

Page

24,136 When shown a telegram from KATO to ARITA to refresh his memory, \* the witness said the question was entirely different from the matter discussed. This involved a proposal submitted that the lower rank advisors of the Renovation Regime be employed as advisors to the new regime, and the answer was given that all appointments of advisors should be left to Wang's initiative and the request was refused. The witness, however, did not know the telegram.

24,137 There were temptations on the part of advisors to interfere with the Nanking Government. \* He did not know how the advisors heretofore acted and whether they interfered or not, but he did know that the Japanese as a race had the habit of interfering with other people's business.

He had stated there was even an anti-Wang Government atmosphere in Japan. The statement that the reason for this was that the Wang Government was too much a tool of the Japanese Army to the exclusion of the interests of the people, was completely opposite to the actual reasons for the antipathy.

He did not remember that the negotiations he and IMAI carried on were known as the WATANABE plan. The results of the negotiations, however, were virtually the same as KONOYE's announcement. He and IMAI only met Wang's representative once in the fall of 1938.

24,139 When asked whether one of the terms was that Japan was to take possession of the natural resources of North China, he stated \* he did not remember the contents, but if one did judge the contents to be the same as KONOYE's statement, he would be right.

INUKAI was in Shanghai when he met with the representatives of Wang Ching-wei. He did not remember whether he and INUKAI had an interview with KONOYE about December 21, 1938, but he frequently met KONOYE. He could not remember that both he and INUKAI met KONOYE and he could not recall telling KONOYE that the secret plot in China would be a success. He did not know what was meant by secret plot.

Exhibits 2721-B to H, inclusive, were received in evidence.

Page REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF KAGESA, Sadaaki  
by Mr. Kato, counsel for DOHIHARA

24,145 With respect to the telegram sent about April 22 or April 23, 1939, while the witness was in Hanoi and after DOHIHARA had returned to Tokyo, the witness stated he did not know whether this telegram was sent or not.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Roberts

24,146 The witness stated that he read Wang's New Year statement in a Chinese newspaper while in Nanking. At present there is no Chinese text of this statement, but there is a translation of the section entitled "General Peace," and the book entitled, "Road to General Peace." \* He identified the book referred to as Exhibit 2721-L.

24,147

In the spring of 1939 Wang told the witness whether or not he considered Chiang Kai-shek as a real representative of the Chinese people. He stated that the people of China all really desired peace and further stated that it was regrettable that Chiang Kai-shek could not exercise his own initiative and act according to his own will because the communistic influence in Chungking was too strong.

24,149 In Exhibit 2721-F the reference to the plan to wait refers to Wang himself.

24,151 Exhibit 2721-B, telegram dated April 19, 1939 \* to the Chief of the General Affairs Section from Chief of Staff, Taiwan Army, stated that Kawamura (KAGESA) had finished commercial dealings and everything was favorable. They were to refer to the TSUCHIDA telegram for details.

24,152 Exhibit 2721-C1, telegram sent \* April 20th to the Chief of General Affairs Section from Chief of Staff, Formosan Army, stated that KAGESA visited Wang in his hideout on the 18th with INUKAI and YANO and talked for three hours. They were already well informed of the details through KO and would prefer discussing the main problems at once. They made known their firm determination and informed of their desire to remove quickly to a place safe and convenient for developing their activities. This was a prerequisite condition.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
June 11, 1947  
DEFENSE - Division III - China  
KAGESA - Redirect

Page 3693

Page

24,153

After various considerations \* it has been decided that the French should be entirely responsible for protection in regard to the escape, that a French steamship should be chartered to carry him to a hideout in the French concession in Shanghai. Japan should previously prepare two or three hideouts in the International Settlement and the Japanese police should be placed around to keep guard. He would request the Foreign Ministry to send instructions to Shanghai to prepare immediately suitable hideouts in the International Settlement and to take necessary protective measures.

24,154

For protection it was advisable to secretly contact Vice-Inspector General AKAGI to have Japanese police guard after arrival. Wang desires proper measures so that he might pass quarantine incognito. ITO will be sent immediately to Shanghai. IWAI will establish connection with SEIKI and take part in the preparations. The Hokko Maru will sail directly to Shanghai \* while secretly escorting Wang's steamer. The Japanese will be on board. The Von Forenhoben is decided as the French steamer. The time of departure and of arrival has not been decided. He will be informed later.

24,155

Exhibit 2721-C2, telegram to Chief of General Affairs Section from Chief of Staff, Formosan Army, stated that the hideout in the French concession is to be temporary and it was the intention to remove them to hideouts in the International Settlement as soon as possible. With respect to preparing three houses it is his desire to make the following considerations. \* All windows are to be covered tightly with bullet proof sheets of wire, with the upper half made so that they can be folded down; small peeping windows to be made in the outside sheets and covered with screens. Iron grilles to be opened and closed will be installed in various places. One of the houses should be in the Hongkew district and two in the south of the Soochow Creek district.

24,156

Exhibit 2721-C3, telegram from Chief of Staff, Formosan Army, to Chief, General Affairs Section, asked for certain corrections to be made in the KAGESA telegram No. 2. \* When the French steamer arrives at Shanghai at the end of the month, the Japanese authorities and Wang's comrades shall be together in charge of the method of disembarkation and transportation of passengers who later boarded the ship.

Page

It would be convenient if he could be taken directly to the hide-out and not to the French concession in Shanghai. Since ITO and Sergeant KAWASHIMI are going to Shanghai first, the Japanese Agency in Shanghai should deliberate with them.

24,157

Exhibit 2721-D, telegram from Hanoi to ARITA from KAWAMURA (KAGESA), April 24, 1939, stated that the negotiation is completed and plans for loading the cargo have already been arranged. Since the situation does not permit any change in plans, they wish to carry it out according to fixed schedule. He is requested to demand an immediate completion of preparations of at least one of the warehouses in Osaka (Shanghai) and to take charge of preparations for unloading. May 6th was the date of arrival.

24,158

Exhibit 2721-E1, telegram dated April 29, 1939 from KAGESA to the Imperial Headquarters, stated that he had successfully established liaison with Wang. \* The course of the Hokko Maru has been changed from Takao to Keelung, arriving there on the 30th, with future destination to be decided later. He hoped that YAMAMOTO would also change his destination and go to Keelung.

Exhibit 2721-E2 stated that it seemed that Wang was somewhere near Hongkong. He had been successful in establishing liaison and was informed of his safety.

24,159

Exhibit 2721-E3 from Major HARUKI to Colonel USUI, April 30th, stated that preparations for landing and guard of residence will be completed by the evening of the 4th at the latest, \* and it was going on satisfactorily with utmost secrecy. It would be very convenient if he could be informed of the approximate time of arrival off Woosung since he hoped to establish liaison directly with KAGESA prior to landing.

Exhibit 2721-F, telegram from KAGESA to Chief of the 2nd Department, through Chief of Staff, Formosan Army, stated that Wang would arrive at Shanghai on the 6th in accordance with pre-arranged plan. He is naturally anticipating after arrival a battle of telegrams with Chiang Kai-shek, and terrorist opposition. He wishes to set himself up as soon as possible at the place most convenient for his various activities.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
June 11, 1947  
DEFENSE - Division III - China  
KAGESA - Redirect

Page 3695

Page

24,160

When they arrive at Shanghai \* they shall stay for the time being in a house prepared and rely on the Japanese Army and Navy for guard and protection. It is reported that Japanese terrorists have been sent from Tokyo for this purpose, but considering the bitter experiences in the past he wished that they would absolutely stop the plan. It may seem a good plan to wait someplace outside Shanghai until preparations for guards and protection would be finished, but he did not believe it would be finished in two or three months.

Wang intends to call on his followers to decide the future negotiation plan; taking the situation of Shanghai into consideration Wang is contemplating hiring a Japanese ship and leaving China for about a month and hold conferences on board it while cruising. According to KAGESA the available Japanese ship could not accommodate thirty, and it is necessary to prepare another. He asked the General Staff to study the matter.

24,161

Exhibit 2721-G, telegram from KAGESA, DOHIHARA Agency, to the Chief of the General Affairs Section, May 23rd, stated \* that Wang will send messengers to Peking and Nanking with his confidential letters to the Provisional and Renovation governments, explaining his reasons for his actions and asking for cooperation. This is aimed to dispel misunderstanding based on various rumors, particularly that his movement is a trick on the part of the Chiang Regime. It will also make clear that Japan will not initiate political negotiations prematurely. Wang realizes that a friendly relation with Wu Pei-Fu would have great influence on his scheme.

24,162

Exhibit 2721-H, telegram from KAGESA, DOHIHARA Agency, to the Chief of the 2nd Department, May 30, 1939, stated \* that Wang and a group of 13 would fly on the 31st, resting at Omura and then coming directly to Tokyo. They will land at Yokusuka. KAGESA, ICHIDA, INUKAI and SUGA will accompany them.

37907

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION  
TAKING THE DEPOSITION OF KAGESA, SADAOKI,  
AT FIRST NATIONAL HOSPITAL, TOKYO, JAPAN,  
MAY 22-23, 1947

The following is found among the "Appearances":

"Historical Consultant for the Defense:  
Mr. Richard De Martino"

It is suggested that the following be added to precede  
the above:

"Historical Consultant for the Prosecution:  
Mr. James T. C. Liu"

*Chinese Division of the*  
^

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
TOKYO

2nd June 1947.

MEMORANDUM for : MR. B. ROBERTS.  
JUDGE NYI.

(Copies to: Judge Dell.  
Mr. Greenberg.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE  
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NORTHCROFT AT  
FIRST NATIONAL HOSPITAL, TOKYO.

A transcript of the proceedings at the First National Hospital, Tokyo, has now been reproduced from the notes taken by the Court reporters, and, as directed by Mr. Justice Northcroft, I enclose a copy herewith.

His Honour desires Counsel for the Prosecution and the Defense to be satisfied as to the correctness of the transcript before he certifies it as being a correct record of the proceedings. He therefore directs me to ask that you go through the transcript yourself, noting the passages which in your opinion are not a correct record, and then, at some convenient time, to attend, either yourself or by representatives, in His Honour's room (Room 228), in order that an endeavour may be made to agree upon such corrections as Prosecution and Defence consider to be necessary. These, as well as any corrections which cannot be agreed upon, I will report to Mr. Justice Northcroft. His Honour will thus have the advantage of Counsels' views before he makes the final corrections to the transcript.



Flight Lieutenant,  
ASSOCIATE TO THE HONOURABLE  
MR. JUSTICE NORTHCROFT.

Encl:

*Evens ho*  
*266950*

*Wing Hq. 81.*

KAGESA PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION

SUGGESTED CORRECTIONS

*Jung*

? 8 3rd line from bottom change (3) & (4).

*Specified ?*

- P. 13 "Hsun Tao-ming" "Hsun" should be "Tung"
- P. 25, line 4 Tung Tao-ming *Should the correction made at p. 65 appear here - ming should be ning.*
- P. 31, line 13 Chou Fuo-hai "Fuo-hai" should be "Fu-hai"
- P. 35, line 11 Chou Fuo-hai "Fuo-hai" should be "Fu-hai"
- 5th line from the bottom "Nationals Government" should be "National Government"
- P. 46-7, 5th line from the bottom "were you" should be "were you not"
- P. 48, 9th line from the bottom "Peking" should be "Peiping"
- 8th " " " " " " *add "not,"*
- P. 49, line 12 "their" should be "his" *summary*
- "its" should be "his"
- ~~P. 51, line 2 "definitely" should be "definite"~~
- (?) P. 52, 10th line from the bottom "this separate regime" should be "these separate regimes"
- P. 53, 9th line from the bottom "informed" should be "made known"
- ~~P. 54, line 1 "was it" should be "was it so"~~
- Specified ?* P. 56, line 5 "repetitive" should be "repetitious"
- P. 60-1, 6th line from the bottom "Mr. Mei Ssu-ping" should be "Mr. Tung Tao-ning"
- ~~P. 68, line 7 "was there?" should be "was there not?"~~
- P. 70, 2nd line from the bottom "successor of MATSUI" should be "successor to MATSUI"
- ~~P. 75, 3rd line from the bottom "was it?" should be "was it not?"~~
- ~~P. 76, line 4 "was it?" should be "was it not?"~~
- P. 77, line 12 "instruction" should be "instructions"
- P. 80, line 6 "prosecution's" should be "prosecution document"



P. 87, 10th line from the bottom

"16th, were you, of April"  
should be "16th of April"

P. 88, line 13

~~"special instruction was"~~  
should be "special instructions  
were"

~~P. 90, 11th line from the bottom~~

~~"you related" should be "you related  
to"~~

P. 91, line 13

"that idea of changing the ship"  
should be  
"that the idea of changing ships"

P. 99, line 11

"I do not propose ~~as~~ it as in  
evidence" should be "I do not  
propose to have it tendered in  
evidence"

*Defense* | *J. 106 line 7 from bottom as another*  
*131 - should the correction be*  
*made in document?*

P. 142, line 9

*long irradial to irradial*  
"an objections" should be  
"an objection"

P. 145, 5th line and 3rd line from  
the bottom

"Lin, Sung" should be "Lin Sung"  
same as before

P. 146, line 7  
3rd line from the bottom

Same as above  
Same as above

P. 153, 10th line from the bottom

"Chow Fu-hia" should be "Chow Fu-hai"

P. 154, 10th line from the bottom

"Wang, Keh-ming" should be  
"Wang Keh-ming"

P. 155, line 11  
line 14

Same as above  
" " "

P. 156, line 13  
line 14

Same as above  
"Personal question?" should be  
"Personnel question?"

