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MISSION #14

RANGOON  
3 Nov 44

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HEADQUARTERS XX BOMBER COMMAND

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TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

MALAGON RAILROAD YARDS

3 NOVEMBER 1944

GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD  
COMMANDING GENERAL  
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

2-5239-42

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3 November 1944

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5	Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon Detachment, Headquarters XX Bomber Command (Attention: Intelligence Officer)
6	Commanding Officer, 40th Bombardment Group
7	Commanding Officer, 444th Bombardment Group
8	Commanding Officer, 462nd Bombardment Group
9	Commanding Officer, 468th Bombardment Group
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\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* 13 Nov 44 TDC \*  
\* Date Initials \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

TACTICAL MISSION  
REPORT

Field Orders No. 14

Mission No. 14

TARGET: MALACON RAILROAD YARDS  
RANGOON, BURMA  
3 November 1944

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Prepared by:  
Intelligence Section  
XX Bomber Command

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APO 493

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XX Bomber Command  
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13 November TDC  
Date Initials  
\*\*\*\*\*

13 November 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 3 November 1944.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington, 25, D.C.

1. UNITS PARTICIPATING:

All bombardment Groups of the XX Bomber Command were ordered to participate in a daylight attack on D-day against The Malagon Railroad Yards at Rangoon, Burma. Groups, their locations, and their Commanding Officers were as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Rear Base</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>
40th	Chakulia	Col. W. H. Blanchard
444th	Dudhkundi	Col. A. L. Harvey
462nd	Piardoba	Col. A. F. Kalberer
468th	Kharagpur	Col. T. S. Faulkner

2. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Attack No. 14.

b. Targets Planned:

- (1) Primary Target: Malagon Railroad Yards, Rangoon, Burma (AAF Folder No. 82.2, XX Bomber Command Target No. 82.2-23).
- (2) Last Resort Target: Military Stores Area, Taungup, Burma (18°51'N - 94°16'E). AAF Folder No. 82.2, XX Bomber Command Target No. 82.2-c.

3. STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS:

a. Importance of Targets:

(1) Primary Target:

(a) The Malagon Railroad Yards are at present the principal rail yards at Rangoon, and in October 1944 contained 300 pieces of rolling stock and 5 locomotives. The yards include a roundhouse and repair shops for minor repairs to locomotives and cars. Since the large Insein Repair Shops north of the city have been bombed out of use, the small Malagon Shops are of increased importance and might at least keep cars and locomotives in a minimum rolling condition.

(2) Last Resort Target:

(a) The Military Stores Area at Taungup, Burma is one of the principal stores areas on the West Coast of Burma.

b. Details of Planning (See also Annex C, Field Orders):

(1) Operational Planning:

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(a) Due to the Commanding General's desire to run a training mission to improve formation, radar and bombing technique, a mission called "Virginia" was planned, to be staged from the India bases in order to prevent depletion of trans-Hump stocks. This mission was originally planned for 4 October, but was postponed due to other commitments at that time.

(b) Moulmein was selected as the primary target originally, being the second most important target within medium range. Rangoon, the first, was considered too heavily defended to be attacked by a mission planned primarily for training purposes. However, since the Strategic Air Force was planning to attack Rangoon about the same time as the Command's attack, it was decided to shift the strike to Rangoon, include the Third Tactical Air Force and make the attack an all-out effort. Nevertheless, the particular target assigned to the Command was separate from the ones assigned to the other forces. Thus the results could be better determined.

(c) Akyab was selected as The Last Resort Target, and was considered the most worthwhile target in the enemy territory nearest our bases. However, the British preferred the Command to attack Taungup as a Last Resort Target because they felt the dump areas there offered better opportunities than much-bombed Akyab, and also it was farther from the British held Cox's Bazaar.

(d) Since the weather was forecast to be best in the target area between 0900 and 1100 local time, and since the pre-strike friendly fighter sweep could not, with its required daylight take-off, hit the area until 1000 IST, the Command's attack was planned for first "bombs away" at 1021 IST.

(e) The altitudes of attack were lowered 3000 feet per group because the aircraft, entering the target area at higher gross weights than on any previous mission (resulting from shorter range and greater bomb load), could not attain the greater heights reached on previous missions.

(f) Three-plane elements were to be formed over the bases, and 12-plane flights (as outlined in the Command's Tactical Doctrines) were to be assembled over the mouths of the Hoogly River. This permitted formation practice on the way to the target and prevented the necessity of formations assembling at bombing altitudes near the target (where the only other possible visual assembly points existed due to over-water route). Forming near the target was considered undesirable due to unwieldy characteristics of the B-29 at high gross weights at high altitudes.

(g) A breakaway to the right from the target and a route home over water were determined as offering the best passive defense against enemy flak and fighter opposition.

(h) In order to carry the greatest weight of bombs possible, the groups were instructed to use all possible aircraft equipped with center-section wing tanks.

(i) Originally one 12-plane formation was to be dispatched by each group plus 3 reserve or replacement aircraft (to fill in formation vacancies caused by aircraft aborting). This was later altered to the requirement of only "12 aircraft airborne" for each group.

(2) Determination of Bomb Load:

(a) The field order directed that each aircraft would load a maximum number of 500 lb. AN-M64 (TNT filled) G.P. bombs. In this



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manner each aircraft was enabled to carry a bomb load consistent with what past performance indicated was its maximum bomb-carrying capacity at the tactical radius indicated on the flight plan.

(b) Since the purpose of the attack was to impede enemy rail transportation in the area as a result of disrupting the railroad sidings as well as the main line in the marshalling yards, destroying engines and rolling stock on the sidings, and neutralizing the round house, 500 lb. AN-M64 (TNT filled) G. P. bombs fuzed one tenth (.1) second nose and twenty-five thousandths (.025) second tail delay were recommended and employed. It was concluded that this fusing would be effective against the roundhouse, which had been selected as the aiming point, as well as against the locomotives which might be contained within it. Similarly, it was estimated that this fusing would be effective in temporarily disorganizing the movement of freight within the yards as the result of tearing up tracks, cratering the road-bed, and demolishing or overturning whatever rolling stock might be contained in the yards at the time of the attack.

(3) Bombing Data: Bombing was to be accomplished by 12-plane formations at assigned altitudes but in no case below 20,000 feet. The axis of attack for all Groups was to be 47° Magnetic with the Round House approximately in the center of the marshalling-yard area as an aiming point. Bombing altitudes were to be 21,000 feet True, 22,000 feet True, 23,000 feet True, and 20,000 feet True for the 40th 444th 462nd and 468th Groups respectively.

(4) Route to be Flown: From the Rear Bases, aircraft were to proceed to Assembly Point No. 1, which varied, for each Group, and thence to a common Assembly Point No. 2 and a common initial point. It was specified that if weather conditions en route were to necessitate assembly at Point No. 2, assembly was to be accomplished at bombing altitudes.

(5) Other provisions:

(a) Strategic Air Force, Eastern Air Command, was to carry out a coordinated attack on the night of 3 November against dock and warehouse facilities and Insein Railway Shops in the Rangoon area in Burma.

(b) The Third Tactical Airforce was to conduct fighter sweeps against enemy airfields in the target area. The first wave of fighters was to strike at 0330Z and the second at 0400Z.

(c) Strike photos were to be taken by as many B-29 aircraft as possible.

4. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION (See Annexes B and L):

a. Take-off (See Annex B, Part I)

(1) Times of take-off were planned as follows: 40th - 022342Z; 444th - 022349Z; 462nd - 022344Z; and 468th - 022351Z.

(2) Take-off was accomplished without incident as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>A/C Airborne</u>	<u>First A/C Off</u>	<u>Last A/C Off</u>
40th	13	022343Z	030004Z
444th	12	022349Z	030011Z
462nd	12	022347Z	030010Z
468th	12	022351Z	030010Z
Totals	49	022343Z	030011Z

(3) At the time of take-off, clear weather prevailed with visibility 5 miles in haze. Winds were calm.

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b. Route Out (See Annex B, Parts II and III):

(1) Route out was flown as planned with the following deviations from the route to the primary target: 40th Group - 3 A/C; 444th Group - 2 A/C; 462nd Group - None; and 468th Group - None. Of these, 3 jettisoned their bombs and turned back as a result of mechanical difficulties, 1 left the briefed route to the primary target as a result of mechanical trouble and bombed the last resort target, and 1 ditched in the Bay of Bengal at approximately 18°10'N - 92°10'E while en route to the target.

(2) Assembly was accomplished without difficulty.

c. Primary Target:

(1) Of the 49 aircraft airborne, 44 reached and bombed the primary target at Rangoon. The first formation to reach the primary target (9 planes of the 444th Group) released its bombs at 0342Z, the second (12 planes of the 462nd Group) at 0344Z, the third (10 planes of the 40th Group) at 0348Z, and the last (12 planes of the 468th Group and 1 of the 444th Group) at 0353Z, an elapsed time between the first and last formations of 11 minutes. During this period, the 44 aircraft released a total of 1669 500-pound GP bombs on the target (417.25 short tons). Total bomb load of aircraft over the primary target was 1683 bombs (420.75 short tons), but 3 aircraft experienced rack malfunctions and dropped only a portion of their bomb load. Subsequently 9 of the bombs that failed to drop were dropped on the Last Resort Target, 4 were jettisoned, and 1 was returned to base.

(2) Cloud cover over the target varied for the various formations from 3/10 to 6/10. Base of cumulus was at 3000 feet with the tops varying from 10,000 to 15,000 feet. Visibility was unlimited.

(3) The cloud cover did not prevent visual bombing. Cumulus clouds directly in the line of flight, however, caused one formation to make a second run to improve its accuracy. Bombing runs were of shorter duration than usual. Smoke and fires from bombs of previous formations covered the aiming point for one formation but offset check points for synchronization were used with excellent results. Bombing runs were not affected by meager to moderate enemy anti-aircraft or by weak enemy fighter opposition.

(4) Bombing altitudes ranged approximately from 20,000 to 24,000 feet with 11 of the 44 aircraft bombing at other than briefed altitudes. Variations were minor in all cases. The majority of the aircraft bombed at indicated air speeds between 190 and 199 mph and at axes of attack between 45° and 49° magnetic.

d. Last Resort Target:

(1) Aircraft 407 (40th) was unable to release 9 of its bombs over the primary target as a result of a rack malfunction. It continued with its formation to 16°05'N - 94°33'E, at which point permission to proceed to the secondary target was received. Two runs were made, the first on a heading of 90° magnetic from 19,000 feet at an IAS of 190 mph and the second on a heading of 297° magnetic at 20,000 feet at an IAS of 190 mph. Bombs were dropped with unobserved results.

(2) A/C 20 2 (444th) flew the briefed route to 17°03'N - 93°00'E, at which point a 120° heading was taken to Cheduba Island, the turning point for the last resort target. From that point a heading of 100° magnetic was taken over the target. However a second run was necessary and 40 500-pound GP bombs were then dropped on a heading of 303° magnetic from 15,650 feet at an IAS of 191 mph at 0341Z. Hits were observed in a curve of a road near which were small sheds and scattered houses.

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e. Route Back:

(1) Route from the target was flown as briefed without incident except for the following deviations: (a) A/C 407 (40th) left the briefed route to bomb the last resort target; (b) A/C 579 (40th) was unable to close its rear bomb bay doors and left the formation to land at Chittagong; (c) A/C 419 (444th) flew directly to Diamond Island and omitted the first return check point; and (d) A/C 485 (444th) spent an hour on the route back searching for and circling A/C 518, which had ditched on the route to the target.

(2) High scattered altocumulus and high thin broken altostratus prevailed at the bases on return. Visibility ranged from 7 miles to unrestricted and winds were calm.

5. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT (See Annex C):

a. Antiaircraft Fire:

(1) Moderate and accurate heavy antiaircraft fire was reported on 82 per cent of the runs over the target from 0335Z to 0354Z at altitudes from 20,000 to 23,000 feet. Thirty-three per cent of the aircraft indicated that the fire had hit and 24 per cent more indicated that the fire had rocked the aircraft. Fifty-nine per cent reported the fire as moderate. The majority of the bursts were reported as black with some white and a few gray. Continuously pointed fire was encountered with the majority of the fire occurring before bombs away.

(2) Meager and inaccurate black heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered at Taungup by 2 aircraft under CAVU conditions.

b. High-Altitude Balloons: Two possible high-altitude balloons were reported by 1 aircraft of a formation of 12 at a position 8 miles northwest of the primary target. The balloons were described as "Sausage-shaped" and were reported to be flying at approximately 15,000 feet.

6. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION (See Annex D):

a. Enemy air opposition on this mission is rated as nil to weak with the majority of the attacks occurring in the target area.

b. Despite the limited numbers of aircraft encountered (12 fighters which made 19 passes or attacks), 5 different types of enemy aircraft were encountered.

c. The majority of attacks were concentrated on one formation—that of the 40th Group, a 10-plane formation and the third over the target.

d. There was a marked preference for the high frontal attack. There was also some indication of a definite planned pre-attack pattern of breaking off on one attack or pass, pulling up, and then flying parallel to the formation before making another attack.

e. The enemy aircraft opened fire in 63 per cent of the encounters, the B-29's in 90 per cent. The enemy opened fire beyond 1000 yards in 58 per cent of the cases in which they fired.

f. Enemy aggressiveness was about the same as that experienced in other recent B-29 missions.

g. There were no coordinated attacks or aerial bombs reported. No new tactics or unusual weapons were observed.

