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"General Marshall: That is correct. I am quite certain, sir."

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4

Then on page 3175 the question appears there, with the Chairman also participating as to clarification of this statement and Senator Ferguson says:

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7

"May we have from the witness what his understanding was?"

8

9

"General Marshall: My understanding was, and I am speaking on hearsay because I had no control over the matter, that the complete report went to the President but that the portions that referred to magic were withdrawn from the portion of the report which was released to the public.

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"Senator Ferguson: Have I misquoted you, General?"

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I quote all of this, Mr. Justice, in justice to Senator

Witness Roberts

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

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Ferguson who, I think, had reason to feel that the situation invited clarification and I assure that it is susceptible of clarification and I gather from what you have said that General Marshall was wrong in his understanding, but I do think we ought to have that as a matter of record.

Shefner--7  
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Shack (8) pm  
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Witness Roberts

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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Mr. Justice Roberts: Well, I have testified to the facts. Now if you want me to say, which I think is a very improper thing, that General Marshall was wrong, I will say General Marshall was teetotally wrong. I have given you facts. The facts are all typed, they are not my word against General Marshall's word.

Sometime ago the President of the United States was asked why portions of the Roberts Report were suppressed and he said "For military reasons".

Senator Brewster: What President?

Mr. Justice Roberts: President Truman. The papers from time to time said that portions of it were suppressed. I was not accused of suppressing it so I did not jump to conclusions.

Senator Brewster: You made your first reputation as an investigator and prosecutor, Mr. Justice, and I cannot believe that in your broad experience you failed to call the attention of witnesses to contradictions of testimony in order to give them an opportunity to clarify it, if it was possible.

I do not think it is questioning the integrity of General Marshall or criticising you when your attention is called to the testimony of General Marshall before this committee, and it was called to your attention for any

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

(9)

Witness Roberts

Questions by: Senator Brewster  
Senator Lucas

1  
2 comment you desired to make, and I do feel very confident,  
3 in examining your distinguished record both as investigator  
4 and Justice of the Highest Court in this country for many  
5 years, that you have found that this could be duplicated  
6 many times.

7 Mr. Justice Roberts: Thank you for those kind words.

8 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I wanted to interrupt and  
9 raise the point of order, but Justice Roberts has taken care  
10 of it.

11 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one  
12 remark.

13 The Chairman: Senator Lucas wishes to ask another  
14 question.

15 Senator Lucas: I want to make one observation with  
16 respect to the winds message, the so-called pilot message  
17 and so-called execute message.

18 There would probably be more misinterpretation about  
19 that message than any other message in this hearing.

20 Mr. Justice Roberts: I haven't any information about it.

21 Senator Lucas: On the question that the Senator from  
22 Michigan asked you, and also calling attention to a question  
23 that you asked a witness while you were in Hawaii, in order  
24 to make the record complete at this point I want to direct  
25 your attention and call the attention of the committee to

1 Witness Roberts

Questions by: Senator Lucas  
The Chairman

2 the fact that on November 28 Admiral Hart sent to Admiral  
3 Kimmel for his information a copy of the pilot message that  
4 is known as the original winds message, the pilot message,  
5 and Admiral Kimmel had that message when you gentlemen were  
6 in Hawaii making this investigation.

7 Mr. Justice Roberts: I did not know it.

8 Senator Lucas: So it is very reasonable to suppose  
9 that, as the result of those high in command in Hawaii having  
10 this original message, that some information leaked out and  
11 got to you along that line.

12 The Chairman: Mr. Justice, just this one question:

13 Regardless of General Marshall's answer to any questions  
14 based upon the assumption that something in the Roberts  
15 Report was suppressed or withheld and that it was done for  
16 military reasons, and regardless of the impression of the  
17 present President of the United States, who was not at that  
18 time familiar with your report or the existence of it, that  
19 if anything was withheld it was for military reasons, the  
20 fact is nothing was suppressed or withheld for military or  
21 other reasons, is it not?

22 Mr. Justice Roberts: That is correct, sir. We tried  
23 not to disclose any military secrets in what we wrote,  
24 but what we wrote was published line for line.

25 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I want the record also to

## Witness Roberts

1  
2 show that General Marshall said he could only give hearsay.  
3 There had been a protest by certain members on this committee  
4 theretofore about hearsay evidence, but he was asked to  
5 pursue a line which necessarily would be hearsay. So it  
6 is not a question of contradiction necessarily, it is a  
7 question of one knowing the fact and the other giving hearsay  
8 evidence.

9 The Chairman: Any further questions by the committee?

10 (No response)

11 The Chairman: By counsel?

12 (No response)

13 The Chairman: Mr. Justice, the committee thanks you  
14 for your cooperation. It regrets the necessity of bringing  
15 you from what Horace in his "Odes" said is a Sabine farm.

16 Mr. Justice Roberts: I cannot get back in time to milk,  
17 Mr. Chairman.

18 The Chairman: I would like to have a photograph of  
19 you in that operation.

20 Mr. Justice Roberts: I think that is the most irrelevant  
21 of anything that the committee has asked me for.

22 The Chairman: Thank you very much.

23 Captain Zacharias, will you resume the witness stand.  
24  
25

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator George

## TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS,

(Resumed)

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4 The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be  
5 in order.

6 Senator George was unavoidably detained when he was  
7 reached this morning and he will inquire at this time, Captain.

8 Senator George: I think my very brief questioning  
9 should follow Senator Lucas since he had already commenced.

10 The Vice Chairman: Without objection, the questions  
11 of Senator George and answers of Captain Zacharias will  
12 appear in the record following the conclusion of Senator  
13 Lucas' inquiry.

14 Senator George: Captain, this forenoon you detailed  
15 a statement that you made to Admiral Kimmel and the dis-  
16 cussion that you had with Admiral Kimmel. I should like to  
17 ask whether or not your statements made to Admiral Kimmel  
18 regarding the air attack on Oahu, or the Hawaiian Islands,  
19 was based on any specific information that you had received  
20 or was it based upon your general knowledge and your general  
21 estimate of the situation?

22 Captain Zacharias: It was based upon my general knowledge  
23 and general estimate of the situation.

24 Senator George: You received no specific information  
25 that there was to be at any particular time an overseas air

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator George

1  
2 attack on the Fleet at Oahu?

3 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

4 Senator George: You never gave any information to  
5 General Short?

6 Captain Zacharias: I did not, sir.

7 Senator George: That, of course, was not your re-  
8 sponsibility. But you did have this conversation with  
9 Admiral Kimmel.

10 Captain Zacharias: Yes.

11 Senator George: I also understood from your testimony  
12 that you did not indicate that an air attack would be made  
13 on any particular Sunday or week-end.

14 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

15 Senator George: And whether it would be on December 1st,  
16 December 7th, December 21st or any other particular day?

17 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

18 Senator George: Your statement was general, not based  
19 upon any specific information whatever but upon your general  
20 evaluation and general knowledge of the Japanese and their  
21 methods of warfare, and so forth?

22 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir, and it was  
23 contingent upon a situation which might result in hostilities  
24 between the United States and Japan.

25 Senator George: Yes, I understand that. That is, if

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator George  
Senator Lucas

2 hostilities actually did become imminent, that is, immediate,  
3 why, this was your conclusion of what would happen, is that  
4 correct?