P. 157, line 2  
line 3

"TAKA" should be "TADA"  
"Wang, Keh-ming" should be  
"Wang Keh-ming"

P. line 14  
line 17  
3rd line from the bottom

Same as above  
" " "  
"is it?" should be "is it not?"

P. 158, line 3

"Wang, Keh-ming" should be "~~Wang Keh-g~~  
"Wang Keh-ming"

~~R. 158, line 5~~  
~~line 7~~

P. 164 line 13

~~P.~~  
P. 174, line 13-3

~~"was it ?" should be "was it not?"~~  
~~" did it ?" should be "did it not ?"~~

"The appointment" should be "  
"The appointments".  
(see P. 165 line 8 for appointments)


"for that long a reply" ?

Kagesa

1. not attempted to grow

2. D. No. 938 }  
£ 2600 }

3. D. No. 1298 } ✓  
£ 2588 }

4. Boat offered "h"  


INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
Document Division

4 June 1947

MEMORANDUM TO COMMANDER MAXON

From: Document Processing Unit

Subject: Distribution of IPS Doc. No. 1005 (4), (6), (8), (11), (13),  
(19) and (20).

1. In compliance with your request of 3 June 1947, the subject named document has been distributed as listed below:

Prosecution	26 May	Routine number of copies
Defense	4 June	35 Eng., 35 Jap.
Attorney (Mr. Laverge)	26 May	24 Eng., 11 Jap. (Court Copies)
Press	4 June	10 Eng., 15 Jap.
Vault	4 June	Surplus
Mr. Greenberg	4 June	25 Eng., 25 Jap.

2. Receipts are attached hereto.

P.S. Judge Hsiang received his copy on 26 May.

----- E.A.B. -----

1st Ind.

TO: Commander Maxon

4 June 1947

From: Mr. D. N. Sutton

Thank you for attending to this matter.

The original receipts are returned herewith to be retained in the file.

----- D.N.S. -----

cross 24 42-172

Break 130 ffs  
of 114 and  
1st day

Part I 42-114 = 72 ffs

Part II 115-172 = 57 ffs.

Office of New Zealand Member,  
International Military Tribunal for  
the Far East,  
Room 228,  
War Ministry Building,  
TOKYO.

4th June 1947.

MEMORANDUM for : MR. GREENBERG.

(Copies to: Mr. B. Roberts,  
Judge Hsiang.)

PROCEEDINGS AT FIRST NATIONAL  
HOSPITAL BEFORE MR. JUSTICE  
NORTHCROFT.

Further to yesterday afternoon's conference regarding corrections to the record of these proceedings, I have to advise you that Mr. Justice Northcroft wishes corrections to be made as set out in the attached sheet.

There were certain other alterations agreed upon between counsel at the conference which are not set out in the enclosed list (e.g. corrections to spelling, etc.) You noted these and know what they are. As the Judge considers that these do not affect the substantive correctness of the record, he himself does not ask for any changes to be made in regard to them.



Flight Lieutenant,  
R.N.Z.A.F.,  
ASSOCIATE TO THE HONOURABLE  
MR. JUSTICE NORTHCROFT.

Encl:

*The objections appear on  
pages 8-9 of the transcript.*

PROCEEDINGS OF COMMISSION TO TAKE EVIDENCE  
OF KAGESA, SADAANKI - CORRECTIONS.

<u>PAGE NO.</u>		<u>CORRECTIONS</u>
2	Line 13	For "Hasegawa, Nutokichi" substitute "SASAGAWA, Tomoji."
	Line 16	In line after "Judge E.H. Dell" insert two lines as follows: "Historical Consultant for the Prosecution" "Mr. James T.C. Liu".
7	8th line from bottom	Delete "the cover of" and insert "in".
	6th line from bottom	After "Sadaaki" add "wherever it so appears".
8	3rd line from bottom	For "(3)" substitute "(e)".
10	Line 13	After "being" insert "tendered".
13	Line 8	For "Hsun" substitute "Tung".
25	Line 4	For "Tao-ming" substitute "Tao-ning".
31	Line 13	For "Fuo-hai" substitute "Fu-hai".
35	Line 11	For "Fuo-hai" substitute "Fu-hai".
	5th line from bottom	For "Nationals" substitute "national".
46-7	5th line from bottom	For "were you" substitute "were you not".
48	9th line from bottom	For "Peking" substitute "Peiping".
	8th line from bottom	After "it" insert "not?"
52	Line 16	Delete "this". For "separate regime" substitute "separate regimes".
60-1	6th line from bottom	For "Mr. Mei Ssu-ping" substitute "Tung Tao-ning".
77	Line 12	For "instruction" substitute "instructions".
79	8th line from bottom	Delete "the protection of".
85	Line 2	After "page" insert "another telegram".
91	Line 13	Before "idea" insert "the". After "changing" delete "the ship" and substitute "ships".
93-a	Line 11	For "are" substitute "is".
99	Line 12	Delete "as" and substitute "to have it tendered".

PAGE  
NO.

CORRECTION

- 110 9th line from bottom After "politics" insert "?".
- 114 Line 8 After "his" insert "fellow".
- 116 Line 12 For "I would, just" substitute "I would suggest".
- 118 Line 13 For "and" substitute "as".
- 119 Line 6 For "headquarters in" substitute "headquarters of".
- Line 14 For "They are both true and false information" substitute "There are true and false informations".
- 120 8th line from bottom For "persons whom" substitute "persons to whom".
- 133 4th line from bottom For "had" substitute "having".
- 135 Line 14 After "that" insert "also".
- Line 17 After "nor irrelevant;" insert "but".
- 142 Line 9 For "objections" substitute "objection".
- 153 Line 16 For "Fu-hia" substitute "Fu-hai".
- 4th line from bottom Before "fleet" insert "expeditionary".  
Delete "commanding".
- 156 Line 2 For "inauguration" substitute "amalgamation".
- Line 14 For "personal question?" substitute "personnel question?".
- 157 Line 2 For "TAKA" substitute "TADA".
- 164 Line 13 For "appointment" substitute "appointments".
- 173 (This page has not been properly reproduced on all copies of the transcript.)
- 174 Line 1 After "desires" insert "to ask questions in".
- Line 13 Delete "long" and substitute "length of".
- Line 16 For "come" substitute "translate".
- 175 Line 17 For "frame" substitute "reframe".
- 176 7th line from bottom For "of" substitute "on".
- 178 Line 1 Delete "Yes".

\* \* \* \* \*



A. 81

B

IPS DOCUMENT NO. 1065-(4)

SECRET TELEGRAM NO. 987

Drafted - April 19, 1939  
Dispatched - 0750  
Arrived - 1547

To : The Chief of General Affairs Section.

From: The Chief of Staff of the Taiwan Army.

HANOI TELEGRAM NO. 50.

From KAWAMURA (T.N. Code Term for KAGESA) to SHIRAIISHI.

Finished commercial dealings. Everything is favorable. Refer to the  
TSUCHIDA TELEGRAM for detail. Answer.

Moreover, inform TSUCHIDA beforehand not to reproduce and distribute  
that telegram.

(end)

Hs 2-3

Chief of Section TSUCHIDA (Written in blue pencil)

Minister (signed)

Vice Minister (signed)

Chief of East Asiatic Bureau (signed)

Chief of the 1st Section of the East Asiatic Bureau (signed)

Chief of the 2nd Section of the East Asiatic Bureau (signed)

SECRET

Confidential Telegram dispatched at 1600 ) April 20  
arrived at 1650 )

To: Chief of General Affairs Section  
From: Chief of Staff of the Formosan Army

Formosan Telegram Extra

Hanoi Telegram No. 51 ( Note in pencil:

Kagesa Telegram No. 2 ( To confer with the Army soon)

We wish to retract the part of the Hanoi Telegram No. 50, requesting you to refer to the Foreign Ministry telegram. It is our desire that you be informed of the results of the operation by the present telegram.

(1) I visited WANG in his hide-out on the 18th with INUKAI and YANO, and had about a three hours talk with them. They said that, as they were already well informed of the details through "KO", they would prefer discussing the main problems at once. They made known to us their firm determination (the results, they trusted to Providence, and our absolute good will, they fully appreciated) and informed us of their desire to remove, as soon as possible, to a place safe and convenient for the development of their activities. They considered this to be a prerequisite condition.

Thus, after various considerations, it has been decided that the French authorities should be entirely responsible for the protection, etc. in regard to the escape; that a French steamship should be chartered to carry him safely to a hide-out in the French Concession in Shanghai; that Japan should previously prepare two or three hide-outs in the International Settlement; and that the Japanese policemen from the Shanghai Municipal Council should be placed around them to keep guard.

In this connection I shall request the authorities of the Foreign Ministry to send appropriate instructions to Shanghai to immediately prepare suitable hide-outs in the International Settlement and to take necessary measures for the protection. (As regards protection, it is believed advisable to secretly contact Vice-Inspector General AKAGI and have Japanese policemen guard him after his arrival.)

Furthermore, it is WANG's desire that you take proper measures so that he may pass the quarantine procedure incognito.

(2) ITO, who is here at present, shall be sent immediately to Shanghai. IWAI shall establish connection with SEIKI and take part in the preparations mentioned in the foregoing paragraph.

(3) The "Hokko Maru" shall sail directly to Shanghai while secretly escorting WANG's steamer. INUKAI, KAGESA, YANO, OSUZU and others shall be on board the ship. You are requested to make Yamashita (T.N. Steamship Co.) understand.

(4) Von Forenhoben /Phonetic/ (730 tons) has been decided to be the French steamer mentioned above. The time of departure from French Indo-China and the time of arrival in Shanghai have not yet been decided so you shall be informed later.

(end)

Chief of Section TSUCHIDA

SECRET

Confidential Telegram dispatched at 1600) April 20  
arrived at 1650)

To : Chief of General Affairs Section  
From: Chief of Staff of the Formosan Army

Formosan Telegram No. 996  
Hanoi Telegram No. 52  
Kagesa Telegram No. 3

1. The hide-out in the French Concession mentioned in the previous telegram is of a temporary nature and it is our intention to remove them to hide-outs in the International Settlement as soon as possible. As regards preparation of houses in three places requested in the previous telegram, it is his desire that you make the following considerations.

A. All the windows of the houses shall be covered tightly with bullet-proof sheets of iron (the upper half to be made so that they can be folded down at any time).

B. Small peeping windows shall be made in these iron sheets, the outside of which shall be covered with screens.

C. Iron grilles that can be opened and closed shall be installed in various places in the houses.

D. It would be suitable if one of the houses will be provided in the Hongkew district and two in the south of the Soochow Creek district (one of them near the extension).

(end)

C-3

Chief of Section TSUCHIDA

SECRET

Confidential Telegram dispatched at 1600) April 20  
arrived at 1655)

To : Chief of General Affairs Section

From: Chief of Staff of the Formosan Army

Formosan Telegram No. 997  
Hanoi Telegram No. 53  
Kagesa Telegram No. 4

1. As a result of further working, the following corrections shall be made in Kagesa telegram No. 2, so you are requested to take measures for previous preparations. (Definite decision shall be made after deliberation with French authorities here.)

A. When the French Steamship arrives at Shanghai (scheduled for the end of this month), the Japanese authorities and WANG's comrades shall be together in charge of the method of disembarkation and transportation of passengers who later boarded the ship.

B. If possible, it would be convenient if he could be taken directly to the hide-out mentioned in the previous telegram and not to the French Concession in Shanghai.

2. As ITO and Sergeant-Major KAWASHIMI (?) will be sent to Shanghai first, the Army is requested to let the Japanese Agency in Shanghai deliberate with these two persons.

D

1.83

IPS DOCUMENT 1005-(8)

Sent from Hanoi P.M. 24 April 1939

Arrived at this office P.M. 24 April 1939

(Code) (Secret)

(TOP SECRET /Office Chief's Code/ )

from Consul-General SUZUKI

to : Foreign Minister ARITA.

No. 93

from: KAWAMURA (T.N. Code Term for KAGESA) to KUME.

The negotiation is completed and plans for loading the cargo (T.N. Code Term for WANG Ching-wei) have already been arranged. Moreover, as the situation does not permit any change in the plans, we wish to carry it out according to the fixed schedule.

In this connection you are requested to demand an immediate completion of preparations for at least one of the warehouses in Osaka (T.N. Code Term for Shanghai); and you are also requested to take charge of preparations for its unloading.

May 6th has been decided for the arrival of the cargo in Osaka.

(End)

7.85

IPS DOCUMENT 1005-(11)

Telegram concerning WATANABE Project.

E-1

~~E-2~~

April 29, 1939  
The Eighth Section,  
Army Department,  
Imperial Headquarters.

