

RESTRICTED

REPORT OF OPERATIONS

(FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORT)

12TH ARMY GROUP

VOL. I

Summary

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
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GLOUCESTER

BRISTOL

LONDON

SOUTHEND-ON-SEA

FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY GROUP
OCTOBER 19, 1943

Eagle Departure from London
July 5, 1944 - Advance Party
July 9, - 1st detachment
July 20, - 2nd "
July 30, - 3rd "

DOVER
ENGLAND STRAITS

SOUTHAMPTON

PORTSMOUTH

July 22, 1944
Hq. 12th Army Group
Closes London, Opens France

August 1, 1944
Hq. 12th Army Group
Becomes Operational

July 31, 1944
Eagle Hq. Closes Colombières
Eagle Main Opens St. Sauveur
Eagle Rear Opens Periers

August 14, 1944
"Eagle Jac"
St. Sauveur - St. James

August 21-25, 1944
"Eagle Main & Eagle Rear"
St. Sauveur/Periers - Laval

August 21, 1944
"Eagle Jac"
St. James - Laval


August 24, 1944
"Eagle Jac"
Laval - Chartres

September 2-5, 1944
"Eagle Main & Eagle Rear"
Laval - Versailles

September 17-18, 1944
"Eagle Main & Eagle Rear"
Versailles - Verdun

FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY GROUP
BECOMES
12TH UNITED STATES ARMY GROUP
JULY 14, 1944





**MOVEMENT OF EAGLE HEADQUARTERS
OCTOBER 1943 — JULY 1945**

INCL. NO. 2, FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORT, HQ. COMD'T. SECTION

12TH ARMY GROUP
"EAGLE"



NOV 2 1948

**HEADQUARTERS
12TH ARMY GROUP
(FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORT)**

**VOLUME I
SUMMARY**

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

370.2 (AG)

31 July 1945

SUBJECT: Final After Action Report.

THRU : Commanding General, US Forces European Theater, APO 887.

TO : The Adjutant General.

1. In order that a final after action report might be prepared and published for Headquarters 12th Army Group upon its disbandment, each staff section has submitted a report of activities covering the period from activation as Headquarters First US Army Group on 19 October 1943 through 14 July 1944, when this headquarters became Headquarters 12th Army Group, to date of disbandment, 31 July 1945.

2. This report has been prepared in fourteen volumes, as follows:

- Volume I — Basic report (a summary of the activities of the headquarters from date of activation to date of disbandment).
- Volume II — G-1
- Volume III — G-2, Parts I through IV
- Volume IV — G-2, Parts V through VII
- Volume V — G-3
- Volume VI — G-4
- Volume VII — G-5
- Volume VIII — AG
- Volume IX — Hq Comdt, Sp Trs
- Volume X — Chap, Fin, IG, JA, PM, Sp Sv
- Volume XI — AAA, Armd, Arty, Sig, CWS
- Volume XII — Engr, Ord, QM, Trans
- Volume XIII — Med
- Volume XIV — P & PW

3. This report is classified as restricted.

FOR THE ARMY GROUP COMMANDER:



C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
 COMMANDING GENERAL AND CHIEFS OF STAFF SECTIONS

1 August 1944

8 May 1945

Lt Gen Omar N. Bradley	Commanding	Gen Omar N. Bradley
Maj Gen Leven C. Allen	Chief of Staff	Maj Gen Leven C. Allen
Brig Gen Robert W. Hasbrouck	D/Chief of Staff	Brig Gen Henry B. Lewis
Lt Col Eldon L. Bailey	Sec Gen Staff	Col Eldon L. Bailey
Col Joseph J. O'Hare	G-1	Brig Gen Joseph J. O'Hare
Brig Gen Edwin L. Sibert	G-2	Brig Gen Edwin L. Sibert
Brig Gen A. Franklin Kibler	G-3	Brig Gen A. Franklin Kibler
Brig Gen Raymond G. Moses	G-4	Brig Gen Raymond G. Moses
Col Cornelius E. Ryan	G-5	Brig Gen Cornelius E. Ryan
Brig Gen Henry B. Lewis	Adjutant General	Col Charles R. Landon
Brig Gen John H. Hinds	Artillery Officer	Col Thomas B. Hedekin
Col Edwin K. Wright	Armored	Col Edwin K. Wright
	Chaplain	Lt Col Morgan J. O'Brien
Col John C. MacArthur	Chemical	Col Patrick F. Powers
Col Patrick H. Timothy	Engineer	Brig Gen Patrick H. Timothy
Lt Col Paul G. Hommeyer	Finance	Maj Eugene R. Melton
Col Harry J. Karakas	Headquarters Comdt	Col Harry J. Karakas
Lt Col Walter B. Cramer	Inspector General	Col Frank G. Ringland
Col Claude B. Mickelwait	Judge Advocate	Col Claude B. Mickelwait
Col Harold A. Nisley	Ordnance	Brig Gen Harold A. Nisley
Col Clifford R. Powell	P & PW	Col Francis J. Fitzgerald
Col Claud E. Stadtman	Provost Marshal	Col Claud E. Stadtman
Col James W. Younger	Quartermaster	Brig Gen James W. Younger
Col Garland C. Black	Signal	Brig Gen Garland C. Black
Lt Col Francis E. Conder	Special Service	Col Thomas M. Crawford
Col Alvin L. Gorby	Surgeon	Col Alvin L. Gorby
Col Calvin L. Whittle	Transportation	Col Calvin L. Whittle
Brig Gen Charles R. Doran	Commanding General, Special Troops	Brig Gen Charles R. Doran

INTRODUCTION

1. ORIGINS.

a. Operation "Overlord" — the plan for the invasion of France and the defeat of Germany in the West — as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain at Quebec in the summer of 1943, contemplated large American forces sufficiently predominating within the Allied expeditionary force to bring about the surrender of the German armed forces. After successful completion of the first phase of the invasion through Normandy, in which only one American army was to participate, the newly arriving United States armies were to be placed under a single American commander and headquarters, whose mission it would be to conduct field operations in a designated geographical sphere under direct command of the Supreme Allied Commander. Such a headquarters was activated in October 1943 and named First US Army Group. Lt Gen Omar N. Bradley was assigned to command the Army Group, in addition to commanding the First US Army.

b. Although organization of the Army Group headquarters was of concern to the War Department, considerable interest in the matter was displayed also by Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA), which had in mind a General Headquarters (GHQ), patterned after the GHQ which had been activated by the War Department in the United States in 1940.

c. As conceived by ETOUSA, the GHQ was to have been vested with all-inclusive administrative functions normally carried out by a Theater Headquarters as well as over-all operational functions of a senior field headquarters conducting large-scale combat operations and logistics.

d. Final instructions on the question of an army group headquarters — in contradistinction to a GHQ — was received at ETOUSA in September. Writing to the Theater Commander, the US Army Chief of Staff directed that an Army Group headquarters, devoted to planning for and commanding in the field a number of American armies, be organized in the United Kingdom. To command the American Army Group (and the First US Army), the Chief of Staff named Lt Gen O. N. Bradley.⁶

* From the unpublished History of 12th Army Group (Vol I), by Captain Albert Norman.

2. COMMAND.

a. Headquarters First US Army Group (FUSAG) was activated on 19 October 1943, with station at London, England, by General Order 74, Headquarters ETOUSA, dated 16 October 1943. On the day of its activation, Lt Gen Omar N. Bradley assumed command of the new headquarters pursuant to General Order 1, Headquarters First US Army Group, dated 19 October 1943.

b. On 14 July 1944, Headquarters 12th Army Group was activated by General Order 73, Headquarters ETOUSA, dated 14 July 1944, and had transferred to it all units and personnel then assigned and attached to First US Army Group, "except those specifically excepted." On the same day, General Bradley assumed command of 12th Army Group. The quoted phrase was inserted in the General Order as a part of the "Overlord" cover plan, to create in the mind of the German High Command the impression that the First US Army Group — which nominally remained in existence under a new commander — was being used to build up Allied forces in the United Kingdom for a main assault landing on the Pas-de-Calais coast of France. First US Army Group continued in existence — on paper only — until 18 October 1944, when it was deactivated by General Order 104, Headquarters ETOUSA, dated 18 October 1944, after the cover plan had proved a success.*

c. Pursuant to authority contained in a letter from General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, dated 25 July 1944, Headquarters 12th Army Group published General Order No. 3, dated 1 August 1944, assigning, effective that date, the First and Third US Armies to 12th Army Group. On the same day, General Bradley relinquished command of the First US Army and assumed operational command of 12th Army Group. The Army Group, however, remained under the over-all operational control of Field Marshal B. L. Montgomery, Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, who was then responsible for all ground force operations in Northern France.

d. On 1 September 1944, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force became operational, assuming direct command of all field operations. 12th Army Group was relieved of responsibility to 21 Army Group and made responsible direct to the Supreme Commander.

* op. cit.

e. Headquarters 12th Army Group ceased to exist on 1 August 1945, pursuant to General Order 177, Headquarters United States Forces European Theater (USFET), dated 1 August 1945.

f. A detailed account of operations of the headquarters, problems encountered and means developed for their solution, is contained in a series of volumes (numbered II through XIV) under the headings of the several General and Special Staff Sections.

I. G-1 SECTION*

1. GENERAL.

a. Brigadier General James E. Wharton was assigned Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, on 22 October 1943. Of immediate concern was the necessity for establishing the personnel requirements to permit the Headquarters and Headquarters Special Troops to function efficiently, both in their planning and in their operational missions. In addition, there were the G-1 planning responsibilities for the administrative support of two operations then under consideration: "OVERLORD" — the plan for the invasion of the Continent of Europe, and "RANKIN," Case "C" — the plan for operations in the event of a pre-invasion German collapse.

b. To meet these problems most effectively and to expedite the handling of routine G-1 matters, General Wharton organized G-1 Section personnel into branches and delegated specific responsibilities to each. The Personnel Branch made early and continuing studies of the personnel needs of the various staff sections, and based on results of those studies allotments of grades and ratings were procured from Theater Headquarters and qualified personnel secured.

c. G-1 was charged with drafting and coordinating plans on all G-1 matters included in the Army Group mission. To carry out this planning responsibility, the Replacement and Prisoner of War Branch formulated personnel reinforcement plans for the support of operations. Casualty estimates were prepared in coordination with the Army Group Surgeon and an estimate of reinforcement needs of the ground forces from D-Day to D + 209 was computed and used by Theater Headquarters as a primary basis for setting up of a reinforcement flow from the United States. The personnel shipping list, required daily to maintain an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements to the continent from D + 15 to D + 89, was submitted to the G-3 Section for inclusion in the shipping priority tables. Procedures were worked out for the close support of each corps and army by reinforcement installations. In addition, plans for the collection, the handling and the evacuation of prisoners of war were formulated in conjunction with the Provost Marshal. The Miscellaneous Branch prepared plans for all other G-1 matters, chiefly for such matters as burial and graves registration, postal services, special service activities, and awards and decorations. A continuing study of the troop list was made to insure that an adequate and timely flow of such G-1 service units as Special Service Companies, Finance Disbursing

* For detailed study see Volume II.

Sections, Army Postal Units, Graves Registration Companies, Military Police Units and American Red Cross clubmobile groups was maintained.

d. Upon the Plans Branch devolved the responsibility of editing these G-1 plans and of bringing them into harmony with the assault phase plan of First US Army, then operationally under Headquarters 21 Army Group. The final plans were published on 19 April 1944, as part of the Joint Administrative Plan — United States Forces, Operation "OVERLORD," which served as the administrative guide to the armies comprising the Army Group.

e. On 2 May, Colonel George A. Miller was announced Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, during the temporary absence of Brigadier General Wharton. Shortly thereafter, G-1 representatives formed part of the US Administrative Staff at 21 Army Group. This staff was headed by Brigadier General Raymond G. Moses, the Army Group Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. Its mission was to coordinate all plans for the American forces with those of the British forces for the period during which American forces would be under the command of 21 Army Group.

f. Immediately following D-Day, the G-1 increment at 21 Army Group (Main) began compiling the daily report of the previous day's casualties, strengths, prisoner of war captures and reinforcements received. While American forces were under British control, this information was submitted as part of the 21 Army Group daily situation report.

g. On 14 July, Brigadier General (then Colonel) J. J. O'Hare was announced as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Headquarters 12th Army Group. To cope more effectively with the operational problems then confronting G-1, a general reorganization of branch responsibilities was inaugurated. This new delegation of branch responsibilities remained relatively stable until the dissolution of the headquarters.

2. OPERATIONS BRANCH.

a. The coordination of all necessary revisions of plans and the preparation of the G-1 portion of administrative orders and instructions were carried out by the Operations Branch. All required reports on G-1 matters were also prepared, the most important being the G-1 Daily Summary, which provided the fastest information available to the Army Group Commander on strengths, casualties, prisoner-of-war captures and reinforcements of all armies, corps and divisions under his command. In addition, the G-1 administrative map, showing locations of all major headquarters and installations of G-1 interest, was maintained. All internal matters of section administration were also handled by this branch.

b. The Operations Branch formulated and supervised the execution of a policy for the reservation of accommodations in army areas for all installations not under army commanders' control.

3. MORALE BRANCH.

a. The primary function of the Morale Branch was processing of recommendations for awards that required action by higher headquarters and handling of necessary details in conjunction with the offer of foreign awards and decorations to members of the Army Group. In order to establish a uniform guide for making awards for gallantry in action and meritorious service, a quota system was devised, based on the number of combat days of a unit the size of an infantry division.

b. Secondary only to the processing of recommendations for awards and decorations was the supervision and coordination of the establishment of rest camps in the army areas, and the granting of leaves, furloughs and passes to recreational areas and leave centers located in the Communications Zone. The first leave center to be placed in operation was Paris, in October 1944. Soon after that, centers were opened in the United Kingdom, Brussels and on the French Riviera.

c. The assignment of American Red Cross clubmobile groups was made by this branch in conjunction with the Regional Executive, American Red Cross. Establishment of Red Cross Clubs and "Donut Dugouts" in the army areas was planned so that maximum benefit would be obtained from available resources. American Red Cross field directors and hospital workers operated under supervision of the units to which they were attached.

d. Post exchange, postal service, special service and graves registration matters were normally handled directly between Commanding Generals of armies and the Commanding General, Communications Zone, in accordance with standing operating procedures. This headquarters maintained a supervisory interest only. The only exception to this rule was the allotment of special service companies to the armies, allocation of which was controlled by this headquarters.

4. PERSONNEL BRANCH.

a. The Personnel Branch made a continual study of personnel requirements for T/O and non-T/O organizations within the command and aided in the procurement of authorized augmentations to headquarters of armies, corps and

divisions. A survey of available qualified personnel as "spare" regimental and battalion commanders was carried out and the personnel procured.

b. Normally, the Personnel Branch was concerned only with reclassification cases involving colonels. Such officers were interviewed at this headquarters and were reassigned without formal reclassification when the facts in the case warranted it.

c. Promotions to and within general officer grades were processed once each month. Recommendations for promotion to the grade of colonel were processed as received. Promotions below the grade of colonel were handled by armies, except for personnel of this headquarters and units directly under its control.

d. Armies were authorized to take final action on battlefield appointments to the grade of second lieutenant and were encouraged to take full advantage of this authority to commission deserving men in combat units. Authority for direct appointment of warrant officers was initially delegated to armies, but this authority was withdrawn by the Theater Commander in August 1944, and appointments to Warrant Officer, Junior Grade, were suspended. After lifting this suspension, authority for final action on such appointments was retained at Theater Headquarters.

5. REINFORCEMENTS BRANCH.

a. After the invasion of Normandy, estimates of battle reinforcement requirements for six months in advance, based on actual experience loss rates, and a ground force troop build-up, were submitted monthly to Theater Headquarters by the Reinforcements Branch. The desired percentage composition, by arm and service, of the reinforcements required was also submitted to Theater Headquarters for use as a basis for stocking reinforcement depots.

b. Priorities by which the Ground Force Reinforcement Command would furnish reinforcements to the major ground force commands were normally published approximately twice a month. These allocations were based on the factors of current personnel shortages, reinforcement stockage in army depots, estimated flow of hospital returnees to each army and future tactical requirements. During the latter part of August, the flow of hospital returnees was considerably greater than the units could absorb. Special priorities were established for the return of this personnel, based on length of service with their respective organizations.

c. A critical shortage of infantry reinforcements developed during November, and by 15 December this shortage of infantry riflemen amounted to 17,581.

Brigadier General O'Hare and the Chief of the Reinforcements Branch comprised members of a group that went to the War Department in December to point out the seriousness of the situation. As a result of the Washington conference, the supply of infantry reinforcements was expedited and increased in January 1945 and in subsequent months. The infantry conversion training program for general assignment of Communications Zone and Air Force personnel, established in January 1945 by Theater Headquarters, also did much to alleviate the infantry shortage.

d. In November 1944, Theater Headquarters, on Army Group recommendation, established the policy whereby units actually engaged in combat could requisition reinforcements, based on estimated losses, 48 hours in advance. This policy cut down the time lag in supplying the reinforcements.

e. Quotas for the Theater Infantry Officer Candidate School and other infantry training schools, established in January, were received and allotted to the armies.

f. During March, thirty-three provisionally organized rifle platoons, composed of colored enlisted personnel who had been retrained as infantry riflemen, were received. These platoons were assigned initially on the basis of one platoon per rifle company and not more than three platoons per division.

g. In order to give the front line combat soldier every consideration in the furlough rotation program to the United States, a policy was established in March whereby over 90% of the personnel returning to the Zone of the Interior monthly for 45 days' rest, relaxation and recuperation were drawn from lettered companies of infantry units or from other personnel who were habitually in close contact with the enemy.

h. Quotas for the return of personnel to the Zone of the Interior, under provisions of War Department Readjustment Regulations 1-2, were received from Theater Headquarters and were allocated to subordinate headquarters on the basis of the percentage of personnel having adjusted service rating scores of 85 and above.

i. An important continuing function of the Reinforcements Branch was the coordination of reinforcement procedures between the armies, Headquarters Ground Force Reinforcement Command, and Theater Headquarters. This coordination became more vital when the system of command and control of reinforcement depots and forward battalions reverted from the armies to the Ground Force Reinforcement Command. Deficiencies noted in the established reinforcement procedures were made the subject of corrective recommendations.

6. MISCELLANEOUS BRANCH

a. G-1 miscellaneous matters were reviewed in the light of operational needs, brought up to date, and consolidated for inclusion in 12th Army Group's Administrative Standing Operating Procedure (ADSOP). Plans, policies and directives for investigating reported violations of the Geneva Conventions and the apprehension, interrogation and detention of war criminals were initiated and promulgated.

b. Implementation of nonfraternization policies, directed by SHAEF, included distribution of SHAEF policy down to include companies; the publication of the booklet "Special Orders for German-American Relations," and the establishment of a plan for orienting all troops through agencies available to the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section under G-1 supervision.

c. From December 1944 through most of May 1945 matters pertaining to the recovery, maintenance and evacuation of Allied prisoners of war were handled.

d. Considerable attention was given to various reports of looting, pillaging and wanton destruction by Allied troops in liberated countries. Command letters were disseminated to all subordinate headquarters.

e. G-1 "ECLIPSE" planning, setting forth administrative policies to be effective upon the surrender of Germany, were initiated and carried through by the Miscellaneous Branch, including reviews of other staff plans, publication of a series of drafts of the G-1 Annex to the "ECLIPSE" Plan, and discussions with representatives of SHAEF and of US Group Control Council. As background for this planning, a Miscellaneous Branch officer attended a special disarmament school in London.

f. Immediately following the cessation of hostilities, the disbandment of German disarmed forces was begun. Initially, only priority occupational categories were discharged, i. e., agricultural workers, miners, transportation workers and other key personnel. Later, general disbandment was authorized. Arrangements were made with the Russians for repatriating their prisoners of war; with Allied Forces Headquarters (which conducted operations in Italy) for sending 100,000 German soldiers from Italy to Germany; with SHAEF for sending 130,000 German soldiers from Norway to Germany; with Communications Zone for sending 60,000 hospitalized German soldiers from France to hospitals in Germany; and with 21 Army Group for initiating the inter-zone transfer of German soldiers between the United States and British zones. By the end of July 1945 it was estimated that disbandment of the German Army in the United States Zone would be approximately 75 per cent completed.

II. G-2 SECTION*

1. Under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, the Section handled all intelligence matters for the armies and the Army Group during both the planning and operations phases. G-2 Section was divided into the following branches: —

a. Administration Branch. This branch handled all matters pertaining to personnel assigned or on duty with the Section.

b. Intelligence Branch. It briefed the General and Special staffs on all matters pertaining to enemy activity. The air portion of the Branch supplied data on the German Air Force and controlled photo cover. It also controlled photo cover before D-Day, in addition to making terrain studies concerning those portions of the beaches that were later to be utilized for operations. It prepared publications concerning G-2 activity and was in general the agency that evaluated reports concerning enemy activity. It also collected and disseminated all intelligence matter to higher and subordinate commands.

c. Counter-Intelligence Branch. During the preparation phase of the work on the invasion this branch was responsible for the security of the headquarters as well as for the preparation of lists of enemy agents who were known to be in areas to become operational. A plan was also set up whereby all CIC agencies and units in the Army Group would be controlled by the Branch. It initiated action and coordinated this action with Allied counterespionage units in suppressing enemy intelligence activity before D-Day and during the entire operational period.

d. Foreign Liaison Branch. This branch carried on liaison with various Allied units and headquarters actively engaged in preparing for the invasion. It was later responsible for all members of foreign units attached to American combat formations within the Army Group.

2. The above four units formed the G-2 Section before D-Day. The work of each was devoted primarily to making plans and preparations for the time when the Army Group would become operational. When the headquarters was split in three echelons, the G-2 Section, with the exception of a small part of the Administrative Branch, was located at the Tactical Headquarters. The functions of the various branches became diversified from what they had originally been, and this resulted in numerous changes in order to cope with current and future situations.

* For detailed study see Volumes III and IV.

3. The Air Branch, formerly associated with the Intelligence Branch, became divorced from that branch and became known as G-2 (Air). It coordinated aerial photo requests and disseminated all information obtained from photos. It had attached to it several photo interpretation units from the Military Intelligence Service.

4. The Intelligence Branch edited and published G-2 reports, daily cables, weekly intelligence summaries and similar publications. In addition, it evaluated information from units in the field and agents' reports.

5. The Counterintelligence Branch had the comparatively simple task of picking up German agents left behind for the purpose of getting information concerning Allied troop movements and intentions on the basis of preparations made before D-Day. Enemy agent activity was hastily neutralized.

6. Foreign liaison became increasingly important as larger areas of the occupied countries were liberated. The Foreign Liaison Branch aided much in coordinating personnel problems of Allied units attached to American combat formations.

