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EVIDENTIARY LOC. NO. 2273

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT NO. 224 ✓

BACKGROUND LOC. NO. _____

SIGNATURE Lopez

ROOM NO. 330

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. Nos. 2271-2272-2273

27 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Transcripts, Interrogations of
Gen. MUTO, Akira

Date: See Below Original Copy Language:
English

Has it been translated? Yes No
Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: IPS (See our Case File #319)

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Gen. MUTO

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>
2271	16 Apr 1946
2272	20 Apr 1946
2273	22 Apr 1946

Analyst: C.W.J. Phelps

Doc. Nos. 2271-2272-2273

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2273

Date

27 June 46

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Gen. MUTO, Akira

Date: 22 Apr 46

Original () Copy ()

Language:

Eng

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Doc Div

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

IPS (see our Case File # 319)

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

Gen. MUTO

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Interrogation of MUTO by Messers
Hyder + Lopez.

Analyst:

CW Phelps

Doc. No.

一九四六年四月二十二日 武藤 章

訊問、抜萃

第七頁

向、南京ニキヲ貴方側ノ軍隊ハ何等支那軍ニ制圧サ
レテハ居ラナカツトセウ南京南城ヲ祝フ事が出来
夕程デアアリマセンカ

答、日本軍ハ城壁外デ待期シテ支那側ニ降服ヲ命ズル傳
單ヲ落下シマシタ。支那側ガ之ニ應ジナカツト為。日本軍
ハ武カヲ以テ市内ニ侵入シマシタ。

向、ソレハドノ位ノ時間ヲ要シマシタカ。
答、實際ニ砲撃ヲ開始シテカラ二日デシタ。

向、貴方ハ又丁度「マニラ」ニ掠奪暴行、起ツタ時山下大將
ノ參謀次長ヲ居タト言フハ偶然、合致デセウカ。

答、南京ノ場合ハ二大隊カミ大隊ガ市中ニ入ルコトニナツテ居
マシタ。トコロガ全軍ガ入城シテマツタ結果、遂ニ南京ハ
掠奪暴行事件トナツタノデス。

「マニラ」場合ハ山下大將ハ市内戦ヲ避ケナイト思フテ
居タ、デシタ。トコロガ山下大將ノ指揮スル軍隊以外、
陸海軍ノ或ル分子ガ市内ニ残留シテ居タ為ニアメリカ
軍ガ「マニラ」市ヲ襲撃スルニ至ツタノデス

向、マニラ市内デ戦闘ガアツタト云フコトデ貴方ノ兵隊ニ
依ル「マニラ」婦人ノ強姦事件「マニラ」カ各分ガ立チマス

谷斯
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向「マニラ」市内で戦闘がアツタト云フコトデ貴國ノ兵
 隊が何十ト云フ一般人ヲカソリシテ燒殺スルトカ
 或ハ核肉銃デ射殺スルトカ而カモ其中ニハ婦女子
 達ガ井ルカガユウイフ事ヲシテ何カ名分ガ立ケマ
 スカネ。

答、斯ノ様ナ事ハ金ノ名分ガ立ケマセン。

同、陸軍又ハ日本政府ニ依ル教育ニ照シ、ソレ等ノ軍
 隊ガシテ振舞ヲ説明シテ世員ヘマスカ

答、ソシテ質向ヲサソテハ困リマス。

在界中何処ノ軍タツテ又トコノ政府タツテソノ人民
 ニ対シテ子供ヤ一般人ヲ射殺チセヨトカ殺害セヨト
 教ヘルモノハアリマセン。

(次頁ニ續ク)