5 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

6 Senator George: That is all the questions I have.

7 The Chairman: Senator Lucas.

8 Senator Lucas: Developing the thought that was just  
9 placed before you by the distinguished Senator from Georgia,  
10 I again call your attention to page 7137 which carries a  
11 copy of the statement that you had given to the committee  
12 which you prepared sometime, as I recall, after the Pearl  
13 Harbor disaster.

14 At page 7138 you make this statement:

15 "Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral  
16 Kimmel and Captain Smith during the course of the hour and  
17 a half conversation with them of the exact events to take  
18 place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen but  
19 also how and when."

20 Now reading that without any clarification would not  
21 I be justified in concluding that you had predicted to  
22 Admiral Kimmel that this would happen on December 7?

23 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir, without knowing that I  
24 had given him this nine months before, and I doubt that  
25 anyone would assume that I would make a prediction as to an

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2 exact date nine months hence. I explained at the conclusion  
3 of this morning's testimony that the two words "7 December"  
4 were synonymous with Pearl Harbor and were injected in  
5 that sentence for the purpose of conveying to Admiral Draemel  
6 and Admiral Nimitz what I was talking about prior to a  
7 certain period.

8 Senator Lucas: I accept your interpretation and  
9 clarification, but what I am asking you is, without any  
10 clarification and verification, would I have the right to  
11 reach the conclusion that you had given Admiral Kimmel  
12 definite information that this attack would happen on the  
13 date of December 7?

14 Captain Zacharias: You would have to assume that I  
15 had some very occult powers.

16 Senator Lucas: I am not assuming anything, whether  
17 you have occult powers or just ordinary powers, I am asking  
18 you whether that would not be a fair interpretation and  
19 whether that is not the way he interpreted it on the following  
20 page, on page 7140, where he said:

21 "The Vice Chairman: And I am now asking you whether  
22 he said to you what he states there, or anything like that.

23 "Admiral Kimmel: He did not. And furthermore, I  
24 would have paid very little attention to any man who told  
25 me in March of 1941 that an attack was going to occur on

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2 the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941."

3 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir, I would agree with him  
4 that such a statement was made.

5 Senator Lucas: In other words, Admiral Kimmel, after  
6 reading your statement, took the position that you had  
7 told him that this would happen on December 7, 1941 and  
8 answered accordingly. You have clarified that and qualified  
9 it by your statement to the committee this morning.

10 Captain Zacharias: Well, it is hard for me to say,  
11 with a careful reading of that sentence and having in mind  
12 that this was a statement prepared for Admiral Draemel sub-  
13 sequent to Pearl Harbor, that he could read any other  
14 meaning into it.

15 Senator Lucas: I will read it again:

16 "Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral  
17 Kimmel and Captain Smith during the course of an hour and  
18 a half conversation with them of the exact events to take  
19 place on 7 December not only as to what would happen but  
20 also how and when."

21 If I understand the construction of the English language --  
22 and I have been practicing law for a good many years -- it  
23 seems to me --

24 Captain Zacharias: (Interposing) The reference to 7  
25 December was made over 3 months after the date, and as I

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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said, it was synonymous with the words "Pearl Harbor".

So I suppose it is possible that Admiral Kimmel would read something else into it. I will grant him that.

Senator Lucas: I read something else into it too.

Captain Zacharias: That is all right, sir.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: I am just wondering if I am not fair in making that kind of interpretation by the way you have it stated here.

Captain Zacharias: I do not think that would be a fair interpretation.

Senator Lucas: I caution you if you have a case in court at any time you better not use that type of language. It may get you into trouble. Especially with a man like Justice Roberts.

The Chairman: Or Lawyer Lucas.

(Laughter)

Senator Lucas: Now, one other question or two, sir.

When you were out with Admiral Halsey, with his task force on the mission to Wake Island, which, I understand you to tell the committee went on a regular routine trip without being armed, or without knowing that War might be imminent at any time --

Captain Zacharias (interposing): We were to leave that morning on a routine training schedule. Our task force was due to go out that day, which we did, but after we were outside the harbor, Admiral Halsey changed the course to the westward, and we proceeded towards Wake.

Subsequent to that time we were advised by signal that we were heading for Wake to deliver planes to the

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Marines at that place.

3 Senator Lucas: What orders did you get from Admiral  
4 Halsey with respect to having your ship ready for anything  
5 that might happen?

6 Captain Zacharias: No additional orders. We were  
7 in condition of readiness 3, which is half of the anti-  
8 aircraft battery manned.

9 Senator Lucas: Is that the way you sailed?

10 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Lucas: To Wake and also upon your return?

12 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir, that is correct.

13 Senator Lucas: When did you finally change over to  
14 an all-out alert on that ship?

15 Captain Zacharias: About 11 o'clock in the morning of  
16 December 7 a report was received that an enemy plane was  
17 sighted to the southward, and we went into condition 2,  
18 in which half of the main battery are manned in addition  
19 to the anti-aircraft battery being manned.

20 Senator Lucas: When did you first learn of the  
21 attack?

22 Captain Zacharias: About 8 o'clock when my communica-  
23 tions officer came into my cabin and informed me that a  
24 message had been received that "Oahu is being attacked.  
25 This is no drill."

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1  
2 Senator Lucas: Then you went on the all-out alert?

3 Captain Zacharias: No, sir. We immediately received  
4 a signal from Admiral Halsey to change our disposition a  
5 slight degree. We reduced the distance of the cruisers  
6 from the carrier, which we were escorting, by one-half.

7 We closed into 1,000 yards from the carrier, whereas  
8 we were out a mile from the carrier before.

9 The destroyers which were screening us closed in  
10 proportionately.

11 Senator Lucas: And you were due back in Pearl Harbor  
12 on the evening of December 5?

13 Captain Zacharias: As far as the schedule provided.

14 Senator Lucas: Why was it again that you did not get  
15 there then?

16 Captain Zacharias: We were delayed by the fueling of  
17 the ships, the destroyers particularly, and also some  
18 little rough weather that we had coming back.

19 Senator Lucas: Did you ever have a conversation with  
20 Admiral Halsey with respect to the surprise attack at Pearl  
21 Harbor?

22 Captain Zacharias: Not during that trip, sir. There  
23 was nothing to justify me in doing that.

24 Senator Lucas: At any time, did you ever talk to him  
25 about it?

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Lucas  
Mr. Murphy

2 Captain Zacharias: During the trip?

3 Senator Lucas: At any time previous to Pearl Harbor  
4 did you ever discuss with Admiral Halsey what you discussed  
5 with Captain Layton -- or do you know about that?

6 Captain Zacharias: Only my conversation. No exact  
7 details.

8 Senator Lucas: I think that is all.

9 The Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

10 Mr. Murphy: Captain, as I understand it, your conver-  
11 zation with Admiral Kimmel was sometime towards the end  
12 of March of 1941, in which you outlined your idea as to  
13 the possible attack on Pearl Harbor, that is right, isn't  
14 it?

15 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: Had you, prior to your conversation with  
17 Admiral Kimmel, been familiar with the message which had  
18 been sent to Hawaii from Washington about the possible  
19 attack on Pearl Harbor, the origin of that being from the  
20 Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Grew?