1. The telegram received at 4 p.m., the 28th:  
I have been successful in establishing liaison with WANG.  
Accordingly, the course of our ship (Note: the Hokko-Maru of the Yamashita Shipping Co.) has been changed from Takao to Keelung. (Will arrive there at 8:00 P.M. the 30th) Further destination will be decided later. I hope YAMAMOTO, who is at present at Taihoku, will also change his destination and go to Keelung.  
(Signed) KAGESA

E-2

2. The telegram received at 4:50 P.M. on the 28th:  
It seems that WANG is somewhere near Hongkong, although not quite certain. I have been successful in establishing liaison with him and have been informed of his safety. (At 1:00 p.m., 28th)

Please communicate this to all authorities concerned.

(Signed) KAGESA

(Note by the Section in Charge: As Colonel YAMAMOTO is now on his way to Tokyo, YOSHIKI Nishi, who is well acquainted with the latest situation in Shanghai, has been sent to Formosa by plane on the 29th of this month)

3. To Colonel USUI, from Major HARUKI.  
April 30: Dispatched 1030  
Received 1310

E-3

I have received your telegram No. 307.

Preparations for landing and guard of the residence etc. will be completed with the help of the officials concerned by the evening of the 4th, at the latest, and it is going on satisfactorily with utmost secrecy. It will be very convenient for me if I shall be informed of the approximate time of arrival off Woosung, since I hope to establish liaison directly with KAWAMURA (T.N. Code Term for KAGESA) prior to landing.

(End)

CONFIDENTIAL, TOP SECRET TELEGRAM

Dispatched 1900 Hrs. May 3rd.  
Received 2055 Hrs. May 3rd.

To Chief of General Affairs Department.  
From Chief of Staff of Formosan Army.

Formosan Army Telegram No. 98.

From KAGESA to Chief of the 2nd Department.

1. WANG and his suite will arrive at the "Pilot Station", Shanghai Port, at 10.00 A.M. on 6th, in accordance with the pre-arranged plan which I have notified to you recently.
2. "Wang is naturally anticipating, after his arrival in Shanghai, a battle of telegrams with Chiang, and also terroristic opposition. Accordingly, he wishes to set himself up as soon as possible at the place most convenient for his various activities."
3. Therefore, when WANG and suite arrive at Shanghai, they shall stay for the time being in a house prepared in Shanghai. We have to rely upon Japanese Navy or Army or some other well organized power for guard and protection.
4. It is reported that Japanese terrorists have been sent from Tokyo to Shanghai for the above purpose. But, considering the bitter experiences in the past, I wish you would absolutely stop the plan. It may seem a good plan to wait in some place outside Shanghai until the preparation for guard and protection by Ting Me Tsun will be finished, but I don't believe it will be finished within two or three months, in view of the general situation.
5. WANG has the intention to call together all his followers (about 30 people) in order to decide the future negotiation plan. Taking the situation in Shanghai into consideration, WANG is also contemplating to hire a Japanese ship and, leaving China for about a month, hold a conference on board the ship while cruising around Singapore, Manila, etc.
6. According to my (KAGESA's) opinion, the Japanese ship available at present cannot accommodate so many people as thirty and it is necessary to prepare another ship. Therefore, I ask the General Staff Headquarters to study the matter.

(The End)

KAGESA

*Mr Sutton*

*g.*

(1-86)

IPS DOCUMENT 1005 (19)

Page 1

Confidential and Top Secret Telegram

Sent 1430) May 23rd  
Arrived 1600)

Original Telegram: Central China No. 249

From: DOIHARA AGENCY

To : The Chief of General Affairs Section

From: Colonel KAGESA

1. Mr. WANG Ching-wei will dispatch messengers to Peking and Nanking before long with his confidential letters to the Provisional and Renovation Governments and to WU Pei-Fu, explaining the reasons for his action and requesting their cooperation.
2. The above is aimed at dispelling the misunderstandings which are based upon the various rumors, particularly the rumor that (WANG's movement) is a camouflaged trick on the part of the CHIANG Regime. It will also make clear that Japan would not initiate political negotiations prematurely.
3. WANG realizes that a friendly relation with WU would have great influence on the future of his scheme. WANG decided to work on his unpreparedness (original note in pencil: "What is the actual meaning?").

(end)



(1.86)

H

(Signed by the Minister, ARITA )  
 ( " by the Vice Minister )  
 ( " by the Chief of the East Asiatic Affairs Bureau )  
 (Sealed by the Chiefs of the 1st and 2nd Sections of the )  
 above Bureau )

URGENT AND CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET TELEGRAM

Sent at 1200, 30 May 1939  
Received at 1320

Original Central China Telegram No. 276.

Addressed to the Chief of the General Affairs Section.  
 From: DOIHARA Agency.  
 To : The Chief of the 2nd Department  
 From: KAGESA.

1. WANG and his suite of 13 will fly on the 31st at 9:00 A.M. if weather permits. They will rest at Omura on their way, and then fly directly to Tokyo.
2. The Navy informed us that their landing-place shall be Yokosuka.
3. KAGESA, ICHIDA, INUKAI and SUGA of the Navy, will accompany them.

(Note: Telephoned by the General Staff:  
 (in pencil)

1. They will land at Omura at 1.00 P.M., 31st
2. They will leave Omura at 2:00 and reach Tokyo about 6:00.

(The end)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
AT TOKYO, JAPAN

Case No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

AFAKI, Sadao, et al

COMMISSION TO TAKE THE DEPOSITION  
OF KAGESA, Sadaaki

The defense having offered in evidence the affidavit of KAGESA, Sadaaki, together with a certificate executed by Doctor MOTOHASHI, Hitoshi, a physician, certifying that the said KAGESA is suffering from illness and unable to attend this trial and give his testimony in person, and the prosecution objecting to the giving in evidence of the testimony of the said KAGESA without opportunity to cross examine him at the time, it also appearing that the said KAGESA is now at the First National Hospital, Tokyo, it is, therefore, duly considered by this Tribunal that the evidence of the said KAGESA should be taken by deposition before one of the members of this Tribunal as Commissioner.

It is ordered that the deposition of the witness KAGESA, Sadaaki, be taken before the Honorable Mr. Justice Northcroft, a member of this Tribunal, as Commissioner so to do, at the First National Hospital, Tokyo, on the 22nd day of May, 1947, at the hour of 9:30 o'clock A.M., and from day to day and hour to hour thereafter until completed,

and the Honorable Mr. Justice Northcroft is hereby designated and appointed as Commissioner before whom said deposition shall be taken: that a sufficient number of court reporters of this Tribunal, with the assistance of interpreters of this Tribunal, shall record the testimony given, and that said deposition when taken, transcribed and translated, shall be filed with the Secretariat of this Tribunal.

It is further ordered that the Secretariat of this Tribunal is ordered to make the necessary arrangements for the taking of this deposition at the First National Hospital, Tokyo.

Dated this 21st day of May, 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

W. F. Webb  
PRESIDENT

*Kagasa*

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
Document Division

26 May 1947

To : Mr. Laverge  
From: Processing Control Unit

1. As per your request of 23 May 1947, at 1400, the following documents have been processed in English and Japanese and distributed as of 1430 this date, except for the court copies (24 English and 11 Japanese) attached hereto:

IPS Doc. No. 1005-4  
1005-6  
1005-8  
1005-11  
1005-13  
1005-19  
1005-20

2. The Japanese original and English copy are also attached.

E. A. BARC Bana

cc: Mr. D. H. Sutton

23 May 1947

Re: KAGESA, Teisho (Sadaaki)  
Questions on HARADA Memoirs.

1. Were the negotiations which you and IMAI carried on with the representatives of WANG, Ching-wei referred to by the Army as the Watanabe plan?

(If yes, was not one of the principal terms of this plan that Japan was to take possession of the natural resources of North China?)

(If no, did the plans finally agreed upon between you and IMAI and the representatives of WANG, Ching-wei include the provision that Japan was to take possession of the natural resources of North China?)

- - -
2. Was INUKAI with you in Shanghai when you met with the representatives of WANG, Ching-wei?
  3. Did you and INCUKAI, on or about December 21, 1938, have an interview with Prince KONOE?
  4. Did you not report to Prince KONOE on that occasion that the secret plot in China would be a success?

~  
Wed A M.

~  
Kagera

1. ask Investigation division re letters  
requested my title 14 way 47.  
avita, floquet +  
Sugata + Wang. ching wei  
apr. 1939.

2 I.P.S. Doc 614 (Flam 131) author for the  
establishment of a post in Mongolia  
(mentioned in title of Flam 17.9.47)

3 what is Doc 2178 of	memo for + com
" " " K	Tanjung 19 5
1814 g.	" "
1685 e	" 9 (See Lewis analysis)
2178 e	" 9
2656	" 10

4 what is of 272  
to urge memo)  
8 way  
J. 10 see 35

5 carry original of the telegram + document  
we want in evidence

Object & more to strike out  
this factor, the affidavit which  
refer to documents purport to give  
their contents without giving any reason  
for failure to produce the original  
or account for its absence, especially

sec 45 f. 3-4 ) 1. "Sensative terms, lease between Japan & China"

↓  
"The Policy for the adjusting of  
relations between Japan & China"

sec 6 f. 4 ) 2. Circular telegram sent by Wang  
Ching-wei Dec. 1938

sec 10 f. 10 ) 3. Circular Japan telegrams 7 16 Jan 1940  
~~in~~ lost in this section

sec 13 f. ) Promissory "Request concerning the

validation of the principle of  
"perfectly voluntary"  
item (a) to inclusion  
in sec 13 on 1/17

4. New Year Statement

sec 14  
1.18

Test of sec 14 on 1/18, 19.

---



Means for + work

1. How many interviews with  
Feb 12 Porcel. w.c. the interpreters  
needed for the interpreters.

2. Jief report army. very but  
no organs or mechanism

Feb 17  
Feb 21

for guidance or reference  
J. Wang Gault.

Doc 1814 F

w.c. on documents on the  
Council of W.

What about K.A.I.N.

△

Kagesa

5/22/47

Corrections - Sec 12 p. 15 (5) change "twelfth" to "13th"

Gen B here. ~~Def~~ Def counsel in Gen.

By Ct. In Gen on what? the accused - all accused

ally. ~~Harada~~ "Itagaki" met June 15

(J. 13)

1st meeting - 11 June (- '38)

Itagaki sd Japan did not fight Chinese people & the communists with the army -

Documents submitted by K + Itagaki on 11 June

Pearl Harbor - will recall the terms

after Nanking Terms accepted but not "Levy" China not required to accept before the end of the year.

Did not participate in <sup>Shanghai City State</sup> the quintilateral from <sup>Ex 463A</sup> is put to beam -

Peking Process - Genl. frame a long before fall of Nanking - want know circumstances

"Some other way" Sec 3 p. 2 - Prime Moroe may be



My plan as chief with off Lee was 1 person

rec 4. knew dir Kao & Han came to Japa. & friend D.  
Miyama in Japa had an airplane (Japa)  
provided for him.

I arranged it - airplane

Watsunobu & the Gomei were again  
arranged it.

→  
was chief Gen Staff Iada & Smith / War  
5 min conference -  
90 min.

rec 1/3 went with auto -

+ China  
I went as rep of War Ministry

Thu 7 M.

rec 8/6) 5 minutes conference held <sup>last March 39</sup>. I recommended myself for the job.

Questions on Harada's Memoirs (Harada's Diary)

31

A 5)

Was the negotiation between you and Imai and the representatives of Wang Chingwei referred to by the army as the Watanabe plan?

Ch 307

2/19/38


p. 15

[if yes]

Was not one of the principal terms of this plan that Japan was to take possession of the natural resources of north China?

[if no]

~~you stated in sec 6 of your affidavit that~~  
did the plans finally agreed upon between you and Imai and the representatives of Wang Chingwei include the provision that Japan was to take possession of the natural resources of north China.



~~sim~~  
1/2

May  
17-18

Did Mackay go with you to Hongkong  
when you met the representatives of Wang Ching?  
~~was not more arranging for the <sup>the plan</sup> escape from~~  
~~Chungking~~

~~what was the plot??~~

Did you and Mackay or on about Dec 21, 1938  
have an interview with  
got Prime Kooze. ~~was not then~~

Did you not report to him on that  
occasion that the <sup>secret</sup> plot in China had been  
~~port-fused~~ ~~the 18th~~ would be a success.

~~Who?~~

Foundation for telegrams 1005 rev

(2) 4-7-39

Did you meet with and tel + the counsel in  
in Hongkong on Apr 1, 39 telling him of the  
expected amount of pay. Amtrak the  
route under which you would travel + the fact  
that the ship <sup>Hokkaido Maru</sup> moved load was one +  
disguise for special duty?

And did not the Dr Smith also state that  
you were of the this affair. And had  
been ordered + assist you in the  
management of the affair.

Was not the counsel for requests of  
rescue for the fuel or steamer or air plane  
+ arrival at Hawaii before the 16th?

Show tel. to request for identification

(3) Did not tell you what kind a tel  
Shanghai & Hongkong on 4-1-39  
giving them the code arranged  
regarding Wang Shing wei & other  
movements

(5) Was not a tel sent by

or

on 1-9 of 39

reporting you inform into Wang

Re-Direct  
Council for Defense

<sup>you were in</sup>  
while Honai. 4-22-39 ~~of~~ Dakota at  
to Tokyo  
This & with Pass stated

a tel. sent + pay for  
I don't know of sent

New York States 1.18

I read in Chinese newspaper in  
New York a translation of a section  
entitled in English entitled "Road &  
Your Speech."

document "Road & Your Speech" shown with  
identified.