問 支那デモ比律賓デモ非常ニ多クノ罪モナイ婦人子供が殺害
サレ又ハ強姦セラレタフトヲ知テ、貴殿ハ良心ノ苦シミヲ感ジマ
センデシタカ。

答 南京及「マニラ」ノ残虐行為ノ事ト、自分ハ兩事件ニ於ケル參
謀ノ一幕僚デシタレド、日本ノ軍隊教育ニ何か欠陥ガアルト
感ジマシタ。

問 軍事教育ニ何か欠ケテキルト思ヒマスカ。

答 南京及「マニラ」テ残虐行為ヲ働イタ軍隊ハ急イテ動員サ
レタ者デシテ、正シイ軍隊教育ヲ受ケテキナカッタデス。

問 南京掠奪暴行ノ件ニ關シ、米人ノ書イタ本ヲ何時見マシタカ。
答 私ハ其ノ本ヲ見テオリマセン、タゞ米國デソシナ本ガ刊行サレタト
云フコトヲ聞イタニ過キマセン。

問 アナタハ一九三七、八年中ニソレヲ聞イタンデセウ。

答 一九三八年中ノコトダツタト思ヒマス。

問 貴下ハ職業軍人ノ一人トシテ斯ノ如キ事態ガ貴下ノ軍ヲ公
訴スル本ノ中ニ出ルナドトハ恥辱ヲ感ジマセンデシタカ。

答 私ハ日本軍ニ對スル恥辱デアルト感ジマシタ。

問 日本ノ高級將校達ハ此問題ヲトリアゲテ檢討シ將來ニ於テ同様ナ
不祥事ガ繰返サレヌ為ニ、如何ナル改善方法ヲ講ジタラバヨ
イカラ登見シナカッタノデスカ。

答 斯カル問題ヲ特ニ論議スルタメノ正式ノ集リハアリマセンデシ
タガ、將校ノ間デ個々ニ議論ガタタカハサレテオリマシタ。

問 貴下ハ一九三八年當時貴軍ノ情報部ニ何かオカシイ所ガアルニ
違ヒナイト感ジマセンデシタカ。南京事件デ貴殿ハ僅カニ十カ
二十ノ出来事ヲシカ知ツテオラナイニ、米人ノ書イタ「南京掠奪」
ト云フ本ニハ一般人全部ヲアケテキルハドウシタ訳デセウ

答 前ニ述ベマシタ通り、私ノ聞ヒタノハ十乃至二十件ニ過ギ
マセン。兩軍内ニ於テ幾ツノ事件が報セラレタカハ
知リマセン。

第〇頁

同 一九三八年ニ南京掠奪暴行ニ就テ考イタ者物
ノコトヲ聞カレタ時ニ、貴下ハ上層部ノ將校達ト非公
式ニ本問題ヲ論議シマセンデシタカ。

答 別ニ論議シタコトハアリマセンデシタ。

同 貴下ハ中國テ約ハレタ跡虐行爲ニ就テ非公
式ニ論議ガアツタコトヲ話シマシタガ、ソレハドンナ
コトヲ論ジタノデスカ

答

別ノ著書ニ關聯スル南京掠奪暴行ノ事件ヲ
論ジタコトハアリマセン。然レハ日本軍隊ガ
不軌跡デアツタガ故ニ之ニ就テ公式テハナイガ議論
ガ爲サレタノデアリマス。

同

答

ソレ等ノ討論デドンナ改善方法が提案サレマシタ。
日清戦争及日露戦争中ニハ新様ナ跡虐行
爲ハ日本陸軍中ニアツタメシガアリマセン。
ソレハ一九一五年日本軍ガサイベリアニ派遣サレタ時カラ
新ノ様ナ跡虐行爲ノ傾向アラハレテ来タノデシテ、
之レハ日本人ノ素行人格が漸次低下シテ来タト
ヲ諷スルモノデス。就テハ此状態カニ処スル爲ニ家庭
並ニ學校ニ於ケル教育ヲ改善シナケレバナリマセン。
新様ナ議論ガ非公式ニデアリマスガナサレタノデ
ス。

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向貴下ノ標ヲ將校達ニハ、新ノ標ヲ跡處約爲ニ付テ
サリカシ高慮サレタ者モ諺山キマセウ不。日中帝國
軍隊ノ名譽ニ威信ニ對シ、面日クナイ泥ヲ塗ツタノ
デスカラネ。