7. A definite need arose for an agency to plan for future operations with respect to occupied Germany in the event of an unconditional surrender. For this purpose, a Plans Branch was formed, which began a study of conditions inside Germany. It took an active part in formulating and putting into effect Operation "ECLIPSE."

8. A special unit known as the Target Branch, or "T" Branch, was organized in early 1944. This unit was organized to isolate and secure intelligence and counterintelligence targets. Each team from this organization, which was attached to a combat unit, consisted of a small task force.

III. G-3 SECTION*

1. GENERAL

The G-3 Section of the headquarters was established on 22 October 1943, and Brigadier General A. Franklin Kibler assigned on that date as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. He occupied this position throughout the life of the headquarters.

2. PLANNING PHASE.

a. From its beginning until 1 August 1944, when the Army Group Headquarters became tactically operational, the G-3 Section was primarily concerned with planning for Operations "OVERLORD" and "RANKIN." On 29 November 1943, the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate), forerunner of Supreme Headquarters, issued a basic directive to the Army Group and to 21 Army Group, specifying the responsibilities of each with respect to "OVERLORD," the operation to defeat the German armed forces. This directive was later supplemented and modified by further orders from COSSAC and from the Supreme Commander. With respect to the main functions of the Army Group G-3, the problem of planning "OVERLORD" was set within the following framework:

b. The Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, was charged jointly with the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief and the Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, with planning the operation and with its execution until such time as the Supreme Commander would allocate an area of responsibility to the Commanding General, First United States Army Group. The tasks allotted to the latter consisted of working in close cooperation with 21 Army Group during the planning and execution of the operation; of working in close consultation with Headquarters ETOUSA and with the British Service Ministries for the mounting of the operation; of preparing for the establishment of First Army Group Headquarters on the Continent when so ordered by the Supreme Commander; and from that time on being responsible for operations on the Western Front within the sphere assigned to it. For the work with the 21 Army Group suitable staff personnel were attached to the British Army Group.

c. As a part of its "OVERLORD" planning responsibilities, First United States Army Group was charged with the preparation of build-up priority tables, which established the order in which all United States troops would move to the Continent from D 15 to D 90, and which provided the basis for the control of the

* For detailed study see Volume V.

build-up of American forces on the Continent. The Commanding General, First United States Army Group was also requested to supply detailed plans, in collaboration with 21 Army Group and Ninth Air Force, for his assumption of command of the Army Group and for the tactical employment of the units that would be assigned to it. Regarding the allotment of troops for carrying out the early phases of the invasion, Headquarters ETOUSA was ordered to place under command of 21 Army Group the First US Army, several Ranger battalions, and a supply and maintenance organization to support the American forces until such time as the First United States Army Group would become operational. As an integral part of the operation it was believed necessary to stage deceptive military operations. To this end, the Army Group was instructed to work in close consultation with Headquarters ETOUSA and 21 Army Group in the preparation and execution of a cover plan. In order to place First United States Army Group in contact with resistance groups inside enemy-held territory, Headquarters Special Operations Executive-Special Operations was instructed to appoint missions to both the First US Army Group and First US Army.

d. With respect to "RANKIN" (a plan for the liberation of German-held territory in Western Europe and for the occupation of Germany in the event of a German collapse or surrender before "OVERLORD" was launched) the Army Group was charged with preparing all portions of the plan that applied to the United States field forces. The G-3 Section was responsible for completing the operational portions of both of the foregoing plans and for coordinating all such planning within the Army Group headquarters.

e. Initially, the G-3 Section was organized for these purposes into an Operations and Plans Branch, an Organization and Equipment Branch, an Air Branch and an Airborne Branch. From time to time, the structure of the Section was modified to adapt it to the changing situation, either by revising the functions of the branches or by increasing or decreasing the number of personnel assigned to them. Thus, the Airborne Branch was dissolved in March 1944 and airborne matters later transferred to a special staff section. As the date for the establishment of an operational headquarters approached, the organization of a liaison service with other headquarters became necessary. Accordingly, such a service was established first as a separate staff section, and later, in May, as a branch of the G-3 Section. Because Headquarters 12th Army Group exercised no command functions during the planning phase, except those pertaining to a few assigned special troop units, no training branch was required during most of that phase. During that period one or two officers were designated to handle passive air defense matters and such training matters as might arise. Later, on

14 June, it was necessary to establish a complete training branch, whose principal function was the collection, collation and dissemination of battle experiences and combat lessons learned from them.

3. OPERATIONAL PHASE

a. On 1 August, the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, assumed command of the First and Third US Armies on the Continent, and the Army Group Headquarters became operational. Thereafter, until the end of hostilities, the G-3 Section performed the normal duties of an operations section in combat. During this period it was principally concerned with tactical studies and estimates, plans and orders based thereon and recommendations relative to the assignment of troop units and allocations of equipment. In addition, it was engaged in the preparation of plans for the occupation of Germany after the cessation of hostilities and in the collection, collation and dissemination of battle experiences and combat lessons until 11 November, on which date most of the personnel and principal functions of the Training Branch were transferred to Headquarters ETOUSA.

b. Not assigned to the G-3 Section, but under the operational control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, was a British Phantom Detachment (detached from 21 Army Group). This detachment, established throughout the Army Group, collected operational information from subordinate units and expedited its transmittal to the armies and to the Army Group Headquarters. Late in 1944 the organization and training of a comparable United States unit was initiated under G-3 supervision. This unit, known as the Army Group Liaison Detachment, had just become operational at the end of hostilities.

c. During the period August 1944 to the cessation of hostilities, the Army Group headquarters operated in three echelons: A Tactical Headquarters, a Main Headquarters, and a Rear Headquarters. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and elements of the Section (the Special Plans Branch and portions of the Operations, Liaison, Plans and Troops Branches, with a total average strength of 15 officers and 18 enlisted men) were on duty with the Tactical Headquarters. The Air Branch (with an average strength of 12 officers and 6 enlisted men) operated at Headquarters Ninth Air Force. The Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and the remainder of the Section (the Organization and Equipment Branch and portions of the Operations, Liaison, Plans and Troops Branches, totalling an average of 30 officers and 44 enlisted men) functioned at Main Headquarters. Until its transfer to Headquarters ETOUSA, the Training Branch was located at Rear Headquarters.

4. POST-HOSTILITIES PHASE

Following the cessation of organized resistance, the activities of the G-3 Section were directed primarily to problems relating to the complete occupation of all portions of Germany in rear of our then existing front lines; to the redistribution of our troops into the final United States zone of occupation and the Bremen Enclave; to the introduction of US troops into and the occupation of the US sector in Berlin; to the redeployment of field forces to the United States or other theaters; and to the preparation of reports on various aspects of the campaign in Western Europe. No material changes in the organization of the G-3 Section were made during this period, except for the gradual decrease in personnel and the final elimination of branches as their functions were discontinued.

5. FUNCTIONS OF BRANCHES

a. Activities of the G-3 branches during the operational period were briefly as follows:

(1) *Plans Branch.* This branch made studies and recommendations for the Army Group Commander as to the desirability and feasibility of operations that might contribute to the accomplishment of the mission assigned to the Army Group. It formulated broad outline plans for contemplated operations in order to assess the resources required and to give the Army Group Commander an indication of a way in which such operations might be undertaken. It kept subordinate planning staffs informed of plans under consideration in order to assist them in their detailed planning, and it coordinated their plans. Although generally considered a function of the Operations Branch, the Plans Branch of the Army Group prepared all Letters of Instruction for pending operations and all other combat instructions pertaining to operations in progress or to be undertaken.

(2) *Special Plans Branch.* This branch planned and directed cover and deception activities for 12th Army Group and conducted the necessary staff training in the preparation. It also rendered advice regarding the training of all troops involved in the execution of these plans.

(3) *Operations Branch.* The Operations Branch prepared and presented reports on combat operations within the 12th Army Group sphere of control. To this end it held daily briefings for the Commanding General and other officers of the headquarters; it prepared situation reports, G-3 reports, and summaries; maintained G-3 operations maps, including data posted in the Map Room and in the Chief of Staff's Conference Room; and supervised and coordinated G-3 liaison activities.

(4) *Liaison Branch*. Under the supervision of the Operations Branch, the Liaison Branch maintained close and continuous liaison on ground force matters with higher, parallel and subordinate headquarters, so as to insure the prompt flow of all pertinent operational information into this headquarters.

(5) *Organization and Equipment Branch*. This branch coordinated matters of supply and equipment with operational requirements; it established priorities for allocation of equipment as well as requirements for special items. It also acted on changes in Tables of Organization and Equipment.

(6) *Troops Branch*. The branch established priorities for the assignment of combat units, allocated such units to the armies, and coordinated troop movements into and between army areas.

(7) *Air Branch*. The Air Branch advised the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (and G-2), on policies relating to air support and tactical and photographic reconnaissance. To this end it maintained close liaison with corresponding agencies of other headquarters and with appropriate sections of the major Air Force commands; it collaborated with other agencies in the preparation of material dealing with various phases of air-ground cooperation. It assisted the Plans Branch in preparing air-ground provisions of operational plans and directives; it advised the Plans Branch as to suitable demands to be made on the Air Forces for air support; and it served as an intermediary between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and appropriate air staffs on all matters pertaining to air-ground cooperation and support.

(8) *Training Branch*. During the period 14 June to 11 November 1944, the Training Branch exercised staff supervision over the normal training functions of the G-3 Section, but was primarily engaged in the collection, collation and dissemination of battle experiences and combat lessons based on combat operations of all ground forces under 12th Army Group command.

(9) *The Passive Air Defense Officer* advised the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, and his staff on all matters pertaining to passive air defense planning, operations, and training. He also coordinated civil defense matters with passive air defense activities and supervised passive air defense staff training.

(10) *The Information and Education Officer* exercised general supervision over the Army education program within 12th Army Group. To this end, he maintained close contact with the Information and Education services of Theater Headquarters, the Army Information-Education Staff School, and the Army Information and Education officers.

IV. G-4 SECTION*

1. Throughout the campaign leading to the defeat of the German armed forces logistics played a paramount role, greatly influencing tactical and strategic decisions. The G-4 Section was organized as a General Staff Section of Headquarters First US Army Group on 23 October 1943. During the months prior to D-Day the Section devoted its primary efforts to planning for operations "OVERLORD" and "RANKIN — Case C." Also, together with elements of several other General and Special Staff Sections of the Headquarters, the G-4 Section comprised the US Administrative Staff at Headquarters 21 Army Group (British) and as such was responsible for coordinating US administrative plans and early operations on the Continent with those of the British forces.

2. From D-Day to V-E Day the principal logistical factor affecting operations was transportation, and although many other items entered the logistical picture, the transport factor was predominant and controlling. Except for the period from 1 September to 8 November 1944, supplies of all classes were generally available and adequate to support full-scale operations. The most serious shortage of supplies existed during the Autumn of 1944, when Quartermaster Class III and Ordnance Class V supplies were critical. Initially there was a shortage of service troops as a result of the curtailment of their build-up in favor of combat troops. As the operation progressed, excessive delays in the equipping of service units after their arrival on the Continent delayed their employment. The major problems with which the G-4 Section was concerned during the occupational phase pertained to the readjustment of the armies into their final zones of occupation and the redeployment of units.

3. During the early period of Continental operations — from 6 June to 31 July — the status of supply and other G-4 activities was generally satisfactory. Although the planned build-up of supplies and service troops was not accomplished, there were sufficient supplies to meet adequately the major demands of the combat troops; and the deficiencies in service troops were not felt measurably as long as operations were confined to the Cotentin Peninsula. The build-up of service troops was intentionally curtailed to permit the accelerated shipment of combat troops. Severe channel storms cancelled all beach discharges for a period of four days at the end of the second week of operations, seriously jeopardizing logistical support and resulting in a very small safety factor of reserves until the setback was overcome. Abnormal requirements for certain types of supplies were the primary causes for most of the critical

* For detailed study see Volume VI.

shortages during that period. The problems involved in the movement of these critical items were largely overcome by a special cross-Channel ferrying service, called the "Red Ball Express," and by the early inauguration of an Air Transport Service. It was found that the standing operating procedure governing air transport was entirely too cumbersome, and this headquarters initiated a new procedure, greatly simplifying the mechanics of air supply. The shallow depth of the bridgehead resulted in highly congested traffic circulation and limited space for storage of supplies. Transportation facilities, however, proved adequate to meet requirements. Evacuation of casualties to the United Kingdom was carried out with little difficulty by LST's, hospital carriers, and air transport. Cherbourg was captured later than anticipated, and its port facilities were only in the process of being developed at the close of the period. Supplies were moved over the beaches and through minor ports.

4. From 1 to 27 August logistical aspects changed considerably. 12th Army Group assumed over-all control of United States tactical and administrative operations on the Continent and the US Administrative Staff at Headquarters 21 Army Group had returned to 12th Army Group late in July. As the Third Army became operational, it rapidly fanned out to the east and west. Lines of communication became progressively elongated and the inadequacy of service units, especially truck companies, was evident. Emphasis, however, continued to be given to the build-up of combat troops. With the exception of chemical warfare and medical supplies varying degrees of insufficiency in all classes developed at one time or another during this period. In order to realize the maximum benefit from all available truck transport, one-way through routes, called "Red Ball Routes," were developed from the beaches to the supply points of the advancing armies. Depots of the First Army were displaced from the St. Lo to the La Loupe area. Third Army had no orthodox service area until late in the period when it, too, began to build up supplies in the La Loupe area. The VIII Corps, operating in the Brittany Peninsula, was designated as a separate command under this Headquarters, with direct supply channels. Air supply, though insignificant in comparison with over-all figures, was of particular value in delivering Classes I and III, the most urgently needed of the critical supplies. The heavy demands placed on the available truck companies increased proportionately the maintenance requirements, which were difficult to meet due to the inadequacy of service units. The rehabilitation of railroads progressed slowly. This was due to the policy of phasing back service units. After the fall of Paris on 27 August, it became apparent that road transportation had reached practically its limit and that operations would

soon have to be retarded until such time as railroad and Class III pipeline facilities could be developed and could assume a larger share of the load in the forward movement of supplies. Acting on the advice of this Headquarters, original plans for the development of main rail lines were radically changed, and Communications Zone engineers devoted their attention to the more rapid construction of one pipeline out of Normandy instead of the three parallel lines originally planned.

5. From 28 August to 30 September the First and Third Armies continued their rapid advance across France and became disposed generally along the Siegfried Line in the north and the Moselle River in the south. The speed of advance was governed by the quantity of food and gasoline that could be supplied the leading elements, the halt being finally caused by increased enemy resistance, the need for organization for further offensive action and for improvement of capacity for logistical support. Normal logistical support during this period was not possible. Lines of communication were severely overtaxed, and there were practically no reserves in the armies' depots. Daily tonnages delivered to the armies, however, increased somewhat toward the close of the period, principally owing to improvements in the rail system, which was developed rapidly on a limited scale to the east of Paris. Because of severe damage done to rail crossings of the Seine and terminals and bridges in the vicinity of Paris, the city itself became a bottleneck in rail operations. Available air supply facilities were particularly beneficial in transporting gasoline to forward elements. The Class III pipeline project proceeded slowly, primarily because of a shortage of transport. First Army established a service area in the vicinity of Liege, and Third Army dumps were moved to the Chalons-Sommeseus area and finally to the Verdun-Nancy area. Because of the lack of sufficient transportation, a system of tonnage allocations became necessary within the stated ability of Communications Zone to haul supplies to the armies.

6 The period from 1 October to 7 November 1944 was characterized by a static situation along the front lines, during which time every effort was made to improve the transportation network and to build up supplies to allow resumption of the offensive. Early in October it became apparent that the critical Class V stocks in Communications Zone were practically exhausted. Because of this condition, together with the fact that the supply status of other items was similarly serious as a result of Communications Zone's inability to deliver items desired, the decision was made temporarily to halt further major offensive operations. At this time the Communications Zone began establishing closer support of army areas and the build-up of stocks in the Advance Section, Com-

munications Zone depots and supply points. In line with this decision, a credit system for Class V was established, whereby only that ammunition physically available in Communications Zone's forward depots would be allocated to the armies. Although the system of allocating tonnages served its desired end, it had the inevitable result of cutting off the flow of items not deemed essential at the moment for continuing the advance, and stocks in the armies became unbalanced. Rail crossings over the Seine were completed and railway rehabilitation to the east and northeast of Paris progressed appreciably, greatly improving the rail situation behind the armies. Maximum demands were placed on available truck companies, and air transport was useful. The pipeline project continued to advance satisfactorily.

7. Although the supply position remained unfavorable in a number of important items, it was decided that the over-all logistical situation was such that major offensives could be sustained on 8 November. The period from 8 November to 16 December was marked by continuous improvement in the G-4 picture. This was due to greater tonnage imports, increased rail facilities and improved distribution methods. Some desirable changes in supply procedure were instituted. Tonnage allocations to armies were abolished; a 10-day requisition period procedure for all supplies, except Class V, was established, with Communications Zone responsible for the movement to army depots. Army service areas were displaced forward. Rail development, which was excellent, was centered in the north in anticipation of large tonnage receipts from Antwerp, which was opened to United States traffic in the latter part of November. The development of a Class III pipeline system from Antwerp, in the direction of Maastricht, was initiated with first priority. Air delivery continued to be helpful despite frequent bad weather. Shortage of equipment in the staging areas prevented the proper flow of service troops in proportion to combat troops.

8. On 16 December the enemy launched his strong counteroffensive, apparently aiming to split the American forces and to destroy the vital supply installations that were built up in the Liege-Namur area, in Belgium. The ability of the armies to cope successfully with the serious enemy threat was largely a result of the improvement made in the logistical situation in the period just prior to the German attack. This improvement continued almost uninterruptedly throughout the offensive. First and Ninth Armies were placed under the operational control of 21 Army Group, though administrative control remained unchanged. It was necessary for First Army to evacuate its forward dumps to keep them from being overrun, and, as a precautionary measure, it also evacuat-

ed its rear area dumps. Actual materiel losses were largely confined to T/E equipment in the hands of forward units. Shifting the axis of logistical support for the Third Army, which was attacking from the south of the "bulge" area, imposed awkward, but not insurmountable, difficulties on the supply and evacuation system. The shift was facilitated expeditiously by promptly obtaining a number of truck companies from Headquarters Communications Zone. The rapidly changing tactical situation necessitated frequent interarmy transfers of service troops. Throughout this most critical phase, this headquarters worked particularly closely with the Communications Zone, lending guidance in the location and establishment of new supply depots, in matters relating to the movement of troops and supplies and on other logistical problems necessary to the proper administrative support of the armies.

9. During the period from 22 February to 14 March 1945 the armies closed to the Rhine in the zone north of the Moselle River and First Army elements seized the Rhine bridge at Remagen, thus establishing a limited bridgehead. Rail nets were adequate and railheads for all armies were well forward. Tonnage capacities from the Paris and Antwerp areas to depots in the Verdun and Liege areas, respectively, became greater than the reception capacities. The over-all supply position, with the exception of a few critical items, was good, and there was no question of the ability logistically to support all armies. Priorities for building up supplies were given to the north, as planning contemplated that the Ninth Army would make the initial crossing of the Rhine into the industrial Ruhr. Ninth Army stock-piled reserves in the Munchen-Gladbach area. The pipeline from Antwerp was dispensing substantial quantities of gasoline east of Maastricht, thus alleviating tank car requirements along the axis. The Cherbourg line was extended to Chalons-sur-Marne, with high priority for its extension toward Verdun. Supply operations were conducted with the logistical support beyond the Rhine in view.

10. During the period from 15 to 23 March 1945 the armies prepared for and launched their coordinated offensive across the Rhine, resulting in the complete encirclement of the Ruhr industrial area by 4 April. Although rail lines were pushed rapidly forward toward the Rhine, they were inadequate to support the rapid advance of the armies. Consequently, more reliance was placed on motor transport and air lift. During the portion of this period up to 29 March very few planes were available, but following that date air support contributed vital assistance in supplying critically needed supplies to forward elements. Resistance, on the whole, was moderate, so that demands for supplies other than food and gasoline were not heavy. The status of Class I supplies

began to become critical due to the release of large numbers of recovered Allied prisoners and displaced persons and it became apparent that stocks of food on the Continent and "on order" in the United States would be insufficient to feed these large numbers. Captured and indigenous stocks were used wherever possible and rigid control was placed on the use of army stocks. Pipeline facilities in the north were extended across the Rhine to Wesel, and in the south they were being pushed rapidly forward. The rapid advance of the armies, the assignment of an operational role to the Fifteenth US Army, and the flow in incoming divisions increased the requirements for the limited number of available service troops. 12th Army Group was assigned area control in Germany, and Advance Section Communications Zone performed its functions in Germany without an assigned area responsibility. The rapid advance did not permit the establishment of normal Advance Section depots in that country.

11. During the period from 5 April to 9 May the "Ruhr Pocket" was cleared, United States forces advanced rapidly to the east and southeast, establishing contact with the Soviet Army, and hostilities ceased. Rail bridges across the Rhine were completed and, although on a limited scale, rail rehabilitation to the east was accomplished expeditiously. In anticipation of the rapid advance of the armies and heavy requirements for motor transport, arrangements had been made to borrow 180 truck companies from the Communications Zone. Air supply established an impressive record in carrying supplies forward and returning large numbers of casualties and Allied ex-prisoners of war. In general, the supply situation was satisfactory, although, because of the ever increasing numbers of recovered Allied ex-prisoners, displaced persons, and German prisoners, the food situation became even more critical. The service troop basis during this period was nearly completed and, with the exception of certain specific types, the available support was generally adequate.

12. From 10 May until the dissolution of the Headquarters, the status of supply and other G-4 matters was satisfactory. With the exception of a few critical items, sufficient supplies of all classes were available to meet the requirements of the armies. Permanent supply depots, located to provide more efficient support to the armies in their occupational role, were being constructed and stocked. Temporary supply installations were closed out, and the Communications Zone turned over its functions in Germany to the armies and to Theater Headquarters. The service troop program was initiated immediately after hostilities ceased. By 30 July, approximately 50 per cent of the service troops with the Army Group had been withdrawn. The units available

to operate in occupied areas were reduced to a minimum. The evacuation of recovered Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons was being carried out satisfactorily. While there was noteworthy improvement in the over-all transportation situation throughout the period, there was, nevertheless, insufficient transportation to fill the requirements of the enormous demands of the troop redeployment program. A shortage of rolling stock for the railroads and an excessive number of deadlined motor vehicles were the primary causes of this insufficiency.

V. G-5 SECTION*

1. Responsibility for Civil Affairs and Military Government was originally vested in the Civil Affairs Section, First US Army Group, upon the organization of the Headquarters. This was implemented by the arrival of eighteen officers, one Warrant Officer and twenty-six enlisted men. This Section became a General Staff Section in May, 1944.

