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**OVERSIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN
REASSURANCE INITIATIVE**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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INITIATIVE**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 13, 2016.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Mrs. HARTZLER. Good afternoon.

I would like to extend a warm thank you to our witnesses testifying before us today. Thank you for being here.

Before I begin, I would like to welcome the members of the full committee who are not permanent members of the subcommittee who are attending today.

I ask unanimous consent that these committee members be permitted to participate in this hearing, with the understanding that all sitting subcommittee members will be recognized for questions prior to those not assigned to the subcommittee.

Without objection, so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent to include into the record all members' statements and extraneous material for members of the committee unable to attend today's hearing and who have asked to include a statement for the record in lieu of attendance.

Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 57.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. This afternoon, this subcommittee plans to discuss the European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI, with representatives of the U.S. European Command, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Army. All have important roles in this initiative's development, implementation, and execution.

The goal of this hearing is to assess how the Department [of Defense] has implemented the initiative since it was announced, authorized, and appropriated by Congress beginning in fiscal year 2015. We also seek to understand how the Department plans to execute the initiative through fiscal year 2017.

We would also like our witnesses to discuss the opportunities and challenges facing implementation within the current European security environment and how the initiative competes for resources

among other critical priorities within the Department, including readiness.

A military that is not ready to deploy cannot credibly serve as a deterrent against aggressive behavior. The Department of Defense [DOD] does not have enough ships to maintain a constant presence in key waters. They don't have a large enough end strength to support a permanent presence in Europe. And the Department's nuclear enterprise and missile defense systems are in dire need of modernization.

The recent NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Warsaw Summit underscored many security challenges that Europe faces today. Foremost of these challenges is a resurgent Russia. The Warsaw Summit provided the opportunity to help form a cohesive and comprehensive NATO plan to counter Russian actions, using both conventional and unconventional methods, but there is much more to be done. Vigilant oversight and consistent evaluation will help ensure that the European Reassurance Initiative invests in the right areas and utilizes resources effectively and efficiently.

From recent congressionally mandated reports submitted by the Department, it seems the Department's strategy, operations, and posture are evolving to adapt to the new security model in Europe.

We must also address the important issue of funding the ERI. Currently, money for the initiative is requested annually through the overseas contingency operations [OCO] budget. While drawing from these funds provides near-term flexibility and responsiveness, relying on such year-to-year appropriations does not allow the Department of Defense to confidently plan or implement an evolving strategy in the region.

The House-passed fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act addressed part of this issue by reallocating \$2.2 billion of the request into the base budget. In doing so, the House has demonstrated its enduring commitment to the success of the European Reassurance Initiative.

So I look forward to discussing the Department's strategy and the issues I have outlined. But before I introduce the witnesses, I turn to the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ranking member for any opening remarks that she would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Hartzler can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Today's hearing is about the ERI, a program to deter Russian aggression and reassure our European partners and allies of our commitment to their security and territorial integrity.

We should have no doubt that Russia does indeed pose a threat, but this threat looks very different from the 1980s. We should be mindful of this difference and allocate our scarce resources accordingly.

Recent events in Europe have underscored this threat. For example, Russia has occupied Crimea and has fomented the continuing separatist struggle in eastern Ukraine. Across Europe and in par-

ticular along Russia's border, the threat of Russian intervention is on many people's minds.

ERI began in fiscal year 2015 as a way to reassure our allies that we stand with them against these threats. If approved, ERI would shift focus to deterrence in fiscal year 2017. It would increase the U.S. presence in Europe, build partner capacity, improve infrastructure, and facilitate interoperability. Over half of ERI funding is for prepositioning military equipment, which would reduce the reaction time needed for U.S. personnel to respond to urgent crises.

I want to make sure programs like ERI take into account the current environment to deter Russian aggression in a sophisticated and measured way. Funding is expected to quadruple to \$3.4 billion in fiscal year 2017, so it is even more important that Congress provide effective oversight.

We should also keep in mind threats like cyber and hybrid warfare. I want to ensure, in addition to the challenges addressed by ERI, we are assisting our allies to guard against less conventional tactics.

In addition to our commitment, our NATO partners must do their part and work to increase their capabilities, presence, and defense spending. The best defense of Europe is a strong collective defense. At last week's NATO summit in Warsaw, NATO leaders underscored their commitment to unity.

Finally, I would like to know whether ERI achieves the right balance. Does it address the needs and requirements in Europe, and are we realistically looking at a long-term investment?

I have concerns that the fiscal year 2017 funding for this program is requested through the OCO. The OCO funding is generally considered to be a temporary war fund. It looks increasingly like the ERI is going to be a long-term program. It also seems like Russia's destructive influence and destabilizing efforts will continue for years to come. Given this, using OCO to pay for ERI is no longer appropriate.

Further, what message does it convey to our allies when we put this, quote, "reassurance," unquote, program into a temporary funding account? It doesn't seem very reassuring. As we evaluate ERI today, I want to ensure our investment is made in the right way with long-term strategic planning and oversight in mind.

And I yield back.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Ms. Speier.

I am pleased to recognize our witnesses today. I want to thank them for taking the time to be with us.

We have with us Major General David Allvin, the Director of Strategy and Policy at U.S. European Command; Ms. Rachel Ellehuus, Principal Director, Europe and NATO Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Mr. Tom Tyra, the Chief of Global Force Planning in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army.

Thank you all for being with us. And so now we will hear your opening statements.

Major General Allvin, we will begin with you.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN DAVID ALLVIN, USAF, DIRECTOR,
STRATEGY AND POLICY, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND**

General ALLVIN. Thank you, Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and members of the committee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and discuss the European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI.

I would also like to express my sincere thanks on behalf of my commander and the Department of Defense for your support of this important initiative over the past 3 years. We believe it is making a real difference.

The strategic environment in Europe has changed drastically over the past 30 months. One of the key reasons for the growing instability has been Russian malign influence, coercion, and aggression against NATO allies and other partner nations.

Since the illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian activity in the Donbass region of Ukraine, the potential for Russia to further advance their military adventurism into NATO countries has demanded a strong response.

We at U.S. European Command have been working to assure our allies that our commitment to Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty is ironclad. The first 2 years of the European Reassurance Initiative were largely focused on assurance. To an extent, assuring our allies has a deterrent effect in and of itself.

However, as we continue to see a malign influence and a Russia acting to upset international norms, we have transitioned beyond purely assurance. We are planning and executing activities designed to serve as a stronger deterrent to Russian aggression. The fiscal year 2017 ERI submission of \$3.4 billion reflects this transition, and I would again like to thank the committee for its support.

The rapid change in the security environment requires a prompt answer. ERI has provided the funding mechanism to respond quickly and effectively, while the Department conducts the full analysis as to which of these requirements are enduring and which may be shorter-lived to provide the appropriate counter to Russian aggression.

At U.S. European Command, we also understand that there are fiscal pressures facing all government budgets. One of our most foundational principles as we design, plan, and execute our ERI activities is to preserve the integrity of the program and ensure that we are being responsible stewards of the taxpayers' dollars.

Through close coordination with our policy and comptroller leadership in the Department, as well as the responsive oversight provided by Congress, we will continue to provide effective deterrence and assurance measures to prevent a conflict in Europe, which could have the potential to spread to the homeland.

Again, thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Allvin can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much.

Ms. Ellehuus.

**STATEMENT OF RACHEL ELLEHUUS, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR,
EUROPE AND NATO POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (POLICY)**

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Thank you.

Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, distinguished members of the committee, thank you also for the opportunity to discuss the U.S. European Reassurance Initiative as well as some of the recent moves that NATO has taken under the Warsaw Summit.

Prior to but particularly since 2014, we have really felt acutely the changed security environment in Europe. Where previously European Command had been focused on theater security cooperation and support to other combatant commands, we now face a real threat in the European theater, whether it is to the east or to the south.

And thanks to the help and the responsiveness of ERI, we have been able to respond rapidly to this changing security environment. We are working very closely with individual allies, with NATO, as well as within the U.S. Government, to reinforce our collective commitment to NATO Article 5.

Since 2014, when we began ERI, we have moved from assurance to deterrence, in step with the security environment. And looking forward to 2017, we will continue to move in that direction, as Russia's provocation does not change. We have seen increased exercises, irresponsible behavior from the Baltics to the Black Sea, and we need to continue to move in step with that.

I wanted to, rather than focus on the five lines of effort, which General Allvin has already highlighted, talk about how U.S. leadership in this regard is paying dividends.

Europeans and NATO are stepping up. At the recent Warsaw Summit, Secretary General Stoltenberg was able to report and announce that a majority of allies had either halted or reversed downward trends in their defense spending and, for the first time since 2009, overall NATO defense spending had increased.

These are positive trends. We see individual allies stepping forward, as witnessed by the enhanced forward presence whereby alongside the U.S., the U.K. [United Kingdom], Germany, and Canada will provide framework nation status in the three Balts [Baltic States] and Poland. So we are seeing very positive signs that our leadership in this area is making a difference.

That having been said, we need to continue to work at this. And the three challenges that I see post-Warsaw and as we continue to think about the future of ERI are: firstly, institutional adaptation. We need to find a way to make NATO more agile in terms of its decisionmaking, command structure, and defense planning. Secondly, defense investment, and that is not just monetary but also in terms of political will. We need to encourage folks to continue to increase their defense spending and to support operations both within the European and transatlantic theater and further afield. And, finally, we need to combat internal political challenges and resist those who seek to divide us or undermine the international security order.

In these past 2 years and in the 50-plus years that NATO has existed, we have found one thing as the threats have evolved and

the security involvement has evolved, and that is that we are stronger together. So thank you for your support.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ellehuus can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Ms. Ellehuus.

Mr. Tyra.

**STATEMENT OF TOM TYRA, CHIEF, GLOBAL FORCE PLANNING,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

Mr. TYRA. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, distinguished members, I thank you for the opportunity to explain the Army's contribution to the European Reassurance Initiative.

I have provided a written statement. I would ask that you put it into the record and we proceed to your questions.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So ordered. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tyra can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. All right. I very much appreciate each of your comments. Now we will begin with some questions.

So, in February of this year, former Commander of U.S. European Command General Breedlove noted in his posture statement that EUCOM has less than the minimum required personnel, equipment, and resources to accomplish our current theater strategy.

Can you elaborate on these shortfalls that General Breedlove references? And will the ERI budget request mitigate some of these shortfalls and gaps? And are there any other additional resources that are needed to sufficiently support ERI?

So, General, I want to start with you.

General ALLVIN. Yes, ma'am. And with the reference to the personnel, equipment, and resources, we find that within the European theater we see a more aggressive Russia that is influencing on the periphery states of NATO.

And so, given the current correlation of forces that might exist in a conflict, specifically with the United States, we do not have nearly the forces we had after 25 years of the degradation of the forces in Europe.

This has been understandable because there have been other national security priorities that obviously have taken precedence in other parts of the world. However, we find ourselves now with a smaller number of forces from all services as well as the appropriate equipment in order to be able to field and to respond to any other Russian aggression.

And I would say that what ERI has done is it has rapidly enabled us to reverse that trend. Specifically, when we look at our fiscal year 2017 submission, when we look at this heel-to-toe rotation, that is an additional armored brigade combat team that is able to make its way into theater with its equipment full-up and ready to train not only with our joint force in the United States forces but also with our partners and allies to enhance interoperability.

I would say that also the submission for the APS, or the Army Prepositioned Stocks, offers the opportunity for that additional

equipment that can start to come closer to leveling the playing field, if you will.

But understanding the resource-constrained environment that we are in, we are pleased with the submission in moving the right direction to be able to recover those resources and the manpower and the forces to be able to deter further Russian aggression. And if the deterrence succeeds, we won't have to, God forbid, get in a conflict.

