

January 7, 1945 Appointed president of the Association to
Protect Decentralized Children.

(Source: "Prominent Persons in Japan and Japanese
Dominated Areas," ONI, 14th N.D., Aug. 1945.)

Asahi Shimbun Files reveal the following:

1939	Commander-in-Chief of expeditionary forces in China.
-	Visited Germany on military mission (no date)
1938	Director of Military Education
1939	Promoted to full General
1941	Personally reported to Emperor on progress of war in China

All readily available sources of information on Subject have
been checked.

NISHIO was confined in Sugamo Prison on 12 December 1945.

Pending requests for additional investigation, case will be
considered administratively closed.

CLOSED.

Case # 51

RE : NISHIO, Toshizo
General (retired)
STATUS : Pending

Memorandum for the Files:

On 4 December 1945 CIS files reflect the following information on personnel indicted as War Criminals and ordered apprehended 3 December 1945:

Inspector General of Military Training, concurrently Member Supreme Military Council, 1938. Appointed Commander-in-Chief Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China, 1939. Supreme Military Council 1941. Governor Tokyo Metropolitan Area, 1944. As with any other Commander-in-Chief in China during Japanese aggression he should be held responsible for acts of the Japanese Army in China.

He appears on the U. S. War Crimes List prepared by State, War and Navy Departments.

He qualifies under Paragraph 7-a, of Joint Chiefs of Staff Basic Directive for Post Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper of 3 November 1945.

JAMES J. GAINES, JR.
Capt., Inf.

4 December 1945

CASE NO. 51

RE: NISHIO, Toshizo

STATUS: Pending.

MEMO FOR THE FILE:

Source: Not stated.

From : NIPPON TIMES #16780, 4 December 1945

INFORMATION:

"NISHIO, Toshizo. This retired General was concurrently Inspector General of Military Training and member of the Supreme Military Council in 1938. In 1939 he was appointed Commander in Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China. In 1944 he became Governor of Tokyo."

UNDEVELOPED LEAD:

Review Nippon Times "morgue" for possible further information.

JOE B. ALEXANDER
2nd Lt., Inf.

FILE:

REPORT BY: D. L. Waldorf

RE : NISHIO, Toshizo, General (Retired)

DATE: 19 January 1946

STATUS: Pending

Inspector General of Military Training, concurrently Member Supreme Military Council, 1938. Appointed Commander-in-Chief Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China, 1939. Supreme Military Council, 1941. Governor Tokyo Metropolitan Area, 1944. As with any other Commander-in-Chief in China during Japanese aggression he should be held responsible for acts of the Japanese Army in China.

He appears on the U. S. War Crimes list prepared by State, War and Navy Departments.

He qualifies under Paragraph 7-a of Joint Chiefs of Staff Basic Directive for Post Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper of 3 November 1945.

PENDING

(Counter Intelligence Justification Files reflected the above indicated information concerning subject.)

NISHIO, Toshio

The following excerpts from the Narrative Summary of the Record relate to NISHIO:

<u>Narrative Summary Page</u>	<u>From cross-examination of MINAMI</u>	<u>Transcript Page</u>
2997	NISHIO was his Chief of Staff, and on December 9, 1935, NISHIO issued a document with MINAMI's authority about propaganda in North China, and MINAMI had heard that he had sent it to the Vice Minister of War.	19,997
	This document was Exhibit No. 1242, and provided for propaganda on the advance into China.	19,998
	Despite the reading of this document, MINAMI contended that during the whole time he was in command of the Kwantung Army he did nothing hostile to the Chinese Government.	20,000
3012 3013	MINAMI, on 16 April, 1947, testified that: The fact that he strictly prohibited crossing of the Great Wall to maintain law and order was well known to chief of staff NISHIO and his deputy ITAGAKI. A part of the army or some small units might have crossed the border and he had heard rumors to that effect, but the Kwantung Army was never given permission to cross the border.	20,075

For additional information see:

**IPS Case File No. 51 - NISHIO, Toshizo (Juzo)
(General - retired)**

NISHIO, Toshizo

Request by: KIMURA, Heitaro

Address: Sugamo Prison, Tokyo

Facts to be proven by witness are that while General KIMURA was a member of Supreme War Council, it was in a position of no importance, and other pertinent facts.

The testimony is relevant in that it tends to prove that KIMURA took no part in important decisions.

RESUME OF CASE NO. 51

NISHIO, Toshizo (Juso)
(General - retired)

- Serial No. 1 CIS files - 17 Nov. 1945. Subject's brief military career.
- Serial No. 2 SCAP press release dated 2 Dec. 1945. Subject was concurrently Inspector General of Military Training and member of the Supreme Military Council in 1938; appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China in 1939; became Governor of Tokyo in 1944.
- Serial No. 5 CIS files. As with any other Commander-in-Chief in China during Japanese aggression, Subject should be held responsible for acts of the Japanese Army in China.
- Serial No. 6 Memorandum from Major Barnard. A review of File No. 51 reflects it contains information which may be of interest to Groups B and C.
- Serial No. 8 Interrogation report dated 17 Jan. 1946; reveals Subject's brief military career; describes the gradual spread of communistic ideas into the Japanese Army; reveals the strength of the Japanese Army in China and Manchuria during 1932.
- Serial No. 11 Interrogation report dated 21 Jan. 1946. Chief of Kwantung Army in 1934; reveals the activities of the Kwantung Army when Subject became connected with it.
- Serial No. 12 Interrogation report dated 8 Feb. 1946. Reveals the functions of the Supreme War Council.
- Serial No. 13 CIS files. Additional biographical report.
- Serial No. 14 Interrogation report dated 12 Feb. 1946. Reveals the discussion of the most important meeting of Supreme War Council which was held December 1941.
- Serial No. 15 Interrogation report dated 11 Feb. 1946. Reveals how Subject became member of Supreme War Council.
- Serial No. 16 Interrogation report dated 14 Feb. 1946. Reveals Subject's duties as Commander-in-Chief at Nanking in 1939.

- Serial No. 17 Interrogation report dated 13 Feb. 1946. Reveals when Japan finally decided to go to war; reveals the military machine of 1936.
- Serial No. 18 Interrogation report dated 5 Feb. 1946. Reveals Subject's relation with ARAKI, MUTO, and MAZAKI.
- Serial No. 19 Interrogation report dated 7 Feb. 1946. Reveals the activities of the Kwantung Army.
- Serial No. 21 Interrogation report dated 18 Feb. 1946. Reveals information on General SATO.
- Serial No. 26 Analysis of Doc. Evidence, Doc. No. 644. Subject implicated in confidential record of Manchurian Affairs.
- Serial No. 28 Analysis of Doc. Evidence, Doc. No. 789. Subject implicated in Economic Monopolies.
- Serial No. 29 Analysis of Doc. Evidence, Doc. No. 1242. Subject implicated in file containing reports concerning propaganda programs to be carried out in North China.
- Serial No. 30 Summary of evidentiary facts made by Subject: Subject - NAGANO.
- Serial No. 31 Summary of evidentiary facts made by Subject: Subject - SHIMADA.
- Serial No. 32 Summary of facts by Subject re DOIHARA.
- Serial No. 33 " " " " " " ITAGAKI.
- Serial No. 34 " " " " " " HATA
- Serial No. 36 " " " " " " TOJO
- Serial No. 37 Complete personnel records of Subject.
- Serial No. 38 Subject's military career in China.
- Serial No. 39 Subject resigned as Assistant Chief of Staff in 1936.
- Serial No. 40 Brief resume of the previous seven interrogation reports of Subject.
- Serial No. 42 Analysis of Doc. Evidence, Doc. No. 1685. Subject implicated in conspiracy to wage aggressive warfare in China and violation of Nine-Power Treaty.