21 Captain Zacharias: No, sir, I did not.

22 Mr. Murphy: Well, you now know, do you not, that there  
23 was such a message in the month of February?

24 Captain Zacharias: I have heard that there was some-  
25 thing.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Had you known at the time you talked to Admiral Kimmel about the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of War's answer, the Secretary of the Navy outlining pretty much in detail the dangers and Pearl Harbor?

Captain Zacharias: No, sir, I did not.

Mr. Murphy: Had you know that just about at the very same time as you were talking to Admiral Kimmel, that there was prepared, I believe on March 21, 1941, a plan which in effect, outlined the steps that you outlined to the Admiral?

Captain Zacharias: I did not know that sir.

Mr. Murphy: There has been a great deal of talk here about a bomb plot from the Japanese in the month of September and decoded in the month of October, but the Martin-Bellinger plan was pretty a bomb plot of what would happen at Pearl Harbor; did you know about that?

Captain Zacharias: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Did you know that the Secretary of War had given a direction to the General at Pearl Harbor to be prepared to meet a situation such as a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, an air raid attack?

Captain Zacharias: I did not, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, Mr. Chairman, so that there will be

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 a complete account of the message sent by Captain Zacharias  
3 to Admiral Draemel, I ask that the letter of March 17,  
4 1942, be spread on the record at this point in its entirety.

5 The Chairman: Without objection, it will be so ordered.

6 (The letter referred to is as follows:)

7 PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

March 17, 1942.

8 Memorandum for Admiral Draemel

9 In accordance with your request after our conversation  
10 this morning, the following memo is submitted:-

11 My conversation with you is impelled from a sense of  
12 duty because of what I consider a serious situation existing  
13 in Hawaii. Once before, in such a situation, I gave concrete  
14 opinions and advice which apparently could not break through  
15 preconceived ideas. History was about to repeat itself and  
16 no one would believe it. I have no personal ambitions  
17 or desires regarding the subject matter other than assuring  
18 that we have a safe and well protected base for our Fleet,  
19 which is the sole reason for the existence of Hawaii. It  
20 has been my attitude that it makes no difference who does a job  
21 as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly.

22 Any criticism direct or implied is offered solely from  
23 a constructive viewpoint and is for the purpose of preventing  
24 in the future a recurrence of a disaster such as that of 7  
25 December.

Witness Zacharias

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3 Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral  
4 Kimmel and Captain Smith, during the course of an hour and  
5 a half conversation with them, of the exact events to take  
6 place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen, but  
7 also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese  
8 were after four battleships and they got five. I also  
9 gave them the reasons for my conclusion and advised them  
10 of the steps necessary to prevent such an attack. From  
11 time to time, in contact with the Staff, I would voice  
12 possibilities and only two months before the attack amazed  
13 at unrealistic attitude I said, "When are we going to stop  
14 these surprise inspections and prepare for surprise attack."  
15 About that same time Mr. Munson, a representative from  
16 Washington (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying  
17 a letter from Opnav to "open everything to him", sought  
18 me for an expression of views on probabilities and my  
19 opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese  
20 here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my  
21 firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us  
22 it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a weekend  
23 and probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor,  
24 and I then stated, "You now have two envoys in Washington.  
25 When the third one arrives you can look for it to break  
immediately, one way or the other." This envoy arrived

h8

1 in Washington about 2 December 1941.

2  
3 On the night of 27 November, after dinner with Lorrin  
4 Thurston, Head of the Honolulu Advertiser and KGU, I  
5 related the impending possibilities as above and he said,  
6 "Here I am a G-2 Officer and I haven't even been advised  
7 what to send out over the radio in case of an attack." I  
8 advised him precisely to say, "We are having a sporadic air  
9 attack, everyone should keep calm and remain indoors. Do  
10 not go on the streets as it will prevent the military from  
11 getting to their stations. There is nothing to worry about."  
12 On 28 November I sailed with Task Force 8 for Wake Island.  
13 Upon receipt of CinPac's despatch on 7 December, "The  
14 Islands are being attacked this is no drill," I turned  
15 on my radio and KGU was sending out my exact words. At  
16 least someone believed it. This was probably made certain  
17 by the press announcement about 3 December that the  
18 Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington as a third  
19 envoy. Seeing this, Mrs. Thurston reminded her husband and  
20 they were alerted.

21 On Friday, 5 December, having received a report of a  
22 submarine off Oahu - one of the things I gave Admiral  
23 Kimmel as a positive indication of intention to attack - I  
24 listened all evening on short wave for Japanese conversation.  
25 All was garbled conversation but the intensity of the

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WARD & LYALL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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acknowledgments (typically Japanese) indicated to me that something was imminent. I tried to obtain a single word which would justify me in requesting ComTaskFor 8 to advise CincPac, but nothing could be made out. I knew what the reaction would be to a recommendation from this air and I assumed that proper warnings would be coming from Washington.

I have made it a point when afloat to give my advice to Intelligence activities both ashore and afloat and when necessary even to the point of "butting in". I had tried for years to have detailed a Fleet Intelligence Officer who was not tied up as Flag Secretary or on other jobs. Finally two years ago Commander Dyer advised me that Cincus was going to have a Fleet Intelligence Officer. I recommended Lt. Commander Layton, who has consistently done a splendid job in an officer where there should have been 20 officers instead of two. Early in November I was about to see Captain Smith and advise that he get some help for Layton and Hudson as they were both worn down and appeared ready to crack up. But I hesitated, wondering why should I have to advise Cincus on the adequacy of his force. It should have been obvious to any Commander that Intelligence at such a time was his most vital issue. I decided not to approach Smith, because I found that Intelligence was not receiving its proper recognition.

WLC

1 One of the contributing factors to 7 December was the  
2 reluctance of Admiral Kimmell to assume his prerogatives and  
3 tell the Commandant to carry out directives or some one else  
4 would be obtained to do the job. The possibilities of an  
5 unpleasant situation should have been readily apparent to the  
6 Department when a former Commander-in-Chief is put under a younger  
7 man. Petty jealousies are bound to be present and these grow  
8 into opposition. A typical indication was one incident which I  
9 observed closely. When I arrived in Honolulu in November,  
10 1940 to take command of the Salt Lake City I was asked to assist  
11 in a survey of the District Intelligence Office which was  
12 initiated by the Commander-in-Chief. It was learned then that  
13 recommendations had been blocked and that the office was of  
14 little value.

15 This survey included immediate and extensive recommendations,  
16 including trained personnel to be taken from my old 11th District  
17 to build up the 14th as quickly as possible.

18 The next day, after telling Admiral Bloch the security we  
19 enjoyed in the 11th and indicating the complete lack here he  
20 approved all steps to remedy the situation. Accordingly, the  
21 personnel arrived and expansion, planning and training were  
22 rapid. During the course of a subsequent survey to outline  
23 faults in the District, the report or digest was brought to the  
24 attention of Admiral Bloch. This survey was made by an officer  
25 who was working for the Commander-in-Chief and also helping the

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.  
JUN 8 1941

WLC2

1 District. At the sight of this critical survey coming from the  
2 Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bloch gave vent to his wrath and  
3 Intelligence activities suffered for quite a time.

4 The skepticism of the Commandant regarding necessity  
5 for security was also typical from a remark once made during  
6 security efforts, "Bring me a Japanese spy. I've never seen  
7 one and would like to see one". His yard was full of them.