Mrs. HARTZLER. That would certainly be the goal.

Do either one of you want to weigh in on that question?

Ms. Ellehuus.

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Yes, certainly. Thank you for the opportunity.

I think the unfortunate reality is that, given today's security environment, demand continues to outpace supply. And the flexibility of funds, such as ERI and some of the training funds that you have provided us to build partner capacity not just of allies but also of partners, help us offset that fact.

One of the other things I would like to highlight is how we offset our risk with our cooperation with allies and partners. So I think increasingly you are seeing the United States cooperating at a strategic level and at an operational level with NATO allies.

So we have seen the French carrier *Charles de Gaulle* deploy in the Middle East to help us with some of our stress on our naval and maritime forces. We have seen, you know, cooperative arrangements to use one another's bases. And we have seen host nations stepping up. So when we send our forces to the Baltic States, host nations such as Poland and the Balts are stepping forward to provide that infrastructure and support.

So, as we realize that the demand outpaces the supply, we need to look and rely more heavily on our allies and partners to help us out.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good.

Mr. Tyra.

Mr. TYRA. Yes, thank you.

So the ability to deploy, first, in and of itself, will make the Army more capable of meeting its global requirements. The units that we deliver, though, will be decisive-action-trained, so we would consider they are ready to conduct operations.

The ability to work with allies and partners and develop an interaction capability and a commonality of training and equipping and the ability to fight together is a bonus. And I think we would view this as actually building readiness higher than it is as we developed, and, over time, the soldiers that make those rotations will come back better able.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good.

Ms. Ellehuus, you discussed the recent NATO summit and some of the outcomes of that. And I think it is encouraging, the increased amount of resources that the countries are providing and their joint willingness to work with us on training and having that forward presence.

But I just wonder, do you see any risk to NATO's cohesion? And, if so, what are those potential risks there? And how should NATO's Article 5 and 6 commitments be applied in this highly ambiguous domain?

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Thank you.

Well, certainly there are a number of forces and actors who are trying to undermine alliance unity, but, fortunately, the Warsaw Summit was a representation of the fact that we are committed to collective defense and they won't be able to do that.

So, whether it is Russian propaganda in the Baltic States and Poland or in Central Europe or it is, you know, provocative actions towards our ally Turkey, I think we have demonstrated through Warsaw and our commitments there to collective defense and Article 5 that we are going to be sticking together and we are not going to allow them to undermine that.

I am anticipating a question about Brexit, so I will preempt it, but we have—

Mrs. HARTZLER. Please tell us about Brexit and your feelings on its impact.

Ms. ELLEHUUS. We have a very close relationship, uniquely close relationship, with the United Kingdom, and, you know, in anticipation of a “yes” or a “no” vote, we continued to reinforce that relationship.

In the days following the Warsaw Summit and the vote, the U.K. has reinforced its commitment to a number of important initiatives. So they have publicly committed at the Farnborough Airshow to their maritime patrol aircraft and the commitment to procure nine P-8s. They have announced procurement of Apaches, and they have announced intent to move forward as quickly as possible—I believe it is the 18th of July—with a debate on their continuous at-sea deterrence and that principle.

So I think that, while there are external forces that seek to divide, we have presented a united front and that, even given some of the trends that could undermine our ability to operate effectively and together, we have a strong enough base that I think we will manage to weather the storm.

Mrs. HARTZLER. I would cautiously say I think I am optimistic or encouraged by some of the recent events and some of the things you just shared. So that is good news.

I now turn to the ranking member, Representative Speier, for her questions.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair.

General Allvin, in your statement, you said that Russia employs multiple types of warfare—conventional, irregular, and asymmetric—to induce regional instability.

How is the ERI going to improve our ability to defend against Russia's asymmetric tactics?

General ALLVIN. Thank you very much for that question.

I would say two things. With respect to sort of the hybrid warfare, which is one of the common terms, hybrid warfare is neither new or unique, but the way the Russians are applying it very effectively now is primarily below the conventional level.

So I would say that the way that the European Reassurance Initiative approaches this is, with our partners and allies specifically in areas which are susceptible or have been susceptible to some of these hybrid tactics, whether they be information operations or propaganda or cyberattacks or these sort of things that disrupt the internal governmental flow or the workings of the government, the European Reassurance Initiative has allowed us to have engage-

ments in those countries. There has been some of the funding that has gone towards some of the cyber engagements that we can teach our tactics and procedures about attribution, about hardening and resilience with the cyber capabilities, about attributing not only the cyberattacks but also some of the propaganda. So it really is an awareness and sharing the tactics and techniques that we use to be able to highlight those.

But I would say that, on the hybrid warfare, part of the hybrid is the high end, and the high end is the conventional conflict. And I would say that, historically, has proven to be the most costly and the most irreversible. And so, if we can continue to reassure and now deter that conventional conflict, it at least sort of brackets it and allows us to work down in some of these lower areas of malign influence and coercion beyond the large conventional conflict.

And so I think the ERI helps us both have a stronger deterrent effect against the conventional conflict, but there are elements that we are doing with engagement and resilience and hardening that help against some of these elements of the lower echelons of hybrid warfare.

Ms. SPEIER. Major General, you had indicated to me privately that the troops that we will have stationed as part of ERI would be engaged in military exercises. And you had suggested that the numbers may be as high as 100 per year—some smaller, some larger. How many of these are airshows?

General ALLVIN. Ma'am, I actually wouldn't put an airshow in the—

Ms. SPEIER. Good.

General ALLVIN [continuing]. Category of exercises.

When we refer to these exercises and when I say 100, some of these are small, maybe company-level exercises, but these are building that understanding, that cohesion at the unit level. And I would say those are the most prolific.

However, with the initial funding we have been able to receive through ERI, we are able to have exercises at the larger level, the battalion level and above, which really help us to understand the interoperability between formations. Because we understand that U.S. European Command will not be the sole entity that will have to defend against Russian aggression. We will be fighting with our allies and partners in the region.

And so these broader exercises, these higher-level exercises really enhance that confidence to be able to fight and maneuver and do combined arms warfare beyond just the United States but in the coalition.

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Tyra, what type of military equipment do you expect to be deployed over the next 5 years as part of the ERI?

Mr. TYRA. So, in the next year, we intend to build an armored brigade combat team. If supported, we intend to build a fires brigade, which is artillery, which would be tube and rocket artillery, to add to it.

We intend to build a division headquarters battalion, which is the equipment that the division commander and his staff use—approximately 500 soldiers. So it would be, you know, computers, radios, satellite communication, vehicles, that kind of stuff, to allow

them to conduct mission command throughout the region. And that will be in 2017.

If the program continues, we would look to meet the next identified requirements for the defense of Europe. And I think you would expect to see engineering battalions moved over there. I think you would expect to see possibly the ground element of an Army aviation brigade. I think we would want to see more satellite communication, more logistics, and whatever was required to speed the delivery of a fighting force.

Ms. SPEIER. So, in terms of actual weapons to be warehoused over there in the next year, we are not talking about a sizable number of weapons systems being transferred over there? I was under the impression that that is what we were doing.

Mr. TYRA. So, in the first armored brigade combat team, you would see 80 M1 tanks and 140 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 18 artillery systems, a number of mortar systems and smaller pieces of equipment. So we would end up with that, plus the support vehicles that enable that to fight.

Then there would be a rotating brigade that would bring identical sets of equipment. As you delivered the fires brigade, you would expect, you know, another 100 or so artillery systems, either tube- or rocket-launched, to be added to that fires brigade.

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. Thank you.

Ms. ELLEHUUS, you know, this is an example of mission creep. I might actually be supportive of this, but this started out as a \$1 billion emergency fund for 1 year, and now it is morphing into a \$3.4 billion program that, for all intents and purposes, is becoming permanent.

What do you see the funding levels growing to in subsequent years?

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Well, certainly, we are aware of this tension between things that are paid for through supplementary funding as opposed to things that are part of our regular base budgets. And when we vet the requests that come through from the services and the combatant commands, we take a very close look at those to make sure that we are not funding enduring requirements indefinitely, and over time we too would like to see more things move into the base, not least because, as all of you have said, it provides a degree of certainty to our allies and partners that our commitment is enduring rather than year to year.

In terms of future-year budgets, I mean, we do have to plan against a baseline, so, you know, I would anticipate that we would plan against last year's baseline as a going-in proposition and then adjust from there. But, you know, we don't want to come in every year asking you to double this amount. We do need to continue to protect the integrity of the program and take a close eye at what is being proposed and what fits with what we need to respond to the strategic environment and whether we are using the right sources of money.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you.

Now we will go to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. Ellehuus, this is somewhat of an opinion question, I recognize, but it is something that I ask myself. Russia's economy today, the impact that it has on Putin's decisionmaking process and how aggressive he is. The weakness in his economy could lead him to be more aggressive; it could lead him to be less aggressive.

What is your opinion on that, whether or not he is less aggressive or more aggressive because of his current economic state? And what happens if the price of oil returns to where his economy actually recovers?

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Thank you for your question.

Yes, it is certainly a difficult balance to determine whether we want a strong Russia or an internally destabilized Russia. So when we think about things like sanctions and oil prices, certainly, instability in Russia is a concern, as well as external provocation.

It is hard to say exactly when I look at what causes a reaction from Mr. Putin and what does not. It seems like, you know, we can try to get into his mind and guess at what is an excuse for provocation, but I don't think that he necessarily needs one.

I take the example of two recent exercises that we had in Europe. We had Anakonda just here in the beginning of June with 31,000 soldiers from 24 nations. We also had BALTOPS 16, which has been happening for decades, and that had about 6,100 soldiers. And it is something that the Russians have been invited to previously, they are aware of. And, of the two exercises, he griped about BALTOPS rather than Anakonda.

So it is hard to get into the mindset and sort of determine what would be provocative and destabilizing. But I think, in the first instance, we need to make sure that we are doing the best to make sure that we deter his aggression and that we are prepared if that deterrence fails.

Mr. SCOTT. And correct me if I am wrong. It seems to me that maybe his perception of weakness on the other side may be more of a determining factor than how strong he is internally or his country is financially.

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Yes. I think an outward show of strength is something that reinforces domestic support for his leadership. And so, if there is an opportunity or an opening to demonstrate that resolve against NATO or individual allies, I think we have seen he is an opportunist and will take that initiative.

Mr. SCOTT. But if that outward show has—the more risk that that outward show has, the less likely he is to engage in it then. Would that be a fair statement?

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Could you please repeat that?

Mr. SCOTT. So the less likely he is to—the more strength that there is on the other side of it, the less likely he would be willing to engage in those provocative behaviors.

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Yes. I think that is certainly our intent with the moves we are trying to take under ERI and in the NATO context.

Earlier, resilience was mentioned. And if you build resilience in a country and you give them options—so, for example, you know, if Putin thinks one of the tools at his disposal is cutting off energy supplies in the Baltic States or the Black Sea, he will use that. But if there is kind of a safety net and an alternative, it undermines his ability to hold them at risk.

So demonstrating strength is certainly a way to change that calculus and make the costs outweigh the risks.

Mr. SCOTT. And so this helps get to my point, which may be contradictory, respectfully, to another colleague's point.

If we have a short-term commitment, he can simply wait us out, where if we show a long-term commitment, then maybe he doesn't feel like he is—maybe he is not as froggy, as we would say in south Georgia—

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Right.

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. If you will.

Ms. ELLEHUUS. It is difficult to know, sir.

Mr. SCOTT. What other plans, other than the European Reassurance Initiative, does the DOD have to deter Russia over the long term?

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Well, I know that we have a number of classified programs, which we would be happy to come back and discuss in another forum, that try to look at some of Russia's capabilities and the military buildup that they have undertaken in recent years and how we might get at that.

