view that the *Philebus* serves as a kind of brief summary of previous philosophical results, as well as an expansion of them in particular directions, and so forms a fitting prelude to the method and content of the *Laws*, we may adduce the opinion of Zeller that the *Philebus* "forms the most direct preparation for the *Republic*," as combining the dialectical results

of the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*, and also criticising the current empirical and eudaemonistic theories of morals[1]. The relation which he conceives to exist between the *Republic* and the *Philebus* is similar to that which I would establish between the *Laws* and the *Philebus*. The reference which Zeller, after Schleiermacher, finds to the discussion of the *Philebus* concerning the Good in *Rep.* III. 505 B proves nothing for the posteriority of the *Republic*, as the rival views concerning Pleasure and Wisdom must have been constantly under debate from the days of Socrates—witness for example the *Gorgias*; and in the face of the evidence from language and style, apart from other considerations, it can carry no weight[2].

ii. *Date.*

Regarding the exact place of the *Philebus* in the series of Plato's writings opinions differ widely. Thus Schleiermacher places it among the second, or 'indirectly dialectical' group, along with the *Politicus* and *Phaedo*, and before the *Gorgias* and *Meno*, as well as before the whole group of 'constructive' dialogues—*Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Laws*.

Munk, again, puts it in his middle group, but he classes these constructive dialogues in the same group, dating them between 383 and 370.

Hermann, on the other hand, places the *Philebus* in his third and last group, the last six dialogues being, according to his arrangement, the *Phaedo*, *Philebus*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*, in this order.

Susemihl, adopting somewhat of a mean view between

[1] Zeller, *Plato*, pp. 138, 139 (Eng. Tr.). Cp. Ribbing, *Genet. Darst. der Pl. Ideenlehre*, Pt. II. p. 115, "wird man in Betrachtung aller dieser Umstände zusammen leicht auf die Vermuthung geführt werden dass *der Philebus die späteste unter allen eigenen Schriften* Plato's und eine Schrift aus dem Greisenalter des Philosophen sei. So unläugbar aber dies ist, scheint dennoch eine Vergleichung zwischen der Art, wie der Begriff des Guten im Philebus bestimmt wird, und der Entwickelung desselben Begriffs, welche im Dial. *de Republica* vorkommt mit voller Gewissheit dar zu legen, dass der letzgenannte Dialog und somit auch der *Timaeus nach jenen* angesetzt werden muss." I.e., Ribbing allowed himself to be misled by Zeller's false view of its relation to the *Republic* into deserting his own original notion of the *Philebus* as one of the last dialogues. Cp. Schleierm. III. 570 ff.

[2] Cp. Jackson, as cited on p. xxvii. n.

Schleiermacher's and Hermann's, makes his third and last group consist, like Schleiermacher, of 'constructive' dialogues, but, like Hermann, places the *Philebus* in this last group; in fact, his ordering of the last six dialogues corresponds exactly with Hermann's.

All these authorities agree, then, in one point at least concerning the *Philebus*,—that it precedes the *Republic*. And in this they find weighty support in the opinion of Zeller, who places the *Philebus* just after the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist* and *Parmenides*, dating the first of these about 390, and supposing the *Republic* to have been finished about 370.

But all the above views appear to be based on very insufficient objective grounds.

The next opinion to notice is that of Peipers[1], which is deduced from his investigation of the notion of *οὐσία*—a more tangible ground of arrangement than any hitherto noticed. In Peipers' scheme the last six dialogues appear in the following order: *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Laws*.

Peipers' method may be said to be rather that of the philologist than that of the philosopher. And certainly we find his results largely justified by the more exclusively philological investigations into the Platonic style which have been pursued within the last dozen years.

Thus Dittenberger[2] makes the last six dialogues to be *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Laws*. According to Schanz the last four are *Philebus*, *Politicus*, *Timaeus*, *Laws*. Siebeck[3] arranges the last six thus: *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Parmenides*, *Laws*. And, finally, Ritter[4] is of opinion that the *Theaetetus* dates about 370, the *Sophist* next about 362—360 (either just before or just after the third Sicilian journey), after which comes the final group (360—47) consisting of the *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*[5].

[1] See Peipers, *Ontologia Platonica*.

[2] W. Dittenberger, *Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge* (*Hermes*, xv. (1881), pp. 321—345).

[3] H. Siebeck, *Zur Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge* (*Jahrb. f. Class. Philol.* 131 (1885), pp. 226—256).

[4] C. Ritter, *Untersuchungen über Plato* (1888).

[5] Cp. also G. Hussey's results as given in *Amer. J. of Philol.* x. pp. 437 ff.

In addition to these philological investigators, whose results are more interesting than the details of their method, we may adduce the opinion of Hirzel who notes, in the last page of his treatise, "miram quae inter libros quos de legibus Plato scripsit et hunc sermonem intercedit similitudinem[1]." And this remark is fully borne out by the many points of resemblance between the two works which have already been noticed.

It may fairly be said, then, that all the recent researches into the details of Plato's style go to show that the *Philebus* belongs to the last period, the period of the *Laws*, and that it has as its fellows in this group the *Sophist*, *Politicus* and *Timaeus*, if not also the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*.

Consequently, while the researches of the philologians forbid us to accept such an account of the development of Plato's thought as that given by Zeller, which places any of these dialogues earlier than the *Republic*, and while we must therefore regard the hypothesis of an early Megarico-dialectic period as untenable, an independent basis is provided for such views of the evolution of Idealism as those of M. F. Tocco and of Dr H. Jackson, to which we have already alluded. Jackson's order is this: *Philebus*, *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Timaeus*, *Laws*[2]. But while agreeing in general with this view of the order, I am unable to accept the position which he assigns to the *Philebus* in the forefront of this group. On the contrary, I am strongly of opinion, on grounds of matter as well as of form, that the *Philebus* is quite the latest of the whole group with the exception only of the *Laws*. In fact it seems quite possible that the *Philebus* may have been written during an

[1] R. Hirzel, *de bonis in fine Philebi enumeratis* (1868). Campbell, Huit, J. von Arnim and Benn may be added to the above list; also Lutoslawski, who sums up the authorities thus: "In den letzten Jahrzehnten haben Grote, Jowett, Tocco, Teichmüller, Susemihl, Windelband, Dümmler, H. Hoffmann aus dem Inhalt des Phil. für dessen späte Abfassungzeit Argumente geschöpft, während Roeper, Dittenberger, Hoefer, Schanz, Gomperz, Walbe, C. Ritter, Siebeck die sprachliche Verwandtschaft des Phil. mit den Gesetzen und dem Timäus zur völligen Evidenz gebracht haben." Hence Lut. concludes *Phil.* to be "ein Werk von Platos Greisenalter, von Plato nach dem Soph. und vielleicht auch nach dem Politic. um sein 70. Lebensjahr geschrieben" (*Arch. f. Gesch. Philos.* IX. 1. p. 105).

[2] See his paper on the *Politicus* (*J. of Phil.* XV. p. 301): but he now inclines rather to the view that the *Philebus* is posterior to the *Parmenides*.

interval while the voluminous *Laws* was in course of production. Consequently its date would have to be somewhere between 360 and 350, and probably nearer the latter year[1].

[1] In Jowett and Campbell's *Republic*, II. pp. 46 ff., there is an 'Excursus on the position of the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*,' with many valuable notes on the diction, supporting the late date of all these dialogues. "In 55 pages," we are told, "the *Phileb.* has only 55 peculiar words, one-third of the proportion of the *Phaedrus*. Of these 55, tragic are: ἀναίνομαι, ἀναπολέω, ἄοινος, μισητός, περιβόητος, προχαίρω, χαρμονή, ψευδῶς: epic are ἀσπαστός, θέρομαι, μισγάγκεια: late derivv. ἀπόρημα, δυσχέρασμα, προσδόκημα, στοχασμός, ἀναχώρησις, θεώρησις, στόχασις, φάρμαξις, διδυμότης, δυσαπαλλακτία, εὐδοκιμία, δοξοκαλία, αὐτάρκεια, παιδαριώδης, περατοειδής, νηφαντικός, ξυλουργικός, ἀνοηταίνω: the rest are chiefly new compounds (with ἀνα, ἐν, ἐπι, προσ, συν, ὑπεξ). The special vocab. of *Phileb.* contains 20 tragic words, 50 new compounds, 13 physiological words." But much of this peculiar diction is best regarded as a mark of the breaking up of the Attic insularity of style before the wave of Panhellenism; see Gomperz' review of Campbell in *Zeitschr. f. Philos.*, Bd. 109, pp. 161 ff.: "Wir sind kühn genug zu behaupten, dass Platons letzte Sprachphase uns im wesentlichen den ersten Einbruch der griechischen Gemeinsprache, der sogenannten κοινή, von Augen stellt." Gomperz approves of Siebeck's suggestion (in *Zeitschr.*, Bd. 107) that in his latest works Plato was influenced by the criticisms and early dialogues of Aristotle: so too Teichmüller.

THE TEXT OF THE PHILEBUS.

For the constitution of the text of our dialogue the following 17 MSS. are available:

(1) MS. E. D. Clarke, 39, otherwise known as *Bodleianus* (Stallb.), *Oxoniensis* (Herm.), 𝔄 (Bekk.).

(2) *Vaticanus* Δ.

(3) *Coislinianus* Γ.

(4) *Venetus* Λ.

(5) *Venetus* Ξ.

(6) *Venetus* Π.

(7) *Venetus* Σ.

(8) *Parisinus B.*

(9) *Parisinus C.*

(10) *Parisinus E.*

(11) *Parisinus F.*

(12) *Parisinus H.*

(13) *Angelicus w.*

(14) *Florentinus a.*

(15) *Florentinus b.*

(16) *Florentinus c.*

(17) *Florentinus d.*

Of these the first 13 are used in Bekker's critical apparatus, while the four Florentine MSS. were collated for Stallbaum's ed. of the dialogue. The inter-relations of the various Platonic codices cannot be said to be yet satisfactorily determined; but the preeminent importance of the Clarke MS. is generally maintained. Bekker states that he did not himself collate the Clarke MS., but trusted for the purposes of his edition to the collation of it published by Dr Thomas Gaisford (1813). So far as I know, it had not been since inspected as regards the *Philebus*, until I made use of it for the present edition;

and though I found previous reports as to its readings correct in the main, I have been able to make additions or emendations in some instances.

I add here a few remarks as to the character of the Platonic MSS. in general, mainly derived from Schanz's papers on the subject, to which I append the views of some of his critics.

The arrangement of the Dialogues in the Platonic MSS. is based on the order established by Thrasyllus, who divided the whole into nine Tetralogies arranged thus:

I.	*a.* Euthyphro.	*b.* Apology.	*c.* Crito.	*d.* Phaedo.
II.	*a.* Cratylus.	*b.* Theaetetus.	*c.* Sophist.	*d.* Politicus.
III.	*a.* Parmenides.	*b.* Philebus.	*c.* Convivium.	*d.* Phaedrus.
IV.	*a.* Alcib. I.	*b.* Alcib. II.	*c.* Hipparchus.	*d.* Anterastae.
V.	*a.* Theages.	*b.* Charmides.	*c.* Laches.	*d.* Lysis.
VI.	*a.* Euthydemus.	*b.* Protagoras.	*c.* Gorgias.	*d.* Meno.
VII.	*a.* Hipp. Maj.	*b.* Hipp. Min.	*c.* Io.	*d.* Menexenus.
VIII.	*a.* Clitopho.	*b.* Republic.	*c.* Timaeus.	*d.* Critias.
IX.	*a.* Minos.	*b.* Leges.	*c.* Epinomis.	*d.* Epistles.

Here the *Philebus* is ranked as the second dialogue in the third Tetralogy, coming between the *Parmenides* and the *Symposium*.

From the fact that the MSS. agree in preserving this order we infer that their source or sources do not reach back to a date anterior to that of Thrasyllus,—in other words, to the beginning of our era.

As the basis or source of all our extant MSS. Schanz assumes the existence of an 'Archetype,' which contained the nine Tetralogies, as given above, followed by the Definitions and seven spurious dialogues. This Archetype he supposes to have formed two volumes, Vol. I. containing the first seven Tetralogies, and Vol. II. the remainder. The derivatives from this Archetype he divides into two classes, that of the old and good MSS. and that of the later and poorer MSS. Class I. is composed of Clark., Vat. Δ and Ven. Π—all which agree in having a lacuna in *Theaet.* 208 D, πάνυ μὲν οὖν...209 A τὸν λόγον, and in omitting Tetral. VII.—and of the Tubingen MS. (Crusianus). Tub. generally agrees with Cl. throughout the first vol. of the Archetype, so far as it goes. Similarly Ven. Π gives us the text of the good class in Tetr. I.—IV., except *Symposium*.

Δ and Θ (225 and 226) are simply two vols. of the same MS. (Vat.), which belongs to the 12th cent. In Tetr. II.—VII. Vat. is merely a copy of Cl., though in Tetr. I. and in *Gorgias* it is from a later source. Its relation to the Clarke MS., as an 'Abschrift,' is sufficiently evident from the text it gives of the *Philebus*, apart from other signs.

Thus we find in the Vat. a series of lacunae, which have been filled up by a much later hand, in exactly those places where the parchment in Cl. has been gapped. In Vat. f. 360 B we find the following (the later supplements being denoted by brackets):

34 E.	ἀναλάβωμεν [πόθεν] δὴ.	*ibid.*	τοῦ [τι δέ γ' ἔ]στι.
ibid.	ἐπιθυμία [ναί].	35 A.	[οἶμαι μὲν] πληρώσεως.
ibid.	ὡς ἔοικεν [ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν].	*ibid.*	πληροῦσθ[αι σαφέ]στατα γε.
ibid.	ὁπόθ[εν εἴτ' αἰσθή]σει.	*ibid.*	μή[τ' ἐν τῷ νῦν] χρόνῳ.
ibid.	ἔπαθε; [καὶ πῶς;].	35 B.	πῶς [γὰρ οὔ;]
ibid.	τοῦτο [δὲ κένω]σις.	*ibid.*	πῇ [τι] τῶν.

The edges of Ff. 184—8 in Cl. are torn off, and the missing words or syllables supplied in the margin; and the above list will be found to correspond almost exactly with the words supplied to fill the place of the twelve missing line-ends in f. 184 of Cl. Again in Vat. f. 352 B (23 C) we find a patched passage: διαλάβωμεν [μᾶλλον] δ' εἰ βούλει τριχῇ καθότι [φράζοις ἂν] λάβωμεν ἄττα, where in Cl. all the words from μᾶλλον to λάβωμεν are added in the margin, their loss in the text being due to the 'homoioteleuton.'

One chief mark of the inferior Class II. is the comparative frequency of interpolations. The passages in which the good class is thus corrupted and the bad not, are rare: such instances are *Phileb.* 39 D ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἢ πρόσθεν Cl.; ἐν τ. πρ. ἡ πρόσθεν Π. *ib.* 66 E νῦν δὴ δυσχεράνας διελήλυθα καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν φ. λόγον Cl., Ven. Π. Cp. *Theaet.* 210 B, *Protag.* 332 E, *Phaedr.* 257 B, D.

Yet even the Archetype itself was by no means free from interpolations. "The instances of interpolation," writes Schanz, "are very numerous and for the most part very ancient. The main task of the Platonic critic will always be that of expelling from the text the numerous spurious additions." A clear case of such interpolation is to be found in *Phileb.* 47 E (see n. *ad loc.*): but there is considerable danger in pushing the spuriosity-hunt to an extreme, as was certainly done by Badham. One important source of interpolations lies in the substitution of a more common for a less common word or phrase. That this corruption is to be traced back to the Archetype is argued by Schanz from evidences in our MSS.: thus *Phileb.* 35 C μηνύει] γρ. δεικνύει mg Π., *Phileb.* 34 A οὐκ ἄπο τρόπου] οὐ πόρρω τρόπου mg Π.

A more frequent error in Class I. is the omission of short questions and answers, e.g. τοὐναντίον in *Phileb.* 43 B (cp. *Alc.* I. 129 B, *Politic.* 275 B, *Soph.* 171 B, 224 A).

Sometimes the consensus of MSS. forces us to attribute the loss or corruption to the original text of the Archetype itself: e.g.

Phileb. 12 A: ὁμολογοῦμεν ἃ for ὁμολογούμενα.
„ 13 D: ἀνιόντες for ἂν ἰόντες.
„ 21 B: μηδὲ ὁρᾶν τι for μὴ δέοι' ἄν τι (P for I).
„ 24 B: ἅτε δῆλόν τε for ἀτελῆ δ' ὄντε.
„ 41 A: ὕστεροῦμεν for ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.
„ 52 A: πληρωθεισῶν for πληρωθεῖσιν.
„ 64 C: προσφυές τε for προσφυέστερον.

But the most fruitful source of error in the Archetype lay in the incorrect junction or division of words,—a kind of blunder which easily led to further blunderings.

The value of the great majority of our MSS., which he collects into Class II., is set down by Schanz as practically *nil.* Excepting in so far as they serve to fill up the lacunae in the better MSS., they have no independent merit, and any occasional flash of light they give is to be attributed merely to the casual brilliance of some late scribe or reader. In this low estimate of the worth of the larger group of MSS. Schanz follows the great Cobet (see *Mnemos.* IX. p. 337); but their view seems to me to be somewhat extreme, and by way of counterpoise I adduce the divergent opinion maintained by Jordan[1].

Jordan would group the Platonic MSS. (collated by Bekk.) in three families:

(α) 𝔄 (= Cl.), ΔΘ (= Vat.), Π (= Ven.), Vindob. LIV. (1), Tubing.

(β) BCEFΛ, IX., Florent. a, b, c, i.

(ξ) Ven. Σ (and Ξ), Vindob. Υ, Zittav.

Again Fam. β may be divided into two parts:

(*a*) Pariss. BCEF, Flor. a, c, etc., of which the best is Par. B, of 12th cent., from which C is derived, while Flor. c is 13th and Flor. a 14th cent.:

(*b*) Ven. Λ, Par. IX., Flor. b (and i?), of which b (12th cent.) is best, and Ven. Λ next best.

Now it is important to observe that the relations between these families are not consistent throughout; for while in some dialogues ξ agrees with α as against β, in others it sides rather with β, and in others again diverges from both alike. Thus in the *Cratylus* ξ generally agrees,

[1] *De codd. Platon. auctoritate*, Lips. 1874.

even to err, with α, but in the *Amatores* β is usually supported by ξ in its variances with α: so too in the *Euthyd.* and *Phileb.* ξ is allied with β rather than with α, as is shown, e.g., by the lacuna in *Phileb.* 64 B.

From the varying relations which thus exist between the third and the other two families, Jordan concludes that "the readings of all the dialogues cannot rest on the authority of the same Archetype."

Further, the greater antiquity of the Clarke MS. (895 A.D.)[1] is not in itself sufficient evidence of the superiority of its Family over Family β, since Tubing., to which Schanz allows a weight almost equal to that of Cl., is no earlier than 12th cent.; nor can the extreme value attached to Cl. be justified unless on the unwarrantable assumption that its Archetype is likewise the Archetype of all the other MSS. An impartial examination of the readings given by at least the better MSS. of Fam. β clearly shows us "eas non conjecturae vel emendationi sed antiquo libro fideli deberi." And so Jordan urges in conclusion—"desinamus denique ceteros omnes prae Bodleiano duobusque vel tribus ei proximis ut deteriores contemnere. Duae praeter ξ exstant codicum familiae, et utrisque et deteriores et meliores codd. supersunt. Illos neglegere possumus et debemus, his ad utriusque archetypi verba, quantum fieri potest, restituenda utendum est."

Wohlrab, too, in a review of some of Schanz's editorial work[2], has protested in a similar strain against the undue depreciation of the second class of MSS., as well as against the tendency to push gloss-hunting to an extreme. Wohlrab there argues "(1) dass Schanz unrecht sei, wenn er Cobet zu liebe die zweite MSS. classe aufzugeben geneigt war: (2) dass man neuerdings in der annahme von athetesen zu weit gehe: (3) dass die Cobetsche richtung der Platonkritik nicht förderlich sei." And the need of such a protest must surely be sufficiently evident to every reader of Badham's second edition of the present dialogue, in which the gloss-hunting *cacoethes* is seen at its height: for in the first 27 pages Badham uses the brackets a full hundred times, and some five-and-seventy times in the rest of the dialogue, not to mention half-a-hundred other places where he has used the sign denoting textual corruption. With all respect and admiration for Dr Badham's scholarship, one can hardly help recalling, after this, the latter end assigned by the poet to him who "turns critic next"! And Wohlrab's observations gain additional point when we remember that Badham possessed, as

[1] That 895, not 896, is the correct date, as given in the 'subscriptio' of this MS., has been shown by Mr W. Waddell, *Parmenides*, p. cxxi.

[2] *Jahrb. f. Cl. Phil.* 1876 and 1881.

he tells us himself, "no Philological journal except the two series of the *Mnemosyne*."

But besides protesting in general against the extremes of critical method pursued by some of the school of Cobet as unscientific, a special protest seems needed in the case of the *Philebus*. For I believe that Mr Paley is right in pronouncing much of the linguistic difficulty of this dialogue to be due to "*intentional* and deliberate eccentricity of style," and right too when he objects to Badham's treatment of the text that "intentional obscurity is not to be made less obscure by arbitrary alterations." Consequently, although, for the sake of completeness, I have been careful to notice most, if not all, of the textual changes proposed by Badham, I have very seldom found myself able to accept them.

Idolatry of the *Codex Clarkianus* on the one hand, and excessive suspiciousness of the handiwork of the *glossator* on the other, form the Scylla and Charybdis which flank the path of the Platonic editor: *medio tutissimus ibit*[1].

[1] A useful account of Platonic MSS. is given by M. Ch. Huit at the end of Vol. II. of his *La vie et l'œuvre de Platon* (Paris, 1893). He remarks that "le texte de chaque dialogue a sa généalogie et sa tradition à part...la seule chose raisonnable, comme l'a montré M. Choiset, c'est de se servir de tous sans s'y asservir et de tâcher d'en tirer ce qu'ils contiennent de bon sans en prendre le mauvais."

As to the Flinders Petrie papyrus (of *Phaedo* 67 E—84 B, c. 260—50 B.C.) which now complicates the textual question, the same critic follows Usener and Weil in finding in it "une preuve de la haute idée qu'on doit se faire de la recension representée par le ms. d'Oxford...et il n'y a pas lieu d'être surpris de ce que ce papyrus égyptien, malgré son antiquité respectable, n'offre en somme aucune garantie supérieure d'exactitude." Cp. Prof. Campbell's remarks in his recent edition of the *Republic*, Vol. II. p. 97.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ

[ἢ περὶ ἡδονῆς, ἠθικός].

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ St. II
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΡΩΤΑΡΧΟΣ, ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ. 11

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δή, Πρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλήβου δέχεσθαι νυνὶ καὶ πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν | ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἐὰν μή σοι κατὰ νοῦν ᾖ λεγόμενος. βούλει B
συγκεφαλαιωσώμεθα ἑκάτερον;

5 ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησι τὸ χαίρειν

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ Δ. ΠΡ. Σ., ΠΡ., ΦΙΛ. om. Cl.

11 A. 1 ἆρα EF. ὦ add. rc. Σ. 2 νυνὶ Cl. ΔΠ: νῦν *S. τὸν] libri τῶν: corr. Schlei.

B. 3 ἐὰν Cl. ΔΠ: ἂν *S.

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1. **ὅρα δή, Πρώταρχε.** For the voc. without ὦ cp. *Parm.* 136, *Symp.* 217, *Euthyd.* 296, *Prot.* 358, *Phileb.* 12 A, 28 B, where the object of address is shifted; also *Gorg.* 489 A, *Symp.* 172 C, 175, 213; *Euthyd.* 293, 294, 295, where the address is emphatic in tone, calling for immediate attention from the person so addressed, as here. The abrupt form of commencement is noteworthy, plunging us at once *in medias res*; I take it rather as aiming at dramatic effect than as implying a lost dialogue which should precede and explain the situation here presupposed.

2. **πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν.** So Stallb. and later edd., adopting Schleierm.'s emendation of MSS.' τῶν. The art. is used δεικτικῶς; and clearly there is no talk here of more than one λόγος.

With παρ' ἡμῖν cp. τὰ νῦν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρ' ἡμῖν, 20 A: ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν λόγοις τιθῶμεν, *Soph.* 251 D. But the gen. is used below: τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημα—'the contention which *proceeds from* us'—the change of case implying a slight change of point of view, from the mental indwelling of the dat. to the mental externalising of the gen.

6. **ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησι τὸ χαίρειν.** There is ambiguity here. Does ἀγαθόν stand for τἀγαθόν, 'summum bonum,'—the art. being omitted without loss to definiteness of sense, as in *Phaed.* 76 D, 77 A; *Rep.* VI. 506 C; *Hipp. Maj.* 293 E? This is Stallb.'s view; whereas Badh. maintains

πᾶσι ζῴοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα· τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημά ἐστι μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ ξυγγενῆ, δόξαν τε ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς
5 λογισμούς, τῆς γε ἡδονῆς ἀμείνω καὶ λῴω γίγνεσθαι | C
ξύμπασιν, ὅσαπερ αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν· δυνατοῖς δὲ μετασχεῖν ὠφελιμώτατον ἁπάντων εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσί τε καὶ ἐσομένοις. μῶν οὐχ οὕτω πως λέγομεν, ὦ Φίληβε, ἑκάτεροι;

10 ΦΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Δέχει δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν.

15 ΣΩ. Δεῖ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπῳ παντὶ τἀληθές πῃ περανθῆναι;

2 ἡμῖν *w*. 3 τὸ ante νοεῖν om. *w*. τὸ ante μεμν. add. Cl. ΔΠ. 4 τε H.
5 λογισμούς Cl.[1], -οὺς corr. Cl.[2]. λωΐω Cl.
C. 8 λέγωμεν Δ. 10 μάλιστα om. Λ. 11 δέχει Cl. et pr. ΔΠ: δέχῃ *S.
αὐτὸν Λ. 15 πῇ add. circumfl. Cl.[2].

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the contrary, that "Philebus' assertion is not represented as being one about the chief good, but merely this; that pleasure, and that which is akin to it, has a right to the name of good in its proper signification, which S. denies."

I have no doubt that the omission of the art. here is correct and intentional. In this dialogue Plato is nothing if not exact. No question is yet being raised as to τἀγαθόν: so far the discussion has been confined to the respective claims of pleasure and thought to the epithet 'good.'

Notice the antithetic correspondences: (1) χαίρειν, ἡδονήν, τέρψιν opposed to the triplet φρονεῖν, νοεῖν, μεμνῆσθαι: (2) πᾶσι ζῴοις opposed to ξύμπασιν, ὅσαπερ κ.τ.λ.: (3) ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα opposed to τὰ τούτων αὖ συγγενῆ. Also note the intentional variation from σύμφωνα (related *ex*ternally, in name) to ξυγγενῆ (related *in*ternally and by nature), and for the implication of *non*-essentiality in σύμφωνα cp. 56 A.

5. **τῆς γε ἡδονῆς ἀμείνω καὶ λῴω.** I.e. while the position of Philebus was positive, that of Socrates was (1) negative, (2) comparative in statement. This shows that τἀγαθόν, which is essentially a superlative notion, is as yet unhandled.

This combination of adjectives dates from Homer, *Od.* I. 376, II. 141, λωίτερον καὶ ἄμεινον. Cp. *Laws* 828 A, Xen. *An.* V. 10, 15.

Badh.[2] brackets τῆς γ' ἡδονῆς, and immediately below prints τὸ [δυνατοῖς] δὲ μετ.

7. **ὠφελιμώτατον.** "Consequutio uerborum haec est: δυνατοῖς δὲ μετασχεῖν (αὐτῶν) ὠφελιμώτατον (αὐτὸ s. μετασχεῖν) εἶναι κτλ." Stallb. This Badham opposes, as "doing violence to the construction," and requiring an "unwarrantable ellipse"; and so he attributes the sing. to "the correspondence in which it stands to ἀγαθόν." But Stallb.'s explanation seems the simplest, and is approved by Paley.

11. **δέχει ... διδόμενον ... λόγον.** Cp. *Gorg.* 499 C ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ: *Euthyd.* 285 A, *Alc.* II. 141 C. As Paley remarks, Prot. "regards himself as the ἐπίτροπος, who undertakes the defence of his friend's view by commission."

15. **περανθῆναι**: cp. *Gorg.* 454 C, 472 B, 497 B, *Rep.* 562 E, *Polit.* 272 D. Notice

ΠΡΩ. | Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν. D

11. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, πρὸς τούτοις διομολογησώμεθα καὶ τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

5 ΣΩ. Ὡς νῦν ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαίμονα παρέχειν. ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ τὴν

10 τοῦ φρονεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἂν ἄλλη τις κρείττων τούτων φανῇ; μῶν

D. 5 ἡμῶν Cl. ΔΠ: αὐτῶν *S praeter Σ et Flor. c, qui om. ἕξιν] ἕξεστι Γ. 12 τούτων om. F et pr. Δ.

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the special application and appropriateness of the word at the outset of this dialogue—"should be brought to πέρας"; and cp. πειρώμεθα περαίνειν 12 B *infra*. See *App. D*.

5. **ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν.** This conjunction recurs in the passage in the *Laws* 792 D, where it would seem that the ethics of the *Philebus* are especially referred to (see below)—τὸ μέσον...ἣν δὴ διάθεσιν καὶ θεοῦ...προσαγορεύομεν, ταύτην τὴν ἕξιν διώκειν φημὶ δεῖν κτλ. And διάθεσις is also to be found in 791 A, and nowhere else in Plato except in the present dialogue (cp. 11 D, 32 E, 48 A, 62 B, 64 C); while ἕξις occurs also several times later in the *Philebus* (48 C, 41 C) and also in *Tim.* 42 D, 47 E (ῥυθμὸς διὰ τὴν ἄμετρον ἐν ἡμῖν ἕξιν...ἐδόθη).

For the sense of both as technical terms compare Ar. *Categ.* 8. 8[b] 25 ff. ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν. διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μονιμώτερον κτλ.—where as exx. of ἕξεις he mentions αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί, and of διαθέσεις, θερμότης καὶ κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια κτλ.

See also *Eth. Nic.* B. 4. 1105[b] 20 ff. where ἕξεις are distinguished from both πάθη and δυνάμεις, and αἱ ἀρεταί are determined to be ἕξεις, since κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαί πως. (Cp. *ib.* 7. 1108[a] 24.) So too in *Met.* Δ 19 and 20 the two terms are practically identified (without the distinction as to *duration* drawn in *Cat. l. c.*): ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἕξις λέγεται διάθεσις καθ' ἣν ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς διακεῖται τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ ἢ καθ' αὑτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια ἕξις τις (1022[b] 10): διάθεσις λέγεται τοῦ ἔχοντος μέρη τάξις, ἢ κατὰ τόπον ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν, ἢ κατ' εἶδος (1022[b] 1)—which last definition is noticeable for the *Philebus*—namely that 'condition' lies in *order* or *symmetry* of a *composite* whole: and note also ἔτι ἕξις λέγεται ἐὰν ᾖ μόριον διαθέσεως τοιαύτης· διὸ καὶ ἡ τῶν μερῶν ἀρετὴ ἕξις τίς ἐστιν (1022[b] 13); i.e. ἕξις can be used of the simple and integral parts or elements of such a whole.

Thus ἕξις differs from διάθεσις as 'enduring state' from 'transient condition': (Arist. *Categ.* c. 6 ἕξις ἐστὶ χρονιώτερον καὶ μονιμώτερον, διάθεσις εὐκίνητον καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλον). The two are here combined so that one or other may cover every possible case of psychic δύναμις—ἕξις being more properly applicable to the intellectual, διάθεσις to the sensual.

7. **εὐδαίμονα,** predicate; 'happy life' is subsequent to 'life': transl. "which is capable of providing happiness in life to all men."

Note that here the wider term ζῷα is narrowed down, without special remark, to ἀνθρώποις, as alone δυνατοῖς (μεταλαβεῖν τῶν ἕξεων).

οὐκ ἂν μὲν ἡδονῇ μᾶλλον φαίνηται συγγενής, ἡττώμεθα μὲν ἀμφότεροι τοῦ ταῦτα ἔχοντος βεβαίως βίου, κρατεῖ δὲ ὁ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

5 ΣΩ. Ἂν δέ γε φρονήσει, νικᾷ μὲν φρόνησις τὴν ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ ἡττᾶται; ταῦθ' οὕτως ὁμολογούμενα φατὲ ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ Φιλήβῳ; τί φῄς;

ΦΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾶν ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει· σὺ

10 δέ, Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσει.

ΠΡΩ. Παραδούς, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κύριος εἴης τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη ὁμολογίας ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον.

1 ἡδονὴ [illegible]
8 [illegible]
12 A. 3 γε om. H. 6 ὁμολογούμενα [illegible] 8 [illegible] 9 [illegible] H. [illegible] 10 [illegible] om. [illegible] γνώσει [illegible] 11 [illegible] 12 τοὐναντίον [illegible]

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2. **τοῦ ταῦτα ἔχοντος βεβ. β.** Stallb. defends ταὐτὰ as referring to τὸ χαίρειν καὶ φρονεῖν, citing in support of the plur. *Gorg.* 447 A, *Apol.* 19 D, *Symp.* 187 B; but this is hardly possible. Badh. alters to τούτων ὧν ἕξιν, to which Paley objects that τούτων here ought grammatically to refer to ἡδονήν: but it might equally be objected that ταῦτα ought to refer to the objects denoted by the same word (τούτων, ταύτην above), i.e. to χαίρειν and φρονεῖν. If, however, ταῦτα is right, it is best to follow Paley in making it refer to "this ἕξις and διάθεσις of the mind for happiness."

ἔχοντος βεβαίως, i.e. possessing as ἕξιν βεβαίαν: this could hardly be applied to διάθεσις if Aristotle's distinction is to hold good.

κρατεῖ ... φρονήσεως; Here Badh.² emends to τοῦ τῆς φρ. on the ground that the acc. with κρατεῖν is not a prose constr. (condemning Ar. *Av.* 420 as spurious).

5. **ἂν δέ γε φρονήσει**, sc. μᾶλλον φαίνηται συγγενής.

6. **ἡ δὲ ἡττᾶται.** 'Pleasure is worsted.' This seems tautologous, and so is pronounced corrupt by Badh.¹, who says that τῇ δὲ ἡττ. is what we want. Paley, however, defends the text thus: "This clause is merely added to check at once, abruptly and decisively, the position of Philebus, that Pleasure is the best of all things. I see not the slightest reason to think the words corrupt with Dr Badham." Still a hypothetical future result can scarcely 'check' anything 'decisively.' But if the text is right ἡ δὲ must be emphasised—"Pleasure is *the* worsted one," as if ἡδονὴ ἡττ. or ἥδε ἡττ.: or perhaps we should insert ἂν after δέ. Badh.² suggests that "the redundancy is due to the constr. with μέν, which was wanted for the sake of emphasis"—retracting his former conj.

9. **δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει.** This variant from the usual formula with τε καί is remarkable, and has tempted Badh., after an old conj. of Stallb., to insert τε. But the omission is defended by *Laws* X. 887 D οἱ τούτων ἡμῖν αἴτιοι τῶν λόγων γεγένηνται καὶ γίγνονται: and it lends intentional emphasis to the second member. So Stallb. correctly says: "copula non geminata primariae sententiae parti aliquid per se cum vi et grauitate adiungitur tanquam secundarium." Transl. "I hold: aye, and will continue to hold."

10. **αὐτὸς γνώσει**, 'shall decide for yourself,' 'do as you please.' For this formula cp. *Gorg.* 505 C τί οὖν ποιήσομεν; ...αὐτὸς γνώσει: *Lach.* 187 C.

12. **τοὐναντίον**, adverbial, 'contrariwise,'—in place of τοὐναντίου, i.e. τῆς ἀπαρνήσεως. Notice the independence of Protarchus, who means the discussion to

ΦΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· | ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιοῦμαι καὶ μαρτύ- B
ρομαι νῦν αὐτὴν τὴν θεόν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἡμεῖς σοι τούτων γε αὐτῶν συμμάρτυρες ἂν εἴμεν, ὡς ταῦτα ἔλεγες ἃ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα
5 ἑξῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅμως καὶ μετὰ Φιλήβου ἑκόντος, ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ, πειρώμεθα περαίνειν.

III. ΣΩ. Πειρατέον, ἀπ' αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς θεοῦ, ἣν ὅδε Ἀφροδίτην μὲν λέγεσθαί φησι, τὸ δ' ἀληθέστατον αὐτῆς ὄνομα ἡδονὴν εἶναι.

10 ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, | ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν C
θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπῃ ἐκείνῃ

B. 3 σε Γ. γε add. Cl. ΓΔΠ et rc. ΞΣ. μάρτυρες pr. Ξ. 4 εἴμεν corr. Σ (et Heindorf, *ad Theaet.* p. 298): ἦμεν *S. ταῦτ' Γ. 5 φιλήβου] φιλίας ΓΑΒw. ἑκόντες F. 7 δὲ (pro δὴ) Cl. ΔΠ. 9 ἡδονὴ F.
C. 12 οὐκ ἔστι] οὐκέτι w.

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be fair and thorough: for παραδούς and κύριος cp. n. on δέχει κτλ. 11 C *supra*.

1. **ἀφοσιοῦμαι**, 'I shake off the pollution,' 'wash my hands of it' (like Pilate's 'I am innocent' etc.): the word has always a ritual tinge.

2. **αὐτὴν τὴν θεόν**, i.e. Ἡδονήν, for whom Phil. professes a holy fear and reverence.

4. **ἔλεγες ἃ λέγεις**, the pres. tense becomes past when looked at from the standpoint of the fut. (ἂν εἴμεν). This remark, though apparently a polite agreement, is really more of a veiled threat, as if "we will not allow you to shift your ground," or "we will bear in mind throughout that you are an extreme sensualist and hedonist." Badh.[2] obelizes ὡς...λέγεις as a 'false gloss.'

5. **ὅμως**, displaced for emphasis from its grammatical place next πειρ. περαίνειν. Cp. *Phaed.* 91 C, *Lys.* 213 A, *Theaet.* 145 D etc.: περαίνειν echoes the περανθῆναι of Socr., 11 C *ad fin.*

ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ, indirect way of putting, with 'Attic urbanity,' ἢ καὶ ἄκοντος or ἢ βίᾳ Φιλήβου.

7. **ἀπ' αὐτῆς δέ**. So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π; but Stallb. adopts δή, perhaps rightly. We should expect with ἀπό, ἀρκτέον, ἀρξαμένους or the like: but as πειρατέον implies 'commencement,' an addition is needless, and Badh.'s demand for such is vain.

αὐτῆς, 'herself,' in her essential nature, as opposed to her mere title, ὄνομα. Cp. the epic formula ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεθα, and ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος *Gorg.* 471 C.

Here we pass on from propounding the thesis to discussing the method proper for the enquiry in hand: see *Introd.* I., III.

11. **τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα**. Socrates dismisses, with an excess of piety that is half ironical, the divine side of Pleasure, and the divine name, as something beyond his unaspiring thought; and so, while leaving the shadowy form of the goddess free and untouched, under the name Aphrodite, he proceeds to attack the actual thing, apart from its deification, under its true title 'pleasure.'

The philosopher is not concerned with ὀνόματα, but with the fundamental notions and realities which underlie them: this indifference to externals is a characteristic of the dialogue: cp. also *Soph.* 218 C, *Polit.* 261 E. For scrupulosity in manner of address to gods cp. *Cratyl.* 400 E: ὥσπερ ἐν εὐχαῖς νόμος ἐστὶν ἡμῖν εὔχεσθαι οἵτινές τε καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι, ταῦτα καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς (τοὺς θεοὺς) καλεῖν, ὡς ἄλλο μηδὲν εἰδότας. *Phaedr.* 246 D: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δή, ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ ἐχέτω τε καὶ λεγέσθω. Aesch. *Ag.* 160 ff.: Ζεύς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ τόδ' αὐτῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ, τοῦτό νιν προσεννέπω. Catull. 34. 21: *Sis quo-*

φίλον, ταύτῃ προσαγορεύω· τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον, καὶ ὅπερ εἶπον, ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἡμᾶς ἀρχομένους ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ σκοπεῖν ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει. ἔστι γάρ, ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως, ἁπλῶς ἕν τι, μορφὰς δὲ δήπου παντοίας
5 εἴληφε καί τινα τρόπον ἀνομοίους ἀλλήλαις. ἰδὲ γάρ· ἥδεσθαι μέν φαμεν τὸν | ἀκολασταίνοντα ἄνθρωπον, ἥδεσθαι D
δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν· ἥδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀνοηταίνοντα καὶ ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν, ἥδεσθαι δ' αὖ τὸν φρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ φρονεῖν· καὶ
10 τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκατέρας πῶς ἄν τις ὁμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἀνόητος φαίνοιτο ἐνδίκως;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὗται πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταί γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι. πῶς γὰρ ἡδονή γε ἡδονῇ μὴ | οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο αὐτὸ E
15 ἑαυτῷ, πάντων χρημάτων;

1 ταύτην ΠS. 3 ἔσχεν Λ. 5 εἴληχε corr. Γ. ἰδὲ Δ.
D. 7 δ' αὖ καὶ Σ: τῷ om. Λ. 9 αὖ om. Cl. ΔΠ. καὶ (post ἥδ. δ' αὖ) om. Cl. ΔΠ. σωφρονοῦντα...σωφρονεῖν Cl. Δ et pr. Π. 11 φαίνεται Δ.
13 τε Π. 14 ἡδονήν γε Cl.
E. 14 τοῦτ' Γ.

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cumque tibi placet Sancta nomine. Hor. *C. S.* 15, 16.

1. **τὴν ἡδονὴν...ποικίλον.** For both sense and construction cp. *Aen.* 4. 569: *uarium et mutabile semper Femina.*

3. **φύσιν,** opposed to ὄνομα, "its essential character"; see *Introd.* v. ii.

4. **ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως,** "to hear it thus named." For this saving clause cp. esp. Dem. *adv. Lept.* 15: ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, λόγον τινὰ ἔχον· εἰ δέ τις ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάσειε, ψεῦδος ἂν ὂν φανείη. So *Lysis* 216 A etc.

ἁπλῶς ἕν τι, "is literally one single definite object." Distinguish ἕν τι from ἕν γέ τι. Badh., it should be noted, puts the comma after ἁπλῶς, thus connecting οὕτως ἁπλῶς.

6. **τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἄνθρωπον.** ἄνθρ., in place of ἄνδρα, has a touch of contempt, besides being generic. For the character of the ἀκόλαστος see Ar. *Eth. N.* III. 10, VII. 7.

7. **αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν...αὐτῷ τῷ φρονεῖν.** Observe that the restrictive αὐτῷ ('pure,' apart from adventitious emotions) is confined to the pair of virtues. In the distribution of particles I have followed Cl. and Stallb.

11. **οὐκ ἀνόητος φαίνοιτο.** As this term has been used just above, I incline to think that Plato would here have noted the repetition, and so suggest that <ἂν αὐτὸς> or <αὐτὸς> has fallen out after ἀνόητος through some copyist's parablepsy.

12. **ἀπ' ἐναντίων,** "resulting from or produced by opposite objects." Note here that Protarchus uses the extreme term ἐναντίαι, whereas ἀνόμοιοι was S.'s word.

14. **τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ,** i.e. pleasure, *qua* pleasure, to pleasure.

The use of μὴ οὐ in **πῶς γὰρ...μὴ οὐχ ὁμ. ἂν εἴη** is noticeable: it is a variation on the Platonic use of μὴ οὐ with subj. to express a suspicion that something may not be true—a cautious negation; which constr., put interrogatively, implies a cautious question with neg. answer implied—e.g. Xen. *Mem.* IV. 2. 12: μὴ οὖν οὐ δύνωμαι ἐγὼ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα ἐξηγήσασθαι; 'do you suspect that I shall be unable to—?' So, here, as Goodwin (*Gk. M. and T.* § 268) explains, "εἴη ἂν

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὦ δαιμόνιε, χρώματι· κατά γε αὐτὸ τοῦτ' οὐδὲν διοίσει τὸ χρῶμα εἶναι πᾶν, τό γε μὴν μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γιγνώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τῷ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιώτατον ὂν τυγχάνει· καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα σχήματι
5 κατὰ ταὐτόν· γένει μέν ἐστι πᾶν ἕν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντιώτατα ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ διαφορότητα | ἔχοντα μυρίαν που τυγχάνει· καὶ πόλλ' ἕτερα οὕτως ἔχονθ' 13
εὑρήσομεν· ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευε, τῷ πάντα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ἓν ποιοῦντι. φοβοῦμαι δέ, μή τινας ἡδονὰς
10 ἡδοναῖς εὑρήσομεν ἐναντίας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦθ' ἡμῶν βλάψει τὸν λόγον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ὄντα ἑτέρῳ, φήσομεν, ὀνόματι. λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ οὐχ ἡδέα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα λόγος οὐδεὶς | ἀμφι- B
15 σβητεῖ· κακὰ δὲ ὄντ' αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν, ὅμως [πάντα] σὺ προσαγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά,

1 ὦ δαιμόνιε ante χρῶμα ponit Γ. χρώματος (pro -τι) Ξ et corr. Π (sic Ast.). 2 οὐδὲν Cl. ΔΛΠC : οὐθὲν *S. τῷ corr. E. εἶναι πᾶν Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠBCHw Flor. a,b,c,i : εἶναι τὸ πᾶν *S (et Galen, v. p. 332, ed. Bas.). 3 ἀφορον Λ. 5 τα δὲ Cl. 6 ἐναντιότητ' w. διαφορώτατα F et pr. Ξ : διαφορότητ' Cl.
13 A. 8 εὑρήσομ' Cl. 11 : ἀλλὰ Cl. ἡμῶν Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCFHw, Flor. a,b,c,i : ἡμῖν *S. 12 ὄντ' ἀνόμοια Γ. ἑταίρω H. 13 πάντ' εἶναι Γ, εἶναι πάντα ΞF. τὰ ἡδέα om. Γ.
B. 15 καλὰ w. δ' ὄντ' Γ, δ' ὄντα Cl. 16 πάντα om. Cl. Δ et pr. Π. ἀγαθὰ αὐτά, ὁμ. Cl.: ἀγαθὰ ὄντα αὐτὰ Γ.

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takes the place of ἤ, and πῶς shows that the original force of μή is forgotten." Cp. *Theaet.* 153 A: τίς ἂν...δύναιτο...μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι; Badh. brackets μὴ as "nothing more than a result of carelessly reading ΗΔΟΝΗΙΟΥΧ."

1. **καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα**...**χρώματι**, sc. ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη. Examples from objects which affect the sense of sight are frequent with Plato, e.g. 53 A below: for this conjunction of χρῶμα and σχῆμα cp. *Gorg.* 465 B. Badh.[2] places both χρώματι and σχήματι in brackets.

7. **μυρίαν**, not of number of individual differences, but of extent, 'measureless': cp. *Apol.* 23 C, ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμί.

8. **πάντα**...**ἓν ποιοῦντι.** The unification of opposites or hasty generalisation was Prot.'s mistake: he allowed himself to be the dupe of common terms.

9. **φοβοῦμαι μή**...with fut. indic. expresses fear that the event *will* take place: cp. *Rep.* 451 A, *Phaed.* 84 E, Soph. *Trach.* 550 for this rare constr.: see also Goodwin, *G. M. T.* § 367.

12. **ὅτι προσαγορεύεις**...**ἑτέρῳ**...**ὀνόματι.** The text is rightly retained by Stallb. and Badh.: but when the former (followed by Paley) renders ἑτέρῳ by "alio nomine atque oportebat quodque cum dissimilitudine illa minime convenit" he seems making over-much of it: it means simply 'second,' i.e. in addition to the name of pleasure ('You apply to them a new predicate,' Jowett). The 'logical damage' only comes in when we outstep the consideration of pleasures as such, and try to attach to them a second quality, such as 'goodness' or the reverse: it is then that the confusion of genus with species βλάπτει τὸν λόγον. Hence emendations are worse than needless—such as Grov.'s ὅτι <οὐ> προσαγ., Heind.'s ἑνί γέ τῳ, B.-Crusius' προσαγορεύσει.

16. **ὅμως σὺ προσαγ. ἀγαθὰ αὐτά, ὁμολ. κτλ.**: I follow Badh. in adopting

ὁμολογῶν ἀνόμοια εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ εἴ τίς σε προσαναγκάζοι. τί οὖν δὴ ταὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς κακαῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν ἀγαθαῖς ἑνὸν πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προσαγορεύεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; οἴει γάρ τινα συγ-
5 χωρήσεσθαι, θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, εἶτα ἀνέξεσθαί σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας | ἀγαθὰς [ἡδονάς], τὰς δέ C
τινας ἑτέρας αὐτῶν κακάς;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν ἀνομοίους γε φήσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι καί τινας ἐναντίας.

10 ΠΡΩ. Οὔτι καθ' ὅσον γε ἡδοναί.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐδ' ἄρα ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι φήσομεν, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα

3 ἀγαθὰς F. 4 τινα om. Γ. 5 εἶτ' Γ.

C. 6 ἡδονὰς om. Δ, post ἀγαθὰς ponunt Cl. ΓΠC. 8 φήσεις H. ἀλλήλους w. 9 ἐναντίους Λ. 10 γε καθόσον Λ Flor. a,b,c,i. ἡδονάς Σ. 11 φερώμεθα F. 12 ἄρα γε Γ. ἡδονὴν ΓΛΞΣBCH et corr. Π: ἡδονὴ *S. ὁμοίους Δ. εἶναι om. ΛΣBEFHw Flor. a,c et pr. Ξ. 13 τὰ νῦν δὴ Cl. ΔΠ, δεῖ τὰ νῦν E: δὴ τὰ νῦν *S.

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the reading and punctuation of Cl.—Stallb. and Wb. read ὅμως πάντα σὺ προσαγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ, αὐτὰ ὁμ. ἀνόμ. εἶναι, τῷ λόγ. κτλ. But 'tres optimi libri πάντα omittunt,' and Turr. bracket the word, and the emphatic position of αὐτά seems wrong. Badh.[1] regards the dative τῷ λόγῳ as constructed ἀπὸ κοινοῦ with both ὁμολ. and προσαναγκ., while Badh.[2] confines it to ἀνόμ., and Wb. to εἴ τις. For ὅμως, H. and Badh.[2] give ὁμοίως.

Before ἀνόμοια Herm. and Badh. insert ἄν, while Jackson would alter προσαναγκάζοι into προσαναγκάζει—a better correction, as Prot. has *already* made the admission as to the diversity of pleasures, *supra* 13 A: Ἴσως κτλ.

2. **τί οὖν...ἑνὸν...προσαγορεύεις;** A strange construction, apparently equal to τί οὖν...ἔνεστιν ὥστε...σε προσαγορεύειν. ἑνόν is probably acc. absol., unless we regard it as dir. object of the verb, in which case πάσας ἡδονάς will be a redundant afterthought. But I incline to adopt, with Jackson, ἐνορῶν for ἑνόν, as Thompson proposed. For, in spite of Badh., ἐνορῶ ἐν σοὶ τοῦτο is quite good Gk.; cp. Thuc. I. 95, *Rivales* 133 D. For the redundant εἶναι with verbs of naming cp. *Cratyl.* 396 B, *Tim.* 59 A, *Parm.* 133 D, *Lach.* 192 A, *Theaet.* 160 B.

4. **συγχωρήσεσθαι** is bracketed by Badh. as an improper rival to ἀνέξ.

5. **ἡδονὴν εἶναι τἀγαθόν.** This is the first definite statement of the claim of ἡδονή to be τἀγαθόν, as distinct from ἀγαθόν: and it is made by Prot. in his excited opposition to S.'s insidious attack.

For **ἀνέχεσθαι** with gen. of partic. cp. *Gorg.* 491 A, *Rep.* 564 D, 613 D.

For position of **εἶτα** cp. *Phaed.* 70 E; and for insertion of τινας (=nescio quas), cp. *Rep.* 339 C, *Laws* 658 B.

6. **τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς [ἡδονάς].** I agree with Wb. in following Vat., which omits the subst., thinking it a gloss inserted by later hands in various positions. In Prot.'s hasty speech such omission would be natural—the pl. ἡδονάς being easily understood from the preceding sing. Badh., however, retains it, after ἀγαθάς with the best MSS., while Stallb. gives ἡδονὰς ἀγαθας on less authority.

7. **ἑτέρας** is obelized by Badh.

οὐδέν τι τρώσει, πεισόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἐροῦμεν ἅπερ οἱ πάντων | φαυλότατοί τε καὶ περὶ λόγους ἅμα νέοι. D

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι σὲ μιμούμενος ἐγὼ καὶ ἀμυνόμενος ἐὰν τολμῶ λέγειν, ὡς τὸ ἀνομοιότατόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνομοιοτάτῳ πάντων ὁμοιότατον, ἔξω τὰ αὐτὰ σοὶ λέγειν, καὶ φανούμεθά γε νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐκπεσὼν οἰχήσεται. πάλιν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνακρουώμεθα, καὶ τάχ' ἂν ἰόντες εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας ἴσως ἄν πως ἀλλήλοις συγχωρήσαιμεν.

ΠΡΩ. | Λέγε πῶς; E

IV. ΣΩ. Ἐμὲ θὲς ὑπὸ σοῦ πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΣΩ. Φρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐγὼ θέμενος εἶπον ἀγαθόν, διερωτώμενος ὅτι ποτέ ἐστι τἀγαθόν, ἆρ' οὐ ταὐτὸν πείσονται τοῦτο ὅπερ ὁ σὸς λόγος;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

1 πειρασώμεθα ΞF, πειρώμεθα ΔΠ, πειρόμεθα Cl.
D. 5 ἀνομοιότατον corr. Π. 6 γε om. ΛF. 7 ἡμῖν ἐκπεσὼν Cl. ΔΠ: ἐκπεσὼν ἡμῖν *S. εἰχήσεται Ξ. 8 ἂν ἰόντες Σw: ἀνιόντες *S. 9 που Γ.
E. 15 ἀγαθὸν Cl. ΔΠΗ: ἀγαθὰ *S. 16 ποτ' ἐστιν ἀγαθόν Cl.

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1. **οὐδέν τι τρώσει.** I adopt Dr H. Jackson's emendation (*J. Phil.* X. p. 262 N.) for the τιτρώσκει of MSS., which Badh. alters to τιτρώσκειν, to make it depend on φήσομεν. Either correction is easy and plausible. Cp. Stallb. on *Phaed.* 65 E.

πεισόμεθα is Badh.'s correction (approved also by Paley) for πειρόμεθα or -ώμεθα of MSS. πειρασόμεθα is the common reading, retained by Stallb. and Wb. Cp. πείσονται ... ὅπερ 13 E *infra*. Badh. also transposes καὶ from before περὶ to before νέοι.

2. **ἅμα νέοι.** Cp. below νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος (like ἀρχαιότερος τοῦ δέοντος *Euthyd.* 295 C): παιδαριώδη 14 D: τῶν νέων 15 E: ὦ παῖδες 16 B. Childishness and crudeness in philosophic method is what Socr. is mainly concerned with castigating in this dialogue. Perhaps the rather superfluous ἅμα should be altered to μάλα, which would give a better correspondence to the preceding superl.

4. **ἐὰν τολμῶ λέγειν,** 'if I am unblushing enough to affirm,' as such an affirmation would be doing violence to his own intellectual honesty, and so would demand an exercise of τόλμα or subjugation of the shame-instinct (αἰδώς).

7. **ἐκπεσὼν οἰχήσεται,** metaphor from a ship stranded in a storm: the rhythm suggests a tragic citation. The marine metaphor is carried on from εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερ. λόγον above, and continued in ἀνακρουώμεθα, 'back her out,' cp. Hdt. 8. 84. **ἂν ἰόντες** for ἀνιόντες H., Badh. and Wb. **εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας,** sc. λαβάς, met. from wrestling, *Phaedr.* 236 C. For the conjunction of metaphors cp. Shaksp.'s "take arms against a sea of troubles."

14. **φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς** are here substituted for φρονεῖν, νοεῖν, μεμνῆσθαι of 11 B, whence ἐπιστήμη, 'acquired knowledge,' seems equated with 'memory.'

15. **διερωτ. ὅτι ποτέ ἐστι τἀγαθόν,** "when questioned closely (δια-) to define (state the τί ἐστί of) the Good." The preceding ἀγαθόν is condemned by Badh. as superfluous.

ΣΩ. Πολλαί τε αἱ ξυνάπασαι ἐπιστῆμαι δόξουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοί τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναντίαι πῃ γίγνονταί τινες, ἆρα | ἄξιος ἂν εἴην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν, 14
εἰ φοβηθεὶς τοῦτο αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνόμοιον φαίην ἐπιστήμην
5 ἐπιστήμῃ γίγνεσθαι, κἄπειθ' ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ μῦθος ἀπολόμενος οἴχοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ σῳζοίμεθα ἐπί τινος ἀλογίας;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν δεῖ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ σωθῆναι. τό γε μήν μοι ἴσον τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγου ἀρέσκει· πολλαὶ μὲν ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γιγνέσθων, πολλαὶ
10 δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ διάφοροι.

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, | τοῦ ἀγα- B
θοῦ τοῦ τ' ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, κατατιθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον, τολμῶμεν, ἄν πῃ ἐλεγχομένω μηνύ-

2 ἀνόμοιαί Cl. ΔΠ. 3 ἆρ' Γ.
14 A. 4 τοῦτ' Γ. μὴ δὲ μίαν Cl. ἀνόμοιον] ἂν ἀνόμοιον S (? ἂν ὅμοιον).
5 ἐπιστήμης (pro -ῃ) E. οὕτως Cl. ΔΠ. 6 ἀπολλόμενος Γ. 7 : ἀλλ' Cl. ΔΞΣΠ, om. personae signum (:) *S. δεῖ τοῦτο ΛΣBCHw : δεῖν τοῦτο Cl. ΔΠ : τοῦτο δεῖ *S.
8 : τό ΞF. ἴσως Γ et corr. Δ. 9 γίγνεσθον Cl. ΓΛBCEFH : γίγνεσθαι Ξw et corr. Σ.
11 : τὴν Cl. ΔΠΣF.
B. 12 γ' Γ. 13 δ' w. τολμώμενα Λ. ἐλεγχόμενοι MSS. et edd. vett.

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1. **πολλαὶ...ἄμφω**: the whole of this is assigned in Steph. and Bekk. to Socr.; Schütz first corrected.

αἱ ξυνάπασαι ἐπ., 'the branches of knowledge as a collective whole.'

2. **καὶ ἐναντίαι**, 'actually contrary,' as contrasted with merely ἀνόμοιοι, 'heterogeneous.'

3. **ἄξιος...εἰ**, Badh. rewrites thus, ἄξιος ἂν εἴην του, [διαλέγεσθαι νῦν,] εἰ κτλ.

5. **ὥσπερ μῦθος ἀπολόμενος οἴχοιτο.** Photius 279. 1: μῦθος ἐσώθη· ἐπίρρημά ἐστι λεγόμενον ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ τοῖς λεγομένοις μύθοις τοῖς παιδίοις. Cp. *Rep.* 621 B: μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ—which suggests, as Badh. notes, that the original saying was ὁ μῦθος ἀπώλετο rather than ὁ μ. ἐσώθη: cp. however also *Laws* 645 B οὕτω...ὁ μῦθος ἀρετῆς σεσωσμένος ἂν εἴη, and contrariwise *Theaet.* 164 D.

For the naval met. cp. esp. *Phaed.* 85 D ἐπὶ (λόγου) τούτου ὀχούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας...ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος ἢ λόγου θείου τινός κτλ.: and above 13 C, D.

9. **γιγνέσθων.** Concessive use of imper.: cp. *Euthyphr.* 9 C, Soph. *Antig.* 74.

13. **τολμῶμεν...ἐλεγχομένω μηνύσωσι.** I follow Grovius, Heind. and Herm. in emending ἐλεγχόμενοι to the dual (sc. τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν ἀγαθόν). Cornarius wrote τλῶμεν ἐλεγχόμενοι, ἄν τινες ἐλεγχόμενοι μηνύσωσι: Fischer τλῶμεν, ἄν τινες ἐλεγχ. μην.: Baumgarten-Crusius τολμῶμεν ἐλεγχ., ἄν πῃ μηνύσωσι, sc. αἱ διαφορότητες: Schleiermacher τολμῶμεν, ἄν πῃ ἐλεγχομένη μηνύσῃ. Winckelmann inserted οἱ λόγοι after ἐλεγχόμενοι, while Bernhardy is content to supply it from the context. Stallb., however, argues that 'non ipsa utriusque boni natura, sed potius diuersitas formarum atque partium utrique propria dicitur fortasse indicatura esse, si exploretur diligentius, num uoluptas, an scientia, an tertium quiddam pro summo et absoluto bono ducendum sit':—whence he maintains that none of the above-mentioned explanations is correct, and so, in the tracks of Schleierm., proposes ἐλεγχόμεναι, sc. αἱ διαφορότητες: and Wohlrab also prints -μεναι.

Badh. suspects τολμῶμεν, and suggests in its place τῷ λόγῳ, ὁρῶμεν, or else an addition such as τολμ. (ἑκάτεροι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον παρέχειν εἰς τὴν κρίσιν) ἄν πῃ κτλ. Paley retains the common text, rendering τολμῶμεν, 'let us bear the issue,' and supplying ὁ σὸς καὶ ἐμὸς λόγος with

σωσι, πότερον ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν δεῖ λέγειν ἢ φρόνησιν ἤ τι τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι. νῦν γὰρ οὐ δήπου πρός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονεικοῦμεν, ὅπως ἀγὼ τίθεμαι, ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἢ ταῦθ' ἃ σύ, τῷ δ' ἀληθεστάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς
5 ἄμφω.

ΠΡΩ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

V. ΣΩ. Τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον | δι' ὁμο- C
λογίας βεβαιωσώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸν ποῖον δή;

10 ΣΩ. Τὸν πᾶσι παρέχοντα ἀνθρώποις πράγματα ἑκοῦσί τε καὶ ἄκουσιν ἐνίοις καὶ ἐνίοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Τὸν νῦν δὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως πεφυκότα θαυμαστόν. ἓν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἓν
15 πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥᾴδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τούτων ὁποτερονοῦν τιθεμένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει | πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ D

1 τι om. Cl. Δ et pr. Π. 2 δ post τοῦτο om. Bekk. (et rec. edd.) cum corr. Γ. 3 ὅπως om. ΣBCEFHw. ἀγω Cl. 4 ἢ] καὶ Λ. δεῖ] δή ΔΛBCHw et pr. ΓΣ.
C. 8 βεβαιωσόμεθα C : ἐβεβαιωσώμεθα corr. F. 14 γὰρ om. Λ. 15 ῥάδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι Cl. Δ et pr. H : ῥάδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι ἂν Γ : ῥᾴδιον ἂν ἀμφισβητῆσαι *S.
17 ὅτ' ἄν τις Cl. φησι F. 18 φυσει E.

ἐλεγχόμενοι (after Bernhardy). Madvig (*adv. crit.* I. 391) supposes an infin. lost after τολμῶμεν, and conj. τολμῶμεν μετιέναι, ἄν πῃ κτλ. (or one might suggest ὁμολογεῖν). K. T. Liebhold (*Neue Jahrb.* 1880, p. 526) conj. for τολμ., πολεμῶμεν. It is, I think, certain that τολμῶμεν must be retained, in view of τολμῶ λέγειν in 13 D, and φοβηθείς in 14 A *supra*. If the claimants in this 'public trial,' the subjects of the legal terms ἐλεγχ. and μηνύσ., are the personified λόγοι, or rival definitions of 'the good' in life, I suggest that the words τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ are a gloss, λόγου being understood with ἐμοῦ and σοῦ. The λέγειν which follows serves to explain τολμ. without need of an insertion.

Most edd. and MSS. read τι τρίτον, but Turr. and Herm. follow the Bodl. in ejecting τι.

3. **φιλονεικεῖν πρός** recurs 50 B : cp. *Laws* 731 A, *Gorg.* 457 E, *Rep.* 338 A : and φιλ. ὅπως is found in Xen. *Mem.* 2. 3. 17. Ought we not to spell the word here -νικοῦμεν (see Cobet *Nov. Lectt.* 691 ff.), as there is clearly a play with the foll. νικῶντα?

13. **τὸν νῦν δὴ παραπεσόντα**, 'which has just now presented itself': cp. ὁ παραπεπτωκὼς λόγος *Laws* 832 B : καιρὸς παραπίπτει Thuc. 4. 23, al.

15. **καὶ ῥᾴδιον ἀμφισβ.** Paley supplies ἐστί with ῥᾴδιον; whereas Stallb. translates "quodque facile efficiat ut quis utrumcunque ponenti moveat controversiam," and Badh., "affording a ready objection against anyone who advances either."

For the general sense of the following passage, see *Introd.* III.

18. **πολλοὺς εἶναι** κτλ. I follow Badh. and Wb. in removing the comma after πάλιν and putting it after ἀλλήλοις, thus making καί simply connect πολλούς and ἐναντίους, which is simpler and neater than the common punctuation.

For the art. before the pronoun cp. 20 B τὸν ἐμέ.

ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;

ΣΩ. Σὺ μέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά, συγκεχωρημένα δὲ ὡς
5 ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἤδη μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥάδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ὑπολαμβανόντων γίγνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, ὅταν | τις E
ἑκάστου τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἄλλα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο εἶναι διομολογησάμενος, ἐλέγχῃ κατα-
10 γελῶν, ὅτι τέρατα διηνάγκασται φάναι, τό τε ἓν ὡς πολλά ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρα, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς ἓν μόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἕτερα λέγεις, ἃ μήπω συγκεχωρημένα δεδήμευται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον; |

ΣΩ. Ὁπόταν, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἓν μὴ τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ 15
15 ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθῇ, καθάπερ ἀρτίως ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν. ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἕν, ὅπερ εἴπομεν νῦν δή, συγκεχώρηται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγχειν· ὅταν δέ τις ἕνα ἄνθρωπον

D. 1 τιθέμενον Cl. Π et pr. Δ: τιθεμένη Λ: τιθεμένοις *S.
E. 9 ἑκάστῳ P. διωμολογησάμενον editt. Bas. 1 et 2 cum Ficino. 11 ἓν om. Λ. 12 ὦ σώκρατες ἕτερα Cl. ΓΔΠΒC: ἕτερα ὦ σώκρατες *S. λέγεις ante ὦ ponit Σ.
15 A. 14 τε om. Δ. 16 δεῖν] δεῖν Cl. ΔΠ.

For the exposure of this vulgar crux cp. *Soph.* 251 A ff., *Parmen.* 130 A ff.

συγκεχωρημένα, partic. pass., agreeing with the object in place of main verb συγκεχώρηται.

ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν with πάντων, 'admitted, nought speaking, on all hands by this time.'

ἅπτεσθαι, 'handle' or 'meddle with' as in *Soph.* 227 B; not 'impugn' or 'revile' as in *Phaed.* 89 D.

ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, sc. δεῖν ἐλέγχειν (συγκεχώρηται) or the like from ἅπτεσθαι above.

τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἄλλα μέρη. Bekk.'s conjecture is ἄμα, so too Heerm. in Ficin. (cum ἄλλα τε ἄμα in Cl. Π et pr. Δ); but Bekk. retains ἄμα. For the combination of 'members and parts' cp. *Laws* 903 B, *Phaed.* 228 A, *Soph.* 245 A, *Tim.* 73 E; for 'members of mortal body' *Soph.* 249 A, *Tim.* 69 C, *Laws* 732 C.

διωμολογησάμενος, 'having got it admitted' or 'having agreed' (Bekk. and Burn.), following Stallb. and Bekk. (Cl.). "ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ὀνόματα ἐκφέρει ἐκφέρειν ὀνόματα." Stallb.

ἐλέγχῃ κατα γελῶν. The obj. in acc., αὐτόν, must be supplied from ἑκάστου: cp. *Soph.* 217 C, 230 B.

10. **τέρατα φάναι**: cp. *Theat.* 163 D, 164 B, 188 C, *Euthyd.* 300 C, *Parmen.* 130 A, *Meno* 91 D, *Hipp. Maj.* 300 E.

13. **συγκεχωρημένα δεδήμευται**: Proc. alludes to Soc.'s expression above, so that συγκεχ. stands for συγκεχ. οὐ δεῖν ἅπτεσθαι, or 'tabooed.' For δημεύειν (publish, popularise, vulgarise) the regular term is δημοσιεύειν (*Theat.* 161 E), while δημεύειν occurs in *Soph.* 251 D, and δημεύεσθαι in Aristotle. Bekk. brackets συγκ.

15. **ἐνταυθοῖ**, i.e. where the one posited is τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων. Socrates will seem more natural in speaking of positing without doubt: and so he proceeds in Ar. Cl. and Prise., where Mss. give ἐνθάδε. After Einsiedel's conjecture of Ar. A. 1. 184, Stallb. adopts ἐνθάδε, but Bekk. retains ἐνταυθοῖ in Ar. 33 D τοιοῦτον ἐνταυθοῖ, 34 B ἐνταυθοῖ, 35 D ἐνταυθοῖ. Here Bekk. prints ἐνθάδε.

17. **τὸ μὴ δεῖν**: sc. the act. with this

ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἕνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἓν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἑνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ πολλὴ* σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

5 ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας | εἶναι μονάδας B
ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὔσας· εἶτα πῶς αὖ ταύτας, μίαν ἑκάστην οὖσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε ὄλεθρον προσδεχομένην, [ὅμως] εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασ-

B. 8 βεβαιότατα Cl. ΓΔΠΣBCFHw et corr. Ξ: βεβαιότητα *S.

verb cp. *Soph.* 218 C δέδοκται...τὸ πρότερον αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν.

2. **ἡ πολλὴ* σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.** Schütz proposed to insert *καί* before *μετά*: and similarly (though more scientifically) Badh.[1] inserted *δέ* after *μετά*, expounding thus: "The reality of ideas is the subject of *earnest consideration*, the mode of their division in things sensible is the cause of *great controversy*." But in ed. 2 he bracketed *σπουδή* as a gloss due to *Phaed.* 248 B: cp. *ib.* 276 D. Paley suggests "it is possible that the words *σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρέσεως* were a gloss on *ἀμφισβήτησις*." His translation runs, "it is about these and such-like unities that all the pains are taken, with careful subdivision, and all the real difficulty is felt." Poste gives: "Such unities earnestly examined and split into pluralities soon kindle genuine controversy." Stallb. defends the received text, "nam *ἡ π. σπ. μετὰ διαιρ.* idem est fere quod *ἡ π. σπουδὴ* quae utitur *διαιρέσεως*," cp. *Rep.* 546 B, 571 B, *Phaed.* 69 B, *Laws* 906 A, B, al. Herm. agrees with Paley: "*σπ. μ. διαιρ.* tanquam interpretamentum sequentis *ἀμφισβήτησις* circumscripsi...Stallbaumii autem explicatio...dubito an a Platonis sententia abhorreat, qui in *Phaedro* c. 49 distinguendo altercationes componi potius quam excitari censet." I once thought we should write *σπουδὴ* <*ἡ*> *μετὰ δ.*, but now prefer to emend to the dat. *σπουδῇ*, cp. *Phaedr.* 276 B ff. This sense is defended by 14 C *supra*: *ἐν γὰρ δὴ...ἀμφισβητῆσαι*, since *διαίρεσις* is the method for converting *ἕν* into *πολλά*.

5. **πρῶτον μὲν εἰ...εἶτα πῶς...μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ'...εἴτε...εἴτε** κτλ. Three distinct points of discussion appear to be here raised regarding (1) the veritable existence of monads of the kind described: (3) how such a monad can be present either in whole or in part in the objects which come and go, while retaining that singleness and self-identity: as to (2) opinions differ.

Badh. held *ὅμως* to mark the contradiction which follows: "*notwithstanding* what is to be said in the following sentence": and so he denied that a new, third, question is introduced by *μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο*. Paley accepts this explanation of *ὅμως*, but still holds (with Stallb. and Maguire) that there are three questions, which seems impossible. Jackson, too, appears to make but two sentences of it. O. Apelt (in *Neue Jahrb.* '93, p. 283) proposes *ὄντως* for *ὅμως*, cp. *Rep.* 585 D.

Schneider explains the second problem thus: "wie, indem jede einzelne immer dieselbe und weder des Entstehens noch des Vergehens fähig ist, sie gleichwohl ganz sicher diese eine sei d. h. wie wir zu der Erkenntniss der einzelnen Ideen gelangen, da die Ideen ausserhalb der Sphäre des Entstehens und Vergehens liegen, innerhalb deren wir stehen," and refers for confirmation to *Parmen.* 133—"was im *Parm.* ausgedrückt wird durch *εἰ ἓν εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἀεί τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις* und die Frage nach der Erkennbarkeit der Ideen hervorruft, das sagen an unserer Stelle des Philebus die Worte: *μίαν ἑκάστην οὖσαν ἀεὶ...προσδεχ.*"

But it is difficult to see how the present clause can yield this sense, or refer to the cognisability of the Monads. Badh.[2]'s suggestion to insert *μή* before *εἶναι*, is tempting: the meaning then will be, 'how can such a monad, although self-

μένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγονυῖαν θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὑτῆς χωρίς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνοιτ' ἄν, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἅμα ἐν ἑνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι. ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα | ἓν καὶ πολλά, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, C
5 ἁπάσης ἀπορίας αἴτια μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογηθέντα καὶ εὐπορίας ἂν αὖ καλῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ νῦν πρῶτον διαπονήσασθαι;

ΣΩ. Ὡς γοῦν ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν.

10 ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντας τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὑπόλαβε συγχωρεῖν σοι τούσδε τὰ τοιαῦτα· Φίληβον δ' ἴσως κράτιστον ἐν τῷ νῦν ἐπερωτῶντα μὴ κινεῖν εὖ κείμενον.

VI. ΣΩ. Εἶεν· πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης | ἄρξηται πολλῆς D

C. 5 ἀπορίας Λ. 7 χρὴ τοῦθ' Cl. ΔΠ: χρή που τοῦθ' *S. 12 κινεῖν κακὸν εὖ Γ. 13 οὖν τις Cl. ΔΠ: οὖν ἄν τις *S.

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identical and invariable, yet be pluralised?' Stallb. explains the second ἀπορία thus: "deinde, quomodo unaquaeque ab ortu et interitu immunis esse intelligatur": but this leaves ὅμως unaccounted for. I think, however, that Stallb. has given us the right sense, and that ὅμως is corrupt: so that the second problem concerns the Eternity of the Monads.

Accordingly, I print ὅμως in brackets, though strongly inclined to accept ὄντως.

For the problems of Idealism, cp. *Introd.* VI.

With **εἶτα πῶς** supply ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ. The constr. with πῶς is continued in the third question also.

The same difficulties are raised also in *Parmen.* 130 A: they are criticisms on a misunderstood Platonism.

2. **ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἅμα ἐν ἑνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγν.**: Schleierm. corrected to τ. καὶ ἓν ἅμα εἶναι καὶ εἰ π. γ.—needlessly.

3. **ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἓν καὶ πολλά** κτλ. "It is these questions,—viz. those which deal with the One and Many of the kind described,—and not those first mentioned (ἐκεῖνα), Protarchus, which," etc.: such I take to be the order of the words, although Stallb. appears to differ, as he translates: "Haecce sunt in talibus quaestionibus τὰ ἓν καὶ πολλά (quae ad res non adspectabiles, atque notiones animis nostris informatas referuntur), nec uero illa (quae ad res sensibus subiectas pertinent), quae, si non recte de iis constiterit, omnis dubitationis caussae existunt; sin recte, etiam prosperi disputationis successus felicitatem afferre possint." From this I suppose Stallb. to take ταῦτα τὰ ἓν καὶ πολλά together. Paley renders, "These are the cases of 'One and Many,' viz. in abstracts, and not in those others, the concretes, which are the causes," etc.; which looks as if he meant to supply περὶ before ἐκεῖνα.

6. **ἂν αὖ καλῶς**, sc. εἴη, cp. *Theaet.* 186 D, Ar. *Nub.* 5 etc.: Badh., however, would expunge ἄν.

11. **Φίληβον...μὴ κινεῖν εὖ κείμενον.** The proverb is thus given by Suidas: Μὴ κινεῖν κακὸν εὖ κείμενον· ἐπὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῖς ἐξ ἀγνοίας πράγματα ἐγειρόντων. "Salse igitur pro κακόν dicitur Φίληβον." Cp. Schol. *ad h. l.*: μὴ κινεῖν κακὸν εὖ κείμενον, ἐπὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῖς ἐξ ἀγνοίας πράγματα ἐγειρόντων. ταύτης μέμνηται καὶ Ἑπερίδης ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἀριστογείτονα· "καὶ οὐδὲ ἐκ τῆς παροιμίας δύνασαι μανθάνειν τὸ μὴ κινεῖν κακὸν εὖ κείμενον." μετῆκται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐν Ῥόδῳ Κολοσσοῦ, ὃς πεσὼν πολλὰς οἰκίας κατέσεισε. βασιλέως δὲ βουλομένου αὐτὸν ἀναστῆσαι, φοβούμενοι οἱ Ῥόδιοι μὴ πάλιν καταπέσῃ, τὸ προκείμενον ἐπεφθέγξαντο.

12. **ἐπερωτῶντα** is bracketed by Badh.[2].

13. **πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἄρξηται**: so the best MSS., omitting the ἄν: the old text was οὖν ἄν τις. For the delib. subj. with

οὔσης καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα μάχης; ἆρ' ἐνθένδε;

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν;

ΣΩ. Φαμέν που ταὐτὸν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων γιγνό-
5 μενα περιτρέχειν πάντῃ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεὶ καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηταί ποτε οὔτε ἤρξατο νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ γευσάμενος ἑκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἡσθεὶς | ὥς E
10 τινα σοφίας εὑρηκὼς θησαυρόν, ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιᾷ τε καὶ πάντα κινεῖ λόγον ἄσμενος, τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν καὶ

D. 3 ποθεν non alteri dant Cl. ΓΛCEFH. 4 που Cl. ΓΔΠ : πη corr. Σ : ποι *S. 5 ἀεὶ ΓΔΣ. 6 παύσηται Λ. 7 ἔστι] ἐπὶ Cl. 8 ἄγηρων Cl. 9 πρῶτος F.
E. 11 κοινωνεῖ Λ. τότε Cl. w.

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indef. subject, cp. *Soph.* 225 A: τί τις ἄλλο εἴπῃ. Sophocl. *O. C.* 170 ποῖ τις φροντίδος ἔλθῃ. Ar. *Plut.* 438 ποῖ τις φύγῃ. Soph. *Aj.* 403. The 1st person in such questions of appeal is much more usual: cp. Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 289.

Were the ἂν retained we should have to alter the verb to the opt.; cp. *Menex.* 237 A: πόθεν ἂν ὀρθῶς ἀρξαίμεθα ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς ἐπαινοῦντες. Soph. *Phil.* 1393: τί δῆτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς δρῷμεν. Badh.[2] objects to ταύτης as inappropriate and bad Greek.

4. **φαμέν που ταὐτὸν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων γιγνόμενα** κτλ. Stallb. states the order to be φ. π. ἓν κ. π. ὑ. λ. ταὐτὸν γιγνόμενα, "dicimus, opinor, unum et multa disserendo idem facta ubique reperiri," this unification consisting in 'genera in partes diuidere, et uicissim partes ad genera sua referre, quo arctissima eorum intelligitur necessitudo et coniunctio.' But Badh. (who reads γιγνόμενον) is right in denying that there is here any reference to the dialectical processes of synthesis and analysis, as is shown by the whole tenor both of S.'s remark and of P.'s reply (τὴν τοιαύτην ταραχήν): so too Paley renders, "We say that this same 'One and Many,' called into being by discussions, goes the round of every subject of conversation, whether new or old," though he gives as variant 'the doctrine of the identity of One and Many.'

λόγοι, 'concepts' which underlie 'words': **λεγόμενα** objects of conception and discourse.

5. **ἀεί** goes with τῶν λεγ., as if τῶν ἀεὶ λεγ., i.q. τῶν ἑκάστοτε λεγ.: cp. *Rep.* 360 A.

6. **οὔτε μὴ παύσηταί ποτε**: Badh.[1] and others change to παύσεται, in conformity with Dawes' Canon: but see Goodwin *M. T.* § 295 and *App.* II.

8. **πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν**. Paley halts between "property of the subjects themselves that arises in our minds," and "feeling in us, resulting from the subjects themselves": the latter is certainly wrong. ἐν ἡμῖν suggests a contrast with ἐν θεῷ or Διὸς ψυχῇ.

ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ γευσάμενος ἑκ. τῶν νέων κτλ. Cp. *Rep.* 539 B: ἆρ' οὖν οὐ μία μὲν εὐλάβεια αὕτη συχνὴ τὸ μὴ νέους ὄντας αὐτῶν γεύεσθαι; οἶμαι γάρ σε οὐ λεληθέναι ὅτι οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύωνται, ὡς παιδιᾷ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ἀεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὥσπερ σκυλάκια κτλ.

11. **τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν**: Badh.[1] says this continues the met. in πάντα λόγον κινεῖ, which alludes to the proverb πάντα λίθον κινεῖν—'turning them upside down and rolling them back again': while Paley suggests that ἀνειλίττειν meant 'to undo a piece of masonry just constructed.' I cannot see the appropriateness of the terms used to express such a metaphor. *Rep.* 539 B suggests that the youths are compared to puppies, the λόγος to a piece of meat: while συμφύρω, as in 51 A, is used of 'kneading' together

συμφύρων εἰς ἕν, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίττων καὶ διαμερίζων, εἰς ἀπορίαν αὐτὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα καταβάλλων, δεύτερον δ' ἀεὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον, ἄντε νεώτερος ἄντε πρεσβύτερος ἄντε ἥλιξ ὢν τυγχάνῃ, φειδόμενος οὔτε πατρὸς οὔτε | μητρὸς 16
5 οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐδενός, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε οὐδενὸς ἂν φείσαιτο, εἴπερ μόνον ἑρμηνέα ποθὲν ἔχοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἆρ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν, καὶ οὐ φοβεῖ μή σοι μετὰ Φιλήβου
10 ξυνεπιθώμεθα, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς λοιδορῇς; ὅμως δέ—μανθάνομεν γὰρ ὃ λέγεις—εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστι καὶ μηχανὴ τὴν μὲν τοιαύτην ταραχὴν ἡμῖν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν, ὁδὸν δέ τινα καλλίω | ταύτης ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀνευρεῖν, σύ τε προθυμοῦ B
τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν· οὐ γὰρ
15 σμικρὸς ὁ παρὼν λόγος, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ παῖδες, ὡς φησιν ὑμᾶς προσαγορεύων Φίληβος. οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο <ἢ> ἧς

1 συμφορῶν F. τότε Cl. ἀνειλίττων Cl. Π et pr. Δ: ἀνελίττων *S. καὶ om. A. 2 ἀπορίαν FH. αὐτὸν Cl. 3 ἑλόμενον F. 4 ἥλιξ Cl.
16 A. 5 οὐδ' ἑνὸς Cl. ὀυλίγου E. καὶ om. EF. 7 μόνον ἑρμηνέα Cl. ΓΔΠ: ἑρμηνέα μόνον *S. 9 οὐ om. H. 12 πῶς Cl.
B. 14 συνακολουθήσωμεν A. 16 ἡμᾶς w. 17 μὴν ἔστι Cl. γένοιτο Cl. ΔΠ: γίγνοιτο *S.

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two unlike or incompatible elements. "Now rolling them all into a ball and kneading them into one, and anon unrolling them back again and tearing them in pieces." Or else the idea may be that of a man handling treasure, now making a heap of it, now spreading each piece out separately as he gloats over it: or Badh.[2] may be right in taking it of the 'handling of a volume.' For ἐπὶ θάτερα cp. *Soph.* 259 C.

3. **ἀεὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον**, i.e. τὸν πλησίον ἀεί.

5. **ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄ. ζ.**, sc. οὐ φειδόμενος: hence there is no need to alter to οὐδὲ φειδ., as does Badh.[2], who also brackets the words οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

6. **ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε**: this refers back to τῶν ἄλλ. ζ., 'barbarians' being regarded as a little less than ἄνθρωποι, 'not man and not the beast' (to adapt Browning's phrase): and so this clause is added to support and modify the apparent extravagance of τῶν ἄλλ. ζ.

8. **ἆρ', ὦ Σ., οὐχ ὁρᾷς** κτλ.: for this jocular address cp. *Phaedr.* 236 C, *Rep.* 327 C, Hor. *Sat.* 1. 4. 140 ff.: "cui si concedere nolis, Multa poetarum ueniat manus, auxilio quae Sit mihi; nam multo plures sumus ac ueluti te Iudaei cogemus in hanc concedere turbam." νέοι is emphatic, since it was ἡ τῶν νέων ὁδός which Socr. had just been ridiculing.

10. **ὅμως δὲ...γάρ**: for this consecution cp. *Parmen.* 137 A: Ar. *Lysistr.* 144.

12. **εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν**. 'take her departure in good humour'—as if Ταραχή were a goddess to be propitiated, in possession of the λόγος, a fort to be captured—and a strong fort, too (οὐ σμικρός = χαλεπός). Of the next clause Badh.[2] writes, "I condemn ὁδὸν—ἀνευρεῖν as spurious, and μὲν (before τοιαύτην), as invented to give it currency."

17. **καλλίων ..ἐραστής**. The idea of 'beauty' suggests that of 'love.' ὁδός is semi-personified—as object of ἔρως, as διαφεύγουσα, as subj. of κατέστησε.

ἐγὼ ἐραστὴς μέν εἰμι ἀεί, πολλάκις δέ με ἤδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημον καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς αὕτη; λεγέσθω μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἣν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ | πάνυ χαλεπόν, χρῆσθαι δὲ C
5 παγχάλεπον· πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα ἀνευρέθη πώποτε, διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε. σκόπει δὲ ἣν λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα
10 φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί· καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες <ὄντες> ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην φήμην παρέδοσαν, ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι,

1 διαφυγοῦσα ἤδη Σ.
C. 4 χρῆναι Cl. 5 ἀνευρεθῇ Cl. (ἐ-ἐθη ΔΠ): ἂν εὑρεθῇ *S. 6 ταῦτα Λ. 8 ἀνθρώπων Λ. δόσιν Λ. 10 φανοτάτω ΓΣBCEH et corr. ΔΠ: φανωτάτῳ *S. τινὶ] συν corr. Γ. 11 φήμῃ ΓΛΞΣBCEFH et corr. Δ. 12 ἐκ add. Cl. ΔΠ.

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17. **οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο <ἡ> ἧς** κτλ. I adopt Madvig's neat addition, which avoids the need for making the gen. do double duty. For the language and thought cp. *Phaedr.* 266 B: τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵν' οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· ἐάν τέ τιν' ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκὸς ὁρᾶν, τοῦτον διώκω κατόπισθε μετ' ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο. The method alluded to is, of course, logic, and the logical processes of συναγωγή and διαίρεσις.

For the potential opt. with ἄν cp. 64 B *infra*, *Rep.* 487 E, *Euthyd.* 290 A: see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 236.

5. **τέχνης ἐχόμενα**: 'appertaining to' or 'derived from': cp. *Rep.* 526 C, *Theaet.* 145 A etc.

8. **θεῶν ... δόσις**: for attribution of human goods, arts or sciences, to a divine source cp. *Rep.* 411 E: δύο τέχνα θεὸν ἔγωγ' ἄν τινα φαίην δεδωκέναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μουσικήν τε καὶ γυμναστικήν κτλ.: *Politic.* 274 B C: *Protag.* 321.

Allusions to this passage are found in Julian *Or.* VI. 183 C; Damasc. ap. Suid. in v. Δῶρος; Numen. ap. Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* XI. 539 A; Iambl. *Myst. Aeg.* III. 10. 71; Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* 2 C: κατάγωμεν δὲ ἄνωθεν ἐξ οὐρανῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἅμα φανοτάτῃ φρονήσει. Badh.[1] calls attention to "the abruptness of the beginning, the use of μὲν without any apodosis, the repetition in θεῶν—ἐκ θεῶν, the collocation of ποθεν, and such a combination as ἐρρίφη with διὰ Προμηθέως," and rightly suggests that "Plato had some poetical passage in his mind which he has adapted to his own mythus": but Badh.[2] pronounces the passage corrupt.

For ἐκ θεῶν ποθεν cp. *Rep.* 560 A: ἢ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρός. *Ib.* 544 E: ἐκ δρυός ποθεν. *Soph.* 246 B: ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται. Also 44 D *infra*.

10. **κρείττονες <ὄντες> ἡμῶν**: the addition of the partic. I adopt from Badh.[2], the loss being due to the 'homoioteleuton.'

11. **ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες**: cp. *Tim.* 40 D: πειστέον δὲ τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἔμπροσθεν, ἐκγόνοις μὲν θεῶν οὖσιν, ὡς ἔφασαν, σαφῶς δέ που τούς γε αὐτῶν προγόνους εἰδόσιν. *Rep.* 388 B: μηδὲ Πρίαμον ἐγγὺς θεῶν γεγονότα λιτανεύοντα. *Ib.* 391 E: οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι, οἱ Ζηνὸς ἐγγύς. Cic. *Tusc.* I. 12: antiquitas, quo propius aberat ab ortu et diuina progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse, quae erant uera, cernebat. Id. *Legg.* II. 11. 27: quoniam antiquitas proxime accedit ad deos.

ταύτην φήμην παρ.: not τ. τὴν φήμην, since φ. is predic., as if τοῦτο ὡς φήμην παρ. Cp. ταύτην σκέψιν 65 D *infra*. Badh.[2] gives τὴν for ταύτην.

12. **ὡς ... ὄντων ... ἐχόντων**. Gen. absol. with ὡς in place of the more regular acc. and infin. construction, to which there is

πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὑτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἐχόντων. δεῖν οὖν | ἡμᾶς τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν D περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν· εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν· ἐὰν οὖν [μετα]λάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, 5 εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἢ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἓν μὴ ὅτι ἓν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴδῃ τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ

1 δὲ om. F. αὑτοῖς Cl., αὐτοῖς Hτν. δεῖ F.
D. 3 ζητῶν Cl. II et pr. Δ. ἐνοῦσαν Cl. 4 μεταλάβωμεν libri omnes: καταλάβωμεν S. 5 ἄλλον] πάλιν F.

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a reversion in the following sentence (δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς κτλ.). Cp. *Laws* 624 A, 626 A, *Phaedr.* 244 C, *Rep.* 437 A, etc.

1. **πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν.** Stallb. explains πέρας here as "genus, quo formae et res individuae comprehenduntur," and ἀπειρία as "infinitae partes atque res singulae eius notioni subiectae"; whereas Badh. declares πέρας to be "the determinate number, the production of the one, which reconciles the one and the many." Paley approves of Jowett's explanation that "by πέρας is meant what we now call 'law' in physics"—but 'law' is not commonly used in such a sense as to be predicable of a thing as its property, but rather as a short formula to summarise observed facts. For further discussion of Plato's use of these terms and of their place in the Pythagorean system, see *Introd.* IV. and *Append.* C, D. In a different application these terms are resumed in 23 C ff.: for the connection consult *App.* F.

ξύμφυτον, i.e. as 'congenital,' natural and inherent properties of things which appertain to them in virtue of their forming part of the eternal system of the *kosmos*. The term **διακεκοσμημένων** recals the famous dictum of Anaxagoras (Diog. II. 6): πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ· εἶτα ὁ νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε: cp. *Laws* 967 B, etc.

3. **εὑρήσειν**: cp. the use of εὑρετικός in *Polit.* 286 E, 287 A.

4. **ἐὰν οὖν [μετα]λάβωμεν.** I follow Badh. and Wb. in excising the prepos.; it is retained by Stallb. and Poste, while Stephens altered to καταλάβωμεν, followed by Paley and Bekker. Possibly μετα- is a corruption of an original μίαν or of μή. The use of μεταλαβεῖν in 21 D might be adduced in support of its position here; but even there it is hardly free from suspicion.

5. **καὶ τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων.** These words have occasioned considerable difficulty. Schütz proposed καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον: where, however, we should expect τούτων, not ἐκείνων, as Badh. remarks. Schleiermacher suggested καὶ τῶν ἐνόντων ἐκείνων ἕκ.: Stallb. at first κ. τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνων ἕκ., later (after Ast) τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, "unaquaeque species atque forma in illo (τῷ παντί) comprehensa," and this, or τὸν ἐν ἐκείνων (τῶν ἰδεῶν) ἑκάστῃ (ἀριθμόν), is suggested also by Poste. Badh. defends τῶν ἕν, as referred to below in distinction from τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἕν, but suggests that the right reading may be καὶ τῶν ἓν τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως. But there seems no sufficient reason for suspecting the text: the original generic unity is analysed into several specific forms—two, three, or more, as the case may be,—and whatever the value of the number of such forms, it is a plurality or sum of specific units, τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων, which in turn must be similarly inspected with a view to further subdivision, until we finally arrive at the *infimae species* or atomic forms. "As an illustration," writes Paley, "take *pleasure*. It is one as an ἰδέα or general abstraction. Subdivide into pleasure *sensual* and pleasure *intellectual*. Again, take each of these two as a ἕν, and say that sensual pleasures are *five*, one to each sense. Again, take pleasures of *taste* as a ἕν, and you will get an infinity of viands and drinks. But do not *jump* to infinity and say, 'Pleasure! oh, of course, pleasures are quite countless and endless,' etc. It is interesting to read these early efforts after systematic classification, which is now made the basis of all true science." The words **καὶ ἄπειρα**, after πολλά, are excised by Badh.[2]

ὁπόσα· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ
προσφέρειν, πρὶν ἄν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ
τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου | τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· τότε δ' ἤδη τὸ ἓν E
ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἐᾶν. οἱ
5 μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν καὶ
μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
σοφοὶ ἓν μέν, | ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, [καὶ πολλὰ] θᾶττον καὶ 17
βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα εὐθύς·
τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει, οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκ-
10 τικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους
τοὺς λόγους.

VII. ΠΡΩ. Τὰ μέν πως, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκῶ σου μαν-
θάνειν, τὰ δὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον δέομαι ἃ λέγεις ἀκοῦσαι.

2 προφέρειν Cl. Δ.
E. 3 τοῦ om. Σ. δὴ δεῖ Cl. ΔΠ: δ' ἤδη Vat. mg. et *S.
4 ἀπάντων ΞF.
17 A. 8 ἓν] ὂν Λ. 10 πάλιν delet Σ. ὁριστικῶς Cl. ΔΠ. ἡμᾶς πάλιν ποιεῖσθαι ΛΣBCHw. 13 σαφέστερον δέομαι Cl. ΔΠ: δέομαι σαφέστερον *S.

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3. **τότε δ' ἤδη.** This reading seems rightly retained by Bekk., Stallb., Herm. and Wb., as against τότε δὴ δεῖ of Bodl., Vat., which Turr., Poste, Badh.[1] adopt. It is more emphatic, and retains the indirect constr., since we must supply δεῖν. Badh.[2] prints τότε δὴ δεῖν. Of δὴ δεῖ H. says: "talia uel optimus liber passim confundit, nec si omnes MSS. in eo consentirent, leuissimam pariter atque elegantissimam emendationem eorum auctoritati posthaberem."

6. **διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους**, cp. 66 A: ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων: the truth when discovered should be published abroad: "how beautiful upon the mountains," etc.

7. **θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον.** This traditional reading is changed by Badh. and Wb. to θ. κ. βραχύτερον, for which Badh. compares *Polit.* 279 C: ὅτι μάλιστα διὰ βραχέων ταχὺ πάντ' ἐπελθόντες. But by this change the ground of S.'s objection to ordinary methods is unduly narrowed: and so, though Paley adopts the change, Hirzel (p. 71) and Maguire are right in defending the common text: logical division may be improper either as neglecting to enumerate certain necessary species (θᾶττον), or as including unnecessary species through making use of a roundabout unscientific method (βραδύτερον) in place of dichotomy: cp. *Polit.* 262, 266 D, 285, and 277 A: παρὰ καιρὸν σπεύδοντες...βραδύνουσιν: also the proverb cited in *Polit.* 264 B: οὐχ ἡσύχους εὖ διαιροῦντας ἡνυκέναι βραδύτερον.

For καὶ πολλά, Herm., after Dindorf, reads τὰ πολλά (*plerumque*), while Klitsch would transpose κ. π. to after τὰ μέσα. Wb., after Stallb. ed. 1 and Badh.[2], brackets the words, and so Hirzel, "ne ei quidem qui πολλά intellexit de multis in universum (instead of "de generum formis" as Stallb.) tolerandum est hoc vocabulum: primum enim quod iam supra commemoravi vocabulum illud dirimit quae arte inter se cohaerent (viz. ὅπ. ἂν τύχ. et θ. κ. βραδ.), deinde vero ex opposito illo μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα εὐθύς apparet etiam antea illud ἓν tantum commemoratum esse." Believing this to be correct, I have printed accordingly. Badh.[2] also obelizes μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν, but this is wanton.

9. **οἷς διακεχώρισται.** The reference is to all the points before-mentioned. For the distinction between dialectic proper and eristic, cp. *Soph.* 216 B, 225 B ff., 231 E, 253 C; *Euthyd.* 271 E ff.

10. **πάλιν καί.** Paley would invert the order, but this seems unnecessary, as διαλ. is really opposed to the method just described, which is merely repeated in ἐριστ.

12. **δοκῶ σου μανθάνειν.** For the gen. cp. *Gorg.* 488 C, *Rep.* 432 E: it marks source.

ΣΩ. Σαφὲς μήν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν ὃ λέγω, καὶ λάμβανε αὐτὸ ἐν τούτοις οἷσπερ | καὶ πεπαίδευσαι. B

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν ἡμῖν ἐστί που μία διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰοῦσα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὖ πλήθει, πάντων τε καὶ ἑκάστου.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ οὐδὲν ἑτέρῳ γε τούτων ἐσμέν πω σοφοί, οὔθ' ὅτι τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῆς ἴσμεν οὔθ' ὅτι τὸ ἕν· ἀλλ' ὅτι πόσα τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖα, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ γραμματικὸν ἕκαστον ποιοῦν ἡμῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὃ τυγχάνει ποιοῦν, τοῦτ' ἔστι ταὐτόν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς; |

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μέν που κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἐστὶ μία C ἐν αὐτῇ.

1 πράγμασιν B, πράγμασιν ΔΞEFHw. 2 λάμβαν Cl.
B. 4 ἡμῖν om. Cl. ΔΠ. 5 ἄπειρος C, ἀπείρους B, ἀπείρους ΓΛEHw et pr. F. 7 οὐδ' ἐν Cl. Ξ et corr. Γ. ἑτέρων ES. που Λ, πως w. 7, 8 οὔθ' ὅτι Γ, ὅτι οὔτε F, οὔτε ὅτι Cl. 8 τὸ] τί w. αὐτοῖς Λ. οὔθ' Cl. ΓΞFH. 8, 9 τ' ἐστὶ Cl. 9 τοῦτό ἐστι Cl. ποιοῦμεν C. 12 τὸν BS. 12, 13 ταυτὸν τοῦτ' ἔστι Γ.
C. 15 καὶ τὸ (post που) om. Cl. ΔΠ.

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2. **λάμβανε αὐτὸ ἐν τούτοις.** For the prepos. cp. 18 B, 29 B, *Rep.* 392 D, etc.

οἷσπερ πεπαίδευσαι: παιδεύειν with simple dat. is found in *Rep.* 430 A, 521 D. For a like familiar παράδειγμα, see *Polit.* 277 E ff.

4. **φωνὴ μέν.** "ἡμῖν post φωνὴ μὲν cum O et S expuli," Herm.

7. **καὶ οὐδὲν ἑτέρῳ γε τούτων.** Stallb. explains this as equal to οὐδετέρῳ γε τ. ἑ. π. σ. τι, just as οὐδὲν μή ποτε (*Charm.* 168 D) stands for οὐ μή ποτέ τι. Cp. *Symp.* 214 A. Poste follows the Bodl. in giving οὐδ' ἐν ἑτ. Badh.[1] suggests οὐδ' ἂν... εἶμεν—for the tmesis in οὐδέτερος comparing Thuc. II. 67, 72; Ar. *Nic. Eth.* VII. 9: καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει. I suggest this same phrase, οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον, here—i.e. ΔΙ for Ν and Ν for Ι. The tmesis was probably confined to a few stereotyped prepositional phrases. Badh.[2] gives οὐδετέρῳ γε. Paley suggests, in place of the initial καὶ, καὶ μὴν: or καίτοι might be conjectured.

8. **πόσα τε καὶ ὁποῖα.** For this conjunction of interrog. and rel. cp. 27 D *infra*, *Gorg.* 500 A, *Crito* 48 A. Paley, however, would read ὁπόσα for ὅτι πόσα. As to the γραμματικός and the μουσικός, see *Soph.* 253 A B, *Cratyl.* 423 B ff., and cp. 56 A ff. *infra*.

12. **καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὃ τ. ποιοῦν.** Stephens with one MS. read τόν. But probably, as Paley suggests, "the τὸ before μουσικόν crept in from the preceding τὸ γραμματικόν, where τὸ belongs to ποιοῦν": otherwise we must take it as a demonstr. rather than article.

15. **φωνὴ μέν που κατ' ἐκείνην** κτλ. So Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π, followed by Poste and Paley. Stallb. however (and Wb.) retains the vulgate καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐκ., making ἐκείνην refer to μουσικήν: whereas it must refer to γραμματικήν, as Badh.[1] rightly points out. Heindorf suggested κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἐστὶ <καὶ ἐστὶ> μία ἐν αὐτῇ. Badham[1] proposed either μί' ἐν ταύτῃ (omitting καὶ τὸ) or φ. μ. π. κατὰ τὸ κατ' ἐ. τ. τ. ἐ. μ. ἐ. ταύτῃ, and the alteration to ταύτῃ seems probable.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Δύο δὲ θῶμεν βαρὺ καὶ ὀξύ, καὶ τρίτον ὁμότονον. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

5 ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὔπω σοφὸς ἂν εἴης τὴν μουσικὴν εἰδὼς ταῦτα μόνα, μὴ δὲ εἰδὼς ὥς γ' ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἰς ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἔσει.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, ἐπειδὰν λάβῃς τὰ διαστήματα ὁπόσα
10 ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὀξύτητός τε πέρι καὶ βαρύτητος, καὶ ὁποῖα, καὶ τοὺς ὅρους | τῶν διαστημάτων, καὶ D
τὰ ἐκ τούτων ὅσα συστήματα γέγονεν, ἃ κατιδόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέδοσαν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἐκείνοις καλεῖν αὐτὰ ἁρμονίας, ἔν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὖ τοῦ σώματος ἕτερα
15 τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα, ἃ δὴ δι' ἀριθμῶν μετρηθέντα δεῖν αὖ φασὶ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ μέτρα ἐπονομάζειν, καὶ ἅμα ἐννοεῖν, ὡς οὕτω δεῖ περὶ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ πολλῶν

6 μόνα om. Λ et pr. E. μὴ δὲ εἰδὼς Cl. Π et pr. Δ: μὴ εἰδὼς δὲ *S.
9 ἐπειδὰν καλῶς λάβῃς Γ et rc. Δ. διατμήματα corr. Π. ὁπόσ' Γ.
10 τε om. Γ.
D. 13 πρόσθε Γ: πρόσθεν *S. 14 αὐτὰ] αὐτὰ δεῖν αὐτὰ Λ. αὖ] αὐτοῦ Γ.
16 αὖ Cl. ΔΠ: αὐτὰ *S. φησι w et pr. Ξ. ἀριθμοὺς Cl. ΔΠ.
17 ἄλλα Cl. et teste Bastio Vat. δὴ Δ et pr. Γ.