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7. WEATHER (See Annex E):

a. Weather conditions at take-off and return caused no difficulties and the presence of 3/10 to 6/10 cloud cover over the target did not prevent visual bombing although it was sufficient to shorten the bomb run for some formations and to cause a second run by one formation. Over-all, the weather encountered had no adverse effect upon the accomplishment of the mission.

b. Navigators rated the Metro Winds Forecast as good.

8. COMMUNICATIONS (See Annex F):

a. Communications procedures as prescribed in the Command's Tactical Doctrine were used successfully with one exception - the misinterpretation of instructions regarding the use of aircraft radio call signs.

b. Air-ground traffic was unusually small in amount with only 6 "bombs away" messages transmitted. One Group required its aircraft to transmit a code message when 250 miles away on return to base. This was not called for in the field orders, but no confusion resulted in this instance.

c. Radio homing beacons were used by all Groups. Three requests for D/F aid were made and all bearings given were rated as reliable. Air-to-air homing was used by 2 Groups successfully.

d. No reports of actual or apparent jamming were made and no violations of cryptographic security were logged.

e. Eleven malfunctions of communications equipment were reported. Four of these were repaired in flight.

9. RADAR (See Annex G):

a. The first real combat conditions were provided on this mission for the use of the new radar-bombsight procedure. The undercast over the target area made the visual bombing run limited. Crew member coordination was excellent. The city of Rangoon was reported as a good radar target.

b. Radar equipment also provided an excellent aid to navigation. Rendezvous and check points were identifiable at usable ranges. Two formations reported excellent results in tracking aircraft of other formations at a distance and aircraft of same formation making a frontal penetration.

c. Improvement was noted in the radar photographic results. The percentage of cameras completing the mission increased as well as the number of pictures returned and pictures usable. The K-24 radar-scope camera was used for the first time on this mission with good results.

d. The AN/APQ-13 radar equipment serviceability was above average. Equipment malfunctions were only 11 per cent or 5 systems not repaired in flight. Reports indicated no airborne failures of auxiliary radar equipment.

10. RCM (See Annex H):

a. RCM activities were confined to searching with particular emphasis on Early Warning Radar in the 40 and 300 megacycle band. From the IP to the target and return to the IP, search was confined to possible radar-controlled antiaircraft guns.

b. RCM-equipped aircraft with D/F antennas were not scheduled for this mission.

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c. Intercepts were as follows: (1) a 69-mc signal west of Pagoda Point, strong and steady at 16°57'N - 93°14'E, reported by 4 observers; (2) an 80-mc signal, the strongest intercepted, at the target reported by 5 observers; (3) a 100-mc signal intercepted off Pagoda Point, strong over the target, reported by 3 observers. Suspected intercepts were also made in the 198-mc to 205-mc range, at 244 mc, and at 552mc.

11. CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY (See Annex I):

a. The mission is considered satisfactory in regard to gunnery. Fighter opposition was nil to weak and claims against enemy aircraft were few; only two claims (both being claims of a damaged enemy aircraft) were made.

b. Rounds of ammunition fired in total numbered 12,031, of which 3,631 rounds were fired in combat and 8,400 in test firing. Total malfunctions of CSFC systems were 6 and of 50-cal. machine guns 11, 2.6 per cent and 2.4 per cent of the totals respectively.

c. A new formation defense plan of search and control had been submitted to the Groups before this mission was run, but the limited fighter opposition made evaluation of its effectiveness impossible.

12. CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS (See Annex J):

a. Seventy-seven cameras of the K-18, K-20 and K-22 types (23, 32 and 22 respectively) were installed in aircraft for this mission. Of these (based on incomplete returns), 31 photographed targets and 302 usable negatives resulted. Malfunctions were few and minor.

b. One K-24 camera was installed as an experiment. Results indicate that further work with this camera is necessary.

13. BATTLE LOSSES AND BATTLE DAMAGE (See Annex K):

a. No aircraft were lost as a result of enemy antiaircraft or enemy fighter opposition.

b. Fourteen aircraft sustained battle damage, only one of which suffered major damage. All battle damage was caused by enemy antiaircraft.

14. FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT (see Annex L):

a. Of the 49 aircraft airborne on the mission, only 5 failed to get over the target with their bombs because of mechanical reasons. Three of these aircraft experienced engine difficulty, one had a turbosupercharger failure, and one ditched as a result of an undetermined mechanical failure.

b. Engineering malfunctions during flight numbered 85, the most prevalent being fuel pressure gage troubles. Engines running hot or rough were also relatively numerous as were inoperative tachometers and cylinder head temperatures gages.

c. Average fuel carried over-all was 4980 gallons and average consumption overall was 4080 gallons. Averages for the Groups ranged from 4825 to 5160 and from 3865 to 4340 gallons respectively.

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15. TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (see Annex M):

a. This damage assessment report is based conclusively on strike photos and must be considered provisional.

b. The bombing was accomplished by four formations consisting of 9, 12, 10 and 13 aircraft respectively. Strike photos from each formation show patterns which blanket the aiming point, the roundhouse. Many hits were observed on the trackage and rolling stock.

c. Examination of strike photos taken by the last Group over the target just prior to bomb strikes show the round house to be destroyed with the northern half practically obliterated. All except one of the several sheds in the immediate vicinity of the round house have been destroyed. Trackage to the east and southeast of the round house has suffered heavily. Numerous breaks are visible in every track in this section and traffic has been effectively halted. All tracks just above the elbow of the yard appear to have been cut, and 74 rolling stock and 4 locomotives have been damaged or destroyed. A part of the north end of the yard is obscured but approximately 1500 feet of the extreme north end appears to have escaped with little damage.

d. Bombs falling west of the roundhouse have cut the main rail line in at least five places and have destroyed several small spur lines. Four buildings of the Staff Quarters were destroyed and several others were damaged.

e. Several establishments lining the river to the east of the yard received damage.

For and in the absence of:

CURTIS E. LEMAY  
Major General, U.S.A.  
Commanding

*John E. Upston*  
JOHN E. UPSTON  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.  
Chief of Staff

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A

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ANNEX

A

MOVEMENT FROM REAR TO FORWARD AREA

- NOTE: 1. Since the aircraft for this mission were staged from their India bases, there was no movement from the Rear Area to the Forward Area.
2. This Annex will be omitted in future reports. The data for each mission in which movement to a staging area is involved is presented in detail in the Consolidated Mission Statistical Summary, Table I.

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B

ANNEX

B

EXECUTION OF THE MISSION

- I - Information on Take-offs
- II - Details of Routes
- III - Track and Vertical Flight Path\*
- IV - Bombing Data\*\*
- V - Bomb Loading
- VI - Disposition of Bombs
- VII - Formations Flown
- VIII - Navigation Report\*
- IX - Mission Operational Losses
- X - Information on Landings

\* Prepared by Staff Navigator

\*\* Page B-IV-1 prepared by Staff Bombardier

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I - INFORMATION ON TAKE-OFFS

Mission No. 14

3 November 1944

	First A/C Off	Last A/C Off	Elapsed Time	No. of A/C Taking Off	Average Take- off Interval
40th	022343Z	030004Z	21 min.	13	105 sec.
44th	022349Z	030011Z	22 min.	12	120 sec.
462nd	022347Z	030010Z	33 min.	12	180 sec.
468th	022351Z	030010Z	20 min.	12	109 sec.
Overall	022343Z	030011Z	34 min.	49	43 sec.

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II - DETAILS OF ROUTES

Mission No. 14

3 November 1944

A. Planned Route

	40th	44th	462nd	468th
Base	Chakulia	Dudhkundi	Piardoba	Kharagpur
Assembly Point #1	Mouth of Subarnarekha River (21°34'N - 87°21'E)	Mouth of Hooghly River (21°17'N - 87°52'E)	Railroad Bridge (23°27'N - 87°53'E)	Halliday Island (21°38'N - 88°38'E)
Assembly Point #2	Diamond Island (15°52'N - 94°17'E)			
Initial Point	Kaingthaung Island (15°42'N - 95°02'E)			
Target	Rangoon, Burma (16°47'N - 96°11'E)			
1st Return Check Point	Un-named Island (15°47'N - 95°30'E)			
2nd Return Check Point	Diamond Island (15°52'N - 94°17'E)			
Base	Chakulia	Dudhkundi	Piardoba	Kharagpur

B. Deviations from Planned Route

1. 40th Group:

- a. Aircraft 407 was able to release all but 9 bombs over the primary target, and continued with its formation to 16°05'N - 94°33'E where it left the formation and proceeded to bomb the last resort target. This aircraft then proceeded to 19°28'N - 93°48'E where it turned on course for Chakulia.
- b. Aircraft 579 after bombing the primary target was unable to close its rear bomb bay doors. It left the formation at 16°39'N - 93°55'E and proceeded to Chittagong, where it landed. Later in the same day it returned to its home base.
- c. Aircraft 457 jettisoned its bombs and returned early due to an excessive cylinder head temperature on #2 engine.
- d. Aircraft 522 jettisoned its bombs and returned early due to mechanical difficulty.
- e. Aircraft 466 jettisoned its bombs and returned early due to an oil leak in the #2 engine.

2. 44th Group:

- a. Aircraft 202 because of mechanical difficulty left the briefed route at 17°03'N - 93°00'E, taking a 12-degree heading to Cheduba Island, the turning point for The Last Resort Target. From Cheduba Island it proceeded to bomb the Last Resort Target and then returned to Dudhkundi by a straight course.

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- b. Aircraft 419 flew the briefed route to the primary target, but from there proceeded directly to Diamond Island, omitting the first return check point.
- c. Aircraft 485 flew the briefed route except for 1 hour spent searching for and circling aircraft 518.
- d. Aircraft 518 ditched at approximately 18°10'N - 92°10'E while en route to the target.


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Date: 6 November 1944

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CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF  
STAFF BOMBARDIER

Date Prepared: 6 November 1944

Field Order No. 14  
Date of Mission: 3 Nov 44

1. Visibility over the primary target was limited due to 5/10 cloud coverage, but this limitation did not prevent visual bombing. Cumulus clouds directly in line of flight caused one Group to make a second run to improve its accuracy. Bombing runs were considerably shorter than usual for some Groups, but bombing results were excellent. One group reported the smoke and fires from bombs of previous formations completely covered the aiming point and off-set checkpoints for synchronization were used, with excellent results.

2. Reported anti-aircraft of meagre to moderate and light enemy fighter attacks did not prevent successful bomb runs.

3. Malfunction of bombing equipment which prevented the release of bombs are as follows:

a. 40th Bomb Group

(1) Aircraft #579 failed to release four bombs; cause undetermined as yet. This aircraft has the all-electric salvo system. This aircraft also had faulty bomb-bay doors which could not be closed; cause, burned out leads to bomb bay door motor.

b. 444th Bomb Group - None.

c. 462nd Bomb Group

(1) Aircraft #393 - Malfunction of front bomb-bay door: cause, bomb-bay door motor burned out. Bombs released from aircraft with the emergency salvo wheel.

(2) Aircraft #531 - Four bombs released as selector lever was pushed into select: cause undetermined as yet.

(3) Aircraft #581 - Had trouble opening bomb-bay doors, but were opened in time with pilot's switch; cause undetermined as yet. Four bombs hung up and were released one second later by hitting the salvo switch a second time; cause undetermined as yet. This aircraft has an all-electric salvo system.

d. 468th Bomb Group - None.

prepared by:

Staff Bombardier

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BOMBING DATA (continued)

A. Times of Bomb Release at P.T.

Z Time	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
0340 - 0344	-	9	12	-	21
0345 - 0349	10	-	-	-	10
0350 - 0354	-	1	-	12	13
Total	10	10	12	12	44

B. Bombing Altitudes at P.T.

Altitude (feet)	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
20,000 - 20,499	2	-	-	12	14
20,500 - 20,999	3	-	-	-	3
21,000 - 21,499	5	-	-	-	5
21,500 - 21,999	-	1	-	-	1
22,000 - 22,499	-	9	1	-	10
22,500 - 22,999	-	-	3	-	3
23,000 - 23,499	-	-	7	-	7
23,500 - 23,999	-	-	1	-	1
Total	10	10	12	12	44
Briefed altitudes	21000 'T	22000 'T	23000 'T	20900 'T	

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C. Indicated Air Speeds over P.T.