For example, I think you are all very familiar with the third offset strategy and some of the efforts we are trying to take to think about how we change the way we approach conventional capabilities and make sure we retain the military edge. So that is definitely one thing.

Also, I would say that, you know, in addition to European Command, we have to remember that other combatant commands have a role in deterring Russia. So I know that Northern Command is looking very closely at the Arctic and what Russia is doing in the Arctic and trying to make sure that, while we keep that stable and safe and demilitarized, we are not being naive about what Russia's intentions there. Similarly, PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] has a role to play. If you are on the west coast, that is how you are looking at the Russia threat. So there are a number of initiatives underway across the Department.

Mr. SCOTT. My time has expired, but, Madam Chair, I hope we have a time for a second round of questions.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yes. I do too. Thank you.

Now we turn to the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Graham.

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate it.

And thank you all very much for being here today.

Please pardon my lack of knowledge in this area, but what is Russia doing in the Arctic?

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Well, certainly, they have a presence there, and a great part of their territory is in the Arctic, so a lot of that presence is legitimate. It is economic interests, and as we see new seaways opening up, I think they are thinking ahead to the economic opportunities but also to being able to control those lanes and passageways.

So, in addition to military buildup in the Baltic Sea region, we are seeing some changes in military buildup in the Arctic, as well—increased exercises and presence that we hadn't seen to date.

So, while some of the presence is certainly legitimate and in defense of their economic and legitimate interests, some of it is a lit-

tle bit worrying, given that in the Arctic Council and other fora we really try to focus on keeping that a conflict-free zone and keeping it stable.

Ms. GRAHAM. Uh-huh. Anything else to add by the other two panelists?

General ALLVIN. Ma'am, I would just add the one. Sort of an exclamation point on that is, you know, beyond their legitimate interests, I forget how many years ago, but they did take sort of the rhetorical point of placing a platinum Russia flag on the northern pole, sort of staking their claim to the very north part of the Arctic.

So there is some rhetoric that is sort of this bullying type of behavior that has been consistently how they approach things.

Ms. GRAHAM. Uh-huh. Thank you.

And I think that segues nicely into my next question: Putin as a bully and how we deal with that type of a personality, the uncertainty that he presents. Because we never know what he is going to do. He is capable of anything.

So I would like you all to address that. How do we deal with someone of the personality type of a Putin?

General ALLVIN. Ma'am, I will take the first shot at that, and then the smarter people to my right and left will probably be able to improve on that.

But that is a question that we ask ourselves continuously. And I think, absent being able to get into the mind of Mr. Putin, which none of us have been able to, I think that we go back to the principles, I guess, of deterrence, when, in fact, we look at the principles of what we need to do to prevent certain behavior or unacceptable behavior from occurring from a certain actor.

And the deterrence theory really says, if you want to prevent that behavior, you need to do a couple of things. You either need to convince that potential doer of adversarial actions that the outcome that they seek will not be attainable, they will not achieve the benefit that they perceive they are going to achieve by that, or, in the pursuit of that, the cost will be so high that it will not be worth that benefit they anticipate they are going to gain.

And so that really is the traditional deterrence paradigm. So if you perceive him as a bully or if you perceive him as a confident, aspirant, great-power leader, however you do that, we judge his actions and we look at what the potential actions would be that would be adversarial to our national security interests, and then what are the things we can do to either make that perception that it is unattainable or that the cost of attaining it would be too high.

And so that is really at the heart of really what the ERI really is. It starts with assurance, where we are showing that we have a stake in the game, perhaps greater than Putin's Russia believed that we did. And so, for the first couple of years, we are assuring our European allies we are going to be there, our commitment to Article 5 is ironclad.

Now, as we are showing we have a better interoperability with them, we are putting more credible combat formations in there, we are showing that cohesion, now we are looking at trying to convince Putin's Russia that this is going to cost more than you think, and your ambitious behavior here may be met with the cost that you may not want to incur for your particular adventurism.

And so we really just fall back on the principles of deterrence as really the foundation for some of the activities we are doing with ERI, whether it is a bully or whatever you see him as.

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you.

Ms. ELLEHUUS. I often think of, sort of, you know, childrearing metaphors in context to international relations, so I very much appreciate the question.

I think, first and foremost, we need to demonstrate unity. So, whether it is on sanctions or, you know, just trying to pick off individual allies, I think that is the worst thing we can do, is allow him to separate us from one another. We just have to demonstrate that resolve and unity.

I actually think the administration's policy of a strong and balanced approach to Russia is very wise, because one of the things that Putin seeks is influence. He wants to matter. He wants a seat at the table. But in order to coerce that behavior in the right direction, where it is supporting rather than undermining the international system, we cooperate with them in areas where they are being a constructive actor. So you reward the good behavior while punishing the bad—again, going back to the childcare metaphor.

Ms. GRAHAM. My kids would be appalled to hear me say this in an open hearing, but that approach does work.

And thank you. I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you.

We will move on to the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Russell.

Mr. RUSSELL. And thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for allowing me to join your committee today.

And thank you, panel, for being here. It is good to see Mr. Tyra. It has been many, many years. And, General Allvin, it is good to see you again.

We have had suggestions here today of mission creep, but I recall, when I joined the military in the mid-1980s, in Europe we had two full corps of soldiers. That would have been a minimum of four total divisions and two armored cavalry regiments, not to mention air forces and allies. So this is not a mission creep. This is staunching the bleed-out of a presence to virtually nothing now in Europe.

It calls to mind that deterrence without a deterrent is a bluff that gambles the future security of Europe. So I guess my question to the three of you is, how reassuring would it be to Europe if we don't have a deterrent, if we don't build this contingency force? What would the reaction be in that scenario?

General ALLVIN. Well, thanks for the question.

I think it, again, is trying to predict an unknown, but I would say that history has shown that if one seeks to split the alliance or a set of individual nations, then one can show how perhaps the team is not all playing together.

And so, to your point, the lack of showing our commitment—and our commitment in presence, our commitment in interoperability, our commitment in training and exercises to show that we are a cohesive, credible combat force—I think logic would dictate that that would have a negative effect on the alliance's confidence in its ability to fight as an alliance and repel a Russian aggression.

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Can I preempt you?

So I, again, am reassured by some of the language in the communique from the Warsaw Summit. NATO focused very much on deterrence and defense and how to reinforce that even if we don't have the volume of forces and capabilities in theater that we had previously.

And the way that they put it is they underscored that that collective defense is a fundamental responsibility of NATO, and it relies on a whole suite of capabilities. So it is a mix of the nuclear, the conventional, missile defense, and, increasingly, even cyber and space and other elements.

So, even if we don't have the heft of conventional forces that we had, I am hopeful that the way we think creatively about the mix of capabilities enables us to get at the problem and to deter.

Mr. TYRA. So I would add to that, the U.S. has a long history of displaying the ability to deploy enormous resources against a problem, and that raising the determination in the U.S. and its allies is not profitable, right? And, therefore, you can, in fact, deploy that entire force and keep deploying it without having to build more of it. The economies in Europe, the U.S. economy, they are all capable of conducting these operations.

And I think that is how we would sell them. What they need is assurance that the U.S. is with them, and then that would be enough.

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, thank you for that.

And I guess my last question would be, what impact would it have on other nations?

We have made much of the initiative to encourage our European allies to provide 2 percent towards their national defense, and we see some movement on that. Some is mixed. A lot of it is tied to a lot of factors.

If we lead and show, from no presence to now a brigade combat team, with a promise of, as you suggest, Mr. Tyra, that, as we show up, there is more to follow—you may pick on little brother today, but big brother is coming. If we don't do that, what impact would that have on the 2 percent initiatives that we have worked so carefully to try to craft with our European allies to make their own commitments?

Ms. ELLEHUUS. I can begin, since you took the last one.

Certainly, it is a fine balance between being there and being a good NATO ally and doing our part while not allowing inequitable burden-sharing.

So I think a good example of this is the enhanced forward presence [EFP]. The U.S. actually did not commit to be a framework nation until we were pretty certain that other allies were going to step up. And it goes with this thinking that, you know, Europeans should also be taking responsibility for their security and caring about it as much as we care about the transatlantic space. So enhanced forward presence is an example of how the U.S. was careful not to underwrite everything, because we had already done quite a bit through ERI.

On 2 percent, I think we do need to keep the pressure on. Again, five allies have stepped up and are now at or above 2 percent, and others are on their way. But we regularly, in our office, have people coming through and telling us that we need to keep the pressure

on, because they need to be able to go back to their parliaments and argue for greater defense spending and why it is central to stability, economic stability, in their countries.

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you for that.

And I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, gentleman.

Now we will turn to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. O'Rourke.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Thank you, Madam Chair, for allowing me to join the hearing today.

I would love to follow up on Mr. Russell's point. We have talked a lot today about deterrence and about the money that we are committing towards that end. But I think it would also send a very powerful message for our NATO allies to meet their commitments in terms of proximity to Russia itself, to the threat that that potentially presents. They have the most to lose in a confrontation.

And it blows me away that, of the 28 NATO member countries, only 5 have met a minimal threshold of 2 percent while we are spending near 4 percent, double all other NATO countries combined. And of the Baltic States, only Estonia has reached that—the Baltic States, who we seem to be preoccupied with in terms of potential Russian provocation.

And so my concern—I don't know if you have an answer to it. You said that we are pretty certain that some of these member countries are going to meet their commitments; we need to do more.

If you have something specific to share, I would love to hear it. If not, I would just love to make the point that we are creating a moral hazard by upping an investment from \$789 million to \$3.4 billion without a concurrent commitment in real dollars or euros from our allies on the continent. And I think that sets its own set of problems in motion.

The other thing that I would like to ask of General Allvin is, last week, we had a great panel, including Dov Zakheim, who talked about the tyranny of consensus. And you have been talking about all the reasons that ERI makes sense, everything that it might be able to do. I would love to get a sense of the intellectual rigor that went into making these decisions and coming up with this strategy.

In much the same way that we may or may not have been able to forecast that Russia might feel encircled as we brought more countries formerly in the eastern bloc into NATO, is there some unintended consequence that we might want to think about now or that you could share with us, in terms of upping our commitment, our force structure, the amount of money that we are spending, ratcheting up the escalation in that area? Again, maybe for the right reasons; maybe we have thought all of this through. But assure me that you have thought through some of the other consequences that may not have been obvious from your testimony.

General ALLVIN. Well, sir, I would say, specifically, with respect to the approach that we have taken, as I mentioned, there has been a transition. For the first couple years, it was really about assurance. And so if one wanted to say that was a more passive approach, because when you looked at the way that we were executing and had been executing, it was very disaggregated with our formations. And it was sort of a statement that we are here, we

are here, but the way that we were here in many of the—the presence in the Baltics, for example, was not necessarily a credible combat formation, but it sent that message that we are standing next to our allies.

And as we saw the continued malign influence and the activities, that is what has had us step up—

Mr. O'ROURKE. I am sorry to interrupt you. I have limited time.

So I am not so interested in the thinking that went into coming up with this as the strategy, but the thinking that challenged this strategy. What are the potential risks of this strategy? What could go wrong?

General ALLVIN. So you actually touched on it very well, Congressman, is that there is an escalation risk here. And so, as we try and understand those things which are true red lines, those things which are rhetorical red lines, the consistency is with our commitments of resources and equipment and exercises and increased focus in Europe. It is also with the consistent messaging, the messaging of what we are here to do and the objectionable behavior by the Russians that has caused this response.

Mr. O'ROURKE. From my perspective as a Member of Congress, Crimea caught me by surprise. And, again, from a little bit of a distance, although I sit on the committee and I have been able to be in some classified discussions on this, I think all of us would have liked to have known more about what was about to come before it hit us.