μία ἐν αὐτῇ is suspected also by Poste, who thinks "the context requires something equivalent to καὶ ἄπειρος αὖ πλήθει": while Badh.[2] would transpose ἐν αὐτῇ to a place after Δύο δὲ θῶμεν below. Another plan is to retain the καί while omitting τό before κατ' ἐκ.: so Herm. and Jowett. "Sound is one in music *as well as* in grammar." By the omission of τό, as Herm. remarks, we can the better explain the loss of καί, from similarity to the following κατά, in the Bodl.

2. **βαρὺ καὶ ὀξύ** κτλ. Cp. *Symp.* 187 A ff.

6. **οὐδενὸς ἄξιος**: cp. 19 B, *Apol.* 23 B. The words are qualified by ὥς γ' ἔπος εἰπεῖν, which expression is to be taken closely with them.

9. **διαστήματα**, 'intervals,' i.e. number of tones between any two notes: **ὅροι** the distinctions between these intervals: συστήματα or ἁρμονίαι resultant compositions of various notes: cp. Cic. *Tusc.* I. 18: Harmoniam ex intervallis sonorum nosse possumus; quorum uaria compositio etiam harmonias efficit plures: and *Tim.* 36 A B.

14. **ἔν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν...ῥυθμοὺς καὶ μέτρα**. Cp. *Laws* 665 A: τῇ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἴη, τῇ δὲ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε ὀξέος ἅμα καὶ βαρέος ξυγκεραννυμένων, ἁρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο, χορεία δὲ τὸ ξυναμφότερον κληθείη. *Ibid.* 672 E: τό γε μὴν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν ῥυθμὸν μὲν κοινὸν τῇ τῆς φωνῆς εἶχε κινήσει κτλ. Cp. also *Symp.* 187 C D, *Gorg.* 502 C, *Rep.* 397 B, *Laws* 655 A, 669 D for connection of harmony and rhythm in both voice and gesture.

15. **ἐνόντα πάθη**: cp. πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν 15 D, *Polit.* 277 D. Poste emends to μάθῃς, followed by Paley.

ἃ δὴ...ἐπονομάζειν. Observe the anacoluthon—φασὶ δεῖν being inserted in place of continuing the acc. and infin. construction after παρέδοσαν: cp. 18 B.

17. **ἐννοεῖν**. Paley would correct to ἐννόῃς, needlessly.

σκοπεῖν. ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτά τε λάβῃς οὕτω, τότε ἐγένου σοφός, ὅταν τε ἄλλο | τῶν ὄντων ἓν ὁτιοῦν ταύτῃ σκοπού- E
μενος ἕλῃς, οὕτως ἔμφρων περὶ τοῦτο γέγονας· τὸ δ' ἄπειρόν σε ἑκάστων καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις πλῆθος ἄπειρον ἑκάστοτε ποιεῖ
5 τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδ' ἐνάριθμον, ἅτ' οὐκ εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἀπιδόντα.

VIII. ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστα, ὦ Φίληβε, ἔμοιγε τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα εἰρηκέναι φαίνεται Σωκράτης.

ΦΙ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτά γε αὐτά· ἀλλὰ τί δή ποτε | πρὸς 18
10 ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος νῦν εἴρηται καὶ τί ποτε βουλόμενος;

ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς μέντοι ταῦθ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἠρώτηκε Φίληβος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνου γε αὐτῷ.

ΣΩ. Δράσω ταῦτα διελθὼν σμικρὸν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν
15 τούτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἓν ὁτιοῦν εἴ τίς ποτε λάβοι, τοῦτον, ὥς φαμεν, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀπείρου φύσιν δεῖ βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπί τινα ἀριθμόν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ὅταν τις τὸ ἄπειρον

1 γὰρ delet Γ. αὐτὰ ΛΣBCEΠw. γε corr. Γ. 2 τε Cl. Π, δ' corr. Δ: δὲ *S. ἄλλα Δ.

E. 2 τῶν ἓν Cl. ΔΠ: τῶν ὄντων *S. ταύτης Λ. 3 τούτων Δ, τούτων Cl. Π, τούτου w. 4 σε] τε Γ. ἐν om. F et pr. Ξ. 5 οὐδέν' ἀριθμὸν Cl. 8 εἰρήμενα F. 9 καί μοι Cl. γε ὄντα αὐτά Γ.

18 A. 11 ταῦθ' Cl. ΔΠ: τοῦθ' *S. 15 εἴ] ἓν εἴ Cl. 16 φύσιν δεῖ Cl. ΓΔΠ: δεῖ φύσιν *S. 17 τω' Γ. οὕτως Florentini. τὸ ἐναντίον Cl.: τοὐναντίον Bekk.

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1. **ὅταν γάρ.** For this use of γάρ see Thompson on *Gorg.* 454 B: it here serves to resume ἐπειδὰν λάβῃς.

2. **ὅταν τε ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων ἓν ὁτιοῦν.** I follow Wb. in combining the rivals, ἓν and ὄντων. Badh. defends the reading of Bodl., Vat., Ven. II, as against the vulgate τῶν ὄντων which Turr., Stallb. and Herm. retain. For τὰ ἓν cp. 16 D.

3. **ἔμφρων περὶ τοῦτο.** Herm., with Bodl., gives τούτων, commenting thus: "multo verisimilius est singularum τοῦτο grammatico deberi, qui eundem numerum in antecedentibus vidisset." Badh.[2] brackets οὕτως...γέγονας, and there is some cause for suspicion both in οὕτως and γέγονας after the aor.

τὸ δ' ἄπειρον κτλ. There is a play on the words ἄπειρον, ἐλλόγιμον, ἐνάριθμον: cp. *Tim.* 55 C: τὸ ἀπείρους [κόσμους εἶναι λέγειν] ἡγήσαιτ' ἂν ὄντως ἀπείρου τινὸς εἶναι δόγμα, ὧν ἔμπειρον χρεὼν εἶναι. Also *Hipp. Maj.* 288 B, where allusion is made to the oracle, of which the last lines (cited by schol. on Theocr. 14. 48 ff.) run thus:

ὑμεῖς δ', ὦ Μεγαρῆς, οὔτε τρίτοι οὔτε τέταρτοι
οὔτε δυωδέκατοι οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὔτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

Cp. also Theocr. *l. c.*; Callim. *Ep.* 26.

9. **καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτά γε αὐτά.** Badh. changes to κἀμοί γ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα. But I believe Stallb.'s explanation of αὐτὰ as *per se seorsum spectata* is right: or perhaps αὐτά γε ταῦτα.

14. **δράσω ταῦτά,** i.e. ἀποκρινοῦμαι. Cp. *Politic.* 262 C, *Soph.* 253 A.

15. **ὥσπερ γὰρ...οὕτω καί**—i.e. as in the analytical or deductive process, so likewise in the synthetic or inductive. As Bodl. gives ἓν εἰ, perhaps we should read πρῶτον εἰ.

ἀναγκασθῇ πρῶτον λαμβάνειν μὴ | ἐπὶ τὸ ἓν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' B
ἐπ' ἀριθμὸν αὖ τινὰ πλῆθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν,
τελευταῖν τε ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἕν. πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι
τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον λάβωμεν.

5 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατενόησεν εἴτε τις θεὸς
εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος, ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεῦθ τινα
τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ

B. 1 ἐπὶ τὸ B, ἐπὶ τὰ AC, τὸ ἐπὶ E. 7 θεῦθον Γ, θεύθ Cl.: in A lacuna: θεῦθ *S. 8 ὡς Cl.

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1. **ἀναγκασθῇ**. This word is purposely chosen to suggest the relation of ἄπειρον to ἀνάγκη, as used in *Tim.* Above, Badh.[2] alters to ἔφαμεν...ἔδει.

1, 2. **ἀλλ' *ἐπ' ἀριθμὸν αὖ τινὰ πλῆθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν.** Stallb. maintains "locum ex parte saltem esse deprauatum." The reference, he thinks, is to the comprehension of a multitude of single things under certain definite 'formae'—"ea uero multitudo formis comprehensa haudquaquam dici potuit ἕκαστον πλῆθος." So he suggests (with Ast) ἑκάστοτ' ἔχοντα, with πλῆθός τι supplying αὐτοῦ, i.e. τοῦ ἀπείρου, so that the sense is: "sed respicere ad aliquem numerum, qui semper copiam aliquam et multitudinem infiniti contineat, h. e. ad formas generi subiectas, quarum numerus aliquis iniri [?uideri] potest." Poste declares that ἔχοντα is equivalent to βλέποντα, and renders "looking not at first for unity, but for some number, detect each separate multitude (i.e. each unit of this number)," thus taking ἕκ. with πλῆθος. A further difficulty is found in κατανοεῖν, which cannot be joined with ἐπ' ἀριθμόν τινα: for it Stallb. conj. κατασκοπεῖν or κατανύειν (sc. τὴν ὁδόν, 'uiam conficere,' cp. Hdt. VI. 40, etc.); while Lehrs proposed to insert ἰόντα after πλ. ἕκ. ἔχοντα. Badh.[1] seems to explain κατανοεῖν as a kind of complementary infin., as if ὥστε κατ. "so that the enquirer may discover them therein," and he too makes ἕκ. agree with πλῆθος. Badh.[2] brackets μὴ...ἀλλ' ἐπ', and suggests ἔχον κατανοεῖν δεῖ. It seems clear, however, that as the text stands we must supply with this clause, from the preceding, the words δεῖ βλέποντα—in spite of Stallb.; and also construe ἕκαστον, as masc., with ἀριθμόν instead of with πλῆθος. So Paley renders: "we ought not to look to One immediately, but in this case too to a certain number containing in each term a certain plurality, and so try to take in that view, thus ending in *One* from *all*." Madvig suggested καταθεῖν for κατανοεῖν: but Liebhold justly defends this infin., and proposes to expunge ἐπί as due to "die Gedankenlosigkeit eines Abschreibers"; with which I incline to agree. One might conj. εἴ τινα...ἔχον ἔστι κατανοεῖν, and for πλῆθος ἕκ. as subj. with ἀριθμόν as obj. cp. 18 E *ad fin.* But, as the case is doubtful, I leave the traditional text.

6. **ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν** κτλ. There is an anacoluthon in constr., there being no regular apodosis—instead of which we have a relative clause ὃς...taking up the subject introduced in the strictly parenthetic clause ὡς...λέγων. Cp. 17 D *supra*, *Phaedo* 86 A. Paley however supposes the apodosis to begin at τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. Badh.[2] brackets φωνὴν ἄπ. κατενόησεν.

For the Egyptian inventor of arts and sciences (Theuth, or Anubis, or Hermes Trismegistus, or Mercury) cp. Cic. *N.D.* III. 22, where a Mercury is mentioned, "quem colunt Pheneatae, qui et Argum dicitur interemisse, ob eamque caussam Aegyptum profugisse, atque Aegyptiis leges et litteras tradidisse. Hunc Aegyptii Thoth appellant, eodemque nomine anni primus mensis apud eos uocatur." Cp. *Phaedr.* 274 B ff., *Cratyl.* 425 D.

7. For **λόγος...λέγων** cp. *Laws* 630 B: ὁ λόγος...λέγει ταῦτα. Badh.[1], however, changes λέγων to λέγω, putting the comma after γενέσθαι, since he adopts the reading of Bodl., ὡς for ὃς: while Badh.[2] gives simply λέγων, πρῶτος, though advocating the further change, πρῶτα.

κατενόησεν οὐχ ἓν ὄντα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὔ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά | τινος, ἀριθμὸν δέ τινα καὶ C τούτων εἶναι· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διῄρει τά τε 5 ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβὼν ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ καὶ ξύμπασι στοιχεῖον ἐπωνόμασε· καθορῶν δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς 10 ὄντα ἕνα καὶ | πάντα ταῦτα ἕν πως ποιοῦντα μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς D ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπών.

ΦΙ. Ταῦτ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐκείνων αὐτά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἔμαθον· τὸ δ' αὐτό μοι τοῦ λόγου νῦν τε καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐλλείπεται.

15 ΣΩ. Μῶν, ὦ Φίληβε, τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὖ ταῦτ' ἐστίν;

ΦΙ. Ναί, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρώταρχος.

C. 3 διεστήσατο γραμμάτων Γ. 4 ἡμῖν om. Σ: ἡμῖν—ἄφωνα post ἑκάστου ponit Γ. τούτων Λ. 5 μέχρι Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠBCFHw: μέχρις *S. 6 ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν Cl. ΓΔΠBC, αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν w: αὐτῶν ἀριθμὸν *S. 8 καθ' αὐτὸ om. H. ἄνευ] ἄρα Σw. 9 τοῦτον] τοῦτον δὲ ΓΛ, τοῦ H.

D. 10 πάντα τὰ ταυτὰ Cl. ΔΠ: ταῦτα πάντα *S. 13 νῦν γε Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCFw: νῦν τε *S. 16 ἔστι λαι Λ. ζητοῦμεν ὃ πάλαι Γ.

Theuth distinguished three species of letters—τὰ φωνήεντα = vowels, τὰ φθόγγου μετέχοντά τινος = semi-vowels or liquids, τὰ ἄφωνα = mute consonants.

Cp. *Theaet.* 203 B: καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ σ τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ δὲ αὖ β οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος. *Cratyl.* 424 C ff.: ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτω δεῖ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνήεντα διελέσθαι, ἔπειτα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ τὰ εἴδη τά τε ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα, οὑτωσί γάρ που λέγουσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων, καὶ αὖ τὰ φωνήεντα μὲν οὔ, οὐ μέντοι ἄφθογγα. Thus class i. (τὰ φωνήεντα) would comprise α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω: class ii. (τὰ ἡμίφωνα or μέσα), λ, μ, ν, ρ, σ, ζ, ξ, ψ: class iii. (τὰ ἄφωνα), β, γ, δ, κ, π, τ, φ, χ, θ—though these last three, as aspirated, were by some grammarians classed as semi-vowels (see Sext. Empir. *adv. Math.* c. 5).

10. **μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν**, i.e. ὡς μίαν οὖσαν. For the order cp. *Soph.* 242 C παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν: *Theaet.* 188 A μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα: *Laws* 878 A. And so not uncommonly ὡς is displaced in the poets: Aesch. *S. c. Th.* 53, 393, 498; Hom. *Il.* 6. 295, etc.

11. For **γραμματικὴ τέχνη** cp. *Rep.* 402 A, *Theaet.* 207 A, *Soph.* 253 A, etc. Poste notes that "in the time of Aristotle γραμματικὴ signified the art of Reading and Writing," citing *Topic.* 6. 5.

ἐπεφθέγξατο is a playful reference to φθόγγος, as Paley remarks.

14. **ἐλλείπεται.** Poste compares Aristippus' rejection of Logic and Physics from Philosophy: δοκοῦσι δὲ κατά τινας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Κυρήνης μόνον ἀσπάζεσθαι τὸ ἠθικὸν μέρος, παραπέμπειν δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα, Sext. Emp. *adv. Math.* 7. 11.

15. **τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος**, "what to the purpose." Cp. *Euthyd.* 295 C ἐὰν μηδὲν πρὸς ἔπος ἀποκρίνωμαι. Similarly ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον τι ᾖ 33 C *infra*: οὐδὲν πρὸς

ΣΩ. Ἦ μὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γε ἤδη γεγονότες ζητεῖτε, ὡς φῄς, | πάλαι. E

ΦΙ. Πῶς;

IX. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὐ περὶ φρονήσεως ἦν καὶ ἡδονῆς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν αἱρετέον;

ΦΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἕν γε ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναί φαμεν.

ΦΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ, πῶς ἔστιν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ ἄπειρα εὐθύς, ἀλλά τινά ποτε ἀριθμὸν ἑκάτερον | ἔμπροσθεν κέκτη- 19
ται τοῦ ἄπειρα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα γεγονέναι;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ εἰς φαῦλόν γε ἐρώτημα, ὦ Φίληβε, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον κύκλῳ πως περιαγαγὼν ἡμᾶς ἐμβέβληκε Σωκράτης. καὶ σκόπει δή, πότερος ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον. ἴσως δὴ γελοῖον τὸ ἐμὲ τοῦ λόγου διάδοχον παντελῶς ὑποστάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι σοὶ πάλιν τοῦτο προστάττειν· γελοιότερον δ' οἶμαι πολὺ τὸ μηδέτερον | ἡμῶν δύνασθαι. B
σκόπει δή, τί δράσομεν. εἴδη γάρ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν ἐρωτᾶν

1 γε] δὲ Α. ζητεῖτε Cl. Π et pr. Δ: ἐζητεῖτε *S.
E. 7 αὐτὴν Α. 8 οὖν] οὖν, καὶ πολλὰ αὖ ἑκάτερον: ναί: mg. Σ. 9 πρόσθε Γ: πρόσθεν *S.
19 A. 11 ἔμπροσθε Γ: ἔμπροσθεν *S. 12 αὐτὸν Cl. 14 πως om. pr. Ξ.
15 δή] δὲ corr. Γ. 18 τούτω Σ.
B. 20 δράσωμεν w.

λόγον 42 E: οὐδὲν πρὸς ἔπος Ar. *Eccles.* 751.

1. **ἦ μὴν...γε**, "and yet surely"; cp. Eur. *Phoen.* 1622, *Med.* 1032. Turr. and Wb. put a note of interrog. after this clause, wrongly as Badh. notes. Badh.[2] gives καὶ for ἦ. For γίγνεσθαι ἐπί τινι cp. *Polit.* 264 B, *Rep.* 532 B, 490 D, *Cratyl.* 422 A.

10. **πῶς μὴ ἄπειρα εὐθύς.** As Paley notices, this μή is remarkable and perhaps without exact parallel elsewhere: it seems similar to the use of μή in alternative indir. questions (Goodwin *M.T.* § 667. 5), but possibly we should read καὶ εἰ πως μὴ ἄπ.

11. **τινά ποτε**: Paley would read τίνα ποτε "because the ποτε is quite unmeaning with the indef. τις"; but does not its position before ἔμπροσθεν lend ποτε sufficient meaning? Badh.[2] proposes to rewrite the passage thus: ἀπαιτεῖ πως, εἰ ἔστιν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, τίνα ποτ' ἀριθμὸν ἔμπροσθεν κέκτηται τοῦ ἄπειρα γεγονέναι.

ἔμπροσθεν...τοῦ...γεγονέναι. The gen. is governed by the quasi-preposition.

14. **περιαγαγών.** The allusion may be to the whirling of a stone in a sling (cp. Polyb. XXVII. 9. 6), with a further suggestion of consequent perplexity (cp. Andoc. 15. 16): cp. 20 A.

16. **διάδοχον π. ὑποστάντα**, "being engaged as your successor without reserve." Paley compares Aesch. *Eum.* 204 ὑπέστης αἵματος δέκτωρ νέου: Dem. *Meid.* 336 χορηγὸς ὑπέστην. Add Lys. 182. 9 ὑπέστην τριήραρχος, compared with ὑπ. τὴν ἀρχήν, Xen. *Anab.* VI. 1. 19. For Prot.'s 'succession,' see 11 C, 12 A *supra*.

18. **γελοιότερον ... πολύ.** Note the order, for which cp. *Alcib. II.* 143 D.

ἡδονῆς ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης, εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα· τῆς τ' αὖ φρονήσεως πέρι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ παῖ Καλλίου· μὴ γὰρ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο κατὰ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ταὐτοῦ
5 δρᾶν καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς ὁ παρελθὼν λόγος ἐμήνυσεν, οὐδεὶς εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδέποτε γένοιτο ἄξιος.

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν ἔοικεν οὕτως, ὦ | Σώκρατες, ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ C
καλὸν μὲν τὸ ξύμπαντα γιγνώσκειν τῷ σώφρονι, δεύτερος δ' εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὑτόν. τί δή μοι
10 τοῦτο εἴρηται τὰ νῦν; ἐγώ σοι φράσω. σὺ τήνδε ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπέδωκας πᾶσι καὶ σεαυτὸν πρὸς τὸ διελέσθαι, τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἄριστον. Φιλήβου γὰρ εἰπόντος ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρὰν καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τοιαῦτά ἐστι, σὺ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντεῖπες, ὡς οὐ ταῦτα
15 ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν, | ἃ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναμιμνήσκομεν D
ἑκόντες, ὀρθῶς δρῶντες, ἵν' ἐν μνήμῃ παρακείμενα ἑκάτερα βασανίζηται· φῂς δ', ὡς ἔοικε, σὺ τὸ προσρηθησόμενον

1 ἡδονὴν Cl. ΔΠ. ἡμᾶς...αὖ om. pr. F. εἴτέ ἐστιν Cl. ὁπόσ' Γ.
2 τ'] δ' Γ. ἢ καὶ φρονήσεως F. ταυτὰ Cl. ΔΠ: τὰ αὐτὰ *S.
6 γένοιτ' Γ. 7 εἴρηκεν Λ. οὕτως ὦ σώκρατες οὕτως ΛΞBEw, οὗτος ὦ σώκρατες οὕτως F.
C. 9 αὐτὸν om. Cl. Δ et pr. Π. 11 σεαυτὸν Cl.: σαυτὸν Bekk. 13 καὶ χαρὰν om. Λ. 14 τοιαῦτ' Cl. Γw. αὐτὰ] ταῦτα Δ.

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4. **κατὰ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ταὐτοῦ δρᾶν καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου**, "in regard to anything (everything) that is One and Similar and Identical, and to its opposite (i.e. the Many, Dissimilar, Other)." *τοῦτο δρᾶν* means to enumerate and describe the *εἴδη*.

5. **οὐδεὶς εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς...οὐδέποτε.** For this emphatic conglomeration of negatives, cp. *Phaedr.* 236 E, *Soph.* 162 E, *Polit.* 187 B, *Phaed.* 78 D, *Laws* 951 C etc. Badh.², by transposition, reads *οὐδεὶς ἂν ἡμῶν εἰς οὐ. κτλ.*

8. **δεύτερος...πλοῦς**, "the next best course"—a proverbial expression: cp. *δεύτερος* sc. *πλοῦς* 59 C *infra*, and *Phaed.* 99 D, *Polit.* 300 B. Probably *καλὰ πάντα τῷ σώφρονι* was also a proverb; cp. *Euthyd.* 293 C: *τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον, καλὰ δὴ πάντα λέγεις.*

9. **λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὑτόν** vulg., St., Poste, Wb.; *αὑτόν* om. Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π; *αὐτὸν* om. Herm. "quum Plato alibi solum *ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν* usurpet, *Protag.* c. 11, *Gorg.* c. 26 etc."

τί...τὰ νῦν; ἐγώ σοι φράσω. So Stallb. and Badh., with a note of interrogation after *νῦν* in place of the usual comma (see Stallb.'s n. on *Gorg.* 487 B, *Charm.* 172 B). It makes the sentences shorter and sharper—of a piece with which tone of Prot. is his use of the term *φράσω*, more grave and emphatic than a more usual word would have been.

10. **τὴν συνουσίαν...ἐπέδωκας... καὶ σεαυτόν.** A kind of zeugma: the force of the prep. in the verb is to imply spontaneity. Presently, 19 E, we have the simple verb *ἔδωκας ... σαυτόν.* Cp. *Euthyphr.* 3 D *δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν*: *Euthyd.* 305 A: Soph. *Philoct.* 84 *δός μοι σεαυτόν.* Badh.² brackets *καὶ σεαυτόν.*

12. **Φιλήβου...τοιαῦτά ἐστι** sc. *τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἄριστον ἐστίν.*

15, 16. **ἀναμιμνήσκομεν ... μνήμῃ**: Paley calls attention to this piece of word-play.

17. **τὸ προσρηθ....ἀγαθόν**, 'you assert, as I suppose, that the good which is to be correctly denominated as "better at any

ὀρθῶς ἄμεινον ἡδονῆς γε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ τούτων ξυγγενῆ, ἃ κτᾶσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκεῖναι τούτων δὴ μετ' ἀμφισβητήσεως ἑκατέρων λεχθέντων ἡμεῖς σοι μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἠπειλήσαμεν, ὡς οὐκ ἀφήσομεν | οἰκαδέ σε, πρὶν ἂν τούτων τῶν λόγων E πέρας ἱκανὸν γένηταί τι διορισθέντων. σὺ δὲ συνεχώρησας καὶ ἔδωκας εἰς ταῦθ' ἡμῖν σαυτόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγομεν, καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες, ὅτι τῶν ὀρθῶς δοθέντων ἀφαίρεσις οὐκ ἔστι· παῦσαι δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. Τίνα λέγεις;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλων καὶ ἀνερωτῶν | ὧν μὴ 20 δυναίμεθ' ἂν ἱκανὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι διδόναι σοι. μὴ γὰρ οἰώμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν νῦν τὴν πάντων ἡμῶν ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' εἰ δρᾶν τοῦθ' ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοῦμεν, σοὶ δραστέον· ὑπέσχου γάρ. βουλεύου δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα αὐτός, πότερον ἡδονῆς εἴδη σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον ἢ καὶ ἑατέον, εἴ πῃ καθ' ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον οἷός τ' εἶ καὶ βούλει δηλῶσαί πως ἄλλως τὰ νῦν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρ' ἡμῖν.

D. 1 γε om. Λ. 2 πάντ' Γ. ἃ add. Σ. 3 δεῖν ΔΠ et corr. ΓΣ: δεῖ *S. οὐκ Γ. ἀμφισβητήσεως Cl. Δ cum pr. Π et corr. Λ: ἀμφισβητήσεων *S. 4 σοι om. Λ. παιδείας Π et pr. Cl.
E. 6 δὴ Cl. Δ et pr. Π. 9 ἡμῶν pr. Δ. ἀπάντων ΛBCFw: ἀπόντων Γ. τούτων ΓΛBCFw. 11 τίνα λέγεις om. pr. Ξ.

20 A. 13 δυνάμεθ' EF. ἱκανῶς w. ἱκανὴν 15 ἀλλ' εἰ] ἀλλὴ Cl. 16 ταῦτ' Γ.

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rate than pleasure" is reason' etc. Prot. is citing from Socr.'s own expression (τῆς ἡδονῆς γ' ἀμείνω καὶ λῴω γίγνεσθαι) 11 B *supra*. Here as there Badh.[2] scents a gloss, and brackets ἄμεινον ἡδονῆς γε.

4. **μετὰ παιδιᾶς** (opposed to μετ' ἀμφισβ.) **ἠπειλήσαμεν.** This playful threat, as Stallb. remarks, is nowhere to be found in the preceding pages of the text: hence we must suppose it to have occurred at an earlier period of the discussion, before Prot. supplanted Phileb. For its 'playful' style we may cp. 16 A *supra*.

6. **πέρας ἱκανόν.** This non-technical use of these significant terms by Prot. seems premeditated. Cp. περαίνεν 11 C, 12 B.

8. **τῶν ὀρθῶς δοθέντων** κτλ. Cp. *Gorg.* 499 B: κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὁτιοῦν, τούτου ἁσμενῶς ἔχεις, ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. In καθάπερ παῖδες there may be an allusion to Socrates' ὦ παῖδες in 16 B.

12. **εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλων.** The partic. is parallel to ἀπαντῶν, depending on παῦσαι—while the whole clause is definitive of τίνα τρόπον.

15. **δρᾶν τοῦτο,** i.e. ἱκανὴν ἀπόκρισιν διδόναι. δρᾶν may repeat any preceding verb even if intransitive: cp. 18 A, 62 A *infra*, *Soph.* 233 C, 253 A, *Polit.* 268 C.

18. **καθ' ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον ... πως ἄλλως.** Observe the tautologous repetition "in quo gratam quandam sermonis negligentiam agnoscimus" (Stallb.). It is a mark of Plato's later style, and is not without point here, as emphasizing the change of method in attacking the problem which is to follow. Badh.[2], however, promptly pounces on καθ' ἕτερον and evicts it.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἔτι προσδοκᾶν | οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν B
ἐμέ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως εἶπες· τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ῥηθὲν λύει
πάντα φόβον ἑκάστων πέρι. πρὸς δὲ αὖ τούτοις μνήμην
τινὰ δοκεῖ τίς μοι δεδωκέναι θεῶν ἡμῖν.

5 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνων;

X. ΣΩ. Λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας ὄναρ ἢ καὶ
ἐγρηγορὰς νῦν ἐννοῶ περί τε ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, ὡς
οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν ἐστὶ τἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι τρίτον, ἕτερον
μὲν τούτων, ἄμεινον δὲ ἀμφοῖν. καίτοι τοῦτό γε ἂν ἐναρ-
10 γῶς | ἡμῖν φανῇ νῦν, ἀπήλλακται μὲν ἡδονὴ τοῦ νικᾶν· C
τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ταὐτὸν αὐτῇ γίγνοιτο. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τῶν δέ γε εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν

B. 1 τὸν om. EF, τον Cl. 3 δ' w. αὖ τούτοις] αὖ τοῖς Cl., αὐτοῖς ΔΠ, τούτοις Γ. 4 δοκεῖ τινα Γ. 6 λόγω pr. EF. 8 τἀγαθὸν Cl. ΔΠ: ἀγαθὸν *S. ἀλλὰ Cl. 9 καὶ τοιοῦτό γε Cl.: καί τοι οὕτω γε marg. Cl. Δ: οὕτω τε Π.

C. 11 γίγνοιτο Cl. ΔΠ et corr. Σ, γίγνεται ΓΛΞBCEFw: γίγνηται *S.

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1. **τὸν ἐμέ.** Bernhardy wished to excise τόν, Schütz to read τὸ κατ' ἐμέ: but Stallb. rightly transl. "*Ille ego*, cui antea minati estis ueniam discedendi negatum iri, iam nihil habeo quod metuam." Similarly Badh. "me, the threatened one—poor me." Paley has "my illustrious self." Other instances of the art. prefixed to the person. pron. occur in *Theaet.* 166 A, *Soph.* 239 B, *Phaedr.* 258 A, Plat. *Epp.* 7, 14 D *supra* and 59 B *infra* (where however the force of the art. is somewhat different).

2. **τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ῥηθέν,** "the utterance of that phrase 'if you please.'" As Badh. notices, this is a remark of quite general bearing, not "exsoluit *me*" as Stallb. renders. The position of the partic. endows it with a predicative force: cp. 14 D *supra*: ἓν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι... θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν. Similarly, Thuc. VII. 23: αἱ πρὸ τοῦ στόματος νῆες ναυμαχοῦσαι.

3. **πρὸς δὲ αὖ τούτοις.** The reading of Bodl. and Turr. αὖ τοῖς is prob. wrong—only explicable by supposing a poetic reminiscence; while that of Vat. and Ven. II, πρὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς, though adopted by Herm. (who takes αὐτοῖς closely with ἡμῖν, not with πρός), is hardly probable. We have a recurrence here of the notion of θεῶν δόσις (16 C), true notions being regarded as divine inspirations. Mention of the divine agency serves to draw attention to the importance of the doctrine to follow—treated as a revelation.

S. is here saying that he had not only *lost* fear but also *gained* new light—two conditions for proceeding with the argument.

In what follows (20 B—22 E) the primary ethical question is disposed of: see *Introd.* I.

6. **ὄναρ ἢ καὶ ἐγρηγορώς.** Cp. *Laws* 800 A: καθ' ὕπνον δὲ οἷόν πού τις ἢ καὶ ὕπαρ ἐγρηγορὼς ὠνείρωξε μαντευόμενος αὐτό. Also *Rep.* 533 C, 563 D, *Theaet.* 201 D, *Polit.* 278 E. ὄναρ is opposed to ἐναργῶς below. Compare n. on μαντεία, 44 C, 67 E.

8. **οὐδέτερον...τἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι τρίτον** κτλ. This really resumes 11 E ff. where a hint had been let drop to the same effect, viz. that a third claimant might oust both φρόνησις and ἡδονή from the first position as τἀγαθόν.

9. **καίτοι τοῦτό γε ἄν:** so Wb. and Badh. καίτοι οὕτω γε Bodl. mg., Herm.; καίτοι τοῦτο ἐάν, vulg., St.; καὶ τοιοῦτο γε, Bodl., Turr., Poste. Perhaps καίτοι τοιοῦτό γε ἄν.

13. **τῶν δέ γε εἰς τὴν διαίρ.** τῶν is gen. of τά but equivalent in sense to τῶν λόγων. Badh.[2] expunges εἰς τὴν διαιρ. as intolerably harsh.

ἔτι προσδεησόμεθα κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν. προϊὸν δ' ἔτι σαφέστερον δείξει.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστα εἰπὼν οὕτω καὶ διαπέραινε.

ΣΩ. Σμίκρ' ἄττα τοίνυν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτι διομολογησώ-
5 μεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον ἢ | μὴ D
τέλεον εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντων δή που τελεώτατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

10 ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἱκανὸν τἀγαθόν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων.

ΣΩ. Τόδε γε μήν, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς πᾶν τὸ γιγνῶσκον αὐτὸ θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται
15 βουλόμενον ἑλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτήσασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς.

1 προσδεηθησόμεθα Λ. προϊὸν Cl. ΓΔΠΣBC: προϊὼν *S. δέ τι w. ὁ λόγος (vulgo post προϊὼν δ' add.) om. Bekk. cum Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCEFw.

3 κάλλιστ' Cl. Γ. διαπεραίνω Γ. 4 μικρ' Cl. διομολογησόμεθα F.
D. 10 τί δέ;] τί δαί; ΓΔ et Cl.² (qui sic passim). 11 : καὶ Ξ. διαφέρειν omnes (-φέρει Steph., Bekk.). 13 τόδε] haec non alteri dat Ξ. 15 ἐλθεῖν Λ et γρ w. περὶ] πειρᾶ E. αὐτὸ Cl.

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1. **προσδεησ.**, 'no *further* need,' i.e. in addition to the immediate argument. Observe, however, that in spite of this a discussion of pleasure is included in this dialogue.

1, 2. **προϊὸν δὲ...δείξει.** The regular formula is αὐτὸ δείξει. Cp. *Theaet.* 200 E, *Cratyl.* 402 C. But δείξει and δηλώσει are used also without αὐτό in the same sense. Cp. Ar. *Ran.* 1261: πάνυ γε μέλη θαυμαστά· δείξει δὴ τάχα: *Rep.* 497 C τότε δηλώσει: Hdt. IX. 68; Arist. *Pol.* IV. 11; Xen. *Mem.* I. 2. 32; id. *Cyrop.* VII. 1. 30. Hence the neut. partic. may stand, as in agreement with the general subject thus supplied. Steph. with some inferior MSS. gives προϊὼν δ' ἔτι ὁ λόγος σ. δ., an obvious gloss. Badh.'s suggestion προϊόντι δέ is very attractive: cp. *Polit.* 287 B: προϊοῦσιν οὐχ ἧττον ἔσται καταφανές. Cp. also *Polit.* 264 B: καὶ τοῦτο...διαπεραινόμενος ὁ λόγος αὐτός σοι κάλλιον μηνύσει.

3. **διαπέραινε.** Notice the recurrence of these verbal forms of πέρας: cp. 19 E, n.

7. **τὴν τἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν...τέλεον.** To attain the position of τἀγαθόν, an object must combine the three characteristics now to be mentioned.

ἡ τἀγαθοῦ μοῖρα recurs 60 B *infra*: cp. *Phaedr.* 255 B: μοῖραν φιλίας οὐδεμίαν παρέχονται. μοῖρα seems to combine the ideas of (allotment by) *destiny*, and *dignity*.

ἢ μὴ τέλεον is bracketed by Badh.², as is also τἀγαθόν just below.

For the sense, see further in *Introd.* V; and for the terminology, *Append.* G.

13. **τόδε γε μὴν...εἶναι.** The infinitive, because dependent on οἶμαι, in spite of its parenthetic position: cp. *Phaedr.* 272 D, with Stallb.'s n.

15. **ἑλεῖν**, as Poste remarks, implies αἱρετόν. βουλόμενον is condemned by Badh.²

καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτήσασθαι, as if κτήσ. αὐτὸ ὥστε περὶ ἑαυτὸ ἔχειν—περὶ αὐτό being proleptic: cp. Dem. *Ol.* I. p. 23: τούτους ἀσπάζεται καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔχει. As Cl. gives αὐτό, perhaps we should read περὶ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κτ.

For 'Good' as a κτῆμα, cp. 66 A with *Append.* B.

16. **πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα**

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ἀντειπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν | δὴ καὶ κρίνωμεν τόν τε ἡδονῆς καὶ τὸν E
φρονήσεως βίον ἰδόντες χωρίς.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς εἶπες;

5 ΣΩ. Μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονή. δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τἀγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι· δεόμενον δ' ἂν φανῇ πότερον, οὐκ ἔστι που τοῦτ' ἔτι | τὸ ὄντως ἡμῖν 21
ἀγαθόν.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνου δή.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

15 ΣΩ. Δέξαιο ἄν, Πρώταρχε, σὺ ζῆν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα ἡδόμενος ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἔτι τινὸς ἄν σοι προσδεῖν ἡγοῖο, εἰ τοῦτ' ἔχεις παντελῶς;

20 ΠΡΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δή, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογί-

1 ὡς οὐκ F.

E. 2 κρίνομεν Ξ et pr. F. 5 τῷ om. pr. Δ. 5, 6 ἡδονῆς...ἡδονή] φρονήσεως ἡδονὴ μήτ' ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις Γ. μήτ' Cl. w. 6 πότερον Cl. ΔΠ, ὁπότερον corr. ΓΣ et mg. F: πρότερον *S. 7 ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν Cl. ΔΠ: ἐστ' ἀγαθὸν *S. μηδὲν μηδένος Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCFw: μηδενὸς μηδὲν *S. τι Δ et pr. Π. 8 ἂν] ἂν τι Π. φᾶναι Γ. πότερον Cl. ΔΛΠBCw: ὁπότερον *S.

21 A. 8 ἡμῖν] μὴ ἦν Λ. 15 δέξαι Cl. Cw et pr. Γ: δέξαιο *S. σὺ ὦ πρώταρχε rc. Σ, πρώταρχε συ Cl. Δ et pr. Π, σοι Πρώταρχε ΛΞBCEFw cum pr. Γ et corr. Π. 19 ἔχεις F, ἔχεις Cl. ΓΛΞΠBCEw et rc. Δ, ἔχει pr. Δ. 21 τοῦ νοεῖν Cl. ΔΠ (τοῦ om. Bekk. *S).

ἀγαθοῖς, "save such things as involve goods in the process of their development." But as the argument regards the τελειότης of τἀγαθόν I rather doubt the correctness of the text: possibly we should read ἅμα ἀγαθόν, the nomin. being corrupted to the dat. through proximity to ἅμα taken as prep. Badh.[2] cancels πλήν.

3. ἰδόντες χωρίς, regarding each of the two separately, each purely on its own merits.

6. πότερον, "either of the two" (ὁποτερονοῦν, *alterutrum*): so 22 D *infra*, *Theaet.* 145 A, *Rep.* 499 C, etc.

7. μηδὲν...προσδεῖσθαι, equivalent to τέλεόν τε καὶ ἱκανὸν εἶναι.

11. ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα. Cp. 17 A *supra*.

15. Πρώταρχε: for the omission of ὦ, see n. on 11 A *supra*.

18. ἆρ...ἂν...ἡγοῖο...εἰ...ἔχεις. For junction of indic. and opt. cp. *Apol.* 25 B, Soph. *O. C.* 969: see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 503 (*a*).

21. καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι. For omission of art., cp. *Soph.* 251 A, *Protag.* 357 A. Badh.[2] brackets τὰ δέοντα.

ζεσθαι τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ὅσα τούτων | ἀδελφά, μῶν μὴ B
δέοι' ἄν τι;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τί; πάντα γὰρ ἔχοιμ' ἄν που τὸ χαίρειν ἔχων.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω ζῶν ἀεὶ μὲν διὰ βίου ταῖς μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς χαίροις ἄν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Νοῦν δέ γε καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν μὴ κεκτημένος ἀληθῆ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο αὐτό, εἰ χαίρεις
10 ἢ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δή πού σε ἀγνοεῖν, κενόν γε ὄντα πάσης φρονήσεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὡσαύτως μνήμην | μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη C
δή που μηδ' ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνῆσθαι, τῆς τ' ἐν τῷ
15 παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μηδ' ἡντινοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν· δόξαν δ' αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον [ἀληθῆ] μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαίροντα, λογισμοῦ δὲ στερόμενον μηδ' εἰς τὸν

B. 1 μὴ ὁρᾶν Σw: μηδὲ ὁρᾶν *S Bekk. ἐρᾶν corr. Σ. 3 ἔχοιμεν Π. ἔχων (om.:) Cl. 5 οὕτω] ἔτι Γ. μὲν ἀεὶ ΞF. 8 νῦν Λ. 9 μὴ om. Σ. ἀληθῆ] haec Socrati continuavi cum ΛΞΣBCEFw. τοῦτ' Γ. εἰ] εἴ η Cl. ΔΠ: om. ΛBCEFw. 10 σε om. w. τε Λ.

C. 14 τῷ om. ΛEF et pr. Ξ. 15 μηδ' ἥντινα οὖν μνήμην Δ, μηδ' ἡντινοῦν μνήμην Π, μὴδ' ἥντιν' οὖν μνήμην Cl., μνήμην μὲν μηδ' ἡντινοῦν E. 16 δ' om. w. 17 χαίρειν μὴ δὲ Cl., μηδὲ χαίρειν Δ. λογισμῷ οὖ H. στερούμενον H et pr. E.

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1. **μῶν μὴ δέοι' ἄν τι;** I follow Klitsch, Badh., Poste, Herm., Wb. in thus correcting *μῶν μηδὲ ὁρᾶν τι*, which is the MSS.' reading. Stallb. proposed *μῶν μηδ' ὄναρ ὁρᾶν τι*, with Winckelm. and Lehrs: for the proverbial *οὐδὲ ὄναρ* cp. 36 E, 65 E *infra*, *Theaet.* 173 D, etc. Paley prefers *μηδὲ ὄναρ*, which leaves *τι* unaccounted for, while to read *ὄναρ τι* would be contrary to usage. *μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν* has also been proposed. But the reading adopted is as certain as an emendation can be: it was first made by Klitsch in 1841, and independently by Badh. in 1855.

5, 6. **ταῖς μεγ. ἡδοναῖς** is bracketed by Badh.[2]

8. **νοῦν δέ γε καὶ μνήμην.** We might suspect that *μνήμην* should be here omitted, as this clause deals only with knowledge of the *present*, whereas in the next clause that of the *past* is first mentioned. But *πρῶτον...φρονήσεως* explains *νοῦν* only, while *μνήμην*, *δόξαν ἀλ.* and *ἐπιστήμην* are explained in the next clause; so that *φρόνησις* seems equated to *νοῦς*, *λογισμός* to *ἐπιστήμη*. Badh.[2] expunges *κ. μν. κ. ἐπ. κ. δόξαν* and *ἀληθῆ*.

9. **κεκτημένος ... σε.** We should expect *ἀγνοήσεις* or the like after the nomin., in place of which a new acc. and infin. constr. is introduced, with *ἀνάγκη*, for emphasis. Badh.[2] gives *κεκτημένον*.

14. *δή πού σε μήθ' ὅτι* Badh.[2], and Stallb. also gives *μήθ' ὅτι*.

15. **μνήμην...δόξαν...ἀληθῆ...λογισμοῦ.** These three intellectual faculties, in addition to the *φρόνησις* already mentioned as dealing with present condition, are meant to include all possible forms and qualities of mental power and to correspond to the four (*νοῦς*, *μνήμη*, *ἐπιστήμη*, *δόξα ἀληθής*) first enumerated (see n. on *νοῦν* above).

16. **ἀληθῆ** is obelized by Badh.[2], as a false addition.

ἔπειτα χρόνον ὡς χαιρήσεις δυνατὸν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ζῆν δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίον, ἀλλά τινος πλεύμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσα θαλάττια μετ' ὀστρείνων ἔμψυχά ἐστι σωμάτων. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔχομεν ἄλλως πως διανοηθῆναι; D

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν αἱρετὸς ἡμῖν βίος ὁ τοιοῦτος;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀφασίαν παντάπασί με, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐμβέβληκε τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Μήπω τοίνυν μαλθακιζώμεθα, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ μεταλαβόντες αὖ βίον ἴδωμεν.

XI. ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις δέξαιτ' ἂν αὖ ζῆν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων | κεκτη- E
μένος, ἡδονῆς δὲ μετέχων μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν, μηδ' αὖ λύπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν ἀπαθὴς πάντων <ὢν> τῶν τοιούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέτερος ὁ βίος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε τούτων αἱρετός, οὐδ' ἄλλῳ μή ποτε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, φανῇ.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὁ ξυναμφότερος, | ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν 22
συμμιχθεὶς κοινὸς γενόμενος;

1 μετέπειτα Γ. 2 πνεύμονος Σ et corr. ΓΔ. 3 ὀστρείνων Cl. ΓΔΞΠΕF et pr. B: ὀστρείων *S.

D. 4 ταῦτ' bis Γ. ἐχόμενα Cl. ΔΠ. πως om. Cl. ΔΠ. 7, 8 εἰς...νῦν om. pr. EF. ὁ λόγος οὗτος Σ. 9 νοῦ] νῦν Cl. μεταβάλλοντες F. 11 ποῖον Cl. Δ et pr. H: τὸν ποῖον *S.

E. 14 δὲ μὴ μετέχων τω. 15 λύπη pr. Δ. τὸ πᾶν ἀπαθὴς καὶ τὸ παράπαν πάντων Γ. 18 ὡς om. Λ. 19 τί δ'] τόδ' Cl.

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1. **ὡς χαιρήσεις.** Stallb. cites Moeris, p. 403: χαιρήσεις Ἀττικῶς, χαιρήσῃ Ἑλληνικῶς.

3. **πλεύμονος,** "the sea-lung," *pulmo* a shell-fish proverbial for insensibility or dulness. So Hesych.: λέγονται πλεύμονες καὶ θαλάττια εἴδη ζῴων ἀναίσθητα. Cp. Ar. *Hist. An.* 5. 15, 21. Plaut. *Epid.* 5. 1. 21: pulmon' es, qui perhibetur. Moeris, p. 300, mentions πλεύμων as 'Attic,' πνεύμων as 'Hellenic.'

'Jelly-fish' or 'stock-fish' are the terms most appropriate in English idiom. θαλάττια is condemned by Badh.[2]

4. **ἔχομεν ἄλλως πως.** So most MSS. and edd. πως om. Basil., Vat., Ven. II, Herm. ("καὶ πῶς ad simplex ἄλλως respicere videtur").

9, 10. **μεταλαβόντες.** The force of the prep. is to express *change* of grasp; "uicissim...sumamus," Stallb. One MS. has -βάλλοντες, whence μεταβαλόντες has been proposed—needlessly: cp. *Prot.* 355 C, 356 D, Xen. *Eq.* 10. 6; and 51 A *infra*, 16 D *supra*.

15. **πάντων <ὢν> τῶν τ.** I adopt the addition of the partic. as recommended by Badh.[2]: cp. 16 C *supra*.

19. **ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμμιχθεὶς κοινὸς γεν.,** i.e. διὰ τὸ συμμιχθῆναι, 'facta mixtione': this causal use of the partic. is common in Plato: cp. *Eq.* 500 B, etc.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονῆς λέγεις καὶ νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως;

ΣΩ. Οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγω ἔγωγε.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς δή που τοῦτόν γε αἱρήσεται πρότερον ἢ ἐκείνων ὁποτερονοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε, οὐχ ὁ μέν, ὁ δ' οὔ.

5 ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι νῦν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τὸ ξυμβαῖνον ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὅτι γε τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προὐτέθησαν, τοῖν | δυοῖν δ' οὐδέτερος ἱκανὸς οὐδὲ αἱρετὸς οὔτ' B
ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ζῴων οὐδενί.

10 ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἤδη τούτων γε πέρι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν εἶχε τἀγαθόν; ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἱκανὸς καὶ τέλεος καὶ πᾶσι καὶ φυτοῖς καὶ ζῴοις αἱρετός, οἷσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν

22 A. 2 καὶ] κατὰ F. τῶν τοιούτων Cl. ΔΠ. ἔγωγε om. Cl. ΔΠ. 3 ταυτόν Λ. τὸ πρότερον Γ. 4 ἐκείνων Cl. ΔΛΠ: κείνων *S. γε add. Cl. ΔΠ. 5 ὅτι] ἔτι Cl. Π. 7 γε om. Cl. ΔΠ.
B. 8 οὐδέτεροι Cl. οὔτ'] οὔτε Cl. 11 αὐτῶν Cl. ΔΛΠ: αὐτοῖν *S. ἂν om. F. ἱκανῶς Δ.

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1. **καὶ φρονήσεως** are bracketed by Badh.[2]

2. **καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγω ἔγωγε**, most MSS. and edd.; καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λέγω of Bodl., Vat., Ven. II is accepted by Herm., who inaptly comments "aptius est Socratem cum mistione simul etiam partes illius respicere."

4. **καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε.** "his uerbis notio atque uis praecedentis πᾶς confirmatur et augetur," Stallb. So Paley: "and not only *any* one, but *every* one." Schleiermacher renders: "Diese wird wohl jeder eher als irgend eine von jenen wählen, und zu jenen dazu; nicht etwa einer, und ein anderer wieder nicht," so that πρὸς τούτοις γε is "in addition to the unmixed lives"; and this explanation is adopted by both Poste and Jowett. But to this Badham objects that ἐκείνοις not τούτοις were the right word, "and besides, how can a man choose both contraries, the unmixed and the mixed together?" Hence (in ed. 1) he would supply ἡμῶν after πᾶς (if πᾶς ἡμῶν is Greek), and render πρὸς τούτοις 'in addition to these (persons) here.'

O. Apelt (*Neue Jahrb.* '93, p. 283) suggests that πρός c. dat. here is used as in the formula πρός τινι εἶναι "bei etwas sein, es ganz womit halten," *Phaedo* 84 C, *Phaedr.* 249 C D; so rendering "und damit hält es jedermann": but this would seem to involve the change of τούτοις to the sing., as well as the insertion of a verb. As the words stand, I think we must agree with Badh.[1] to take them of 'the present audience': but I suspect a corruption. Badh.[2] proposes προσθήσεται τούτοις γ', 'and one and all will bear me out in saying so.' I should prefer, on the lines of Apelt, πρὸς τούτῳ γε <νήσεται> or ἔσται. Klitsch suggested transposing the phrase to a place after μῶν οὖν (l. 10 below): but a still more suitable place might be found after μῶν οὖν σοι, 23 D *infra*.

For **οὐχ ὁ μέν, ὁ δ' οὔ** cp. Aesch. *Pers.* 802, Hdt. I. 138, II. 37, Plat. *Laws* 923 B, *Rep.* 475 B.

11. **ἦν γὰρ ἄν**, i.e. εἰ εἶχε τἀγαθόν.

12. **πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζ.** Sydenham wished to read π. τοῖς ζ.: but to Plato τὰ φυτά were 'animantia,' with a βίος of their own, cp. *Tim.* 77 A ff.: ὥσθ' ἕτερον ζῷον εἶναι...ἃ δὴ νῦν...δένδρα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ σπέρματα...πᾶν γὰρ οὖν, ὅτιπερ ἂν μετάσχῃ τοῦ ζῆν, ζῷον μὲν ἂν ἐν δίκῃ λέγοιτο ὀρθότατα...διὸ δὴ ζῇ μὲν ἔστι τε οὐχ ἕτερον ζῴου, μόνιμον δὲ καὶ κατερριζώμενον πέπηγε διὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεως ἐστερῆσθαι.

The plant has αἴσθησις, yet it is not strictly correct to attribute αἵρεσις to it, nor to suppose it capable of 'sampling' and rejecting the purely noëtic life. Badh.[2] thinks it "high time these φυτά were weeded out of the text," and so

οὕτως ἀεὶ διὰ βίου ζῆν· εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ᾑρεῖθ' ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἱρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἤ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔοικε γοῦν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν.

5 ΣΩ. Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν | τήν γε Φιλήβου θεὸν οὐ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι ταὐτὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαί μοι δοκεῖ. C

ΦΙ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σὸς νοῦς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστι τἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἕξει που ταὐτὰ ἐγκλήματα.

ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἄν, ὦ Φίληβε, ὅ γ' ἐμός· οὐ μέντοι τόν γε 10 ἀληθινὸν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον οἶμαι νοῦν, ἀλλ' ἄλλως πως ἔχειν. τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὁρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι τί δράσομεν. τάχα | γὰρ ἂν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου D αἰτιώμεθ' ἂν ἑκάτερος ὁ μὲν τὸν νοῦν αἴτιον, ὁ δ' ἡδονὴν

.2 ἀληθῶς Cl. ΔΠ: ἀληθοῦς *S.
C. 5 τὴν γετοίνυν Γ. 6 ἡρεῖσθαι Λ. 7 ἔσται F. 8 ταυτὰ Δ et pr. Π: ταῦτα τὰ *S. 9 τόν γε ἀληθινὸν om. Λ. 13 πέρι om. F.
D. 13 ἂν om. Ξ.

brackets καὶ φυτοῖς: but a too hasty husbandman is apt to pull up wheat for tares.

2. **ἄκων**, 'contrary to the true will' of the subject choosing, as well as contrary to the true nature (φύσιν) of the object of choice. This recals the Socratic doctrine that vice is never at bottom voluntary, but always due to inner or outer unintentional warping. ἀνάγκη οὐκ εὐδαίμων, as Paley says, means ἄτη: an impulse which is not εὐδαίμων cannot result in εὐδαιμονία or τἀγαθόν.

5. **τήν γε Φ. θεόν.** See 12 B ff. *supra*: ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς θεοῦ...Ἀφροδίτην...ἡδονήν. The foregoing argument, as Poste reminds us, is alluded to by Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* X. 2: τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τἀγαθόν· αἱρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρίς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτὸ τἀγαθὸν αἱρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. This text also confirms the authenticity of our dialogue.

6. **ταὐτὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν**: so MSS., but probably we should insert ὄν after ταὐτόν, as Stallb., Paley and others suggest.

ἱκανῶς...δοκεῖ, i.e. we have adequately disposed of the original ethical problem: but there now emerges a second question, which is aetiological: see *Introd.* I. and V.

9. **ὅ γ' ἐμός**, sc. νοῦς. Observe the opposition here established between the individual νοῦς and ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἅμα καὶ θεῖος νοῦς. The latter is not immediately under discussion—not a claimant for the place of τἀγαθόν—but is 'on a different footing' (ἄλλως πως ἔχειν). It will find further mention below, 28 A ff.

11. **οὐκ ἀμφισβ. πω.** πω, 'not *yet*,' seems to imply that such a claim will be urged later on—though not on behalf of ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, whose case has already been given up: and as θεῖος νοῦς has not strictly any part in the κοινὸς βίος, it is possible that Badh.[2] is right in regarding πω as a dittographic error.

For ἀμφισβ. with gen. cp. *Polit.* 275 B.

13. **τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου**, κτλ. The κοινός or μικτὸς βίος gains the νικητήρια, without further dispute for the present. The next question is, which of the two other claimants, which of the unmixed lives, comes 2nd and gains the δευτερεῖα? In other words, which of the two deserves rather to be regarded as the αἴτιον, the cause which makes the mixed life the Good? If we can discover that element or ingredient to which the Good life owes its goodness and desirability, then this 'cause' will serve as the standard by which to estimate the comparative merits of reason and pleasure. Thus the point under discussion is here changed; as Socrates

εἶναι, καὶ οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων οὐδέτερον ἂν εἴη, τάχα δ' ἂν αἴτιόν τις ὑπολάβοι πότερον αὐτῶν εἶναι. τούτου δὴ πέρι καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς Φίληβον διαμαχοίμην ἄν, ὡς ἐν τῷ μικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ, ὅτι ποτ' ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ λαβὼν ὁ βίος
5 οὗτος γέγονεν αἱρετὸς ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ νοῦς τούτῳ ξυγγενέστερον καὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον | τὸν λόγον οὔτ' ἂν τῶν πρωτείων οὐδ' αὖ τῶν δευτερείων E
ἡδονῇ μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο· πορρωτέρω δέ ἐστι τῶν τριτείων, εἴ τι τῷ ἐμῷ νῷ δεῖ πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν.

10 ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν ἡδονή σοι πεπτωκέναι καθαπερεὶ πληγεῖσα ὑπὸ τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων· τῶν γὰρ νικητηρίων πέρι μαχομένη κεῖται. τὸν δὲ νοῦν, ὡς | ἔοικε, λεκτέον ὡς ἐμφρόνως οὐκ ἀντεποιεῖτο τῶν νικη- 23
τηρίων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἔπαθεν ἄν. τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων
15 στερηθεῖσα ἡδονὴ παντάπασιν ἄν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοίη πρὸς τῶν αὐτῆς ἐραστῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἔτ' ἂν ὁμοίως φαίνοιτο καλή.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἄμεινον αὐτὴν ἐᾶν ἤδη καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγχοντα
20 λυπεῖν;

1 τῷ S. οὐδετέρων Cl. Δ et pr. Π. 2 πότερον Cl. ΔΛΞΠΒCEHw: ὁπότερον *S. 4 τούτῳ] τούτω Cl.
E. 7 οὔτ' ἂν Cl. ΔΠ: οὔτ' αὖ *S. οὔτ' Σw. ἂν ΔΠ. 8 μετὼν E. δ' Cl. 9 ὑμᾶς Γ. 10 μὲν om. Cl. ΔΠ. 11 καθάπερ ἡ Λ et pr. Γ. ἀπὸ H. 12 γὰρ] γὰρ δὴ w. μαχουμένη ΓΛCEFHw.
23 A. 14 αὐτ' Cl. 16 αὐτῆς Cl.

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now begins to maintain, not that νοῦς and its fellows are τἀγαθόν, but that they are nearest akin to τὸ αἴτιον or that which makes ὁ κοινὸς βίος to be τἀγαθόν.

Badh.[2] brackets both αἴτιον and εἶναι as superfluities.

7. **οὔτ'...οὐδ' αὖ**: οὐδ' αὖ for οὔτε lends more emphasis to the second alternative. Cp. 42 B *infra*, *Laws* 840 A, *Rep.* 426 B. So too οὔτε...οὐδέ γε is permissible, but never οὔτε...οὐδέ. With **μετόν** (used almost as a noun) sc. εἶναι; cp. *Laws* 900 E.

9. **τῷ ἐμῷ νῷ**. Alluding playfully to ὅ γ' ἐμὸς (νοῦς) of 22 C.

11. **πεπτωκέναι καθ. πληγεῖσα**. The met. is from 'the ring.' Cp. *Protag.* 339 E: ὥσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγεὶς ἐσκοτώθην. *Euthyd.* 303 A: ὥσπερ πληγεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἐκείμην ἄφωνος. Badh.[2] suggests ὑποπεπτ., to get rid of the dat. constr. In the competition for first prize, Pleasure has been 'knocked out of time' by the Mixed Life, while Reason 'lay low,' and showed its sense (φρόνησις acting ἐμφρόνως) by declining to enter the field as a rival for τὰ πρωτεῖα, since it would have fared no better than Pleasure, but merely come in for a 'knock-down' itself.

16. **πρὸς τῶν αὐτῆς ἐραστῶν...καλή**. Here ἡδονή is regarded not as θεός but rather as a mistress, beloved for her κάλλος: and in the word 'lovers' there is esp. reference to Φίληβος.

οὐδὲ ἐκείνοις, 'not *even* to her lovers': hence, à fortiori, not to the rest of mankind.

18. **τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην...βάσανον**: 'the most exact and exacting test.'

In ἐξελέγχοντα Socrates quietly assumes the point at issue—the inferiority of Pleasure: it is a foregone conclusion,

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. | Ἆρ' ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν; B

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ὡς οὐδείς πώ σε ἡμῶν μεθήσει, πρὶν ἂν εἰς τέλος ἐπεξέλθῃς τούτων τῷ λόγῳ.

ΣΩ. Βαβαὶ ἄρα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, συχνοῦ μὲν λόγου τοῦ λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίου πάνυ τι νῦν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλης μηχανῆς ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον, οἷον βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων· ἔστι δὲ ἴσως ἔνια καὶ ταὐτά. οὐκοῦν χρή;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

XII. ΣΩ. Τὴν δέ γε ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ διευλαβεῖσθαι | πειρώμεθα τιθέμενοι. C

1 οὐδὲν...ἡδονὴν om. pr. E.
B. 3 πῶ Cl. 6 βαβαῖ Cl. 7 οὐδὲ] εἰ δὲ CHw: om. AE. ῥαδίου corr. Σ: ῥᾴδιον *S. 8 δεῖν...νοῦ om. Γ. 9 τῶν om. pr. Ξ. ἔμπροσθε Γ. 10 ἴσως δέ ἐστιν Λ. ταῦτα Cl. ΔΛΣCEFw. : οὐκοῦν ΔΞΠ. 11 πῶς...] haec non alteri dat Δ. 12 τὴν] ne haec quidem Ξ. εὐλαβεῖσθαι Λ.

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hence no need to prolong the discussion. All through S. is represented as being in haste to get away, the others as anxious to keep him.

2. **τὸ ἀδύνατον...λυπεῖν ἡδονήν**, 'a paradox, the paining of pleasure.' Had Prot. already seen the joke when he said οὐδὲν λέγεις? I think not; but S. is in a humorous bantering mood and points out his own joke.

3. **οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλ'**... Cp. *Gorg.* 490 E, *Phaedo* 107 B. τούτων goes with εἰς τέλος, so that ἐπεξελθεῖν is used absol. as 65 B *infra*, *Gorg.* 492 D, *Rep.* 349 A etc.

7. **οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίου**. So Badh.[1] and Wb. after Ven. Ξ. Most MSS. and edd. give ῥᾴδιον, which Stallb. retains, supplying αὐτό i.e. τὸ ἐπεξελθεῖν: but, as Badh. notes, the μὲν...δὲ seems almost decisive in favour of the gen. Badh.[2] alters the order to οὐδὲ πάνυ τι ῥᾳδίου. νῦν γὰρ δὴ κτλ.

8. **δεῖν ἄλλης μηχανῆς ..οἷον βέλη ἔχειν**... Lehrs proposed to take the words in the order φ. ἐ. τὰ δ. ὑ. ν. π. δεῖν ἔχειν οἷον ἄλλης μηχανῆς βέλη ἕτ. τ. ἐ. λ. Stallb., however, places a comma after μηχανῆς and takes the foll. words as added 'per epexegesin quandam': similarly Paley renders: 'If I mistake not you require some other shift. If you go in for the second prize on behalf of Mind you must have weapons different from your former arguments.' Badh.[1] (followed by Wb.) punctuates after πορευόμενον, commenting: "as the ἄλλη μηχανή consists in ἔχειν β. ἐ., this is added by way of explanation" —and this seems the better way. But as the db. constr. of δεῖν, with both gen. and infin., is harsh, we might conjecture that after ΔΕΙΝ the prepos. ΜΕΤΑ or ΔΙΑ has been lost. H. Gloël (*Rh. Mus.* '82, p. 136) proposes ἐπί <τε> τὰ δευτ. Or I would suggest as better οἷόν <τε> βέλη. Badh.[2] excises both ἄλλης μηχανῆς and λόγων; the latter certainly looks like a gloss, but cp. κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον 25 A *infra*.

9. **πορευόμενον ἐπί**..., 'marching to the capture of.'

10. **ἔνια καὶ ταὐτά**, i.e. some of the old slings and arrows of argument will be used again: so just below λάβωμεν ἅττα τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων. "Socrates seems to refer to the proposition that all being is a union of Unity and Multiplicity as well as to the method of generalisation and division" (Poste): i.e. he is passing over from analysis of the subjective to that of the objective. Badh.[2] gives οὐκοῦν χρή; to Pr. and πῶς γὰρ οὔ; to Socr.

12. **τὴν δέ γε ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ...τιθέμενοι**, 'principium rei dum ponimus' Stallb.;

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῇ διαλάβωμεν, μᾶλλον δ', εἰ βούλει, τριχῇ.

ΠΡΩ. Καθ' ὅτι, φράζοις ἄν.

5 ΣΩ. Λάβωμεν ἄττα τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

10 ΣΩ. Τούτω δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθώμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἕν τι ξυμμισγόμενον. | εἰμὶ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν, D ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις ἄνθρωπος τά τ' εἴδη διιστὰς καὶ συναριθμούμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Τί φῄς, ὠγαθέ;

15 ΣΩ. Τετάρτου μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν φαίνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνος.

ΣΩ. Τῆς ξυμμίξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν ὅρα, καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις τέταρτον τοῦτο.

C. 3 μᾶλλον...λάβωμεν in mg. Cl. 5 ἄττα Cl. 7 τὸν pr. Δ. μὲν] μὲν οὖν Π, om. Λ. 10 τούτων omnes. τὰ] τὸ Σ. 11 τούτων F.
D. 12 ἄνθρωπος] ἱκανὸς Cl. ΔΠ: ἱκανῶς *S, Bekk. τάτ' Cl. Π et pr. Δ: κατ' *S, Bekk. 15 φαίνεται om. Cl. Δ. 17 ξ(υμμίξεως) ΓΣBCHw. 18 τίθημι (omisso μοι) Ξ: "unde sumendum τίθη" (Bekk.). ἐκείνας Λ.

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but surely αὐτοῦ refers to the συχνὸς λόγος of S.'s last speech: Stallb. is right, however, in saying that the principal notion is contained, as often, in the partic.

Here we are launched on a new current of discourse, of physico-metaphysical character: see *Introd.* I. and IV.

2. **διχῇ...μᾶλλον δ'...τριχῇ**, i.e. into one fresh division beside the two already mentioned: the apparent correction draws attention to the fact that the third class (τὸ τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν) is an addendum not included in τοῖς νῦν δὴ λόγοις.

7. **ἐλέγομέν που**: see 16 C ff. *supra*.

ἄπειρον: for the pre-Platonic use of this term, cp. *Append.* C.

8. **πέρας ἔχον** was wrongly read here by Heind. and Schleierm.

10. **τούτω δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν**. This is Stallb.'s correction for the τούτων of MSS. and seems almost necessitated by the context. However, it is just possible that τούτων may be right, as referring to the *three*fold division made above.

12. **γελοῖός τις ἄνθρωπος τά τ' εἴδη**. I adopt the correction of Badh.[2]; so too Wb., except that he gives κατ' εἴδη. γελοῖός τις ἱκανῶς κ. εἴ. διιστὰς κ. συναρ. is read by Stallb. and Badh.[1], but the best MSS. read ἱκανὸς τά τ' εἴδη. The corruption was due to the shorthand of the archetype—γελ. τις ἄνος (= ἄνθρωπος) τάτ' εἴδη δ. κ. σ.—coupled with dittography. In any case the particc., being presents, must be understood, as Stallb. points out, 'de *conatu*'—"*attempting* to distinguish and enumerate" Badh. Perhaps τρία τ' should be read, as the original of the variants κατ' and τάτ'. For the idiom, cp. *Phaedr.* 236 D γελοῖος ἔσομαι...αὐτοσχεδιάζων: *Prot.* 340 D εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός: *Rep.* 392 D.

15. **προσδεῖν φαίνεται**. Turr., Stallb., Poste, Badh. omit φ. with Bodl. and Vat., supplying, of course, φημί from the previous line. Herm. however follows the older editors in retaining it, saying "etsi ab Oxon. abest, suppleri tamen ex ante-

ΠΡΩ. Μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτου προσδεήσει διάκρισίν τινος δυναμένου;

ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἄν· οὐ μὴν οἶμαί γε ἐν τῷ νῦν· ἐὰν δέ τι δέῃ, συγγνώσει πού | μοι σὺ μεταδιώκοντι πέμπτον [βίον]. E

5 ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τὰ τρία διελόμενοι, τὰ δύο τούτων πειρώμεθα, πολλὰ ἑκάτερον ἐσχισμένον καὶ διεσπασμένον ἰδόντες, εἰς ἓν πάλιν ἑκάτερον συναγαγόντες

1 νοῆσαι, πῇ ποτὲ ἦν αὐτῶν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἑκάτερον.

10 ΠΡΩ. Εἴ μοι σαφέστερον ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποις, τάχ' ἂν ἐποίμην.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν τὰ δύο, ἃ προτίθεμαι, | ταῦτ' εἶναι, 24
ἅπερ νῦν δή, τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον· ὅτι δὲ τρόπον τινὰ τὸ ἄπειρον πολλά ἐστι, πειράσομαι φράζειν.

15 τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον ἡμᾶς περιμενέτω.

1 προσδεήσῃ ΛCw, προσθήσει Γ. διάκρισιν...δέῃ om. C. 3 ἐὰν] ἂν Cl. 4 συγγνώσει pr. Γ.
E. 4 μοι συμμεταδιώκοντι Cl. Δ et pr. Π. 6 τεττάρων Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCHw: τεσσάρων *S. 7 ἐσχισμένον...ἑκάτερον om. H et pr. ΔΠ. 11 ἐσποίμην H. 12 ἃ om. Γ. προστίθεμαι F.
24 A. 14 πολλ' Cl.

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cedentibus aegre poterit," and so too Wb. Badh.[2] reads πρὸς τοῖς τρισίν both here and below, 26 E.

1. **μῶν οὖν...πέμπτου.** As S. had emphasised the causal element required to effect the *mixture*, this suggests to P. to ask whether there would not be needed also, as a fifth class, the motive force of the contrary process, dissolution. To this S. replies 'not at present'—since διάκρισις and its cause are wholly outside the scope of the present argument, which is confined to the life's mixture. Poste suggests that Prot.'s familiarity with Empedocleanism (with its Φιλότης and Νεῖκος) may be implied in this remark of his—also that S.'s rejection of a fifth principle is due to the fact that the αἰτία "is not a blind elementary principle with a single necessary operation, but of an intelligent artistic nature, and therefore possesses both powers"—which is a just remark.

For δύνασθαί τι, 'to be capable of effecting,' cp. *Cratyl.* 405 B, *Laws* 757 A, *Gorg.* 453 A: Badh.[2] reads τινα for τινος.

4. **μεταδιώκοντι πέμπτον [βίον].** Edd. all agree in bracketing βίον, though I have seen no sufficient explanation of its insertion. Badh.[1] thinks "another word (εἶδος or γένος) is wanted in its room." Might we possibly accentuate βιόν, to be taken to refer to the met. in μηχανὴ... βέλη 23 B *supra*? or read πέμπτον τι ὄν. Cousin wished to render βίον, 'manière d'être,' or 'classe d'existences'—but such a meaning is impossible, at least in Plato.

7. **τὰ δύο,** i.e. τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πέρας ἔχον. As Badh. remarks πολλά is neither 'much' nor 'into many,' but 'existing as many' in their division and dispersion. For διεσπασμένον cp. 25 A.

Badh.[2] suggests that τὰ τρία should be τὸ τρίτον i.e. τὸ κοινὸν γένος.

13. **τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον.** In this repeated phrase Badh. both times expunges the ἔχον. But his "tilgungseifer" is rightly rebuked by O. Apelt (*Neue Jahrb.* '93, p. 283)—"denn πέρας ἔχον ist gar nicht notwendig so viel als πεπερασμένον. Es ist 'das was die grenze mit sich bringt.' Vielleicht ist der ausdruck einem formellen bedürfnis nach deutlichkeit entsprungen, da τὸ πέρας bekanntlich auch adverbial gebraucht wird." But Poste confusedly tells us that τὸ π. ἔχον here denotes "not τὸ πέρας but τὸ μικτόν," whereas below τῶν π. ἐχόντων is "equivalent to τῶν περάτων."

ΠΡΩ. Μένει.

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δή. χαλεπὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμον, ὃ κελεύω σε σκοπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ σκόπει. θερμοτέρου καὶ ψυχροτέρου πέρι πρῶτον ὅρα πέρας εἴ ποτέ τι νοήσαις
5 ἄν, ἢ τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἐν αὐτοῖς οἰκοῦντε τοῖς γένεσιν, ? ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνοικῆτον, τέλος οὐκ | ἂν ἐπιτρεψαίτην γίγνε- B σθαι· γενομένης γὰρ τελευτῆς καὶ αὐτὼ τετελευτήκατον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀεὶ δέ γε, φαμέν, ἔν τε τῷ θερμοτέρῳ καὶ τῷ
10 ψυχροτέρῳ τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἔνι.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἀεὶ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει ἡμῖν τούτω μὴ τέλος ἔχειν· ἀτελῆ δ' ὄντε δήπου παντάπασιν ἀπείρω γίγνεσθον.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

15 ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εὖ γε, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, ὑπέλαβες καὶ ἀνέμνησας, | ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἐφθέγξω, καὶ C

1 μενεῖ w. 3 καὶ θερμοτέρου Ξ. 5 οἰκοῦν τε τοῖς rc. Γ: οἰκοῦν τοῖς *S (Bekk.). 6 ὥσπερ EF. ἐνοικῆτον Cl. ΓΔΠ, ἐνοικεῖ του F: ἐνοικεῖτον *S. οὐκ ἂν om. Π, in mg. ponunt Cl. Δ.

B. 9 ἔν τε Cl. ΓΔΞΠΣBCFH et rc. E, ἔν τε w: εἴτε S. τῷ θερμοτέρῳ καὶ ψυχροτέρῳ Cl. ΔΠ: τῷ ψυχροτέρῳ καὶ τῷ θερμοτέρῳ *S. 10 τι H. 12 ἡμῖν om. Cl. ΔΠ. τοῦτο ΛC. 13 ἀτελῆ δ' ὄντε] ἄτε δῆλόν τε Cl. Π et pr. Δ, ἀτελῆ δ' οὔτε H. γίγνεσθον ἀπείρω Γ.

C. 16 τὸ om. Λ.

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3. **θερμ. καὶ ψυχρ. πέρι** κτλ. This is well illustrated by Paley: "So long as you keep urging a stoker to get up 'more steam,' the hotness or pressure is of the nature of indefiniteness. But when once you say 'get it up to 100 pounds on the inch' you put in the πέρας, which brings the indefinite at once to an end. It is then only 'hot' up to a certain mark, and not 'hotter.'"

Badh.[1] bids us separate ἐν αὐτοῖς from τοῖς γένεσιν, which seems too artificial. But I do not feel certain that the text is all sound here. Badh.[2] reads εἴ που ἔστι νοῆσαι, objecting to the conditional mood. For the significance of these exx. of ἄπειρον, see *App.* D.

6. **οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτρεψαίτην**, "satius visum est cum Stallb. οἰκοῦντε et οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτρεψαίτην edere quam cum O et T οἰκοῦν scribere et οὐκ ἂν omittere, quod codicis certe margini adscriptum est neque ante responsum ἀληθέστατα λέγεις abesse debebat" Herm. Badh.[2] gives οὐκ ἐπιτρέψετον.

7. **τελευτῆς...τετελ.** τελευτή is substituted for τέλος or πέρας in order to form this word-play with τελευτάω. αὐτώ means τὸ μ. τε καὶ ἧττ.

9. **τῷ θερμ. καὶ τῷ ψυχρ.** Contrary to most edd. Herm., with Bodl., omits τῷ before ψυχρ.

14. **καὶ σφόδρα γε...τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο** κτλ. Another instance of S.'s playfully minute attention to words. τὸ σφ. κ. τὸ ἠρέμα is not distinguished from τὸ μᾶλλόν τε κ. ἧττον as the 'intensive' from the 'extensive,' quality from quantity—both of which spheres are subordinated to and included in τὸ ἄπειρον: rather, while *both* expressions imply *qualitative* indefinity, the former regards such intensity in actions (πράξεσιν 24 C), the latter in states or conditions (γένεσιν 24 A). This is Badh.'s explanation; but the re-introduction of the ex. τὸ θερμ. κ. ψυχρ. just below seems at first sight to do away with any hard and fast distinction. Another hint for distinguishing the phrases is given by the contrast of τὸ μ. καὶ ἧττ. to τέλος but of τὸ σφ. κ. ἠρ. to ποσόν. But S. expressly states that both have the same δύναμις—

τό γε ἠρέμα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχετον τῷ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον. ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ἐνῆτον, οὐκ ἐᾶτον εἶναι ποσὸν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ σφοδρότερον ἡσυχαιτέρου καὶ τοὐναντίον ἑκάσταις πράξεσιν ἐμποιοῦντε τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀπεργάζεσθον, 5 τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἀφανίζετον. ὃ γὰρ ἐλέχθη νῦν δή, μὴ ἀφανίσαντε τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλ' ἐάσαντε αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα | ἕδρᾳ ἐγγενέσθαι, αὐτὰ ἔρρει ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν χώρας, ἐν ᾗ ἐνῆν. D
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θερμότερον οὐδὲ ψυχρότερον ἤστην ἂν, λαβόντε 10 τὸ ποσόν· προχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ προϊὸν ἐπαύσατο. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄπειρον γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ θερμότερον καὶ τοὐναντίον ἅμα.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἔστι δ', ὅπερ εἶπες, 15 οὐ ῥᾴδια ταῦτα ξυνέπεσθαι· τὸ δὲ εἰς αὖθίς τε καὶ αὖθις | ἴσως λεχθέντα τόν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἱκανῶς E ἂν ξυμφωνοῦντας ἀποφήνειεν.

1 μᾶλλόν τε Cl. ΔΠ: τε μᾶλλον *S. 2 ἂν add. Cl. ΓΔΞΠΣBCFHw.
6 ἐάσοντε Π. γε EF.

D. 8 ταυτὰ H. 9 θερμοτέρω οὐδὲ ψυχροτέρω S. ἤστην Δ, ἔστην Cl., ἔστην Π, εἴτην ΓΛΣBCEFHw: ἤτην S. 10 ψυχρότερον ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ θερμότερον Λ.
15 τε καὶ αὖθις om. F et pr. ΔE.
E. 17 ξ(υμφ.) Λ. ἀποφήνειεν] libri ἀποφήναιεν.

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and so it is best to regard τὸ σφ. κ. ἠρ. merely as a particular form or species of τὸ μ. κ. ἧττ.—Cp. *Introd.* IV., and *App.* D.

6. **τὸ ποσόν...καὶ τὸ μέτριον.** How far again are these two distinguishable? It is at least true to say that the latter is the narrower term, as lending itself to the expression of an ethical judgment, cp. *Polit.* 283 C ff.: for its general Platonic use see *App.* E. Here the difference of the two terms corresponds to that of the pair discussed in the preceding note. Badh.[2] deletes the καὶ before σφόδρα.

8. **ἔρρει...χώρας.** For this ὑπεκχώρησις of opposites, cp. *Phaedo* 103 D: δοκεῖ σοι οὐδέποτε χιόνα γ' οὖσαν, δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν...ἔτι ἔσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι.

9. Badh.[2] gives εἴτην for ἤστην, but he is wrong in saying Bodl. has ἔτην; like Ven. it has ἔστην: still εἴτην may be right.

13. **καὶ τοὐναντίον ἅμα,** i.e. πέρας ἔχον, according to Paley, who accuses Poste of mistranslation in 'this proves the unlimited character of Hotter and his antagonist.' But it is Paley, I think, who is wrong; for κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον is meant to summarise the whole of the preceding argument regarding τὸ θερμ. κ. ψ., and does not mean, as Paley says, 'if ποσὸν could co-exist with ἄπειρον': and so τοὐναντίον means τὸ ψυχρότερον, just as above (24 C σφοδρ. ἡσ. καὶ τοὐν.) it refers to ἡσ.

15. **τὸ δὲ εἰς αὖθίς τε καὶ αὖθις ἴσως λεχθέντα...ἀποφήνειεν.** A curious sentence. Badh. in ed. 1 proposed to alter τὸ δὲ to τάχα δὲ, while in ed. 2 he brackets λεχθέντα: but these alterations are by no means convincing. What does οὕτω ποιεῖν in S.'s next remark refer to?

In 23 E *ad fin.* Prot. had said εἴ μοι σαφέστερον ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποις, τάχ' ἂν ἐποίμην: a similar remark would be appropriate here. Hence I suggest τὸ δ' εἰ σαφέστερον ἔτι αὖθις, ὦ Σ., λεχθὲν τάχα τόν τε ἐρ. κτλ. (or the like), meaning "If I repeat my request 'explain yourself more clearly' our agreement will be ascertained."

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εὖ μὲν λέγεις, καὶ πειρατέον οὕτω ποιεῖν. νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξόμεθα σημεῖον, ἵνα μὴ πάντ' ἐπεξιόντες μηκύνωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, | εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς 25 ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι, κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον, ὃν ἔφαμεν, ὅσα διέσπασται καὶ διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρῆναι κατὰ δύναμιν μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαί τινα φύσιν, εἰ μέμνησαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μέμνημαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ᾖ πρὸς μέτρον, | ταῦτα ξύμπαντα B εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο. τί πῶς σὺ φῄς;

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XIII. ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μικτὸν ἐκ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν τίνα ἰδέαν φήσομεν ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς οἶμαι.

6 τὸ σφόδρα καὶ om. pr. Δ: τὸ om. Ξ.
25 A. 7 γένους Cl. εἰς post ὡς om. Σ. 8 δὴ ΛΗ. ταῦτα πάντα ΞF. ἔμπροσθε Γ. 13 τἀναντία Σ: τὰ ἐναντία *S. 16 ἀριθμὸς] ἀριθμοὶ Λ. ἢ add. Cl. ΓΔΠΣCFw, ἢ ΛΞΕΗ.
B. 17 δοκοῖεν F. 19 τε H. 20 τούτων, in mg. τρίτον, F. 22 φήσεις E.

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8. **δεῖ** is altered to δεῖν by Badh.², as dependent on λέγω implied in τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

10. **κατὰ δύναμιν μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαί τινα φύσιν.** Paley transl. κ. δ. 'according to their peculiar property,' and Jowett 'corresponding to some one power and quality in them': but the words have merely their common adverbial meaning 'as best we can' (which rendering Paley relegates to a foot-note), and μίαν belongs only to φύσιν.

For this use of ἐπισημ. cp. ἐπισφραγισθέντα 26 D *infra*, *Polit.* 258 C, *Phaedo* 75 D. The appended parenthetic phrase εἰ μέμνησαι recurs in *Rep.* 522 A: cp. εἰ ξυννοεῖς 26 C *infra*.

15. **πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν** κτλ. I.e. the triple, the quadruple etc., and the inverse fractions: in short, all definite multiples or measures, whether in nos. or in figures, whether continuous or discontinuous magnitudes. It is hardly clear from the sentence itself whether ταῦτα ξύμπαντα refers to τὰ δεχόμενα, the recipients, or to τἀναντία, the objects received: but as the φύσις (or γένος) is spoken of as ἡ δεχομένη in 25 C, τὰ δεχόμενα must be its constituent members.

22. **σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φρ.** is read by MSS. and most edd.; but Wb. prints σοὶ κ. ἐ. φ.

ΣΩ. Θεὸς μὲν οὖν, ἄνπερ γε ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπήκοος γίγνηταί τις θεῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Εὔχου δὴ καὶ σκόπει.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶ· καί μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν
5 φίλος ἡμῖν νῦν δὴ γεγονέναι.

ΠΡΩ. | Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο καὶ τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῇ; C

ΣΩ. Φράσω δῆλον ὅτι. σὺ δέ μοι συνακολούθησον τῷ λόγῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

10 ΣΩ. Θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νῦν δή πού τι καὶ ψυχρότερον. ἦ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πρόσθες δὴ ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ μεῖζον
15 καὶ σμικρότερον καὶ ὁπόσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν εἰς ἓν φύσεως.

ΠΡΩ. | Τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις; D

ΣΩ. Ναί. συμμίγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν.

20 ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

ΣΩ. Ἣν καὶ νῦν δή, δέον ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπεί-

1 · ὁ θεὸς Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 3 σκοποῦ w. 4 μοι] τοι H.
C. 6 πῶς] πῶς δὴ Λ. χρῇ, in mg. posito ει, Cl. 7 τῷ λόγῳ συνακολούθησον Γ. 10 ἐφθεγξόμεθα w. ψυχρότερον; Cl. 13 πρόσθε Γ. 16 τε om. F et pr. Ξ.
D. 18 ναί: Cl. συμμίγνυ Cl. Δ et pr. Π: συμμίγνυε *S. τὸ om. F. 19 αὖ τοῦ Γ: αὐτοῦ *S. 21 δή om. Λ.

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1. **θεὸς μὲν οὖν** κτλ. Here, as usually, the invocation of the deity draws attention to the combined difficulty and importance of what is to follow—namely the account of τὸ τρίτον τὸ μικτόν: cp. 61 B, C.

16. **εἰς ἕν**, before φύσεως, is bracketed by Badh.[2]

18. **συμμίγνυ...γένναν.** γέννα, 'race,' 'family,' 'offspring,' is to be carefully distinguished from γένος: Stallb. confuses them in his rendering '*finiti genus.*' The notion of sexual union which γέννα implies is involved also in συμμίγνυ.

21. **ἣν καὶ νῦν δή** κτλ. "The deficiency complained of is, that they had not made an enumeration of the things which contain the πέρας. For...we have nothing to answer to ὑγρότερον καὶ ξηρότερον and the other examples. These are supplied by S. further on in...ἆρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις κτλ." (Badh.[1] approved by Paley). But the latter passage, as Badh.[2] notes, concerns the κοινόν, not the πέρας: Badh.[2] also objects that "ταὐτὸν implies that the thing has been done before," and that "neither καὶ nor νῦν δὴ is compatible with οὐ συνηγάγομεν": hence he prints οὐ in brackets. Further, as there seems no sufficient evidence that ταὐτὸν δράσει can mean (as Stallb. renders it) 'it will do as well,' Badh.[1] proposes ταὐτὸν δράσασι (dat. after καταφανὴς γεν.), and Paley ταὐτὸν δρῶσι or ἂν τ. δράσῃς. Badh.[2] prints τ. δράσεις, and then transposes the next clause (τούτων...γενήσεται) so as to make it follow ἀπεργάζεται, at the end of S.'s next statement, commenting:— "beyond all doubt κἀκείνη refers to the *third* γέννα which

ρου συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἕν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς συναγαγεῖν, οὐ συνηγάγομεν.*

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση παύει
5 πρὸς | ἄλληλα τἀναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ E
σύμφωνα ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται. *ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν δράσει, τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συμ<μισ>γομένων καταφανὴς κἀκείνη γενήσεται.*

ΠΡΩ. Μανθάνω· φαίνει γάρ μοι λέγειν, μιγνῦσι ταῦτα
10 γενέσεις τινὰς ἀφ' ἑκάστων αὐτῶν συμβαίνειν.

ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς γὰρ φαίνομαι.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις ἡ τούτων ὀρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ὑγιείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;

15 ΠΡΩ. | Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 26

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις οὖσιν, ἆρ' οὐ ταὐτὰ ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα ἅμα πέρας τε ἀπειργάσατο καὶ μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν τελεώτατα ξυνεστήσατο;

20 ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔν γε χειμῶσι καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγενόμενα

1 τοῦ om. Λ. 2 οὐ om. Λ. 3 ποίαν Cl. ΓΔΛΞΒCHw Flor. a,b,c,i: ποῖ *S. E. 7 δράσει Cl. ΓΔΞΠΣΕFH: δράσῃ *S. συνεισαγομένων Σ: συναγομένων *S, Bekk. etc. 8 κακείνης Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 9 φαίνει Cl. ΔΠΗ et pr. Γ: φαίνῃ *S (Bekk.). μιγνὺς omnes. 10 ἐφ' F, ἀφ' Cl. Π. αὐτῶν in mg. ponit Δ, om. Cl. et pr. Π: αὐτῶν καὶ H. 13 ἄρα Cl. 14 ὑγίειαν w. **26** A. 17 ταυτὰ ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα Δ, ταῦτὰ ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα Cl., ταῦτα ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα Π: ταῦτα ἐγγιγνόμενα τὰ αὐτὰ *S. 18 ξ(υν.) Γ. 20 κάλλιστά Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣΒCEHw: μάλιστα *S. 21 χειμῶσιν Cl. ἐγγενόμενα Cl. ΔΠ, ἐγγινομένη w: ἐγγενομένη *S.

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they have been some time in quest of. But who could help taking **ποίαν** to refer to **κακείνη**? and yet **ποίαν** is answered by Socr. as referring to the *second*. **ἀμφ. συναγ. μ. κ. γ.** is an interruption to the argument." I adopt Jackson's emendation for reasons set forth in *App.* A.

9. **μιγνῦσι**, for **μιγνὺς** of the MSS., is the conj. of Klitsch, adopted by Badh., Poste, and Wb.; Paley, however, prefers the vulgate which is defended also by Stallb.: Heind. conj. **ἂν μιγνύῃς**.

10. **ἀφ' ἑκάστων**, Turr., Poste, Badh. etc., with Cl.; but **ἐφ' ἑκάστων** is adopted by Stallb., Herm. and Wb.

17. **ταὐτὰ...ταῦτα**, i.e., as Badh. explains, "the **γέννα τοῦ πέρατος**, *instances of the limit*, not the **πέρας** and **ἄπειρον**, as Stallbaum supposes, for how can they be said to be **ἐν τοῖς ἀπείροις** or **πέρας ἀπεργάσασθαι**?"

18. **ξύμπασαν τελεώτατα** is suspected by Badh. who conj. **ξ. τελειότητα**. Jackson suggests **ξ. θ' ἁρμονίαν τελεώτατα**, cp. 31 C; but the dubitative **οἶμαι** there seems rather against his view.

20. **κάλλιστα** is retained by Poste and Wb., but Badh. gives the commonplace **μάλιστα** after some early edd.

τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δὲ ἔμμετρον καὶ ἅμα σύμμετρον ἀπειργάσατο.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὧραί τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ | πάντα B
5 ἡμῖν γέγονε, τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων συμμιχθέντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄλλα γε δὴ μυρία ἐπιλείπω λέγων, οἷον μεθ' ὑγιείας κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμπολλα ἕτερα
10 καὶ πάγκαλα. ὕβριν γάρ που καὶ ξύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίαν αὕτη κατιδοῦσα ἡ θεός, ὦ καλὲ Φίληβε, πέρας οὔτε ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ

1 λεῖον Cl. ΔΠ. καὶ om. S. 2 ἀπειργάσατο; Cl. 4 οὐκ οὖν ΔB. B. 8 γε om. Cl. ΔΠ. ἀπολείπω Σ. 11 οὔτε ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν Cl. ΔΠ, οὐδὲν οὔθ' ἡδονῶν Γ. 12 νόμον] μόνον w.

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1. **τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν.** In defence of the post-position of the adv. Stallb. compares the position of πάνυ in Ar. *Ran.* 615, 768, 1124; *Crit.* 45 A, *Menex.* 235 A, *Ion* 533 E, *Parmen.* 129 E: of ἄγαν in Soph. *Antig.* 469: of λίαν in Eur. *Hippol.* 489; Ar. *Ran.* 835; *Sophist.* 225 C. Klitsch would insert καὶ before λίαν.

11. **αὕτη κατιδοῦσα ἡ θεός.** Schütz took this to refer to Ἡδονή or Ἀφροδίτη, the goddess championed by Philebus (12 B *supra*), and consequently supposed "aliquot periodos excidisse post uerba: καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς...πάγκαλα," and further wished to alter ἡδονῶν in the foll. clause to κενώσεων for the sake of antithesis with πλησμονῶν. Stallb. on the contrary maintained that αὕτη ἡ θεός might refer to τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κοινωνίαν—"Enimuero eadem fere Socrates huic attribuit, quae alibi uel Amori uel etiam Harmoniae tribuuntur. Quocirca protenus de ea tanquam dea aliqua loquitur, iocose scilicet ipsius Philebi imitans exemplum, qui uoluptatem suam eandem esse uoluerat atque Ἀφροδίτην." This sudden personification of an abstract notion he explains as due to the natural 'cogitandi celeritas' of the Greek mind (cp. Stallb. on *Sympos.* 196 D).

Badham however revived Schütz's view on the ground that "the notion that this is a personification of the 3rd γένος is sufficiently refuted by the appeal to Philebus, which could only be made because his goddess was in question." But instead of the hypothesis of a lacuna, B. inserts <σὴ> between ἡ and θεός—a much neater method.

Paley however objects that Badham's interpretation 'totally perverts the passage' and reverting to Stallb.'s interpretation translates 'it was this goddess Harmony...that first saw' etc. And I believe that the view suggested thus by Stallb. and Paley is substantially correct. ὑγίεια (*plus* κάλλος and ἰσχύς) in the body together with μουσική (*plus* the ἀρεταί) in the soul are regarded, concretely and synthetically, as a single goddess, who might aptly be named ἁρμονία. Cp. 63 E where ὑγίεια and ἀρετή together are called θεός. This is also Dr H. Jackson's view (*J. of Phil.* x. p. 276 n.): he adds—"plainly Plato here pythagorizes: cp. Diog. Laert. VIII. 33 τήν τ' ἀρετὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἅπαν καὶ τὸν θεόν· διὸ καὶ καθ' ἁρμονίαν συνεστάναι τὰ ὅλα. The whole passage recals *Sympos.* 185 E—188 D."

Badham's ground is wrong, since, as Jackson well says, "Philebus is appealed to, not 'because *his* goddess was in question,' but because here, as in 27 E, where Philebus is again brought into the conversation, the width of the difference between him and Socrates is insisted upon."

πέρας οὔτε ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρας ἐχόντων ἔθετο. This is the Bodl. text. The vulgate, followed by Stallb., has πέρας ἔχοντ' ἔθετο: to which Badham

τάξιν πέρας ἐχόντων ἔθετο· καὶ σὺ μὲν ἀποκναῖσαι φῆς αὐτήν, | ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀποσῶσαι λέγω. σοὶ δέ, ὦ C
Πρώταρχε, πῶς φαίνεται;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε κατὰ νοῦν.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία ταῦτα εἴρηκα, εἰ ξυννοεῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οἶμαι κατανοεῖν· ἓν μὲν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τὸ ἄπειρον λέγειν, ἓν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον τὸ πέρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσι· τρίτον δὲ οὐ σφόδρα κατέχω τί βούλει φράζειν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ πλῆθός σε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐξέπληξε τῆς τοῦ
10 τρίτου γενέσεως· καί τοι πολλά γε καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον | παρέ- D
σχετο γένη, ὅμως δ' ἐπισφραγισθέντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναντίου γένει ἓν ἐφάνη.

1 ἐχόντων Cl. Π et pr. Δ. ἀποκνᾶς ΓΔFw, ἀποκναῖς Cl. ΠBCH, ἀποκνᾶς αἶσαι E, ἀποκν Λ: ἀποκνᾶν cum *S in litura Ξ. ἔφης omnes.
C. 2 ἀπῶσαι Λ. 5 δὴ add. Cl. ΔΠ. 7 λέγων Cl. Π et pr. Δ.
8 κατέχω σφόδρα Γ.

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objects "law and order *are* the limit in this case, and can scarcely be said to have it," and he accepts ἐχόντων "as right but in its wrong place," reading πέρας ἐχόντων οὔτε...τάξιν πέρας ἔθετο in his 2nd ed., while in his 1st ed. he placed ἐχόντων between ἐν αὐτοῖς and νόμον, either of which, as Paley remarks of the latter, makes ἐνόν superfluous. Paley suggests that "some scribe, finding ἔχοντ', wrongly took it as an abbreviation for ἐχόντων." If ἐχόντων is genuine, it will be possess. gen. which seems to make possible sense —'the law and order which attaches to πέρας ἔχοντα': but I believe that the right reading, which best explains the variation in MSS., is ἔχοντ' ἐνέθετο, comparing, for the prepos. which answers to that in ἐνόν, ἐγγενόμενα 26 A *supra*. ἀρετή is a συμμετρία resulting fr. the infusion of the πέρας ἔχον which is τάξις into the ἄπειρον which is ὕβρις: hence Badh.'s objection is misplaced.

1. **σὺ μὲν ἀποκναῖσαι φῆς αὐτήν.** Schütz rendered thus: "Et tu quidem me deae tuae, uoluptati, detrahere dicebas, ego contra me eam seruasse dico," retaining the ἔφη of MSS. and supposing the ref. to be to some remark of Phil. made before the opening of the dialogue.

Stallb. however rightly takes αὐτήν (i.e. Harmony) as subject, and ἀποκναῖσαι absol. ('Esse quasi quandam enecatricem'), remarking "quod quidem non sic accipiendum est, ac si Philebus antea his ipsis uerbis usus sit, sed pertinet potius ad omnem eius sententiam, qua summum bonum statuit in una uoluptate inesse." Badham supplies πάντας as object to ἀποκναῖσαι, though suggesting also the insertion of ἡμᾶς after αὐτήν: Poste and Jowett supply τὴν ψυχήν: Paley translates 'You say that she (i.e. moderation) utterly spoils life,' following Stallb. For the verb cp. *Rep.* 406 A.

9. **τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος...τῆς τοῦ τρίτου γενέσεως**—"recte dicitur pro τοῦ τρίτου γένους, quandoquidem ita eleganti periphrasi simul significatur mixti origo. Cp. *Politic.* 284 C, E al." Stallb. Badham alters γενέσεως to γέννης, on the ground that "πλῆθος τῆς γενέσεως cannot mean αἱ πολλαὶ γενέσεις as one editor is rash enough to state." But the change seems needless: γένεσις may be concrete, 'family,' as in *Laws* 691 D δίδυμον φυτεύσας τὴν τῶν βασιλέων γένεσιν, and elsewhere.

10. **καί τοι παρέσχετο γένη.** Badh. brackets γένη as 'in the true style of the interpolator.' It may be wrong, either an interpolation or a corruption of some such word as εἴδη, but as we have already had the poetical γέννα, the poet. γένος ('son' or 'scion,' in pl. Hdt. III. 159) may have been here adopted for the sake of the word-play.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε πέρας οὔτε <ὅτι> πολλὰ εἶχεν, οὔτ' ἐδυσκολαίνομεν ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἓν φύσει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

5 ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἓν τοῦτο τιθέντα τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔμαθον.

XIV. ΣΩ. | Ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς <τοῖς> τρισὶ τέταρτόν τι Ε

10 τότε ἔφαμεν εἶναι γένος σκεπτέον· κοινὴ δ' ἡ σκέψις. ὅρα γάρ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τινα αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι.

D. 2 τότε Λ. οὔτε Cl. 3 ἐν Cl. 5 : ἀλλὰ Ξ. φασί FS. ἐν Π et pr. Δ. τοῦτο] τι τούτων Cl. Π, τι τούτων Δ. 6 ἐγγονον Cl. ΔΠ. 7 ἀπειργασμένην Σ, ἀπειργασμένον corr. Γ.

E. 9 τι om. H. 10 τότε ΓΔΛ, τότε ΣBC, τόγε Cl. Π: ποτε *S. εἶναι om. Λ. καινῇ Π. 11 εἶναι Λ. 12 τω' Γ.

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2. **τό γε πέρας οὔτε <ὅτι> πολλὰ εἶχεν, οὔτ' ἐδυσκ.** Schütz proposed οὔτε ὡς πολλὰ εἶχεν, and Badham in ed. 1 wrote "either ἧττον or an additional negative must have dropped out," while in ed. 2 he suggests ὅτι for οὔτε and οὔτοι ἐδ. for οὔτ' ἐδ. Stallb.'s defence of the MS. text I confess myself unable to understand, and Paley's attempt to explain it away, by assuming a previous contrast between τὰ πέρας ἔχοντα as few and τὰ ἄπειρα as many, is equally unjustifiable. Here, as before, πέρας is just as much an ex. of the unification of the πολλά of particulars into a single genus as is ἄπειρον, and no contrast can be drawn between them without vitiating the argument both elsewhere and here, where the sense clearly needs that *both* the two previous kinds should be mentioned as showing similar features to that found in the third kind. I have printed what seems the simplest correction, adding ὅτι after οὔτε. One might conjecture as an alternative οὔτε πολλὰ <εἰ> εἶχεν. Other suggestions are O. Apelt's (*Neue Jahrb.* '93, p. 283 ff.) ὅτε πολλὰ εἶχεν, οὐκ ἐδυσκ.—"das ὅτε εἶχεν zeigt den bekannten und häufigen Platonischen gebrauch des imperfects in hinsicht auf früher in dem nämlichen dialoge verhandeltes; est ist gleich ὅτε ἐλέγομεν ὅτι πολλὰ ἔχει" (for which idiom cp. 23 E, and Stallb. on *Laws* 628 C, *Crito* 47 B): and Gloël's οὔτε πολλὰ <οὐκ> εἶχεν οὔτ' ἐδ. ὡς οὐκ ἦν κτλ.

6. **τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν...μέτρων.** Badh.[2] alters to γένεσιν οὖσαν on the grounds that every γένεσις must be εἰς οὐσίαν, and so the expression is tautologous, and further that the partic. is the right form in which to add a reason. Stallb. suspects μέτρων: "pro μέτρων uide an μετρίων legendum sit," and either this or one of the adjs. used above, ἐμμέτρων or συμμέτρων, would seem more natural, since μέτρα are πέρατος γέννα and themselves agents which σύμμετρα ἀπεργάζεται, 25 D E *supra*. As to μέτρον, however, see further in *Append.* E. The phrase is meant to summarise the account given in 25 E ff. I incline to think we should read ἀπειργασμένην, 'a product wrought out into being from,' etc.

9. **πρὸς <τοῖς> τρισί.** I follow Badh. in the insertion (*invitis codicibus*) of the art., which here seems indispensable.

10. **τότε** refers back to 23 D.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔμοιγε· πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς τούτου γίγνοιτο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦντος φύσις οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον ἕν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ποιούμενον αὖ | καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον 27
οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι, καθάπερ τὸ νῦν δή, διαφέρον εὑρήσομεν. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

10 ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἡγεῖται μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἐπακολουθεῖ γιγνόμενον ἐκείνῳ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο ἄρα καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν αἰτία τ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ.

15 ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη;

1 τούτου Cl. ΔΣ, τοῦτο Π: τούτων *S. 2 οὐδὲ Σ. 3 αἰτίας] οὐσίας Γ. ποιὸν Γ.
27 A. 7 δή om. Λ. εὑρήσομεν om. Λ. 11 ἀκολουθεῖ Cl. ΔΠ. ἐκεῖνο Δ.
13 αἰτίαν corr. Π. 16 ἐξ ὧν] ἔξω pr. Cl. ΔΠ.