I.A.S. (mph)	40th	44th	462nd	468th	Total
185 - 189	-	2	-	-	2
190 - 194	10	7	7	-	24
195 - 199	-	1	4	10	15
200 - 204	-	-	1	1	2
205 - 209	-	-	-	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>44</b>

D. Axis of Attack at P.T.

Degrees	40th-a	44th-b	462nd-a	468th-c	Total
40 - 44	1				1
45 - 49	9	4		12	25
50 - 54		5			5
55 - 59		1			1
295 - 299			1		1
300 - 304			2		2
305 - 309			1		1
310 - 314			3		3
315 - 319			3		3
330			2		2
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>44</b>

- a - Reported as magnetic.
- b - Not reported whether true or magnetic.
- c - Reported as true.

NOTE: Briefed axis of attack was 47° magnetic.

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V - BOMB LOADING\*

Mission No. 14

3 November 1944

Loads	40th		444th		462nd		468th		Total	
	A/C	GP	A/C	GP	A/C	GP	A/C	GP	A/C	GP
24 G.P.	-	-	-	-	2	48	2	48	4	96
32 G.P.	-	-	-	-	1	32	-	-	1	32
37 G.P.	-	-	-	-	1	37	-	-	1	37
39 G.P.	-	-	-	-	1	39	1	39	2	78
40 G.P.	13	520	12	480	7	280	9	360	41	1640
Total A/C	13		12		12		12		49	
Total G.P.		520		480		436		447		1883

G.P. per A/C	40	40	36.5	37.3	38.45
--------------	----	----	------	------	-------

\* Based on aircraft airborne. "G.P." indicates 500-pound AN-M-64 GP (TNT filled) bomb, fused .1 second nose and .025 second tail.

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VI - DISPOSITION OF BOMBS

Mission No. 14

3 November 1944

	40th		441th		462nd		468th		Totals	
	A/C	GP*	A/C	GP	A/C	GP	A/C	GP	A/C	GP
A/C airborne and bomb load	13	520	12	480	12	436	12	447	49	1883
A/C over P.T. and bomb load	10	400	10	400	12	436	12	447	44	1683
A/C bombing P.T. and bombs dropped	10	391	10	400	12	431	12	447	44	1669
A/C bombing L.R.T. and bombs dropped	0-a	9	1	40	-	-	-	-	1	49
Jettisoned bombs	3	120	1-b	40	0-c	4	-	-	4	164
Brought bombs back	-	-	-	-	0-d	1	-	-	0	1
Total	13	520	12	480	12	436	12	447	49	1883

\* "GP" indicates 500# M-64 (TNT filled) bombs, fused .1 second nose and .025 second tail.

a. A/C 407 (40th) which dropped 31 bombs on the P.T. and 9 on the L.R.T. is tabulated as having bombed the P.T.

b. A/C 518 (441th) which ditched while enroute to the target is presumed to have jettisoned its bombs prior to ditching.

c. A/C 531 (462nd) dropped 36 bombs on the P.T. and jettisoned 4.

d. A/C 475 (462nd) dropped 39 bombs on P.T. and brought 1 bomb back.

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VII - FORMATIONS FLOWN

Mission No. 14

3 November 1944

A. Formations Planned

1. The 12 - plane formation as defined in the Command's Tactical Doctrine was the formation required by the Field Orders. (For a description of this formation, see Tactical Mission Report No. 10, Annex B, Part VII).

B. Assembly Points

1. The briefed assembly points were as follows:

Group	Assembly Point No. 1	Assembly Point #2	Altitude at Assembly Pt. #2
40th	Mouth of Subarnarekha River (21°34'N - 87°21'E)	Diamond Island  (15°52'N - 94°17'E)	21,000' T.
444th	Mouth of Hooghly River (21°47'N - 87°52'E)		22,000' T.
462nd	Railroad Bridge (23°27'N - 87°53'E)		23,000' T.
468th	Halliday Island (21°38'N - 88°38'E)		20,000' T.

2. Three-plane elements were to assemble over the field. Twelve-plane formations were to assemble at the designated first assembly point. If weather conditions en route necessitated assembly at the second assembly point, assembly was to be accomplished at assigned bombing altitudes.

3. No undue difficulty was encountered in forming as indicated by the fact that with one exception every aircraft bombing the primary target did so in its assigned formation.

C. Formations over the Target

1. Formations are shown below as they were at the time of bomb release. The time, altitude, and heading is that of the lead aircraft. The diagrams are intended to indicate relative position only ("W" represents an aircraft of the 40th Group; "X", the 444th; "Y", the 462nd; and "Z" the 468th.)

a. Time: 0342Z  
Altitude: 22,000'  
Heading: 45°

X 419  
X 375 X 485  
X 492 X 411 X 580  
X 524  
X 584 X 510

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b. Time: 0344 Z.  
Altitude: 23,000' T.  
Heading: 330° M.

Y 475  
Y 479 Y 393  
Y 329 Y 444  
Y 213 Y 506 Y 505 Y 581 Y 463  
Y 461 Y 531

c. Time: 0348 Z.  
Altitude: 20,800' T.  
Heading: 45° M.

W 582  
W 452 W 407  
W 508  
W 541 W 574 W 396 W 394  
W 579 W 503

d. Time: 0353 Z.  
Altitude: 20,000' T.  
Heading: 48° M.

Z 279  
Z 353 Z 494 Z 442  
Z 542 Z 546 Z 415 Z 525  
Z 429 Z 486 X 469 Z 208  
X 507

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Auth: CG, XX BC  
Initials: JPP  
Date: 6 Nov 44

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION  
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND NAVIGATION OFFICER

Date Prepared: 6 November 1944

Field Order No. 14

Date of Mission: 3 Nov 44

1. Navigation was carried out in a commendable manner. Rendezvous was accomplished without difficulty and all Groups remained in formation until base area was reached.

a. Average Navigation times out and back:

	<u>NAV TIME OUT</u>	<u>NAV TIME BACK</u>
40th -	3h 43m	3h 40m
444th -	3h 28m	3h 40m
462nd -	3h 26m	3h 22m
468th -	3h 40m	3h 20m

b. Forecast winds were very close to the actual winds computed. Those few navigators who disagreed with forecast winds were also found to disagree with average computed winds. Average winds and altitudes follow:

	<u>ONE HALF OUT</u>	<u>TARGET AREA</u>	<u>ONE HALF BACK</u>
40th -	6000' 290 @ 13K	20,000' 280 @ 16K	14,000' 250 @ 15K
444th -	12,000' 260 @ 13K	21,000' 270 @ 15K	10,000' 260 @ 15K
462nd -	17,000' 285 @ 17K	23,000' 280 @ 17K	15,000' 280 @ 17K
468th -	17,000' 290 @ 15K	20,000' 255 @ 15K	17,000' 270 @ 17K

c. The following statistical information is presented as a general indication of the extent to which aids are being used by the various Groups:

	<u>BASE NO.*</u>	<u>CEL</u>	<u>RADIO</u>	<u>CEL</u>	<u>RADIO</u>	<u>QDM'S</u>
	<u>OF A/C</u>	<u>LOP'S</u>	<u>LOP'S</u>	<u>FIXES</u>	<u>FIXES</u>	
40th -	10	55	3	0	2	0
444th -	10	27	0	0	0	1
462nd -	12	44	4	0	0	0
468th -	12	63	0	3	0	0
	<u>44</u>	<u>189</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>

\* No. a/c each Group bombing PT.

2. Comments by Groups: None.

B-VIII-1

Prepared by:  
Staff Navigator

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IX - MISSION OPERATIONAL LOSSES

Mission No. 14

3 November 1944

A. Aircraft 518 of the 444th Group took off at 0005Z, 3 November 1944. The first indication of trouble came at 0225Z when two undecipherable calls from the tail gunner were heard at the interphone. It was afterwards determined that he had evidently screamed, "Fire in the tail gunner's position" but for one of two reasons the message was garbled; since the Radar operator had already experienced trouble with the interphone that may have caused the distortion of the message or it may have been the result of the shouting of the Tail Gunner. As soon as the plane was depressurized the Radar Operator went back to see what the difficulty was. He stated that the gunner's door was open about two inches, flames could be seen and the density of the smoke made it impossible to tell whether or not the Tail Gunner was still in the compartment. Later observations showed the compartment completely gutted and that the fire had burned through the fuselage. The Tail Gunner is still unaccounted for. No chutes were reported by other planes of the formation.

B. The aircraft was at 15,000 feet when the pilot decided to ditch. The fire and smoke prevented some members from taking their conventional ditching position. However a successful ditching was made at approximately 18°10'N - 92°10'E, and the only injury was a possible cracked vertebra suffered by the Right Gunner. Two life rafts were successfully inflated, and additional supplies were dropped to the crew.

C. The survivors were rescued by a 72-foot motor launch of the Royal Indian Navy at an approximate position of 17°42'N - 92°02'E. The crew had spent about 36 hours in the rafts and were in good condition with the exception of the injured Right Gunner. It is believed that the Tail Gunner was severely burned and jumped prior to the ditching.

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X INFORMATION ON LANDINGS

Mission No. 14

3 November 1944

A. Landed at XX Bomber Command Bases

1. Aircraft bombing primary target:

	<u>First A/C down</u>	<u>Last A/C down</u>
a. 40th	0735 Z	0746 Z*
b. 444th	0709 Z	0804 Z**
c. 462nd	0652 Z	0736 Z
d. 468th	<u>0720 Z</u>	<u>0733 Z</u>
Over-all	0652 Z	0804 Z

\* Does not include A/C 407 (40th) which bombed both P.T. and L.R.T., landing at 0809 Z.

\*\* Does not include A/C 485 (444th), which after bombing P.T., spent 1 hour searching for and circling ditched A/C 518. A/C 485 landed at 0835 Z.

2. Aircraft failing to bomb primary target:

a. 40th Group:

- (1) A/C 457: 0005Z - jettisoned bombs.
- (2) A/C 522: 0534Z - jettisoned bombs.
- (3) A/C 466: 0050Z - jettisoned bombs.

b. 444th Group:

- (1) A/C 202: 0605Z - bombed L.R.T.

B. Landed Elsewhere

1. 40th Group:

- a. A/C 579: landed at Chittagong at 0646Z due to a failure of the rear bomb bay doors to close. The malfunction was fixed, 1000 gallons of gas were unloaded, and the aircraft proceeded the same day to its own base, landing at 1044 Z.

C. Losses

1. 444th Group:

- a. A/C 518: ditched at approximately 18°10'N - 92°10'E while en route to the target.

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C

ANNEX

C

ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* Flak Officer \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

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I - ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT

Mission No. 14

3 November 1944  
(Preliminary Report)

A. Antiaircraft Fire Encountered

1. Rangoon (16°47'N - 96°11'E):

a. Moderate and accurate heavy antiaircraft fire was reported for 82% (46 out of 56) of the aircraft-runs over the area from 0335Z to 0354Z at altitudes varying from 20,000 to 23,000 feet. Bombing was accomplished by 4 formations (1 of which made 2 runs over the target) as follows:

<u>Formation</u>	<u>Bomb Release Time</u>	<u>Number of A/C</u>	<u>Altitude feet</u>	<u>Holding in Degrees</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	0335Z*	12	23,000	45	Did not bomb
2	0342Z	9	22,000	45	Bombed
3 (1)	0344Z	12	23,000	330	Bombed, 2nd run
4	0348Z	10	21,000	45	Bombed
5	0353Z	13	20,000	48	Bombed

\* Approximate time at the Bomb Release Line and time fire encountered. Formations listed as 1 and 3 are the same, 1 being the first run, 3 being the second and bombing run.

b. The approximate intensity, accuracy and deviations of bursts were reported as follows:

Reports of Accuracy

<u>Formation</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>Total</u>
Struck	1	5	1	3	5	15 (33%)
Rocked	2	-	2	3	4	11 (24%)
Missed	2	4	6	4	4	20 (43%)
No Report	7	-	3	-	-	10 ---

Reports of Intensity

Intense . . . . . 2 ( 4 per cent)  
Moderate . . . . . 27 (59 per cent)  
Meager . . . . . 17 (37 per cent)

Reports of Deviations

(Numbers indicate aircraft reporting in the affirmative, percentages are determined from the total reports of deviation in one direction only, i.e., above, level, or below)

Above . . . . 8 (13 per cent)    Ahead . . . . 22 (14 per cent)  
Level . . . . 39 (62 per cent)    Abreast . . . . 19 (35 per cent)  
Below . . . . 16 (25 per cent)    Behind . . . . 13 (24 per cent)

Left . . . . 12 (27 per cent)  
In Line . . . . 21 (46 per cent)  
Right . . . . 12 (27 per cent)

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c. The majority of the burst were reported as black with some white and a few gray. Undercast varied from 4/10 to 7/10. Continuously Pointed fire was encountered with the majority of the fire occurring before bombs away, some at the bomb release line, and only a relatively small amount after bombs away.

d. At 0347Z, 2 enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude, also at 0353Z 1 single engine fighter was reported near the formation, on course, and to the side.

e. In general the "OUT" heading was at 90 degrees. No definite possibility of gun-laying radar was evident through R.C.M. intercepts, extent of undercast, or characteristics of fire.