Tell me what, since Crimea, you have done in terms—that you could talk about here—in terms of maybe Russian language specialists who are on your staff, your ability to collect information, the ability not just through deterrence and force presence but perhaps the nonforce aspects of what we do in Europe to prevent something from happening in the first place or to anticipate it before it hits us.

General ALLVIN. Absolutely.

Mr. O'ROURKE. And I didn't leave you much time, so I may have to take this for the record, Madam Chair.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

General ALLVIN. I would just—I will introduce, and perhaps I will get a chance to expound on it later, but the Russian Strategic Initiative is something I would like to share and talk about.

Of course, with respect to the intel [intelligence] capabilities, I am not of that particular ilk, and I know that there are more intel professionals who can speak more deeply on this. But they are committed to regaining that expertise in the quantities that have sort of eroded over the past 15, 20 years, for the right reasons, because there are more global requirements for that. But that is a commitment that the intel community is making.

The Russia Strategic Initiative is—much of it is about learning, it is about understanding. So, to your point, sir, that the surprise of Crimea, that caught a lot of us sort of unawares, and understanding that we need to be able to have a better understanding of the thinking, of the strategy, of the doctrine of Russia to be able to anticipate better, in conjunction with the increasing resources

from the Intelligence Community, we have an understanding to how to respond to those and perhaps get ahead of that.

So and I would be happy to talk further at length about the Russia Strategic Initiative, which is something that, incidentally, was initially funded through ERI.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mrs. HARTZLER. You bet. And we are getting ready to start here in a minute a second round of questioning. So if you can stick around, we would love to have you have the opportunity to share any more questions you might have, because those are really excellent questions.

Representative Moulton.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It is great to be here.

First of all, I just want to associate myself with Representative Russell and Representative O'Rourke and their remarks about the importance of contributions to the NATO alliance. You emphasized how important it is that we have a united alliance.

General, you used the terms "commitment in presence," "confidence in the alliance," "effectiveness of interoperability." Do you think it would be a wise decision to dismantle NATO?

General ALLVIN. No. Absolutely not. I could go on for minutes or hours, but, absolutely, if NATO—

Mr. MOULTON. Well, you are preaching to the choir here. We just, unfortunately, have a major-party candidate who thinks that is a good idea.

You also talked about the importance of deterring Putin. And I couldn't agree more that he is a real threat. Is it helpful to have people talking about his leadership, praising his military accomplishments? Is that a good way to deter Putin, General?

General ALLVIN. I can really only speak to the way that we can try and avert behavior through our strength and, sort of, the primary deterrence theory model. With respect to other influences outside of the principles of deterrence, which are deny the benefit or increase the cost, I am not really a deterrence specialist beyond the principles of deterrence theory, so I really can't speak to those elements.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you.

Would anyone else like to comment on that?

Ms. ELLEHUUS. We work with alliances and partnerships every day, so we see the value of those.

And the transatlantic community, you know, Putin aside, when we have other nations who are undermining the rules-based international order which we have tried so hard to create, I think the transatlantic community has greater influence together.

And so, outside of a NATO perspective, I think in terms of relative influence, there is a rationale for keeping NATO and increasing our relationship with individual allies in the EU.

Mr. MOULTON. Great. Thank you very much.

I would like to talk about something that some other people have brought up, which is the Russian hybrid warfare threat and how we are meeting that threat.

When I was in Eastern Europe looking at the threat of Russia last year, it was very clear that we have gotten—you know, we were doing some good tank drills and things like that, but Russia has an incredibly well-developed propaganda effort—for example, extensive propaganda, both clandestine but also, frankly, very public, with their public TV stations.

One of the lessons that we have learned in fighting ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] over the past several years is that we can drop a lot of bombs and kill a lot of ISIS fighters, but if we don't address the recruiting effort, either right there on the ground amongst the family and friends of those we kill or through the Internet with folks even back home, then we are really not going to win this fight against ISIS.

And it strikes me that there is a bit of an analogy with the fight against Russia, that we can add a few more battalions of tanks and do some larger tank drills and shows of force with our Air Force, but if we are not addressing the way that they are really undermining confidence in the NATO alliance right there in Eastern Europe, then we are probably not going to win this fight in the long run.

So, General, can you talk about the balance that you see in the ERI and whether we are putting enough effort into those types of battles as well?

General ALLVIN. I would say that balance of effort does not necessarily equate to balance of dollars.

Mr. MOULTON. Sure.

General ALLVIN. So I think that there are some areas that are smaller dollar amounts within ERI, and some of the things that we are doing just within the normal conduct of business with our Special Operations Command in Europe that really get at this using the host nation to strengthen their ability to attribute, to be able to sort of call out, to be able to identify that which is true with that which is being, you know, formulated, the facts on the ground.

I think, inherently, you step back and it is easy to understand how a country that acts fully out of interests versus a country which is value-based has an advantage tactically in being able to not be encumbered by the truth. So it makes it a bit of a challenge, but one that I think we embrace happily as a values-based nation.

So I think those sort of things that we are doing to be able to help them attribute it, confront it, call them out, and be able to identify the differences between the truth and what is being portrayed, that is being funded partially through ERI and some of the engagements that we do in the day-to-day business within European—

Mr. MOULTON. Do you think it is being funded sufficiently?

General ALLVIN. Honestly, I am not enough of an expert to say what—

Mr. MOULTON. I mean, my impression a year ago was that we were doing very little, compared to what they are doing, to counter their effort. So, I mean, if there has been a dramatic change in the last 12 months, then I would be willing to revise my assessment, but—

General ALLVIN. I would offer that, as we look at this, it is not necessarily the Russian military alone that is doing this. They are

approaching it with a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation approach, and—

Mr. MOULTON. And do we have enough of a whole-of-nation, whole-of-government approach in response?

General ALLVIN. I would say that is beyond my particular area of expertise to—

Mr. MOULTON. From your perspective, do you think you are being supported enough? I mean, you have a job that is very dependent on these other arms of government. Do you think we are doing enough?

General ALLVIN. I honestly—understanding the tensions that exist within this government for all the things that have to be done, I cannot speak credibly as to what the other elements of the government are doing, whether it is sufficient.

Mr. MOULTON. So, General, if you cannot even speak to what the other elements of government are doing, it certainly doesn't give me enough confidence that we have enough of a whole-of-government approach to this threat.

Thank you very much.

Madam Chair, thank you.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much.

Now, as has been alluded to, in this initiative for fiscal year 2017, we are funding the operation at \$3.4 billion, which is up from \$789 million authorized and appropriated last year. So that is a huge increase in investment.

And the request addressed most of those funds towards a conventional buildup, including consecutive, rotational, or heel-to-toe deployments of U.S. troops and the prepositioning of an armored brigade combat team's equipment in Europe. And the funds also are providing for additional military exercises with one or more foreign partners, building foreign military capacity, countering unconventional threats, and military construction, or MILCON, projects.

So, just for the record, could you expound on specific examples of the way this money is being used, specific MILCON projects that are going to be using this money, specific training exercises that you have been doing, and examples of building that foreign military capacity?

General.

General ALLVIN. Yes, ma'am. Well, I would say specifically—well, starting with the exercises. That is one we alluded to earlier, whether it be Anakonda 16 or the BALTOPS or Cold Response, Trident Juncture. These are elements of exercising that we are enabling to grow and be more multinational and more opportunities to test interoperability amongst nations. So, on the exercise, it has been very robust.

The infrastructure, when we talk about MILCON, it is not necessarily what we would consider big construction. It is a very small percentage. But the military construction is really to allow the infrastructure of the host nation to better support their training and our training needs alongside them.

So, when you have slight improvements, for example, in training ranges, in Bulgaria, for example, that allows us to have better bilateral or multilateral exercising and training interoperability exercises, given the improvements in the ranges, for example.

With respect to the presence—I would say that each of these five lines of effort, the key is that this is one area where the sum is much greater than the parts. If you have the, sort of, slight increase in the infrastructure, it enables you to do more robust exercising. If you have a greater presence of this armored brigade combat team, which is their heel-to-toe, fully with their equipment, it allows you to do more broader engagements and interoperabilities and leverage the small infrastructure improvements that we are doing. As you increase the engagements with your partners at the smaller level with building partnership capacity, that is done through the presence and the engagements of those forces that are able to come over.

And in a purely deterrence aspect, which is really what this—the prepositioned stocks are largely a deterrent aspect, but they also enable the Army to in future times come over and fall in on that and be able to exercise that as a deterrent. So each of those really feed into each other for an overall increased deterrent effect.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. And, as we discussed privately, you will be modernizing some of the bunkers and some of the old facilities that are there in order to house the equipment and to be able to have those prepositioned stocks.

What can we expect our allies to contribute to the ERI from both a capability and capacity perspective?

And, separately, would the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program be a useful mechanism through which the U.S. could aid our ERI partners? And, if so, are there any FMS cases that are currently working their way through the FMS process relating to this initiative and our partner nations?

Ms. ELLEHUUS. I can begin on that.

Certainly, you know, as we have moved from assurance to deterrence, and we have learned more each year as we have proceeded with the training and exercises and other efforts under ERI. So, for example, as we do the training and exercises, we find other vulnerabilities, in terms of maneuverability or movements or gaps in infrastructure or communications, and so we are able to build on that.

And those aren't just vulnerabilities that we, the United States, needs to come in and fix; those are lessons learned that we pass on to individual allies about their vulnerabilities and what they need to do to reinforce their own defense, and there are things that we pass on to NATO as well.

So, to give you one example, you are probably familiar with NATO's RAP, or Reassurance Action Plan, which was a holdover from the Wales Summit in 2014. And the NAC [North Atlantic Council] recently agreed the Readiness Action Plan reception, staging, and onward movement and preposition capability packages, whereby NSIP [NATO Security Investment Programme] funding, about 300 million euros, will be used to support ERI projects, so design and construction, including storage of U.S. equipment in Poland.

So, you know, that is a lot of words, but, in short, we have said we want to preposition stocks in Poland and we want to train there, and NATO is recognizing that they will take advantage of those sites as well. And so they recognize that NATO will also pro-

vide funding for that. So that heavily reduces the bill for the U.S. and allows us to either give back that ERI funding or use it elsewhere.

And so I give you that example just to show the kind of expectations we are conveying not only to individual allies, in terms of host-nation support, but to NATO, saying, you are benefiting from this as well, you are going to use those training ranges, you are going to use those bases.

In terms of your second question about building partner capacity and FMF [Foreign Military Financing], I would have to get back to you because I would need to confer with State Department about what the security assistance plan is for this year.

But I do know that in the discussions that DOD has been involved in with State Department about building that program, we have argued for pooled funding for the Baltic nations to increase their capabilities under the Baltic Defense Capabilities Initiative, particularly in areas such as air defense. And so we have tried to look at them, you know, as three rather than individual nations and look at what they already have and what they might need in future to reinforce their own defenses, using mechanisms like FMF.

But we can certainly take that for the record and get you exact numbers for FMF.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. I appreciate that. Yeah, this subcommittee has been looking at the foreign military sales process and ways that it is impacting our global defense, as well as any problems, so that is why I ask that question.

My last question before I turn to the other members is, giving the information coming out of Eastern Europe, I understand that there are very lethal threats to our primary ground combat platforms and their crews. And many in the Army, including General McMaster, the Director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center and Deputy Commanding General of Futures at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, has stated that our ground combat vehicles are losing their qualitative edge over our adversaries. "With Russia demonstrating the capability to field advanced anti-tank weapons and thermobaric warheads, our armored vehicles and servicemembers will be vulnerable in a fight."