Wang Ching wei told us that he  
~~Chung Kuo~~ ~~had~~ ~~the~~ ~~people~~ of China  
with Peace in their hearts desired  
Peace. It was unintentional that  
Chen Kai shek would not accept his words



1/1 <sup>community</sup> ~~community~~ co in Nanby about to  
strong -

rel 7 way 3 24 7. way cross

24 F

Mentioned  
R. 222 97  
15 May 1947

Mentioned  
R. 220 93  
5-14-47

Def Doc No. 1252

22294-22797  
5-15-47

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FAR EAST

The United States of America, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent : KAGASA, Yoshiaki  
Sadaaki (charged)

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet  
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country  
I hereby depose as follows.

object f. 18  
1.16

See below Certificate

# 1387

renewed 5/8/47

object  
Wong Ching Wei's  
Certificate f. 2

Case 2

Wong Ching Wei's  
27 more 39 f. 2

denative terms of Peace f. 3

Def. Doc. # 1282

1. I, KAGESA, Sadaaki, am an ex-Lieutenant-General, and now recuperating at the 1st National Hospital from pulmonary tuberculosis.
2. I had served as Chief of the Chinese Section of the General Staff Office from August of the 12th year of Showa (1937), and was appointed Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry in June 1938.

In accordance with the decision of the HIRANUMA Cabinet's Five Ministers Council in April of the 14th year of Showa (1939) with respect to Mr. Wang Ching-wei's Japan-China peace movement, I assisted Mr. Wang Ching-wei in removing to Shanghai as he, having moved to Hanoi from Chungking at that time, was planning the peace movement. He was beginning to feel his personal danger. I helped him continuously in his movement of establishing the Central Government. At the establishment of Wang's Government towards the end of March in the 15th year of Showa (1940), I became his highest military adviser and held the position till May of the 17th year, of Showa (1942).

Therefore, I am well acquainted with the details of the establishment and the character of the Nanking Government which had Wang Ching wei at its head.

3. I am not very well acquainted with the peace negotiations carried out through the medium of Mr. Trautmann, German Ambassador to China, from the end of 1937 to the beginning of 1938 since they were presided over by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, I recollect that the National Government once was about to accept the terms of the Japanese

*what terms*

*the  
KAGESA*

Def. Doc. # 1232

Government, <sup>but</sup> on the 14th of January it suddenly sent an answer contrary to the expectation of the Japanese Government.

*Heather's  
can introduce*

The attitude of the National Government towards these negotiations may be seen from an essay of Wan Ching wei's entitled "For An Instance" published on the 27th of March 1939.

Upon receipt of the National Government's reply of the 14th of January the Japanese Government drew the conclusion that the Chinese Government had no sincerity in the peace negotiations between China and Japan and announced: On Jan. 16 that henceforth it would have nothing to do with the National Government. It was not because the Japanese Government abandoned all hopes for an over all peace between China and Japan. Japan was very eager for it and gave up the peace effort with the National Government which was judged to be unfaithful to the idea of general peace. She intended to accomplish the same purpose in some other way.

4. In the spring of 1933 Mr. Kao Tsung-wu, former Director of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs, and Mr. Hsun Tap-ning, former Chief of a section of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs, came to TOKYO in succession. I met them in the capacity of Chief of the Chinese Section of the Affairs Bureau. <sup>(Hodge) the military staff +</sup> Their purpose of visiting TOKYO was, in fine, to make the Japanese Government understand that "once the Japanese Government disregarded the Chiang Regime, some other person than Chiang Kai-shek must be sought to invite peace between Japan and China. For that purpose no one was better suited than Mr. Wang Ching-wei, who feeling

*Corrected*

*+ translation error*

*Washington DC.  
Secret Room*

the necessity of expeditiously settling the problem between Japan and China is advocating peace. His assertion, however, would never be accepted by the National Government. Therefore there was no alternative but to make Chiang Kai-shok listen to peace overtures by launching a national peace movement outside the Government."

The Japanese Government seemed to have no particular objections to Mr. Kao's plan.

After that, however, the Japanese did not make any positive overtures to Mr. Wang Ching-wei.

5. As we heard nothing further from Mr. Kao Sung Wu, we thought that his movement had failed and did not take any particular pains to investigate into the matter. But in the autumn of the same year (1938), Colonel IMAI of the General Staff, who happened to go to Shanghai on official business, returned to TOKYO with the "Tentative Terms of Peace between Japan and China" which had been drawn up by Mr. Kao and Mr. Mei Ssu-ping.

The Central military authorities made some amendments to that tentative plan in accordance with "the policy for the adjustment of relations between Japan and China" which had already been drawn up, and I together with Colonel IMAI was ordered to proceed with the terms to Shanghai on the 19th of November and transmitted them to Messrs Kao and Mei. Since they gave us their opinions containing some desires on the part of China, we made several amendments. In form, this plan was different from the KONOE statement of the 22nd of December of the same year, but in substance

it was almost the same. In addition to that, the Chinese proposed that "Mr. Wang escape from Chungking according to a pre-arranged plan and thereupon the Japanese Government would be expected to announce the terms of peace." This was due to the fact that in order to give impetus to the development of Mr. Wang's peace movement it was necessary to clarify what Japan desired of China.

We transmitted these matters to our respective superiors, and the War Minister reported them to the Five Ministers Council and obtained its assent. I remember it was on the 25th of November.

6. Mr. Wang agreed to the result of our conversations at Shanghai and escaped from Chungking on the 18th of December 1938, according to a pre-arranged plan and reached Hanoi in French Indo-China on the 20th.

Premier KONOE announced what is known as "Konoe's three principles" regarding the policy for the adjustment of relations between Japan and China on the 22nd of the same month, while Mr. Wang in response to the Konoe statement sent circular telegrams containing peace representations to the Central Office of the Kuomintang Party, Chiang, President of the Kuomintang Party, and the Central Executive Committee. In these telegrams he argued the necessity of peace between Japan and China, stated the impossibility of resistance, and explained that, once Japan's attitude had been made clear by the KONOE Statement further resistance was useless. Thus he earnestly desired reconsideration of the National Government.

Letter to Wang 9 Dec 1938

Object

Def. Doc. # 1232

7. At this juncture, I must go into the history of the KONOE statement, and recollect the broad points of view of Premier KONOE, Navy Minister YONAI, War Minister ITAGAKI, Foreign Minister ARITA and Finance Minister ISHIWATARI with respect to the adjustment of relations between Japan and China.

In view of the attitude of the National Government at that time, a fairly long war was to be expected. It is natural that the Japanese demands upon China would increase, in proportion with the prolongation of the war resulting in the increase of sacrifices and the magnification of victories. But what Japan wanted of China was the Co-existence and co-prosperity of Japan and China based on a hearty collaboration between the two nations. At this point, in accordance with the various Minister's idea that Japan's grand policy embracing what she desired of China must be decided as the National policy, the authorities of the War, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministries commenced to formulate plan from about July 1933, and at length, it was referred to an Imperial Conference on the 30th of November. The national policy was decided then. The KONOE Statement of the 22nd December 1933 was the summary thereof. At that time, not a few people, civilians, government and military circles and like thought that reparations for the sacrifices suffered during the Chino-Japanese Incident should be in the form of acquisition of territory or control of management. It is a remarkable fact that this grand national policy which seemed rather weak-kneed was decided upon under such circumstances utterly abandoning the idea of reparations.

- 5 -

own  
translator's  
correction

on the "policy for adjustment  
of relations between Japan  
& China" and "General outline  
of war"

Def. Co. # 1232

8. On the 1st of January 1939 the Kuomintang Party of the Republic of China decided to strike Mr. Wang's name off the party register and to expel him from all public offices. Special service agents were dispatched to Hanoi by the Chungking Government and they threatened him. Mr. Tseng Chung-ming, Mr. Wang's right hand man was assassinated at Mr. Wang's house in Hanoi on the 21st of March. Thus it was reported that his life was endangered every minute. At a meeting of the Five Minister's Council it was determined that I should see Mr. Wang and, if necessary, assist him to reach a safety-zone if requested. I reached Hanoi on the 17th of April by the "HOKKO-MARU" together with YANO, Secretary of the Foreign Office and Mr. INUKAI, Ken.

*When  
Wiley says  
letter post  
March 1939*

9. I met Mr. Wang Ching-wei at his private residence in Hanoi on the 18th of April.

*1939*

Mr. Wang regretted the outbreak and the development of the Sino-Japanese Incident, and said "I discussed with Mr. Chiang Kai-shek in writing or in direct talk about the necessity of Sino-Japanese Co-operation in which I believe, but Mr. Chiang Kai-shek told me that it was impossible to bring about peace partly because he himself was suspicious of Japan's real intentions, and partly because of various circumstances. Just when I thought that there was no way but to attempt to sway the Chungking Government by arousing public opinion from the outside giving up the project of getting Mr. Chiang Kai-shek to change his mind while in Chungking I was notified by Mr. Kao Sung Wu and Mr. Mei



Ssu Ping of Japan's peace policy. I strongly believed that it was not impossible to obtain public opinion, if Japan really abided by that policy." He also said that the KONOE Statement of the 22nd of December had a most important effect on the development of the peace move.

Mr. Wang further stated that, as it was dangerous and meaningless to stay at Hanoi, he wanted to further the movement with the seat of his activities in Shanghai and that he was intending to move from Hanoi to Shanghai with the consent of the French Indo-china Authorities. He also hoped to develop the peace move after arriving at Shanghai by a much more advanced method than which had been planned till then. He was considering the plan to be followed.

Mr. Wang's original plan for the development of the peace move was to instill peace enthusiasm among the people with the members of the Kuomintang as central figures and make the National Government do away with the anti-Japan policy. As already mentioned he had no intention of establishing a government.

10. Mr. Wang chartered a French ship with the consent of the French Indo-china authorities and boarded it on the 25th of April, 1939. at KATOBA Island (T.N. Not clear), guarded by staffs of the Peace-Preservation Bureau of French Indo-china. The ship left on the 26th, We, the Japanese members boarded the "HOKKO-MARU" at Haiphong. On the 28th we received from Mr. Wang Ching-wei a communication to the effect that he wanted to transfer to the "HOKKO-MARU", and in the same evening he changed ships presumably in the offing north-east of Bias Bay. Then,

after touching at Keelung to replenish coal and provisions, sailed straight for Shanghai and reached the Hongkew wharf in Shanghai on the 3th of May. I often talked with Mr. Wang on board the "HCKKO MARU". The important things which Mr. Wang told me and Mr. INUKAI during our conversations are as follows.

(1) Until then the plan of the peace move was to organize a peace body centred around the Kuomintang members, to point out the reason why Chungking's anti-Japanese theory was erroneous, to explain that peace was the only way to save China and East Asia; to enlarge the peace camp by degrees; and ultimately to make Chungking change its policy. But upon careful consideration, it is extremely difficult to make the Chungking Government change its policy by discussion alone.

Now, the advocacy of peace came from his love for China, but anti-Japanism is also an expression of patriotism. However, advocacy for peace cannot easily be distinguished from treason. It is therefore difficult to make the general populace listen to the advocacy of peace quite unlike the advocacy of resistance to Japan which fall on ready ears. Advocacy for peace can shine only when the righteousness and adequacy of Japan's policy are endorsed by facts. That is, if the KONOE statement is actually put into practice, the Chungking Government's advocacy for resistance to Japan will lose its basis. Then, I believe, even the Chungking Government will have no choice but to turn to peace swayed by the general current of public opinion. For that purpose, the shortest way is to establish a peaceful government

Def. Doc. # 1282

and cooperate with the Japanese Government with in implementing the KONOE statement.

For this reason, I thought it best to give up the previous plan and establish a peace Government, to arouse public opinion that resistance was meaningless not only through the enlightening movement by speech to Chungking but also through factual proof of the good results of Sino-Japanese Cooperation. By doing this the Chungking Government might turn to peace.

Therefore, if the Government of your country has no objection to this new plan, I wish to change the previous plan and proceed with the establishment of a peace government.

(2) The establishment of the government does not aim at the destruction of the Chungking Government. If only peace can be invited, I don't care who holds the political power. The purpose of the peace move is to influence the Chungking Government to turn to peace, and to make it cease the resistance. For that reason, it is not desirable to provoke a civil war such as to fight against Chungking and cause bloodshed though it will be necessary to possess military forces after the establishment of the government. If the Chungking Government join my movement in the future, the purpose of the movement will have been attained and I shall retire to private life without any hesitation. This fact I wish to state definitely and make myself clear."

In short, what Mr. Wang intended was to show the Chungking Government and the general public that the advocacy of peace was not groundless

by establishing the peace government and creating a living example of co-operation with Japan, and thereby conduct the Chungking Government to peace, and bring about a general peaceful cooperation with Japan in conjunction with the Chungking Government. Therefore, with the establishment of Mr. Wang's new regime, China would be, for a time, divided into two camps -- the peace faction and the resistance group -- but ultimately she would be reunited into one. Without this reunion it is a certainty that general peace cannot be achieved. That was the guiding principle of Mr. Wang's movement.