Serial No. 43 Analysis of Doc. Evidence, Doc. No. 1673. Subject
implicated in reports of the Mukden Special Service
Agency.

Serial No. 44 Analysis of Doc. Evidence, Doc. No. 2626. Subject
implicated in File of Operational and Garrison Duty
Documents relating to Manchurian Army.

NISHIO, Toshizo (Juzo)

Additional information, not included in the Curriculum Vitae, which was obtained from a review of CIS files:

1903 Graduated Military Academy with highest honors.
1904-05 Participated Russo-Japanese War with 40th Infantry.
1910 Graduated Army Staff College, 2nd in class.
1920-21 Adjutant, War Ministry.
1923-24 Instructor in military science, Army Staff College.
1926-28 Chief, 1st Section, Office Inspector General of Military Training.
1930 Attached to Central Ordnance Depot; concurrently Chairman, Military Inquiry Committee, War Ministry.
1932 Chief, 4th Bureau, Army General Staff.
1937 March Commander, Imperial Guards Division.
1937 Aug. Sent to North China on secret mission.
1938 April Inspector General of Military Training; concurrently Member Supreme Military Council.

Typical staff officer, quiet, modest, and without political affiliations. Formerly spoken of as authority on Japanese war plans with respect to Russia. Reputed to have been drafter of "Compendium of Combat" (Santo Kyo), army handbook. (21,104).

(Source: Report of Ital. Mil. Attache in Tokyo for May 1938, OSS FEI. Attended a conference at the Palace held by the Emperor on 16 January 1945. Source: FCC, Daily Report, 16 Jan. 1945).

Chief of the Kanto Munitions Intendance Bureau.

(Source: FCC, Daily Report, 16 July 1945.)

He inspires much faith in Japanese military circles for his military and political ability; may become the future head of the new central government of China, as already a Japanese General has become head of the Manchu State.

(Source: Italian Consular Official)
JICA North Africa, carded BR 21 February 1944.

He hates Communism and also hates Japan's great capitalist families, principally because the latter disputed mastery of Japan with the Army. His great friend is General Sa. ITAGAKI whom he has used to soothe offended financiers while he quietly extended the Army's grip on industry. Of ITAGAKI, NISHIO once said: "I'll do the fighting; let ITAGAKI do the office work."

(Source: OSS FE)

Issued appeal to the inhabitants of the City (Tokyo) to exhibit an "exemplary attitude" and confront "all difficulties, even death."

(Source: FCC Daily Report, 8 August 1944.)

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A review of ATTIS files revealed the following additional information concerning NISHIO:

July 25, 1944 Appointed Governor of Tokyo with the additional duties of Chief of the Yokohama Court of Admiralty, Superintendent General of the Kanto-Shinetsu Regional Bloc; Chief of the Yokohama Sea Transportation Bureau.

Jan. 7, 1945 Appointed president of the Association to Protect Decentralized Children.

(Source: "Prominent Persons in Japan and Japanese Dominated Areas," ONI, 14th N.D., Aug. 1945.)

ASAHI SHIMBUN Files reveal the following:

1939 Commander-in-Chief of expeditionary forces in China.
 Visited Germany on military mission (no date)

1938 Director of Military Education.

1939 Promoted to full General.

1941 Personally reported to Emperor on progress of war in China.

Miscellaneous information re: WISHIO, Toshizo

File No. 51, Ser. 5 - The name of WISHIO, Toshizo appears on the U. S. War Crimes list prepared by State, War and Navy Departments.

Ser. 1 - In January 1944 was Military Judicial Administrator of South Seas Areas.

(Note: Typical staff officer, quiet, modest, and without political affiliations.
... Drinks heavily and turns taciturn and sour. Hates communism and also hates Japan's great capitalist families, principally because the latter disputed mastery of Japan with the army.)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

20 March 1947

MEMORANDUM

To: Lt. D. L. Waldorf
From: Cmdr. Cole
Subject: Decorations awarded to Witnesses

1. The memorandum from Mr. Lopez dated 11 March 1947 lists four decorations awarded to one NISHIO, Chuzo (Doc. No. 2971, p. 65).
2. Information is desired as to whether the said NISHIO, Chuzo, is the same person as the NISHIO, Toshizo, who has been called as a witness for the defendant KIMURA. The curriculum vitae of NISHIO, Toshizo (Case File No. 51) indicates that he received a number of decorations not mentioned in Doc. No. 2971. It is requested that an investigation be conducted on this point and a report made to the writer.

C. T. COLE
Cmdr., USN

Case # 51

RE : NISHIO, Toshizo
General (retired)
STATUS : Pending

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JAMES J. GAINES, JR.
Capt., Inf.

4 December 1945

CASE NO. 51

RE: NISHIO, Toshizo

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MEMO FOR THE FILE:

Source: Not stated.

From : NIPPON TIMES #16780, 4 December 1945.

INFORMATION:

"NISHIO, Toshizo. This retired General was concurrently Inspector General of Military Training and member of the Supreme Military Council in 1938. In 1939 he was appointed Commander in Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China. In 1944 he became Governor of Tokyo."

UNDEVELOPED LEAD:

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JOE B. ALEXANDER
2nd Lt., Inf.

FILE:

REPORT BY: D. L. Waldorf

RE : NISHIO, Toshizo, General (Retired)

DATE: 19 January 1946

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PENDING

(Counter Intelligence Justification Files reflected the above indicated information concerning subject.)

NISHIO, Chuze

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CLASS OF DECORATION</u>	<u>ACHIEVEMENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDING MINISTRY</u>
29 Apr. 1934	Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Military Order of the Golden Kite - 1st Class	China Incident	War Ministry
2 May 1936	Chingyuan-Chang 1st Class (Manchukuo)	Japan and Manchukuo Amity	Foreign Ministry
23 Dec. 1937	Gros KreuzAdler Order	Japanese- German Amity	Foreign Ministry
2 Nov. 1938	Granted set of silver cups	Japan- German Agreement	"

1 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR NISHIO, Chuzo (KIMURA witness) FILE:

NISHIO, Chuzo is called as a witness by ITAGAKI and will testify on the Manchurian and China Incidents phase. KIMURA is calling him to testify that while KIMURA was a member of the Supreme War Council it was in a position of no importance, the relevancy of the testimony being to prove that KIMURA took no part in important decisions.

With exception of going into his record in connection with the Supreme War Council, it is believed that the analysis sheet covering NISHIO bearing on the Manchurian and China Incidents phase will suffice.