8 On 16 September, 1941, in a letter to Admiral Stark, I  
9 stated, "It is gratifying to see that there is a possibility of  
10 resolving the Japanese situation, but we must not relax until  
11 they have given concrete demonstrations of sincerity".

12 All of the foregoing is simply to indicate the possibility  
13 of qualified personnel accurately estimating the situation, and  
14 the distressing fact that nothing was done about it.

15 I am now concerned because of another situation which is  
16 growing in seriousness and proportions. Rumors are increasing  
17 and I find not only the morale of civilians falling lower and  
18 lower but also that of Naval Officers. This is a typical  
19 fifth column technique and it must be stopped. It not only  
20 softens up our own people but it is throwing the second  
21 generation Japanese into the laps of enemy agents, many of  
22 whom are still not in custody. I used to be most optimistic  
23 about the Japanese never returning here for another raid, but  
24 that persistence of the present situation, which they will learn  
25 about soon enough, will be an invitation to them to return.

WARD S. BAILEY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WLC3

1 This situation can be corrected somewhat by strong "offensive"  
2 pronouncements but not by "defensive" ones, and by punitive  
3 action against rumor mongers. I found one woman frantically  
4 engaging passage because an Army man told her how terrible the  
5 gas attack would be when it came. Someone is spreading a rumor  
6 that there is to be a Japanese Fleet attack on April 14th. I am  
7 now trying to trace the source of some rumors. Rumors are some-  
8 times started to enhance the position of an individual or organi-  
9 zation.

10           Apparently, on the West Coast they are undecided how to  
11 handle the Japanese situation. Here, where it is much more  
12 difficult, I find that little or nothing is being done. Make no  
13 mistake about it, the proper handling of this situation requires  
14 two qualifications: first, highly professional Intelligence  
15 activities, and second, a thorough knowledge of the Japanese  
16 people. The Army in Hawaii has no one qualified to handle  
17 either. I know what they have and what they are capable of  
18 doing. It makes no difference who does the job as long as it  
19 is done efficiently and thoroughly. But I venture to make the  
20 flat statement that little or no results have been received on  
21 cases turned over to them by the 14th Naval District. I find  
22 that the numerous Japanese amateur operators have only been  
23 admonished by letter only not to operate. Adequate searches  
24 have not been made. Known suspects have not been taken into  
25 custody. Strategic locations are still endangered by the

WARD &amp; PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. MONTGOMERY JUAN &amp; GRAY

1 presence of enemy aliens. The problem can be solved in forty-  
2 five days by qualified personnel and Intelligent Action.

3 In my long interview with General Emmons, I was impressed  
4 with his incompetence. He appeared to have no thoughts of his  
5 own. He gave as the reason for continuing the Japanese news-  
6 papers that they were necessary for the morale of the enemy  
7 aliens. At the same time, the Army has assembled all the second  
8 generation Japanese into one battalion of the Territorial  
9 Guard and have disbanded it. The selectees have been dis-  
10 armed and put into labor battalions. This action will have the  
11 effect of sending these boys slinking home and into the laps  
12 of enemy agents. It is most serious. There are sensible  
13 solutions to all these problems which certain of us have worked  
14 out, but it is inadvisable to let incompetent hands take on  
15 pre-prejudiced solutions.

16 After my interview with General Emmons, I searched for  
17 the reasons for what seemed like an undue influence upon him.  
18 Yesterday I think I discovered the answer. I was told that one  
19 of his principal advisors on Island and Japanese matters is  
20 General Wells, a highly paid official, of one of the large local  
21 industries whose objectives are still "maintenance of the status  
22 quo".

23 At the present time the Army is endeavoring to take over  
24 control of the Intelligence Organization in Hawaii. Under those  
25 conditions the Commander-in-Chief would be tying his own hands

the them

1 voluntarily. Their past and present training and performances  
 2 in no way qualifies the them for the work. I know their cap-  
 3 abilities and what they have because it was I who for many years,  
 4 tried to have them implemented on the West Coast, but the War  
 5 Department invariably replied, "No action will be taken until  
 6 M day". As a result they "had not a single trained Intelligence  
 7 man with which to start an organization". The quotations are  
 8 from General Miles, the head of G-2.

9 The Naval Intelligence Organization of the 14th District  
 10 has been built up and trained through the intensive effort of  
 11 two excellent officers with years of experience behind them.  
 12 Through their knowledge, excellent personnel have been enrolled  
 13 and trained and I am safe in saying that in spite of obstruc-  
 14 tions which should have been help, this organization is so far  
 15 superior to the Army and F.B.I. for Intelligence work that  
 16 there is no comparison.

17 Conclusion

18 Hawaii, as a defense outpost of the United States, is of  
 19 value solely as a safe base for the Fleet. The protection  
 20 of it provides the only excuse for the existence of the Army.  
 21 An offensive attitude is a requisite to that defense. This  
 22 offensive attitude does not exist. Under the present state  
 23 of administration, the influences at work, and the degenerating  
 24 morale, I cannot escape the feeling that unless firm action is  
 25 taken we are approaching a situation which might result in some-

1 worse than that of 7 December. (It has always been my consider-  
2 ed opinion for a long time that because of the racial situation  
3 the Hawaiian Islands will eventually require a military govern-  
4 ment. Its purposes dictate that it should be a Naval military  
5 government, therefore now is the time to start it.)

6 Recommendation

7 That the Commander-in-Chief, as Military Commander, exer-  
8 cise his function as Military Governor and take command of all  
9 activities that the administration of martial law be delegated  
10 to a Deputy, as at present, if such administration has been  
11 satisfactory, and that the Intelligence Organization be centered  
12 under the Commander-in-Chief, in order to insure the security  
13 of the Fleet and the Fleet Base.

14 That power of arrest be extended to special agents of  
15 the Naval Intelligence Organization. (The most vitally interest-  
16 ed agency but the only government agency not having the power.)

17 That the security of the Naval District and the Navy Yard  
18 be incorporated under a competent head (The present security  
19 officer, Victor Houston, was recently removed from the Police  
20 Commission and it is inconceivable that he should be in a  
21 position to hamper Naval security.

22 E. M. ZACHARIAS.  
23  
24  
25

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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W. G. MOTTENBRAW - JUAN S. GRAY

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: Now, Captain, I would like to take you  
3 to the memorandum which you sent to Admiral Stark on  
4 February 9, 1941, in which you outlined your conversation  
5 with Ambassador Nomura.

6 Did you at any place in that letter to Admiral Stark,  
7 a copy of which was apparently sent to Admiral Kimmel,  
8 refer to the details which you have outlined as to Pearl  
9 Harbor?

10 Captain Zacharias: I did not, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy: That letter which you sent to Admiral  
12 Stark, and which Admiral Kimmel got a copy of, was, in  
13 effect, your appraisal of the situation, of the relations  
14 between Japan and the United States, as the result of  
15 the Nomura talk, isn't that right?

16 Captain Zacharias: I would say it was more in rela-  
17 tion to the details of the conversation than the reactions  
18 of Admiral Nomura.

19 Senator Brewster: Will the Congressman yield?

20 Mr. Murphy: Yes, surely.

21 Senator Brewster: Do you contemplate putting this  
22 entire matter in? It seems to me it might be a valuable  
23 thing as an exhibit in the case, and I was going to suggest  
24 that at the proper time.