So I understand that new technologies like the Active Protection System, the APS, can defeat these threats, and they have already been successfully fielded and combat-tested by our allies with great results. And I have been a very strong advocate of APS technologies to protect our men and women and believe we need the technology fielded now.

So, General Allvin, can you tell us how EUCOM, in particular, views the threat situation to our ground combat vehicles? And how is EUCOM working with the Army to address the threat sooner rather than later, especially if the APS solution already exists?

General ALLVIN. Well, I will tell you that what we are learning in—as we mentioned, this last 30 months has been—it is relatively rapid, I guess, in bureaucratic timeframe, but we have been getting smarter about what it takes to operate in the vicinity of and what

combat might look like if, God forbid, it were to actually happen through some of our contingency planning and wargaming.

And that actually has yielded deficiencies in several domains, so it is not only just the land domain but the air domain. Their ability to inhibit freedom of movement and the qualitative edge is, sort of, waning in several areas.

So, while I can't speak to this specifically, what we do as a result of that, those are the capability gaps and shortfalls that we do submit in each of those domains, those shortfalls, as they are identified and clarified to the Department. And that goes back to the services and into the building to come up with the solutions to those.

So we do identify the gaps and the shortfalls, and then the solutions come out through OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the services. And I would say that this one, this particular one, has not elevated above others to us. There is a general category of inhibitors to freedom of movement and things where the qualitative edge has waned with respect to a potential confrontation with the Russians.

Mrs. HARTZLER. I am having a classified briefing tomorrow on some of these issues, so perhaps we can delve further into those vulnerabilities at that time. But thank you for your answer.

Ranking Member Speier, do you have any additional questions?

Ms. SPEIER. No.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good.

Mr. Scott, do you have any additional questions?

Mr. SCOTT. General Allvin, I wanted to follow up, and this may give you a chance to speak about the initiative you were talking about earlier.

What requirements remain unfunded under the current budget, and how would you assess the risk that that causes the forces under European Command? And then just any general comments that you have. I know you had some comments about the Russian initiative.

General ALLVIN. Well, thank you.

I would say that, in general, we do need those forces that are coming in through ERI, those increased rotational forces. And I think one of the other areas that has been identified is also, as we mentioned, the ability to counter this anti-access/area denial capability that the Russians have been able to put up that could inhibit the freedom of movement. That is about as much depth at this classification.

But I would say thank you for the opportunity to reengage on the Russia Strategic Initiative. Because one thing we certainly understand is that we do have some learning to do, and we have to do it fairly rapidly. And so, while the Intelligence Community is really working hard on being able to increase the robustness and the capacity of their resources and their analysts and the understanding, we also in the Department understand that this is an issue that crosses combatant commands and it is something that we need to understand as a department.

And so, thanks to initially the funding of the European Reassurance Initiative, we have developed this Russia Strategic Initiative. And I can tell you at this classification level, its primary role is to

enhance our understanding and to help support some of the planning that we would do and some of the deterrent activities.

A lot of these questions that have been asked today we are still trying to get to the correct answers on. The Russia Strategic Initiative is moving us closer to a better understanding that will help us be able to have more satisfying answers to questions like this in the future.

And I would say that this is an example, as we look at the question of what is in the OCO which should be into base, this is one of those that the Department realizes this is a long-term initiative. And so it has been transitioned into a program of record. So the funding that started off in ERI is going to transition into the Army's base budget as a program of record. So this is one of the examples where we keep analyzing those things that we think are going to be long-term requirements and how we might be able to move them into the base budgets.

So thank you for the opportunity to respond.

Mr. SCOTT. Do you think that Mr. Putin underestimated the global response with his actions in the Ukraine?

General ALLVIN. That is a very difficult question. It is a great question, and I think that there are many competing scholars who have differing opinions as to whether he achieved some level of success and is satisfied with that at this point. There are others who will say that he was surprised, that he did not anticipate the level of national unity post-Crimea that actually came against him when he went into the Donbass.

I will say that is still an open question at this point, but, as we look at the future, we do understand something about Russia, that they are a learning and adaptive country. This is not the Soviet Union of old. And so, as you look at the tactics and the techniques and what they have been doing, starting with Georgia in 2008 up to now, they are learning and adapting.

The question of what they are learning from Ukraine I believe is still an open one, and I can't give you a good, solid answer on that.

Mr. SCOTT. Do either of you have an opinion on that that you would like to share?

Ms. ELLEHUUS. I think he certainly underestimated the resolve coming out of NATO. I mean, the increase in defense spending and the refocus on deterrence and defense, that has really energized the alliance at a time when I think some countries were certainly sitting back and looking for a further peace dividend. It has woken up a lot of people.

I think of the example of Germany, in particular, which has always played a pretty calm role in arbitrating between, kind of, Europe and Russia. And, you know, Chancellor Merkel speaks Russian and has a long history there and so thought she had an understanding of where he was coming from. But, clearly, a lot of countries woke up and realized that you can't handle—

Mr. SCOTT. They also have very strong trade relationships with Germany, as I understand it. And I would think that that would lead to maybe part of the surprise that he had from—

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Certainly. But Germany, in particular, has been very strong on sanctions, with Chancellor Merkel leading the

charge in their rollover each and every time and focusing on the importance of Minsk implementation. Other nations haven't been as strong, but she has been a real champion of that, despite the damage it has done to Germany's economy.

Mr. TYRA. So I would observe that every action that has been taken has resulted in an action that is unhelpful to them. And so the more times they push, the harder it gets. And I think the reaction is they are only making the coalition stronger, they are only making NATO stronger. And I think they will eventually get to that point.

I would observe that Germany, among others, is one of the framework nations for the EFP. And so I think it is clear where they believe their future lies.

Mr. SCOTT [presiding]. Well, certainly, every member of this committee is aware of the challenges of what is in OCO that we would prefer to be in base and something that we look forward to resolving as time goes forward.

I would make one final point, which is, certainly, he saw where our NATO allies increased their defense spending, and he can also see when we reduce our defense spending. And I think that maybe leads to a false perception of weakness of the United States and our resolve.

With that, Mr. O'Rourke.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Thank you.

General Allvin, going back to the line of questions about unintended consequences or thinking through next-order effects of some of the decisions we are making today, we increase our force size in Europe and the amount that we are spending there; ideally, Russia gets the message and it deters them from provocation or doing things that we don't or the Europeans don't want them to do. What if Russia increases its force size with its border with NATO?

To Ranking Member Speier's question in terms of anticipating the budgetary consequences of this, do we see you back here, or someone from the Pentagon, 2 years from now saying, "Look, we thought \$3.4 billion was going to do the trick. It turns out the Russians have put two more divisions here. We need to step up"?

You can understand my concern along this trajectory. Tell me how you have addressed that concern for yourself or for others in the Pentagon.

General ALLVIN. Well, certainly, our role in U.S. European Command is to be able to identify, sort of, the demand as we see it to be able to counter security threats in Europe. So to the extent that—and I certainly wouldn't be able to predict what might happen in the coming years.

I think our role here is to ensure that the money that we are being given now, we are spending it in the most efficient and effective manner, to where we are actually increasing the power of the alliance, increasing the power of not just the United States forces over there but the interoperability and that what we are learning from our training and exercises is making the entire alliance stronger.

And if we succeed at that, then, in fact, the likelihood of coming back—and whether that comes back or makes it through the Department—because that is actually what we do. We compete with

all the other combatant commands to say, this is what we see in our AOR [area of responsibility]. I think the more successful we are in utilizing the resources we have now to help build the alliance and build that unity, the less likely it is that you will see us here, you know, in a couple years.

Mr. O'ROURKE. So a success would be we have calibrated this correctly, we have spent the right amount, we have put the precise number of forces there to get the desired outcome. Failure would be the Pentagon coming back or a future administration coming back and saying, actually, we didn't quite get this right; it looks like the Russians have escalated; we now need to, in turn, escalate.

Let me ask you, just because of limited time, as we bring more U.S. forces into this region and as the Russians respond in kind, I think we increase the opportunities for miscalculation. You mentioned your efforts towards ensuring that we do a better job of gathering intelligence and are just smarter and more effective with the resources that we have there.

Talk about military-to-military cooperation with Russia, your relationships with your counterpart or your counterparts in Russia and your ability to talk to each other to ensure that we don't have a miscalculation that leads to an unintended conflict or war.

General ALLVIN. I am going to actually probably yield that second to my policy counterpart.

But I will just say quickly on the first, I don't know that I would calculate that failure would be necessarily that we come back here. It might be a failure to predict. There are certain things that they say the enemy gets a vote. So the failure to predict exactly what an unpredictable Russia would do could actually result in us coming back.

So there are many things that we don't fully have control over. We are going to focus on the things we do have control over to make sure that, again, we are making the best use of the resources that you are providing for us.

I am going to actually turn it over with respect to the mil-to-mil policy to Rachel.

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Yes, certainly. Thank you.

Yes, I mean, I think when we look at these programs each year, success would actually be Russia behaving responsibly and becoming a cooperative partner, as it has been in the past, on Afghanistan, in the Balkans. We have very positive examples of a time when they did work with the international community.

If things have gotten worse, I think we need to actually have a more fundamental relook at our prioritization of the Russia threat vis-a-vis other threats that the Department and the U.S. Government have identified.

In terms of how—you know, your question about deconflicting and dialogue with Russia, again, the strategy is strong and balanced, so the "balanced" side of that is having a dialogue with Russia. Today, in fact, there is a NATO-Russia Council meeting. It is the second since 2014, when we said no business as usual and actually stopped the military-to-military cooperation under the business-as-usual rubric.

So we do continue that dialogue, not least in Syria, where it is very important that we talk with them to avoid miscalculation.

And every time they have a violation of airspace or fly too close to our ships, we also call out that bad behavior, because the last thing we need is miscalculation or an accident.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Yeah. Well, I appreciate that.

And, as I yield back, I would just like to make the point that I would view continued escalation to be a failure. And I would hope that, in maybe working through the committee staff, the ranking member, and the chair, there would be some way to hold a joint hearing with our colleagues on Foreign Affairs, because I would really like to understand everything that we are doing to address these issues militarily but also non-militarily.

And nothing that I can think of condones Russia's behavior in the areas that we have talked about, but there is a logic to it. And I can understand them responding to the growth of NATO, to things that happened in Ukraine, a part of the world that is central to the Russian psyche. And the responses, while not justified, are understandable to me.

And, in that same way, I want to make sure we are thinking through adding \$3.4 billion to the fire, bringing more forces in, and potentially setting us on a trajectory where we will be obligated, as things continue to escalate, to bring more forces and more dollars into play, thereby provoking additional responses that may not be wise, they may not follow the international norms, but may follow a logic that we have seen play out from Georgia to Ukraine to Crimea.

And so, anyhow, I would just like to set that out there. I really appreciate your all's work and response to our questions.

With that, I yield back to the chair.

Mr. SCOTT. Ma'am, do you have any?

Ms. SPEIER. No.

Mr. SCOTT. I want to thank all of you for being here. It is very clear to me that we need your expertise.

And the other thing that is clear to me from this hearing is that Putin—he may be predictable sometimes and at other times unpredictable, but he clearly would not have stopped in the Ukraine, in my opinion, had the United States not shown the resolve and had our NATO allies not shown the resolve that they did to stop him.

And so we will have honest and respectful discussions about the funding of the operations in that part of the world. And I look forward to your input on that, and I look forward to making the world a better place.

With that, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JULY 13, 2016

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 13, 2016

**Opening Remarks of Chairwoman Vicky Hartzler
Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigation Hearing
“Oversight of the European Reassurance Initiative”
July 13, 2016**

Good afternoon. I’d like to extend a warm thank-you to our witnesses testifying before us today.

