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Ans : To nullify the validity of the Washington Treaty as of 31 December 1936, when the term of validity expires, it is necessary to notify the intentions of renunciation two years before the above date. (Washington Treaty Article 23 Clause 1.)

(2) When the renunciation notification is sent, a conference (Article 23 Clause 2) is to be held by all contracting powers within one year after it takes effect, but should the notification not be sent within the year, there is fear of the conference not being able to open within the next year.

A conference according to the London Treaty is scheduled to be held next year. (London Treaty Article 23 Clause 2.) It is earnestly hoped that these two conferences be held jointly to discuss the general problems on naval armament limitation.

With a view to attain the object of our proposal on disarmament, we particularly feel the necessity to do so.

Ques: During the investigation of the Washington Treaty, the Government explained to the effect that even if our strength was not equal to that of the U.S. the security of national defense can be established.

Does the same circumstances prevail today?

Ans : Owing to progress in technical and scientific fields and the changes in international situation, it has become

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difficult to rely upon the security of national defense today with the inferior strength fixed by the Washington Treaty. Furthermore, fixing graded strength as in the Washington Treaty gives the impression of admitting gradings between nations and cannot be considered to be fair.

It is necessary to start out from the basic idea of not attaching mechanically any gradings, at least among major powers.

Ques: Is there any difference between our assertions made hitherto at a disarmament conference and our assertions to be made at the conference next year? If there is give reasons.

Ans : They agree completely on the point that the security of national defense is the principal object. However, there are differences in concrete expressions and demands to meet the needs of the time, which is owing to unavoidable circumstances.

Ques: To when does it indicate where it says, "Two years prior to the above term," in Article 23 Clause I of the Washington Treaty.

Ans : Two years before 31 December 1936, that is, prior to 1 January 1935 and it is understood that any time before that time would be justified.

The renunciation of the Washington Treaty will cause considerable grave influence on disarmament.

It will be necessary for all nations to take counter-measures. That is the reason why a minimum two years advance notice period is provided.

It is stipulated in the second clause of the same article to open a conference to work out a remedial measure during this period.

Ques: What are the effects of the notification of renunciation.

Ans : (1) After the lapse of two years from the date the notification takes effect (In case the notification was made within this year it would be 31 December 1936) the Treaty definitely loses its effect.

(II)

However, in case a special arrangement is made at the conference it could bring about a different result.

(2) A conference should be held by all the signatory powers within one year after the renunciation notification takes effect. This conference does not require any special formalities such as sending invitations, and should as a matter of course be held in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty.

Ques: The relation between the conference to be held as a result of the abolition notification and the conference

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to be opened in conformity with the provisions of the London Treaty.

- Ans : (1) Both conferences will be held for separate reasons but not only do their objectives and matters for discussion bear similarity but almost in an indivisible relation with one another.
- (2) On Article 23 Clause 2 of the London Treaty it is provided that, "a conference shall be held in 1935 with a view to form a new treaty which will replace this Treaty and moreover accomplish the objectives of this Treaty."

Further, it is stated in the foregoing paragraph to the following effect, "to prevent the dangers entailing competitive armamenting and desire to reduce the burden as well as develop the enterprise entered upon by the Washington Naval Conference."

The conference to be held as a result of renouncing the Washington Treaty will doubtlessly discuss on matters set forth in the Washington Treaty whereby it should be clear that there are common points in the objectives of the two conferences.

- (3) Participant nations obliged to participate at the conference to be held in conformity with the London Treaty are the three countries of Japan, the U.S. and Britain. However, it was anticipated at the time of treaty signing as five nations, inclusive of Italy and France. Again it is apparent that without the participation by all five nations it will be difficult to form an effective treaty. Therefore, it may be said that

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the participant nations in both conferences shall be the same.

(4) It is evident that matters for discussion will chiefly be on items provided in the Washington Treaty on one hand and on items set forth in the provisions of the London Treaty on the other. But if examined into details, there are provisions in the Washington Treaty besides limitation of capital ships and aircraft-carriers, those one exempt vessels (Article 11), types of auxiliary vessels (Article 12) notification on warship construction (Article 16), prohibition of using warships being constructed for third powers (Article 17), prohibition of alienating warships (Article 18) etc.

Again in Article 1 of the London Treaty, a stipulation is made on the postponement of capital ship replacement. Also in Article Two a provision is set forth on the abolition of capital ships.

In Article Three there is a provision on aircraft-carriers, and in Article 8 there is a provision on exempt vessels.

From what has already been stated we learn that some portions of the items in both treaties correlate with one another. Therefore, the items to be discussed at both conferences should also bear mutual correlation.

(5) In view of the fact that the circumstances and naval disarmament situation stand as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, an exhaustive and impartial conclusion will be difficult to reach without an extensive investigation on naval

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armament. Thereby it is considered vital to hold both conference jointly.

Ques: On the nature etc. of the preparatory negotiations.

Ans : (1) Preparatory negotiations have always been made in conferences up to date, for the purpose of deciding the place and subjects for discussion at the conference, and with a aim to pave the way for smooth progress of the conference.

(2) In view of the conference to be held next year expected to be important and complicated, and also deemed necessary to clarify our basic points on disarmament, the Empire attaches much importance on the preparatory talks and has arranged for sufficient preparation.

(3) The preparatory negotiations will not restrain the respective powers from a legal point of view, but will undoubtedly show real effect from a moral standpoint. Consequently, the words or action made by the respective government representatives at the preparatory negotiations will bear effect at the regular conference.

(4) It is difficult to forecast the preparatory conference outcomes, or definite items for negotiation at the present.