NISHIO - 37

25 January, 1946.

NISHIO - 36

25 January, 1946

- A. There is nothing special between the two places.
- Q. The Japanese were constantly occupying Chinese territory, isn't that true?
- A. All this resulted in repelling Chinese counter attacks.
- Q. Didn't the Japanese forces at any time initiate an attack?
- A. Yes, in certain parts or regions.
- Q. What parts or regions?
- A. It would be difficult to state exactly in what regions the Japanese forces initiated an attack, in view of the wide area covered and to prepare for an eventual attack by Chinese forces attacks would have been initiated by Japanese commanders on the spot in various localities.
- Q. You say "would have been", do you mean attacks were made at those places?
- A. As I said before, it would be difficult to state just where attacks were initiated. When TOKKEN had been occupied my orders were not to advance south towards TSINAN but Chinese troops crossing the Yellow River and infiltrating into TOKKEN-TSINAN region necessitated attacking them. They were repulsed and this led to the occupation of TSINAN. To protect Tsinan it was necessary to protect the railway line running south in the direction of the SHANTUNG-KAINGSU border.
- Q. General, you stated that the first army and part of the second army traveled south on both sides of the HANKOW PEKING railroad, isn't that so?
- A. Yes, until the enemy was dispersed.
- Q. At what point?
- A. At JUNTOKU.
- Q. What is the distance between JUNTOKU and PEIPING?
- A. Between 300 and 400 kilometers.
- Q. What strategic places, if any are located between those two points between Juntoku and Peiping?
- A. The junction of the TAIYUAN railway with the Peking Hangkow railway at SHINCHIACHUANG as an important place from the point of view of communications.
- Q. What was the population of SHINCHIACHUANG at that time?
- A. Judging from the size I would say it was a town of some 100,000, but this is a Chinese town and they may have had 150,000.

25 January, 1946.

- A. There is nothing special between the two places.
- Q. From a military point of view are there places within these two points of strategic value?
- A. No.
- Q. What is the population of Juntoku?
- A. I don't know as I've never been there.
- Q. Is it a large or small place from the standpoint of population?
- A. It is a town, but I don't know its size.
- Q. What is the distance between Juntoku and Kaifeng?
- A. Perhaps 150 to 200 kilometers.
- Q. Is Kaifeng a large town or city?
- A. It is a rather big town.
- Q. About how many people would you say?
- A. I am not sure, but perhaps it is 200,000 more or less.
- Q. Are there any important places between Juntoku and Kaifeng?
- A. There is a town called SHINGO between Juntoku and Kaifeng.
- Q. Are there any other towns between those towns?
- A. Towns and villages, but I don't remember their names and population.
- Q. Did the Japanese forces at any time occupy Kaifeng?
- A. Yes, about the end of May or early in June.
- Q. What year?
- A. 1938.
- Q. How far had those armies gone down along the Hangkow railroad during 1937?
- A. I think it was near Juntoku.
- Q. About what time did the Japanese forces arrive there - that is, what date?
- A. About the 25th of October.
- Q. Did the Japanese forces meet the Chinese forces at any point between Juntoku and Peiping?
- A. Fighting occurred with HOTE as a center and Chinese troops were repelled and retreated south.
- Q. This was early in October, 1937?
- A. Yes.

- Q. To what point?
- A. After the Hote battles there were no serious occasions. The Chinese forces retreated over the great wall towards Taiyuan. Some of these Chinese forces retreated south along the Peking-Hankow railway line.
- Q. How far?
- A. They retreated south of TAIYUAN and towards SHINGO on the railway line and no big battles were fought below SHINCHUACHUANG.
- Q. Did those two Japanese armies continue to advance south?
- A. Yes, to Juntoku.
- Q. General, if the Japanese forces were advancing between the places just mentioned and in view of the fact that there are very few towns between some of those places through which the Japanese forces proceeded would you not say that the Japanese forces were on the offensive at the time, that is, that they were taking aggressive action against the Chinese forces?
- A. The object of all attacks is to defeat and disperse the enemy and attacking retreating forces is a fundamental principle of military strategy.

29 January, 1946

- Q. General, you said that you heard rumors in connection with the inner group of young officers who it is alleged planned what took place at Mukden in 1931. Will you tell us please what you recall now in connection with those rumors?
- A. I don't remember because I didn't pay much attention to the rumors.
- Q. General, you might not have paid any attention to these rumors, but what were the rumors in this connection?
- A. The rumors were to the effect that groups in Tokyo were in contact with groups in the Kwantung army urging them to exceed their authority and instructions in certain matters.
- Q. What were those matters?
- A. I don't know just what these matters were as these are merely rumors that I heard, however, I am certain that the Kwantung army command was not implicated in these matters.
- Q. Then General according to the rumors you heard at that time, there must have been a division within the Kwantung Army as to what should be done regarding matters in Manchuria.
- A. There must have been differences of opinion amongst members of the staff but I do not know just what these differences were.
- Q. General, I am not asking you what you know about the differences, but what you call rumor or hearsay told you about those differences?
- A. I don't know just what these differences were that were being rumored about.
- Q. From the rumors you heard, General, would you say that there was a division between the younger officers and older officers in the Kwantung army?
- A. There may have been differences of opinion, but I have never heard of this matter being discussed in the Kwantung army.
- Q. Well, General, I would like you to tell me, based upon the rumors that you heard at that time, what some of these differences were no matter where you heard them?
- A. I have never heard of what these differences were. I really don't know. I merely know that there was a difference of opinion. There must have been as a result of the collusion between elements in Tokyo and elements in the Kwantung Army.
- Q. What elements in Tokyo were in collusion with elements in the Kwantung army in Manchuria.
- A. I know nothing about this at all.
- Q. From the rumors you have heard about this matter, General, would you say these elements in Tokyo were military men, navy men, or civilians?
- A. I believe they were military men according to rumors.

NISHIO - 46 - 47

29 January, 1946.

- Q. According to rumors would you say these men were young men or old men?
A. I believe they were younger men.
- Q. They would hold what rank, General?
A. I believe they were generally people below the rank of Lt. Colonel.

Interrogation concluded at 1600 - 1/29/46
To be continued.

NISHIO - 68

5 February, 1946.

- Q. What was your relations with MUTO?
- A. When General MUTO was Chief of the Department of Military Training, I was a colonel and served under him for about two-and-one-half years as Chief of a section.
- Q. What years?
- A. I think it was from about 1927 to 1929.
- Q. Did you serve with General MUTO during the 1930's?
- A. Not after the dates previously mentioned.

31 January, 1946.

- Q. General, you arrived in Manchuria sometime in 1934 as Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army that is true, isn't it? What month was that, General?
- A. Yes. It was in March of 1934. It was Chief of Staff, not Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. And you continued as Chief of Staff of this army until what time, General?
- A. Until March, 1936.
- Q. From a military point of view were things quiet in Manchuria at the time you arrived there?
- A. When I arrived there banditry was rife all over Manchuria. Their actions included opposing the Japanese Forces and destruction of railroads and other such things.
- Q. And before you arrived, General, Manchukuo had been recognized as a state by Japan. Isn't that true?
- A. Yes.
- Q. A government had been set up in Manchuria at that time, isn't that true?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Wasn't that government able to cope with such matters as banditry?
- A. Manchukuo being a newly formed state, her forces were insufficient to cope with the bandits. The small forces at her disposal were for the greater part composed of reformed bandits who were poorly trained and it was incumbent upon the Japanese forces to maintain peace and order.
- Q. By what right, General, did Japan have to go into another state which had been recognized, to quell activities of bandits?
- A. When Manchukuo was established as a state an agreement was made whereby the protection and maintenance of peace and order in Manchukuo would be undertaken by Japanese and Manchukuo forces, for the defense of the country.
- Q. Japanese forces did not enter Manchukuo at that time as a result of any agreement with the then Government of China?
- A. No, we were not on good terms with Chiang Kai-Shek's government.
- Q. General, will you describe the situation in Manchuria when you arrived in 1934, from a military point of view?
- A. Generally along the railway lines, peace and order prevailed, but some distance from these lines banditry was rife. As a result jurisdiction of the Manchurian government was effective only along these railway lines and it was the desire of the Manchukuo government and the Japanese army to bring peace and order throughout Manchuria. The country west of the

NISHIO - 56

31 January, 1946.

DANIEN-MUKDEN and HARBIN railway line and north of this line was sparsely settled, but to the east of the line, the region was mountainous and more populated. Bandits used the mountains as refuges and operated from bases maintained in the mountains.