答。彼等ハ非常ニ高慮シテオリマシタ。
向。アタタ自身高慮サレ、一々ノ事が出タ時、此ノ事能ク
改善スル爲ニハドウシタラ、ヨイカラ探究ナサラウト
シタ諺デスネ。一南系標奪暴行ニ関スル本ノ
事デス。

(次頁ニ續ク)

答 永ラク私ハ、教育總監部ニ關係シテ申マシタガ、眞軍隊教育ニ非常ニ

興味ヲモツテ申シタ。

同 一九一五年西伯利亞出兵後現シテキタラ、貴方が氣付カレタト云フ之等

欠陥ヲ匡正スル爲ニ、之レカラ陸軍ニ入ラウトシテ其ノ青年ノ訓育

及教育ニトシ様ナ改革ヲ加ヘマシタカ。

答 日本軍ガ「サイベリア」ニ派遣サレタ時ハ、私ハ軍ナル一少尉デシタカラ、

從令其ノコトヲ知ツタリテモ、何トモスルコトガ出来マセンデシタ。

同 然レ、貴下ガ軍ノ訓練ヲ担当スル高級副官ノ役ニ件ツカヲモツタ際、

ゾット昔ノ一九一五年ニ氣付カレタアノ弱矣ヲ改善強化スル爲ニ、ドウ様

ナラシメラナサツタノデスカ。

答 陸軍中將ニシタ後ト雖モ、私ハ師團長デナカッタカラ、何モスルコトガ

出来マセンデシタ。

如何ナルヲ實行スルニシマシテモ、師團長トナラナケレバナリマセン。

同 陸軍々務局長トナツタ時ハ如何デシタカ。

答 軍務局長ハ、軍ニ陸軍大臣ノ一下僚ニ過ギマセン、ソレテ斯カル問題

ニ付テ命令ヲ発スル權能ハアリマセン。

同 若シモ、貴下ガ師團長デアツタト假定シ、或ハ學校ニ於ケル訓育ナリ

教育ヲ担当シタトスレバ、貴下ハ一九一五年以降承知シテオラシタ此ノ

弱矣ヲ改善強化スル様ニ學校ニ對シ命令ヲ発セラレタコトデセウ。

答 ハイ、(證人笑フ)

同 日本ノ兵隊ノ素質ガ低下シ始メタト云フガ、「サイベリア」ニ於テドン

ナコトガアツタノデスカ。

答 徵発ト申シマスカ、ムシロ凶切盜デス、ソレシテ強姦、強盜、ト云フ様

ナラシメテス。

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Page 1

Extract from Interrogation of MUTO, Akira
22 April 1946

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* * *

- Q. Your forces in Nanking were not being pressed by the Chinese forces in any way--so much so that you were able to celebrate the taking over, is it not?
- A. Japanese troops waited outside the city wall, and leaflets were dropped ordering the Chinese to surrender. Such orders were not obeyed; therefore, the Japanese troops entered the city by force.
- Q. How long did it take them to do it?
- A. Two days, after the actual bombardment commenced.
- Q. Do you attribute it to coincidence the fact that you were also the Deputy Chief of Staff of General YAMASHITA when the rape of Manila happened?
- A. In the case of Nanking, two or three battalions were to enter the city. However, the whole army entered within the walls, thereby resulting in the rape of Nanking. In the case of Manila, General YAMASHITA desired to avoid fighting within the city. However, certain elements of the navy and the army outside of General YAMASHITA's command remained in the city, thereby forcing American forces to attack the City of Manila.
- Q. Is fighting in the City of Manila any justification for raping of the women of Manila by your soldiers?
- A. Such is not justifiable.
- Q. Is fighting in the City of Manila any justification for your soldiers of killing thousands of civilians by burning them with gasoline or by shooting them with machine guns, including women and small children?
- A. Such is definitely not justifiable.
- Q. Can you explain the behavior of those troops in the light of education given by the army or by the Government of Japan?