Ques: Nations to be invited.

Ans : In both, the conference to be held in accordance with

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the London Treaty and the conference to be held due to the abolition notification of the Washington Treaty, do not stipulate any provisions in the Treaties as regards the invitation of nations.

It is something which needs to be decided at the preparatory negotiation. The conference to be held as a result of the Washington Treaty abolition obligates all signatory powers to participate and therefore it is understood that there is no need for sending invitations. The conference to be held in accordance with the London Treaty we believe requires the taking of some steps against Italy and France. Therefore, it is probable that it will be necessary for a certain nation, or a few nations, jointly send invitations to the above countries.

In case, the above two conferences are held jointly it will follow the case of the conference to be held due to the Washington Treaty abolition notification.

Ques: Do you intend to retain the Four Power Treaty, the Nine Power Treaty etc, as they are?

Ans : Both, the Four Power Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty do have direct connection with the Washington Treaty.

Again, as it cannot be thought to be an obstacle in concluding a new agreement on disarmament we shall not any steps at the present dealing with them.

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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the 2nd Demobilization Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 26 pages and entitled "Studies through Questions and Answers concerning the Notification of Abolishing the Washington Treaty" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of July, 1947

/S/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /S/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

A Study of War Expenditures of Various
Nations Based On Past Records.

-- Excerpt from the Report submitted (August 15th
1934) by the Committee to investigate the
matters concerning the Conference for the
Reduction of Naval Armaments, 1935.

1. Japan.

(2) The percentage of military expenditures against national income just before the Washington Treaty (not including expenditures for interim cases) were from 1917 to 1921, an average of 7.72% for the 5 years.

Applying this to the national income for the year 1930 which was 10,440,000,000 yen it would amount to 790,000,000 yen.

(b)

(1) The average percentage of military expenditures against the annual expenditure for general accounts before the Russo-Japanese War from 1897 to 1903, a period of 7 years was 41.77%.

(2) The percentage of military expenditures (not including any contingent outlays) against the annual expenditures from General accounts were for the 5 year period from 1917 to 1921 an average 43.54 percent.

The average annual military expenditure during the above 5 year period (not including contingent outlays) was little less than 516,000,000 yen.

(During the above 5 year period, the average price index as of July 1914 based on a research conducted by the Bank of Japan was 217.7).

Vessels completed during the 5 year period from January 1, 1917 to end of 1921.

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Battleships (From YAMASHIRO to MUTSU)	5 ships
154,750 tons	
B Class Cruisers	7 ships
31,960 tons	
Destroyers	43 ships
40,645 tons	
Submarines	17 ships
12,899 tons	
Total	72 ships
240,254 tons	
Average yearly	48,051 tons
Exempted ships	9 ships
85,300 tons	
Grand total	81 ships
325,554 tons	
Average yearly	65,111 tons

(3) Average percentage of military expenses against the annual expenditure from general accounts during the 9 year period from 1925 to 1933 was 30.3%.

The annual average expenditure of military expenses during the above 9 years was 527,000,000 yen. (The average price index as of July 1914 based on a survey made by the Bank of Japan was 163.2).

To step up the above annual average to the percentage at the time immediately prior to the Washington Conference would be 760,000,000 yen.

Ships completed during the 9 years period from January 1, 1925
to the end of 1933.

Aircraft carriers 3 vessels

60,900 tons

A Class Cruisers 12 vessels

107,800 tons

B Class Cruisers 5 vessels

15,560 tons

Destroyers 41 vessels

63,126 tons

Submarines 31 vessels

45,826 tons

Total 90 vessels

293,248 tons

Average 32,582 tons

Exempted ships 9 vessels

4,600 tons

Grand Total 99 vessels

299,908 tons

Annual Average 33,524 tons

(4) 41.77% of the estimated annual revenue for 1937 at 1,800,000,000
yen would be 750,000,000 yen and 43.55% of 1,800,000,000 yen would
be 785,000,000 yen.

(c) The percentage of military expenses for the 3 year period from 1932 to 1934 against the national income for 1930 was 8.03 percent.

The percentage of military expenses for 1934 against the annual expenditure from general accounts (including public loans to fill the deficits amounting to approximately 810,000,000 yen) was approximately 44 percent and, reaches the percentage in the foregoing items of (1), (2) of (a) or (b).

2. The United States.

(a) Percentage and outlines of naval vessel construction of military expenses immediately before the Washington Conference and recent 9 year period against total annual expenditures.

(1) From 1919 to 1922.

Average for 4 Year period 297%.

(Average price index based on standard of July 1914 was 173.8)

Vessels completed in the 4 year period from January 1, 1919 to 1922.

Battleships	4 vessels	127,200 tons
Destroyers	210 vessels	236,366 tons
Submarines	43 vessels	29,350 tons
Total	257 ships	392,926 tons
Average annually		98,231 tons

(2) Average for 9 year period from 1925 to 1933 was 17%.

Annual average of military expenses during the above period of 9 years.

Approximately 770,000,000 dollars. (Average price index in the

above 9 year period as based on standard of July 1914 was 127.1).

23 percent of the national expenditure (percentage of military expenses just before the Washington Treaty) for the recent 9 year period and based upon figures presented above, would be roughly 1,110,000,000 dollars.

Vessels completed in 9 year period from January 1, 1925 to end of 1933

Aircraft Carriers	2 vessels	66,000 tons
A Class Cruisers	10 vessels	92,650 tons
B Class Cruisers	1 vessels	7,950 tons
Submarines	10 vessels	17,410 tons

Total 182,810 tons

Annual Average 20,312 tons

(b) The percentage of military expenses against national income in the period immediately prior to the Washington Treaty and recent 3 years.