25 Mr. Murphy: I ask that the letter of February 9,

h2

1  
2 1941, be spread in the record at this point, and that  
3 all of the letters be marked as an exhibit.

4 Senator Brewster: Do you have: what I have here,  
5 labelled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to  
6 Pearl Harbor and Events Leading up to it." I think that  
7 should be in as an exhibit.

8 Mr. Masten: That will be Exhibit 141.

9 The Vice Chairman: It will be received as Exhibit  
10 141, and the request of Mr. Murphy to spread the letter  
11 he described on the record will be granted without objec-  
12 tion.

13 (The document referred to was marked Exhibit 141.)

14 (The letter referred to is as follows:)

15 U. S. S. SALT LAKE CITY

16 Mare Island, California,

17 February 9, 1941.

18 My dear Admiral:

19 I think that you will be interested in a conversation  
20 that I had with Admiral Nomura yesterday. It lasted for  
21 more than an hour and we were alone the entire time in his  
22 room at the hotel. Having known him intimately and favor-  
23 able over a long period we were in a position to speak  
24 frankly. I decided to arrange for such a conversation in  
25 order to determine if possible the purpose for which he was

h3

1  
2 sent over here and to explore, if possible, the latitude  
3 which might be in his hands. As a result of the conversa-  
4 tion I have formed the following impressions:

5 (1) That Japan regrets her partnership in the Axis  
6 and is greatly concerned over the China venture, therefore  
7 Admiral Nomura was sent here to determine the best bargain  
8 to be obtained. (A previous thought that he might be  
9 coming to "Rock us to sleep" while Japan proceeded to  
10 the Southward, has been eliminated definitely).

11 (2) He will try to prevent an embargo on oil and  
12 other essentials now being obtained here, and will request  
13 reconsideration on those now under embargo.

14 (3) Japan definitely has decided that they cannot  
15 "conquer" China or exert sufficient control while Chiang  
16 Kai-Shek maintains his present position and strength. They  
17 realize that their best way out is a peace. This will be  
18 attempted first by trying to dissuade us from further aid  
19 to China, thereby allowing the Wang Chin-wei group to gain  
20 control under Japanese direction. If this is impossible  
21 he will then explore the other possible means of bringing  
22 about peace in China.

23 (4) That hostilities between Japan and the U.S. can  
24 be avoided if he is given sufficient basis for an approach  
25 to the Leaders in Japan. (I indicated to him that an

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1  
2 immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan would  
3 have to be forthcoming if our Government opened such an  
4 approach. When he asked "What for example," I replied,  
5 "If I were asked, I would say 'Immediate cessation of all  
6 Japanese activities in Siam and French Indo-China'". He  
7 made no comment on this.

8 In the course of the conversation he made the following  
9 positive statements:

10 (1) That his mission was to prevent a resort to force  
11 between Japan and the U.S. in setting present disagreements.

12 (2) That Japan has completely changed her views with  
13 regard to China, and that peace is essential to both  
14 countries.

15 (3) That if the U. S. is patient until Europe is settled  
16 then the Far Eastern situation will take care of itself.

17 (This statement I took to be a feeler, therefore I resisted  
18 an impulse to ask him if impatience meant probability of  
19 force by us in the Far East). My reply was optimism over  
20 British prospects which prompted the question from him "Do  
21 you think it will be a long war?" My answer was negative  
22 and reason given was the effect upon the German people when  
23 they finally hear of U. S. aid to Britain.

24 (4) That the signing of the Axis pact was done only  
25 after a sharp division of opinion and with only a slight

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1  
2 balance of influence in its favor. Now, the mistake is  
3 realized but as it is a "Fait accompli" nothing can be  
4 done towards cancelling it. It must die a natural death.  
5 (The previous day a leading Japanese business representa-  
6 tive in San Francisco referred to the signing of the pact  
7 by Japan as a grave mistake. When asked what could have  
8 brought this about he stated without hesitation and authori-  
9 tatively that it was accomplished by bribery of officials  
10 with tremendous sums of money from Germany.

11 Details of Conversation.

12 After the usual exchange of pleasantries I opened the  
13 conversation by indicating to the Admiral that I thought he  
14 had been given a most difficult task and asked him how he  
15 expected to handle it.

16 He said "My hope is to prevent a resort to force in  
17 settling the difficulties existing between our two countries.  
18 I replied, "Of course you know that at least 65 percent of  
19 the American people are reconciled to any action as far  
20 as the Far East is concerned, and you yourself have often  
21 said that such a conflict would be a disastrous for Japan  
22 and entail great loss for the U.S.

23 "We have no desire to see Japan defeated and destroyed.  
24 We saved her in 1904, you will agree?" He answered in  
25 the affirmative, and I continued, "Well, we would like to

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1

save her again because the very same reasons exist today.

2

The American people have long since learned that a strong

3

Russia or a strong China means the end of Japan, in

4

which case problems for us will come from other sources.

5

I have always told the Japanese that we would go to war

6

if our commerce was blocked off, because that has been the

7

cause of every war in which we have engaged. Now see what

8

has happened to all Foreign trade in Manchuria. What

9

would happen in the rest of Asia?" At this he apologized

10

for their extremists and I reminded him that they are

11

the ones who bring on wars. I then said, "Admiral, one

12

thing which the American people can't reconcile is why Japan,

13

a country which has called continually for 'Equal Oppor-

14

tunity" could sign a pact with Germany which has done away

15

with all opportunity and has the utmost contempt for all

16

other nations?" He replied that there was a sharp division

17

of opinion in Japan as to the advisability of signing the

18

pact and that only a very slight balance of influence made

19

it possible. Now, they realize the mistake but it is a "fait

20

accompli" and it is practically impossible to cancel it.

21

Therefore it will have to die a natural death.

22

WLC fls

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WLC1

1 "Admiral, I would like to know why you think you can  
2 pick a man like Wang Chin-wei, set him up and count upon him  
3 working for Japan?"

4 He replied that Wang was for peace in China and that this  
5 was very necessary now to combat the growing menace of Communism  
6 which has spread Russian influence as far South as Peiping. "In  
7 this case", I said, "it seems to me that you want a man like  
8 Chiang Kai-shek to combat it, as he has done so successfully  
9 for over ten years. That is where you ought to make your agree-  
10 ment if you really want the peace of Asia, and here is where the  
11 U.S. might act as Mediator and again save Japan. With communica-  
12 tions as now exist in China you will never be able to conquer or  
13 control it. Peace in China will bring prosperity to all three of  
14 our countries. Your objective of markets and raw materials will  
15 be realized. Our complementary trade will thrive again and  
16 there remains only the problem of taking care of Japan's expanding  
17 population. Let's explore the realms of possibility. Do you  
18 think that if Chiang Kai-shek should be willing to cede Manchuria  
19 to Japan in return for the protection it would afford Asia from  
20 the inroads of Communism, would you then be able to go to the  
21 Japanese people and say 'Japan has at last reached her original  
22 objective, we can now stop this war in China and settle down to  
23 prosperity', do you think it would be accepted?" This question  
24 was evidently unexpected for after much hesitation the Admiral  
25 laughing and then seriously said, "It would have to be handled

LC2

1 very carefully, you know how excited the extremists become in  
 2 such matters and the steps they take." I replied that I remember  
 3 well the affair of resumption of normal affairs under the careful  
 4 direction of Chiang Kai-shek and the long desired development  
 5 would eventuate, China would disappear." The Admiral again  
 6 indicated the difficulty of approach to such problems in Japan  
 7 at this time, but I said that the more difficult they were the  
 8 more important they became. And I added, "Of course, you  
 9 understand that if Japan really wants the U.S. to assist in  
 10 solving this serious situation without resort to force, which  
 11 you say is your mission, then there would have to be an immediate  
 12 definite indication of sincerity by Japan." I would say Immediate  
 13 cessation of all Japanese activities in Siam and French Indo-China.  
 14 He made no comment on this and remained thoughtful for an apprec-  
 15 iable interval.