2. Taungup (18°51'N - 94°16'E):

a. Meager and inaccurate black heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered by 2 aircraft under CAWU conditions with no enemy aircraft reported on the same course and altitude.

b. The first aircraft bombed at 0341Z at an altitude of 14,000 feet, while 2 bombing runs were made by the second aircraft over the area at 20,000 feet at 0535Z and 0540Z.

c. Since the first aircraft reported deviations as level, ahead and to the left and right, it appears that the enemy was using the same altitude for his prediction at 0535Z when the deviations were reported as 5,000 feet below. However, he corrected by 0540Z when the bursts were level, behind and to the left.

d. At 0535Z and 0540Z no more than 3 bursts were reported on each run.

B. Ground-To-Air Rockets

None reported.

C. Smokescreens

None reported.

D. Barrage Balloons

None reported.

E. High-Altitude Balloons

Two possible high-altitude balloons were reported by 1 aircraft of a formation of 12 at 0330Z, 8 miles northwest of the primary target. Because of the extreme distance no details such as fins, cables, etc., were observed, although the balloons were described as "sausage" shaped, and as flying at an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet. The observation was made from 23,000 feet.

F. Damage From Heavy Antiaircraft Fire

Thirteen of the 15 aircraft struck by heavy antiaircraft fire over Rangoon sustained minor damage.

G. Warning

It is possible that the enemy had approximately 1 hour warning of the approach of our aircraft, based on R.C.M. intercepts of early warning radar signals.

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H. Observations

a. One aircraft at 0348Z observed a 9-gun battery of antiaircraft at the southwest corner of Rangoon. Flashes were seen from 7 guns. Guns were in groups of 3, in an open space near the river's edge.

b. Ground flashes were observed across the Rangoon River, south of the Round House at the Malagon Railroad Yards.

c. White streamers were observed through 1 concentration of flak, but the origin is unknown.

d. An antiaircraft position was seen halfway between Central Station, Rangoon and the roundhouse at the Malagon Railroad Yards. Three gun flashes were seen from the position.

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D

ANNEX

D

ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* Operational Intelligence Unit \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

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\*\*\*\*\*  
\* SECRET \*  
\* By Auth of the CG \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* 16 NOV 44 JDG \*  
\* Date Initials \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

I. JAPANESE FIGHTER TACTICS - MISSION NO. 14

TARGET: Rangoon, Burma

TIME: Day Mission.

DATE: 3 November 1944

1. Fighter Opposition:

a. Of the 49 aircraft airborne on this mission, twelve were attacked by Japanese fighters. Overall aerial opposition is rated as weak, and for one group, the 44th, as nil. A total of nineteen attacks were recorded, two of which resulted in claimed damage to the enemy. No claims of destroyed or probably destroyed were filed. There were no coordinated attacks.

b. All except two attacks materialized in the target area; the exceptions being slightly south of Rangoon, on the way to and from the target. All attacks took place within thirty minutes, and at altitudes varying from 18,500 to 23,500 indicated, with no marked concentration on aircraft flying at any particular altitude.

c. Four attacks occurred before and fifteen after bombs were away.

d. It is estimated that approximately twelve fighters intercepted the attacking force; 5 TOJOS, 3 OSCARS, 2 TONYs, 1 HAMP and 1 NICK.

Table No. 1 - Details of Encounters

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of Encounters</u>	<u>Type of E/A</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Altitude</u>
1. Enroute to Target 16°46'N-96°10'E	1	1 by TOJO	0337Z	23,500
2. In the Target Area	17	7 by TOJO 4 by OSCAR 3 by TONY 2 by ZEKE 1 by S/E	0343Z to 0407Z	18,500 to 22,000
3. Enroute from Target 16°15'N-96°35'E	1	1 by HAMP	0358Z	19,800

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2. Distribution of Attacks Within Formations: Fourteen of the nineteen attacks were made against one formation, that of the 40th Group, with a marked concentration on the left side of that formation. The three aircraft flying in position to the extreme right were not attacked.

3. Direction and Level of Attacks: The high frontal approach was definitely preferred, with seventeen of the 19 attacks emanating from the left portion of the front quarter, and fifteen of those seventeen from above. The one level attack was a direct frontal approach, while of the three low attacks, two were from eleven o'clock, and one from six o'clock. All aircraft attacking the 40th Group's formation followed a definite pattern, paralleling the formation on the right, then pulling out in front in a wide circle to attack from the frontal (mostly 11 o'clock) high position.

Table No. 2 - Direction and Level of Approach

Direction of Attack or Pass	Left Side			Front			Rear			Total
	8	9	10	11	12	1	5	6	7	
High	0	1	1	8	5	0	0	0	0	15 (79%)
Level	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1 (5%)
Low	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	3 (16%)
TOTAL	0	1	1	10	6	0	0	1	0	19
	2 (10%)			16 (85%)			1 (5%)			

4. Exchange of Fire: The enemy was reported to have opened fire in 12 of the 19 encounters (63%); not to have opened fire in 4 (21%) and in the remaining three encounters (16%) it is questionable as to whether or not they fired. These figures are in keeping with past missions, the enemy having opened fire in 52% of the encounters on Mission Number 9, 50% on Mission No. 11; 73% on Mission Number 12, and 68% in Mission No. 13. (No attacks took place on Mission No. 10). In seven of the twelve attacks on which the enemy fired, he opened fire at 1000 yards or more. Our aircraft opened fire in all but two of nineteen encounters, and in five cases commenced firing at 1000 yards or more. One NICK was twice observed to have fired a few bursts from a turret at distances of between 1000 and 2500 yards from our aircraft.

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Table No. 3 - Distances Opened Fire

<u>Distance (Yards)</u>	<u>Enemy Fire</u>	<u>B-29 Fire</u>
0 to 499	17 %	35 %
500 to 799	17 %	18 %
800 to 999	8 %	18 %
1000 and over	58 %	29 %

5. Aggressiveness of Enemy Attacks: Aggressiveness shown compares closely with Missions Numbers 9, 11, and 13 (No. 12 being exceptional in the closeness to which the enemy pressed his attacks). In Mission Number 11, 41% of the attacks were pressed to within 250 yards as compared with 43%, 40%, 75% and 40% on Missions 9, 11, 12, 13 respectively. Three fighters dove through our formations.

Table 4 - Distances Encounters Were Closed To

<u>Distance (Yards)</u>	<u>Encounters</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1000 & over	2	11%
800 to 999	2	11%
500 to 799	3	16%
250 to 499	4	21%
0 to 249	8	41%
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	19	100%

6. Breakaways: The usual variety of breakaway maneuvers was employed by the enemy, with dives and diving turns the most prevalent. The Split-S was used by one aircraft, and a corkscrew breakaway upward toward 12 o'clock was executed by the one fighter which attacked from 6 o'clock low. Other maneuvers included a roll and dive, a roll over the formation, and breaks to the left and right to assume a position parallel with our formations.

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7. Coordinated Attacks: None.
8. Aerial Bomb Attacks: None.
9. Evasive Action: Only one instance of evasive action is reported, in this instance the leader of the formation of the 40th Group turned into the attacking fighter.
10. Claims: Preliminary claims list two enemy aircraft damaged.
11. New and Unusual Tactics: No new Japanese tactics were observed on Mission 14. Unusual tactics observed were the paralleling of the formation by enemy fighters described in section 3 of this report.
12. Summary:
  - a. Nil to weak opposition.
  - b. Bulk of attacks in the target area.
  - c. Variety of fighter types despite limited numbers.
  - d. Concentration of great majority of attacks on one formation.
  - e. Marked preference for the high frontal attack.
  - f. Following of a definite pre-attack pattern of paralleling the formation.
  - g. Enemy opened fire in 63% of the encounters; B-29's fired in 90% of the encounters. The enemy commenced firing beyond 1000 yards in 53% of the cases when they fired.
  - h. Enemy aggressiveness was about the same as recently experienced on other missions.
  - i. There were no coordinated or aerial bomb attacks; or new tactics.

- 4 -

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13. Enemy Aircraft Markings;

<u>Color</u>	<u>Plane</u>	<u>Markings</u>
Silver	S/E Unidentified	Yellow wings.
	TOJO or OSCAR	None observed.
	TOJO	Rising Sun.
	OSCAR	White wings with black suns where red usually are.
	TOJO	Red ball insignia.
Camouflaged	OSCAR	Dirty Green.
	TONY	Brown and green with two red balls on wings.
	TONY	Brown and green mottled two red spots on wings.
	HAMP	Light O.D.
	S/E	Two red balls.
	TOJOS	Dark Camouflage.
Unreported	TOJO	Red spots on wing, red nose and cowling.
	S/E	Red nose.

S E C R E T

E

ANNEX

E

WEATHER INFORMATION

- I - Weather Information
- II - Chart-Weather as Forecast and as Encountered
- III - Chart-Synoptic Map

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I - WEATHER INFORMATION

Mission No. 14

3 November 1944

	AS FORECAST	AS ENCOUNTERED
Base (Take-Off)	Clear. Visibility 5 miles.	KHARAGPUR; Scattered cirrus. Visibility 5 miles in haze. Wind calm. PIARDOBA; Clear. Visibility 5 miles in haze. Wind calm. CHAKULIA; Clear. Visibility 5 miles in haze. Wind calm. DUDHKUNDI; Clear. Visibility 5 miles. Wind calm.
Route Out	Clear to beyond coast with few scattered cumulus, base 1500', tops 3000', -over bay increasing to 6/10 cumulus with tops at 8000' at 90 to 91 Degrees E. where there will also be scattered thunder storms. From 91 Degrees E to target there will be broken cumulus, base 1500', tops 8000' and scattered showers.	Base to 19° S; Clear. Visibility 15 miles. 19° S. TO COAST; 2/10-3/10 cumulus with bases at 2000', tops at 5000' with tops increasing to 13-15,000' at 16 Degrees and amount increasing to 5/10 to 6/10.
TARGET AREA	3/10 cirrus at 25,000'. 4/10 cumulus, base 3000', tops 7000'. Visibility 15 miles. Altimeter setting; 29.88 in. Secondary; Broken towering cumulus, base 3000', tops 15,000'. Visibility 20 miles.	PRIMARY TARGET; Cloud cover varied for the various formations from 3/10 to 4/10. Base of cumulus was at 3000' with tops variable from 10,000' to 15,000'. A few scattered Thunderheads were observed with tops to 23,000'. 3/10 to 4/10 cirrostratus above 22,000'. Visibility unlimited. SECONDARY TARGET; Clear. Visibility unlimited.
Return Route	Conditions same as route out.	Clouds deteriorated rapidly after leaving target and became 2/10 with cumulus tops at 10,000' by the time 190° N was reached. These conditions persisted to base.
Base on Return	Visibility unlimited.	KHARAGPUR; High scattered Altocumulus. Visibility unrestricted. Wind calm. PIARDOBA; High scattered altocumulus. Visibility unlimited. Wind calm. CHAKULIA; High thin broken altostratus. Visibility 7 miles. Wind calm. DUDHKUNDI; High scattered altocumulus. Visibility unlimited. Wind calm.
Freezing Level	17,500'. Moderate clear ice in cumulus tops.	

A. Winds Aloft - Forecast

Altitude	First Half	Second Half	Target
Surface	270° - 5K		
3000'	290° - 7K		
6000'	350° - 10K	270° - 15K	
10,000'	300° - 15K	260° - 10K	
15,000'	290° - 17K	270° - 15K	
21,000'	280° - 20K	280° - 20K	280° - 15K

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B. Winds Aloft - Encountered

Altitude	Terminal	Midway	Target
16,000'		265° - 18K	
17,000'		230° - 15K	
18,000'		230° - 15K	
19,000'		280° - 20K	
20,000'		280° - 20K	280° - 20K
21,000'			260° - 10K
22,000'			330° - 10K

C. Target Temperatures

Forecast:

Altitude	Temperature
Surface	20° C
3000'	26° C
6000'	20° C
10,000'	12° C
15,000'	4° C
21,000'	-5° C

Mean temperature to 21,000'. +11° C

Encountered:

Altitude	Temperature
21,000'	-6° C
22,000'	-6° C


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
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S E C R E T

F

ANNEX

F

COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Communications Section \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)  
By NND 740120  
By CD/m NARS, Date OCT 20 1975

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Authority NND 760063  
By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

SECRET  
Auth: CG, XX BC  
Initials: AKD  
Date: 6 Nov 44

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION  
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS (RADIO) OFFICER

Date Prepared: 6 November 1944

Field Order Number: 14

Date of Mission: 3 Nov 1944

1. The Communications Annex to Field Orders number fourteen in general contained those portions of Part I, Section VIII, current Tactical Doctrine as could be made applicable to an India based Mission. As planned, communications proved satisfactory with but one exception; that exception being occasioned by the misinterpretation of instructions issued by this Headquarters regarding the use of aircraft radio call signs. No confusion resulted in air-ground communication from this misinterpretation, but compilation of relayed messages by Operational Intelligence was to some extent delayed.