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1. **πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς τούτου γίγνοιτο;** So Bekk. etc. with best MSS.: τούτων, Stallb. Badh. obelizes τούτου, taking χωρίς as adv. Paley suggests that τι may have dropped out before γίγνοιτο, in which case it might be best to read τούτων τι, taking χωρίς as adv. and explaining the MS. change as due to the loss of τι followed by misconstruction of χωρίς with τούτων, as referring to αἰτίας, which led further to its emendation to sing. But no change is imperative, as τούτου means τοῦ τετάρτου γένους and the subject to γίγνοιτο is easily supplied from πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα.

2. **οὐκοῦν...ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον ἕν;** Badh.[2] brackets πλὴν ὀνόματι and ἕν, so that the first part of the sentence affirms identity of *nature* between 'cause' and 'maker,' the second convertibility of *name*—"the first has been confused with the second by the intrusion of πλὴν ὀνόματι borrowed from below. This makes P. say 'that there is no difference *in their essence, except their name*'; which is like saying, there is no difference in their stature, except their complexion. The second part is made ungrammatical by the intrusion of ἕν; for if τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ αἴτιον are both of them subjects, λεγόμενα is indispensable. But what a clumsy way of saying, 'that you can apply either name indifferently' is this, 'The Maker and the Cause would rightly be called one'! Nor can λεγόμενον ἂν εἴη be used for λέγοιτ' ἂν with ἕν or with any name we may apply *occasionally*, but only where some declaration of a *name to be permanently borne henceforth* is intended."

I cite this note as a good example of B.'s vigour and rigour. But of his three objections to the text, the first is merely captious, the second pedantic, and the third ignores the inner force of λεγόμενον as 'rationally (λόγῳ) expressed' which makes it antithetic to ὀνόματι.

10. **τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἐπακολουθεῖ γιγνόμενον.** So Stallb. Wb. etc.; but Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π give the simple verb ἀκολουθεῖ, and so too Poste: perhaps ποιούμενον ἀεὶ ἀκ. or π. ἔτι ἀκ.

Badh. in ed. 2 brackets γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ | δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν λέγομεν τέ- B
ταρτον, τὴν αἰτίαν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἕτερον ἐκείνων δεδηλωμένον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν.

5 ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς μὴν ἔχει διωρισμένων τῶν τεττάρων ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μνήμης ἕνεκα ἑφεξῆς αὐτὰ καταριθμήσασθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐ-
10 σίαν· τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην λέγων ἆρα μὴ | πλημμελοίην ἄν τι; C

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τὸ μετὰ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν τίς ὁ λόγος, καὶ τί ποτε βουληθέντες εἰς ταῦτα ἀφικόμεθα; ἆρ' οὐ τόδε ἦν;
15 δευτερεῖα ἐζητοῦμεν πότερον ἡδονῆς γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἢ φρονήσεως. οὐχ οὕτως ἦν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν [ὡς] νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα οὕτω διειλόμεθα,

B. 2 λέγομεν Cl. ΛΞΠΗ et pr. Δ: λέγωμεν *S, Bekk. 3 δεδηλωμένων Cl. ΔΠ. 4 λέγομεν Λ, ἕτερον Cl. ΔΠ: λέγωμεν *S, Bekk. 5 μὲν Η. 9 τρίτου corr. Δ. 10 λέγων Cl. ΔΛΞΣΒCΗ et corr. F: λέγω *S. 11 post ἆρα om. μὴ Cl. Δ et pr. Π.
C. 11 πλεμμελείην ΞF, πλημμελοίμην S. ἄν τι] ἄρτι w. 13 τὸ μετὰ om. Λ. 14 ταῦτ' Γ. τόδ' w. 17 οὖν] οὖν ὡς Cl. ΓΔΞΠΒCE, ὡς Hw et pr. F: om. BCE et pr. Ξ. 18 διειλόμεθα οὕτω Γ.

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2. **λέγομεν τέταρτον...ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν.** So Bodl. and Δ: MSS. variants are λέγωμεν for λέγομεν in first clause and λέγομεν for ἕτερον in Prot.'s reply. Stallb. reads λέγωμεν τέτ. κτλ.; λέγωμεν γὰρ οὖν. Poste, Wb. and Badh. in ed. 1 read λέγομεν τέτ....ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν, while Badh.[2] has λέγωμεν τέτ....λέγωμεν· ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν.

As against Stallb., Badh. rightly remarks: "the drift of the whole argument confirms the correctness of the Bodleian ἕτερον. ποιοῦν precedes, ποιούμενον follows, but ποιοῦν = αἰτία and ποιούμενον = δουλεῦον κ.τ.ἐ. Therefore αἰτία and δουλεῦον are different. Now our first three classes belonged to the ποιούμενα = γιγνόμενα, or their elements, and as ποιοῦν is different from these, it has a right to a separate (4th) class. The distinctness then of Cause from the other three classes is that on which the whole stress of the sentence falls....For γὰρ οὖν cp. in this dialogue 14 B, 16 B, 17 C, 30 C D, 32 C."

11. **ἆρα μὴ πλημμελοίην ἄν τι;** Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π omit μή, as do Herm. and Poste. But its omission seems more explicable than its insertion, so the other edd. are probably right in retaining it. For ἆρα μὴ...; cp. *Phaedo* 64 C, 103 C, *Parmen.* 163 C, *Crito* 44 E, *Charm.* 174 A.

15. **γίγνοιτ' ἄν.** Badh.[2] alone, in the teeth of all MSS., expunges ἄν, holding γίγνεται to be the form of the direct question.

18. **ἆρ' οὖν [ὡς] νῦν.** "ὡς ab Oxon. multisque aliis codd. servatum, etsi a V B S T recte abesse videtur, tamen cum cancellis reponendum censui, si cui forte antiquae lectionis vestigia deprehendere contigerit; quanquam etiam ex male repetito ἴσως oriri poterat quod alii codd. post κάλλιον inferciunt" Herm.; so too Poste, Badh., Wb.

κάλλιον ἂν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτελεσαίμεθα πρώτου πέρι καὶ δευτέρου, περὶ ὧν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἠμφισβητήσαμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι | δή· νικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μικτὸν βίον D
ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως. ἦν οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον μὲν τὸν βίον ὁρῶμέν που τίς τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποίου γένους;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μέρος γ' αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι τοῦ τρίτου, οἶμαι, γένους· οὐ γὰρ δυοῖν τινοῖν ἐστὶ μικτὸν ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλὰ ξυμπάντων τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ὁ νικηφόρος οὗτος βίος μέρος ἐκείνου γίγνοιτ' ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

XV. ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τί δὲ ὁ σός, ὦ | Φίληβε, ἡδὺς καὶ E
ἄμικτος ὤν; ἐν τίνι γένει τῶν εἰρημένων λεγόμενος ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο; ὧδε δ' ἀπόκριναί μοι πρὶν ἀποφήνασθαι.

ΦΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον, ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένων ἐστόν;

ΦΙ. Ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ πανάγαθον ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἄπειρον ἐτύγχανε πεφυκὸς καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.

1 κάλλιον Cl. ΔΠ, καλλίονα *S. ἂν καὶ Cl. ΓΔΛΣBCHτw et pr. Ξ: ἂν ἴσως καὶ *S. D. 4 μὲν add. Cl. ΔΠ. 5 τε om. Δ. 7 που] σου Π. τέ add. Cl. ΔΠ. 8 ὁποῖον γένος Γ. 10 καὶ om. F. μέρους Λ. γ' αὐτὸν] ταὐτὸν Cl. ΔΠ. ἐφήσαμεν Cl. ΔΠ. πρώτου Γ et γρ Δ. 11 γὰρ δυοῖν Cl. ΔΠF: γὰρ ὁ δυοῖν *S. τινυν Cl. μικτὸς ἐκεῖνος omnes. ἀλλὰ Cl. ΔΠ: ἀλλ' ὁ *S. 12 τῶν add. Cl. ΔΠ. ἀπὸ w. δεδεγμένων Π. 13 ὀρθὸς Cl. Δ. οὗτος ὁ βίος Σw. 15 ὅσα, in mg. ὁ σός, F. E. 16 μικτὸς Cl. Π et pr. Δ. μέρει Π. 17 ὧιδε Cl. ἀπόκριναί μοι corr. ΔΠ, ἀποκρίνομαί μοι Cl. 20 δὲ Π. ἔστον Cl. ΔΞΠ: ἐστίν *S. 21 ναὶ τῶν τὸ ΓΔΛΞΣBCEFHw, ναὶ τὸν τὸν (? τὸ) Cl. Π: ναὶ τὸ S. 23 τῷ] τὸν Cl. ΠF et pr. ΔE.

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11. **οὐ γὰρ δυοῖν τινοῖν ἐστὶ μικτὸν ἐκεῖνο.** This correction of the MS. text μικτὸς ἐκεῖνος is due to Schütz: it is approved by Schleiermacher and Stallb., and adopted by Badh., and seems necessary to the sense. The argument is that since all mixtures of πέρας and ἄπειρα are contained in the 3rd Genus, therefore the Life which is a mixture of wisdom and pleasure must belong to that Genus; whereas it would be absurd to say that the mixed *life* is compounded of all limited ἄπειρα. Klitsch, Poste and Wb., however, give the masc. with the MSS., while Paley translates the neut. without comment.

21. **οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ πανάγαθον ἦν... οὐδέ...λύπη πάγκακον.** This is Bekker's correction, accepted by Badh., for πᾶν ἀγαθὸν...πᾶν κακόν of MSS., which Stallb. tries to defend, and most edd. retain.

22. **πεφυκός** by attraction for πεφυκυῖα: cp. *Gorg.* 463 E, *Protag.* 354 C, etc.

If it is to its ἀπειρία that Pleasure owes its excellence, it is equally to its ἀπειρία,

ΣΩ. | Οὐδέ γ' ἄν, ὦ Φίληβε, λύπη πάγκακον· ὥστ' ἄλλο 28
τι νῷν σκεπτέον ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν, ᾧ παρέχεταί τι
μέρος ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀγαθοῦ. τοῦτο δή σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων
γεγονὸς ἔστω· φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ νοῦν εἰς τί
5 ποτε τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ Πρώταρχέ τε καὶ Φίληβε, νῦν
θέντες οὐκ ἂν ἀσεβοῖμεν; οὐ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ σμικρὸς ἡμῖν
εἶναι ὁ κίνδυνος κατορθώσασι καὶ μὴ περὶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώ-
μενον.

ΦΙ. Σεμνύνεις γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, | τὸν σεαυτοῦ θεόν. B

10 ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὴν σαυτοῦ· τὸ δ' ἐρωτώ-
μενον ὅμως ἡμῖν λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, ὦ Φίληβε, καὶ αὐτῷ
πειστέον.

ΦΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ σύ, Πρώταρχε, προῄρησαι,
15 λέγειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε· νῦν μέντοι σχεδὸν ἀπορῶ, καὶ δέομαί
γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτόν σε ἡμῖν γενέσθαι προφήτην, ἵνα
μηδὲν ἡμεῖς σοι περὶ τὸν ἀγωνιστὴν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες παρὰ
μέλος φθεγξώμεθά τι.

28 A. 1 γ' om. Cl. ΔΠ. 2 νῶν Δ. ὡς H, ὦ pr. Π: ὡς ceteri, Bekk. 3 τοῦτο corr. Σ: τούτων *S, Bekk. 5 τε om. ΓΛΣBCEFHw et pr. Ξ. 7 εἶναι ὁ κίνδυνος κατορθώσασι Cl. ΔΠ: ὁ κίνδυνος εἶναι καὶ κατορθώσασι *S.

B. 9 σεαυτοῦ Cl. ΔΠ: σαυτοῦ *S, Bekk. 10 σαυτοῦ Cl. ΔΠ: σεαυτοῦ *S, Bekk. 11 ὅπως pr. Π. 12 τι τω. ὦ φίληβε om. Cl. et pr. Π, in mg. ponit Δ. 14 ὑπὲρ] πρὸ F. ὦ add. F. προείρησαι pr. Δ. 16 γε om. pr. Δ. μέντοι νῦν Δ, μὲν τοίνυν Π, μέντοι νῦν Cl. 17 σε] γε Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 18 περὶ H.

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retorts S., that Pain owes *its* superlativeness: hence ἡ τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσις as causative of these two opposite results cannot be the good element in pleasure.

πλήθει, 'in numerical variety,' as Paley gives in his note, or 'in multiplicity.'

1. **ἄλλο τι νῷν σκεπτέον...ᾧ παρέχεται.** ᾧ is Paley's correction for ὡς of MSS. and Bekk. Steph.'s ὅ is adopted by Stallb., Turr. and Poste. Badh., however, objects that σκεπτέον cannot mean 'we must look for': hence he would retain ὡς and alter σκεπτέον to λεκτέον or ὑπολεπτέον (or, one might add, θετέον), either of which would require ὡς. But σκεπτέον may be defended by 26 E *supra*. Herm. retains ὡς, noting that "ἄλλο τι κτλ. per attractionem tantum cum σκεπτέον iuncta esse": so too Wb.

3. **τοῦτο δή σοι.** So Stallb., Herm. and Wb. for τούτων δή σ.: τοῦτ' οὖν δὴ Badh.[1]: τοῦτο δέ σ. Badh.[2]—"δὲ for δή, because we need the conjunction to oppose τοῦτο to ἄλλο τι." I conjecture τοῦτο δ' ἤδη.

τοῦτο is taken by Stallb. and Poste as referring to ἡδονήν (cp. *Phaedo* 85 A, 109 A, *Theaet.* 145 D, *Rep.* 562 B, etc.): Paley, however, translates "Let this therefore be taken by you as one of the points not yet fully determined," and calls attention to "the play on ἀπεράντων γεγ. in the sense of 'offspring of the ἄπειρον'"—rightly, as I think.

9. **σεμνύνεις γάρ**: 'Thou dost magnify.' Cp. *Gorg.* 512 B, *Phaedr.* 272 D.

17. **ἵνα μηδὲν ἡμεῖς.** Badh. brackets ἵνα, and for μηδέν reads μὴ δή—needlessly.

18. **τὸν ἀγωνιστήν** refers of course to Νοῦς as the antagonist of Ἡδονή for the

ΣΩ. Πειστέον, | ὦ Πρώταρχε· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν C
ἐπιτάττεις· ἀλλ' ὄντως σε ἐγώ, καθάπερ εἶπε Φίληβος,
σεμνύνων ἐν τῷ παίζειν ἐθορύβησα, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην
ἐρόμενος ὁποίου γένους εἶεν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ῥᾴδιον. πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ
σοφοί, ἑαυτοὺς ὄντως σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς
ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἴσως εὖ λέγουσι. διὰ μακρο-
τέρων δ', εἰ βούλει, τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησώ-
10 μεθα. |

ΠΡΩ. Λέγ' ὅπως βούλει, μηδὲν μῆκος ἡμῖν ὑπολογιζό- D
μενος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὐκ ἀπεχθησόμενος.

XVI. ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες. ἀρξώμεθα δέ πως ὧδε ἐπα-
νερωτῶντες.

15 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πότερον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ ξύμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ
καλούμενον ὅλον ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ
εἰκῇ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν, ἢ τἀναντία, καθάπερ οἱ
πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν
20 συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν; |

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὦ θαυμάσιε Σώκρατες. ὃ μὲν E

C. 2 οὕτως F. σε om. Λ. 7 ὄντως Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣΒCHw et γρ Ξ: οὕτω *S. ὡς] καὶ Λ. 8 τε add. Cl. ΔΠ.
D. 13 ὧιδε Cl. 16 πρότερον Cl. τὸ om. ΓΛBCEFHw. 18 τὸ Cl. ΞCw (τὰ vulg., Bekk.), om. ΛH.

δευτερεῖα. For the metaph. in παρὰ μέλος cp. *Laws* 696 D, *Critias* 106 B.

3. **σεμνύνων...εἶεν**; In this clause Badh. brackets ἐν τῷ παίζειν, and removes the note of interrogation after εἶεν. But no change is needed: there is something of an antithesis between ὄντως and ἐν τῷ παίζειν: σεμνύνων refers back to Phil.'s σεμνύνεις γάρ (28 B), and ἐθορύβησα alludes to Prot.'s νῦν...ἀπορῶ.

7. **ὄντως σεμνύνοντες.** The point of ὄντως is to contrast the 'earnest' of these σοφοί with the previous 'jest' (ἐν τῷ παίζειν) of Socr.: for a σοφός to exalt σοφία is self-exaltation.

11. **ὑπολογιζόμενος**, a book-keeping term—'taking no account of,' 'reckoning nothing for': cp. *Laws* 702 C, *Phaedr.* 231 B, *Gorg.* 480 C.

17. **τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν.** Cp. *Tim.* 34 C μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος τε καὶ εἰκῇ: *Polit.* 265 C τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννῶν ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης—where the same question is discussed.

18. **οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν**, like οἱ σοφοί above, refers primarily to Anaxagoras.

21. **οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν.** In ed. 1 Badh. suspected these words, and proposed τῶν ἀλύτων: but in ed. 2 he retains them and alters the following words ὃ μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν δὴ λέγεις to ὃ μὲν ἐν ἀρχῇ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες. The difficulty in the vulgate, as he remarks, is its indefiniteness: "οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is a most complete rejection, and so is οὐδ' ὅσιον..., but there is in the received text a fatal want of distinctness as to what he rejects." οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, 'nothing like,' 'nothing of the kind' may be defended by Isocr. *Panath.* 270 B,

γὰρ σὺ νῦν δὴ λέγεις, οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναί μοι φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ νοῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν αὐτὰ φάναι καὶ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάσης τῆς περιφορᾶς ἄξιον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγ' ἄν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν
5 εἴποιμι οὐδ' ἂν δοξάσαιμι.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δῆτά τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογούμενον ξυμφήσωμεν, ὡς ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, | καὶ μὴ μόνον 29
οἰώμεθα δεῖν τἀλλότρια ἄνευ κινδύνου λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκινδυνεύωμεν καὶ μετέχωμεν τοῦ ψόγου, ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινὸς
10 φῇ ταῦτα μὴ οὕτως ἀλλ' ἀτάκτως ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βουλοίμην;

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τούτων νῦν ἡμῖν λόγον ἄθρει.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

15 ΣΩ. Τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἁπάντων τῶν ζῴων, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα καθορῶμέν που καὶ γῆν, καθάπερ οἱ χειμαζόμενοί φασιν, ἐνόντα ἐν τῇ | συστάσει. B

E. 1 νῦν λέγεις ΓΛΣBCHw Flor. a,b,c,i, νῦν δὴ λέγεις Cl. ΔΠ: λέγεις νῦν *S. 2 παντάπαν Γ. 3 ἀστέρων Cl. ΔΠ: ἄστρων *S. 5 δόξαιμι Γ. 6 τι add. Cl. ΔΠ ὁμολογούμενον Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCHw Flor. a,b,c, ὁμολογούμενοι EF Flor. i: ὁμολογουμένοις *S. 7 ξυμφήσομεν ΞE. ὡς] εἰ Γ. τοῦθ' Λ.

29 A. 8 ὀνόμεθα Λ. 9 συγκινδυνεύωμεν...μετέχωμεν F, συγκινδυνεύομεν... μετέχομεν Ξ. 10 ἀλλ' Cl.

B. 17 στάσει Γ, συστάσει; Cl.

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277 C, 279 C: though none of these places is precisely parallel. I do not believe in Badham's second proposal, but suspect τῶν αὐτῶν, for which τῶν ἀλύτων ("it is no hard problem you put") may be right —or else some such word as αὐτομάτων, ἀτάκτων, ἀκρίτων, ἀτόπων or ἀλόγων, which last is suggested by Paley,—or ἀναύδων (cp. Soph. *Ai.* 714 οὐδὲν ἀναύδατον φατίσαιμ' ἄν, *Ibid.* 947), or αἰσίων. Poste concludes from Plat. *Epp.* 341 B that the phrase can mean "without iteration," "on our own responsibility"—which is but poor evidence for a poor sense. Maguire would transl. 'the two cases are quite unlike,' supposing that the words refer to the foll. antithesis—ὁ μὲν...τὸ δὲ κτλ.

2. **νοῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν** is in direct allusion to Anaxagoras' dogma. Cp. *Rep.* 376 B, 452 B, *Phaedr.* 250 B, *Laws* 887 D, 910 A, 966 D.

ὄψις is here used in the objective sense, 'spectacle,' as in *Rep.* 376 B, 452 B; *Laws* 887 D, etc.: cp. the db. sense of Eng. 'vision.'

6. **βούλει δῆτά τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογούμενον ξυμφήσωμεν.** So most edd. after Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π. Badh. alters to β. δῆτ' ἔτι...ξυμφῶμεν, and brackets ὁμολογούμενον as 'a tautology or a redundancy.' If any alteration is to be made the best would be ὡμολογημένον.

9. **ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινός.** The reference appears to be to sophists such as Gorgias and Critias: cp. *Laws* 885 B ff., 888 E, 966 D E; *Soph.* 265 C; Sext. Empir. 562. For this ironical use of δεινός, cp. *Theaet.* 154 D, 173 B.

17. **καθάπερ οἱ χειμαζόμενοί φασιν, ἐνόντα ἐν τῇ συστάσει.** "Prouerbium uidetur fuisse οἱ χειμαζόμενοι γῆν καθορῶσιν...Illud φασίν autem, quod Astio tantam creauit molestiam, ut id eiici uoluerit, commate post χειμ. illato, per parenthesin accipiendum pro ὡς φασίν,

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα· χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως ὑπ' ἀπορίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν λαβὲ τὸ τοιόνδε.

5 ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι σμικρόν τε τούτων ἕκαστον παρ' ἡμῖν ἔνεστι καὶ φαῦλον καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὂν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον· ἐν ἑνὶ δὲ λαβὼν περὶ πάντων νόει ταὐτόν. οἷον πῦρ μὲν ἔστι που παρ' ἡμῖν, ἔστι
10 δ' ἐν τῷ παντί.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν | σμικρὸν μέν τι τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενὲς C
καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλήθει τε θαυμαστὸν καὶ κάλλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ οὔσῃ.

15 ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα ἀληθὲς ὃ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτου καὶ ἄρχεται τὸ τοῦ παντὸς πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν πυρός, ἢ τοὐναντίον

1 ὄντος Λ. ἀπειρίας ΛΞFH. 3 περὶ om. Γ. ἕκαστον F. τὸ w. 6 μικρὸν Cl. παρ' ἡμῖν om. F. ἔν ἐστι CHw Flor. a. 7 καὶ ante φαῦλον om. Σw. 8 λαβὸν Λ. 9 μέν ἐστι Cl. ΔΠ. 11 τί μὴν πλήθει E: Τί...παντὶ om. F.
C. 12 τοί ΛΞ. ἀσφαλὲς C. 15 μάλ' Cl. 16 δαί Cl.², δαὶ Δ. δέ *S.

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ut aiunt, qui usus nihil habet offensionis." So Stallb.—but what 'offensio' is there in taking φασίν with οἱ χειμ., 'to use the expression of sailors in a storm'? The last clause, ἐνόντα ἐν τῇ συστάσει, is obelized by Badh. because "if this means the σύστασις of our bodies it is an idle repetition; if of the Universe it comes too soon": but this objection is not valid, since (1) the greater and lesser συστάσεις are not here distinguished, and (2) apparent tautologies are characteristic of P.'s later style. Paley cites Aesch. *Ag.* 899 καὶ γῆν φανεῖσαν ναυτίλοις παρ' ἐλπίδα, κάλλιστον ἦμαρ εἰσιδεῖν ἐκ χείματος.

1. **χειμαζόμεθα ... λόγοις.** For the simile cp. *Lach.* 194 B ἀνδράσι φίλοις χειμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσι βοήθησον. *Euthyd.* 293 A σῶσαι ἡμᾶς...ἐκ τῆς τρικυμίας τοῦ λόγου. *Rep.* 472 A.

6. **ὅτι σμικρόν τε...ἔχον.** With ἔνεστι we must seemingly supply τοῖς σώμασι τῶν ζῴων or τῇ συστάσει. To avert repetition Badh. here again uses the bracket, cutting out both τούτων ἕκ. παρ' ἡμῖν and the καὶ before οὐδαμῇ: the latter excision is plausible, as both particc. are epexegetic of φαῦλον—poor both in quality and in effectiveness; and the omission of the καὶ before φαῦλον in Ven. Σ may indicate such a corruption of the text. Also the db. prep. in παρ' ἡμῖν ἔνεστι is awkward; so Klitsch and Wb. may be right in bracketing παρ', the alternative being to read ἐστί for ἔνεστι, if we scruple to diverge farther with Badh. Still I do not think any change imperative.

8. **ἐν ἑνὶ δὲ λαβών,** 'in a single instance,' viz. fire. For this use of ἐν cp. 17 A, 18 B, 21 A, etc.

16. **τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτου,** i.e. ἐκ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν. Badh. brackets ἐκ τούτου as unsuitable to the first verb, alleging that ὑπό is "quite appropriate enough for the three verbs taken together." We might retort that ἐκ is quite appropriate enough for the two verbs taken together: but more, in 29 E we find the very construction denounced—ἐκ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦτο τρέφεται.

ὑπ' ἐκείνου τό τ' ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἅπαντ' ἴσχει ταῦτα;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν οὐδ' ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἐρωτᾷς.

ΣΩ. | Ὀρθῶς· ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἐρεῖς, οἶμαι, περί τε τῆς ἐν D
5 τοῖς ζῴοις γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντί, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων, ὅσων ἠρώτησα ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν, οὕτως ἀποκρινεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ὑγιαίνων ἄν ποτε φανείη;

10 ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδ' ὁστισοῦν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑξῆς ἔπου. πάντα γὰρ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα ἆρ' οὐκ εἰς ἓν συγκείμενα ἰδόντες ἐπωνομάσαμεν σῶμα;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ταὐτὸν δὴ λαβὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦδε | ὃν κόσμον λέ- E
15 γομεν· [διὰ] τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἂν εἴη που σῶμα, σύνθετον ὂν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ὅλως τὸ παρ'

D. 4 γὰρ Cl. ΔΠ: γ' ἂν *S. οἶμαι om. F. 6 πάντων add. Cl. ΔΠ. ἠρώτησα πέρι rc. Σ. ὀλίγων pr. Γ. ἔμπροσθεν om. Λ. 7 ἀποκρινεῖ Cl. Δ pr. Γ: vulg. ἀποκρινῇ. 8 τί Δ. 12 ἐπωνομάσωμεν H, ἐπονομάσωμεν Λ. 14 λαβὲ Δ: λάβε *S.
E. 15 αὐτὸν γὰρ τὸν H. 16 ὂν om. Λ. 17 ὀρθότατον S. 18 τοῦ om. Λ.

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1. **ὑπ' ἐκείνου**: "pro ὑπ' ἐκείνου malim ἀπ' ἐκείνου" writes Stallb., but the proximity of the preceding ὑπό is sufficient to defend the quite legitimate prepos.

4. **ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἐρεῖς**. γάρ is appropriate, since ὀρθῶς expresses, as Badh. remarks, not merely assent but rather "satisfaction that the argument is advancing as was intended." Hence Ast's conj. ταὐτά γ' αὖ ἐρεῖς is needless.

περί τε τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε. τῆς ἐνθάδε, i.e. τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν, is added because there are other ζῷα beside ours. But Badh. as usual suspects a redundancy and uses the pruning-hook to excise τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις: while on the next clause he remarks "in place of καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων I suspect that we ought to read καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ περὶ πάντων." Ast proposed to read ἔμπροσθεν. οὕτως ἀποκρινεῖ;—which (or ἢ πῶς ἀπ.) seems to me a probable correction, although *Theaet.* 171 B, 172 B etc. may be urged in defence of the repetition ταὐτὰ ἐρεῖς...οὕτως ἀποκρινεῖ: cp. also 13 B *supra*.

10. **ἀλλὰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο...ἕπου**. Badh. follows Ast in reading τῷ μ. τ., but it is quite possible to take τὸ μ. τ. as an accus. absol., as Stallb. explains.

14. **περὶ τοῦδε ὃν**. For this attraction of the rel. cp. 40 A: λόγοι...ἃς ἐλπίδας ὀνομάζομεν. *Phaedr.* 255 C πηγή, ὃν ἵμερον...ὠνόμασε.

15. **[διὰ] τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον**. "The cause of its being a body is given in σύνθετον...αὐτῶν. Therefore the causal διὰ seems out of place here as well as unsuitable to τρόπον" Badh. If we have a prepos. at all with τρόπον it should be κατά: hence, unless τρόπον be corrupt, to expunge διά with Badh. seems the simplest correction. Should we read λέγομεν ἀεί. τὸν αὐ. κτλ.? or Δία?

ἡμῖν σῶμα ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦτο τρέφεταί τε καὶ ὅσα νῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν εἴπομεν εἴληφέ τε καὶ ἴσχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τοῦθ' ἕτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐρωτήσεως.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τόδε ἆρα ἄξιον; ἢ πῶς ἐρεῖς; 30

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τὸ ποῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρ' οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Πόθεν, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὂν ἐτύγχανε, ταὐτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα;

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὡς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος,

1 ἡμῖν τοῦτο] ὑμῖν τοῦτο C. 2 εἴπωμεν Ξ. εἴληφεν Cl. ἴσχει Cl. ΔΠ: ἔχει *S.

30 A. 5 δαί Cl.² Δ: δὲ *S. ἆρα Cl., ἆρ' Γ, ἆρ' οὐκ F. 9 λαβὼν Λ. 10 ἐὸν Cl. ΔΠ. 11 πάντῃ add. Cl. ΓΔΠ. 13 πω Γ. τέτταρ' Γ. 14 πέρας om. Cl. Π, in mg. ponit Δ.

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1. **ὅσα νῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν εἴπομεν.** This refers to καὶ γίγνεται καὶ ἄρχεται 29 C: Badh. again brackets περὶ αὐτῶν for no sufficient reason. Just above, ὅλως is rendered by Paley "whether it is from this body in its entirety," with the footnote "Or, 'in a general way.' There seems to be a kind of play on the double sense": but I doubt the intent to pun.

9. **πόθεν...λαβόν.** The notion that human souls are fractions of the Cosmic soul is ascribed to the Pythagoreans. Cp. Cic. *de Senect.* c. 21: audiebam Pythagoram Pythagoreosque...numquam dubitasse quin ex uniuersa mente diuina delibatos animos haberemus. Also to Socrates in Xen. *Mem.* IV. 3. 14 ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή, ἣ...τοῦ θείου μετέχει. Cp. Cic. *N. D.* III. 11, II. 6; *de Divin.* I. 49; *Tusc.* V. 13 etc.

13. **οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε...φύσιν.** On this passage Stallb. comments: "Anacoluthia huius loci prorsus singularis est, nec tamen eiusmodi ut explicari nequeat ...Sententia uerborum haec est: Nunquam enim dabimus ex quattuor illis generibus, infinito, finito, mixto atque τῷ αἰτίῳ, quartum hoc, quatenus in nobis inest atque mentem et animum pariter atque corporis uires nobis largitur, omnem omnis generis sapientiam dici; quum uero eadem et multo meliora in uniuerso et magnis partibus insint, in his illud caussae genus pulcherrimorum ac praestantissimorum non effecisse naturam." Thus though the sentence begins with mention of all four γένη, the true subject of the whole is the fourth only, τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, which in the first clause is resumed by τοῦτο as accus. (agreeing with the particc. παρέχον, ἐμποιοῦν, συντιθέν, ἀκούμενον) before the infin. ἐπικαλεῖσθαι, and in the second clause (after the genit. absol.) as accus. subj. to μεμηχανῆσθαι, which verb, as Paley notes, is to be taken as middle. In the latter clause τῶν δ' αὐτῶν τούτων is "these same four kinds"; while the foll. ἐν τούτοις refers, not to them, but to the οὐρανός and its parts.

Badham, however, wishes to emend. From the fact that Bodl. and Ven. II omit πέρας he argues that there was an old hiatus in the text, wrongly supplied by the insertion of πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινόν—which words he objects to because (1) they lack the article, and (2) Prot. presently appears ignorant of what κοινόν means (inf. 31 C): excising these words, then, he would fill up the gap thus: τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα <ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν μόνοις εἶναι,> καὶ τὸ

ἐν | ἅπασι τέταρτον ἑνόν, τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχήν B
τε παρέχον καὶ σωμασκίαν ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πταίσαντος σώματος
ἰατρικὴν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθὲν καὶ ἀκούμενον πᾶσαν
καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι, τῶν δ' αὐτῶν τούτων ὄντων
5 ἐν ὅλῳ τε οὐρανῷ καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτι καλῶν
καὶ εἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τούτοις δ' οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν
καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν. |

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοι. C

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, μετ' ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἂν
10 ἑπόμενοι βέλτιον λέγοιμεν, ὡς ἔστιν, ἃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν,
ἄπειρόν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολύ, καὶ πέρας ἱκανόν, καί τις
ἐπ' αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα
ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη
δικαιότατ' ἄν.

15 ΠΡΩ. Δικαιότατα δῆτα.

B. 2 σωμασκίαν] σῶμα σκιὰν S, σῶμα καὶ σκιὰν Flor. b. 3 συντεθὲν ΓΔΞBCEFHτυ. ἀκουόμενον BCHτυ. 4 τούτων] πάντων EF. 6 ἄρ' οὐ Γ. τὴν] διὰ Cl. Δ et pr. Π, qui rc. διὰ τὴν.
C. 8 ἂν om. F, ἄν; Cl.

τ. αἰτ. κτλ. Badh.'s criticism leads me to doubt the genuineness of the words in question, though perhaps the omission of the art. may be meant to contrast the other three with the immediately important fourth γένος; and the Bodl.'s omission of πέρας needs explanation. I would suggest that the fault lies with τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, which is an error for τά τε τρία ἐκεῖνα, '*those* three' being contrasted with (instead of including) "*this* (τοῦτο) fourth kind, Cause": if so, the omission of one name would be due to a hasty desire for consistency.

Again, Badh.[2] falls foul of the phrase ψυχήν τε παρέχον, arguing that "it is evident throughout that he is speaking of this human ψυχή being enabled by this αἰτία to work on our inferior elements by introducing πέρας into the ἄπειρα, and, when the μέτρον thus introduced has been disturbed, of readjusting it; in other words, he is speaking of *human skill*. And, pray, what human skill can be said ψυχὴν παρέχειν?" But the Cause, as Genus, is the same everywhere: and 'human skill' is not to be thus disparted from Cosmic wisdom: ψυχὴν π., σωμ. ἐμπ., πταίσ. σώμ. are three stages in human growth and life—marking the entrance of soul into body and the after-culture both preservative and remedial of body by soul. Still there may be corruption: read perhaps ψυχῆς τ' ἐπάρχον or ψυχῇ τε τέχνην.

6. **μεμηχανῆσθαι**, remarks Poste, "is active and emphatic: 'is an intelligent designer'"; while the same editor tells us that τὴν τῶν καλλίστων...φύσιν, "is not the Soul, for that is first introduced presently, but the Cosmos or visible World."

9. **οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο.** The last three words are obelized by Badh.[2] as "out of construction and redundant." But it is easy to supply εὖ ἂν λέγοιμεν or the like.

11. **καὶ πέρας ἱκανόν.** Winckelmann maintained that καὶ κοινόν has fallen out after ἱκανόν: but, as Badh. remarks, he should at least have given it an epithet for symmetry's sake—and the same criticism applies to Stallb.'s "si quid desideres, pro ἱκανόν reposuerim καὶ κοινόν." The epithets have a playful significance, and κοινόν is already implied in τῷ παντί.

13. **λεγομένη δικαιότατ' ἄν**, i.e. ἣ σ. κ. ν. δικ. ἂν λέγοιτο. Cp. *Rep.* 478 E, 562 A; *Soph.* 224 A; and 52 C *infra*.

ΣΩ. Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίσθην.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς | ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν D
5 μὲν ψυχήν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν, ἐν δὲ ἄλλοις ἄλλα καλά, καθ' ὃ φίλον ἑκάστοις λέγεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς μή τι μάτην δόξῃς,
10 ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφηναμένοις, ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει, ξύμμαχος ἐκείνοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δέ γε ἐμῇ ζητήσει πεπορικὼς ἀπόκρισιν, ὅτι νοῦς ἐστὶ γένους [τῆς] | τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου λεχθέντος· τῶν E

1 μὲν F. 4 οὐκ οὖν Δ, ut saepe.
D. 5 ἐγγενέσθαι Λ. 6 δ' Cl. καθὸ Cl. Δ et pr. Π: καθότι *S, Bekk.
9 δὲ w. 13 τῇ] non alteri dat Cl. 14 γένους τῆς Cl. Δ, γενούστης corr. Π cum *S.

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1. **ἄνευ ψυχῆς.** Cp. *Tim.* 30 B: νοῦν δ' αὖ χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῳ. "It may be observed however in both these passages that the terms employed (γενοίσθην, παραγενέσθαι τῳ) exclude from consideration the Eternal Reason, or extra-mundane Cause" (Poste). Cp. also the argument in *Soph.* 248 D ff., and Plotin. *Enn.* III. v. 9, IV. iv. 9.

4. **ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς φύσει...διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν.** Cause is prior and superordinate even to Zeus, for whom cp. *Phaedr.* 247 A, 252 C. Zeus is not to be confounded with the Demiurgus of the *Timaeus*. (Paley's transl.—'on account of its influence as a cause'—seems to identify αἰτία and φύσις.)

6. **ἐν δὲ ἄλλοις,** sc. θεοῖς. καθ' ὃ φίλον recals the similar expression in 12 C *supra*: cp. also *Phaedr.* 246 D, *Laws* 886 D; and ἄλλα δ' ἀλλαχοῦ καλά (of the Furies' names) Soph. *O. C.* 43. Hirzel, however, argues that the reference is to "quae in ceteris ac singulis ad hominem pertinentibus pulchra et bona a mente efficiuntur...non enim de eis quaeritur in quibus ista pulchra insunt sed qualia illa pulchra sint."

10. **τοῖς μὲν...ξύμμαχος ἐκείνοις:** for the redundant ἐκείνοις (which Badh. leaves alone for once) Stallb. compares the similar use of αὐτός in *Phaedo* 111 C, *Symp.* 195 A; Xen. *Cyrop.* I. 3. 15.

13. **τῇ δέ γε ἐμῇ ζητήσει**—for which see above 28 A: φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ νοῦν εἰς τί ποτε...θέντες κτλ.

ὅτι νοῦς ἐστὶ γένους [τῆς] τοῦ πάντων κτλ. Bekk. corrected the vulgate, γενούστης τοῦ π., to γένους τοῦ π., followed by Herm. and Wb. who bracket τῆς.

γενούστης has the support of the grammarians, e.g. Hesych.: γενούστης· ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐννοίας, ὁ γεννητικός. Suidas: γεννούστης οἷον γεννήτης ἢ συγγενὴς ἢ ἔγγονος. Stallb. further defends the word as invented by the Platonic Socrates in place of the ordinary γεννήτης or γενήτης "faceto lusu...quippe quod ipso sono suo prope ad τὸν νοῦν accederet." But Badh. in ed. 1 writes "I have little doubt but that it is corrupt, and arose from γένους being added as an explanation of γενήτης," and in ed. 2: "It may have arisen from a dittographia γένους, γεννήτης." Whereas Paley affirms "it is not more extravagant than other pretended derivations given by Plato, e.g. in *Phaedr.* 244 C and 251 C, and also ib. 238 C....Plato himself seems to allude to this coined word in παιδιά, inf. p. 30 fin." But if γενούστης is to stand, it cannot be a synonym for γεννήτης or "real originator" (as Paley renders it) since (1) we have seen that νοῦς is posterior to αἰτία, and (2) the question is

τεττάρων <δ'> ἦν ἡμῖν ἓν τοῦτο. ἔχεις γὰρ δήπου νῦν ἡμῶν ἤδη τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔχω καὶ μάλα ἱκανῶς· καίτοι με ἀποκρινάμενος ἔλαθες.

5 ΣΩ. Ἀνάπαυλα γάρ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοτε ἡ παιδιά.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Νοῦς δήπου, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὗ μὲν γένους | ἐστὶ καὶ 31
τίνα ποτὲ δύναμιν κέκτηται, σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν
10 δεδήλωται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἡδονῆς γε ὡσαύτως πάλαι τὸ γένος ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

E. 1 ὧν (post τεττάρων) add. *S, Bekk., om. Cl. Π et pr. Δ. ἦν om. ΛΞw Flor. a,i. 3 μάλ' Γ. καίτι F, καίτοι Cl. ἀποκρινόμενος Λ. 5 ὦ πρώταρχε τῆς σπουδῆς Cl. ΓΔΔΠΣBCH Flor. a,b,c,i: τῆς σπουδῆς ὦ πρώταρχε *S. 7 καὶ καλῶς Cl. ΔΠ (vulg. om. καί). 8 νοῦς] νοῦν Γ, νῦν *S. που] νοῦς Cl. Δ et fortasse pr. Π. οὗ Cl. Λ. μὴν H. γένος Λ.

31 A. 9 κέκτηται σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν om. F. τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν Σ.

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as to the *genus* to which νοῦς belongs: so that Schol. *ad h. l.* rightly has γενούστης· ὁ οἷον γεννήτης ἢ συγγενὴς ἢ ἔγγονος, ὧν τὸ τελευταῖον ἐκδέχεσθαι ἄμεινον. For 'son' γενέτης may be used (e.g. Soph. *Oed. Tyr.* 462) but never γεννήτης.

Hence might be suggested γένους γενέτης or simpler γένους ἕτης in the Homeric sense of this word 'a clansman': but in this case we should expect τοῦ γένους, so that I should regard γένους as a gloss on αἰτίου or dittographic blunder, and read simply ἕτης τοῦ π. Cp. *Soph.* 268 D ταύτης τῆς γενεᾶς...τὸν ὄντως σοφιστὴν εἶναι, and *Rep.* 547 A, with *Il.* B 211. This Homeric allusion will explain the παιδιά below, and also the words νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν ξυγγενὴς καὶ τούτου σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους, which are not suitable if Socr. had already used such a word as γεννήτης, or an unqualified γένους, of the relation of Mind to Cause.

14. **λεχθέντος· τῶν τεττάρων <δ'> ἦν ἡμῖν ἓν τοῦτο.** I follow Herm. and Badh.[1] in accepting Stallb.'s correction. λεχθέντος τῶν τεττάρων, ὧν ἦν ἡμῖν ἓν τοῦτο is the vulgate, retained by Wb. and Klitsch; but Bodl. Vat. omit ὧν, and Ven. ΛΞ omit ἦν, and the passage is manifestly corrupt. Perhaps we should better account for the text of the majority of MSS. by reading τῶν τετ. <δὲ γέν>ων ἦν or τῶν τ. <δ' ἐκείν>ων. Badh.[2] sees in the words τῶν τ....τοῦτο "a marginal note on which all correction is thrown away."

1. **ἔχεις...τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.** For ἔχειν of mental apprehension cp. *Phaedo* 71 A, 100 D, *Rep.* 477 A, etc.—esp. in combination with ἱκανῶς.

7. **καὶ καλῶς εἶπες** is the reading of Bodl. which Wb. properly retains: Herm. altered to ναί, κ. εἶπ. Most edd. read simply καλῶς εἶπες.

8. **νοῦς δήπου, ὦ ἑταῖρε.** So Bekk., Stallb., Herm., Badh., Wb. for νῦν δήπου of old edd.: νοῦν δ. Coisl.: νῦν δὴ νοῦς Bodl. Vat., 'quod minus placet' on account of the foll. τὰ νῦν, although Poste retains it.

Here, then, ends the enquiry announced in 28 C, διὰ μακροτέρων τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησώμεθα. After this important digression S. reverts to the original subject — the comparison between the rivals Pleasure and Intelligence. For the contents of the next section, see *Introd.* II.

ΣΩ. Μεμνώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν ξυγγενὴς καὶ τούτου σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους, ἡδονὴ δὲ ἄπειρός τε αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν αὑτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδὲ ἕξοντός ποτε γένους.

5 ΠΡΩ. Μεμνησόμεθα· | πῶς γὰρ οὔ; B

XVII. ΣΩ. Δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τέ ἐστιν ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ διὰ τί πάθος γίγνεσθον, ὁπόταν γίγνησθον, ἰδεῖν ἡμᾶς· πρῶτον τὴν ἡδονήν· ὥσπερ τὸ γένος αὐτῆς πρότερον ἐβασανίσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα πρότερα.
10 λύπης δ' αὖ χωρὶς τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα ἱκανῶς βασανίσαι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ ταύτῃ χρὴ πορεύεσθαι, ταύτῃ πορευώμεθα.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν σοὶ καθάπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τῆς γενέσεως
15 αὐτῶν πέρι;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ | ποῖον; C

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ἅμα φαίνεσθον λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονὴ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Κοινὸν δέ γε, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, ὑπομίμνησκε
20 ἡμᾶς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων βούλει δηλοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἔσται ταῦτ' εἰς δύναμιν, ὦ θαυμάσιε.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν.

1 μεμνήμεθα w. 2 τοῦ om. ΛCHw Flor. a,b,c,i. 3 αὕτη Cl. 4 ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ΔΠw, ἐν αὑτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ Cl. ΓΛΞΣBCH: ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ *S.

B. 7 πλῆθος Cl. ΔΠ (Δ mg. πάθος). ὁπόταν γίγνησθον C, ὁπόταν γίγνοισθον Δ. 10 δὲ Cl. δυνάμεθα E. 12 : ἀλλ' ΓΛΞCEFH, Bekk.: eidem dant *S, Ald. εἰ ταύτην F. 14 : ἄρ' ΓΞEFH, Bekk.: eidem dant *S, Ald. γενέσεως ὡς αὐτῶν Π.

C. 17 ἅμα φαινέμεθον Λ: φαίνεσθον ἅμα ES. 19 ὑπομίμνησκε Cl.[1], add ι Cl.[2] 24 ἐλέγομεν om. F.

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8. **ἰδεῖν ἡμᾶς· πρῶτον τὴν ἡδονήν· ὥσπερ** κτλ. This punctuation is due to Stallb., and is now generally adopted, though opposed by Klitsch.

9. **ταῦτα πρότερα,** i.e. ἐν ᾧ and διὰ τί πάθος. Here pleasure is again treated of as a concrete fact of life (no longer 'viewed *per se* and apart from pain, which acts as a salutary πέρας'—to cite Paley's note), and so passes from the purely abstract and metaphysical category of the ἄπειρον to that of the κοινόν or μικτόν. This apparent inconsistency of statement regarding the nature of pleasure, due simply to change in point of view, has much disquieted certain interpreters of the dialogue: see *Introd.* II.

23. **κοινὸν τ. ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δή,** 'by *common* one must understand':—the nearest parallel to this use of the verb is in *Soph.* 261 D. I suspect we ought to insert before ὅ its antecedent ἐκεῖνο. Paley conj. ὑπονοῶμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὃ μετὰ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑγίειαν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἁρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο;

ΣΩ. | Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. τὸν νοῦν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστ' ἤδη D πρόσεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἅμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλγηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ λέγεις εἰκός.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὲ ἁρμοττομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν ἀπιούσης ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ δι' ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων ὅτι τάχιστα ῥηθῆναι. |

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μέν σε ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμ- E φανέστερον δὲ ἔτι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πειρώμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ δημόσιά που καὶ περιφανῆ ῥᾷστον συννοεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Πείνη μέν που λύσις καὶ λύπη;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐδωδὴ δέ, πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἡδονή;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δῖψος δ' αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις], ἡ δὲ τοῦ

1 : δ ΓΞEF, Bekk.: eidem dant *S, Ald. 2 ἐτίθεις Cl. Δ et pr. Π, ἐτίθεσον H.
D. 3 δ κάλλιστ' Cl. Δ et pr. Π, non alteri dantes. nec dant ΓΞEF. : τὸν Cl. μάλιστ'] κάλλιστα Δ. 7 λύσιν] λύσεως Λ.
E. 14 ἔτι om. F. ταὐτὰ Cl. Δ, om. pr. Π : τὰ αὐτὰ *S. 18 πείνηι...λύπηι B. 20 ἐδωδῆι ΛBCw : ἐδωδὴ *S. 22 + δὲ δῖψος Π, δίψης w. λῦσις Cl.

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2. **οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἁρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο**; For this absol. use of *οἶμαι* in parenthetic phrase cp. *Rep.* 465 A. But when had harmony been so classed? See note on 26 A *supra*; and observe the dubitative *οἶμαι*.

6. **τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυομένης...πάλιν δὲ ἁρμοττομένης.** For this theory of (physical) pain and pleasure, as consisting of two opposite processes of divergence from a mean state (*φύσις*), cp. *Tim.* 64 C ff.: *τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἀθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ' εἰς φύσιν ἀπιὸν πάλιν ἀθρόον ἡδύ, κτλ.*; *Rep.* 583 C ff.: and for a criticism of it, see Arist. *Eth. Nic.* X. iii. 1173ᵃ 31, ff.

11. **ἀπιούσης** is suspected by Badh., who suggests *πάλιν ἰούσης* or *ἐπανιούσης*: but the force of the prep. here is similar to that in *ἀποδοῦναι*, *reddere*, and *ἀπόδοσις* 32 A; cp. also *Tim. l.c.*

20. **ἐδωδὴ δέ, πλήρωσις γ. π., ἡδ.** So Stallb., Poste, Badh., Wb., after best MSS.; but Schleiermacher and Bekk., with some poorer MSS., give *ἐδωδῇ δὲ πλ.* But (1) *ἐδωδὴ δέ* makes the proper correspondence with *πείνη μέν που* above; (2) the order would be *πλήρωσις δὲ ἐδωδῇ γιγν.*; (3) *ἐδωδή* here means not food but *eating*, as in *Rep.* 350 A.

22. **δίψος δ' αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις].** Stallb., Badh., Poste, and Wb. follow Schleierm. in obelizing *καὶ λύσις* as a gloss on *φθορά*. Cousin and Klitsch at-

ὑγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθὲν πληροῦσα | δύναμις ἡδονή· διά- 32
κρισις δέ γ' αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν, τοῦ πνίγους
πάθη, λύπη, κατὰ φύσιν δ' ἡ πάλιν ἀπόδοσίς τε καὶ ψῦξις
ἡδονή.

5 ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ῥίγους ἡ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζῴου τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις λύπη· πάλιν δ' εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀπιόντων καὶ δια-

32 A. 1 ἡδονή] ἡδονή : τί μήν : mg. Σ. διάκρισις...ἡδονή om. pr. Π. 2 δέ τε A. καὶ διάλυσις om. mg. Π. 3 δ' ἡ] δὲ corr. Σ, δὴ *S. 5 πάνυ... ἡδονή (addito : ναί :) in mg. ponit rc. Σ.

tempted their defence; but the word λύσις is certainly wrong, as its sense has been already given by φθορά (=λύσις four lines above). I would suggest however that the error comes not from a gloss but from a mistake in copying, and that we should read καὶ αὖσις: αὖσις (from αὔω, αὖος, as θραῦσις from θραύω), 'parching drought,' is not elsewhere found, but its appropriateness may be confirmed by *Epigr. Gr.* 1037, 8 δίψῃ αὔῃ: Ovid *Met.* 11. 130 sitis arida guttur Urit: Hor. *Sat.* i. 2. 114 fauces urit sitis. To the ideas of depletion and of consequent pain associated with Hunger there is added, in the case of Thirst, the third idea of lack of moisture, which is conveyed by τὸ ξηρανθέν only in the common text, but by both αὖσις and τὸ ξ. if my suggestion be accepted, so that the symmetry is improved if a third subst. be retained. But if this conjecture be right, it will involve a transposition, since the antithesis demands that λύπη come last; so perhaps we should read δίψους δ' αὖ φθορὰ καὶ <αὖσις> λύπη. Similarly below we have the genit. πνίγους and ῥίγους.

1. **διάκρισις δέ γ' αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν, τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, λύπη, κατὰ φύσιν δ' ἡ πάλιν ἀπόδοσίς τε καὶ ψῦξις ἡδονή.** I adopt the punctuation of Wb., who follows Stallb. and Schneider except for a comma (in place of a colon) after λύπη: similarly Poste, except that he absurdly puts a mark of interrogation behind λύπη. The vulgate put the comma after διάλυσις, taking ἡ π. φ. τ. πν. π. together; and so too Klitsch. To διάκρ. κ. διάλ. Stallb. supplies τοῦ ὑγροῦ—"discretio ac dissolutio (humidorum) naturae contraria, qui sunt caloris effectus, dolorem affert."

Badh., however, brackets διάλυσις as being a mere synonym of διάκρισις and as spoiling the symmetry of the sentence, when διάκρισις=ἀπόδοσις, παρὰ φ.=κατὰ φ., πνίγους πάθη=ψῦξις, λύπη=ἡδονή—and he also objects to ἀπόδοσις without a genit., to supply which he transplants ῥίγους from two lines below and inserts it below ἡ and πάλιν: but these objections seem merely captious.

6. **καὶ ῥίγους...πῆξις.** For this double gen., one active the other passive, with a single subst., cp. Thuc. 7. 34, Madv. *Gr. Gr.* § 52: thus ῥίγους may be a gen. of source or cause, 'rigor frigore *effectus*.' But Badh. cuts out ῥίγους (see preceding n.): and the next sentence, εἰς ταὐτὸν κτλ. displeases him yet more, because of (1) the use of ἀπό; (2) the plur., which 'refers to nothing yet mentioned'; (3) εἰς ταὐτόν, which ought to imply *meeting*, not *separation*: hence he proposes πάλιν δὲ ταύτης διακρινομένης or πάλιν δὲ τῶν παγέντων διακρινομένων, or "at all events something very different from what we now read." Schleierm. conj. εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν, suggested by Stobaeus' εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν (*Ecl. Phys.* 90). Stallb., however, tries to defend εἰς ταὐτόν as "in eundem statum in quo fuerunt antea," while to the genitive plur. he supplies τῶν ὑγρῶν from the preceding τῆς ὑγρότητος. For δ' εἰς ταὐτόν, I once thought of δὲ τέταρτον, which involves a change of but three letters (ι to τ, ς to ε, γ to ρ); the sense will then be—'conversely, for the fourth case, reversion and dissolution in the natural process is pleasure,' since Cold is the fourth instance of physical pain and pleasure (after Hunger, Thirst, Heat): for τέταρτον (without art.) as adv. acc., cf. *Phaedr.* 266 E. But εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν, sc. ὑγρότητα, would be a better correction—or possibly δὲ κ<ατὰ>ταὐτόν (ΙΣ=Κ). Change, however, is needless; as Dr Jackson reminds me, the text is amply confirmed by *Tim.* 64 E πάλιν ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἀπιούσης εἶδος, 65 A καθιστάμενα δὲ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν.

κρινομένων ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδονή. καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος, ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν | ἔμψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον B
ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν
5 λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ' εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δ' αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστω· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἓν εἶδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἑκατέροις;

10 ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

XVIII. ΣΩ. Τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα | τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων C
ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.

15 ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν τοῦθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἕτερον

2 τοῦ] τῆς omnes.
B. 4 τούτω pr. Ξ. μὲν] μὲν δὴ Ξ. 5 αὐτῶν Cl. δὲ Cl.
7 : ἔστω : Cl. ἔχειν οὕτω rc. Π. 11 τὸ om. Λ.
C. 13 θαρραλαῖον ΛFH et pr. Ξ. λυπῶν Cl. ΔΠτυ. 15 οὖν om. ΛΞF.

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2. **εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος**, 'if the definition is just in your eyes': *μέτριος* is a significant term throughout this dialogue.

φῇ τὸ...εἶδος,...ὅταν μ. τ. φθ., τὴν μὲν φθ. λ. εἶναι. Another case of anacoluthon, the original accus. being supplanted by a new subj. of the infin., so that the former has the guise of a loose acc. of respect. Cp. 30 A B.

7. **τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν.** Cp. 61 A *τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἤτοι σαφῶς ἢ καί τινα τύπον αὐτοῦ ληπτέον*: *Rep.* 414 A *ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, εἰρῆσθαι*: *ib.* 559 A *προελώμεθα δή τι παράδειγμα ἑκατέρων ...ἵνα τύπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτάς.* Thus *τύπος* is used of general representation, adumbration, or outline.

9. **ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν.** After these words Stallb. suggests the insertion of *ἑνόν*—but why make Socr. talk illogically of one *πάθος* 'existing in' another? *ἐν* is simply 'in the case of,' like *ἐν τούτοις* below, 32 C. Poste reminds us that in *Rep.* 585 "an equivalent definition is extended to all kinds of Pleasure, including intellectual," which explains statements like that in *Eth. Nic.* VII. 11: *ὅλως οὐκ ἀγαθὸν φασὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσι.*

11. **τίθει τοίνυν.** *τοίνυν* is here not inferential but transitional, as in *Rep.* 603 B, *Gorg.* 459 A. The next class of feelings to be examined are of the purely mental, non-physical kind—"pleasures of hope" and pains of fear, concerned neither with *τὰ γεγονότα* nor with *τὰ παρόντα*, but solely with *τὰ μέλλοντα*. Cp. *Lach.* 198 B *δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ.*

13. **ἐλπιζόμενον** is obelized by Badh., on the ground that "it is not the expected thing but the state of expectation which is either painful or pleasant." But *προσδόκημα* (which appears to be a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*) means not 'an expected thing,' but 'an expectation'—and if one may 'hope a hope' (cognate acc. with act.), why should not a hope *be* hoped? Perhaps, however, we should read *ἐλπιζομένων* (in which conj., I find, Gloël has anticipated me).

πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν. VBST, Poste, Badh., Wb.: *πρὸ τῶν λυπῶν*, Herm. after Cl.

εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον.

ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οἶμαι, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, εἰλικρινέσι τε ἑκατέροις γιγνομένοις, ὡς δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀμίκτοις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, πότερον ὅλον ἐστὶ | τὸ γένος ἀσπαστόν, D ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ τῶν προειρημένων δοτέον ἡμῖν γενῶν, ἡδονῇ δὲ καὶ λύπῃ, καθάπερ θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις, τοτὲ μὲν ἀσπαστέον αὐτά, τοτὲ δὲ οὐκ ἀσπα-

1 προσδοκίας Cl. ΓΔΠΣΒCHw Flor. a,b,c,i : προσδοκίαν *S. 4 εἰλικρινέσιν Cl. D. 7 τινὶ om. Cl. et pr. Π, in mg. ponit Δ. 8 δὲ Cl. ΔΞΠ et corr. Σ (vulg. τε). 9 τοτὲ δὲ] τὸ τί δε Cl.

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1. **τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς.** Here again Badh. sees tautology, due to the blundering 'sciolist,' and accordingly he brackets αὐτῆς τ. ψ.: but it would be intemperate to follow him.

These προσδοκήματα are illustrated by Paley thus: "'how delightful it will be to get home to a good dinner'; 'how we shall feel the want of food if we are detained three hours beyond the dinner-hour,' etc. These are the anticipations respectively of πλήρωσις and λύσις ἁρμονίας."

3. **ἐν γὰρ τούτοις, οἶμαι, κτλ.** This passage offers difficulties. (1) To what does τούτοις refer—to the προσδοκήματα alone, or to the εἴδη? (2) Is ὡς δοκεῖ sound? and if so, is it more than merely tautologous? (3) How can ταῦτα (whatever they are) be λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἄμικτα? Stallbaum explains thus: (1) ἐν τούτοις = ἐν τῷ πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν ἐλπιζομένῳ προσδοκήματι. (2) οἶμαι, κ. τ. ἐ. δόξαν, ὡς δοκεῖ are said "per abundantiam quandam," for which cp. *Phaedo* 60 C, *Hipp. Min.* 369 E. (3) ἀμ. λ. τ. κ. ἡδ. = ἄνευ συμμίξεως οὖσι λ. τ. κ. ἡδ., i.e. fear free from pleasure, hope free from pain. Badh. (1) takes τούτοις to refer to the two εἴδη of physical and mental feeling: (2) explains κ. τ. ἐ. δόξαν as "modifying the confident air" of οἶμαι, and ὡς δοκεῖ as implying uncertainty regarding the purity of the εἴδη (in ed. 1), or else (in ed. 2) as "a gloss to κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν, before δόξαν was added by way of explanation": (3) in ed. 1 renders 'pleasure unmixed with pain, and pain with pleasure,' but in ed. 2 proposes εἰλ. θ' ἑκατέραις γιγνομέναις καὶ ἀμίκτοις λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς, as instrum. datives to ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι. Paley seems to agree with Stallb., rendering 'For in these expectances,—which, as I view it, are each wholly independent of body, and so unmixed with actual pain and pleasure,—I think that we shall find a clear proof,' etc. I believe this to be the right explanation of τούτοις—but not quite correct as regards the modifying phrases, of which οἶμαι, κατὰ...δόξαν should be taken together as qualifying the verb (ἐμφ. ἔσεσθαι), but ὡς δοκεῖ ('as we are agreed') with the partic. (εἰλ. γιγν. κ. ἀμίκτ.). Ast proposed to read εἰλικρινοῦς τε ἑκατέρου γιγνομένου, ὡς δ., καὶ ἀμίκτου, λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς: but no change seems required. Hirzel, after Badh., takes ἑκατ. of contrasted physical and mental feelings, and proceeds, "atqui si de voluptatis et doloris generibus quorum alterum in solo animo alterum in corpore versatur verba illa ut debemus accipimus ista λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς e quibus qui aliter locum interpretati sunt sensum aliquem extorquebant nullum omnino habent intellectum. Itaque...verba ista ejicienda sunt."

7. **ἑτέρῳ τινὶ...δοτέον,** i.e., as Paley notes, to the κοινόν or μικτόν, as opposed to the ἄμικτα πάθη now under consideration.

9. **τοῖς τοιούτοις, τοτὲ μέν.** Before τοτέ Badh. inserts ὡς—and either ὡς or ὅτι (which I should prefer) seems required: possibly the following ὡς, not indispensable in its present place, belongs here. αὐτά, i.e. ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην.

στέον, ὡς ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὐκ ὄντα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἔνια δεχόμενα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὅπῃ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις, ὅτι ταύτῃ πῃ δεῖ διαπορευθῆναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον.

5 ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τόδε ξυνίδωμεν· ὡς εἴπερ ὄντως | ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον, διαφθειρομένων μὲν αὐτῶν ἀλγηδών, E ἀνασῳζομένων δὲ ἡδονή, τῶν μήτε διαφθειρομένων μήτε ἀνασῳζομένων ἐννοήσωμεν πέρι, τίνα ποτὲ ἕξιν δεῖ τότε ἐν ἑκάστοις εἶναι τοῖς ζῴοις, ὅταν οὕτως ἴσχῃ. σφόδρα δὲ 10 προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εἰπέ· ἆρ' οὐ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ ζῷον μήτε τι λυπεῖσθαι μήτε ἥδεσθαι μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔστι τις τρίτη ἡμῶν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις 15 παρά τε τὴν τοῦ | χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λυπουμένου; 33

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

2 ὅτε omnes. 3 διαθηρευθῆναι S. 4 τὸν Πτ. διωκόμενον pr. Σ. 5 πρῶτον... non alteri dat Cl.

E. 6 ἀλγηδὼν ἄν. διασωζομένων Cl. ΔΠ. 8 πέρι ΓΞ : περὶ S. 10 ἆρα Cl. τῷ om. H. 11 μήτε τι] μή τι Λ. μήθ' Γ. 14 ἡμῶν Δ, ἡμῖν Γ : om. EF.

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1. **ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἔνια... ἔστιν ὅπῃ φύσιν.** I accept Badh.'s[2] correction—which had occurred to me independently—ὅπῃ for the vulgate ὅτε. Stallb. cites Xen. *Cyrop.* I. 6. 9 for ἔνια ἔστιν ἃ, and *Phaedo* 74 B ἐνίοτε...τότε μὲν...τότε δέ, *Laws* 893 D E ἔστιν ὅτε...τότε μὲν... τότε δέ—but evidently none of these avail to support the intolerable tautology here. Badh. in ed. I suggested ἔστιν οὗ.

3. **διαπορευθῆναι.** Steph., with Ald. and Bas. I, reads the unexampled διαθηρευθῆναι. The metaphor, drawn from the chase, is frequent in Plato: cp. *Soph.* 226 A; *Phaedo* 66 A; *Tim.* 64 B; *Lach.* 194 B; *Parmen.* 128 C; *Polit.* 258 E, 284 B, 301 E; 64 ff. *infra*, etc. But this reply of Prot. seems scarcely natural, and I suspect some corruption.

5. **ξυνίδωμεν· ὡς.** So Stallb. punctuates, explaining ὡς as merely connective, *etenim*. Badh. puts a full stop after ξυν. and brackets ὡς, then changes τὸ λεγόμενον to τῶν γενομένων, on the ground that "without some qualifying adverb τ. λ. cannot be used in any other sense but 'what is commonly said,'" and that we have here a confusion of ἀληθῶς λέγεται of statements and ὄντως ἔστι of facts,—next brackets αὐτῶν as referring to no plur. expressed or implied—then alters οὕτως ἴσχῃ to οὕτω σχῇ—and finally cuts out the τι before λυπεῖσθαι. αὐτῶν certainly presents grave difficulty, and Stallb.'s explanation (when he makes it = ἐκείνων, referring to ὑγρόν, πνῖγος, ῥῖγος) is far from satisfactory; but I am by no means sure that Badh.'s lection is preferable. Gloël proposes to read τῶν λεγομένων and excise αὐτῶν as a later insertion: but this conj., though simpler than Badh.'s, equally lacks support from MSS. If τὸ λεγόμενον is taken as parenthetic, there can be no objection to the use of ὄντως ἔστι. Or if τὸ λεγ. is used to cite a proverbial dictum (as regularly) ought we to read σῶς εἴπερ κτλ. and suppose an allusion to Soph. *Phil.* 21? This however would not help out αὐτῶν, which might be emended to φύτων used as in *Soph.* 283 E, *Rep.* 401 A.

14. **τρίτη ἡμῶν... διάθεσις.** So Bodl., followed by Stallb., Poste, Wb.; but Coisl. has ἡμῖν, which is preferred by Badh. For an account of this intermediate state, cp. *Rep.* 583 C ff., *Tim.* 64 C ff.

ΣΩ. Ἄγε δὴ τοίνυν, ταύτης προθυμοῦ μεμνῆσθαι. πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς κρίσιν οὐ σμικρὸν μεμνῆσθαι ταύτην ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ἢ μή. βραχὺ δέ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλει, διαπεράνωμεν.

5 ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ποῖον.

ΣΩ. Τῷ τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἑλομένῳ βίον οἶσθ' ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι | λέγεις; B

ΣΩ. Ἐρρήθη γάρ που τότε ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων
10 μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἑλομένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα οὕτως ἐρρήθη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνῳ γε ὑπάρχοι· καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θειότατος.

15 ΠΡΩ. Οὔκουν εἰκός γε οὔτε χαίρειν τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκός· ἄσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν

33 A. 2 *ταύτης* corr. Γ Bekk.: *ταύτην* *S. 3 *αὐτῶν* Λ. 6 *βίῳ* Λ.

B. 8 *λέγεις* EF. 10 *δεῖ* w. *μέγαν* ΛBCHw. *τὸν* om. Λ, ante *τῷ* ponit EF. 12 *μάλ'* Γ. *ἐρρέθη* ΓΣBCF. 13 *οὕτος* corr. Σ. *ὑπάρχει* Σ, *ὑπάρχον* w. : *καὶ* Ξ. 15 *μήτε* w. *τοὺς* add. Cl. ΔΠ. 17 *οὖν* om. ΓΔ. : *ἄσχημον* Cl.

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2. **μεμνῆσθαι ταύτην.** So Poste and Wb. after most MSS. *ταύτης* is Bekk.'s corr., after corr. in Coisl., adopted by Stallb. Badh. however, in ed. 2, brackets both *μεμν. τ.* and *ἢ μή* as a "foolish supplement." There are some instances of *μεμν.* with accus. in poetry (e.g. Aesch. *Cho.* 492, Soph. *O. T.* 1057), though this rare constr. is certainly strange here, esp. immediately after *ταύτης μεμν.* above: so perhaps we should take *ταύτην* with *κρίσιν*, however harsh the order of words.

6. **τῷ τὸν τοῦ φρ. ἑλομένῳ βίον... οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.** Badh. brackets *τῷ* and *ἑλομένῳ* as borrowed from below and wrongly making *ἀποκωλύει* govern a dat.; but as Stallb. says *οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει* is "absolute dictum": cp. Matth. *Gr.* § 387: but possibly we should read *ἀποκωλῦον ἦν*, as preparatory to the foll. *τότε*.

9. **τότε ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ.** See 20 E ff., esp. 21 D E.

13. **οὐκοῦν οὕτως.** Badh. in ed. 1 follows Bast. and Steph. in writing *οὗτος*, after Ven. Σ; but in ed. 2 he retracts that view, translating—'*In this way then* (this being so) it would be the very life which he *had already chosen*.' Stallb. explains *οὕτως* by "intell. *ὥστε μηδὲν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαίρειν*": but Badh.'s view is to be preferred.

ἐκείνῳ γε is altered by Badh. to *ἐκ. τε*, as being "absolutely without meaning," though it is hard to see why. For *θειότατος*, cp. the doctrine of the 'theoretic' life in *Eth. Nic.* X. 7.

15. **οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον**, i.e. *λυπεῖσθαι*, *τὸ ἐν.* being adverbial and euphemistically substituted for the positive word. *τοὺς θεούς* is given by Bekk. etc., after Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π, but Stallb. refuses to retain the art. Poste contrasts the view expressed in *Eth. Nic.* VII. 14, 1154^{b} 25 *εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν.* Cp. *Met.* XI. 7.

ἑκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἔτι καὶ εἰς αὖθις ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐὰν | πρὸς λόγον τι ᾖ, καὶ τῷ νῷ πρὸς C τὰ δευτερεῖα, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς τὰ πρωτεῖα δυνώμεθα προσθεῖναι, προσθήσομεν.

5 ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

XIX. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἕτερον εἶδος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης πᾶν ἐστὶ γεγονός.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι ποτ' ἔστι, πρότερον ἀνα-
10 ληπτέον, καὶ κινδυνεύει πάλιν ἔτι πρότερον αἴσθησιν μνή-
μης, εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν κατὰ τρόπον φανερά πῃ γενήσεσθαι. |

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς φῄς; D

ΣΩ. Θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἑκάστοτε παθημάτων
15 τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθῆ ἐκείνην ἐάσαντα, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα καί τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἴδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν ἑκατέρῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

20 ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν δὴ μὴ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα ἐὰν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φῶμεν λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν μὴ λανθάνειν, ἆρ' ὀρθότατα ἐροῦμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ | οὔ; E

C. 2 ἐπισκεψώμεθα omnes. πρὸς τὰ om. H. 3 δυνάμεθα w. προσθῆναι, προσθήσωμεν Λ. 6 τότε Λ. 9 ἔστιν Cl. 11 τὰ add. Cl. ΔΠΣ.
D. 14 τῶν] τὸν Cl. ΔΠ. 16 δι' om. Cl. Π Flor. a,c. 20 μὴ om. Λ. ἐὰν C.

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1. **εἰς αὖθις ἐπισκεψόμεθα.** The fut. is Bekk.'s corr. for ἐπισκεψώμεθα of MSS. which Badh. denounces as "both less suitable in itself, unusual with εἰσαῦθις, which requires a future, and quite incompatible with προσθησομεν." εἰς αὖθις 'hereafter,' as commonly, e.g. *Phaedo* 115 A, *Protag.* 357 B, and 24 D *supra*.

2. **πρὸς λόγον τι ᾖ**: cp. 18 D, 42 E.

9. **μνήμην...ἀναληπτέον.** Stallb. defends the verbal (1) as meaning not resumption but merely assumption of a question for discussion, as in *Polit.* 261 C, *Apol.* 22 B, *Men.* 87 E, *infr.* 34 E etc.; and (2) as affording "facetus uerborum lusus." In ed. 1 Badh. accepts this view; but in ed. 2 he denies the propriety of either ἀνα- or παραληπτέον and conjectures πρ. ἂν εἴη ληπτέον—needlessly.

10. **αἴσθησιν**: supply again ἀναληπτέον εἶναι.

11. **κατὰ τρόπον**, of which the contrary is ἀπὸ τρόπου 34 A, is common in Plato for 'duly,' e.g. *Cratyl.* 425 B, *Polit.* 310 C, *Tim.* 42 E, *Laws* 638 C: ἀπὸ τρ. occurs in *Crat.* 421 D, *Theaet.* 143 C, al.

14 **θὲς τῶν περί** κτλ. This is an account of αἴσθησις, defined as an affection of both body and soul together. Cp. *Tim.* 43 C διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἱ κινήσεις ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν φερόμεναι προσπίπτουσιν· αἱ δὴ... αἰσθήσεις ξυνάπασαι κέκληνται: also *ib.* 42 A, 43 D E, 64 B ff. Sensation involves consciousness. For the initial θές, cp. *Theaet.* 191 C θὲς δή μοι λόγου ἕνεκα... ἑνόν κτλ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν λεληθέναι μηδαμῶς ὑπολάβῃς ὡς λέγω λήθης ἐνταῦθά που γένεσιν· ἔστι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος· ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὔπω γέγονε· τοῦ δὲ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γεγονότος πω γίγνεσθαι φάναι τινὰ ἀποβολὴν ἄτοπον. 5 ἦ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ τοίνυν ὀνόματα μετάβαλε μόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν ἀπαθὴς 10 αὕτη γίγνηται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος, ἣν νῦν λήθην | καλεῖς, ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμασον. 34

ΠΡΩ. Ἔμαθον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐν ἑνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ' αὖ τὴν κίνησιν 15 ὀνομάζων αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοι' ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη μανθάνομεν, ὃ βουλόμεθα καλεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

E. 3 δὲ] δὴ Cl. Δ, δου Π. 4 πω] πως S*, Bekk.: πῶς Cl. 10 τῶν ante τοῦ om. Γ. νῦν om. pr. Π.
34 A. 13 τὸ Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCFH: τῷ *S. δ' Cl.: δὲ *S. 14 κοίνησιν Λ. 15 οὐ πόρρω τρόπου γρ. Cw.

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2. **λήθης ἐνταῦθά που γένεσιν**, 'the arising of forgetfulness somewhere in that state.' *γένεσις λήθης* is equivalent to *φθορὰ μνήμης*, and the point of the remark is that the term λεληθέναι (or λήθη) here is used, for lack of a better, to mean 'unconsciousness' not 'forgetfulness' proper, i.e. a neutral state of mind instead of a process (*γένεσις*) from opposite to opposite.

λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος. We should almost expect a word like *ἀκριβῶς* here to point the meaning: should we read λήθη <ἢ γ' ἀληθινή>? For the def. cp. *Phaedo* 75 D *ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν*; *Symp.* 208 A *λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος*—which passages suggest that *ἐπιστήμης*, not *μνήμης*, may be the true lection here also (MN = ΠΙCΤ).

4. **γεγονότος πω**. Stallb.'s corr. of MS. *πῶς*, now generally adopted, as by Poste, Badh., Wb.: ΠΟΤΕ would be an almost equally easy correction.

10. **ἣν νῦν λήθην καλεῖς**. On the ground that Prot. has never actually applied this term, Schleierm. and Heindorf emended to *ἵνα μὴ λ. καλῇς*, while Badh.[2] obelizes the whole phrase; but *μετάβαλε μόνον* seems sufficient to confirm the text: 'which at present you usually call....'

13. **κοινῇ γιγνόμενον**. Badh.[2] follows Sydenham in reading *γιγνόμενα*, because the sing. partic. besides being an anomaly would obscure the notion of '*joint* participation'; but surely the use of the sing. for plur. rather emphasises the notion of unity.

15. **οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου**. See note on 33 C. Stallb. prefers to accentuate *ἄπο* which is given, he says, by MSS. in *Rep.* 470 B, *Theaet.* 143 C, 179 C, *Phaedr.* 278 D, *Tim.* 25 E, by Vat. Δ here and also (which he fails to note) by Bodl.

ΣΩ. Σωτηρίαν τοίνυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὀρθῶς ἄν τις λέγοι κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.

ΠΡΩ. | Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οὖν. B

ΣΩ. Μνήμης δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἆρ' οὐ διαφέρουσαν λέγομεν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τόδε;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἃ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχέ ποθ' ἡ ψυχή, ταῦτ' ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀνα-

10 λαμβάνῃ, τότε ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί που λέγομεν. ἦ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἴτε αἰσθήσεως εἴτ' αὖ μαθήματος αὖθις ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ πάλιν αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, | καὶ ταῦτα ξύμπαντα ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμας που C

15 λέγομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὗ δὴ χάριν ἅπαντ' εἴρηται ταῦτα, ἔστι τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

B. 4 λέγωμεν Cl. Δ, λέγοιμεν Ξ et corr. Π. 8 ἔπαθε ΣΒΗ: ἔπασχε... σώματος om. ΛCE: ἔπασχεν Cl. πάθ' ἡ ψυχή Η, πάθη ψυχή Cl. ΔΠ 9 μάλιστ' Γ. 10 λέγωμεν C. 12 εἴτ' Cl. 13 εἶτ' w.
C. 14 ταῦτα] πάντα F. ξυμπαντ' Γ. 17 ταῦτ' Cl. τόδε; Cl.

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1. **σωτηρίαν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην.** Stallb. explains that memory is to Plato in German phrase "das Bewusstsein von Empfindungen und Wahrnehmungen"—continued consciousness of impressions and perceptions. Cp. *Theaet.* 163 C ff., *Cratyl.* 437 B ἡ μνήμη παντί που μηνύει ὅτι μονή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ: Arist. *An. post.* II. 19. 99ᵇ 26 ff. ἐνούσης δ' αἰσθήσεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἐγγίγνεται μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθήματος...ἐν οἷς δ' (ἐγγίγνεται), ἔνεστι <μὴ> αἰσθανομένοις ἔχειν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ...ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίγνεται μνήμη, κτλ.: *id. Met.* I. 1. 980ᵃ 28: we might also refer to Hume's 'ideas,' and to Lady Macbeth's "Memory, the *warder* of the brain."

ἀνάμνησις differs, in that it is a purely and independently mental action, while in μνήμη is involved αἴσθησις and therefore bodily κίνησις.

8. **ἔπασχέ ποθ' ἡ ψυχή.** So Stallb. Herm. Wb. and Badh. with the vulgate: but Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π give πάθη ψυχή, whence Poste and the Zürich edd. read πάθη ἡ: but, as Badh. remarks, ποτέ "adds to the clearness of the sentence." For the def. of ἀνάμνησις cp. *Meno* 85 D τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί ἐστιν; πάνυ γε.

13. **αὖθις ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ.** This rare word seems partly chosen from its likeness in sound to the preceding ἀπολέσασα: it is a metaphor from ploughing, cp. Lat. *uoluere, uersare* (*animo*).

14. **ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμας.** For μνήμας Sydenh. proposed μνήμης ἀνακτήσεις—and the use of the word here is strange, following so soon on μνήμης in the stricter sense. Stallb. cites μνήμας καὶ δόξας from *Laws* 645 E, and παραδιδόναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ταῖς μνημαῖς from 964 E, which are of little help for the present use—nor has he told us how far the two terms differ, or if they correspond to the distinction between μνήμη αἰσθήσεως and μνήμη μαθήματος. I incline to write καὶ <ἀναλήψεις> μνήμης: cp. μνήμης ἀνάληψις, Ar. *Mem.* 2. 2. There seems to be no early authority for ἀνάκτησις. Gloël, too, condemns καὶ μνήμας as "Zusatz eines Lesers." Badh. seems to have overlooked the difficulty.

ΣΩ. Ἵνα ἤδη τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώματος ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν, καὶ ἅμα ἐπιθυμίαν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων πως ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἔοικε δηλοῦσθαι.

XX. ΠΡΩ. Λέγωμεν τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤδη τὸ μετὰ
5 ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πολλά γε περὶ γένεσιν ἡδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν [τὴν] | μορφὴν αὐτῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγοντας σκοπεῖν. καὶ D γὰρ νῦν πρότερον ἔτι φαίνεται ληπτέον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι, τί ποτ' ἔστι καὶ ποῦ γίγνεται.

10 ΠΡΩ. Σκοπῶμεν τοίνυν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπολοῦμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν, καὶ ταῦτά γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εὑρόντες ὃ νῦν ζητοῦμεν, [ἀπολοῦμεν] τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς ἠμύνω· τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πειρώμεθα
15 λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ πείνην τε καὶ δίψος καὶ πόλλ' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἔφαμεν εἶναί | τινας ἐπιθυμίας; E

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα ταὐτὸν βλέψαντες οὕτω πολὺ
20 διαφέροντα ταῦθ' ἑνὶ προσαγορεύομεν ὀνόματι;

1 ἤδη] μὴ omnes. ψυχὴν H, ψυχὴν Γ, τῆς ψυχῆς Cl. ΔΠ. 2 καὶ post μάλιστα om. CF et pr. Ξ. 3 πῶς Cl. ἔοικεν Cl. 6 πολλά...non alteri dat Cl. D. 7 αὐτὴν Cl. Π. 11 μὲν add. Cl. ΔΠΣ. ταύτη corr. Σ. 12 ἃ corr. Γ. ἀπολοῦμεν add. Cl. ΔΠ. 16 πεινῆν H. πολλὰ Cl.

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1. **ἵνα ἤδη τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδ.** The MSS. give μή: πῃ is the conj. of Schütz, Heindorf, and van Heusde, adopted by Stallb. Badh. in ed. 1 and Poste read δή, following Grovius, Ast, and Zürich edd., on the ground that πῃ ill suits the superll. ὅτι μάλιστα κ. ἐναργέστατα, as Schleierm. argued; but in ed. 2 B. reads ἵν' ἅμα (? ἅμα τε). I once thought of ἵν' αὐτήν, but now accept Herm. and Wb.'s ἵνα ἤδη, supported by Prot.'s reply, and the similar corruption in *Polit.* 303 A.

τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς is the reading of Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π, followed by Poste, Badh., Herm., Wb.; but Stallb. supports the vulgate τὴν ψυχῆς as corresponding better with the omission of art. before σώματος—not quite a convincing reason. χωρὶς σώματος Stallb. explains as a brachylogy for χ. τῆς σώμ., comparing 41 C *infr.*, *Protag.* 358 D, *Gorg.* 455 E; but I fail to see the aptness of such an ellipse here: the point is not so much the separation of mental ἡδονή from bodily ἡδ. as from bodily κίνησις or from αἴσθησις.

6. **πᾶσαν [τὴν] μορφὴν αὐτῆς.** I follow Badh. in bracketing the art., as the meaning should be 'every,' not 'the whole': but possibly τήν is a corruption of τινα, 'every individual form.' μορφή = εἶδος.

12. **ζητοῦμεν, [ἀπολοῦμεν].** The second ἀπολ. appears in Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π, and is retained by Turr. and Poste, but is excised by Herm., Wb., Stallb. and Badh. as a marginal gloss. Badh. further omits the καί before ταῦτά γε and changes ὅ to ἃ, so as to give an accus. to the first ἀπολοῦμεν and a proper antecedent in plur. to αὐτὰ ταῦτα. Perhaps we should alter the first ἀπολοῦμεν to ἀποροῦμεν, or else the second to ἀπολύσομεν—and καί may be corrupted from κατά, and a δέ lost after εὑρόντες. For this corrective use of μὲν οὖν cp. *Symp.* 201 C, *Gorg.* 466 A E, *Rep.* 331 D, etc.

19. **πρὸς τί...ταὐτὸν βλέψαντες.** Stallb.

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὅμως λεκτέον.

ΣΩ. Ἐκεῖθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν δή;

5 ΣΩ. Διψῇ που λέγομεν ἑκάστοτέ τι;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δέ γ' ἐστὶ κενοῦται;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ δίψος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία;

10 ΠΡΩ. Ναί, πώματός γε.

ΣΩ. Πώματος, | ἢ πληρώσεως πώματος; 35

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν πληρώσεως.

ΣΩ. Ὁ κενούμενος ἡμῶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει· κενούμενος γὰρ ἐρᾷ πληροῦσθαι.

15 ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατά γε.

E. 1 μὰ...non alteri dat Cl. 3 ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν Cl. ΔΠ : πάλιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν *S. λάβωμεν pr. Ξ. 5 διψῇ Cl. ΓΔΛΞΣBCEHw, Flor. a,b,c,i, διψῇ F, δήψει Π : διψῆν S. γέ που Cl. ΔΠ. ἑκάστου Cl. τις ΣBCHw, ἔτι Cl. 7 κενοῦσθαι FS. 10 πώματός Cl. Π et pr. ΓΔ : πόματός *S. haec non alteri dat Ξ. γε; Cl. 11 πώματος; Cl.

35 A. 11 ἢ] πόματος ἢ rc. Γ. continuant haec eidem Ξw.

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comments: "hic ταὐτόν est idem quod τὸ ἕν s. τὸ γένος, τὸ εἶδος." This is misleading: ταὐτόν is the common, unvarying quality, in view of which a number of objects are called by the same name, and so form a *genus*, in spite of minor differences of type. For a def. of ἐπιθυμία, cp. Arist. *De An.* II. 3. 414ᵇ 4 ᾧ δ' αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη...οἷς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη: *Eth. Nic.* II. 4, 1105ᵇ 21 λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον...ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη: also *Tim.* 42 A, *Rep.* 437 B ff., and the etymology in *Cratyl.* 419 E. The Stoic view of this πάθος may be seen in Stob. *Ecl.* II. 166, Cic. *Tusc.* IV. 11 ff.

3. **ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν** is added by way of epexegesis to ἐκεῖθεν, as in *Euthyd.* 271 C ἐντεῦθέν ποθέν εἰσιν ἐκ Χίου: *Phaedr.* 229 B ἐνθένδε μέντοι ποθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισσοῦ. πάλιν with ἀναλάβ. is not tautologous, since the prep. does not necessarily imply *re*sumption: cp. 33 C, note.

5. **διψῇ που λέγομεν ἑκάστοτέ τι;** So Stallb. and Wb.: Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π give διψῇ γέ που: while the vulgate is διψῆν που. Below all MSS. except Paris. F read κενοῦται, not κενοῦσθαι. Badh. reads "διψῇ" λέγοντες, λέγ. ἐκ. τι, supposing that λεγ was corrupted to γεπ, afterwards "so supplemented as to become γέ που." The infin. is supported by such passages as *Meno* 75 E, *Protag.* 358 D—and in these formulae τι regularly refers to some subst. or infin. (cp. *Meno* 76 A, 88 A). που, as Stallb. tells us, is to be joined with λέγομεν, for which collocation he cites *Phaedr.* 258 A, *Polit.* 306 E.

I suggest διψῆν γε λέγομεν ἕκαστός τού ποτε. And below, perhaps, for ἐστὶ κ. we should read εἴ τι κενοῦται. For 'we' as subj. to διψῆν cp. ὁ κενούμενος ἡμῶν ἄρα l. 13 *infra*.

Liebhold proposes διψῇ γέ του, λέγομεν, ἑκάστοτέ τις, "man dürstet, pflegen wir zu sagen, jedesmal, nach irgend etwas," cp. ὃ γ' ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, 35 B: and Paley, too, suggests τις for τι.

12. **οἶμαι μὲν πλ.** This use of μέν without a following δέ is not infrequent: cp. *Soph.* 221 A, *Laws* 676 A. For a similar fine distinction, cp. that between ᾧ and δι' οὗ in *Theaet.* 184 C (referred to by Paley).

13. **τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει.** The full and more regular form would be τ. ἐ. ἢ ἃ πάσχει, which was actually proposed by

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος ἔστιν ὁπόθεν εἴτ' αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτοιτ' ἂν εἴτε μνήμῃ, τούτου ὃ μήτ' ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μήτ' ἐν τῷ πρόσθε πώποτ' ἔπαθεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γ' ἐπιθυμῶν | τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, φαμέν. B

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὅ γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. διψῇ γάρ, τοῦτο δὲ κένωσις· ὁ δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πληρώσεώς γ' ἄρα πῇ τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἂν ἐφάπτοιτο.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ἀδύνατον· κενοῦται γάρ που.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι λοιπόν, τῇ μνήμῃ δῆλον ὅτι· | τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἔτ' ἄλλῳ ἐφάψαιτο; C

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδενί.

XXI. ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὃ συμβέβηχ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν οὔ φησιν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

3 πάσχει μήτ'] πάσχειν εἴτ' pr. Δ. πρόσθε ΓΔ Bekk.: πρόσθεν *S. πώποτε Cl. 6 γε Cl.

B. 6 ἐπιθυμεῖν corr. F. 8 ἄρ' Γw. 9 δ' Cl. 11 γ' ἄρα Cl. Π, γὰρ pr. Δ (vulg. ἄρα). 17 : δῆλον ὅτι : Cl.

C. 17 τῷ γὰρ Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCw : τῷ τίνι γὰρ *S. haec priori continuant ΞH. ἂν om. F. ἔτ' add. Cl. ΔΠ Bekk.: om. *S. ἐφάψοιτο Ξ. 19 μανθάνομεν...] haec non alteri dant ΞH. οὖν Cl. ΔΠ: γοῦν *S.

Stallb. (cp. *Gorg.* 481 C, *Phaedo* 115 D, *Rep.* 339 E); but the omission of the rel. pron. is supported by *Phaedr.* 275 A, *Rep.* 334 E, *Euthyphr.* 12 A.

1. **ὁ τὸ πρῶτον** κτλ. The order, says Stallb., is ὁ τ. πρ. κεν. ἔ. ὁπ. ἐφάπτ. ἂν ε. αἰσ. ε. μν. πληρ. τούτου ὃ κτλ. Badh., however, brackets πληρώσεως, which appears to be a gloss on τούτου, as the πάθος in question is πλήρωσις. If πληρώσεως is to be retained it might be taken (as Paley prefers) as gen. after αἰσθήσει and μνήμῃ, while τούτου... ἔπαθε—which is synonymous—belongs to ἐφάπτ. But πληρώσεως ... ἐφάπτοιτο below suggests another order, viz. ἐφάπτ. πλ. ε. αἰσθ. ε. μν. τ. ὃ κτλ., in which case πάσχει will apply to αἰσθ., ἔπαθεν to μνήμῃ: which I incline to think the best interpretation.

11. **πληρώσεώς γ' ἄρα πῇ τι.** So Stallb., Poste, Wb. and Badh.[1], with Bodl., Ven. Π : γάρ Vat. Badh.[2] brackets γ', remarking that "the γε is useless unless we change its place and read π. ἄρα ἔν γέ τι." Possibly we should read τἄρα for γ' ἄρα.

τῶν is partit. gen. after τι, 'some part of the thirsting man,' i.e. his σῶμα or ψυχή.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν ἀεὶ παντὸς ζῴου μηνύει τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ὁρμή γε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἄγουσα ἢ τὰ παθή-
5 ματα δηλοῖ που μνήμην οὖσαν τῶν τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐναντίων.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. | Τὴν ἄρα ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα ἀπο- D
δείξας μνήμην ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς ξύμπασαν τήν τε ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζῴου παντὸς ἀπέφηνεν.

10 ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Διψῆν ἄρα ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινῆν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων πάσχειν οὐδαμῇ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι δὴ καὶ τόδε περὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν.
15 βίου γὰρ εἶδός τί μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. | Ἐν τίσι καὶ ποίου περὶ βίου φράζεις; E

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἴ τις
20 τούτων ἐν ἑκατέρῳ γιγνόμενος ἡμῶν ἀλγεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ χαίρει κατὰ τὰς μεταβολάς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνηται;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;

2 δεικνύει γρ. Π. τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ξ et mg. EF. 6 γε om. pr. Δ.
D. 7 ἄρ' Γ. 8 καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ΛΣCHw Flor. a,b,c,i et rc. B. 11 δίψην Cl. Δ et pr. Π: διψῆν...ἀληθέστατα om. Λ. ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα Cl. ΔΠ: τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν *S. πείνην Cl. Δ et pr. Π. 12 αἱρεῖν CHw, ἐρεῖ corr. Γ. 14 ταὐτὰ Cl. Δ et pr. Π, αὐτὰ pr. E, τὰ αὐτὰ *S. ταῦτα om. Λ. 15 βούλεσθαι Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCHw Flor. a,b,c,i: βουλεύεσθαι *S.
E. 17 περὶ βίου Cl. ΔΠ: βίου πέρι S. 18 καὶ κενοῦσθαι om. pr. Ξ. 19 τε Cl. 20 ἐν om. Λ. τότε vulg., τόδε Λ. δὴ pr. Γ et corr. Δ.

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7. **τὴν ἄρα ἐπάγουσαν**... 'In demonstrating, then, that Memory is that which conducts to the objects of desire, the discourse has made it clear that it is to the soul that belong the whole of impulse and desire and the sway of the whole creature.' *μνήμην* and *ψυχῆς*, the emphatic words, are centralised.

12. **ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ**, 'the argument asserts,' or makes good, *euincit*: cp. *Rep.* 604 C, *Parm.* 141 D, *Crito* 48 C: "the figure of speech seems to be borrowed from the draught-board" (Badh.[2]).

19. **καὶ εἴ τις...μεταβολάς.** The construction is irregular, as often in this dialogue—the present form being substituted for *καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν...χαίρειν*: also *τοτὲ μέν* would naturally be expected before *ἀλγεῖ*, cp. 36 E n.

23. **ἐν μέσῳ τούτων.** Cp. *Rep.* 583 C ff. *μεταξὺ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ ὂν ἡσυχίαν τινὰ περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς κτλ.*

ΣΩ. Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῇ, μεμνῆται δὲ τῶν ἡδέων, ὧν γενομένων παύοιτ' ἂν τῆς ἀλγηδόνος, πληρῶται δὲ μήπω· τί τότε; φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν | παθη- 36
μάτων εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Φῶμεν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀλγούνθ' ὅλως ἢ χαίροντα;

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δί', ἀλλὰ διπλῇ τινὶ λύπῃ λυπούμενον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοκίας τινὶ πόθῳ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης εἶπες; ἆρ' οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἡμῶν κενούμενος ἐν ἐλπίδι φανερᾷ τοῦ πληρωθήσεσθαι | καθέστηκε, τοτὲ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀνελ- B
πίστως ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθήσεσθαι τῷ μεμνῆσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἅμα δὲ κενούμενος ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις ἀλγεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τότ' ἄρα ἄνθρωπος καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα λυπεῖταί τε ἅμα καὶ χαίρει.

1 ἀλγεῖ BC, ἀλγῇ Cl. ΔΞΠΗ, ἀλγεῖν Florentini: ἀλγεῖ *S, Bekk. ἡδέων ὧν corr. Σ: ὧν om. *S, Bekk. 2 γιγνομένων Γ et corr. ΔΣ. πληρῶται Cl. ΔΠ: πεπλήρωται *S, Bekk. 3 μὴ φῶμεν ἢ φῶμεν ΔΠ.
36 A. 5 μὲν om. EF. 10 εἶπες om. Π et pr. Δ.
B. 13 ἔχειν F. 15 οὐκ Γ. 17 ἀλγεῖ S. 19 τότε Cl. ἄρ Cl. Γ.

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1. **διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος...μήπω.** There is some divergence here in MSS., see the critical note. The subjj. ἀλγῇ, πληρῶται depend on ὅταν supplied from above.

7. **μὰ Δί', ἀλλά.** Ficinus has "non gaudentem per Iouem, sed," etc.; whence van Heusde suspected the loss of μὴ χαίροντα before μά—unnecessarily, since μά has here a negative force, as seen from the following ἀλλά: cp. *Gorg.* 489 D, *Euthyd.* 293 C, *Alcib.* I. 109 D, 110 C; Ar. *Eq.* 85, *Nub.* 330, 1291, al.

8. **ἐν τῷ παθήματι.** Stallb. once proposed to excise the prep.—needlessly, since it serves to point the contrast between the present and fut., the physical and the mental: translate 'in the course of the affection.'

On **προσδοκίας τ. π.** Paley remarks, "As when a man gets impatient from having to wait long for his dinner." Cp. *Rep.* 584 C αἱ περὶ μελλόντων τούτων ἐκ προσδοκίας γιγνόμεναι προησθήσεις τε καὶ προλυπήσεις κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσιν.

16. **ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις.** So all MSS.: but the expression has aroused suspicion. Stallb. formerly proposed ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρόνοις, while Badh. in ed. 1 regarded τοῖς χρόνοις as the addition by "some glossator" to an orig. ἐν τούτοις. ἐν τούτοις τοὐναντίον might be also suggested, or ἐν τοῖς τοῦ <σώματος> πόνοις. Paley writes: "Perhaps the sentence is purposely interlaced; 'at such times he feels at once pleasure and pain.'" This is an obscure saying, but if it means that ἐν... χρόνοις ought naturally to be at the beginning of the sentence, as referring back to the previous ἔστιν ὅτε, I believe it to be the right view—which precludes the need for any textual change.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν ἀνελπίστως ἔχῃ κενούμενος τεύξεσθαι πληρώσεως; ἆρ' οὐ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνοιτ' ἂν περὶ τὰς λύπας πάθος, ὃ σὺ νῦν δὴ κατιδὼν ᾠήθης ἁπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν; C

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τόδε χρησώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταύτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν; ἢ τὰς μέν τινας ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δ' οὔ;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἂν εἶεν ψευδεῖς ἡδοναὶ ἢ λῦπαι;

ΣΩ. Πῶς δέ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φόβοι ἂν ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς, ἢ προσδοκίαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ μή, ἢ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Δόξας μὲν ἔγωγ' ἄν που συγχωροίην, τὰ δ' D ἕτερα ταῦτ' οὐκ ἄν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φῄς; λόγον μέντοι τινὰ κινδυνεύομεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὸν ἐπεγείρειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρεληλυθότα, ὦ παῖ 'κείνου τἀνδρός, προσήκοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

4 δὴ add. Cl. ΔΠ et rc. Ξ.

C. 7 τοιαύτῃ Λ. τόδε πρὸς F, τούτων τόδε Γ. 8 χρησόμεθα Ξ.
10 τὰς om. ΔΠ, add. Cl.[2] 12 δ' om. Cl. ΔΠ. ἢ] αἱ Cl. Π et pr. Δ.
D. 18 μέντοι] μὲν Λ. 21 εἰ] ἢ corr. Γ, ἀεὶ S. 22 τἀνδρὸς Cl. ΔΠ; τοῦ ἀνδρὸς *S.

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4. **ἁπλῶς διπλοῦν**, 'indifferently (or without exception) double': "a less appropriate word has been chosen for the sake of playing upon διπλοῦν" (Badh.). For the oxymoron cp. ἀληθῶς ψευδές, *Theaet.* 189 D.

7. **τόδε χρησώμεθα...πότερον ἀληθεῖς.** Here begins that discussion of the truth and falsity of pleasures which has caused such a stumbling-block to some critics of Platonism. Cp. *Rep.* 585 A ff. and Nemesius *de Nat. Hom.* p. 223 (cited by Stallb.): and see *App.* F.

12. **πῶς δ', ὦ Σ.** So most edd.; but Turr. and Poste follow Bodl. in omitting δέ.

15. **ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς**, after δόξαι, are suspected by Paley as an interpolation.

18. **λόγον...ἐπεγείρειν.** For the met. cp. *Theaet.* 184 A, *Cratyl.* 411 A, *Rep.* 450 A οὐκ ἴστε ὅσον ἐσμὸν λόγων ἐπεγείρετε.

21. **ὦ παῖ 'κείνου τἀνδρός.** This voc., says Stallb., is applied to Prot. "facete" as the disciple of Philebus (cp. *supra* 16 A where Phil. says ὦ παῖδες—and *Laws* 769 B παῖδες ζωγράφων, 'pupils'): "quod si ita est, facile apparet urbane carpi Prot. et Phil., qui antea sedulo cavendum statuerant, ne disputatio extra oleas vagaretur. Etenim tanguntur hoc loco illa p. 17 E sq.": so too Poste. More recently this view has been defended by Mr J. Adam (*Class. Rev.* X. 5, p. 237), who compares *Rep.* 368 A ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός (of Glaucon and Adeimantus), and says: "Prot. is κληρονόμος of Phil.'s λόγος (cp. *Rep.* i. 381 E) and is con-

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρειν τοίνυν δεῖ λέγειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν ἢ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον λεγομένων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

5 ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι· θαῦμα γὰρ ἐμέ γ' ἔχει διὰ τέλους E ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἃ νῦν δὴ προυθέμεθα ἀπορήματα.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ φῄς;

ΣΩ. Ψευδεῖς, αἱ δ' ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἡδοναί;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

10 ΣΩ. Οὔτε δὴ ὄναρ οὔθ' ὕπαρ, ὡς φῄς, [ἔστιν] οὔτ' ἐν μανίαις οὔτ' ἐν παραφροσύναις οὐδεὶς ἔσθ' ὅστις ποτὲ δοκεῖ μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δὲ οὐδαμῶς, οὐδ' αὖ δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι, λυπεῖται δ' οὔ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνθ' οὕτω ταῦτ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν πάντες

15 ὑπειλήφαμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ὀρθῶς; ἢ σκεπτέον εἴτ' ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ταῦτα λέγεται;

E. 5 γὰρ μέ γε Cl. 6 ἀεὶ ΔΣ : αἰεὶ *S. προυθέμεθα Cl. ΓΔΠ : προεθέμεθα *S. 8 δ' om. pr. Δ. ἔστιν Cl. 11 παραφροσύναις Δ et corr. Cl. (παρα...φροσύναις): πάσαις ἀφροσύναις *S. δοκεῖ] ἂν δοκῇ F. 14 ταῦτ' Γw.

sequently described as his son." But Badh. takes the words literally: "the word ἐκεῖνος is often substituted for the proper name in speaking of an absent or deceased person with respect...It is not known who was Protarchus' father, except that Socrates above calls him Callias, but he no doubt belonged to a principal family in Athens." So Paley renders "son of a distinguished sire." Cp. Soph. *Trach.* 1017 ὦ παῖ τοῦδ' ἀνδρός. But as neither of these explanations seems satisfactory, I add the suggestion that the ref. may be to *Gorgias* (ob. c. 375, probably years before the *Phil.*) who is mentioned as Prot.'s instructor in 58 B ff.: Gorgias' work on rhetoric may have treated of 'digressions,' as he certainly was noted for μήκη, and the *Gorgias* deals with Pleasure.

2. **τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν**, 'long discourses': for omission of λόγων cp. *Rep.* 437 A, where μηκύνειν is used without λόγον. Cp. *Polit.* 283 B ff. for τὸ προσῆκον (δέον, πρέπον, μέτριον) as the law limiting digressions (παραδείγματα, etc.) in discourse; esp. 286 D χρὴ τόν τε ψόγον ἑκάστοτε καὶ ἔπαινον ποιεῖσθαι βραχύτητος ἅμα καὶ μήκους ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ περὶ λέγωμεν... κρίνοντες...πρὸς τὸ πρέπον: also *Cratyl.* 414 E τὸ μέτριον δεῖ φυλάττειν καὶ τὸ εἰκός, sc. in etymologizing.