W. B. HORTON, JR., WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1           During this conversation I made two referencd to my  
2 watch and the fact that he must have many callers, in order  
3 to give him the opportunity to indicate a desire to break  
4 off, but each time he stressed that he had no engagements  
5 and wanted to continue talking.

6           Other parts of the conversation were devoted to the  
7 general cause of ill feeling between the two countries  
8 which I indicated has been due solely to the vilification  
9 of the U. S. by the controlled press of Japan. Starting  
10 with the unjustified raging over the Portsmouth Treaty  
11 after the U. S. had saved Japan from defeat, it continued  
12 with every incident. Typical was that after the immigration  
13 bill, a purely economic expedient occasioned by the failure  
14 of immigrant farmers to adhere to the existing standards  
15 thereby endangering the California farmers. Japan does not  
16 admit farmers.

17           I indicated that the Public is now well aware of  
18 the vast difference between the Monroe Doctrine and the  
19 Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Also that the public does under-  
20 stand Japans needs and the difficult situations with which  
21 she has been confronted in the past, however they do not  
22 understand and will not tolerate either in Europe or Asia  
23 any impositions on our commerce which restricts their  
24 freedom to go where and when they will.

25           In conclusion I told the Admiral that he had been

1 quoted in the Press as having accepted this mission on  
2 the condition that while he was here the Japanese Government  
3 would not take any steps in the Far East which might embarrass  
4 him. He neither confirmed nor denied this. I then said  
5 that I hoped that it was true because if had put him in a  
6 very favorable light with the American public and they  
7 would wish him every success as I do.

8 Admiral Nomura is accompanied by Mr. Wakasugi, as  
9 advisor. Wakasugi was formerly Consul-General at San  
10 Francisco, and was not looked upon as a good mixer. Having  
11 had some occasion to observe him in 1931 I was not impressed  
12 with his ability. For a diplomat he was unusually un-  
13 approachable, which gave the impression of assumed reticence  
14 to hide inferior qualities. It is believed that he will  
15 be only a general guide for Admiral Nomura, whose activities  
16 or conclusions will not be influenced by Mr. Wakasugi.

17 Admiral Nomura was very appreciative of the attentions  
18 which he received from Admiral Richardson while in Honolulu,  
19 and I am sure these will have a profound effect in Japan,  
20 in raising his prestige.

21 Admiral Richardson, who knew of my proposed conversa-  
22 tion with Admiral Nomura, had expressed a desire to  
23 have any details I could give him on it. I am therefore  
24 sending a copy of this letter to Admiral Kimmel.

25

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

2 Sincerely,

3 E. M. ZACHARIAS.

4 Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N.

5 Navy Department

6 Washington, D. C.

7  
8  
9 Mr. Murphy: Captain, my understanding of the reason  
10 for you having been listed as a witness was that early in  
11 the executive session one of the members of the committee  
12 said you had given two talks at Annapolis relative to the  
13 Pearl Harbor situation.

14 Did you give talks at Annapolis to the student body?

15 Captain Zacharias: I had given talks at Annapolis to  
16 the student body, but I do not recall that they referred  
17 specifically to the Pearl Harbor situation.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

18 AL  
19 fls

20  
21 Captain Zacharias: The prevailing winds in the Bay of  
22 Chesapeake are from the northward, because of the trade winds.  
23 The trade winds are from the northward, but in the  
24 Chesapeake they are -- I do not know just what the prevailing  
25 winds are from the northward.

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Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: You do not recall any such talks there?

3 Captain Zacharias: I always talked about Japan and  
4 the possibilities of war, but I do not believe I referred  
5 to what might occur specifically at Pearl Harbor.

6 Mr. Murphy: Now you gave testimony this morning to  
7 the effect that, in your judgment, the north of the island  
8 was the most dangerous. Were atmospheric conditions any  
9 different on the north of the island usually than they were  
10 on the other parts of the Island of Oahu? Was it clearer  
11 there ordinarily?

12 Captain Zacharias: There is quite frequently a  
13 difference in the atmospheric conditions to the northward  
14 from those to the southward because of the configuration  
15 of the land areas.

16 Mr. Murphy: You also said something about the north  
17 being a more dangerous area for an attack because of the  
18 wind conditions. What degree of the arc would you say,  
19 or what degree of area would be covered by that particular  
20 wind condition?

21 Captain Zacharias: The prevailing winds in the Hawaiian  
22 area are from the northward, because of the trade winds.  
23 The trade winds are from the northeastward, but in the  
24 Hawaiian area they are -- I do not know just what the prevalence  
25 is, but they are from the northern sector.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: Now is it your judgment -- while I agree  
3 that this was marked as an exhibit, is it your judgment that  
4 all of this material is pertinent to this inquiry? They  
5 are your notes, are they not?

6 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir. Of course there are  
7 letters there which bring out what I felt were organizational  
8 deficiencies regarding the improper indoctrination in the  
9 Navy and the Naval officers regarding security.

10 Mr. Murphy: You have seen fit to criticise the conduct  
11 of officers even after Pearl Harbor. Was that part of your  
12 function? You remember that, don't you? You made some  
13 very caustic remarks and uncomplimentary remarks about  
14 General Emmons.

15 Captain Zacharias: Well, you will note these reports  
16 were marked "personal and confidential", made up for a  
17 superior officer of the Navy, for his use, on which to base  
18 an estimate of the situation. As an Intelligence Officer  
19 and as an Officer of 37 years in the Navy I felt that I had  
20 reached the stage where I could present facts to a superior  
21 officer without mincing any words.

22 Mr. Murphy: Did you think it was part of the Navy  
23 function to be criticising Army generals? That is what  
24 I am wondering about.

25 Captain Zacharias: That report was not for the purpose

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 of criticising Army generals, but was for the purpose of  
3 emphasizing to the Commander in Chief what I considered  
4 the danger in allowing Japanese newspapers, under the control  
5 of alien enemies, to be republished in Hawaii after Pearl  
6 Harbor.

7 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, the report was written for  
8 the Admiral in charge after there was unity of command and  
9 after the Army, in effect, was under the command of the  
10 Navy, is that right?

11 Captain Zacharias: Well, I understood by the joint  
12 agreement of the Army and Navy that the Senior Officer present  
13 in an outlying station, such as Pearl Harbor, the Senior  
14 Officer was, in fact, in a position to exercise unity of  
15 command.

16 Mr. Murphy: I think there is considerable disagreement  
17 about that. The fact is, however, after December 7 there  
18 was unity of command and it was in charge of a Navy man  
19 and your letter was written while the Navy was, in effect,  
20 in command and the Army under the Navy command, is that right?  
21 Do you understand me?