From 1919 to 1922. The average of 4 years. 2.26%.

From 1931 to 1933. The average of 3 years. 2.05%.

And the 2.26% of the recent national income is approximately 900,000,000 dollars.

(c) If the percentage of war expenditures at the time just before the Washington Treaty is regarded as tolerable in peacetime by the U.S. people, under present circumstances the military expenses would be estimated to be approximately 8,000,000,000 dollars.

And in the U.S., Military expenditures for the army and navy are roughly the same.

The projected naval estimates for 1935 of approximately 455,000,000 dollars (including expenditures for rehabilitation of industries) and yearly tonnage for ship-construction in 1934 at approximately 62,300 tons (as investigated by Section Five, Navy General Staff) can be regarded as approaching the limit mark in peacetime.

Moreover, it should be noted that deficit in the 1934 year annual revenue was approximately 4,000,000,000 dollars.

3. Britain.

(a) Percentage and outlines of ship-constructions of past war expenditures against total annual revenue.

(1) Average for the 9 year period (Shipbuilding competition period between Britain and Germany) from 1906 to 1914 was 38.2%. War expenditures for the above 9 year period. Average annual expenditure was little over 67,000,000 pounds.

(2). From 1919 to 1922. Average for the 4 year period (immediately before the Washington Treaty) 22.6%.

The average annual war expenditures during the above 4 years period was little over 289,000,000 pounds. (Average price index during the above 4 year period as based on the standard of 1914 was 250.4).

Vessels completed in the 4 year period from January 1, 1919 to end of 1922.

Battleships	1 Vessel	42,100 tons
Cruisers	11 vessels	55,950 tons

Destroyer	46 vessels	46,040 tons
Submarines	22 vessels	14,830 tons
Total	80 vessels	158,920 tons
Annual average		39,720 tons.

(3) From 1925 to 1933.

Average for 9 year period 14.3%.

Annual average of war expenditures during the above 9 year period.

Approximately 113,000,000 pounds. (Average price index during

the above 9 year period, taking the standard of 1914 was 129.9).

Vessels completed during the period of 9 years from January

(1925) 1, 1925 to end of 1933.

Battleships	2 vessels	67,400 tons
A Class Cruisers	15 vessels	143,970 tons
B Class Cruisers	5 vessels	39,070 tons
Destroyers	38 vessels	52,064 tons
Submarines	28 vessels	36,794 tons
Total	88 vessels	339,298 tons

Annual average

(b) Percentage of armament expense against national income in the past.

1913 3.3%

1924 - 1925 average 3.6%

1931 - 1932 average 3.4%

(c) The general economic world was still in a state of depression but recently it recovered a little to make some margin in the yearly budget.

(d) Judging from the foregoing facts it can be observed that it is considerably difficult to effect any ship construction which is beyond the

present standards.

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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 11 pages and entitled "A Study of War Expenditures of Various Nations Based on Past Records" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau)

Certified at Tokyo, on this 3th day of August, 1947.

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

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JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON UPPER LIMIT
OF NAVAL TONNAGE.

- L.N.C. (35)(1st Committee)
10th Meeting on Wednesday,
15th January 1936.

1. Although I have tried at past meetings of this Committee to explain our proposal at considerable length and in sufficient detail to clarify its purport as well as to point out its implications, it does not appear that I have succeeded in my task to the extent of removing all doubts from the minds of the other Delegations. I wish to be permitted to-day, therefore, to undertake a further elaboration of our plan by supplementing the explanations already given and, in order to assure a more complete understanding of our proposals, to offer our views on certain of the observations which the other Delegations have been good enough to make with reference thereto.

If any part of what I am about to say appears to you to be in the nature of repetition of statements I have already made, I can only ask your indulgence, for I feel that a certain measure of repetition is inevitable if I am to present the Japanese plan to you in the clearest possible light.

I wish further to state-with all due deference to the lofty aims of the other Powers-that Japan is second to no country in her sincere and zealous desire for world peace. It is our guiding principle in international politics that all nations should mutual understanding, that it should be made possible for all peoples, happily free from anxieties concerning their national security, to work out their respective destinies in an atmosphere of happiness and contentment that can only come as a blessing of peace among nations.

In considering possible measures for attaining agreement upon disarmament, therefore, we have taken as our primary objective the elimination of the menace of war, and the assurance of an equality of security for all Powers concerned. A plan of disarmament, to be adopted, must, of course, be one which does not give rise to the fallacious notion that there can be any justification for discriminatory treatment between nations, and we have taken great care to assure that the plan should moreover be a practical one.

Having devised our plan with due consideration and careful thought to the three points I have just mentioned, I believe that the Japanese proposal is at once fair, just and practical, and is characterised by a high degree of elasticity. So that if the Delegations will examine our proposal carefully and with sympathy, I feel that no serious difficulty will be encountered in

discovering therein a reasonable basis for a new agreement on disarmament.

As we are now about to enter on the final examination of the Japanese proposal, I venture to express the hope that the Delegations will find it possible, without undue attachment to existing facts or past circumstances, to approach the task in hand with a firm determination to draft a new and the very best possible plan, and, to that end, to study and discuss the Japanese proposal from every possible angle and with a sympathetic understanding of its spirit and purpose.

II. If any Power were to put forward a claim for a very large naval force in anticipation of a need therefore arising simultaneously in various parts of the world, such a claim might, in effect, amount to a demand for a naval force sufficient to deal with two or more Powers. Such a demand might tend to militate against the chances of reaching agreement on the disarmament question, which should, in any case, be considered on the basis of a "one Power versus one Power" relationship.