5. **διὰ τέλους ἀεί.** Cp. διὰ βίου ἀεί 39 E.

6. **περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἃ** is the reading of all MSS. and most edd., but Badh. substitutes ταῦτα "for the unmeaning τὰ αὐτά of the Editions." If we retain τὰ αὐτά I suppose it must be meant to emphasise the notion implied by δ. τ. ἀεί—continued attention fixed on this *one* constant subject.

7. **πῶς δὴ φῄς;** This is 'restored' by Badh.[2] 'from Protarchus to Socrates,' I incline to think rightly, cp. ὡς φῄς just below.

8. **ψευδεῖς, αἱ δ' ἀληθεῖς.** Elliptic for αἱ μὲν ψ. Cp. *Protag.* 330 A, 35 E *supra*, al.

9. **πῶς γὰρ ἄν;** i.e. οὐδαμῶς.

10. **οὔτε δὴ ὄναρ...ἔστιν.** Badh. and Wb. follow Stallb. in bracketing ἔστιν, of which St. writes: "adscriptum uidetur ab iis qui formulam οὔτε ὄναρ οὔθ' ὕπαρ per se seorsum accipiendam putarent, neque omnem uerborum constructionem satis perspectam haberent." Poste retains the word. For the adverbial formula cp. 65 E. Possibly we should read

XXII.

ΣΩ. Διο[illegible]
μενον ἡδονῆς
ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Νο[illegible]

ΣΩ. Καὶ [illegible]

ΠΡΩ. Νο[illegible]

ΣΩ. Καὶ [illegible]

ΠΡΩ. Πά[illegible]

ΣΩ. Καὶ [illegible]

ΠΡΩ. Κα[illegible]

ΣΩ. Οὐκο[illegible]
δοξάζῃ, τό γε [illegible]

ΠΡΩ. | Πά[illegible]

ΣΩ. Οὐκο[illegible]
ἥδηται, τό γε [illegible]

ΠΡΩ. Ναι[illegible]

ΣΩ. Ὅτῳ [illegible]
ἀληθὴς ἡμῖν φ[illegible]
δοξάζειν δ' ὅ[illegible]
< σκεπτέον >.

[illegible] οὐκ ὀρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν, ἂν [illegible] ἡδονήν;

[illegible]

[illegible] ἁμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον | ᾖ, τὴν E
[illegible] γε οὐκ ὀρθὴν ὁμολογητέον οὐδ'

[illegible]

[illegible] αἱ λύπην ἢ τινα ἡδονὴν περὶ τὸ ἐφ'
[illegible] ἁμαρτάνουσαν ἐφορῶμεν, ὀρθὴν
[illegible] καλῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῇ προσθήσομεν;
[illegible] τε. εἴπερ ἁμαρτήσεταί γε ἡδονή.
[illegible] ἔοικέ γε ἡδονὴ πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης
[illegible] ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι.
[illegible] καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὦ Σώκρα-
[illegible] καὶ τότε λέγομεν ψευδῆ, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν 38
[illegible] τότε προσείποι ψευδῆ.
[illegible] πρόθυμος ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὦ Πρώ-
[illegible] τα ἀν.

[illegible] Λ, ἁμαρτάνον μὲν mg. F. 10 τῶν οὐ καλῶν F.
[illegible] 9 ἢ, μὴ Cl. ΔΠ.
[illegible] γε om. Σ.
[illegible] omnes. τὴν...ψευδῆ om. Λ. ἡδομέ-

1 ὥς γ' ἐγὼ ΣBCHw
37 A. 3 ἔστιν C
om. ΛΞF. τι
om. pr. Δ (add. mg. C
Cl. ΔΠ.
9. ἐφορῶμεν, ὀρ
Badh. writes: "the I
which is out of the
are not supposed to
but to *detect* it"; an
emends to φωρῶμεν.
cp. *Polit.* 307 C.

10. ἢ τι τῶν κ. ὀν. 50 MSS. and Badh. with most edd.; but Stallb. reads ἢ τί τ. κ. ὀ., on the ground that ὀρθὴν ἢ χρηστήν equals τὸ ὄνομα ὀρθῆς ἢ χρηστῆς. Stallb. also says "dicere volebat Socrates: ὀρθὴν ἢ χρηστὴν ἢ πῶς αὐτὴν ὀνομάσομεν;" But the *nuance* of the query is surely much better conveyed by the indef., which implies a universal negative for answer—and I can see no "rariorem structurae enallagen," when ὄνομα προσθήσειν is merely a synonym for ὀνομάσειν (προσειπεῖν).

For καλὰ ὀνόματα, 'fine names,' i.e. names of fine things, cp. *Cratyl.* 411 A ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ ὀνόματα—οἷον φρόνησίς τε καὶ σύνεσις καὶ δικαιοσύνη, *Theag.* 122 D; conversely αἰσχρὰ ὀν. *Rep.* 344 B, φαῦλα ὀν. *Hipp. Maj.* 288 D, οἰκετικὰ ὀν. *Soph.* 226 B.

Poste cites *Eth. Nic.* II. 6 and VI. 9 to [illegible] that "ὀρθὴ and ἁμαρτάνουσα or ἁμαρ- [illegible] are contrasted in Greek as Right [illegible]" and that "ἁμαρτία and [illegible] generic meaning, and as [illegible] express truth or [illegible] actions or feelings [illegible] conformity to [illegible] Bai[illegible] refore be a [illegible] ἁμαρτία, as Socrates seems to propose."

15. ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε λέγομεν ψευδῆ. λέγομεν is Stallb.'s conj. (adopted by Badh. and Paley) for ἐλέγομεν of MSS. and previous edd.: the corruption arose from wrong division of τοτελεγομε ν. Wb. and Poste, however, retain ἔλεγ[illegible]

ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, 'similarly conditioned,' i.e. ἁμαρτάνουσαν or misapprehending its object.

[illegible] ἐφύρωμεν:

[illegible] and Wrong, [illegible] ὀρθότης have a ge[illegible] applied to the inten[illegible] Vat. V[illegible] eneric meaning, and as falsehood, as applied to [illegible]ad τῷ [illegible]lect express truth or express conformity or no[illegible] κεπτέ[illegible] actions or feelings the moral law....It would th[illegible] conformity to fallacy to infer falsehood from ἁ[illegible]

ΠΡΩ. Σκεπτέον.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' ὅτι δόξῃ μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθον ψεῦδός τε καὶ | ἀληθές, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά C
τις ἑκατέρα, σκεπτέον φῂς τοῦτ' εἶναι;

5 ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς δέ γε τούτοις, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡμῖν τὰ μέν ἐστι ποί' ἄττα, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἅπερ ἐστί, ποιώ τινε δὲ οὐ γίγνεσθον, καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν διομολογητέον.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν, ὅτι καὶ ποιώ τινε. πάλαι γὰρ εἴπομεν, ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ καὶ σφόδρα ἑκάτεραι γίγνονται, λῦπαί | τε καὶ ἡδοναί. D

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἂν δέ γε πονηρία τούτων, ὦ Πρώταρχε, προσ-
15 γίγνηταί τινι, πονηρὰν μὲν φήσομεν οὕτω γίγνεσθαι δόξαν, πονηρὰν δὲ καὶ ἡδονήν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἂν ὀρθότης ἢ τοὐναντίον ὀρθότητι τινὶ τού-

2 ἆρά τι Cl. ΔΠ. ψευδῆ F.
C. 3 ποῖα mg. H, ποια Cl.: ὁποία *S, Bekk. 4 ταῦτα w. 7 ποί' Σ, ποι Cl. ΓΛΞBCEF, ποιά ΔΠ. τε H, τε ΔΞBCEFw, δὲ cum *S corr. Γ. ἑστον corr. Σ. 8 ποιῶν ΔΛΠBCEHw et pr. ΓF, ποιων Cl.
D. 14 γε] γε καὶ H. 16 δὲ om. Π. 18 ἂν Cl. ΔΠ: ἐὰν *S.

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whole of this clause, while in ed. 1 he suggests that ὁμοίως εἴληφε has been corrupted from ὁμοίως ἀεὶ φιλεῖ. Herm. keeps εἴληφεν "eodem exemplo quo Sophist. c. 14 ex opt. cod. εἰλήφασι pro εἰλήχασι scribendum fuit": and Wb. also reads τῷ..εἴληφεν.—On the whole I incline to retain ὅτῳ and add σκεπτέον at the end of Socr.'s remark, with Baiter; since Badh.'s arrangement lays too heavy a task on Prot., who would scarcely even say σκεπτέον unless by way of echoing Socr., cp. 36 E *ad fin.* where Prot. repeats the σκεπτέον suggested by Socr.—The argument is briefly this:—if δόξα and ἡδονή are on a par as regards οὐσία (being always 'real'), they should also be on a par as regards ἀλήθεια: but δόξα is inconstant as regards ἀλήθ. (admitting both contraries): therefore ἡδονή should vary similarly in respect of ἀλήθεια. This involves a distinction between 'essence' and 'quality' (ποιόν), to which latter category ἀλήθ. belongs.

2. **ἆρ' ὅτι δόξῃ.** So most MSS. and edd., who give this clause to Socr.; but Badh.[2] reads ἆρα ὅπῃ δ., attributing the clause ἆρα...εἶναι to Prot., and the foll. ναί. πρός γε...διομολογ. all to Socr. But see preceding note. ἆρά τι δ. is the reading of Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π.

3. **ποιά τις ἑκατέρα.** Cf. *Soph.* 263 A ποιὸν δέ γέ τινά φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν λόγων...τὸν μὲν ψευδῆ, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ.

11. **καὶ σφόδρα ἑκ. γίγν.** Cornarius conj. καὶ σφοδρὰν καὶ ἡσυχαίτεραι ἑκ. γίγν., approved by Steph. and Orelli: but Stallb. defends the present use of σφόδρα by 24 C, 41 E, *Phaedo* 93 B, *Protag.* 355 E, *Hipp. Maj.* 299 D. Badh.[2] brackets λῦπαί τε καὶ ἡδοναί as a gloss. Paley takes σφόδρα with γίγν., 'do decidedly become,' with the alternative 'and each of these (great or small) in a high degree.' I once thought that σφόδρα might be a corruption of διάφοροι, cp. 12 D ff., the first two letters being lost after καί: but change is needless.

των προσγίγνηται; μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ὀρθότητα ἴσχῃ, ταὐτὸν δὲ ἡδονήν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Ἂν δέ γε ἁμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον | ᾖ, τὴν E
5 δόξαν τότε ἁμαρτάνουσάν γε οὐκ ὀρθὴν ὁμολογητέον οὐδ' ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσαν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἂν αὖ λύπην ἤ τινα ἡδονὴν περὶ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ λυπεῖται ἢ τοὐναντίον ἁμαρτάνουσαν ἐφορῶμεν, ὀρθὴν
10 ἢ χρηστὴν ἤ τι τῶν καλῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῇ προσθήσομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ ἁμαρτήσεταί γε ἡδονή.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡδονὴ πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀλλὰ μετὰ ψεύδους ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὦ Σώκρα-
15 τες, | ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε λέγομεν ψευδῆ, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν 38
αὐτὴν οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε προσείποι ψευδῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ προθύμως ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγῳ τὰ νῦν.

4 γε om. Λw. ἁμαρτάνωμεν Λ, ἁμαρτάνον μὲν mg. F.
E. 8 ὃ Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 9 ἢ] μὴ Cl. ΔΠ. 10 τῶν οὐ καλῶν F.
12 ἔοικεν Cl. 14 καὶ] ἀλλὰ Σ. γε om. Σ.
38 A. 15 λέγομεν] ἐλέγομεν libri omnes. τὴν...ψευδῆ om. Λ. ἡδομένην Cl. Δ et pr. Π. 17 τὸ Cl.

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2. **ταὐτὸν δὲ ἡδονήν**; For this adverbial use of ταὐτόν in elliptic phrase, 'equally,' cp. *Cratyl.* 404 E, *Soph.* 249 B, *Symp.* 169 E, *Rep.* 535 D, *Protag.* 318 A, 344 D.

9. **ἐφορῶμεν, ὀρθὴν ... προσθήσομεν.** Badh. writes: "the Books have ἐφορῶμεν, which is out of the question. Inquirers are not supposed to *gaze upon* an error, but to *detect* it"; and so in his text he emends to φωρῶμεν. Perhaps ἐφεύρωμεν: cp. *Polit.* 307 C.

10. **ἢ τι τῶν κ. ὀν.** So MSS. and Badh. with most edd.; but Stallb. reads ἢ τί τ. κ. ὀ., on the ground that ὀρθὴν ἢ χρηστήν equals τὸ ὄνομα ὀρθῆς ἢ χρηστῆς. Stallb. also says "dicere volebat Socrates: ὀρθὴν ἢ χρηστὴν ἢ πῶς αὐτὴν ὀνομάσομεν;" But the [illegible]ance of the query is surely much better [illegible]nveyed by the indef., which implies a [illegible]iversal negative for answer—and I can [illegible] no "rariorem structurae enallagen," [illegible]hen ὄνομα προσθήσειν is merely a syn[illegible]ym for ὀνομάσειν (προσειπεῖν).

For καλὰ ὀνόματα, 'fine names,' i.e. [illegible]mes of fine things, cp. *Cratyl.* 411 A ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ ὀνόματα—οἷον φρόνησίς τε καὶ σύνεσις καὶ δικαιοσύνη, *Theag.* 122 D; conversely αἰσχρὰ ὀν. *Rep.* 344 B, φαῦλα ὀν. *Hipp. Maj.* 288 D, οἰκετικὰ ὀν. *Soph.* 226 B.

Poste cites *Eth. Nic.* II. 6 and VI. 9 to show that "ὀρθὴ and ἁμαρτάνουσα or ἁμαρτανομένη are contrasted in Greek as Right and Wrong, [illegible] and that "ἁμαρτία and ὀρθότης have a generic meaning, and as applied to the intellect express truth or falsehood, as applied to [illegible]ctions or feelings express conformity or non-conformity to the moral law....It would therefore be a fallacy to infer falsehood from ἁμ[illegible]ία, as Socrates seems to propose."

15. **ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε λέγομ[illegible] ψευδῆ.** λέγομεν is Stallb.'s conj. (adopted by Badh. and Paley) for ἐλέγομεν of [illegible] and previous edd.: the corruption, [illegible] from wrong division of τοτελεγομε[illegible] is and Poste, however, retain ἔλεγ[illegible] ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, 'similarly cor[illegible] i.e. ἁμαρτάνουσαν or misapprel[illegible] object.

[illegible] *Meno* 77 D, [illegible] brackets the

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέν γε, ἀλλ' ἅπερ ἀκούω λέγω.

ΣΩ. Διαφέρει δ' ἡμῖν οὐδέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἡ μετὰ δόξης τε ὀρθῆς καὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἡδονὴ τῆς μετὰ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ ἀγνοίας πολλάκις ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν ἐγγιγνομένης; |

5 ΠΡΩ. Εἰκὸς γοῦν μὴ σμικρὸν διαφέρειν. B

XXIII. ΣΩ. Τῆς δὴ διαφορᾶς αὐτοῖν ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ἔλθωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄγε ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τῇδε δὴ ἄγω.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;

ΣΩ. Δόξα, φαμέν, ἡμῖν ἔστι μὲν ψευδής, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀληθής;

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἕπεται μὴν ταύταις, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡδονὴ

15 καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευδεῖ δόξῃ λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρεῖν γίγνεθ' | ἑκάστοτε; C

1 λόγω Cl. 3 τοῦ om. Λ. 4 ἀγνοίας] libri ἀνοίας. B. 8 ἄγ' Cl. 9 τῇδε ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCHw, τηι δὲ Cl.: πῇ δὲ *S. 11 δόξα μέν φαμεν F. ἡμῖν ἔστι om. H. μὲν om. ΠH. 14 ἡδονῆι καὶ λύπηι Cl.: δοξάζειν w (et ed. Bas. 2). 18 ἐγχειρεῖν Cl. ΓΔΠ, εγχωρεῖν Ξ: ἐγχωρεῖν *S. γίγνεθ' Δ, γίγνεσθαι Π, γίγνεσθ' Cl.: γίγνεται *S.

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1. **οὐδέν γε, ἀλλ'.** "The γε is added to οὐδείς and οὐδέν before πλήν and its equivalents. Cp. Eur. *Iph. T.* 548 (564) οὐδείς γε πλὴν θανοῦσαν οὐχ ὁρᾶν φάος. Arist. *Nub.* 734 οὐδέν γε πλὴν ἤ. *Protag.* 310 B οὐδέν γ' εἰ μή." (Badh.) ἅπερ ἀκούω λέγω, says Poste, is better rendered 'I assert that this is the ordinary use of language' than 'I speak as I am prompted by my companions'; but I suspect that the simple 'I only say what I hear' (Paley) is more correct than either. "ἀκούω, h.e. ἀκούσας ἐπίσταμαι," Stallb.

3. **καὶ ἀγνοίας π.** "Sic Cornarius coniecit. Libri ἀνοίας." Stallb.: so too Bekk., Turr., Badh., Wb. But Herm.'s view on this matter is worth citing: "(ἄνοιαν) vocem omnino dici non potest quanta invidia Platonis editores passim persecuti sint. Remansit tamen in loco plane genuino *Phaed.* c. 29: πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀπηλλαγμένη, neque intelligitur, quomodo ei, qui νοῦν et ἐπιστήμην arctissimis mutuae necessitudinis vinculis coniunxit, ἄνοιαν et ἄγνοιαν promiscue usurpare non licuerit; adde insignem locum, *Tim.* p. 86 B: νόσον μὲν δὴ ψυχῆς ἄνοιαν συγχωρητέον, δύο δ' ἀνοίας γένη, τὸ μὲν μανίαν, τὸ δὲ ἀμαθίαν: quae quum ita sint, ubicumque sine librorum fide ἄνοια in ἄγνοιαν ab editoribus mutata est, tacitus corrigam." I doubt, however, this theory of 'promiscuity,' and conceive Plato to have used ἄνοια in a wider sense than ἄγνοια, an inference to be drawn from *Tim. loc. cit.* For a discussion of the relations between δόξα, γνῶσις or ἐπιστήμη, and ἄγνοια or ἀγνωσία, see *Rep.* 476 D ff.

17. **οὐκοῦν...καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρεῖν γίγνεθ' ἑκάστοτε;** So Bekk., Stallb., Poste, Wb. Badh. emends to καὶ τὸ δὴ δοξάζειν ἐγχωρεῖν γίγνεσθον ἐκ. and translates: "From Memory, then, and from Sensation, our notions, and indeed the capacity for forming notions at all, are derived in every instance." διαδοξάζειν is explained as 'to distinguish notion from notion'—and, as Stallb. remarks, "hoc uno Platonis loco legitur": cp. διονομάζειν,

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἡμᾶς ὧδε περὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμεθα ἴσχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

5 ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἰδόντι τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνυ σαφῶς τὰ καθορώμενα ξυμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἂν ταῦθ' ἅπερ ὁρᾷ;

ΠΡΩ. Φαίην ἄν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς αὑτὸν οὗτος ἀνέροιτ' 10 ἂν ὧδε;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ' ἑστάναι φανταζόμενον | ὑπό τινι δένδρῳ; ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν ἄν τις πρὸς D ἑαυτὸν δοκεῖ σοι, τοιαῦτα ἄττα κατιδὼν φαντασθέντα αὐτῷ 15 ποτέ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος ὡς ἀποκρινόμενος ἂν πρὸς αὐτὸν εἴποι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπιτυχῶς εἰπών;

C. 2 ἡγούμεθ' Cl., σοφῶς H. 9 αὐτὸ σαυτὸν· Cl. οὕτως ἂν ἔροιτ' ἂν Cl. 12 ποτ' ἄρ' Γw, ποτε ἄρ' Cl.

D. 14 δοκεῖ σοι Γ, δοκήσοι Cl. ΔΠ : δοκῇ σοι *S. τοιαῦτ' Cl. Γ, τοιαῦθ' w. αὐτῶι Cl. 15 πη corr. Σ. 17 οὐ F. ταῦθ' Γ. 18 αὐτὸν Cl. τοῦτο om. Cl. Δ et pr. Π. ἐπιτυχ' ὡς Cl.

Polit. 263 D. As to the lection δοξάζειν, it is, says St., "nihili facienda"; while ἐγχωρεῖν is "nauci non faciendum."

O. Apelt (*Neue Jahrb.* '93, p. 284) emends to καὶ τὸ δι' ὃ δοξάζειν ἐγχωρεῖ, "und dasjenige, wodurch uns das urteilen möglich wird": he compares τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ λυπεῖται 37 E, and the MSS.' error δεῖν for δεῖ in 54 D. Paley keeps the common text, and transl. 'and the attempt to discern by judgment,' with the note "as in the case that follows, when a statue may be mistaken for a man": while Poste comments "διαδ. seems to be formed on the analogy of διαλέγεσθαι, or διανοεῖσθαι, and expresses either the dialogue with one's self that is presently described, or syllogism from probable premisses." I think the foll. passage, esp. 38 E, is sufficient to defend the compound—διαδοξάζειν being silent (or πρὸς αὐτὸν) διαλέγεσθαι, just as δόξα is unspoken λόγος (τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ...σιγῇ πρὸς αὑτόν, *Theaet.* 190 A), so that the common view is correct and emendation needless. But perhaps we should read ἐγχωρεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἐκ.

6. **τὰ καθορώμενα.** These words are secluded by Badh., with the comment "it is very unnecessary for a man κρίνειν τὰ καθορώμενα," besides which he objects to the double obj. after κρίνειν. But we must interpret the prep. as merely local, 'when a man sees from a distant height the prospect *below*': and in a similar sense we have κατιδών just below. For the argument regarding ψευδὴς δόξα, cp. *Theaet.* 187 B ff.; and for the illustration, cp. *ib.* 191 B ἆρα λέγεις...ὅτι ἐνίοτ' ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὁρῶν ἄλλον ὃν οὐ γιγνώσκω, ᾠήθην εἶναι Σωκράτη ὃν οἶδα;—also *Cratyl.* 429 C ff., *Rep.* 523 B.

12. **ἑστάναι φανταζόμενον.** Also bracketed by Badh. as turning the sentence into bombast, and as being "not even Greek."

18. **ἐπιτυχῶς εἰπών,** 'hitting on the truth in his assertion': the oppos. of this

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παρενεχθείς γ' αὖ τάχ' ἄν ὡς ἔστι τινῶν ποιμένων ἔργον τὸ καθορώμενον ἄγαλμα προσείποι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

5 ΣΩ. Κἂν μέν τίς γ' αὐτῷ παρῇ, τά | τε πρὸς αὐτὸν E
ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἂν πάλιν φθέγξαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

10 ΣΩ. Ἂν δ' ἄρα μόνος ᾖ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν διανοούμενος, ἐνίοτε καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ πορεύεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἆρα σοὶ φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τοῦτον γιγνόμενον ὅπερ ἐμοί;

15 ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ μοι τότε ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσεοικέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι | ξυμπίπτουσα εἰς ταὐ- 39
20 τόν, κἀκεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ παθήματα, φαίνονταί μοι

3 ποιουμένων F. 4 μάλιστά E S. 5 μὲν om. Cl. ΔΠ. γε F. E. 5 αὐτὸν Cl. 6 παρόντ' Γ. αὐτῷ Δ. 7 πάλιν] πάλαι ἃ Cl. ΔΠ. φθέγξαι Λ. οὕτος ΞF. 10 ἂν δ'] ἀλλ' Cl. Π et fortasse pr. Δ. τοῦτ' αὐτὸ Γ. αὐτὸ Cl. αὐτὸ Π : αὐτὸν cum *S corr. Δ. 11 αυτωι Cl. 13 τούτων libri, S, Bekk. γιγνόμενον add. Cl. ΔΠ. 16 μοι om. Cl. ΔΠ.
39 A. 20 ταῦτ' Cl.

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is the foll. παρενεχθείς, 'going wide of the mark,' for which cp. 60 D. Paley, however, gives as an alternative "speaking at hazard" (like 'drawing a bow at a venture'): but Isocr. 239 A and 280 D seem decisive for the other sense, in spite of ὁ ἐπιτυχών.

2. ὡς ἔστι τινῶν ποιμένων ἔργον τὸ κ. ἄγ. προσείποι. προσείποι is rendered by Stallb. "*praeterea* s. *insuper* dixerit" —a strange use of the prep., and, as Badh. remarks, what is said "is no addition but a substitution." Hence Badh. emends to ὥς τι τ. π. ἔργον ὂν τ. κ. ἄ. πρ.: which however corresponds less closely than the vulgate to the form of the preceding sentence. Paley renders 'he might call it a statue.' Perhaps ποιμένων <εἰπὼν> ἔργον. But on the whole it seems best to supply πρὸς αὐτόν with προσείποι and take ἔργον and ἄγαλμα as in apposition, τὸ καθ. being subj. to ἔστι.

13. τὸ περὶ τοῦτον γιγνόμενον. MSS. and most edd. read τούτων: Badh., objecting to both number and case, alters to π. τοῦτο: Stallb. writes "expectabas περὶ ταῦτα; sed genitivus ponitur propter φαίνεται: cp. *Phaedo* 58 A, *Apol.* 32 B." I accept O. Apelt's emendation, which improves grammar and sense alike: for this typical ἡμῶν τις as οὗτος cp. 38 C *supra*.

19. ἡ μνήμη...ἀπέβη. In this unsatisfactory passage Badh. makes several changes —bracketing καί before ἐκεῖνα, writing περὶ ταύτας for π. ταῦτα and φαίνεται for φαίνονται, bracketing λόγους and τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα. In the second sentence most earlier edd. put a comma after γράψῃ, but Stallb., Poste and Wb. punctuate instead after πάθημα. The main difficulty seems to lie in the words κἀκεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ παθήματα: Stallb. and Badh.[1] take ἐκεῖνα with τὰ παθ. and

σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους· καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῆ γράψῃ τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα, δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ λόγοι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ξυμβαίνουσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι· ψευδῆ δ' ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρ' ἡμῖν γραμματεὺς γράψῃ, τἀναντία τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀπέβη.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ | ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ῥηθέντα οὕτως. B

ΣΩ. Ἀποδέχου δὴ καὶ ἕτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Ζωγράφον, ὃς μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.

2 τὸ om. Λ. τε om. *tw*. 5 γράψῃ Cl. ΔΠ : γράφῃ *S.
B. 9 γιγνόμενα BC*tw*.

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understand περὶ ταῦτα to refer to τὴν μνήμην καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, 'and those affections which belong to these faculties' (with which Paley agrees). περὶ ταῦτα τὰ παθ. cannot be taken together, since that would involve, as Badh.[2] points out, 'an extraordinary use of παθήματα, transferred from the affection of an organ, or of a power, to the organ or power itself.' The meaning, then, so far is—"Memory and the Sense-affections inscribe λόγοι." In the next clause the phrase τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα seems odd, standing as sing. to equate with the preceding plur., and as a neuter abstract word to equate with the concrete agent ὁ γραμματεύς which follows—a curious change of horses when crossing the stream! Stallb. however attempts to explain the fact that 'memoriae et perceptionis in unum coniunctae uis et facultas appellatur πάθημα' by saying that τὰ περὶ ταῦτα παθήματα were the factors last mentioned and that Socr. here resumes them by the sing. 'tanquam in unum comprehendens'; and also that 'illa affectio etiam efficiendi quandam uim habet: est enim effectrix opinionum,' and that 'nomina in μα exeuntia subinde etiam actiue significare uidentur, cp. θρέμμα, *nutrimentum*, *Politic.* 289 B.' But this defence is very lame: for πάθημα is doubly passive, and though in general by change in point of view a word now regarded as passive may presently come to assume an active signif., yet here such a metamorphosis is out of the question. Poste equates both κἀκεῖνα ... παθήματα and τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα with τὸ δοξαστικόν, 'the judgment as concerned with sensuous perceptions.'

O. Apelt proposes γραφῇ for γράψῃ, holding it "für schlechthin unstatthaft τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα zu dem vordersatz mit ὅταν zu ziehen als dessen subject." Further, he would print thus, τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα· δόξα τε...γιγνόμενοι, "folgendes ist das erlebnis, folgendes trägt sich zu: es entstehen wahre meinung und wahre begriffe." (Cp. 52 E οὕτωσί διανοηθῶμεν· προελόμενοι κτλ. for the asyndetic constr., and for τοῦτο, in place of the more usual τοιοῦτο, *Gorg.* 491 D, *Rep.* 332 C). Perhaps ἀληθὲς (-ῶς) γραφῇ or ἀληθῆ γράψῃ <περὶ> τ. But it is difficult to reduce the sentence to satisfactory order without adopting a large number of conjectural changes; and so, perforce, I print the traditional text, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ῥηθέντα οὕτως.

11. ζωγράφον.. τούτων γράφει. Badh. proposes που ζωγραφεῖ for τούτων γρ., objecting to the position of τούτων, which must be taken as repeating τῶν λεγ.,—but needlessly. 'Ad λεγομένων intelligi licet ὑφ' ἡμῶν. Cf. 46 D, 51 E, *Theaet.* 188 D, *Phaedo* 67 C, 77 D,' Stallb. Grote objects that "it is odd that Plato here puts the painter *after* the scribe and not before him. The images or phantasms of sense must be painted on the mind before any words are written upon it (if we are to adopt both these metaphors)." But the εἰκών in Plato's meaning is rather a *re*-presentation than a sense-presentation (as the context shows), and, as Maguire remarks, *perception* (the work of the

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ τοῦτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγομεν;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἀπ' ὄψεως ἤ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀπαγαγών τις τὰς τῶν δοξασθέντων καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὑτῷ ὁρᾷ | πως. ἢ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι C
5 γιγνόμενον παρ' ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνες ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασιν.

10 ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι καὶ τόδε ἐπὶ τούτοις σκεψώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων ταῦτα ἡμῖν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων οὔ;

15 ΠΡΩ. Περὶ ἁπάντων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὡσαύτως.

ΣΩ. | Οὐκοῦν αἵ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἡδοναὶ καὶ D
λῦπαι ἐλέχθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς πρὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προγίγνοιντ' ἄν, ὥσθ' ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει τὸ προχαίρειν τε καὶ τὸ προλυπεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν
20 μέλλοντα χρόνον εἶναι γιγνόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα. —

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ ζωγραφήματα, ἃ

1 αὖ] οὖν H. λέγομεν Cl. ΔΠ: λέγωμεν *S. 3 ἀπαγαγόντες τὰς H. δοξαζόντων F. 4 αὐτῶι Cl. ὁρῶ F.
C. 5 ὑμῖν H. 7 ἀληθινῶν F. 13 μὲν...οὔ (14) om. Λ. τῶν post καὶ om. pr. Ξ. ταῦθ' Γ.
D. 16 αὐτῆς add. Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCHw. 17 ἔμπροσθεν Γ: πρόσθεν ἢ πρόσθεν Π et, qui ἢ, Cl. πρὸς πρὸ F, πρὸς E. 18 προγίγνοιτ' Cl. ΔΛΞFw, πρὸσ γίγνοιτ' Π, προσ γίγνοιτ' Γ. 19 συμβαίνει ES. τὸ post καὶ add. Cl. ΔΠ.

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empirical faculty, δοξαστική) rightly precedes *conception* (the work of εἰκαστική); so that the objection falls through.

For the analogy cp. Plac. IV. 11, 1: οἱ Στωικοί φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ χάρτην εὔεργον εἰς ἀπογραφήν· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται. Similar is Locke's theory of the child's mind as a *tabula rasa* in his *Essay*.

13. **εἰ περὶ...ἀναγκαῖον.** This indirect question depends on σκεψώμεθα above: cp. *Soph.* 233 A.

18. **ὥσθ' ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει.** Badh.[2] alters to ὡς θ' ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνοι, on the ground that "two things were said of the second εἶδος of Pleasures and Pains (the mental class), first, that they preceded the others, ὅτι προγίγνοιντο, and secondly, that our anticipation was thus connected with future time: ὡς ξυμβαίνοι...εἶναι γιγνόμενον." This is possibly right; but as only the second point concerns the present argument, I see no reason to change the common lection. The ref. is to προσδοκία in 32 C ff., and μνήμη in 33 C, 34 B ff., indicated by ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν.

20. **εἶναι γιγνόμενον** is not merely periphrastic, but means 'is a γιγνόμενον,' εἶναί τι τῶν γιγνομένων: cp. 42 A, 39 C *ad init.*

22. **πότερον οὖν τὰ γρ.** Badh. alters to οὔκουν τὰ γρ., as more suitable both to

σμικρῷ πρότερον ἐτίθεμεν ἐν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, περὶ μὲν τὸν γεγονότα καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἐστί, | περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα E
οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

5 ΣΩ. Ἆρα σφόδρα λέγεις, ὅτι πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἐλπίδες εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὖσαι, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἀεὶ γέμομεν ἐλπίδων;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

XXIV. ΣΩ. Ἄγε δή, πρὸς τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις καὶ
10 τόδε ἀπόκριναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Δίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἆρ' οὐ θεοφιλής ἐστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

15 ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἄδικός τε καὶ παντάπασι κακὸς ἆρ' οὐ τοὐναντίον | ἐκείνῳ; 40

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Πολλῶν μὴν ἐλπίδων, ὡς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος γέμει;

20 ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Λόγοι μήν εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν, ἃς ἐλπίδας ὀνομάζομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα <τὰ> ἐζωγραφημένα·

1 σμικρὸν Ξ. ἐν om. H. 2 πάντα pr. Π. ἐστιν Cl.: ἐστι... χρόνον om. Λ.
E. 5 ταῦτ' Γ. 15 τί δέ] τί δαὶ Cl.² Δ.
40 A. 19 γέμοι Cl. ΔΠ. 21 μὲν Σ. ἐν om. Σ. 23 ναί om. EF.

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the argument, and to Prot.'s reply Σφόδρα γε—but his argument is not convincing.

4. **σφόδρα γε. ἆρα σφόδρα λέγεις.** For a similar reply by Prot. commented on by Socr. cp. 24 B, *ad fin.*

15. **παντάπασι κακός.** Badh. suspects that παντάπασι here is interpolated 'by way of bringing π. κακός into correspondence with the πάντως of the preceding speech of Socr. which the interpolator supposed to belong to ἀγαθός, whereas it is in fact intended to colour the whole question.' But why should not παντάπασι qualify the two adjj. here, if it be true that πάντως qualifies the three above? Still I believe that Badh. is wrong in denying that πάντως goes closely with ἀγαθός: for it is intended to imply the missing virtues σοφία, σωφροσύνη, and ἀνδρεία. The mention of εὐσεβής is noteworthy, since 'piety' is not usually counted among the cardinal virtues outside of the earlier dialogues, e.g. *Protagoras*. Here it may be due to the form of the predicate —θεοφιλής.

16. **τοὐναντίον ἐκείνῳ**, i.e. θεομισής: cp. *Rep.* 612 E ὁ μὲν θεοφιλὴς ἂν εἴη, ὁ δὲ θεομισής, where also it is argued that the δίκαιος is θεοφιλής, and that τῷ θεοφιλεῖ, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ θεῶν γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἷόν τε ἄριστα.

24. **καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα <τὰ> ἐζωγραφημένα.** See above 39 C. In addition to 'propositions' (λόγοι), hopes involve the second process of imaginative picturing. If the MS. text is right, ἐζωγρ. must be

καί τις ὁρᾷ πολλάκις ἑαυτῷ χρυσὸν γιγνόμενον ἄφθονον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἡδονάς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνεζωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐφ' αὑτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα καθορᾷ.

ΠΡΩ. | Τί δ' οὔ; B

5 ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν πότερα φῶμεν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ γεγραμμένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὖ <τὸ> πολὺ τοὐναντίον, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα φατέον.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἡδοναί γε οὐδὲν ἧττον πάρεισιν ἐζωγραφημέναι, ψευδεῖς δὲ αὗταί που.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. | Ψευδέσιν ἄρα ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ χαί- C
ρουσιν, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν.

15 ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ δὴ κατὰ τοὺς νῦν λόγους ψευδεῖς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἡδοναί, μεμιμημέναι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα· καὶ λῦπαι δὲ ὡσαύτως.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσίν.

20 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἦν δοξάζειν μὲν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν

1 ἑαυτῆι Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 2 ἐνεζωγραφημένον Cl. ΔΠ : ἐζωγραφημένον *S.
3 χαίροντας Cl.
B. 5 πότερον Ξ. τὸ] οὐ Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 6 περιτίθεσθαι H.
9 μεγάλα φατέον Π. 11 ἐζωγραφημένα E.
C. 13 ἄρ' Γ. χαίρουσιν οἱ πονηροὶ Ξ. 16 εἰσιν Cl. 17 μεμνημέναι ΛF, μιμούμεναι mg. H. 20 ὄντως Cl. Π et pr. Δ : οὕτως *S.

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predicate, 'and the images as paintings' (sc. 'are in every person,' or 'we call hopes'). Paley proposed to transpose the art., so as to read καὶ φ. τὰ ἐζ. Otherwise, καὶ δὴ καλὰ φ. ἐζ., or καὶ δῆλα ἄττα φ. ἐζ., might be suggested; but the simplest corr. is to bracket τά or else repeat it before ἐζ., which last I adopt.

2. **ἐνεζωγραφημένον αὐτόν.** The force of the prepos. is well brought out in Badh.'s rendering (followed by Paley), 'he sees himself, *as part of the picture*, rejoicing in himself exceedingly.' Badh. also suggests altering the MSS.' αὐτόν to the reflexive αὑτόν, after Beck, but no other edd. adopt the needless change.

7. **τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὖ <τὸ> πολὺ τοὐναντίον.** τό before πολύ is Stallb.'s conj., accepted by most later edd. Paley, misled by Stallb., wrongly supposes that Bodl. gives ὡς οὐ πολὺ ἐναντίον (? τοὐναντίον), which he would retain, punctuating ὡς οὔ (sc. ἀληθῆ), πολὺ ἐν.,—but he cites no parallels.

17. **μεμιμημέναι...ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα.** Cp. *Symp.* 214 E ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερά με ἐπαινέσεις: *Polit.* 293 E ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίονα μεμιμῆσθαι, 297 C: *Laws* 814 D, E ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν...ἐπὶ τὸ φαῦλον μιμουμένην. So 'ficto *In peius* uoltu proponi cereus,' Hor. *Epp.* II. i. 265: cp. Tac. *Ann.* 14, 39, 43.

20. **δοξάζειν ὄντως...μὴ ἐπ' οὖσι δέ.** Here the ambiguity of ὄν, as denoting both *reality* and *existence*, is well brought out. Some MSS. give οὕτως, an evident and easy error.

δοξάζοντι, μὴ ἐπ' οὖσι δὲ μηδὲ ἐπὶ γεγονόσι μηδ' ἐπ' ἐσομένοις ἐνίοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ | ταῦτά γε ἦν, οἶμαι, τὰ ἀπεργαζόμενα δόξαν D
5 ψευδῆ τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν. ἦ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἕξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

10 ΣΩ. Ὡς ἦν μὲν χαίρειν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν ὁπωσοῦν καὶ εἰκῇ χαίροντι, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσι μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐνίοτε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἴσως πλειστάκις ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδὲ μέλλουσί ποτε γενήσεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. | Καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν. E

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἂν εἴη περὶ φόβων τε καὶ θυμῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἔστι καὶ ψευδῆ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνίοτε;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πονηρὰς δόξας [καὶ χρηστὰς] ἄλλως ἢ
20 ψευδεῖς γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν;

1 ἐπ' οὖσι ΓΔΛΞΣBCFHτυ Flor. a b c i : ἐποῦσι *S. μηδ' Cl. ἐπὶ γεγονόσι ΓΔΞCF : ἐπιγεγονόσι *S. μηδὲ Cl. ἐπ' ἐσομένοις ΓΔΞΠΣCEFH : ἐπεσομένοις *S.
D. 4 ἐπεργαζόμενα E. 5 ψευδῶς] ψεῦδος Δ. 9 πῶς om. EF.
10 μὲν] μὲν ἐκείνοις Σ. 12 ἴσως καὶ Γ.
E. 14 ἀναγκαῖον ὦ σώκρατες Cl. ΓΔΠ : ὦ σώκρατες ἀναγκαῖον *S. 19 τί δέ] τί δαὶ Δ, Cl.². ἄλλως ἢ ὅτι ἀληθεῖς ἢ mg. F.

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8. **τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἕξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις.** The 'analogous state' is that a thing may be real and yet rest on unreal grounds. ἐκείνοις is taken usually to refer to δόξα and τὸ δοξάζειν: τούτων to λῦπαι and ἡδοναί. But, as Badh. objects, it is improper to speak of τὴν τούτων ἕξιν *before* the ἕξις has been assigned to pleasure and pain; besides which we should expect τῇ ἐν ἐκείνοις after ἀντίστροφον. Hence B. proposes to "reverse the direction of the pronouns, and by τούτων understand the notions and beliefs, and by ἐκείνοις pleasures and pains. To do this we must remove ταῖς λύπ. τε καὶ ἡδ., and frame the sentence thus: οὐκ ἀνταπ. τὴν τούτων ἕξιν ἀντίστρ. ἐκείνοις." But this remedy is too heroic. From *Tim.* 87 C (τὸ δὲ τούτων ἀντίστροφον αὖ...πάλιν εἰκὸς καὶ πρέπον ἀνταποδοῦναι) we might be tempted to infer that τούτων refers generally to what precedes, and ἐκείνοις to λύπ. τ. κ. ἡδ.: but the latter seems impossible. Another explanation of ἐν ἐκείνοις is given by Poste, who renders "in respect of those predicates, i.e. reality and groundlessness"; which may be what Stallb. means by his "sc. ἐν τῷ δοξάζειν μὲν ὄντως, μὴ ἐπ' οὖσι δέ." If τούτων has the same ref. as the preceding ταῦτα, i.e. to real yet groundless opinion, perhaps we should delete the ἐν before ἐκείνοις, or else, if ἐκείνοις is to be taken as by Stallb. etc., change ἐν to ἐπί as in μὴ ἐπ' οὖσι κτλ. above. But on the whole I prefer to avoid change, and interpret τούτων (as ταῦτα above) of 'reality and groundlessness' and ἐκείνοις as meaning δόξα and δοξάζειν.

ἀντίστρ. may either take *gen.* as subst. (*Rep.* 530 D etc.), or *dat.* as adj. (*Rep.* 605 A etc.).

19. **πονηρὰς δόξας καὶ χρηστὰς ἄλλως**

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἡδονάς γ', οἶμαι, κατανοοῦμεν ὡς ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον εἰσὶ πονηραὶ πλὴν | τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι. 41

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοὐναντίον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴρηκας. σχεδὸν γὰρ τῷ ψευδεῖ μὲν οὐ πάνυ πονηρὰς ἄν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θείη, μεγάλῃ δὲ ἄλλῃ καὶ πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας πονηρίᾳ.

ΣΩ. Τὰς μὲν τοίνυν πονηρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ διὰ πονηρίαν οὔσας τοιαύτας ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ἔτι δοκῇ νῷν· τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνούσας τε καὶ ἐγγιγνομένας | λεκτέον. τούτῳ γὰρ ἴσως B χρησόμεθα πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; εἴπερ εἰσίν.

2 γ' Cl. ΔΠ et corr. Γ, om. *w* : δ' *S. οἶμαι] εἶναι Π. 3 εἰσιν Cl.
41 A. 3 ψευδεῖς εἶναι Cl. ΔΠ : ψευδεῖς γ' εἶναι *S. 4 εἴρηκας ὦ σώκρατες Λ.
5 : σχεδὸν Cl. ψεύδει libri. λυπηρὰς E. τε om. Cl. ΔΠ. 6 δὲ] δὲ καὶ Cl.
7 πονηρία Cl., add. ι Cl.². 9 ὀλίγουν Λ. ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν] ὑστεροῦμεν Cl. Π et pr. Δ. ἔτι om. ΔΠ.
B. 12 χρησώμεθα ΞF et pr. Δ. 13 γε (post εἴπερ) om. Cl. ΔΠ.

ἢ ψευδεῖς γιγν. ἔχ. εἰπεῖν; The text here is open to suspicion. Badh. would expunge both καὶ χρηστάς and ἢ ψευδεῖς. Stallb., too, once rejected καὶ χρ. (as do Paley and Wb.), but in his later edition defends the text, on the ground that the good opinions are only incidentally mentioned, "quocirca in altero membro orationis quod addi poterat καὶ ἀληθεῖς, id silentio transmittit, et tantummodo ad πονηρὰς δόξας refert istud ἢ ψευδεῖς." But it seems doubtful if this is a sufficient defence of the clause. One MS., Par. F, gives ἢ ὅτι ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς, whence Schleierm. emended ἄλλως ἢ ἀληθεῖς καὶ ψ. γ., and this or ἢ ψ. κ. ἀληθεῖς seems a fairly probable restoration on the assumption of 'parablepsis.' O. Apelt suggests π. δόξας κἀχρήστους.

4. **πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοὐναντίον.** μὲν οὖν corrective may be used in either assent or denial, here the latter, so that πάνυ belongs to τοὐναντίον: to this Badh. objects that it is "as absurd in Greek as to say that one thing is *very opposite* would be in English," and so he alters πάνυ to πᾶν, followed by Wb. But πάνυ τοὐναντίον is as good in Greek as 'quite the contrary' is in English.

After τοίν. Paley reads ἢ εἴρηκας, and this (or οἷς εἴρ.) appears a probable insertion since the ellipse 'contrary to the truth' or 'to the correct assertion' is harsh, in the absence of any parallel passage where τοίν. alone means 'wrongly.'

5. **τῷ ψευδεῖ**, for τῷ ψεύδει, is due to Badh.: the talk is of the abstract quality, not of a particular lie.

λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονάς. V B S T, Poste, Wb. retain the τε, which Herm. with Bodl. omits.

6. **μεγάλῃ δὲ ἄλλῃ καὶ πολλῇ.** So most MSS. and edd.: ἄλλῃ δὲ καὶ πολλῇ Herm., who remarks, "non semper *magna* prauitate opus est, ut uoluptas praua exsistat."

8. **τὰς ἡδονὰς...ἐροῦμεν.** For the acc., in place of περί c. gen., of the *theme*, rather than matter, of discourse, cp. *Apol.* 23 A with Stallb.'s n. *ad loc.*

9. **ἂν ἔτι δοκῇ.** Herm. omits the ἔτι inserted in VBST, relying on Bekk.'s false report of its absence from Bodl., repeated in Stallb.

13. **εἴπερ εἰσίν**, Bodl., Herm.: εἴπερ γέ εἰσιν VBST, Wb.: "at simili in sententia abest γε *Euthyphr.* c. 9, *Protag.* c. 10, *Euthyd.* c. 15, *Hipp. Min.* c. 18 etc." Herm.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰσὶ κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα ἕως ἂν κέηται παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον ἀνέλεγκτον δή που γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς.

5 XXV. ΣΩ. Περιϊστώμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθληταὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὖ τὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἴωμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴπομεν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα, ὀλίγον ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, | ὡς ὅταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν ἡμῖν ὦσι, C
10 δίχα ἄρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι διείληπται.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνήμεθα, καὶ προερρήθη ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίων ἕξεων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα ἤ τινα διὰ
15 πάθος ἡδονὴν τὸ σῶμα ἦν τὸ παρεχόμενον;

1 εἰσὶ] εἰσιν Cl., εἰ Σ, εἰς w. ἐμὴν δόξαν mg. H. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα] δεῖ ψῆφον τίθεσθαι τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα corr. Σ. 2 ἂν om. Λ. ἀνέλεγκτον ἀδύνατον δή που τὰς κρίσεις ἡμῖν εὖ γίγνεσθαι corr. Σ. 5 περιϊστώμεθα Cl. Δ, περιστάμεθα Π: προσιστώμεθα *S, Bekk. 8 εἴπωμεν E. 9 πρόσθεν Cl. ΔΠ : ἔμπροσθεν *S.
C. 9 ὡς ὅταν αἱ Cl. ΔΞΠΣ, ἕως ὅταν αἱ ΓΛBCHw : ἕως αἱ *S. 10 ἡ ψυχὴ corr. Σ. 13 τὴν (post ψυχὴ) Cl. Π : τῶν cum *S corr. Δ. 14 ἐναντίον Ξ. τὸ δὲ Cl., τοὺς Cl.² et pr. ΔΠ. τινα om. F. 15 πάθους Σ, πλῆθος Cl.² ΔΠ. παρεχόμενον Cl. ΔΠ : παραδεχόμενον *S.

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1. **κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν,** sc. γνώμην. Cp. *Rep.* 397 D, *Polit.* 277 A, 291 C, *Laws* 653 C, 862 A.

τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα...γίγνεσθαι. Stallb. and Paley explain the dogma to be 'that pleasures cannot be false'; Badh. on the contrary makes it refer to the preceding εἰσί γε κ. τὴν ἐμήν, as 'the belief that pleasures may be false or true,' and so he translates: "But until this judgment of mine is approved and established in us both, it is impossible for it to escape (or become exempt from) examination." But if an antithesis were intended between '*my* opinion' and '*our* decision' it must have been more clearly expressed, as by παρ' ἀμφοῖν—an objection rightly urged by Paley against Badh.: hence κέηται means merely 'is propounded' as a thesis for discussion.

5. **περιϊστώμεθα,** which Bodl. gives, is rightly retained here by Herm., though Bekk., Stallb., Turr., Poste, Badh., and Wb. agree in following Stephens' προσιστώμεθα. W. H. Thompson's defence of the former word (which Dr Jackson has shown me) by a comparison with Aesch. *c. Ctes.* p. 82 (ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὁρᾶτε τοῖς πύκτας περὶ τῆς στάσεως ἀλλήλοις διαγωνιζομένοις, οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς...μάχεσθε, καὶ μὴ ἐᾶτε αὐτὸν εἰς τοὺς ἔξω τοῦ παρανόμου λόγους περιΐστασθαι) is sufficient. For ἀθληταί, cp. *Theaet.* 169 AB.

8. **ὀλίγον ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν,** i.e. 34 B ff.

10. **καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς.** Paley proposes ἡ ψυχή, as 'it was not the *body* that had the double πάθος.' But this is needless: cp. 35 C σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν οὔ ...γίγνεσθαι...ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν ἀεὶ παντὸς ζῴου μηνύει τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν, and 35 A ὁ κενούμενος ἡμῶν... ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει.

13. **τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίων ἕξεων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα** κτλ. For this brachylogy, in place of τῶν ἐν. ἕξ. τῶν τοῦ σώμ., cp. 34 C (χωρὶς σώματος). For τὸ δέ Bodl., Vat., Ven. II give τούς, whence Badh. conj. ἢ τότε, τὴν δ' ἀλγ.

Badh. further finds fault with ἤ τινα διὰ πάθος ἡδονήν κτλ. and suggests τὴν δ' ἀλγ. τὴν διά τι πάθος ἥδη ἐνόν κτλ.: the text is somewhat peculiar, and the superscript πλῆθος in Bodl. suggests διὰ

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Συλλογίζου δὴ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τούτοις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

ΣΩ. Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ὁπόταν ᾖ | ταῦτα, ἅμα παρακεῖσθαι D
5 λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις ἅμα παρ' ἀλλήλας ἐναντίων οὐσῶν γίγνεσθαι, ὃ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἴρηται καὶ συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἔμπροσθεν κεῖται;

10 ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἄμφω τούτω δέχεσθον, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων εἴτην.

ΠΡΩ. Εἴρηται. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν μηχανὴ ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς κρίνεσθαι;

15 ΠΡΩ. | Πῇ δὴ καὶ πῶς; E

ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ βούλημα ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ διαγνῶναι βούλεται ἑκάστοτε, τίς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλας μείζων καὶ τίς ἐλάττων καὶ τίς μᾶλλον καὶ τίς

D. 4 ταῦθ' Γ. 5 παράλληλα pr. Δ. 6 ἐναντίον Δ. 8 οὐκοῦν om. Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 9 ἔμπροσθε ΓΔ : ἔμπροσθεν *S. 11 τε καὶ] καὶ τὸ ΞF. τοῦτον C. 12 ἥτην S. 13 εἴρηται: (quod non alteri dat) Cl. E. 15 : καὶ πῶς : Cl. 18 τίς μᾶλλον] τί μᾶλλον w.

πλήρωσιν. Paley explains the πάθος here as 'the act of drinking when thirsty etc.' But probably διὰ πάθος qualifies ἀλγηδόνα as well as ἡδονήν: cp. 35 E διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῇ, μέμνηται δὲ τῶν ἡδέων. Paley also suggests the omission of the τό before παρεχόμενον.

4. **γίγνεται τοίνυν.** Badh. would alter to φαίνεται to 'get rid of the clumsy γίγνεται γίγνεσθαι, and to have a better correspondence to ἐφάνη and to Protarchus' φαίνεται γοῦν.'

11. **ὡς...καὶ ὅτι...εἴτην.** Badh.[2] expunges the καί, saying that 'ὡς introduces the fact, ὅτι the reason for it,' though in his first ed. he had cited *Phaedo* 95 for the indic. after ὡς coupled with the opt. after ὅτι. And in fact it is rather the ὡς-clause that states the reason and the ὅτι-clause that gives the resultant fact.

For the classification of Pleasure and Pain under τὸ ἄπειρον, see 27 E ff.

14. **τίς οὖν μηχανὴ ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς κρίνεσθαι; πῇ δὴ καὶ πῶς;** Stallb. and Turr. accentuate τίς οὖν μ., a most unnatural position for the enclitic, as Badh. remarks. For πῇ Heindorf and Schleiermacher conj. ποῖα, followed by Bekker and Wb. But Badh. objects that εἰ τόδε κτλ. is no answer to either πῇ or ποῖα, and hence he suggests "that something has fallen out, perhaps to the following effect: τί οὖν; μηχανὴ ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς κρίνεσθαι; (τῇδε δὲ σκεψάμενος πείρω ἀποκρίνεσθαι)." This is ingenious, but hardly right. I once thought we should read τῇδ' (or ἔστι τις) for τίς. But there is no need for change, since, as Apelt (*N. Jahrb.* 1893, p. 285) points out, P.'s question refers to κρίνεσθαι.

16. **εἰ τὸ βούλημα ἡμῖν** κτλ. Badh.[2] thus re-writes this passage: εἰ τόδε τὸ βούλημ' ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων· ἐν τοι. τ. δ. [βούλεται] ἑκ.,...καὶ τίς μᾶλλον [καὶ τίς σφοδροτέρα], κτλ. He argues that "τὸ βούλημα is not the will but a particular wish, and τὸ β. τῆς κρίσεως is the wish to judge. But how can the wish to judge judge? and if it cannot judge, how can it wish to judge? My correction is fully borne out by Prot.'s answer—ἡ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὕτη. By leaving out καὶ τίς σφοδροτέρα the difficulty which besets τίς μᾶλλον disappears." As to the last point,

σφοδροτέρα, λύπη τε πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπη πρὸς λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴ πρὸς ἡδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' ἔστι ταῦτά τε τοιαῦτα καὶ ἡ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὕτη.

5 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐν μὲν ὄψει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν ὁρᾶν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν | ἀφανίζει καὶ ψευδῆ ποιεῖ δοξάζειν, 42
ἐν λύπαις δ' ἄρα καὶ ἡδοναῖς οὐκ ἔστι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

10 ΣΩ. Ἐναντίον δὴ τὸ νῦν τῷ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τότε μὲν αἱ δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς αὐταὶ γιγνόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἅμα τοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς παθήματος ἀνεπίμπλασαν.

15 ΠΡΩ. | Ἀληθέστατα. B

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε αὐταὶ διὰ τὸ πόρρωθέν τε καὶ ἐγγύθεν ἑκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἅμα τιθέμεναι παρ' ἀλλήλας, αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ παρὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν μείζους φαίνονται καὶ σφοδρότεραι, λῦπαι δ' αὖ διὰ τὸ παρ' ἡδονὰς
20 τοὐναντίον ἐκείναις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταῦτα.

1 σφοδρότερα Γ. 5 ἐν μὲν corr. ΔΠ, ἐσμὲν Cl.
42 A. 6 ποιεῖν Cl. 7 ταὐτὸ Σ. τοῦτο τὸ γιγνόμενον Γ.
10 : ἐναντίον ΔΛΞΠΣBCFH : eidem dant *S, Ald. τῷ] τὸ Λ. ἔμπροσθε ΓΔΠ : ἔμπροσθεν *S. 12 αὔτε (ut videtur) Γ : αὗται *S. 13 καὶ ἡδονὰς ἅμα Cl. ΔΠ : ἅμα καὶ ἡδονὰς *S. αὐταῖς Cl., αὐτοὺς Γ.
B. 16 αὗται Cl. S.

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the insertion of the adv. along with a row of adjj., which offended Schleierm., is sufficiently defended by Stallb. who cites parallels from 61 D, *Phaed.* 93 B, *Protag.* 356 A, 355 E, 357 A, *Polit.* 276 B etc. And the former criticism is not convincing, since surely a wish can *wish*, i.e. relate to an object or possess content. The conditional εἰ depends from μηχανή ἐστι above: so that even the suggestion of Badh.[1], ἤ for εἰ, is needless, as also is Apelt's proposal ἔστι τὸ βούλημα ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις τισί· διαγνῶναι βούλεται (sc. ἡ κρίσις) ἑκάστοτε, τίς κτλ., "die absicht eines urteils über diese dinge besteht im folgenden: das urteil will erkennen, welches, usw." (For this use of τοιοῦτός τις, cp. *Gorg.* 497 B.) But the want of symmetry remains; it could be remedied either by changing σφοδρ. to σμικρ. or μείζων to μείων, cp. 25 C: Madvig (*adv. crit.* p. 393) suggests καὶ τίς μαλακωτέρα or ὁμαλωτέρα: Liebhold would insert ἁπλῆ after μᾶλλον (cp. 61 D, n.).

Prot.'s reply suggests τοῦτο ὥστ' ἐν τ. τοιούτοις practically means ἀπείροις.

5. **ἐν μὲν ὄψει τὸ πόρρωθεν** κτλ. For the ref. to vision and its errors cp. *Rep.* 602 C ταὐτόν που ἡμῖν μέγεθος ἐγγύθεν τε καὶ πόρρωθεν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως οὐκ ἴσον φαίνεται κτλ.: *Prot.* 356 C φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῇ ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζω, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω κτλ., where the relativity of Sense is made to illustrate the relativity of Pleasure, as here. Paley proposes to omit the words καὶ ἐγγύθεν.

12. **αὗται γιγνόμεναι.** Stallb. with Bodl. gives αὔται, referring to *Charm.* 163 C: but Poste and Wb. keep αὗται.

14. **ἀνεπίμπλασαν.** Badh. rightly

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ μείζους τῶν οὐσῶν ἑκάτεραι καὶ ἐλάττους φαίνονται, τοῦτο ἀποτεμόμενος ἑκατέρων τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄν, οὔτε αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς φαινόμενον | ἐρεῖς, οὐδ' αὖ C
ποτὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον
5 ὀρθόν τε καὶ ἀληθὲς τολμήσεις λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτων τοίνυν ἑξῆς ὀψόμεθα, ἐὰν τῇδε ἀπαντῶμεν, ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτας φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις.

10 ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δὴ καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

XXVI. ΣΩ. Εἴρηταί που πολλάκις, ὅτι τῆς φύσεως ἑκάστων διαφθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσεσι καὶ διακρίσεσι καὶ πληρώσεσι καὶ κενώσεσι | καί τισιν αὔξαις καὶ φθίσεσι D
λῦπαί τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνες καὶ ὀδύναι καὶ πάνθ', ὁπόσα τοιαῦτ'
15 ὀνόματ' ἔχει, ξυμβαίνει γιγνόμενα.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, ταῦτα εἴρηται πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Εἰς δέ γε τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῆται, ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

20 ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον ἡμῶν ᾖ;

ΠΡΩ. Πότε δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;

1 ὅτῳ *w*. 2 ἑκάτερον libri.
C. 4 ποτὲ om. F et pr. Ξ. τούτῳ Cl. ΓΛΞΠΣBCFH*w* et corr. Δ : τοῦτο *S. 5 ὀρθότερον Σ*w*. τολμήσειε Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 7 ἐξ ἧς Cl. ὀψόμεθα Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCH*w* : ὀψώμεθα *S. 12 καὶ διακρίσεσι om. Cl. ΔΠ.
D. 13 αὔξεσι EFS. 15 ὀνόματα Cl. 16 ταῦτ' Γ. 17 αὐτῶν Cl. 18 ἡδονῶν H. 22 γένοιτ' Γ.

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draws attention to the tense: 'were found to communicate.'

1. **οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ** κτλ. "That much then, by which either appears greater than it really is, that apparent and unreal quantity, you will cut off, and you will neither say that the appearance itself is a right appearance, nor will you venture to call that part of the pleasure or the pain which is founded upon it, right and true." (Badh.)

μείζους τῶν οὐσῶν, i.e. ἢ ὄντως εἰσίν.

2. **ἑκατέρων**, for the ἑκάτερον of MSS., is due to Schleierm. For οὔτε...οὐδ' αὖ, cp. 22 E.

7. **τούτων τοίνυν ἑξῆς.** ἑξῆς and ἐφεξῆς may take either dat. (as in 34 D *supra*, *Gorg.* 494 E, *Tim.* 30 C, etc.) or gen. as here and *Rep.* 390 A.

The usual comma after **ἀπαντῶμεν** is removed by Stallb., on the ground that ἀπ., as containing the notion of 'discovery,' governs the foll. accus., and he refers to Lobeck's note on Soph. *Aj.* 832: so too Wb. But it seems better to retain it.

9. **ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις**, "in the case of animals, i.e., in which the *mental* effects have less influence, or none at all" (Paley). But a man also is ζῷον.

11. **εἴρηταί που πολλάκις.** See 31 C ff.; also *Tim.* 64 A ff., *Rep.* 583 C ff.

12. **καὶ διακρίσεσι** are missing in Bodl. —an evident case of parablepsy.

18. **κατάστασιν.** A term used, as Poste notes, in the def. of Pleasure in Ar. *Rhet.* 1. 11 ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἁθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν | πρὸς λόγον ἐστίν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὃ σὺ νῦν E
ἤρου τὸ ἐρώτημα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Διότι τὴν ἐμὴν ἐρώτησιν οὐ κωλύει ἐμὲ διερέσθαι
5 σε πάλιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δ' οὖν μὴ γίγνοιτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φήσω, τὸ τοιοῦτον, τί ποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἑκάτερα φῄς;

10 ΣΩ. Οὕτως.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὔτε ἡδονὴ γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ποτὲ οὔτ' ἄν τις λύπη.

ΣΩ. | Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. ἀλλὰ γάρ, οἶμαι, τόδε λέγεις, ὡς 43
ἀεί τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνειν, ὡς οἱ σοφοί φασιν·
15 ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγουσι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκοῦσί γε οὐ φαύλως λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ φαῦλοί γε ὄντες; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπεκστῆναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον βούλομαι. τῇδ'
20 οὖν διανοοῦμαι φεύγειν, καὶ σύ μοι ξύμφευγε.

E. 1 ἐστὶν add. Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣΒCHw. 4 κωλύει ἐμὲ Cl. ΔΠ : κωλύσεις με *S. 5 σε om Λ. 7 γίγνοιτ' Γ. 8 τοιοῦτο Λ. συμβαίνει corr. Γ. 9 μὴ...] haec eidem dant Cl. ΔΛΠCH. : φῇς οὕτω : Λ. 10 οὕτω non alteri dant ΓΔΠCH, οὕτως; (non alteri dans) Cl. 11 δὴ] δὲ Π.
43 A. 14 τοῦτο γρ. Δ. ξυμβαίνει S. 15 καὶ om. Π. 18 γὰρ om. Λ. 20 τί Δ.

ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, κτλ.: cp. 31 D, n., and 46 C.

1. **οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον**. Cp. 18 D τί πρὸς ἔπος αὖ ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

3. **τί δή**; stands for διὰ τί δή; as shown by the reply διότι κτλ.

4. **οὐ κωλύει ἐμὲ διερ.** So Bodl., Vat., Ven. II and later edd. The older edd. give οὐ κωλύσεις με διερ.

7. **τὸ τοιοῦτον...ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ** (12) allude to the condition above stated by S. as ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον ἡμῶν ᾖ, and here by Prot. as μὴ κινουμένου τ. σ. ἐφ' ἑκάτερα, i. e., the neutral, impassive, stable condition—the 'dead point' in the resolution of physical processes. As Paley remarks, the μὴ here is virtually repeated from ὅταν μηδέν κτλ. above and does not affect the sense.

15. **ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα...ῥεῖ.** The σοφοί who preached this doctrine were, of course, the disciples of Heraclitus. They are alluded to more at length in *Theaet.* 179 E ff. (cp. 152 E, 160 D), *Soph.* 249 B ff., *Cratyl.* 402 A ff., *Phaedo* 89 ff. The point of the present allusion is to guard against the overthrow of the theory of the state of indifference to pleasure and pain by an attack from the Heraclitean stand-point: for that theory is apparently inconsistent with the doctrine of perpetual flux. The difficulty thus raised is evaded, if not actually solved, by distinguishing sub-conscious from conscious processes.

Paley's suggestion, ῥεῖν for ῥεῖ, is worth consideration. Citations from Diog. Laert. IX. 7 and Clem. Al. *Strom.* 6, p. 624 C (746), regarding Heraclitus' doctrine, will be found in Poste's note *ad h. l.*, which may be amplified from Ritt. and Pr. §§ 26 ff.

19. **ὑπεκστῆναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον.** The Heraclitean λόγος is likened to a charging foe—warrior or warship. For the acc. after ὑπεκστ. cp. Soph. *Aj.* 82

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ὅπῃ.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτως ἔστω, φῶμεν πρὸς τούτους. σὺ δ' | ἀπόκριναι· πότερον ἀεὶ πάντα, ὁπόσα πάσχει τι τῶν B ἐμψύχων, ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον, καὶ οὔτ' αὐξανόμενοι λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν πάσχοντες, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἅπαν δή που τοὐναντίον. ὀλίγου γὰρ τά γε τοιαῦτα λέληθε πάνθ' ἡμᾶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν καλῶς ἡμῖν εἴρηται τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν, ὡς αἱ μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω γιγνόμεναι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀπεργάζονται.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ὧδ' ἔσται κάλλιον | καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγό- C μενον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δ' αὖ μέτριαί τε καὶ σμικραὶ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέτερα τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότερον οὕτως ἢ 'κείνως, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτω, πάλιν ὁ νῦν δὴ ῥηθεὶς βίος ἂν ἥκοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖος;

ΣΩ. Ὃν ἄλυπόν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμονῶν ἔφαμεν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

1 λέγ' Γ. ὅποι Λ. 2 τούτοις ΔΠ.
B. 3 ἀπόκρινε ΞF. πάνθ' Γ. ὁπόσα Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠBCFHw Flor. a b c i : ὅσα *S. 5 αὖ τοὺς Cl. 7 ἅπαν δή που τοὐναντίον om. Cl. Δ et pr. Π. που ΓΛΞΣBCFHw Flor. a b c i : μου *S. ὀλίγου...] haec eidem dat Cl. 9 καλῶς τοίνυν Γ. εἴρηται ἡμῖν w. 12 τί μήν; ὧδ'] ὧδε δ' ἡμῖν corr. Γ.
C. 13 γιγνόμενον F. 16 ὡς add. Cl. ΔΠ. 19 ἐκείνως ΔΞ : κείνως *S. 21 ἀνήκοι Cl.

φρονοῦντα γάρ νιν οὐκ ἂν ἐξέστην ὄκνῳ. Similarly we have ὑπεκτρέπεσθαί τινα in *Phaedo* 108 B.

7. **ἅπαν δή που τοὐναντίον.** These words are missing in Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π —another case of parablepsy.

12. **τί μήν;** usually assents to an affirm. proposition, but here to a negative.

13. **ἀνεπιληπτότερον,** 'less reprehensible' or 'more inexpugnable': cp. Eur. *Orest.* 922 ἀνεπίληπτον ἠσκηκὼς βίον, and the use of ἐπιλαβέσθαι to denote a verbal 'attack' in *Phaedr.* 236 B, *Rep.* 490 C.

16. **ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μ.** So Bekk., Poste, Badh., Wb. etc. after Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π; but Stallb. rejects ὡς, saying "istud ὡς unde pendeat nihil uidemus, siquidem ex τὸ λεγόμενον suspensum esse non potest": but why 'non potest'? The construction is precisely similar to the foregoing τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν ὡς κτλ. For the distinction between conscious and subconscious processes, cp. *Tim.* 64 C.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τιθῶμεν τριττοὺς ἡμῖν βίους, ἕνα μὲν ἡδύν, τὸν δ' αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δ' ἕνα | μηδέτερα. ἢ πῶς D
ἂν φαίης σὺ περὶ τούτων;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἢ ταύτῃ, τρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς βίους.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαί ποτε ταὐτὸν τῷ χαίρειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Ὁπόταν οὖν ἀκούσῃς ὡς ἥδιστον πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλύπως διατελεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, τί τόθ' ὑπολαμβάνεις
10 λέγειν τὸν τοιοῦτον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδὺ λέγειν φαίνεται ἔμοιγε οὗτος τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τριῶν οὖν ὄντων ἡμῖν, ὧντινων βούλει, τίθει, | καλλίοσιν ἵνα ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσόν, τὸ δ' E
ἄργυρον, τρίτον δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων.

15 ΠΡΩ. Κεῖται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γένοιτ' ἄν, χρυσὸς ἢ ἄργυρος;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα ὁ μέσος βίος ἡδὺς ἢ λυπηρὸς λεγόμενος

1 τρίτους Π. 2 ἡδὺν] ἰδεῖν Λ.
D. 4 οὐκ ἀλῶς Cl., οὐ καλῶς Π et pr. Δ. ἢ om. Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 5 λυπῆσαί Cl. ΔΠ. 8 ἀκούσῃι Cl. Π et pr. Δ. ὡς] ὡς τινος rc Γ, ἴσως Cl. ΔΠ. 9 ἀλύπως διατελεῖν Cl. ΔΠ : διατελεῖν ἀλύπως *S. 11 ἔμοιγε] ἔ- add. mg. Cl. οὕτως Λ, ὁ τοιοῦτος w. μὴ om. Δ. 12 ὄντων οὖν Cl. ΓΔΠ. τινων εἰ βούλει Γ.
E. 14 δὲ μηδέτερα Cl. ΔΠ : δὲ τὸ μηδέτερα *S. 16 δὴ Cl. ΓΠ, om. Δ. 17 γένοιτο Cl. 19 ἄρ' Γ.

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8. **ὁπόταν οὖν ἀκούσῃς** κτλ. Who are the theorists that held happiness to lie in painlessness? Schleierm.'s identification of them with Antisthenes and his school is now generally accepted (see 44 C *infra*, n.); but it seems better to ascribe the theory to the Atomists, with Hirzel (*Unters.* I. 141).

10. **τὸν τοιοῦτον** refers to the τινός which is to be supplied with ἀκούσῃς.

12. **ὧντινων βούλει,** i.e. not three lives in particular, but *any* three things you choose to name.

13. **καλλίοσιν ὀνόμασι.** Cp. n. on 37 E; and for the nomenclature, *Rep.* 546 E ff. τὰ Ἡσιόδου τε καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν γένη, χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν καὶ σιδηροῦν, κτλ.

19. **οὐδ' ἄρα ... λεγόμενος ... λεχθείη.** Badh. reads γενόμενος, arguing that "it would be childish to say ὁ μέσος βίος is not and cannot be rightly thought to be that from which it has been formally distinguished; but it is necessary for the argument to show that the circumstance of its coming immediately after pain cannot *alter* its nature, and make it *become* pleasure." And Paley seems to adopt B.'s emendation when he renders: "Then neither would the middle life become pleasant or painful" etc. The preceding γένοιτ' ἄν appears a corroboration of the change: but I scruple to adopt it, as I take λεγόμενος to be resumptive of ὁπόταν ἀκούσῃς ... λέγειν τὸν τοιοῦτον ten lines above. Poste notes that ὀρθὸς λόγος, which generally means 'right reason,' is here used 'by a sort of play upon words' for 'right speech.'

ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε οὔτ' εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζοιτο, οὔτ' εἰ λέγοι, λεχθείη, κατά γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα | καὶ 44
5 δοξαζόντων αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἴονται τότε, ὅταν μὴ λυπῶνται;

ΠΡΩ. Φασὶ γοῦν.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἴονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγόν που.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ψευδῆ γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εἴπερ χωρὶς τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν ἡ φύσις ἑκατέρου.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μὴν χωρίς γε ἦν.

15 ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αἱρώμεθα παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτ' εἶναι, καθάπερ ἄρτι, τρία, ἢ δύο μόνα, | λύπην μὲν κακὸν τοῖς B
ἀνθρώποις, τὴν δ' ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν λυπῶν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν ὄν, ἡδὺ προσαγορεύεσθαι;

XXVII. ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ νῦν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρω-
20 τώμεθα ὑφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. Ὄντως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβου τοῦδε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐ μανθάνεις.

1 οὔτ' om. H. δοξάζοι Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCHw (Flor. a b c i) : δοξάζει *S.
44 A. 7 καὶ add. Cl. ΓΔΠ. οἴωνται Σ. 11 καὶ κινδυνεύει Ξ.
12 γε add. Cl. ΔΠ. 14 γε ἦν] γοῦν S. 15 αἱρώμεθα οὖν Δ, οὖν ἐρώμεθα Λ.
B. 16 λύπη pr. Δ. 17 λυπηρῶν F. τοῦτ' Γ. 19 νῦν om. ΓΞF.
τοῦτό γε ὦ Λ. 22 μανθάνεις; Cl.

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4. **λεγόντων γε ταῦτα...αἰσθανόμεθα.** "We observe people who do speak in this way"; e.g. Soph. *Aj.* 553 ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν γὰρ μηδὲν ἥδιστος βίος (cited by Paley): but it is the ethical tenet of the Cynics (?) which is specially alluded to here.

7. **πότερον οὖν** κτλ. Note that the second member of the interrog. is here omitted, ἢ οὔ being easily supplied: cp. *Meno* 98 D, *Alcib.* I. 107 A, etc.

12. **εἴπερ χωρὶς τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν ἡ φύσις ἑκατέρου.** Badh. brackets τοῦ μὴ λ. κ. τ. χαίρειν, evidently as a gloss on ἑκατέρου: and Mr E. F. Horton suggests the alternative that ἑκατέρου is the word to omit. But tautology must be admitted in this dialogue; and Stallb. well remarks "ex abundanti additur dein ἑκατέρου ut utriusque rei discrimen fortius significetur. Similiter Aristoph. *Thesm.* v. 10 χωρὶς γὰρ αὐτοῖν ἑκατέρου 'στὶν ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μήτ' ἀκούειν μήθ' ὁρᾶν."

21. **τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβου τοῦδε.** These are the same dogmatists as those alluded to above 43 D, i.e., according to most historians, the Cynics, precursors of the Stoics in their general tendency. Grote, however (pp. 609 ff.), supposes that the thinkers whom Plato refers to here and in *Theaet.* 156 "were most probably Pythagorising friends of his own; who, adopting a ritual of extreme rigour, distinguished themselves by the violence of their antipathies towards the unseemly pleasures." And Poste objects that "we are expressly told that Antisthenes abstained from Physical speculation" (Diog. L. 6. 103), and that it is

ΠΡΩ. Λέγεις δὲ αὐτοὺς τίνας;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οἳ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὔ φασιν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

5 ΣΩ. Λυπῶν | ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγάς, ἃς νῦν οἱ C
περὶ Φίληβον ἡδονὰς ἐπονομάζουσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι ξυμβουλεύεις, ἢ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρῆσθαί τισι, μαν-
10 τευομένοις οὐ τέχνῃ ἀλλά τινι δυσχερείᾳ φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς, λίαν μεμισηκότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νενομικότων οὐδὲν ὑγιές, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν γοήτευμα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡδονὴν εἶναι. τούτοις | μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἂν προσχρή- D
σαιο, σκεψάμενος ἔτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα·

1 αὐτούς τινας Cl. 2, 3 ὅναρ ἅπαν Cl. Π : οἳ τὸ παράπαν cum *S corr. Δ et γρ. Cl.
C. 5 ἃ pr. Ξ. 7 πείσεσθαι EF. ξ(υμβ.) Σ. 10 τι, in mg. τῇ ἢ τινί, F. ἀγενοῦς w. 12 αὐτοῖς Λ. 13 ἀλλ' om. Cl. ΔΠ. ἡδονὴ FH, ἡδονὴ Cl. ΓΔΔΞΠBCE.
D. 13 ταῦτ' Γ. 14 τἆλλ' Γ.

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improbable also that the Megaric Ἐριστικοί "were addicted even to abstract Physical speculations." Natorp (*Die Ethike des Demokritos*, pp. 164 ff.) and Hirzel identify these δυσχερεῖς with Democritus and his set, and in spite of the objections urged by v. Arnim (*Gött. gel. Anz.* 1894), I incline to accept this view. Cp. *Theaet.* 155—6 (with Campbell's *Introd.* pp. xlii. ff.), and *Soph.* 246—7; also the theory of τῶν σοφῶν τινός in *Rep.* 583 B.

4. **τί μήν;** "What then (do they say they are, if not pleasures)?" As if τί μὴν ἄλλο φασὶν εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, for which Stallb. compares *Polit.* 263 B—a false parallel, since there, as usually, it merely indicates assent.

5. **λυπῶν...ἀποφυγάς**: cp. *Rep.* 584 C αἵ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἡδοναί...εἰσὶ λυπῶν τινὲς ἀπαλλαγαί.

οἱ περὶ Φίληβον, 'Philebus and his party,' as a compact band in antagonism to τοῖς πολεμίοις Φ. Cp. *Crat.* 440 C οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτον.

9. **ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρῆσθαί τισι**, i.e. as 'diviners' who hit the truth θείᾳ μοίρᾳ, by intuition or inspiration, rather than by a logical method (οὐ τέχνῃ). Cp. 64 A n., *Lys.* 215 D, *Rep.* 349 A.

10. **τινι δυσχερείᾳ**, 'a certain sourness,' or 'Puritan spirit,' like that of Catullus' 'senum seueriorum.'

11. **λίαν μεμισηκότων** κτλ. This change from dat. to gen. is noteworthy. Stallb. explains it as gen. absol., comparing *Rep.* 518 A, 547 C, *Symp.* 183 B, etc. But it is better to take it with Badh. as in construction with δυσχερείᾳ φύσεως —"with the harshness of men who have overmuch detested" etc.

12. **οὐδὲν ὑγιές**, sc. αὐτῆς. Cp. *Rep.* 584 A καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις. Cp. *Phaed.* 90 C, *Crat.* 440 C, *Gorg.* 524 E etc. This shows the word to mean 'genuine,' 'solid,' 'real'—as Poste rightly notes—rather than 'salubrious' or 'salutary.'

γοήτευμα, not found elsewhere in Plato. Cp. *Soph.* 241 B ἐν τῇ τῶν ψευδουργῶν καὶ γοήτων τέχνῃ, *Meno* 80 A γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις, *Gorg.* 484 A κατεπᾴδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες.

14. **δυσχεράσματα**. This word is condemned by Pollux *Onom.* III. 133: πονηρὰ δὲ τὰ Πλάτωνος δυσχεράσματα: upon which Lobeck (*Paralip.* II. p. 416) comments thus: "Platonicum δυσχέρασμα

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα αἵ γέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι, πεύσει, ἵνα ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν λόγοιν σκεψάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς παραθώμεθα πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

5 ΣΩ. Μεταδιώκωμεν δὴ τούτους, ὥσπερ ξυμμάχους, κατὰ τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἴχνος. οἶμαι γὰρ τοιόνδε τι λέγειν αὐτούς, ἀρχομένους ποθὲν ἄνωθεν, ὡς εἰ βουληθεῖμεν ὁτουοῦν | εἴδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, οἷον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ E σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἂν μᾶλλον συννοήσαιμεν 10 ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι; δεῖ δή σε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, καθάπερ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δυσχερέσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γε αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος ἰδεῖν ἥντινά 15 ποτε ἔχει φύσιν βουληθεῖμεν, οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποβλεπτέον, | ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας καὶ σφοδροτάτας 45 λεγομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς ἄν σοι ταύτῃ συγχωροίη τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν, αἱ πρόχειροί γε εἴπερ καὶ μέγισται τῶν 20 ἡδονῶν, ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμά εἰσιν αὗται;

1 αἵ...δοκοῦσιν] ἄν...δοκῶσιν S. 7 βουληθοῖμεν Γ, βουληθείημεν EF, βούλῃ θεῖμεν w : βούλῃ, θείημεν S.
E. 8 πότερα C. 9 σκληρότερα Γ. 11 δυσχεραίνουσιν Cl. ΔΠ.
12 σέ γε E. ὅτι om. Cl. ΔΠ. 13 μεγέθει Cl. ΓΞΠΕ Flor. a,b,c,i et pr. Δ, μεγέθει F : μεγέθη *S. 15 ποτ' Cl. βουληθοῖμεν Γ, βουληθείημεν ES.
45 A. 19 γε om. Cl. ΔΠ. αἴπερ libri. μέγιστοι Δ.

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improbat Pollux haud immerito, quandoquidem a verbis parasynthetis, ut ἀμαραίνω, ἀνοηταίνω, δυσθυμαίνω, al., substantiva non ducuntur; ἀκολάστασμα sive ἀκολάσταμα Epicuro dignius quam Aristophane." But, as Badh. notes, ἀκολαστάσματα in Ar. *Lysistr.* 398 is a sound reading, and the scarcity of such formations may be due to an objection to their clumsiness as well as to the scarcity of the verbs.

7. **ὡς εἰ βουληθεῖμεν ... πότερον** κτλ. Supposing an anacoluthon, Stallb. cites Soph. *Antig.* 2 ff. ἆρ' οἶσθ' ὅτι Ζεὺς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν ὁποῖον οὐχὶ νῷν ἔτι ζῶσαιν τελεῖ; and *O. T.* 1401. But it is better, with Apelt, to take ὡς as introducing the citation: for this use of ὡς, in place of the more usual ὅτι, he cites *Rep.* 424 B, *Laws* 777 A, Arist. *de caelo* 294ᵃ 25, Theophr. περὶ αἰσθήσ. 10 (Diels, Doxogr. 502, 10).

10. **τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι ... τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονάς** (15). πολλοστός (analogous in form to the ordinals εἰκοστός, ἑκατοστός, χιλιοστός, etc.) appears to occur in Plato only here and *Laws* 896 B. Poste points out that the present postulate, as immediately interpreted (ll. 12 ff.), is inconsistent with that in 53 A ff., where καθαρότης, not μέγεθος, is the pre-condition for discovery of φύσις.

11. **δυσχερέσιν**, VBS Herm., Wb.: δυσχεραίνουσιν Bodl., Turr., Poste; but cp. 46 A where these δυσχερεῖς are expressly referred to. The choice of the ex. σκληρότης is pointed, if we are dealing with Atomists.

19. **Ἆρ' οὖν, αἱ πρόχειροί γε εἴπερ καὶ μέγισται τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ** κτλ. The vulgate gave πρόχειροί γε αἴπερ, but Stallb. and most later edd. omit γε with Bodl., Vat., Ven. II. Badh.² however

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν μείζους εἰσὶ καὶ γίγνονται περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἢ περὶ τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας; εὐλαβηθῶμεν δέ, μὴ προπετῶς ἀποκρινόμενοι πταίσωμέν πῃ. τάχα γὰρ ἴσως φαῖμεν | ἂν περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας. B

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ'; οὐχ αὗται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ὧν ἂν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι μέγισται προγίγνωνται;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ πυρέττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι μᾶλλον διψῶσι καὶ ῥιγοῦσι καὶ πάντα, ὁπόσα διὰ

2 οὖν μείζους Cl. ΔΠ : οὖν καὶ μείζους *S. 3 περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας Cl. ΔΠ : περὶ τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας *S. 4 δέ] δὲ δὴ E, δὴ S. πταίσαιμεν Γ. πῃι non alteri dant Cl. (?) ΔΠ. τάχα γὰρ] τὰ γὰρ Cl. Π, τα αρ pr. Δ. 5 ἂν ἴσως C. φῶμεν Δ.

B. 8 προσγίγνονται Cl. Γ: προσγίγνωνται *S. 10 ἀλλ' οὐχ] ἆρ' οὖν οὐχὶ S. οἱ] ὅτι ΓΑΞΣΒCEFHw. τούτοις τοῖς Γ. 11 πάνθ' Γ. ὅσα ΞF.

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retains γε, alters *Αρ' to 'Αλλ', and brackets αἴπερ...ἡδονῶν, explaining the corruption assumed thus: "A copyist had got as far as ΑΙΠΕΡ and stopped. Afterwards he saw that he had skipped ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις; so he returns to this, but forgets to cancel ΑΙΠΕΡ. 'Here is some gap,' says a grammarian, 'which we must fill up'; and he fills it up so as to make Plato say that the common bodily pleasures which are also the greatest are *the most intense. En cor Zenodoti! En jecur Cratetis!*"

In his 1st edition B. had not yet made this last change, but had assigned αὗται to the beginning of Prot.'s reply—an improbable arrangement. As to ἀλλ' οὖν ...γε, as Paley notes, it is regularly used 'to extort a reluctant admission,' which is not in point here. So we must seek a simpler corr. Madv. proposed εἴπερ for αἴπερ: Liebhold, ἅσπερ καὶ μεγίστας τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγομεν, omitting ὃ. Wb. follows Madv., printing αἱ πρ. γε εἴπερ, which I adopt.

ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις means 'as the saying goes,' implying that αἱ πρόχειροι ἡδοναὶ καὶ μέγισται was a commonplace,—not 'as *we* have often said.'

2. **περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἢ περὶ τοὺς ὑγ.** Badh.[2] brackets κάμνοντας, on the ground that "Plato could not use the article with one participle and not with another": but it is better to insert τούς before ὑγ., with the inferior MSS.

4. **πταίσωμέν πῃ. τάχα...ὑγιαίνοντας.** So Turr., Herm., Poste, Badh. and Wb., making S.'s speech continuous from πότερον to ὑγ. But Stallb. and Bekk. follow the vulgate, which makes S. end at πταίσωμεν, assigns πῇ; to Prot., and writes τάχα...ὑγ. as S.'s answer; and Paley's translation follows the same division. But the former arrangement seems decidedly preferable, as the interrog. πῇ is not in place here.

7. **ὧν ἂν...προγίγνωνται.** This is Stephens' emendation, for the προσγίγνωνται of most MSS. (προσγίγνονται Bodl.), accepted by Bekk., Herm., Poste, Badh., Wb. Stallb., however, retains and tries to defend προσγ., rendering: "nonne eae voluptates magnitudine sua eminent, ad quas etiam maximae cupiditates accedunt (s. cum quibus maximae cupiditates coniunguntur, sive hae antecedunt illas, sive eas comitentur aut sequantur; nam hoc quidem nunc nihil refert)." With προσγ., the gen. would be due to the subst., for which Stallb. compares *Soph.* 266 B, *Symp.* 182 C. A similar error occurs at 39 D, where Ven. Π gives πρὸς γίγνοιτ' for προγίγνοιντ'.

11. **καὶ πάντα, ὁπόσα** κτλ. Badh. alters to πάντων, to be taken in connection with ἐνδείᾳ and ἀποπληρουμένων, and renders: "as to all those things which they are accustomed to feel through the body, they are more affected with the want of these." But the text is easily

τοῦ σώματος εἰώθασι πάσχειν, μᾶλλόν τ' ἐνδείᾳ ξυγγίγνονται καὶ ἀποπληρουμένων μείζους ἡδονὰς ἴσχουσιν; ἢ τοῦτο οὐ φήσομεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν νῦν ῥηθὲν | φαίνεται. C

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὀρθῶς ἂν φαινοίμεθα λέγοντες, ὡς εἴ τις τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ἰδεῖν βούλοιτο, οὐκ εἰς ὑγίειαν ἀλλ' εἰς νόσον ἰόντας δεῖ σκοπεῖν; ὅρα δέ, μή με ἡγῇ διανοούμενον ἐρωτᾶν σε, εἰ πλείω χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα νοσοῦντες τῶν ὑγιαινόντων, ἀλλ' οἷου μέγεθός με ζητεῖν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ποῦ ποτὲ γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε. νοῆσαι γὰρ δεῖν φαμὲν ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει καὶ τίνα λέγουσιν οἱ φάσκοντες μηδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν | αὐτήν. D

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἕπομαι τῷ λόγῳ σου.

XXVIII. ΣΩ. Τάχα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐχ ἧττον δείξεις, ἀποκρινεῖ γάρ· ἐν ὕβρει μείζους ἡδονάς, οὐ πλείους λέγω, τῷ

1 μᾶλλον πάσχουσιν· εἰ δ' αὐτοῖς αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι μείζονι ἐνδείᾳ corr. Σ. τ' Cl. ΔΠ et corr. Γ : δὲ *S. 2 ἢ...γ' (p. 108, l. 11)] in H lacuna paginarum 3⅓. 4 νῦν add. Cl. Δ.

C. 6 ὑγείαν ΞEF. 7 ἰόντα corr. Γ. ἡγεῖ Cl. 11 νοῆσαι μὲν γὰρ F. δεῖν Cl. ΔΠ et corr. F, δὴ Cw : δεῖ *S.

D. 14 δείξης E, δόξεις corr. Σ. 15 ἀποκρινεῖ Cl. w, ἀποκρίνει Π : ἀποκρινῇ vulg.

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explicable if we supply, with Stallb. and Paley, πάσχουσι or εἰώθασι πάσχειν.

1. **ἐνδείᾳ ξυγγίγνονται.** This phrase 'are conversant with want' may be defended perhaps by ἀνοίᾳ ξυγγενομένη *Laws* 897 B, συνεῖναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς *Rep.* 586 B, and the like. Badh., however, proposes ξυντείνονται, comparing ξύντασιν ἀγρίαν 46 D, and ξυντείνει τε καὶ ἐνίοτε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ 47 A: but there the conditions, as involving pleasure, are different, so that I hardly think the word suitable here. If a change is needed, I would propose ξυνίσχονται: cp. above ἐν νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι: νοσήμασιν ξυνισχόμενος (-εχόμενος) *Theaet.* 479 A, 512 A, *Laws* 714 A: ξυνεξ. ἀγνοίᾳ *Laws* 863 C, ὀνείδει 944 E, ἀπορίᾳ *Soph.* 250 D, etc.

5. **εἴ τις...ἰόντας,** the plur. after such an universalising pronoun is common: cp. *Rep.* 536 A, *Prot.* 345 E, etc.

7. **μή με ἡγῇ διανοούμενον.** This is changed by Badh.[2] to μή με διανόου: and below he reads καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοιοῦτον for κ. τ. σφ. περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου, 'e mera coniectura.' With περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου, sc. οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι.

11. **τίνα λέγουσιν...αὐτήν.** To enquire how a thing is described by those who deny its existence would seem a useless quest: but what is meant, of course, is the denial of pleasure *as such*, i.e. of the claim of the affection so described to the title of pleasure, or of the existence of pleasure as something absolute and positive.

13. **ἕπομαι τῷ λόγῳ σου.** These last three words Badh.[2] condemns as an 'Alexandrian phrase'; but we find ἕπομαι σοῦ τῷ λόγῳ in *Prot.* 319 A.

14. **τάχα οὐχ ἧττον δείξεις, ἀποκρινεῖ γάρ.** Ven. Σ gives δόξεις: Heindorf and Schleierm. conj. δείξει (cp. σαφέστερον δείξει 20 C): Winckelmann ἐξῆς. But Stallb. defends the text, except that he would write (with Schleierm.) the imper. ἀπόκριναι for the fut.; and Badh. comments thus: "I entirely agree with Stallb. that it is 'nodum in scirpo quaerere' to be dissatisfied with these words; but his own translation of them has led him to suspect another word which is equally sound. The sense is, 'You will presently (τάχα) prove it (that you understand me) no less (than you now profess it), for you will answer my question.'" As Dr Jackson

σφόδρα δὲ καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερεχούσας ὁρᾷς ἢ ἐν τῷ σώφρονι βίῳ; λέγε δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις, καὶ πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον ὁρῶ. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ σώφρονάς που καὶ ὁ παροιμιαζόμενος ἐπίσχει
5 λόγος ἑκάστοτε, ὁ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν | παρακελευόμενος, ᾧ E
πείθονται· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων τε καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἡ σφοδρὰ ἡδονὴ κατέχουσα περιβοήτους ἀπεργάζεται.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς· καὶ εἴ γε ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς ἔν τινι πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἀρετῇ
10 μέγισται μὲν ἡδοναί, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λῦπαι γίγνονται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων τινὰς προελόμενον δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἐχούσας ἐλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι μεγίστας.

ΠΡΩ. | Ἀνάγκη. 46

15 ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶνδε νοσημάτων ἡδονάς, τίνα ποτὲ ἔχουσι τρόπον.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίων;

2 δὴ (post λέγε) Σ. 3 διαφέρον Cl. ΔΠ : διάφορον *S. 4 ὁ add. Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCw Flor. a,b,c,i et rc. Ξ.
E. 6 πείθοντέ Cl. 7 εἰ σφόδρα Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 8 ταῦθ' Cl. ΔΠ : τοῦθ' *S. ἐν add. Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCHw Flor. a,b,c,i. 10 λέγονται w.
13 ἐλέγομεν Cl. ΔΠ : λέγομεν *S. τινας εἶναι αὐτὰς Π.

points out to me, the best defence of our text is *Rep.* 432 C (ἐάν μοι ἑπομένῳ χρῇ καὶ τὰ δεικνύμενα δυναμένῳ καθορᾷν κτλ.), which shows that there is an antithesis between ἕπομαι, "follow your lead," and δείξεις, "show the way." Herm. gives δείξεις, ἀπόκριναι γάρ·, followed by Wb.

5. **ὁ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν**—attributed to the Lacedaemonian sage Chilon (Ar. *Rhet.* II. 12, 14): cp. Theognis 335, Pind. *Fr.* 235.

6. **τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων.** For this periphrasis for τοὺς ἄφρονας, cp. *Rep.* 563 C τὸ τῶν θηρίων: *ib.* 571 A τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν. Here it gives a contemptuous tone to the phrase.

The whole of this passage should be closely compared with *Laws* 733 A ff. where the relation of morals to pleasure and pain is set forth: thus, 734 A ἀκόλαστον δὲ ὀξὺν ἐπὶ πάντα καὶ σφοδρὰς μὲν λύπας, σφοδρὰς δὲ ἡδονάς, συντόνους δὲ καὶ οἰστρώδεις ἐπιθυμίας τε καὶ ἔρωτας ὡς οἷόν τ' ἐμμανεστάτους παρεχόμενον.

7. **περιβοήτους.** It is a question whether this is to be taken as active, with Ast ('qui insanos clamores facit') and Badham ("*frantic*, properly applied to men maddened by the noise of some Bacchanalian or other orgies"), or as passive, with Stallb. ("infamis, malis rumoribus celebratus") and Paley ("notorious, talked of as men about town"). L. and S. assign to it here the act. sense, for which cp. Soph. *O. T.* 192: for the pass. sense cp. Dem. 324. 29 αἰσχρὸς καὶ περιβόητος. Cp. 47 A, which makes for the act. sense here; also *Laws* 672 C μαίνεταί τε καὶ βοᾷ ἀτάκτως, καὶ...ἀτάκτως αὖ πηδᾷ.

8. **ἔν τινι πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος.** Of this Badh.[1] writes "either we must supply τῆς τε before ψυχῆς or suppose καὶ τοῦ to be corrupt; it may have been ἤτοι"; in ed. 2 he brackets καὶ τ. σώμ. as due to 'the interpolator.' I once thought that the τοῦ might have arisen from νό(σῳ) σώματος, when the 1st σω had been omitted by parablepsis: but a better correction might be to read διὰ for καί, cp. διὰ τοῦ σώματος...πάσχειν 45 B *supra*; in any case we can scarcely do without some mention of σῶμα here, in view of the preceding argument.

13. **τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἐχούσας** κτλ. I.e. what is there in the character of these pleasures which justifies us in terming them 'greatest'?

ΣΩ. Τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων, ἃς οὓς εἴπομεν δυσχερεῖς μισοῦσι παντελῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας;

ΣΩ. Οἷον τὰς τῆς ψώρας ἰάσεις τῷ τρίβειν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ἄλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως· τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτε φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι; πότερον ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην;

ΠΡΩ. Σύμμικτον τοῦτό γ' ἄρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικε γίγνεσθαί τι κακόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ Φιλήβου γε ἕνεκα παρεθέμην τὸν λόγον· B ἀλλ' ἄνευ τούτων, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἑπομένων, ἂν μὴ κατοφθῶσι, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα διακρίνασθαι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἰτέον ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων ξυγγενεῖς.

ΣΩ. Τὰς ἐν τῇ μίξει κοινωνούσας λέγεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ τοίνυν μίξεις αἱ μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν αὐτοῖς

46 A. 1 *οὓς* om. Cl. Π, in mg. ponit Δ. 8 *σύμμικτον* Cl. ΓΔΞΠΣBC*w* Flor. *συμ*a, *ἔμμικτον* EF : *ἔμμικτον* S. γ' ἄρα] γὰρ Δ, γ' ἄρ' Cl. Π : γε *S, Bekk.
B. 10 *μὴν* Γ. 11 *ταύτης* Cl. Λ. 12 *κατορθῶσιν* Λ. 13 *διακρίνεσθαι* Π. 14 ξ(υγ.) Cl. ΔΞΠ.

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1. **τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων**, sc. *νοσημάτων*. I observe this in view of Stallb.'s misleading note: "quinam sunt *οἱ ἀσχήμονες*, facile ex iis, quae subiiciuntur, perspicias. Sunt enim indecori ac turpes," etc. Paley rightly renders, "the pleasures from disorders of a less decent kind."

4. **ἰάσεις τῷ τρίβειν**. For the dat. of means with the subst. cp. *Cratyl.* 423 A *δήλωμά του τῷ σώματι*, 433 B.

8. **σύμμικτον τοῦτό γ' ἄρα**. "*ἄρ'* vulgo deest, e Bodl. et Ven. Π restitutum. Vat. *γάρ*," Stallb. Badh.², however, restores *γε*, holding that *γ' ἄρ'* arose from *γάρ*, originally a blunder for *γε*, and so too Wb.: but there seems no valid objection to the text, *ἄρα* and *γ' ἄρα* being common in affirmations.

10. **Φιλήβου γε ἕνεκα**. An ironical repudiation of any personal reflection upon the 'lover of youth.' The matter is unsavoury, says S., but its examination necessary for the argument in hand. For this matter cp. *Gorg.* 494 C ff. Badh.² reads *οὐ μὴν ἀν* Φ.

11. **τῶν ταύταις ἑπομένων**, 'the allied pleasures.' Cp. 54 E, 56 C, 57 D, *Laws* 815 C, etc.

14. **οὐκοῦν ἰτέον...ξυγγενεῖς**. MSS. and most edd. assign this all to Prot. This, however, as Badh.² remarks, "makes the young man show the way and the philosopher follow it": hence he gives *ἐπὶ τὰς τ. ξ.*, *τὰς...λέγεις* all to Socr. But *οὐκοῦν ἰτέον* is not a likely answer for Prot. to make here: hence it were better to make S.'s speech continue down to *λέγεις*, altering *τὰς* (*ἐν τ. μ.*) to *ἃς*, or *λέγεις* to *γενέσεις*. However, no change seems imperative.

17. **εἰσὶ τοίνυν μίξεις...ψυχῇ**. Badh.² cancels *μίξεις*, remarking, "if you say there are *mixtures*—then one of each pair, either *κατὰ τὸ σῶμα* or *ἐν α. τ. σώμασι*, either *αὐτῆς τ. ψ.* or *ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ* becomes quite meaningless." I fail to see the force of this objection.

τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δ' αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· | τὰς δ' αὖ C
τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνευρήσομεν λύπας ἡδοναῖς
μιχθείσας τοτὲ μὲν ἡδονὰς τὰ ξυναμφότερα, τοτὲ δὲ λύπας
ἐπικαλουμένας.

5 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὁπόταν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τις ἢ τῇ διαφθορᾷ
τἀναντία ἅμα πάθη πάσχῃ, ποτὲ ῥιγῶν θέρηται καὶ θερμαινό-
μενος ἐνίοτε ψύχηται, ζητῶν, οἶμαι, τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τοῦ δ'
ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον πικρῷ γλυκὺ μεμιγμένον,
10 μετὰ δυσαπαλλακτίας παρόν, ἀγανάκτησιν | καὶ ὕστερον D
σύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ' ἀληθὲς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ τοιαῦται μίξεις αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἴσων εἰσὶ
λυπῶν τε καὶ ἡδονῶν, αἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἑτέρων πλειόνων;

15 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τὰς μέν, ὅταν πλείους λῦπαι τῶν ἡδονῶν
γίγνωνται, τὰς τῆς ψώρας λεγομένας νῦν δὴ ταύτας εἶναι καὶ
τὰς τῶν γαργαλισμῶν, ὁπόταν ἐντὸς τὸ ζέον ᾖ καὶ τὸ φλεγ-

1 αὐτῆς] αὖ τῆς Cl. τῆς om. Cl. Δ. ψυχῆς] ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῆς Λ.
C. 1 τῆς, in mg. τὰς, F. αὖ τῆς Cl. Γ, αὖ Δ : αὐτῆς *S. 2 εὑρή-σομεν pr. Ξ. λύπας om. w. 6 διαφορᾷ Ew. 7 πότε ῥιγῶν πότε Cl. ΔΠ, ποτὲ ῥιγῶν Γ. 8 δὲ Cl. 9 πικρῷ γλυκεῖ F.
D. 10 ὕστερον om. Cl. Π, in mg. ponit Δ. 11 σύντασιν Cl. Δ et pr. Π, ξύνστασιν pr. Γ : ξύστασιν *S. 12 μάλα Cl. νῦν λεγόμενον Cl. Π et pr. Δ : νῦν δὴ λεγόμενον *S. 16 λέγω Π. λῦπαι Σ : λύπαι S. 17 λεγομένης Γ.

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6. **ἐν τῇ καταστάσει** κτλ. See above 31 C ff.

7. **ποτὲ ῥιγῶν θέρηται.** So Herm., Wb., Poste and Badh. Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π give πότε ῥ. ποτέ, but Coisl. ποτὲ ῥ. Stallb. reads ῥ. ποτέ, but, as Badh. notes, ποτέ here should have the emphatic position to mark its opposition to ἐνίοτε.

8. **ζητῶν,** 'desiring': for this sense cp. 57 A, *Rep.* 375 E, 486 D, 571 C, etc.