2. Air-ground traffic was at a minimum, a resume of such traffic being as follows:

a. "Bombs away" messages:

40th Group    444th Group    462nd Group    468th Group

1                    2                    1                    2

b. Intercept messages: none transmitted

c. Convoy sighting messages: none required.

d. The 444th Group required their aircraft to transmit a coded message when 250 miles from base on the return to base, this being in addition to those messages required by the Field Order. A total of eleven (11) of these messages were sent. While there was no confusion caused by these additional messages in this instance, no such deviations should be made from the Field Orders in the future without prior permission of this Headquarters, in order to obviate any confusion that might possibly arise.

3. Aids to navigation were used as follows:

a. Radio Homing beacons:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of a/c Reporting</u>	<u>Average Initial Contact</u>	<u>Extreme Initial Contact</u>	<u>Average Track of a/c Rep'ing</u>
Chakulia (AF)	12	450 miles	650 miles	---
Piardoba (ML)	11	289 miles	600 miles	---
Dudkhundi (FN)	--	150 miles	--	---
Kharagpur (GK)	6 (468 Gp)	118 miles	--	---
	(444 Gp)	300 miles	--	---

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b. Radio Ranges:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No of a/c Reporting</u>	<u>Average Initial Contact</u>	<u>Extreme Initial Contact</u>	<u>Average Track of a/c Reporting</u>
Kharagpur(GK)	2(468 Gp) --(444 Gp)	225 miles 100 miles	-- --	-- --

c. D/F facilities.

- (1) The 40th, 462nd, and 468th Groups reported no D/F requests.

<u>A/C Number</u>	<u>D/F Station</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>and Class</u>	<u>Approx Dist.</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
485	4E3	8495 kcs	--	- I	200 mi.	Reliable
485	4E3	8495 kcs	--	- II	200 mi.	Reliable
375	4E3	8495 kcs	--	- II	180 mi.	Reliable

d. Air-to-air homing was used by aircraft of the 444th and 462nd Groups. Each Group reported three (3) aircraft using this procedure, the 444th Group reporting the aircraft homed from a distance of fifty (50) miles.

4. Frequencies most in use were the assigned eight megacycle frequencies and all Groups reported signal strengths of S-2 to S-5 over the target. Some skip was present on all the eight megacycle frequencies at shorter ranges, but did not interfere with necessary air-ground traffic. Weather static was encountered, but was local in character.

5. The 444th Group reported some interference on the assigned eight megacycle frequency. Corrective action is being requested from Theater Headquarters to clear this interference.

6. No reports of actual or apparent jamming were made.
7. No violations of cryptographic security were logged.
8. Malfunctions of equipment are summarized as follows:

40TH BOMB GROUP - Two (2) Malfunctions.

- a. Output transformer on Liaison Receiver burned out. Not repairable in flight.
- b. Housing for loop antenna loose and vibrating and flattop sense antenna for Radio Compass broken. Not repairable in flight.

444th BOMB GROUP - Four (4) Malfunctions.

- a. One Interphone Jackbox failed; i.e. all positions could be heard at once. Jackbox replaced in flight.
- b. Pilots microphone cut out consistently. Replaced in flight.
- c. Number 2 Command Transmitter (SCR-274N Radio Set) would not load satisfactorily. Not repairable in flight.
- d. Fixed antenna for Radio Compass broke. Repaired in flight.

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462nd BOMB GROUP - Two (2) Malfunctions.

- a. Antenna Switching Relay not functioning properly. Trouble ascertained to be shorted wire from Antenna Post on Radio Receiver BC-348 to Antenna Knife Switch. Repaired in flight.
- b. Weak Liaison Receiver. Trouble was located in faulty Antenna Switching Relay. Not repaired in flight.

468th BOMB GROUP - Three (3) malfunctions.

- a. Compass sense antenna lead-in broken. Could not repair in flight.
- b. Compass sense antenna lead-in broken. Could not repair in flight.
- c. Dynamotor for Liaison set went out. Could not be repaired in flight. Trouble believed to be in dynamotor contained relay.

9. A time study of transmission of Operational Intelligence Reports is attached as Annex Number 1.

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By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

Annex # 1 to Communications Critique on Mission # 14

Reporting on Mission No. 14

Flash Messages (by phone)

Group	Time Down Last A/c	Time of Receipt of coded messages by phone from group	Flash Telecon Report filed to Washington	Elapsed Time
40th	0809Z	0840Z	0850Z	41 min.
444th	0835Z	0900Z	0905Z	30 min.
462nd	0736Z	0830Z	0835Z	59 min.
468th	0733Z	0815Z	0825Z	52 min.

Preliminary Reports (urgent radio)

Group	Time Down Last A/c	Time filed sending msg center	Time msg rec'd this Hqs	Time delivered to Intell.	Elapsed time from filing at senders base to receipt by Intell. this Hq.	Telecon message to Wash. filed.
40th	0809Z	1032Z	1109Z	1153Z*	61 min.	1430Z
444th	0835Z	1034Z	1225Z	1313Z*	159 min.	1430Z
462nd	0736Z	0934Z	1209Z	1235Z*	181 min.	1430Z
468th	0733Z	0845Z	0930Z	0941Z*	56 min.	1430Z

Elapsed time of 77 minutes from receipt of last message to filing time of message was required to compile, check and actually type a three page telecon, coordinate it, and deliver it to telecon room. First photo results were included.

P-I-A

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ANNEX

G

RADAR INFORMATION

- I RADAR INFORMATION
- II RADAR TABLES

G

\*\*\*\*\*  
\*Prepared by: \*  
\* \*  
\* Radar Section \*  
\* XX Bomber Command\*  
\*\*\*\*\*

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By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

.....  
•SECRET •  
•Auth: CG XX BC •  
•Initials: MA •  
•Date: 7 Nov 44 •  
.....

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION  
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND RADAR OFFICER

Date Prepared: 7 November 1944. Field Orders No. 14  
Date of Mission: 3 Nov 44.

I - Radar Information

A - Radar Bombing

Conditions on this mission provided the first real combat test of the new Radar-Bombsight Procedure. Scattered cloud coverage over the target area, four-tenths (4/10) to six-tenths (6/10), made the visual bombing run not only difficult but also limited. Bombardier reports indicated the primary target of Rangoon was visible only thirty (30) to ninety (90) seconds before the bomb release point. Coordination was excellent between crew members on the bombing run.

B - Radar Navigation

1. Radar Navigation was reported as a great aid. The rendezvous points, Halliday and Diamond Islands, were readily identifiable at an average distance of thirty (30) nautical miles. The Hooghly and Rangoon Rivers together with the Coast of India and Burma provided excellent radar check points. One group compared ground speed readings and reported the radar operators' ground speeds to check within four (4) to six (6) knots of the ground speeds computed by the Navigator.

2. Radar equipment provided a great aid while over water in locating and tracking formations of aircraft. One formation reported tracking another formation at a distance of seventy (70) nautical miles. Another formation of aircraft simulated a frontal penetration and reassembly, the radar operators being briefed to attempt tracking other aircraft in the formation. Eight (8) radar operators reported of the twelve (12) plane formation. Three (3) operators reported tracking the entire formation, while one (1) operator tracked ten (10) of the eleven (11) other aircraft. Two (2) other radar operators tracked nine (9) aircraft, one (1) tracked seven (7) and one (1), five (5) of the eleven (11) other planes. The possibility of identifying other aircraft in formation depends greatly on the location of the aircraft. These tests did prove, however, the aid radar equipment can afford in penetration of fronts, contact during penetration and recognition of distant aircraft. The auxiliary radar equipment, namely SCR-695 and SCR-729, were not used in the trials by either formation.

C - Radar Operator Efficiency

1. Radar operator efficiency was satisfactory on this mission. The aid rendered in navigation and bombing was reported especially good. Kaingthaung Island, the initial point, was identified by eighty-three (83) per cent of the radar operators at an average range of thirty (30) nautical miles. The city of Rangoon was identified at

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an average range of forty (40) nautical miles, while the target, Malagon Marshalling Yards, within the city, was reported very difficult to divide from the general signal return of the city. The Rangoon River and the Pazundaung Creek, however, were reported to have provided excellent check points making the city proper an excellent radar target.

2. The number of operators computing ground speeds and drift increased, namely sixty-seven (67) per cent. Azimuth stabilization and Sector Scan were used also by a greater number. Radar interference was noted, but not of a serious nature. One group reported tuning out the interference, thus making the turning off of the AN/APQ-13 radar sets unnecessary. Interference during the simulated frontal penetration was negligible.

D - Radar Scope Photography

Photographic results from this mission were by far the best to date. The percentage of cameras completing the mission increased, namely eighty-three (83) per cent, while the number of pictures returned and useable was forty-seven (47) per cent, based on the number of cameras completing the mission. Four (4) cameras completing the mission were in aircraft having malfunctioning AN/APQ-13 and pictures were unobtainable. Seven (7) sets of pictures were returned. All seven (7) sets were useable. One set of useable pictures was received from a new K-24 radar camera installation. The first use of the K-24 radar camera by this organization was on this mission and the results were considered very satisfactory. Additional K-24 cameras are in the process of being installed.

E - Radar Serviceability

1. Serviceability of the AN/APQ-13 radar equipment was above average operation on this mission. Only one (1) system was inoperative at take-off, due to the accidental dropping of a screw driver in the radome. Eighty-nine (89) per cent of the systems were operational over the target and only five (5) sets were inoperative due to unrepairable failures. These malfunctions have been listed in Section II, Radar Tables.

2. There were no reports of auxiliary radar equipment failures.

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II - RADAR TABLES

A - BOMBING DATA

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total A/C Reporting	13	-	12	-	12	-	12	-	49	-
Total A/C Bombing *	10	77	11	92	12	100	12	100	45	92
A/C Bombing P.T. #	10	100	10	91	12	100	12	100	44	98
A/C Bombing L.R. #	0	0	1	9	0	0	0	0	1	2
A/C Jettisoning and Misc. Conditions	3	-	1	-	0	-	0	-	4	-

\* Percentage based on A/C Reporting  
 # Percentage based on A/C Bombing (All Bombing by Radar - Bombsight Procedure - Visual Release)

B - Photographic Results

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No. Cameras Installed	6	-	6	-	3	-	3	-	18	-
C-3 Cameras	1	-	2	-	1	-	0	-	4	22
K-35 Cameras	3	-	3	-	0	-	2	-	8	44
K-24 Cameras	2	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	5	28
H2X Cameras	0	-	0	-	1	-	0	-	1	6
No. Cameras in Abort and Early Return A/C	1	17	2	33	0	0	0	0	3	17
No. Cameras Completing Mission	5	83	4	67	3	100	3	100	15	83
No. Cameras in Radar Malfunction A/C *	1	20	2	50	1	33	0	0	4	27
Sets of Pictures Returned *	4	80	2	50	1	33	0	0	7	47
Sets of Useable Pictures *	4	80	2	50	1	33	0	0	7	47
Sets Tracing Bombing Run *	4	80	1	25	1	33	0	0	6	40

\* Percentage based on No. Cameras Completing Mission

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C - Radar Operator Efficiency

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No. Possible Determining G.S & Drift by Radar	9	-	9	-	11	-	10	-	39	-
No. Determining	9	100	5	56	8	73	4	40	26	67
No. Possible Identifying I.P. at useable range	9	-	7	-	9	-	10	-	35	-
No. Identifying	9	100	5	72	6	67	9	90	29	83
No. Possible Identifying A.P. at range greater than 15 miles	9	-	6	-	7	-	8	-	30	-
No. Identifying	9	100	6	100	5	71	8	100	28	93
No. Possible Using Azim. Stab. & Sector Scan	9	-	7	-	7	-	8	-	31	-
No. Using Azim. Stab.	8	89	7	100	7	100	8	100	30	97
No. Using Sector Scan	6	67	6	86	5	72	4	50	21	68

D - Radar Serviceability

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total A/C Reporting	13	-	12	-	12	-	12	-	49	-
AN/APQ-13 Operative at Take-off	13	100	12	100	11	92	12	100	48	98
SCR-729 Failures *	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SCR-695 Failures *	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A/C Bombing	10	77	11	92	12	100	12	100	45	92
AN/APQ-13 Operative over Target #	9	90	9	82	11	92	11	92	40	89
AN/APQ-13 Unrepairable Failures #	1-a	10	2	18	1	8	1	8	5	11
AN/APQ-13 Repaired in Flight	0	-	2	-	0	-	0	-	2	-

a - A/C 4541 malfunction, 6SA7 tube, could have been repaired in flight

\* - Percentage based on aircraft reporting

# - Percentage based on aircraft bombing.

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E - Radar Malfunctions

DATA	40th Gp	444th Gp	462nd Gp	468th Gp	Total
Total A/C Reporting	13	12	12	12	49
Malfunction at Take-off Screw Driver accidentally left in radome	0	0	1	0	1
Total Unrepairable	0	0	1	0	1
Malfunctions between Take-off and Target (Unrepairable)					
Range Unit, V-1613 (6Sa7)	1	0	0	0	1
Antenna Connection with K-24 Camera	0	1	0	0	1
Antenna, Limit Switch	0	1	0	0	1
Antenna, Selsyn	0	0	1	0	1
Inverter	0	0	0	1	1
Total Unrepairable	1	2	1	1	5
Malfunctions Repairable in Flight					
Repaired Micro-Switch in JB-40	0	2	0	0	2
Total Repairable	0	2	0	0	2