It two Powers are to conclude such an agreement on the strength of their naval forces as will give them equal standing and guarantee their mutual security, the most rational principle to be applied is that of equality of armaments. We believe, in fact, that there is no other method which would at once be fair and just, and this is especially true as between two Powers which are separated by oceans and whose defence is wholly dependent on their navies.

Moreover, when we consider the high degree of mobility of naval armaments and the peculiar character of naval warfare, the need of defensive equality for all Powers demands that there shall be equality of naval forces and especially of those categories which form the backbone of the fleet. It is for this reason that the Japanese proposal provides for equality, category by category, in "A" class cruisers and all larger types. But as regards categories whose use is exclusively defensive, suitable adjustments should be made to meet the special circumstances of each Power; hence the provision of the Japanese proposals that, as regards "B" class cruisers and all lesser types, limitation shall be effected globally. It is a peculiar characteristic of naval forces that they can be moved about at will with great facility; and it goes without saying that this characteristic will become more and more pronounced in the future as improvements in the technique of naval construction continue. It is, moreover, a fundamental rule of naval strategy that forces which are scattered over several seas shall be concentrated in a single area whenever necessary for technical reasons. That this can be done—and, what is more, that a Power can concentrate its forces in a particular area so as to constitute a mortal threat to another Power—is borne out by numerous instances in naval history. Consequently, when discussing naval relations between two countries, it is only reasonable that at least all the vessels

capable of participating in naval engagements shall be taken into consideration, and, if the total of such vessels of one Power is superior to that of the other, the only possible consequence is that the inferior Power will have its sense of security impaired, while the superior naval Power will be in a position to exceed the actual needs of its national defence, even to the point of becoming a menace to others.

Moreover, in order to establish as complete a state of non-aggression and non-menace as possible, we advocate the complete abolition or drastic reduction of offensive armaments. To explain more fully, we advocate the abolition of aircraft-carriers and a drastic reduction in capital ships and "A" class cruisers. But if there were a general sentiment in favour of the abolition of capital ships also, we should be ready to give our support thereto.

As regards armaments which are essentially defensive in character and purpose, we believe that each Power should be permitted to equip itself in the manner best suited to its conditions and circumstances.

If this feature of the Japanese proposal were to be put into effect, we believe that naval forces would be largely deprived of their capacity for menacing other Powers. The complete abolition or drastic reduction of offensive armaments would not only result directly in a very substantial measure of reduction, but it would also have the indirect effect of producing still further reductions all round because the strengthening of the sense of security consequent on the disappearance of offensive types is bound to give rise to a general tendency on the part of the naval Powers to reduce further the sizes of their navies.

III. In order to bring once more to the minds of the Delegations the principal features of the Japanese proposal, I would now undertake to set forth the framework of our formula, somewhat as follows...

(1) There would first of all be fixed a maximum global tonnage which none of the Powers concerned might exceed. This maximum global tonnage must not only be a suitable one for practical purposes, but it must be fixed at as low a level as possible so as not to be contrary to the spirit of disarmament.

(2) Simultaneously with the determination of the global tonnage, there would be fixed for those categories which are generally recognized to be predominantly offensive in character—namely, capital ships, aircraft-carriers (in the event of their non-abolition), and "A" class cruisers—a common maximum tonnage and a common number of units to be allowed to each Power in respect of each of the three categories separately.

(3) As regards "B" class cruisers and vessels of lesser type, which are generally recognized to be essentially defensive, it should be sufficient to fix a common maximum global tonnage for all of the said categories, so as to make it possible for each Power to determine,

in accordance with its own needs, the tonnage which it may deem appropriate in each of those categories.

(4) Any Power which may deem it necessary to do so for reasons of its special circumstances, may voluntarily reduce its tonnage in "A" class cruisers, and increase its tonnage in any of the defensive categories mentioned in paragraph (3). Although there may conceivably be numerous ways of effecting the above-mentioned reduction and increase, we believe it should be made the subject of technical examination.

This provision, together with the provision of paragraph (3), would give to each Power a very wide scope for making adjustments so as to compensate for its vulnerability.

(5) Since the powers concerned would be left to work out their naval problems according to their own free will within the scope of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the Japan plan would not necessarily preclude the adoption of such a formula, for instance, as a declaration of naval building programmes.

(6) If there should be any Power which claims the necessity of effecting modifications even beyond the adjustments contemplated in the foregoing paragraphs, such claim would be carefully examined by the Powers concerned, and, if it were proved to be reasonable and well-founded, Japan would not refuse its recognition. But since, as I have repeatedly explained, the establishment of a state of non-aggression and non-menace is at the very basis of our proposal, I think it can be readily understood that, while we might be able to recognise a claim for additional adjustment based on purely defensive needs arising from the special circumstances of the Power concerned, we could in no circumstances consent to an increase in the combatant strength of a navy such as would jeopardise the state of non-aggression and non-menace.

Moreover, it is not intended that, a common upper limit having once been set, all Powers must build up to it. It goes without saying that each should restrict its navy to the smallest size with which its defensive needs can be adequately met. In this regard, goodwill and mutual trust among the various Powers are absolutely indispensable, and I believe the Committee will agree with us that, without such goodwill and mutual trust, agreement on any kind of a disarmament treaty is impossible, no matter by what formula or on what principles the attempt may be made.