2. The original mission of the Section was to prepare plans for and to exercise supervision over activities dealing with civilian populations, local government, the necessary functions involved in supply, law and order, public health, utilities services, care and control of refugees and displaced persons, and public finance and property control. This mission was modified and broadened during succeeding periods to include all matters involving relations with civil agencies and individuals. It had the normal staff responsibilities to the Army Group Commander and to other General and Special Staff Sections.

3. The Section was originally organized in four branches — namely, Government Affairs, Economics-Supply, Operations and Personnel, and Administration. This was broadened at a later date to provide for separate branches to deal with legal affairs, public health, public safety, displaced persons, and finance. Within these branches, specialist officers assumed responsibility for technical subjects, the number of such specialized subjects eventually reaching 125. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 and the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 exercised over-all supervision and coordinated the work of the branches through the Executive Officer.

4. Originally, and until 6 June 1944, the work of the Section was primarily that of planning. The first plans made were those under "RANKIN — Case C," which contemplated the possibility of an early German collapse. These were completed about 1 March 1944. The opposite eventuality was contemplated under plans for "OVERLORD". However, much of the ground work was common between them. The Civil Affairs Annex to First Army Group's "OVERLORD" plan was completed about 5 April 1944. Great benefit to the final operation resulted from the thorough exploration of possibilities under both above mentioned plans.

5. With the approach of D-Day and the advance of the First US Army to an operational status, the Section took an active part in preparing the Army for its combat role vis-a-vis Civil Affairs. Through the Army G-5, attachment

* For detailed study see Volume VII.

was made of approximately fifty Civil Affairs Detachments from the European Civil Affairs Division, comprising approximately 500 officers and 1,300 enlisted men. A similar attachment was made to Third US Army, effective 15 June. Arrangements were made to earmark and forward to the Continent 50,270 tons of Civil Affairs supplies. Detachments were supplied with proclamations, "invasion money" and flags.

6. Commencing with the invasion of Normandy, the Section began to exercise close staff supervision of initial operations by Civil Affairs elements and to observe closely the experiences of these units for such lessons as might be beneficially applied in future operations.

7. At the time of the St.Lo breakthrough the need for detachments to be deployed in French towns was accelerated, and a rapid requisitioning was made. This process was further accelerated when Third US Army advanced into Brittany in early August.

8. The first echelon of the G-5 Section arrived on the Continent 12 July and was joined by the rear echelon at Perriers on 6 August.

9. The activities of the Section included the following:

- a. Close liaison with and supervision of Civil Affairs activities by armies.
- b. Preparation of the Daily Civil Affairs Summary for the information of interested headquarters.
- c. Control of detachments released by Communications Zone for reassignment to armies and their reattachment as army boundaries changed.
- d. Support of army requisitions for Civil Affairs supplies.
- e. Close staff coordination of functional specialties, many of which (viz., public utilities) transcended army boundaries.
- f. Future planning for further operations in liberated territories and for operations in occupied territory.

10. In anticipation of operations in Germany, the 2nd and 3rd European Civil Affairs Regiments were called forward to the Continent early in September. This step was closely followed by the disassociation of the integrated British-US elements in the detachments.

11. As of 1 September, the food situation in the Paris area was eased by a daily allocation of 1,500 tons of food from military supplies, until local transport could be organized by the French. Some food was imported by air from the United Kingdom. By the time of the completion of the liberation of Paris, 10,000 tons of Civil Affairs supplies (food) had been landed, 1,070.8 tons of which had been distributed. Ten tons of enemy medical supplies had been captured and distri-

buted to the needy. At the same time, sixty-three detachments were deployed in the Cotentin and Brittany Peninsulas, and police departments in French towns re-established. Courts were opened and violators of proclamations and notices prosecuted.

12. Between the day of liberation of Paris and 1 October, United States armies pushed rapidly to the German frontier. Detachments were redeployed in accordance with the advance, only key cities being supplied with detachments after they passed to Communications Zone.

13. While an estimated one million refugees were handled in France and smaller numbers in Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland during the liberation phase, they were rapidly absorbed by French communities. A limited number of United Nations displaced persons were found in France, and these were accommodated in camps and generally moved to the rear.

14. During the period 1 October to 15 December 1944 more extensive studies and plans were made in the Section for operations leading offensively into Germany. This planning was thorough and rigid and made fullest use of experience gained in operations up to that time.

15. With the commencement of the German offensive in the Ardennes on 16 December, this Section coordinated the withdrawal of Civil Affairs and Military Government detachments and made immediate arrangements for the handling of any refugees who could not be accommodated in their own areas by the armies. The limitation of the German advance resulted in a stabilization of the refugee situation before any considerable number of refugees had left the confines of Belgium and Luxembourg. However, plans had been perfected for handling any anticipated number that might prove to be forced into France.

16. With the resumed advance into Germany, the Section passed rapidly from a Civil Affairs to a Military Government status. The functional branches executed the prepared plans. Supply allocations were checked and supplies called forward, enabling the armies to build stockpiles. Re-establishment and de-Nazification of local government by the armies was supported and coordinated by this Headquarters. Policies calling for the reopening of banking institutions and for the proper use of available funds were put in force and closely supervised by the Section. Law and order was restored, military courts were appointed, and the administration of justice begun.

17. Large numbers of displaced persons were encountered at this time, and requisitions for personnel for their care and control were renewed. Close coordination was maintained with the armies, particularly governing movements

of displaced persons. In the early stages of operations in Germany, approximately 20,000 Eastern European displaced persons were moved into liberated territories to remain as a military commitment and later to be returned to Germany.

18. As of 12 March, an embargo on the movement of eastbound European displaced persons into liberated territory was announced by this Headquarters and was enforced continuously after that date. In the mean time, 12th Army Group's rear boundary had moved forward, so that the transition to Military Government was complete.

19. Restoration of trade and industry in those categories that were of value to the military forces was emphasized in Germany. This was particularly true of coal mining.

20. Fifteenth Army became operational early in March and was supplied with personnel drawn from this Headquarters and the armies for its G-5 Section. By successive steps it took over the Rhineland and occupied a portion of the Ruhr, this Headquarters exercising coordination as that Army assumed Military Government functions.

21. As operations progressed east of the Rhine, the shortage of Military Government personnel became acute. This shortage had been foreseen and requisitions made in November 1944. In view of plans for the eventual take-over by the British of the northern Rhineland, Westphalia and Hannover, a total of thirty-two British Military Government detachments were supplied by 21 Army Group, and attached to armies and deployed in those areas.

22. Increasing numbers of displaced persons were freed as the Third Army thrust southeastward into Bavaria, the First Army into Saxony and the Ninth Army into Anhalt. The critical problem of the care and control of nearly 4,000,000 displaced persons stretched the available personnel to the utmost. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) staff, which had been scheduled to be available 1 March 1945 was delayed by shipping priorities until 1 May and later. In the interim, spearhead UNRRA teams, only 55% full strength, were called forward. Fifty of these teams were with the armies by 20 April. By 10 May there were 120 such teams with the armies. Three hundred and seventy-five Allied liaison officers for repatriations were also with the armies, taking care of their own nationals, but assisting generally in displaced persons work. In addition, twenty-six French MMLA (Mission Militaire Liaison Administratif) teams, in the process of being absorbed into UNRRA, were taken into Germany and used in handling displaced persons.

23. Early in April the supply of Military Government detachments was completely exhausted, the area of 12th Army Group having extended in all directions. Authority was obtained and given to the armies to organize provisional Military Government detachments. Approximately 150 such detachments were quickly organized and deployed. The bulk of these were later withdrawn as other Allies advanced to their zones.

24. By the middle of the same month it became apparent that conditions of collapse or surrender had materialized in most of the areas of Germany. It was therefore ordered that the Military Government portion of the plan "ECLIPSE" be applied wherever practicable. This resulted in economy of manpower and advanced greatly the program of Military Government.

25. With the German surrender, Military Government of the static phase was extended to cover all areas of 12th Army Group. The full plan, including all functional specialties, was put into effect. Necessary transition steps to the final organization, with Eastern and Western Military Districts, under Headquarters United States Forces European Theater, were rapidly taken between 9 May and 10 July.

26. Repatriation of displaced persons proceeded apace. In April, approximately 140,000 displaced persons, mostly Western Europeans, were repatriated. In May, over 890,000, including a large proportion of Eastern Europeans, went back to their homelands. In June, 1,210,000 were repatriated.

27. Of approximately 4,200,000 displaced persons uncovered by 12th Army Group, more than 2,700,000, or 95% of those immediately repatriable, had been repatriated by 10 July 1945; over 500,000 more had been turned over to the British, Russians, and French as they advanced to their national zones; of the balance, approximately 200,000 were scheduled to move through already organized channels. About 200,000 Hungarians and Roumanians were expected to be repatriable in a few month's time. The balance were Poles and stateless individuals.

28. On the instance of this Headquarters, the Commanding General, United States Forces European Theater, took over all responsibility for Military Government as of midnight 10—11 July 1945.

VI. ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION*

I. GENERAL.

a. Headquarters, First US Army Group was activated on 19 October 1943. The Adjutant General's Section was established on 21 October 1943. Brigadier General Henry B. Lewis, USA, served as Adjutant General from its inception until his appointment as Deputy Chief of Staff on 21 September 1944. Colonel Charles R. Landon, AGD, succeeded him and served as Adjutant General until the disbandment of the headquarters on 1 August 1945.

b. The organization of the headquarters, the establishment of administrative procedures and policies, the selection and training of personnel, the control and successful discharge of administrative functions and the intelligent comprehension of the ever-changing requirements, demanded planning, study and adjustment. Accepted headquarters procedures were applied and recognized staff functions and doctrines invoked, but adjustments and revisions were made in the beginning in an attempt to anticipate needs of future operations and subsequently to satisfy the complex ramifications of administration developing from the missions assigned to the Army Group.

c. Although the mission of the Headquarters was largely tactical and although administration was reduced to the minimum consistent with efficient operation, the size and scope of the tasks assigned, the demands made by higher echelons, and the operations undertaken created administrative problems and office activities that frequently were laid at the threshold of the Adjutant General. Papers had to be so routed and filed as to provide various agencies with only that information which they required and still not involve the headquarters in administrative detail. Management of administrative matters centered in the Deputy Chief of Staff. The accomplishment of these administrative matters, their actual delimitation, comprehension, and consummation was assigned to the Adjutant General as the administrative executive of the Commanding General. Complete cooperation with the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Secretary, General Staff, insured reduction of duplication, avoided conflicting instructions, and helped simplification.

d. The Section performed for the Headquarters the customary office routine of coordinating, routing, checking and authenticating orders and correspondence, maintaining the office of record, and attending to all matters pertaining to officer personnel; furnished the following services: publication, postal, MRU, statistical and visitors' accommodations; and performed such additional related

* For detailed study see Volume VIII.

functions as were required from time to time, including the writing of the Army Group history and assisting in the control of records resulting from the disbandment of the German armed forces.

e. The Adjutant General established the office procedures for the Headquarters, including handling of all official correspondence and routing of correspondence, reports and other papers to the staff section having primary interest, and maintenance of the records and suspense files of the headquarters. All official correspondence, except that requiring the personal signature of the Army Group Commander (or, in his absence, of the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff) was signed by the Adjutant General or an Assistant Adjutant General.

2. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS.

a. The Adjutant General's Section was authorized initially 26 officers, 6 warrant officers and 52 enlisted personnel. This was revised in the early part of 1944 to 19 officers, 7 warrant officers and 85 enlisted personnel. It was increased during the planning phase to 25 officers, 6 warrant officers and 110 enlisted personnel and further increased during the "Eclipse" phase to 36 officers, and 137 enlisted personnel. Regardless of the nature of the work of a headquarters, whether planning, administrative or tactical, there is no appreciable difference either in the mission or in the variety of business passing through an Adjutant General's office. As long as any work exists which requires individuals to issue written instructions and to keep records, either for current use or historical reference, or to receive and send out letters, the work consistently continues at a certain minimum level requiring the services of a specified number of officers and enlisted men regardless of the nature of the mission assigned the headquarters. Obviously, the addition of any specialized functions or duties, or an increase in the size of other staff sections demands an increase automatically in AG personnel to insure a prompt and efficient performance of such additional work. Equally obviously, this personnel must be provided coincidentally with the increased load.

b. The Section was divided originally into Administrative, Operations, and Personnel branches. The Executive and Historical Branches and the Visitor's Bureau were added at a later date.

c. The Administrative Branch was divided into Mail and Distribution Center, Top Secret Control, Central Records, and Cables Groups. It was responsible for receiving and dispatching all official mail; furnishing courier and messenger service for the headquarters; establishment and operation of the Top Secret

Control procedure for the headquarters; maintenance of an office of record, which included a permanent file of all papers as well as a policy and precedent file for the Headquarters as a whole; and furnishing all incoming and outgoing cable service.

d. The Operations Branch was divided into Correspondence, Publications, and Troop Statistics Groups. It was responsible for routing and processing miscellaneous correspondence, verifying staff coordination, typing and preparing for dispatch outgoing correspondence (other than those processed by Personnel Branch) and cables and maintaining Headquarters suspense for incoming and outgoing papers; securing printing service and furnishing reproduction by multi-lith, mimeograph, photostat, black and white and gelatin processes, reproduction of blank forms and publications of higher and lower headquarters as required; preparing, editing, and proofreading all publications, including telephone directory and Headquarters Regulations; furnishing drafting service for the Headquarters, including charts, graphs, signs and drawings; maintaining a distributing agency for the Headquarters and Special Troops and in certain cases for subordinate commands; maintaining a Headquarters library of publications from the War Department, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Headquarters ETOUSA, Headquarters Communications Zone and Army Group publications; providing and supplying information concerning troop movements and location of ground force units; and preparing statistical studies.

e. The Operations Branch likewise was responsible for supervision of MRU policies and activities throughout the Army Group, the activities of the 37th MRU, the supervision of general postal policies and matters pertaining to the Army Group and the operations of APO 655. To this were later added the supervision of the Engineer Reproduction Detachment.

f. The Personnel Branch handled all personnel matters, consisting of registration of officers; preparation of efficiency reports, casualty reports, personnel correspondence, rosters and requisitions; effected assignments and transfers to units and to other arms and services; issued travel and temporary duty orders and orders for rotation to the United States; handled promotions and demotions, reclassification, resignations and other separations, disciplinary cases and awards and decorations; and prepared special orders.

g. The functions and activities of the Visitors' Bureau were assigned to this section 28 June 1944. The chief responsibilities of the Bureau were to receive and provide accommodations for all visitors to this Headquarters and to coordinate the visits with interested staff sections, or, in many cases, to plan itineraries and arrange clearance into army areas. High officials from the War Department,

committees from the Senate and House of Representatives and groups of prominent civilians were accommodated during their visits to this Headquarters. In the latter phase of its operation, the Visitors' Bureau operated two large hotels, accommodating a daily average of 150 visitors. A dining room served a daily average of 300 visitors.

h. The Visitors' Bureau became a separate branch of the Adjutant General's Section on 1 May 1945. Coincident with its establishment as a special branch, the Visitors's Bureau became responsible for the organization and operation of an air transportation service for officers of this Headquarters and for visitors. An airline, comprising six C-47 aircraft, was formed, and daily flights were made to all army and army group headquarters, Supreme Headquarters, Theater and Communications Zone Headquarters, and to leave areas. A monthly average of approximately 2,500 passengers were flown.

i. The Executive Branch was established on 14 December 1944. It was comprised of the executive officer, chief clerk and two enlisted assistants, and was charged with the coordination of policies in the operation of the Section, the administration of personnel, and discharge of property responsibility to include procurement, transfer, exchange, repair and salvage of items of equipment.

j. The Historical Branch was formed on 4 January 1945, when Captain Albert Norman arrived to assume his duties as Army Group Historian and of writing the official history of the Army Group. At the time of the inactivation of the Headquarters, a 300-page volume, dealing with the inter-Allied plans for the invasion and the role United States forces were to play on the Western Front, and covering the period 1943—1 August 1944, was completed. The volume received the approval of the Army Group Chief of Staff.

k. The 37th Machine Records Unit was attached to the Headquarters on 31 January 1944 and furnished machine records service for Army Group troops, including various divisions assigned to the Headquarters from time to time. It maintained a troop status file, a G-2 Counterintelligence Branch "suspected persons" file; a file on awards issued by subordinate commands; a code name directory; a Headquarters telephone directory; and a file of field grade officers. It prepared weekly station lists and troop lists with daily changes, statistical strength reports or studies and other miscellaneous reports and analyses. During the Ardennes battle it serviced, in addition to its normal duties, six divisions scattered from Holland to Switzerland and from the German border to the Atlantic Ocean and assigned to four different armies.

l. The 585th and 135th Army Postal Units conducted the operation of APO 655 under the supervision of the Operations Branch. The 135th APU was not assigned until 6 September 1944.

m. Technical supervision of the Engineer Reproduction Detachment was assumed by the Operations Branch on 9 May 1945, when reproduction work became almost entirely administrative, map requirements having ceased.

3. PLANNING PHASE.

a. During the first few months, the Section assisted in the pre-invasion operational plans with which the Headquarters was concerned. Administrative and Headquarters policies and procedures were established and implemented through Headquarters Regulations and other publications to facilitate the proper functioning of the Headquarters upon the opening of the operational phase. Just before midnight, on 14 March 1944, some of the Headquarters buildings, in London, were subjected to incendiary bombing by enemy planes. The buildings in which the Section was located were damaged by fire, resulting in heavy property loss. All records, however, were saved and operations continued with little loss of time.

b. A detachment from First US Army Group was attached to 21 Army Group to perform the administrative functions relating to the United States forces placed under the temporary command of 21 Army Group. This Section sent a representation to the 21 Army Group Main Headquarters on 30 April 1944, and to the Rear Headquarters on 16 May. The Adjutant General's Section at Main Headquarters, 21 Army Group, consisted of one officer and three enlisted men, and at Rear, of four officers and fifteen enlisted men.

c. Members of the Women's Army Corps (WAC) were first assigned to this Section on 14 June 1944. In August, after the Army Group became operational and was divided into TAC, Main and Rear echelons, the WACs arrived on the Continent and were all assigned to the Rear echelon. Staff sections in the other echelons formerly having WAC personnel transferred them to Rear echelon in exchange for enlisted men. A large portion of the WAC personnel of the Headquarters thus found its way into the Adjutant General's Section. This resulted in the loss of a large number of trained enlisted men and required rapid training of the newly assigned women in order to maintain uninterrupted operations. This was accomplished without difficulty and the WAC personnel assumed their full share of responsibility. They were a decided asset.

d. Headquarters First US Army Group became Headquarters 12th Army Group on 14 July 1944. During this month the headquarters commenced moving

to the Continent. Frequent moves and lack of proper office space prevented all of the reproduction equipment from being placed in operation. It was not utilized fully until the Headquarters arrived in Verdun in September.

4. OPERATIONAL PHASE.

a. The Adjutant General's Section continued its normal operations when the Headquarters assumed command of the First and Third US Armies on 1 August 1944. It was represented at each of the three echelons that were then organized, and continued to furnish normal services under difficult conditions and with a pressing need for additional personnel demanded by the three echelon division.

b. The Adjutant General was located with the majority of his personnel at the Rear echelon, where the bulk of the AG Section work was accomplished. The Assistant Adjutant General at the Main echelon supervised the activities of the Section there and at the TAC echelon.

c. The volume of work increased considerably when the Headquarters became operational and it was then found necessary to operate some of the groups on a regular 24-hour basis. Cable facilities were continuously overburdened, with the result that cables were not infrequently dispatched by other means. Wherever possible the messageform was used in lieu of cables to ease the cable load. These messageforms were dispatched by air and given high priority in handling. Demands on publication, MRU and postal services rose sharply. A further striking growth occurred when the Headquarters was located for many months in Verdun. These requirements could be traced to the growth of other staff sections, notably G-5, and added responsibilities assigned by higher headquarters.

5. "ECLIPSE" PHASE.

This phase had commenced even before the cessation of hostilities in Europe. It brought with it increased administrative work incident to redeployment of units and personnel, disbandment of the German Army and documentation of its personnel, adjustment of personnel records, preparation of final reports, increased correspondence and cables. The increased demands were complicated by the loss of trained and experienced personnel within the Section through return to the United States for rotation and discharge, through the policy of granting leaves, furloughs, and weekly holidays, and through encouragement of participation in athletic programs and other forms of recreation.

6. CONCLUSIONS.

The operations of the Section have demonstrated the necessity for adequate and properly trained personnel (both officers and enlisted personnel), the need for positively coordinating and continually eliminating and limiting administrative matters in an Army Group headquarters, the necessity for prompt and efficient distribution and routing of official mail and the processing of outgoing cables and correspondence, the provision of proper security control and adequate record files, the necessity for elastic reproduction facilities and distribution of publications together with adequate MRU and postal services and provision of visitors' accommodations. Experience again demonstrates that the Adjutant General, unlike a special staff section, furnishes services and administrative facilities for an entire headquarters and rarely, if ever, for the benefit of one section. His primary duty is to assure the smooth operation of the Headquarters by facilitating the transaction of everybody's business. He does this by operating the many odds and ends of administrative facilities that are common to all or many sections, and acting as a coordinating go-between with those he does not operate. He is the logical source for controlling, coordinating and accomplishing Headquarters administration under the supervision of the Chief or Deputy Chief of Staff. Any administrative function which falls within this broad scope is properly in his sphere.

VII. HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT*

1. When the Army Group Headquarters was activated, the Headquarters Commandant was confronted with the problem of setting up his organizational framework to allow for expansion. He immediately estimated the space, equipment, and supply requirements, and determined the nature of service units that would be necessary. The Headquarters was established in Bryanston Square, London, and through the efforts of mess, supply, and service personnel, operating directly under the Headquarters Commandant, functioned smoothly from the beginning.

2. In January 1944, Headquarters Special Troops was established, and it assumed administrative control of all troops. The Headquarters Commandant retained operational control of Headquarters Company, Car Company, and Utilities Platoon.

3. Once the Headquarters was firmly established, preparations had to be made for movement to the Continent and operation in the field. A "Special List of Equipment" was prepared and frequently revised. A plan for field operation in three echelons was devised and practice field operation conducted.

4. Movement to the Continent was accomplished in three increments, plus an advance party. The movement began on 5 July 1944 and was completed on 5 August.

5. After initially locating at Colombieres, France, the Headquarters was divided into three echelons: TAC, Main, and Rear. These three echelons operated close in the wake of the armies as they moved across France and Germany, TAC echelon moving most frequently and operating in closest contact with the armies.

6. Main and Rear echelons reunited at Wiesbaden, Germany, on 4 May 1945, and TAC echelon joined them on 1 June. At Wiesbaden, the Headquarters turned in field equipment and later was disbanded. It turned over all installations and most of its equipment to Headquarters, United States Forces European Theater (USFET).

* For detailed study see Volume IX.

VIII. HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL TROOPS*

1. Headquarters Special Troops, First US Army Group, was activated on 19 October 1943, with the mission of providing housekeeping facilities for First US Army Group.