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- A. I regret that you ask such a question. There is no army in the world or government in the world that will instruct their people to shoot or kill children or civilian population.
- Q. Has it not troubled your conscience to find that so many innocent women and children were either killed or raped, either in China or the Philippines?
- A. After the atrocities in Nanking and Manila, and being a member of the General Staff at both incidents, I felt that something was lacking in the Japanese military education.
- Q. What do you think is lacking in military education?
- A. The troops that committed the atrocities in Nanking and Manila were men mobilized in a hurry, and they were not trained properly in military education.
- Q. When did you come across that book written by an American on the rape of Nanking?
- A. I have not seen the book, but I merely heard that such a book was printed in America.
- Q. You were told about it in 1937 - 1938?
- A. I believe it was in 1938.
- Q. Were you not ashamed as a professional soldier that such a state of things should find itself in a book indicting against your army?
- A. I felt that it was a shame to the Japanese troops.
- Q. Did not the high ranking Japanese officers discuss the matter and find out in what way you could improve the situation so that similar incidents would not be repeated in the future?
- A. There were no formal gatherings just to discuss such matters, but among the officers there were individual discussions.
- Q. Did you not feel at the time in 1938 that there must be something wrong with the information section of your army? Why was it that in the case of Nanking you only knew about ten or twenty incidents when the book mentioned written by the American, "The Rape of Nanking", the whole civilian population?

- A. As I have stated before, I have only heard of between ten to twenty incidents. How many incidents were reported within the two armies I do not know.

* * *

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- Q. When you heard in 1938 about the book mentioning about the rape of Nanking, did you not discuss the matter informally with other officers in a higher echelon?
- A. There were no discussions.
- Q. You mentioned about informal discussions about atrocities committed in China. Of what did those discussions consist?
- A. There were no discussions concerning the rape of Nanking in regards to the published book. However, because the Japanese troops were misbehaving, there were informal discussions.
- Q. What remedies were suggested in those discussions?
- A. During the China-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese War such atrocious acts were not known among the Japanese Army. It was about 1915 when Japanese troops were sent to Siberia such tendencies toward atrocity came into the limelight, thereby proving that the quality and character of the Japanese is slowly deteriorating. Therefore, education in homes and schools must be changed to meet the situation. Such discussions were held informally.
- Q. Many officers like you were worried about such atrocities because it reflected adversely on the honor and prestige of the Japanese Imperial Forces, is it not?
- A. They were very much worried.
- Q. You were worried yourself so that when the book appeared you tried to investigate what you could do in order to remedy the situation--the book on the rape of Nanking?
- A. For a long time I had been associated with the Inspector General Military Training Department, and I was very much interested in the proper education of the army.
- Q. What reforms did you introduce in the training and education of the young men who were about to go into the army so that those weaknesses which you noticed to have cropped up after the Siberian expedition in 1915 could be corrected?

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- A. At the time when Japanese troops were sent to Siberia, I was only a Second Lieutenant, so even if I did notice that I couldn't do anything about it.
- Q. But when you had influence with the office of the Adjutant General who was in charge of military training, what did you do in order to strengthen that weakness which you noticed way back in 1915?
- A. Even after I became Lieutenant General I could not do anything as I was not a divisional commander. In order to put anything into force one has to be a divisional commander.
- Q. How about when you became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau?
- A. The Chief of the Military Bureau is only a staff under the Minister of War, and he has no power to give out orders on such.
- Q. If you were a divisional commander or if you had been in charge of the training or education in the schools, you would have given out orders to the schools that that weakness which you noticed since 1915 was strengthened and fortified?
- A. Yes. (witness laughs)
- Q. What happened in Siberia which started the deterioration of the character of the Japanese soldier?
- A. Confiscation, or rather stealing, rape, robbery, and such.