31 January, 1946.

- Q. According to the TANGKU agreement Japan was ordered to withdraw troops and so was China. Japan did withdraw and isn't it reasonable to assume that China pursuant to the terms of the truce also withdrew its forces?
- A. While the Chinese troops did withdraw they also continued infiltrating in the guise of police troops. However, I am not well acquainted with matters in China and these are merely suppositions.
- Q. Then, General, as I understand it you do not know the details regarding that truce and as to whether and how it was carried out?
- A. I don't know the details and I don't know whether the agreement was adhered to.
- Q. Let us discuss now, General, the situation in Manchuria when you arrived there. What I would like to know is the number of troops that the Japanese had in Manchuria at that time; where they were stationed, and something about the relationship between Japan and the government of Manchukuo regarding military, civil and political matters. That is a large question and I think it might be advisable if you would state chronologically or in narrative form the substance of the question just asked.
- A. About the time I returned from Manchuria there were approximately four divisions, Japanese divisions, stationed there and six brigades approximately. These brigades were used for railway protection and as railway lines increased, brigades were increased and I think there were about six. The four divisions were stationed in the following places - one division at HARBIN, and one division at MUTANCHANG, and one division in the region between MUKDEN and JEHOL. With reference to the six brigades these brigades were scattered and I can only give you the location of the headquarters. These were in the following places, TSITSIHAR, HARBIN, MUTANCHANG, KAIRIN MUKDEN, and one west of Mukden, the name of which place I cannot recall at the moment. The divisions I think were composed of about 10,000 men each, and the brigades of about 4,000 men each.

The development of railways and road construction were considered of prime importance, in addition to development of industry, and the maintenance of peace all over Manchukuo would have been facilitated. Also, with a view to possible trouble with the Soviet these were considered necessary as a part of the defenses and great efforts were expended to perfect these. Other objectives were the development of coal fields, of steel production, agricultural developments, forestry and lumber. Great efforts were made to have CHANG HSUEH LIANG give up his anti-Japanese attitude.

WISHIO

17 January 1946

Q. Between January 1, 1931 and the present time will you state what positions you held in the Japanese army?

A. In 1931 I was connected with the Investigation Section of the War Office.

In 1932 I was Chief of the 4th Section of General Headquarters.

I was Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters in 1934.

I was Assistant Commandant of the General Headquarters in Tokyo in 1936.

I was Commandant of the Koono Regiment -- that is the Imperial Guards -- in 1937.

Also in 1937 I was Commander of the Second Army in North China.

In May 1938 I was Inspector General of the Department of Military Training.

In September 1939 I was Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Forces in China.

In March 1941 I became a military counsellor and returned to Tokyo.

In May 1943 I left the active service and was placed in the reserves.

In July 1944 I became Governor of Tokyo-to in a civilian capacity.

And in August 1945 I resigned from this position.

That is all.

Q. General, as a member of the Investigation Section of the War Office in 1931 will you briefly describe what your duties were?

A. In this Investigation Section my duties comprised supervision over military thought and also I controlled the section that was liaison between the military and the press.

Q. Will you explain just what you mean when you say that you had control of the thought of the military?

A. Rather than controlling thoughts it was investigating the thoughts that prevailed amongst the military as this would have some effect on the education of the military.

17 January 1946.

- Q. What kind of thinking were you interested in ascertaining?
- A. One of the principal things was the gradual spread of communistic ideas in Japan.
- Q. Was there a communistic society or party in Japan at that time?
- A. There was nothing on the surface, but communistic ideas infiltrated into the army. They were not numerous, but they were there.
- Q. In what respect would this communistic thinking be detrimental to the welfare of the army?
- A. By infiltrating into the army and working on the weaker elements within the army the communists would be able to undermine the unity and the discipline under which the army operated. And eventually their ideas were to promote rebellion or a revolution in Japan. And the object of my efforts was to lead these weaker elements in the right path so they would not be misled by the communists.
- Q. You stated that these members of the army who were communistic sought a revolution against the government. Is that true?
- A. Yes. I knew that these people with communistic ideas had revolution as their final objective and to lead these people away from communistic tendencies -- to educate them was my main objective.

NISHIO - 5

- Q. During 1932 Japan had an army in China. Isn't that true?
- A. I think there were some soldiers in the vicinity of Peking and Tientsin.
- Q. Could you give us an approximation of how many?
- A. I think there were two or three battalions -- not more.
- Q. How many men in a battalion?
- A. Around a thousand. That is only my guess.
- Q. What were the soldiers doing in those places at that time -- during 1932?
- A. They were there for the protection of communications between Tientsin and Peking and protection of the Japanese nationals.
- Q. Had there been a dispute between China and Japan prior to the time these men arrived in those two cities?
- A. These soldiers were sent to that district in the year 1900 as a result of the Treaty entered into with China and, as a result, Japan - as one of the co-signers with the other nations - sent a certain number of soldiers to that district.
- Q. Had there been Japanese troops in any other part of China during 1932?
- A. This was the year in which the Manchurian Incident started and there were soldiers in Manchuria but outside of that I do not think there were other Japanese soldiers.
- Q. Could you give us an approximation as to the number of Japanese soldiers in Manchuria during 1932?
- A. I think there were in Manchuria at the time one division plus one brigade.

3 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Capt. Robinson USN Att: Cmdr. Cole; Mr. Edwards;
Mr. Lopez; Mr. Cunningham; Mr. Sutton
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

ITAGAKI
OSHIMA

WITNESS

NISHIO, Toshizo ✓

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

A staff study compiled by G-2 on this witness has been included in the Investigative Files and is now available.

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

C
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(From Case #51, Serial 1, p. 51)

S E C R E T

(Routing Slip)

NISHIO Toshizo, Internee in Sugamo Prison.

G-2

Legal Section
(Attn: Invest. Div.
Lt. Col. R. E. Rudisill)

2 June 1947
GB/CIS/OD:FAF/mc

Info Copy to: IPS (Attn: Invest. Div.
Mr. E. P. Monaghan)

1

1. Curriculum vitae of NISHIO Toshizo (TAB A) shows that he is a career Army Officer whose long and diversified experience culminated in the posts of Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China. NISHIO served as Mayor of TOKYO-TO during the last year of hostilities.

2. "Japanese Government Officials, 1937-1945", published by the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C., on 21 July 1945, evaluates NISHIO as per TAB B.