2. As the Army Group headquarters grew, the duties Special Troops was called upon to perform increased correspondingly. In the months that followed, "housekeeping" included procuring and assigning enlisted personnel for Army Group staff sections; billeting and feeding Army Group personnel; moving the Headquarters; furnishing transportation for staff officers; directing training, discipline and administration; providing security and police protection, signal facilities, religious services and post exchange supplies; and eventually furnishing special service, and information and education facilities.

3. Upon its activation, the Headquarters consisted of three officers and eleven enlisted men, with Lt Col Harry J. Karakas in command, and was located at 20 Bryanston Square, London. By the end of October, although there were still only three officers in the organization, enlisted personnel had increased to forty-eight. As problems continued to grow and to become more complex, the organization continued to expand, until on 4 July 1945 there were forty-one officers and 207 enlisted men assigned and attached to the Headquarters.

4. Growth of the Headquarters, however, was gradual. For some time, Special Troops was permitted by Headquarters First US Army Group to carry certain personnel above the authorized allowance, and it was not until 22 April 1944 that a new distribution of grades and ratings was approved, giving the organization twenty-one officers and thirty-eight enlisted men. Need for further expansion was recognized in succeeding months and in October, Special Troops was allowed another substantial increase in grades and ratings.

5. Headquarters Special Troops played an essential part in the life of the Army Group from the very beginning. In order to function properly, the Army Group Headquarters needed additional personnel. Special Troops procured enlisted personnel for all the staff sections. Special Troops took over Bryanston and Montagu Squares and Norfolk Crescent for billets and office space, converted Bryanston Square Park into a car park, and established four enlisted men's messes and one officers' mess in the area.

6. On 14 March 1944, Bryanston Square was caught in a German incendiary raid. Five office buildings and three buildings used for billets were destroyed

* For detailed study see Volume IX.

and three enlisted men injured. There were no fatalities and the loss of equipment was not serious.

7. Colonel Herbert H. Harris, then Commanding Officer of Special Troops, directed deployment of military personnel in the area and arranged for hot food for the bombed-out soldiers and fire fighters, for the guarding of salvaged equipment, and for temporary billeting of personnel in nearby American Red Cross clubs.

8. The office used by Special Troops for its headquarters was burned out in the raid, but within twenty-four hours the organization was back to near normalcy in new quarters, while the job of locating new billets for the bombed-out enlisted men and for additional men and a WAC Detachment went on uninterruptedly.

9. As the invasion date approached, Special Troops began to prepare for its mission of moving the Army Group Headquarters to the Continent. To aid in this preparation, practice moves of the Headquarters and its component units were staged from London to nearby Warfield Park during the month of May, to determine the amount of transportation that would be needed and to gain experience in operations with the Headquarters divided in echelons.

10. Brigadier General Charles R. Doran assumed command of Headquarters Special Troops on 13 May 1944 and remained in command for the duration of its existence.

11. When movement to the Continent began, Headquarters First US Army Group was redesignated Headquarters 12th Army Group and, accordingly, Special Troops, First US Army Group was renamed Special Troops, 12th Army Group.

12. Those who were left behind when the first increment of Special Troops left London on 16 July 1944 for the Southampton marshalling area, were exposed, like other residents of the British capital, to intensified robot plane attacks, which had begun on 13 June. None of the Headquarters personnel were injured and the Headquarters suffered no material damage.

13. The initial increment of Special Troops landed on Omaha Beach on 22 July and proceeded from there by motor transport to the Army Group Command Post between Colombieres and Trevieres, where it remained until 1 August 1944, when the Headquarters moved south. On this relocation, the Headquarters was divided into two echelons: Main, at Periers, and Rear, at St Sauveur-de-Lendelin. Special Troops headquarters was established as part of the Rear echelon.

14. During the first fifteen days of August the Headquarters moved its remaining units and detachments from the United Kingdom to France, with twenty complete organizations locating in the Army Group area between the fourth and the tenth day of the month and the remaining personnel of Special Troops joining the Command on 10 August.

15. It was at this time that Special Troops had its real baptism of supervisory control. Constant assignment, attachment, and reassignment of units took place on an unprecedented scale. In addition, many situations which could not have been solved in London now presented themselves as the Headquarters and its units found itself operating under field conditions. An outstanding example of this was the problem of providing bathing and housing facilities for the WAC Detachment, and it became apparent that special considerations would have to be made for the women in the Headquarters on later moves.

16. As the pace of the Allied drive across France increased, so did the rapidity of the Headquarters' moves. The next relocation was to Laval, France, a move that extended from 21 to 24 August. Hardly had the troops found their way around town, when Paris fell and 12th Army Group and Special Troops moved again — this time 185 miles by road to Versailles. Here, on 5 September, Special Troops occupied Camp de Satory, a comfortable French military post in the suburbs of the city, and here for the first time the Headquarters was faced with the problems that arise when a military organization is billeted in or near a large city.

17. While at Versailles, personnel of the Headquarters had their first opportunity to visit Paris — but not for long. On 16 September, Main echelon moved to Verdun and two days later Rear and Special Troops relocated in Caserne Niel, in that city.

18. While in Verdun, Special Troops was charged, for the first time, with conducting ceremonies for Army Group Headquarters. On Armistice Day, General Doran delivered the keynote address at a commemorative service at the Meuse-Argonne American cemetery, Verdun. Later, Special Troops arranged for ceremonies at which British, French, and Luxembourg awards were presented to 12th Army Group personnel, as well as for parades at which medals and plaques were bestowed on units and personnel of Special Troops.

19. During the German counteroffensive through the Ardennes, Special Troops became tactically operational for the only time in its history. On the night of 22 December, with the enemy advance threatening the city of Luxembourg, General Doran was charged with the defense of Verdun, guarding of

the Meuse River bridges from that city to Commercy, and if the enemy drive should continue unchecked, defense of the west bank of the river.

20. The Headquarters immediately went on a 24-hour-a-day operational basis. Utilizing 12th Army Group and Communications Zone troops in the area, as well as small units attached to Special Troops for the defensive mission, necessary reconnaissance was performed, bridges were mined, communications laid to strategic points; road blocks, traffic control posts and gun positions established and manned, and motorized patrols maintained an aggressive coverage of all roads within a five mile radius of the city. In addition, the Headquarters' Liaison Squadron provided an air patrol during daylight hours, a striking force was mobilized for defense against a surprise enemy attack either from the air or on the ground, and constant liaison was maintained with French forces in the area.

21. Within the Headquarters area, plans were made for withdrawal to the west, if necessary, including the evacuation of personnel and equipment, and the destruction of property which could not be moved.

22. On 26 December, the 513th Airborne Infantry Battalion was ordered to Verdun and Special Troops was relieved of responsibility for the defense of the area, although Special Troops continued to maintain road blocks in the vicinity of the Headquarters and Special Troops Military Police continued to patrol the Verdun area until the emergency had passed.

23. While the struggle for the Siegfried Line stalled the American armies during the first part of 1945, 12th Army Group's progress across the Continent also bogged down, and the Headquarters remained in Verdun until 1 May.

24. On that date, the Headquarters moved to Wiesbaden, Germany. With the entry into enemy territory came a host of new situations. Special Troops was called upon to provide for the security of Army Group Headquarters on an unprecedented scale, to assist Military Government in supplying coal for the city's utilities, to aid in policing of the community, and to enforce the civilian curfew and the Theater nonfraternization policy. After V-E Day, celebrated with laudable restraint by military personnel in the city, there came an increased need for off-duty leisure time activities, and Special Troops was charged with furnishing Special Service and Information and Education facilities to 12th Army Group Headquarters. Special Troops acquired and operated a swimming pool, a golf course, tennis courts, a river boat, athletic fields, and theaters, while information and education activities were expanded to include a school, "on-the-job" training, and increased emphasis on correspondence

courses. The Post Exchange operated by Special Troops continued to enlarge its facilities, and by the end of June it had in operation separate officers' and enlisted men's branches, as well as a large café patronized by 400 to 500 enlisted men and women each evening.

25. As Special Troops, 12th Army Group, neared the end of its existence, it devoted its principal efforts to the redeployment of troops to the Pacific and to the readjustment of troops within the command.

IX. CHAPLAIN*

1. When the Army Group Headquarters was organized, a T/O provided for three chaplains. At that time there was a definite scarcity of chaplains in the European Theater, with the result that thirteen months elapsed before one was assigned to the Headquarters staff. During the interim, ample opportunities were provided to the Headquarters personnel to attend religious services conducted by civilian clergymen or army chaplains attached to other units. Shortly after D-Day, two chaplains were assigned to Special Troops. These officers provided religious services not only for their own troops, but for Headquarters personnel as well.

2. The Chaplain's Section, Hq 12th Army Group, was activated 1 November 1944, in Verdun, France, with the assignment of Chaplain Morgan J. O'Brien. The mission of the Section was to maintain liaison with army and Theater chaplains on policies affecting the Corps of Chaplains; to act in an advisory capacity to all members of the armed forces on religious, morale, and welfare problems; to supervise the spiritual welfare of this command; to conduct religious services; and to make recommendations as to assignments and transfers of chaplains.

3. Armistice Day, November 11, was commemorated by the holding of memorial services at the American World War I Military Cemetery at Romagne, France.

4. This Section called a meeting of all chaplains in the Verdun area in order to coordinate religious services so that units without chaplains could have weekly services. With the influx of German PW's in the area, a survey was made to determine if any clergymen were included in their number. In some camps, as many as six clergymen were found, while others had none. The Army Group Chaplain assisted the Provost Marshal in screening the clergymen and also in assigning them to camps, so that all PW's were provided with religious services by their own clergymen, thus leaving American chaplains free to devote all their time to American troops. Through the cooperation and generosity of the French clergy, the Section was able to provide equipment — such as Mass kits and Communion sets — for the German clergymen.

5. By conferring with Army chaplains and the Theater Chaplain, a study was made of the needs of evacuation and field hospitals which had a T/O calling for only one chaplain. The following plan was put into practice as a result of these conferences: The field hospitals, when they were functioning during combat and well up front, close to the combat area where emergency operations were

* For detailed study see Volume X.

performed on the wounded men, had one of the chaplains from division headquarters stay at the field hospital in order to be constantly available. For evacuation hospitals, the following was the procedure: a chaplain from the division that was being served by the hospital, or from units attached to that division, was sent for one day to be on duty at the hospital, then he was relieved by another chaplain, and the rotation was thus kept up. In this way, the chaplain got to see men of his own division as they were being hospitalized, and he was also given relief for one day from the strain of front-line duty.

6. For the members of Army Group TAC, stationed in Luxembourg, a midnight Mass was said at one of the local churches on Christmas. Similar services were held at Rear and Main headquarters.

7. As a result of a conference with the Senior Chaplain, Advance Section Communications Zone, religious supplies were made available at Army Group for all chaplains in the area. Thirty-five members of the Corps of Chaplains attended a memorial service for deceased chaplains. At a meeting after the services the nonfraternization policy of the army and the best means of making it effective were discussed.

8. Memorial services were conducted in the Cathedral of Verdun for the late President Roosevelt. At this service, the bishop of Verdun expressed the sympathy of the French people.

9. Nordhausen and Buchenwald concentration camps were visited for the purpose of providing spiritual consolation for the dying. On investigation, eight clergymen were found among the inmates at Buchenwald, and two at Nordhausen. The Army Group Chaplain made arrangements with the commandants of these camps for the men to be placed on chaplain's status and also provided them with the necessary equipment for religious services.

10. On 1 May, the Headquarters moved from Verdun, France, to Wiesbaden, Germany. Two badly damaged stores were renovated and furnished as an office and chapel.

11. The chapel was used for the first time for a Thanksgiving service on V-E Day. It was dedicated to "Our Lady of Victory." In the vicinity of the Headquarters, a Polish displaced persons camp with thousands of inmates, obtained two Polish priests from Dachau concentration camp, where they were located. For the spiritual guidance of these people the Chaplain's Section obtained two Polish priests from Dachau Concentration Camp, where they were held prisoner by the Germans.

12. Daily religious services were held in the Headquarters Chapel. Sunday services were held in a theater and in the Red Cross "Kurhaus" building.

X. FINANCE SECTION*

1. The Finance Section was organized on 4 December 1943, with the assignment of Major Paul G. Hommeyer, FD, as Finance Officer. The Section was originally authorized two officers and four enlisted men, but this strength proved inadequate during the planning stage and the allotment was changed to provide for two officers, one warrant officer, and six enlisted men. Later, the authorized strength was reduced to one officer, one warrant officer, and four enlisted men. Major Eugene R. Melton, FD, assumed the duties of Finance Officer on 17 October 1944, when Lt Col Hommeyer was returned to the United States to be relieved from active duty.

2. Functions assigned to the Finance Section were as follows: advisory service to the Commanding General on all finance and fiscal matters; administrative supervision over all finance officers not assigned or attached to armies; preparation of all finance and fiscal plans; coordination on matters concerning two or more armies and between armies, the Theater Fiscal Director, and the Fiscal Director of Advance Section Communications Zone; promotion of savings through the cash sale of war bonds; and preparation of all allotment and insurance applications.

3. The principal duty of the Assistant Finance Officer was the preparation of all finance and fiscal plans. In the preparation of these plans it was necessary to hold numerous conferences with the finance officers of armies and the Theater Fiscal Director. Although several plans were prepared, the only ones used were "OVERLORD" and "ECLIPSE." In general, all troops were paid on time, funds were properly safeguarded, and every individual received a partial payment prior to his departure for the Continent. Principal difficulties encountered resulted from the failure of other headquarters to coordinate their plans with this Headquarters and Theater Headquarters. As an example, the Theater Fiscal Director was not aware of plans of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to stamp all currency then in circulation and to convert it later into a new issue of Luxembourg and Belgian Francs. The result of the lack of coordination in this case was that troops in Luxembourg did not have any spendable money for a period of several days. This situation was remedied by this Section by contacting the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, who furnished postal employees to assist a US Finance Officer in stamping approximately five million dollars worth of Belgian francs. The stamped Belgian francs were then furnished to the troops by splitting a 20-man disbursing section into four teams of cashiers.

* For detailed study see Volume X.

4. Prior to the cessation of hostilities plans were prepared for operation "ECLIPSE," the plan of operations after the defeat of Germany. The plan called for closing all German finance officers' accounts and opening of new accounts under the supervision of the US officers charged with disbandment of the German Army. The plans called for payment of Wehrsold (army pay) to all members of the Wehrmacht and of discharge pay, amounting to eighty Reichsmarks, to each enlisted man. The payment of Wehrsold could not be effected until 1 July 1945 because of the shortage of currency in some areas. Discharge pay could not be paid in some areas because discharge commenced too rapidly, and it was not felt that payment should in any way interfere with disbandment. Plans also called for a Wehrmacht Fiscal Branch, for the supervision of all Wehrmacht finance officers and for the audit of all vouchers paid by them. This branch was organized in July, using civilian personnel.

5. The administrative branch was charged with normal administrative functions, in addition to assignment and attachment of finance disbursing sections. During most of the operation, all Finance Sections were attached to this Headquarters and further attached to armies. Later, all sections were assigned to this Headquarters and further assigned to armies. During the period in which sections were attached, they were treated as orphans, resulting in low morale and general deterioration of the sections' functions. After sections were assigned, there was a noticeable improvement in morale and of general efficiency. During operations, there were adequate finance sections available at all times to insure the prompt payment of all troops. Upon cessation of hostilities, many difficulties were encountered. Demands of the Assembly Area Command and the staging areas for Finance Sections was so great that it became physically impossible to pay all troops. Though many sections employed civilians and received an authorized overstrength to help alleviate the situation, it was still impossible to pay all troops on time.

6. The prime difficulty encountered by all sections was exchanging funds. Each time troops moved from one country to another it was necessary to effect a complete conversion of all monies in the possession of troops. Many sections required as many as four cashiers, working full time, when T/O's did not provide for cashiers. In addition to conversions, all finance officers had very large collections. It was not at all unusual for a finance officer to have collections far in excess of his disbursements.

7. Due to the number of currencies in use and the lack of a checking account, it was necessary for all finance officers to carry tremendous amounts of cash on hand. Most finance officers kept in their personal possession ap-

proximately one million dollars in cash. The tables of equipment did not provide sufficient safes to hold such amounts, so that most finance officers had to use improvised wooden boxes for the storage of funds. During the early stages of operations, only one funding office was provided, which was usually several hundreds of miles from division disbursing officers. Later, this Section requested Advance Section Communications Zone to provide several centrally located funding officers, which helped somewhat to remedy the situation.

8. One of the problems that was faced, which was not expected during the planning period, was the payment of Allied troops other than American. Many allied officers and enlisted men were attached to American forces, and except for the British, no plans were made for their payment. This Section, through agreement with the Fiscal Director, made arrangements for payment by the use of "Spearhead" deposits.

9. Captured enemy funds and funds found in prisoner of war cages presented a serious problem. In most prisoner of war cages there were no records to indicate to whom the funds belonged. Finance officers found it physically impossible to count funds turned in to them. Some finance officers referred to captured funds and funds found in prisoner of war cages in terms of tons rather than amounts. This Section made arrangements with the Theater Fiscal Director to have such funds shipped to the Central Disbursing Officer, without taking them into the accounts of the disbursing officer.

10. Fiscal functions presented no problem as far as this Headquarters was concerned. The amount of expenditures by this Headquarters for military intelligence and entertainment was negligible. Most supplies and services required were obtained by requisitioning.

11. Within the armies the situation was somewhat different. Each time a unit was transferred from one army to another it was necessary to cancel one allotment of funds and issue a new one. This situation could have been avoided only by having direct allotment of all funds from a central agency.

12. It was not the policy of this Headquarters to stress savings during the campaign. It was the policy to have every facility available to those who desired to save. This proved very effective, as the amount of cash retained by combat troops was often as low as five per cent of their pay, while the over-all amount for the entire 12th Army Group was about eleven per cent.

13. The Section sold war bonds for cash and through the preparation of war bond allotment forms. Allotment forms were also processed for all officers of the Headquarters.

XI. INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SECTION*

1. The Inspector General's Section was established in London on 4 May 1944.

2. Inspectors General assigned to this Headquarters functioned under the immediate direction and control of the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff. At the time of the establishment of this Section, routine preparation for overseas movement (POM) inspections of all units of Special Troops were made to insure their readiness to perform efficiently on the Continent.

3. Upon movement of the Headquarters to the Continent, and upon activation of Headquarters 12th Army Group, the constant movement of troop units in combat areas presented many varied problems. Investigations were made of cases involving morale, discipline and efficiency of troop units, black market activities, misbehavior of soldiers before the enemy, illegal currency transactions, looting and pilfering, dispersal of art objects, desecration of church property, destruction of business enterprises, and the treatment of prisoners of war.

4. The Inspector General was originally charged with the investigation of war crimes perpetrated by the enemy against United States soldiers and with the investigation of alleged violations of the Geneva Convention.

5. Inspections of money accounts, the soldier voting program, and other routine matters continued in combat areas without interruption or delay.

6. Constant supervision, assistance, and advice was given to Inspectors General of armies and divisions and a system of replacement and training of junior officers in Inspector General's work was inaugurated. This provided an efficient and well-trained group to perform the complex and important final inspections necessitated by redeployment and discharge of thousands of troops from this Theater.

* For detailed study see Volume X.

XII. JUDGE ADVOCATE'S SECTION*

1. The Judge Advocate's Section of the Headquarters was activated on 15 November 1943 and Colonel Clarence E. Brand, JAGD, named Army Group Judge Advocate. A tentative strength of two colonels, one major, one warrant officer, and four enlisted men was authorized for the Section. Colonel A. P. Miceli, JAGD, reported for duty as Executive Officer in December.

2. The first few months after activation were devoted primarily to planning. Since an Army Group, and consequently an Army Group Judge Advocate, were at that time innovations in the military organizational scheme, the entire problem of organization, personnel, and equipment was one that had to be envisioned and provided for without reference to precedent. Among other difficulties encountered was the destruction of the Section's equipment on 14 March 1944 as a result of enemy aerial action. The task of rebuilding began immediately.

3. Colonel H. W. Jones, JAGD, was appointed Army Group Judge Advocate on 4 May 1944, relieving Colonel Brand. Numerous plans, evolved within the Headquarters during the pre-invasion period, were submitted to the Army Group Judge Advocate for consideration and recommendation. The many and varied problems anticipated in a liberated Europe, involving among others, war criminals, prisoners of war, displaced persons, military justice, Allied military tribunals, and other international law problems, were studied and coordinated with other staff sections.

4. Colonel C. B. Mickelwait, JAGD, relieved Colonel Jones on 22 June. Colonel Mickelwait originated a request for — and obtained — general courts-martial jurisdiction for the Commanding General, First US Army Group, and subsequently, upon the redesignation of that headquarters, for the Commanding General, 12th Army Group. General courts-martial jurisdiction was likewise obtained for the Commanding General, Special Troops.

5. Prior to D-Day, at a conference in the office of the Army Group Judge Advocate, attended by the Judge Advocates of the major ground forces and Air Force installations, a proposed SOP for military justice during Continental operations, based largely on the Army Group Judge Advocate's prior combat experience, was drafted and later submitted to the Theater Judge Advocate and Theater Commander for approval. This proposed SOP was adopted.

6. The Section departed from London on 1 August, arrived in France on 4 August and began operations near Periers, France, the following day. On

* For detailed study see Volume X.

23 August the office moved to Laval, France; on 5 September to Versailles; on 18 September to Verdun; and, finally, on 1 May 1945, to Wiesbaden, Germany.

7. Soon after its arrival on the Continent, the Section was reorganized and the various branches, i. e., Administrative, Military Justice, Military Affairs, International Law, and War Crimes, began to function under the direction and supervision of the Army Group Judge Advocate, with Colonel W. D. Partlow, Jr., JAGD, as Executive Officer. The original authorized strength of the Section had been steadily augmented until it aggregated a strength of fortyseven officers and seventy-eight enlisted men. The activities of the various branches during the period of Continental operations were as follows:

a. *Administrative Branch:* The administrative officer directed and instructed all enlisted personnel in matters of procedure and office routine, supervised and coordinated clerical and administrative matters between the various branches, and maintained the necessary records and rosters pertaining to Section personnel. This branch furnished typing and stenographic service to the Section and during combat operations was responsible for the packing and security of Section equipment on all tactical movements of the Headquarters.

b. *Military Justice Branch:* The Army Group Judge Advocate, in his capacity as legal advisor to the Army Group Commander, was charged with general supervision of the administration of military justice within the command. Close supervision of all general court-martial jurisdictions was maintained, monthly reports required, liaison encouraged, and periodical reports and recommendations made in this regard. In order to insure protection to those soldiers suffering from battle exhaustion, action was taken to have every accused charged with a "combat" offense screened and cleared by a psychiatrist prior to trial. Information circulars designed to disseminate matters of interest to Judge Advocates of this command were published and distributed to the various general court-martial jurisdictions. At various intervals reports were rendered to the Army Group Commander as to the administration of military justice within the command.

c. *Military Affairs:* This branch furnished opinions and advice on the application and interpretation of United States laws, as well as War Department and Theater regulations and instructions affecting army administration and personnel. Legal assistance was rendered to Headquarters personnel on various matters pertaining to personal and domestic affairs.

d. *International Law:* (1) The International Law Branch rendered opinions on the application and interpretation of the rules of land warfare, including the handling and treatment of prisoners of war, paroles, protected personnel, use

of requisitions, seizure of public property, punishment of prisoners of war and spies, and the use of reprisals. Advice was also furnished to other staff sections and subordinate units on questions involving international law and the rules and customs of war. Coordination was maintained with appropriate staffs of our Allies in this regard.