If, on the other hand, it should be possible to deprive naval armaments of their capacity to menace other Powers, as is contemplated by the Japanese proposal, the various Powers would not feel the necessity of extensive naval construction; in fact, there would probably be no Power that would even contemplate huge naval programmes. We believe, in other words, that there is no ground for apprehension that the establishment of a common upper limit will give impetus to a general movement for larger navies.

IV. May I be permitted at this stage to consider in the light of the basic conception underlying the Japanese proposal, which I have just explained, a few of the points raised by the other Delegations in the course of their observations upon our plan, for I feel that the explanation of our plan will be facilitated by my so doing.

The view that a nation, by reason of its being also a Pacific Power, should be entitled to possess in the Pacific a naval strength equal to that of the other Powers in the same waters, in addition to other naval forces which it claims to be necessary in European waters or in the Atlantic Ocean, appears to us tantamount, in effect, to a claim to the right to possess a navy equal in strength to the combined strengths of the navies of two or more countries. Such a claim, it appears to us, may be said to be hardly commendable as a basis for an agreement on disarmament. And, as I have pointed out already, it would not be possible for us to support such a claim, in view of the highly mobile character of Naval armaments.

We can readily understand that the possession of greater and more numerous overseas territories and lines of communication may well justify a demand for a greater strength than other Powers in small and purely defensive types of vessels which have no combatant capacity at sea, but which are suitable for coast patrol, defence of harbours and other similar purposes. But, if for the same reason, a Power should demand superiority in naval force as a whole, the sense of security of other Powers would thereby be disturbed. In any case, I believe it is a well-known fact that the condition of nations whose naval forces are now on a basis of parity are not the same as regards their overseas possessions and lines of communication.

Frequent references have been made to the defensive needs of certain outlying possessions. But we find it difficult to see the reasonableness of a claim for superior forces for the defence of such outlying possessions if, as a consequence, the very heart of another Power will be menaced thereby.

It appears to us quite clear that a nation's ability to protect its overseas possessions and sea routes depends wholly upon whether or not it can control the seas.

Considering the question of overseas possessions and colonies from another angle, it would seem clear that, through the possession of such interests overseas, a nation enjoys the advantage of having bases and sources of supplies located in widely scattered parts of the world. That, we believe, may be an incalculable advantage, not only as regards the protection of lines of communication, but also in facilitating the movement and concentration of naval forces.

If we were to subscribe to the view that has been expressed, that a nation which is dependent on the sea requires a large naval force, it could be said for Japan that she too is wholly dependent on the sea. What is more, she is poor in natural resources and, with her population exceeding in density that of any other country in the world, is forced to look to countries beyond the seas for the greater part of the supplies necessary to her existence as well as for the raw materials for her industries. There is thus a vast difference between Japan and the countries which, though obtaining part of their supplies from abroad, can nevertheless have most of their needs supplied by their own territorial possessions; and this difference becomes even more pronounced when comparison is made with a country which has an abundance of resources at home and which is for the most part self-supporting and self-sufficient. Considered in that light, it is difficult to see how a country, so situated as Japan is, can be expected to feel secure with a naval force inferior to that of another whose circumstances are far more favourable.

V. By way of conclusion, I desire to say that, while Japan will never cease to hope for the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on naval disarmament, that is not to say that she is going to insist on attaining the impossible.

The plan which the Japanese Delegation has submitted to this Conference was prepared in the light of the experience and results of past disarmament conferences, with due attention to the actualities of the international situation of the day and with careful consideration of the various relevant problems from every possible angle. And it is our conviction that through the adoption of the principles embodied in the Japanese proposal, the Conference would succeed in achieving a comprehensive agreement on naval disarmament without serious difficulties.

Once the Japanese proposal is adopted by the Conference, the way could be found for incorporating therein the important features of the other proposals with such modifications as may be deemed suitable. For the Japanese proposal, as a formula for disarmament, is neither rigid nor academic. It is a practical one, marked by its comprehensive character and flexibility.

The Japanese Delegation, in submitting its proposal, was anxious that it should thereby be able to give satisfaction to all the Powers concerned in equal measure. It is only after the most careful study and mature consideration, prompted by our recognition of the urgent world-wide desire for effective measures of disarmament, that we have brought ourselves to place our proposal before this Conference.

I therefore desire finally to urge that all the Delegates be good enough to give their most mature consideration to our plan sympathetically and with an open mind.

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Annex 20

Date of dispatch: (P.M.) 12th January 1936
To : Plenipotentiary, Disarmament Conference.
From : Foreign Minister HIROTA
Subject : Instructions in response to request made
by the Plenipotentiary at the Disarmament
Conference.

(Code) Disarmament. No. 13

(Secret:)

On response to your telegram No. 54 Thanking every member of the
delegation for your efforts.

1. You are to explain exhaustively our previous assertions at the
next committee meeting and at other occasions that the basic
policy of the Imperial Government is to establish a common
maximum limitation as well as reducing offensive military
strength both in quantity and quality thereby establishing a
principle of non-intimidation and non-aggression, and also our
assertions on a complete disarmament plan, that is, the complete
abolition or extreme (drastic) reduction of aircraft carriers,
capital ships and A-class cruisers which may be classed as
offensive strength, which is in an inseparable connection with
the common maximum limitation plan. Clearly explain that the

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Imperial Government cherishes no other intentions and earnestly hopes for the conclusion of an impartial and fair disarmament agreement based on the above basic policy. Endeavour to express our sincerity towards the disarmament project. And still if our basic assertions are not recognized the Imperial Government does not hold any intention of remaining in conference to discuss over a shipbuilding notification plan or the plan on restricting quality. Consequently, cession from the conference would be inevitable.