3. Evaluation of NISHIO at the time of his arrest in December 1945 reads as per TAB C.

4. Direct and implied accusations against NISHIO in these documents (TABS B and C) are:

- a. "Inspector General of Military Training, concurrently member Supreme Military Council, 1938."
- b. "Appointed Commander-in-Chief Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China, 1939."
- c. "Supreme Military Council, 1941."
- d. "Governor, Tokyo Metropolitan Area, 1944."
- e. "As with any other Commander-in-Chief in China during Japanese aggression he should be held responsible for acts of the Japanese Army in China."

5. In addition, NISHIO's long military career embraced the post of Chief of Staff, under General MINAMI Jiro, of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria.

6. Facts bearing on NISHIO's case are as follows:

- a. That NISHIO was Inspector-General of Military Education (concurrently a Military Affairs Councillor to the Supreme War Council) in 1938; Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China in 1939; a member of the Supreme War Council in 1941; and Mayor of the Tokyo Metropolis in 1944 are not ipso facto bases for war crimes charges

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

NISHIO Toshizo, Internee in Sugamo Prison.

Legal Section

2 Jun 1947

(Attn: Invest. Div.) GB/CIS/OD:FAF/mc

Info Copy to: IPS (Attn: Invest. Div.)

1
cont'd.

Ipsa facto they are merely details in a long military career.

b. The following is noted regarding the statement "As with any other Commander-in-Chief in China during the Japanese aggression he should be held responsible for acts of the Japanese Army in China."

(1) NISHIO was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China in September 1939 for the purpose of "ensuring the successful settlement of the China Affair by tackling the situation efficiently" (TAB D - Japanese GHQ in China). "This step marks a new advance in the work of settling the China Affair in keeping with the progress of the peace movement in China" asserted the Asahi. Joseph C. Grew in his "Ten Years in Japan" says: "October 25, 1939. One of my liberal Japanese friends has told me that ever since my 'epoch making' speech he had been discussing it with the highest officials....He said that some doubt is felt with regard to solving the problem of the New Order in East Asia versus the Nine-Power Treaty but there is a genuine determination to take steps to clear the atmosphere with a view to improving public opinion in the United States and to demonstrate Japan's desire for good relations. He said that he believed that General NISHIO, who had been sent to China to unify the command and to stop the constant bickerings between the Military in the North and the Military in the South, is likewise sympathetic to such a programme...."

In March 1941 when NISHIO was relieved of his command of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China the Domei recalled his brilliant achievements (TAB E - General HATA Gets Command in China; NISHIO's Successor); "with the support of General NISHIO, the WANG Regime was finally established March 30, 1940...General NISHIO announced that the Chinese factories and assets under the Japanese army's control would be returned to the Chinese....A new Japan-China basic treaty was concluded October 30. At the same time a joint proclamation of co-operation between Japan, China and Manchukuo, consolidating the way for peace in the Far East was signed." Otto Tolischus in his "Tokyo Record" commented: "A short while ago, TOJO shook up the higher Army command in what the Japan Times Advertiser characterized as his 'determination to strengthen the Army in coping with the difficulties confronting Japan at home and abroad'. General Shunroku HATA, former War Minister, was appointed Commander-in-Chief in China, succeeding General NISHIO...."

7. Responsibility for war atrocities based on "remote control" such as is exercised by a high command is certainly open to interpretation.

- 2 -

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NISHIO Toshizo, Internee in Sugamo Prison.

Legal Section 2 Jun 1947
(Attn: Invest. Div.) GB/CIS/OD:FAF/mc

Info Copy to: IPS (Attn: Invest. Div.)

1
Contd.

In the light of such policy as may be established with respect to such interpretations, examination of evidence may reveal basis for war atrocities charges against NISHIO. However, it is believed that no war atrocities proportionate to the "Rape of Nanking" were committed during NISHIO's tenure in China.

8. Furthermore, it is the belief of G-2 that accusation of responsibility for war crimes should arise from the crime rather than from arrest made on the premise that some guilt exists and can be established.

9. Unless evidence sufficient for charges against NISHIO of aggressive militarism has been uncovered by the IMTFE prosecution and/or unless evidence of NISHIO's responsibility for war atrocities has been established, G-2 recommends that NISHIO be released from internment without preference of charges.

- TAB A - Curriculum Vitae of NISHIO Toshizo
- TAB B - Extract from "Japanese Government Officials, 1937-1945"
- TAB C - Evaluation of NISHIO Toshizo at time of arrest
- TAB D - Japanese GHQ in China
- TAB E - General HATA Gets Command in China; NISHIO's Successor

----- C. A. W. -----

S E C R E T

24 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Capt. Robinson, USN ATT: Cmdr. Cole;
Mr. Lopez; Mr. Edwards; Mr. Hyde; Mr. Cunningham

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - Itagaki ✓

Oshima

WITNESS

Nishio, Toshizo

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Record

Man. Sum.

2277-2279

p. 67

2967

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E. P. M.
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Name: Nishio, Toshizo

Record
2967

Man. Sum.

Title: Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, October 1935.

Source: Letter to FURUSO, Mikio, Vice-Army Minister.

He sent plans for control of public opinion and press to Manchuria to FURUSO on October 25, 1935, showing intent to aid Japanese policies by this method.

Name: Nishio, Toshizo

Record
2277-
2279

Manchurian
Summary
Pg 67

Title: Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, Dec 9, 1935

Source: Letter from Nishio to Furuso, Vice War Minister
on Dec 9, 1935.

Stated Kwantung Army's propaganda plan shall be
carried out in parallel with its military activity in
North China proper.

Witness: NISHIO, General Toshizo (Juzo)

I. Defense Application

1. Witness expected to testify -

- a. That the ideal of establishing a new state in Manchuria was to create in that region an entirely new state realizing all the ideals and wishes of Japanese and persons of all nationalities living therein and to establish a defense line against Soviet invasion.
- b. That the Kwantung Army was under strict limitation concerning guidance of the new government in Manchuria and that after Generals MINAMI and ITAGAKI arrived in Manchuria there was improvement of the co-operative attitude of Manchukuo.
- c. The chief aims of the Kwantung Army towards North China after the Tan-ku armistice agreement was to preserve peace in the areas around Manchukuo so that no anti-Japanese disturbances then prevailing in China would affect the Manchurian administration.
- d. That the Kwantung Army did not welcome the invasion of Chinese armies into Charhar District as that would infringe the spirit of the Tan-ku agreement, but that at the same time it did not support the independent movements of Mongolians in Inner-Mongolia.
- e. That the incidents which happened around Outer-Mongolia and near the maritime district were due to aggressive policies of Soviet Russia towards Manchuria and Korea.
- f. That in respect to the military activities in China no aggressive policy or plan was entertained and their purpose was to obtain speedy settlement of disturbances then extant and bring peace and prosperity between China and Japan.
- g. That the government under Wang -Chen-Wei was not a puppet government.

2. Background

- a. Was one time Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army (at which time ITAGAKI was Assistant Chief of Staff).

- b. Later Commander-in-Chief of China Expeditionary Army (at which time ITAGAKI was Chief of General Staff of the same army).