*In this  
in a:*

This can be seen through the words in his circular peace telegram of 16th January 1940 "If Mr. Chiang in consideration of the fate of the country and the welfare of the nation, courageously decides upon a far-sighted policy, makes peace with Japan, and, in accordance with the principles of the <sup>KONOE</sup> Statement seeks its concrete facts, Chao-ming and his comrades will certainly join forces with him and rapidly bring about peace to the whole country."

*Agreed*

11. Reaching Shanghai on 8th May 1939, Mr. Wang Ching-wei met his comrades, Chu Min-yi, Chow Fu-hia, Fu Shi-shuo, Mei Ssu-ping, Kao Tsung-wu etc. as a result of the meeting he decided to visit Japan. He informed me of that determination and requested me to communicate with the Japanese Government at my discretion. He was drawing up the plan of the peace movement and studying the points which he would demand from the Japanese Government. as soon as these plans were completed,

he intended to depart.

The principal points drawn up by Mr. Wang with respect to his visit to Japan were in substance as follows.

(1) Opinions will be frankly exchanged with Prince KONOE, Premier HIRANUMA and some other ministers concerned, Mr. Wang would personally attend to these matters.

(2) If as a result of the meetings, the peace movement is considered hopeful the following articles will be implemented by Chou Fu-hai.

*see then  
w w*

A. In order to further the movement "Demands Concerning the Execution of Principles of the Respect of Sovereign Rights" will be presented to the Japanese Government due to the necessity of making the Chinese people understand that Japan has no intention of aggression, control or of interfering with the internal affairs of China.

B. In order to show that the new government was not formed under the pressure of Japan, it is necessary not to disrupt the previous judicial system and the Japanese Government will be required the consent to the recognition of the following matters as being indispensable terms: The new government shall be called the National Government. The form of its establishment shall be the "return to the capital". The San Min Chu-i, Three Peoples' Principles will be made the guiding conception, the "Sun -in-the-blue-sky-flag" will be used as the national flag.

12. Mr. Wang and his party left Shanghai for Tokyo by air at the beginning of June, 1939. The party consisted of Chou Fu-Hai, Mei Ssu-Ping, Kao Tsung-Wu, Chou Lung-Yang and Tung Tao-Ming. On the

*not in original but  
translator's copy*

Def. Doc. # 1282

Japanese side, Yano and Shimizu, Secretaries of the Foreign Office and Ken Inukai and I joined the party.

Soon after our arrival at Tokyo, Mr. Wang had an interview with Premier Hiranuma. At the interview, the Premier expressed his opinion concerning the Sino-Japanese Co-operation to be based upon moral conception and admired Mr. Wang's moral courage in attempting to solve the unfortunate incident between Japan and China. Answering this, Mr. Wang said that further struggle between Japan and China would be meaningless and that he is determined to concentrate all his energies on the materialization of peace. He then asked the Premier whether Japan had a policy for promoting the peace movement with the Chungking Government for the positive solution of the Incident; whether Japan had the policy of directing its activities towards sympathizers in civil circles and excluding the Kuomintang party members; whether Japan had the intention of paving the way to the solution of the incident by welcoming all persons who give thought to the future of both countries regardless of whether they both are among Government circles or among civilian circles, members of the Kuomintang or other party. And he stated that he would establish a Peace Government with himself as its central figure if Japan considered this third method appropriate, and that he would serve sincerely for the attainment of the purpose.

In reply to Mr. Wang, Premier Hiranuma said that the present cabinet inherited the ideas of the Konee Statement and is adhering to it firmly. He also expressed his approval of the opinion of Mr. Wang and

the peace policy, and stated that Japan was ready to lend absolute assistance and support in response to his decisive will. To this interview I was a witness and heard everything from the beginning to the end.

As for the interview with the other ministers concerned, I have no recollection of anything requiring special mention, except to the statement of the War Minister, Itagaki, acting in the capacity of proxy for Premier Hiranuma, the War Minister, Itagaki, in the morning of June 15 stated just what was expected by Japan and exchanged opinions.

I was a witness to this interview and was able to understand well the contents of the conversations. I observed that the War Minister was especially careful in the choice of his words so as to avoid giving any impression to Mr. Wang of interference in the internal policy of China. Recalling from my memory, the gist of the conversation was as follows:--

(1) The War Minister asked Mr. Wang, what is your opinion concerning the liquidation of past evils arising out of the doctrine of 'One Nation, One Party' at this opportunity?" Mr. Wang said that he held the same opinion and that he had the desire to live up to the Minister's expectation by directing matters in such a way as to take in members of all parties and Factions, Kaomintang or otherwise, in as much as it is feared that any dislocation of the juridical system would entail an

obstacle to the future development of the movement.

(2) The Minister answered, "persons belonging to the two existing governments the Provisional and, the Restoration are faithful to the same idea. They have striven for the peaceful co-operation between Japan and China enduring persecutions joy and Japan cannot dissolve them without some consideration. Therefore I want your opinion on the establishment of a political council with the Provisional Government and Economic Council with the Reformation Government or something of the sort in order to manage Sino-Japanese relations locally." To this Mr. Wang answered "I have NO objection to the establishment of a Council in North China which is far from Nanking and in entrusting the local administration thereto to a certain extent. There is an example in Mr. Huang Fu who was once the head of the Political Council there. However, I am unable to consent to the establishment of anything of this nature in Central China. I am ready to consider, of course, the warm treatment of persons thus affected in this region."

Not in agreement with

(3) The Minister said, "Many people interpret nationalism or the doctrine of the people's welfare in SAN-MIN-Chu-I as if it accepts pro-Communism and Anti-Japanism. Have you not any opinion as to the adjustment of this at this opportunity and promote Sino-Japanese Co-operation, and anti-Communism?" Mr. Wang answered that he was altogether of the same opinion.

(4) The minister stated, "most of the Japanese people think that the 'Sun in the Blue Sky' Flag denotes the sign of Anti-Japanism. If the

our translator may add here

but I firmly believe this was not the intention of Mr. Yat-sen



Peace Government and its army had the same flag with that of the Anti-Japanese Government, unexpected results may occur in actual Military actions of the Japanese army. May I ask you for some consideration on this point?" Mr. Wang was absolutely opposed to this but said that he would consider a method by which a distinction may be made between the Nanking and Chung king corps.

(5) The minister sought Mr. Wang's opinion as to the problem of the recognition of Manchukuo. To this Mr. Wang answered in the following vein, -- "according to the address given by Dr. Sun Yat-Sin in Kobe in the <sup>13th</sup> twelfth year of Taisho, recognition of Manchurian independence is not against doctrine. We should recognize Manchukuo as an independent nation in view of her present stage of vivid development. Inasmuch as I am set on the aim of realizing peace with Japan, I am firmly convinced there is no alternative but to recognize Manchukuo."


In the above interview, the Minister considered that in so far as the internal affairs were concerned, it would be wise to accept Mr. Wang's opinion, but since the problem of the national flag and that of the dissolution of the Renovation Government are concerned with the prosecution of the war, he perceived that it would be necessary to make the Japanese army in China cognizant of the opinion of Mr. Wang and therefore summoned his staff officers to Tokyo. The staff officers of each army were opposed to "the Blue Sky and the White Sun Flag", because the Japanese officers and soldiers have a strong belief that the 'Blue Sky and the White Sun Flag' is the symbol of Anti-Japanism and that it makes

*conceded*

*Recognize  
Manchukuo*

*Ray*

the distinction between the peace Army and the Anti-Japan Army difficult; They were also opposed to the dissolution of the Renovation Government because it would give rise to difficult problems in the Maintenance of public peace.



But as a result of discussions, the staff officers of each army understood the will of the minister who thought that it had better respect fully the will of Mr. Wang concerning such internal problems in China, and they came to agree with the opinion of the minister. Thus they arrived at the conclusion that since the central authorities had resolved to respect Mr. Wang's opinions they must make their subordinates subservient to this decision.

Itagaki, the War Minister, informed the Five Ministers Conference of these happenings and it was decided to respect without reservations the will of Mr. Wang.

After the interview with the Premier and the ministers concerned, Mr. Wang had an interview with Prince Konoé. Without an interpreter Prince Konoé talked with Mr. Wang for hours, and so I could not understand its contents in detail. But it seemed to me that at this interview Mr. Wang was inspired with much courage and hope as to the future of the peace movement.

*How many interviews*

13. Following this, the aforementioned "request concerning the realization of the principle of respecting sovereignty" was submitted by CHOU Fuo-hai and the contention on the Chinese side was generally admitted by the Japanese Government. The more important items, still

*objed*

*our Doc  
2178 F*



in my memory, are as follows:

(a) Japan will not interfere with China's domestic administration. Therefore all negotiations will be carried out through the regular diplomatic channels. Advisers shall be provided at China's request only in the Central Government and the highest military body.

An adviser will answer inquiries and submit his opinion occasionally to the Chief concerned but a decision will be made exclusively by the chief concerned.

(b) As to joint enterprises, improper appraisal of property on the Chinese side shall be corrected and the proportion of Japanese investment shall be limited.

(c) Surplus customs duties in the custody of the Tax control Bureau and the YOKOHAMA Specie Bank shall be transferred to the Central Government after its organization.

(d) The Salt Administration shall regain its pre-war status immediately after the organization of the Central Government.

(e) Factories, mines and houses under the Japanese Army's control shall promptly be returned to China except those which are necessary from the military viewpoint.

14. As previously mentioned, the original plan of WANG Ching-wei was to develop a peace movement with Kuomintang members as its leaders, with no intention whatsoever to establish a government. But he changed his mind during his stay in HANOI and that plan was replaced by a peace move-


ment plan based on establishing a government. The Establishment of Mr. WANG's regime entirely depended on his own free will, and the Japanese Government neither requested Mr. WANG to establish a government, nor persuaded him to do so. This is clear in the talk between Premier HIRANUMA and Mr. WANG Ching-wei during his visit to Tokyo in the first ten days of June, 1939. His New-year's statement issued on January 1st, 1940 bore eloquent witness to these circumstances.

From the following paragraph in the New-Year's statement, it is evident that the NANKING Government was established really in accordance with Mr. WANG's free will: "As to my positive embarkation on the peace movement for saving our country, some of my friends approved it and others opposed it, advising me in various ways. I myself, was extremely worried about the means and ways. In order to achieve the great mission which is in common with Japan and China or the stabilization and security in East Asia and establishment of a new order in East Asia, was I to stay out of the government and to convert the present thoroughly anti-Japanese government, advocating peace and salvation of our country, or to achieve this by establishing a new political power? Or, even in case of establishing a new political regime, was I first to establish it as a local political power and then enlarge it gradually to make it Central Government or was I to establish the central government from the beginning? Thus there were many ways conceivable. But comparing all these ways, I reached the conclusion that the most direct and bold way was the most effective and most conducive to future development, and

*23 this  
in 11  
no*

*marked for  
3/29/47*

*obj*



finally I decided to head straight for establishing a central political power."

15. The KONOYE Statement of December 22, 1938 is the only datum available to Mr. WANG Ching-wei with regard to Japan's desire towards China. But it was too abstract, that various opinions, both firm and moderate, would arise therefrom if one were to put it in practice.

If, after Mr. WANG Ching-wei succeeded in organizing a government, great difference should be found between draft treaty submitted by Japan and Mr. WANG's understanding of the KONOYE Statement, Mr. WANG would face a difficult situation. The result thereof would be the collapse of his government or his being left in the hands of a puppet political power. In either case it was certain that the peace movement would fail.

It may be said, therefore, that, in order to show the Japanese Government's sincerity toward Mr. WANG and also to make the peace movement a success, the Japanese Government should deliberate with Mr. WANG as to the embodiment of the KONOYE Statement prior to Mr. WANG's organizing a government.

However, in case the contentions of both sides do not agree, Mr. WANG has the liberty to suspend establishing his government.

I presented the above view to the Government and it was approved. In October, 1939 a tentative plan was shown me by the China Affairs Board.

70-A-11

I, together with Rear Admiral SUGA, Foreign Office Secretary YANO and INUKAI Ken on our side and CHOU FUG-HAI, LEE Ssu-PING, LIN PAISHENG,

and CHOU LUNG-HSINANG on WANG's side, conducted exhaustive investigations and discussions. Due amendments were made to the said draft plan and a conclusion was reached on Dec. 30. To this amended plan both the Japanese Government and WANG CHING-WEI expressed mutual agreement.

16. It seems that peace negotiations with CHUNGKING, even after the issuance of KONOYE's statement, in January, 1938 to the effect that Japan will have no further dealings with the Nationals Government, were in many instances conducted by non-official Japanese with the understanding of high government authorities, but I am not well acquainted with this matter. From about January, 1940, under the supervision of ITAGAKI, Chief of Staff of the Expeditionary Army in China, peace negotiations with CHUNGKING were actively held. This endeavour was carried on with a view to contributing toward a merger of the CHUNGKING regime and WANG's prospective government and also to bringing about an overall peace. The said peace negotiations were promoted through SUNG Tzu-aiang.

About the end of March it was observed that the possibility of their succeeding was very great so that Chief of Staff, ITAGAKI, after consultation with WANG, decided to postpone the formal establishment of the latter's government for several days. But, finally without achieving the effected results, WANG's government was formally set up on March 30. Even after this, maneuvers for peace through SUNG TZU-LLANG were enthusiastically continued by Chief of Staff, ITAGAKI, The Sino-Japanese

treaty negotiations which were started from June, 1940, were conducted on a "dilly-dallying" policy after consultation with WANG. This was also for the purpose of facilitating the success of the said peace manoeuvres. Unfortunately, however, these manoeuvres also proved unsuccessful, and in October of the same year, it was decided to discontinue the endeavour for peace.