Before I begin, I would like to welcome the members of the full committee who are not permanent members of the subcommittee and who are attending today. I ask **unanimous consent** that these committee members be permitted to participate in this hearing with the understanding that all sitting subcommittee members will be recognized for questions prior to those not assigned to the subcommittee. **Without objection, so ordered.**

I also ask **unanimous consent** to include into the record all member statements and extraneous material for members of the committee unable to attend today’s hearing and who have asked to include a statement for the record in lieu of attendance. **Without objection, so ordered.**

This afternoon, the subcommittee plans to discuss the European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI, with representatives of U.S. European Command, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Army. All have important roles in the initiative’s development, implementation, and execution.

The goal of this hearing is to assess how the Department has implemented the initiative since it was announced, authorized, and appropriated by Congress beginning in Fiscal Year 2015. We also seek to understand how the Department plans to execute the initiative through Fiscal Year 2017.

We’d also like our witnesses to discuss the opportunities and challenges facing implementation within the current European security environment, and how the initiative competes for resources among other critical priorities within the Department, including readiness. A military that is not ready to deploy cannot credibly serve as a deterrent against aggressive behavior. The Department of Defense does not have enough ships to maintain a constant presence in key waters, they don’t have a large enough end strength to support a permanent presence in Europe, and the Department’s nuclear enterprise and missile defense systems are in dire need of modernization.

The recent NATO Warsaw Summit underscored many security challenges that Europe faces today. Foremost of these challenges is a resurgent Russia.

The Warsaw Summit provided the opportunity to help form a cohesive and comprehensive NATO plan to counter Russian actions, using both

conventional and unconventional methods. But there is much more to be done.

Vigilant oversight and consistent evaluation will help ensure that the European Reassurance Initiative invests in the right areas and utilizes resources efficiently and effectively. From recent Congressionally-mandated reports submitted by the Department, it seems the Department of Defense's strategy, operations, and posture are evolving to adapt to the new security model in Europe.

We must also address the important issue of funding the ERI. Currently, money for the Initiative is requested annually through the Overseas Contingency Operations budget. While drawing from these funds provides near-term flexibility and responsiveness, relying on such year-to-year appropriations does not allow the Department of Defense to confidently plan or implement an evolving strategy in the region. The House-passed FY17 National Defense Authorization Act addressed part of this issue by reallocating \$2.2 billion of the request into the base budget. In doing so, the House has demonstrated its enduring commitment to the success of the European Reassurance Initiative.

I look forward to discussing the Department's strategy and the issues I've outlined.

But before I introduce the witnesses, I turn to the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Ranking Member for any opening remarks she would like to make.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

**STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL DAVID ALLVIN
DIRECTOR OF POLICY, STRATEGY, PARTNERING AND CAPABILITIES**

U.S. FORCES EUROPE

July 13, 2016

I would first like to thank Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier and the other Members of the Committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am pleased to represent the men and women of our armed services and civilian personnel of the United States European Command. On behalf of the US European Command, thank you for your unwavering support.

I am privileged to discuss the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) — which marks a major turning point in the USEUCOM's prioritization of activities in the European Theater. The United States seeks to maintain its role as a secure, stabilizing presence in the theater, in light of Russia's provocative actions and destabilizing interventions— ERI provides the funding to help us accomplish that goal.

We have carefully devised a strategy to address this Russian threat, and assert our commitment to NATO Allies. However, strategy alone will not impede Russian hostility. Through continued Congressional support of the ERI, we will continue to implement strategy by resourcing capabilities deterrent activities and increasing responsiveness.

Over the last few years, the European Security environment has drastically evolved. Since the beginning of Russia's occupation of Crimea in 2014, our largest area for concern is Russian military activity to the east and north. Russia is increasingly aggressive in Eastern Europe and is militarizing the Arctic. Russia employs multiple types of warfare—conventional, irregular, and asymmetric—to induce regional instability. Russia's its malign intervention causes political and economic disruption along its border with Eastern Europe/in many places/etc.

Since 2014, U.S. forces have taken measures to assure our NATO Allies and partners by communicating our commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Under the ERI in previous fiscal years, we have accomplished a great deal to assure our NATO Allies and partners.

Through your support, we have increased the U.S. military presence in Europe; conducted bilateral and multilateral exercises; improved U.S. and allied military infrastructure in Europe; prepositioned more U.S. equipment in Europe; and intensified efforts to build the capacity and interoperability of NATO Allies and partners.

We recently completed Exercise ANAKONDA 2016, a multinational training exercise in Poland integrating over 31,000 forces from across 24 nations including NATO Allies and our partners. This exercise supported our assurance effort by demonstrating collaborative

capabilities to deploy, mass, and sustain combined land, sea, air, and Special Operations Forces combat power. Nearly simultaneously, we conducted a U.S. Army Europe-led airborne crisis response exercise that focused on exercising the U.S. Global Response Force to conduct rapid, efficient and effective joint forcible entry operations alongside allied airborne forces in Europe. Exercise Swift Response demonstrated U.S. and our NATO Allies' ability to respond to a crisis scenario from staging bases in both Europe and the United States. On the sea, a U.S. Navy-led exercise, BALTOPS is the premier maritime exercise in the Baltic Sea region and one of the largest exercises in northern Europe. Held from June 3-19, 2016, the exercise demonstrated interoperability between U.S., NATO Allies, and partners and assured nations of NATO's commitment to the security and stability of the Baltic Sea region. The exercise concentrated on maritime interdiction, anti-subsurface warfare, amphibious operations, and air defense in a joint environment.

Fiscal Year 2016's ERI has had a substantial impact on the assurance of our NATO Allies through these bilateral and multilateral exercises. However, there are large gaps in our capability to deter Russian aggression. The FY 2017 ERI request includes five lines of effort (discussed below) that address those gaps. The execution of these events shows that ERI is not solely operating in the context of a US bilateral effort, but serves as an impetus for NATO coordination and cooperation.

In this past weekend's NATO summit, member nations announced they would continue these efforts to deter Russia and assure partnership capacity and committed to reestablishing a credible deterrent along NATO's eastern flank by implementing the Readiness Action Plan, fully sourcing an enhanced forward land presence in Poland and the Baltics, making discernable progress on the allied defense investment pledge, and committing to improve allied preparations to resist armed attacks, as well as other initiatives.

The FY 2017 European Reassurance Initiative will continue to provide assurance measures to our NATO Allies and partners, and provide the funding to continue reversing over twenty-five years of atrophy in our combat capabilities in theater. Additionally, FY 2017 ERI will continue building credible deterrence. Both assurance and deterrence is addressed through five lines of effort. I would like to expand upon these lines of effort, and explain how they fit into our theater strategy.

Our first line of effort is to increase our presence in theater. USEUCOM intends to increase the presence of forces in the air, sea, and on land with a heel-to-toe approach, which continuously maintains forces on the ground without gaps between rotations. This will include a mix of permanently deployed and rotational forces with the capability to effectively deter adversaries. ERI ensures that all U.S. military services will augment their presence and enhance deterrence in Europe through stepped-up rotations and, potentially, deferring previously planned force reductions in Europe. In FY 2017, the Army will augment presence through the rotation of U.S.-based units from an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), the Air Force will sustain its current Mobility Air Force (MAF) capability, add new intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in Europe, and source theater security packages that provide 5th Generation capabilities, and Navy and Marine forces will maintain a presence in the Black Sea, Nordic and Baltic regions.

Secondly, our FY17 request continues additional bilateral and multilateral exercises/training with NATO Allies and partners. Through these activities, we assure our NATO Allies and partners that we are willing, committed, and ready. Additionally, these exercises address the challenges and threats emerging in Europe by demonstrating interoperability and responsiveness.

Our third line of effort sets the stage for a strong, prepared force through enhanced prepositioning of U.S. equipment. Preparedness-to-defeat is a key point of the ERI deterrence message. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) increases responsiveness and options for deterrence in Europe. Prepositioning of U.S. equipment will allow EUCOM-based forces to respond more rapidly to potential contingencies that appear in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Additionally, APS will also decrease force deployment times for U.S.-based units because stocks are already in place. With Russia expanding its military capabilities and technologies, Europe needs to have a ready, responsive ability to deter.

Our fourth line of effort, improved infrastructure, supports our increase in exercises, forces, and prepositioned equipment. This infrastructure is not solely new military construction, but includes improvements to existing structures, such as training centers and airfields. These improvements to infrastructure will provide flexibility and enhance readiness in our AOR.

Our fifth line of effort is to intensify efforts to build partner capacity with NATO Allies and partners. Russia continues to exert and bolster instability in neighboring countries and are

creating detrimental economic and social impact through their malign influence. We seek to counter these activities by strengthening partners' ability to react when a crisis occurs.

Through these five lines of effort, we will not only strengthen existing relationships with NATO members and other partners, but we will also show our strength and deter future Russian provocations. The sum of all ERI lines of effort is greater than the five individual parts, when considering that increased rotational presence allows us to sustain more frequent allied and partner exercises and therefore build interoperability more rapidly. Similarly, improving infrastructure builds national capacity in addition to increasing U.S. and NATO readiness.

Again, I thank you for your support. Through the European Reassurance Initiative, you have amplified our nation's commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—one of the cornerstones of Europe's security and stability.

Major General David W. Allvin, USAF

Maj. Gen. David W. Allvin is the Director, Strategy, and Policy, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany. He is responsible to Commander USEUCOM for formulation and staff direction of the execution of military/political policy and planning for command activities involving relations with other U.S. Unified Commands, allied military and international military organizations, and subordinate commands.

General Allvin graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1986. He has commanded at the squadron and wing levels, including the 97th Air Mobility Wing, Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma. He has held major command staff assignments and served on the Joint Staff.

General Allvin was the Commanding General, NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul, Afghanistan and Commander, 618th Air and Space Operations Center (TACC). He most recently served as the Director, Strategy, Concepts, and Assessments, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force.

The general is a command pilot with more than 4,600 hours in more than 30 aircraft models, including 800 flight test hours.

EDUCATION

- 1986 Bachelor of Science, Astronautical Engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
- 1989 Master of Science, Management, Troy State University, Troy, Ala.
- 1992 Distinguish graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
- 1998 Distinguish graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
- 1999 Master of Airpower Art and Science, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB Ala.
- 2000 Air War College, by correspondence
- 2004 Distinguished graduate, Master of Science, National Security Strategy, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
- 2006 Executive Leadership Seminar, Smeal Business College, Pennsylvania State University
- 2008 Program for Senior Managers in National Security, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
- 2008 Air Force Enterprise Leadership Seminar, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
- 2009 Program for Senior Executive Fellows, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
- 2010 Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y.
- 2013 Combined Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
- 2014 Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala

ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 1986 - Aug 1987, student, undergraduate pilot training, 82nd Student Squadron, Williams AFB, Ariz.
2. November 1987 - August 1990, C-12F copilot, aircraft commander, instructor pilot and flight examiner, 58th Military Airlift Squadron, Ramstein Air Base, Germany
3. August 1990 - June 1993, C-141B copilot, aircraft commander, instructor pilot and flight examiner, 36th Military Airlift Squadron, McChord AFB, Wash.
4. June 1993 - June 1994, student, USAF Test Pilot School, Edwards AFB, Calif.
5. June 1994 - July 1997, C-17 and C-130J experimental test pilot, flight commander, flight examiner and assistant operations officer, 418th Flight Test Squadron, Edwards AFB, Calif.