3. Address

- a. Sugamo Prison

II. Summary of Prosecution's Evidence Relating to Witness

1. None

III. Other Available Facts

1. 1903, Graduate Military Academy with highest honors, Second Lieutenant, Infantry.
1904-05, Participated Russo-Japanese War with 48th Infantry.
March 1934 to March 1936, Chief of General Staff of the Kwantung Army.
(Page 55, 31 January 1946 interrogation of witness by Mr. English.)
1937, Commander of the Second Army in North China.
September 1939, Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Forces in China.
(Page 51, 17 January 1946 interrogation of witness by Mr. English.)
March 1941, Member of Supreme Military Council.
2. Italian Consular file reflects of him:
"He inspires much faith in Japanese military circles for his military and political ability; may become the future head of the new central government of China, as already a Japanese General has become head of the Manchu State."
3. OSS file says of him:
"He hates Communism and also hates Japan's great capitalist families, principally because the latter disputed mastery of Japan with the Army. His great friend is General S. ITAGAKI whom he has used to soothe offended financiers while he quietly extended the Army's grip on industry. Of ITAGAKI, NISHIO once said: 'I'll do the fighting; let ITAGAKI do the office work'."

4. The Chinese Division says of him:

"1928 - Secretary to the Prime Minister, General TANAKA, the author of the alleged Tanaka Memorial."

5. Decorations

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29 Apr. 1934	Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Military Order of the Golden Kite - 1st Class	China Incident	War Ministry
2 May 1936	Chingyuan-Chang, 1st Class (Manchukuo)	Japan and Manchukuo Amity	Foreign Ministry
23 Dec. 1937	Gros Kreuz Adler Order	Japanese-German Amity	Foreign Ministry
2 Nov. 1938	Granted set of silver cups	Japan-German Agreement	

IV. Suggested Subjects for Cross-Examination -

1. Japanese ideal in Manchuria (See I-1-a ante)

- a. Fully covered by Comyns-Carr interrogation of YAMAMOTO Kumaichi (Tsn. pp. 17929-17988; 18019-18032)
- b. On pp. 45-46 of his 29 Jan. 1946 interrogation by Mr. English, witness stated he heard rumors groups in Tokyo were in contact with groups in Kwantung Army urging them to exceed their authority and instructions (See Appendix 1)
- c. He was Chief of Fourth Department, Army General Staff, relatively small position and in Tokyo. Why should he know about ideals behind Manchurian establishment? (Source: CIS file)

2. Tang-ku Truce (See I-1-c and d ante)

- a. Presented as Pros. Exh. 193, dated May 31, 1933 (For summary of provisions, see Appendix 2)
- b. Pros. witness GOETTE testified that after Tang-ku Truce of May 31, 1933 he saw Chinese renegade troops under two Chinese generals enter demilitarized zones from Japanese-controlled areas and disappear into Japanese-held areas (See GOETTE's testimony re Tang-ku, Appendix 3)
- c. On p. 58 of his 31 Jan. 1946 interrogation by Mr. English, witness stated he did not know the details regarding Tang-ku agreement, did not know whether agreement was adhered to (See Appendix 4)

3. China operations

- a. On p. 36 of his 25 Jan. '46 interrogation by Mr. English, witness steadfastly defended justification of capturing districts and towns beyond to protect his position in those already captured. Thus, when asked the reason for advancing beyond 300 kilometers of sparsely populated territory, he answered "when TOKKEN had been occupied my orders were not to advance south towards TSINAN but Chinese troops crossing the Yellow River and infiltrating into TOKKEN-TSINAN region necessitated attacking them. They were repulsed and this led to the occupation of TSINAN. To protect TSINAN it was necessary to protect the railway line running south in the direction of the SHANTUNG-KAING-SU border."

Indicative of his shrewdness, is the way he answered the following question:

- "Q. General, if the Japanese forces were advancing between the places just mentioned and in view of the fact that there are very few towns between some of those places through which the Japanese forces proceeded would you not say that the Japanese forces were on the offensive at the time, that is, they were taking aggressive action against the Chinese forces?"

"A. The object of all attacks is to defeat and disperse the enemy and attacking retreating forces is a fundamental principle of military strategy."
(See Appendix 5)

4. Puppetry of Wang-Chen-Wei government (See I-1-g ante)

- a. Pros. Exh. 272, Report from Central China Expeditionary Army to War Ministry, 1939. (Record p. 3,659; p. 3,672)

A new central government will be established with WANG as its head. Japan will conciliate both the regular and irregular forces and use them to strengthen the power of the new government. It was aimed at to weaken the enemy, CHIANG, the national government of China, and to drive out pro-CHIANG movements of third powers. The theory of racial consciousness was used only for the purpose of estranging the Chinese from CHIANG. Japan must draft the principles and platform of the new central government and make it the basis of propaganda.

- b. Pros. witness GOETTE, stated on pp. 3,858-3,860 of the Record:

"Jan. 1940, Japanese decided to combine all the puppet regimes then existing into one under WANG. General KAGESA dominated the whole show, during the conference at TSINGTAO as well as in Nanking. WANG himself merely said in vague terms."

- c. Exh. 465, secret agreements and letter from WANG to ABE, the Japanese Envoy (Record, pp. 5,327-31):

"Japan secured the right to demand from China military necessities, and communication facilities, for the troops stationed there. Japan had to 'cooperate' with Japan for the production and the use of raw materials. WANG promised Japan the cooperation for Japan's warlike purposes."

- d. IPS Doc. 1519, being Foreign Ministry Files of WANG Chin-wei, now under process, will show that WANG was under complete control of the Japanese.

5. Decorations

- a. Is it not true that you were one of the military leaders of Japan who urged strongly for Japanese-German collaboration and alliance? (Tone of examiner should be such as to induce the witness to answer in the negative).

- b. If he answers in the negative, encourage him to speak on his solicitude for friendship with America and Britain. Then ask him if on 23 Dec. '37 he was not awarded the Gros Kreuz Adler Order for promoting German-Japanese collaboration. Did he not receive on 2 Nov. '38 a set of silver cups in recognition of his services in promoting Japanese-German agreement.
 - c. Also ask him about texts and reasons for other awards received in connection with Manchurian and China Incidents (See III-5 ante)
6. Very good friend of ITAGAKI
- a. When he was Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army, ITAGAKI was his Assistant Chief of Staff; when he was later C-in-C of China Expeditionary Army, ITAGAKI was his Chief of Staff (See I-2-a and d)
 - b. He used to soothe offended financiers on behalf of ITAGAKI. He once said; "I'll do the fighting; let ITAGAKI do the office work." (See III-3 ante).

Nishio

See Dr. 2656

1. Summary of Personal History
2. Summary of Assoc. 'End. All relations

3. old ambulatory

4. Suggested subjects for Cross-Examination

1. ~~the appendix to the above~~ Japanese school in Nambu (see 1-1-a)
and of the system to state that of

2. Description

Do you know that you were one of the top leaders of
the group of young men who were with Shimizu?

If he says no, ask if he - he never
saw relat

3. young friend of Shimizu

Recurrence by: Cdr Colr

Date: 29 April '47

Nishid, Toshizo (Chuzo or Juzo)

1. Requested as witness by: Kimura

2. Subpoena request: states that "the facts to be proved by this witness are that while General Kimura was a member of the Supreme War Council, it was a position of no importance, and other pertinent facts. The testimony of this witness is relevant in that it tends to prove that Kimura took no part in important decisions."