(2) In July 1944 a request was prepared for authorization for the appointment of military commissions with jurisdiction in cases affecting the security or efficiency of our forces in combat. This authorization was granted by the Theater Commander and has proved effective in decreasing the activity of spies, the improper use of the United States Army uniform by the enemy, and sabotage, and similar offenses. In August, the Army Group Judge Advocate prepared and published regulations covering the conduct of such commissions. Despite a paucity of precedence in this field, these regulations, fixing the jurisdiction and procedure of such commissions, have stood the acid tests of campaign practice and may be regarded as a model in this field. The availability of such judicial procedures for swift and effective justice has fortified the confidence of our troops and increased their safety and security.

(3) Among other questions of international law, which became a responsibility of this Section subsequent to its activation, were those pertaining to Military Government and the administration of martial law in occupied territory. Included in such questions was the review of records of trial in which death sentences were imposed by Military Government courts and which it was the responsibility of the Army Group Commander to confirm prior to execution. Likewise, the claims of residents of liberated territories to property located in occupied territory posed many difficult legal problems for this Section. Problems relating to civil affairs resulting from agreements between the United States and liberated countries were referred to this branch for opinion, as well as legal questions pertaining to the conduct of Military Government by this command in occupied territory.

e. *War Crimes Branch:* Early in September 1944 the responsibilities of the United States Government as to the apprehension, detention, and trial of war criminals was recognized. The necessity for thorough investigation of such crimes, perpetrated upon United States nationals and nationals of Allied and liberated countries, was apparent. As a result of research and study conducted in this branch under the supervision of the Army Group Judge Advocate as to the prosecution of persons suspected of violations of the laws of war, specific procedures for the investigation and reporting of all war crimes coming to the attention of members of this command were devised and promulgated.

Under that directive, the War Crimes Branch processed approximately 1,500 separate reports of investigation involving violations of the laws and usages of war by the enemy. A number of these cases were tried and hundreds of others were in process for early trial when the Headquarters was dissolved. These cases involved hundreds of thousands of victims of all nationalities, and each report of investigation was designed for utilization in the prosecution of Nazi perpetrators of war crimes. Approximately 325 members of this Headquarters were engaged in the active investigation of war crimes throughout the area of the 12th Army Group, and close liaison was maintained with 21 Army Group and the French Government in this connection. This branch has served as the focal point for higher authority in this regard, such as the United Nations War Crimes Commission, the War Department, members of Congressional delegations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, and Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA). As our forces began to overrun concentration camps, such as Buchenwald, Dachau, and others, a central depository for bulky evidence, accumulated there and at other places, was established. This evidence was safeguarded for use in other investigations involving not only petty war criminals, but also those who were responsible for the general long-term policy of annihilation of other peoples, practiced by the Germans during the period of Nazi rule. This center has functioned efficiently and effectively; and there have been attached to this branch, with offices at the Evidence Center, French, Polish, Yugoslavian, Belgian, Czechoslovakian and other foreign war crimes liaison investigating teams, concerned primarily with those crimes perpetrated against nationals of their respective countries. This branch has laid the foundation for the ultimate meting out of justice to hundreds of thousands of war criminals who have perpetrated crimes against the laws of humanity during the Nazi era.

XIII. PROVOST MARSHAL'S SECTION*

1. The Provost Marshal's Section was organized by Colonel Claud E. Stadtman, Infantry, immediately after he reported for duty as Provost Marshal on 9 November 1943. Since the Army Group Headquarters had no prescribed table of organization for the Section it was necessary to draw up such a table immediately and to obtain the necessary key personnel and office equipment. This was accomplished during November and December.

2. The organization was designed to permit, initially, the planning of Provost Marshal and Military Police requirements for operations on the Continent for the armies, and, later, coordination and supervision of the armies' activities after the Army Group became operational. It was never contemplated that the Section should directly operate Military Police units or be directly responsible for their administration. Therefore, it was not considered that a large, elaborately organized Section was required. The organization adopted provided for an Executive and Administrative Branch, a Provost Branch, and a Prisoner-of-War Branch.

3. Lt Col E. M. Rudolph, CMP, reported to the Provost Marshal on 1 February 1944 and was appointed Executive Officer. He served in that capacity till the Headquarters was dissolved.

4. Initially, the Section was responsible for the planning of all military police activities for Operations "OVERLORD" and "RANKIN" and for coordinating this planning with the First US Army and 21 Army Group. This phase continued from the time of organization to 1 August 1944. At that time the 12th Army Group, which had landed on the Continent during the latter part of July, became operational, commanding the First and Third US Armies. Both supervision and coordination of Military Police activities in the two armies were conducted by personnel of this Section. In September, when the Ninth US Army began operations under the command of 12th Army Group, supervision and coordination of all military police activities were carried on also with that army. In March 1945, supervision and coordination of Military Police activities were extended to include the Fifteenth US Army.

5. From V-E Day, this Section, in addition to its normal functions of supervision and coordination of Provost Marshal and Military Police activities, planned the redeployment of military police units and the troop basis of units to be employed by the occupational forces.

* For detailed study see Volume X.

6. Details of the Provost and Prisoner of War Branches follow:

a. *Provost Branch:* (1) The Provost Branch was established in the Section during the first week of December 1943. Lt Col (then Major) Paul Phillips, Infantry, was appointed Chief of Branch. The Branch was charged with planning all matters pertaining to military discipline, law and order, road traffic control, and criminal investigation for Operations "RANKIN" and "OVERLORD." It was also charged with matters pertaining to the Military Police troop basis and training and supply of military police units other than escort guard.

(2) Considerable attention was paid to the drafting and publication of a standing operating procedure on road traffic regulation and control (later published as ETO SOP #50) and a standing operating procedure governing the relation between Provost Marshals and civil affairs officers (later published as ETO SOP #12). In both these major fields existing directives were inadequate. Concurrently, considerable work was done with the G-1 Section in the planning for and publication of administrative directives on matters pertaining to discipline, apprehension and return of stragglers and personnel absent without leave, and for the evacuation of general prisoners.

(3) Initially, only one officer (the Branch Chief) was assigned to the Branch. Subsequently (in the Spring of 1944) two additional officers, Major Richard E. Barrett, CMP, and Capt George J. Adams, CMP, were assigned.

(4) During the first two months of Operation "OVERLORD" the branch Chief was attached to Headquarters 21 Army Group as a member of the US Administrative Staff there, where he handled the coordination of US provost matters with the British.

(5) In August, the Provost Branch launched into actual staff supervision of the towns assigned to it. Constant contact with the appropriate General Staff Sections of the Headquarters, the Theater Provost Marshal, and with the armies' Provost Marshals was maintained on all matters having to do with maintenance of discipline, law and order, and road traffic control. In addition, supervision of criminal investigation activities in the armies was assumed. The job largely consisted of constantly endeavoring to bring about uniformity of method in the armies, providing assistance to them in the solution of their operational problems, and looking out for their interests in matters of supplies and equipment peculiar to Military Police units.

(6) A basic troop basis of two Military Police battalions and two criminal investigation sections per army, plus one Military Police company per corps, established during the planning phase, was effected for all armies. In early 1945

an additional Military Police battalion was obtained for each of the three operational armies.

(7) In November 1944, as a part of a general reduction of the Headquarters, the Branch was reduced to one officer. This was insufficient to allow efficient operation, and finally, in May 1945, the Branch again was increased by two officers. Lt Col E. Barrett returned to the Branch to handle traffic matters. Major Benjamin F. Lehman, CMP, was transferred to the Branch from the Theater Provost Marshal's office to handle police matters. In addition, Captain William G. Yerg, CMP, was placed on detached service with the Branch and took over all criminal investigation matters. This resulted in a workable-sized Branch.

(8) From V-E Day onward, until the dissolution of the Headquarters, the Branch concerned itself mainly with the redeployment of Military Police units and the establishment of static Military Police operational methods in the armies.

b. *Prisoner of War Branch:* (1) This Branch was established in the Section during the first week of December 1943, and Lt Col (then Major) Karl F. Moessner, CMP, was detailed as Branch Chief. The Branch was charged with planning all matters relative to prisoners of war, civilian internees, and escapees and evaders for Operations "RANKIN" and "OVERLORD." It was also charged with responsibility for the MP escort guard troop basis and the training and supply of these troops. The Branch initially contained only one officer (the Branch Chief), but was supplemented by two additional officers, Major S. B. Paine, CMP, and Capt J. G. Allen, CMP, in May 1945, when the retention of prisoners of war in the army areas greatly increased the amount of technical supervision and administration necessary.

(2) The main problem during hostilities was that of maintaining prompt and rapid evacuation of prisoners of war from the armies to Communications Zone installations in the rear in order that the burden of supplying, guarding, and administering prisoners of war would not hamper operations. Continuous efforts were directed to persuading the armies to site prisoner of war enclosures at locations where adequate rail and highway routes were available to Advance Section Com-Z, the evacuating agency, and to insuring that sufficient escort was on hand to accomplish evacuations.

(3) At the cessation of hostilities, the armies were no longer able to evacuate prisoners of war to Com-Z, but were required to receive and hold all disarmed German forces in army, corps and division enclosures for screening and eventual release or internment. At this time, the Branch was chiefly concerned with problems relative to the operation of static prisoner of war en-

closures and to coordination necessary in transfers of prisoners of war among the US armies and between US armies and Allied armies when the area boundaries were adjusted to conform to those of final occupational zones and districts.

(4) During the months of March, April, and May 1945, the Branch acted in an advisory capacity to G-1 on matters pertaining to recovered Allied military personnel. Several field trips were made to insure that existing SHAEF and Theater Headquarters directives relative to the handling of these people were being followed.

(5) Contact was maintained throughout operations with appropriate staff sections of this Headquarters, Theater Headquarters and with the army Provost Marshals in order to solve immediate and future problems in prisoner of war activities.

XIV. SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION*

1. This report covers the period 1 December 1944 to 21 June 1945. The Special Services Section at all times operated under the supervision of G-1 and not as an independent special staff section.

2. There is no record of the activity of this Section prior to 1 December. The Section consisted of one officer and two enlisted men and functioned chiefly as the Special Services Section for Headquarters 12th Army Group, rather than as one administering to the needs of the subordinate major units within the Army Group.

3. Subsequent to 1 December 1944 the same type of duties were performed, plus a routine relaying of requests from armies to higher headquarters.

4. On 20 April 1945 the Section was reorganized with a view of assuming its normal functions immediately upon the announcement of V-E Day. A new Special Services Officer, Colonel T. M. Crawford, Infantry, was appointed and instructed to expand the Section to the extent necessary to serve the major subordinate commands. Considerable effort was necessary to separate the specific duties of the new Section from those of the Morale Section of G-1, and from the Information and Education functions.

5. A comprehensive plan of Special Services activities was drawn up, implementing War Department and European Theater directives.

6. First emphasis was placed upon an athletic program, as it was immediately recognized that the cessation of hostilities, plus the stringent nonfraternization policy, would immediately result in a letdown of soldier activity, with a consequent major amount of free time which would have to be filled. To this end, Theater Headquarters was asked to delineate a definite athletic policy and the exact status of the supply of athletic equipment. Next, athletic officers of subordinate units were assembled early in May and a definite program of athletic sports prescribed. Every effort was made to facilitate the manner in which supplies would flow from warehouse to user.

7. After the indicated program had had a chance to get started, the athletic officers were again assembled on 7 June and given more detailed directives as to seasonal sports, awards, interarmy competition, and other incidentals

* For detailed study see Volume X.

leading to individual Theater championships. Armies reported that athletic equipment was beginning to arrive. Many problems had to be solved subsequent to V-E Day, owing to the highly involved shifting of all corps and divisions, both in assignments and geographically.

8. On 10 June, the entire Special Services Section, consisting of nine officers, was ordered to merge with the Special Services Section, ETOUSA, and moved to Paris to join that Headquarters. The Special Services Section of 12th Army Group ceased to exist on 21 June.

XV. ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SECTION*

1. At the time of the formation of the Headquarters, an anti-aircraft planning staff was authorized consisting of one lieutenant colonel, one major, and two enlisted men. Personnel was drawn from the Anti-aircraft Section, Headquarters ETOUSA. On 1 February 1944, Brigadier General Claude M. Thiele was appointed Chief of the Anti-aircraft Artillery Section, First US Army Group.

2. Considerable time was spent preparing the AAA Plan for Operation "OVERLORD" and perfecting rules of fire and restrictions to flying, which would allow AAA and the air forces maximum freedom of action with minimum risk to friendly forces. The over-all policy and rules for engagement were published by SHAEF, and on 8 April the final Joint Operations Plan — US Forces, Operation "OVERLORD" was approved by First US Army Group, Ninth Air Force and the Commander, Western Naval Task Force. The AAA Annex of this plan covered the SHAEF policy with regard to command and control of AAA, and the rules of fire were published by Headquarters First US Army Group as the first AAA Operations Memorandum.

3. The strength of the AAA Section for the operational stage was set at ten officers, one warrant officer, and twelve enlisted men. Personnel arrived in April and May. Original planning called for the attachment of certain American AAA units in rear of Army areas to 21 Army Group prior to the time Headquarters First US Army Group would become operational. To assist in the administration of such units, four officers and four enlisted men from the AAA Section were attached to GHQ AA Troops, 21 Army Group, in April 1944.

4. On 14 July, all personnel of the AAA Section were transferred from Headquarters First US Army Group to Headquarters 12th Army Group. As Operation "OVERLORD" progressed the rear area of the United States zone was at no time under the direct control of 21 Army Group, and consequently no American AAA units were attached to GHQ, AA Troops. All personnel attached to 21 Army Group returned to the AAA Section shortly after Headquarters 12th Army Group became operational on 1 August.

5. At an early date, it was decided to publish an AAA information bulletin, covering matters of general interest. This publication, the "AAA Notes," proved to be a valuable medium of keeping units informed of AAA operations and of sending information of interest to higher headquarters. In October, the publication of "AAA Notes" was discontinued by this Headquarters, but a weekly

* For detailed study see Volume XI.

AAA activity report was submitted to Headquarters ETOUSA for inclusion in the ETOUSA AAA Notes. This Section also published a weekly AAA Order of Battle, showing the disposition of AAA units in 12th Army Group.

6. One of the early problems encountered on becoming operational was the establishment of so-called Inner Artillery Zones (IAZ). The necessity for IAZ's arose out of the inadequacy of movement of liaison information from the Air Forces and of the extreme vulnerability of certain high priority ground installations to enemy air attack. Requests for IAZ's were made to this Headquarters from armies and then forwarded to SHAEF for further approval and publication. The majority of requests were approved. However, in September, certain aircraft corridors were defined by Allied Expeditionary Air Force, which were kept free from restricted zones. At the same time it was agreed that the number of IAZ's would be kept to a minimum consistent with adequate AAA protection.

7. In the matter of supply for AAA units, spare parts for the radar SCR-584, and M-7 power plant presented the greatest problems. In the early stages the supply of radar spare parts was especially critical, particularly in Third Army. At times it seemed certain that sets would go off the air because of a lack of spare parts. The situation improved somewhat in September, when a signal subdepot was established in Paris, but it was still critical in October owing to a lack of technically trained personnel in the depots, which resulted in considerable difficulty in the identification of parts. In November, the Chief Signal Officer, ETOUSA, sent personnel to the United Kingdom to locate additional radar spare parts, and as a result of these efforts the situation improved by the end of the year and was never serious thereafter. The problem presented by the lack of spare parts and repair facilities for the M-7 power plant, while not as critical as that of the lack of radar spare parts, was nevertheless very serious. It was not until the final stages of the campaign that facilities were established for the overhauling of these units.

8. The demand for aircraft recognition material was out of proportion to the supply, and this Section made efforts to secure such material for the armies. Some success was achieved in December 1944, but it was still apparent that the requirements had not been met. During the early part of 1945, however, a considerable amount of recognition material was procured and distributed.

9. Early in November, the AAA defenses of Antwerp and Brussels were given first priority for supply. This priority was maintained until the Spring of 1945. Occasionally it worked hardship upon army AAA units, particularly

in the supply of such items as radar spare parts, M9 directors, and new equipment. POZIT ammunition was released in December 1944; and while Antwerp units had priority on this, adequate allocations were made to cover all requirements of the armies.

10. During the rapidly-moving situation in August 1944, the inadequacy of early warning information from Air Force sources became apparent. Therefore, attempts were made to procure early warning radar sets for AAA troops in order to provide organic early warning. These attempts were unsuccessful, but the rapid advance in the closing months of the campaign again proved most emphatically that some means of obtaining early warning had to be organically provided for AAA troops, inasmuch as Air Force sources were not prepared to fulfill this requirement.

11. After the arrival of AAA units on the original Army Group troop list, about 1 September 1944, the chief concern of this Section with regard to troops was to expedite the arrival of AAA units still in the United Kingdom and those due from the United States. Considerable confusion arose when certain AAA units, originally scheduled for arrival on the Continent directly from the United States, were rerouted to the United Kingdom. In many such cases the unit equipment was not routed correctly and long delays resulted in equipping the units. After such experiences it was decided to stage all succeeding units in the United Kingdom. Fortunately, enemy air activity during the months of September, October, and November was light and the flow of units was restored to a satisfactory rate by the beginning of December, at which time the need for AAA troops became more urgent. AAA units continued to arrive until the beginning of March, when the 12th Army Group AAA troop basis was completed.

12. At the time this Headquarters became operational army rear boundaries were drawn. All AAA troops in 12th Army Group were assigned to armies. AAA defense of rear areas passed to Communications Zone and was delegated to IX Air Defense Command. The question of the protection of airfields in army areas was a source of much contention, although it had originally been decided that armies would defend all installations, including airfields, in their areas. A novel policy was established whereby the Air Force AAA units would be attached to the armies for operations only, but it was found that in many cases AAA units so attached had to be logistically supported by the armies.

13. At the time of the Ardennes counteroffensive, a number of rear area AAA units were attached to First US Army to augment existing AAA and

ground defenses in Belgium. The usual difficulties in supplying these units were experienced as a result of their attachment for operations only, but assistance was furnished by the army. This form of attachment was still considered unsatisfactory by the Ninth Air Force, and in January 1945 a new system was put into effect whereby a so-called Army Group Rear Air Boundary (AGRAB) was established. This boundary did not necessarily coincide with the army rear boundaries. Responsibility for AAA defense forward of the AGRAB rested with the Army Group, while defense of all installations behind it was the responsibility of IX Air Defense Command. All IX Air Defense Command units attached to armies were relieved from such attachment, and when reinforcement was needed in the army areas the AGRAB was moved forward to allow army AAA units to be moved up. The basic motive in the establishment of this boundary, however, was to allow IX Air Defense Command to retain control of its units in army areas. As a means for reinforcing armies it proved awkward and highly inflexible.

14. In December 1944 and January 1945 a considerable number of air attacks on friendly troops and installations by friendly type aircraft were made. However, no definite information was ever obtained to confirm the possibility that the Germans were using Allied aircraft and, as a result, the policy of holding fire in such cases was continued. Ninth Air Force was permitted to conduct investigations of such incidents and measures for identification of friendly troops were intensified.

15. In February it was decided that experiments with the SCR-584 for mortar location should be carried out. Since this radar already was being employed by antiaircraft units, it was decided that AAA units should furnish the personnel for such experiments, although the final tactical use would devolve upon the field artillery. Consequently, a school was set up by Fifteenth US Army in March and three teams were trained for each of the First, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies. Ironically enough, these teams never had an opportunity to make use of their training in the European Theater since they completed the course in April, during the final stages of the campaign.

16. On 23 April, Colonel John W. Davis was announced as Antiaircraft Officer, vice Brigadier General Claude M. Thiele, relieved.

17. Following the cessation of hostilities, a conference of AAA officers was held to discuss methods for obtaining information from units on the basis of conclusions reached during operations on the Continent and to make recommendations for improvements in the T/O & E's. It was decided that the Theater

AAA Officer should submit a questionnaire to all AAA units and that the completed questionnaires be analyzed and then forwarded to Army Group forces.

18. At this time AAA was called upon to furnish a large number of personnel for duty with the Communications Zone. Such duty included operation of military railway services, guarding and processing of German PW's, and assistance in the operation of assembly area centers. By the middle of June, a considerable proportion of the antiaircraft units of 12th Army Group had been shifted to Communications Zone, and on the 25th, at the request of the Anti-aircraft Officer, the AAA Section was dissolved as a Special Staff Section of Headquarters 12th Army Group. One antiaircraft officer was delegated to handle future Army Group antiaircraft matters under the G-3 Section.

19. In this campaign, AAA units assigned to the armies of 12th Army Group were given an opportunity to show their capabilities against a determined and well organized enemy air force as well as to engage in numerous successful ground actions. How well they accomplished their mission against the enemy air force can best be expressed in figures. Over 3,000 German aircraft were confirmed as having been destroyed or probably destroyed by the AAA units of the armies of 12th Army Group, and of this total more than two thirds were definitely destroyed.

XVI. ARMORED SECTION*

1. The Armored Section was organized and activated as a Special Staff Section of the Army Group pursuant to authority contained in General Order No. 8, Headquarters First US Army Group, dated 8 March 1944. The activation of the Section was a direct result of a conference held in the office of the Theater Commander, in London, on 26 February, regarding the specialized problems involved in the training, maintenance, supply, and operations of the large amount of armor that was to be utilized in Operation "OVERLORD." Present at this conference were General Omar N. Bradley, First US Army Group and First US Army Commander, and Colonel Edwin K. Wright, who was later designated Chief of the Armored Section.

2. The functions of the Armored Section were outlined in a memorandum entitled Functions of the Armored Section, Headquarters First US Army Group, 22 March 1944.

3. Immediately following its activation the Section operated in two echelons. The forward echelon — consisting of the Chief of Section, one technical officer, one warrant officer and two enlisted clerks — functioned with the Royal Armored Corps Branch of Headquarters 21 Army Group, initially located at St Paul's School, Hammersmith, London. The main echelon, consisting of the remainder of the Section, functioned with Headquarters First US Army Group, located at Bryanston Square.