6. August 1997 - June 1998, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
7. July 1998 - June 1999, student, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
8. June 1999 - April 2001, assistant Chief, Commander's Action Group, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
9. April 2001 - June 2003, Commander, 905th Air Refueling Squadron, Grand Forks AFB, N.D.
10. June 2003 - June 2004, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
11. June 2004 - June 2005, Chief, Organizational Policy Branch, Policy Division, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
12. June 2005 - April 2006, special assistant to the Director, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
13. May 2006 - July 2007, Vice Commander, 12th Flying Training Wing, Randolph AFB, Texas
14. August 2007 - July 2009, Commander, 97th Air Mobility Wing, Altus AFB, Okla.
15. August 2009 - August 2010, Senior Air Force Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y.
16. September 2010 - August 2011, Commanding General, NATO Air Training Command - Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul, Afghanistan
17. September 2011 - April 2012, Vice Commander, 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott AFB, Ill.
18. April 2012 - Jun 2013, Commander, 618th Air and Space Operations Center (Tanker Airlift Control Center), Scott AFB, Ill.
19. June 2013 - September 2014, Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
20. October 2014 - August 2015, Director, Strategy, Concepts, and Assessments, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
21. August 2015 - present, Director, Strategy, and Policy, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 2004 - June 2005, Chief, Organizational Policy Branch, Policy Division, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant colonel
2. June 2005 - April 2006, special assistant to the Director, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C, as a colonel
3. September 2010 - August 2011, Commanding General, NATO Air Training Command - Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul, Afghanistan, as a brigadier general

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: command pilot

Flight hours: more than 4,600

Aircraft flown: C-12F, C-141A/B, KC-135R/T, C-17, C-130, C-130J, C-23, F-15, F-16 and T-38

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster

Bronze Star Medal

Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters

Air Medal with oak leaf cluster

Aerial Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster

Joint Service Commendation Medal

Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters

NATO Meritorious Service Medal

Non-Article 5 NATO Medal (ISAF)

PUBLICATIONS

“Paradigm Lost: Rethinking Theater Airlift to Support the Army After Next,” Cadre Papers, Sept. 9, 2000

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant May 28, 1986

First Lieutenant May 28, 1988

Captain May 28, 1990

Major Aug. 1, 1996

Lieutenant Colonel May 1, 2000

Colonel July 1, 2005

Brigadier General Sept. 2, 2010

Major General July 26, 2013

(Current as of September 2015)

WRITTEN STATEMENT BY

**MS RACHEL ELLEHUUS
PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
EUROPE & NATO POLICY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE**

SECOND SESSION, 114TH CONGRESS

JULY 13, 2016

Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to present this opening statement outlining the United States' European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), and the strategy, implementation, and challenges related to this initiative. In addition to these points, my remarks will highlight measures NATO has taken including outcomes from the NATO Summit held last week in Warsaw, Poland.

In response to Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and destabilizing actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe, the United States, individual Allies and partners, and NATO have worked together since 2014 to develop a broad range of efforts designed to demonstrate our collective commitment to the security and stability of the transatlantic space. Since then, these measures have evolved in step with the security environment in Europe, with initial efforts to assure Allies and partners shifting to a focus on reinforcing deterrence and defense.

Turning first to those efforts undertaken by the United States, President Obama in June 2014 called on you, Congress, to approve up to \$1 billion to support the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Under ERI – for which Congress provided \$985 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 and \$789.3 million in FY 2016 – the United States launched Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) to maintain a persistent, rotational presence of air, land, and sea forces on the territory of the eastern Allies, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. In FY 2015 and FY 2016, activities funded under ERI focused on expanding exercises and training with NATO Allies and partners; building the capacity of our regional Allies and partners; and augmenting prepositioned European Activity Sets of equipment for use in joint exercises. Building on this, our current FY 2017 ERI request of \$3.4 billion represents a significant augmentation of these efforts, enabling us to move from assurance to deterrence by expanding and deepening activities within five lines of effort:

- Increased Presence. In addition to maintaining our commitment to a persistent, rotational presence of air, land, and sea forces, the United States will contribute to the broader deterrence posture by rotating an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) on a heel-to-toe basis into Europe. We will also deploy the rotational ABCT headquarters to Poland, and the ABCT will be able to move around Central and Eastern Europe as appropriate to participate in training and exercise activities. This, together with the two brigades already stationed in Europe, will provide for a division-sized ground force capability that can respond across the theater, if necessary.
- Enhanced Prepositioning. To support this increased presence, the United States will use ERI to place additional Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) in Europe. These additional combat vehicles and supplies are intended to reduce force deployment times and enable a rapid response to any potential contingencies.
- Improved Infrastructure. Improvements throughout Europe to areas such as airfields, training areas, and ranges on military installations will improve military readiness and provide for quick dispersal of forces, if required.
- Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises and Training. ERI will also enable us to continue extensive U.S. participation in exercises and training activities with NATO Allies and partners with the aim of demonstrating resolve and improving overall readiness and interoperability.
- Building the Capacity of Allies and Partners. ERI funding will continue to help build the capacity of Central and Eastern European Allies and partners to defend themselves and bolster their full participation as operational partners in responding

Yet, as President Obama discussed at last week's NATO Summit in Warsaw, our ERI contributions are but one part of the broader NATO efforts. At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO developed its Readiness Action Plan (RAP), under which it decided to enhance the NATO Response Force (NRF), generate the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), and create NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) to facilitate rapid reinforcement of forces. At last week's Warsaw Summit, NATO, like the United States, took concrete steps to strengthen deterrence by announcing the deployment of a NATO battalion-sized battlegroup, the so-called Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), into each of the three Baltic nations and Poland. The United States will be the eFP Framework Nation for Poland, with the UK, Canada, and Germany serving as Framework Nation for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, respectively. These eFP NATO battalions will result, for the first time, in rotational units being deployed persistently in the region whose mission is specifically focused on countering any action by aggressive actors in the region. Taken together, these U.S. and NATO combat forces will represent the greatest gathering of Allied deterrent power in the Baltic nations and Poland since the end of the Cold War.

Although these U.S. and NATO steps to reinforce deterrence and defense are significant and contribute to greater transatlantic security in the short run, challenges remain. First, NATO must continue to adapt institutionally to ensure its decision making, command structure, and defense planning processes are flexible and agile. Additionally, the United States must continue to encourage our European Allies to meet the Wales Defense Investment Pledge target of spending 2% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense within a decade and to make the necessary investments in readiness and capabilities. Since the Wales Summit, a majority of NATO Allies have taken steps to reverse negative trends in defense spending, with 23 of 28 Allies having halted the decline in their defense spending in absolute real terms. Collectively, Allies will spend more on defense in 2016 than the year prior, making this the first time since 2009 that total NATO

fractiousness and stand united against those who seek to divide the Alliance and undermine the rules and norms that underpin our security.

In closing, I thank Congress for its continued support of ERI. I also thank and applaud the performance of the entire team – including the Military Departments and Services, the Joint Staff, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and NATO – all of whom have been central to implementing this strategy. The transatlantic community stands stronger together; we are working together to strengthen transatlantic and, in turn, global security. I look forward to this session and to answering any questions you may have.

Rachel Ellehuus
Principal Director for European and NATO Policy
Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Rachel is the Principal Director for European and NATO Policy in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for European and NATO Policy. Rachel previously served as Director for Central and Southern Europe in this same office. Prior to this, Rachel worked in OSD's Strategy, Plans, and Force Posture (SPF) office where she covered Middle East and Africa strategy and force posture issues and was responsible for outreach/implementation of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.

From 2009-2012, Rachel was assigned to the Strategy Unit in the UK Ministry of Defence in London as part of OSD Long Term Training Exchange. In this position, Rachel worked on the UK's Defence Green Paper, 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), and 2012 Defense Engagement Strategy. During this time, Rachel also completed a rotation in the tri-departmental (MOD, MFA, Dept. for International Development) UK Stabilisation Unit.

Prior to her assignment to London, Rachel worked in ISP/European and NATO Policy in October 2005 where she was Country Director for Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and the Netherlands and, previously, Country Director for Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Malta.

Prior to joining the Department of Defense, Rachel lived in Copenhagen, Denmark where she was a Researcher at the Danish Institute of International Affairs. In this position, she conducted military-political and strategic analysis for the Danish Ministry of Defense on European security and defense issues to include ESDP, transatlantic security, defense industry and armaments cooperation, and specialization/niche defense. Rachel has lectured at the University of Copenhagen, Danish Naval Academy, and Denmark's International Studies Program. Before arriving in Copenhagen, Rachel lived in the Czech Republic where she worked at the East West Institute, Prague Center.

Rachel graduated from Colgate University with a BA in International Relations and German and received her MA in Political Science and European Affairs from the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium. She also studied at Albert Ludwigs Universität in Freiburg, Germany. She is fluent in Danish and proficient in German, Czech, Spanish, and French.

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RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

**MR. THOMAS TYRA
GLOBAL FORCE PLANNING CHIEF
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, G-3/5/7
UNITED STATES ARMY**

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

SECOND SESSION, 114th CONGRESS

ON

THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE

JULY 13, 2016

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, distinguished members of the committee, I have a brief opening statement to highlight some of our initial insights about the current status of the United States' European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI, our evolving support to NATO initiatives, and on specific Army's strategy, execution, and challenges.

As my colleague from OSD Policy will address in more detail, in March of this year, the Secretary of Defense issued a formal announcement to NATO member states and host nations of our planned deployment of rotational and deterrent forces in support of ERI. Since then, the U.S. has enjoyed in-depth cooperation with our Allies in developing a synchronized plan to address challenges to European security. That cooperation continues to this day as we with the land forces of our Allies and partners work to address common issues and realize our shared goals.

The U.S. European Reassurance Initiative has evolved from an initiative primarily focused on assurance to one focused on deterrence. Under ERI, we introduced rotational units on an intermittent basis as part of our effort to maintain a persistent, rotational presence of air, land, and sea forces. As part of this, we established a single pre-positioned armored brigade combat team (ABCT) equipment set, as part of the first European Activity Set. This activity set was used for deployments and our initial rotational commitments. This increased U.S. presence in Europe, as well as increased funding, has enabled a capstone DOD assurance event, the recent Polish national exercise, Operation Anakonda.

Operation Anakonda, held this past month fielded 31,000 multinational soldiers from 24 countries, almost half of whom were American. The 4th Infantry Division Headquarters deployed and provided all command and control for U.S. military elements and operations. Army forces, including those already assigned to Europe, units from the 82nd Airborne Division, 10th Army Air & Missile Defense Command, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve conducted multinational air assault and airborne operations, air defense operations, combined artillery live fire operations,

bridging operations, and numerous other training events. Continuing such complex, realistic, tough exercises with multiple partner nations will improve the Army's collective warfighting capabilities across the full range of military missions, and demonstrate credible US and allied capabilities to potential adversaries in the region.

With Anakonda complete and 66 exercises scheduled with U.S. Army - Europe participation in Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, we are increasing our capacity for deterrence which we deem as the bedrock of future strategy in the region. The previously-mentioned ABCT equipment set, already in Europe will form the core of new division-sized Army pre-positioned stock (APS) equipment sets under APS-2 supporting EUCOM. An ABCT equipment set will soon be joined by equipment sets for a Division Headquarters and Division-level artillery brigade. By the end of FY 2017, these three equipment sets will be on the ground as the foundation of the European Command's (EUCOM's) deterrent force. Over the next five years, the Army plans to add enabler units, as well as additional combat equipment sets to APS-2. These pre-positioned sets could round-out a Division's worth of potential combat power that can be rapidly manned and fielded for deterrence exercises or in response to contingency operations.

During this next fiscal year, the Army will transfer the ABCT equipment set in the European Activity Set to pre-positioned stock. US-based ABCT's will deploy to Europe with their entire complement of tanks, fighting vehicles, and support equipment. This deployment, which we refer to as a "heel-to-toe" rotation, will establish a persistent presence in Europe, while providing Army units the opportunity to practice and develop their deployment skills.