2. In conformity with the above, endeavor to persuade other plenipotentiaries (delegates) to reconsider our proposal, but without pressing for its adoption. While on the other hand make it clear that there are no objections in settling restrictions on ----- and submarines, thereby concluding between the five nations concerned any possible agreements such as the restriction on using submarines at an early possible date. Moreover, lead the conference so it would be closed by announcing a joint statement to the effect that there would be no competitive armamenting among the participant nations. As for the other problems, in case it should be the request of the other powers, it is considered advisable if it took the form of transferring it to another new conference when the Imperial Government will not participate.

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3. The British side cherishes the opinion of retaining Clause 22, Chapter 4 of the London Treaty, concerning the restriction on employing submarines, as an independent agreement. The Imperial Government also does not have any objection towards the same provision becoming an independent agreement. If needs be, we have no objections in continuing the various clauses in the Washington Treaty, such as Clause 14 (restriction on arming merchant ships), Clause 17 (prohibition of using a warship under construction for another power, during war.), Clause 18 (agreements on disposition of warships). There are no objections in proceeding with negotiations, with the representatives of nations concerned, in adjusting such clauses and forming a new agreement.
4. In the case a conference should be held with our Government excluded, there is no objection in sending an observer to the conference. However, as to the selection of the observer you will wait for instructions.

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Annex 20

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of the 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Instructions in response to request made by the Plenipotentiary at the Disarmament Conference" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 30th day of July, 1947

(signed) YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

4

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of 2nd Demobilization office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "To Foreign Minister Hirota from Disarmament Delegate Message No. 54 Part 1", is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30 day of July, 1947.

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

Telegram 54 Part 2.

We, the members of the Japanese delegation have endeavored to our utmost since our arrival in London, both in and out of the Conference chambers in observance of the purport of your instructions to achieve the basic principles advocated by Japan. It is deeply regrettable that we could not convince the powers concerned. However, as the situation was as previously stated, we shall, after making further detailed explanation of our contention at the committee meeting to be held for the discussion of our empire's proposal on the 13th at 1730 hours, ask for definite expressions of opinion by all the powers. And after it has thus been ascertained that they are all opposed to our proposal, we believe that there will be no alternative for us but to withdraw from the conference with an explanation of the reasons for our inability to remain. Should the four powers continue the conference after our withdrawal, we can see no objection to the presence of a mere observer, since such a step should not work to our disadvantage.

Will you, therefore, give your careful consideration to situation in the conference, and then inform us as soon as possible of your opinion on the steps we propose to take, as abovementioned, and on the advisability of taking part in the discussion of the question of restrictions on the use of submarines.

If there is no prospect of your instructions reaching us in time for the meeting on the 13th, we propose to ask for a postponement of the said meeting. Will you, therefore, inform us also as to the date on which we may expect your instructions to reach us.

To Foreign Minister Hirota From Disarmament

Delegate Message No. 54 Part 1.

We have first discussed the problem of quantitative disarmament and urged the consolidation of a basis for a disarmament agreement. You are doubtless already informed on the procedure of the conference having progressed as we desired. However, after the recess the Conference turned its attention from declaration of shipbuilding program to construction notification as reported in telegram No. 49.

As the situation thus showed a tendency to drift away from the problem of quantitative disarmament, our delegation considered it important to prevent it at an early stage, and on the 8th strongly emphasized the necessity of first discussing the quantitative problem and to leave the notification problem to a later date.

However, as you have already been informed by telegram No. 52, it was suggested by the British delegation that if our contentions were to be recognized it would mean that a decision would have to be made on our proposal before all the other proposals; in which event,

- (1) If the Japanese proposal were rejected, would the Japanese delegation be prepared to remain in the Conference and to discuss the other proposals; and
- (2) if the Japanese delegation withdrew from the Conference and the other four powers continued with the Conference, would our delegation be willing to send an observer?

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Japanese Proposal for a Common Upper Limit of Naval Tonnage" is an official document handed to me when I attended ^{the} London Naval Conference, 1935" as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (1)

CONFIDENTIAL.

Copy No. 129

L.N.C. (35) 7

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE; 1935

The Secretary-General presents his compliments and transmits herewith a copy of a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Conference by the Japanese Delegation together with a copy of the reply, the terms of which were agreed at the Eleventh Meeting of the First Committee held on the 16th January, 1936.

Secretariat-General,
Clarence House,
16th January, 1936.

JAPANESE DELEGATION TO THE
LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE,
15th January, 1936.

My Lord,

I have the honour hereby to notify Your Lordship that as it has become sufficiently clear at to-day's session of the First Committee that the basic principles embodied in our proposal for a comprehensive limitation and reduction of naval armaments cannot secure general support, our Delegation usefully continue our participation in the deliberation of the present Conference.

We remain, nevertheless, firmly convinced that our proposal is one best calculated to attain an effective disarmament, and we regret to state that we cannot subscribe, for the reasons we have repeatedly set forth, to the plans of quantitative limitation submitted by the other Delegations.

I desire to assure you, on this occasion, that we most sincerely appreciate the cordial manner in which you have been good enough to conduct the Conference; at the same time, I should like to tender our deepest thanks on behalf of our Delegation, for the hearty co-operation of all the Delegations to this Conference.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Sd.) USAME HAGANO.

The Right Honourable Viscount Monsell of Evesham, G.B.E.,

First Lord of the Admiralty.

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (1)

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 2 pages and known as "L.N.C. (35) 7 (Annex 22 (1))" is an official document handed to me when I attended ^{the} London Naval Conference, 1935 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO Jui (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (2)

CONFIDENTIAL.