9. **τὸ δὴ λεγ. πικρῷ γλυκὺ μεμιγμένον.** Bekk. proposed πικρόγλυκυ. But if this be accepted, μεμιγ., as Stallb. objected, 'molestissime redundabit.' Hence Badh.², reading πικρόγλυκυ, cancels μεμιγ. But the proposed compound nowhere occurs, though we find γλυκύπικρον ὄρπετον in Sappho *Fr.* 37 (40). (Cp. Catullus' 'quae *dulcem* curis miscet *amaritiem*' (68. 18), and Horace's '*dulcium* mater *saeva* Cupidinum.')

11. **σύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ.** So Herm., Poste, Wb. and Badh., with Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π. Other MSS. give ξύστασιν, which is inadequately defended by Stallb. For ξυντείνειν, as applicable either to the rackings of pain or to the thrill of pleasure, Badh. well compares the Lat. 'renes morbo *tentantur* acuto,' and '*pertentant* gaudia pectus.' For the lit. sense of the verb cp. *Phaedo* 98 D χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα: for the metaph. sense cp. 47 A *infra*. As Poste remarks, Eur. *Alc.* 797 (τοῦ νῦν σκυθρωποῦ καὶ ξυνεστῶτος φρενῶν) shows that ξύστασις would express "a sullen, gloomy, moody or pensive state, not excitement, tension, fury, which the context requires."

18. **ὁπόταν ἐντὸς...παρατιθέναι.** This passage is difficult. Badh.²'s treatment will appear from the following note: "I have put δ' after ὁπόταν. The first case is that where κνῆσις and τρῖψις are said διαχεῖν, because they *discuss* the heat in the part affected. When this is insufficient, the affection being too deep-seated,

μαῖνον, τῇ τρίψει δὲ καὶ τῇ κνήσει μὴ ἐφικνῆταί τις, τὰ δ' ἐπιπολῆς | μόνον διαχέῃ, [τοτὲ] φέροντες εἰς πῦρ αὐτὰ καὶ E εἰς τοὐναντίον ἀπορίαις μεταβάλλοντες ἐνίοτε ἀμηχάνους ἡδονάς, τοτὲ δὲ τοὐναντίον τοῖς ἐντὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἔξω λύπας

1 κνήσει Heusdius : libri κινήσει. ἐφικνεῖταί Cl. τὰ δ' Schützius : libri τὸ δ'. 2 ἐπὶ πολῆς Cl., ἐπὶ πολλῆς Ξ.
E. 2 διαχέῃ Cl. τότε Cl. ΔΠ. πῦρ] lacuna in w. 4 προστάττων Cl. Π : πρὸς τὰς τῶν cum *S corr. Δ.

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then recourse is had to irritation of the surface in order to relieve the interior. This is effected *by bringing the parts to the fire, and shifting the affection to the opposite place:* i.e., by producing external heat in place of internal. When men do this, they sometimes produce terrible **ἀπορίας**, states where pleasure and pain are confounded, and the patient does not know what to do with himself. This sense is brought out by transposing ἀπορίας, and cancelling ἡδονάς. The only difficulty that remains is in the last clause: *they procure, as the case may turn out, sometimes great embarrassments, and sometimes mingled pleasure for the inner parts contrasted with the pain of the outer, by forcibly dissolving what is compacted and compacting what is separate, and by procuring to themselves pain mingled with pleasure.* This is saying that they do a thing by doing it; what we need to be told is, how that which they do involves a mixture of pain and pleasure. I therefore propose to read τῷ τὰ σ. β. δ. ἢ τὰ δ. συγχεῖν, ὁμοῦ λύπας ἡδοναῖς παρατιθέντες: *procuring pain along with pleasure, by forcibly dispersing* (κνήσει καὶ τρίψει) *what is congested* (the accumulated heat), *and determining what is dispersed* (by inflaming the surface artificially)."—The text as it stands is thus rendered by Stallb.: "quando intus (sub cute) est id quod fervet et inflammatum est, fricando autem atque scabendo aliquis illuc non pervenit sed superficiem tantum (scabendo) diffundit; tum illi (qui sic affecti sunt) partes laborantes inflammantes, eoque ipso prae remediorum inopia in contrarium mutantes, modo sibi immensas voluptates parant, modo ex contrario partibus internis, ad externarum partium dolores, voluptates doloribus mixtas afferunt, prouti res aut huc aut illuc vergit, eo quod concreta violenter disiungunt, aut discreta coniungunt atque simul dolores voluptatibus apponunt." This rendering is closely followed by Paley.

As to details, the views of Stallb. and others will appear from the following:

(1) **κνήσει** for κινήσει is v. Heusde's correction, adopted by Bekk., Stallb., Herm., Poste, Wb. **τὰ δ' ἐπιπολῆς** for τὸ δ' ἐ., Stallb., Poste, Wb. after Schütz. ἡδονάς for **ἡδοναῖς**, Schütz, Stallb., and Poste.

(2) **φέροντες**, plur. after ὅταν τις, as after εἴ τις 45 C *supra*: cp. *Rep.* 344 B, 536 A.

(3) **φέρειν εἰς πῦρ** is equivalent, says St., to ἐμπυροῦν, *inflammare*, πῦρ here being equal to πυρετός—whereas "plerique omnes de ignis usu cogitant, atque deinde τοὐναντίον de aqua et frigore." But St. admits that he can find no parallel for this.

αὐτὰ refers to τὰ ἐπιπολῆς, the external parts (Stallb.).

(4) **εἰς τοὐναντίον μεταβάλλοντες.** This, says St., denotes the effect of the 'inflaming' process, by which τὸ φλεγμαῖνον extends to the outer as well as inner parts. As Paley puts it, "changing the seat of the affection, i.e. making the outer hotter, whereas the inner was so before"; and P. suggests the analogy of blistering 'to disperse humors.'

(5) **ἀπορίαις**, 'prae consilii inopia' (St.), 'in despair of relief' (P.): but the plur. is strange, so that St. admits the possibility of ἀπορίᾳ. Badh. in *Rh. Mus.* 1872 conj. ἀ ψωριᾷ, but ἀπορίας in both edd.

(6) **ἐνίοτε** answers to τότε δή. Both pairs of accuss., ἀμηχ. ἡδονάς and ἡδονὰς ξυγκερ., depend on παρέσχοντο, which thus has the double sense of 'sibi comparant' and 'afferunt' (Stallb.).

(7) **εἰς ὁπότερ' ἂν ῥέψῃ**, i.e. 'nachdem die Sache ausschlägt,' goes closely with παρέσχ. For omission of the subject with ῥέψῃ cp. *Theaet.* 171 A, 187 C, etc. The result of the vigorous friction which causes inflammation and pain may be either (α) the sensation of extreme pleasure, since the friction may produce unwonted titillation of the external parts; or (β) the

ἡδοναῖς ξυγκερασθείσας, εἰς ὁπότερ' ἂν ῥέψῃ, παρέσχοντο τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βίᾳ διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν καὶ ὁμοῦ | λύπας ἡδοναῖς παρατιθέναι. 47

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁπόταν αὖ πλείων ἡδονὴ κατὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ξυμμιχθῇ, τὸ μὲν ὑπομεμιγμένον τῆς λύπης γαργαλίζει τε καὶ ἠρέμα ἀγανακτεῖν ποιεῖ, τὸ δ' αὖ τῆς ἡδονῆς πολὺ πλέον ἐγκεχυμένον συντείνει τε καὶ ἐνίοτε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα, παντοῖα δὲ σχήματα, παντοῖα δὲ

1 ἡδονὰς Schützius : libri ἡδοναῖς. ξυγκερασθείσας ΓΛΣC, ξυγκερασθείσας B, συγκερασθείσας Ξw. πότερ' Λ. ῥίψῃ w. 2 τὸ w. συγκεκραμένα Λ, συγκεκρυμμένα Ξ διασχεῖν ΓΛ.

47 A. 3 ἡδονὰς F. 5 τὰ add. C. 6 μὲν] μὲν οὖν Γ. 7 αὖ τῆς] αὐτῆς S. 8 πλεῖον Π, πλείων Cl. et pr. Δ. ἐγκεχυμένον Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCw Flor. a,b,c,i : ἐκκεχυμένον *S. 9 παντοῖα δὲ σχήματα om. F.

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feeling of pain in the external parts, combined with a decrease of the internal heat, whence πρὸς τῶν ἔξω λύπας ἡδονὰς (αὐταῖς) ξυγκερ. παρέχονται. (St.)

Poste's interpretation differs in some points from Stallb.'s: "then, by exposing the external parts to fire, or rushing back for the chance of relief to the extreme of cold, the sufferer occasions to the inner parts excessive pleasure, and sometimes the reverse, mixed with pain or pleasure of the outward parts as the balance may incline." πρὸς τ. τ. ἐ. λύπας, ἡδονάς Poste explains as asyndeton for λύπ. ἢ ἡδ., of which εἰς ὁπ. ἂν ῥ. is an epexegesis; and he says that ξυγκερ. agrees with the first ἡδονάς, to which λύπας corresponds, while the second ἡδονάς answers to τοὐναντίον. Thus he seems to give the const. ξυγκερ. πρὸς... for 'mix with,' which is unexampled.

On the above views I would offer a few remarks. Neither in (3) nor (4) is Stallb.'s view probable: the antithesis of διαχεῖν and συγχεῖν below convinces me that we have here an antithesis of heat and cold as productive of diffusion and congealing respectively. Hence I agree with Poste's (and the older) explanation of τοὐναντίον, and would take ἀπορίαις μεταβ. together as 'altering (the treatment), or alternating, owing to their varied distresses.' Then, below, I prefer to read λύπας ἡδοναῖς with the MSS., taking πρὸς...ῥέψῃ as all referring to the condition of the external parts. The sense then is simply that while externally there is always a mixed feeling, in which either pain or pleasure may predominate, the internal parts feel ἀμηχάνως the opposite to the predominant external sensation. But the whole passage is very obscure and ambiguous in diction.

Wb. brackets τοτέ before φέροντες, puts a comma after εἰς τοὐναντίον, reads πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἔξω λύπας ἡδοναῖς ξυγκ., and omits the comma after παρέσχοντο. I adopt the first of these corrections.

5. **οὐκοῦν ὁπόταν αὖ.** Badh.[2] places αὖ in brackets, without comment—I suppose on account of the αὖ which follows shortly.

6. **γαργαλίζει.** Etym. Magn. γαργαλίζει· κινεῖ, προτρέπει, ἐρεθίζει. Cp. *Phaedr.* 251 C κνῆσίς τε καὶ ἀγανάκτησις ...ζεῖ τε καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύουσα τὰ πτερά: *ibid.* 263 E ὅταν... γαργαλισμοῦ τε καὶ πόθου κέντρων ὑποπλησθῇ.

8. **πηδᾶν ποιεῖ.** Paley cites Pers. *Sat.* I. 82: 'Trossulus exsultat tibi per subsellia laevis'; with the remark that "extatic feelings are described *honesto nomine*. There is an euphemistic sense in the word ἀφροσύνη." Cp. 65 C ff. *infra*, 45 E *supra*.

9. **παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα...ἀπεργάζεται.** Bodl., Vat., Ven. II. give ἀπεργαζόμενα ...ἀπεργάζεται: but most edd. accept Buttmann's ἀπεργαζόμενον, and ἐνεργάζεται, which is given in the inferior MSS. Winckelmann conj. ἐναπεργάζεται. Badh.[1] gave

πνεύματα ἀπεργαζόμενον πᾶσαν ἔκπληξιν καὶ βοὰς μετ' ἀφροσύνης ἀπεργάζεται;

ΠΡΩ. | Μάλα γε. B

ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγειν τε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, αὐτόν τε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου, ὡς ταύταις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τερπόμενος οἷον ἀποθνῄσκει· καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ παντάπασιν ἀεὶ μεταδιώκει τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀκολαστότερός τε καὶ ἀφρονέστερος ὢν τυγχάνῃ, καὶ καλεῖ δὴ μεγίστας ταύτας, καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐταῖς ὅτι μάλιστ' ἀεὶ ζῶντα εὐδαιμονέστατον καταριθμεῖται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν | διεπέρανας. C

1 ἀπεργαζόμενον Buttmannus : libri ἀπεργαζόμενα. μετ' Γ, καὶ μετὰ Δ.
2 ἀεὶ εὐφροσύνης EF, εὐφροσύνης Γ cum corr. Ξ et γρ. Δ. ἀπεργάξεται Cl. ΔΠ: ἐνεργάζεται *S, Bekk.
B. 4 γε (ante ὦ) Cl. ΔΠΣ. γε F. 5 καὶ περὶ ἄλλου Cl. ΔΠ, καὶ περὶ ἄλλον γρ. ΣBCw Flor. a,c, καὶ περὶ ἄλλων γρ. Ξ. 6 δεῖ Γ. 7 ἂν om. Cl. Π et pr. Δ. ἀφρονέστατος Γ. 8 καλῇ Γ. ταύτας] καὶ ταῦτα ΣBC. αὐταῖς] ταύταις Cl. ΔΠ. 9 μάλιστα εἰ Cl. εὐδαιμ. αὐτὸν καταρ. EF.

ἀπεργαζόμενα ... ἐνεργάζεται, but Badh.[2] says "ἐνεργάζεται is merely a contrivance, and not a successful one, to avoid the inelegant repetition... πνεύματα do not admit of sufficient variety to be called παντοῖα. It is not unlikely that this addition is due to some corrupt dittographia, and that the old text ran thus: παντοῖα μὲν χρ., π. δὲ σχ., πᾶσαν δ' ἔκπληξιν κ. β. μ. ἀ. ἀπεργάζεται." I am inclined to retain ἀπεργαζόμενα —in the sense of 'represent,' 'body forth,' rather than 'effect,'—and alter ἀπεργάζεται to κατεργάζεται, for which cp. *Laws* 791 A κατειργάσατο ἀντὶ μανικῶν ἡμῖν διαθέσεων ἕξεις ἔμφρονας, *ib.* 686 E; whereas ἐνεργάζεσθαι is nowhere else found in Plato: συνεργαζόμενα (pass.) might also be suggested. Or possibly a compound of ὀργιάζω underlies one of the words.

4. **καὶ λέγειν γε** is given by most edd. with Bodl. Vat. Ven. ΠΣ. Stallb. and Wb. however read λέγειν **τε**, which answers to καὶ ταύτας γε δή below; and this seems decidedly preferable.

5. **καὶ περὶ ἄλλου.** So most edd. with Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. καὶ περὶ ἄλλον marg. Ven. Σ, Par. BC; whence Stallb. and Wb. give simply καὶ ἄλλον. Badh.[2] combines the two readings in καὶ ἄλλον περὶ ἄλλου. Thus, in both these last, the trajection of the τε is avoided. Perhaps περὶ ἄλλου ἄλλον would best account for the variation in MSS.

6. **παντάπασιν ἀεί** κτλ. Badh.[2] proposes πάντας φασὶ δεῖν μεταδιώκειν τ. μ. ὅ. ἂν ἀκ. τις καὶ ἀφρ. κτλ.

10. **τὰ συμβαίνοντα ... διεπέρανας.** For this Stallb. gives Ficinus' rendering, 'omnia quae apud magnam hominum multitudinem ueniunt in existimationem': but Badh.[1], 'that which one meets with from the common run of men as to opinion.' Badh.[2] however objects to both these renderings, and suggests περὶ τῶν π. ἀνθρ. δόξαν: and Paley, too, agrees that either πρός or εἰς should be omitted. Possibly we should read συμβάλλοντα πρὸς τ. π. ἀ. εἰς δόξαν (or εὐδοξίαν), 'which contribute to glory in the eyes of the crowd'—though the act. is very rare in this sense (for συμβάλλεσθαι εἰς cp. *Laws* 905 C, *Tim.* 47 C, etc.); or better, συ<λλα>μβάνοντα, for which cp. Hdt. VII. 6, Ar. *Eq.* 229 etc.: otherwise ᾗ ἔδοξαν. Or, keeping the text, may we construe εἰς δ., 'satisfactorily,' with διεπέρανας?

For **δόξα πρός** c. gen. cp. *Laws* 950 C: δόξαν πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ... παρασκευάζεσθαι. δόξα παρά c. gen. occurs in *Phaedr.* 232 A, *Rep.* 612 D.

εἰς δόξαν is found in *Euthyd.* 305 D, meaning 'as far as common belief goes.'

ΣΩ. Περί γε τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς παθήμασι αἴτιοι τοῖς σώματος τῶν ἐπιπολῆς τε καὶ ἐντὸς κεραστέοισιν· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ <εἰ> σώματι τἀναντία ξυμβαίνει λύπην τε ἅμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς λύπην. ὅταν τε εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κρᾶσιν ἴέναι, ταῦτα ἐμπροσθεν μὲν διέλιπεν, ὡς, ὁπόταν αὖ κενῶται, πληρώσεως ἐπιλείπει· καὶ ἐπιόντων μὲν χαίρει, κενούμενος δὲ ἀλγεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐμπροσθεν ἐμπίπτει. νῦν δὲ λέγομεν, ὡς D ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα διαφερομένης ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πλήθει ἀμηχάνου οὖσι μίξις μία λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ξυμπίπτει γενομένη.

C. 2 ἐν. τῶν Ξ. 4 ἐν. τῶν Ξ. 5 ἐν. om. H. 6 ταῦτ' Γ, καὶ ταῦτα Ξ. 7 διέλιπε Ξ, Γ, διέλιπε Ξ. 8 ἐν. om. Γ. 8 δὴ τότε Ξ, ΔΗ.

D. 10 ἐν. om. Ξ.

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1. **περί γε τῶν ἡδονῶν . . κεραστέοισιν.** Badh.[2] would cancel κεραστέοισιν, for the strange reason that "it is not the outward and inward parts which are mingled." With τῶν κοιν. sc. παθημάτων.

3. **περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ κτλ.** This passage has caused much discussion. Stallb. thinks it clear that the sentence deals with "voluptatibus mixtis corpori et animo communibus." So after mentioning Buttmann's ἐν ψυχῇ <καὶ σώματι. ὅταν ψυχῇ> σώματι ταν. ξ., and Ast's ἐν ψ. <ἡ> σώμ., and Winckelmann's περὶ δὲ τῶν ἃ (or ἂν) ψυχὴ σωμ. τ. ξ.—which last he rejects on the ground that τῶν, sc. ἡδονῶν, is fem., not neut.—he suggests περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψ. καὶ σώματι, ὅτε τἀν. ξ., though allowing that this is hardly felicitous. Badh.[1] suggests περὶ δέ γ' ὧν (i.e. τούτων γ' ἃ), rendering: "But of those conditions (παθήματα), which in the mind contribute the opposite results to those of the body, both pleasure opposed to its pain, and pain opposed to its pleasure." Paley agrees that τῶν refers to παθημάτων, not ἡδονῶν, but rightly points out that Badh.'s ὧν involves the illegitimate attraction of the subject nomin. Paley himself suggests σώματι τἀναντία <ἃ> ξ. Badh.[2] writes: "I believe that of the words περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴ alone has any claim to legitimacy: that the damaged text was restored by a conjecture founded on the antithetical περί γε τῶν ἡδονῶν κτλ."; so he would emend the phrase to ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ψυχή κτλ. Poste suggests περὶ δὲ τῶν <ἐν αἷς> (or ὅτε) ψυχή, 'about the Pleasures where,' etc. Madv. emended to περὶ δὲ τῶν, εἰ ψυχὴ τ. τ. ξ.: Liebhold to π. δὲ τ. ἐν ψυχῇ ἡ σ. τ. ξ. ἐμβάλλεται. Apelt proposes ἐν ψυχῇ <εἰ> σωμ.: and another plausible conj. is ἐν ψυχῇ <ἡ> σώματι. Wb. follows Madv., and so too Gloël. I accept Apelt's correction as textually easiest, though with some hesitation.

6. **ὡς, ὁπόταν [αὖ] κενῶται.** This passage is no less unsatisfactory. From the use of αὖ together with the lack of a proper subject for κενῶται and the other verbs, Stallb. argues that the sentence is incomplete; and he proposes to supply the lacuna thus: "ὡς ὅταν μέν τις πληρῶται, χαίρει. ὁπόταν δ' αὖ κενῶται κτλ. ἐ. κτλ." Similarly Badh.[1] supposes 'a gap, which probably arose from the repetition of ὁπόταν'; while Badh.[2] conjectures for ὁπόταν αὖ κ., ὅστις ἂν κ. Hermann gives περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ <ὡς> σώμ....διήλθομεν, ὡς <δέ>, ὁπόταν αὖ κ. κτλ. Apelt would write ὡς ὁ πιών, ἂν αὖ κενῶται κτλ. (cp. 34 E); while Gloël suggests ὁπόταν τις κενῶται. I follow Wb. in merely bracketing αὖ, although not at all satisfied that we thereby obtain the true text.

10. **ξυμπίπτει γενομένη.** Badh.[1] wrote: "the elements of the μίξις are prior to the μίξις itself, and this may justify γενομένη; but γιγνομένη, though only conjectural, seems far more simple and natural": and Badh.[2] prints γιγνομένη. γιγν. was a former conj. of Stallb. afterwards retracted, when he thought he could defend the aor. as equal to ὅταν γένηται or ὅτε ἐγένετο. I see no point here in a departure from the regular pres. tense; though possibly the aor. may stand.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύεις ὀρθότατα λέγειν.

XXIX. ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν ἡμῖν τῶν μίξεων λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς λοιπὴ μία.

ΠΡΩ. Ποία, φῄς;

5 ΣΩ. Ἣν αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῇ πολλάκις λαμβάνειν σύγκρασιν φαμέν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ λέγομεν;

ΣΩ. Ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον | καὶ θρῆνον καὶ E
ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἆρ' οὐκ αὐτῆς
10 τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεσαι ταύτας λύπας τινάς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὰς ἡδονῶν μεστὰς εὑρήσομεν ἀμηχάνων; ἢ δεόμεθα ὑπομιμνήσκεσθαι τὸ ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε [τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ ταῖς ὀργαῖς τὸ] πολύφρονά περ χαλεπῆναι,

15 ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο, |
καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρήνοις καὶ πόθοις ἡδονὰς ἐν λύπαις οὔσας 48
ἀναμεμιγμένας;

3 λοιπὴ] λοι superscr. Cl.². 5 αὐτῆι Cl. 6 σύγκρισιν S. ἔφαμεν libri.
7 δὴ add. Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCFw Flor. a,b,c,i.
E. 10 τίθεσθαι w. 13 ὡστ' vel ὥστε Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCEFw. φαιηκε Π, ἔφη μὲν Γ. 15 ὥστε F, ὥστε ceteri. πολὺν Π, πάνυ Δ. καταλιβομένοιο Γ.
48 A. 16 πόθοις S cum mg. F: πότοις ceteri.

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4. **ποία, φῄς; ἣν αὐτήν** κτλ. So all MSS. and most edd. Stephens conj. ποίαν φῄς. Badh.² suggests that "the MS. had ημ' αὐτήν, the *rubricator* having neglected to put an initial φ"; and so he reads ποία; φημὶ αὐτήν κτλ., ejecting ἔφαμεν at the end of S.'s remark, since "it is quite untrue that they have said anything as yet on this mixture." A better explanation of ποία, φῄς; is that suggested to me by Dr Jackson—that the words belong to *Socr.*, who then returns answer to himself in ἣν...φαμέν. Ast proposed to eject σύγκρασιν, as tautologous after ἣν, which refers to μῖξιν. The latter change is needless; but as Badh.'s denial of previous mention of the present mixture is correct, and λέγομεν follows we must read (in l. 6) φαμέν.

7. **τοῦτ' αὐτὸ λ.**: τοῦτ' αὖ λ. conj. Ast.

8. **ὀργήν**. For a similar view of anger as a mixed pain, see Arist. *Rhet.* II. 2. 1 ff. ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης...καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἕπεσθαί τινα ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι...διὸ καλῶς εἴρηται περὶ θυμοῦ "ὅς τε πολὺ...ἀέξεται·" ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἡδονή τις διά τε τοῦτο κτλ., with Cope's n. *ad loc.*

13. **τὸ ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε** κτλ. The passage referred to, *Il.* 18. 107 ff. runs thus:
ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο,
καὶ χόλος, ὅς τ' ἐφ.***καταλειβομένοιο
ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται ἠΰτε καπνός.

After τὸ ὅς τ' ἐφ. the MSS. add τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ ταῖς ὀργαῖς τό, which Stephens proposed to insert after ὑπομ., ejecting the second τό: but most edd. follow Fischer in ejecting the whole phrase: "quis enim sanae mentis homo dixerit 'iram per iracundiam et iram immittere sapienti indignationem'?" (Stallb.). Klitsch, however, makes an effort to defend the phrase.

16. **τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρήνοις καὶ πόθοις ἡδονάς**. Paley comments: "though tears give *relief* in grief, and in this sense, 'there's bliss in tears'; yet Plato seems rather to have been thinking of tears of joy, when γεγηθὸς ἕρπει δάκρυον ὀμμάτων ἄπο. In this case, however, as mere emotion, not any mixture of grief, is the cause, the argument is not a sound one." Cp. the Homeric πᾶσιν δ' ἱμερόεις ὑπέδυ γόος (*Od.* 10. 398).

ΠΡΩ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω ταῦτά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν ξυμβαίνοι γιγνόμενα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τάς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἅμα χαίροντες κλάωσι, μέμνησαι;

5 ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τὴν δ' ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἆρ' οἶσθ' ὡς ἔστι κἀν τούτοις μῖξις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ πάνυ κατανοῶ.

ΣΩ. Παντάπασι γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ | Πρώταρχε, ἐν τούτῳ B

10 ξυννοεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτε πάθος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὔκουν ὥς γ' ἔοικεν ἐμοί.

ΣΩ. Λάβωμέν γε μὴν αὐτὸ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ σκοτεινότερόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ῥᾷον καταμαθεῖν τις οἷός τ' ᾖ μῖξιν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς.

15 ΠΡΩ. Λέγοις ἄν.

ΣΩ. Τό τοι νῦν δὴ ῥηθὲν ὄνομα φθόνου πότερα λύπην τινὰ ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας

20 ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται.

ΠΡΩ. | Σφόδρα γε. C

3 τε (post τάς) Σw. 4 κελεύουσι Π. 7 γε ΑΒC.
B. 12 αὐτὸς Γ. 13 ῥᾶον Cl. ΔΠ: ῥᾴδιον *S. 18 ὄντως w. 19 μὲν H. φωνῶν Ξ. 20 ἀναφανήσεται; Cl.

3. **τάς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις.** Cp. *Ion* 535 E, *Rep.* 605 C ff. ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδιοποιῶν χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑπόμεθα ξυμπάσχοντες,...ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ. This evidence for the highly emotional temperament of the Attic audiences is of much interest. (For other indications as to the character of audiences, see Haigh's *Attic Theatre*, ch. VII. § 5.) With κλάωσι a general subject, οἱ ἄνθρωποι, is to be supplied, as often: cp. *Cratyl.* 387 D, *Soph.* 228 D.

7. **ὡς ἔστι κἀν τούτοις μῖξις.** Badh.[2] brackets both κἀν τούτοις and ἐν τούτῳ with the note: "No ταῦτα have been mentioned, but the corrector was unfamiliar with so common an Atticism as οἶσθα τὴν διάθεσιν ὡς ἔστι μῖξις. Nor is ἐν τούτῳ (below) at all more intelligible; there the neuters αὐτὸ and σκοτεινότερον, which obviously refer to πάθος, were supposed to refer to some example or instance." But ἐν τούτοις, as a temporal phrase ('therein,' or 'thereupon,' more fully ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις, as 50 A), is independent of external relation, and so may stand here as a variant for ἐν ταύταις, sc. κωμῳδίαις. As ἐν τούτῳ seems to refer really to the διάθεσις, we must translate vaguely 'in this case'; but the phrase is unsatisfactory and needless.

16. **φθόνου...λύπην.** Cp. Arist. *Rhet.* II. 9. 3 λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶ καὶ εἰς εὐπραγίαν...τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου: id. *Eth. Nic.* II. 7. 1108[b] 1 ff. νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσιν τοῖς πέλας γινομένας κτλ.

19. **ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γε...σφόδρα γε.** This passage is cited in Stob. *Ecl.* p. 226.

οἱ πέλας, like οἱ πλησίον, is a common phrase in tragedy: cp. too *Laws* 671 B, 936 E. If asked, "Who, then, is my neighbour?" the answer would be "all with whom any sort of relation actually or possibly exists"; i.e. the phrase is one of indefinitely wide denotation.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν μὴν ἄνοια καὶ ἣν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτερίαν ἕξιν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει.

5 ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι δὴ πονηρία μέν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον, ἕξεώς τινος ἐπίκλην λεγομένη· τῆς δ' αὖ πάσης πονηρίας ἐστὶ τοὐναντίον πάθος ἔχον ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων.

10 ΠΡΩ. Τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε. τοὐναντίον | μὴν ἐκείνῳ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ D
μηδαμῇ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ γράμματος ἂν εἴη.

C. 1 ἄνοια libri: ἄγνοια S, Bekk. δὲ Cl. ΓΔΠ. ἀβελτέραν libri. 4 ἰδὲ Cl. Δ: ἴδε S. 6 ἔστιν Cl. 7 λεγομένην Π, λεγομένης w. 8 : τοὐναντίον H. 10 τὸ...eidem dat Cl. 11 : τοὐναντίον Cl.

D. 11 μὴν μὲν F. 12 αὐτὸν Cl.

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1. **κακὸν μὴν ἄνοια καὶ ἣν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτερίαν ἕξιν.** ἄγνοια is Cornarius' conj., accepted by Stephens, Bekk., Stallb., Badh., Poste, Wb. Hermann, however, retains ἄνοια, rightly, I think: cp. *Tim.* 86 B δύο...ἀνοίας γένη, τὸ μὲν μανίαν, τὸ δ' ἀμαθίαν: *Laws* 688 E ff. For ἀβελτέραν Dr Jackson (*J. of Ph.* vol. iv. p. 149) proposed ἀβελτερίαν, which I unhesitatingly adopt. ἀβέλτερος is elsewhere (*Rep.* 409 C, *Hipp. Maj.* 301 D) used by Plato of persons, and the following subst. would be very likely to change ἀβελτερίαν ('crassness,' *Theaet.* 174 C, *Symp.* 198 D) into the adj.

For the general sense, cp. *Soph.* 228 C, D ἔστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα...κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ ψυχῇ) γένη, τὸ μὲν πονηρία...τὸ δέ γε ἄγνοιαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κτλ.

6. **τὸ κεφάλαιον** is here adverbial, like ἐν κεφαλαίῳ (-οις): cp. *Symp.* 205 C, *Euthyph.* 8 E, *Critias* 108 E.

ἕξεώς τινος ἐπίκλην λεγομένη. The genitive is rightly taken by Ast, L. and S., Paley, and Badh. as dependent on ἐπίκλην, not on πονηρία as Stallb. and Poste would have it. The acc. absol. ἐπίκλην is cited very rarely outside of Plato, and it is noteworthy that he uses it only in *later* dialogues (*Soph.* 221 C, *Tim.* 38 C, 58 D, 66 B), where it denotes a *specific* name. Cp. the Homeric use of ἐπίκλησιν as acc. absol. with καλέειν, *Il.* 18. 487, 22. 506, etc.

7. **ἐστὶ τοὐναντίον πάθος ἔχον ἢ** κτλ. "Opus est ut aut cum Astio corrigatur τὸ τοὐν. π. ἐ., aut τὸ ἐναντίον π. ἐ. scribatur" (Stallb.). Badh.[2] says 'a subject to ἔχον is indispensable,' and accordingly inserts τι after ἐστί: but τὸ γελοῖον is to be supplied, as is shown by ἔχον, which echoes the foregoing ἔχει. I approve, however, of Ast's addition.

8. **τὸ λεγ. ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμ.** Cp. *Charm.* 164 D τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα: *Protag.* 343 B, *Phaedr.* 229 E, *Erast.* 138 A; Eur. *Hippol.* 265.

11. **τοὐναντίον μὴν ἐκείνῳ...εἴη.** Stallb. thinks a joke is here intended, and translates: "uerumtamen apertum est contrarium illi ab inscriptione dici τὸ μηδ. γιγν. ἑαυτόν." But Badh. writes: "it is better to bracket these words (λεγ. ὑπὸ τ. γ.), as Beck recommended, than to think Plato capable of such a frigid joke": and the words are bracketed by Poste. Schleierm. conj. γιγνώσκειν αὖ τὸν λεγ. κτλ. I think the corruption may lie in the word λεγόμενον, and would suggest λειπόμενον ... ἂν εἴη, 'is left unmentioned'; or perhaps γελώμενον, 'derided,' a rare pass., for which cp. Soph. *Ant.* 838. Herm. retains the suspected phrase, "quia satis venuste Delphico praecepto etiam contrarii sui appellatio tribuitur: si omnis malitiae contrarium Delphici praecepti verbis declaratur, contrarium hujus, hoc est malitiae fontem, idem velut negatione sui nuncupabit."

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ὦ Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τριχῇ τέμνειν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ φῄς; οὐ γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸς ὦ.

ΣΩ. Λέγεις δὴ δεῖν ἐμὲ τοῦτο διελέσθαι τὰ νῦν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Λέγω, καὶ δέομαί γε πρὸς τῷ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτοὺς κατὰ τρία ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν ἕκαστον;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι | πλου- E
10 σιώτερον ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰσὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ἔχοντες.

ΣΩ. Πλείους δέ γε, οἳ μείζους καὶ καλλίους αὐτοὺς δοξάζουσι, καὶ πάντα ὅσα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι διαφερόντως τῆς οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας.

15 ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πολὺ δὲ πλεῖστοί γε, οἶμαι, περὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶδος τὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήκασιν, ἀρετὴν δοξάζοντες βελτίους ἑαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντες.

2 ὦ πρ.... eidem dat Cl. δὲ Cl. ΔΠ. 3 μὴ om. pr. Π. δυνατὸν H. 5 λέγω add. Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCHw Flor. a,b,c,i, Stob. *Ecl. Eth.* 21. τὸ ΛΠ et pr. Δ.
E. 10 αὐτῶν Cl. 11 εἰσιν Cl. τοιοῦτο ΣBCH. ἔχοντος Ξ. 12 δέ γε] λέγε w. αὐτοὺς Cl. 13 πάνθ' Γ. 14 αὐτοῖς Cl. ΓΔΛΞΣBCHw Flor. a,b,c,i, αὐτῆς F: αὐτῆς *S. 16 πλεῖσταί Γ. 17 τούτων libri, quod ante ἐν ponunt Cl. ΔΠ, post ψυχαῖς *S. ἀρετὴν om. ΣBCHw Flor. a,b,c,i et pr. Ξ, ἀρετῆς *S.

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2. **ὦ Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δή.** δέ Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π, Stallb. δή V B T, Poste, Badh., Wb. For δέ Stallb. cites *Theag.* 127 C.

3. **οὐ γ. μὴ δυνατὸς ὦ.** For the rare *pres.* subj. with οὐ μή in denial cp. *Rep.* 341 B ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ οἷός τ' ᾖς, and see Goodwin *M. T.* § 295: Paley (after Madvig) would transpose to μὴ γὰρ οὐ δυν. ὦ, as the idiom 'more usual and more appropriate to the context,'—but 'potior lectio difficilior.'

5. **καὶ δέομαί γε,** 'nay more, I entreat you.' For καὶ...γε cp. Ar. *Ran.* 562, 564, 799 etc.: also 28 B *supra.*

6. **κατὰ τρία.** This recals the popular division of goods into the four classes of health, beauty, strength and wealth; for which cp. *Laws* 661 A, *Gorg.* 451 E.

9. **πλουσιώτερον ἢ κ. τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν.** Stephens conj. πλουσιωτέρους, and Badh. says the MS. reading is indefensible. The plural αὐτῶν relates to the virtual pl. ἕκαστον, as in *Laws* 754 D δι' ὧν ἂν ἕκαστος ἀπογράψῃ...τὸ πλῆθος τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας (cited by Stallb.), and *Rep.* 550 D. The reverse mode (e.g. καθ' ὅσον δύνανται ἕκαστος *Prot.* 327 E) is less rare.

Stallb., however, refuses to accept Baiter's correction of αὐτῶν for αὐτῶν: and Jackson, too, defends αὐτῶν, but (unlike Stallb.) takes it as neut. (sc. τῶν χρημάτων), citing *Phaedr.* 240 A οὐσίαν γ' ἔχοντα χρυσοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλης κτήσεως: but this construction is scarcely suitable here.

12. **μείζους καὶ καλλίους.** For this conjunction of stature with beauty cp. *Charm.* 158 A, *Alc.* I. 104 A, etc.

13. **διαφερόντως** c. gen., as in *Phaedo* 65 A, *Crito* 52 B, *Protag.* 328 B. ἀλήθεια is here 'Wirklichkeit' rather than 'Wahrheit.' We may either say that the neut. πάντα is here put in the stead of masc. adjj. to be understood, or else take πάντα as acc. of respect and supply some such word as χαρίεντας with εἶναι.

16. **περὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶδος τὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψ. δ.** Bekk., Stallb. and Poste, with

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀρετῶν δ' ἆρ' οὐ | σοφίας πέρι τὸ πλῆθος 49
πάντως ἀντεχόμενον μεστὸν ἐρίδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἐστὶ
ψευδοῦς;

5 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Κακὸν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἄν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὀρθῶς
ἂν εἴποι πάθος.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι διαιρετέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, δίχα, εἰ
10 μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἄτοπον ἡδονῆς καὶ
λύπης ὄψεσθαι μῖξιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν τέμνομεν δίχα, λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντες ὁπόσοι ταύτην τὴν ψευδῆ | δόξαν περὶ B
ἑαυτῶν ἀνοήτως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ

2 δὲ Cl.

49 A. 3 δοξοσοφίας ἐστὶ ψευδοῦς Π, δοξοσοφίας ἐστὶ ψεύδους Cl. ΓΔΛCHw Flor. a,b,c,i: δοξοσοφίας ἐστὶ καὶ ψεύδους *S. 9 δίχα om. Π. 12 : πῶς... Cl. τέμνομεν Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠBCEFHw Flor. a,b,c,i et corr. Σ: vulg. τέμνωμεν. λέγοις ἂν corr. Σ. 13 ante πάντες omisi ναί cum Cl. ΠΣ pr. Δ, Bekk. τὴν ψευδῆ ταύτην Γ. τὴν om. Λ.

Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π read τούτων ἐν ψ. δ. The older books had εἶδος ἐν τ. ψ. τούτων δ. Winckelmann conj. ἑαυτῶν ἐν τ. ψ. Stallb. suspects a corruption, saying "ante ἐν ταῖς ψ. desideratur articulus τό, quem iam olim revocandum censuimus." I follow Badh. and Wb. in reading τὸ τῶν for τούτων, of which conj. Paley says it is probable, though not necessary since "the words in this dialogue are purposely so interlaced, that the author may well have meant πολὺ πλεῖστοι τούτων."

2. **τῶν ἀρετῶν δ' ἆρ' οὐ σοφίας πέρι ...ψευδοῦς.** Stallb. comments: "σοφίας πέρι absolute dicitur nulla habita verbi ratione; cp. *Rep.* 538 E, *Phaedr.* 231 D, 250 C. Ad ἀντεχόμενον vero intelligendum relinquitur αὐτῆς, usu pervulgato." Badh.[2] writes, characteristically: "I myself was driven to a conjecture: ἀντίτεχνον ὄν, but fortunately I admitted it to be too audacious. These are the shifts to which we are driven by the dunce who inserted πέρι. I have no faith in ψευδοῦς, for who ever heard of δοξοσοφία ἀληθής?" Is not this also 'too audacious'? The expression δοξοσοφία ψευδής seems defended by τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν περὶ ἑαυτῶν below (l. 13); cp. also *Soph.* 231 B ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνόμενος ἔλεγχος. As to πέρι, one might propose either transposition, to join it to τῶν ἀρετῶν, or alteration to πέρα—'making extravagant claims universally,' cp. *Tim.* 29 D; or, lastly, περὶ...παντός.

For δοξοσοφία (or τὸ τὴν ἀμαθίαν τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ δοκεῖν σοφίαν εἶναι) traced to its source in φιλαυτία, see *Laws* 731 E ff.

10. **ἄτοπον**, i.e. οὐ ῥᾴδιον ξυννοεῖν 48 B. "The pleasure meant is that undoubtedly natural, though wrong, feeling which Plato attributes to envy, but which is not easy to analyse, that makes us like to hear others disparaged. The pain is the malady itself" (Paley).

12. **πῶς οὖν τέμνομεν δίχα, λέγεις;** So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π, etc., followed by Stallb., Herm. But Badh. and Poste follow the vulgate in giving τέμνωμεν. Wohlrab assigns πῶς...λέγεις; to Socr., and inserts Ναί. as Prot.'s reply, keeping τέμνομεν. Apelt proposes τεμνόμενον, "inwiefern nennst du es ein zwiefach geteiltes?" comparing, for the partic. with λέγω, 12 A, 22 E, 34 B, *Laws* 893 E, 900 E: and this is, perhaps, better than Jackson's ingenious δίχ' ἃ λέγεις ("how then do we divide into your two parts?"). Another possible corr. would be τμητέον: but in any case πῶς...λέγεις must be given to Prot., cp. 47 D *ad fin.*

13. **πάντες ὁπόσοι** κτλ. Observe the

ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ φθόνον ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸν τοῦτο ἀπεργαζόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Γελῶντας ἄρα ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων γελοίοις φησὶν ὁ λόγος, κεραννύντας ἡδονὴν [αὖ] φθόνῳ, λύπῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν ξυγκεραννύναι· τὸν γὰρ φθόνον ὡμολογῆσθαι λύπην τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτω ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μηνύει | δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν B
τραγῳδίαις <καὶ κωμῳδίαις>, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου ξυμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς ἅμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀδύνατον μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ καί τις φιλονεικοῖ πάνυ πρὸς τἀναντία.

XXX. ΣΩ. Ὀργὴν μὴν καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ φόβον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον προυθέμεθα | καὶ C

50 A. 2 τοῦτ' Cl. Γw. 5 αὖ add. Cl. Π. φθόνῳ λύπῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν in mg. ponit Δ. λύπην F. 6 σ(υγκ.) Cl., κεραννύναι Λ. 7 τῆς add. Cl. ΔΠ. ψυχὴν Π. 8 γίγνεσθαι δὲ Cl. ΔΠ: vulg. δὲ γίγν. τοῦτο libri. τοῖς om. pr. Ξ.

B. 10 δὴ Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCHw: δὲ *S. τε om. Π. 12 καὶ post ἀλλὰ om. Cl. ΔΠ. 13 ἡδονὰς ΓΛΕΗw. 14 μὴ] μὲν w. ταῦτ' Γ. 15 τι Π. φιλονεικεῖ Λ. πάνυ] πάντη EFS. 16 μὴν om. H.

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1. **ἡδονὴν δὲ...ἀπεργαζόμενον.** As ἡδ. depends on ἀπεργ., the τοῦτο is awkward, and Badh.[2] brackets it: Stallb., however, defends it after the fem. subst. by *Symp.* 219 C; and the irregular order should make us chary of suspecting it.

2. **ἔφαμεν** of all MSS. is altered to φαμέν by Stallb., "quod flagitat Protarchi responsi Ἀνάγκη."

5. **ἡδονὴν [αὖ] φθόνῳ.** ἡδ. φθόνῳ V B S T, Badh., Poste, Wb. Herm. retains αὖ of Bodl. with the note—"quo rarius Oxon. plura offert quam reliqui, eo major ejus auctoritas est." Possibly αὖ may be a corruption of ἀεί or should follow λύπῃ.

7. **ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτω,** i.e. φθόνον καὶ γέλωτα. This certain correction of τοῦτο is due, I believe, to Badh., and is adopted by Paley; Wb., however, retains the old text.

10. **ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις.** It is generally agreed by edd. that the text is corrupt; since a comparison with 47 E ff. shows that the mention of comedy here is indispensable. Stallb. once proposed to substitute κωμῳδίαις for τραγ., while Orelli suggested τρυγῳδίαις: but later Stallb. accepted God. Hermann's theory that the words καὶ κωμῳδίαις have fallen out after τραγῳδίαις. So too Badh.[1] says that "no doubt some words have been lost here"; but Badh.[2] brackets ἐν τραγῳδίαις as "an idle addition." I prefer Hermann's method, which had occurred to me independently, and print accordingly.

For the idea of life as a play, Stallb. refers to the commentators on *Petron.* c. 80, and Cic. *Cat. Maj.* c. 2. Cp. "All the world's a stage," etc.

16. **ὀργὴν μὴν καὶ πόθον** κτλ. For exactly the same list, though in a somewhat different order, see 47 E *supra.*

ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα, ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὑρήσειν μιγνύμενα τὰ νῦν πολλάκις λεγόμενα. ἦ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν, ὅτι θρήνου πέρι καὶ φθόνου καὶ ὀργῆς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν δὴ διαπεραν θέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Διὰ δὴ τί μάλισθ' ὑπολαμβάνεις με δεῖξαί σοι τὴν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ μῖξιν; ἆρ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν, ὅτι τήν γε ἐν τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς | ἄλλοις ῥᾴδιον κρᾶσιν D ἐπιδεῖξαι· λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφεῖναί με μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἰόντα δεῖν μηκύνειν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ σώματος καὶ κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις; νῦν οὖν λέγε, πότερα ἀφίης με ἢ μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας; εἰπὼν δὲ σμικρὰ οἶμαί σου τεύξεσθαι μεθεῖναί με· τούτων γὰρ ἁπάντων αὔριον ἐθελήσω | σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι E στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἣν Φίληβος ἐπιτάττει.

C. 1 φαμὲν Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 5 πάντ' Γ. διαπεραθέντα Σ. 9 με om. Π. 11 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις om. ΣF.

D. 12 σαυτῷ] ταυτῶι Cl. Δ, ταὐτὸ Π. 13 ἑόντα Π. 15 κενῇ Γ. 16 συγκεκερασμένης Γ, συγκεραμένης w. 17 ἀφείης Cl. Π. : εἰπὼν Cl. 18 με; Cl.

E. 19 βούλομαι Cl. ΓΔΞΠCHw Flor. a,b,c,i: βουλεύομαι *S.

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1. **ἔφαμεν**. So the vulgate, Bekk., Stallb., Herm., Wb.; but Bodl. has φαμέν, and so Turr. and Poste. The sense seems to demand the impf., which Badh.[2] strangely claims as "my correction of the MS. reading φαμέν."

10. **ἆρ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν...λύπαις.** πίστις is here 'evidence,' cp. *Phaedo* 70 B. Stallb. observes that the constr. changes from ὅτι...ῥᾴδιον (sc. ἐστίν) to the accus. and infin., for which cp. 63 B: this gives us ἀφεῖναί τινα followed by a neg. and infin. which is unusual, cp. *Laws* 635 A, *Rep.* 451 B; as is also the *aor.* infin. after πίστεως χάριν.

Badh.[1], however, denies that λαβόντα δὲ...ἀφεῖναι depends on πίστεως, the construction being ἆρ' οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνεις δεῖν ἀφεῖναι, while μηκύνειν depends immediately on ἀφ.; and so he marks an interrog. at ἐπιδεῖξαι, as does Poste. But Badh.[2] prefers to remove ἀφεῖναί με as a 'foolish comment.' Paley proposes ἀφ. με <καὶ> μηκ. Possibly δέον should be read for δεῖν, or else μηδ' ἔτι...πάλιν (or ἄδην) μηκ.: but if δεῖν be taken to govern ἀφεῖναι, change seems needless. **ἐκεῖνα** refers to πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά, repeated in τοῖς φόβοις κ. ἔ. κ. τ. ἄλλοις: in τοῖς ἄλλοις are included πόθος and ζῆλος.

17. **μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας.** For the use of ποιεῖν in this phrase cp. Dem. 392. 18: Cic. *ad Att.* 5. 20 Iconii diem fecimus: Anth. *Pal.* XI. 85 νύκτα μέσην ἐποίησε τρέχων. For the plur. (of "the night-watches") cp. *Prot.* 310 C, *Symp.* 217 D, *Rep.* 621 B; Ar. *Nub.* 2, Hdt. 4. 181.

οἶμαί σου τεύξεσθαι. Liebhold would insert παρά before σου: for the simple gen. cp. Soph. *O. C.* 1168.

20. **στέλλεσθαι.** For the metaphor from sea-faring cp. *Laws* 892 C, 893 B.

τούτων ἀναγκαιότατον ἕπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ῥώμην αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν, τοῖς δέ, οἶμαι, τοὐναντίον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ τοίνυν δίελε, καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσὶ μετ' ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελώμενοι τιμωρεῖσθαι, γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἶναι τἀληθῆ φθέγξει· τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι φοβεροὺς καὶ ἰσχυροὺς καὶ ἐχθροὺς προσαγορεύων | ὀρθότατον τούτων σαυτῷ λόγον ἀποδώσεις. C ἄνοια γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἐχθρά τε καὶ αἰσχρά· βλαβερὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πέλας αὐτή τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσίν· ἡ δ' ἀσθενὴς ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἴληχε τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν μῖξις ἐν τούτοις οὔπω μοι καταφανής.

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοίνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. | Λύπη τις ἄδικός ἐστί που καὶ ἡδονή; D

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς οὔτ' ἄδικον οὔτε φθονερόν ἐστι τὸ χαίρειν;

B. 1 τοῦτον F, τοῦτον Cl. 2 οἶμαι om. Σ. 4 ταύτην τοίνυν Π, τοίνυν ταύτην Γ. δίελαι Λ. 5 τοιοῦτοι om. Γ. 7 καὶ ἐχθροὺς om. Σw.
C. 8 τούτων Cl. ΔΠ, τοῦτον ceteri: τοῦτο S. 9 ἄνοι Π, ἄνοια ceteri. 10 αὐτή Heusdius: αὕτη libri. αὐτῆς Cl. ΔΠ: ταύτης *S. 11 τὴν om. F. εἴληχε τάξιν γε καὶ φύσιν Cl. ΔΠ: εἴληχε φύσιν *S. 13 οὔπω] πῶ Cl. Π. 14 δύναμιν λάβε ES.
D. 16 που add. Cl. ΔΠ.

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anacoluthon, the construction being changed at καθάπερ so that πάντες is left pendent, without a verb: one would expect πάντες...οἱ μὲν ῥώμην ἴσχουσιν, οἱ δὲ τ., or the like.

7. **φοβεροὺς καὶ ἰσχυροὺς καὶ ἐχθροὺς προσ.** Schleierm., Poste and Badh.[1] adopted Schütz's conj. αἰσχρούς for ἰσχυρούς; but thus, Stallb. objects, we get the word in a strange position between φοβερούς and ἐχθρούς: to remedy this Stallb. would follow Ven. Σ in omitting καὶ ἐχθρούς, so as to read simply φοβ. καὶ αἰσχροὺς προσ. For αἰσχρούς cp. *Soph.* 228 E τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἀγνοίας πάθος αἶσχος θετέον: and *Lach.* 193 D αἰσχρὰ ἡ ἄφρων τόλμα κτλ. Paley, however, refuses to accept either change, saying "ἰσχυρούς here bears the opprobrious sense of 'big bullies.' Hence ἰσχυρικός, 'of the character of a good fighter,' *Theaet.* p. 169 B. Cp. Dem. *Mid.* p. 559, ὁρῶντας τὴν τούτου ἀφορμήν, ἥπερ ἰσχυρὸν ποιεῖ καὶ φοβερὸν τὸν κατάπτυστον τουτονί." Badh.[2] brackets καί before ἐχθρούς.

The most plausible reading is, perhaps, that proposed by Vahlen and adopted by Wb., τιμ. καὶ ἰσχ. φοβ. καὶ ἐχθρ., which affords symmetry without other change than a slight one of order. Or τ. καὶ φοβ. αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἐχθρούς might be suggested.

10. **ἡ δ' ἀσθενής**, sc. ἄνοια, for ἡ τῶν ἀσθενῶν. Poste suggests that τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν, 'in fiction and in reality,' correspond to the previous distinction αὐτή τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες αὐτῆς 'both in real life and on the stage'; and he remarks that "Aristotle's definition of the Ridiculous (*A.P.* c. 5) seems to have been suggested by this passage."

18. **ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς** κτλ. For this unchristian sentiment, several interesting parallels are adduced by Stallb., e.g Solon 13, 5 (Bergk):—

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων ὁρῶντας ἔστιν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δὲ ἆρ' οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν ἄνοιαν εἴπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξοκαλίαν καὶ | ὅσα νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἐν τρισὶ λέγοντες εἴδεσι γίγνε- E σθαι, γελοῖα μὲν ὁπόσα ἀσθενῆ, μισητὰ δ' ὁπόσα ἐρρωμένα,
10 <φῶμεν> ἢ μὴ φῶμεν ὅπερ εἶπον ἄρτι, τὴν τῶν φίλων ἕξιν ταύτην ὅταν ἔχῃ τις τὴν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἄλλοις γελοίαν εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δ' οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτὴν ἄνοιάν γε οὖσαν εἶναι;

15 ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρομεν δὲ ἢ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπ' αὐτῇ γελῶμεν; |

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι χαίρομεν. 50

2 δέ om. FS. 3 ἆρ'] ἄρα Cl., ἅμα Π. ἄδικος F. 5 ἄνοιαν libri. εἴπωμεν Λ. 7 τὴν] τί S.
E. 8 δὴ add. Cl. ΔΠ. τρισὶν...εἴδεσιν Cl. 9 ὁπόσ' Γ. sequebatur μὴ: id om. Bekk. cum Cl. ΓΔΠ. 10 ἢ μὴ] ἡμῖν F, φῶμεν ἢ μὴ corr. Σ. 13—15 κακὸν...σφ. γε om. pr. ΞEF. 13 ἄνοιαν libri: ἄγνοιαν S, Bekk. γε om. Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 14 εἶναι Cl. ΓΔΠΣCFw.

εἶναι δὲ γλυκὺν ὧδε φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρόν;
τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν.

Archil. 65 (75) ἓν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα, τὸν κακῶς τι δρῶντα ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακοῖς. Eurip. *Fr.* ἐχθρὸν κακῶς δρᾶν ἀνδρὸς ἡγοῦμαι μέρος. Plat. *Crito* 49 B ΣΩ. οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν; ΚΡ. οὐ φαίνεται. Cp. *Rep.* 332 D, *Meno* 71 E; Xen. *Anab.* I. 9. 17.

2. **τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων.** The term φίλοι is not to be construed too precisely, since men are divided into the two classes only of foes and friends: so Stallb. warns us "cave igitur de amicis, qui vulgo dicuntur, hic cogitaveris."

7. **τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων...γελοίαν εἶναι.** The clearest explanation of this irregularly constructed sentence is afforded by Wb.'s revision which I follow: Wb. substitutes a comma for the period after ἐρρωμένα, and inserts φῶμεν before ἢ μὴ φῶμεν. Unless this addition be made, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν is surely bad grammar in the sense required, when Prot. replies πάνυ γε. Possibly ἢ μή is corrupted from some such word as πάντῃ, and possibly also we should expunge τήν and read γελοῖον. Badh. puts a dash, instead of a question-note, after ἐρρωμένα, with the comment: "The completion of the sentence would have been ἆρ' οὐ φατέον γελοῖον εἶναι καὶ κακόν; But instead of finishing the question, he breaks it into two, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν—; and κακὸν δ' οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν—;" Also he brackets the 2nd τῶν φίλων as a "perverse addition." And certainly, if τῶν φίλων belongs to ἕξιν, it is here inappropriate, as the ἀδύνατοι of 49 B are not necessarily 'friends,' and one might suggest, instead of expunging τῶν φίλων, to read τῶν φαύλων: but the text may stand if we connect the gen. with τις.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ φθόνον ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸν τοῦτο ἀπεργαζόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Γελῶντας ἄρα ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων γελοίοις φησὶν ὁ λόγος, κεραννύντας ἡδονὴν [αὖ] φθόνῳ, λύπῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν ξυγκεραννύναι· τὸν γὰρ φθόνον ὡμολογῆσθαι λύπην τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτω ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μηνύει | δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν B
τραγῳδίαις <καὶ κωμῳδίαις>, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου ξυμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς ἅμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀδύνατον μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ καί τις φιλονεικοῖ πάνυ πρὸς τἀναντία.

XXX. ΣΩ. Ὀργὴν μὴν καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ φόβον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον προυθέμεθα | καὶ C

50 A. 2 τοῦτ' Cl. Γw. 5 αὖ add. Cl. Π. φθόνῳ λύπῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν in mg. ponit Δ. λύπην F. 6 σ(υγκ.) Cl., κεραννύναι Λ. 7 τῆς add. Cl. ΔΠ. ψυχὴν Π. 8 γίγνεσθαι δὲ Cl. ΔΠ: vulg. δὲ γίγν. τοῦτο libri. τοῖς om. pr. Ξ.

B. 10 δὴ Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCHw: δὲ *S. τε om. Π. 12 καὶ post ἀλλὰ om. Cl. ΔΠ. 13 ἡδονὰς ΓΛΕΗw. 14 μὴ] μὲν w. ταῦτ' Γ. 15 τι Π. φιλονεικεῖ Λ. πάνυ] πάντη EFS. 16 μὴν om. H.

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1. **ἡδονὴν δὲ...ἀπεργαζόμενον.** As ἡδ. depends on ἀπεργ., the τοῦτο is awkward, and Badh.[2] brackets it: Stallb., however, defends it after the fem. subst. by *Symp.* 219 C; and the irregular order should make us chary of suspecting it.

2. **ἔφαμεν** of all MSS. is altered to φαμέν by Stallb., "quod flagitat Protarchi responsi Ἀνάγκη."

5. **ἡδονὴν [αὖ] φθόνῳ.** ἡδ. φθόνῳ V B S T, Badh., Poste, Wb. Herm. retains αὖ of Bodl. with the note—"quo rarius Oxon. plura offert quam reliqui, eo major ejus auctoritas est." Possibly αὖ may be a corruption of ἀεί or should follow λύπῃ.

7. **ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτω,** i.e. φθόνον καὶ γέλωτα. This certain correction of τοῦτο is due, I believe, to Badh., and is adopted by Paley; Wb., however, retains the old text.

10. **ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις.** It is generally agreed by edd. that the text is corrupt; since a comparison with 47 E ff. shows that the mention of comedy here is indispensable. Stallb. once proposed to substitute κωμῳδίαις for τραγ., while Orelli suggested τρυγῳδίαις: but later Stallb. accepted God. Hermann's theory that the words καὶ κωμῳδίαις have fallen out after τραγῳδίαις. So too Badh.[1] says that "no doubt some words have been lost here"; but Badh.[2] brackets ἐν τραγῳδίαις as "an idle addition." I prefer Hermann's method, which had occurred to me independently, and print accordingly.

For the idea of life as a play, Stallb. refers to the commentators on *Petron.* c. 80, and Cic. *Cat. Maj.* c. 2. Cp. "All the world's a stage," etc.

16. **ὀργὴν μὴν καὶ πόθον** κτλ. For exactly the same list, though in a somewhat different order, see 47 E *supra.*

ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα, ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὑρήσειν μιγνύμενα τὰ νῦν πολλάκις λεγόμενα. ἦ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν, ὅτι θρήνου πέρι καὶ φθόνου καὶ ὀργῆς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν δὴ διαπεραν θέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Διὰ δὴ τί μάλισθ' ὑπολαμβάνεις με δεῖξαί σοι τὴν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ μῖξιν; ἆρ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν, ὅτι τήν γε ἐν τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς | ἄλλοις ῥᾴδιον κρᾶσιν D ἐπιδεῖξαι· λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφεῖναί με μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἰόντα δεῖν μηκύνειν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ σώματος καὶ κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις; νῦν οὖν λέγε, πότερα ἀφίης με ἢ μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας; εἰπὼν δὲ σμικρὰ οἶμαί σου τεύξεσθαι μεθεῖναί με· τούτων γὰρ ἁπάντων αὔριον ἐθελήσω | σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι E στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἣν Φίληβος ἐπιτάττει.

C. 1 φαμὲν Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 5 πάντ' Γ. διαπεραθέντα Σ. 9 με om. Π. 11 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις om. ΣF.

D. 12 σαυτῷ] ταυτῶι Cl. Δ, ταὐτὸ Π. 13 ἑόντα Π. 15 κενῇ Γ. 16 συγκεκερασμένης Γ, συγκεραμένης w. 17 ἀφείης Cl. Π. : εἰπὼν Cl. 18 με; Cl.

E. 19 βούλομαι Cl. ΓΔΞΠCHw Flor. a,b,c,i: βουλεύομαι *S.

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1. **ἔφαμεν.** So the vulgate, Bekk., Stallb., Herm., Wb.; but Bodl. has φαμέν, and so Turr. and Poste. The sense seems to demand the impf., which Badh.[2] strangely claims as "my correction of the MS. reading φαμέν."

10. **ἆρ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν ... λύπαις.** πίστις is here 'evidence,' cp. *Phaedo* 70 B. Stallb. observes that the constr. changes from ὅτι...ῥᾴδιον (sc. ἐστίν) to the accus. and infin., for which cp. 63 B: this gives us ἀφεῖναί τινα followed by a neg. and infin. which is unusual, cp. *Laws* 635 A, *Rep.* 451 B; as is also the *aor.* infin. after πίστεως χάριν.

Badh.[1], however, denies that λαβόντα δὲ...ἀφεῖναι depends on πίστεως, the construction being ἆρ' οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνεις δεῖν ἀφεῖναι, while μηκύνειν depends immediately on ἀφ.; and so he marks an interrog. at ἐπιδεῖξαι, as does Poste. But Badh.[2] prefers to remove ἀφεῖναί με as a 'foolish comment.' Paley proposes ἀφ. με <καὶ> μηκ. Possibly δέον should be read for δεῖν, or else μηδ' ἔτι...πάλιν (or ἄδην) μηκ.: but if δεῖν be taken to govern ἀφεῖναι, change seems needless. **ἐκεῖνα** refers to πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά, repeated in τοῖς φόβοις κ. ἔ. κ. τ. ἄλλοις: in τοῖς ἄλλοις are included πόθος and ζῆλος.

17. **μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας.** For the use of ποιεῖν in this phrase cp. Dem. 392. 18: Cic. *ad Att.* 5. 20 Iconii diem fecimus: Anth. *Pal.* XI. 85 νύκτα μέσην ἐποίησε τρέχων. For the plur. (of "the night-watches") cp. *Prot.* 310 C, *Symp.* 217 D, *Rep.* 621 B; Ar. *Nub.* 2, Hdt. 4. 181.

οἶμαί σου τεύξεσθαι. Liebhold would insert παρά before σου: for the simple gen. cp. Soph. *O. C.* 1168.

20. **στέλλεσθαι.** For the metaphor from sea-faring cp. *Laws* 892 C, 893 B.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅσα λοιπὰ ἡμῖν διέξελθε ὅπῃ σοι φίλον.

XXXI. ΣΩ. Κατὰ φύσιν τοίνυν μετὰ τὰς μιχθείσας ἡδονὰς ὑπὸ δή τινος ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμίκτους πορευοίμεθ' ἂν ἐν τῷ μέρει. |

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. 51

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὴ πειράσομαι μεταβαλὼν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν αὐτάς. τοῖς γὰρ φάσκουσι λυπῶν εἶναι παῦλαν πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ πως πείθομαι, ἀλλ' ὅπερ εἶπον, μάρτυσι καταχρῶμαι πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὔσας δ' οὐδαμῶς, καὶ μεγάλας ἑτέρας τινὰς ἅμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, εἶναι δ' αὐτὰς συμπεφυρμένας ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεσιν ὀδυνῶν τῶν μεγίστων περί τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπορίας. |

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεῖς δ' αὖ τίνας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμβάνων B ὀρθῶς τις διανοοῖτ' ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας [καθαρὰς λυπῶν] παραδίδωσιν.

1 ἡμῖν λοιπὰ ΞF. 2 ἔξελθε Λ. 3 κατὰ... eidem dat Cl. λεχθείσας Π. 4 ὑπὸ] μετὰ Γ.

51 A. 7 δὲ w. μεταλαβὼν BCEF, μεταλαβὼν Hw Flor. a,i. ὑμῖν S. 10 πρὸς] ἐπὶ Γ. τὸ] τε Cl. ΔΠ. 12 αὖ τὰς Π. 13 σῶμα Cl. et pr. ΔΠ.

B. 16 τις om. Cl. ΠF et pr. Δ. 17 τε om. w.

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4. **ὑπὸ δή τινος ἀνάγκης.** For δή τις cp. *Polit.* 306 B, *Phaedo* 107 D, *Symp.* 179 C; Soph. *Antig.* 158.

7. **μεταβαλὼν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν αὐτάς.** "μεταλαβών Par. BCEFH. Pro ἡμῖν solus Steph. ὑμῖν invitis libris omnibus" (Stallb.). But Badh.[2] accepts the worse-supported reading in both cases. μεταβάλλω here may mean, as Ast phrases it, "permutando vel vicissim sumo," for which cp. *Phaedr.* 241 A (v.l. μεταλαβών), *Laws* 904 D, *Cratyl.* 405 D: or it may be intrans., 'changing,' for which cp. *Laws* 904 C, *Cratyl.* 439 E. **ἡμῖν** is defended by Stallb. as "urbanius; nam eo significat Socr., se etiam sua ipsius caussa rem esse explicaturum."

9. **μάρτυσι καταχρῶμαι.** Schütz conj. μάντεσι (cp. 44 C, 67 B), which is accepted by Ast and Herm., but rejected by Stallb., Poste, Wb. etc.

12. **εἶναι δ' αὐτάς.** These words are rashly cancelled by Badh.[2] as "interrupting the continuity of the description."

19. **καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ..παραδίδωσιν.** Stallb. declares this passage manifestly corrupt, and proceeds: "tria suppetunt ulceris remedia: ut aut καὶ ante καθαρὰς inseramus, aut ἡδείας exterminemus, aut καθαρὰς λυπῶν tanquam glossema eiiciamus": of these alternatives he accepts the 3rd—"fluxit enim καθαρὰς λυπῶν ex interpretatione scioli alicuius, qui αἰσθητοὺς (*sic*) καὶ ἡδείας expli-

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ λέγομεν οὕτως;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς δῆλά ἐστιν ἃ λέγω, πειρατέον | μὴν δηλοῦν. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐχ ὅπερ C
ἂν ὑπολάβοιεν οἱ πολλοὶ πειρῶμαι νῦν λέγειν, ἢ ζῴων ἤ τινων
5 ζωγραφημάτων, ἀλλ' εὐθύ τι λέγω, φησὶν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περι-
φερὲς καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ τά τε τοῖς τόρνοις γιγνόμενα ἐπίπεδά
τε καὶ στερεὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς κανόσι καὶ γωνίαις, εἴ μου μανθάνεις.
ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρός τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ ἄλλα, ἀλλ'
ἀεὶ καλὰ καθ' αὑτὰ πεφυκέναι καί τινας ἡδονὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν, |
10 οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κνήσεων προσφερεῖς· καὶ χρώματα δὴ τοῦτον D
τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα † καλὰ καὶ ἡδονάς. ἀλλ' ἆρα μανθάνομεν,
ἢ πῶς;

1 ταῦτ' Γ. οὕτω Cl.
C. 3 κάλλος Flor. i, καλῶς Cl. Π: κάλλους S. ἢ Cl. ΔΠ: οἷον *S, Bekk.
D. 10 κνήσεων Heusdius: libri κινήσεων. δή που ΞF Flor. a,b,c S.

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care vellet, nec tamen satis reputaret, ad τὴν καθαρότητα τῶν λυπῶν illud quoque requiri, quod in priore sententiae parte memoratur, ut ἔνδειαι sint ἀναίσθητοι καὶ ἄλυποι." Jackson, too, agrees in condemning καθ. λυπῶν "as an interpretation of ἀλύπους." Contrariwise, Badh. (like Klitsch) declares that the words καθ. λυπῶν "neither require a conjunction to precede them, nor is there the least ground of suspicion against them; they are added as descriptive of the manner in which the πληρώσεις are ἡδεῖαι." But πληρώσεις are always purely ἡδεῖαι, and the present clumsy tautology seems indefensible. Paley's rendering seems to imply a καί before καθαράς, but he has no note on the matter.

2. **πάνυ μὲν οὖν...πειρατέον μὴν δ.** Badh.[2] brackets οὖν with the note: "Socrates is not correcting but conceding; and in this sense μὲν οὖν cannot be employed. But if μὲν is in apodosis to a suppressed δὲ contained in μήν (while οὖν characterises the answer), the particle after it would most certainly be γοῦν. We must either restore this—but γοῦν οὐκ usually becomes οὔκουν—γε, or suppose οὖν itself to be owing to the frequent combination of μὲν and οὖν." Certainly μέν and οὖν must not be construed together, and πάνυ μὲν γοῦν would be nearly as strange a collocation. It is possible that πάνυ should be πάντα: but the present phrase may well stand.

4. **λέγειν, ἢ ζῴων ἤ τ. ζ.** So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π., Turr., Badh., Poste: but Bekk., Stallb., and Wb. prefer the vulgate λ. οἷον ζῴων ἤ τ. ζ. Poste remarks that "the Beauty of the sphere is referred in the *Timaeus* to its equality and similarity, species of Unity": and these views of Plato are generally traced to Pythagorean influence.

6. **τά τε τοῖς τόρνοις.** Hesychius defines τόρνος as ἐργαλεῖον τεκτονικόν, ᾧ τὰ στρογγύλα σχήματα περιγράφεται: hence the 'surfaces' described by such an instrument will be circles, and the 'solids' spheres (περιφερές); while triangles, squares, cubes (εὐθύ τι) will be produced by the rule and square. For the value of the circle cp. *Tim.* 33 B (κυκλοτερὲς αὐτὸ ἐτορνεύσατο, πάντων τελεώτατον σχημάτων), and the Pythagorean speculations.

8. **πρός τι καλά**, 'absolutely, not relatively, beautiful': see *Charm.* 168 B for illustrations of relativity.

10. **ταῖς τῶν κνήσεων προσφερεῖς.** This is van Heusde's correction of κινήσεων, now generally accepted, though not by the Zürich editors. The pleasures of 'scratchings' are accidental, due to the presence of previous discomfort.

11. **καλὰ καὶ ἡδονάς.** These words are bracketed by Stallb. and Badh., as a gloss—otherwise, says Stallb., "additum vellemus αὐτῶν οἰκείας." Paley, after Klitsch, defends the phrase, rendering "So, too, the colours I refer to are those which are beautiful because they are of the same general character, and the same in the pleasures they produce"—

ΠΡΩ. Πειρῶμαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες· πειράθητι δὲ καὶ σὺ σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ †τὰς τῶν φθόγγων τὰς λείας καὶ λαμπρὰς τὰς ἕν τι καθαρὸν ἱείσας μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον καλὰς ἀλλ' αὐτὰς καθ' αὐτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων ξυμφύτους ἡδονὰς ἑπομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. | Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἧττον μὲν τούτων θεῖον γένος E ἡδονῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμῖχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγκαίους λύπας, καὶ ὅπῃ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ τυγχάνει γεγονὸς ἡμῖν, τοῦτ' ἐκείνοις τίθημι ἀντίστροφον ἅπαν. ἀλλ', εἰ κατανοεῖς, ταῦτα εἴδη δύο <ὧν> λέγομεν ἡδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Κατανοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις προσθῶμεν | τὰς περὶ τὰ 52

3 ταλείας Cl. 4 ἰούσας Π, ἰούσας Cl. καλὰς om. Cl. Π et pr. Λ. 5 πάντων, γρ. τούτων, F. ξυμφύτους καὶ ἡδονὰς F.

E. 7 δὲ om. Σw. τούτων om. EFS. 8 τῷ F. ἀναγκαίας S. 10 ἐκείνης wS. 11 λεγομένων libri. 13 δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις] νῦν δὴ τούτοις Γ, δὴ τούτοις τοίνυν Π.

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as if ὡς ἔχοντα: but this is very forced. I propose ἔχοντα καθαρὰς ἡδονάς, taking τοῦτον τὸν τύπον (like τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον) as adv. acc. Badh. formerly conj. κάλλους καὶ ἡδονῆς.

3. **τὰς τῶν φθόγγων.** As ἡδονάς cannot be here supplied, Stallb. bids us write τῶν φωνῶν, omitting τάς: to which Badh. replies, "it is more likely that Plato would use φθόγγων, as he had done so before, and as it is more comprehensive than φωνῶν," and he suggests to supply a femin. noun such as ἰδέας to τάς. Paley proposes λ. δὴ τῶν φθογγῶν (fem.), omitting also εἶναι after αὐτάς: which may be right. Poste follows Stallb., and Herm. gives καὶ τῶν φωνῶν. Wb. has λ. δὴ ἰὰς τῶν φθόγγων, using the rare word ἰά found in Orac. ap Hdt. 1. 85, Aesch. *Pers.* 936, Eur. *Rhes.* 553. This makes a kind of play with ἱείσας, and is graphically close to the MSS., but I should prefer the commoner ἠχάς (ἠ- lost after δή): cp. *Crito* 54 D, *Tim.* 37 B ἄνευ φθόγγου καὶ ἠχῆς.

For the qualities of sound cp. *Tim.* 67 B, 80 A ff., *Polit.* 307 A; Arist. *de An.* 419^{b} 4 ff.

8. **τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμῖχθαι ... ἅπαν.** Stallb. renders thus: "Dass aber ihnen (den Lüsten, welche die Gerüche gewähren) nicht nothwendig Schmerz beigemischt ist, und die Art und Weise *wie*, und dasjenige, *woran* uns *dieses* (dass sie frei von Schmerz sind) zu Theil geworden ist, *alles* das setze ich als etwas, was zu jenen ein Gegenstück ist und ihnen vollkommen entspricht"—"nam articulus τὸ infin. μὴ ξυμ. praemissus etiam ad ὅπῃ τοῦτο—ἡμῖν intelligendus est: similiter supra 28 D, τὸ ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν." For the process cp. *Rep.* 584 C, and *Tim.* 65 A, where it is attributed to 'the gradual and insensible degradation of the organ,' as Poste remarks.

10. **ἐκείνοις ἀντίστροφον,** 'the one mental, the other bodily' (Paley): for ἀντίστρ. cp. 40 D *supra*.

ἀλλ', εἰ κατανοεῖς,... <ὧν> λέγομεν ἡδονῶν. I adopt Jackson's transposition, ὧν λέγομεν ἡδονῶν, for the traditional λεγομένων ἡδ. Ast conj. ἀλλ' ἢ...ἡδονῶν; Winckelmann ἀλλ' εἰ... ἡδονῶν;—both making the clause interrog. Heindorf conj. λέγομεν τῶν ἡδ., accepted by Schleierm.; while Badh. and Wb. give λέγομεν ἡδ., and Schütz ἐλέγομεν ἡδ. Stallb., as usual, retains the MS. text, and transl. "sed, si iam rem perspicis, haec duo sunt genera voluptatum a nobis illustratarum"—supplying ὑφ' ἡμῶν to λεγομένων. Since we are here dealing not with ἡδοναί at large but only with ἀληθεῖς ἡδ., we need some qualifying term, and Jackson's conj. best supplies this.

μαθήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὗται πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀλγηδόνας ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὕτω ξυνδοκεῖ.

5 ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἐὰν ὕστερον ἀποβολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίγνωνται, καθορᾷς τινὰς ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλγηδόνας;

ΠΡΩ. Οὔ τι φύσει γε, ἀλλ' ἔν τισι λογισμοῖς, τοῦ μαθήματος, ὅταν | τις στερηθεὶς λυπηθῇ διὰ τὴν χρείαν. B

10 ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ μακάριε, νῦν γε ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρὶς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαπεραίνομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ τοίνυν λέγεις, ὅτι χωρὶς λύπης ἡμῖν λήθη γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν.

ΣΩ. Ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμίκτους

15 τε εἶναι λύπαις ῥητέον καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ῥητέον;

XXXII. | ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἤδη διακεκρίμεθα C χωρὶς τάς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτους

20 ὀρθῶς ἂν λεχθείσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρίαν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τοὐναντίον ἐμμετρίαν· καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὖ καὶ πολλάκις καὶ ὀλιγάκις γιγνο-

52 A. 2 πεινῆν ΓΛBCEFH. 3 γενομένας Cl. ΔΠ: γιγνομένας *S. 5 δαὶ ΓΔ et Cl.[2]. πληρωθεῖσιν Schützius: libri πληρωθεισῶν. 6 καθαρᾶς Λ. ἐν αὐταῖς τινὰς Ξ. 8 οὔ τι] ἰόντι Γ. τισι] τι pr. Δ. 9 παθήματος ΛΗ, Flor. a,c, παθήματος E, μαθήματος BC: μαθήματος *S.

B. 10 αὐτὰ τὰ Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCHτυ Flor. a,b,c,i: αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ *S. 11 μόνα F. 12 ἡμῖν om. Λ. ἀληθῆ Cl. ΔΠ. 13 γίνεσθ' Cl. 15 τε om. Σ. λύπης Λ Flor. b,i.

C. 18 οὐκ ἂν Π. ὅτι H. 20 ὀρθῶς om. Λ. ἂν om. Cl. Π et pr. Δ. μὲν om. Λ. σφόδρα Δ. 21 ἀμετρίαν Λ. 22 τὸ ante σφοδρὸν om. Σ. αὖ om. F et pr. Ξ.

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1. **πείνας...τοῦ μανθάνειν**: for this metaph. use (like our 'hunger and thirst after righteousness') cp. Xen. *Oec.* 13. 9, *Cyrop.* VIII. 3. 16: similarly, διψῶ ἐλευθερίας, *Rep.* 562 C.—Poste cites *Eth. Nic.* VII. 12, and X. 2. 1173[b] 16 ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἵ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ...αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὁράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνῆμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες.

5. **μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν**: so most edd. after the conj. of Schütz and Schleierm. MSS. πληρωθεισῶν. Van Heusde conj. πληρωθείς τις.

8. **λογισμοῖς, τοῦ μαθήματος**: so the best MSS., followed by Wb.: but Bekk., Stallb., Poste, and Badh. accept τοῦ παθήματος, i.e. τοῦ ἀποβαλεῖν μαθήματα, "in the account they take of the accident" (Badh.).

12. **ἀληθῆ...λήθη**. Notice the word-play both here and below in μετρίως... ἀμετρίαν...ἐμμετρίαν.

20. **προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ...καὶ πολλάκις** κτλ. Badh.[2] rewrites thus: π. τ. λ. τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὐτῶν καὶ πολλ. κτλ.; and below he cuts out προσθῶμεν αὐταῖς before εἶναι. Stallb. says: "verba sic fere refingas: καὶ τὰς τὸ μ. κ. τὸ σφ.

μένας τοιαύτας [τῆς] τοῦ ἀπείρου γε ἐκείνου καὶ ἧττον καὶ μᾶλλον διά τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς φερομένου προσθῶμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι γένους, | ταῖς δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐμμέτρων. D

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

5 ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε αὐτῶν διαθεατέον.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι; τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ εἰλικρινὲς ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ

10 τὸ ἱκανόν;

1 τῆς] τοῖς Σ. γ' Cl. ΓΔΛΠΗ Flor. b,i, τ' ΣBCw: τέ γ' *S. 3 αὐτὰς corr. Σ: αὐταῖς cet.
D. 3 ταῖς Cl.: τὰς *S, Bekk. μὴ om. Cl. Π et pr. Δ. ἀμέτρων Λ.
6 διαθεατέον corr. Σ: διαθετέον cet. 9 τε post σφόδρα om. Γ. καὶ] ἢ Γ.
τὸ ante πολὺ om. Λ.

αὖ δεχομένας κ. π. κ. ὁλ. γ. τοι. τοῦ ἀπείρου γ' ἐκ. κ. ἢ. κ. μ. δ. τ. σ. κ. ψ. φερ. θῶμεν αὐτὰς εἶ. γ., τὰς δ. μ. τ. ἐ." The extrusion of τῆς before τοῦ ἀπείρου was conj. by Stephens; and αὐτάς, for αὐταῖς, is found in Ven. Σ.

Paley suggests the insertion of δεχομένου after ἧττον καὶ μᾶλλον, cp. 25 C. Apelt proposes καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὖ, κἂν πολλάκις κἂν ὀλιγάκις γιγνομένας τοιαύτας θῇς, τοῦ ἀπείρου γ' ἐκείνου κτλ., "wir wollen den charakter des starken und heftigen, magst du nun annehmen dass die lüste sich oft oder dass sie selten sich zu solcher höhe steigern, ihnen zurechnen als zu dem geschlecht des unbegrenzten gehörend." (For κἂν...κἂν, cp. *Polit.* 296 D.) Wb. follows Stallb. in adding τάς and δεχομένας, and bracketing τῆς and προσ(θῶμεν): he also brackets αὖ. Poste remarks that "if, as Badham proposes, we read γενεᾶς for γένους, the reading of the MSS., no other alteration is necessary": but it is surely over-bold to say, as he does, that "τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν is equivalent to τὰς μεγάλας καὶ τὰς σφοδράς." Hirzel too accepts γενεᾶς. I think the last clause may stand as in the MSS. (viz. τοῦ ἀπείρου γε ἐκ....προσθῶμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι γένους, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τ. ἐ.), except for the change of αὐταῖς to ταύταις: the former part I would reconstruct thus: καὶ τὸ μ. κ. τ. σφ. ἂς κἂν πολλάκις κἂν ὀλιγάκις <δεχομένας> γιγνομένας <τε> τοιαύτας ἴδῃς κτλ. But all proposed restorations are so dubious that I print the MS. text, merely bracketing the impossible τῆς.

6. **διαθεατέον**: Van Heusde's corr. for διαθετέον, confirmed by Ven. Σ, and now generally accepted.

8. **πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι** is construed by Stallb. 'veritati consentaneum esse,' 'ad veritatem facere,' on the analogy of πρὸς λόγον, πρὸς ἡδονὴν εἶναι. But Badh. affirms that the only admissible meaning of the words is 'in relation to truth.' Paley conj. πρὸς ἀληθείας, 'on the side of truth,' and ὁπότερον for τί ποτε: τί πρότερον was a former conj. of Badh. Apelt would punctuate τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι; πρὸς ἀλ. εἶναι κτλ., and for ἱκανόν he suggests, doubtfully, μανικόν. Badh.[2] prints τ. π. χρ. φ. π. ἀλ. εἶναι τὸ καθ. τε καὶ εἰλ. καὶ τὸ σφ. τε [καὶ τὸ] πολὺ καὶ [τὸ] μέγα, καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλόν; As to the alteration of ἱκανόν, B. writes "μέτρον which is just disposed of, and ἀλήθεια and κάλλος are those Ideas which play a most important part in the concluding pages of the Dialogue. Also, in the very next page, ἀληθέστατον and κάλλιστον, κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον, ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλλίων are dwelt on together in the conclusion of the argument here started. Now what was to be proved must have been propounded; and it cannot have been propounded elsewhere." I would accept τί πρότερον (or τί ποτε πρότερον), and transpose καὶ τὸ ἱκανόν to follow εἰλικρινές. In this latter change I find myself anticipated by the independent conj. of Dr H. Jackson: but perhaps we need the further change of σμικρόν or μανόν (*Laws* 734 C) in place of ἱκανόν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί ποτ' ἄρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτᾷς βουλόμενος;

ΣΩ. Μηδέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων ἡδονῆς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ | τὸ μὲν ἄρ' αὐτῶν ἑκατέρου καθαρόν ἐστι, E
τὸ δ' οὐ καθαρόν, ἵνα καθαρὸν ἑκάτερον ἰὸν εἰς τὴν κρίσιν
5 ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ καὶ ξυνάπασι τοῖσδε ῥᾴω παρέχῃ τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, περὶ πάντων, ὅσα καθαρὰ γένη λέγομεν, οὑτωσὶ διανοηθῶμεν· προελόμενοι πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἕν τι διασκοπῶμεν. |

10 ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν προελώμεθα; 53

ΣΩ. Τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον, εἰ βούλει, θεασώμεθα γένος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν λευκοῦ καὶ τίς καθαρότης ἡμῖν εἴη;
15 πότερα τὸ μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλεῖστον ἢ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον, ἐν ᾧ χρώματος μηδεμία μοῖρα ἄλλη μηδενὸς ἐνείη;

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μάλιστα εἰλικρινὲς ὄν.

Right? ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς. ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο ἀληθέστατον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, καὶ ἅμα δὴ κάλλιστον τῶν λευκῶν πάντων | θήσομεν, B
20 ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλεῖστον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον;

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατά γε.

1 ἄρ' Γ. ἐρωτᾶ Λ. : βουλόμενος; Cl. 2 ἐπιλειπεῖν Π. 3 ἢ Π. E. 4 ἰὼν Cl. 5 καὶ post σοὶ om. Δ. ῥάως ΓΛΞEFH. 7 πάντα Γ et corr. Δ. γένει Π. 8 ἐν τίσι Cl. Π. σκοπῶμεν Cl. Γ et post lituram Δ.

53 A. 11 πρῶτον Cl. ΔΠ: πρώτοις *S. 14 ἂν Cl. ΔΠ: αὖ *S. 15 ἀκρατότατον H et corr. Σ, ἀκρότατον γρ. ΣBCEvv. 16 ἄλλη] ἀλλὰ ἡ Cl. ἐνείη Cl ΔΠ: ἂν εἴη *S. 17 τὸ om. Λ. μάλιστ' εἰλ. Cl., μάλισθ' εἰλ. Γ. 18 : ἆρ' Cl. οὐ add. Cl. ΔΠ. του Π. 19 δὴ] δὴ καὶ F.

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4. **ἰὸν εἰς τὴν κρίσιν...παρέχῃ τὴν κρίσιν.** Badh. proposed to read εἰς τὴν κρᾶσιν, and Paley would either adopt this change or omit the final τὴν κρίσιν as a gloss. The former conj. is plausible and the phrase ὥστ' εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κρᾶσιν ἰέναι 47 C speaks strongly in its favour, but in view of 33 A *supra*, and εἰς κρίσιν ἄγων *Laws* 856 C, I hesitate to desert the MSS. Poste accepts κρᾶσιν, but Wb. retains κρίσιν. Cp. 55 C, where a like doubt occurs.

15. **τὸ ἀκρατέστατον**, superl. from ἄκρατος, as if from ἀκρατής: cp. ἀκρατέστερος Ar. *Probl.* 3. 3, Hyperid. ap. Ath. 424 D.

16. **ἄλλη** is changed by Badh. to ἄλλου, which he thinks 'absolutely necessary for the sense': perhaps ἀλλὰ ἡ of Bodl. points to ἀλλοία.

ἐνείη is the reading of Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π and recent edd. for vulgate ἂν εἴη. For the omission of ἂν Stallb. compares 60 C μηδενὸς...ἔχειν (sc. ἄν), *Gorg.* 521 C; but, as Badh. observes, ἂν with the descriptive relative would be as bad grammar as ἂν with εἰ and the opt.

As predicate to the sentence, supply λευκὸν ἂν εἴη ἡμῖν καθαρόν.

ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν ἄρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν μεμιγμένου πολλοῦ λευκοῦ λευκότερον ἅμα καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον ἐὰν φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐροῦμεν ὀρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐ δή που πολλῶν δεησόμεθα παραδειγμάτων τοιούτων ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἡδονῆς περὶ λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ νοεῖν ἡμῖν αὐτόθεν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ξύμπασα ἡδονὴ σμικρὰ μεγάλης | καὶ ὀλίγη πολλῆς, καθαρὰ λύπης, ἡδίων καὶ ἀλη- C
θεστέρα καὶ καλλίων γίγνοιτ' ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν, καὶ τό γε παράδειγμα ἱκανόν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε; ἆρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν, ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

B. 1 μεμιγμένον Π. 2 λευκοῦ] καθαροῦ Cl. II et pr. (ut videtur) Δ. κάλλιστον Π. 5 δεθησόμεθα F. 6 λέγον Π.
C. 10 γε] δὲ Π. παράδειγμα ἱκανὸν in mg. ponit Δ. 11 δαὶ Cl.² Δ. τὸ] τὸν Γ, περὶ τὸ pr. E. 12 ἀεὶ Δ. 13 : κομψοὶ Ξ. δὴ ΓΞ.

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1. **σμικρὸν ἄρα καθαρόν** κτλ. "A pure white though small is after all at once whiter, fairer, truer than a large piece of adulterated white." Ficinus wrongly renders: "Si ergo, quod parvum purumque album est, admixto multo albo, albius simul et pulchrius et verius esse dicamus—": for the mixing of white with *white* could not affect its purity.

For χρῶμα λευκόν as a stock ex. of colour, cp. *Theaet.* 153 D, Arist. *de An.* 418ᵃ 21.

7. **σμικρὰ μεγάλης καὶ ὀλίγη πολλῆς, κ. λ.** The genitives follow the comparatives ἡδίων etc., and we must supply with them μεμιγμένης, which in fact Heindorf proposed to insert after μεγάλης: but the late position of καθαρὰ λύπης, as contrasted with that of καθαρόν in the corresponding clause above, tells I think against the insertion of μεμιγμ., in the position proposed at least. I would suggest, however, that λύπης is unnecessary —the bare καθαρά here matching better with the bare καθαρόν above, and may represent an original μικτῆς. Another conjecture is J. Krähenbühl's (*Jhrb.* 1874) καθαρὰ ἀκαθάρτου for κ. λύπης.

13. **κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες.** This is usually understood, as by Poste, Stallb. and Trendelenburg, to refer to Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school: Badh. suggests that the Heracliteans and Protagoreans may be included (cp. Protagoras' dictum, οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεται *Theaet.* 152 D): Peipers suggests the Atomists (cp. 43 B n.); Reinhardt, Euclides. It is difficult to determine either how far the Cyrenaics were influenced by Heracl. and Protag., or with what degree of precision Plato alludes to contemporary doctrines (cp. Campbell, *Introd.* to *Theaet.* pp. xxx ff.).

15. **τί δή;** Upon this Badh.² comments thus: "Protarchus' answer is not germane to the question ἆρα οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν. Probably the words belong not to Prot. but to Socr., who stops himself and says τί δέ; διαπεράνωμαι κ. τ. ἑ. To which Prot. answers not by an ungracious Λέγε but by Ὦ φίλε, λέγε κ. τ. ἑ. This will rid us of the absurd collocation ὦ Πρώταρχε φίλε." To this we may reply that λέγε is neither uncommon nor necessarily ungracious—that the voc. of address with epithet is more natural in Socr.'s mouth than in Prot.'s—that Prot's τί δή; ('Why, pray?') may apply only to the final words of Socr. οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν—and that the order ὦ Πρ. φίλε is sufficiently defensible (see Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 277), the φίλε being added as a subst. in

ΣΩ. Διαπερανοῦμαί σοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτῶν, ὦ Πρώταρχε | φίλε. D

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε καὶ ἐρώτα μόνον.

XXXIII. ΣΩ. Ἔστὸν δή τινε δύο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς τούτω καὶ τίνε λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον ἀεὶ πεφυκός, τὸ δ' ἐλλιπὲς ἐκείνου.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγ' ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Παιδικά που καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τεθεωρήκαμεν ἅμα καὶ ἐραστὰς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τούτοις τοίνυν ἐοικότα δυοῖν οὖσι δύ' ἄλλα ζήτει κατὰ | πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι. E

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρῶ, λέγε σαφέστερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅ τι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν τι ποικίλον, ὦ Πρώταρχε· ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ἐρεσχηλεῖ νῷν, λέγει δ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕνεκά του τῶν ὄντων ἔστ'

1 διαπερανοῦμαι...] haec non alteri dat Ξ. τοῦτο Cl. αὐτὸ om. Cl. ΔΠ.
D. 4 δύω Cl. ΓΑΣBCFH. 5 δ' Cl. 6 τοῦτο Cl. Π. 7 ἐλλειπὲς Cl. (?).
9 λέγ' ἔτι Cl. Δ: λέγε τι *S. 10 καλὰ] πολλὰ Δ. κἀγαθὰ Γ: καὶ ἀγαθὰ *S.
13 δύο Cl. ζήτει Cl. ΔΑΠΣF: ζητεῖ *S.
E. 14 πάνθ' Cl. Γ. 15 τὸ τρίτον ἑτέρῳ: (quod non alteri dant) libri, τι ἕτερον corr. Σ. 16 ὅτι καὶ λέγεις ΞF. 18 ἐρεσχερεῖ Γ, ἐρεσχηλεῖ corr. Cl. τούτων Cl.

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apposition, rather than as an epithet. But as the order seems unexampled in Plato, there is perhaps some corruption: the *μόνον* in Prot.'s reply suggests that we should read *εἰ, Πρώταρχε, φίλον*.

4. **Ἔστὸν δή τινε δύο** κτλ. For this discussion of things absolute and relative cp. *Charm.* 168 B ff.

14. **ὅσα λέγομεν** κτλ. *ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἑτέρῳ* is the MS. text, on which Stallb. remarks "Aenigmatice loquitur per facetum quendam et urbanum iocum ...Nimirum istud *tertium* nihil est aliud, nisi necessitudo et coniunctio qua alterum cum altero similiter continetur, atque amator cum amasio." But where does the joke come in—beyond the possible allusion to the relation between Philebus and Protarchus? Schleierm. pronounced the joke, whatever it be, 'admodum frigidum,' and consequently fancied an underlying reference to some current proverb. And Paley (followed by Maguire) suggests that *τὸ τρίτον ἑτέρῳ* may have been "one of those brief formulae of which Plato was fond, to imply, 'relation of one thing to another.'" Cornarius' conj. *τὸ τρίτον Σωτῆρι*, though approved by Taylor, is, as Paley rightly says, quite out of place here.

I have no doubt that we must accept Badh.'s correction, by which Socr.'s speech is made to end with *εἶναι* (for which cp. 16 D *τῶν λεγομένων εἶναι*), and the next words, emended to *τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρῶ, λέγε* κτλ., are assigned to Protarchus, who has enquired virtually twice before for Socr.'s exact meaning (in *πῶς... λέγεις;* and *λέγ' ἔτι σαφέστερον* above). Poste adopts this, and also Wb., who, however, marks a question at *ἐρῶ;*

18. **ἐρεσχηλεῖ**: this, and not *ἐρεσχελεῖ* (as Stallb.), is the form found here in Bodl., and it is undoubtedly the correct form (cp. Pierson on *Moeris*, p. 159). Hesych.: *Ἐρεσχελεῖ· ἀηδίζεται, ὀχλεῖται, ἐρεθίζει, ἀδολεσχεῖ, χλευάζει, παίζει, σκώπτει, διαμάχεται.* The word is also found in *Phaedr.*

ἀεί, τὸ δ' οὗ χάριν ἑκάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Μόγις ἔμαθον διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεχθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Τάχα δ' ἴσως, ὦ παῖ, μᾶλλον μαθησόμεθα προελθόντος | τοῦ λόγου. 54

ΠΡΩ. Τί γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Δύο δὴ τάδε ἕτερα λάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ἓν μέν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἕτερον ἕν.

ΠΡΩ. Δύο ἀποδέχομαί σου ταῦτα, οὐσίαν καὶ γένεσιν.

ΣΩ. Ὀρθότατα. πότερον οὖν τούτων ἕνεκα ποτέρου, τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα φῶμεν ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι γενέσεως ἕνεκα;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο ὃ προσαγορεύεται οὐσία εἰ γενέσεως ἕνεκα τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅπερ ἐστί, νῦν πυνθάνει;

ΣΩ. Φαίνομαι.

ΠΡΩ. | Πρὸς θεῶν ἆρ' [ἂν] ἐπανερωτᾷς με τοιόνδε τι; B
λέγ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, μοί, πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἕνεκα φῂς

1 οὐ Cl.

54 A. 9 τοι Λ. δὲ om. H. 10 δύ' Γ. 11 : πότερον Cl. 14 τοῦτο...] haec non alteri dant Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCFH. : εἰ Cl. ΔΠΣ. ἢ w. 15 ἔστιν ὅπερ om. H.

B. 17 θεῶν οὖν ἆρ' corr. Σ. ἐπανερωταῖς Cl. ΔΠ: ἐπερωτᾷς *S. με om. Σ. τοιόνδε...] haec eidem dant ΞEH: alteri dant *S, Bekk. τινα λόγον corr. Σ.: τι λέγω *S, Bekk. 18 μοι Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠBCEFHw Flor. a,b,c,i, με Σ: σοι *Σ. πότερον Ξ.

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236 B, *Laws* 885 C, *Rep.* 545 E παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας.

Stallb. thinks that the use of this word here proves the occurrence of the joke he finds above (see last note), but it simply alludes, I suppose, to the ex. of παιδικά and ἐρασταί used above.

17. **πρὸς θεῶν ἆρ' [ἂν] ἐπανερωτᾷς με κτλ.** MSS. and edd. generally make Prot.'s question end here, and give τοιόνδε τι λέγω, ὦ Πρώταρχε to Socr. In this case the difficulty is to emend the evidently corrupt ἆρ' ἂν ἐπαν. Numerous conjj. have been offered: Schleierm. ἆρ' οὖν ἔτι ἐρωτᾷς με: Ast ἆρ' οὖν ἐπαν.: Baiter ἄγαν ἐπ.: Sauppe ἄρα τί ἐπ.: Stallb. τί πρὸς θεῶν ἆρ' αὖ ἐπ.: Klitsch ἆρά γε ἐπ.: Hirschig (and Poste) ἆρ' ἂν ἐπανερωτῴης με.

But I prefer the re-distribution of the passage, suggested by Bekker's note, 'τοιόνδε—haec eidem dant ΞEH,' and adopted by Badh., by which πρὸς θεῶν—τοιαῦτ' ἐστί; is given to Prot., and λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὦ Πρώταρχε again to Socr. Accordingly I agree with Badh. in cancelling ἂν after ἆρ', putting the interrog. mark after τοιόνδε τι, and altering λέγω, ὦ Πρ. to λέγ', ὦ Πρ. This gives a much more satisfactory arrangement.

Paley suggests ἆρ' ἃ ἐπαν. μέ ἐστι τοιόνδε τι; but otherwise follows Badh.'s rearrangement, which Wb. too accepts in all points: Maguire prefers the vulgate. Possibly we should read ἆρά τι or, after Stallb., ἆρ' αὖ: but the redundant ἂν may be explained as due to dittography, as Badh. suggests, or, better, as a misplaced insertion of the -αν- of the verb which disappeared from many MSS.

18. **πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἕνεκα**: the order is due to the usual tendency towards the juxtaposition of contrasted terms: for the separation of prepos. and case cp. ἐπ' αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, Aesch. *P. V.* 957.

γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα ἕνεκα ναυπηγίας, καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τοιαῦτ' ἐστί;

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὦ Πρώταρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαυτῷ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

5 ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὔ· σὺ μέντοι τοῦ λόγου συμμέτεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ | πάντα ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, ἑκάστην C δὲ γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἑκάστης ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι,

10 ξύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι ξυμπάσης.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτ' ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

15 ΣΩ. Τό γε μὴν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνοιτ' ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὦ ἄριστε, μοῖραν θετέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατον. |

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἡδονή γε εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, εἰς ἄλλην D

20 ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς θήσομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

1 ἕνεκα add. Cl. ΓΔΠ. ναυπηγείας Λ. 2 ἐστιν Cl. 3 : λέγω Cl. ΞCE, πότερα λέγω corr. Σ. τοῦτ' αὐτό] τούτων corr. Σ. 5 οὐδὲν...] haec eidem dat Cl. οὐ καὶ σὺ corr. Σ. λεγομένου w. συμμέτεχε Cl. ΔΠ: μέτεχε *S. 7 μὲν] ἐμ' Cl.

C. 9 τινὸς om. F. 10 ξυμπάσης F. ξύμπασαν...γίγνεσθαι om. Cl. ΓΔ et pr. Π. ξυμπάσηι Cl. 15 οὗ] οὗ τὸ Π. τὸ C, τῷ BF, τῷ Γ. 16 μοῖραν Π.

D. 19 τε Λ.

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1. **πλοῖα ἕνεκα ναυπηγίας**: so Bodl., Vat. Ven. Π, Coisl. and most edd.; but Stallb. omits ἕνεκα, cp. *Gorg.* 468 A.

5. **οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὔ**, sc. ἀποκρινοῦμαι. For this elliptic form of reply cp. *Euthyd.* 294 E.

10. **ξύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν ... γίγνεσθαι.** Winckelmann followed the Bodleian, etc., in discarding these words; but their omission, owing to the ὁμοιοτέλευτον, is more explicable than their insertion, so that most edd. agree to retain them.

15. **τό γε μὴν...ἀεὶ γίγνοιτ' ἄν.** Badh. emends to γίγνεται, holding the opt. with ἄν to be 'barbarous,' when we have ἐστι (not εἴη ἄν) following; but this is rash, as a protasis has to be mentally supplied.

16. **ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι.** For the phrase ἐν τῇ μοίρᾳ ('in numero') cp. *Menex.* 249 B, *Crito* 51 B ἁγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ: μοῖρα conveys the idea of a divine dispensation: here we may render 'rank.'

ἐκεῖνο seems preferred to τοῦτο here as conveying the idea of a distant, celestial, residence for τὸ ἀγαθόν, as something not παρ' ἡμῖν, cp. 29 B ff.

19. **Ἆρ' οὖν ἡδονή γε.** Badh. changes to Ἀλλ' οὖν ἡδ. γε, calling the received text 'absurd.' Ast proposed ἡδονήν, which is needless, as ἡδονή can equally form part of the protasis.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τούτου τοῦ λόγου, τῷ μηνύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μέν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδ' ἡντινοῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾷ.

5 ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν <ὁ> αὐτὸς οὗτος ἑκάστοτε καὶ τῶν | ἐν E
ταῖς γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων καταγελάσεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποίων λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τῶν ὅσοι ἐξιώμενοι ἢ πείνην ἢ δίψαν ἤ τι τῶν
10 τοιούτων, ὅσα γένεσις ἐξιᾶται, χαίρουσι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἅτε ἡδονῆς οὔσης αὐτῆς, καί φασι ζῆν οὐκ ἂν δέξασθαι μὴ διψῶντές τε καὶ πεινῶντες καὶ τἆλλα, ἅ τις ἂν εἴποι, πάντα τὰ ἑπόμενα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθήμασι μὴ πάσχοντες.

ΠΡΩ. | Ἐοίκασι γοῦν. 55

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ γίγνεσθαί γε τοὐναντίον ἅπαντες τὸ φθείρεσθαι φαῖμεν ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

3 ἐν τινοῦν H. ἔχειν δεῖ ΓC et corr. Ξ, ἔχειν δεῖν Cl. ΔΠ, δεῖν ἔχειν H: δεῖ ἔχειν *S. 4 καταγελάσεται ΓH et γρ. BCw. 6 ὁ libris deest (add. Bekk.). E. 7 γένεσει Γ et pr. Ξ. καταγελάσεται ἀποτελουμένου Γ. 9 ἢ om. Cl. ΔΠ. πεινῆν ἢ διψῆν Γ. εἴ Σ. τοι C. 10 ἐξιαται H. 55 A. 15 τὸ γενέσθαι Cl. Π et pr. Δ. γε] τε Λ, om. Cl. ΔΠ.

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1. **ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον.** See above, 53 C.