3. Summary of Personal History:

31 Oct. 1881 - Born

22 Nov. 1902 - Graduated Military Academy
appointed a probationary officer

1 Aug. 1929 - Promoted to Major General.

11 April 1932 - appointed Head of 4th Dept at Staff H. A.

10 April 1933 - appointed Chief of Staff

5 Mar 1934 - appointed Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army
and Head of Special Service in Kwantung Army.

23 Mar 1936 - appointed Vice Chief of ~~Staff~~ ^{Army General Staff}

1 Dec 1936 - appointed Director of the General Affairs Section of
General Staff Headquarters

16 Aug 1937 - appointed Commander of the 2nd Army.

1 Aug 1939 - Promoted to General

12 Sept. 1939 - appointed General Commander of the Army sent to China.

~~22 May 1939~~ - appointed

1 Mar 1941 - appointed member of Supreme War Council

3 May 1943 - Out on reserve list.

25 July 1944

~~10 June 1945~~ - appointed Governor of Tokyo.

4. Decorations -

Date	Class of Decoration	Achievement	Recommending Ministers
29 Apr. 1934	Grand Cordon of Order of Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministers
29 Apr. 1940	Military Order of Golden Kite - 1st Class	China Incident	War Minister
2 May 1936	Chingyuan - Chang 1st Class (Manchurian)	Japan and Manchurian Unity	Foreign Ministers
23 Dec 1937	Grand Kreuz Adler Order	Japanese-German Unity	Foreign Ministers
2 Mar 1938	Grand set of silver cups	Japan-German agreement	Foreign Ministers

→

4 Present Status - ex-General, Imperial Japanese Army
at present in Sugamo Prison, Tokyo

5. Summary of Interrogations -

The witness was interrogated on Ten occasions (IPS case file
no 51 - serial P, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21).
A ^{general} summary of ~~the~~ ^{the first two} ~~of~~ ^{set forth} ~~the~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ⁱⁿ
IPS case file no 51 - serial 40 as follows: -
- take in (1)

The witness was interrogated on three occasions (IPS case
file # 51 - 12, 14, 15,) ~~concerning~~ ^{concerning} the
Supreme War Council. These interrogations are summarized
as follows: -

~~Nishio was a member of the Supreme War Council from~~
~~from March 1941 until he retired from active service in~~
~~April, 1943.~~ The Supreme War Council is composed
of Marshalls, Ministers of Army and Navy, the Chiefs
of Staff of Army and Navy and the Generals and
Lieut. Generals who are members of the War Council. The
Supreme War Council's function is to assist the Emperor
~~in making military decisions.~~ ~~Occasionally~~ ^{Occasionally} Members of the
War Council are invited to participate in the Supreme War

Council. Hishio was a member of the War Council from March 1941 until he retired from active service in April, 1943. He was never invited to participate in the Supreme War Council. (p. 83) (Serial 12, p. 82)

The office of ~~President~~ ^{Secretary} of the Supreme War Council ~~was~~ ^{was} nominal and honorary and usually ^{composed of} members of the Imperial Family. (Serial 12, p. 82)

The duty of the War Council was to answer questions put by the Emperor on military matters. (Serial 13, p. 84)

In the early part of December, 1941 a meeting of the War Council was held at the Palace in Tokyo at which the Emperor asked them if the Japanese Army and Navy were ready to fight in the event diplomatic negotiations failed. The Council was unanimously in favor of war with the United States. (Serial 12, p. 86)

The Council felt that ~~there was~~ there was no way out for Japan except war since Japan was blockaded economically and was requested to withdraw from Manchuria which would leave her without protection against Russia. (Serial 14, p. 102)

Hishio became a member of the War Council by command of the Emperor upon the recommendation of the War Minister Tojo. (Serial 15, p. 88)

Nishio had one conversation with Tojo during the summer of 1941 concerning a tour of inspection he had made of military installations in Japan. (Serial 15 p. 91)

Nishio attended two ~~of~~ the meetings of the War Council while he was a member, one early in December, 1941 already mentioned and the other (date unknown) which concerned a new manual of ~~arms~~ for the use of military troops. (Serial 15 p. 94)

(c) (c)
① Note - It appears that the witness Nishi was incorrect in ~~his~~ ~~conclusion~~ ^{terminology}, when he distinguished between the Supreme War Council and the War Council. What he called the Supreme War Council is really the Board of ~~War~~ Marshals and Fleet Admirals. On page 524 of the Transcript ~~the~~ The distinction is stated as follows: -

"Then there were the Emperor's Military Board which consisted, in the first place, of the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals, which was established in 1898 and consisted of the Princes of the Royal Blood and the highest army and navy officers.

Secondly, the Supreme War Council, which originated in 1887 when the services were being revamped on western lines and was definitely established by Imperial Ordinance No 294 in 1903."

~~Reference to~~

in interrogations

6. Statements by witness concerning The Supreme War Council

Interrogation of 8 February, 1946 (PJS Case File 51-12)

Q. "General, were you at any time etc

(A) → take in from p. 20 to p 4 bottom of page) as marked in red.

(C) → →

Interrogation of 11 February, 1946 (PJS Case File 51-15)

Q. "General, how many meetings etc

(B) take in p 94-95 as marked in red

~~attempted to confuse the issue by~~

7. Cross-examination -

It is suggested that Nishi be cross-examined as follows:-

(a) In his interrogation quoted above the witness stated that he attended only two meetings of the War Council and never attended a meeting of the Supreme War Council (and ~~was a member of the Supreme War Council~~). He was a member of the ^{Supreme} War Council from March, 1941 until he retired from active service in April, 1943. Since Kimura did not become a member of the ^{Supreme} War Council until 11 March, 1943 their respective terms of office coincided only for a few weeks. Accordingly, it is difficult to see how this witness could have any real knowledge as to

As pointed out above this was merely an attempt to evade the issue by a confusion in nomenclature. Nishi said Supreme War Council he meant the Council of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. In fact, the two meetings he attended were the Supreme War Council.

whether Kimura took an active part in the War Council meetings. The witness should be interrogated on this point. It is to be noted however that Kimura will claim that ^{the Prosecution has introduced no evidence} ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~Supreme~~ War Council ever held a meeting while he was a member (Motion to Dismiss ^{by defendant Kimura} dated 20 Jan. 1947 p. 3) Prosecution Court Exhibit # 2246 (P.M.O. # 2534-A) states that Kimura attended a meeting of the Supreme War Council on 30 June, 1941. (Transcript p. 16, 178). Defense ^{who was} ~~is~~ will claim that Kimura ~~is~~ ^{was} Vice Minister of War on that date attended only as a representative of the Army and not as a member (Motion to Dismiss by defendant Kimura dated 20 Jan 1947 p. 3). However, the fact is that Kimura ~~is~~ ^{as part of the inner circle} ~~attended~~ ^{and presumably took part} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ any sessions.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Operations, CIS, G-2
Compilation Branch

SUBJECT: NISHIO, Toshizo General

Born in 1881. Until 1936 Chief of the General Staff of the Army of Kwantung; from 1936-37 Vice Chief of Japanese General Staff; Commander of the Imperial Guard; until 1939 Director of Military Education; since September 1939 has been Commander in Chief of Expeditionary Corps in China. He inspires much faith in Japanese military circles for his military and political ability; has been raised to the post of Commander in Chief of the Japanese forces in China through having unity of command in war operations and flanks. May become the future head of the new central government of China, as already a Japanese General has become head of the Manchese State.