After the failure of the manoeuvres through SUNG TZE-LLANG, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, after consultation with WANG, schemed for peace negotiations through the agency of CHIEN YUNG-MING and until the results thereof were definitely known, the signature of the treaty was withheld. But at last, on Nov. 30 of the same year there took place the ceremony for the signing of the treaty and Japan granted recognition to WANG's Government. As stated above, all through the period covering before and after the setting up of WANG's government, every successive Cabinet was deeply concerned about the establishment of peace with CHUNGKING.

17. The Japanese government Army and Navy had no organs or mechanism established for the guidance and supervision of the WANG Government. Although the NANKING Government had advisors in its Military and Economic Council, these advisors were all appointed and engaged by WANG CHINGWEI. They were not forced upon or recommended by the Japanese side. These advisors all acted in accordance with the Chinese regulations and gave advice whenever called upon. They offered their opinions occasionally, but never exercised guidance or interference, nor did they make investigations. These Advisors, acting as a medium between WANG's

government and the Japanese side, made great efforts for the prosecution of the policies of WANG's Government.

The Advisors, in order to avoid as much as possible temptations to interfere, assumed such an attitude that they were rather too passive in their conduct. But this was in accordance with the intention of the Japanese Government and the military so as to prevent WANG's Government from becoming a puppet. Accordingly, in the WANG Government organization and personnel affairs were all left to the free will of the Chinese and no restrictions were exercised with respect to these matters. It was the same with the decision on policies and not a few of them were only brought to the knowledge of the Japanese after the decisions thereon were made some of the policies which WANG's Government wanted to put into effect proved infeasible because of Military restrictions, but this was unavoidable. It cannot however, be denied that the Japanese Army assumed an attitude to help the execution of the policies of WANG's Government, to the greatest extent permissible under such circumstances. As for the budgets also, the Chinese independently decided on them and, according to what we have heard, the economic Advisors were lending their good offices by giving their views regarding financial resources.

On the basis of the demand regarding the political independence which had been agreed upon between the WANG Government and the Japanese Government in June 1937, the latter stipulated some restrictions to the economic advance of the Japanese into China. In particular, the reduction and restrictions made in the percentage of the shares to be held

1939



by the Japanese in Sino-Japanese joint concerns which were national policy companies, created considerable repercussions among the Japanese economic circles. And it was also promised that many of the already established advantages and vested interests would be returned to the Chinese. This caused not a few people among the military, governmental and non-governmental circles to entertain antipathy and scepticism towards WANG's Government, and some even went as far as to call Wang's Government an anti-Japanese government under the veil of peace. Thus an anti-WANG Government atmosphere was created with in Japan. This was, after all, a reaction to WANG's Government having planned for its political independence and the Japanese Government having rendered assistance thereto. This also can serve as a testimony of the fact that WANG's Government was not a puppet government.

On this 15th day of March, 1947,  
at Tokyo.

DEPONENT /S/ KAGESA Yoshiaki (seal)

I, YAMADA Hanzo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness : /S/ YAMADA Hanzo (seal)

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KAGESA Yoshiaki (seal)

6 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. D. N. Sutton

FROM : Capt. James J. Robinson, Mr. W. E. Edwards, Mr. Pedro Lopez

SUBJECT : Witness - KAGESA, Sadaaki

1. Additional suggested subjects for cross-examination on the puppetry of Wang's Government.

a. IPS Document No. 1519-B - Top Secret telegram from Foreign Minister ARITA to Consul-General MIURA in Shanghai sent on 13 June 1939 stated among others that "after deliberation with Colonel KAGESA it was decided to make the KAGESA Organ and the Embassy help them with movement expenses; and such being the case, I hope you will give them ¥3,000 defraying it from your political movement expenses."

b. IPS Document No. 1519-C - Secret telegram from Consul-General MIURA to Foreign Minister ARITA sent on 10 June 1939 states among others "that DOHIMARA, HARANO, KAGESA, Chen Chuin, and Chen Chung-fu acted as mediators for coalition between Wang and Japan"; and "that Wang had a deliberate talk with the leaders of both the Provisional and Renovation Governments, and exchanged their views on a plan for the organization of the central government, but after all both Japan and Wang, that are in a hurry with the establishment of the central government, are going to set up Wu Pei-fu as President and Wang as Premier, and the government seems to be established about the first of September; and that Japan has a secret design at the back of the organization of the central government that she intends to make Wang conclude a humiliating treaty with Japan by taking advantage of these sorts of peace negotiation organs with Japan, and materialize such an underhand design as to 'conquer enemy with enemy' by making a cat's paw of Wang in order to make China a tributary to Japan by controlling China's sovereignty."

c. IPS Document No. 1519-D, -page 3 - Top Secret memorandum from MACHIJIRI, Kazumoto, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, the War Ministry, to Mr. SUZUKI, Teiichi, Chief of the Administrative Affairs Department, KO-A-IN, mentions Artillery Colonel KAGESA, Sadaaki as the responsible person for movements, adding: "However, the name 'KAGESA, Sadaaki' should be used in case of receiving money."

d. In IPS Document No. 1519-H - Top Secret statements of the interview between Wang Keh-min and Wang Ching-wei. Paragraph 1 on first page thereof mentioned KAGESA as one of those who might arrange for the time and nature of topics to be broached in the interview between Wang Keh-min and Wang Ching-wei; on page 3 of the same document Wang Ching-wei stated that he told the three points to Colonel KAGESA later and he said that he would talk over them in Tokyo, and that at the beginning of April, KAGESA came to Hanoi and advised

him to escape from Hanoi as he was in personal danger; on page 7 of the same document KAGESA was mentioned twice, first with reference to a telegram from SHIMIZU and second with respect to the anxiety of Wang Ching-wei to have "the chief...inform Colonel KAGESA of this secretly"; and page 11 of the same document Wang Keh-min stated that "As for a code, please consult well with Colonel KAGESA."

e. IFS Document No. 1519-I - Top Secret Record of an Interview between Wang Ching-wei and Councillor MORISHIMA dated 3 July 1939 emanating from the KAGESA Organ.

f. IFS Document No. 1519-L - is a Record of an Interview between Wang Ching-wei and OIKAWA dated 4 July 1939 emanating from the KAGESA Organ. On page 4 thereof Commander OIKAWA boasted: "The Japanese Navy is mighty enough to control the whole American fleet triumphantly in the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, the Japanese Navy is prepared enough not to allow the navy of any country to touch even a finger to the Orient. You can march forward without any fear about this point."

Capt. James J. Robinson  
Mr. W. E. Edwards  
Mr. Pedro Lopez

By:

IPS DOC. 1297-B

Top Secret-1940-No. 52,830-code-from Nanking to the Ministry

Dispatched - afternoon 30 March  
Received - evening 30 March

To Foreign Minister ARITA  
From Consul General HORI

No. 109 (Top Secret) in the Ambassador's code

1. It was observed today that the Chinese displayed their national flag with only a much smaller yellow banner than stipulated by the agreement attached to the same flag pole. The same was true at the official buildings of the National Government and the residences of important officials. Other government organs imitated the specially displayed pattern as at the national government front gate, while there were quite a few official buildings flying flags without yellow banners at all.
2. Thereupon, the UME Kikan (Agency) summoned CHU Ming-Yi, Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Chairman of the "Preparatory Committee for the Restoration of the Capital". It was pointed out by KAGESA to him that although the people's mistaken way of displaying the flag could be ascribed to the new Government's procedural negligence, yet the responsibility could not be overlooked in regarding the flag having been displayed by the government organs as well as at the private residences of important officials directly under President WANG by violating the agreement. CHU Ming-Yi, together with MEI Su-Ping and TING Mo-Tsung who also hastened to the scene explained that it was entirely due to the negligence of the WANG side rather than any malicious intention. They made every effort to apologize and promised to amend matters, following which they departed. WANG Ching-Wei, at the request of KAGESA, furthermore, dispatched MEI Su-Ping, at 2:30 p.m. to tender formal apologies to the Expeditionary Forces Headquarters and to the Fleet Commanding Headquarters. The following points were also promised:
  - a. The flags at the government buildings not in conformity with the agreement shall be immediately corrected. Flags without the banners shall be withdrawn.
  - b. The people shall be clearly instructed, as soon as possible, as regards the proper way to display the flag.
  - c. WANG side shall maintain close liaison with UME Kikan (Agency) in carrying out the above.

*Amendment  
card*

IPS DOC. 1297-B

Page 2

The matter was thus settled for the present.

This cable was relayed to Peking and to the Minister at SHANGHAI.

22 May 1947

Memorandum to: Mr. Sutton

Re: SUGGESTED SUBJECTS FRO CROSS-EXAMINATION  
OF KAGESA

1. The development of WATANABE Plan with regard to WANG CHING-WEI and participants therein. Stress that phase of the plan which contemplated Japanese possession of natural resources in North China (Harada Memoirs, Chapter 307, Dec. 19, 1938, p. 15.)
2. WANG CHING-WEI request that KONOYE make official statement followed by telegram. An official statement was anticipated by WANG on the peace solution and severing relations with China. However, WANG sent a telegram to KONOYE that he could not make this statement due to CHANG's return to Chungking (Id. p. 16)
3. INUKAI and KAGESA went to Shanghai to formulate the plan. Develop the plot. (Id. Dec. 21, p. 18.)

F. S. TAVENNER, Jr.

Are you familiar with what the <sup>Japanese</sup> army called the  
Watanabe plan in Dec 1938.

if yes -

~~was it was true of the terms and conditions~~  
~~was an anti-comintern~~

was one of the terms - that Japan was to take  
possession of the natural resources of North China?

if no.

was it not arranged that Wang Ching-wei

"Hokko-Maru" specially chartered -

you arrived in Hanoi before me

1005-2

letter of Wang for Itagaki it also

Don't recall other code names - weak code.

22 May 1947

Re: KAGESA, Yoshiaki (Sadaaki)  
Def. Doc. No. 1282

The Prosecution objects to and <sup>now</sup> ~~seeks~~ to strike out those portions of the affidavit which refer to documents and purport to give their contents, which documents are not produced and no reason is given for the failure to produce them. A number of such references appear in the affidavit. We draw particular attention to the following:

1. Section 5, pages 3 and 4, the documents entitled, "Tentative Terms of Peace between Japan and China", and "The Policy for the Adjustment of Relations between Japan and China."
2. Section 6, page 4, the circular telegram sent by WANG, Ching-wei in December 1938.
2. Section 10, page 10, the last paragraph of that section which purports to give the contents of the circular peace telegrams of 16 January 1940.
3. Section 13, pages 16-17, the provisions of the document entitled, "Request Concerning the Realization of the Principle of Respecting Sovereignty." This objection applies particularly to items (a) to (e), inclusive, in section 13 on page 17.
4. Section 14, page 18, the New Year's statement, being the last paragraph of section 14.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

14 May 1947

Memorandum

To : Investigative Division  
From : D. N. Sutton  
Subject: Letters from ARITA, ITAGAKI and SUZUKI  
to WANG, Ching-wei in April 1939.

It appears that in April 1939 letters were sent by Foreign Minister ARITA, War Minister ITAGAKI and SUZUKI of the Ko-A-In to WANG, Ching-wei, who at that time was staying at Hanoi in French Indo-China. These letters were probably carried by KAGESA, Sadaaki. Will you please locate these letters if possible.

D. N. Sutton,  
Assistant Counsel.

cc: Mr. Tavenner  
Mr. Laverge  
Judge Hsiang  
Judge Nyi

5/20  
Report could not  
locate

Head of Telegraph Section  
(sealed)

Person in charge of Sending:  
(sealed)

Supervisor: Head of the Bureau  
of East Asia  
(sealed)

Chief Official: Chief of the 1st Section of  
the Bureau of East Asia;  
Chief of the 2nd Section of  
Bureau of East Asia  
(signed)

Drawn up: June 13, 1939.

Transmission No. 14476

Sent: 10.30 p.m., June 13, 1939.

To:

From:

Consul-General MIUR., Shanghai.

Foreign Minister ARITA.

Name of Case:

Recording Name of Case:

Re T. IZUCHI (T.N. Wang) Movements.

Cipher: No. 895

(TOP SECRET)

To Councillor MORISHIMA from SHIMIZU. Isamu GOTO, Michio KIHARA, and Masaru HARA--these three persons are scheduled to start from here for your place on the 16th.

They are expected to engage continuously in thought movements by request of Lieutenant-General DONIHARA, whom you know of; and as Colonel IMAI conceives an ardent desire to give them assistance as before, after deliberation with Colonel KAGESA, it was decided to make the KAGESA. Organ and the Embassy help them with movement expenses; and such being the case, I hope you will give them ¥3,000 defraying it from your political movement expenses.

/Marginal Remarks:/

(Secret)

(Copy of Telegram)

Send two copies to Colonel USUI: (Sent)

Sending: Done

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1939/SHOWA 14/

17450

(Cipher)

Sent from Shanghai: In the afternoon, June 10.

Reached the home office: In the afternoon, /June/ 10.