22 Captain Zacharias: I would like to have that again.

23 Mr. Murphy: Read it please, Mr. Reporter.

24 (The question was read by the reporter.)

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Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2           Captain Zacharias: That is correct. I would like  
3 to add that the report that I made up after my conference  
4 with General Emmons regarding allowing these Japanese news-  
5 papers to resume publication, I went to see him upon the  
6 direction of Admiral Nimitz and the report was made out  
7 in an official manner for Admiral Nimitz. I took along  
8 with me, now that you have mentioned the criticism, I took  
9 along with me the District Intelligence Officer, Captain  
10 I. H. Mayfield, now Rear Admiral I. H. Mayfield, who upon  
11 the termination of our conference with General Emmons, or  
12 my inter-conversation with General Emmons, as we left he  
13 turned to me and he said, "Now you see what we are up against."

14           A year later I was advised by an Army officer who  
15 was then the head of the Joint Intelligence activity that  
16 he had read this report that I had submitted to Admiral  
17 Nimitz and he wanted to say that he and Admiral Richardson  
18 agreed with everything I had to say in it and steps would  
19 be taken to remedy the situation immediately.

20           Mr. Murphy: I have just one more question.

21           Captain, you have been asked about the particular alert  
22 condition of the ship you were on after it departed from  
23 Pearl Harbor immediately prior to December 7, 1941. There  
24 is an article -- and I do not like to go to the Saturday  
25 Evening Post for my authority, but it has been mentioned here

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 at different times -- there is an article by Lieutenant  
3 J. Bryan, 3rd, U.S.N.R., of January 1, 1944, in which he  
4 said that on November 28, one day out at sea, battle order  
5 No. 1 was put into effect and that that provided the following:

6 "1. The ENTERPRISE is now operating under war con-  
7 ditions.

8 "2. At any time day or night we must be ready for  
9 instant action.

10 "3. Hostile submarines may be encountered."

11 The writer says further:

12 "Further he ordered all planes armed with torpedoes,  
13 bombs and ammunition and told the pilots 'sink anything  
14 you sight'."

15 Do you know of anything like that ever having existed?

16 Captain Zacharias: No order of that nature was trans-  
17 mitted to us but it is quite possible that it was in effect  
18 on the ENTERPRISE because of their duties of scouting and  
19 other matters.

20 Mr. Murphy: I have no other questions.

21 The Chairman: Senator Brewster.

22 The Chair might say, in view of the fact the members  
23 of the House have some duties at the other end, we have  
24 decided not to go later than 4:15.

25 Senator Brewster: I don't think I will take more than

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 three minutes.

3 The Chairman: All right.

4 Senator Brewster: I have asked that this entire record  
5 be placed in evidence as an exhibit because I think there  
6 is some very valuable material in there on Intelligence  
7 and it is to the broader questions that I shall address myself.

8 With regard to the December 7 date concerning which  
9 you were examined by Mr. Lucas, I think it may be pertinent  
10 to call attention to what appears in the subsequent portion  
11 of the same paragraph where the statement is made:

12 "About that same time Mr. Munson, a representative from  
13 Washington (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying  
14 a letter from OPNAV to 'open everything to him', sought  
15 me for an expression of views on probabilities and my  
16 opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese  
17 here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my  
18 firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us  
19 it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a week-  
20 end, and probably Sunday morning, with all reasons therefor,  
21 and I then stated, 'you now have two envoys in Washington.  
22 When the third one arrives you can look for it to break  
23 immediately, one way or the other.'" So that in the  
24 same paragraph to which Admiral Kimmel's attention had been  
25 called in reference to the letter it did appear that while

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 on March 17 you apparently had predicted December 7, if  
3 it is read very literally in October when Mr. Munson arrived  
4 you did not defend the date but indicated you were referring  
5 to the attack and the time?

6 Captain Zacharias: That is correct.

7 Senator Brewster: So it lends some confirmation to  
8 the interpretation which you placed on the communication,  
9 you gather?

10 Captain Zacharias: It does, sir.

(2) 11 Senator Brewster: Now, on the broader question of  
12 the Intelligence, Admiral Stark in his testimony, on page  
13 6280 said, in response to a question about Intelligence,  
14 and, as I understand, there were three officers in charge  
15 of Intelligence in the year preceding Pearl Harbor, is  
16 that correct?

17 Captain Zacharias: That is correct.

18 Senator Brewster: Admiral Kirk, Admiral Anderson and  
19 Admiral Wilkinson, three in the year preceding?

20 Captain Zacharias: Yes.

21 Senator Brewster: Admiral Stark in response to a  
22 question about the officer desiring to go to sea and be taken  
23 out of Intelligence said:

24 "Generally speaking that is true in the Navy. An  
25 officer in wartime, or if the occasion demanded I think at

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 any time might sacrifice his career, \*\*\*"

3 Now, in a letter which you have written I find that  
4 same language, that you indicated in one of your exhibits  
5 your readiness to sacrifice your career for Intelligence.  
6 What does that mean?

7 Captain Zacharias: I was asked one day by Admiral  
8 Anderson, when he was Director of Naval Intelligence, whether  
9 I would sacrifice my career for Intelligence. I was rather  
10 puzzled at the question and I said to him, "Admiral, I  
11 think that the situation is such that if some of us don't  
12 think about sacrificing our careers there aren't going to  
13 be any to sacrifice." I later in my letter to Admiral Stark  
14 reiterated to him that, something along that same line that  
15 I had told to Admiral Anderson. That was for the purpose  
16 of emphasizing that regardless of the prejudice against  
17 ourselves which we wrought by engaging in too much Intelligence  
18 work, because we thought it was vitally necessary for the  
19 security of the nation, I was ready to accept that if  
20 necessary.

21 Senator Brewster: As it would mean that your promotion  
22 might be seriously affected by failure to have the well-  
23 rounded activities of the Navy?

24 Captain Zacharias: That would be correct, but I felt  
25 that I did have a well-rounded activity throughout the Navy

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 as my record at sea will show.

3 Senator Brewster: One other thing and I am through.

4 In your letter of 16 September 1941 you emphasize this  
5 in your communication to Admiral Stark:

6 "Of course I look forward to the day when I will be  
7 in the position to continue to work out the many ideas which  
8 I know to be vital to our Intelligence organization. As  
9 you know, the Commander in Chief has expressed himself as  
10 to the lack of a sufficient and thoroughly effective Intelli-  
11 gence organization. In the past it has been a difficult  
12 'selling' job, but I hope eventually to make our people,  
13 particularly the higher ranks, realize the important elements.  
14 Last June, while in Washington, Admiral Anderson asked me  
15 one day if I would be willing to sacrifice my career for  
16 Intelligence --"

17 Was he then in charge of Intelligence?

18 Captain Zacharias: Yes, I am quite sure.

19 Senator Brewster: (Reading)

20 "-- asked me one day if I would be willing to sacrifice  
21 my career for Intelligence. I replied, 'Admiral, the time  
22 has come when if we don't think about sacrificing our  
23 careers, there won't be any to sacrifice.' Of course, I  
24 am delighted with my ship and will soon have in half of my  
25 two years in grade, but if and when the situation demands my

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1 statement above still stands."

2  
3 In other words, is it your impression that the importance  
4 of competently directed Intelligence had not been sufficiently  
5 appreciated in what you term the higher ranks of the Navy  
6 prior to Pearl Harbor?