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S E C R E T


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
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# RADAR SCOPE PHOTOGRAPHS RANGOON AREA-BURMA




COURSE 136°00'M (135°00'T)  
SWEEP 50 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 18,000'

15°56'00"N  
94°20'00"E



COURSE 106°00'M (105°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 18,000'

15°47'30"N  
94°39'00"E




SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 18,500'

15°44'00"N  
95°03'00"E




COURSE 42°00'  
SWEEP 20 MILE  
ALTITUDE: 19,000'



SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 11,300'

16°13'00"N  
94°18'00"E



SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 11,000'

16°23'00"N  
94°08'15"E



COURSE 41°00'  
SWEEP 10 MILE  
ALTITUDE: 19,000'



COURSE 121°00'  
SWEEP 20 MIL  
ALTITUDE: 19,000'

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PREPARED BY TARGET UNIT-INTELLIGENCE SECTION — XX BOMBER COMMAND

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
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R-82.2-23 SHEET A


# RADAR SCOPE PHOTOGRAPHS RANGOON AREA-BURMA



15°56'00"N  
94°20'00"E




COURSE 106°00'M (105°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 18,000'



15°47'30"N  
94°39'00"E

SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 18,500'




15°44'00"N  
95°03'00"E

COURSE 42°00'M (41°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 19,000'

16°22'00"N  
95°49'00"E



16°13'00"N  
94°18'00"E




COURSE 41°00'M (40°00'T)  
SWEEP 10 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 19,000'

16°45'00"N  
96°08'00"E



16°23'00"N  
94°08'15"E



COURSE 121°00'M (120°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 19,000'

16°50'00"N  
96°23'30"E

SECRET

PREPARED BY TARGET UNIT-INTELLIGENCE SECTION—XX BOMBER COMMAND

ALL LOCATIONS APPROX.


DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 760063


By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

SECRET

### RADAR SCOPE PHOTOGRAPHS RANGOON AREA-BURMA



COURSE 38°00'M (37°00'T) 15°59'00"N  
SWEEP 20 MILES 95°27'00"E  
ALTITUDE: 21,000'



COURSE 41°00'M (40°00'T) 16°22'00"N  
SWEEP 20 MILES 95°47'00"E  
ALTITUDE: 21,000'



COURSE 41°00'M (40°00'T) 16°39'00"N  
SWEEP 20 MILES 96°05'00"E  
ALTITUDE: 21,000'




COURSE 43°00'M  
SWEEP 10 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 21,000'



COURSE 42°00'M (41°00'T) 15°44'00"N  
SWEEP 20 MILES 95°11'00"E  
ALTITUDE: 21,000'



COURSE 43°00'M  
SWEEP 10 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 21,000'



COURSE 96°00'M (95°00'T) 15°43'00"N  
SWEEP 50 MILES 94°56'30"E  
ALTITUDE: 20,900'



COURSE 91°00'M  
SWEEP 10 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 21,000'

SECRET

PREPARED BY TARGET UNIT-INTELLIGENCE SECTION - XX BOMBER COMMAND

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Authority NND 760063

By AB NARA Date 10/18/05


SECRET

R-82.2-23 SHEET B

RADAR SCOPE PHOTOGRAPHS  
RANGOON AREA-BURMA



15°59'00"N  
95°27'00"E




COURSE 41°00'M (40°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 21,000'

16°22'00"N  
95°47'00"E



COURSE 41°00'M (40°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 21,000'

16°39'00"N  
96°05'00"E




COURSE 43°00'M (42°00'T)  
SWEEP 10 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 21,000'

16°43'00"N  
96°10'00"E



15°44'00"N  
95°11'00"E




COURSE 43°00'M (42°00'T)  
SWEEP 10 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 21,000'

16°50'00"N  
96°15'00"E



15°43'00"N  
94°56'30"E



COURSE 91°00'M (90°00'T)  
SWEEP 10 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 21,000'

16°51'00"N  
96°18'00"E



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PREPARED BY TARGET UNIT-INTELLIGENCE SECTION - XX BOMBER COMMAND

ALL LOCATIONS APPROX.

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By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

S E C R E T

ANNEX

H

RCM INFORMATION

H

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* RCM Section \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

SECRET  
AUTH: CG, XX BC  
Initials: MMW  
Date: 8 Nov. 44

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

8 November 1944

SUBJECT: RCM Report - Combat Mission No. 14  
Rangoon, Burma - 3 November 1944 - Daylight.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force,  
Washington 25, D.C.

A. General

RCM activities were confined to searching from take off to target and return. enroute to the target, particular attention was placed on Early Warning Radar in the 40 to 300 Megacycle band. From the IP to the target and return to the IP, search was confined to possible radar controlled anti-aircraft guns. Frequency coverage over the target was as follows:

2	40-300 Mc.
2	150-250 Mc.
4	300-1000 Mc.
2	1000-3000 Mc.

B. Results

1. RCM equipped aircraft with D/F antennas were not scheduled for this mission, therefore the coordinates associated with the signals will be merely the area of intercept and not the location of the radar station.

2. Early Warning: In searching for possible enemy low frequency Early Warning Radar, several allied MRU's were intercepted. The location of the intercepts definitely classed the Radar as friendly.

3. 69 Mc. 500 PPS, 40 USEC: This signal was intercepted to the West of Pagoda Point. At 16<sup>05</sup>7'N, 95<sup>01</sup>4'E it was reported strong and steady. Four Observers reported this intercept.

4. 80 Mc. 520 PPS, 32 USEC: This was the strongest signal intercepted on Mission No. 14. (It is interesting to note that on Mission No. 10 and 11 to Formosa, the strongest signal was also an 80 Mc. intercept). Maximum signal strength was noticed

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By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

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at the target, Therefore it may be assumed that the radar is located in the Rangoon Area. Five observers reported this intercept.

5. 100 Mc. 780 PPS, 33 USEC: This signal was intercepted off Pagoda Point and was heard strong over the target. Three Observers reported this intercept.

6. Suspected Intercepts.

A. 198-205 Mc: Signals of this type were intercepted over the target but the observers all claimed that the signals were weak and of doubtful origin.

B. 552 Mc. 1/2 USEC: This signal was intercepted going away from the target. The signal was on for a period of five minutes and was weak. The PRF was high.

C. 244 Mc. 510 PPS, 20 USEC: This signal was intercepted over Rangoon. It was on for only a few minutes.

7. Attached is a map showing the the approximate route, and the area of intercept of the three early warning signals.

C. Equipment

1. O-10/APA-6X Audio Oscillator: Four oscillators operated intermittently during flight and had to be cooled at regular intervals to maintain oscillation. The changing of paper condensers to metal encased condensers should alleviate this problem.

2. AN/APA-6 Pulse Analyzer: One pulse analyzer failed during flight. No horizontal sweep. The equipment was turned over to the Service Group for repair.

3. SCR-587 Receiver: One receiver with low output was serviced in flight. 6AG7 tube replaced.

For the Commanding General:

*Leo I. Herman*  
LEO I. HERMAN  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Actg. Adjutant General

1 Incl:  
Map of Route and Area of Intercept.


H-1-2

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By AB NARA Date 10/18/05



SECRET

SECRET

MISSION 14  
SIGNAL INTERCEPTS  
RCM SECTION

CALCUTTA

BAY OF BENGAL


AKYAB

IRRAWADDY RIVER

RAN GOON

AIRCRAFT TRACK

ANDAMAN ISLANDS



80

100

69

20°

25°

95°

10°

100°

105°

5°S

15°

90°

"SECRET"  
*pc*

S E C R E T

ANNEX

I

CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY

I

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* Staff Gunnery Officer \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

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Authority NND 760063  
By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

SECRET

By auth of CG XX BC

6 Nov 44 4PB  
Initial Date

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF  
STAFF GUNNERY OFFICER

Dated Prepared: 6 November 1944

Field Order No. 14  
Date of Mission: 3 Nov 44

1. On the mission directed by Field Orders No. 14 fighter opposition was reported to be very weak, as the few enemy aircraft sighted were not eager to press attacks on our B-29 formations. This is in direct contrast to tactics used on previous missions and indicates that fighter pilots in this target area are of inferior calibre to those encountered on the Japanese Mainland.

2. The mission is considered as very satisfactory in regards to gunnery. No losses or damage to our airplanes were reported due to enemy fighters.

3. The following statistical data are submitted:

	40th	444th	462nd	468th
Ammunition used test firing	380	1,075	6,400	545
Ammunition used in combat	2,735	0	430	416
Malfunction of C.F.C.	1	0	1	4
Total turrets on mission	55	55	60	60
Malfunction of cal. .50 M.G.	0	4	4	3
Total cal. .50 M.G. on mission	110	110	120	120
Total airplanes (basis of report)	11	11	12	12

Total percent malfunctions all groups C.F. C. 2.6 cal. .50 M.G. 2.4

Claims by our gunners:

Destroyed	Probably	Destroyed	Damaged
0	0	0	2

4. In conclusion, due to weak fighter opposition on this mission, it is considered impossible to evaluate the effectiveness of the formation defense plan which was recently drawn up and submitted to each group. However, there is every indication that this plan of search and control as prescribed will give the maximum protection to the formation if the formation and plan are executed properly.

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By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

S E C R E T

ANNEX

J

CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

S E C R E T

J

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By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

SECRET

I - CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Mission No. 14

3 November 1944

A. 10th Group

	K - 18	K - 20	K - 22	Total
No. cameras installed	4	12	4	20
No. in aborting A/C	1	3	1	5
No. completing mission	3	9	3	15
No. photographing targets	2	*	3	5**
No. usable negatives	30	*	22	52**

\* Not available

\*\* Incomplete

B. 144th Group

	K - 18	K - 20	K - 22	Total
No. cameras installed	5	5	4	14
No. in aborting A/C	2	2	1	5
No. completing mission	3	3	3	9
No. photographing targets	3	*	3	6**
No. usable negatives	17	*	39	56**

\* Not available

\*\* Incomplete

C. 162nd Group

	K - 18	K - 20	K - 22	Total
No. cameras installed	6	2	8	16
No. in aborting A/C	1	1	5	7
No. completing mission	5	1	3	9
No. photographing targets	5	1	3	9
No. usable negatives	16	7	8	31

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By AB NARA Date 10/18/05



D. 468th Group

	K-18	K-20	K-22	Total
Number cameras installed	8	13	6	27
Number in aborting aircraft	1	3	2	6
Number completing mission	7	10	4	21
Number photographing targets	7	*	4	11**
Number usable negatives	128	*	35	163**

\* Not available  
\*\* Incomplete

E. Totals

	K-18	K-20	K-22	Total
Number cameras installed	23	32	22	77
Number in aborting aircraft	5	9	9	23
Number completing mission	18	23	13	54
Number photographing targets	17	1**	13	31**
Number usable negatives	191	7**	104	302**

\*\* Incomplete

NOTE: For information on radar cameras, see Radar, Annex G.

J-I-2

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By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

S E C R E T

ANNEX

K

BATTLE LOSSES AND BATTLE DAMAGED\*

\* For details by aircraft including cause and description of damage, see "Table IV - Aircraft Lost and Damaged", Consolidated Mission Statistical Summary, Annex N.

K

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By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

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ANNEX

L

FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

- I - Functioning of Equipment
- II - Malfunctions of Equipment - Engineering
- III - Fuel Consumption\*

\*Prepared by:

Operations, Plan & Training  
~~XX~~ Bomber Command

S E C R E T

L

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Authority NND 760063  
By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

S E C R E T

I - FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

Mission No. 14

3 November 1944

A. Details by Aircraft

1. A/C airborne on mission 49
2. Loss A/C failing to get over target with bombs - mechanical reasons 5
  - (a) Bombed Last Resort Target (1);
    - (1) A/C 202 (444th) - failure of turbo super-charger.
  - (b) Jettisoned bombs (4);
    - (1) A/C 457 (40th) - excessive cylinder head temperature on #2 engine.
    - (2) A/C 522 (40th) - #3 engine failure, #3 engine feathered.
    - (3) A/C 466 (40th) - oil leak #2 engine, #3 engine feathered.
    - (4) A/C 518 (444th) - ditched, cause unknown.
3. A/C bombing Primary Target 44

- NOTE:
1. A/C 579 (40th) could not close its rear bomb bay doors, landed at Chittagong. Bomb bay doors were fixed at that base, gas was unloaded, and the plane proceeded to its base, landing on D-day.
  2. A/C 407 (40th) dropped 31 bombs on the PT and 9 on the LRT - rack malfunction.
  3. A/C 531 (462nd) dropped 36 bombs on the PT and jettisoned 4 - rack malfunction.
  4. A/C 475 (462nd) dropped 39 bombs on the PT and brought one back - rack malfunction.