1939

/Abbreviation of/ Asia; Information

/From/ Consul-General MIURA

/To/ Foreign Minister ARITA

No. 1594.

Since the mandate for arrest of Wang Ching-wei was made public it has been causing various quarters extraordinary concern.

According to a Chungking despatch of the U.P. 9th, the official circles there announced as information about QA that Wang started from Shanghai on May 31 and arrived at Tokyo on June 1, and that it was Chou Fou-hai who had left for Japan before that. The Sheng Pao issued on the 10th, however, reports that the members of Wang's suite were Chen Pi-chun, Chen Chung-fu, and Kao Tsung-wu; that DOHIMURA, HARANO, KIGESA, Chen Chuin, and Chen Chung-fu acted as mediators for coalition between Wang and Japan; that besides those mentioned above, Germany offered to act a part, and contributed to the domestic control by persuading Chen Kung-po, a Germanophile, into neutralizing the movement

in opposition to Wang's trip to Japan; that though there has been a rumor abroad that Chen broke off his relations with Wang, it was a smoke-screen to disguise the outward appearance; that Wang had a deliberate talk with the leaders of both the Provisional and (T.N. in Peking) Renovation (T.N. in Nanking) Governments, and exchanged their views on a plan for the organization of the central government, but after all both Japan and Wang, that are in a hurry with the establishment of the central government, are going to set up Wu Peifu as President and Wang as Premier, and the government seems to be established about the first of September; and that Japan has a secret design at the back of the organization of the central government that she intends to make Wang conclude a humiliating treaty with Japan by taking advantage of these sorts of peace negotiation organs with Japan, and materialize such an underhand design as to 'conquer enemy with enemy' by making a cat's paw of Wang in order to make China a tributary to Japan by controlling China's sovereignty.

The message has been transferred to Peking, Tientsin, Nanking, Hankow, and Hongkong.

*Shanghai  
a  
HP suspected  
Chungking*

/Marginal Remarks/ A matter pertaining to Wang.

(Several signatures, illegible)

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Top Secret

June 29, 1939

/From/SUZUKI, Teiichi,

Chief of the Administrative Affairs Dep't, KO-A-IN.

Sealed

/To/ Mr. KURIHARA, Masashi,

Chief of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs, the  
Foreign Ministry.

Re a spot Japanese nominal person responsible for movements.

Regarding the matter mentioned above, I beg to inform you  
that I have submitted a notification to the Vice-chief of the Liaison  
Office of North and Central CHINA as per the separate sheet.

COPY

(Separate Sheet)

Top Secret.

/From/ The Chief of the Administrative Affairs Department

/To/ The Vice-chief of the Liaison Office of the North and  
Central CHINA.

Re a spot Japanese nominal person responsible for movements.

*who*

I beg to inform you that with regard to the spot Japanese nominal person responsible for the expenses needed for the National Salvation Anti-Commintern League in accordance with the decision on April 1 at the conference of the KO-A-IN and for the movements of Wu/T.N. Wu Pei-fu/ in accordance with the decision of June 23 at the meeting of the KO-A-IN, the chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry has notified us as per the separate sheet.

Military Affairs despatch No. 736.

Top Secret

Re a spot Japanese nominal person responsible for the movements.

June 23, 1939.

/From/ MACHIJIRI, Kazumoto,

Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, the War Ministry.

/To/ Mr. SUZUKI, Teiichi,

Chief of the Administrative Affairs Department, KO-A-IN.

I beg to inform you that I have notified the Finance Ministry regarding the spot nominal person responsible for the expenses needed for the National Salvation Anti-Commintern League in accordance with the decision made on April 1 at the meeting of the KO-A-IN as follows:-

The Spot Responsible Person for Movements:

Artillery Colonel KAGESA, Sadaaki.

However, the name "KAGESA, Sadaaki" should be used in case of receiving money. ✓

*see with Suzuki*

COPY

Military Affairs despatch No. 737

Top Secret

Re a spot Japanese Nominal Person Responsible for movements

June 23, 1939

/From/ M. CHIJIRI, Kazumoto

Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, the War Ministry.

/To/ Mr. SUZUKI, Teiichi

Chief of the Administrative Affairs Department of the KO-A-IN.

I beg to inform you that I have notified the Finance Ministry regarding the spot Japanese nominal person responsible for the expenses needed for the movements of Wu/ T.N. Wu Fei-fu/ in accordance with the decision made at the meeting of the KO-A-IN as follows:-

The spot Japanese Responsible Person:

Rear Admiral ŌSEKO, Michisada

However, the name "ŌSEKO, Michisada" should be used in case of receiving money.



DCC. NO. 1519-H

/Marginal Remarks:/

(Top Secret)

Secretary TSUCHIDA

Chief of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs: (signed)

Minister: (signed)

Vice-Minister: (signed)

Chief of the 1st Section of the Bureau: (signed)

Chief of the 2nd Section of the Bureau: (signed)

Received from Secretary YOSHANO, July 2, 1939.

Confidential, in the Ministry only (in ink)

Matters concerning the Interview between Wang Keh-min and  
TAKEUCHI /T.N. Wang Chao-ming/.

#### 1. THE FIRST INTERVIEW

On the 24th, Secretary OTA went to Tientsin with Colonel AMAMIYA and met Colonel KAGESA and Lt. Colonel KAZUTA at the official residence of the divisional commander. They made arrangements for the time and nature of topics to be broached in the interview between Wang Keh-min and TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei). In accordance with the above arrangements, Wang Keh-min started from the Hsichio /T.N. Western suburbs/ airfield at 8:20 a.m., June 25, (Chinese side: Wang Keh-min, Chief of the Section Chang, and Private Secretary KATO; - Liaison side: Chief KITA (T.N. of the North China Liaison Office of the KO-A-IN, and Secretary OTA), and had an interview with TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-Wei) all alone at nine in the Italian concession and the interview continued until about a half past ten.

After the above interview, Wang Ko-min went to the official residence of the divisional commander, where Chief KITA was

waiting for him, and paid his respects to the divisional commander concerning the problem of concession, and after this, leaving the official residence of the divisional commander at 11:10 for the official residence of Mayor Wen (accompanied by Chief of the Military Intelligence Service SHIBAYAMA), exchanged views on the problems of the Tientsin Concessions and the financial questions of Tientsin Municipal Government with the Mayor and SHIBAYAMA, Chief of the Military Intelligence Service. He started from the Tientsin air-field at one and returned safely to the Provisional Government at some time after two o'clock.

After his return Wang Keh-min gave the chief the account of his talk with TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) to the following effect:

I. As I had been on intimate terms with Mr. TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei), the talk proceeded very pleasantly. First of all, Mr. TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) renewed our friendship, and told me that he intended to see me before he went to Tokyo, but that he was sorry that his business had prevented him from doing so. I (Wang Keh-min) evinced my desire to hear what Mr. TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) could tell on the following three questions: (1) an account of all that has hitherto passed, (2) his future plan, and (3) Mr. TAKEUCHI's (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) requests to me (Wang Keh-min).

II. On this, Mr. TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) said: "Chiang Kai-shek attaches great importance to the affairs relating to Soviet Russia and is using Britain and France only secondarily. Many a time I advised Chiang about his attitude

of pro-communism, but it was all in vain, and so I was trying to get out from Chungking. At this time Mr. Kung, who had been dispatched by Lung Yun, happened to come to Chungking, so getting his ticket of an air-plane, I escaped from there to Lung Yun." And again he said:

III. "I (TAKEUCHI; T.N. Wang Ching-wei) thought of three measures concerning the solution of the Japanese-Chinese questions:

- (i) In order to organize a powerful and independent central government, the situation shall be saved by dealing with Chiang Kai-shek;
- (ii) the situation shall be saved with the existing political regimes as its nucleus;
- (iii) the National Party shall be reorganized and other various parties other than the National Party shall be joined, and then all of them shall hold a joint consultation to establish a central government. "And it was my intention to write a letter to Prince KONOE, which was to be sent by Kao Tsung-wu about February, to the effect that when (i) or (ii) is adopted I shall support it without taking government office, and that when (iii) is adopted I shall have no objection if I should be asked to come forward. This, however, was not realized on account of Tseng Chung-ming's assassination. As for the three points, I told them to Colonel KAGESA later, and he said that he would talk over them in Tokyo.

"At the beginning of April, KAGESA came to Hanoi and advised me to escape from Hanoi as I was in personal danger.

So I escaped from French Indo-China in a small ship, and, changing my ships on the way, arrived at Shanghai at the beginning of May. In Shanghai, I met Major General ŌSEKO and others, but they were not in connection with the matter. To sound the Japanese side on the subject, I decided to go to Tokyo and went there of my own accord. Besides, I wrote a letter to Liang Hung-chih and sent it by Chao Tsun-yu.

IV. "In Tokyo I met Ex-Prime Minister KONOYE, Yōsuke MATSUOKA, and some other people besides five ministers. Prime Minister KONOYE, acting as go-between, introduced me (TAKEUCHI; T.N. Wang Ching-wei) to the people of the government. Prime Minister HIRANUMA said that he would approve of a plan to form a strong independent government, but it would be awkward to have Chiang Kai-shek make it.

"The details were told by War Minister ITAGAKI and on that occasion he talked about national consciousness. Then I told him that recently national consciousness has been prevailing in China, but Japan was trying to destroy it, while Russia was exploiting it.

"As for my trip to Peking, it was not suggested directly by the War Ministry, but indirectly by the army.

As I had some contract with Wu Pei-fu and the joint committee, I came to Tientsin.

"The Finance Minister told me (TAKEUCHI; T.N. Wang Ching-wei) that China had underrated Japanese economical power." (Wang told me that though he had been told about the nature of the interview with the Navy Minister by TAKEUCHI /T.N. Wang Ching-wei), he could not recall it.

Mr. TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) told me that Prime Minister KONOYE's talk had been very sincere, but he did not talk about its nature. Mr. TAKEUCHI /T.N. Wang Ching-wei/ said that the talk in Tokyo substantially resulted in the above-mentioned (iii): namely it was to reorganize the National Party and to establish a central government with the help of the people of various fields from Chungking.

V. Summarizing the talk of Mr. TAKEUCHI /T.N. Wang Ching-wei/):

(i) It is my (T.N. Wang Chao-min's) desire to form an independent and free central government, but I (TAKEUCHI /T.N. Wang Ching-wei/) don't mean to do it single-handed.

(ii) All that concerns China I will decide after consultation with others.

(iii) The movement to pick out prominent persons of Chungking shall be done in cooperation with others.

(iv) Restoring the National Government, we shall ask Lin Sen to be President. (Note: This point is contrary to 'a concrete temporary expedient concerning the saving of the situation'). And the old national flag \* shall be used as before.

After he related the above and other things, Mr. TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) said, "The result of the exchange of views in Tokyo shows that our desires will not be necessarily unrealizable." Further, he said that he had told Prime Minister HIRANUMA, "at present in discussing peace between Japan and China, we have to attend to it in all sincerity: it will be difficult to realize peace if customers insist on seeing goods, and merchants try to decide the price beforehand."

When I (Wang Keh-min) asked Mr. TAKEUCHI /T.N. Wang Ching-wei/ if he had something to ask me, he said that he wanted to hear about the movement toward Wu. So I told him about it briefly. On this, Mr. TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) said, "Wu's is not worthy much consideration. Wu wants to be President, but that is out of the question, because I wish Lin Sen to be President."

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/Margin Notes:/

(I want to make sure the following:)

How does the Army think of the matter of Lin Sen?

\*About this point, the army commander gave a clear explanation at the meeting of the 27th.

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VI. Next, I (Wang Keh-min) questioned about the state of affairs concerning the liaison with Chungking, specially with the troops. Mr. TAKEUCHI /T.N. Wang Ching-wei/ answered: "Two divisions under Lung Yun's command being in Kiangsi now, it is inconvenient, but Lung Yun surely is making preparations. In the past I had been in touch with the people of the National Party in Chungking, but I do not know how they feel at present."

As Mr. TAKEUCHI /T.N. Wang Ching-wei/ asked me about the state of both the temporary and restoration governments, I answered, "The question of the Provisional Government is simple; but as to the Renovation Government, though I met Liang Hung-chih in March, I do not see him recently; so I am not familiar with the details. I suppose it may be more or less difficult."\* And I added, "You said that Wu's was out of question, but it

should not be neglected. He may come into question."

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\*/Marginal Note:/ This point is at variance with what TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) said to KAGESA. I think there is a telegram from SHIMIZU.)

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Then I asked again if he had heard something about Wu from War Minister ITAGAKI, and TAKEUCHI / T.N. Wang Ching-wei/ answered that he hadn't. Finally he said, "I may go to Peking to see the army commander on the 26th, tomorrow. If so, I am to see Wu Pei-fu. I know I shall have a chance to have a long talk with you (Wang Keh-min)."

Moreover, Mr. TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) asked me: "Isn't there a fear of beginning a negotiation with Chiang Kai-shek separately?" I (Wang Keh-ming) answered, "That will not be." Mr. TAKEUCHI /T.N. Wang Ching-wei/ seemed to understand in outline, but looked more or less anxious about that point. In this connection, I wish the chief will inform Colonel KAGESA of this secretly. Next, I (Wang Keh-ming) said: "Chiang Kai-shek will not be pleased with your movements." "Of course he wont," answered Mr. TAKEUCHI / T.N. Wang Ching-wei/. And he told me in details how Tseng Chung-ming had been assassinated.