4. During the period prior to D-Day, in carrying out its assigned function, the Armored Section was particularly concerned with maintaining direct contact and liaison with armored units being processed and trained in the United Kingdom; with the conduct of training and experimentation in specialized armored equipment (mine exploders, special assault equipment, etc.), both American and British; with problems involved in the establishment of suitable reserves of armored equipment; with the conduct of special firing and ammunition tests; and with the coordination of US and British armored units in preparation for the assault on the Continent.

5. On 26 April the forward echelon of the Section moved with Main Headquarters, 21 Army Group, to Southwick (Portsmouth), where it was placed in a better position to assist in the processing, final training, and marshalling of

* For detailed study see Volume XI.

Allied armored elements being prepared for the assault and build-up phases of the invasion.

6. During the period from 6 June to 1 August, Colonel Wright, Chief of the Armored Section, and Major General G. W. Richards, Chief of the Royal Armored Corps Branch, 21 Army Group, alternated each week between Southwick and the Continent. When functioning at their post on the Continent they operated from the Tactical Headquarters of 21 Army Group, near Mosles, six miles northwest of Bayeux. This method provided for the maintenance of close contact with Allied armored units being marshalled for the build-up in the United Kingdom and France, at the same time retaining personal contact with Allied armored units already ashore in France.

7. When 12th Army Group became operational, both echelons of the Armored Section were joined with the Main Headquarters at St. Sauveur-Lendelin. From that date until the inactivation of the Headquarters the entire Armored Section functioned as a part of Main Headquarters, with stations progressively at Laval, Versailles, Verdun, and Wiesbaden.

8. During the same period, the Section continued to carry out the functions outlined in the original directive to the Section. However, many specific points of interest augmented the routine functioning of the Section, and they are discussed in detail in the Armored chapter of this report (vol. XI).

9. Shortly after the activation of the Section, a similar section, with identical functions, was established in First US Army. The close liaison between that Section and our own greatly facilitated the operations of armor in the early days of the campaign and established a system of mutual cooperation that was invaluable in the handling of armored matters. Based on the experience of First US Army, both the Ninth and Fifteenth Armies established armored sections as Special Staff Sections of their headquarters prior to the dates on which they became operational. It became habitual practice for each corps headquarters to establish a small corps armored section by the utilization of personnel detailed from Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the particular armored group assigned to the corps. The War Department soon recognized the necessity for armored sections in corps and higher headquarters and provided for them in changes to the T/O & E's of corps and armies, under date of 20 January 1945. Thereafter, the Armored Sections became integral members of the Special Staff at the army headquarters.

10. Since the end of hostilities, the Armored Section has provided technical and operational assistance in the redeployment of armored units and in the establishment of the armored occupational troop basis. A final function was the summarizing of technical, logistical, and operational reference data on armor for further study and research by the Armored Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and for the information of other theaters of operations.

XVII. ARTILLERY SECTION*

1. The Artillery Section, Headquarters 12th Army Group, was for a long period the Artillery Section, Headquarters ETOUSA. As such, it was called upon, especially during the planning phase, to aid in the solution not only of Army Group problems but also of Theater problems.

For purposes of this discussion the work of the Artillery Section is divided into two phases: planning and operations.

2. PLANNING.

a. During the planning period, the Artillery Section had two main functions: to solve known deficiencies in artillery organization, equipment, and training and to foresee possible future artillery requirements so that proper preparation would prevent future deficiencies.

b. During the same period, the Section was organized in four branches: Air, OP Operations, Munitions and Equipment, and Administration. One officer was attached to the British 21 Army Group as an artillery liaison officer.

c. The Artillery Officer initiated action to augment and revise the artillery troop basis. This resulted in an increase from thirty-two battalions to a total of 176. Major revision was an increase in the number of 8" howitzer battalions from twelve to twenty-eight and a corresponding decrease in the number of 155mm howitzer battalions from sixty-four to forty-eight.

d. The Artillery Section aided the Artillery Branch, G-3, SHAEF, in the preparation and distribution of the Field Artillery Liaison Notebook. This booklet was designed to facilitate the work of British/US units when supporting troops of the other nationality. It was distributed down to battalions.

e. The Section also aided in the preparation of a Theater estimate of ammunition expenditures from D-Day through December 1944. This estimate was sent to the War Department in early April. Although the quantities listed were never delivered to the guns, the estimate itself proved correct.

f. Section staff members recognized the apparent shortage of T/O forward observers in field artillery units and initiated action which resulted in the addition of forward observer sections to divisional artillery battalions — three per light battalion and one per medium battalion. A similar request for observers for nondivisional light and medium artillery was disapproved. A recommendation providing for antitank subsections in the artillery headquarters of divisions and

* For detailed study see Volume XI.

corps and in the artillery sections of armies was made. These were to be provided by a special allotment of grades and ratings over and above T/O.

g. The Army Group Artillery Officer averted a critical shortage of graphical firing tables by procuring homemade ones from the Field Artillery School.

h. The Artillery Section, representing First US Army Group (and Theater Headquarters) worked with First and Third US Armies and developed policies covering the responsibilities for the supply and maintenance of field artillery aircraft.

3. OPERATIONS.

a. The organization of the Section during the operations phase was similar to that during the planning phase, except that for a short while the Section included an Intelligence and Information Branch. This branch was highly desirable. However, a shortage of personnel forced its abandonment. Also during this phase, the Section no longer maintained a liaison officer at 21 Army Group.

b. During operations, the Artillery Officer was the adviser to G-3 on the distribution of artillery and tank destroyer units. No artillery was retained under Army Group control.

c. The Section adopted a policy of considering a tank destroyer battalion as a semiorganic unit of a specific division. This improved teamwork.

d. The Artillery Officer was intimately associated with the development of an Army Group ammunition policy and was a strong advocate of the system adopted in October and November whereby credits were allocated to armies and forecasts of future allocations made to permit planning. The Artillery Officer was also the adviser to G-3 on the division of artillery ammunition among armies. The policy was to divide ammunition on the basis of the number of active and inactive divisions and of the tactical situation rather than to divide the ammunition on a "per gun" basis. This was believed to be sound, since the most important thing was to have the greatest number of rounds land in front of the most active division. The Army Group massed ammunition, not guns. Had it been possible, it would have been ideal to have massed both.

e. The Artillery Section did considerable research (including test firing) to determine gunnery problems incident to the introduction of Pozit Fuze to ground action. The results of this research were made available to the armies and, as an aid to development, were also made available to the ordnance Pozit experts from the United States.

f. The Section originated and coordinated a program which resulted in the conversion of almost all towed tank destroyer battalions to self-propelled tank destroyer battalions. Battle experience showed the towed tank destroyer a poor substitute for the self-propelled one. A program to provide counter mortar radar teams for artillery was fostered. During April, Fifteenth US Army conducted a school for these teams. At the close of the campaign, each corps had received one trained and equipped counter mortar radar team.

g. The Section coordinated the movement of 600 T/E field artillery aircraft from England to the Continent during the first five months of combat. These aircraft were flown by Field Artillery pilots from Air Force bases in Britain. The Section also coordinated delivery to the armies of replacements of Field Artillery aircraft (and pilots) and initiated action to provide various modifications to Field Artillery aircraft. Notable among these modifications was the development of a lightweight radio case and the provision of plexi-glass enclosures to provide improved vision.

XVIII. SIGNAL SECTION*

1. SIGNAL COMMUNICATION.

a. The Headquarters' Signal aspect of the over-all planning included co-ordination with Supreme Headquarters, 21 Army Group, First and Third US Armies, and other associated commands in the layout and engineering of the main line wire network on the Continent; the allocation of radio frequencies and call signs; provision of visual, pigeon, and messenger (air and motor) communication; and the drawing up of operating procedures suitable to combined, joint, and intraservice operations. During the planning stage, signal communication for Headquarters First US Army Group was provided by agencies of Headquarters European Theater of Operations, augmented by a limited-scale signal center operated by personnel of the 302d and 305th Signal Operation Battalions.

b. When the Army Group moved to the Continent, initial signal communication to serve the Headquarters consisted primarily of hastily constructed open wire and spiral four lines, upon which carrier systems to provide maximum facilities were installed, together with limited motor messenger service. As rapidly as sections of the French open wire and underground cable systems were rehabilitated they were immediately included in the main network. The rapid advance of our troops following the St. Lo breakthrough imposed an ever increasing traffic load, far beyond the capacity of the limited wire network. To meet this overload, high frequency point-to-point radio circuits were established between this Headquarters and those of the two armies, together with very high frequency radio links employing the AN/TRE-1, 3 & 4 equipment, to provide additional voice and teletypewriter channels. At the same time, greater demands were made on motor messenger service. In several instances, motor messenger runs covered 700—800 miles, which represented a major accomplishment in view of the road conditions at that time. It was during this phase of operations that the Headquarters was divided into three operating echelons, each served by a signal center and with established signal communication among all.

c. The relatively static situation which prevailed when the Allied armies reached the Siegfried Line made possible the consolidation and enlargement of the signal communication facilities at the Headquarters and between the Headquarters and the armies under its command. The added construction of open wire lines and rehabilitation of existing open wire and underground cable

* For detailed study see Volume XI.

systems were accomplished during this period and provided an extensive and reliable main line wire network, thus reducing the load on radio and motor messenger means. At the same time, existing operating procedures were perfected and new ones initiated, among which was the procedure for use on the administrative tape relay network between principal elements of the command. By the beginning of the Ardennes counteroffensive on 16 December 1944, wire and VHF communication was so extensively established that communication was maintained with subordinate units even at a time when the enemy overran and interrupted the principal lateral 20-wire open wire line between Aubange and Jemelle and the underground cables between Jemelle and Liege, in Belgium. Such an interruption necessitated the rerouting of wire circuits and motor messenger runs through rear areas west of the Meuse River, and implementation of the existing signal communication means by additional point-to-point radio circuits and air messenger runs. With the restoration of a more favorable tactical situation in January 1945, signal communication was restored on the same extensive scale as had existed before the breakthrough. The establishment of the Remagen bridgehead and the subsequent rapid push by our forces through Germany again presented signal communication problems similar to those encountered in the race across France. Again it was not possible to maintain wire construction and underground cable rehabilitation to a degree sufficient to maintain contact with the fast moving armies. The gaps thus formed were satisfactorily bridged by VHF and SHF radio links and resort was had to increased motor and air messenger runs. All during this period, traffic loads continued to grow, taxing signal center operating personnel and facilities to the utmost.

d. Upon the cessation of hostilities, primary emphasis was placed on the occupational military wire network and the orderly development of facilities to serve fundamental civilian requirements. Radio was relegated to a stand-by means of communication. Motor and air messenger services were maintained on a scale sufficient to handle traffic of low precedence and to locations with which electrical communication had not yet been established

2. SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE.

The Signal Intelligence Branch of the Signal Section planned and coordinated organization of corps signal service companies (RI), established policies and supervised the activities of all signal radio intelligence units assigned or attached to 12th Army Group, and coordinated all matters of signal security and signal intelligence with Supreme Headquarters, Theater Headquarters, Com-

munications Zone, and Allied Force Headquarters. Distribution was made of all codes and ciphers for the United States ground forces under the command of this Headquarters. Numerous enemy intelligence prisoners of war were sent to interrogation centers of Theater Headquarters, to the United Kingdom, and to the United States. Enemy equipment intelligence service for the Army Group was supervised, including the selection of targets and liaison of all army units with higher headquarters for the purpose of research intelligence. As the campaign lengthened, large quantities of enemy equipment were made available to our forces and personality targets achieved major importance. All radio countermeasure activities for the ground forces were controlled, including the regulation of radio traffic levels and circuit silence periods. Problems of interference and jamming were investigated and dealt with by means of special investigation units designed for countermeasures of radio controlled devices of the enemy.

3. SIGNAL REQUIREMENTS.

a. During the planning period, in London, the principal supply problem of the Section consisted of the preparation of signal projects for Continental operations and the coordination of all United States forces planning for Operation "NEPTUNE." Additional activities in connection with Operation "NEPTUNE" included recommendations for signal supply levels, preparation of signal logistical factors, and coordination with the Air Force on matters pertaining to signal supply. The Signal Section reviewed daily tonnage allocations set up for the pre-scheduled supply to the Continent and expedited receipt of signal project supplies for units of the Headquarters' signal service.

b. Emergency Signal supply requirements were processed and submitted to Headquarters Communications Zone for priority air and boat dispatch to the Continent. After arrival on the Continent, staff liaison visits were made and allocation problems settled by arbitration between signal staffs. After Advance Section Communications Zone and Third US Army became operational, signal stocks, which were in short supply from the United Kingdom, were made available from the First US Army stocks. Problems arising from such difficulties as late and uneven arrivals of daily pre-scheduled shipments from the United Kingdom and of effecting delivery of signal supplies from the Normandy beaches to advance units were overcome by the use of such expedients as the Red Ball Express, wherein a daily minimum tonnage was allocated by each army for signal supplies. Also, a series of signal conferences were initiated weekly for the purpose of coordinating requirements. A signal depot was estab-

lished under the control of the Signal Officer, 12th Army Group, and proved to be of great value in supplying signal troops assigned to this Headquarters during operations. The processing of new Tables of Organization and Equipment, changes to T/O and E's, special lists of equipment (SLOE) signal projects, the introduction of new equipment, and the handling of all signal personnel matters constituted a major portion of activities during this period.

c. The supply situation continued to improve considerably during operations in Germany, and Advance Section Communications Zone entered actively into supply functions and was able to supply armies on a ten day requisitioning cycle. Items of signal equipment, the lack of which was considered operationally significant, were incorporated in a "critical signal items" list, from which Communications Zone was able to furnish the Signal Section with availability reports. Allocations were made to armies in accordance with relative operational requirements. As sizeable stocks of German signal equipment were uncovered, it became necessary for the Signal Section to coordinate all activities on the collection, identification, and rehabilitation of this equipment in Germany.

4. PHOTOGRAPHY.

a. During the planning phase of the Headquarters, the Photographic Group of the Section cooperated with the Army Pictorial Division, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Headquarters Communications Zone, in over-all photographic plans. Particular attention was paid to photographic coverage of D-Day operations and the actual landings of American forces on the Continent. At this time the only photographic organization available was the 165th Signal Photographic Company assigned to First US Army, which began covering American troops in action. All photographic activities were coordinated between Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, the Army Pictorial Division of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Communications Zone, and armies of the Army Group. This included setting up a film return system, whereby transmission of exposed film to the Army Pictorial Service laboratory in London was expedited and prints and critiques forwarded to the armies. During the Northern France phase of operations, photographic coverage was greatly expanded. Expanded coverage for the Headquarters was handled by units of the 326th Signal Service Company (Photographic) and the 167th Signal Photographic Company. Special coverage was also made for the Headquarters' staff sections.

b. With the opening of the Germany phase of operations, Signal Corps photographers were covering combat operations of First, Third and Ninth US

Armies, plus any special coverage required by this Headquarters. Arrangements were made for photographers to view their work and receive technical aid. Radio-photo enabled prints to be released in the United States on the same day they were shot, and photography in color was also instituted. The 168th Signal Photographic Company was assigned to Ninth US Army, and later the 198th Signal Photographic Company arrived and was assigned to Fifteenth US Army. At the peak of operations there were five Signal Photographic Companies and one Signal Service Company (Photographic) in 12th Army Group. With the final collapse of German resistance, considerable coverage was given to war crimes, concentration camps, release of prisoner and surrender negotiations.

XIX. CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION*

1. The Chemical Warfare Section was set up in October 1943, with Lt Col A. Leggin as Acting Chemical Officer and Liaison Officer from the Office of the Chief of Chemical Warfare, Headquarters ETOUSA.

2. During the remaining months of 1943 and January 1944, activities were confined to organizing the T/O and T/E for the Section, establishing over-all chemical warfare policies, and computing logistical supply data.

3. In February 1944, Lt Col Leggin was assigned to First US Army Group as Acting Chief Chemical Officer and the Section formally activated. Activities were confined to acquiring personnel for the Section, to liaison with First US Army in working out details for chemical warfare plans for the invasion, and to attending demonstrations of chemical warfare materiel.

4. The building occupied by this Section was destroyed on the night of 14 March 1944 by enemy action, as a result of which all records, files, and equipment were lost.

5. Colonel John C. MacArthur reported to this Headquarters as Chemical Officer on 1 April 1944. The remaining officers and enlisted men reported for duty during the remainder of the month.

6. On 16 May a detachment, consisting of two officers and two enlisted men, was attached to 21 Army Group to coordinate British-American chemical warfare activities during the initial stages of the invasion. During this period, supply plans of First US Army were reviewed, computations of chemical warfare ammunition for all units made, reserves for supplies established, and intelligence studies brought up to date.

7. Colonel MacArthur visited the combat areas on the Continent for a study of the 4.2" chemical mortar and the chemical warfare situation during the early phase of the operations.

8. The main detachment of this Section arrived on the Continent 22 July 1944 and the rear echelon on 2 August. After the complete Section had arrived, a detachment of one officer and one enlisted woman was placed in the Rear Headquarters and the remainder of the Section of three officers and five enlisted men at the Main Headquarters.

9. The initial duties of the Signal Section were to study the supply and troop situation and to make rearrangements to the satisfaction of the two armies then under Army Group control.

* For detailed study see Volume XI.

10. During the Germans' Ardennes offensive two smoke generator companies were converted from rear area static units to tactical troops to screen vital targets and bridges required for the movement of troops. Reconversion of these troops required new techniques and equipment. However, this was accomplished with a minimum of delay.

11. During August, the Section moved with the rest of the Headquarters to Laval and then Versailles, France.

12. A more lenient policy regarding the carrying of chemical warfare equipment was published during September. Troops were not required to wear impregnated clothing; gas masks could be held in regimental storage, and all other protective equipment had to be turned in to depots.

13. The Section moved to Verdun on 10 September.

14. A study was made late in September on the bottleneck which had developed in getting chemical warfare supplies up to forward army areas from rear area depots. This study entailed a check of all operations, from the issuance of a requisition by an army to the final delivery of the item to the troops.

15. Colonel Mac Arthur was relieved as Chemical Officer on 4 October 1944, and assigned to duty with the War Department.

16. A new T/O was received for the Section on 13 October, reducing the Section to two officers and three enlisted men.

17. A conference was held on 8 October with chemical warfare officers of 21 Army Group and 6th Army Group to coordinate chemical warfare activities on the whole of the Western Front.

18. Colonel Patrick F. Powers joined this Headquarters as Chemical Officer on 27 October.

19. Change #5 to ADSOP, 12th Army Group, regarding the carrying of chemical warfare protective equipment was published on 23 December. This policy required that all units in front of division rear boundary carry the gas mask and contents of the gas mask carrier and maintain full chemical warfare protective equipment.

20. Chemical warfare intelligence activities increased during October. Consequently, additional technical intelligence teams were obtained, information regarding possible enemy toxic installations disseminated to all units, and prisoner of war questionnaires prepared.

21. Mechanized flame throwers were made available to the Army Group, resulting in the establishment of a basis of issue and allocations. Instructors from the United States were detailed to all units using the weapon to give instruction in its use.

22. During the Ardennes campaign, a revision of the assignments of chemical mortar battalions was made. A complete study of the losses in chemical warfare equipment was also compiled.

23. Due to the increased interest in chemical warfare and the tactical situation at this time, the Intelligence Officer of this Section was attached to G-2 for the preparation of weekly chemical warfare intelligence reports.

24. During January, a revised requirement for chemical warfare ammunition for the next six months was submitted. The unanticipated expenditures of CWS Class V items caused a large increase in the requirements of the Army Group. Maintenance day-of-supply figures were also prepared.

25. A conference of representatives of all chemical mortar battalions was held 11 January 1945 to study various tactical procedures and difficulties encountered by the battalions.

26. All CWS Class V items were placed under an allocation system effective 17 January, owing to the critical shortage of these items.

27. Brigadier General Bullene, from the Office of the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, visited the chemical mortar units of this command to study the causes of barrel bursts in the 4.2" chemical mortars.

28. During the month of March, all CWS units in the Army Group were visited by members of this Section.

29. A change in ADSOP, 12th Army Group, regarding disposition of captured enemy toxic ammunition was drawn up on account of the large amount of enemy toxic materiel captured. All installations were visited by members of this Section and reports compiled for higher headquarters.

30. During April, a Mortar Location Radar School was in operation in conjunction with Headquarters Fifteenth US Army, using 4.2" chemical mortars.

31. Revised flame thrower fuel, smoke, and protective equipment requirements were compiled during this period.

32. Upon the cessation of hostilities, all credits and allocations of CWS Class V items were cancelled, a revised policy on carrying protective equipment issued, and studies on the redeployment of chemical warfare troops submitted.

33. Colonel Powers was relieved from duty with this Headquarters as Chemical Officer on 25 May 1945, Lt Col Leggin taking over as Acting Chemical Officer.

34. Activities after 1 June 1945 were confined to redeployment of troops and compilation of reports on supply, captured enemy equipment and toxic ammunition, and recommendations regarding CWS troops and units.

XX. ENGINEER SECTION*

1. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS.

a. The Engineer Section was organized late in January 1944 with an approved strength of fifteen officers and forty-three enlisted men, which was later reduced by eight enlisted men. The final strength proved sufficient for proper functioning within the Headquarters, but limited somewhat the freedom of officers to make field technical inspections. After early adjustments, the final organization was set up to include branches on administration, topography, intelligence, troops and operations, and engineer service.

b. The fact that the Army Group Headquarters was to be primarily a tactical rather than an administrative one determined the manner of functioning of the Special Staff sections. It was apparent from the outset that the control of mapping and map distribution presented a special problem entirely unlike that of supply generally. Accordingly, the Topographic Branch was made to exercise close technical control over army mapping and map distribution activities and to maintain close liaison with the Communications Zone and with British survey agencies. The Intelligence Branch was made to operate in a normal manner in making terrain and special studies, but having no field information sources under its direct control it was merely made to assure that basic intelligence was disseminated properly and that field engineer intelligence was supplied to higher headquarters and distributed laterally to other army groups. The Troops and Operations Branch, in addition to advising on the practicability of plans from the engineer viewpoint, recommended the assignment of available engineer troop units, the basis of issue of newly developed equipment, and changes in Tables of Organization and Equipment. The principal functions of the Engineer Service Branch consisted of advising on the practicability of engineer logistical support, recommending allocation of critical items of supply, and following up unfilled army requisitions for critical items. Minor functions included advice on fire-fighting planning and on real estate acquisition procedures.