7 Captain Zacharias: If I may say so, I think that is  
8 one of the greatest contributing factors for Pearl Harbor.

9 Senator Brewster: That is all.

10 The Chairman: If I may interject there, what you mean  
11 is that the average Naval Officer making a choice between  
12 gluing himself to a desk or a station for Intelligence  
13 work or going to sea in command of a vessel would choose  
14 the sea and that in order to have a properly directed  
15 Intelligence service men must give up the chances of  
16 promotion that would be involved in command at sea and  
17 remain, if necessary, glued to their desks in the Intelligence  
18 Service?

19 Captain Zacharias: That is one phase of it, sir, but  
20 what I was driving at in the two letters which I wrote on  
21 January 27, 1942 which are included in there, one regarding  
22 the lack of security indoctrination in the Navy and the  
23 other the faulty selection of officers for Intelligence  
24 duty, those were based upon a belief on my part that the  
25 officers of the Navy were not sufficiently cognizant of the

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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scope and importance of Intelligence as such and I urged that training facilities be installed to remedy that situation.

(3)

I felt that once a general knowledge on the part of all officers of the Navy became a fact, a general knowledge regarding the scope and importance of Intelligence, that the future would be safeguarded against such a thing as occurred at Pearl Harbor.

I would like to invite attention to one page in one of those letters, I think it is page 40 in the documents listed, which outlines my opinion of what constituted a good Intelligence Officer.

Refner follows

J. G. NOTENHAW "JUN 8 DRAW

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 Among the things which are given there in addition to the  
3 qualifications, I say that an officer must not only be able  
4 to receive the information and evaluate it properly. He must  
5 have the courage to present it to his superior officer and  
6 that is where in the past that has been one of the greatest  
7 drawbacks and that is the reason I said that this situation  
8 was one of the greatest contributing factors to Pearl Harbor.

9 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

10 The Chairman: Yes.

11 The Vice Chairman: I understood Admiral Stark to say and  
12 I won't say that I am correct about it and I hope you can  
13 tell me, - I understood Admiral Stark to say that as a matter  
14 of law by Act of Congress naval officers had to have a cer-  
15 tain amount of sea duty.

16 Captain Zacharias: I think it is custom rather than law.

17 The Vice Chairman: Well, the custom is then that they  
18 have to have a certain amount of sea duty.

19 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir, in order to be eligible  
20 for to have a good chance of selection and be promoted.

21 The Vice Chairman: And that does have some bearing on  
22 promotions?

23 Captain Zacharias: It does, yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: And that, he thought, affects an  
25 officer's career.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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Captain Zacharias: It affects those who might otherwise choose Intelligence as a field.

3

4

The Vice Chairman: Well, are there any Intelligence officers at sea?

5

6

Captain Zacharias: Each ship has an Intelligence officer designated as such but --

7

8

The Vice Chairman: That is what I thought.

9

10

Captain Zacharias: (Continuing) -- very few have any Intelligence background or experience.

11

12

The Vice Chairman: Well, I thought they had Intelligence officers at sea.

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Captain Zacharias: They now have people with experience because during the one year which I had as Deputy Director of Navy Intelligence between my two war cruises I installed an entirely new system of training which gave basic and advanced Intelligence training and provided for the Fleet the officers which they now have to interpret what we call operational Intelligence.

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The Vice Chairman: Well, these officers who have Intelligence duties at sea, does that count in their favor the same as if they were serving in Intelligence work on shore?

24

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Captain Zacharias: In the past that duty at sea has been a collateral duty. They had regular ship's duties in addition to having Intelligence duties.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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The Vice Chairman: Well, does the fact that they do Intelligence work at sea militate against their interest?

3

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Captain Zacharias: No, sir, it does not.

5

The Vice Chairman: All right.

6

The Chairman: Senator Lucas.

7

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Senator Lucas: As I recall, Captain, there are some special duty stations in the Navy where the officers are never changed, am I correct about that?

10

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Captain Zacharias: That is correct, yes, sir. They all have the status of engineering duty only although they might not be in engineering.

13

14

Senator Lucas: Their promotion is not affected as a result of being placed in that special duty work?

15

16

Captain Zacharias: The general feeling has been that an officer in specialist duty is prejudiced to some extent.

17

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Senator Lucas: But there are some spots where they make no change. Once they get a good man in that place they keep him there.

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Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas: There are a few instances of that kind, as I recalled, testified to before the Naval Affairs Committee some time ago and I would like to ask you whether or not in view of what has happened here in the development of a lack of proper Intelligence, perhaps, or lack of proper evalu-

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 ation, whether or not if you found the right type of a man  
3 that really could do the job it wouldn't be more advantageous  
4 to the national defense to keep that man in Intelligence  
5 rather than move him out every year and a half or two years  
6 all over the globe?

7 Captain Zacharias: I think that goes without saying, sir.

8 Senator Lucas: You would advocate that, wouldn't you --

9 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Lucas: (Continuing) -- as one who has had a lot  
11 of experience in that kind of work?

12 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir, that is quite. Of course,  
13 then --

14 Senator Lucas: In other words, take a fellow like Edgar  
15 Hoover here, who is the head of crime detection in this  
16 country and of Intelligence. We don't take him out every so  
17 often and put a new man in because he has done and is doing  
18 a whale of a job, and it seems to me that in the Army and  
19 Navy as a result of this Pearl Harbor investigation we must  
20 have something on the same order and it does seem to me that  
21 that has to come about.

22 Captain Zacharias: I am now convinced that we will have  
23 to come to something of that nature, and this lack of the  
24 knowledge and scope of the work of Intelligence ordinarily  
25 has tended to create another organization unit. I think it

Witness Zacharias

1  
2 has been brought out in these hearings that the War Plans  
3 officers have taken over the functions of evaluation, which  
4 are primarily the functions of the Chiefs of Intelligence,  
5 and I feel certain that if the Chiefs of Intelligence had been  
6 allowed to retain that function and had the responsibility,  
7 that a great many things which did occur would not occur and  
8 I certainly advocate that for the future.

9 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I wanted to just say that  
10 I did not go into detail in this exhibit just introduced,  
11 which gives Captain Zacharias' views at considerable length,  
12 on account of the time element. I think they are highly im-  
13 portant. I do want to read this additional sentence that I  
14 found there in the letter of the 27th of January:

15 "The orthodox and conservative type of naval officer  
16 is designed by training and indoctrination not to be an  
17 Intelligence officer."

18 Captain Zacharias: I think that is correct.

19 Senator Brewster: I think that is a considered conclu-  
20 sion. I might say in conclusion, Captain, that in November  
21 1940 when you were going to Pearl Harbor, if you need addi-  
22 tional corroboration as to your concern, you stated it very  
23 fully to me in the course of a trip out there, as to your  
24 very great anxiety over the Pearl Harbor situation, to which  
25 you then pointed.

Witness Zacharias

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Were you then a Captain?

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Captain Zacharias: I was then a Captain. I was en route to take command of the Salt Lake City.

5

6

Senator Brewster: And you have not been promoted since that time?

7

8

Captain Zacharias: No, sir.

9

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The Chairman: Well, the committee will suspend until ten o'clock tomorrow, when the Captain will resume.

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(Whereupon, at 4:30 o'clock P.M., January 28, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 o'clock A. M., Tuesday, January 29, 1946.)

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