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By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

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II - MALFUNCTIONS OF EQUIPMENT - ENGINEERING

Mission No. 14

3 November 1944

	<u>40th</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. Fuel pressure gages read too high	-	7	2	-	9
2. Tachometer out	5	-	-	2	7
3. Engine running hot	2	2	1	1	6
4. Cylinder head temperature gage out	2	1	2	-	5
5. Engine running rough	1	2	1	1	5
6. Oil leaks	1	1	1	1	4
7. Inverter out	1	-	1	1	3
8. C.A.T. gage inoperative	-	2	1	-	3
9. Fuel quantity gage inoperative	-	2	1	-	3
10. Airspeed indicator out or inaccurate	-	2	1	-	3
11. Engine developed too high or low RPM	-	1	2	-	3
12. Fuel pressure low or fluctuating	2	-	-	-	2
13. Generators out	1	-	-	1	2
14. Bomb bay door not closing or opening normally	1	-	-	1	2
15. Altimeter out	-	2	-	-	2
16. Collector ring blown	-	2	-	-	2
17. Prop governor malfunction	-	1	-	1	2
18. Intercooler indicator inoperative	-	1	1	-	2
19. Manifold pressure low or fluctuating	-	-	1	1	2
20. Voltage regulator burning	-	-	-	2	2
21. Turbo malfunction	1	-	-	-	1
22. Prop governor control switch sticking	1	-	-	-	1
23. Oil cooler flaps inoperative in automatic	1	-	-	-	1
24. Fluxgate compass off	-	1	-	-	1
25. Flight indicator sluggish	-	1	-	-	1
26. Engine lost power	-	-	1	-	1
27. Prop malfunction	-	-	1	-	1
28. Bomb bay door motor failure	-	-	1	-	1
29. Nose oil pressure low	-	-	1	-	1
30. Landing gear failed to retract	-	-	1	-	1
31. Directional gyro out	-	-	1	-	1
32. Cowl flap indicator out	-	-	1	-	1
33. Rear oil pressure low	-	-	-	1	1
34. Oil cooler door inoperative	-	-	-	1	1
35. Ignition malfunction	-	-	-	1	1
36. Oil cooler malfunction	-	-	-	1	1
Total	19	28	22	16	85

Note: See "Table VIII - Engineering Malfunctions," Consolidated Mission Statistical Summary, Annex N, for details by aircraft.

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Authority NND 760063

By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

SECRET  
SUMMARY OF ALL AIRCRAFT - F.O. #14

Formation Position	Over-all	Ldrs Id Elem.	Wing-men
Number of Aircraft	43	4	39
Total Flight Time	7:40	7:36	7:41
Time to Target	3:52	-	-
Fuel Burned	4080	4080	4080
Fuel Carried	4980	5000	4980
Fuel Remaining	900	920	900
Air Miles	1750	-	-
Ground Miles	1690	-	-
Gals/Air Mile	2.33	-	-
*Range of Bombing Altitudes	19000 to 22500 ft.		
*Ave. Bombing Altitude	20550	-	-
Reported Gross Weight	132,500	134,300	132,300
Weight of Bombs	20,800	21,800	20,750
Number of M-64 Bombs	38.2	40	38.1
*Pressure Altitude			

Summary does not include a/c #469 of the 468th Group for which logs were not available.

L-14-a  
III

SECRET

SECRET

Summary by Groups - F.O. #14.

Group Formation Position	40th				444th				462nd				468th		
	Over- all	Ldr ld Ele	Ldrs All Ele	Wing	Over All	Ldr ld Ele	Ldrs All Ele	Wing	Over- All	Ldr Ld Ele	Ldr All Ele	Wing	Over All	Ldr Ld Ele	Wing
No. of Aircraft	10	1	3	7	10	1	4	6	12	1	4	8	11	1	10
Total Flight Time	7:54	7:50	8:00	7:52	7:39	7:20	7:31	7:44	7:40	7:40	7:42	7:38	7:29	7:34	7:28
Time to Target	4:03	3:48	4:16	3:57	3:44	3:56	3:46	3:43	3:47	3:55	3:50	3:45	3:53		
Fuel Burned	Ave.	4105	4150	4100	4110	3865	3770	3855	3870	4340	4390	4430	4300	3960	3955
	Max.	4400				4500				4500				4230	
	Min.	3600				3600				4125				3370	
Fuel Carried	Ave.	5000	5000	4970	5020	4920	4900	4900	4930	5160	5300	5300	5100	4825	4830
	Max.	5200				5000				5400				5000	
	Min.	4900				4900				4900				4800	
Fuel Remaining	Ave.	1044	850	875	1140	1055	1130	1045	1065	820	910	870	800	830	830
	Max.	1400				1300				1070				1430	
	min.	675				900				500				570	
Air Miles	1750	1790	1805	1725	1670	1700	1680	1665	1825	1820	1805	1835	1750	1800	1745
Ground Miles	1740	1715	1745	1735	1570	1590	1585	1560	1755	1700	1710	1700	1695	1800	1680
Gal./Air Mile	2.35	2.32	2.27	2.38	2.32	2.22	2.30	2.32	2.38	2.41	2.45	2.35	2.26	2.22	2.27
* Ave. Bomb. Alt.	19500				20600				22000				20000		
Starting Gross Wt.	Ave.	133400	134080	133500	133300	133590	134765	134000	133300	132500	135960	131500	133400	131100	132600
	Max.	134080				134765				135960				133100	
	Min.	132910				132260				126095				123000	
Wt. of Bombs.	21800	21800	21800	21800	21800	21800	21800	21800	19000	21800	17440	21000	20200	21300	20050
No. of M-64 Bombs	Ave.	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	36.3	40	32	38.5	37.1	40
	Max.	40				40				40				40	
	Min.	40				40				24				24	

\* Pressure Altitude.

SECRET

Summary does not include a/c #469 of the 468th Group  
 for which logs were not available.  
 L-17-b

S E C R E T

ANNEX

M

TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

```
* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* Target Unit *
* Intelligence Section *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *
```

S E C R E T

M



SECRET

SECRET  
Auth: CG, XX BC  
Initials: JDG  
Date: 8 Nov 44

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT NO. 18 (PROVISIONAL)

TARGET: Malagon Marshalling Yard, Rangoon, Burma. (16° 47' N - 96° 11' E).

GENERAL STATEMENT:

This report relates to damage resulting from a daylight attack on the Malagon Marshalling Yards on 3 November 1944. A total of 44 aircraft dropping 1670 500# GP AN-M64 bombs. Assessment of damage was accomplished exclusively from strike photos and as such must be considered provisional.

The bombing was accomplished by four formations consisting of 9, 12, 10 and 13 aircraft respectively. Strike photos from each formation show patterns which blanket the aiming point, the roundhouse, with many hits observed on trackage and rolling stock (see photo Annex).

Examination of strike photos taken by the last Group over the target just prior to bomb strikes show the roundhouse to be destroyed with the northern half practically obliterated. All except one of the several sheds in the immediate vicinity of the roundhouse have been destroyed and the remaining one damaged. Trackage to the east and southeast of the roundhouse has suffered heavily with large areas seen to be destroyed. Numerous breaks are visible in every track in this section and traffic has been effectively halted. A stick of bombs falling across the tracks just above the elbow of the yard appear to have cut all tracks. A total of 74 rolling stock and 4 locomotives have been damaged or destroyed. Six of the locomotive blast shelters have been damaged, three heavily. Cloud and smoke obscures a part of the north end of the yard but approximately 1500' of the extreme north end appears to have escaped with little damage.

Bombs falling west of the roundhouse have cut the main rail line in at least five places and have destroyed several small spur lines. Bombs falling east of the yard in Staff Quarters destroyed 4 buildings and damaged several others. Two bays of a large multiple bay building just off the elbow of the yard have been damaged and several small nearby buildings largely destroyed.

Several establishments lining the river to the east of the yard received damage. A long narrow bay of the Ellerman Rice Mill has been heavily damaged as have several small buildings nearby. A bay of the Anglo-Burma Rice Company complex has been severely damaged. Several hits are observed on the main road south and east of the target, on rail sidings throughout the area and on several business/residential districts.

Bombs from the 468th Group, the last formation over the target, are seen to have fallen again on the roundhouse and yard with incidental hits observed in the Staff Quarters Area, on a small hitherto undamaged yard south and east of the Staff Quarters, on several small buildings near the river and in a residential area west of the target.

REFERENCES: (1) Air Objective Folder No. 82.2.  
(2) C.P.I.C., S.E.A. Detailed Intelligence Report No. DM. 328.

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By AB NARA Date 10/18/05

S E C R E T

WEIGHT OF ATTACK:

See attached Photo Annex.

PREVIOUS PHOTO COVER: (1) XX Bomber Command strike photos.  
(2) 4OPR, Mission No. 4MD151.

ANNEXES: (1) Photo Annex.

DETAILS OF DAMAGE:

(To follow when post-strike reconnaissance is available).

*James D. Garcia*  
JAMES D. GARCIA *msb*  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Chief, Intelligence Section

PREPARED BY: TARGET UNIT  
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

S E C R E T

-2-

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TARGET: MALAGON MARSHALLING YARDS, RANGOON, BURMA (16 47N - 96 11E)

DATE : 3 NOVEMBER 1944

UNITS : 40th, 44th, 462nd and 468th BOMB. GROUPS, XX BOMBER COMMAND  
MISSION NO. 14

DETAILS OF ATTACK:

	<u>40th BG</u>	<u>44th BG</u>	<u>462nd BG</u>	<u>468th BG</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
TIME OVER TARGET: :	0348 Z	0342 Z	0344 Z	0353 Z	
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT :	10	9	12	13	44
ALTITUDE :	20800'	22000'	23000'	20000'	
WEIGHT OF ATTACK :	391*	360*	431*	488*	1670*
AIMING POINT :	ROUNDHOUSE	ROUNDHOUSE	ROUNDHOUSE	ROUNDHOUSE	
HEADING :	45 M	45 M	330 M	48 M	

\* ALL BOMBS DROPPED WERE 500# AN-M64 GP (TNT FILLED), FUZED .1 SECOND NOSE AND .025 SECOND TAIL.

Prepared By: Target Unit, Intel. Sec.,  
XX Bomber Command

BEFORE



1st OVER TARGET:



2nd OVER TARGET:



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SECRET

DURING

1st OVER TARGET:

444th BOMB GROUP



3rd OVER TARGET:

40th BOM



2nd OVER TARGET:

462nd BOMB GROUP



4th OVER TARGET:

4



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T

DURING

GROUP

3rd OVER TARGET:

40th BOMB GROUP



GROUP

4th OVER TARGET:


468th BOMB GROUP



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Handwritten scribbles on aged paper, including a horizontal line and two large, loopy shapes.



S E C R E T

ANNEX

N

CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* Statistical Section \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T

N

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IX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Mission Number Fourteen  
 3 November 1944

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 11-9-44 SR  
 Date Initials

Table I - \*Aircraft Participating

Group	Mission No.	Field Order No.	** A/C Taking Off	Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Designated Primary Target								Time of First Takeoff	Time of Latest Return	Average Time Of Flight	
				Total No.	Percent	Reason					A/C Bombing Primary			Airborne A/C Not Bombing Primary	
						Mech.	Pers.	Wea.	Not in Form.	Misc.					Unknown
40th	14	14	13	3	23%	3						2343Z	0809Z	7:50	2:19
444th	14	14	12	2	16.7%	1					1	2349Z	0835Z	7:29	6:08
462nd	14	14	12	0	0%							2347Z	0736Z	7:25	0
468th	14	14	12	0	0%							2351Z	0733Z	7:26	0
TOTAL	14	14	49	5	10.2%	4					1	2343Z	0835Z	7:31	3:16

\* Mission was run from Rear Area bases.

\*\* Field Order 14 requires each group to have 12 aircraft airborne on mission.