3. **χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ.** So Coisl., Par. C and corr. Ven. Σ, followed by most edd.; Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π give ἔχειν δεῖν, probably due to confusion of the circumflex with final ν. The infin. however would not be impossible: cp. 20 D, with *Phaedr.* 272 D, *Euthyph.* 4 E.

6. **τῶν ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων,** "i.e. quibus generationes satisfaciunt ad explendum voluptatis desiderium," Stallb. But Badh.[1], denying ἀποτελ. to mean 'those who are satisfied,' construed it as neut., and accordingly altered τῶν ὅσοι ἐξ. below to τῶν ὅσ' οἱ ἐξ., 'he will laugh at all such things as they rejoice in, who assuage hunger' etc. Paley, however, is content to take ἀποτελ. as masc. and mid. voice, rendering 'those who make the end consist in such productions'; and Badh. himself, in his 2nd ed., withdraws the conj. with the note: "the difference between οἱ φάσκοντες and οἱ ἀποτελούμενοι is that between philosophers and men who follow a certain mode of life...but I still doubt whether we do not require εὐδαιμόνων or μακαρίων after ἀποτελουμένων." But is not the omission of any such word—which we should certainly expect on the analogy of *Laws* 631 B, 718 B, 789 A etc.—intentional here, as subtly indicating that their τέλος is ἀληθῶς οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ συμφορά? Poste agrees with Paley, rendering 'Who find their τέλος in a productive process,' which, he suggests, alludes to the Cyrenaic definition of the End: τέλος δ' ἀπέφαινε τὴν λείαν κίνησιν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἀναδιδομένην.—"Ironically he pretends that Aristippus is against the party who advocate pleasure, and therefore is virtually on the side of Antisthenes, or the pleasure-haters called οἱ δυσχερεῖς" (Paley).

15. **τῷ γίγνεσθαί γε τοὐναντίον.** So the edd., but Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π give τὸ γενέσθαι τοὐν.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἱροῖτ' ἄν τις τοῦθ' αἱρούμενος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν τρίτον ἐκεῖνον βίον, τὸν ἐν ᾧ μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι, φρονεῖν δ' ἣν δυνατὸν ὡς οἷόν τε καθαρώτατα.

5 ΠΡΩ. Πολλή τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλογία συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, ἐάν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἡμῖν τιθῆται.

ΣΩ. Πολλή, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι λέγωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ; |

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μηδὲ B
10 καλὸν μήτε ἐν σώμασι μήτ' ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡδονὴν μόνον, ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ νοῦν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα ἀγαθὰ εἵληχε ψυχή, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι; πρὸς τούτοις δὲ ἔτι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα, ἀλγοῦντα δὲ ἀναγκάζεσθαι φάναι κακὸν εἶναι τότε ὅταν ἀλγῇ, κἂν ᾖ
15 ἄριστος πάντων, καὶ τὸν χαίροντα αὖ, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, τότε ὅταν χαίρῃ, τοσούτῳ διαφέρειν | πρὸς ἀρετήν. C

ΠΡΩ. Πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς δυνατὸν ἀλογώτατα.

XXXIV. ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἡδονῆς μὲν πάντως ἐξέτασιν
20 πᾶσαν ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιήσασθαι, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης οἷον φειδόμενοι σφόδρα φανῶμεν· γενναίως δέ, εἴ πῇ τι σαθρὸν

1 δὲ w. τις Cl. ΔΠ: ὁ *S Bekk. 3 δ' ἣν] δεῖν Ξ. 6 τὲ θῆται Γ.
7 ἐπειδὴ ΞΣ 8 πῆι eidem dat Cl.
B. 11 ἡδονὴ ΞΕ. 12 ἄλλων] τοιούτων Δ. ὅσ' Γ. 16 τοσούτω Cl. ΔΛΠΣΒCHw Flor. a,b,c,i: τοσοῦτον *S.
C. 17 ἀλγότατον Λ. 19 μὲν πάντως Cl. ΔΠ: μέντοι πάντως (?) S. 21 σφόδρα φειδόμενοι Γ. εἴποι Λ.

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3. **φρονεῖν δ' ἣν δυνατόν.** Stallb. brackets δυνατόν.

5. **πολλή τις...ἀλογία σ. γ.** Stephens proposed πολλήν τινα...ἀλογίαν ξ. γ.: but cp. *Phaedo* 67 C, *Parm.* 134 A, *Rep.* 438 E, and below 64 E, for the personal constr. with the infin. γίγνεσθαι or εἶναι.

It is contended by Poste that the words πολλή...ἀλογώτατα (18) form an interpolation which serves to solder together two originally distinct dialogues. This is based on a denial of the continuity of the Dialogue, for which see *Introd.* i.

12. **ὅσα ἀγαθὰ εἵληχε ψυχή.** Badh. cancels ἀγαθά as 'begging the question': the objection seems forcible, but is the remedy right? Do these virtues belong to soul simply as such, and not rather to a specially qualified soul? Hence I propose ἀγαθὴ εἵλ. ψυχή. Otherwise, we must explain ἀγαθά as virtually in inverted commas (i.q. λεγόμενα ἀγαθά).

We pass on now to a fresh section of the discourse, in which knowledge and its species are examined and classified with a view to defining their relation to The Good: see *Introd.* iii.

21. **εἴ πῇ τι σαθρὸν ἔχει.** Wyttenbach (*ad* Plutarch. *de discern. adul. ab amico* 64 D: κἂν διαπειρώμενος κρούσῃς, σαθρὸν ὑπηχεῖ) conj. σαθρὸν ἠχεῖ, followed by Steinbrüchel. Stallb., though not actually accepting it, pronounces this emendation 'elegantissima': while Badh. objects that 'if this had been the meaning, the fut. must have been used.' For Plato's use of σαθρός, cp. *Euthyph.* 5 C εὕροιμ' ἂν... ὅπῃ σαθρός ἐστι: *Theaet.* 179 D διακρούοντα εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται: *Gorg.* 493 E τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά: so that it means 'leaky,' 'unsound.'

περικρούειν here means 'to test by

ἔχει, πᾶν περικρούωμεν, ἕως [ὅ τι καθαρώτατόν ἐστ' αὐτῶν φύσει,] τοῦτο κατιδόντες εἰς τὴν κρίσιν χρώμεθα τὴν κοινὴν τοῖς τε τούτων καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς μέρεσιν ἀληθεστάτοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν | τὸ μέν, οἶμαι, δημιουργικόν ἐστι D τῆς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὴ ταῖς χειροτεχνικαῖς διανοηθῶμεν πρῶτα εἰ 10 τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἐχόμενον, τὸ δὲ ἧττον ἔνι, καὶ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ὡς καθαρώτατα νομίζειν, τὰ δ' ὡς ἀκαθαρτότερα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

ΣΩ. Τὰς τοίνυν ἡγεμονικὰς διαληπτέον ἑκάστων αὐτῶν χωρίς;

2 τοῦτο φύσει Γ. 3 τοῖς τε] τῆς τε Cl. ΓΛΣBCEF, τε pr. Ξ.
D. 6 καὶ Cl. ΔΠ: ἢ *S. 10 δ' Cl. ἐστι Schleiermacherus: ἔνι libri.
11 δεῖ] δὴ Cl. ΔΠ. ἀκαθαρτότατα ΠES.

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sounding,' 'to ring' (cp. κωδωνίζειν of coins): it is only used once elsewhere by Plato, *Rep.* 611 E, and there in another sense.

1. **ἕως ὅ τι καθαρώτατόν ἐστ'...χρώμεθα.** Badh.[2] notes here "ἕως χρώμεθα is barbarous; and if we desired to retain ἕως, no change short of the following would be really sufficient: ἕως ἂν κατίδωμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ...χρησώμεθα." Accordingly he expunges ἕως and inserts δέ after ὅ τι. In Ast's *Lex.* s.v. this place is cited under ἕως *c. indic.*, along with *Critias* 115 D, *Charm.* 155 C, *Lach.* 183 E, *Ion* 541 E. But of fut. result this seems impossible; while certainly the omission of ἄν, as well as the use of the pres. tense, are rare poetic phenomena when ἕως takes the subj. (cp. Goodwin *M. T.* §§ 614, 620). Possibly we should read ἕως, or else adopt Apelt's suggestion—final ὡς for ἕως.

2. **εἰς τὴν κρίσιν χρώμεθα.** The MSS. give κρίσιν, which is retained by Bekk., Stallb., Paley, Herm., and Wb., and gains support from 22 C, 27 C, D, 52 E: but κρᾶσιν, first proposed by Schleierm., is very plausible, and is accepted by Badh. and Poste.

5. **οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν ... τροφήν.** Badh.[2] brackets περὶ τὰ μαθήματα on the ground that "it is to be understood either in its widest sense, and then it is superfluous; for what ἐπιστήμη is there which is not π. τ. μαθήματα? Or it is to be taken in a restricted sense, and then it is on its wrong side; for a knowledge π. τ. μαθ. is a knowledge π. τ. παιδείαν." But τὰ μαθ. is needed to echo back to 52 A, B.

6. **καὶ τροφήν.** So Bodl. Vat. Ven. II, followed by Stallb. and most later edd. Vulg. ἢ τροφήν.

9. **ἐν δὴ ταῖς χειροτεχνικαῖς ... ὡς ἀκαθαρτότερα.** The correct text here is doubtful. First, Badh.[2] reads χειροτεχνίαις ... πρώταις ... αὖ μᾶλλον ... ἔνι ... ὡς καθαρώτερα κτλ.; basing the first change on the ground that neither τέχναις nor ἐπιστήμαις can aptly be supplied to χειροτεχνικαῖς—and the last, that 'any art which is καθαρωτάτη would on the withdrawal of the scientific element cease altogether.' But only the last of these changes appears convincing: for χειροτεχνική (sc. τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη) cp. *Polit.* 259 C ff. Again, Stallb. and Wb. follow Schleierm. in changing the ἔνι of MSS. to ἐστι, as belonging to ἐχόμενον: while Baiter proposed τῷ δὲ ἧττον. Finally, Stephens, with Par., E F Ald., Bas. 1, read ἀκαθαρτότατα.

Possibly for ἔνι καὶ δή of Bodl. we should read ἔπειτα δ' εἰ χρή—taking εἰ χρὴ νομίζειν with both clauses, χρή being echoed in Prot.'s reply. I suspect too that τὰ μὲν ... τὰ δέ and their adjj. should be altered to the femin.

13. **ἑκάστων αὐτῶν χωρίς.** Stallb. renders "eae quae principatum tenent a

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας καὶ πῶς; |

ΣΩ. Οἷον πασῶν που τεχνῶν ἄν τις ἀριθμητικὴν E
χωρίζῃ καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ στατικήν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, φαῦλον
τὸ καταλειπόμενον ἑκάστης ἂν γίγνοιτο.

5 ΠΡΩ. Φαῦλον μὲν δή.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτ' εἰκάζειν λείποιτ' ἂν καὶ τὰς
αἰσθήσεις καταμελετᾶν ἐμπειρίᾳ καί τινι τριβῇ, ταῖς τῆς
στοχαστικῆς προσχρωμένους δυνάμεσιν, ἃς πολλοὶ τέχνας
ἐπονομάζουσι, | μελέτῃ καὶ πόνῳ τὴν ῥώμην ἀπειργασμένας. 56

10 ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μεστὴ μέν που μουσικὴ πρῶτον, τὸ ξύμ-
φωνον ἁρμόττουσα οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῷ· καὶ
ξύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητική, τὸ μέτρον ἑκάστης χορδῆς τῷ

E. 3 μερικὴν Λ. στοχαστικὴν mg. H. 4 τὸ om. pr. ΔΠ. 5 μὲν δὴ Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCHw Flor. a,b,c,i: μέντοι *S.
56 A. 9 ἀπειργασμένας Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠBCHw Flor. a,b,c,i: ἀπειργασμένους *S. 13 αὐτῶν ΛH Flor. b. αὐλητικὴ καὶ κιθαριστικὴ τὸ rc. Σ.

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singulis illis segregandae sunt"; but Paley, "in each of these we should take separately the leading arts"; and it seems better not to connect the gen. with χωρίς. Stephens wished to emend ἑκάστην.

2. **ἄν τις...χωρίζῃ...φαῦλον...ἂν γίγνοιτο.** Badh.[2] falls foul of this combination as 'not Greek,' and accordingly brackets ἂν γίγνοιτο: but see Goodwin *M. T.* § 505 (c).

5. **φαῦλον μὲν δή.** So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π etc. Older edd. gave μέντοι. Badh. notes that "μὲν δή is the form of simple assent...μέντοι is the more suitable when the answerer adds the weight of his own authority to the mere assent."

6. **τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτ' εἰκάζειν** κτλ. For the distinction between Art proper and merely experimental and conjectural methods, cp. *Gorg.* 465 A, 463 B, 501 A, *Phaedr.* 260 E, 270 B, *Laws* 857, 938 A, etc.; and for the relation of Mathematics to the Arts, cp. *Rep.* 522 C πᾶσα τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῶν (sc. ἀριθμοῦ τε καὶ λογισμοῦ) μέτοχος γίγνεσθαι κτλ.

"The subject of προσχρ. is the possessors of the senses, that of ἀπειργασμένας is δυνάμεις," Badh. rightly. μελέτη and πόνος are commonly applied to gymnastic training.

11. **οὐκοῦν μεστὴ...οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῷ.** Stallb. explains this as μεστὴ μέν που τοῦ ἁρμόττειν τὸ ξ. οὐ μ. ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῷ—though suggesting τούτου for που as the gen. after μεστή. Badh.[2] alters to μελέτῃ στοχασμοῦ, and as he comments "in proportion as an art trusts less to measure and more to practice, it must be full of guess-work," it would seem that he connects μεστή and στοχασμοῦ, though his punctuation gives no indication of such connection. Badh.[1] suggests τοιούτων for πρῶτον.

The ellipse with μεστή is most awkward, unless we construe it closely with the partic., as in Soph. *O. C.* 768, Dem. 1175. 5: possibly we should read μεριστή; but see the following note *ad fin.*, and cp. 62 C μουσικὴν...στοχάσεως τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστὴν οὖσαν, and *Laws* II. 668 A, B οὐκοῦν μουσικήν γε πᾶσάν φαμεν εἰκαστικήν τε εἶναι καὶ μιμητικήν;

12. **καὶ ξύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητική.** Van Heusde and Schleierm. conj. αὐτῆς αὖ πληκτικῇ. Stallb. prefers the reading in Ven. Σ, αὐλητικὴ καὶ κιθαριστικὴ τὸ μ.—'quarum artium commemoratione idem plane quod ipsius musicae nomine significatur': while for αὐτῆς as partitive gen. he cites *Polit.* 261 D. Badh. reads ξ. αὐτὴ καὶ αὐλ., and suggests in ed. 1 φθεγγομένης for φερομένης, but in ed. 2 θηρωμένη 'of which the more common form θηρεύουσα was a gloss.' Hirzel suggests κ. ξ. καὶ αὐτῆς ἡ πληκτική, and approves of Badh.'s φθεγγομένης. Paley comments "as for αὐτῆς, it seems to mean στοχαστικῆς, of which ξύμπασα

στοχάζεσθαι φερομένης θηρεύουσα, ὥστε πολὺ μεμιγμένον ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, σμικρὸν δὲ τὸ βέβαιον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν | ἰατρικήν τε καὶ γεωργίαν καὶ κυβερνη- B
5 τικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν ὡσαύτως εὑρήσομεν ἐχούσας.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τεκτονικὴν δέ γε, οἶμαι, πλείστοις μέτροις τε καὶ ὀργάνοις χρωμένην τὰ πολλὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτῇ πορίζοντα τεχνικωτέραν τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν παρέχεται.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;

ΣΩ. Κατά τε ναυπηγίαν καὶ κατ' οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς ξυλουργικῆς. κανόνι γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ τόρνῳ χρῆται καὶ διαβήτῃ καὶ στάθμῃ | καί τινι προσαγωγίῳ C κεκομψευμένῳ.

1 φερομένης] θηρευομένης Π.
B. 5 στρατηγητικὴν S. 9 πολλῶν] πάλαι Λ. 12 τοῖς H. 13 διαβῆτι ΞF.
C. 13 προσαγωγείωι Cl. ΔΠ, προσαγωγίω Σ, προαγωγία H: προαγωγίῳ *S.

αὐλητικὴ μεστή ἐστι... Perhaps φερομένης is an interpolation. But I think it may refer to the notes of the lute passing, as it were, to the ear of the player who accompanies it on the flute." Hermann reads αὖ ψαλτική, "quod et iis, quae hac de arte τὸ μέτρον ἑκάστης χορδῆς θηρευούσῃ dicuntur, admodum convenit et ipsi μουσικῇ recte opponitur, quippe quae in intelligendis potius concentus legibus quam in ipsis fidibus pulsandis cernatur: cf. *Sympos.* 197 C, *Phaedr.* 268 E, inque primis etiam Aristot. *Politic.* VIII. 6, ubi hoc ipsum quaeritur, eos qui μουσικὴν discant πότερον δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ᾄδοντάς τι καὶ χειρουργοῦντας ἢ μή." Poste says "only αὐλητική is expressed, because κιθαριστική is implied in ἁρμόττουσα... μέτρον here must mean pitch, not time or rhythm." αὐτῆς seems certainly most simply taken of μουσική, as partit. gen., and χορδῆς seems to prove some corruption in αὐλητική (yet cp. *Rep.* 399 D); but none of the proposed restorations are convincing, αὐτῆς αὖ πληκτική being perhaps the best (though the word does not occur elsewhere in Plato in this sense). I would suggest that the difficulties in both these clauses might be most simply cured by a transposition, reading μεστὴ μέν που αὐτῆς αὐλητικὴ πρῶτον ... καὶ ξύμπασα μουσική κτλ.: for ξύμπασα μουσική cp. 26 A.

8. **τὰ πολλὴν...παρέχεται.** For τά Schütz conj. ταῦτα, Heindorf ἃ, which last was accepted by Turr.: but change is needless, as Stallb. and Badh. agree.

12. **κανόνι γάρ** κτλ. For the κανών and τόρνος *vide* 51 C: the **διαβήτης** here meant seems to have been the compass with extended legs (in the shape of an A or Λ, see Schol. ad Ar. *Nub.* 178), from the apex of which depended the στάθμη, or plumb-line. See Smith's *Dict. of Ant.* I. 429 b (*circinus*).

13. For **στάθμη** cp. Schol. ad *Iliad.* 15. 410 στάθμη· ἐργαλεῖον τεκτονικόν· ἣ καὶ κατευθυντηρία λεγομένη. τούτῳ δὲ κανονίζεται τὸ ξύλον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ σχοινίον λεπτόν, ἐρυθρῷ ἢ μέλανι χρώματι κεχρισμένον. Lat. *rubrica.*

προσαγώγιον: the exact nature of this instrument is less precisely known. Hesych.: Προσαγώγιον· διαβήτης ἢ τὸ τῶν τεκτόνων ὄργανον. Suidas: Προσ.· τὸ τῶν τεκτόνων ὄργανον, ὃ προσάγοντες εὐθύνουσι τὰ στρεβλὰ ξύλα. Similarly the Schol. *ad h. l.*, Schneider, and Ast: "instrumentum fabrile quo ligna curva diriguntur (germ. *Klammer* vel *Schraube*)." But Badh. sensibly objects that "if this is correct, it is much less κεκομψευμένον than the rest, which are scientific helps, while this is a mere engine of force." Hence it seems more probable that the word means not a 'vice' or 'cramp-iron' (as L. and S.) but rather 'an instrument for taking the angles of curves,' as Badh. suggests; thus we find in Smith *D. A.*

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Θῶμεν τοίνυν διχῇ τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας, τὰς μὲν μουσικῇ ξυνεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλάττονος ἀκριβείας μετισχούσας, τὰς δὲ τεκτονικῇ πλείονος.

5 ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὲ ταύτας ἀκριβεστάτας εἶναι τέχνας, ἃς νῦν δὴ πρώτας εἴπομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν φαίνει μοι λέγειν καὶ ὅσας μετὰ ταύτης τέχνας ἐφθέγξω νῦν δή.

10 ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν | οὖν. ἀλλ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἆρ' οὐ διττὰς D
αὖ καὶ ταύτας λεκτέον; ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν πρῶτον ἆρ' οὐκ ἄλλην μέν τινα τὴν τῶν πολλῶν φατέον, ἄλλην δ' αὖ τὴν τῶν φιλοσοφούντων;

15 ΠΡΩ. Πῇ ποτὲ διορισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην θείη τις ἂν ἀριθμητικήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐ σμικρὸς ὅρος, ὦ Πρώταρχε. οἱ μὲν γάρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμόν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο | καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ E
20 καὶ τὰ πάντων μέγιστα· οἱ δ' οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολου-

4 μετεχούσας w. τὰ Cl. (?). 6 εἶναι om. Γ. ἃς om. Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 7 νῦν δὴ Cl. ΔΠ: δὴ νῦν *S. εἴπωμεν pr. Δ, εἴποιμεν Cl. Π. 8 ἀριθμητικὴν...] haec non alteri dat Cl. φαίνει Cl. F. ὅσα C.

D. 13 ἀριθμητικὴ F, ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν Γ. 18 μονάδος E. ἀριθμου Γ.
E. 20 τὰ om. F et pr. Ξ.

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loc. cit. an illustration of a second kind of compass, "with curved legs, probably intended to measure the thickness of columns, cylindrical pieces of wood, or similar objects"—so that, practically, κανών : τόρνος :: στάθμη : προσαγ. Cp. the use of προσάγεσθαι, 'clasp,' in οὐκ ἔκυσας...οὐ προσηγάγου, οὐκ ὠρχιπέδισας, Ar. *Av.* 142.

Paley gives 'an ingenious contrivance for applying the plummet': he might have cited Ar. *Eth. Nic.* v. 1137ᵇ 30 with Fritzsche's note *ad loc.* where ὁ μολίβδινος κανών is explained (after Paus. II. 11) to mean "eine bewegliche aus mehrerem Linealen zusammengesetzten Schmiege" used in building walls of polygonal stones.

6. **τούτων...ἀκριβεστάτας.** Jackson points out (*Camb. Philol. Trans.* i. 103) that, since τούτων refers to the manual and ταύτας to the hegemonic arts and since the latter should be ranked above rather than among the former (cp. 57 C), the text is open to suspicion. He suggests ἀκριβεστέρας, which may be right; but cp. 55 E.

8. **Ἀριθμητικήν:** for the study of numbers, scientific and popular, cp. *Rep.* 525 B ff., *Laws* 817 E ff.: and see also the remarks on 'Metretic' in *App.* E.

15. **Πῇ...ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην.** The ellipse of τὴν μέν is a not infrequent piece of irregular writing: Stephens needlessly proposed to insert the missing words: cp. 36 E.

17. **οὐ σμικρὸς ὅρος.** Badh. emends οὐ σμικρῷ ὅρῳ, on the ground that the nomin. "is out of structure, and if anyone wishes to understand ἐστί, he must at least insert the article. But the words are evidently an answer to πῇ π. δ." This is hardly convincing: we can easily supply κεῖται or the like.

20. **οἱ δ'...αὐτοῖς συνακολ.** Badh. brackets αὐτοῖς as "supplied to give a

θήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γ' εὖ λέγεις οὐ σμικρὰν διαφορὰν τῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν τενταζόντων, ὥστε λόγον ἔχειν δύο αὐτὰς εἶναι.

5 ΣΩ. Τί δέ; λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ ἡ κατὰ τεκτονικὴν καὶ κατ' ἐμπορικὴν τῆς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν | καταμελετωμένων—πότερον ὡς μία ἑκατέρα λεκ- 57
τέον ἢ δύο τιθῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῖς πρόσθεν ἑπόμενος ἔγωγ' ἂν δύο κατὰ τὴν
10 ἐμὴν ψῆφον τιθείην ἑκατέραν τούτων.

ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς. οὗ δ' ἕνεκα ταῦτα προηνεγκάμεθα εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἆρα ἐννοεῖς;

1 μυρίων Cl. ΔΠ: μορίων *S. 2 ἄλλης] ἄλην Γ. τι Cl. et pr. ΔΠ.
3 γ' add. Δ. 4 ἀσθμὸν w. ἐταζόντων corr. Δ, ταξάντων γρ. Δ, τευξόντων Γ.
δύ' Cl. Γ, δι' ΔΠ. 5 λογικὴ Λ. μετρικὴ ΛS. ἡ add. rc. Σ.
κατὰ] καὶ κατὰ Λ. τρητονικὴν Λ.
57 A. 7 ἑκάτερα Γ. 9 τῆς πρόσθ' Γ: τῇ πρόσθεν *S. ἑπόμενοι EF.
10 τούτων Ξ. 11 οὗ] οὐ H. προσηνεγκάμεθα Cl. ΔΠ, προσηναγκάμεθα Γ.
12 ἆρ' Γ.

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case to συνακ., and the consequence is that the condition of B assenting to A is not A changing his mind, but some third C propounding the same doctrine as B." But why should not τις refer to the same people as αὐτοῖς, i.e. τοῖς πολλοῖς, instead of to 'some third C'? And if so, where is the ground for suspicion?

1. **εἰ μὴ μονάδα...διαφέρουσαν**, 'that no single monad of all the myriads differs from any other monad'—the redundancy in this triple opposition is, as Badh. observes, intentional, to denote the absolute homogeneity of all the monads under every aspect.

4. **τενταζόντων** is thus explained by Schol. *ad h. l.*: πραγματευομένων, ἐπὶ πολὺ διατριβόντων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, φροντιζόντων ἢ ἐπιστροφῶς τι πραττόντων ἢ ἐνεργόντων ἢ σπουδαζόντων. It occurs, in the perfect form, in *Rep.* 521 E, *Tim.* 90 B.

5. **τί δέ; λογιστικὴ...τιθῶμεν**; There is difficulty here in the construction of the gen. τῆς κ. φιλ. κτλ. Stephens bids us supply διαφέρει from διαφορὰν above: Stallb. prefers to regard it as a case of anacoluthon—"nam videtur scriptor διαφέρει in animo habuisse, sed mutato sermonis tenore post καταμελ. intulisse πότερον...τιθῶμεν, in quibus verbis certe notio verbi διαφέρειν comprehenditur. quamobrem ante πότερον sustulimus notam interrogandi" (supplying its place with a dash). Badh. emends to the dat. τῇ κ. φ. γεωμετρίᾳ τ. κ. λογισμῷ, and brackets καταμελετωμένων, which, he thinks, 'means here about as much as would τυπτομένων.' Is it possible that the awkward gen. depends on a missing ἑτέρα, which through similarity of lettering fell out after γεωμετρίας? Paley supplies the words 'as respectively differing from,' without comment. I agree with Badh. in suspecting καταμελ., esp. because of its use in 55 E—though in my text I follow Stallb. and Wb.

Poste's statement that λογιστική is 'that part of the theory of numbers which treats of Ratios (λόγοι),' seems incorrect. Broadly, 'logistic' is distinguished as 'the practical art of calculation' from 'arithmetic' as the 'theory of numbers': cp. *Gorg.* 450 D ff., *Euthyd.* 290 B, C, *Rep.* 525 A ff., and see Smith *D. Antiq.* I. 187 b (*Arithmetica*).

7. **ὡς μία ἑκατέρα λεκτέον.** For this less common constr. cp. *Rep.* 460 B δοτέον... ἀφθονεστέρα ἡ ἐξουσία: *Soph.* 223 B ἡ...θήρα προσρητέον...σοφιστική.

11. **προηνεγκάμεθα εἰς τὸ μέσον**: 'pro-

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως, ἀλλὰ σὲ βουλοίμην ἂν ἀποφήνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν ἔμοιγε οὗτος ὁ λόγος οὐχ ἧττον, ἢ ὅτε λέγειν αὐτὸν ἠρχόμεθα, ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ζητῶν ἀντίστροφον
5 ἐνταῦθα προβεβ[λ]ηκέναι | σκοπῶν ἆρά ἐστί τις ἑτέρας ἄλλη B
καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, καθάπερ ἡδονῆς ἡδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα σαφὲς τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ταῦθ' ἕνεκα τούτων ἐπικεχείρηκεν.

XXXV. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἆρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν
10 ἐπ' ἄλλοις ἄλλην τέχνην οὖσαν ἀνεύρισκε σαφεστέραν καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν ἄλλην ἄλλης;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἆρ' οὔ τινα τέχνην ὡς ὁμώνυμον φθεγξάμενος, εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας ὡς μιᾶς, πάλιν ὡς δυοῖν

B. 5 σκοπῶν E, σκοπεῖν corr. Σ. ἄλλην Λ. 7 γε τοῦτο σαφὲς Γ. 10 ἄλλοις Cl. ΓΔΠΣBCHw Flor. a,c: vulg. ἄλλης. ἀνευρίσκειν Cl. ΓΔΛΠBCEHw Flor. a,b,c,i et corr. Ξ, ἀνευρήκει corr. Σ, ἀνευρίσκει σαφεστέραν om. Γ: vulg. ἀνευρίσκει, ἀνείρισκε Schützius. οὖσαν ante καὶ om. Cl. ΓΔΠF. 11 σαφεστέραν pr. Γ.

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tulimus in medium,' cp. *Laws* 812 C, 886 D, 936 A. Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π give προσην. ('attulimus'), which is contrary to Gk. usage.

4. **ζητῶν ἀντίστροφον ἐ. προβεβ[λ]ηκέναι σκοπῶν.** Stephens conj. ζήτησιν ἀντ., i.e. τῇ περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ζητήσει: Ast conj. τῆς ἡδονῆς for ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, the gen. with ἀντίστρ. being found in 40 D, 51 E, *Rep.* 522, 530 D etc., but the dat. is also found in *Gorg.* 464 B: Schleierm. conj. προβεβηκέναι, accepted by Bekk., Badh., Poste; but Stallb. supports the MS. text by 65 D εὔσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν προβέβληκας, and *Hipp. Maj.* 293 D ἐνίοτε δὲ...αὐτός μοι προβάλλει ἐρωτῶν εἰ τοιόνδε μοι δοκεῖ κτλ.

As to the constr. of ἀντίστροφον, Stallb. states "idem est quod ἀντίστροφόν τι"—a possibility which Badh. rejects, and so he adds the art., τἀντίστροφον. Paley renders "it seems to me that the present argument has advanced thus far in looking for some counterpart to pleasures... and to be now inquiring whether," etc. He notes the present as 'a strangely involved sentence,' and suggests ζητοῦντες for ζητῶν.

I doubtfully acquiesce in reading προβεβηκέναι without further change.

9. **ἆρ' οὐκ...ἄλλης;** Bodl. Vat. Coisl. Ven. A Π give ἀνευρίσκειν, so Herm.: older edd., Turr. and Poste ἀνευρίσκει: Stallb., Badh., Wb., from Schütz' conj., ἀνεύρισκε (sc. ὁ λόγος).

With Bekk., Stallb., Poste, Herm., and Wb. I follow the better MSS. in omitting οὖσαν after σαφ., which was given in the vulgate. Badh. brackets σαφεστέραν also.

13. **ὁμώνυμον**, as Poste remarks, "is not equivalent either to ὁμώνυμον or συνώνυμον as defined by Aristotle" (in *Categ.* 1, *An. Post.* I. 13): but is he right in rendering it here 'an individual,' or 'an indivisible species'?

14. **εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας ὡς μιᾶς.** Cp. *Euthyd.* 305 D ἡγοῦνται οὖν, ἐὰν τούτους εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσι, μηδενὸς δοκεῖν ἀξίους εἶναι...παρὰ πᾶσι τὰ νικητήρια εἰς δόξαν οἴσεσθαι. *Cratyl.* 431 A εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι.

Badh. reads μίαν, and inserts ὄντοιν after δύοιν, and puts 'the absurd supplement τὸ σαφὲς...περὶ ταῦτα into brackets.'

For the omission of the gen. of the partic. ὤν, Stallb. cites Soph. *O. C.* 83 ὡς ἐμοῦ μόνης πέλας, and *O. T.* 966—"quamquam exempla hujus genit. apud prosae orationis scriptores sic sine participio positi nulla suppetunt": perhaps we should substitute ὄντοιν for τούτοιν.

ἐπανερωτᾷ τούτοιν | αὐτοῖν τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν περὶ C
ταῦτα πότερον ἡ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἢ μὴ φιλοσοφούντων
ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα δοκεῖ μοι τοῦτο διερωτᾶν.

5 ΣΩ. Τίν' οὖν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῷ δίδομεν ἀπόκρισιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς θαυμαστὸν διαφορᾶς μέγεθος εἰς σαφήνειαν προεληλύθαμεν ἐπιστημῶν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινούμεθα ῥᾷον;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν; καὶ εἰρήσθω γε ὅτι πολὺ μὲν αὗται τῶν
10 ἄλλων τεχνῶν διαφέρουσι, τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ περὶ τὴν τῶν | D
ὄντως φιλοσοφούντων ὁρμὴν ἀμήχανον ἀκριβείᾳ τε καὶ
ἀληθείᾳ περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμοὺς διαφέρουσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἔστω ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοὶ δὴ πιστεύοντες θαρροῦντες ἀποκρινόμεθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὁλκήν—

15 ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικαὶ καὶ δύο μετρητικαὶ καὶ

C. 1 καθαρὸν περὶ Cl. ΓΔΠ, καθαρὸν τὸ περὶ Σ: καθαρόν τε περὶ *S. 2 ἡ] ἢ Cl. ΔΠ. 4 διερωτῶν H. 5 δίδομεν Cl. Π et pr. Δ: διδῶμεν *S. 6 εἰ ΛC. 8 ἀποκρίνου καθὰ ῥᾶιον Cl. 9 καὶ...] haec non alteri dat Ξ. 10 τῶν om. CF.
D. 11 τε post ἀκριβείᾳ add. Cl. ΔΠ. 12 περὶ μέτρα Cl. ΔΠ: περὶ τὰ μέτρα *S. 14 ἀποκρινόμεθα Cl. ΛΞΠΣBCEFHw Flor. a,b,c,i et pr. Δ, ἀποκρινούμεθα Γ: ἀποκρινώμεθα *S. λόγον w. αλκην Π, ἀκοὴν γρ. ΣBCw. 16 καὶ δύο μετρητικαὶ add. Cl. ΔΠ. καὶ om. Cl. et pr. ΔΠ.

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5. **τίν' οὖν, ὦ Π., αὐτῷ δίδομεν ἀπόκρισιν**; Stallb. gives διδῶμεν, with the note "δίδομεν Bodl., Ven. Π et pr. Vat. inepte. Non enim hoc dicitur: 'quodnam responsum est quod ei damus?' sed 'quid ei respondeamus?'" But Herm. (followed by Wb.) defends the indic. both here and in ἀποκρινόμεθα, 57 D *infra*, "quod non intelligo cur editores post Stephanum fere omnes in conjunctivum mutaverint; nam postquam Socrates praecedentia pro concessis sumsit, jam sine dubitatione habet quae respondeat."

10. **τῶν ὄντως φιλοσοφούντων**. ὄντως is suspected by Stallb., who thinks that "ab iis additum esse qui recordarentur τοὺς ὄντως s. ἀληθῶς et ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντας s. φιλοσόφους qui alibi, veluti in Phaedone, falsis vel opinatis philosophis opponuntur": but the suspicion is gratuitous.

14. **τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὁλκήν**. Cp. the eristical sophists who are said in *Theaet.* 195 C τοὺς λόγους ἄνω κάτω ἕλκειν. Also *Cratyl.* 435 C ἀλλὰ μὴ... γλισχρὰ ᾖ ἡ ὁλκὴ αὕτη τῆς ὁμοιότητος: and *Theaet.* 168 C (ὀνόματα) ἕλκοντες. Poste suggests that there may be a special allusion here to the polemic of Protagoras against the Mathematicians, mentioned in Ar. *Met.* B. 998 A: cp. also Theodorus' antipathy to Heraclitism in *Theaet.* 179 D ff.

16. **καὶ δύο μετρητικαί**. "Haec verba, quae ante Bekkerum desiderabantur e Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π addita sunt; nec dubitari potest quin genuina sunt. Iidem libri καὶ ante ταύταις ἄλλαι omittunt. Tum vett. editt. ἄλλαι δύο τοιαῦται, quod soli tenent Par. EF. Et certe istud δύο ineptum" (Stallb.). There seems to be a blunder in Herm.'s note, "τοιαῦται post ἄλλαι optimorum librorum fide non minus quam dudum δύο tollendum erat."

ταύταις ἄλλαι τοιαῦται συνεπόμεναι συχναί, τὴν διδυμότητα ἔχουσαι ταύτην, ὀνόματος δὲ ἑνὸς κεκοινωμέναι.

ΠΡΩ. | Διδῶμεν τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ τούτοις, οὓς φῂς δεινοὺς E
εἶναι, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

5 ΣΩ. Ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστα εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀναίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν.

10 ΠΡΩ. Τίνα δὲ ταύτην αὖ δεῖ | λέγειν; 58

ΣΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι ἣ πᾶσαν <ἂν> τήν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνοίη. τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἔγωγε οἶμαι ἡγεῖσθαι ξύμπαντας, ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρτηται, μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι
15 γνῶσιν· σὺ δὲ τί; πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνοις ἄν;

1 ἄλλαι δύο τοιαῦται EFS. 2 δὲ add. Cl. ΔΠ. κεκοινωμέναι Cl. ΓΔΛΠCEHw Flor. a,b,c,i, κεκοινωνηκέναι ΞF: κεκοινωνημέναι *S.
E. 4 εἶναι om. H. 5 μάλιστ' Cl. Γw.
58 A. 11 ὅτιὴ πᾶσαν Cl.: vulg. ὅτι ἣ πᾶσαν. 12 γνοίην Π. κατ' αὐτὸν EF, κατὰ τὰ ταὐτὸν H. 13 ξύμπαντας ἡγεῖσθαι Γ. 14 προσήρηται Cl. et pr. ΔΠ. 15 τί καὶ πῶς rc. Σ. τοῦτ' add. Cl. ΓΔΠ et rc. Ξ.

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1. **ἄλλαι τ. συνεπόμεναι συχναί**, e.g. statics, stereometry, astronomy; cp. *Rep.* 527 C ff. For the distinction between practical and theoretical sciences (facts and laws), Poste cites Ar. *Anal. Post.* I. 13 τὸ μὲν ὅτι τῶν αἰσθητικῶν εἰδέναι, τὸ δὲ διότι τῶν μαθηματικῶν.

3. **τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ**: cp. *Critias* 43 D, *Symp.* 177 E.

8. **ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις**. This expression recurs *Rep.* 511 B, 533 A: cp. 58 C.

ἀναίνομαι ('repudiate,' 'disown') seems to occur nowhere else in Plato.

11. **δῆλον ὅτι ἣ πᾶσαν...γνοίη**. Ven. Π γνοίην, whence Stallb. suggests γνοίη ἄν: but πᾶσαν <ἂν> would seem a likelier conj. on the same lines. Poste adopts Dr W. H. Thompson's correction δῆλον ὁτιὴ πᾶς ἄν, which is both neat and plausible: similarly Badh. and Wb., after Madvig, print δῆλον ὅτι πᾶς ἄν. Hirzel however expressly rejects the change, holding the text necessary "quibus dialectica distinguatur ab ea quae dicitur περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμη," for which he cites *Rep.* VII. 537. I doubt also if ὁτιή is Platonic, in spite of Bodl.; and as διαλεκτική is here personified, and γνοίη echoed by γνῶσιν, I prefer the vulgate. Paley suggests δῆλον ὅτι πᾶσαν τήν γε νῦν λεγομένην διάνοιαν, which seems scarcely felicitous.

For the character of dialectic cp. *Rep.* 531 D ff., *Theaet.* 176 C ff. Badh. objects to τὸ ὄντως as misplaced in the statement, not of the meaning of a word, but of the objects of a given science: hence he brackets καὶ τό before ὄντως. There is no parallel to this absolute use of ὄντως, so that it is tempting to adopt either Badh.'s excision or an addition such as τὸ <ὂν> ὄντως, or a change such as τὸ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτόν.

15. **σὺ δὲ τί; πῶς...διακρίνοις ἄν;** This is best printed as two separate questions, as by Herm., Paley and Wb. Stallb. prints as a single question, and cites the formula πῶς τί (*Tim.* 22 C, *Hipp. Maj.* 297 E), and Eur. *Hel.* 873 Ἑλένη, τί τάμὰ πῶς ἔχει θεσπίσματα; But these fail to justify the double question in a single clause here.

Badh. brackets πῶς...διακρ. ἄν; as "contrary to the usual order," and "unworthy of our author."

ΠΡΩ. Ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἑκάστοτε Γορ-
γίου πολλάκις, ὡς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν·
πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὑτῇ δοῦλα δι' ἑκόντων | ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας B
ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν· νῦν δ'
5 οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνῳ βουλοίμην ἂν ἐναντία τίθεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τὰ ὅπλα μοι δοκεῖς βουληθεὶς εἰπεῖν αἰσχυνθεὶς
ἀπολιπεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστω νῦν ταῦτα ταύτῃ, ὅπῃ σοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν αἴτιος ἐγὼ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν σε;

10 ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, τοῦτο ἔγωγε ἐζήτουν πω,
τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ | μεγίστη καὶ C
ἀρίστη καὶ πλεῖστα ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφὲς

2 πολλάκις γοργίας Γ. τὸ (γρ. ἡ τοῦ) Ξ, ἡ τοῦ τῷ EF. διαφέρει ΓΑBCEFHw Flor. a,b,c,i.
B. 4 ποιοῖτο] βιοῖτο Γ. μακρῶν Γ. ἀρίστη πασῶν Cl. ΔΠ: πασῶν ἀρίστη *S. 8 ταύτῃ] ταῦτον H. σὺ Γ. 9 ὑπολαμβάνειν EF. 11 τοῦτ' Γ. 12 ἢ om. Cl. et pr. ΔΠ.
C. 13 ἀρίστη εἶναι καὶ rc. Σ.

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1. **ἤκουον μὲν ... πολλάκις.** Bekk. inserted τοῦτο after ἔγωγε. πολλάκις is suspected by Badh. 'as quite incompatible with ἑκάστοτε': but he has forgotten *Polit.* 306 E τῶν πράξεων ἐν πολλαῖς καὶ πολλάκις ἑκάστοτε τάχος...λέγομεν κτλ.: "consistently and repeatedly" is not logically redundant.

For Gorgias' glorification of his own rhetorical art, see esp. *Gorg.* 452 D ff.: cp. 448 C.

3. **ὑφ' αὑτῇ δ. δι' ἑκόντων...ποιοῖτο.** Badh. censures δι' ἑκόντων as an 'objectionable mode of expression,' and suggests δι' ἑκόντων αὐτῶν—the point of which change I fail to see. Plato rather affects διά c. gen. as an equivalent for advv. of manner: e.g. διὰ ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι *Prot.* 347 C: διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι *Gorg.* 449 B, *Theaet.* 172 D: δι' ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν *Rep.* 378 A.

ὑπό c. dat. is almost confined in Attic prose to phrases like the present, expressive of 'submission' or 'subjugation' to a political or social power.

6. **τὰ ὅπλα ... εἰπεῖν ... ἀπολιπεῖν.** Socr. plays on the double sense of ἐναντία τίθεσθαι, as used either in argument (as here by Prot.) or in warfare, as in ἀντία ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα, Hdt. I. 62; and also on the double sense of ἀπολιπεῖν, 'abandon,' as applicable either to the weapons or to the word 'ὅπλα.' Poste suggests the rendering: "But now I should not like to *break with* either of you,"—"*Break a lance with* either, you were going to say, I think, but a sudden humility restrained you."

12. **διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστη κ. ἀ. κ. π. ὠ. ἡμᾶς.** Ven. Σ rec. ἀρίστη εἶναι καὶ πλ.—and so Stallb. once conj. Paley declares that "either εἶναι has dropped out after ἀρίστη, or the author, with studied ambiguity, has left it to be understood." Lehrs thought there was a ref. here to Prot.'s former expression διαφέροι πασῶν ...ἀρίστη 58 AB, and so construed: "*isto* μεγίστη κτλ. quo tu usus es." Similarly Badh.[1]: "*in this title, greatest* etc. The words μεγ....ἡμᾶς are taken as one name, and so become susceptible of the article. Cp. Arist. *Vesp.* 666 ἐς τούτους, τοὺς οὐχὶ προδώσω τὸν Ἀθηναίων κολοσυρτόν." And this seems right. But in ed. 2 Badh. rejects the words διαφέρει τῷ as an interpolation, since "if Plato had used any such word as διαφέρει, he would have made both grounds of comparison, *certainty* as well as *general merit*, depend upon it." Stallb.'s explanation is that we have here a case of confusion or con-

καὶ τἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν εἰ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ ὀνινᾶσα, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ ζητοῦμεν. ἀλλ' ὅρα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπεχθήσει Γοργίᾳ, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχειν τέχνῃ διδοὺς πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν, ᾗ δ' εἶπον
5 ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματείᾳ, καθάπερ τοῦ λευκοῦ πέρι τότε ἔλεγον, κἂν εἰ σμικρόν, καθαρὸν δ' εἴη, τοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ μὴ τοιούτου διαφέρειν | τούτῳ γ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ, καὶ νῦν δὴ D σφόδρα διανοηθέντες καὶ ἱκανῶς διαλογισάμενοι, μήτ' εἴς τινας ὠφελείας ἐπιστημῶν βλέψαντες μήτε τινὰς εὐδοκιμίας,
10 ἀλλ' εἴ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην εἴπωμεν, διεξερευνησάμενοι τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως, εἰ ταύτην μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἐκτῆσθαι φαῖμεν ἂν ἤ τινα ἑτέραν ταύτης κυριωτέραν ἡμῖν | ζητητέον. E

15 ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σκοπῶ, καὶ χαλεπόν, οἶμαι, συγχωρῆσαί

1 τἀκριβὲς Cl. ΔΠ: τὸ ἀκριβὲς *S. κἂν Cl. ᾗ Cornarius: libri εἰ.
2 καὶ σμικρὰ Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣCHw Flor. a,b,c,i: καὶ μὴ σμικρὰ S. ὀνινᾶσα BC, ὀνήνασα Cl., ὀνήσασα ΓHw et γρ. F, ὀνισᾶσα Ξ: vulgg. ὀνίνασα, ὀνινᾶσα conj. Bekk.
3 ἀπεχθήσει Cl. ΓΔΠ. τὴν Π. 4 διδοὺς] δειλοὺς w. 5 ἐγὼ νῦν Cl. ΔΠ: νῦν ἐγὼ *S. 6 καθαρὸν om. pr. Ξ. δεῖη Cl.

D. 7 γ'] γὰρ Γ. δὴ νῦν Γ. 8 διαθέντες Σ. 10 ἀλλ' εἴτις BCEF, ἀλλ' ἤτις Ξw, ἀλλήτις Π, ἄλλη τις Cl. Δ. ἐρῶν Λ. 11 πάνθ' Γ. 12 διερευνησάμενοι Cl. ΔΠ. 13 ἐκτῆσθαι Cl. Π et pr. Δ: κεκτῆσθαι *S. τιν' Γ.

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flation of two constructions, viz. διαφέρει τῷ...εἶναι...ὠφελεῖν and διαφέρει ὡς...οὖσα ...ὠφελοῦσα—a well-known Thucydideanism for which he cites Poppo on Thuc. I. 2, IV. 36, V. 7, VI. 1, 84; also *Rep.* 346 B ἐάν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιὴς γίγνηται διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρον αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ.

1. **κἂν εἰ σμικρά.** "Cornarius κἂν ᾗ σμ. quod inde a Steph. receptum est, invitis libris omnibus" (Stallb.). For κἂν εἰ σμ. (sc. ἐστίν) cp. *Polit.* 308 C, *Soph.* 247 D, 267 D. Bekk., Badh. and Wb. give ᾗ.

2. **ὃ νῦν δὴ ζητοῦμεν.** Badh.[2] reads, by a plausible conj., ἐζητοῦμεν: but I hesitate to desert the MSS., as the pres. tense seems defensible.

3. **τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχειν** κτλ. Stallb. bids us connect thus: τῇ μὲν ἐκ. τέχνῃ διδοὺς ὑπάρχειν (αὐτὴν) πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρ. κρατεῖν, i.e. ὥστε κρατεῖν. Badh. reads τῇ μὲν ἐκ. ὑπερέχειν τέχνῃ δ. π. χρ. τ. ἀνθρώποις, κρατεῖν δ' ᾗ εἶπον κτλ. He further puts a period after τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ, beginning the next clause καὶ νῦν δὲ †σφόδρα: and next proceeds to bracket τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως. These last two changes are found in ed. 2: in ed. 1 we find in their place that of ταύτην εἴπωμεν to ταύτῃ εἴπ. If we avoid altering the text, we must explain the irregularity in grammar as a case of anacoluthon: as Stallb. puts it, the dat. ᾗ... πραγματείᾳ is due to the retention of the construction found in the earlier part of the sentence, while the phrase ταύτην εἴπ. διερ. κτλ. is added on after the intermediate clause καθάπερ...πράττειν, independently of all that precedes. But Wb. is perhaps right in accepting ὑπερέχειν and κρατεῖν δ' ᾗ: Poste, too, approves of the former correction, and in place of the latter proposes πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν δ' ᾗ εἶπον. I follow Wb. in pointing ταύτην εἴπωμεν, διεξερευνησάμενοι τὸ καθ. κτλ.: Paley, on the contrary, bids us join ταύτην διερευνησάμενοι, though not denying the possibility of Badh.'s ταύτῃ.

τινα ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην ἢ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντέχεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτην.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐννοήσας τὸ τοιόνδε εἴρηκας ὃ λέγεις νῦν, ὡς αἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ταῦτα πεπόνηνται, πρῶτον | 5 μὲν δόξαις χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ δόξας ζητοῦσι συντεταμένως; 59 εἴτε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἡγεῖταί τις ζητεῖν, οἶσθ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπῃ τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπῃ πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπῃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου; φαῖμεν ἂν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀεί, περὶ δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα ἡμῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνῄρηται τὸν πόνον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν τι σαφὲς ἂν φαῖμεν τῇ ἀκριβεστάτῃ 15 ἀληθείᾳ | γίγνεσθαι, ὧν μήτε ἔσχε μηδὲν πώποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ B μήθ' ἕξει μήτε εἰς τὸ νῦν παρὸν ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Περὶ οὖν τὰ μὴ κεκτημένα βεβαιότητα μηδ' ἡντινοῦν πῶς ἄν ποτε βέβαιον γίγνοιθ' ἡμῖν καὶ ὁτιοῦν;

20 ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμῶς.

E. 1 τιν' Γ. 4 ὅσαι libri.
59 A. 5 δόξας] δόξαν Cl. ΔΠ. συντεταμένως corr. Σ: ξυντεταγμένως *S. 7 τε add. Cl. ΔΠ. πάσχη Γ. 10 ἀεὶ Γ. γενόμενα Γ. 11 γεγονότος Γ. 14 οὖν om. ΛΣBCEFHw Flor. a,b,c,i et pr. Ξ.
B. 15 ταῦτα Cl. 18 βεβαιότατα Λ. 19 καὶ om. Γ.

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4. **καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ταῦτα πεπόνηνται.** Stallb. retains the MSS.' text ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτα π. As to ὅσοι I follow Herm. who comments: "ex Astii conj. ὅσοι edidi pro ὅσαι, quod frustra Stallb. relato ad terrestria verbo ταῦτα tueri conatus est; de hominibus agi etiam sequentia ζητεῖ διὰ βίου et ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνῄρηται arguunt." ὅσοι is also accepted by Poste, Badh., Wb. and Paley. For περὶ ταῦτα Schleierm. conj. περὶ τὰ ἐνταῦθα, and Badh. περὶ ταύτας, which Paley adopts. The latter may be right; but the neut. seems sufficiently defended (as used δεικτικῶς, for τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν) by 62 A, *Phaedo* 75 E, *Phaedr.* 250 E etc., which Stallb. cites.

5. **συντεταμένως**: so Ven. Σ corr., also van Heusde conj., accepted by Bekk., Herm. and most later edd., exc. Stallb., who retains the ξυντεταγμένως of MSS., citing *Apol. Socr.* 25 E, where doubtless Herm. was right in altering to -τεταμένως as here: cp. *Rep.* 399 B.

6. **περὶ φύσεως ἡγεῖταί τις ζητεῖν.** Badh. thinks ἡγεῖται appropriate only 'if the physicist mistook what φύσις was,' while here 'no intimation is given that there is any higher sense of φύσις or of the investigation of it'; whence he proposes ᾤρηται. But Plato is generally conscious of the higher sense of φύσις. For his estimation of physical investigation see *Tim.* 29 A ff., 42 E ff., 46 D: and cp. *Phaedo* 97 C ff. (on Anaxagoras), *Phaedr.* 270 A ff.

11. **ἀνῄρηται τὸν πόνον**: cp. ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἔργον *Laws* 921 A, D: ἐχθρὰς ἀναιρ. *Phaedr.* 233 C, 243 C.

An alternative word in such combinations is αἱρεσθαι, as *Rep.* 374 E, *Polit.* 277 B.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα νοῦς οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτά ἐστι τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἔχουσα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὔκουν εἰκός γε.

XXXVI. ΣΩ. Τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ
5 Φίληβον χρὴ συχνὰ χαίρειν ἐᾶν, τόδε δὲ διαμαρτύρασθαι |
τῷ λόγῳ. C

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ἢ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθ' ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὃ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές, περὶ τὰ
10 ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα, ἢ [δεύτερος] ἐκείνων ὅ τι μάλιστά ἐστι ξυγγενές· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα δεύτερά τε καὶ ὕστερα λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλλιστα ἆρ'
15 οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις δικαιότατον ἀπονέμειν;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γε. |

1 ἐστι om. Σ. 5 το δε Cl. et pr. ΔΠ. διαμαρτύρεσθαι ΛΗ.

C. 8 ἢ F, ἡ ΓΔΑΣBCEH. 9 καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς Cl. ΓΔΠ: καὶ ἀληθὲς *S. εἰλικρινὲς Γ. τὰ Cl. ΔΠΣBCw, τὸ H: τὸ *S. 10 καὶ post ἀεὶ om. Cl. ΓΔΑΠΣBCEH Flor. a,b,c,i. κατὰ om. w. ἔχοντα] ἔχον BS. δευτέρως corr. Σ, δεύτερος H. 11 τὰ δ' om. Cl. ΔΠ. ἀλλὰ Cl. ΔΠ. 12 ὕστατα Λ.

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1. **οὐδ' ἄρα νοῦς οὐδέ τις ἐπ.** Badh.[2] rejects νοῦς as the insertion of a scribe ignorant of the idiom οὐδ' ἄρα οὐδέ.

4. **τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμέ.** For this use of the art. before the person. pron. cp. 20 B.

5. **συχνὰ χαίρειν ἐᾶν.** This is a variant for the common formula πολλὰ χ. ἐᾶν, for which cp. Ar. *Ach.* 200 χαίρειν κελεύων πολλὰ τοὺς Ἀχαρνέας: *Pax* 719. In Plato we find χαίρειν ἐᾶν *Prot.* 347 E, *Phaedr.* 230 A, *Gorg.* 458 B, 461 A, *Phaedo* 63 E, *Symp.* 176 E, *Rep.* 358 B, 618 E, *Soph.* 220 A, *Polit.* 260 B, *Laws* 810 B, etc.; and χαίρειν εἰπεῖν (λέγειν) *Phaedr.* 272 E, *Phaedo* 64 C, 82 D, *Rep.* 406 D, *Theaet.* 188 A, *Soph.* 258 A, *Phil.* 36 D, *Laws* 842 D.

8. **καὶ τὸ καθαρόν.** These words are pronounced spurious by Badh. because "βέβαιον cannot be separated from ἀληθές," nor καθαρόν from εἰλικρινές.

10. **ἢ [δεύτερος] ἐκείνων.** With δεύτερος Schleierm. and Stallb. supply πλοῦς (cp. 19 C, *Phaedo* 99 D, *Polit.* 300 B for this proverbial phrase); but such an ellipse is hardly conceivable. Stephens commented: "Aut δεύτερον scribendum, aut aliquid cum δεύτερος deesse dicendum est." The Zürich edd. and Poste give δευτέρως. Badh.[2] obelizes, with the note; "it is incredible that Plato should make two δεύτερα to one and the same *first*." Herm. observes: "δεύτερος, quod vel propter sequens δεύτερα ferri nequit, quia cum Tur. δευτέρως scribendo neutiquam sanatur, circumscripsi; facile tamen patiar aliam vocem feliciore conjectura substitui." Badh.[1] reads δεύτερ' ὅσ' ἐκείνων... ξυγγενῆ. Wb. follows Herm. in bracketing, as do I. I would suggest however that δεύτερος (like πρῶτον in 60 A) arose from the compend. (β), which may have been corrupted from an abbreviated περί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ φρόνησις, ἅ γ' ἄν τις τιμήσειε μάλιστα ὀνόματα; D

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἄρα ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὂν ὄντως ἐννοίαις ἔστιν ἀπηκριβωμένα ὀρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἅ γε εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐγὼ τότε παρεσχόμην, οὐκ ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πέρι πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μῖξιν | εἴ τις φαίη καθαπερεὶ δημιουργοῖς E ἡμῖν, ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι, παρακεῖσθαι, καλῶς ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἆρ' οὐ μιγνύναι ἐπιχειρητέον;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

D. 2 μάλιστ' Γ. 4 ὄντων E. ἐννοίαις om. Γ. 10 δὴ] δὴ γὰρ Cl. ΔΠ.

E. 12 δεῖ δημιουργεῖν Cl. Π, δημιουργεῖν δεῖ Δ, δεῖ δὴ δημιουργεῖν F: δὴ δημιουργεῖν *S.

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1. **ἅ γ' ἄν τις τιμήσειε.** Badh. alters to ἅτ' ἄν.

4. **ταῦτ' ἄρα...καλεῖσθαι.** The current explanations of the text are thus given in Paley's note: "it seems best to construe ἀπηκριβωμένα καλεῖσθαι, 'the right words in the right place,' as we say. Mr Poste's version merely evades the difficulty; 'these names then may be given to the science of real Being with a superlatively just application.' (Poste gives ἀπηκρ. 'the force of a superlative adv. = πάνυ or μάλα,' so that ἀπ. ὀρθῶς = ὀρθότατα.) Mr Jowett, 'to have their truest and exactest application.' Taylor, 'Rightly then are these names in accurate speech appropriated to the intelligence and contemplation of real being.'" Stallbaum renders ἀπηκριβωμένα, "quippe accommodata illis diligentissime." Paley's own rendering is, "Then such terms, in abstract conceptions, may, if rightly given, be called fitly applied," apparently taking ἔστιν καλεῖσθαι as "it is possible to call," i.e. equivalent to ἔστιν καλεῖν. ἀπακριβῶ is only found in the later dialogues, *Tim.* 29 C, 33 C, *Laws* 810 B, in the sense of 'exactly framed or fitted.' καλεῖσθαι, as middle voice, seems to occur only in *Laws* 914 C, 937 A, and in the sense of 'invite' or 'summon.' We might, perhaps, explain the construction as similar to that in *Prot.* 329 B σμικροῦ τινὸς ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν, where the ellipse of ὥστε is usually assumed. Otherwise some such change as ἐννοίαις <ὅσαι> εἰσὶν ἀπηκριβωμέναι...καλεῖσθαι, or ἔστιν <ἃ χρὴ> ἀπηκρ. κτλ., or ἔστιν <ἃ> ἀπηκ. ὀρθῶς φαῖμεν ἂν καλεῖσθαι might be proposed. Badh. proposed ἔστω ἀπηκριβωμένως κείμενα καλεῖσθαι. But Jackson's suggestion to excise ὀρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι seems the most plausible.

12. **ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς.** Similarly we might say that bricks are made *out of* straw, while a potter works *in* clay, i.e., as Badh. says, the material may be regarded either as a secondary cause of production, or as the substance in which the artificer realises his art.

καλῶς ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι, 'he would rightly picture it in words': cp. *Parm.* 128 E οὐ κακῶς ἀπεικάσας, *Symp.* 221 C, D, *Cratyl.* 426 E, 432 B, for ἀπεικάζειν, *uerbis exprimere.* Paley remarks that "this sentence affords a good example of the purposely involved style the author has adopted throughout the dialogue."

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τάδε προειποῦσι καὶ ἀναμνήσασιν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὀρθότερον ἂν ἔχοι;

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ἃ καὶ πρότερον ἐμνήσθημεν· εὖ δ' ἡ παροιμία
5 δοκεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς τό γε καλῶς | ἔχον ἐπανα- 60
πολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· οἶμαι γὰρ οὑτωσί πως τὰ τότε λεχθέντα ῥηθῆναι.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φίληβός φησι τὴν ἡδονὴν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν πᾶσι ζῴοις γεγονέναι καὶ δεῖν πάντας τούτου στοχάζεσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τἀγαθὸν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ξύμπασι, καὶ δύο ὀνόματα, ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ, ἑνί τινι καὶ φύσει μιᾷ τούτῳ ὀρθῶς τεθέντ'
15 ἔχειν· Σωκράτης δ' ἓν μὲν | οὔ φησι τοῦτ' εἶναι, δύο δὲ B
καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ

1 προσειποῦσι H. 4 δ' ἡ] δὴ Cl. 5 καὶ ante δὶς add. Cl. ΓΔΠ.
60 A. 8 οὕτω Cl. ΔΠ. 13 τοῦτ' αὐτὸ] ταυτὸ H. 14 τούτῳ ὀρθῶς τεθέντ' Heindorfius, ὀρθῶς τοῦτο τεθὲν Σ: τοῦτο ὀρθῶς τεθὲν *S. τεχθὲν corr. Π.
15 σώματα EF. κράτης δὲ πρῶτον libri.
B. 16 τό τε ἀγαθὸν Cl. ΔΣΗ, pr. Π, corr. F: τότε τὸ ἀγαθὸν *S. καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ Cl. ΔΠΣ: καὶ ἡδὺ *S. 17 μέτοχον Cl. (?) ΔΠ: μετέχον *S.

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4. **ἃ καὶ πρότερον ἐμνήσθημεν.** Badh. brackets ἐμνήσθ. as "a supplement originating with some one who did not see that the verbs to be understood are εἴπομεν καὶ ἀνεμνήσαμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς"—a scarcely convincing statement: ἐμνήσθην is much used by Plato.

5. **τὸ καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπ.** The proverb was δὶς καὶ τρὶς τὸ καλόν or καλὸν τὰ καλὰ λέγειν ('a good thing can't be too often repeated'), for which cp. *Gorg.* 498 E καὶ δὶς...καὶ τρίς φασι καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.

13. **τἀγαθὸν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ξ.**, the neut pron. refers, of course, to ἡδονήν, by a common idiom.

14. **ἑνί τινι καὶ φύσει μιᾷ τούτῳ ὀρθῶς τεθέντ' ἔχειν.** MSS. τοῦτο ὀρθῶς τεθὲν ἔχ. The correction, adopted by most later edd., including Stallb., Herm. and Wb., is due to the sagacity of Heindorf. Badh. however reads τούτῳ...τεθέντ', and then, complaining that the words καὶ φ. μιᾷ separate τινι from τούτῳ, proceeds to bracket them—a piece of strange perversity.

15. **ἓν μὲν οὔ φησι τοῦτ' εἶναι.** The MSS. give πρῶτον μέν, upon which Stallb. comments: "additurus erat ἔπειτα τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῶν ἄλλων, quod ipsum deinde oratione variata subiungitur"; and also that "τοῦτο εἶναι est: *hoc verum esse, hoc ita se habere*, sc. bonum et iucundum esse unum idemque." Herm. avoided the latter difficulty by accepting van Heusde's insertion of ἓν after πρῶτον μέν: while Badh.'s emendation avoids both difficulties. As Badh. remarks, "the scribe has here confounded the ordinal and the cardinal numbers, both of which are written with the same compendium (α)." For this substitution of ἓν for πρῶτον, which is adopted also by Wb., cp. 18 A, Note.

ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ ταῦτ' ἔστι τε καὶ ἦν τὰ τότε λεγόμενα, ὦ Πρώταρχε;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἂν ξυνομο-
5 λογοῖτο;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλλων.

ΠΡΩ. | Τίνι; C

ΣΩ. Ὧι παρείη τοῦτ' ἀεὶ τῶν ζῴων διὰ τέλους πάντως
10 καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἑκάστων, ἄμικτον μὲν ἡδονὴν
15 φρονήσει, φρόνησιν δὲ ὡσαύτως ἡδονῆς μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσαν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τότε πότερον | ἱκανὸν ἔδοξεν D
εἶναί τῳ;

20 ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

XXXVII. ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε παρηνέχθημέν τι τότε, νῦν ὁστισοῦν ἐπαναλαβὼν ὀρθότερον εἰπάτω, μνήμην καὶ φρό-

1 τοῦτ' pr. Δ. ἔστιν Cl. 4 καὶ post τόδε om. Cl. ΔΠ. 7 τῷδε] τόδε Cl. Π et pr. Δ. τῶν] μᾶλλον τῶν ES.
C. 9 αἰεὶ Cl. 14 θέντος corr. Λ. 15 ὡσαύτως ἡδονῆς Cl. ΔΠ: ἡδονῆς ὡσαύτως *S. 17 ταῦτα] τα Λ. 18 ὁπότερον corr. Σ.
D. 19 τῶι Cl. 21 γε] τι F. τοι pr. F. 22 φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην

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4. **καὶ τόδε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν.** Herm., with Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π, omits the second *καί*. But the vulgate is retained by Stallb., Badh., Poste and Wb.

9. **ᾧ παρείη** κτλ. This is a virtual protasis; for εἴ τινι π. cp. *Phaedr.* 276 B, *Gorg.* 521 C. For the construction of the infin. without ἄν in apod., cp. Goodwin *M. T.* §§ 499 ff. Stallb. states that the infin. προσδ. and ἔχειν depend on the preceding infin. διαφέρειν: but surely they are parallel to διαφ. in depending on ξυνομολογοῖτο above, which serves to introduce the or. obl. Paley suggests ποτ' <ἂν> ἔτι, "the ἂν being more usually added when an optative precedes"; but there is nothing to account for its loss here.

13. **ἐπειράθημεν...θέντες,** "we placed them as an experimental test": cp. 21 A ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα.

18. **πότερον** is here used in the rarer sense of *alterutrum*: cp. 20 E, *Soph.* 252 A, *Theaet.* 145 A, etc. Hirzel would eject τῳ on the ground that ἱκανόν can only mean 'id quod *sibi* sufficit,' citing Ficinus, 'visumne tunc nobis ex his alterutrum sufficiens esse': but τῳ is defensible as merely a *dat. commodi*.

21. **εἰ δέ γε παρηνέχθημεν** κτλ. For the use of παραφέρεσθαι for 'aberration' cp. 38 D: and for this polite method of closing the argument cp. *Tim.* 54 A, *Laws* 796 D, *Ep.* VIII. 333 E.

νησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος καὶ σκοπῶν εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτ' ἄν οἱ καὶ ὁτιοῦν εἶναι ἢ καὶ γίγνεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δή γε ἡδονὴν εἴθ' ὡς πλείστην εἴθ' ὡς σφοδροτάτην, ἣν μήτε ἀληθῶς δοξάζοι
5 χαίρειν μήτε τὸ παράπαν γιγνώσκοι τί ποτε πέπονθε πάθος | μήτ' αὖ μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μηδ' ὁντινοῦν χρόνον ἔχοι. E
ταὐτὰ δὲ λεγέτω καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, εἴ τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτ' ἂν φρόνησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετά τινων ἡδονῶν ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως
10 μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως αὖ τινός.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτά γε πολλάκις ἐπερωτᾶν.

ΣΩ. | Οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ τὸ 61
παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἂν τούτων εἴη;

15 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν ἤτοι σαφῶς ἢ καί τινα τύπον αὐτοῦ ληπτέον, ἵν', ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν, δευτερεῖα ὅτῳ δώσομεν ἔχωμεν.

Cl. ΔΠ: ἐπιστήμην καὶ φρόνησιν *S. 2 οἱ] ἢ F. 3 ἢ γίγνεσθαι Cl. ΔΠ: ἢ καὶ γίγνεσθαι *S. 4 ἣν Cl., ἣν ΓΔΛΞΠΣ, ἣν BCw, ἣν FH, εἰ Ficinus, Bekk.: ἢ *S. δοξάζειν Cl. Π et pr. Δ.

E. 7 ταυτὰ B, ταυτα, circumfl. deleto, Cl.: ταῦτα *S. λέγω Cl. ΔΠ: vulg. λέγε. ἤτις Cl. ΔΠ. 8 τῆς om. w. βραχὺ ταύτης Λ. 11 γε] τε Cl. ΔΠ, om. F.

61 A. 15 πῶς γὰρ ἄν] οὐδέτερον mg. Σ, om. ΛΣCFHw et pr. ΞE. 17 λέγομεν Cl. et pr. ΔΠ. 18 ἔχοιμεν Γ.

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1. **τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος.** For the gen. of classification with τίθεσθαι, cp. *Rep.* 376 E, 424 C.

2. **ἄνευ τούτων:** these words are explained and expanded in the foll. εἰ μήτε...ἔχοι—a construction similar to that in 46 B.

3. **μὴ ὅτι δή γε ἡδονήν.** "Plato and Xenophon sometimes use merely μὴ ὅτι and sometimes add δή only (e.g. *Phaedr.* 240 D). In the cases where γε is added, it is found sometimes before δή, sometimes after it. Cp. this passage with one in Demosth. *against Conon* μὴ ὅτι γε δή, and with one in *Politicus*, μὴ ὅτι δὴ βασιλεῖς γε." (Badh.)

7. **ταὐτὰ δὲ λεγέτω.** MSS. ταῦτα: corr. Schleierm.—λέγω Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π, Turr., Poste, Badh., Herm.: λέγε Stallb., al.: λεγέτω Wb., which εἰπάτω above, as well as the variance of MSS., proves to be right.

8. **φρόνησιν ἔχειν ... τινός.** Here Badh. brackets both ἢ μετά τινων ἡδονῶν and χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ: while the foll. reply of Prot. is, he thinks, 'no answer at all,' and 'ought to be ἔστι ταῦτα, or in other words οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἢ ταῦτά γε': but there is no real objection to the text in either case.

16. **τινα τύπον αὐτοῦ,** i.e. in rough outline or adumbration, a general sketch: cp. 32 B, *Rep.* 414 A ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας εἰρῆσθαι, 491 C, 559 A, 504 D (ὑπογραφήν), *Protag.* 344 B. Poste remarks here that "τὸ ἀγαθόν is henceforth used to signify the ideal or supramundane Good; and τὸ τέλεον, i.e. ὁ μικτὸς βίος, the final cause of human life, only holds the second rank. The characteristics of

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁδὸν μέν τινα ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν εἰλήφαμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Καθάπερ εἴ τίς τινα ἄνθρωπον ζητῶν τὴν οἴκησιν
5 πρῶτον | ὀρθῶς, ἵν' οἰκεῖ, πύθοιτο αὐτοῦ, μέγα τι δή που B
πρὸς τὴν εὕρεσιν ἂν ἔχοι τοῦ ζητουμένου.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δή τις λόγος ἐμήνυσεν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχάς, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμίκτῳ βίῳ τἀγαθὸν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ
10 μικτῷ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐλπὶς μὴν πλείων ἐν τῷ μιχθέντι καλῶς τὸ ζητούμενον ἔσεσθαι φανερώτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ μή;

ΠΡΩ. Πολύ γε.

15 ΣΩ. Τοῖς δὴ θεοῖς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εὐχόμενοι κεραννύωμεν, εἴτε Διόνυσος | εἴτε Ἥφαιστος εἴθ' ὅστις θεῶν ταύτην τὴν C
τιμὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγκράσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καθάπερ ἡμῖν οἰνοχόοις τισὶ παρεστᾶσι

B. 5 εἰκῇ Cl. ΔΠ. πύθοιτ' Γ, πείθοιτο Cl. ΔΠ. 6 ἀνέχοι Cl. 9 ἐν om. Λ. 15 κεραννύομεν Cl. ΔΠ.
C. 16 εἴθ' Γ. 17 συγκρίσεως pr. H. 19 παρεστᾶσι Cl. ΓΔΛΞΣBCFHw Flor. a,b,c,i, Athen. x. c. 16: παρεστῶσι *S.

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this latter are deduced from the attributes of the ideal Good or the divine nature." How far this is true may be seen from the *Introduction* to the present work.

15. **τοῖς δὴ θεοῖς** κτλ. For the invocation of the gods at an important turning-point in the procedure, cp. 25 B. Dionysus seems mentioned simply as the Wine-god, and Hephaestus probably as the cup-bearer to the gods (*Il.* 1. 597: αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοισι θεοῖς ἐνδέξια πᾶσιν Οἰνοχόει, γλυκὺ νέκταρ ἀπὸ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσων). But the Neo-platonist Olympiodorus supplies us with an elaborate allegorical interpretation: Ὅτι ἐπὶ κράσεως θεοί εἰσι τῆς μὲν φυσικῆς τε καὶ ἐγκοσμίου ὁ Ἥφαιστος, τῆς δὲ ψυχικῆς τε καὶ ὑπερκοσμίου ὁ Διόνυσος. ἄρχεται γὰρ ἄνωθεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν ἡ συγκρατικὴ ἰδιότης, πρόεισι δὲ μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων ὑπάρξεων· οἷον ὁ Ἥφαιστος τῆς φυσικῆς κράσεως ἐξάρχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ πρῶτον τὸ ἰδίωμα προεβάλετο, εἶτα ἐν τῷ νῷ τῷ... φύσεως ἐπιβατεύοντι, εἶτα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁμοίως τῇ τοιαύτῃ, καὶ τέλος ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ κόσμῳ καθ' ὕπαρξιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Διόνυσος ὡσαύτως. ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῆς ψυχικῆς κράσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναφήνας τὸν θεῖον τρόπον ἐξῆς ἐν τῷ νῷ ταύτην ὑπεστήσατο νοερῶς καὶ καθ' ὕπαρξιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸν συνδετικὸν τρόπον ἐν τῷ ἐμψύχῳ σώματι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων ἀνωτέρω ἐπὶ τῆς νοερᾶς ἐστὶ κράσεως ὁ Ζεύς, εἰσὶ δὲ ἄλλοι καὶ μερικώτεροι Διονύσου καὶ Ἡφαίστου. καλεῖ δὲ τούτους ὡς μέλλων πάσας μιγνύναι τὰς μίξεις τάς τε ὑπερκοσμίους καὶ ἐγκοσμίους. τὴν δὲ Δῖον παρῆκε κρᾶσιν ὡς ὑπερτέραν ἢ κατὰ τὰ προκείμενα. Paley suggests that Hephaestus' 'skill in the blending and alloy of metals may be meant, as described in *Il.* XVIII.' (see esp. vv. 474 ff.), but as κρᾶσις is nowhere used in that passage, and the only material here mentioned is wine, this view will hardly hold.

19. **καθάπερ ἡμῖν οἰνοχόοις τισὶ π.** For the inverted order Stallb. cites *Rep.* 545 E, 520 E, 414 E, *Protag.* 337 E, Ar.

κρῆναι, μέλιτος μὲν ἂν ἀπεικάζοι τις τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς, τὴν δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως νηφαντικὴν καὶ ἄοινον αὐστηροῦ καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ τινὸς ὕδατος· ἃς προθυμητέον ὡς κάλλιστα συμμιγνύναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

5 ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἆρα πᾶσαν | ἡδονὴν πάσῃ D
φρονήσει μιγνύντες τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοιμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσφαλές. ᾗ δὲ ἀκινδυνότερον ἂν μιγνύοιμεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τινὰ ἀποφήνασθαι ἄν.

10 ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνα.

ΣΩ. Ἣν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τε ἀληθῶς, ὡς οἰόμεθα, μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἄλλη καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

1 ἂν om. F et pr. Ξ. τις] τό τις rc. Π. 3 ἃς om. Cl. et pr. ΔΠ.
5 πότερον pr. Ξ.
D. 6 μάλιστ' Γ. 8 ἀσφαλῶς ΓΕ. ἀκιδνότερον Γ. 9 δοκῶν Λ.
10 λέγε δὴ Λ. 11 ἣν ἡμῖν ἡδονήν Π. μᾶλλον om. Cl. ΔΠ. 12 δὴν pr. Ξ.
καὶ post δὴ add. Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣΒCHw et pr. Ξ.

Nub. 257, *Vesp.* 363. The whole passage τοῖς δὲ θεοῖς ... συμμιγνύναι is cited by Athenaeus x. 6; and there καί is found inserted before μέλιτος, which Fischer held should be retained. Stallb. is perplexed by the gen. μέλιτος with ἀπεικάζοι, since ἀπεικ. regularly takes the dat.—"itaque aut ad μέλιτος ex antegressis assumendum est κρήνῃ, aut genit. pendere ex ἀπεικάζοι putari debet, quod idem est atque ὁμοίαν εἶναι λέγοι. praestabilior tamen illa est ratio." Certainly supply κρήνῃ—for if we had μέλιτι we should not have an easier constr. but a case of the poet. 'comparatio compendiaria'; it is to honey and to water, not to their springs, that pleasure and wisdom are respectively compared. The wineless offering to wisdom may have been suggested, as Winckelmann supposed, by the offerings of honey and water (μελίκρατον, νηφάλια, ἄπυρα) to the Eumenides and other deities, such as Mnemosyne, Aphrodite Urania, and Aurora: cp. Aesch. *Eum.* 107, Soph. *O. C.* 100, 471 ff.

2. **αὐστηροῦ**, 'unsweetened'—the contrary of γλυκύς: 'tart,' as applied to wine, almost 'saline' of water.

6. **τοῦ καλῶς**, sc. μιγνύναι. Cp. Stallb. on *Phaedo* 114 B.

11. **ἡδονή τε ἀληθῶς, ὡς οἰόμεθα, μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἄλλη** κτλ. Turr. and Herm. omit μᾶλλον with Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π; but most MSS. and edd. (as Poste and Wb.) retain it. Against the omission of μᾶλλον Stallb. urges (1) that then ἀκριβεστέρα must be referred to pleasures, contrary to its usage, and (2) that ἀληθῶς will be redundant. He renders ἡδονὴ ἣν ἀληθῶς by "voluptas *revera* sive *vere* erat": and μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἄλλη by "eine *in höherem Grade* als die andere" (cp. 41 D), and attributes the omission of μᾶλλον to the mistaken zeal of 'critics.' Schleierm. proposed ἀληθής for ἀληθῶς. Badh. writes "ὡς οἰόμεθα is quite hopeless, and we have nothing whereby to decide our choice between ἀληθὴς τοιαύτη μᾶλλον or (following the Bodleian, which omits μᾶλλον), ἀληθεστέρα ἄλλης ἄλλη." Liebhold proposes (here as in 41 E) μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἁπλῇ. I think it safest to retain the common text, but understand it otherwise than Stallb.: "we found Pleasure to be actually what we think it in some cases more than others": this gives more point to ὡς οἰόμεθα, but we should alter perhaps to ἀληθῶς <οἷον> οἰόμεθα. Another plan would be to add καθαρά either before or after μᾶλλον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ἀποβλέπουσα, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ | τὰ E
μήτε γιγνόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα ἀεί. ταύτην εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπισκοπούμενοι ἡγησάμεθα
5 ἐκείνης ἀληθεστέραν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τἀληθέστατα τμήματα ἑκατέρας ἴδοιμεν πρῶτον συμμίξαντες, ἆρα ἱκανὰ ταῦτα συγκεκραμένα τὸν ἀγαπητότατον βίον ἀπεργασάμενα παρέχειν ἡμῖν, ἤ τινος ἔτι
10 προσδεόμεθα καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων; |

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ δρᾶν οὕτως. 62

XXXVIII. ΣΩ. Ἔστω δή τις ἡμῖν φρονῶν ἄνθρωπος αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅτι ἔστι, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἑπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν ὄντων
15 ὡσαύτως διανοούμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστω γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὗτος ἱκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἕξει κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δὲ

2 δ' Cl.
E. 3 δὲ ὡσαύτως Γ et pr. Σ: δὲ καὶ ὡσαύτως *S. 4 ὄντα] ἐν τῷ H. aleì Cl.
5 ἀσφαλεστέραν Cl. ΔΠ. 8 ἄρ' Γ. 9 ἀπεργασάμενον ΛC, ἀπεργασάμεθα Γ.
62 A. 12 ἔστιν Cl. 13 ἑπόμενον...ἔχων (18) om. pr. Π. 14 νοῖ mg. Π.
πάντων Cl. Δ. 17 ἱκανὸς Λ. ἐπιστήμην mg. Π.

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3. **κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ὡσαύτως.** "Bekk. cum Coislin. et pr. Ven. Σ *καὶ* ante *ὡσαύτως* delevit; non opus. Solet enim in hac formula *καὶ* modo addi, modo omitti, sicuti docuerunt Fischer. et Heindorf. ad *Phaedon*. p. 78 D" (Stallb.). Wb. keeps *καί*.

4. **ταύτην εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπισκ.** For the asyndeton cp. 25 D. Badh. brackets *εἰς τὸ ἀληθές*, without comment.

7. **οὐκοῦν εἰ τἀληθέστατα...ἴδοιμεν.** Badh.[1] reads *οὐκοῦν εἰς τἀλ.—ἴδωμεν*: to which Paley objects, "it may be doubted if the hortative subj. would admit of the *οὐκ*, even in a formula virtually equivalent to *οὖν*." Badh.[2] also gives the subj. *ἴδωμεν*, but brackets *εἰ*—which is open to the same objection.

9. **ἀπεργασάμενα παρέχειν.** For this collocation Stallb. cites *Laws* 667 D *οὐκοῦν ἡδονῇ κρίνοιτ' ἂν μόνον ἐκεῖνο ὀρθῶς, ὃ μήτε τινὰ ὠφέλειαν μήτε ἀλήθειαν μήτε ὁμοιότητα ἀπεργαζόμενον παρέχεται, μήδ' αὖ γε βλάβην...;*

11. **δοκεῖ δρᾶν οὕτως**, i.e. *συμμῖξαι*. As Paley remarks, "Protarchus' reply is tantamount to 'let us try the mixture and see for ourselves': as if S. had asked *οὐκοῦν δεῖ ἰδεῖν συμμίξαντας*, etc." *δρᾶν* can stand for any, even an intrans., antecedent verb: cp. 20 A, *Soph.* 233 C, 253 A, *Polit.* 260 C.

13. **λόγον ἔχων.** Stallb. rightly says "falluntur qui de una orationis facultate (*Rede*) haec interpretati sunt. Ceterum conf. *Tim.* p. 27 *τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περίληπτον κτλ.*" *λόγος* is the 'discourse of reason,' or logical process—the means to the end which consists in final intuition, *τῷ νοεῖν, νοήσει*. **διανοούμενος**, as Poste reminds us, "in the *Republic* is an epithet appropriated to the Mathematician. It appears used designedly here to express with *φρονῶν* the two first divisions of Science." Cp. *Rep.* p. 529.

18. **αὐτῆς τῆς θείας.** These words qualify *κύκλου* as well as *σφαίρας*: for the phrase cp. *Phaedo* 80 B *τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ*

ἀνθρωπίνην ταύτην σφαῖραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τούτους ἀγνοῶν, καὶ χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ | τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως B
κανόσι † καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις;

ΠΡΩ. Γελοίαν διάθεσιν ἡμῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῖς θείαις οὖσαν μόνον ἐπιστήμαις λέγομεν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φῄς; ἢ τοῦ ψευδοῦς κανόνος ἅμα καὶ τοῦ κύκλου τὴν οὐ βέβαιον οὐδὲ καθαρὰν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον κοινῇ καὶ συγκρατέον;

[ψευδοῦς]

1 ταύτην τὴν σφαῖραν Cl. ΔΠ.
B. 2 τοῖς om. pr. Σ. 6 ἡ Cl. ψεύδους Cl. 7 κύκλου ἅμα τὴν F. καθαρὸν Γ. ἐκβλητέον pr. Ξ.

ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή.

τὸν λόγον ἔχων. For the article, '*the* (only right) rational account,' cp. *Euthyd.* 286 A.

1. **ταύτην** means 'that in the visible sphere,' or τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν: cp. 58 E, n., and Aristotle's use of τὰ δεῦρο.

2. **χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ...κύκλοις;** I cite Stallb.'s note: "Haec verba etiamnunc suum expectant vel sospitatorem vel interpretem. Nam quod ea Schleierm. reddidit 'und sich nun in der Baukunst doch der andern Richtmaasse und Kreise bedienen sich sollen' hoc non magis in Graecis inest quam quod alii proposuerunt: 'und sich beim Häuserbau und den übrigen Geschäften auf gleiche Weise (wie in der höhern so in der niedern Wissenschaft) der Richtmaasse und Zirkel bedient'; aut: 'und der sie gebraucht beim Bau, und wo sonst Richtmaass und Kreis vorkommt.' Nec placet Astii explicatio: 'licet in aedificatione cum reliquis utatur regulis, tum etiam circulis.' Ita enim et ὁμοίως neglectum, et, 'reliquae' regulae, quid sibi velint, non intelligitur. Schützius verba κανόσι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις tanquam importunum additamentum delenda iudicavit. Heindorfius, leniore medicina adhibita, scribendum putabat: κανόσι θείοις καὶ κύκλοις. Videtur vero locus integer esse. Putamus enim sententiam esse hanc: 'atque in aedificatione ceterisque negotiis regulis et iis quos diximus circulis *similiter* uti conans'; h. e. sic, ut divini quidem instrumenti (ideae) notitiam habeat, humanam eius rationem naturamque plane ignoret." Paley diverges in part from Stallb., rendering—"if he uses in house-building, in the same abstract and unpractical way, not only the circles but all other rules and measures": while Poste gives "who uses when he builds a house the other rules to the same extent that he uses the circles; i.e. who instead of material instruments...has only the ideal ...line, angle, &c. to guide his handiwork."

Badh.[2] suspects the words καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, saying, "if they are correct, we must understand by them, 'using other pattern figures in the same manner as the circles.' But we might read ὁμοίοις, and omit καί: 'Using, in building and in other things, patterns like the circles,' i.e. divine."

None of the above explanations or emendations commends itself. If the text is right we should construe, I think, in this order: ἐν οἰκοδ. χρώμ. κανόσι ὁμοίως καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις, 'using rules in a similar way to other instruments including circles'; i.e. the man's ignorance is shown by his using indiscriminately straight and circular measures: cp. 51 C. But as Stallb.'s rendering of the words χρώμενος...ἄλλοις is preferable, I believe the latter part corrupt. Wb. reads κανόσι καινοῖς καὶ κύκλοις: I would suggest καὶ <αὐτοῖς> τοῖς κύκλοις or ἄλλοις <αὐτοῖς> ὁμ. κανόσι καὶ <αὐ>τοῖς κύκλοις.

The absurdity might consist either in confusion of human instruments with one another or in substitution of divine for human (in calculations).

7. **ἐμβλητέον κοινῇ.** Schütz needlessly conj. ἐμβλ. ἐκείνῃ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον γάρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἑκάστοτε ἐξευρήσειν οἴκαδε.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ μουσικήν, | ἣν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ἔφαμεν C στοχάσεώς τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστὴν οὖσαν καθαρότητος ἐνδεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἔμοιγε, εἴπερ γε ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ποτὲ βίος.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δῆτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπ' ὄχλου τις ὠθούμενος καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἡττηθεὶς ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀφῶ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσρεῖν καὶ μίγνυσθαι ὁμοῦ καθαρᾷ τὴν ἐνδεεστέραν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὔκουν ἔγωγε οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, | ὅτι τις ἂν D βλάπτοιτο πάσας λαβὼν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, ἔχων τὰς πρώτας.

ΣΩ. Μεθιῶ δὴ τὰς ξυμπάσας ῥεῖν εἰς τὴν τῆς Ὁμήρου καὶ μάλα ποιητικῆς μισγαγκείας ὑποδοχήν;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

XXXIX. ΣΩ. Μεθεῖνται· καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν πηγὴν ἰτέον. ὡς γὰρ διενοήθημεν αὐτὰς μιγνύναι,

3 ἡ...] haec eidem dat Cl.

C. 4 λεπτὴν Γ. 6 γε post εἴπερ om. ΔΞF. 7 ἔσται] ἄρα Γ. 8 τις Cl. ΔΠ: τινὸς *S. 9 τὰς om. Cl. ΔΠ. 11 δεεστέραν pr. Δ.

D. 15 Μεθιῶ] Μεθίω corr. Bekk. δὲ Cl. ΔΠ. τῆς] τοῦ Δ. 16 ποιητικῶς Cl. ΔΠ. 17 πάνυ μὲν οὖν om. Π. 18 μεθεῖντο pr. ΔΠ, μεθεῖντε Cl., μεθεῖνται δὴ rc. Σ. 19 γὰρ om. Δ.

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3. **ἡ καὶ μουσικήν.** For the choice of this art and that of building as types, cp. 55 D, 56 A.

4. **μιμήσεως** here, says Poste, "seems to be an oversight of Plato's, for there has been no mention of *μίμησις*, unless indeed it is a synonym of *στοχασμός*." Perhaps we should insert the word in 56 A.

6. **ὁ βίος ἔσται...βίος,** i.e. *βίος βιωτός* (*Apol.* 38 A, *Symp.* 211 D): cp. Eur. *Alc.* 802 *ὡς τοῖς γε σεμνοῖς...οὐ βίος ἀληθῶς ὁ βίος, ἀλλὰ συμφορά.*

8. **θυρωρὸς ὑπ' ὄχλου τις ὠθ.** So Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π and later edd. for vulg. *ὑπ' ὄχλου τινὸς ὠθ.* *ὄχλος*, 'a turbulent crowd,' can be used of things as well as of men; cp. *Tim.* 75 E, Aesch. *P. V.* 827.

13. **ἔχων τὰς πρώτας,** the condition which secures that the rest are innocuous: Poste compares *Rep.* 595.

15. **τὴν τῆς Ὁμήρου...ὑποδοχήν;** The ref. is to Hom. *Il.* IV. 452 ff.:

ὡς ὅτε χείμαρροι ποταμοὶ κατ' ὄρεσφι ῥέοντες
ἐς μισγάγκειαν συμβάλλετον ὄβριμον ὕδωρ.

Schol. *ad loc.*: *εἰς μισγάγκειαν· εἰς κοῖλον τόπον, ἔνθα ὁμοῦ συμμίσγεται τὸ ὕδωρ ἀπὸ διαφόρων τόπων.* It is noteworthy that the term *ὑποδοχή* is only used by Plato in the later dialogues, meaning either 'reception,' as in *Laws* 949 E, 950 D, 955 B, 919 A,—or 'receptacle,' as here, in *Laws* 848 E, and (as a technical description of the so-called 'Platonic matter') in *Tim.* 49 A, 51 A, 73 A.

18. **μεθεῖνται· καὶ πάλιν** κτλ. "Male vulgo partes personarum distribuuntur sic: ΠΡΩ. *πάνυ μὲν οὖν· μεθεῖνται.* ΣΩ. *καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδ.* κτλ. Unus Aldus omisit Socratis nomen" (Stallb.). The redistribution is due to Boeckh (in *Min.* p. 107), and is generally accepted. Cp. *Laws* 636 D *δύο γὰρ αὗται πηγαὶ μεθεῖνται φύσει ῥεῖν* (sc. *τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ τῶν λύπων*).

19. **ὡς γὰρ...ἡδονῶν.** Stallb. renders: "Nam eo modo, quo utrasque (et artes et voluptates) commiscere cogitavimus, ut

τὰ τῶν ἀληθῶν μόρια πρῶτον, οὐκ ἐξεγένεθ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιστήμην εἰς | ταὐτὸν μεθεῖμεν ἀθρόας E καὶ πρόσθεν τῶν ἡδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

5 ΣΩ. Ὥρα δὴ βουλεύεσθαι νῷν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν, πότερα καὶ ταύτας πάσας ἀθρόας ἀφετέον ἢ καὶ τούτων πρώτας μεθετέον ἡμῖν ὅσαι ἀληθεῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Πολύ τι διαφέρει πρός γε ἀσφάλειαν πρώτας τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἀφεῖναι.

10 ΣΩ. Μεθείσθων δή. τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἆρ' οὐκ εἰ μέν τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ, ξυμμικτέον καὶ ταύτας;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὔ; τάς γε ἀναγκαίας δήπουθεν.

1 ἀληθῶν] ἀληθινῶν ἐπιστημῶν Σ. ἐξενήθη (in mg. εἰς ξενίαν συνέστη) corr. Σ: ἐξεγενήθη *S.

E. 2 μεθεῖκεν (μεν) E. 3 πρόσθε Γ. 4 ἀληθέστατα...ἡδονῶν om. H. 5 ὡσα Cl. περὶ] ἐπὶ Λ. 6 ταύταις (ας) E. ἀφετέον] σαφέστερον Cl. Π et pr. Δ. 8 τι Cl. ΔΠ: γε *S. 10 μεθείσθω Cl. Δ et pr. ΠΕ. δὴ Cl. ΔΠ et pr. Ξ. 11 τινος Cl. (?). ἐκείναις Γ. ξ(υμμ.) Cl. Δ.

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primum verarum tantummodo particulae miscerentur, nobis non licuit," etc. Badh.[2] alters ὡς to οἷς, and transfers πρῶτον from its place after μόρια to the place after μιγνύναι, rendering, "For the parts of the true sciences, with which we first proposed to mingle them, were not sufficient for us." I am inclined to accept οἷς for ὡς, as I do not see how Stallb.'s view that αὐτάς refers 'non ad unas voluptates, sed etiam ad artes ac disciplinas' can hold. Possibly we should read, for αὐτάς, ἑκατέρας—the first syll. being absorbed by the preceding termination. Heindorf proposed to read: ἰτέον, <ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν>—μόρια πρῶτα <μὲν μεθεῖμεν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀποκλείειν> οὐκ ἐξεγένετο ἡμῖν κτλ.: but this is too inventive. As the text stands, I suppose we must understand αὐτάς of ἐπιστήμας.

5. **ὥρα δὴ βουλεύεσθαι.** Cp. *Soph.* 241 B, *Crito* 46 A. Both ὥρα and καιρός, used thus with infin., either with or without ἐστίν, are of frequent occurrence: cp. *Protag.* 362 A, *Phaedo* 115 A, etc.; Ar. *Av.* 643, *Plut.* 255, *Thesm.* 667.

8. **πολύ τι διαφέρει πρός γε ἀσφάλειαν.** So Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π, Herm., Wb., Poste and Badh.: Stallb., however, defends the vulgate πολύ γε δ. as 'elegantior,' though 'insolentior'—in accordance with his usual distrust of the 'critici' to whom he attributes the Bodleian recension.—For the regard to be had for 'safety,' cp. 61 D, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσφαλές, κτλ.

10. **μεθείσθων δή.** So most MSS. and edd.; but Winckelmann would retain the μεθείσθω of Bodl. and Ven. Π. This impers. construction is rare, however, and less probable here.

12. **τί δ' οὔ; τάς γε ἀναγκαίας δήπουθεν.** MSS. and most edd. assign all this to Prot.; but Van Heusde proposed to eject τάς γε ἀν. δ. as a gloss, "utpote valde ieiuna atque languida"; and Badh., after Ficinus, assigns these words to Socr., making Prot.'s reply consist of only τί δ' οὔ; Stallb., however, defends the received text and order as being equally 'elegans' with "Warum nicht? die nothwendigen, denke ich, doch wohl."

But I am strongly of opinion that Badh. is right here, the sense being, as he puts it: "Must we mix the necessary pleasures?" "I see no objection." "I presume you do not, if they are necessary."

The form δήπουθεν, if we may trust Ast, is found only here and *Ion* 534 A.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε καί, καθάπερ τὰς | τέχνας πάσας ἀβλαβές 63
τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἦν ἐπίστασθαι διὰ βίου, καὶ νῦν δὴ ταὐτὰ
λέγομεν περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν, εἴπερ πάσας ἡδονὰς ἥδεσθαι διὰ
βίου συμφέρον τε ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀβλαβὲς ἅπασι, πάσας
5 συγκρατέον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων λέγωμεν; καὶ
πῶς ποιῶμεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διερωτᾶν χρή, τὰς ἡδονὰς
δὲ αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις διαπυνθανομένους τὸ τοιόνδε
10 ἀλλήλων | πέρι. B

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὦ φίλαι, εἴτε ἡδονὰς ὑμᾶς χρὴ προσαγορεύειν
εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν ὀνόματι, μῶν οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε οἰκεῖν μετὰ
φρονήσεως πάσης ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν;' οἶμαι μὲν πρὸς
15 ταῦτα τόδ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθη, τὸ μόνον καὶ
ἔρημον εἰλικρινὲς εἶναί τι γένος οὔτε πάνυ τι δυνατὸν οὔτ'
ὠφέλιμον· πάντων γε μὴν ἡγούμεθα γενῶν ἄριστον | ἓν ἀνθ' C

1 τὰς] αἱ τὰς Cl. Π et pr. Δ.
63 A. 2 καὶ...βίου om. F. ταυτὰ ΞFS, ταῦτα cet. 3 λέγομεν Σ: λέγωμεν *S. 6 λέγωμεν ΣB Flor. a,c S, ceteri λέγομεν. 8 ἡμεῖς Λ. χρὴ] δεῖ Δ.
B. 11 τὸ ποῖον] ὁποῖον Π. 12 φίλε Cl. ΓΔΛΠBCw et pr. ΣE. ἡμᾶς Cl. ΓΔΛΠBCEFH Flor. a,b,c,i. 13 ὄνομα τιμῶν Λ. δέξεσθε Ξ, δέξεσθαι Cl., δέξασθαι ΓΛΠBCEFHw: δέξαισθε cum S corr. Δ. 14 χωρὶς om. pr. F. 15 αὐταῖς Σ. 17 ὅτι om. F. 18 οὔτε] οὔτω Γ.

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1. **εἰ δέ γε καί.** Ast proposed ἔτι, needlessly. In the following sentence, notice the 'chiasmus,' ἀβλαβές τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον = συμφέρον τε καὶ ἀβλαβές, and τέχνας πάσας = πάσας ἡδονάς—a piece of 'artistic finish,' as Badh. remarks.

2. **ταὐτὰ λέγομεν.** Most MSS. have ταῦτα λέγωμεν: Ven. Σ alone shows λέγομεν, which Stallb. too conj., and which is now generally accepted. Needless suspicion has fallen on εἴπερ...ἅπασι, as being a gloss.

6. **περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων:** "Either αὐτῶν or τούτων is perhaps a gloss, or interpolation" (Paley). αὐτῶν might be ascribed to the influence of the following αὐτάς, as it seems out of place here. I propose π. τούτων αὖ: an original αὖ superscript might occasion the corruption. Cp., however, 57 B *ad fin.*

12. **ὦ φίλαι,...ὑμᾶς.** Bodl., Vat., Ven. Π, Coisl. give ὦ φίλε,...ἡμᾶς, which Winckelmann would retain: but it is clearly wrong. For the personification cp. 12 B: and for the offer of a choice of title, proper in addressing divinities, cp. (besides 12 C) Catull. 34. 21 "Sis quocunque placet tibi Sancta nomine"; Hor. *Carm. Saec.* 14, 15 "Sive tu Lucina probas vocari Seu Genitalis."

13. **δέξαισθε...ἤ,** i.e. μᾶλλον ἤ, the compar. notion being implicit in the verb, as in αἱρεῖσθαι and the like. Badh., however, reads μετὰ φρονήσεως, ἢ πάσης χωρὶς [τοῦ φρονεῖν];

17. **ὅτι καθάπερ...ὠφέλιμον.** Stallb.

ἑνὸς συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ γιγνώσκειν τἆλλά τε πάντα καὶ [αὖ τὴν] αὐτὴν ἡμῶν τελέως εἰς δύναμιν ἑκάστην.'

ΠΡΩ. 'Καὶ καλῶς γε εἰρήκατε τὰ νῦν,' φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς. πάλιν τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον· 'ἆρ' ἡδονῶν τι προσδεῖσθε ἐν τῇ συγκράσει;' φαῖμεν ἂν αὖ τὸν νοῦν τε καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνερωτῶντες. 'ποίων,' φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως, 'ἡδονῶν;'

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός.

C. 1 τἆλλα Cl. 2 τὴν αὐτὴν Cl. Π et pr. Δ, αὐτὴν αὖ corr. Σ: αὖ τὴν αὐτὴν *S. εἰς] τὴν corr. Σ. ἑκάστης ΠΕ. 5 τι] τε Γ. προσδεῖσθαι Cl. ΓΕFHw. 6 φαμὲν Cl. ΔΠ. αὐτὸν ΛΠF. 7 ποίων οὖν rc. Σ. ἂν φαῖεν ΓΛ: φαῖμεν ἂν *S.

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renders: "nec fieri posse nec esse utile, ut genus aliquod sincerum purumque (quod nihil alieni admixtum habeat) maneat solum ac veluti orbum, neque cum alio genere commisceatur." Badham rejects εἰλικρινές as "obviously an interpolation"; but there is no good reason why a '*pure* genus' should not be specified here.

1. **τἆλλά τε πάντα...ἑκάστην.** The reading of most MSS. is καὶ αὖ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡ. τ. εἰς δύναμιν ἑκάστην: but Bodl. Ven. and pr. Vat. omit αὖ; and Ven. Σ gives αὐτὴν αὖ and τὴν δύναμιν for εἰς δ.; while Ven. Π Par. E have ἑκάστης. Stallb. and Poste accept Schleierm.'s conj. αὐτὴν αὐτῶν ἡμῶν, joining αὐτὴν ἑκάστην and construing τελέως εἰς δύναμιν with γιγνώσκειν. Van Heusde proposed καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν τ. ε. δ. ἑκάστην. Badh.[2] cancels εἰς and reads ἑκάστης and καὶ αὐτὴν αὖ τὴν ἡ. (with Ven. Σ). Badh.[1] gives αὐτὴν αὖ τιν' ἡμῶν.

Paley renders: "We think...that is the best...which consists in the comprehensive knowledge not only of things generally, but also of each of us Pleasures in as perfect a manner as is possible."

Herm. reads καὶ [τὴν] αὐτῶν ἡμῶν τ. εἰς δ. ἑκάστην, following Bodl. and Schleierm., and cancelling the τήν as due to dittography. He suggests, however (as less satisfactory) τὴν αὐτῶν ἡμῶν τελέως δύναμιν ἑκάστην—which resembles the text of Badh.[2] Wb. prints καὶ [αὖ τὴν] αὐτὴν ἡμῶν τ. εἰς δ. ἑκάστην.

It seems possible that the whole phrase τἆλλά τε ... ἑκάστην should be taken differently from the construction assumed by all the above authorities. They assume that these words are the object of γιγνώσκειν: but we might understand them as giving the reason for the superiority assigned to the genus γιγνώσκειν, i.e. to be construed closely with ἄριστον: then we should read τἆλλά τε πάντα καὶ ΔΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΥΞΗΝ ἡμῶν τελέως εἰς <τὴν> δύναμιν ἑκάστης.

Otherwise αὐτὴν αὐτῶν ἡ. τ. τὴν δυν. ἑκάστης or V. Heusde's αὐτὴν αὐτὴν...εἰς δ. ἑκάστην seem the best proposals. However, I print Wb.'s text, as it best preserves the tradition.

