

EXHIBIT No. 3168

(11)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- Against -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

DEPONENT: MASAKI, Jinsaburo

My name is Jinsaburo MASAKI. I was formerly a General of the Imperial Japanese Army.

I was the Vice-Chief of the General Staff from January 1932 to June 19th 1933, a War Councillor for a short while; the Inspector-General of training from January 1934 to July 16th 1935; a War Councillor again and was then transferred to the first reserve in March 1936.

When I became the Vice-Chief of the General Staff the Chief of the General Staff was H.R.H. the Prince KAN-IN and the War Minister was Lieutenant-General ARAKI Sadao.

When I assumed this post War Minister ARAKI explained to me the internal and external situations of Japan which existed at that time, the gist of which, as far as I remember, was as follows.

"The State of affairs of our country, both internal and external is quite alarming. There have already been many internal incidents and our relation with the League of Nations is far from being satisfactory.

As for Manchuria in spite of the non-expansion policy of the former cabinet, the situation has simply become more aggravated.

As there is every danger that it will develop into a regular war, we must leave no stone unturned in immediate saving of this complicated situation. When I (ARAKI) was appointed Minister of War the CHINCHOU district was in a critical condition. Unless we saved it, our residents and troops would be endangered. The diplomatic negotiations were at a standstill; the situation was aggravated, and the KUANTUNG Army was in a difficulty. The Government, therefore, was obliged to decide to liquidate that district for self-defence and protection of the residents. The General Staff Office ordered the KUANTUNG Army to that effect. The liquidation campaign has just finished. I think there will be no need of further operations unless our Army is challenged. At any rate we will try to cease hostilities within the smallest possible scope. The Government is on principle dealing with Chang Hsuehliang who is still disturbing peace and order. Therefore our scope of operation is limited under any condition within his sphere of influence. Bearing this in mind, please control the Army strictly."

At my appointment, my predecessor told me almost the same thing.

At the time when ^{I met} I assumed the post as the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Premier INUKAI. While he has explained chiefly our political difficulties that Japan was experiencing at that time, he also made some remarks on the situation which was more or less similar

Def. Doc. # 116?

to that of War Minister ARAKI. The Premier did not in any way suggest that he had any intention of petitioning to the Throne for an Imperial Order, by virtue of which to withdraw all the troops from Manchuria, not did I ever hear from anyone that Premier INUKAI had any such intention.

I reported to H.R.H. the Prince KAN-IN, Chief of General Staff, what I had heard from the Premier and the War Minister respectively, and with his approval, I managed and conducted the matters in accordance with the Government's policies shown to me by War Minister ARAKI. While I was doing so, it was suddenly decided by the Ministry that troops be dispatched immediately to Shanghai which were requested by navy authorities for the purpose of reinforcing the navy and to protect Japanese nationals there.

Bearing in mind what I had heard from the War Minister I took every precaution to observe his principle so that the dispatched troops would not exceed the scope of their primary object. Divisional Commander UEDA (T.N. - Commander of the dispatched troops) also followed closely this principle and endeavoured to settle the situation without resorting to means of bloodshed. I remember he first, made a proclamation requesting reconsideration by the opponent over their action. However, contrary to his expectation, the opponent increased their preparation for fighting and added difficulties. In fact, there were signs that an overall clash between Chinese and Japanese was inevitable.

Under these circumstances, further reinforcement was decided from the point of view of strategic importance with the purpose of solving the situation quickly. When the vanguard of the second reinforcement made their landing at CHIILAIKOU along the YANGTZEKIANG, the 19 Route Army began to retreat, and as it was driven beyond the expected line, attack was ceased. Thus hostilities ended in three days, with almost negligible casualties.

In due course, an agreement was signed to ensure the future safety.

This agreement provided Japan the right of stationing certain part of her troops there, but in view of War Minister ARAKI's principle, which was completely identical to ours, we decided to evacuate all the troops from China and I think the complete withdrawal was made within a month of signing the agreement. JOHOL and HULUNPEIRH campaigns were and the task of the Kwantung Army through the provisions of the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol and because of constant disturbances of law and order in and around Johol chiefly by TANG YULIAN and in HULUNPEIRH chiefly by SU PING WEN, it became necessary for the Japanese and Manchoukuo forces to resort to military action based on the provisions of the Protocol. It took place after the formal recognition of the State of Manchoukuo, and as the precaution was taken throughout the campaign not to divert from the primary principle of bringing about law and order the operation called for extreme difficulties; nevertheless, as to HULUNPEIRH our object was achieved through good offices of the Soviet Union and as to JOHOL efforts were made to limit the action within the line of the Great Wall and observance of this fundamental policy was sternly requested to the troops in the front at the risk of suffering considerable operational inconveniences. There was an occasion when the troops advanced beyond this limit, but they were immediately ordered to return and further action was stopped at that. Then the hostilities were finally settled by the conclusion of Tengkou Agreement.

I believe that War Minister ARAKI was one of the persons who were most seriously worried about the Manchurian Incident. Because of this worry, he had made a firm determination to settle it, which finally led to the Tangku Agreement. No sooner had the Agreement been signed than he strove to settle the overall situation of Japan by adjusting foreign as well as domestic affairs.

He often told me in those days that he was devoting his effort toward letting the people live up to the original teachings of Japan, enhancing by so doing the virtue of benevolence of His Majesty the Emperor among the people, and externally, toward improving aggravated international relations by realizing the already advocated International Peace Conference.

The natives' wishes for the Independence of Manchukuo were ardent, when I was appointed the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. The General Staff did not on principle interfere with it as it was a political problem. Minister of War ARAKI assumed the most prudent attitude toward it. He was in accordance with the decision of the Government based on the opinion of the Foreign Office and the real situation. During this time the General Staff was devoting itself to security of peace and order there.

The opinion of War Minister ARAKI toward the League of Nations was quite clear. He fully explained his opinion at the cabinet meeting and induced the meeting to the decision that Japan would not withdraw from the League.

I was under the impression that the War Minister had been prepared with an opinion with which he hoped to persuade the League of Nation. It also seemed to me that the War Minister had had a firm belief of getting the complete understanding of powers over Japan's position if once restoration of law and order in Manchuria were attained which he thought above everything else.

War Minister ARAKI stressed importance on quality than on quantity of troops from the viewpoint of armament. He endeavoured to recover the armament which had fallen behind since World War I up to that of other Powers at the time of the War. He had his own ideal on national defence, which was all based on morality. He was particularly concerned in promoting the character and moral standard of the commissioned officers.

War Minister ARAKI also exerted to calm the mind of young officers who, indignant at the current situation, had already caused considerable troubles. He did his best to develop the immaculate spirit of those officers without being distorted so that they may devote their unshattered attention to their duty. While devoting his whole hearted attention for this purpose, he also let his subordinates spare no time in teaching and guiding the younger officers, and so they began to show the sign of composure in due course, and at the occasion of May 15th Incident, it turned out that no army commissioned officer participated in it.