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S E C R E T

XV BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Mission Number Fourteen  
 3 November 1944

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 11-8-44 JLR  
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Table II - Bombing Puns

Group	No. of A/C Bomb- ing	Target Bombed	Time of Release		Altitude of Release		Visual Bombing		Radar Bombing		On the Leader	Aircraft Dropping On	
			Earliest	Latest	Highest	Lowest	A/C Sighting For		A/C Sighting For			AFCE	Manual
							R & D	Range	R & D	Range			
40th	* 10	Pangoon	0348Z	0348Z	21,000	21,000	1				9	1	9
	1	Taungup	0535Z	0535Z	20,000	20,000	1					1	
444th	10	Pangoon	0342Z	0354Z	22,000	21,800	1				9	1	9
	1	Taungup	0341Z	0341Z	15,650	15,650	1					1	
462nd	12	Pangoon	0343Z	0345Z	23,600	22,000	1				11	1	11
468th	12	Pangoon	0353Z	0353Z	20,000	20,000	1				11	1	11
TOTAL	44	Pangoon	0342Z	0354Z	23,600	20,000	4				40	4	40
	2	Taungup	0341Z	0535Z	20,000	15,650	2					2	

\* One aircraft also bombed Taungup.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Mission Number Fourteen  
 3 November 1944

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Table III - Bomb and Gasoline Loading

Group	* Type of Bombs	Bomb Loading				Target		Bomb Disposal		Av. Gross Wt Per Plane Before Rear Area Takeoff	Av. Gals Gas Loaded Per A/C Before Rear Area Takeoff	Av. Gals Consumed On Mission		Av. Gals Remaining In A/C After Mission	
		Fusing		Average Number Loaded Per A/C	Total Number Loaded In A/C Airborne In Rear Area	Pan-goos	Taun-gop	Jet-tison	Re-turned			Per A/C Bombing Primary	Per A/C Not Bombing Primary	Per A/C Bombing Primary	Per A/C Not Bombing Primary
		Nose	Tail												
40th	500" Gp	.1	.025	40.0	520	391	9	120		133,515	4,994	4,103	1,533	880	3,500
444th	500" Gp	.1	.025	40.0	480	400	40	40		133,470	4,900	3,864	2,000	1,036	2,900
462nd	500" Gp	.1	.025	36.3	436	431		4	1	132,473	5,163	4,342		820	
468th	500" Gp	.1	.025	37.3	447	447				131,133	4,817	3,932		885	
TOTAL	500" Gp	.1	.025	38.4	1,883	1,669	49	164	1	132,665	4,969	4,067	1,650	901	3,350

\* 500" Gp - (N-143)  
 (N-164) actual weight may average over 500 pounds.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Mission Number Fourteen  
3 November 1944

Table IV - Aircraft Lost and Damaged

Aircraft Lost

<u>Group</u>	<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
444th	24518	X 1	Ditched in Bay of Bengal. Reason unknown.

Aircraft Damaged

Major Damage

<u>Group</u>	<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>W/A</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
468th	46279		X		Prop #3 has two inch tear; holes in right wing.
			1		

Minor Damage

<u>Group</u>	<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>W/A</u>	<u>Omn Guns</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
40th	24574				X	Shell casings from another aircraft scarred flexiglass.
	63396		X			Two flak holes rt wing, outboard #4 (middle) also a hole in put put area.
	24541		X			Fuselage.
	24508		X			Right wing - two flak holes.
	63394				X	Broken bombardier's window. Hole in leading edge of left wing from shell casings of other aircraft.
			3		2	
444th	24510		X			Small hole in wing.
	24485		X			Right wing and flap.
	63411		X			Hole between co-pilot and engineer - loss of some cabin pressure.
	24524		X			#2 inboard turbo.
			4			
462nd	24475		X			#4 engine intake scoop and lower left cowl flap. Holes in scoop and cowl flap.
	6444				X	L.H. forward bomb door - R.H. elevator.
			1		1	
468th	24546		X			Left wing, outer panel.
	63353		X			Horizontal stabilizer; #3 nacelle.
	24525		X			High up on bomb bay, flak holes.
	24442		X			#3 nacelle.
	24486		X			Bomb bay door (rear left) and up thru top of aircraft.
			5			
GRAND TOTAL			13		1	2

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Mission Number Fourteen  
3 November 1944

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Table V - Attacks & Passes by Enemy Aircraft

DIRECTION	ALTITUDE												TOTAL			
	HIGH				LOW				LEVEL				40th	444th	462nd	468th
	40th	444th	462nd	468th	40th	444th	462nd	468th	40th	444th	462nd	468th	40th	444th	462nd	468th
0800																
0900				1												1
1000	1												1			
1100	7			1			2						7		2	1
1200	5								1				6			
0100																
0200																
0300																
0400																
0500																
0600							1								1	
0700																
TOTAL	13			2			3		1				14		3	2

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Fourteen  
 3 November 1944

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Table VI - Personnel Losses

Crew Position	Killed				Missing				Seriously Injured				Slightly Injured				Total Casualties				Total Participating			
	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468
Pilot																					13	12	12	13
Co-Pilot													1				1				13	12	12	13
Navigator																					13	12	12	12
Bombardier																					13	12	12	12
Flt. Engr.													1				1				13	12	12	12
Radar																					13	12	12	12
Radio																					13	12	12	12
CFC Spec																					13	12	12	12
Right Gnr																					13	12	12	12
Left Gnr																					13	12	12	12
Tail Gnr			1														1				13	12	12	12
R C M																								3
Radar Obs																								3
Others																					7	15	5	5
TOT'L			1										2				3				150	147	137	145

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Mission Number Fourteen  
 3 November 1944

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Table VII - Expenditures of Ammunition and Claims Against Enemy Aircraft

Group	Ammunition Expended Per Plane In Combat Flying					Total Expended	Claims Against Enemy Aircraft					
	Upper Front	Lower Front	Upper Rear	Lower Rear	50 Cal. Tail		Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged	Per 1000 Rounds Expended in Combat		
										Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
40th	73	53	62	18	20	2,700	0	0	2	0	0	.74
444th	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
462nd	3	8	2	18	10	480	0	0	0	0	0	0
468th	14	0	18	0	2	416	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	22	15	21	9	8	3,596	0	0	2	0	0	.56

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Mission Number Fourteen

3 November 1944

Table VIII - Engineering Malfunctions

<u>Group</u>	<u>Aircraft Serial No.</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
40th	24582	#2 turbo oscillates a bit at high power & high altitude (during climb), #4 fuel pressure 13#, #2 Tach. oscillates, #2 Tach. out.
	24452	#1 running hot & cut out in auto lean so placed it in auto kick - operation O.K., #2 engine ran hot keost 8° coil fla reset at 0 - 4°, #2 Tach. out, #3 prop switch stuck, ran up to 2600 RPM.
	63394	Normal inverter out, catch on pilots seat broken, seat slides left landing light out.
	63407	#2 Tach. out, bomb rack trouble.
	63396	2 cyl. head temps failed, 1 tachometer went out.
	24579	Fear bomb doors would not close on normal system, emergency motor cannon plug having bent prongs could not be plugged in.
	24541	#4 fuel pressure fluctuates, small leak in emergency hydraulic system, warning horn could not be turned off, #2 generator out, oil leak round #3 nose section.
	24503	#4 oil cooler flap would not operate automatically, on descent (2000 RPM-28") #4 backfired, puffed smoke, tachometer oscillated and manif. pressure dropped.
444th	24510	#1 cyl. head temperature gage out.
	24492	All 4 fuel pressures read too high - lines need to be bled, Co-Pilots Flight Indicator sluggish.
	65202	Pilots interphone button sticks, #2 eng. backfires in auto lean, #2 - no turbos, #4 eng. runs very hot intermittently and cylinder head temperature very erratic, #4 eng. cuts out in auto lean fuel gages always read 600 gals., collector ring blown on #3, flux gate off 10° on some headings, radar antenna tilt out.
	24507	Cylinder head temperature ran 260° at 20,000 feet with 12° cowl flaps and 200 ind. air speed.
	63375	Very pistol does not fit flare chute.
	63411	#2 C.A.T. gage inoperative, #1 fuel pressure reads 20 PSI, bombardiers & navigator's airspeed ind. & altimeter out, #2 fuel gage inoperative, #3 eng. develops only 2500 RPM on T.O.

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Table VIII - Engineering Malfunctions - (cont'd)

Aircraft Group	Serial No.	Explanation
444th cont'd		
	24524	Oil leak in #4, #2 and #3 fuel gages need bleeding.
	24580	Prop governor would not go into full low pitch, lower right collector ring broke.
	63419	Intercooler indicator stuck at 15° with shutter closed.
462nd		
	24461	#4 engine power dropped to 950 RPM 17" MP cyl. temp 130°, oil temp. and pressure within limits.
	63393	Prop ran away 2900 RPM for three minutes, forward bomb bay door motor failed.
	24475	#1 eng. idles too high (900), #2 eng. idles too low (500), co-pilots and pilots mike button bad.
	24506	Oil leak in #4 eng., lost 10 gals. oil, leak stopped after reducing power.
	24581	#2 fuel pressure high, #2 nose oil pressure 10" low, #4 C.A.T. reads 150, bombardier bomb door switch inoperative.
	6329	#3 cyl. head temp low & fluctuating, #3 fuel liquidometer out, #2 fuel pressure 22 pounds.
	65213	#2 eng. ran very hot (260°-280° with 3" cowl flap with pwr on).
	24479	Landing gear failed to retract, pilots airspeed indicator fast, CFC dome cracked, both alternate & normal inverters made interphone very noisy, P. directional gyro out, #1 manifold pressure fluctuates at high altitude.
	24531	#4 eng. began backfiring and kicking back on throttle at 12:10, puffs of black smoke come out of the exhaust for a few minutes, then developed into a steady stream, feathered engine at 12:15, inverter went out, and the cowl flap and intercooler indicator started spinning during taxi after landing, #2 cyl. head temperature indicated 285 during climb.
	6444	#3 cut out while climbing-vibrated continuously rest of flight.
468th		
	65208	#1 eng. overheated at altitude (20,000') - 2300 RPM 39", radio compass antenna lost.
	42679	#1 turbo low manifold pressure at altitude, #3 oil pressure rear dropped to 20".
	24486	#4 oil leak - about 20 gallons.
	24542	#4 oil cooler door inoperative, #2 tachometer oscillated.

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Table VIII - Engineering Malfunctions - (cont'd)

<u>Group</u>	<u>Aircraft Serial No.</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
468th cont'd		
	24429	Inverter went out.
	24525	#1 bomb bay doors refused to open on normal system, eng. runs rough on L. Mag., upper forward turret failed to operate normally from bombardier.
	24546	#4 prop governor went out, on 1900 PM, #3 generator - no volts or amps.
	63353	#4 oil cooler - temp. went up; full open shutter did not help.
	63415	Pilots Tech inoperative #3 and #4 INB voltage reg. started to burn, #3 engine ran rough at high power settings.

Airborne Aircraft Failing to Bomb Primary Target

<u>Group</u>	<u>Aircraft Serial No.</u>	<u>Reason</u>
40th	24457	#2 engine cylinder head temp. excessively high.
	24466	Oil leak #2 engine; #3 engine feathered.
	24522	#3 engine failure - #3 engine feathered.
444th	65202	Turbo supercharger failed.
	24518	Ditched in Bay of Bengal - reason unknown.

- 3 -

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ANNEX

C

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*****  
* All Field Orders material in the *  
* following Annex, originally classi- *  
* fied TOP SECRET, is hereby reclassi- *  
* fied to SECRET. *  
* By authority of the C.G., *  
* XX Bomber Command *  
* *  
* 12 Nov 1944 JDC *  
* Date Initials *  
*****
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SECRET

SECRET

Auth: CG XX BC

Initials: F.L.B.

Date: 28 October 44

NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE AIR

ON COMBAT MISSION

CORRECTED COPY:

FIELD ORDER )

NUMBER 14 )

XX BOMBER COMMAND

APO 493

28 October 1944 - 0800Z

MAPS: AAF Aeronautical Charts, 1:1,000,000 #557, 558, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679.  
(or) International Map of the World: 1:1,000,000 (CALCUTTA, JAGANNATH,  
IRRAWADDY, RANGOON, ANDAMAN ISLANDS, BANGKOK.)  
AAF Aeronautical Charts: 1:500,000, 558B, 558C, 557D, 675B, 676A, 676C,  
676D, 677D, 678A, 679B.  
AAF Long Range Air Navigation Charts: 1:3,000,000, INDIA and BENGAL.  
Naval Aviation Charts, V-30 Series, 1:2,188,800, No. 41.

1. a. (1) Hostile ground situation: See Intelligence Annex No. 1.  
(2) Hostile aircraft locations and airfields: See Intelligence Annex No.
  - b. (1) Omitted.  
(2) Strategic Air Force, EAC, will carry out co-ordinated attack on the night of third November against dock and warehouse facilities and INSEIN RAILWAY SHOPS, RANGOON AREA, BURMA.  
(3) Third Tactical Airforce will conduct fighter sweeps against enemy airfields in target area. First wave of friendly fighters will strike at 0330Z, and second wave will strike at 0400Z.
2. This Command conducts a daylight attack on D-Day against the MALAGON RAILROAD YARDS at RANGOON, BURMA. AAF Folder No. 82.2, XX Bomber Command Target No. 82.2-23. See Annex No. 2, Radar Folder.

ROUTE OUT: BASE AREA - ASSEMBLY POINT NUMBER ONE - ASSEMBLY POINT NUMBER TWO - IP - TARGET.

ROUTE BACK: TARGET - UN-NAMED ISLAND (15°47'N, 95°30'E) - DIAMOND ISLAND (15°52'N, 94°17'E) - BASE AREA.

ASSEMBLY POINT NO. 1: As designated below.

ASSEMBLY POINT NO. 2: DIAMOND ISLAND (15°52'N, 94°17'E)

IP: KAINGTHAUNG ISLAND (15°42'N, 95°02'E)

AXIS OF ATTACK: 47° Magnetic.

AIMING POINT: Round House approximately in center of marshalling yard area.

METHOD OF BOMBING: 12 plane formations at assigned altitudes, but in no case below 20,000 feet.

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