These ERI contributions are part of the broader NATO effort to strengthen deterrence, which include deploying a NATO battalion-sized battlegroup, called Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), into Poland and each of the three Baltic nations. These eFP NATO battalions will result, for the first time, in units being deployed persistently in the region whose mission is specifically focused on countering any incursion.

Through deterrence and Enhanced Forward Presence, the United States' efforts define the theater strategy the Army is developing and executing with ERI funding provided by Congress. We are doing this in close cooperation with, and in support of, the Joint Staff and EUCOM Commander. As the President and Secretary of Defense further define support to NATO, the Army will adapt strategies and plans in Europe to meet new requirements. We fully support an increased deterrent posture in Europe.

Having addressed the strategy and execution efforts to date, I'd like to discuss some challenges we face in fully realizing the effects we desire. First, of course, is the instability associated with ERI budget requests.

Our base budget remains challenged; without augmentation or tradeoffs to other defense priorities, it will be unsustainably stressed in order to support emerging demands to demonstrate US commitment to Europe and deter aggression, requiring a high operational tempo, ready units, and modernized equipment. Serious risk will be introduced to other Army commitments. Building deterrence requires significant amounts of equipment and materiel over the future year defense program. Our ability to do that while continuing to reset the Army after 15 years of war and meeting Combatant Command mission requirements worldwide with ready forces places immense pressures on the Army budget. The overall plan to restore the health of our nation's Army, especially over the next two years, is at risk unless the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 ERI budget is approved at the requested level.

Increasingly, it appears that the Department will be starting FY 2017 under a Continuing Resolution and operating under the restrictions therein. Continuing Resolutions may limit the Army's ability to deploy rotational brigades and build EUCOM's prepositioned equipment sets starting early in 2017 to meet exercise timelines.

The second challenge we face, as we develop contingency plans in Europe, is the need for more coordinated support at the government level from our Allies to ensure a synchronized and cooperative environment, should plans need to be executed. We welcome NATO actions to develop a comprehensive plan to ensure the freedom of maneuver necessary to support assurance and deterrence initiatives; and we encourage greater speed in its development. In the near term, the Army will benefit from NATO's execution of the Enhanced Forward Presence effort as collective action will ensure these efforts are complementary towards building our shared deterrence goal.

Your support, through funding the President's requests for ERI, is an essential component of the European deterrence strategy. However, our ability to support steady-state and peacetime priorities will no doubt be challenged if we must meet emerging requirements at the same time.

In closing, I thank Congress for your support of the European Reassurance Initiative and applaud the performance of the entire team –the Department, NATO, as well as the National Guard and Reserves, all of whom have played key roles in this strategy. We're rebuilding strength in Europe more and more every day. I am also privileged to observe the great contributions of the young men and women in our Army who are key to improving security in NATO and the wider world. I look forward to this session and answering any questions you may have.

Thomas E. Tyra

Mr. Tyra is the Chief, Global Force Planning, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Headquarters, Department of the Army. His principal areas of expertise are defense and national security policy, strategic and operational planning, international military and political affairs and force development. He is currently leading the Army efforts in the determining future force capability and capacity requirements, analyzing Army strategy, force requirements, and global posture. He has previously served in positions in the United States, Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia and is a veteran of Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Enduring Freedom.

His military education includes the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College.

His awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal with Valor Device, three Humanitarian Service Medals and two Superior Civilian Service Medals along with a number of campaign and unit recognition awards.

A native of Miami, Florida he is a graduate of the University of Miami. He earned a Master's of Business Administration from the Florida Institute of Technology and a Master's of Strategic Studies from the Army War College.

He served as a Senior Army Fellow during a year-long fellowship in policy development with the Department of State and is a MIT Seminar XXI Fellow and completed the Department of Defense's program in national security studies at George Washington University.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 13, 2016

Statement for the Record
Submitted to the House Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee

By the EuroAtlantic Coalition

Wednesday, July 13, 2016

“Oversight of the European Reassurance Initiative”

2118 House Rayburn Building

The EuroAtlantic Coalition appreciates the opportunity to submit the following testimony for the record for the hearing, *“Oversight of the European Reassurance Initiative,”* with the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee. NATO is in a precarious position. Because the eastern boundaries of NATO were extended after the end of the Cold War to cover many new countries, we now have Article V treaty commitments to countries that are small and do not have the capacity to defend themselves. Russian President Putin has demonstrated in Ukraine that he is willing to ignore international norms and seize territory. He also has demonstrated an ability to influence NATO governments from within, to support political parties that protest the status quo, and to use the media to enhance the Russian position.

We are pleased to see this hearing on the U.S. commitment to increased defense spending in Europe. The ERI represents a sharp increase in U.S. spending on assuring our European allies and deterring continued Russian aggression, but we need to see a correlated increase in defense spending on the part of our European allies. The Warsaw Summit reconfirmed the importance of the Wales Summit commitments for all NATO members to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense, and at least 20% of defense spending on major weapons systems. Many of the most at-risk NATO members are woefully deficient in their preparedness; this statement presents an example of a case where this deficiency is a matter of political will, not budget constraints.

Recently the U.S. Army War College recommended a more focused and integrated land-power strategy to deter Russian invasion. “NATO lacks the capability to defeat a surprise Russian conventional attack into the Baltic States or Eastern Europe, regardless of the likelihood of such a scenario. However, this does not preclude the need to enhance conventional capabilities, modify force posture, and develop additional capabilities to counter both conventional and ambiguous threats, which will in turn underpin credible deterrence against Russian aggression.

“European NATO members should continue searching for more effective ways to increase capabilities and progressively increase their defense budgets. The United States European Command (EUCOM) and the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) must more effectively align their security cooperation activities to support capability development.”

If the goal is to deter foreign invasion, there is no substitute for land forces. Most of the countries nearest Russia have very weak armies, rendered even weaker by their lack of land-force multipliers such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and armored personnel carriers (APCs). If President Putin decided to invade

Central Europe, there would be very little material force available to mount any resistance. This situation is exacerbated by elements inside some of the allied governments who are refusing to spend money allocated for defense. The strategy aims not only at making an invasion easy, but at making any invasion unnecessary, because it so obviously would succeed. And if Russia is able again to dominate central Europe, then NATO membership ceases to have real value.

Case Study: Czech Land Forces

The Czech Republic offers a perfect case study of a NATO member state avoiding Wales Summit commitments. It is especially important for Czechs to be the role models, because Czech General Petr Pavel is the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. The GOCR has available funding and an existing contract for wheeled armored vehicles, and does not need to go through a tender or other bureaucratic procedure, but it is planning to return the funding to the Treasury rather than spend it on defense systems. Relevant data points are below:

- Current Czech inventory of NATO-standard armored vehicles is only 67 units¹.
- Conventional treaty limits allow up to 1,367 vehicles for the GOCR²; the Czech Army Chief of Staff has indicated a need for at least 100 more wheeled APC's in the short term. 20 units have been approved for purchase by the Cabinet in August 2015³, but the Ministry of Defense has yet to actually sign the purchase order.
- GOCR has 5 billion CZK (\$207 million) in defense budget that is about to be returned as surplus to the Ministry of Finance.⁴
- GOCR has an existing contract for wheeled APCs that meet NATO standards and have American content (General Dynamics Pandurs). This is a plus-up order, and thus doesn't require a tender.
- The GOCR could use that surplus money and that contract to purchase up to 100 Pandurs, and could allocate out-year funding to purchase up to 300 total.
- This order will bring jobs and technology to the Czech Republic; it also meets the desperate need for vehicles outlined by the Czech Army Chief of Staff.
- Failing to place this order undermines the deterrence doctrine of NATO.

Czech General Petr Pavel, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, stated on July 8, 2016 that the "Czech percentage of GDP on defense spending has actually fallen" which shows "that they do not yet take the deteriorating security situation so seriously."⁵

¹ <http://spectator.org/nato-facing-a-game-of-thrones-scenario-from-russia/>

² <http://www.army.cz/en/facts-file/equipment-size/equipment-size-in-2016-117876/>

³ http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2015/08/21/Czechs-approve-acquisition-of-Pandur-II-armored-vehicles/9311440180868/

⁴ <http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=5760>

⁵ <http://www.dotyk.cz/publicistika/druhy-muz-nato-ruskou-hrozbu-podcenujeme-20170624.html>

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

JULY 13, 2016

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Yes. For Ukraine, there is one FMS case for 2,250 AN/PVS-14 Night-Vision Devices that is still being processed using the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) funds, and the devices are tentatively scheduled to be delivered by the end of September 2016. Other than Ukraine, there are no other FMS cases to our Partner nations that are funded with ERI appropriations. [See page 22.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. O'ROURKE

General ALLVIN. While more work needs to be done, EUCOM has enhanced our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance interoperability and sharing with partner nations in order to maximize limited resources. This includes multiple lines of effort: coordinating processes, sharing key intelligence questions, deconflicting capabilities, and developing shared architecture and tools. [See page 17.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

JULY 13, 2016

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

Mrs. HARTZLER. Please expand on your comments about the value of restricting Russia's options by "bracketing" the scope of its hybrid warfare. Even if Russia takes actions at the lower-intensity end of the hybrid warfare spectrum, what value do you foresee in continuing to invest the full amount of requested ERI funds to increase the costs to Vladimir Putin—and therefore decrease the likelihood—of higher-end military engagements? Do you believe the U.S. should continue to fund ERI based on an analysis of the region's strategic goals and the changing operational landscape in Europe?

General ALLVIN. (U) In order to effectively counter the lower end of hybrid warfare and strive to prevent high end conflict, USEUCOM must understand what messages our adversary is pushing, which messages have traction with key audiences and how our adversary reacts to US counter-messaging and reassurance/deterrence activities. This understanding will both help USEUCOM message more effectively, and avoid unintentionally provoking our adversary.

(U) A lack of a presence in the information environment during steady state operations would leave DoD at a distinct disadvantage when dealing with audiences that have been inundated with adversary propaganda and malign influence efforts. USEUCOM is reliant on ERI funding to augment the ASSURED VOICE base funding it currently receives in order to effectively counter propaganda and deter aggression. Until this funding issue is addressed, USEUCOM's ability to compete in the information space will be limited and therefore the risk of higher end military engagement is increased.

(U) With regard to the last question on if ERI should continue to be funded, as a Combatant Command it is our responsibility not to advocate for funding sources but to clearly communicate requirements given our strategic environment and assigned missions. Given this, we clearly see an enduring demand signal to successfully deter Russia, and sincerely appreciate the support to date Congress has provided through ERI.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Please provide an update on the timeline for deploying the 80 M-1 tanks and 140 Bradley vehicles to EUCOM, and please elaborate on the the types of modernization and capability improvements that will be integrated into each set of vehicles.

Mr. TYRA. Starting in 2nd Quarter Fiscal Year 2017, the Army will initiate heel-to-toe rotations of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) to Europe. The current plan is to rotate units with 87 M1A2SEPV2 Abrams tanks and 138 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs). With respect to the Bradley Fighting vehicles, 125 are M2A3 BFVs and 13 are M7A3 Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicles. These vehicles have digital architecture and 2nd Generation forward-looking infrared which provides visible imaging for day or night operations. If the European Reassurance Initiative program continues, the Army would recommend fielding an additional Armored Brigade as prepositioned stock. This would provide U.S. Army Europe two complete Armored Brigade prepositioned stock sets while continuing to rotationally deploy one ABCT.

Accordingly, the Army has requested funding to modernize 14 Abrams and 14 BFVs available due to unit conversions in the European Reassurance Initiative portion of the 2017 President's Budget. This will begin building a second ABCT set in Europe.

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