2. PRE-OCCUPATIONAL PERIOD.

a. In addition to the usual growing pains of a newly-activated organization there existed the problem of developing a proper concept of the manner in which recognized engineer functions should be performed at Army Group level. Personnel for all branches was procured as individuals, except in the case of

* For detailed study see Volume XII.

the Topographic Branch, which was procured as a complete unit from the United States. Branch functions were defined, a technical library, including basic engineer intelligence files, was quickly acquired, and action was completed on the organization of the Map Reproduction Detachment, which was attached to the Engineer Section for operational control.

b. Since the First US Army had been placed under 21 Army Group for operations, engineer liaison officers from Headquarters 12th Army Group were attached to the Chief Engineer, 21 Army Group. This action later facilitated transfer of engineer technical control to 12th Army Group, even though under the British system the Army Group has administrative as well as technical-tactical responsibilities. Assistance was rendered the First Army by checking to insure that it received all engineer intelligence available and by assisting it in technical inspections of its topographic units.

c. Close contact with the Theater Chief Engineer and with British survey agencies was maintained and a part taken in the drafting of plans for mapping and map distribution, which facilitated later assumption of control by the Army Group.

d. Within the Headquarters, activities included making terrain and special studies of prospective areas of operations. A study of the road and waterway net of the Contentin Peninsula was the basis for determination of the phasing-in of heavy engineer bridging and other supplies during the build-up period. Failure of the Germans to execute demolitions there to the extent expected made possible the provision of a more than ample cushion of bridging material for operations subsequent to the breakthrough from the beach areas. Among other studies made was one covering the north coast of Brittany and the immediate hinterland; one of the valley of the lower Loire; and another of the Quiberon Bay area and Belle Isle. In connection with the last, detailed studies of roads and of depths and bridge clearances of inland waterways disclosed the practicability of moving small landing craft overland for possible Quiberon area operations. Other activities included recommendations on assignments of engineer units to armies, furnishing files of engineer intelligence to newly arriving army headquarters, recommending changes in drafts of Supreme Headquarters' operational memoranda pertaining to the Engineers, and writing the "Engineer Annex" of the Army Group's plan for "OVERLORD," which was correlated with plans of Theater Headquarters and Ninth Air Force. The Section also prepared a series of basic outline maps of Western Europe and supervised the Engineer Map Reproduction Detachment in lithographing

and waxing of overprints needed for the G-3 Daily Situation Reports and for logistical and other maps required by various staff sections.

3. OPERATIONAL PERIOD.

a. Incident to the inauguration of the Headquarters' operational phase, the most important problem was the determination of the proper distribution of available engineer units between the First and Third Armies. The insufficiency of engineer combat battalions in the Theater was overcome partly by the agreement of Communications Zone to attach three General Service Regiments to the Third Army. The regiments remained attached until after V-E Day. Considerable and frequent shifting of engineer units between armies was required throughout operations. To meet the anticipated shortage of engineer troops, a call was made on the War Department to send to Europe combat battalions then in training, completion of the training to be assumed by the Theater. As these battalions arrived they were trained in rear areas, under a general program formulated by the Army Group Engineer.

b. Activities of the Troops and Operations Branch involved study of the capabilities of newly designed equipment and recommendations as to their issue; study and planning of road nets to support operations; issue of technical instructions regarding road damage expected to occur during spring thaws; studies on ways and means of solving the problem of using narrow standard bridges when these were the only ones available to transport the wider tanks and transporters being issued; study of the effects of flooding from the Roer River dams; planning and arranging for the use of naval landing craft and N. L. pontoons in the Rhine River crossings; initiating the design of booms for protection of bridges against floating mines and swimmer attack; and initiating the establishment of a flood prediction service for Rhine River operations.

c. The rapid advance after the breakthrough from Normandy introduced a critical situation in the supply of maps. This was caused by the failure of arrival of advance area maps from the United States on time and by enemy action whereby large shipments were lost. The problem was solved by air dispatch of 200 tons of maps and by utilizing Paris commercial printing establishments which, fortunately, had sufficient paper stocks on hand. As the front became stabilized and it developed that 1:25000 scale maps required revision, an extensive map revision program was initiated — and completed — covering territory as far east as Kassel, Germany, by March of 1945.

d. Engineer intelligence functions followed the established practice of preparing terrain and other special studies. By study of air coverage, assault

crossing sites on the Seine, Aisne and Marne were selected. Photo coverage of the Meuse, Moselle, Rhine, and less important streams were furnished the armies, and engineer intelligence was furnished to the 6th Army Group covering its probable areas of operations. Much unpublished data on Germany than was available in England was brought to the Continent by air couriers, collated, reproduced, and distributed to armies. In collaboration with the Office of the Chief Engineer, ETOUSA, hydrologic studies of the Rhine were made and distributed. In April 1945 attention was focused on the German "Redoubt Area," necessitating the distribution of road and bridge reports on that area. Closing operations required the dissemination of engineer intelligence on Czechoslovakia and Austria.

e. Initial supply interests after 1 August concerned rectification of the unequal distribution of supplies which had resulted from placing Communications Zone stocks on the Continent under First Army control. Following the advance across France, transportation shortages and long lines of communication necessitated allocation of maintenance tonnages to armies. Supply of heavy engineer equipment fared none too well under this system. Officers were dispatched to follow consignments through from base depots to destination. As a result, certain difficulties, especially in documentation, were encountered. Corrective recommendations were made and approved, which effected improvement in engineer supply. Operations disclosed that small parts, furnished with standard bridge sets, frequently were lost. Action towards establishing special maintenance factors for these corrected the difficulty. Other supply activities included direct control of allocation of lumber to armies; direct allocation of the somewhat limited supply of antitank and antipersonnel mines during the Ardennes battle; increase of Continental stocks of the M-2 treadway bridge to meet Rhine crossing requirements; clarification of split-service responsibility in the supply of engineer Class V items; and correction of deficiencies in spare part supply procedure in the armies. The early exercise of foresight in planning for Rhine crossing equipment bore fruit. Engineer supply support proved ample in all crossing zones.

f. During this period, the Engineer plan for operations "ECLIPSE" was evolved.

4. AFTER V-E DAY.

It was necessary to supplement engineer plans for operation "ECLIPSE" by arranging for heavy shipments of engineer materials from the armies to the Communications Zone for support of Com-Z's redeployment responsibilities. As a result of early listing of engineer intelligence targets, considerable topo-

graphic data and engineer equipment for research were shipped to Theater Headquarters. Production of materials needed for the occupation and redeployment was initiated and progressed with a fair degree of success. Action was initiated on the opening of minimum navigation channels on the Rhine in the United States area between Coblenz and Karlsruhe.

5. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

a. A discussion of certain general characteristics and deficiencies in engineer organization, equipment, procedure, technique and training is included in the Engineer Annex to this report. Most of these matters have been made the subject of separate letters to the War Department. However, it is desired to emphasize here the more important conclusions arrived at:

b. The engineer Army Group type of organization is basically sound and should be retained, although administrative functions of Group headquarters should be limited and more clearly defined.

c. The split-service responsibility of the Air Force and Engineers in the matter of control of mapping photography should be placed entirely with the Engineers.

d. Map distribution means were inadequate. T/O & E's should provide special units for the job.

e. Engineer depot personnel and equipment were inadequate. The organization should be expanded.

f. Means of communication provided for Engineer combat group headquarters and combat battalions were inadequate. More and greater range radio sets and more operators should be provided.

g. Divisional Engineer combat battalions should have a fourth lettered company

h. T/O's of engineer units should provide for operators for a two-shift operation of certain items of heavy engineer equipment.

i. Control of the recording of minefields was not entirely satisfactory. In each Theater a central records office should be maintained.

XXI. ORDNANCE SECTION*

1. The Ordnance Special staff Section was formed on 6 March 1944. Until that time all ordnance matters were handled by a representative from the Office of the Chief Ordnance Officer, Headquarters Services of Supply, ETOUSA. This representative never established an office at Headquarters First US Army Group, but was available for planning purposes, for attending conferences involving ordnance and for advising on ordnance matters.

2. During the planning period from 6 March until 1 August, when the Army Group became operational, the Ordnance Section prepared logistical calculations covering the reserve and maintenance requirements of all classes of ordnance supplies and submitted bids for ordnance tonnage. Each draft plan was evaluated as to adequacy from the standpoint of ordnance service. Recommendations were made covering the required priority shipping of ordnance service units from the United Kingdom to France.

3. Also during this period, an attempt was made to foresee, insofar as was possible, the nature of future operations and to plan an operating procedure which would result in a minimum of interference with the operations of the armies and at the same time provide necessary information to permit this Section to exercise the necessary control and keep the Army Group Commander advised of the status of ordnance supply.

4. Following the assault landing on D-Day, the Ordnance Section made every effort to obtain up-to-the-minute information on the status of ordnance supplies on the Continent. At the beginning, this information was obtained by maintaining the closest contact with the Ordnance Officer, ETOUSA, who received requests for critical supplies direct from the Ordnance Officer, First US Army. After approximately two weeks, the Section began to receive copies of supply reports regularly from the First Army Ordnance Officer. These reports enabled this Section to keep G-4 informed as to the rate at which supplies were built up and as to the status of supply of certain critical items of ammunition and Class II supplies.

5. Prior to the time Headquarters 12th Army Group became operational the supply of ammunition and of Ordnance Class II and IV items was handled by Headquarters Advance Section Communications Zone (ADSEC), which then was under direct control of First US Army. All supplies on the Continent were

* For detailed study see Volume XII.

considered as belonging to First US Army, since that army was then the senior US Army headquarters on the Continent. Owing to bad weather and insufficient unloading facilities, ordnance supply did not reach the volume that had been planned. For supplies other than ammunition, First US Army relied almost entirely on what it had brought along. Only very small amounts of equipment were on hand in ADSEC depots. As for ammunition, the expenditures during the first two weeks of July increased to such an extent that the meager reserves were being depleted. As a result, it became necessary to ration ammunition items in order to restrict expenditures.

6. When Third US Army became operational on 1 August, ADSEC was relieved from control of First US Army and came under the control of 12th Army Group, thus becoming responsible for supplying both the First and Third US Armies. As a result of the shortages, it became necessary for 12th Army Group to allocate between the two armies the available ammunition and items of equipment which were in short supply.

7. First US Army had been adequately equipped with ordnance general supplies and with ordnance service troops for the assault phase. Projects for Continental operations (PROCO) adequately took care of excess equipment needed for the landing operations. From the start, the Third US Army was short of ordnance service units, since their shipment to France was phased back to permit the rapid build-up of combat divisions. Also, due to conditions in the marshalling area many of its ordnance units arrived entirely without or with only a small portion of their basic load of supplies and spare parts. In general, Third Army combat units were provided with T/E equipment but Third Army ordnance units were almost completely without their authorized reserve. Nor did Third Army have any additional equipment such as was provided First US Army under PROCO projects.

8. The month of September was characterized by overextended lines of communication and practically no reserves in army or ADSEC depots. Although there was an increase in daily tonnage delivered, principally on account of improvement in the rail system, the only sizeable reserves were in the vicinity of the Normandy ports and beaches. Total hauling capacities were not sufficient to build up army reserves, much less to establish reserves in ADSEC and rear areas of the Communications Zone.

9. Following the race across France to the Siegfried Line, the month of October was characterized by a general building up of supplies for the coming offensive to the Rhine. There was an improvement in general supply discipline

during this period. Units were not allowed to go back to the beaches to grab equipment and spare parts. All ordnance equipment unloaded on Omaha and Utah beaches was sent directly to Depot 0-644, in Paris. Depot 0-619, near Cherbourg, handled the equipment from Cherbourg harbor only. When requisitions could not be filled at Depot 0-644, the items were back-ordered to Depot 0-619. Equipment was slowly moved from Cherbourg to Paris in order to facilitate deliveries to army depots.

10. Early in October the armies began to send requisitions for such items as ammunition for the 105mm M2 and 105mm M3 howitzers. It became apparent that the ammunition reserves, which had been dwindling ever since August, had at last been depleted. Until that time rationing had been on expenditures rather than on issues. There were approximately thirty-five ships of ammunition off shore, but unloadings had been drastically reduced across the beaches due to adverse weather, and sufficient berths at Cherbourg had not been allocated for the discharge of ammunition. It was agreed that a credit system of ammunition control would have to be started. The armies were advised of the situation and told they could not expect any more ammunition until the first of November over and above what they physically had on hand and what was on shipping order to them. Heretofore, all ammunition coming ashore had been shipped direct to the armies and, as a result, ADSEC stocks were practically nonexistent. Under the credit system put into effect, the armies' allocation of tonnage was used to fill ADSEC stocks. At the same time, as much ammunition as possible was to be moved forward from the Normandy depots. In the future, armies were to draw all Class V ammunition from ADSEC depots against established credits, and credits were to be written only against ammunition physically present in forward depots. The forward depots, from which 12th Army Group was to be supplied, were located at Liege, Verdun, and Soissons.

11. In conjunction with the credit system it was necessary to inform the armies on the future availability of ammunition. Beginning with the first of November, thirty-day forecasts to the armies were initiated. These forecasts were revised every ten days, so that the armies might always know what amount of ammunition would be available for the next thirty days.

12. A general offensive to the Rhine was started on 7 November and continued until 16 December. By the end of this period ordnance general supplies in the armies had been built up until they were in the best of conditions since D-Day. With the exception of certain items in critical short supply, all armies

had received their authorized T/E equipment, plus authorized reserves. The stringent restrictions on ammunition expenditures which were imposed during October had permitted the building up of stocks in forward ADSEC depots. The credit system, as established during October, was operating smoothly, and even though an offensive was in operation, the army tonnages were maintained at a constant level and the tonnages in forward ADSEC depots were building up.

13 The German winter counteroffensive started on 16 December 1944. At the beginning, battle losses in major items were extremely high. Immediately after the German breakthrough ordnance was given first priority on the movement of combat vehicles. Daily loss reports from armies were consolidated by this Section and forwarded to Headquarters Communications Zone, which in turn released equipment that was available. The Communications Zone kept in close contact with the Zone of the Interior, and as battle losses were reported, they were immediately relayed to the United States for replacement shipments to Europe.

14. Until the time of the breakthrough the emphasis on shipping ammunition forward had been for heavy artillery pieces. With the change in the tactical situation, critical shortages of mines, small arms ammunition, antitank rockets and demolition supplies developed. Mines were available in rear depots and approximately 500,000 were shipped forward by express shipments. All available machine gun ammunition in the rear was brought forward but still proved inadequate to meet the high expenditures. Two boats loaded with antitank rockets and small arms were called into port and given first priority of discharge. The items thus unloaded were sent by "Red Ball" shipment to forward depots. Credits had been previously established, so that as soon as the items arrived they were reconsigned forward to the armies.

15. On the first of January 1945 the critical items of ammunition were allocated by SHAEF to 12th and 21 Army Groups. This allocation was in the form of rates which had been determined for each type of weapon. These rates were known as the "SHAEF Maintenance Supply Rates." 12th Army Group was allowed ammunition on the basis of the rate for each type of weapon, times the number of weapons of that type in the Army Group, times the number of days for which each allotment was intended. In order to balance stocks on hand, each army group was allowed an allotment for twenty-seven days for all weapons at the specified rates. The difference between these 27-day supplies and the quantities already on hand allocated to the armies as of 1 January, were either added to, or subtracted from, the January allowance, depending upon

whether army stocks were smaller or larger than the calculated 27-day allowance.

16. With the elimination of the "bulge" late in January, army stocks of ordnance Class II, IV and V were built up in forward depots to support the coming offensive to the Rhine.

17. By 1 March, the stocks of ordnance Class II, IV and V were in satisfactory condition in all armies, and from then on till the cessation of hostilities the main problem was one of transportation.

18. After 9 May, the main task of the Ordnance Section consisted of redeploying ordnance units and shipping equipment. Extra burdens were placed on the armies by the early redeployment of ordnance units and also as a result of heavy demands made on the Army Group by Communications Zone for ordnance troops to carry out the redeployment program set up by the War Department.

XXII. QUARTERMASTER SECTION*

1. Following the activation of the Army Group, the Quartermaster Section was established as one of the Special Staff sections. It was initially headed by Lieutenant Colonel Murdock K. Goodwin, Quartermaster Corps, formerly with the Office of the Chief Quartermaster, Headquarters ETOUSA of Operations. Gradually, throughout the winter and early spring, additional officers and enlisted men were assigned to the Section. Colonel James W. Younger, QM, formerly Quartermaster, Army Ground Forces and Second US Army, reported for duty and was designated Chief of Section on 8 April 1944. By the end of April, several other officers, especially selected by Colonel Younger, had reported for duty.

2. Early Army Group activities embraced not only planning for forthcoming operations but also the establishment of the missions, functions and inter-relationships of the various staff sections. When it was decided that the First US Army Group would be primarily tactical and not administrative, it became evident that the mission of the Quartermaster Section would be chiefly to coordinate and supervise. In consequence, the solution appeared to be that of a small but well qualified staff section. When the decision was made that the Communications Zone would operate directly under Theater Headquarters and not under the Army Group the decision was strengthened still further.

3. In the joint operation to establish a lodgment area on the coast of France, First US Army, under British 21 Army Group control, was to take part in the landing and was to be responsible for all American activities on the far shore during the initial phase of operations. First US Army, already organized in the United Kingdom, by early Spring had largely completed all its detailed planning. It was necessary, therefore, for the Army Group staff sections merely to screen these plans and to offer such additional advice as appeared necessary. Headquarters Third US Army on the other hand did not arrive in the United Kingdom until March 1944, and many of its units were still in the United States. Much of the Army Group's planning, therefore, had to do with the details of operation for Third US Army. Although the advance party of Headquarters Ninth US Army actually arrived before the invasion started, its particular assignment and mission was not initially decided upon and depended largely upon the outcome of early operations. Likewise, no detailed planning was done in connection with the employment of Fifteenth US Army.

* For detailed study see Volume XII.

4. Early Quartermaster studies included the assignment and phasing-in of Quartermaster service units, levels of all classes of supply and their build-up, and policies governing the methods of operation. As a technical guide, experience gained in the North African campaign, in Italy, and to a lesser extent on maneuvers in the United States was studied and analysed.

5. In order to administer U. S. Quartermaster Corps troops which were to operate under British control, the QM Section was made a part of the US Administrative Staff at Headquarters 21 Army Group a few weeks before the start of active operations. This assignment in no way relieved the QM Section from its normal responsibilities in connection with the First US Army Group. The United States Administrative Staff actually functioned until the Army Group became fully operational on 1 August 1944.

6. The Quartermaster Section arrived in France on 22 July. Control and supervision of QM operations until that date was exercised through the exchange of messages and reports received from the Continent. Initially, First US Army controlled all supplies that had been landed, and it was not until the latter part of July, after the port of Cherbourg had been captured and was in operation, that Communications Zone began to function. Headquarters Advance Section Communications Zone, then took over a portion of First US Army's supplies at the ports and beaches and supply procedure was established on a conventional basis. Third US Army elements were beginning to arrive and, although Third Army did not become operational until 1 August, its build-up of reserves began

7. At the time of the breakout at St Lo, substantial reserves in all classes of supply had been built up to satisfactory levels, and there was a steady flow of incoming shipments. After the breakout, the advance was so rapid that supply became increasingly difficult. It was not possible to restore the railway system in France as rapidly as the advance progressed, and service unit support, particularly truck companies, had not been brought to the Continent in proportion to combat elements. By the time the Seine was reached in the latter part of August orthodox supply procedures had been abandoned, but through the combined efforts of all agencies, and with every means available, support was maintained to continue the pursuit of the retreating Germans.

8. By early September, Third US Army was beyond Nancy, facing Metz, and First US Army had swept through Belgium and was close to the Siegfried Line, but the greatly extended lines of communication broke under the strain and further advance was impossible until additional supplies could be brought for-

ward. There were ample stocks of reserves of all classes of supply at the ports and beaches, but operations were governed by the amount of transport available. The almost complete destruction of the French railroad system by the Allied air forces and the retreating Germans made it necessary to rely largely on motor transport and supply by air. Every available piece of motor transport was put in operation on a "round-the-clock" basis; and still tonnage requirements could not be met. It became necessary at this time to make tonnage allocations to each army.

9. The next four months witnessed a gratifying build-up of supplies, both in the armies and in the Communications Zone. During this period, the armies themselves were relatively static, although the Third US Army was able to push on to the Siegfried Line and First US Army to hold its wedge into Aachen. Ninth US Army was assigned a sector on First Army's left and the army built up by assigning to her certain units from First Army and some newly-arrived units from the United States. Throughout the period, lack of service unit support was evident, although operations were not actually hindered. Early in the period, the Continental supply of Class III became extremely critical and the Quartermaster Section devoted much time and thought to its improvement. Ultimately, however, the supply and distribution of gasoline became highly effective.

10. The surprise German counterthrust through the Ardennes in December found the armies in a splendid supply position and they in turn were well supported by the Advance Section Communications Zone. This fact contributed materially to holding the enemy and driving him back. Third US Army, in the south, was suddenly shifted to the north, at the shoulder of the Ardennes bulge, and it is significant that in the establishment of many new supply points, and the abandonment of others, the operation was supported effectively. No large supply points fell into the hands of the enemy, although losses in unit and individual equipment were heavy. Refitting of combat units to replace battle losses was successfully accomplished without strain on the supply system.

11. Not only were operations handicapped by unusually heavy autumn rains, causing swollen rivers, road failures, and a denial of the use of open fields for storage areas, but winter conditions were also unusually severe. Distribution of winter clothing and equipment had been slow, although large quantities were in the port areas awaiting transportation inland. Lack of interior depots retarded the flow and distribution of Class II and IV supplies, and a considerable effort had to be exerted during the early part of the winter in equipping the troops. Men did not actually suffer from lack of clothing, but rather from lack

of uniformity in the type of clothing and, as a result, intensive studies were made, which led to Theater Headquarters recommending to the War Department certain types of cold weather clothing and equipment for use in the future.

12. As if to compensate for the adverse weather in autumn and winter, spring broke early and enabled the armies to reach the Rhine sooner than expected. Starting in February, and with the momentum gained by forcing the Germans back in the Ardennes bulge, the drive into the heart of Germany proceeded with good speed. The early stages of this drive were easily supported by the vast stocks of supplies which had been brought up in preparation. As the columns fanned out after crossing the Rhine, conditions began to approach those of the early campaign in northern France. The problem of restoring railroads in Germany again necessitated the maximum use of motor and air transport. This time, however, there were considerably more carriers available and the situation did not become acute. First and Ninth US Armies gained their objectives several weeks before the German surrender on 9 May 1945, but Third US Army was still on the move when the capitulation came, and supplying it became more and more difficult. The vast numbers of German prisoners taken, together with the release of even greater numbers of displaced persons, placed a tremendous burden on the supply system, particularly in the matter of Class I supplies, and the abnormal use of operational rations threatened to exhaust stocks on hand on the Continent. Following the surrender, better control over the overall food situation was gained and more stocks of German foodstuffs were found than had been anticipated.