COPY NO. 137

(35) 9

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935

The Secretary-General presents his compliments and transmits herewith a copy of a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Conference by the Japanese Delegation.

Secretary-General
Clarence House,
Westminster, S.W.1.
21st January, 1936.

JAPANESE DELEGATION TO THE
LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE,

January 20th, 1936.

My Lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's letter of the 16th instant and to state in reply that the Japanese Government are pleased to accept the invitation of the Committee to leave Observers who will keep in touch with the work of the Conference. The Japanese Government understand that such observers are to be present at the meetings of the First Committee and other important meetings.

I further have the honour to inform you that the Japanese Government have appointed Mr. K. Fujii, Charge d'Affaires, and Captain R. Fujita, Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy, as observers at the London Naval Conference.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) OSAMI NAGANO.

Ref. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (2)

The Right Honourable Viscount Monsell of Evesham, G.B.E.,

First Lord of the Admiralty and Chairman of the First

Committee of the London Naval Conference.

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (2)

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 2 pages and known as "L.N.C. (35) 9 (Annex 22(2))" is an official document handed to me when I attended ^{the} London Naval Conference, 1935 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Jui (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,

on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

Measures to be adopted in view of the
World Naval Power Disarmament Conference.

-Excerpt from the Report submitted (August
15th, 1934) by the Committee to investigate
the matters concerning the Conference for
the Reduction of Naval Armaments, 1935.

1. If an agreement should be formed at the next naval disarmament conference it may serve as basis to create a tendency for many more powers to conclude naval agreements: It would be necessary in such a case to take steps beforehand to consolidate the agreements which are already formed.
2. It is thought proper to meet the situation with the following policies when dealing with countries who are not contracting parties.
 - (a) Take into due consideration the existent conditions of all naval powers and reduce its armament as much as possible.
 - (b) As for the possession of capital ships, aircraft carriers, A class cruisers and submarines, they shall either be greatly limited or totally abolished in accordance with the agreement among the great powers.
 - (c) As for other types of vessels and exempted ships, they shall be dealt with in accordance with the Imperial Government's policy

adopted hitherto as well as the provisions of the agreement which may be concluded at the coming conference.

3. In the event an agreement was not concluded at the next conference and if a naval disarmament conference participated by all the navies in the world was held, perhaps at the Geneva General Disarmament Conference, it is proper that the Imperial Government adopt the following policies,

(a) Firstly, an agreement should be formed among the major naval powers and it should serve as a criterion for general naval agreements.

(b) The naval powers other than the major naval powers, shall be dealt with according to the above item.

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Annex 23

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archipelago
of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that
the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and
entitled "Measures to be adopted in view of the World Level Power Disarmament
Conference" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in
the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobiliza-
tion Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 8th day of August, 1947

(signed) YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto
in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

The Report Submitted To The
Emperor By The Plenipotentiaries Attending
The Naval Disarmament Conference
Held At London In 1935.

Your subjects; Osami, Matsuzo and others in compliance with Your Majesty's command to attend The Naval Disarmament Conference at London, left Your Majesty's Palace on 16 November of last year and arrived in London on 2 December.

The conference opened on 9 December with its First General Meeting. Statements were read by the plenipotentiaries of the respective nations. Following which, considerations were to be made by the First Committee which was to consist of all members of the plenipotentiaries, but as we considered it more important to exchange unreserved opinions with the delegates of respective nations concerned, we did not wait for the conference to open and negotiated with British authorities which extended the invitation, and with the French authorities. After which, during the session of the Conference we conferred with the delegates of the respective participant nations now and then, thereby endeavoured to facilitate the accomplishment of our assertions.

At the First Committee session, we asserted that the question of limitation in numerical strength should be taken up with greatest importance in order to realize a disarmament and thereby requested priority in deliberating on this problem. The respective nations

agreed upon this move and our plan of proposal was to be the subject of discussion.

The debate on our proposal continued through five sessions of the conference. The point of argument was centered upon the establishment of a common maximum limitation. We explained in details the fundamental policy of our Imperial Government. We also earnestly explained to the effect that in order to materialize the equality of security which the Disarmament Conference should attach great importance to, was to first, establish a common maximum limitation in view of the faculties of naval strength and next, if necessary, make adequate adjustments in contents taking into consideration the special circumstances of respective nations within the scope of the above common maximum limitation. To reach an agreement in numerical strength was the best method in attaining the objectives of armament restriction. However, the British side said that a nation whose vulnerability was great in national defense and its responsibilities extensive would have to possess military strength which was greater than the nation which was not so. Therefore, if a common maximum limitation was established such a nation would not only be left in insecurity but be extremely unfair. Again, if in case a common maximum limitation was established, such limitation could not be restricted to such low standards as Japan claims, but would invite in general an expansion in armaments. And if adjustments were made in view of the special circumstances of the various nations, it would ultimately be the acknowledging of differences in military strength.

Moreover, the balance of defensive strength which served as the basis of the Washington Treaty does not appertain to equality of military strength, and to determine a common maximum limitation and equalize military strength would upset the balance of defensive strength.

The American delegates emphasized that there was no other way to secure equality in safety and balance in defensive strength than to follow the principles of the Washington Treaty. They also expressed opinions similar to those of the British delegates.

The French delegates said that there was doubt in whether the common maximum limitation would provide sufficient security even if adjustments were made and also, if other European powers demanded its application it would create a general uneasiness.

The Italian delegates said that if adjustments were made according to special circumstances, it would mean the recognize such ratios.