3. **καλῶς...τὰ νῦν**, sc. λεχθέντα or λεγόμενα: cp. *Soph.* 284 D, *Polit.* 362 C.

4. **τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον.** These words are bracketed by Badh.[2] because of (*a*) the repetition in φαῖμεν ἂν...ἀνερωτῶντες, (*b*) the incompatibility of the verbal with φαῖμεν ἄν, (*c*) the position of αὖ, which should naturally follow φρόνησιν.

But in dealing with the present dialogue, such criticism is by no means convincing. However, we ought perhaps to read αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν, comparing ἡδονὰς αὐτάς in 63 A *ad fin.*

7. **ποίων ... ἡδονῶν.** Stallb. notes that "habet haec interrogatio quandam indignationis significationem: cp. *Theaet.* 180 B, *Gorg.* 490 D, *Charm.* 174 B, *Euthyd.* 304 E": but that is not necessarily the case, indignation being implied in the tone of utterance rather than in the word itself; and it is not the case here, I think, since more than one species had been seriously recognised by science, and since the question is seriously answered in the next sentence of Socrates.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γ' ἡμέτερος | λόγος μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅδε. D
'πρὸς ταῖς ἀληθέσιν ἐκείναις ἡδοναῖς,' φήσομεν, 'ἆρ' ἔτι
προσδεῖσθ' ὑμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς συνοίκους εἶναι καὶ
τὰς σφοδροτάτας;' 'καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες,' φαῖεν ἄν, 'αἵ γ'
5 ἐμποδίσματά τε μυρία ἡμῖν ἔχουσι, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκοῦμεν
ταράττουσαι διὰ μανικὰς †ἡδονάς, καὶ γίγνεσθαί τε ἡμᾶς
τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἐῶσι, τά τε γιγνόμενα ἡμῶν | τέκνα ὡς τὸ E
πολύ, δι' ἀμέλειαν λήθην ἐμποιοῦσαι, παντάπασι διαφθεί-
ρουσιν; ἀλλ' ἃς τε ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς [ἃς] εἶπες,
10 σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθ' ὑγιείας
καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς ὁπόσαι
καθάπερ θεοῦ ὀπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ συνακολουθοῦσι
πάντῃ, ταύτας μίγνυ· τὰς δ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς
ἄλλης κακίας ἑπομένας πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μιγνύναι
15 τὸν βουλόμενον ὅτι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην

D. 4 σώκρατες φαῖεν Cl. ΔΠ: Σώκρατες ἴσως φαῖεν *S. 5 ὑμῖν Γ. παρέχουσι corr. Σ.
E. 9 ἄλλας τε libri, ἄλλας δὲ Fischerus. εἶπε Cl. 10 ταύτας F et pr. Ξ cum S. ὑγείας Cl. ΔΠ. 12 σαυτῇ Π. 13 παντὶ Cl. Π et pr. Δ. ταυτας BCEF, ταύτης Γ, ταύτας δὲ rc. Σ. μίγνυ τὰς Heusdius: libri μιγνύντας ἀεὶ τὰς corr. Σ: δ' ἀεὶ *S. εὐφροσύνης H. 14 τῷ] καὶ τῷ rc. Σ. 15 τὸ Λ.

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1. **λόγος μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅδε.** Edd. generally refuse to accept Stephens' conj. ἔσται, which is clearly unnecessary—the λόγος existing at once as a whole, though only followed out gradually to its full development.

5. **ἐμποδίσματα...ἔχουσι,** 'contain,' 'bring with them': cp. *Soph.* 268 A. For the pestilential effect of such pleasures on the soul, see esp. *Phaedo* 66 B ff.

6. **διὰ μανικὰς ἡδονάς.** To say that "Pleasures disturb us owing to frantic pleasures" is, to say the least, a strange expression. Hence Stallb. bids his reader, "corrige sodes, διὰ μ. ἐπιθυμίας": while Badh., followed by Jackson, puts the three words in brackets.

One might suggest, for ἡδονάς, either σπουδάς (*Laws* 631 E) or πλησμονάς (26 B in plur.), either of which would be more easily corrupted to ἡδονάς than would ἐπιθυμίας, though neither would quite suit μανικάς. Or possibly μανίας τινάς, on which ἡδονάς was a gloss. For the physical μέγισται ἡδοναί referred to, see 46 A ff., and for the epithet μανικαί, cp. 36 E, 45 E, *Laws* 839 A, *Cratyl.* 404 A τὴν τοῦ σώματος πτόησιν καὶ μανίαν.

γίγνεσθαί τε ἡμᾶς, i.e. τὸν νοῦν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, whose τέκνα are impressions and notions: for the metaphor cp. *Symp.* 206 C ff., 208 E, 209 C, 211 D.

9. ἄλλας δ' ἡδονὰς ἀλ. κ. καθαρὰς ἃς εἶπες is the common text: "Libri omnes habent τε, quod verissime emendavit Fischerus, probante etiam Bekkero" (Stallb.): so too Badh. But Herm. reads ἀλλ' ἃς γε ἡδ. ἀλ. κ. καθαρὰς εἶπες, "qua id simul lucramur, ut indefinitum languidumque illud ἄλλας eliminemus": so too Wb. And this reading is decidedly preferable in point of emphasis. I accept Apelt's restoration, which only differs in retaining the MSS.' τε as complementary to καὶ πρὸς ταύταις, cp. *Phaedo* 110 E τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρύσῳ.

13. **ταύτας μίγνυ· τὰς δ' ἀεί.** So all later edd., adopting Van Heusde's felicitous emendation of the MS. text ταύτας μιγνύντας δ' ἀεί.

μῖξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν | ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πειρᾶσθαι, τί ποτε ἔν τε 64
ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν

64 A. 1 ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν Cl. ΔΠ, μαθεῖν ἐν ταύτῃ *S. ἐν τἀνθρώπωι Cl., τε om. Σ.

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2. **καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν...μαντευτέον.** Badh. proposes to remove "the difficulty which the sentence presents" by reading καὶ <κατὰ> τίν' ἰδέαν κτλ. (cp. κατ' εἴδη *Soph.* 252 A). But no change is needful.

μάντις occurs in 44 C, 67; μαντεία in 66 B; μαντεύομαι in 44 C, 67.

In 44 C Socrates is proposing to treat the enemies of Pleasure (οἳ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὔ φασιν εἶναι)—ὥσπερ μάντεσι... τισι, μαντευομένοις οὐ τέχνῃ ἀλλά τινι δυσχερείᾳ φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς. Whereby he means to contrast their view of pleasures as all alike unreal with his own more scientific method of division and classification of various species of pleasures. The real point of thus terming these thinkers *diviners* I take to lie in the fact that they treated ἡδοναί as a *single* indistinguishable whole, a class of *identicals*. We only get τέχνη, as opposed to μαντεία, when we are able to distinguish, analyse, compare, measure: when all is the same, we get only one simple impression, and this simple ultimate impression or intuition, as not further determinable, is what is signified by μαντεία. It is regarded as a *divine* inspiration, as not being the product of the human mind, as incapable of further treatment by the human reason. What is given in 'divination' is something immediate and not to be transcended: there it is, and we have to take it as it is, and there's an end of it.

But there are two kinds of μαντεία, the false and the true, the divination of the vulgar and the divination of the philosopher. The vulgar divines, for example, deduce destiny from the flight of birds, just as the herd of men and beasts deduce the identity of the Good with Pleasure from their own lusts; but the method of divination of the Philosophic Muse is widely different (67 B).

The Philosopher, then, 'divines' scientifically (τέχνῃ). But if we were right in saying that the essence of μαντεία lies in its simplicity and unity of impression, how can there be a scientific method with regard to it?

If we recal the logical discussion of 16 C ff. I think it will be clear how this point is to be understood. There we are told that the scientific method is—μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν: while the unscientific observers look for μετὰ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα εὐθύς· τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει.

The 'enemies of Pleasure' then were guilty of this blunder—of passing straight from the indefinite plurality of particulars to the generic unity, without taking account of the species or middle terms.

Their μαντεία, then, consisted in their impression of the ἕν or generic unity, which in itself admitted of being true as well as false; while the falsity of this 'divination' lay in their incorrect logical method, or rather lack of method.

The philosopher, too, is a μάντις in so far as he 'divines' the generic unity which lies at the furthest point of his logical 'scala ascensoria'; but he is a *true* diviner, since he keeps close to the true order of thought and of reality, and refuses to swerve from the strait path.

What constitutes μαντεία, then,—apart from the accident of its truth or falsity—is just the intuition or vision of μίαν ἰδέαν.

And hence we see the full significance of the expression in the passage before us as applied to the ideal Form of the Good. The unity of the Good is not simple unity, but *generic* unity, and as such capable of logical analysis; but when we resynthesize our divisions and determinations of it, this generic whole, τἀγαθόν as ultimate unity, is as such to be apprehended only by μαντεία—in which logical discussion reaches its limit and completion.

There is one further text in the *Philebus* regarding 'divination' which remains to be adduced. It is that in 66 B, when the third grade of goods is thus set forth: τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεὶς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις.

I have elsewhere tried to show that τὸ τρίτον is in reality τὸ πρῶτον as regards order of merit, if we consider only constituent *elements*; and that from the point

εἶναί ποτε μαντευτέον.' ἆρ' οὐκ ἐμφρόνως ταῦτα καὶ ἐχόντως ἑαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν φήσομεν ὑπέρ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ μνήμης καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

5 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἄν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδ' ἂν ἕν.

ΠΡΩ. | Τὸ ποῖον; B

ΣΩ. Ὧι μὴ μίξομεν ἀλήθειαν οὐκ ἄν ποτε τοῦτο ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδ' ἂν γενόμενον εἴη.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

XL. ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ' εἴ τινος ἔτι προσδεῖ τῇ συγκράσει ταύτῃ, λέγετε σύ τε καὶ Φίληβος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερεὶ κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται.

1 ἆρ'] ἆρ' οὖν Σ, ἂν Π. εὐφρόνως pr. Π. ἔχοντος Cl. Π et pr. Δ, οὐκ ἐχόντως Λ. 2 αυτοῦ Cl.: ἑαυτοῦ *S, Bekk. 5 τό pr. Δ. καί] ὡς Σ. 6 ἂν ποτε γένοιτο om. pr. Σ, γένοιτο...ποτε om. Στυ, οὐδ'...γίγνοιτο om. pr. EF.

B. 8 μίξομεν B, μίξωμεν C, μίξωμεν Cl. ΔΛΠFH. τοῦτ' Γ. 9 πινόμενον Π. 10 ἂν] οὰν Cl. 11 : ἀλλ' Cl. 12 σύ τε Cl. ΔΠ, καὶ σὺ ΞF : σὺ *S. 13 ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος om. ΓΛΞΣBCEHτw Flor. a,b,c,i et pr. F. 14 ἀπειργάσασθαι Λ.

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of view of *cause* it is also first; its anomalous position as third being necessitated by its falling under both these heads, and possessing a double aspect. Also I have shown that νοῦς is here taken as identical with ἀλήθεια, and that it is further to be identified with the ultimate aspect of τἀγαθόν itself. Hence, this group is in Socrates' eyes the most important of all—and this importance is marked by the significant words ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία. The ultimate unity, the final cause of All—whether in the Kosmos as a whole or in Man the Microcosm—is Reason; and this ultimate unity is the be-all and end-all of the philosophic 'divination'—it is the ultimate ἕν or μία ἰδέα upon which rests the intuition of the dialectician, and also it *is* just that intuition.

Νοῦς is itself at once the ultimate Unity, the ultimate cause of unification, and the ultimate subjective intuition which apprehends the resultant unity.

In thus determining Reason as the final Good we will not 'swerve aside from the path of Truth,' for Reason and Truth meet together, and embrace each other in ultimate Union (cp. *App.* B and F).

1. **ἐχόντως ἑαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν.** A play on the more usual νουνεχόντως, for which we find ἐχόντως νοῦν in *Laws* 686 E, Isocr. *de Pac.* p. 161, *Panathen.* p. 278: cp. Eur. *I. A.* 1139 ὁ νοῦς δδ' αὐτὸς νοῦν ἔχων οὐ τυγχάνει.

For καὶ μνήμης καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς, Van Heusde conj. καὶ ἐπιστήμης κ. δ. ὀ.—but the collocation in the text is supported by 11 B, and ἐπιστήμης is already implied in αὐτοῦ.

8. **ᾧ μὴ μίξομεν ἀλήθειαν.** This mention of Truth (objective) as an element in the mixture has excited the suspicions of certain critics: see *Append.* F.

13. **κόσμος τις ἀσώματος.** Apparently ὁ λόγος : ἡ σύγκρασις :: κόσμος : ἔμψυχον σῶμα (or ζῷον); i.e. rational process is the ordering principle in both the intellectual and the physical sphere.

The words ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος are omitted in several of the inferior MSS., an error evidently due to the ὁμοιοτέλευτον in ἀσώματος ... σώματος. Paley

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω λέγε δεδόχθαι.

ΣΩ. | Ἆρ' οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις C
καὶ τῆς οἰκήσεως ἐφεστάναι τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου λέγοντες ἴσως
ὀρθῶς ἄν τινα τρόπον φαῖμεν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δῆτα ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει τιμιώτατον ἅμα καὶ μάλιστ' αἴτιον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡμῖν τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφιλῆ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν; τοῦτο γὰρ ἰδόντες μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εἴθ' ἡδονῇ εἴτε τῷ νῷ προσφυέστερον καὶ οἰκειότερον
10 ἐν τῷ παντὶ ξυνέστηκεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς· | τοῦτο γὰρ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ D
συμφορώτατον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ξυμπάσης γε μίξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν, δι' ἣν ἢ παντὸς ἀξία γίγνεται ἢ τισοῦν ἢ τὸ
15 παράπαν οὐδενός.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδείς που τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων ἀγνοεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

1 δεδέχθαι Γw.
C. 4 ὀρθῶς Cl. ΔΠ, ὀρθὴν H: ὀρθὸν *S. φαμέν Cl. ΔΠ. 7 ἄρτιον Γ. πᾶσιν Cl. 8 ἐπισκεψόμεθα Cl. ΞΠ et pr. Δ, ἐπισκεψάμεθα H: ἐπισκεψώμεθα *S. 9 ἡδονὴ Cl. τῷ add. Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣΒΕΗw. προσφυέστερον Heusdius: libri προσφυές τε. 10 ξ(υν.) ΛC.
D. 11 ἡμῶν Σ. ἐστὶν ante εἰς pon. ΞF. 13 καὶ post μὴν add. ΔΠ (? Cl.). 14 ἢ] ἡ Cl. πάντως Π, πάντως Cl. 17 που Cl. ΔΠΣ: πω *S.

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needlessly doubts "if the future partic. here would be correct Greek, although ἄρχων would be an easy correction.... The true laws of μῖξις form as it were an invisible rule of order for the right government of the τὸ σύνθετον in man, the compound of body and soul." Poste says "the λόγος of which S. speaks is the def. of the τέλεον ἀγαθόν"—which comes to much the same.

2. **ἆρ' οὖν...φαῖμεν**; The construction here is somewhat awkward; so Badh. cancels καί and also τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου, which latter "seems to have been inserted after this intrusive καί had made τῆς οἰκήσεως seem to be without an owner."

The omission of the καί is certainly plausible. Paley takes τῆς οἰκ. as gen. after προθ., but suggests that καὶ τῆς οἰκήσεως...τῆς may be a gloss. For the οἴκησις τἀγαθοῦ cp. 61 B *ad init.* This passage is alluded to in Plotin. *Enn.* V. bk. 9.

7. **αἴτιον**: for this use of the term, cp. 22 D: Poste notes that in these places it means Formal Cause, whereas Αἰτία as one of the four Principles (=τὸ ποιοῦν) was Efficient Cause: he compares *Phaedo* p. 101. See *Introd.* iv.

9. **εἴτε τῷ νῷ προσφυέστερον.** The article is omitted in the vulgate and bracketed by Badh., but Bekk., Stallb., Poste, Wb. follow Bodl. and the better MSS. in inserting it. Then MSS. and older edd. give προσφυές τε καὶ οἰκ., which Van Heusde emended.

11. **ἡμῖν ἐστὶ συμφορώτατον.** Ficinus and Cornarius emended to ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς συμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχοῦσα ἡτισοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν σύγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τά τε κεραννύμενα καὶ πρώτην αὐτήν. οὐδὲ | γὰρ κρᾶσις, E
ἀλλά τις ἄκρατος συμπεφορημένη ἀληθῶς ἡ τοιαύτη γίγνεται
5 ἑκάστοτε ὄντως τοῖς κεκτημένοις ξυμφορά.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετριότης γὰρ καὶ συμμετρία κάλλος δή που καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀλήθειάν γε ἔφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κράσει μεμῖχθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν |
15 θηρεῦσαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ ξυμμετρίᾳ καὶ 65
ἀληθείᾳ, λέγωμεν ὡς τοῦτο οἷον ἓν ὀρθότατ' ἂν αἰτιασαίμεθ' ἂν τῶν ἐν τῇ συμμίξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὂν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγονέναι.

1 μέτρου Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠCFHw Flor. a,b,c,i: μέτρον *S. 3 αὐτήν Cl.: ἑαυτήν *S. E. 5 συμφορά Cl. 7 ἡμῖν Cl. ΔΠ: ἡμᾶς *S. 11 ἑαυτοῖς Cl. ΔΠ.

65 A. 15 θησαυρίσαι ΓΛΣBCEFHw Flor. a,b,c,i. ξ(υμμ.) ΛΣHw, σ. B. 16 οἷον om. pr. F. ἂν om. pr. Σ. 18 αὐτὴν om. Σ.

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1. **μέτρου καὶ τῆς συμμέτρου φύσεως.** For the value of these terms see *Append.* B, E and cp. *Polit.* 283 C ff.

2. **ὁπωσοῦν** goes with μὴ τυχοῦσα. There is no need of Sydenham's conj. ὁπόσα οὖν.

4. **συμπεφορημένη ... ξυμφορά**: note the play on these words. We might render something like "a mere mass of mischief instead of a mixture"; or, as Schleierm. put it, "ein zusammengewehetes Wehe." For the seeming redundancy in ἀληθῶς...ὄντως, cp. ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι *Phaedo* 66 C.—Liebhold would read συμπεφυρμένη, cp. 15 E, 51 A, *Phaedo* 66 E.

8. **μετριότης...ἀρετή.** As Badh. explains, μετριότης answers to ἀρετή and συμμετρία to κάλλος, so that we have a 'chiasmus'; though as the former pair are logically prior they are really implied in the latter. Cp. *Polit.* 284 B (τέχναι) τὸ μέτριον σώζουσαι πάντα ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀπεργάζονται. *Tim.* 87 D τὸ δὲ καλὸν οὐκ ἄμετρον, καὶ ζῷον οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐσόμενον σύμμετρον θετέον. *Soph.* 228 A; *Rep.* 486 E; and see further in *Append.* B *ad fin.*

14. **οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυν. ἰδέᾳ κτλ.** The text can well stand. For the metaph. from the chase in θηρεῦσαι, cp. *Theaet.* 203 D, *Lach.* 194 B ff., *Rep.* 432 B ff., 56 A *supra*, and the use of καταπέφευγεν above (l. 7). αἰτιᾶσθαι (without αἴτιον) with acc. of agent and gen. of result is not exceptional, cp. *Rep.* 379 C, *Soph.* 218 A, *Laws* 636 B. With τῶν ἐν τῇ συμμίξει, supply from the context ἀγαθῶν ὄντων. Ast needlessly proposed to write καὶ <ξυμμίξει> διὰ τοῦτο.

Badh. brackets θηρεῦσαι, reads σύντρισι in one word, changes συμμετρίᾳ to ἐμμετρίᾳ, marks οἷον ἓν as corrupt, brackets the second ἂν (suggesting αἰτ. αὐτῶν, preceded by "some word like παρουσίας"): but this is very wild work. A variant θησαυρίσαι is found in a number of minor MSS., whence Apelt suggests that the original word may have been θεωρῆσαι.

17. **τοιαύτην** stands, of course, for ἀγαθήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

XLI. ΣΩ. Ἤδη τοίνυν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἱκανὸς ἡμῖν γένοιτ' ἂν ὁστισοῦν κριτὴς ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ φρονήσεως, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν τοῦ ἀρίστου | ξυγγενέστερόν τε καὶ τιμιώ- B
5 τερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέ ἐστι καὶ θεοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον μέν, ὅμως δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν βέλτιον.

ΣΩ. Καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρίνωμεν. δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν, ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον
10 ξυγγενὲς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμοῦμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος πέρι λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ναί. πρῶτον δέ γε ἀληθείας λαβοῦ, ὦ Πρώταρχε· καὶ λαβόμενος βλέψας εἰς τρία νοῦν καὶ | ἀλήθειαν καὶ C
ἡδονὴν πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον ἀπόκριναι σαυτῷ, πότερον
15 ἡδονὴ ξυγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς ἀληθείᾳ.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δὲ χρόνου δεῖ; πολὺ γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρετον. ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τἀφροδίσια, αἳ δὴ μέγισται δοκοῦσιν

1 οὖν] ἦν Π. 2 ἱκανῶς Π et pr. Δ.
B. 5 καὶ ἐν θεοῖς w. 6 οὖν Cl. ΓΔΛΞΠΣBCw Flor. a,b,c,i: αὖ *S. ἐπελθεῖν Cl. ΔΠ. 9 δεῖν Π. ποτέρω Cl.
C. 14 ἀπόκρινε w. 17 ἀλαζονίστατον Cl. Π cum pr. Δ et corr. Σ: ἀλαζονέστατον *S. δὴ w. 18 τἀφροδίσια Cl. ΔΛΠ, ἀφροδίσια (omisso articulo) Σ: τὰ ἀφροδίσια *S.

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8. **καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον...τῶν τριῶν.** For this use of κατά c. acc. in place of the simple accus. cp. *Rep.* 436 B, *Tim.* 41 C, etc. When the phrase is used with the double accus., as here and Dem. *Meid.* 39, it is simplest to take the second alone with the verb, as Buttmann does (Index ad Dem. *Meid.* p. 177).

The phrase κρίνειν τι πρός τι recurs in *Phaedo* 110 A, *Polit.* 286 C, *Protag.* 327 D.

10. **ξυγγενὲς ... ἀπονεμοῦμεν.** Badh. brackets ξυγγενές, with the note that "if anyone wishes to retain it he must insert ὡς." There is force in the implied objection; but we must by no means cancel the adj. The simplest correction will be the insertion of ὄν after μᾶλλον: "to which we shall assign each of them, as being more nearly akin to it." ἕκαστον αὐτῶν seems to refer to the same objects (κάλλος, μετριότης, ἀλήθεια) as ἕκαστον τῶν τριῶν above, and ποτέρῳ to ἡδονῇ and νῷ, though the converse would be the more natural mode of expression, as in 65 A and C.—Paley notices that this phrase is a "metaphor from the laws of guardianship" (cp. *Od.* XX. 336, *Dem.* 948. 10, *Rep.* 574 A): in *Polit.* 276 D al. ἀπονέμειν is used of logical division.

14. **πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον.** So *Phaedo* 59 E οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἐπισχών. *Ib.* 95 E συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχών. *Alc. II.* 148 B, *Laws* 571 B etc.

17. **ἀλαζονίστατον.** So later edd. with Bodl., Ven. Π. Older texts give -έστατον. *Timaeus* Gloss. p. 22: ἀλαζών· ψευδής.—Poste remarks that "Violent Pleasures of sense were excluded from the best life, and ought to have been from the comparison with knowledge: and yet it is to these kinds of Pleasure that the answer of Protarchus refers." Certainly there seems carelessness in thus reverting to the common usage of ἡδονή, but it is not without design.

εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν συγγνώμην εἴληφε παρὰ θεῶν, ὡς καθάπερ παίδων τῶν ἡδονῶν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ὀλίγιστον | κε- D
κτημένων· νοῦς δὲ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὡσαύτως σκέψαι, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέκτηται;

ΠΡΩ. Εὔσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέβληκας. οἶμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων
10 πεφυκὸς ἀμετρώτερον εὑρεῖν ἄν τινα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρώτερον οὐδ' ἂν ἕν ποτε.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς | εἴρηκας. ὅμως δ' ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον. E
νοῦς ἡμῖν κάλλους μετείληφε πλέον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος, ὥστε εἶναι καλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἢ τοὐναντίον;

15 ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ' ὄναρ αἰσχρὸν οὔτε εἶδεν οὔτε

1 περιορκεῖν Γ. 2 νῦν οὐδὲ τὸ Λ. ὀλιγοστὸν Π.
D. 5 τὸν H. μετα (acc. om.) Cl. ὡσαύτως Cl. ΔΠ, αὖ οὕτως corr. Σ: ὡς οὕτως *S. 8 εὐάσκεπτον H. τε ΛCH. ταύτην] ταύτην τὴν w. 9 μὲν om. Σ. περιχαρίας C. 10 ἀμετρώτερον et mox ἐμμετρώτερον Cl. Π et pr. Δ: ἀμετρότερον...ἐμμετρότερον *S (cum Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* XIV. c. 22 et Stob. *Ecl. Eth.* VI. p. 65). καὶ om. H.
E. 13 πλέον Γ Euseb.: πλεῖον *S. γένος BCEF, μέρος ΞHw. γένος... 14 ἡδονῆς om. Γ. 15 ἄρ' Cl.: ἄρ' *S. οὖν] οὖν ἢ Cl. Π et pr. Δ.

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1. **τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν συγγνώμην εἴληφε.** Cp. *Symp.* 183 B ὡς γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι καὶ ὀμνύντι μόνον συγγνώμη, παρὰ θεῶν ἐκβάντι τὸν ὅρκον· ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ ὅρκον οὔ φασιν εἶναι. Tibull. I. 4. 21 Nec iurare time: Veneris periuria uenti Irrita per terras et freta summa ferunt. *Id.* III. 6. 49 periuria ridet amantum Iupiter, et uentos irrita ferre iubet. Claudian *De Nupt. Honor.* 83 Et lasciua uolant leuibus Periuria pennis.

3. **νοῦς...ταὐτὸν καὶ ἀλήθεια.** For this important dogma we may cp. *Phaedo* 80 B τῷ θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ...ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχὴν συμβαίνει. Poste remarks that "when Reason is said to be identical or nearly identical with truth, we verge very closely upon a fallacy of equivocation." For further criticism of this point, see *App.* F.

6. **πλείω κέκτηται,** sc. τὴν μετριότητα.

10. **ἀμετρώτερον...ἐμμετρώτερον.** So Badh. with Bodl. Ven. II, pr. Vat. But most edd. retain the vulgate forms in -ότερον. "Productionem syllabae probat Porson. ad Eurip. *Phoeniss.* v. 1367, improbat Buttmann. *Gramm. Ampl.* I. p. 263" (Stallb.). A similar variance of reading is found in *Laws* 674 C, 926 A, *Tim.* 90 E, *Rep.* 474 D.

Liebhold would eject πεφυκός "als müsziger zusatz eines glossators."

15. **ἀλλ' οὖν.** So Badh.[1, 2] emends, rightly, thinking the MS. text ἄρ' οὖν "out of place where an admission is made in answer to a previous question, and when the only answer made by the next speaker is Ὀρθῶς." The change is approved by Paley, and adopted by Wb.

ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἐσόμενον.

ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονὰς δέ γέ που, καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰς μεγίστας,
5 ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἡδόμενον ὁντινοῦν, ἢ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ
πάντων αἴσχιστον ἑπόμενον ὁρῶντες | αὐτοί τε αἰσχυνόμεθα 66
καὶ ἀφανίζοντες κρύπτομεν ὅτι μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ
τοιαῦτα διδόντες, ὡς φῶς οὐ δέον ὁρᾶν αὐτά.

ΣΩ. Πάντῃ δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων
10 πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι
πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν πῃ περὶ μέτρον
καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα
νομίζειν τὴν ἀΐδιον ῥῆσθαι φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.

15 ΣΩ. |Δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ B
τέλεον καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὖ ταύτης
ἐστίν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ

1 οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς Euseb. γενόμενον Euseb. 4 ταῦτα Cl. ΓΔΛΠΒCEHw, ταύτας cum *S corr. Σ. 5 ἴδωμεν om. Γ. ἡδόμενον om. F.
66 A. 8 δέον] δὲ F. 9 πάντῃ...] haec non alteri dat Cl. φύσεις Λ.
10 ὡς post κτῆμα ponit Σ. 11 πῃ] τῃ Π. 12 πάνθ' Γ. χρὴ τοιαῦτα Cl. ΔΠΣ: τοιαῦτα χρὴ *S. 13 ηρῆσθαι Cl., ῥῆσθαι ΔΠ: εἰρῆσθαι *S. φύσιν] φάσιν ΓΞΣCH, om. Cl. ΔΠ. 14 γοῦν Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCHw Flor. a,b,c,i: οὖν *S.
B. 15 τὸ om. E. 16 αὖ ταύτης Cl. ΓΔΛΠΣBCHw: ταύτης αὖ *S. 19 ἡ om. pr. Ξ.

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1. **οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνόμενον.** Eusebius, in citing this passage (*Praepar. Evangel.* XIV. c. 22), gives οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γενόμενον, whence Stallb. adopts γενόμενον against the MSS. of Plato.

9. **πάντῃ δὴ φήσεις** κτλ. Euseb. has παντί: Ficinus apparently πᾶσι, since he renders, "Cunctis igitur et per nuntios et uoce praesenti declarato."

For πάντῃ Stallb. aptly cites Pindar *Ol.* IX. 36 ἐγὼ δέ τοι...παντᾷ ἀγγελίαν πέμψω ταύταν, which Plato probably had here in mind. Van Heusde proposed ὑπό τε ἄγγελον πέμπων, construing ὑπὸ with πέμπων, as a tmesis: while Badh. brackets πέμπων. But the text is satisfactorily defended by Stallb., who, with Ast, renders πέμπων "sagen lassend" (cp. Eur. *I. A.* 360, Aesch. *Sept.* 430), and for the construction ἀγορεύειν (ἀπειπεῖν etc.) ὑπὸ κήρυκος (ἀγγέλου etc.) cites *Laws* 917 D, 928 D; Hdt. IX. 98; Eur. *Alc.* 753.

12. **ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν.** So Herm., Stallb., Poste, Wb., with Bodl. Vat. Ven. ΠΣ. Badh., however, follows the inferior MSS. in giving ὁπ. τοιαῦτα χρὴ νομίζειν, as that "which alone makes sense." But see *App.* B.

13. **τὴν ἀΐδιον ῥῆσθαι φύσιν.** So most later edd. with Vat. Ven. Π. Older edd. gave εἰρῆσθαι. Badh. adopts ηὐρῆσθαι. See further, *Introd.* V. and *Append.* B.

19. **ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία.** These words are significant: cp. 67 B, 44 C and 64 A, n.

φρόνησιν τιθεὶς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐδ' ἃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας
5 τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὀρθὰς λεχθείσας, ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ | πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτα, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γέ ἐστι μᾶλλον C
[ἢ] τῆς ἡδονῆς ξυγγενῆ;

ΠΡΩ. Τάχ' ἄν.

ΣΩ. Πέμπτας τοίνυν, ἃς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν ἀλύπους ὁρισά-
10 μενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμαις, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν ἑπομένας;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἕκτῃ δ' ἐν γενεᾷ, φησὶν Ὀρφεύς, καταπαύσατε κόσμον ἀοιδῆς· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν
15 ἕκτῃ καταπεπαυμένος εἶναι κρίσει. τὸ δὴ μετὰ | ταῦθ' ἡμῖν D
οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

1 τεθεὶς Π. 4 οὖν om. Cl. et pr. ΔΠ. οὐδ'] οὐ τέτταρα w, οὐ τέταρτα *S. αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν Cl. ΔΠ: ἔθεμεν αὐτῆς *S. 5 ὀρθῶς Σ. ταύτας Π. τὰ om. Γ.
C. 6 τέτταρα Cl. ΔΠ. γέ om. Cl. ΔΠ. 10 ἐπιστήμαις corr. Σ, ἐπιστήμης pr. Ξ: ἐπιστήμας *S. 11 libri ταῖς. ἑπόμεναι Cl. 13 καταπαύσετε Σ et pr. Ξ. 15 το (acc. om.) Cl.
D. 15 ἡμῖν om. Π.

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1. **τῆς ἀληθείας.** Badh. rightly notes that "these words are introduced with a certain bye-purpose of shewing that this νοῦς owes its place to the Truth of which it is the realisation." Cp. 65 D *ad init.*

4. **ἆρ' οὖν οὐδ' ἃ...τὰ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτα.** The traditional text is οὐ τέταρτα ἃ κτλ.: Ast proposed to eject the first τέταρτα, reading ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἃ κτλ., while Badh.[2] cancelled οὐ τέταρτα. Badh.[1] proposed πέφανται in place of the former τέταρτα, while Paley suggested the omission of ἃ. The text I adopt is due to the ingenious conjecture of Dr H. Jackson: he supposes that the final Δ of the negative was confused with the numerical sign, and the variant τέτταρα confirms this hypothesis. With οὐδ' ἃ sc. ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις τιθείς.

6. **μᾶλλον [ἢ] τῆς ἡδονῆς ξ.** Most recent edd. agree to cancel ἢ as contrary to the sense, which requires that the comparison should lie between Pleasure and Science, not between Pleasure and the Good. Possibly we should read μᾶλλόν τι, for which modified combination cp. *Prot.* 327 B, *Theaet.* 169 B, *Soph.* 227 A, and 62 E *supra* (πολύ τι). Paley keeps the ἢ in his transl. "more akin to the Good than to Pleasure."

10. **καθαρὰς ... ἐπιστήμαις.** Stallb. follows Schleierm. in bracketing the MS. ἐπιστήμας as "ex perverso supplemento natum." Trendelenburg rewrites thus: καθ. ἐπον. τῆς ψ. αὐτῆς, ταῖς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν καὶ ἐπιστήμας ἑπομένας. Liebhold would insert ὁρμάς (cp. 35 D, 57 D) after ἑπομένας. But I decide (with Poste, Wb. and Paley) to accept Badh.'s emendation ἐπιστήμαις, τὰς δ' αἰσθ., which he explains by the note, "The scribe was put out by the want of τὰς μέν, but it is understood in τὰς δέ, according to a common idiom." For the 'pure' pleasures, see 51 B, and for those attendant on learning, 52 A ff.

13. **ἕκτῃ δ' ἐν γενεᾷ.** For this Orphic verse, see Lobeck *Aglaoph.* p. 788 ff.: cp. 30 D, n.

16. **ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι.** The phrase κεφαλὴν ἐπιθεῖναι occurs in *Gorg.*

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

XLII. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δή;

5 ΣΩ. Φίληβος τἀγαθὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παντελῆ.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἔοικας, ἔλεγες ἀρτίως τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Ναί, τὸ δέ γε μετὰ | τοῦτο ἀκούωμεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ E
10 κατιδὼν ἅπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς ἡδονῆς γε νοῦς εἴη μακρῷ βέλτιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

15 ΣΩ. Ὑποπτεύων δέ γε καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλὰ εἶπον, ὡς εἰ φανείη τι τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ τῶν δευτερείων νῷ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ξυνδιαμαχοίμην, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερήσοιτο.

ΠΡΩ. | Εἶπες γὰρ οὖν. 67

20 ΣΩ. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτά γε πάντων ἱκανώτατον τούτοιν οὐδέτερον ἱκανὸν ἐφάνη.

3 ἐπεξελθόντες pr. Δ. 8 τὸν] τὸ τὸν rc. Σ. δεῖ w.
E. 10 νῦν δὴ] νῦν δὴ δυσχεράνας Cl. ΔΠ, νῦν ΓΛΞΣBCFHw Flor. a,c Euseb.: νυνὶ *S. 12 νοῦς εἴη Cl. et pr. ΔΠ, νοῦς ἂν εἴη Λ: νοῦς εἴη ἂν *S. μακρὸς Cl. 16 τι Cl. ΔΠ: τὸ *S. τούτων Cl. ΔΠ.
67 A. 20 γε εἰπὼν τἀγαθὸν πάντων rc. F. ἱκανώτατον Cl. ΔΠ et pr. Ξ: ἱκανώτατα *S, Bekk. τούτων Cl. 21 οὐ δεύτερον Cl. ἀνεφάνη Euseb.

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505 D, *Tim.* 69 A; κολοφῶνα ἐπιθεῖναι in *Euthyd.* 301 E, *Laws* 673 D, *Ep.* III. 318 B; τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ λόγῳ in *Symp.* 186 A. Whereas, says Stallb., "qui ἀποδοῦναι κεφαλήν dixerit, novimus neminem"; hence he proposes to 'restore' ἐπιθεῖναι. But there is no cause here for such a corruption, and no reason why the expression should not admit of variation: ἀποδοῦναι, *reddere*, 'to give duly' (or give back). (Cp. *Append.* A *ad fin.*)

2. **τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι.** Cp. Aesch. *Eumen.* 759 τοῦ πάντα κραίνοντος τρίτου Σωτῆρος. *Suppl.* 27 καὶ Ζεὺς σωτὴρ τρίτος. Schol. ad *Charmid.* 167 B τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι· ἐπὶ τῶν τελείως τι πραττόντων. *Charmid.* 167 A, *Rep.* 583 B, Pind. *Isth.* 6 (5). 11.

8. **τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς...λόγον.** "Mira profecto haec articuli collocatio est. Refingas τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπ. δεῖν τὸν λόγον." (Stallb.) Ven. Σ gives τὸ τὸν ἐξ ἀ. But change seems unnecessary: the phrase is, as Paley explains, "a short way of saying ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν τὸν ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγον—a well-known Attic idiom," and commonly designated 'pregnant.'

10. **δυσχεράνας.** This term recals to our mind the anti-hedonistic δυσχερεῖς of 44 C ff.

20. **ἱκανώτατον...ἱκανόν.** So Herm. Poste with Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. Stallb. and Wb. retain the reading of the inferior MSS. ἱκανώτατα, supposed to be used as adv.; while Badh. brackets ἱκανόν. Hirzel proposes κ. μ. ταῦτά γε <τἀγαθὸν

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπήλλακτο καὶ ἡδονὴ μή τοι τἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ μηδ' ἕτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναι, στερομένοιν αὐταρκείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ
5 τελέου δυνάμεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Φανέντος δέ γε ἄλλου τρίτου κρείττονος τούτοιν ἑκατέρου, μυρίῳ γ' αὖ νοῦς ἡδονῆς οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφυέστερον πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέᾳ.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀπεφήνατο, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. | Πρῶτον δέ γε οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι B
15 καὶ τἆλλα ξύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν· οἷς

3 ἕτερος Λ. 4 στερομένοιν corr. Σ, στερόμενον Ξ: στερομένων *S. 5 τελείου S. 7 ἄλλου κριτοῦ Λ, ἀλλοτρίου corr. Π. τούτων Cl. ΔΠ. 8 γ' om. Cl. ΔΠ. 12 ἡ] καὶ F.

B. 14 οὐδ' Cl. ΓΔΠ et corr. ΞΣ: οὐκ *S. 15 θηρία om. Π. ante τῷ interpungunt ΓΛΣBCEFH.

εἰπόντι > πάντων ἱκανώτατον, after Ficinus' rendering, "praeterea cum dixissem bonum ipsum esse omnium sufficientissimum neutrum ex eis tamen sufficiens esse constitit," and the correction in Par. F: but this is hardly substantial authority for the addition. One might conj. καὶ ματεύοντί τι π. ἱκ., or the like. For both sense and phraseology cp. 20 B ff.

3. **ἀπήλλακτο...μή τοι...εἶναι.** Cp. *Lysis* 200 B τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀπήλλακτο, μὴ φίλου τινὸς ἕνεκα τὸ φίλον φίλον εἶναι: also 20 C. For μή τοι Badh. reads μή τι. Heindorf emended αὐτό to αὐτώ (i.e. νοῦς καὶ ἡδονή), and στερόμενον to στερομένω. With Bekk. Stallb. and Wb. I adopt στερομένοιν from Ven. Σ corr.: the vulgate has στερομένων, while Badh., Herm. and Poste adopt στερόμενον from Ven. Ξ.

9. **τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέᾳ.** "More akin to the nature of the conqueror" (Jowett): "more nearly related and more suited to it in all the conditions that characterise a superior" (Paley). This latter rendering seems impossible. "The order now seems to be (1) μικτὸς βίος, (2) τὸ αὔταρκες, (3) μέτρον, (4) νοῦς, (5) ἡδονή" (Paley): but this is futile as no new classification is here intended. Taylor reads ἕκτον (sensual Pleasure) for πέμπτον.

14. **πρῶτον δέ γε οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες.** So later edd. with the support of the best MSS.; older edd. give οὐκ ἂν οἱ π.: Euseb. οὔ, κἂν ἅπαντες, which reading Badh. pronounces "no way inferior to that in the text"; while Stallb. proposes πρῶτον δέ γ' οὔ, οὐδ' ἂν οἱ π.; and one or other of these may well be right.

15. **φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν,** i.e. affirm the priority of pleasure by deeds, if not words, when they make it the object of their pursuit; the implication being that pleasure-seekers, who solely 'live to eat,' are 'brute beasts which have no understanding.' The hedonistic or Epicurean principle that Pleasure is the *natural* end of life may be found stated in Cic. *de Fin.* I. 9, Sext. Empir. *Pyrrh. Hyp.* III. c. 24. Cp. also *Rep.* 505 C ff., 586 A ff., *Laws* 874 E, Arist. *Eth. Nic.* I. 5. The present passage is referred to by Porphyry *de esu animal.* III. 1 Σωκράτης πρὸς τοὺς ἡδονὴν διαμφισβητοῦντας εἶναι τὸ

πιστεύοντες, ὥσπερ μάντεις ὄρνισιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῖν εὖ κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν ἐν μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἑκάστοτε λόγων.

5 ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρῆσθαί σοι νῦν ἤδη φαμὲν ἅπαντες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀφίετέ με;

ΠΡΩ. Σμικρὸν ἔτι τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δή που σύ γε ἀπερεῖς πρότερος ἡμῶν· ὑπομνήσω δέ σε τὰ 10 λειπόμενα.

3 ἐρῶντας Cl. ΓΔΠ. ἢ om. Π. 4 φιλοσόφων Π. μαντευμένων H, μεμαντευομένων w. λόγον Cl., λόγω Γ. 8 σμικρὸν] σ add. Cl.². ἔτι τὸ λοιπόν Cl. ΔΠ: ἔτι λοιπόν *S. 9 ἀπερεῖς ΓΞΣBCEFHw Flor. a,c et γρ. Δ, ἀπορεῖς Cl. ΔΛ, ἀπαίρεις corr. Π: ἀπαρεῖς *S.

τέλος, οὐδ' ἂν πάντες, ἔφη, σύες τε καὶ τράγοι τούτῳ συναινοῖεν, πεισθήσεσθαι ἄν, ἐν τῷ ἥδεσθαι τὸ εὔδαιμον ἡμῶν κεῖσθαι, ἔστ' ἂν νοῦς ἐν τοῖς πᾶσι κρατῇ.—It may be suggested that the choice of ἵπποι, as typical θηρία, in the present passage is meant to allude to the champion of Hedonism, Aristippus, or to Hippias, the founder of naturalism in ethics (see Benn in *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos.* IX. 1. 24 ff.). Even Plato is not above indulging in an occasional pun. For the bovi-porcine nature in man cp. the famous line Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί.

3. **ἔρωτας...μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν... λόγων.** Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π, Coisl. give ἐρῶντας, but the edd. by general consent ἔρωτας. The rest of the phrase is possibly corrupt: thus Stallb. asks "quinam tandem erunt ἔρωτες isti τῶν λόγων?" and proposes λόγους for λόγων; while Badh. brackets the words ἢ τούς. Paley renders τῶν λόγων as object. gen. after τοὺς (ἔρωτας), as "Socrates often professed himself φιλόλογος, 'a lover of discussion'" (and we may add the use of ἐραστής in 16 B). But as θηρίων is subject. gen., τῶν λόγων can hardly be taken otherwise, which means that the λόγοι are practically personified, so that μεμαντευμένων must be taken in the act. sense (as Paley, too, takes it) 'which have uttered divinations': μεμάντευμαι is mid. in Pind. *Pyth.* 4. 290, but pass. in Hdt. 5. 45. Cp. 64 A, *n.*, and for κυρίους 58 D, *Rep.* 583 A.

ἐν μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ, "in (the strength of) the Muse," i.e., as Badh. explains, in songs inspired by her: cp. *Laws* 899 E, *Polit.* 309 D. For the epithet cp. *Rep.* 548 B διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἠμελη-κέναι.

9. **σύ γε ἀπερεῖς.** So Bekk., Poste, Herm., Wb. and Badh. with considerable support from MSS. ἀπορεῖς, the reading of Bodl., would be an easier corruption of ἀπερεῖς than of the vulgate ἀπαρεῖς which Stallb. attempts to defend (*Crito* 53 D). Socr. is represented all through as in a hurry to get away, see 19 D, E, 23 B, 51 D, E. Paley notices that "the *Symposium* ends in a very similar way," and explains that Prot. playfully alludes to "the καρτερία and the τὸ φιλόλογον of Socr."

τὰ λειπόμενα may perhaps refer, as Stallb. suggests, to a discussion of the value of the rest of the pleasures.

APPENDIX A.

The text of 25 D *ff.*

I add here some further remarks, beyond the compass of a footnote, on the very difficult passage regarding the nature of πέρας in 25 D. The common text reads thus:—

25 D Σω. συμμίγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν) τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν. Πρω. ποίαν; Σω. ἣν καὶ νῦν δὴ δέον ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἕν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς συναγαγεῖν, οὐ συνηγάγομεν. ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν δράσει· τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανὴς κἀκείνη γενήσεται. Πρω. ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις; Σω. τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση παύει πρὸς ἄλληλα τἀναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται.

Πρω. μανθάνω· φαίνει γάρ μοι λέγειν, μιγνῦσι (μιγνὺς) ταῦτα γενέσεις τινὰς ἀφ' (ἐφ') ἑκάστων συμβαίνειν, κτλ.

The difficulties raised to shew the corruptness of this text may be thus briefly summed up:—

(1) "The words ἣν καὶ νῦν δὴ οὐ συνηγάγομεν contain a positive mis-statement, the γέννα in question having been 'collected' in the phrase τὰ τούτων τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα κτλ. 25 A, just as the ἀπείρου γέννα was collected in the phrase ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα κτλ. 24 E."

(2) "The words τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς sc. γένναν seem a strange superfluity in an answer to the question, 'What do you mean by the πέρατος γέννα?'"

(3) "While τὴν τοῦ πέρατος γένναν and τὸ περατοειδές are intelligible phrases, τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς has no authority elsewhere, and contains a hardly justifiable redundancy."

(4) "The words ταὐτὸν δράσει can scarcely mean 'will do as well.'"

(5) "Though the word κἀκείνη, which clearly needs explanation, has intervened, Protarchus repeats his question about the πέρατος γέννα, and Socrates gives the answer which he might as well have given before."

(6) "Protarchus's reply is strangely abrupt[1]."

To cure this ξυμπᾶσαν πάντων πονηρίαν and restore to the text νόμον καὶ τάξιν, *Jackson* proposes to interchange ἣν καὶ νῦν δὴ δέον ἡμᾶς... οὐ συνηγάγομεν and τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλ....ἀπεργάζεται, and in the former passage to bracket the words καθάπερ...περατοειδοῦς; also for συναγομένων to substitute συμμισγομένων.

Badham likewise indulges in a transposition—that of τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων κατ. κἀκ. γενήσεται from its old place to one immediately after ἀπεργάζεται—in order to get a mention of *mixture* just before Protarchus' reply μανθάνω κτλ.; but, as Jackson observes, in order to obtain such a sense it will be necessary also to change συναγομένων, which can only mean 'collect under one genus,' to συμμισγομένων or the like. Badham also, in order to obviate the 1st of the above-mentioned difficulties, brackets οὐ before συνηγάγομεν: and, to remedy the 4th, he reads δράσεις for δράσει in his second ed.; while in his first ed. he proposed...ταὐτὸν δράσασι, τούτων κτλ.

Vahlen makes no further change than that of reading...ταὐτὸν δράσει, <εἰ> τούτων κτλ., and he is followed by Wohlrab in the Teubner text.

We have now to consider how far these changes are necessary, or whether the text as it stands is explicable without their aid. Let us commence by assuming the validity of the 1st objection—that the πέρατος γέννα has been already collected.

Dealing with the text as it stands in the MSS., it is pretty clear that Protarchus' second ποίαν must refer to κἀκείνη. To what then does κἀκείνη refer? Badham says that "beyond all doubt it refers to the third γέννα," or rather, he should have said, to the ἰδέα τοῦ μικτοῦ. Assuming this to be so, we arrive at the strange sense that the ἰδέα or generic form is to be manifested not by a *mixture* of the γέννα πέρατος with the γέννα ἀπείρου but by a *unification* of each. Further, if ταὐτὸν δράσει is in its right place, it cannot bear the sense put on it by Stallbaum, but must, as Badham suggests, be altered to δράσεις or δράσασι —preferably the latter—and regarded as alluding to the phrase ταῦτα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο (25 B); while similarly δέον ἡμᾶς must be regarded as referring back to 25 A—εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖν πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι...κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον (cp. 19 B), ὃν ἔφαμεν, ὅσα διέσπασται καὶ διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρῆναι κατὰ δύναμιν μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαί τινα φύσιν. (Cp. 23 E.) Thus ταὐτόν, as Badham remarks, "implies that the thing has been done before," and he also observes that neither καί nor νῦν δή appears compatible with οὐ συνηγάγομεν. Consequently we must either cut out or emend οὐ: and one might suggest to read for οὐ another οὕτω,—'being obliged to collect it so, we did collect it so'; or else repeat εἰς ἕν.

By these means we should succeed in avoiding difficulties (1) and (4).

But before admitting such changes we must determine the exact sense, supposing it to be genuine, of the expression ἡ τοῦ περατοειδοῦς γέννα and its relation to such others as πέρατος γέννα, πέρας ἔχον, πέρας.

[1] See Jackson on the *Philebus* (*Journ. of Phil.* x. p. 269, n. 1).

In the *συναγωγή*, at 25 A, which appears to be here referred to, *πέρας* was made the *genus* which comprised in one *ξύμπαντα τὰ δεχόμενα... ἰσότητα κτλ.*, i.e. the many particular concrete things which admit of fixed mathematical relations—the equal, double, triple etc. Accordingly we shall have to equate *ἡ τοῦ περατοειδοῦς γέννα* to these *δεχόμενα* and also to *ἡ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου* (*γέννα*) in 25 E.

Consequently, the 2nd and 3rd as well as the 5th difficulty (granting their force) seem insoluble on the above hypothesis that the *συναγωγή* in 25 A is meant to be merely repeated here. So unless we are prepared to go further and adopt some such transposition as is suggested by the commentators above referred to, we must seek a new method of attacking the problem.

According to our new hypothesis, renouncing objection (1) and holding *οὐ συνηγάγομεν* to be the correct text, we shall assume that this speech of Socrates is meant to express dissatisfaction with the account given of *πέρας* in 25 A. Indications that this is so may be found in the reference, already noted, to the method of *συναγωγή* which lies in *δέον*; also in the expression in 24 A *τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον περιμενέτω*, which seems to imply that the account of *τὸ πέρας ἔχον* is to be deferred for some time, an implication hardly consistent with the apparent assumption of the commentators that this account is sufficiently conveyed in *οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα κτλ.* 25 A. Further it is to be remarked that Protarchus' question regarding *ἡ τοῦ πέρατος γέννα* is somewhat strange, if a sufficient 'collection' of it had already been made in 25 A; and also, in 26 B, attention must be drawn to the words of Protarchus: *ἓν μὲν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τὸ ἄπειρον λέγειν, ἓν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον τὸ πέρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, τρίτον δὲ οὐ σφόδρα κατέχω τί βούλει φράζειν.*

Now the method of the discourse, and of the logical *συναγωγαί* contained therein, has been precisely laid down in 23 E: *πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τὰ τρία διελόμενοι, τὰ δύο τούτων πειρώμεθα πολλὰ ἑκάτερον ἐσχισμένον καὶ διεσπασμένον ἰδόντες, εἰς ἓν πάλιν ἑκάτερον συναγαγόντες νοῆσαι πῇ ποτε ἦν αὐτῶν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἑκάτερον* (cf. 18 A, 19 B). And after this method are to be investigated, says Socrates (24 A), first *τὸ ἄπειρον* and then *τὸ πέρας ἔχον*.

Accordingly we get a description of *θερμότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον* as an example of the *πολλά* into which *τὸ ἄπειρον* is 'split up,' and we also see *τὸ απειρον* divided into certain *εἴδη* such as *μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον, σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα, λίαν*, etc. That is, in the *συναγωγή* of *τὸ ἄπειρον* we have shown to us both the *ἕν*, or generic notion, the *μέσα* or *εἴδη* or intermediate causes, and the particulars (*ἄπειρα*).

Now when we come to the account of *πέρας* in 25 A, we remark first that the term used is *τὸ πέρας* not *τὸ πέρας ἔχον* as in 24 A; secondly, that the word used for 'collection' is not *συναγωγή* or its verb but *ἀπολογιζόμενοι*; thirdly, that Socrates' query at the close of it, *καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο, ἢ πῶς σὺ φῄς;* with Protarchus' emphatic reply *κάλλιστά γ', ὦ Σώκρατες*, i such as to lead us to suspect that all is not right, and that a certain irony of tone purposely pervades the passage; fourthly, that the invocation of Heaven's aid expressed in 25 B—*θεὸς μὲν οὖν, ἄνπερ γε ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπήκοος γίγνηταί τις θεῶν*—seems to imply

something wrong in the last step of the discourse, involving the need for a new departure.

Clearly then τὸ πέρας ἔχον has not been fairly dealt by in 25 A. What then is wrong? I take it to be that the account of geometrical ratios there given is merely an account of the εἴδη of τὸ πέρας, and so does not constitute a regular συναγωγή of τὸ πέρας ἔχον, or fulfil the terms of 23 E ff. That is to say, I agree with Badham's note (in his first ed. p. 25): "the deficiency complained of is, that they had not made an enumeration of *the things which contain* the πέρας. For while we have πέρας corresponding to ἄπειρον, and ἴσον καὶ διπλάσιον to μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα, and the like, we have nothing to answer to ὑγρότερον καὶ ξηρότερον and the other examples."

The cause of this insufficiency in the account of πέρας, the cause of the neglect of πέρας ἔχοντα in 25 A, is clear enough. The concrete examples of πέρας, or the πέρατος γέννα, could not be surveyed until at the same time we had the μικτὸν γένος in view[1]. For evidently the μικτά and the πέρας ἔχοντα are identical so far as form goes; and it is only through our observation of the ἔμμετρα καὶ σύμμετρα which belong to the μικτὸν γένος that the πέρας ἔχοντα which inhabit them can become apparent to us. And this, too, is why, after the examples of the mixed products (such as health, harmony, and the beautiful generally), Protarchus confounds these with τὸ πέρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσι and says he does not quite know what Socrates means by τὸ τρίτον or the Mixed kind (26 C).

We thus see that ἡ πέρατος γέννα as a comprehensive term is equivalent to τὸ πέρας ἔχον (εἶδος or γένος) in 24 A; and so that it includes under it τὰ ἐγγιγνόμενα such as τὸ ποσόν and τὸ μέτριον of 24 C, D.

And now we are in a position to explain τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς (γένναν). In defence of this phrase against objections (2) and (3), it may be urged that it is to be identified with that which follows—τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου καὶ ὁπόση παύει...σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται: i.e. that τὸ περατοειδές is to be identified with τὸ ἴσον καὶ διπλάσιον, or with mathematical ratios, as set forth in 25 A—in other words with the εἴδη of τὸ πέρας. So that, though τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς γένναν is in fact nearly identical with τὴν τοῦ πέρατος γένναν just above, it yet differs in this, that it is more near to the concrete and particular examples, to τὰ πέρας ἔχοντα, and so is not to be regarded as merely an idle variation. In short, in the family of the Limit, as in that of the Limitless, we have to distinguish three generations—Father (πέρας), Children (πέρατος γέννα, πέρας ἔχον, περατοειδές), and Children's Children (περατοειδοῦς γέννα)—and to classify by means of two συναγωγαί.

Of the first sentence in this reply of Socrates, and with it the first three difficulties enumerated, the foregoing may perhaps seem a sufficient explanation.

The next sentence, together with the difficulties it involves—the construction of δράσει, and the meaning of ἐκείνη—cannot, I think, be explained without an alteration of the text. So I find myself, in spite

[1] For τὸ μικτόν is in fact τὸ πεπερασμένον, apart from which it is impossible to observe (in concrete examples) the varieties of τὸ πέρας ἔχον.

of a deep distrust of such manœuvres in general, compelled here to advocate a transposition; and I believe the simplest and best to be that which Jackson first suggested[1], viz. to transfer the words ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν δράσει· τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανὴς κἀκείνη γενήσεται from their present position to the end of Socrates' next reply after ἀπεργάζεται.

This plausible suggestion has in its favour, as its author observes, the further point that this clause is thus made to contain a "playful application of the theory under examination to the circumstances of the dialogue" (cf. *Phaedo* 73 B, 92 C, and τῷ ἐμῷ νῷ in *Phil.* 22 C); while the additional change of συναγομένων to συμμισγομένων which this transposition involves is sufficiently easy[2].

We thus get the following sense :—

Socr. Next, you must combine with the Unlimited the offspring of the Limit. *Prot.* What offspring? *Socr.* That which we neglected just now to collect scientifically when we ought to have collected the offspring of the Limit-informed just as we actually did collect the offspring of the Unlimited. *Prot.* What do you mean by the offspring of the Limit-informed and how did we neglect it? *Socr.* I mean the offspring of the equal and double and whatever ends the mutual strife of opposites and, by implanting number, produces in them symmetry and harmony; and haply now also it will have the same effect (i.e. give symmetry to our λόγος)[3]: in the combination of both of these, the third genus also will come to light.

APPENDIX B.

The Final Scheme of Goods in 66 A—C.

The text of this passage, which calls for more detailed discussion than is possible in a note, is usually given thus :—Πάντῃ δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα, ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν τὴν ἀΐδιον ῥῆσθαι φύσιν. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων. Δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ πάνθ', ὁπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὖ ταύτης ἐστίν, κτλ.

Postponing for the moment textual considerations, let us see what the commentators have made of the general sense of this 'locus nobilissimus de boni summi gradibus,' as Stallbaum calls it. Neglecting Schleiermacher, who did more to propound difficulties than to explain

[1] In a paper read before the Cambridge Philol. Soc., Oct. 18, 1877.

[2] As an alternative, συγγιγνομένων might be proposed: it is rather easier palaeographically, and would give a similar sense to συμμισγ.; cp. *Laws* 930 D, *Polit.* 279 B, 311 A—C.

[3] Cp. *Tim.* 69 A τελευτὴν ἤδη κεφαλήν τε τῷ μύθῳ πειρώμεθα ἁρμόττουσαν ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς πρόσθεν: and *Phileb.* 66 D ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις: also 64 B.

[illegible], we may first take the scheme proposed by Ast (*Über Platons Leben und Schriften*, pp. 237 sq.):—

1. "Begrenzer" i.e. νοῦς διατάττων as ruling principle of the universe.

2. "Unbegrenzten," i.e. formless matter as substrate for Mind's activity.

3. "Reale Synthese: Schönheit," i.e. Pythagorean κόσμος, as copy of Divine Mind.

4. "Ideale Synthese: Erkenntniss," i.e. human mind as reflex of the Divine.

5. "Lust."

But this view is clearly untenable and inconsistent with the language of the text, and as such, both Stallbaum and Trendelenburg refuted it with ease; so that it is unnecessary here to repeat their objections (for which see also Badham: *Philebus*, ed. 1. p. xiv).

Stallbaum's view may be mentioned next. It is exhibited by the following classification: 1. τὸ αἴτιον 2. τὸ ξυμμισγόμενον. 3. τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τὸ πέρας. 4. τὸ καθαρὸν πέρας. 5. τὸ καθαρὸν ἄπειρον. The criticisms passed on this explanation by Trendelenburg ('de Platonis Philebi consilio,' p. 29) and Badham, not to mention later writers, sufficiently display its improbability.

Trendelenburg's scheme comes next in order, as his tract was published in 1837, and so falls between the dates of the 1st and 2nd ed. of Stallbaum's commentary. According to him, the 1st class contains 'ipsius boni idea,' and the cognate Ideas; the 2nd, 'eius in rerum natura simulacra'; the 3rd, 'ipsa mens quasi idea in humano animo'; the 4th, 'quae mens humana parit et gignit, scientiae, artes, opinatio recta'; the 5th, 'voluptates purae.' But though this classification (which is closely akin to that of Brandis, Hermann and Steger) seems decidedly more plausible than either of the preceding, it is open to weighty objections, especially on the score of language, which may be seen stated in Badham (*loc. cit.*) and Zeller (*Eng. Tr.* p. 443, n.).

Badham's own explanation may next be mentioned, as put forward by him in his ed. of 1855. He maintains that the order of the first three grades is due, 'not to any superiority of πρέσβεια or δύναμις, as in the case of τἀγαθόν,' but to 'difference between them as to priority in thought,' or to difference of extent in the sphere in which they are exhibited. Measure, as universally present, comes first; 'perfection of individual things as to beauty or use (τὸ ἱκανόν)' comes second, as 'a result and part of the former'; the least comprehensive of the three circles is Mind and Thought, 'it therefore is put in the third place.' But though he is undoubtedly right in insisting that it is of 'the good most suitable for man' that the author is, or at least *ought* to be, here speaking, he has not been careful to illustrate his view fully, or to show whether it is supported by the rest of the dialogue.

A more fruitful discussion of the subject was that by R. Hirzel (*de bonis in fine Philebi enumeratis*, 1868). He follows Badham in thinking that our passage contains no reference to Ideas, but is confined to the ordering of human goods, the 1st class containing 'quae moderata

sunt et in unum conspirant,' the 2nd 'quae secum ipsa congruunt et perfecta sunt' (p. 77); and, like Badham, he holds also that there is no difference between these two *genera* in the way of pre-eminence, the μέτριον class owing its prior position merely to the fact that it was discovered first (p. 60). This explanation, it should be noticed, assumes as correct Badham's emendation of ᾑρῆσθαι to ηὑρῆσθαι.

Zeller agrees with Badham and Hirzel, as against Trendelenburg and others, in insisting that 'as the *Philebus* generally has aimed at giving a definition of the highest Good for mankind' and as in this passage 'it treats expressly of the κτῆμα πρῶτον, δεύτερον etc., the Good, therefore, is here considered not in its essence, but in reference to the subject in which it occurs' (so too Ritter, Steinhart, Susemihl, Strümpell): 'as the 1st element of the highest Good, participation in the μέτρον is specified; as the 2nd element, the beauty and completeness proceeding thence.'

In addition to the views already noticed, we must not omit to mention that defended by the late Prof. Maguire. I cite his translation and comments *in extenso* (see *Hermath.* I. 2, pp. 442 ff.):—"This passage (ἡδονὴ κτῆμα...ταύτης ἐστίν) I translate as follows, without regard to elegance, the words in italics being inserted to make the construction plain:—'You will tell on all hands that Pleasure is not the first possession, nor even the second, but that the first *possession* in a manner has to do with Regulation and with that which is submitted to Regulation and has *thereby* become suitable to something, and *has to do with* all things of such a kind as that we must from their very nature suppose them to have taken to themselves the eternal principle of being.

"'The second *possession* has to do with those things whose elements are brought into mutual correlation and *thereby* evoke a sense of the Beautiful, and *has to do with* that which is not an only object *per se* to us but is likewise an adequate object, and everything which belongs to this order of things.' *Phil.* 66 A, B.

"Nearly every word in this passage requires comment. πρῶτον μέν πῃ surely required to have κτῆμα understood as its noun, as δεύτερον obviously has in the next clause. Besides the case all through the dialogue is Intelligence *versus* Pleasure, and, in order to settle the point, *Petenda* are classed in the order of ethical merit—a merit founded on metaphysical considerations. πῃ means to a certain extent—*sub modo*—in reference to the common Platonic doctrine that we see realities only in part: *Rep.* 205 A (? 505 A), 517 B, C; *Tim.* 28 C, *Phaedo* 67 C—68 B. Thus again, περί τι is in the sense of object-matter—*id circa quod*—of knowledge or of influence, and therefore in the Platonic sense of apprehension of Reality, and so justifies κτῆμα. περί occurs in this sense in the *Philebus* in the following passages, which will perhaps suffice to prove its use, 29 A, C, 32 C, 33 C, 35 E, 36 B, E, 57 C, 58 A, 59 A *quater*, B *ter*, C *bis*, D *bis*, 66 C, and perhaps elsewhere." So far, then (as Maguire shows), the text is defensible; although πῃ might suggest the possibility of a foll. διῃρῆσθαι. But the real textual crux lies in the next words; and so our critic proceeds:—

"But the fight has raged most fiercely over ᾑρῆσθαι as may be seen

from the following: Dr Badham will not have it at any price and conjectures ηὑρῆσθαι; in this he was joined by Prof. W. H. Thompson of Cambridge, who, however, in his edition of the *Phaedrus*, p. 71, takes ᾑρῆσθαι in the passive sense *captam esse*, i.e. τὴν ἀΐδιον φύσιν is *hunted down*, a sense justified by *Ag.* 1209 and other passages.

"Mr Poste in his edition, p. 135, translates, 'Whatever similar attributes the eternal essence must be deemed to combine,' while in his translation he makes it 'Whatever things are like to them and inhabit the eternal sphere,' p. 88. Mr Jowett: 'Whatever similar attributes the eternal nature may be deemed to have attained,' *Plato* 3, p. 219. And Mr Grote paraphrases thus: 'With everything else analogous, which we can believe to be of eternal nature,' *Plato* 2, p. 617. The true construction can only be settled by a consideration of some Platonic doctrine.

"To Mr Poste and Mr Jowett it must be conceded that Plato is fond of placing the object of the verb first; this would certainly favour making τὴν ἀΐδιον φύσιν the subject, but the following considerations will lead to the absolute rejection of that construction here." The considerations which follow are mainly directed "to show that τὴν ἀΐδιον φύσιν is identical with τὸ ἕν and with τὸ ἀγαθόν." For this Maguire refers to Ar. *Met.* A. 6, N. 4, to show that τὸ ἕν : τἀγαθόν :: Form : Matter :: τὸ πέρας : τὸ ἄπειρον, whence he concludes "that τὴν ἀΐδιον φύσιν is the Good and the One so far as the notion is required in an ethical discussion without dwelling on either of its constituents—either its formal or its material elements. Τὴν ἀΐδιον φύσιν would thus represent that which, to use Butler's language, is an object to the heart and a subject to the understanding[1].

"If then we recollect in the Pythagorean συστοιχία that τὸ πέρας is good and τὸ ἄπειρον evil, and that the lower elements are in Plato represented as receiving the higher we may translate ᾑρῆσθαι τὴν ἀΐδιον φύσιν 'to have incorporated the eternal principle of the One and the Good.'

"Thus we have θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται βουλόμενον ἑλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτήσασθαι, *Phil.* 20 D. The kindred word δέχεσθαι in the sense of admitting a quality or predicate occurs *Phil.* 24 E, 25 A *bis*, 27 E, 32 D, and the application of such verbs to the higher elements as ἐπεῖναι, ἐπισφραγίζεσθαι, ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, ἐπινέμεσθαι and such like is frequent.

"That Plato in the *Philebus* identifies τὸ πέρας with τὸ ἕν is plain; καὶ μὴν τό γε πέρας οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν οὔτε ἐδυσκολαίνομεν ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἓν φύσει, *Phil.* 26 D. So likewise τὸ ἄπειρον is a kind of Multiety, τρόπον τινὰ τὸ ἄπειρον πολλά ἐστι 24 A, and lastly φύσις, as applied to the permanent factor, is in accordance with his usage of that word to denote the manifestation of the Idea, rather than the Idea itself."

Maguire further observes: "with regard to the order of the words, πάνθ' ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα occur in this order, *Phileb.* 54 B, 19 C, 42 D, and the full construction is πάνθ', ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, ἃ κτλ., as in περὶ τὰ

[1] Cp. Teichmüller, *Stud. z. Gesch. d. Begriffe*, p. 255 ff. (Die Gränze (πέρας) ist die Idee): *ibid.* p. 370, n. (πέρας and ἄπειρον = τὸ ἕν and τἄλλα of *Parmen.*): and see *Introd.* ch. vi.

ξυμβολαῖα πάνθ', ὁπόσα κεῖται νόμμα, παραλαβοῦσα, *Polit.* 305 B; and see on the omission of the copula Prof. Campbell's note on *Polit.* 281 C, p. 92. As to the position of χρή with the infinitive, anyone who cares to investigate the matter will see that Plato places χρή both before and after the infin., apparently guided merely by sound. The passage therefore is really equivalent to ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα τὴν ἀΐδιον ᾕρηται φύσιν, and may therefore be rendered, *all such things as have taken on themselves the eternal Nature*, i.e. are such, because they have taken on themselves the eternal Nature[1]."

"Mr Paley's version is:—'that the first is surely that connected with measure and the moderate, with right time and place, and with all those qualities and conditions which we must suppose that, as being of the like kind, the eternal Nature has chosen for its own.... The second, then, is that which has symmetry, beauty, perfection, sufficiency, and all the qualities which belong to this other class.' And in his note Mr Paley adds 'with Stallbaum it seems that we must take τοιαῦτα for ὡς τοιαῦτα ὄντα.' This, and the construction given above, comes to that of Trendelenburg, 'quidquid eiusmodi aeterni naturam suscepisse credendum est[2].' πῃ appears to be treated with contempt by all the English translators. It surely cannot be '*surely*' as in Mr Paley."

Maguire's explanation of πῃ and περί and also of πάντα...νομίζειν seems satisfactory, and if we adopt his view it will so far obviate the necessity of altering the text. But there is more to be said about the phrase τὴν ἀΐδιον ᾕρῆσθαι φύσιν. It raises the following questions: (1) is τὴν ἀΐδιον φύσιν sound, for Bodl. gives merely τὴν ἀΐδιον ηρῆσθαι? (2) is φύσιν subj. or obj. to the infin.? (3) what does ἀΐδιος φύσις exactly mean? (4) is ᾕρῆσθαι sound? (5) is it mid. or pass., and what sense exactly does it bear? And all these questions are closely connected.

First, as to ᾕρῆσθαι: although it is tempting to conjecture διῃρῆσθαι (πῃ περὶ μέτρον—cp. 19 C, *Soph.* 220 A, 225 C, etc., esp. *Laws* 946 B), 'has been divided,' or 'set apart,' authority forbids us to rashly reject ᾕρῆσθαι. And if we keep this word it is still optional whether we take it as mid. or pass. in any of the three senses (*a*) *capture* (*Soph.* 241 C ἑλεῖν τὸν σοφιστήν: *ib.* 261 C ᾕρημένον pf. pass.), (*b*) *appoint* or establish (*Laws* 755 E, 770 A, etc.), (*c*) *choose* or prefer (*Phileb.* 18 D, 22 A, B, 33 A, 44 A, 55 A in mid.; 17 E, 20 D in act.; *Laws* 807 C in pass.). If we choose to take it as pass. in the first of these senses (with Thompson) it will save the need for adopting (with Badh. and Hirzel) the conjectural ηὑρῆσθαι: but to decide on this point we must re-consider the meaning of τὴν ἀΐδιον φύσιν.

It is clear that the total result of the discussion in the dialogue as regards the *human* Good, comes to about this: in the first place must be set the μικτὸς or κοινὸς βίος, next to it Reason and Knowledge, and thirdly Pleasure, in so far as it is pure.

The question then is—how are we to square this result with the scheme of five classes in 66 A ff.? Now the human ἀγαθόν corresponds,

[1] Cp. Susemihl II. 52 ff., where ἀΐδιος φύσις is said to be distinct from the first rank of Goods which "hat diese φύσις nur in sich aufgenommen (ᾕρῆσθαι)."

[2] *naturam* is evidently meant to be object.

not to any one or more of these classes, but to the mixture or sum total of the whole five; so that we must not attempt to equate either of the first two classes with τἀγαθόν, as ethical end. The *ordering* of the classes has reference solely to their relation to ἡ αἰτία (or τἀγαθόν in the stricter sense)[1]. Hence the first-mentioned three classes contain the three principles which were determined as the standards of ἀγαθόν or species of αἴτιον, i.e. μέτρον, σύμμετρον, ἀλήθεια: and they are placed in that order, so that ἀλήθεια, in so far as it applies to man, is identified with human νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις.

And this enables us to see the meaning of τὴν ἀΐδιον φύσιν, which I take to refer to τἀγαθόν as a composite whole, and not to the elemental principles of form or matter (πέρας or ἄπειρον) of which it is constituted. For I hold that this expression is to be explained in the light of the preceding determination regarding οὐσία, and in that of the Aristotelian view of φύσις[2].

If then φύσιν be the right reading here, it gives us an important clue to the sense. For φύσις is in implicit contrast with δύναμις (cp. 64 E); and so, to cite what I have said elsewhere: "the Universal δύναμις or energy descends into the particular φύσεις to which it imparts their particular δυνάμεις, by a kind of self-division or self-expansion, as the root expands into its square or the πυθμήν (or primary ratio) in the geometrical progression proceeds onward in the series 1...*n*. As thus expanded and actualised the Ideal δύναμις becomes itself φύσις: hence in *Phileb.* 66 A τὴν ἀΐδιον φύσιν (as subject to ῥῆσθαι if the text be right) can indicate τἀγαθόν. And so the Ideas as real are said to be ἑστηκότα ἐν τῇ φύσει, i.e. permanent elements, or rather laws, in *rerum natura*....The φύσις of a thing may be said to be its compound union of both form and matter; but its δύναμις depends solely on its formal character."

Thus while Ideality is signified by the adj. ἀΐδιος, Multiplicity or Complexity is signified by the subst. φύσις.

Now this Ideality points us to the fact that in the *formal* characteristics of The Good it is not only the Ethical *summum bonum* for Man but the Cosmical Good, The Good in its absolute aspect, that is here determined. So that this final summary blends in one the human and the Divine, the Ideal and the real, which run side by side as parallel streams of thought throughout the dialogue.

To be precise, then, we should notice that this ἀΐδιος φύσις, in its higher significance, relates only to the first two classes, or formal conditions[3]. And if we wish to square this account with that of the four classes, we should regard these as corresponding to the πέρας, the

[1] Cp. Zeller: "as the highest Good, according to Plato, does not consist in an individual activity, but in the whole of all activities which are agreeable to nature, the first condition of it (αἰτία, μάλιστ' αἴτιον 64 C ff., 65 A) is the harmony of human existence...this harmony we have displayed in our two first determinations, and then come the individual Goods" (*Eng. Tr.* p. 443, n.): this seems to approximate to the right view.

[2] Cp. *Append.* F.

[3] The difficulties regarding ἀλήθεια and νοῦς in our passage will be further discussed in *Append.* F: see also 64 A, n.

material content (of sciences and pleasures) to the ἄπειρον, and the Total Ethical End as μικτὸς βίος to the μικτὸν γένος: but we must here avoid Stallbaum's error of forcing the two passages into correspondence.

To return to the debatable ἡρῆσθαι. If we take it, as proposed, in the sense of 'has been captured' we may cite, in support of the figure involved, 61 A καθάπερ εἴ τίς τινα ἄνθρωπον ζητῶν τὴν οἴκησιν...πύθοιτ' αὐτοῦ, and 64 E οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κτλ. These passages suggest also that περί here has a quasi-local sense ('in the neighbourhood of μέτρον,' etc.), but then we should expect που for πῃ: so it is safer, with Maguire, to understand the prep. in the more general sense of 'dealing with' or 'embracing.' And since, upon examination, none of the other explanations of ἡρῆσθαι seems so appropriate, I decide to cast in my vote with Thompson, and take it as pf. pass. with φύσιν for subject.

It remains to consider the significance of the various terms which are thus summed up in this passage under Classes 1 and 2. Hirzel has examined into the question at length, and what follows is mainly a summary of his results.

To begin then with μέτρον: if we turn to dialogues other than the *Philebus* we may distinguish at least three different senses of the word.

(1) It may denote a measure or canon of measurement (*mensuram qua metimur*), as when in *Tim.* 39 B the sun is spoken of as μέτρον ἐναργές τι, and in *Laws* 716 C we read ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον αν εἴη μάλιστα. We might thus express this notion of μέτρον as the 'formal cause' of numerables and measurables whether with regard to temporal or to spatial extent. Other passages which exhibit this sense, outside the *Philebus*, are *Rep.* 603 A, and *Laws* 947 A.

(2) Next, 'measure' may be regarded as *inherent* in things, which μέτρον ἔχει, τυγχάνει, σώζει (see *Polit.* 284 A, *Laws* 757 A, 846 C, 918 D, 957 A, 959 A, 836 A, 692 A), which measure may appear (*a*) simply as a measure, not further determined, or (*b*) as the right, *just* measure, a fixed *quantum* (see *Laws* 848 C).

(3) Thirdly, the attention may be directed to the thing as a concrete embodiment of μέτρον, as when we speak of a 'measure of barley,' meaning barley in measured quantity: and here again we may distinguish between (*a*) simple, undetermined 'measure,'—as in *Rep.* 621 A, *Laws* 843 E, *Polit.* 269 C,—and (*b*) *just*, proper 'measure,' conceived as a fixed sum—as in *Rep.* 504 C, *Tim.* 68 B, *Laws* 744 E.

The important inference to be drawn from this is that μέτρον may be used—not only with distinction of cause and effect, or of law and example of law, or of genus and particular, or of transcendent and immanent, or of ideal and real—but also of *specified*, just or determined measure, as opposed to measure in general, not otherwise definitely qualified. In this special sense μέτρον might be termed 'unit of measurement.'

Similarly if we examine the usage of μέτριον, outside the *Philebus*, we find it may mean, as Hirzel puts it, "aut in universum id quod finitum sit aut quod iusto modo finitum sit." Of the first sense—'measured' or 'limited' simply as such—examples occur in *Rep.* 430 C,

Laws 746 A, 816 C: of the second, when *just* or certain measure is implied, whether (*a*) absolute, or (*b*) relative, we find instances in (*a*) *Rep.* 396 C, 423 E, 466 B, *Laws* 719 D, 809 E, 918 D, 955 E, and (*b*) *Laws* 789 C, 810 A[1].

We pass next to καίριον, whose meaning may best be determined by first examining the substantive whence it is derived. In καιρός, then, we can distinguish a triple usage:—(1) of opportune time, or due occasion, as in *Tim.* 38 B, *Laws* 709 C; (2) of the ground of conservation, or 'occasion' as salutary cause, as in *Laws* 915 C; (3) in general, of whatever is opportune or salutary, as in *Polit.* 307 B, *Tim.* 85 D, *Laws* 636 E.

Corresponding to these grades of meaning in καιρός, we expect to find in the adj. καίριος, as expressing inherence of καιρός in some one or other way, a similar threefold sense. But in Plato, outside the *Philebus*, it occurs only three times in all, according to Ast's Lexicon, viz. *Laws* 961 A, where it denotes what is 'opportune'; *ib.* 855 E, what is 'suitable,' or 'useful'; *Tim.* 51 D, in a similar sense, where, however, in place of καιριώτατον the best MSS. give ἐγκαιριώτατον. So that we are here without an instance of καίριος in the second of the senses ascribed above to καιρός. But if we add to the above exx. of καιρός the proverbial καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος (Hes. *Op.* 692, Theogn. 401), and Pindar's phrase καιρὸς παντὸς ἔχει κορυφάν (*Pyth.* 9. 135), and such frequent expressions as καιροῦ πέρα,—μεῖζον,—πορρωτέρω, it is easy to see that, as καιρός in this use was practically equivalent to μέτρον, *modus* or '*due* measure,' its adj. might equally have been used, as a synonym for μέτριος, of the 'duly measured.'

We arrive now at the second group of terms, of which the first is σύμμετρον. It means (1) what is '*commensurable*' with something else, as defined in *Parmenides* 140 C: μεῖζον δέ που ἢ ἔλαττον ὄν, οἷς μὲν ἂν σύμμετρον ᾖ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείω μέτρα ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω. Ναί. Οἷς δ' ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται. So that if two things have a 'common measure' they are thereby σύμμετρα, the same 'unit of measure' (or μέτρον, see above 3 *b*) being applicable to each, and each being a 'rational' quantum in regard to that unit; whereas μὴ σύμμετρα are 'irrational' quanta if each is measured by the μέτρον of the other. For this sense we may compare *Rep.* 514 A, *Soph.* 235 D, E, 236 A. Closely akin to this is (2) the second use, of what admits of *combination*, as a result of its commensurability or homogeneity: e.g. *Tim.* 66 A, D, 69 B. And finally (3) in extended sense, of what possesses congruity or fitness in general, cp. *Laws* 772 E, 788 E, 995 A, 803 B. In these last instances, further, we observe that the word has a twofold application, (*a*) to things considered *in themselves* as a combination of commensurable parts, and (*b*) to things regarded in relation to others: a good instance of the former use is *Tim.* 87 C.

In καλόν also we may distinguish several senses.

(1) It may express 'value in use,' as a synonym of χρήσιμον, *Hipp. Maj.* 295 C.

[1] For a further discussion of the notion, see *App.* E.

(2) Beauty may be regarded as that which gratifies the senses, so that καλόν is 'iucundum,' as in *Hipp. Maj.* 298 A, *Laws* 655 E; cp. *Gorg.* 474 D, where καλόν as *utile* is distinguished from καλόν as *dulce.*

(3) καλόν may equal πρέπον, as in *Hipp. Maj.* 293 E—combining *decorum* with *dulce.* But in addition to these (*a*) external aspects of τὸ καλόν, we find (*b*) a more important determination of it in *Tim.* 87 D, where we are told that ὅλον τὸ ζῶον is καλόν when it exhibits συμμετρία in its parts ψυχή and σῶμα; whence it appears that symmetry or commensurability, quantitative or qualitative, of the internal elements is a necessary condition of beauty; so that κάλλος may be termed the ἀρετή of a thing regarded as a whole, while συμμετρία is the ἀρετή of the parts of such a whole regarded in their mutual relations to one another. Thus this last example teaches us the nature of καλόν regarded *per se*, while the first three senses—*utile*, *dulce*, *decorum*—express its nature in reference to other external ends[1].

τέλεον in addition to (*a*) the general sense of 'complete,' may mean (*b*) more precisely what is 'limited' or ended in a definite point, as τέλος ἔχον: cp. *Rep.* 371 E, 443 B, *Laws* 850 C. And this τέλος, again, may be regarded as imposed either (1) from without or (2) from within, as natural or artificial. There is no difficulty about this word in the *Philebus*, when it is consistently used of what is in *itself* perfect:—22 B, 60 C, 61 A, 67 A. Nor need the last term cause us trouble; for ἱκανόν means simply what *suffices* for any end external to itself, e.g. 19 E, 22 B, 52 D, 60 D. Hence we may conclude that the distinction between τέλεον and ἱκανόν lies in the fact that the former expresses *self*-reference, the latter *external* reference, just as we saw that καλόν, in one aspect at least, expresses self-reference as opposed to σύμμετρον which, in one aspect, implies external relation.

In other words καλόν and τέλεον are applicable to a thing when regarded *per se*, as an absolute subject, while σύμμετρον and ἱκανόν are both terms applicable only to a relative subject. Or, looking at the notions involved from the Aristotelian point of view, we may say that καλόν and σύμμετρον express the absolute and relative sides of perfection from the point of view of 'formal cause' or εἶδος, while τέλεον and ἱκανόν express the same in the 'final' aspect[2].

Now that we have investigated the meaning of each of these terms singly, it remains to enquire why the first group is distinguished from the second, and why μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ καίριον and the rest are put together under one head. As I have so far followed Hirzel in his treatment of the subject, I will here quote his explanation of these points. With regard to the common notion which in his view characterises the 1st group he writes (p. 23): "itaque cum uno genere haec tria vocabula μέτρον μέτριον καίριον Plato coniunxerit necesse est in genus eorum rettulerit quae iustam mensuram non excedunt sed mediam inter duo extrema viam sequuntur"; in support of which he quotes in special

[1] For καλόν in *Philebus*, cp. Sträter, *Stud. z. Gesch. der Aesthetik* I., pp. 66 ff. and Van Heusde, *Init. Phil. Plat.* p. 340.

[2] These terms will be found further illustrated in *App.* G.

Polit. 284 E. And his view of the difference between the 1st and 2nd groups is indicated thus (p. 33):—"*posterioris* igitur generis vocabula illo Philebi loco summo bono, *prioris* singulis quibus illud constat partibus tribuuntur"; and similarly further on (p. 40) he writes:—"id ipsum erat quod probare volui *congruentiam* ubi commemoretur totius alicuius praestantiam, *moderationem* partis virtutem significare."

According to this view, the first group includes the elements of τἀγαθόν regarded singly and independently; and in the second these elements are regarded as united into a perfect whole to form the *summum bonum*[1]. We must, however, bear in mind the fact that Hirzel excludes from consideration the extra-ethical and Cosmic aspect of the Good; and this exclusion renders his view incomplete as an interpretation of Plato's thought, although correct within its limits.

APPENDIX C.

Τὸ ἄπειρον *in Early Greek Thought.*

It is of considerable interest as well as importance in connection with the doctrine of the *Philebus* to examine how far the notion of the 'Infinite' had developed in pre-Platonic thought.

It was Anaximander who first brought τὸ ἄπειρον into prominence as a philosophical term. He uses it to qualify the homogeneous matter which he assumes at the commencement of each of the successive worlds.

What then does he mean by terming his primitive matter τὸ ἄπειρον?

Without discussing the question at length, I will briefly state here my opinion that he cannot have meant, as Aristotle apparently takes him to mean, that matter is infinite in extent, since it is unlikely that in his days the mathematical necessity of conceiving space as unlimited was as yet forced upon the Greek mind, and since, also, the rotatory motion ascribed to the universe by Anaximander is, in the very nature of the conception, only compatible with a limited matter.

The incompatibility of these two conceptions—infinity and circular motion—becomes clearly apparent, as M. Tannery has pointed out, in the history of Anaximander's immediate successors. Thus, Xenophanes maintains against the Pythagoreans the absolute Unity of the Universe, and in so far approximates to Anaximander's view; but since, on the other hand, he agrees with the Pythagoreans in holding the Universe to be infinite, he is obliged to reject the other side of Anaximander's doctrine, and to postulate, instead of revolution, absolute immobility.

[1] Hirzel's conclusions are endorsed by Peipers (*Ontol. Plat.* pp. 285 ff.).

Again, the theory of Anaximander in which he accounts for the immobility of the earth by its equidistance in all directions from the bounds of the (rotating) universe, is a sufficiently precise negation of the infinitude of matter.

Consequently, it is impossible, I believe, to ascribe to Anaximander the notion of a *spatially* infinite matter. But it is interesting to observe that, though he did not frame the notion of infinite space, he did frame that of infinite *time*, as is proved by his doctrine of the endless succession of perishable worlds. So that we find historically that, while a long and elaborate course of reasoning is necessary to the formation of the one notion, the other appears to spring up immediately and instinctively. It is natural to think of time as what is ceaseless and persistent, without beginning or end; there is, in fact, a subjective necessity to conceive it as such, and no objective obstacle to impede that necessity. Such a view of space, on the other hand, seems to require an objective confirmation, a confirmation which can never be completely forthcoming; and the imagination of the early thinker was bound to stop sooner in its flight through space than that of the modern to whom astronomy lectures airily about millions and billions of miles.

Spatial infinity, then, not being the signification of Anaximander's ἄπειρον, we are forced to give it a *qualitative* application. It is the homogeneous matter which at the commencement of each formation of a world is capable of furnishing the three distinct kinds of body to be found in the world, fire, water, earth; it is, in short, the potential of these elements. Yet it is conceived by the vivid fancy of the physicist not as qualitatively undetermined, but rather as possessing definite form, yet intermediate between the elements as afterwards separated from it,—that is, as a something 'more subtile than water, more dense than air' (Arist. *De Coelo* III. 5); "un fluide aériforme chargé de vapeur d'eau," in fact *mist*.

We find τὸ ἄπειρον again in the doctrine of the earlier Pythagoreans. "The Pythagoreans admit," says Aristotle (*Phys.* IV. 6), "the existence of the void; they say that it penetrates into the heaven in so far as the heaven inspires the *infinite breath* (πνεῦμα ἄπειρον), and that it is this void which forms the limits of things." There is certainly no *à priori* reason why this doctrine should not be ascribed to the founder of the school. Only we must not be deceived by the term 'void.' In all probability the theory of an absolute void was first promulgated by the Atomists, and certainly it must not be ascribed to thinkers of the preceding century. The void of Pythagoras was a concrete notion, not absolute but merely apparent emptiness, i.e. air. The synonym *pneuma* sufficiently shows the way in which the early Pythagoreans conceived of void, as also does the polemic of Anaxagoras against their doctrine. In their anthropomorphic conception the world is a huge animal which inspires and expires—a living and rotating sphere. Consequently, this Pythagorean ἄπειρον is similar to that of Anaximander as regards its concrete nature, and differs in that it is regarded as being mostly outside of the world instead of forming itself one phase of the world which has no outside. And thus, the infinite *pneuma* not being

merely co-extensive with the world, the idea of this infinite is not incompatible with that of the rotatory motion of the world, since it is not τὸ ἄπειρον itself that revolves (as with Anaximander) but only the οὐρανός, the inner core around which stretches on all sides the illimitable air.

Thus in this view we find the geometrical notion of infinite space, which is identified physically with that of boundless air.

But the Pythagorean Infinite plays another part, in so far as it enters into the sphere of the 'Heaven.' As an internal factor of the Cosmos, derived by inspiration from without, it limits things and is itself, in turn, limited by things. Consequently it is opposed not to the 'Limited' (πεπερασμένον) but to the 'Limit' (πέρας). This means, physically, that the air is opposed to the element which gives things their density and solidity, and geometrically, that unfigured space is opposed to the figures (point, line, surface) which give it its determinations. In this aspect, τὸ ἄπειρον is the continuous, τὸ πέρας the principle of discontinuity or individuality.

We may state then that the scientific concept of space, as the continuous and as the unlimited, dates from Pythagoras; and that he united both sides of this double concept under the single term ἄπειρον which Anaximander had already used in a more narrow sense. But we must remember that Pythagoras had not as yet disengaged the abstract from the concrete, his 'Infinite' or apparent 'Void' being limitless air, not as yet resolved into absolute space, as a purely abstract notion.

It is one thing to perceive the *subjective* logical necessity of postulating for geometric purposes the infinity of space-extension, and quite another to be convinced of the *objective* validity of this postulate, the non-limitation of physical space, or the 'place of matter.'

We have seen that in Anaximander's doctrine the meaning of τὸ ἄπειρον was sufficiently precise. Yet the term in itself is ambiguous, as applicable to either the Infinite or the Indeterminate, to indefinite extension or intension. Hence, when the proposition of Anaximander is stated in the form "τὸ ἄπειρον is One and subject to rotatory motion," it might be construed as unifying the three notions of Infinity, Unity, and Revolving Motion. This, however, being an inconceivable conjunction, there are clearly three simple ways of modifying the doctrine, namely by denying in turn one or other of the notions so conjoined.

The Pythagoreans, we have seen, made use of all three notions in their system, but so as to render that system a dualism; for they united Unity with Rotation in the Cosmos, while denying Rotation to the Infinite, which was conceived as external to the Cosmos. A similar resolution of the antinomy was adopted by such later physicists as Diogenes of Apollonia and, in a peculiar form, by Anaxagoras.

Another method was to deny the apparent rotatory motion, thus leaving the Infinite One as motionless: and in one form or other, this was the method adopted by Philolaus, by Xenophanes, and by Melissus.

Finally, it was open to deny Infinity—the line taken by Parmenides and Empedocles. In Parmenides' view the world is a complete Unity; hence, there can be nothing outside of it, unless we assume it to be empty space, the absolute void. But such a void Parmenides refuses to

allow; it is, for him, the Not-being which can in no wise be. Furthermore, as motion is only relative to an object outside of that which is in motion, and as there is no such being possibly outside of the spherical One, the apparent motion of the sphere is an illusion, logically impossible—a matter of mere opinion afforded by the senses, in contrast to the truth which is declared by the reason. Thus, by holding fast to the central notion, Unity, Parmenides was led to the complete negation of the other two, Motion and Infinity.

In such ways did these various thinkers strive to surmount the problem raised by the form of Anaximander's doctrine. But a word must be said also as to the meaning of this same term ἄπειρον in the system of the third great physicist of Miletus, *Anaximenes.* In most of the main points his system resembles that of his compatriot: he too maintained the Unity of matter, the eternity of the rotatory motion, the endless succession of worlds evolving and perishing in turn; and further, in determining the form of the initial, original matter as *air*, he applies to it the same epithet as Anaximander, ἄπειρον. Aristotle and Theophrastus understand this to mean, in both cases, absence of spatial limitation, the 'Infinite.'

That this cannot be true of Anaximander's ἄπειρον we have seen already; and as Anaximenes equally holds to the notions of Unity and Rotatory Motion, it is no less impossible to attribute to him the notion of the Infinity of matter. And so, in spite of Zeller's support of the Aristotelian view, it seems best (with Teichmüller and Tannery) to suppose that in this regard Anaximenes' ἄπειρον, like Anaximander's, is the 'Indeterminate' rather than the 'Infinite,' and that, though spatially continuous, or without internal limitations, it is not infinitely extended. In fact the question of the external limitation or non-limitation of the world was not as yet mooted among the Ionians of the sixth century, nor did they think of asking whether matter goes on for ever through space, being content to speculate rather how the great worlds spin "for ever down the ringing grooves of change."

We have already seen what was the position taken up by Parmenides with regard to the connection of the three main philosophic notions first juxtaposed ambiguously by Anaximander—the notions of Unity, Infinity and Motion.

But a word or two more is needed to show how Parmenides led up to the dialectical position of the later Eleatics, and to indicate how far he is to be regarded as the originator of Idealism. His idealistic tendency consists mainly in this, that he distinctly marked off the perceptions of sense from the results of pure reasoning, that he drew a broad line of cleavage between "the way of Truth" and "the way of Opinion." It is in the former aspect, as Truth, that he presents his own doctrine concerning the world,—that it is spherical, and consequently limited, though at the same time filling all space. For space itself is not unlimited in extent. Beyond this space-filling matter or matter-filled space of the globular cosmos, there is and can be nothing; for absolute void is impossible and unthinkable, and the relative or apparent void of the Pythagorean doctrine no less impossible. The Universe, then, is

everywhere equally and uniformly full, and as such it has existence from all eternity in changeless immobility.

This is the world that the logical faculty must postulate, in a doctrine which may be described as a materialistic monism. But here we see that no attempt is made to explain the *phenomena* of experience. Physics proper, which deals with matter in motion, belongs to the inferior sphere of enquiry, to "the way of Opinion." And here Parmenides ceases to be original: the views that he propounds as the verdict of opinion concerning the phenomenal world are no longer his own, but borrowed nearly *in toto* from the theories of the Pythagorean school. These views he holds not indeed as unimportant, yet as incapable of attaining to the certainty of strict logical demonstration.

As Tannery well puts it: "Parménide se montre sous une double face; à la fois tourné vers le passé et vers l'avenir, il est en même temps physicien probabiliste, et logicien dogmatique. Mais s'il se place successivement aux deux points de vue, il ne cherche pas à réunir, dans une synthèse commune, le double aspect des choses. C'est là, je l'ai dit, son caractère essentiel; c'est par là qu'il a fourni à l'idéalisme sa matière propre, en même temps qu'il lui donnait sa forme, en créant le genre de logique qui lui est spécial."

His main importance, then, lies in this, that he laid the groundwork of a theory of knowledge through his insistence on the generic difference between Truth and Opinion, a difference no less insisted on by the Idealist Plato. It was undoubtedly his connection with the school of the Mathematical philosophers that led Parmenides to this result, and forced on his mind the profound chasm which separates all mathematical demonstrations, in point of convincing certainty, from the mere guess-work of any attempt to get beyond the immediate impressions of sense in the sphere of physical enquiry.

Pythagoreanism was thus not without a large influence on the great Eleate. And the position of his successor, Zeno, was also largely determined by his relations to the same system.

Zeno's philosophic position, as Tannery has shown, has been generally misunderstood. He is commonly represented as a sceptic, as one who delighted in polemic and in paralogisms, and who, to reinforce the positive doctrine of his 'Father Parmenides,' applied his dialectic skill to disprove the possibility of motion and of plurality, i.e. of the phenomenal world.

It is forgotten that the arguments of Zeno are expressly *hypothetical*. *If* the many are, he argues, then motion is impossible. Thus he does not attempt to disprove unconditionally the possibility of motion or of the phenomenal world, but only that such motion is incompatible with the reality of 'the many.' So that it is the belief in plurality against which his dialectic is directed. But what sort of plurality is it that he holds to be thus incredible? Is it the common view, as that two sheep or six goats are not one and the same thing, that he is attacking? Or are the beliefs in question some theses of Anaxagoras or of Leucippus concerning the plurality of the real? To none of these can his arguments be made to apply fitly. It remains then to adopt the hint

suggested by the relation of Parmenides to the Pythagorean school, and to enquire whether 'the Many' against which Zeno directs his darts is not some Pythagorean postulate.

Parmenides himself had, on the one hand, denied the Truth of the dualistic thesis of this school, while, on the other hand, he had adopted, at least in part, their cosmological and physical theories as constituting more or less probable Opinion. His conclusions, then, regarding the unity, continuity and immobility of the Cosmos contradicted peremptorily the tenets of the thinkers to whom for his general physical conclusions he was most largely indebted.

So it is natural to suppose that the keenest opposition to the peculiar features of Eleaticism was that offered by members of the Pythagorean brotherhood. And, consequently, it is among the Pythagorean doctrines that we are to look for that particular thesis against which Zeno directs his attack.

The thesis in question is, in fact, none other than the Pythagorean dogma concerning the *point*, of which Aristotle tells us. They defined the point as '*unity having position*,' and conversely the monad as στιγμὴ ἄθετος. If, then, the point has position in space, or extension, in however minute a degree, it follows that the geometrical magnitude is a sum of points, a plurality, just as the arithmetical magnitude, or number, is a sum of unities. Now this conception of the point is clearly false: the point, mathematically speaking, is not a unity at all but a mere zero, quantitatively *nil*; and a geometrical magnitude, surface or line, is by no means to be regarded as a totality or sum of juxtaposed points. It was, however, on this false conception that much of the Pythagorean speculation was based: the discovery of incommensurable quantities had not yet been made, and so these theorists continued still to compound arithmetically, out of sums of points, geometrical figures, and to argue concerning triangular, polygonal, and pyramidal numbers. Numbers, in fact, were to them figures; and further, figures were bodies. That is to say, the geometrical and the physical, bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial, were not clearly distinguished. This need not quite mean that they *identified* the object of sense with the object of geometry; it is hard to say how far exactly they could distinguish between mere analogy and actual sameness. But, at least, they held that the physical body was made up of a sum of physical points, and so was a plurality. And it was in this sense that they affirmed 'Things are Numbers,' and held the properties of things to be accounted for by the properties of the numbers representing the sums of their constituent points.

This doctrine, then, of the extended reality of the point is that against which Zeno directs his dialectic. He argues indirectly,—that is, he assumes his opponent's thesis and then proceeds to deduce from it by strict logic self-contradictory results. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* process whereby he proves the incredibility of the contested hypothesis, εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα.

Alex. Aphrod. (ap. Simpl. in *Phys.* 216) thus expounds one of Zeno's arguments: Plurality is a collection of unities. Wherein then consists

the Unity of a thing? Unity, say the opponents, is the point; but the point is nothing: consequently there is no plurality (for a collection of nothings is nothing). Here what Zeno denies is not Unity, as Simplicius wrongly states, but the Pythagorean identification of Unity with the point. For Zeno's own positive doctrine is, like that of his master, that Unity is the Cosmic Whole, the sum total of all things; to this it is that Unity and Continuity are truly to be ascribed, and not to a falsely-conceived indivisible element of bodies.

The main results of what we learn from Aristotle (*Phys.* VI. 9) and from Simplicius concerning the arguments of Zeno I must be content here to indicate with barest brevity, referring for fuller information to M. Tannery's excellent exposition of the matter (*Science Hell.*, pp. 252 ff.).

The continuous—i.e. the infinitely divisible—cannot, maintains Zeno, be conceived as a sum of indivisible elements; for if these elements possess no magnitude, their sum can possess none; whereas if, on the contrary, they do possess magnitude, as their number is infinite, their sum must be infinite in extent. The result of this, combined with the rest of the celebrated λόγοι recounted by Aristotle, is to establish by the indirect method of argument (the *reductio ad impossibile*) the three following negative theses:

(*a*) a body is not a sum of points:

(*b*) time is not a sum of instants:

(*c*) motion is not a sum of simple transitions from point to point.

In all this Zeno nowhere appears to us as an Idealist. He is not combating an abstract Non-being, or maintaining the Unity of the Absolute Spirit, or anything of the like immaterial nature. His point of view is concrete throughout, and Being, the Real, is to him something definitely corporeal and extended. But for all this, Zeno is following in the path of Parmenides, as the pioneer of Idealism, in so far as he affirms the distinction between the sensible and the intellectual, and the superiority of the latter sphere, thus laying the foundations for an Idealistic Epistemology.

Only the Intelligible is the Real, declared Parmenides. The Intelligible—such as point, line, surface—is not the physically concretely Existent, added Zeno. And the synthesis of these two moments of thought leads to the result that the absolute Real, which is the Intelligible, is not the sensible and Phenomenal, but is rather to be found in the sphere of Mathematical Science. Or, as it is tersely phrased by M. Tannery (*op. cit.* p. 258): "les εἴδη μαθηματικά se trouvent, du coup, constitués en opposition aux εἴδη αἰσθητά."

The third great name in the Eleatic school is that of *Melissus*. His importance for the history of thought, no less than that of Zeno, has suffered much from misinterpretation, but the labours of more recent enquirers have restored him again to his proper position as the most advanced idealist of his school. Most of his extant fragments show him simply as the follower of Parmenides in ontological speculation, with this peculiarity, that he attributes Infinity to the Universal Being.

But in his two last fragments[1] we find the ground completely changed; for in one of them he denies that the Being whereof he treats possesses spatial extension, and in the other he affirms with no less decision that the changing world of phenomena is nothing more than an illusion of our senses, and that under none of the manifold forms of the Becoming can reason discern the true reality of Being. Here then we have definitely proclaimed a form of doctrine at once monistic and idealistic.

To explain how it came about that the Eleaticism of Parmenides developed so soon into so advanced a doctrine as this, we must recal once more the close connection which we have seen existing, whether by way of conciliation or of antagonism, between the Eleates and the Pythagoreans.