13. After the cessation of hostilities, many of the earlier problems ceased to exist and operations no longer had to be conducted under the stress of battle. When it was announced that 12th Army Group would be dissolved and its functions and responsibilities taken over by Theater Headquarters, inventories of supplies were taken and many reports and records completed. Brigadier General Younger (promoted from Colonel on 13 April 1945) was assigned to Theater Headquarters on 13 June and Colonel Hazeltine designated Chief of Section.

XXIII. TRANSPORTATION SECTION*

1. The Transportation Section was activated on 12 December 1943 and consisted of one officer, who was assigned and working with the Movements Branch, G-4 Section. On 1 March 1944, the Section, complete with four officers and four enlisted men, assumed its responsibilities as outlined in its activation order: to advise the Commanding General and General Staff on all matters pertaining to the Transportation Corps and to maintain liaison with transportation staff sections of subordinate commands and other transportation agencies. This entailed a review of Transportation Corps responsibilities for the planned invasion of the Continent and the subsequent transportation capabilities for logistical support of tactical operations.

2. The Transportation Section reviewed several proposed plans for Transportation Corps activities on the Continent and analysed likely Transportation Corps functions. Close liaison was maintained with the G-4 staff of First US Army and assistance given in the preparation of logistical studies of motor truck transportation requirements to support initial assault operations in Normandy.

3. Later, the Transportation Section, as part of the US Administrative Staff of Headquarters 21 Army Group, continued its assigned functions, integrating them with the over-all Allied plan for the invasion of the Continent. After D-Day, and while still a part of the US Administrative Staff of 21 Army Group, the Section maintained current records of movements to and from the Continent and continued its studies of transportation capabilities to support the current tactical operations.

4. When the Army Group became operational, the Section, to accomplish its mission of keeping abreast of transportation operations by highway, rail and water, maintained close liaison with the armies, with Headquarters Forward and Advance Sections, Communications Zone, and with the port of Cherbourg. Following the breakout at St. Lo, the speed of our advance increased considerably. The necessity for rapid rehabilitation of the rail net from Cherbourg and beaches to support the armies' forward movement was immediately realized. Also, it was found that motor transport then on the Continent was not sufficient to provide adequate build-up of supplies behind the rapidly advancing armies. The Transportation Section made strong recommendations for an increase in engineer general service regiments and the phasing-in of additional truck

* For detailed study see Volume XII.

companies to assure maximum support in the rehabilitation of the rail net and to provide additional lift for the movement of supplies by motor transport. The over-all transportation operations were observed very closely in relation to the tactical operations. From time to time, logistical studies were made to ascertain the ability of the transportation system to support tactical operations. Current records were maintained of port and beach discharge of vehicles, personnel, and supplies, as well as the tonnages delivered to the armies via truck transportation and rail.

5. With an increase in motor traffic, on an exceedingly good road network in France, the need for regulation and control of road movement was early recognized. The policy for such control and regulation was initially developed prior to D-Day and subsequently revised to fit operations on the Continent. The Transportation Section was responsible for contributing to the development of the announced policy for traffic regulation and control, which was published as a Theater directive. This included the establishment of supply routes to each Army and controlling all movements over them.

6. As tactical operations progressed and the armies fanned out in easterly and westerly directions from the base of the Cotentin peninsula, the lines of communication were stretched to their maximum and much planning was necessary to keep supplies moving to all elements of the tactical forces. As the drive shifted eastward, increased stress was placed on rehabilitation of rail lines from Laval toward Paris. Every effort was made to make use of all major and minor rail lines even though it necessitated long detours to get around major rail demolitions. At times, when continued progress of rail rehabilitation was retarded for the reconstruction of major bridges, motor transportation was relied upon to its maximum ability to furnish the necessary supplies to the armies. The long haul from the beaches and Cherbourg, with consequent increased turn-around of rail and truck transportation, continued to retard the ability to provide reserve supplies for the armies. However, with a pooling of all available motor truck transportation and the establishment of the express "Red Ball" motor transport system, increased tonnages of supplies were furnished the Armies as they advanced to the north into Belgium.

7. As the campaign progressed, and the tactical plan contemplated breaching the Siegfried Line at widely separated points, plans were developed to provide the armies with supply build-up which would permit an all-out drive through the Siegfried Line, with the Rhine River as an objective. To support this tactical plan it was necessary to standardize the rail operation to assure regularly

scheduled supply trains to reach armies daily. At the same time, all available motor truck transportation was assembled to carry the supplies forward from railheads behind the armies to army service areas and, in many cases, as far forward as division supply points. While building up supplies behind the armies for the contemplated drive through the Siegfried Line, the rail net was hastily rehabilitated; and for the first time it became possible to establish railheads as far forward as corps and, in some cases, division areas. With the combination of increased use of rail facilities and the "Red Ball" motor transport system, a build-up of supplies in the forward Advance Section Com-Z dumps was accomplished to a total of approximately 400,000 tons. It was realized at this time that the effect of Allied bombing and demolition on the rail system had created a critical shortage of rail equipment.

8. With a turn-around time of twenty days from Cherbourg to army railheads, more than 20,000 cars were required to be under load or returning to provide the necessary daily maintenance and reserve for the field armies. To obtain maximum use of the limited rolling stock, the Transportation Section was in constant touch with the armies, the Advance Section Communications Zone, and the Office of the Chief of Transportation in an effort to speed up the unloading in the army areas and to release all empties to the rear.

9. Prior to the crossing of the Rhine it was anticipated there would be few, if any, rail bridges remaining. Plans were therefore made to make maximum use of all available motor truck transportation to support the armies as they established bridgeheads on the Rhine. This plan called for establishing a separate highway supply line behind each army, with sufficient truck companies to carry supplies forward a distance of one to two hundred miles beyond the Rhine. Sufficient truck transportation was made available to move a maximum of 24,000 tons daily on a one-day turn-around and with a proportionate decrease in this tonnage as the distance increased beyond the Rhine. In addition to a final total of 179 2½-ton truck companies operating in support of the armies at the peak of this operation, there was a tanker fleet of 17 companies, capable of carrying over 4,000 tons of POL daily on a one-day turn-around.

10. With the possibility of bridging the Rhine at Wesel in the north and Mainz in the south, movement of supplies by rail was again studied in an effort to obtain maximum use of this means of transport, thus relieving the severely increased burden placed on motor truck transportation. As the rail bridges were being constructed and our operational forces continued beyond the Rhine

toward the Elbe, the rail net west of the Rhine was rehabilitated at strategic locations, so that upon completion of the bridges it was possible to move supplies by rail as far forward as division supply points. As a result of the increased use of the railroads, motor truck transportation requirements decreased proportionately and it was finally possible to provide much needed maintenance for a large percentage of the trucks that had been in use in the Theater.

11. During the four months of the German campaign prior to V-E Day, the Transportation Section was engaged in planning for operations "ECLIPSE." Conferences with the armies of 12th Army Group, Headquarters 6th Army Group, and Headquarters Advance Section Communications Zone were held to ascertain transportation responsibilities that should be set forth in the plan. A proposed transportation organization and outline of functions to be performed was finally approved and submitted to the armies. This transportation organization was to have been a Transportation Corps staff attached to each army commander's staff for the purpose of advising on all transportation matters when operation "ECLIPSE" would begin.

12. Following V-E Day, moving displaced persons, Allied prisoners of war, and shifting of personnel for redeployment involved transporting millions of persons. This presented a very difficult problem in transportation. Whereas prior to this time all movements had been generally in one direction — forward in support of the armies — it now became necessary to shift personnel and supplies in all directions. After a number of conferences, involving higher headquarters and most of the Army Group General Staff, plans were developed whereby, with the aid of system of exchanging persons, proper documentation and reception, distribution points, and allocation of transportation facilities, it was possible to move hundreds of thousands of persons daily, far in excess of the original estimate. That this task was accomplished as planned was due largely to the rapid rehabilitation of the rail net within Germany and the employment of Germans in operational positions.

XXIV. MEDICAL SECTION*

1. The Medical Section was activated as a Special Staff Section by paragraph 1, General Order No. 9, Headquarters First US Army Group, dated 26 December 1943.

2. The early weeks were devoted to routine office organization, to collecting and studying pertinent directives, circulars, and other material from the Office of the Theater Chief Surgeon and the War Department, and to establishing liaison with other agencies in Headquarters First US Army Group, SHAEF, the Office of the Chief Surgeon, and the British 21 Army Group.

3. This was followed by a period of intensive planning for the medical support of various operations. All phases of medical support needed for the landings in France were considered. Recommendations were made for the use of LST's and hospital carriers for casualty evacuation, and property exchange and other related problems were studied. Also during this time, much effort was allotted to studying and advising the Preventive Medicine Branches of the First and Third US Armies on their preventive medicine plans; to establishing close liaison and good working relationships with army surgeons; and to visiting army headquarters frequently for the purpose of becoming familiar with army preventive medicine and professional problems. This office acted as a direct link and agency for interpreting field conditions between the Theater Chief Surgeon and the army Surgeons.

4. During the period from 16 May to 6 July 1944, the Medical Section functioned as a part of the US Administrative Staff (Rear) of 21 Army Group. The plans and the administrative orders of US troops attached to the British Army Group were screened, and recommendations for phasing-in of units, hospital carriers, trains, etc., promulgated. During the initial phase of the landings, all emergency air shipments of medical supplies were coordinated with Communications Zone.

5. On 7 July 1944, the Medical Section returned to First US Army Group control and preparations were made for movement to the Continent. The Section landed in France on 22 July 1944.

6. The Medical Section entered its operational phase on 1 August.

7. From the time the American armies broke out of the Cotentin peninsula until the cessation of hostilities, the distances from the front lines to the general hospitals on the Continent in most cases were too great for the patients to be

* For detailed study see Volume XIII.

evacuated by motor ambulance. Air evacuation, when weather permitted, proved to be the solution to this problem and was considered the ideal one. It was felt that a certain number of transport planes should have been allocated entirely for this type of work. In doing so, many of the problems that arose, because evacuation was only incidental to air supply, could have been overcome. Not least among the problems that arose was the lack of property exchange. With each patient who was evacuated by air one litter and at least three blankets were lost. This placed a severe strain on the stocks of these items in the forward areas. With planes used exclusively for evacuation this property exchange would have been a simple matter. It was also felt that airfields should have been designated for supply and evacuation every fifty to seventy-five miles of advance.

8. After rail lines became operational, hospital trains were used extensively. They were the only means of evacuation to the Communications Zone when weather kept the aircraft grounded. In addition to the regular hospital trains brought to the Continent, French rolling stock was converted and used for evacuation.

9. Medical units in general were present in adequate numbers to support the combat troops properly. There were times when the 12th Army Group had fewer ambulance companies than were considered desirable; and for those units that were present, great difficulty was experienced in obtaining ambulances to replace those lost in combat. Although every effort was made by the Surgeon to correct this situation, there were three medical companies on V-E Day that still had not received their T/E allotment.

10. Medical supplies were generally adequate throughout the whole of "OVERLORD." Initially, whole blood was in short supply, and during this time the Army Group Surgeon allocated the amount that was available to the armies. After the institution of a program of flying whole blood directly from the United States, there was always an adequate supply and no allocation was necessary. Movement of medical supplies forward was somewhat of a problem at times. Items critically needed were flown to forward airstrips. Others were sent forward in hospital trains and by medical units going from the beaches to the army areas. During the Ardennes campaign, a considerable amount of medical equipment was lost, which was replaced without delay from stocks in army depots and from ADSEC depots in the Liege area. At no time were operations impeded by a lack of medical supplies.

11. The Surgeon instituted studies which, it is believed, will be of great value in planning future operations. Maintenance factors were determined for

each item in the medical supply catalogue. These factors were derived from records kept by Third Army and covered a five-month period of operations. Likewise, a continuous study was made of T/O & E's of medical units. Recommendations on desirable changes were made and, in some cases, entirely new T/O & E's were proposed.

12. With the beginning of difficult fighting in the approach to the Siegfried Line, and with the onset of winter, two major medical problems manifested themselves, viz., combat exhaustion and trench foot. Through the medium of "Health of Command Reports" and personal conferences with G-1 of this Headquarters, the extreme importance of these conditions were presented as command problems and command responsibility for their control emphasized. Casualties from trench foot became so great and such a general problem that drastic steps were necessary to control it. The Commanding General was informed of the situation by letter and by a personal visit of the Surgeon. This resulted in personal letters to each army commander from General Bradley, and, in addition, a directive from his headquarters. Following upon these procedures, and with much support from the Communications Zone's Preventive Medicine Division and from the Chief Quartermaster as to the supply of winter clothing, rates of trench foot decreased greatly. However, subsequent increases, as the winter progressed, required additional measures, which took the form of trench foot control teams in each army and the appointing of trench foot noncommissioned officers in each company-size organization. With the waning of the winter season and the application of these drastic control measures, trench foot ceased to be a serious problem.

13. As the move into Germany progressed and the Rhine River was reached typhus fever was discovered — first in the Cologne area. Comprehensive control measures in the form of dusting with DDT powder, immunization, and the use of case finding teams brought this epidemic under control. As the campaign progressed into Germany east of the Rhine and concentration camps and other foci of typhus were uncovered, the disease spread and small outbreaks occurred in many localities. To prevent the spread of the disease west of the Rhine, a cordon sanitaire was established along the natural barrier of the Rhine. Dusting stations were set up and all nonmilitary personnel going westward dusted.

14. The handling of displaced persons presented numerous problems. Sanitation in DP camps was poor, and many potentially hazardous communicable disease situations were brought under control. A Public Health nurse organization was established and Public Health nurses deployed to DP camps to

assist in the many problems, such as child and maternity welfare, feeding, dispensary organization, sanitation, and many others. As the displaced persons and other public health problems were encountered in large areas, it became necessary to employ military medical units for their control. Military Government was inadequately equipped and staffed to meet these problems. Consequently, steps were taken to have Military Government personnel, equipment, and supplies put under the control of the Surgeons of the various echelons. Public Health staffs in each army were placed on the Surgeon's staffs, and a coordinated effort made to utilize all facilities and personnel for medical and public health problems. The results of this arrangement ably demonstrated the necessity for unified effort and single control of all health problems, whether military or civilian.

15. After V-E Day, this Section was concerned chiefly with the withdrawal into the final US zone of occupation, redeployment of medical units, and planning for the medical service of the forces comprising the occupation.

XXV. PUBLICITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SECTION*

1. The Publicity and Psychological Warfare (P & PW) Section was activated 29 December 1943 under the provisions of General Order 99, Headquarters ETOUSA. It consisted initially of seventy-eight officers, two warrant officers, and sixty-eight enlisted men. In March 1944, this strength was divided in half — a staff section consisting of twelve officers, one warrant officer and twelve enlisted men and a provisional Publicity and Psychological Warfare Detachment, under operational control of the Army Group P & PW Officer, consisting of the remaining personnel.

2. The Section, headed by the P & PW Officer, reported directly to the Chief of Staff. The dual function of the P & PW Section resulted from the overall planning which had preceded the formation of the Army Group headquarters. The principal public relations function was to provide facilities for release of news and information to the world press concerning the operations of the Command. Psychological warfare was the projection of information and propaganda to enemy troops, to enemy civilians behind the lines, and the control and dissemination of information in occupied territories. Both public relations and psychological warfare relied on the same media: press, radio, public address equipment, photography, and all types of printed matter. Both required the same types of specialist personnel and both had as their primary concern the dissemination of information of interest to the public. It was determined, therefore, to coordinate the maintenance and use of facilities and to centralize the flow of news and information through one staff section designed to assure its complete and proper treatment.

3. The troops (and equipment) necessary to perform the P & PW mission were assembled from various sources and formed into a provisional battalion, reorganized on 8 March 1944 under T/O & E 30-46 (dated 22 January 44), and designated the 72nd Publicity Service Battalion.

4. The 72nd Publicity Service Battalion consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies (to which the 5th MRB Co was later attached) and a Headquarters Company containing communications, service, and administrative personnel to service press camps and to work in battalion administration.

5. Miscellaneous personnel, attached to 12th Army Group for special purposes, and some additional grades and ratings authorized for Publicity and Psychological Warfare assignments, were grouped in the provisional P & PW

* For detailed study see Volume XIV.

Detachment. The 72nd Publicity Service Battalion and the P & PW Detachment were attached to Special Troops, 12th Army Group, for administration. When the 12th Army Group responsibility extended to occupied portions of Germany, two units, called District Information Services Control Commands, were attached from SHAEF to 12th Army Group under the operational control of the P & PW Officer to organize and control the German press, radio, theater, and all other media of information within Germany.

a. *Publicity*: (1) Facilities provided for war correspondents included a direct communications system, housing, mess, transportation, briefing, current summaries of military and political news, and a press courier system for handling of film and press copy not transmitted by electrical means.

(2) Press camps were established at each army, usually near to army headquarters and at points such as Paris and Bremen. Personnel and equipment for establishment of all press camps were provided from the 72nd Publicity Service Battalion and placed on detached service with the major subordinate unit. Communications in the P & PW network consisted of three electrical means: teletype, radio, and high speed commercial radio transmitting directly to New York. A courier system, for rapid handling of news copy and film to Paris and London, was implemented within the Army Group area by motor courier and liaison planes. Normally, five press camps were in operation, accommodating approximately two hundred war correspondents throughout the Army Group area. More than twenty-two million words were transmitted to the newspapers and radio stations in the United States and Great Britain over the P & PW networks.

(3) An average of one hundred voice broadcasts weekly were made by war correspondents representing the Allied radio networks. Army Signal Corps photographers and accredited war correspondent photographers furnished more than ten thousand photographs weekly from the 12th Army Group zone of operations, which were developed and censored at London and made available to all news agencies through a pool of mutual contribution. Likewise, all army areas were covered by newsreel and army motion picture teams, whose censored films were made available through a newsreel pool in London.

(4) "Hometown" individual items concerning decorations, awards, promotions, and like matters totalled approximately 270,000 during the operational period.

b. *Press Censorship*: More than one hundred thousand submissions (nearly thirty million words) were processed by field press censors at Army Group

and armies. Nearly fifty thousand photographs were censored, though the bulk of news photography was transmitted undeveloped to London. Censorship in the armies was a responsibility of the Army Group Commander, who, through the P & PW Officer, appointed a qualified assistant as press censor. The assistant for press censorship arranged for security clearance of matters affecting Army Group tactical operations, maintained liaison with SHAEF and other censorship authorities, supervised the activities of all field press censors in the Army Group area, prepared censorship guidances on matters of Army Group interest, and furnished periodic "Trend of Copy" reports for the information of the Army Group and Army Commanders.

c. *Psychological Warfare*: (1) Combat psychological warfare closely supported all major tactical operations. More than 568 million leaflets were dropped in enemy rear areas. In addition to that, fifty-three million leaflets were designed and printed monthly in the 12th Army Group area on mobile printing equipment for artillery fire and fighter-bomber pin point targets.

(2) Combat public address units were available to army commanders on call. The number maintained in readiness for tactical employment was based on the number of corps in the line. The number of missions performed and the number of prisoners taken has never been determined, for the public address units mounted on light vehicles and on medium tanks were constantly moving from place to place at the front, making various appeals based on latest intelligence reports. However, many thousands of prisoners stated that they had heard these broadcasts and through them were finally convinced that further resistance was futile.

(3) Radio broadcasting and technical personnel assumed control of radio stations at Cherbourg, Rennes, Paris, and Luxembourg, putting them in operation as soon as they could be repaired. Radio Luxembourg reached all of Europe in several languages, and for four months, in addition to its regular broadcasts, the transmitter was the source of a highly successful "black" propaganda program in the vernacular of the Rhineland. During the Ardennes offensive, Belgian programs, countering intense German propaganda, kept the Belgians informed of the true situation and averted panic and mass evacuations. American Forces Network troop broadcasting transmitters were operated by Psychological Warfare technical personnel. In occupied Germany, radio transmitters at Trier, Saarbrücken, Koblenz, Stuttgart, Cologne, Frankfurt, Nurnberg, Leipzig, and Munich were taken under control.

(4) Guidance and aid was given to the re-establishment of newspapers in France and Belgium. During the first few days of liberation in an area, public address units touring the towns and villages gave short summaries of news and other civil affairs announcements.

(5) In occupied Germany, weekly newspapers were established in ten large cities under the supervision of press control teams. Distribution to the area surrounding the publication center was accomplished without delay. A maximum circulation of four and a half million copies of each edition reached every part of the US areas of occupation. A weekly newspaper for displaced persons was published in four languages and more than four million copies circulated.

d. *Special Plans:* Under the P & PW Officer the Special Plans Subsection prepared news releases, radio scripts, drafts of public addresses, and information concerning the nonfraternization policy, with a view to wide publicity in newspapers for troops, magazines, and radio broadcasts.

e. *Visitors' Bureau:* During the planning period, the Visitors' Bureau was a responsibility of the P & PW Officer. However, when Headquarters 12th Army Group became operational on the Continent, this function was transferred to the Adjutant General's Section.



COMMANDING GENERAL
AND
STAFF SECTION CHIEFS



HEADQUARTERS
12TH ARMY GROUP

1 MAY 1945







London, England




"TAC" Headquarters
Luxembourg



"Rear" Headquarters
Verdun, France



"Main" Headquarters
Verdun, France



Wiesbaden, Germany

FEB 07 1945

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
APR 14 1945

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BRI:

Eagle
Main
Rear
Jac

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FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY GROUP
BECOMES
12TH UNITED STATES ARMY GROUP
JULY 14, 1944



July 31, 1944
Eagle Hq. Closes Colombieres
Eagle Main Opens St. Sauveur
Eagle Rear Opens Periers

August 6, 1944
Hq. 12th Army Group
Becomes Operational

August 14, 1944
"Eagle Jac"
St. Sauveur - St. James

August 21-25, 1944
"Eagle Main & Eagle Rear"
St. Sauveur/Periers - Laval

September 17-18, 1944
"Eagle Main & Eagle Rear"
Versailles - Vendun

August 21, 1944
"Eagle Jac"
St. James - Laval


August 24, 1944
"Eagle Jac"
Laval - Chartres

September 2-5, 1944
"Eagle Main & Eagle Rear"
Laval - Versailles



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WSTER



COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Twelfth Army Group - author
LIBRARY REGULATIONS

1. Books, pamphlets, and periodicals must be charged at the loan desk (signature on book-loan card) before being taken from the Library.
2. Any item drawn from the Library must be returned within one month.

Exceptions to this regulation are as follows:

- (1) Material issued to classes as a whole.
- (2) Material issued to instructors for professional use.
- (3) New books which are in demand must be returned within one week.
- (4) Books required for faculty use are subject to recall at any time.
- (5) All persons having library material in their possession will return same before leaving the post permanently.
- (6) Books loaned outside the School must be returned within two weeks.

3. Reference books and current periodicals will not be removed from the library.

*1945
& Eagle Rear
Wiesbaden*

HEADQUARTERS
— JULY 1945

LIBRARY
COMMAND
AND
GENERAL
STAFF

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