As for the item (3) in the paragraph (I), namely Mr. TAKEUCHI's (T.N. Wang Ching-wei's) requests to me (Wang Keh-min), we did not have time enough to discuss it. I intend to discuss it when we meet tomorrow (the 26th). Now, I wish to add that what Mr. TAKEUCHI /T.N. Wang Ching-wei/ says must be read between

lines, and, besides, he will often speak after due consideration, so much so that in some occasions he speaks only a half of what he wants to say and let other persons guess the rest. So I am not quite sure if my present report has fully conveyed you Mr. TAKEUCHI's /T.N. Wang Ching-wei's intention. In any case, Mr. TAKEUCHI /T.N. Wang Ching-wei's/ looked very well, though he was a little thin.

## 2. THE SECOND INTERVIEW

TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) was expected to come to the Shintokusha (T.N. Chin-teh-seh) on the 26th to have an interview with Wu Peifu, but could not meet him owing to the circumstances on the part of Wu. So he postponed his program by one day and arrived at Peking on the 27th and had an interview with the Commander-in-Chief at the Shintokusha for about one hour beginning at 9:30 (the details of the interview are omitted). Then after having a talk with Wu Pei-fu from 10:45 to 12:30 there, he took lunch with him and returned to Tientsin by the plane that left the Shintokusha at about 2 p.m.

The outline of Wang Keh-min's report after the interview to Chief KITA as the details of the talk is as follows:

Wang Keh-min: If you take the leadership, how many influential people do you expect to pick up, and from what quarters,

TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei): When the Kuomintang representatives' convention be held, I am confident that I shall be able to get together about 300 persons. I am sure part of our comrades that belong to the National Party and now in Chungking will attend it. As for military forces, I shall be able to



get two-fifths or three-fifths of the present troops: those forces of Canton, Chang Fa-kuei, and Hsueh Yueh will come. For a step to acquire these comrades, I think it better to make our attitude clear before a central government is established. What is your opinion about it?

Wang Keh-min: To start the activities as you stated, it is necessary to have leaders, so it seems needful to form a central government after making a thorough connection with them beforehand.

TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei): How do you think of holding a Kuomintang representatives' convention at Peking?

Wang Keh-min: I think Shanghai more suitable, but if it is dangerous, either Peking or Tientsin will do.

TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei): I want to carry out the movement for establishing a central government by first holding a Kuomintang representatives' convention, then negotiating with Chinese troops, and lastly making arrangements with various parties. I hope you will honor us with your presence at these meetings.

Wang Keh-min: I shall be very glad to be present and give counsel to you. However, I have no intention of becoming a member of the central government; I hope you will understand this point. You have not met Wu Pei-fu yet on account of various circumstances, but I think nothing will be better if you could succeed in reaching an understanding with him. It would be inexpedient to increase your enemies.

TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei): I intend to make a declaration before holding a Kuomintang representatives' convention, and state before it to the effect, that, the spirit of anti-communism which the existing political regimes have been advocating being nothing different from our idea, we will also act on that line.

As for Mongolian districts, though it is my intention to include their names in the declaration, I think I will allow them join us in the central government after it is established.

Wang Keh-min: You had better not express your opinion too often about the restoration of the national government and the sun-in-the-blue-sky flag for the present, so I think.

TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei): I know it well, And I want to send Kao Tsing-wu to North China to make connection with the people there.

Wang: How is the state of things concerning the connection with Chiang Kai-shek's side?

TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei): Some in the financial circles in Shanghai are on my side. For instance, they helped me with my travelling expenses to Tokyo, though it is not a great sum. T. V. Soong is opposed to H. H. Kung and not on good terms with Chiang Kai-shek; and he also declines to collaborate with me. Ho Yin-chin seems to have an intention to collaborate with us on the whole, but it is a question how to escape from Chungking. I have some connection with Chen Li-fu, but he also finds it difficult to escape. Hereafter I want to make ourselves understood through a code.

Wang Keh-min: As for a code, please consult well with Colonel KAGESA.

In concluding his opinion, Wang Keh-min said to the Chief that as a result of his interview with Commander-in-Chief, Mr. TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Chao-min) appeared to be in much higher spirits than when he had met him on the 25th, and that according to his observation, various quarters' supports extended to TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) seemed to be producing satisfactory results, considering the circumstances. Wang Ku-min too seemed to me that through his two interviews with him, he had been roused a good feeling towards TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang Ching-wei) and had become fairly interested in this movement.

Telegram Copy

Top Secret

1931 21506

Cipher. Sent from Canton: July 12, a.m.  
Received by the home office: 12, a.m.

/To:/ Foreign Minister ARITA/From:/ Consul-General OKAZAKI

No. 414

In the code of the office head.

From KAWAMURA to section chief TSUCHIDA.

On the 10th, I called on the assistant manager of the NAWA branch office (T.N. written in pencil 'Chief of the military staff?') accompanied by TAKAHASHI (T.N. written in pencil 'Lt. Col. KAZUTA'). TAKAHASHI (T.N. written in pencil 'KAZUTA') told him the outline of circumstances concerning TAKEUCHI's inspection (T.N. written in pencil 'WANG's movement') and both TAKEUCHI's (T.N. written in pencil 'WANG') and KAWAMURA's (T.N. written in pencil 'KAGESA') trip to Itozaki (T.N. written in pencil 'Canton'), and asked his co-operation in preparing store-houses (T.N. written in pencil 'dwelling') and others. And then, he readily consented to co-operate with us saying that he had been thinking it most expedient for TAKEUCHI (T.N. written in pencil 'WANG') to start his inspection (T.N. written in pencil 'movement')) by making this city its base. Further he said that the coal inspection, (T.N. written in pencil 'military movement') of NAWA (T.N. written in pencil 'the Army') towards the Shimono family's contract (T.N. written 'China's split') had gradually offered a

DOC. No. 1519-I

Page 2

promising prospect for its success, though he did not know if it was the same person to whom TAKEUCHI (T.N. written in pencil (WANG') had an eye.

Doc. No. 1519-L

Page 1

Top Secret

Matter related with Wang.

Foreign Ministry

Chief of the Board of East Asiatic Affairs (signed)

Chief of the 1st Section of the Board (signed)

Chief of the 2nd Section of the Board (signed)

Record of an Interview between Wang and Councillor MORISHIMA.

July 3, 1939.

THE KAGESA ORGAN

Received from Col. USI,

July 21.

The Outline of an Interview between Wang and Councillor MORISHIMA.

Made at the temporary residence of Wang, from 4 p.m. to

5:30 p.m., July 3, 1939

(Consul-General T. JIRI sat in company with them)

WANG: I express my sincere thanks for your kind arrangements such as the liaisons with the Italian Ambassador in Shanghai and so forth on the occasion of my travelling to Tientsin last time. Through your good offices I could proceed on my journey around there without a hitch.

MORI: The Italian Ambassador was so kind at that time that he wrote a letter of introduction under my very eyes for the Consul-General in Tientsin, and cabled to Tientsin at the same time. Few days after that, he went to Pehtaiho to pass the summer there, but he told me that he had specially taken the trouble of leaving an interpreter of the Chinese language in Shanghai with a view to getting liaison with you.

WANG: Just after our arrival at Tientsin, the Italian Ambassador, who had been staying at Pehtaiho then, specially sent an attache to the Embassy on his behalf and the Consul-General in Tientsin also favoured me with various conveniences.

Has there been any change in the Problem of the Tsientsin Concession since then?

MORI: A conversation between Japan and England is to be held in Tokyo for the discussion of the problem of the Tsientsin Concessions.

WANG: Is there any possibility to settle the matter successfully at the coming conversation?

MORI: Under the present circumstances, an improvement of situation could no longer be attained by a local settlement only. Japan, therefore, is now demanding of England not only the matters needed for peace maintenance such as delivering of the criminals of "Terrorism" but also a fundamental amendment of her policy so that England may take an attitude to recognize a new order by cooperating with Japan and the new government.

Of the recent tendency of English people in China, for instance, it is reported that English merchants in Shanghai, worrying themselves about the decline of the commercial rights of England brought about by the rival relations between Japan and England, have been asking the home government to take a proper step. The Consul-General has also complained that he could not proceed successfully the negotiations on the pending problems under the condition that he is obliged to ask Ambassador Karr for his instructions in all cases.

I suppose that English people are too sharp on their interests to repeat such foolishness as to suffer losses by the continuance of the pro-Chiang policy.

WANG: Those countries that support the anti-Japanese Chiang government at present are principally the Soviet Union and England. But I don't think England will continue her support of Chiang to the end. For your information to obtain knowledge of the inside of the England's



pro-Chiang policy, I will tell you about the condition at the time when I had an interview with Ambassador Karr before I left the government office last year. In November last year, Chiang had an interview with Ambassador Karr in Changsha (It was before Changsha had been destroyed by fire.) and I myself had my interview with him in Chungking respectively; on that occasion Karr told me that Japan seemed to be requesting Chiang's retirement from public life, but that China would not be affected by his retirement if I had taken his post and maintained the substance and structure of the government as it was. On this, I rejected his suggestion saying that the situation could not be saved by patching up the matter for the present through replacing Chiang's position with me, because the present incident had been brought about by the wrong policies taken by the National Government for those years. It is reported that the attitude Ambassador Karr assumed at the time of his interview with Chiang was very cool; and that Chiang replied to him half-menacingly that the Chinese government should think out another way in case England should not support China thoroughly.

In our interview, Ambassador Karr spoke reminiscently before me that he could not understand what Chiang meant when he had told him "think out another way."

The prominent persons in Chungking had been much surprised at Ambassador Karr's cool attitude then, and Hung Hsiang-hsi and Wang Chung-hui, for instance, were so pessimistic that they told me that they thought they could never expect further support

from England. However, as soon as the negotiations between Japan and England held in Tokyo later was ended fruitlessly, the attitude of England, as you know, returned again to the pro-Chiang policy, and England soon agreed to a Loan-Contract with China for a bulky amount.

In short, England at that time seems to have weighed Japan and China in the balance and to have intended to transfer to one of the most convenient sides. As for the relations between Soviet Russia and Chiang, there is an inseparable relation between them.

According to a report obtained from one of my comrades who has just arrived from Hongkong today, a contract for the supply of great quantity of munition has been concluded recently between Soviet Russia and the Chungking government, and for this China is said to have agreed to supply Russia with her mining and agricultural products of the South-Western provinces.

I think it may be an idea to have England give up her pro-Chiang policy by pointing out those circumstances.

TAJIRI: Even though efforts were made to make England think over again by stressing the close connection between Soviet Russia and Chiang, England would, I presume, hesitate to oppose against Soviet in the Far East at the present moment when she is striving very hard, in Europe, to secure support from Soviet Russia. It is my opinion that we should make it the first consideration to strongly request England, as a first step of our policy, to adopt a policy suitable for a new situation in co-operation with Japan and the new government, in

Japanese occupied areas, and make her understand that the rights and interests of England could not be guaranteed otherwise. If we succeed in this, I think there will be the possibility of her support for Chiang becoming gradually less and less in proportion to this till finally she will come to cut off her relations with Chiang completely.

WANG:

In order to settle the present incident, diplomacy toward England is very important; the point is to adopt a wise measure so as to induce her not to stand in our way while we are establishing a New East Asia, though we should not forget to check England by force on the other hand; and what we have to pay our attention to in that case is an attitude of the U.S.A.; we must be very careful not to let the U.S.A. interfere together with England in the problems of the Orient.

MORI:

In view of the recent attitude of the U.S.A., I think the U.S.A. will not follow blindly after England so far as we do not accord her an extreme unjust treatment.

In Shanghai there is a tendency that the U.S.A. will act a part of a mediator at the conference of the Diplomatic Corps: There was a case that to a proposal to appoint a Japanese as the Vice-Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police Bureau in the International Settlements, England opposed insisting that there had been no such an instance for the past 80 years but that the U.S.A. presented a compromise measure and tried to convince England of it.

There was another instance that, some time ago, the U.S. government told us that she wished to make public her past protests en gross, which had been filed with us by her every time Japanese airplanes bombed American churches and others, but when Japan wished her to decline the proposal fearing lest it should irritate Japanese people and the diplomatic relations between two countries should be affected if such an announcement was made at that time, the U.S.A. took it into consideration and agreed to decline her proposal. It may not be difficult for us to see her real intention. Japan, therefore, is taking great care not to irritate her unreasonably, and I think it may not be impossible to take a measure in order to separate the U.S.A. from England.

WANG: If that be the case, it will be very convenient.

TAJIRI: In case you establish a new government in order to dissolve the Chungking government, important as the diplomatic relation is, you must not ignore a movement towards the Chinese merchants residing abroad. Living as I am in Hongkong, I am interested in the affair. With what measures are you making your movements towards the Chinese merchants residing abroad? We have an intention to cooperate with you thoroughly concerning the above.

WANG: I know well how necessary the movements toward the Chinese merchants residing abroad are as you have just said.

We have already sent liaison men to the South Seas, America and other places. The Chinese merchants residing abroad are extremely vain by nature and are fond of showiness; for instance, when Hu Han-min,