With the break up of the Pythagorean school, as a political and scientific brotherhood, in the middle of the 5th century, the followers of 'the Master' parted into sects, all having some part in the common tradition of the founder, yet each presenting some peculiar feature of its own in the way of physical or numerical speculation. And it was in the midst of this Italic atmosphere of speculation that Eleaticism had its origin. Pythagoreanism was the main theoretic element of which it had to take account: the Eleatic doctrine acted mainly upon the Pythagorean, and the Pythagorean in turn reacted mainly on the Eleatic, and from the mutual intercourse of these two it was that the Idealism of Melissus sprang. Parmenides and Zeno had shown the scientific inferiority of hypotheses concerning the concrete and the physical to demonstrations of notions mathematical and abstract: they had opposed these two methods and their subject-matter as corresponding to the sharp antithesis between Opinion and Truth. And the philosophic "Zeitgeist," of which the Eleatics were thus the exponents, had risen up against the traditional views of the Pythagoreans and had overcome them, so that these thinkers found themselves compelled to devote themselves to the study of the abstract, i.e. of Mathematics. Thus from the Parmenidean thought, 'the Intelligible alone is the Real,' developed in relation to mathematical notions, we arrive at the Monism of Melissus as an abstract theoretical system.

Consequently the 'Infinity' of which Melissus speaks is not to be understood as a spatial infinity, as something objective, but merely as Infinity in the abstract, as pure concept. Being is unextended, yet at the same time Infinite. And this eternal permanent Being is the All. It is of the All, the absolute Being, that motion is denied. In the All the sum total of effects is equal to the sum total of causes, so that there is an equilibrium,—based on the law *ex nihilo nil*, or the equation of the antecedent to its consequent,—in the totality of things which leaves that Whole as Whole unmoved. There remains, however, some doubt as to how far exactly Melissus carried his Idealism, and as to the precise

[1] Bäumker and Burnet deny that Melissus taught the incorporeality of the Real. In the above I have followed Tannery in adopting the more usual explanation of the last two fragments.

consecution of his thought. Nor can we easily decide how far he may have been influenced by atomistic or Anaxagorean doctrines.

The mention of *Anaxagoras* of Clazomenae leads us next to consider the speculations of that thinker in so far as they bear on our enquiry. His main achievement was, of course, the distinction he drew between Mind and Matter, or, as Aristotle put it, his introduction of the new factor, Reason, as the Moving Cause of the Universe. The importance of this for the development of metaphysic can scarcely be over-estimated.

But his theory of Matter itself was scarcely understood in its full import until that acute critic, M. Tannery, drew attention to it; and here again I am indebted to his exposition. The Eleatic critique of the world of motion had shown the necessity for reconstituting on a new basis the Ionic cosmology. The diurnal revolution, held by Anaximander to be the permanent cause of the World, can no longer be regarded as such if all motion is in truth but an illusion of the senses. And while the Ionic dogma was 'the One, which is All, is Moved,' the Eleatic was its contradictory, 'the One, which is All, is Unmoved.'

A new view, then, which should include that of the Milesians, must be in some sort a compromise. The One must be conceived as spatially Infinite, and the Motion postulated must take place only in a limited portion of this Infinite. But this Infinite being conceived as corporeal in some sort (the notion of absolute void being not as yet advanced), it follows that since the motion does not belong to the whole Infinite it does not belong to Matter as such. Hence to postulate Matter is not *ipso facto* to postulate Motion also—or, in other words, the cause of Motion does not lie in the nature of Matter; consequently an outside cause of this Motion has to be sought. Such, then, was the position of Anaxagoras, and the cause desiderated he found in Νοῦς.

Πάντα ἦν ὁμοῦ· νοῦς δ' ἐλθὼν διεκόσμησε αὐτά. The thought of Anaxagoras is this: Postulating Matter as Infinite, and Reason, at a fixed moment the latter commences to act upon the former: to begin with, Reason establishes a small organised core, thence it continues its ordering energy in all directions, successively organising portion after portion of the inert chaotic Infinite Mass. But the field of action for Mind being thus infinite, no limit can be placed to the extent of its efforts.

The noticeable point in this theory is the mode in which the Infinite is conceived—as a Mathematical Infinite. The world is a magnitude which increases indefinitely, surpassing any assignable limits, enlarging *ad infinitum*. Anaxagoras uses the term ἄπειρον as should a true geometer.

The method of Mind's action on Matter is this: it sets up a vortex or rotation whereby the various elements heaped together in the material Mass, which is thought as a mechanical μῖγμα, are separated and so reduced to order, like becoming conjoined with like.

But here we come to the peculiarity of Anaxagoras' view of Matter. If we speak of Matter and elements of Matter, we are faced by the Zenonian problem. If Matter is not an absolute Unity, in dividing it indefinitely you must ultimately arrive at a point where its constituent elements become separated, i.e. you will make of your original Unity,

Matter, a plurality. How, then, can this plurality form a Unity? How can Being be at once ἓν καὶ πολλά? To answer these questions, and to conciliate in his answer the conflicting monistic dynamism of the Ionians with the pluralistic mechanism of his own cosmology, was the problem with which Anaxagoras was confronted. Yet the method adopted was, after all, for the geometrical mind of this philosopher, sufficiently simple.

Matter is, said Anaxagoras, divisible to infinity, and it is also true that it is a mixture; but the difficulty alleged by Zeno is no real difficulty, since the constitutive elements will never be separated by any amount of division, the Unity will never become a heterogeneous plurality, the plurality will never become an absolutely pure unity. For the mixture which obtains in the largest fractions of matter obtains equally in the smallest, even in the infinitesimally small fractions; between largest and smallest portions the only difference that subsists is a difference of dimension, of magnitude, and this has no effect on the question of composition. Everywhere alike, in all its parts, Matter is at once single and composite, one and many.

Accustomed as we are, in scientific discourse, to the atomic theory of matter, this conception of Anaxagoras appears at first sight strange and paradoxical. It deserves, then, a word of explanation.

What we regard as the *elements* of bodies, are distinguished only by their qualitative differences, meaning by qualities determinate conditions of sensible phenomena. To say, then, that it is impossible to isolate the elements of a body by division, can only mean that in every part, however small, the qualities of the whole will be found reproduced, i.e. that each fraction will contain the same conditions capable of producing phenomena of the same kind. This is conceivable enough, granting that the degree, or intrinsic value, of the qualities can differ to any extent; and granting also that the resultant phenomena may be imperceptible to the senses, either because of the quantitative smallness of matter or the intensive weakness of the quality. For scientific purposes these infinitesimal agents or products may be left out of account.

We have, then, qualities determined, according to the phenomena which they produce, for every physical body and for each of its parts, but variable from one body to another and from one part to another, yet variable in such a way that for every given point they have a precise value, which value will form the limit towards which the quality of the molecule enveloping that point will tend.

Thus to each point of matter there will be found attached a coefficient for each quality considered (density, temperature, electric state, etc.); the number of these qualities, which are pure abstractions, may be indefinite, but it is assumed that according to natural laws, known or unknown, the knowledge of a given quality is connected with that of certain others, so that, for purposes of enquiry, it is sufficient to select a fixed number of qualities, hypothetically regarded as primary, to which the rest may be brought into relation. Upon the sum of the values of a given quality for the various points of a body (according to the rules of integral calculus) will depend the quality of that body as a whole,

that is to say, the manner in which it will behave in relation to the senses as regards the phenomenon considered.

Such a conception of matter evidently lends itself perfectly to all forms of mathematical calculation, and to all the logical combinations necessary for the explanation of phenomena. And as it is practically the same as the Kantian theory on the subject, it is not to be treated with contempt.

How far this conception was developed on its mathematical side by Anaxagoras himself, it is difficult to determine with accuracy. Only this much may be laid down with certainty, that it was as *qualities inherent* in matter, yet variable in degree from body to body,—and not, as is commonly thought, as elemental parts of a mixture—that Anaxagoras conceived his *homoeomeries*. This last term itself and the wrong associations connected with it are due to Aristotle. But Anaxagoras himself speaks only of *qualities*, not of elemental substances.

This misunderstanding of Aristotle is based on the false notion that the 'seeds of things' (σπέρματα) of which Anaxagoras speaks are meant to be elemental substances. But this is not so: the 'seeds,' no less than the bodies built up of them, are themselves conglomerations of a plurality of qualities, and can be decomposed equally with the bodies into Hot and Cold, Wet and Dry, Bright and Dark, Thick and Thin, of varying degrees of intensity. So intimately are these qualities commingled throughout the whole realm of Matter that no amount of division can isolate them one from another. Hence every quality is everywhere present in some degree; and in no particle of matter is any one quality excluded. Fire, for example, is what is Hottest, Brightest, Driest, Thinnest, yet it must always contain something of the Cold, the Dark, the Wet, the Thick.

That this theory is not free from imperfections is easy enough to see. For in the first place, it is impossible thus to mark off from each other the opposites Hot and Cold, Wet and Dry, etc.: such a use of the hatchet is a sign of crudity of thought: "pour nous," remarks Tannery, "le froid et le chaud apparaissent comme deux degrés éloignés sur l'échelle intensive d'une même qualité." Anaxagoras himself, however, is not to be held wholly accountable for this error, as he took over these pairs of opposites ready made from the system of the Pythagoreans.

And besides this, it would appear that he did not clearly distinguish between quality and substance, as he makes qualitative variations in things depend upon a mechanical displacement of the particles of matter to which the qualities are attached, instead of holding consistently to the dynamical point of view which takes account of *intensive* modifications only.

A few words must here be added regarding the historical influence of this conception of Anaxagoras, as pointed out by M. Tannery.

As has already been said, this theory of matter was propounded as a means of conciliating the Ionian monism with the pluralism of the Pythagorean opposites. But as it needed the logical mind of a mathematician to appreciate its full import, it was not unnaturally liable to misconstruction. Assuming, however, the truth of Anaxagoras' view,

let us see how we can derive from it the answers to the main problems raised in the age succeeding.

If we ask why a thing is said to be what it is, we can reply because it participates in such-and-such a kind or quality: a thing, for instance, is cold because it participates in The Cold. The Cold is present in it, yet not so as to exclude other qualities or to constitute alone the whole being of the thing. On the contrary, the same thing participates equally in The Hot: hence it is either hot or cold relatively to the terms of comparison chosen. The absolutely Hot or absolutely Cold exists nowhere in nature, though all natural bodies participate in these two species. Further, the natural bodies are the subjects of becoming and perishing, whereas the kinds or qualities subsist eternally unchanged. Such views as these, which are those of Plato, are deducible without difficulty from that conception of matter which was originated by Anaxagoras. This does not mean that the Platonic Ideas are to be at once identified with the inherent physical qualities of Anaxagoras, but it suggests at least that Plato interpreted aright the inner meaning of Anaxagoras' theory and that it suggested to him certain portions of his own doctrine.

For this reason—its bearing on Platonism—I have given thus much attention to Anaxagoras' conception of Matter.

APPENDIX D.

τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πέρας in Plato.

1. τὸ ἄπειρον.

In the account of τὸ ἄπειρον (23 C—26 D, see *Introd.* ch. iv.) we notice first what care is taken to insist that as a generic notion it is at once One and Many,—One as always characterised by the More and Less, and Many as manifested in a variety of forms such as Hotter and Colder, Faster and Slower, Greater and Smaller etc. Of all these the characteristic is, negatively, the exclusion of Limit, End, Completion, Definite Quantity or Quality; and this means, positively, *continuous* change and motion, or absolute non-determination in point of either quantity, quality, or both.

Now if we consider the examples given of ἄπειρα, we see that they are objects of sensation—of touch, or taste, or hearing or sight.

The primary example of ἄπειρον is θερμότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον, next to which comes ὑγρότερον καὶ ξηρότερον.

Why are these indefinite qualities of temperature and moisture here put forward in preference to any other cases of indefinitude? it may be asked. For answer, I call attention to some other places in Aristotle

and Plato which will sufficiently exhibit the pertinence as well as significance of the illustrations here used.

In Arist. *de part. an.* B. 1. 646ᵃ 13 ff. we read: *τριῶν δ' οὐσῶν τῶν συνθέσεων πρώτην μὲν ἄν τις θείη τὴν ἐκ τῶν καλουμένων ὑπό τινων στοιχείων, οἷον γῆς, ἀέρος, ὕδατος, πυρός. ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἴσως ἐκ τῶν δυνάμεων λέγειν, καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐξ ἁπασῶν,...ὑγρὸν γὰρ καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὕλη τῶν συνθέτων σωμάτων ἐστίν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ταύταις ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οἷον βάρος καὶ κουφότης καὶ πυκνότης καὶ μανότης καὶ τραχύτης καὶ λειότης καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῶν σωμάτων.*

I.e. the primary *σύνθεσις* or *σύστασις*, or the substrate of composite organised bodies, is to be found in the four elements or rather in their prime *δυνάμεις*,—functions, characteristics, qualities—namely Heat and Cold, Moisture and Dryness.

Presently, in chap. 2, Aristotle proceeds to investigate the function of Blood, and this, he says, necessitates a previous enquiry *περὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ—πολλῶν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀνάγεται πρὸς ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ πολλοὶ διαμφισβητοῦσι, ποῖα θερμὰ καὶ ποῖα ψυχρὰ τῶν ζώων ἢ τῶν μορίων.* The function and distribution of Heat and Cold in the animal economy was much disputed by the physiologists: some saying that absence of blood implied greater natural heat, by way of compensation, and Parmenides maintaining, contrariwise, that women possess more heat than men. Clearly then the terms Heat and Cold are ambiguous (*πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα*): *διὸ δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς δεῖ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων τὰ μὲν θερμὰ λέγειν τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ καὶ τὰ μὲν ξηρὰ τὰ δ' ὑγρά, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γ' αἴτια ταῦτα σχεδὸν καὶ θανάτου καὶ ζωῆς ἔοικεν εἶναι φανερόν, ἔτι δ' ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως καὶ ἀκμῆς καὶ γήρως καὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας * * * ἀρχαὶ τῶν φυσικῶν στοιχείων αὐταί εἰσι, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν* (648ᵇ 2 ff.).

Heat and cold, moisture and dryness, as 'principles of the physical elements,' are conditions necessarily inherent in the animal organism, upon the proportionate and harmonious ordering of which the animal's health and well-being depend. For growth is impossible without food, *ἡ δὲ τροφὴ πᾶσιν ἐξ ὑγροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ*: and again for the using up and digesting of this solid and liquid food the power of Heat is required, so that for growth and maintenance, if for no other cause, all *ζῶα* and *φυτά* must possess a 'natural principle of Heat' (*ἀρχὴν θερμοῦ φυσικήν*).

And so throughout this treatise *de partibus*, whose object is to explain the Causes of the position and character of the various portions of the animal form, we notice what great prominence is given to these notions of Heat and Cold, Moisture and Dryness, as the *δυνάμεις* or primary conditions which determine the constitution of the various phases of animal life: this is especially to be observed in the treatment of *αἷμα, μυελός, γονή.* (Cp. *de Gen. et Corr.* 2. 7.)

The same elemental qualities play a large part in the physiology of the latter portion of the *Timaeus.* Especially may we here cite, for comparison with the Aristotelian view, the very similar account of the various *συστάσεις* in *Tim.* c. 39, where the nature of disease is thus explained:

Tim. 81 E ff. τὸ δὲ τῶν νόσων ὅθεν ξυνίσταται, δῆλόν που καὶ παντί. τεττάρων γὰρ οὔτων γενῶν, ἐξ ὧν συμπέπηγε τὸ σῶμα, γῆς πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος, τούτων ἡ παρὰ φύσιν πλεονεξία καὶ ἔνδεια καὶ τῆς χώρας μετάστασις ἐξ οἰκείας ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίαν γιγνομένη, πυρός τε αὖ καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐπειδὴ γένη πλείονα ἑνὸς ὄντα τυγχάνει, τὸ μὴ προσῆκον ἕκαστον ἑαυτῷ προσλαμβάνειν καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα τοιαῦτα στάσεις καὶ νόσους παρέχει. παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἑκάστου γιγνομένου καὶ μεθισταμένου θερμαίνεται μὲν ὅσα ἂν πρότερον ψύχηται, ξηρὰ δὲ ὄντα εἰς ὕστερον γίγνεται νοτερά, καὶ κοῦφα δὴ καὶ βαρέα, καὶ πάσας πάντῃ μεταβολὰς δέχεται.

μόνως γὰρ δή, φαμέν, ταὐτὸν ταὐτῷ κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀνὰ λόγον προσγιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπογιγνόμενον ἐάσει ταὐτὸν ὂν αὑτῷ σῶν καὶ ὑγιὲς μένειν. (With which cp. also Hippocr. *de nat. hom.* vol. I. pp. 350 ff.)

Here too the bodily condition is made to depend on the arrangement and proportion of the qualities of Heat and Cold, Moisture and Dryness, and these again have for base the elementary triangles of which the four elements are composed: when this proportion is correct and when it varies κατὰ φύσιν or ἀνὰ λόγον, then the resultant condition is Health, otherwise it is Disease. All Disease then involves, as the *Philebus* also implies, the Too Hot and Too Cold and the Too Moist and Too Dry.

One more example may be adduced of this aspect of θερμότης as a mark of Health or of Disease. In *Theaet.* 178 C ff., where the Protagorean theory regarding sensible qualities is under discussion, Socrates asks whether we are to suppose that man possesses in himself the 'Criterion' of judging the sensation which *is to be*, so that it comes to be what he opines it will be—οἷον θερμά· ἆρ' ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ἰδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἕτερος, ἰατρὸς δέ, ἀντοιηθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ οὐ θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γίγνεται, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα; Here θερμότης, in excess, is the diseased condition which exhibits itself as fever, and so is an object for medical science,—which must include both the complementary studies of physiology (which deals with ἕξεις κατὰ φύσιν) and pathology (dealing with ἕξεις παρὰ φύσιν).

Hence we see that the θερμότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον of *Phil.* 24 A—D, 25 C, as well as the ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον of 25 C, especially connote diseased condition of the animal nature, and so are involved in the νόσοι mentioned in 25 E, which by the introduction of the proper πέρας ἔχοντα pass from the sphere of τὸ ἄπειρον to that of τὸ μικτόν or τὸ πεπερασμένον.

The other example of Sound, dissonant and consonant, may be illustrated by *Tim.* 80 A ff.: καὶ ὅσοι φθόγγοι ταχεῖς τε καὶ βραδεῖς, ὀξεῖς τε καὶ βαρεῖς φαίνονται, τοτὲ μὲν ἀνάρμοστοι φερόμενοι δι' ἀνομοιότητα τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν ὑπ' αὐτῶν κινήσεως, τοτὲ δὲ ξύμφωνοι δι' ὁμοιότητα.

We must, however, hold fast to the view that the *Unlimited* of the *Philebus* is the abstract general principle which in combination with Unity combines to form Being. The fact that the examples given—such as Health and Disease (25 E, 31 C), Melody and Rhythm (26 A),

Temperature and Season (26 A), Beauty and Strength of Body and Soul (26 B), Pleasure and Pain (27 E, 31 A), etc.—are all cases not of substances but of properties or relations (ποιότης), is due to the point of view of the dialogue, which is dealing with ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις (with ἡδονή, ἐπιστήμη, μικτὸς βίος), rather than with their concrete subjects. And in this lies the difference between the material principle of the *Timaeus* and that of the *Philebus*—for the former is pure *space*, conceived merely as the *quantitatively* indeterminate: whereas in the *Philebus* τὸ ἄπειρον combines the quantitative[1] with the qualitative aspect.

Further, as in the *Timaeus* qualitative differences in sense-objects are referred to quantitative distinctions as their ultimate ground, by the reduction of corporeality, or secondary matter, to space as the prime substrate, and of the qualitatively distinct elements (earth, air, fire, water), to quantitatively distinct geometric forms (cube, tetrahedron, etc.),—so in the *Philebus* this possibility of reducing quality to quantity as the more absolute notion appears to be assumed[2].

And this may be urged as an argument in favour of assigning the *Philebus* to a later date than the *Timaeus*. The *prima facie* difference between the account of the material substrate in the two dialogues does not imply that when the *Philebus* was written Plato had not attained to the ultimate determination of matter as given in the *Timaeus*[3]; on the contrary, this ultimate determination is throughout implied in the *Philebus*, though the immediate purpose of the dialogue necessitates such a mode of discussion that this is only perceived incidentally[4].

[1] For τὸ ἄπειρον in quantitative or *ex*tensive aspect cp. 16 C, where ἕν = πέρας and πολλά = ἀπειρία (as rightly remarked by Bäumker, p. 195, and Hirzel). So 15 B ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ἀπείροις: 17 B ἄπειρον πλήθει: 17 E ἄπειρον πλῆθος. And thus τὸ ἄπειρον corresponds also to the Platonic ἀόριστος δυάς, of which Aristotle tells us: in fact under itself as genus it unites, as species, arithmetical plurality or series, geometric space or continuance (χώρα of *Timaeus* 52 D), qualitative indetermination, κίνησις as such, besides the logical aspect which it bears in 15—16.

Cp. Bäumker, p. 196: "Somit ist es eine Reduction auf höhern und allgemeinen Principien, wenn Plato den Gegensatz von Materie (unbegrenzter Ausdehnung) und Form unter den Gegensatz des Unbegrenzten und der Grenze subsumiert." Cp. Ar. *Met.* B. 3. 998ᵇ 9: *Phil.* 25 A εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἕν κτλ.: 25 C τῆς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν εἰς ἓν φύσεως. See also Poste, *Philebus*, *Append.* B, and Ar. *Eth. Nic.* X. 2, there cited.

[2] Bäumker observes (p. 195): "Jetzt ist die quantitative Unbestimmtheit das Erste und Ursprüngliche, die Materie zunächst ein quantitativ und erst infolge dessen auch ein qualitativ Unbestimmtes." So too Poste (*Append.* B, p. 160): "The *Philebus* does not carry the analysis so far (as the *Timaeus*). It regards quality as the ultimate matter," etc. But see also Schneider, *Das Materiale Princip*, and Kilb, *Platons Lehre von der Materie*, pp. 39 ff.

[3] Consequently I think that Dr Jackson (*J. of Phil.* XV. 300) and Mr Archer-Hind (in his ed. of the *Timaeus*, *Introd.* p. 24) are wrong in arguing that the *Timaeus* is the later.

[4] We may distinguish in Plato a three-fold application of ἄπειρον, to Dialectic, Physics and Ethics, see Stölzle, *Die Lehre vom Unendlichen bei Aristoteles*, pp. 10 ff. For ἄπειρον as the 'Great and Small,' see Ar. *Met.* A. 6, N. 1 ff., *Phys.* I. 4, 6, 9, III. 4, IV. 2 etc.: and on its relations to the theory of the 'Indefinite Dyad' and of Ideal Numbers, see Trendel., *Plat. de ideis et numeris*, and Susemihl, *Genet. Entw.* III. pp. 509 ff. also the citations in Poste, *l.c.*

2. τὸ πέρας.

In connection with the notion of τὸ ἄπειρον we must examine that of its opposite, τὸ πέρας.

It will be sufficient here to collate the evidence of Aristotle regarding this notion, without attempting a more precise account of its place in the Ontology of the *Philebus*.

In *Met.* Δ. (περὶ τῶν ποσαχῶς λεγομένων), chapter 17 is devoted to an account of the various senses of πέρας, as follows (1022ᵃ 4 ff.):—πέρας λέγεται τὸ ἔσχατον ἑκάστου καὶ οὗ ἔξω μηδὲν ἔστι λαβεῖν πρώτου, καὶ οὗ ἔσω πάντα πρώτου, καὶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ εἶδος μεγέθους ἢ ἔχοντος μέγεθος, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἑκάστου· τοιοῦτον δ' ἐφ' ὃ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὐκ ἀφ' οὗ, ὅτε δὲ ἄμφω καὶ ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἐφ' ὅ. καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἑκάστου, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ· τῆς γνώσεως γὰρ τοῦτο πέρας· εἰ δὲ τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ τοῦ πράγματος. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ὁσαχῶς τε ἡ ἀρχὴ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς καὶ τὸ πέρας, καὶ ἔτι πλεοναχῶς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ πέρας τι, τὸ δὲ πέρας οὐ πᾶν ἀρχή.

The senses of ἀρχή are enumerated in Δ. 1, summed shortly thus (1013ᵃ 16 ff.):—ἰσαχῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ αἴτια λέγεται· πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια ἀρχαί. πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι ὅθεν ἢ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γιγνώσκεται· τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσαί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ἐκτός. διὸ ἥ τε φύσις ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον καὶ ἡ διάνοια καὶ προαίρεσις καὶ οὐσία καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ τοῦ γνῶναι καὶ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν. From which it appears that it is hardly correct to say that πέρας is as wide in variety of meaning as ἀρχή, if not wider (see Bonitz, Comm. *ad loc.*, p. 264).

Thus we learn from Aristotle that πέρας may mean

(1) the *limits* or bounds of an extended magnitude—geometrical *form* or figure—ὁποῖόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἡ ἐπιφάνεια (Alex. Aphr. *ad loc.*):

(2) the *final* cause of an action—ἐφ' ὃ ἡ κίνησις καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα:

(3) the *source* or starting-point of action, as well as the end aimed at—what is last in deliberation being first in action:

(4) the *essential notion*, or substance, as the end of knowledge concerning an object—τῆς γνώσεως πέρας. Cp. *Met.* A. 3. 983ᵃ 31 τετάρτην δὲ...αἰτίαν (φαμὲν εἶναι)...τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τἀγαθόν (τέλος γὰρ γενέσεως καὶ κινήσεως πάσης τοῦτ' ἐστίν) with B. 4. 999ᵇ 9 ἔτι δὲ γενέσεως οὔσης καὶ κινήσεως ἀνάγκη καὶ πέρας εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄπειρός ἐστιν οὐδεμία κίνησις ἀλλὰ πάσης ἐστὶ τέλος κτλ.

Thus, in brief, the Limit may be regarded from the point of view of Extension, of Becoming, or of Knowing, as applied to things mathematical, natural, ethical, or logical.

For comparison, we may sum up shortly what is said respecting it in the *Philebus*[1].

In 23 C τὸ πέρας as one class τῶν ὄντων is opposed to τὸ ἄπειρον.

In 24 A πέρας, τέλος, τελευτή are said to be incompatible with τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον and unable to reside in the same γένη with them.

[1] See also *Introd.* ch. iv., and *Append.* A.

In 24 C ff. τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον, in temperature and in actions, are similarly said to be exclusive of τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ μέτριον.

In 25 A, B the function of πέρας as *genus* is thus summed up: οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ᾖ μέτρον ᾖ πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα ξύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο. ἢ πῶς σὺ φῇς. This means that under the *generic* notion of πέρας are to be comprised all determinate arithmetical and geometrical *relations* or ratios—the equal, the double, the triple, etc., or, in other words, the ratios 1 : 1; 2 : 1; 3 : 1, etc.[1]. So that the Limit is made up of mathematical correlates (πρὸς ἄλληλα), which are in all cases *fixed* and exactly determined, as opposed to the genus τὸ ἄπειρον, which has for the characteristic, or law, of its members the *indeterminate* and variable (τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον). And these particular manifestations of πέρας are what is meant by ἡ τοῦ πέρατος γέννα (25 D) and τὰ πέρας ἔχοντα (26 A).

For the general significance of 'the Equal, the Double,' etc., and their 'brood,' we may refer to Nicom. *Intr. Arith.* I. 17 τοῦ πρός τι τοίνυν ποσοῦ δύο αἱ ἀνωτάτω γενικαὶ διαιρέσεις εἰσίν, ἰσότης καὶ ἀνισότης...τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴσον θεωρεῖται, ὅταν τῶν συγκρινομένων τὸ ἕτερον μήτε ὑπερέχῃ μήτε ἐλλείπῃ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λοιποῦ παραβολήν, οἷον ἑκατὸν πρὸς ἑκατὸν...ἢ μνᾶ πρὸς μνᾶν ἢ τάλαντον πρὸς τάλαντον ἢ πῆχυς πρὸς πῆχυν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια εἴτε ἐν ὄγκῳ εἴτε ἐν μήκει εἴτε ἐν βάρει εἴτε ἐν ποσότητι ᾗτινιοῦν...τὸ δ' ἄνισον καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' ὑποδιαίρεσιν διχῇ σχίζεται καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν μεῖζον, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον, ἀντωνυμούμενά τε καὶ ἀντίθετα ἀλλήλοις κατὰ ποσότητα καὶ σχέσιν αὐτῶν...τοῦ μὲν οὖν μείζονος καθ' ὑποδιαίρεσιν δευτέραν εἰς πέντε εἴδη διαιρουμένου τὸ μέν ἐστι πολλαπλάσιον, τὸ δὲ ἐπιμόριον, τὸ δὲ ἐπιμερές, τὸ δὲ πολλαπλασιεπιμόριον, τὸ δὲ πολλαπλασιεπιμερές. καὶ τοῦ ἀντιθέτου δὲ τούτῳ, τουτέστι τοῦ ἐλάττονος, πέντη εἴδη ὁμοίως...ὑποπολλαπλάσιον, ὑποεπιμόριον κτλ.

ib. 18 τὸ γὰρ διπλάσιον ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ β διὰ πάντων ἀρτίων πρόεισιν.

ib. 14 ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ πλείονι αἵ τε ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ πλεονεξίαι καὶ ὑπερεκπτώσεις καὶ περισσότητες γίνονται, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐλάττονι αἱ ἔνδειαι καὶ ἐλλείψεις καὶ στερήσεις καὶ ὀλιγοεξίαι, ἐν δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ τοῦ πλέον καὶ τοῦ ἔλαττον, ὅ ἐστιν ἴσῳ, ἀρεταί τε καὶ ὑγιεῖαι καὶ μετριότητες καὶ εὐπρέπειαι καὶ κάλλη καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ὧν γενικώτατον τὸ λεχθὲν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ εἶδος τὸ τέλειον (= αἰεὶ ἴσον τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσιν ὑπάρχον, 16). With which cp. *Phileb.* 25 E, 26 A—C.

There is also an important passage in the *Laws* (757 B) which must be cited in illustration of this notion of Equality: τὴν δὲ ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα, οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον παντὶ ἰδεῖν. Διὸς γὰρ δὴ κρίσις ἐστί, καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀεὶ σμικρὰ μὲν ἐπαρκεῖ, πᾶν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἐπαρκέσῃ πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώταις πάντ' ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται· τῷ μὲν γὰρ μειζόνι πλείω, τῷ δὲ ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν

[1] For *ratios* as formal cause, cp. Ar. *Met.* A. 9. 991[b] 13 εἰ δ' ὅτι λόγοι ἀριθμῶν τἀνταῦθα, οἷον ἡ συμφωνία...φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ λόγοι τινὲς ἔσονται ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον κτλ.

αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζοσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζους, τοῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἑκατέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον. Here equality appears as the 'judgment of Zeus,' that is as *equity* or just proportion in the distribution of rewards or punishments to virtue or vice; and as a political principle, according to the proverb, ἰσότης φιλότητα ἀπεργάζεται (contrast *Eth. Nic.* 1158[b] 29 ff. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν κτλ.). The mathematical notion finds here, as in the *Philebus*, its application in the sphere of politics, ethics, physics. This is already implied in *Gorg.* 508 A, B λέληθέ σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται. σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. And the ethical application is drawn out at length in Ar. *Eth. Nic.* E. 6 (ἀνάγκη τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι κτλ.).

So that Equality in this aspect appears as the Divine Law whose application is universal and which has for keynote *suum cuique.*

APPENDIX E.

Ἡ Μετρητική.

We are dealing with a kindred topic to that last examined when we pass on from the notion of *Limit* to illustrate the Platonic view of *Measure.* For Plato's earlier view the *Republic* (VI. and VII.) is the most important dialogue. The high value which he there sets on Mathematical science is quite clear. On the one hand, the faculty by which we apprehend mathematical objects (διάνοια) is scarcely distinguishable from that which deals with the Ideas (νοῦς); and on the other, these objects themselves are spoken of as eternal and constant[1]. Yet at the same time Dialectic, or the Ideal science, is distinctly separated from Mathematical sciences, which serve merely as a προπαιδεία, or preparatory training for the philosopher. For one thing, the distinction lies in this, that while Mathematics is based on sensible objects—things spatially extended—Dialectic treats wholly of νοητά as such; though it remains obscure whether the intelligibles of the dialectician are otherwise derived than those of the mathematician, for Plato in the *Republic* is not clear in his treatment of the *origin* of notions. Another point which may perhaps be said to differentiate Mathematics from Dialectics, in the *Republic*, is that the latter appears rather confined to *moral* Ideas—the dialectician being specially the ethical and political scientist. But on one point at least the *Republic* is clear: the way to attain true knowledge of the sensible world is by Mathematical Science; to *know* objects in space, to get at their *Ideas*, we must *measure* them and weigh them[2].

[1] Cp. *Rep.* VII. 525 C ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσει αὐτῇ. *ib.* 526 B τὸ μάθημα...φαίνεταί γε προσαναγκάζον αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει χρῆσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. *ib.* 527 B τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γνῶσίς ἐστιν.

[2] *Rep.* X. 602 D ff. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν, καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἱστάναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ

A similar position of value in correcting the falsity and inconsistency of sense-impressions is assigned to ἡ μετρητική in the *Protagoras*. The 'Metretic Art' is preservative of human life as dispelling the illusions of the senses and so enabling us to guide our conduct with rectitude and safety:—ἡ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχήν, μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν βίον; (*Prot.* 356 D ff.). If man is not to be at the mercy of the perplexing variations of shifting sense, he must call in to his aid Mensuration, he must use his 'logistic' or computative faculty: for the object of this faculty is fixed, definite and true, and only by its exercise can he exalt his perceptions (as Brandis puts it) "über den Wandel subjectiver Affektionen." In short, external objects become defined, are rendered objects of knowledge, only by means of mathematical science: only in virtue of its determinations can any such object be designated σαφές, ἀκριβές, βέβαιον, ἀληθές[1].

Thus far had Plato gone in his view of the value of Mathematical science in his earlier dialogues. When we come to the later group, we find his esteem for that science greatly increased, and his view as to its application largely extended. The centre point of his later doctrine lies in the conception of τὸ μέτρον—an important one for the philosophy of the *Philebus*.

The notion of the '*Measure*' is first expressly set forth in the *Politicus* (283 C—295 C), in a passage noticeably devoted to the promulgation of this new doctrine, and forming a digression from the main line of argument. First, the science of 'Metretic' is divided into two parts, according as it deals with the relations of spatial magnitudes—the intercommunion of Greatness and Smallness—or with 'the necessary being of Becoming[2].' Next, it is stated, that what exceeds or falls short of the 'nature of the measured,' whether in words or in works, is not deprived thereby of reality or actuality, but remains ὄντως γιγνόμενον[3]. Further, without this science of Measurement no art were possible; for all arts acknowledge the reality of excess and defect—as a fact, and a stubborn fact—and turn out their best products only by observing the True Measure[4]. Consequently, we must hold to the notion of the Great and Small or More and Less as a necessary postulate, without which artistic perfection—the Good and Beautiful—would remain as inexplicable,

πλέον ἢ βαρύτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογισάμενον καὶ μετρῆσαν ἢ καὶ στῆσαν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ ἔργον. Τούτου γὰρ οὖν. Τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις, μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι, μείζω ἄττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἑτέρων ἢ ἴσα, τἀναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταὐτά. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι; Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ' ἔφαμεν. Τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν.

[1] Cf. *Phaedo* 65 B.

[2] *Polit.* 283 D διέλωμεν (τὴν μετρητικὴν) δύο μέρη...τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος κοινωνίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκαίαν οὐσίαν.

[3] *Polit.* 283 E τὸ τὴν τοῦ μετρίου φύσιν ὑπερβάλλον καὶ ὑπερβαλλόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἐν λόγοις εἴτε καὶ ἐν ἔργοις ἆρ' οὐκ αὖ λέξομεν ὡς ὄντως γιγνόμενον.

[4] *ib.* 284 A ἅπασαι γὰρ αἱ τοιαῦταί που τὸ τοῦ μετρίου πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον οὐχ ὡς οὐκ ὂν ἀλλ' ὡς ὂν χαλεπὸν περὶ τὰς πράξεις παραφυλάττουσι, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τὸ μέτρον σώζουσαι πάντ' ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀπεργάζονται.

as the logical Good, i.e. the True, would be if we refused to allow real Being to *μὴ-ὄν*. As in the *Sophist* the possibility of Falsehood, and therefore also of Truth, was found to depend on the relative Being of Not-being, so in the *Politicus* we find that we must attribute to the Excessive and Defective, the More and Less, *τὸ ἄμετρον*, a similar reality, or being, in relation to Due Measure[1].

This theory of the *Mean* in the *Politicus* is closely related to the doctrine of the *Philebus* (55 D ff.), and we also find intimations of it in the *Laws*[2].

A summary has already been given (see *Append.* B, p. 175) of the senses in which Plato uses the term *μέτρον*. Its primary meaning is that of 'a measure' or 'rule,' i.e. a standard, canon or criterion by which to measure things or determine their quantity or amount whether in space or in time—extensively or intensively. Thus in *Rep.* 603 A the part of the soul which opines *παρὰ τὰ μέτρα* is opposed to that which opines *κατὰ τὰ μέτρα*, and it is stated that the part which trusts 'to measure and calculation' is the best part of the soul—*ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ μέτρῳ γε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεῦον βέλτιστον ἂν εἴη τῆς ψυχῆς*. And in *Laws* 947 A, B it is ordained that the name of the chief priest shall be posted up annually to serve as a measure of time—*τοὔνομα ἀναγράφειν τούτου κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται μέτρον ἀριθμοῦ τοῦ χρόνου, ἕως ἂν ἡ πόλις οἰκῆται.* Similarly in *Tim.* 39 B the Demiurgus is said to have kindled the sun as a light in the heavens "that there might be some clear measure (*μέτρον ἐναργές τι*) of the relative swiftness and slowness with which the planets moved in their eight revolutions"—the sun serving as the standard of time[3]. Again, in *Laws* 716 C we have the remarkable expression—*ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα*, which is clearly meant as a counter-statement to the famous phrase of Protagoras and the relativists—*πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν* (see *Theaet.* 152 A ff.).

In the above passages *μέτρον* has appeared rather as something external; an outside standard which acted, we might say, as the 'formal cause' of things numerable and measurable. But besides this 'transcendent' sense, 'Measure' may also be regarded as an inherent quality in things which are said *μέτρον ἔχειν, σώζειν, τυγχάνειν*[4]. And in this sense it may appear either (*a*) simply as 'Measure,' without more precise definition, or (*b*) as the right, *just* measure, a fixed and

[1] *ib.* 284 B, C *Πότερον οὖν, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ προσηναγκάσαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ...οὕτω καὶ νῦν τὸ πλέον αὖ καὶ ἔλαττον μετρητὰ προσαναγκαστέον γίγνεσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν;*

[2] *Laws* 788 E, 806 D, 809 D, 810 A, 823 C.

[3] For *μέτρον χρόνου* cp. *Polit.* 269 C *ὅταν αἱ περίοδοι τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτῷ μέτρον εἰλήφωσιν ἤδη χρόνου*—where the sense is that of a 'determined sum of years,' and so differs somewhat from that in *Tim.*

[4] Cp. (*αἱ τέχναι*) *τὸ μέτρον σώζουσαι πάντα ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀπεργάζονται.* *Laws* 757 A *τοῖς γὰρ ἀνίσοις τὰ ἴσα ἄνισα γίγνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου:* *ib.* 846 C, 918 D, 957 A, 959 A, 836 A, 692 A, 848 C *μέτροις τε καὶ ἀριθμῷ διανέμεσθαι.* The frequency of these mathematical terms in the *Laws* should be observed as an important link of connection with the *Philebus*.

known *quantum*. And a third distinction in the use of the term may be observed when μέτρον denotes the concrete embodiment of 'measure,' or identity of the thing measured, as self-measured, with the instrument or standard, whether or not further defined as the *just* measure[1].

The function of τὸ μέτρον may be further illustrated by an interesting discussion of it in the 10th book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*[2]. It is there explained that one of the essential meanings of Unity is to be the primary standard of measurement. τὸ ἕν and τὸ μέτρον are both indivisible, logically and in concept, at least, if not spatially. And the function of μέτρον is to enable us to *know* quantity. We start in knowledge with the *unit*, and by it we measure and quantify all else. In the simplest and most abstract and general case, the object of knowledge is merely number—form without content, the base of which is the numerical *One*. Consequently this *One* is the ultimate *principle* and the ultimate *standard*, μέτρον καὶ ἀρχή. And this arithmetical μέτρον is the *monad*. But while number is thus the *summum genus* of the cognisable, its principles are equally applicable to all branches of Science, and to all objects which admit of exact determination. It is true that the science of arithmetic is the most exact (τὸ ἀκριβέστατον, cp. *Phileb.* 56 A ff.), being the most abstract: yet other sciences, such as geometry and physics, which deal with spatial dimensions, can borrow its principles (μιμοῦνται τὸ τοιοῦτον), and assume an axiomatic unit as μέτρον. Whatever the hypothetical unit of measurement, to postulate some such μέτρον is necessary for every science: we cannot build without a foundation, and that foundation or ἀρχή is τὸ ἕν and τὸ μέτρον. It is the indispensable *means* of cognition—καὶ τότ' οἴονται εἰδέναι τὸ ποσόν, ὅταν εἰδῶσι διὰ τούτου τοῦ μέτρου (1053ᵃ 7). In practical application it is immaterial whether the μέτρον is a numerical unit or not (οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἓν τὸ μέτρον, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε πλείω, οἷον αἱ διέσεις δύο κτλ., 1053ᵃ 15); its logical unity it always retains.

It has been seen that this Unit of measurement is to be primarily found as the principle of arithmetical science, whence it pervades the methods of all the sciences which deal with objects of spatial extension, and with things that can be weighed or measured. But its application does not end here: besides sensible form there is logical form, and besides the section and division of the mathematician or physicist there

[1] *Rep.* X. 621 A μέτρον μὲν οὖν τι τοῦ ὕδατος πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πιεῖν κτλ. *Laws* 843 E ἐὰν μὴ ἀπολείπῃ τὸ μέτρον τῶν τοῦ γείτονος χωρίων—i.e. prescribed space. *ib.* 744 E μέτρον θέμενος διπλάσιον κτλ.—prescribed quantity of goods. *Tim.* 68 B ὅσον μέτρον ὅσοις—of the proportions of ingredients in colours.

[2] Ar. *Met.* I. 1. 1052ᵇ 15 ff. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι...μάλιστα δὲ τὸ μέτρῳ εἶναι πρώτῳ ἑκάστου γένους καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ....μέτρον γάρ ἐστιν ᾧ τὸ ποσὸν γιγνώσκεται· γιγνώσκεται δ' ἢ ἑνὶ ἢ ἀριθμῷ τὸ ποσὸν ᾗ ποσόν, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ἅπας ἑνί... ᾧ πρώτῳ ποσὰ γιγνώσκεται, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἕν· διὸ τὸ ἓν ἀριθμοῦ ἀρχὴ ᾗ ἀριθμός. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις λέγεται μέτρον τε ᾧ ἕκαστον πρώτῳ γιγνώσκεται, καὶ τὸ μέτρον ἑκάστου ἓν ἐν μήκει, ἐν πλάτει, ἐν βάθει, ἐν βάρει, ἐν τάχει...ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τούτοις μέτρον καὶ ἀρχὴ ἕν τι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς γραμμαῖς χρῶνται ὡς ἀτόμῳ τῇ ποδιαίᾳ. πανταχοῦ γὰρ τὸ μέτρον ἕν τι ζητοῦσι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἢ τῷ ποιῷ ἢ τῷ ποσῷ. ὅπου μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μὴ εἶναι ἀφελεῖν ἢ προσθεῖναι, τοῦτο ἀκριβὲς τὸ μέτρον. διὸ τὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀκριβέστατον. τὴν γὰρ μονάδα τιθέασι πάντῃ ἀδιαίρετον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μιμοῦνται τὸ τοιοῦτον κτλ.

is the division and analysis of the logician and dialectician. *οὕτω δὴ πάντων μέτρον τὸ ἕν, ὅτι γνωρίζομεν ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία διαιροῦντες ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος* (1053ᵃ 18 ff.).

With this passage we must further compare an important reference to *μέτρον* in the last book of the *Metaphysics*[1].

Aristotle is there arguing against the view of the Academics that their opposite principles are *οὐσίαι*. *τὸ ἕν*, which is antithetic to *θάτερον* or to *τὸ πλῆθος*, is not a real substance, he asserts. As it is *μέτρον*, it must be *ποιόν τι* or *ποσόν τι*, and so it belongs to a subordinate category. Properly *Unity* belongs to the category of quantity as an arithmetical notion; the *One* being the *measure* of plurality, and *number* being a *measured* plurality or a plurality of definitely determined units. The unit of measurement must in every case be of like kind (*συγγενές*) to the plurality or quantum which is to be measured, so that the *μέτρον* or *ἕν* will vary in nature according to circumstances. If we are dealing with men, our measuring-unit will be the individual man; if with horses, the single horse; and so on.

This passage should be compared with the account of *ἡ ἀριθμητική* given in *Philebus* 56 D, E. There, as we have already seen, the difference between the arithmetic of the unlearned differs from that of scientific enquirers in the following way: *οἱ μὲν γάρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμόν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάντων μέγιστα· οἱ δ' οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει.* That is to say, the unit of the scientist is something *ἀδιάφορον* and *ἀδιαίρετον*, a constant and self-identical monad. It is *τὸ μέτρον* for his science, whatever that science may be, and it is aimed at by abstraction from all varying qualities; and the *ἀκρίβεια* of the science depends just on this feature, that it uses a *μέτρον* which is abstract, and consequently *καθαρόν, βέβαιον, σαφές*. And so the ultimate form of all such *μέτρα*, the ideal unit of measurement, is the numerical monad. It is the perfect *type* of a fundamental and primary scientific notion.

And thus we get at the point of view which enables us to see how *ἡ μετρητική* was for Plato the ultimate, most generic, paradigm of the sciences; how its dual principles *τὸ ἕν* and *τὸ πλῆθος* stood to him for the ultimate opposites, so that from them are derived the dual principles which pervade all secondary and more concrete branches of philosophy;

[1] Ar. *Met.* N. 1. 1087ᵇ 33 ff. *τὸ δ' ἓν ὅτι μέτρον σημαίνει, φανερόν. καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐστί τι ἕτερον ὑποκείμενον, οἷον ἐν ἁρμονίᾳ δίεσις...καὶ κατὰ πάντων δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ποιοῖς ποιόν τι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ποσοῖς ποσόν τι (καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τὸ μέτρον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν) ὡς οὐκ ὄντος τινὸς τοῦ ἑνὸς καθ' αὑτὸ οὐσίας ...σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ ἓν ὅτι μέτρον πλήθους τινός, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅτι πλῆθος μεμετρημένον καὶ πλῆθος μέτρων. διὸ καὶ εὐλόγως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἓν ἀριθμός· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ μέτρον μέτρα, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ ἕν. δεῖ δ' αἰεὶ τὸ αὐτό τι ὑπάρχειν πᾶσι τὸ μέτρον, οἷον εἰ ἵππος τὸ μέτρον ἵππους, καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπους. εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος καὶ θεός, ζῷον ἴσως, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς αὐτῶν ἔσται ζῷα.*

Cp. I. 1. 1053ᵃ 24 ff. *αἰεὶ δὲ συγγενὲς τὸ μέτρον· μεγεθῶν μὲν γὰρ μέγεθος, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον μήκους μῆκος...μονάδων μονάς. οὕτω γὰρ δεῖ λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι ἀριθμῶν ἀριθμός...ὥσπερ εἰ μονάδων μονάδας ἀξιώσειε μέτρον ἀλλὰ μὴ μονάδα· ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς πλῆθος μονάδων.*

and how the form and method of mathematics came to be regarded as the fundamental form and method of all correct thinking, of all exact knowledge. ὁ θεὸς γεωμετρεῖ, and the philosopher, with whatever particular branch of thought concerned, must likewise geometrize.

It will thus be seen that the *Philebus* aims at establishing a mathematico-scientific method which will apply to all branches of knowledge—to ethics and aesthetics amongst others. *Qua* sciences their objects must be mathematically determinable.

And in this connection attention may be called to yet another passage in the *Metaphysics*, where the claim of mathematicians that their objects are the Good and the Beautiful is vindicated.

The geometer, Aristotle says, in dealing with objects makes abstraction of all qualities except that of space-dimension, which forms his proper object. He deals, for example, with a man, not *qua* man, but *qua* solid. And the objects of his science are ὄντα. If we distinguish the Beautiful, as that which belongs both to motionless objects and to matters of practice, from the Good which belongs only to the latter, then it will be false to assert that the mathematical sciences are concerned with neither of these two subjects[1]. For though these sciences do not particularly, expressly, and directly deal with the Beautiful or Good as such, yet at least in their method and results they exhibit the Beautiful. For the main forms or divisions of the Beautiful are order, symmetry, and determination or the definite; and it is these especially that mathematics exhibits and demonstrates. If, then, these qualities are causative of what is Beautiful and Good, the dignity of mathematical science is sufficiently assured.

The blasphemers against mathematics here alluded to were most probably the Cyrenaics[2]; and it is also against the Cyrenaic doctrine, in regard to ethics, that the *Philebus* is largely directed. This makes the deliverance of Aristotle doubly striking, constituting, as it does, a defence of the point of view of our dialogue. But it should be noted that Aristotle himself carefully insists on the need of distinguishing ethics from mathematics[3].

[1] Ar. *Met.* M. 3. 1078ᵃ 31 ff. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἕτερον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐν πράξει, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις), οἱ φάσκοντες οὐδὲν λέγειν τὰς μαθηματικὰς ἐπιστήμας περὶ καλοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ ψεύδονται. λέγουσι γὰρ καὶ δεικνύουσι μάλιστα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ὀνομάζουσι, τὰ δ' ἔργα καὶ τοὺς λόγους δεικνύουσιν, οὐ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν. τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἴδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον, ἃ μάλιστα δεικνύουσιν αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. καὶ ἐπεί γε πολλῶν αἴτια φαίνεται ταῦτα...δῆλον ὅτι λέγοιεν ἂν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν τὴν ὡς τὸ καλὸν αἴτιον τρόπον τινά. Cp. next note.

[2] *Met.* B. 2. 996ᵃ 32 ff. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα τῶν σοφιστῶν τινὲς οἷον Ἀρίστιππος προεπηλάκιζεν αὐτὰς [sc. τὰς μαθηματικὰς τέχνας]. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ ταῖς βαναύσοις, οἷον ἐν τεκτονικῇ καὶ σκυτικῇ, διότι βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον λέγεσθαι πάντα, τὰς δὲ μαθηματικὰς οὐδένα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

[3] *Met.* B. 2. 996ᵃ 21 ff., which is scarcely consistent with M. 1078ᵃ 31 ff. cited above.

APPENDIX F.

The term *truth* admits of a certain ambiguity of meaning which it is well to bear in mind. For it may be used either in an *objective* or in a *subjective* sense—that is, we may predicate truth either of an *external* object, as when we speak of 'a true friend,' 'a true mountain,' 'true blue,' and the like, or of the *inner* content of our own minds, true notions, true opinions, and so forth. In the first sense, accordingly, we can substitute for the word 'true' other words such as 'genuine,' 'sincere,' 'real.' And so too we find in Plato the term ἀληθής or ἀληθινός joined to the practically synonymous terms ἁπλοῦς, καθαρός, ὤν. Thus in *Rep.* II. 382 E he speaks of God as κομιδῇ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔν τε ἔργῳ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, and in the *Philebus* we have seen certain ἡδοναί described as at once καθαραί and ἀληθεῖς.

Now when a thing is judged to be true in this objective sense, it can only be so as an object of perception to an intelligence capable of forming such a judgment, an intelligence which can compare the appearance of the thing with its reality and pronounce them in agreement. In other words, an object is judged to be *true* when it corresponds to its *Idea*, its essence, its τί ἔστι; and in Plato's opinion the Ideas alone are entirely true, combining ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ τὸ ὄν. But together with this perfect truth, the Ideas as ὄντως ὄντα have *absolute* Being, and for that they are not dependent upon subjective cognition. And in this point we see the distinction which, in strictness, is to be drawn between τὸ ἀληθές and τὸ ὄν; for though both may be predicated alike of a true object, yet they differ in this, that, while τὸ ὄν states self-subsistent reality, τὸ ἀληθές suggests the relation of the real object to an intelligent subject, though this subject need not necessarily be conceived as a particular or individual mind.

Objective truth, or reality, may be negatively defined as the opposite of *phenomenality*: the real thing is set over against its mere appearance, reflection, image or shadow. So in *Rep.* X. 596 D Socrates says:—"You will soon see how you can make a new heaven and a new earth of your own, if you will only take a *mirror* and carry it about with you everywhere; before long you will make a sun and moon and stars and earth, you will make all kinds of animals, including your own self, besides vessels, and plants, and everything else." "Yes," is the reply, "in appearance, but not existent in truth, of course" (φαινόμενα, οὐ μέντοι ὄντα γέ που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ). With which we may compare a similar passage in the *Sophist*[1], where *true being* (τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὄντως ὄν) is contrasted with its

[1] *Soph.* 240 A, B τί δῆτα, ὦ ξένε, εἴδωλον ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι πλήν γε τὸ πρὸς τἀληθινὸν ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον; Ἕτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ἀληθινόν, ἢ ἐπὶ τίνι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶπες; Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' ἐοικὸς μέν. Ἆρα τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὄντως ὂν λέγων. Οὕτως. Τί δέ; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἆρ' ἐναντίον ἀληθοῦς; Τί μήν; Οὐκ ὄντως [οὐκ] ὂν ἄρα λέγεις τὸ ἐοικός, εἴπερ αὐτό γε μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἐρεῖς. Ἀλλ' ἔστι γε μήν πως. Οὔκουν ἀληθῶς γε, φῄς. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν· πλήν γ' εἰκὼν ὄντος. Οὐκ ὂν ἄρα οὐκ ὄντως ἐστὶν ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα; Cp. *Tim.* 52 C.

copy (τὸ πρὸς τἀληθινὸν ἀφωμοιωμένον). The original model, or Idea, is ὄντως ὄν, while the copy, as other than its model, and falling short of perfect truth, or true Being, is in so far μὴ ὄν, or non-ent. But this non-entity of the copy is not absolute non-entity: τὸ οὐκ ὂν ἔστι, the non-ent *is*: its non-being is only *relative*, as compared with the absolute Being of its Idea. Or, to change the terms, while the Idea is absolutely *true* to its own essential notion, since it *is* just that notion, the particular which corresponds to, or 'partakes of,' it is *not-true* (or false) just in so far as it differs from the Idea and fails to exactly represent that essential notion which is its truth. And it is to this, at first sight paradoxical, determination of the Being of Non-being that Plato owes his explanation of the possibility of falsehood in opinion or statement,—or, as we might phrase it, of the truth of non-truth. The problem of false opinion is treated at length in the *Theaetetus*, and more shortly also in the *Philebus* itself; but as it falls under the other (*sub*jective) side of ἀλήθεια, it does not call for further consideration here.

The passages above quoted sufficiently illustrate the closeness of the connection between ἀλήθεια, as objective, and οὐσία in Platonic terminology. But there is another passage in the *Republic* which deserves notice as especially illustrative of the *Philebus*.

In *Rep.* IX. 583 B ff. two kinds of pleasure are distinguished—that of the good and wise man, and that of the ignorant and vicious. Of these the first is *true* and pure, while the second, being merely absence from pain, is untrue and unreal, a mere *simulacrum* or fallacious appearance of the true emotion. For the false pleasure is that which is correlative to pain, and involved in a mixed state of alternating sensations. But the true pleasure is that which attaches to true Being through the increase of its being—it is the process which is πλήρωσις τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων. So that *pleasure* is judged to be more or less *true*, i.e. more or less real and genuine, according as the subject who feels it is more or less true (i.e. the function to which it accrues higher or lower, such as that of νοῦς or of θυμός), and according as the object which causes it is more or less true. Which practically amounts to saying that the truest pleasure is that attendant on pure intellectual functioning, and that other pleasures are the truer the more nearly they approach to this, or the less they involve of corporeal or nervous excitation and sensation. Another way of stating the same difference is to say that the true pleasure is the *pure* pleasure, that which is unmixed with its opposite, pain. Pleasure is *true* when it is what it pretends to be, and what it ought to be, as judged by the ideal standard or by the definition which the philosopher would frame of it (ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν, as Aristotle puts it). Just as the colour white is the more really and truly white, or that which it is, the less it contains admixture of black or blue or other colour—so pleasure is then most *truly* pleasure when it is least adulterated by contrary feelings. Hence τὸ ἀληθές is identical here, as describing intensive quality, with τὸ καθαρόν, τὸ εἰλικρινές, τὸ ἄμικτον, τὸ καθ' αὑτό[1].

[1] Cp. *Phil.* 53 A, 59 C: *Rep.* 583 B οὐδὲ παναληθής ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις. 584 A οὐκ ἔστιν

Objective *truth*, then, may be defined as purity and self-identity; and so, as we have seen in the *Philebus* (59 C), the object of pure cognition (τό τε βέβαιον καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ τὶ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὃ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές) is pure and eternally self-identical (περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα). Similarly in the *Phaedo*[1] it is shown that for *pure* intellectual apprehension of an object it is necessary that it should be viewed as it is *in itself*, cleared from all admixture of what is other than itself, and necessary also that the intellect which apprehends, no less than its object, should be pure, self-identical, and free from sense-disturbance. And a little further on (67 A, B) the same notion of the equivalence of truth with *purity* and self-identity is again repeated—γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές·[2] τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές· μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ. And this property of purity and self-identity belongs especially to Ideal essence, whence the well-known formula αὐτὸ ὅ ἔστιν (ἴσον κτλ.)—the Ideas being οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο ὅ ἔστι (*Phaedo* 75 D)[3].

In contrast to true Being, or the intelligible object, we have the sensible or apparent object, the *phenomenon*. Everything in its *particularity*, as an object of sense, and so in space and time, is so far not *pure* but mixed being (συγκεχυμένον τι), admitting of opposite predicates according to the manner in which it affects the sense. If we see a house at a distance it may appear small, while if seen close it is large; if we put a stick under water it looks crooked, though when taken out it is seen to be quite straight, and so on[4]. In other words, phenomena, or sensible objects, are as such purely relative—τὰ αἰσθητά are πρός τι.

But we must notice here that these φαινόμενα or αἰσθητά include not merely those which possess *ex*tension in space but also those which are *in*tensive—i.e. objects of the senses regarded in *qualitative* rather than quantitative aspect, such as hot and cold, hard and soft, white and black.

A thing, then, may be either phenomenal or noumenal, sensible or ideal, false or true. That is, with regard to a special object, the judgment of the percipient subject concerning it may be correct or incorrect,

ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδὺ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀλγεινὸν τότε ἡ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις. 584 C μὴ ἄρα πειθώμεθα καθαρὰν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὴν λύπης ἀπαλλαγήν. 585 D, E εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδύ ἐστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρειν ἂν ποιοῖ ἡδονῇ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἧττον ὄντων μεταλαμβάνον ἧττόν τε ἂν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως πληροῖτο καὶ ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἧττον ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι. 586 B ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡδοναῖς ξυνεῖναι μεμιγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλοις τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημέναις κτλ.

[1] *Phaedo* 65 E Ἆρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο (sc. τὸ διανοηθῆναι αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ) ποιήσειε καθαρώτατα, ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων κτλ.

[2] For εἰλικρινές, cp. Teichmüller, *Neue Stud.* I. pp. 108 ff.

[3] For full discussion and exx. of this term, see Peiper's *Ontol. Plat.* pp. 38 ff.

[4] Cp. *Rep.* X. 598 A: 602 C ταὐτόν που ἡμῖν μέγεθος ἐγγύθεν τε καὶ πόρρωθεν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως οὐκ ἴσον φαίνεται. οὐ γάρ, κτλ.: *Soph.* 235 E sqq : *Phileb.* 38 C, etc.

true or false. But when we affirm that any such judgment is true or false—meaning thereby that it does or does not correctly represent the real or actual nature of the object—we imply the possession of a *criterion* of truth. For unless we have a definite standard whereby to *measure* such a judgment, it is clear that we have no sufficient ground for pronouncing it right or wrong. And in the case of a judgment concerning any object, the standard whereby to measure its correctness can only be the *true form*, or essence, of the object itself. So that the object, if it is to be an element in a judgment,—and if, therefore, it can bear the predicates 'true' and 'false'—must be both determinable and determined, in other words measurable and measured. And in so far as it is thus measurable, or capable of definite and precise determination, quantitative or qualitative, extensive or intensive, in so far does the object become an ἐπιστητόν, an object of scientific knowledge. And conversely, in as far as the object is ἐπιστητόν and scientifically quantified, in so far can we predicate of it *truth*. For a thing is ἀληθές when it is what it *is*, when it expresses its own proper τί ἐστί or οὐσία—which can only be determined by the scientific process of measurement. Now this process of measurement is the bridge between the φαινόμενον and the νοητόν, and it is the *means* for converting the mere sense-presentation into the intelligible determinate object. It is a process at once mathematical and logical, common to both ἀριθμητική and διαλεκτική. Accordingly we find in Plato that the apparent chasm between the objects of sense and the objects of intelligence is bridged over by the help of dialectic and by that of mathematical science, with their apparatus of inductive and deductive methods, definition and division, generalisation and classification. They help us to attain to ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν.

The Platonic use of the term ἀλήθεια may be illustrated by a reference to its etymological value. ἀληθής is compounded of ἀ privative + *λῆθος (as ἀσθενής fr. ἀ + σθένος, ἀκηδής fr. ἀ + κῆδος, ἀταρβής, etc.). *λῆθος (Doric λᾶθος, cp. Theocr. 23. 24) means 'oblivion,' 'forgetting,' 'concealing'; the weak stem λαθ appears in λάθρῃ, 'in concealment,' λανθάνω, etc. It implies also *intention* or design in the act of concealment: cp. Hom. *Il.* II. 515 ὃ δέ οἱ παρελέξατο λάθρῃ: *ib.* XV. 430, etc. So ἀληθὴς γυνή, *Il.* XII. 433, means an 'honest woman,' one who hides nothing: and ἀληθέα μυθήσασθαι and similar formulae (*Il.* VI. 382; XIV. 125, etc.) mean 'frank and candid speech,' in which there is no *arrière-pensée*, nothing kept back or concealed.

Thus the notion of Truth among the Greeks was originally a *negative* notion: instead of regarding the false as the 'untrue,' they spoke of the true as the 'unfalse,' the 'unhidden.' According to the Greek view, the True is that which is not put or kept out of sight, but is *always present* to view for the mind's eye. It is the 'unforgotten,' the *permanent* content of memory. It is in this sense that Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* Z. 5. 1140^b 26 ff.) characterises φρόνησις, or moral sense, as ἀληθής although it deals with particulars: compare ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν (1140^b 20) with ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης ἕξεως

ἔστιν, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. The *practical* truth which thus belongs to φρόνησις as opposed to δόξα (though in *theoretic* aspect both are akin) is due to the character of permanence (βεβαιότης) as opposed to transience (λήθη) which it possesses. As Teichmüller (*Neue Studien*, III. p. 237) well puts it: "Die bloss theoretische Meinung nämlich braucht keine feste Basis zu haben und es ist ihr darum charakteristisch, dass sie unbeständig und nicht fest (μόνιμον, βέβαιον) ist; wir können desshalb frühere Meinungen vergessen und andere annehmen. Die Lebensweisheit (φρόνησις) aber ruht als Resultat auf unserem ganzen sittlichen Leben." In similar terms we find Aristotle, in *Eth. Nic.* A. 11, insisting on the stability and constancy of moral virtue by the use of the expressions βέβαιον, μόνιμον, συνεχές, ἀεὶ διὰ βίου, and considering this permanence as consisting in 'unforgettability,' τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰς λήθην.

In confirmation of the above explanation of the meaning of this term I may adduce the authority of Schneider (*Die Ideenlehre in Pl. Phil.* p. 17): "Was ist Plato Wahrheit im metaphysischen Sinne? Es muss festgehalten werden, dass es sich durchaus nicht um die subjektive Wahrheit handelt, d. h. um die Wahrheit, die in der Uebereinstimmung des denkenden Subjekts mit dem gedachten Objekte besteht, sondern um eine rein objektive Wahrheit, um die Wahrheit in den Gegenständen selbst, ganz abgesehen davon, ob sie gedacht werden oder nicht." In support of this he cites the account of White in 53 A, and argues that "diese objektive Wahrheit auf der Reinheit des Gegenstandes beruht, auf dem Freisein von aller fremdartigen Beimischung, und also in dem Freisein von innerem Widerspruche besteht, oder positiv ausgedrückt, in der inneren Einheit....Die meisten Gegenstände aber sind zusammengesetzter, oder um mit Plato zu reden, gemischter Natur, und bei diesen besteht die Wahrheit nicht in der absoluten Einfachheit, sondern in der Harmonie der Theile untereinander."

Trendelenburg's view of the matter is also worth citing (*De Pl. Phil. Cons.* p. 14): "veritas est duplex, vel cognitio quae cum rei natura consentit, vel natura quae ipsius rei rationibus et notioni ita respondet, ut id sit, quod esse debeat. Illa quidem vi animo (*Meno* 86 B, *Phaedo* 65 B; Ar. *Met.* Θ. 10), hac rebus (*Rep.* V. 508 D) veritatem vindices; illa e.g. trianguli veritatem pronuntiabis, si ut est in rerum natura, ita intellexeris; hac, si quod tale est, quale ex naturae necessitate esse debet, ut trianguli rationi et legibus satisfaciat. In illa perceptio ad rei, qualis est, statum tanquam ad regulam refertur; nihil enim aliud egeris, nisi ut rem cogitatione exaeques. Haec altior est; etenim ex rei specie et forma, qualis menti informata rebus exemplar est, causam repetit et ipsi rei legem imponit. Quodsi Platonis formula uti volueris, qualis in ipso *Philebo* (54 A) illustratur, rebus veritatem tum tribues, quum ipsarum γένεσις οὐσίας μετέχει." "Primam hanc rerum veritatem altera cognitionis sequitur; res enim, nisi ipsis veritas et ratio inesset, hominem plane deciperent. Cognitionis veritas nihil est nisi rerum veritatis simulacrum."

Similarly Hirzel states: "duas veritatis esse notiones ex ipso *Philebo* apparet. Ita, p. 51 B, voluptates appellantur verae quae ipsam voluptatis naturam quam accuratissime exprimunt. Similiter autem cognitio

alicujus rei vera dicitur esse si ejus naturam probe perspexit. Atqui ipsa natura quam modo dixi a Platone cogitatur idea rei esse. Utroque igitur loco inter se collato facile intellegimus et res et cognitiones veras esse eas quae sempiternas illas species aliquo modo repraesentant" (p. 53).

The remarks already made on the Platonic use of the term ἀλήθεια may help to obviate one of the difficulties raised by 'chorizontic' critics of the *Philebus*. It is alleged, for example, by Dr F. Horn (*Platonstudien*, pp. 382, 3)[1], that it is absurd and unplatonic to classify pleasure with mental concepts as 'true' and 'false.' For while the concept implies an object, in pleasure there is no such contrast of the external and internal. Further, the pleasure of hope is just as much *pleasure* when the hope is ill-founded, or due to false opinion, as when it is well-founded and based on right opinion. So that, Horn argues, this theory is not true Platonism, but rather anti-Protagoreanism: "dem extremen Subjektivismus wird ein ebenso extremer und gewaltsamer Objektivismus entgegengestellt." And he quotes approvingly the remark of Grote (*Plato* III. p. 391): "In my judgment this is one main defect pervading the Platonic *Philebus*...the violent pressure employed to force Pleasures and Pains into the same classifying framework as cognitive Beliefs—the true and the false."

But, surely, in such criticism as this we may discover a considerable ignorance of Platonism. For "Plato's explanation of the terms (37 A—39 E)," as Dr Maguire rightly contends, "is clear and justifiable: the pleasures, as actually experienced, cannot be false, but may attract that predicate when examined by the light of further experience." It is useless to say that the term 'truth' ought to be confined to purely logical relations, and is inapplicable to such subjects as pleasure and pain. It may indeed be convenient for scientific purposes so to confine the use of the term; but the fact remains that Plato did not so confine it. This is sufficiently obvious from the *Philebus* itself, as well as from the passages already quoted from the 9th book of the *Republic*; besides being probable

[1] "Die Vorstellung ist ihrem Wesen nach...das Seelenbild eines Gegenstandes und muss daher wie jedes andere Bild mit seinem Gegenstande entweder übereinstimmen oder nicht übereinstimmen, d. h. sie muss wahr oder falsch sein. Das Wesen der Lust aber besteht nicht darin das Bild eines Gegenstandes zu entwerfen und darum kann bei ihr die Frage ob sie wahr oder falsch ist nicht gestellt werden....Die Behauptung der Analogie zwischen Lust und Vorstellung ist demnach unhaltbar."

Similarly Jowett (Introd. to *Phileb.* p. 138): "It is difficult to acquit Plato of being a tyro in dialectics, when he overlooks such a distinction as that between the pleasures and the erroneous opinions, whether arising out of the illusion of distance or not, on which they are founded." ** "The comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really a comparison of two elements which have no common measure, and which cannot be excluded from each other." Huit allows that the language of P. is "psychologiquement inexact," and so too Apelt. Maguire defends P. thus: "Plato's Ethics are rational and not sentimental; it is, therefore, not inappropriate to apply such terms to Pleasure and Pain, and thus force us to see that the Reason or Intellect is the ultimate judge of human feeling and conduct....If τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν be that which, on the moment of impression, presents characteristics from which we call the object ἀγαθόν, and afterwards that predicate is at variance with experience, why can we not, *mutatis mutandis*, apply the same process to τὸ ἡδύ? Unless heterogeneous predicates be applicable to pleasures, Ethic is impossible."

à priori, when we consider the unifying tendency of all Plato's philosophy. Physics and metaphysics, ethics and logic,—he aimed at comprising them all in a single network of thought, at finding for them all, as it were, a common denominator.

Moreover, Plato would have been slow to admit the postulate of his critics, that Pleasure is purely subjective, and so cannot admit of such predicates as 'good' and 'bad,' 'true' and 'false.'

Is it Platonic, in fact, to call anything 'merely subjective'? Are not all things ultimately measurable by God, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον? Are not all things intelligible to Absolute Reason? But apart from the general question, in so far as ἡδονή is capable of definition and determination as πλήρωσις or as γένεσις or as a species of ἄπειρον, it may become in so far an object of knowledge: and in so far as it becomes an object of knowledge, and an object of philosophic discussion, in so far does it cease to be purely subjective. That is to say, the various states of consciousness known as pleasurable or the reverse can be experimentally determined and classified; and the *causes* also which produce them can be likewise determined. We can distinguish between a mixed state which involves both the opposite feelings at once, and a pure state either of pleasure or of pain; and we can distinguish, also, an intermediate or mean state which is the dead point in feeling or point of equilibrium between the two opposites.

In other words, there is such a thing as a *science* of psychology, which determines correctly psychic phenomena, just as mathematics or natural science determines correctly the phenomena of external nature. And in both cases the experience of the *individual*, which forms purely subjective feeling or opinion, needs to be corrected by reference to the knowledge of the scientist.

Pleasure is not uncaused, and therefore, we may argue, it is more than mere subjective affection. It is an element *in* consciousness, and therefore Plato insists on qualifying or quantifying it, according to that function of the soul's life to which it attaches. And he finds the true doctrine of pleasure to be this—that the higher the function, the *purer* is the attendant pleasure; and if purer, then *truer*; for what is pure in quality is thereby *itself*, the expression of its own essence, or of its own Idea, which is only another way of saying that it is true, in the objective sense of the term. And when he speaks of *false* pleasure he is not thinking of the subject of the feeling, but regarding it from the Ideal point of view, the point of view of philosophy: from this point of view it is seen that pleasure and pain are two opposite processes (ἄπειρα), which meet, as it were, in a middle point, which is the normal state (μετριότης), wherein both disappear; the excess of consciousness above this point is pleasure, the defect pain. And as most pleasures or pains involve reactions (like the swing of a pendulum), most are impure, and so false; and the truly desirable state is the mean, or the position of equilibrium and rest.

One or two other difficulties, besides this regarding False Pleasure, have been found in the *Philebus*, which the above observations regarding Plato's notion of τὸ ἀληθές may help to explain.

With reference to the passage 64 B (ᾧ μὴ μίξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τοῦτο ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδ' ἂν γενόμενον εἴη), one of the critics already alluded to, Dr Horn, indulges in the following severe strictures:—"Diese Wendung ist *eine der überraschendsten* im ganzen Philebos. Denn wir haben in der Mischung bereits wahre Erkenntniss und wahre Lust, sie muss also Wahrheit enthalten, schon bevor ihr diese als besonderer Bestandteil zugesetzt wird, und diess kann um so weniger zweifelhaft sein, als fast unmittelbar nachher (p. 65 D) erklärt wird, die Erkenntniss sei 'Entweder ganz dasselbe wie die Wahrheit oder ihr doch unter allen am ähnlichsten und das wahrste.' Wir stehen demnach hier vor *einer jener Unbegreiflichkeiten*, welche von da ab bis zum Schlusse des Werkes sich in rascher Folge häufen" (*Platonstudien*, p. 398).

But it is by no means clear that there is any absurdity or inconsistency in the introduction of ἀλήθεια here. On the contrary, we may well contend that this procedure is entirely 'begreiflich,' and that Horn's objection rests wholly on a misunderstanding of the passage in question —or rather, we might say, on his misunderstanding of the entire dialogue. It is quite true that already pleasures and sciences had been ranked in order of truth as elements for the mixture; but it is one thing to have the constituent *elements* ἀληθῆ (or ἀκριβῆ and καθαρά) and quite another to have truth in the mixture itself as a *process*, or in the μεμιγμένον as resultant and final *product*. We must distinguish the three distinct stages: (1) where the elements ἐξ ὧν, or materials, are still regarded as separate, each having an ἀλήθεια, i.e. ideality, purity, or exactitude of its own; (2) where the two elements are already *being* brought together, and the combination is in *process* of taking place, during which ἀλήθεια consists in correct artistic treatment, in due measure of combination with regard to the εἶδος, παράδειγμα, or final cause; and (3) where the process is finally completed, and τὸ μεμιγμένον is a finished product, the ἀλήθεια of which resides in its symmetry and beauty, that is in its exact correspondence to its Ideal archetype.

Yet another problem with regard to the '*Truth*' of the *Philebus* remains for solution. How is it that in the final list of goods, as set forth in 66 A ff., no mention is made of the all-important ἀλήθεια? "Wo ist in derselben, muss man vor allem fragen, die Wahrheit geblieben, auf deren besonderer Beimischung Sokrates mit solchem Nachdruck bestanden hat? Da Sokrates in seine Liste sowol die Bestandteile als die Eigenschaften der Mischung aufnimmt und da er überdiess vorher die Wahrheit sowol unter jenen wie unter diesen aufgezält hat, *ist das Fehlen derselben in der Liste unerklärlich*" (Horn, p. 402).

Various attempts have been made to explain its absence. Thus Zeller (*Phil. d. Gr.* II. 1. ed. 4, p. 874 A 5) places truth in the first grade, quoting 64 D to show that μέτρον is "noch genauer als die Vereinigung von κάλλος, ξυμμετρία und ἀλήθεια beschrieben." But, as Horn rightly remarks (*loc. cit.*), it was not μέτρον but τἀγαθόν that was equated to this triad. Susemihl takes a similar view to Zeller, observing that the first ranks contains "die ewige ideale Natur überhaupt, in welcher denn allerdings auch die Wahrheit und sie vor allem inbegriffen sei" (*Genet.*

Entw. d. pl. Phil. II. I. p. 52)[1]. Schleiermacher, on the other hand (II. iii. p. 89), places truth in the third rank, with νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις, alleging that "der Geist als der einzige Ort der Wahrheit den Dingen erst die Realität zubringt." So too Steinhart would find truth in the third class, on the ground that Reason is here put in the place of Truth, since Reason is "das Vermögen die Wahrheit zu erkennen," and since objective truth when known becomes thus, as it were, subjectified[2].

This whole discussion seems to rest on ambiguity of language and confusion of thought. What ἀλήθεια is it that the commentators wish to find mentioned? Is it *ob*jective truth, i.e. exact conformation to the εἶδος on the part of a natural existence? Or is it *sub*jective truth, i.e. agreement of the mental presentation with its object? Is it to be discovered in the human good as a composite whole, μικτὸς βίος,—or *in* any of the *elements* of that whole, or *as* a separate element of that whole? Or is it to be found as a separate *cause* of the Good? Where and how and why do they seek for it[3]? Until we have our notions clear on these points it seems vain either to pose the problem or to attempt its answer.

To me the meaning and intention of the omission appears quite clear. The final determination is this (see pp. 173—4, above)—the (human) Good, as a composite whole, has been found to contain (as conditions or causes) measure and proportion, and (as elements) reason, knowledge etc. The first two grades—as the text itself shows if rightly interpreted (see p. 153, n.)—contain mention not of constituent factors but of conditions or formal causes; the elements themselves being first brought in with the third group, νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις, which is thus the *first* in order of merit or value, as the tenor of the whole argument from first to last shows. And as an element itself (64 B), ἀλήθεια may be regarded in the *subjective* aspect as identical with νοῦς, or at least implicit therein. But in its *objective* aspect, connoting the Ideality of

[1] Similarly Trendel. p. 20: "Adest enim veritas dum verba ὀπ. τ. χ. ν., ἀΐδιον ᾠρῆσθαι φύσιν recte expenderis." See also *Append.* B, pp. 170 ff.; and cp. Schneider *op. cit.* p. 20: "So ruht die Schönheit einmal auf der Wahrheit und zweitens auf dem Maasse;...die Wahrheit aber beruht auf der inneren Einheit, und wo eine Mehrheit von Theilen vorhanden ist, beruht diese Einheit wesentlich auf Maass und Ebenmaass So bildet das Maass das Fundament von diesen Dreien...das Hauptmerkmal der Idee des Guten."

[2] Pleased with this diversity of opinion, Horn remarks: "Alle diese mühseligen Erklärungsversuche beweisen nur, was ohnehin keines Beweises bedarf: dass Sokrates die Wahrheit in der Schlussaufzählung einfach ausgelassen hat" (*op. cit.* p. 402, n.). But see Apelt's reply in *Arch. Gesch. Phil.* IX. I: "Meines Erachtens gehört die ἀλήθεια, gemäss ihrem teils objectiven, teils subjectiven Charakter, ebenso zur ersten wie zur dritten Stufe, und konnte eben darum nicht einer einzelnen zugewiesen werden." This seems to approximate to what I take to be the right view of the matter.

[3] Thus Hirzel maintains that the truth of 64 B is that "quae speciem externam sibi contrariam habet neque illam qua quid cum idea aliqua convenire designatur"; hence "de veritate constat eam non pro bono sed pro summi boni aliqua causa habendam esse": whereas "qui veritatem interpretati sunt de statu cum ideis congruente quique omnes ideas propter sempiternam earum naturam a Philebi auctore pro bonis haberi putarunt ei sane debebunt quaecunque res ad ideae similitudinem facta erit eam bonam existimare" (pp. 58—9).

the real, Truth attaches both to each constituent of the Mixture and to the Mixture as a whole. Hence if we are right in understanding ἀΐδιος φύσις of the Good as a complex totality, it involves ἀλήθεια: to be ἀΐδιος is to be ἀ-ληθής. And so we will assent to Trendelenburg's view that objective Truth (aeterna ideae necessitas, nascendi et occidendi mutationi non obnoxia) is involved in the statement as to the eternal φύσις.

Closely connected with the notion of ἀλήθεια, in Platonic usage, is that of οὐσία.

The terms τὸ ὄν, οὐσία, εἶναι admit of various shades of meaning. Peipers, in his exhaustive treatise on Platonic Ontology, distinguishes five special uses of the words:—(1) to denote *existence*; (2) to denote *things* in general, τὰ πράγματα, whether self-existent or merely transient γιγνόμενα; (3) to denote Ideal *essence*, ὅ ἔστι or ὂν ὄντως; (4) to denote objective *truth* and validity, as opposed to what is fictitious—esp. in advv. ὄντως, τῷ ὄντι; (5) to denote what is a *whole* and *absolute*, as opposed to objects in growth or decay.

Of the *first* of these senses we have an ex. in *Philebus* 23 C πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῇ διαλάβωμεν (cp. 11 C, 39 E of *present* existence), and in the similar, though more particular, application to a *familiar* thing, in 48 E (cp. *Polit.* 292 A, *Theaet.* 144 C, D).

The *second* use is found in 17 E, 20 D (τἀγαθὸν...πάντων...διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων), 23 C, 26 E, 53 E (τὸ μὲν ἕνεκά του τῶν ὄντων ἔστ' ἀεί), 65 D.

Thirdly, ὄντως ὄν is used of the object of νοῦς, which is said to lie ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὂν ὄντως ἐννοίαις, in 59 D; and of the Ideal objects of Dialectic, which treats περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκός, in 58 A —τὰ ὄντα ἀεί being opposed to the objects of physical science in 59 A, and τὰ ὄντα used of Ideas as objects of τὸ φρονεῖν, νοεῖν, διανοεῖσθαι in 62 A.

In the *fourth* sense, εἶναι and ὄν are found denoting the *true* and real, as opposed to the merely phenomenal, in 42 B, C ὅσῳ μείζους τῶν οὐσῶν ἑκάτεραι καὶ ἐλάττους φαίνονται, τοῦτο ἀποτεμόμενος ἑκατέρων τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄν, οὔτε αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς φαινόμενον ἐρεῖς, οὐδ' αὖ ποτὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὀρθόν τε καὶ ἀληθὲς τολμήσεις λέγειν. Similarly in 51 A we have ἡδοναὶ δοκοῦσαι opposed to οὖσαι (cp. *Soph.* 233 C ff., *Theaet.* 157 E ff. etc.).

Lastly, we come to the peculiar use of οὐσία to denote a thing which is *whole*, *complete*, *fully-developed*: this is found in 26 D (γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν), 27 B (μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν), 53 C (οὐσία οὐκ ἔστι...ἡδονῆς), 54 A, B, C. Outside of the *Philebus*, this notion of Being as a mean between two extremes, a synthesis of two antitheses (here πέρας and ἄπειρον), only occurs in the *Timaeus* (35 B, 37 A)[1], according to Peipers' statement.

The development of this notion of οὐσία is of high importance as marking the trend of Plato's thought. Roughly we may say that while

[1] *Tim.* 37 A: (ἡ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ) ἐκ τῆς ταὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως ἔκ τε οὐσίας τριῶν τούτων συγκραθεῖσα μοιρῶν κτλ. See Boeckh, 'Ueber die Bildung der Weltseele' (*Kl. Schr.* III. p. 134); Peipers, *Ont. Plat.* pp. 99 ff. Cp. Hirzel, p. 62: "satis confirmatum est vocabulo οὐσία perfectum rei statum (non sempiternam essentiam) designari."

in the earlier dialogues he is more at pains to separate γιγνόμενα from ὄντα (i.e. ὄντως ὄντα), in his later period his care is rather to synthesize the two. For the purposes of this combination and unification (μῖξις) he enlarges the borders of the Real, and extends the sphere of οὐσία until it comprehends in one exhaustive whole all grades of being, ὄντως ὄντα and γιγνόμενα alike.

According to this aspect of Platonism, οὐσία would seem to be coextensive and almost identical with ψυχή ("Being is Thought and Thought is Being"): the two are but different aspects of the same ultimate reality; for the World-Soul of the *Timaeus* is the All of Being, and the complexity of Soul (as both rational and conative) reflects the complexity of Being. This notion of Being, then, is no longer one of a pair of antitheses; it is not the contrary of an absolute non-being, but it is rather the synthesis of Being and Becoming, comprehending alike the absolute and the relative.

Within this universality of scope, however, we may distinguish three separate spheres, containing (1) the Ideas, (2) the objects of mathematical science, and (3) the objects of sense-perception. The second of these is designated τὰ μεταξύ, as intermediate between the Ideal realm and the phenomenal: that is, mathematical notions partake at once of the character of Ideas, in so far as they are ἀΐδια, timeless and *à priori*, and of the character of sense-objects, in so far as they are spatial and συμβλητά. But all three grades alike are endowed with this virtue in common, that they possess, in greater or less degree, οὐσία: under the supreme category of Being they all become united.

APPENDIX G.

τέλεον, ἱκανόν, αἱρετόν.

The Ethical argument emphasises the fact (in 20 C ff. and again in 60 C ff.) that the Good must possess the three qualities of τὸ τέλεον, τὸ ἱκανόν, and τὸ πᾶσιν αἱρετόν—the combination of which three is only to be found in the Mixed Life and not in that of either unmixed ἡδονή or unmixed φρόνησις.

It will be well then to further illustrate the associations of these words[1]. First as to τέλεον. If we turn to *Tim.* 30 C we find it stated that the archetypal ζῶον of which the cosmos is the copy cannot be ἐν μέρους εἴδει or ἀτελές—ἀτελεῖ γὰρ ἐοικὸς οὐδέν ποτ' ἂν γένοιτο καλόν. οὗ δ' ἔστι τἆλλα ζῶα καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια, τούτῳ πάντων ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τιθῶμεν...τῷ γὰρ τῶν νοουμένων καλλίστῳ καὶ κατὰ πάντα τελέῳ μάλιστα αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς ὁμοιῶσαι βουληθείς, ζῶον ἓν ὁρατόν, πάνθ' ὅσα αὐτοῦ

[1] For a summary account of τέλεον and ἱκανόν in immediate connection with the argument of 66 A ff., see above *App.* B, *ad fin.*

κατὰ φύσιν ξυγγενῆ ζῶα ἐντὸς ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ, ξυνέστησε...ἵνα οὖν τόδε κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ παντελεῖ ζώῳ, διὰ ταῦτα οὔτε δύο οὔτ' ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους, ἀλλ' εἷς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς γεγονὼς ἔστι τε καὶ ἔτ' ἔσται. Here we see that to be καλόν the cosmos must be τέλεον, and to be τέλεον it must be all-inclusive of the things which belong to its own kind, as the concrete whole which is exactly equivalent to the sum of all its parts.

So in 32 c ff. each of the four elements is wholly used up in the construction of the cosmos—ἵνα ὅλον ὅτι μάλιστα ζῶον τέλεον ἐκ τελέων τῶν μερῶν εἴη...ἓν ὅλον ὅλων ἐξ ἁπάντων τέλεον καὶ ἀγήρων καὶ ἄνοσον αὐτὸν ἐτεκτήνατο. Moreover the spherical form of the cosmos is due to its 'perfection'—κυκλοτερὲς αὐτὸ ἐτορνεύσατο, πάντων τελεώτατον ὁμοιότατόν τε αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ σχημάτων (33 B). And it needs no organs or external appendages, as being in all respects self-supporting and self-sufficient, its own subject and object—πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάσχον καὶ δρῶν ἐκ τέχνης γέγονεν· ἡγήσατο γὰρ αὐτὸ ὁ ξυνθεὶς αὔταρκες ὂν ἄμεινον ἔσεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ προσδεὲς ἄλλων.....διὰ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα εὐδαίμονα θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐγεννήσατο (34 B). Here we see that εὐδαιμονία implies αὐτάρκεια, just as in *Phil.* 20 E we read δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν (sc. ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως) ἐστὶ τἀγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι. δεόμενον δ' ἂν φαιμὴ πότερον, οὐκ ἔστι που τοῖτ' ἔτι τὸ ὄντως ἡμῖν ἀγαθόν: and again in 60 C, ᾧ παρείη τοῖτ' (sc. τἀγαθόν) ἀεὶ τῶν ζώων διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν.

Thus, then, with the notion of *self-sufficiency*, or independence of external addition, we pass from τὸ τέλεον to τὸ ἱκανόν. For while τὸ τέλεον chiefly implies *self*-reference, as the perfection of a thing's *own* nature or the attainment of its own inherent *end* (τέλος), τὸ ἱκανόν rather implies reference to an outside standard or end, indicating sufficiency for the accomplishment of a purpose; i.e. the subject of ἱκανός is regarded rather in instrumental than in final aspect (cp. p. 177, above). By the union of the two characteristics, then, in the *Philebus*, we get the Good (for man) determined as a state of being identical with that described in the *Timaeus* as the state of the cosmos, 'the blessed God,' —a state of *internal* perfection, or equality between whole and parts, and also a state which as complete and self-sufficing cannot be added to (nor subtracted from) nor by any means bettered, being the *absolutely* good of its kind.

The above citations from the *Timaeus*, besides forming another link to connect in historic relation the two dialogues, are important for their bearing on the philosophy of the *Philebus*. In them we see the cosmic and universal application of the notions τέλεον and ἱκανόν, which denote the Absolute, the Unconditioned, the Self-determined—such as is Hegel's 'good Infinite.' And accordingly, in the *Philebus*, these notions are meant not merely to be characteristics of the moral end of human life, or happiness, in the narrower sense, but also to be marks of the Universal Good. Whence they are conjoined with the third mark τὸ πᾶσιν αἱρετόν—the *universal* end of desire for all ἐμψυχα. τὸ ἱκανόν, as an epithet of τἀγαθόν in this supreme sense of the notion, is also to be

found in *Phaedo* 101 D, where the ultimate Hypothesis for all true deduction (i.e. the ἀνυπόθετον of *Rep.* VI. 511), which is τἀγαθόν, is determined as what alone can fully claim the title of ἱκανόν. Hence this term must be regarded as a *vox propria*, in the Platonic vocabulary, for the ultimate (ethical) ἀρχή. And so in the *Philebus* its use helps to confirm what is shown by many other signs, that the law of human life is identical with and derived from that of the Divine Life, and that the Good, as eternally valid Idea, is the same in all its various manifestations.

As affording further illustration of these doctrines of the *Philebus*, attention must be directed to a notable passage of the *Laws*, where the Universality of the Good is taught. In *Laws* X. 903 B ff. we read: πείθωμεν τὸν νεανίαν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ' ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα, ὧν καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς δύναμιν ἕκαστον τὸ προσῆκον πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. τούτοις δ' εἰσὶν ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρότατον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως, εἰς μερισμὸν τὸν ἔσχατον τέλος ἀπειργασμένοι· ὧν ἓν καὶ τὸ σόν, ὦ σχέτλιε, μόριον εἰς τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει βλέπον ἀεί, καί περ πάνσμικρον ὄν. σὲ δὲ λέληθε περὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὡς γένεσις ἕνεκα ἐκείνου γίγνεται πᾶσα, ὅπως ᾖ ἡ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς βίῳ ὑπάρχουσα εὐδαίμων οὐσία, οὐχ ἕνεκα σοῦ γιγνομένη, σὺ δὲ ἕνεκα ἐκείνου. πᾶς γὰρ ἰατρὸς καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δημιουργὸς παντὸς μὲν ἕνεκα πάντα ἐργάζεται, πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυντεῖνον βέλτιστον, μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται. σὺ δὲ ἀγανακτεῖς ἀγνοῶν ὅπῃ τὸ περὶ σὲ ἄριστον τῷ παντὶ ξυμβαίνει καὶ σοὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν τῆς κοινῆς γενέσεως. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀεὶ ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη σώματι τότε μὲν ἄλλῳ, τότε δὲ ἄλλῳ, μεταβάλλει παντοίας μεταβολὰς δι' ἑαυτὴν ἢ δι' ἑτέραν ψυχήν[1]. Here the particular is subordinated to the cosmical, which forms its Final Good.

Aristotle, too, is close to Platonism when (in *Ethics* I. 5) he finds the common notion underlying the various kinds of the Good to be the final cause or end (οὗ χάριν, οὗ ἕνεκα, τέλος). Moreover these ends are distinguished by him into two grades—that of the secondary, instrumental, and incomplete, and that of the primary, complete, and final. The latter are ends in and for themselves, not chosen for the sake of a further end. Such an ultimate and perfect end is, in Ethics, Happiness. And it is, therefore, self-sufficient and self-complete[2].

[1] Cp. *ib.* 904 C μεταβάλλει μὲν τοίνυν πάνθ' ὅσα μέτοχά ἐστι ψυχῆς, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κεκτημένα τὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν. *ib.* 904 C ὅπῃ γὰρ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ ὁποῖός τις ὢν τὴν ψυχήν, ταύτῃ σχεδὸν ἑκάστοτε καὶ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται ἅπας ἡμῶν ὡς τὸ πολύ.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* A. 5. 1097ᵃ 18 sqq. τί οὖν ἑκάστης [sc. πράξεως καὶ τέχνης] τἀγαθόν; ἢ οὗ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δὲ ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἁπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες κτλ.

ᵃ25 ff. ἐπεὶ δὴ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δὲ αἱρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς (?) καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ μέν ἐστιν ἕν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν <καὶ> καθ' αὑτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε

In the next chapter (1. 6) Aristotle further determines the Good, in morals as in crafts and arts, to lie in the *work* or action[1]. The work peculiar to the soul of man is rational activity, or a certain kind of life, and the good man's work is good rational activity and conduct. Hence the human good is a virtuous activity of the soul of the most perfect kind[2].

A further determination of the ethical Good by Aristotle is to make it an object of honour (τίμιον) rather than of praise (ἐπαινετόν). Praise is confined to things relative, the quality of virtue, for instance[3]. But objects which are absolute, such as the gods, we rather magnify, worship, honour. Justice may be commended, but happiness is esteemed blessed. To commend God or the Good were ridiculous: and the Good is cause of all subordinate goods, and therefore, as a principle, perfect, divine, and *honourable*[4].

δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ....τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά...αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ κτλ.

1097ᵇ 14 τὸ δ' αὔταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ.

A. 10. 1099ᵇ 27 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς.

[1] *Eth. Nic.* A. 6. 1097ᵇ 25 ff. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτῷ.

[2] *ib.* 1098ᵃ 12 ff. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δὲ ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἕκαστον δὲ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται. εἰ δὴ οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην.

We may append here, as a summary, Teichmüller's comparative scheme of "Die drei formalen Charaktere des Guten," exhibiting how "der Aristotelische Mond das Platonische Sonnenlicht sehr gut reflectirt":—

1.	τὸ τέλεον	*Phileb.* 20 D	=	*Eth. Nic.* A. 5. 1097ᵃ 25
2.	τὸ ἱκανόν	,, 20 D, 67	=	,, ,, ,, 1097ᵇ 7
3.	τὸ τέλος (οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται)	,, ,,	=	,, ,, A. 1. 1094ᵃ 2
	Recapitulation	,, 22 B	=	,, ,, A. 5. 1097ᵇ 20.

[3] *Eth. Nic.* A. 12. 1101ᵇ 12 φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρός τί πως ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι...τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα κτλ.

[4] *ib.* 1101ᵇ 22 δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι καὶ βέλτιον... τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν...ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει...

ib. 1102ᵃ 1 ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων. ἔοικεν δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.

Cp. *Phil.* 59 D οὐκοῦν νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ φρόνησις ἅ γ' ἄν τις τιμήσειε μάλιστα ὀνόματα; and *ib.* 64 C, cited above.

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

11 B. **ἀγαθὸν...τὸ χαίρειν.** I retract the statement in my note that ἀγαθόν here cannot stand for τἀγαθόν. In view of such texts as 13 E, 19 C and 60 A—urged upon me by Dr H. Jackson—it seems safer to agree with Stallbaum; and the emphatic position of ἀγαθόν may serve to compensate in some degree for the absence of the article.

13 B. **εἶτ' ἀνέξεσθαι.** To avoid the tautology with συγχωρήσεσθαι which offended Badham, Jackson suggests writing εἶτ' ἀνέξεσθαι—an attractive conjecture.

15 A. **ἡ πολλὴ σπουδή** κτλ. Jackson proposes ἢ π. σπουδὴ <ἢ> μετὰ διαίρ. ἀ. γ.: "These units are matters of either profound interest or, when division begins, controversy." But we may question whether μετά could be used in this hypothetical way; and also whether a contrast is intended between two stages of debate, before and after διαίρεσις.

Another conjecture is Prof. J. B. Bury's που δή for σπουδή.

15 A, B. **πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας** κτλ. As against Badham's view, Jackson argues thus: "(1) it is improbable that μή has dropped out: (2) the facts that the phrase πῶς αὖ ταύτας κτλ. in the sentence which begins with εἶτα is incomplete without the word θετέον, derived from the sentence which begins with μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ', and that the phrase ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖ κτλ., in the sentence which begins with μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ', is incomplete without the words πῶς ταύτας κτλ. derived from the sentence which begins with εἶτα, seem to show that the two sentences are indissolubly connected. And I think that the text as it stands gives an appropriate—indeed the appropriate—sense. Socrates asks (1) are there these monads? (2) how are we to suppose these monads—if they are each of them eternally, immutably, one, neither coming into being, not ceasing to be—severally to retain this their unity, and yet, either by division or by multiplication, to be distributed amongst a plurality of particulars? That is to say, the participial clause, μίαν ἑκάστην κτλ., describes the monads as essentially units, and the words ὅμως εἶναι κτλ. bring this their characteristic into contrast with the pluralization which somehow or other they must needs undergo in particular things."

On the other hand Mr G. E. Moore urges that "μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο would be inexplicable unless three questions were intended," and that "the position of ὅμως, as the text stands, renders the fusion of the two clauses impossible: εἶναι μέν would surely be necessary." Mr Moore's interpretation of the second clause (εἶτα...μίαν ταύτην) has, I believe, the merit of novelty. He would render: "How (we are to suppose) that these monads, *though* each one and always the same..., are *yet* most surely all of them one (αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν)"—explaining that "this clause would raise the question of the connection of ideas with one another, not only the question of the connection of ideas with particulars, which is all that seems commonly supposed to be raised

in the dialogue (cp. *Soph.* 253 D, *Phaedo* 104 D, 105 E)." As to the grammar, he holds that ταύτην is 'assimilated' in number to μίαν, referring back to ταύτας, and that the word is added "to emphasize the paradoxical nature of the hypothesis that *these* distinct immutables should yet all be but one immutable, and therefore instead of *these*, might, as the course of the sentence has suggested, be called *this*."

A recent suggestion of Zeller's is that "statt μίαν 'μέν' und statt des Kolon nach ταύτην ein Komma gesetzt werden könnte"; or else that the words εἶναι βεβ....μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ' should be struck out as a gloss. And Prof. J. B. Bury has proposed to me that the original might have been βεβαιότατα μεν ταύτην, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ' κτλ., for βεβ. πρῶτον μὲν τ.

17 A. **καὶ πολλά.** Jackson would retain these words on the ground that "the words μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἓν...προσφέρειν κτλ. seem plainly to imply that the eristics recognize ἕν, πολλά, and ἄπειρα, though in their passage from ἕν to πολλά and from πολλά to ἄπειρα they ignore intermediate steps." But as this is inconsistent with μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα εὐθύς, he would here emend to μ. δὲ τὰ ἓν ἀ. εὐ., supporting the plural by 16 E (τότε δ' ἤδη τὸ ἓν ἕκαστον) where "each of the πολλά is regarded as a ἕν."

Mr G. E. Moore contends that "ἕν and πολλά both alike signify ideas," and that "the method here objected to is merely the too hasty satisfaction with the adoption of one idea connecting any group of particulars (ἄπειρα), without troubling to shew the connection of these ἕνς (τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων), which are identical with πολλά, with one another. καὶ πολλά would thus signify 'that is, unities'." He would explain μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἕν as referring both to ἕν and to πολλά: and so he considers any change in the text unnecessary.

17 B. **οὐδὲν ἑτέρῳ.** Jackson proposes οὐδ' ἑνὶ ἑτέρῳ, 'by neither singly.'

17 D. **ἑνόντα πάθη <ἢ> γιγνόμενα** conj. Madvig.

23 B. **ἔστι δ' ἴσως.** Jackson would emend to the fut., ἔσται δ' ἴσως.

25 D, E. Mr G. E. Moore would here also retain the traditional text. He writes: "Dr Jackson, in supporting αὖ for οὐ συνηγάγομεν, does not seem to have noticed that, whereas of ἄπειρα there has been a double συναγωγή (24 E—25 A, and 25 C), of περατοειδῆ there has been only one (25 A—B). I imagine, therefore, that the οὐ refers to the lack of this second συναγωγή, which is at once supplied in 25 D—E, τὴν τοῦ ἴσου κτλ. This interpretation renders it unnecessary to transpose ἀλλ' ἴσως...γενήσεται or to alter συναγομένων to συμμισγομένων. I think there need be no difficulty as to the reference of ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις; to τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς instead of to κἀκείνη, which, had the text never been doubted, would have been considered sufficiently plain from the sense. And as to μιγνὺς ταῦτα (25 E), I take ταῦτα as referring only to τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, not to τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ περατοειδές, and would supply with μιγνύς, εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν, referring back to 25 D, συμμίγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν...τὴν αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν. As to the meaning of the two συναγωγαί, I can only suggest that the first is of *ideas*, the second of *particulars*, which seems borne out by the expression τὴν τοῦ πέρατος γένναν as contrasted with εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι (25 B)."

26 D. **ἐκ τῶν...ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων.** In my conj. ἀπειργασμένην I find that I am anticipated by Jackson: he argues that (1) the order of the words is against ἀπειργασμένων in this position, judged by Plato's later style: (2) the word itself is here superfluous: (3) "ἀπειργασμένην, in agreement with γένεσιν, would conveniently connect that word with ἐκ τῶν μ. τ. π. μ.": (4) Proclus *in Tim.* 54 A, τὴν ὅλην ἀπειρίαν

μετὰ τῶν τοῦ πέρατος μέτρων γένεσιν ἀπειργασμένην, "suggests that the text which Proclus used did not join the participle to μέτρων."

27 D. **μικτὸν ἐκεῖνο.** Jackson suggests that the μικτὸς ἐκεῖνος of the MSS. "represents a marginal ὁ μικτὸς ἐκεῖνος, which was a gloss upon νικηφόρος below." I am inclined to accept this view.

29 C. **τρέφεται...καὶ ἄρχεται.** For ἄρχεται Jackson proposes αὔξεται, which should certainly be adopted: see the parallels he adduces from *Phaedr.* 246 E, *Rep.* 509 B, *Tim.* 41 D, 44 B.

30 A. **τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα** κτλ. Jackson suggests that all the words here from τὰ τέτταρα to τοῦτο, excepting only τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνόν, should be rejected as "a marginal note explaining that τέταρτον refers not to the quaternion of the context (fire, air, earth, water), but to the quaternion of 28 C."

32 D. **διαπορευθῆναι.** Mr Solomon has proposed διαπορηθῆναι.

40 D. **ἐν ἐκείνοις.** My conj. ἐπ' ἐκείνοις has been made independently by Jackson.

51 E. **ἀλλ', εἰ κατανοεῖς** κτλ. Mr G. E. Moore would retain λεγομένων as meaning 'generally recognized.' "Its purport would thus be to distinguish the 'true' pleasures just enumerated from τὰς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα, which latter, it is to be noted, are not mentioned in the general summary given in 51 B. Plato says with regard to these, not only, what he says of the other true pleasures (51 C), that he means them in a different sense from οἱ πολλοί, but that they actually belong to very few (52 B). This statement would point the antithesis to λεγομένων."

I regard this as a satisfactory defence of the traditional text, which precludes the need of emendation.

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