

INTERV OF TOGO, SHIGENORI  
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE**  
**WASHINGTON**



**DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.**

INTERROGATION OF

Shigenori TOGO

Date and Time: 8 March 1946, 1440-1540 hours

Place : Togo Residence, Tokyo

Present : Shigenori TOGO  
Fumihiko Togo, son of Shigenori TOGO, Interpreter  
Mr. Roy L. Morgan, Interrogator  
Pfc. Francis Suzukwa, Interpreter  
Mildred Rich, Stenographer

Questions by Mr. Morgan  
Interpretation by Fumihiko Togo

- Q. Now in the little while we have Mr. Togo may make a statement, if he so desires.
- A. I have been answering you the facts as I know them, and I shall continue to answer you the facts as I know them. By our preceding conversations I think there should be some added explanations to the statements already made, and that is the point that Japan is said to have made a treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor. This point involves the honor of Japan, as well as my own, and I want to add more explanations to it.

As soon as the war started, President Roosevelt reported to the Congress that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor without previously notifying the United States of the termination of negotiations and the rupture of diplomatic relations, but I think by your investigations it is already clear to you that the intention of the Japanese government was to send the notification with sufficient time advance of the attack, and that the notification was delayed by technical difficulties in the Japanese Embassy in Washington, which was very unfortunate.

This is the first point. I have already explained in the previous explanations the situation how it came to send the notification to the United States Government, including the termination of the negotiations and rupture of diplomatic relations. That is, at the first it was navy high command opinion to have a surprise attack to make the opening of war as effective as possible, but I insisted that enough notification - - - - but I insisted that - - - - as the result of my insistence the navy high command agreed to send notification prior to the attack.

I would like to explain in more detail how I came to agree to send a notification without a declaration of war. I will also explain that the Japanese government, including myself, thought that the notification of termination of negotiations and rupture of diplomatic relations was sufficient as judged by the situation then prevailing.

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~~Exhibit #324~~

Shigenori TOGO

8 March 1946

First of all came the HULL Note of November 26, 1941. Instead of explaining the situation in detail, I will make it plain on documents on the American side, which proves that the Japanese government, including myself, interpreted that note as an ultimatum. I have been reading recently in the newspapers the report of the investigating committee in the navy department made public in Japan, published in November last, in which it is stated whether or not the Secretary of State, Mr. HULL, disclaims now the notification of the 26 November ultimatum. GREW testified that Japan regarded it as an ultimatum. The Japanese they acted upon it and likewise Mr. HULL acted so and informed the Secretary of the Army, Mr. STIMSON, in the morning of the 27th he had the matter broken off. I also remember that around the 27th or 28th Mr. HULL told Lord HALIFAX, British Ambassador, to the effect that the matters were already handed to the army and navy.

By these statements it is clear that the HULL note of November 26 was an ultimatum and since the Japanese notification was the rejection of that note of November 26 which was interpreted as an ultimatum, the Japanese notification was nothing but the notification of declaration of war. Moreover, I am also informed that the United States government knew by at least ten o'clock in the morning of December 7, 1941, that the Japanese government was to hand the United States government that notification and that military warnings were issued to various outposts of the United States. The military warnings were also sent to Hawaii, but since the United States authorities apparently expected that hostilities would start in the Southwest Pacific, judging from the movement of Japanese vessels, and did not expect the attack on Hawaii. That was a miscalculation on the part of the United States authorities. Our attack, therefore, could not be a "surprise" attack.

What I want you to review and study the facts and underlying circumstances about the matter instead of looking at it superficially.

Next, I would like to mention about the relations with Hague treaty. The spirit of the Hague treaty is to forbid surprise attack, and from what I have told you I think it is clear and evident that there is no intention on the part of the Japanese government to make a surprise attack. Provisions of the Hague treaty provide that either a declaration of war or an ultimatum should be handed prior to hostilities, but there is no provisions about how much time should be given in advance. This point came up at the time when the treaty was made. It was proposed by the Dutch government, as I remember, that the notification should be given at least twenty-four hours in advance, but other governments opposed this proposal; and the treaty has no provision, and the treaty has no provision about the amount of time to be given in advance. Many scholars in international law contended that if the treaty allows to notify one minute in advance of the hostilities, then the treaty serves no purpose.

Shigenori TOGO

8 March 1946

In signing the Hague treaty, the delegate of the United States, General PORTER, as I remember, made the reservation that in case of war of self-defense, any country can start the war any time at any place without notification; and the delegates of all participating countries took that reservation for granted.

On this point I have heard personally from the late Dr. TACHI, Sakutaro, authority on international law in Japan, in detail and many other Japanese scholars in international law have the same opinion. The Japanese government, including myself, believe firmly that under the circumstances that it was proper from the standpoint of international law to start a war by sending the note at 1:00 PM, December 7.

I would like to state in addition, as one who desires for world peace, that the Hague treaty is not sufficient for the purpose of avoiding war. It is necessary that there should be a clear cut definition of self-defense, and, secondly, a time limit, such as twenty-four hours, or two or three days, in order that the treaty should serve any purpose. The form and contents as existed is not sufficient for serving the purpose of avoiding war and additional revisions - - - It is my personal opinion that in order to make the Hague treaty serve the purpose, the revisions must be made, revisions to these two points.

Shigenori TOGO

8 March 1946  
1440-1540 hours

Certificate of Stenographer:

I, Mildred Rich, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out herewith, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Mildred Rich

Certificate of Interrogator:

I, Roy L. Morgan, certify that on 8 March 1946 Shigenori TOGO personally gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth herein.

Roy L. Morgan