Thus, every nation did not express approval of our proposal.

Against which we strongly emphasized that although naval strength should be considered as a whole because it can be shifted, our proposal would remove the difference in military strength which is the greatest cause for vulnerability in national defense and abolish offensive military strength while adjust defensive military strength thereby leading to a state of non-menace and non-aggression. Consequently there would be no uneasiness in national defense, no partiality and fear of armament expansion. As for adjustment, by taking into consideration the contents of military strength held by such means as holding special type

warships which will meet the demands of the special condition, it could be done within the scope of the common maximum limitation.

As for the Washington Treaty, it was based on military strength held by respective powers at that time. However, the progress in warships and military equipments and the change in situation has made it impossible to maintain equality in security. However, they firmly adhered to their own opinions and we too strongly adhered to our assertions with a resolute attitude from beginning to end.

During this time, we further endeavored to accomplish our assertion and held two conferences with the British delegates. However, the Imperial proposal finally could not win the approval of the participant nations, and on 16 December it was decided to postpone debates to a later date.

On the next day, the 17th, the U.S. side suggested devising some expedient measure to clear a way out of the deadlock between the U.S. and Japan. However, the above was based on previously existing treaties with a few modifications added to it and could not be accepted by our side.

The British plan of proposal which was submitted for consideration at the First Committee session following the debate on the Japanese proposal, recognized the independent right of armament as well as the announcement of a shipbuilding program in a fixed number of year, from an one-sided and voluntary standpoint. It was tendered as a numerical restriction plan, its significance being the averting of ratio. However, the above proposal was, in substance, aimed at supporting existing at

present among the various nations. It conflicts our fundamental policy and therefore we made it clear that we could not accept it. On the other hand, France and Italy both were opposed to the proposal. Later, France and Italy taking into consideration Japan's standpoint presented a plan which added an item on shipbuilding notification to the announcement of a short period shipbuilding program, to serve as a compromise plan. Concurrently, Britain presented a single shipbuilding notification plan and the conference reached a situation where the above three plans concerning shipbuilding notification were to be taken up for consideration.

We had perceived since long before that the participant nations had viewed the solution of the numerical strength problem to be extremely difficult and sought to restrict it to an agreement on limitation of quality and other problems of secondary importance. If the conference should separate from the problem of restriction on numerical strength, we judged that our accomplishment in asserting our aims would become still difficult and therefore endeavored to impress the necessity of deliberating on the same problem before others. However, we faced a situation where the shipbuilding program announcement changed to a shipbuilding notification problem which seemed to be irrelevant with the problem of limitation in numerical strength. Thereby we realized the necessity of stopping such move at an early stage and on 3 January of this year we strongly stressed the deliberation on the problem of numerical strength to come first and to discuss the problem of notification at a later date, at the session of the First Committee. Moreover, we

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expressed disapproval to the part dealing with the announcement of shipbuilding program submitted by France and Italy on grounds that adjustments could not be made on present military strength. As for the part dealing with notification of shipbuildings we took a non-debating attitude. In view of our strong attitude, the British side asked us straightforwardly if Japan would still remain at the conference if the Japanese proposal was rejected and would like to know if Japan would send an attendant to listen at the conference if it were continued by the four nations without Japan.

We had intended to continue further efforts to gain the understanding of the nations concerned by making still more explanations on our proposal, but when the situation had come to this stage, the adoption of our proposal was considered difficult and we judged that sooner or later we would have to leave the conference. Whereupon, we summed up the situation and waited for instructions from the Government. In compliance with the instructions received, we negotiated with the British side and as a result our proposal was to be submitted again to the First Committee session on 15 January.

At the session of the First Committee we explained the significance and contents of our proposal in details and cordially and urged the reconsideration by the participant nations. But the participant powers repeated their former opinions and adhered to the attitude of opposing our proposal. Whereupon it became clear that we could not gain the support of our proposal by the participant nations, and as our Empire

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could not acknowledge other nations plans, it lead to our secession from the conference.

Moreover, we were to send an attendant to listen at the conference held among the four nations in complinace with the request made at the conference. Looking back upon the conference, we explained in details the significance and contents of our proposal ever since we arrived in London, beginning with the First General Meeting and not to speak of every conference where our proposal was considered and later on at practically every session of the First Committee which was held several times, and also at every opportunity. While on the other hand, even outside the conference, several meetings were held with the delegates of the U.S., Britain, France and Italy, exchanging frank opinions, thereby exerting every possible effort throughout the conference session in the hope of accomplishing our important task. However, to summarize the true motives of the nations concerned, Britain saw the necessity of taking into consideration the naval powers, both in the Pacific area and the European area, and could not approve of reducing her present numerical military strength. The U.S. though adding a few modifications, definitely sought to rely upon the significance of the treaties in effect and both France and Italy did not desire the proposal of a balance of powers in view of the special conditions peculiar to Europe.

For such reasons as stated above all participant nations did not approve of our proposal. Our being unable to accomplished our task by convincing them of our assertions and seceding from the conference was

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due to our incapability for which we are really sorry. However we are convinced that we have made it clear to the nations concerned the sincerity and policy of our Imperial Government in dealing with the problem of Naval disarmament.

We submit the above report to Your Majesty.

12 March 1936

Delegates Plenipotentiary at
The London Disarmament Conference

Admiral: Osami Nagano
Ambassador Plenipotentiary: Matsuzao Nagai

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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of the 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "The Report Submitted To The Emperor By The Plenipotentiaries Attending The Naval Disarmament Conference Held at London In 1935", is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: /s/ ONUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)