SOURCE: Italian Consular Official
JICA North Africa, carded BR 21 Feb. 1944 (OSS Card File).

Subject's great friend is General S. ITAGAKI whom he has used to soothe offended financiers while he quietly extended the Army's grip on industry. Of ITAGAKI, NISHIO once said: "I'll do the fighting; let ITAGAKI do the office work".

SOURCE: (OSS Card File)

Enclosed is a Interrogation Report on NISHIO, Toshizo, conducted by the Interrogation Section, Special Intelligence Division, CIS

NISHIO, Toshizo

Request by: ITAGAKI, Seishiro

Address: Sugamo Prison

Was one time Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army (at which time ITAGAKI was Assistant Chief of Staff). Later CinC of China Expeditionary Army (at which time ITAGAKI was Chief of General Staff of the same army.).

The facts concerning which this witness can give testimony are:

- (1) That the ideal of establishing a new state in Manchuria was to create in that region an entirely new state realizing all the ideals and wishes of Japanese and persons of all nationalities living therein and to establish a defense line against Soviet invasion.
- (2) That the Kwantung Army was under strict limitation concerning guidance of the new government in Manchuria and that after Generals MINAMI and ITAGAKI arrived in Manchuria there was improvement of the cooperative attitude of Manchukuo.
- (3) The chief aims of the Kwantung Army towards North China after the Tan-ku armistice agreement was to preserve peace in the areas around Manchukuo so that no anti-Japanese disturbances then prevailing in China would affect the Manchurian administration.
- (4) That the Kwantung Army did not welcome the invasion of Chinese armies into Charhar District as that would infringe the spirit of the Tan-ku agreement, but that at the same time it did not support the independent movements of Mongolians in Inner-Mongolia.
- (5) That the incidents which happened around Outer-Mongolia and near the maritime district were due to aggressive policies of Soviet Russia towards Manchuria and Korea.
- (6) That in respect to the military activities in China no aggressive policy or plan was entertained and their purpose was to obtain speedy settlement of disturbances then extant and bring peace and prosperity between China and Japan.
- (7) That the government under Wang-Chen-Wei was not a puppet government.

NISHIO, Juzo

Request by: DOHIHARA, Kenji

Address: Sugamo

Served as Supreme War Councillor during period that accused served in a similar capacity. Testimony of witness will be principally concerned with the activities of the accused during the period he served in such capacity.

Testimony believed to be relevant and is specifically concerned with Count 20.

Resh

see transcript p 19, 997

Q. 19, 969

o

Case file - #51

revised Tokyo

Copy - interrogator report 57-11

p 34, 37 38, 46, 47, 68, 56, 59

Interrog. 57-P (17 Jan)
P - - - and - - -

57-5 - review by Capt. Baird

57-3 - review by Lt. Alexander

57-10 - rep. by Mollaf

57- - rep. by Special Agents - (3 pages)

Decisions

Review of 1 April - what is analysis status needs ???

for index

atlas of operations - 2803 - Item 361

Gen M. Can July 206 - 1

" Crime -> 200 - 15

Gen. Nishino, Chief of Staff, Japan. Expel. done in China against
Cap. Mabari (Chief of Finance Dept.), main duty "to work
able adm. of Opun resources in occupied areas" 11. 26 Oct 1939

> 2806 - 1 - report by J. H. Barnard dated 27 Dec 1945 re "Kamote"

Kanada - Nishiohara ^{Chief} of Staff of Central China Task Force
was real Director of Military Elements - found for possible
attacks by Russia. Dir. Gen. of Military Elements at that
time was General Nishio.

Nishid, Chuzo (Toshizo)
Partials

Hilly

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- 2
- 3
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- 5
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- 8
- 9

(NW 57)

~~Check~~

ate Present - 2003

- 506 - 1
- 200 - 15
- 99 - 110
- 318 - 1
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Ex. No. 270

FILE
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Receipt signed by C. J. Cole
on 20 March, 1946

FILES UNIT

Room 361

DO NOT DETACH

Gist of the Talk by SATO, Kenryo,
Chief of Press Section, War Ministry.

Aug. 25 - Aug. 29, 1938,
At the temporary conference of Police
Bureau Chiefs in the Home Office.

Two talks by SATO, Kenryo, are practically the same except for a slight change in the contents and in the order. Following is a collection of both talks. The responsibility for the wordings, of course is on the writer.

On the Policy in Dealing with the Chinese Incident.

Under the present incident, I believe, there are many doubtful points in the government's policies in coping with the incident to all the people in positions to lead the public in regards to maintaining peace and order in various districts and in making the people understand the object of this affair. I also believe that these people are not the least dissatisfied from the point of executing their duties. To this I am of the same opinion. The truth is that the highest authorities themselves are not very clear on this policy of dealing with the Chinese Incident. The division commanders and brigade commanders also have asked me the same questions and they, too, seem to hope for a definite policy.

However, this is, in reality, a very difficult problem. In the case of the Sino-Japanese War all we had to do was to repel the Chinese forces from the Korean Peninsula, and in the Russo-Japanese War all we had to do was to clean up the Russian influence from South Manchuria and to annihilate the Russian troops. Both these wars had a very simple object, but this present incident is quite different and is very complicated.

The present incident, in the first place, has a very complicated and an always changing object. Therefore, the objects of operations are not definite. Even if the object is definite:

1. Manipulation of troops for operations on the continent.
2. The abnormal conditions of China--without the modern national system, she is like an earthworm, for no matter how she is cut up, each portion will continue its existence.
3. Britain and Russia are in the back of China, aiding her directly and indirectly, greatly hampering our field of operations.

At the time of the outbreak of the present conflict in the Marco Polo Bridge incident in July last year, Japan's attitude was to take the policy of settling the incident on the spot and not to spread the hostilities. In spite of this, the Chinese have not stopped their disturbances, repeatedly bringing about the Kwaa-an Gate Incident in Peking and the Oyama Incident in Shanghai.

Finally, our government, on August 15 at 1.30 a. m. had made a declaration to the world of our intentions. The gist of the declaration is as follows:

"Japan, in the hope of establishing everlasting peace in East Asia, has, for a long time, strived for a friendly coalition between China and Japan. However, the Nanking Government, overconfident in her national power, and ignoring the true strength of Japan, has come to cross swords with our country in collaboration with the communistic influences by taking an anti-Japanese stand, and insulting our Empire.

"In recent years, the Chinese have provoked repeated disgraceful incidents. This time, they have caused the outbreak of a disgraceful affair on the banks of the Yung-King River. (Marco Polo Bridge Incident), and they have ventured atrocious acts, not to be tolerated by both mankind and God, upon many Japanese residents in Tung-Chow. The lives and properties of Japanese residents in Central and South China have faced a grave crisis and our countrymen have had to evacuate temporarily from their lands of long years of peaceful living.

"However, Japan, through patience and self-respect, has earnestly hoped not to spread the hostilities, and has repeatedly implored the Nanking Government in the hope of settling the incident on the spot peacefully, to stop their acts of hostilities and not to obstruct our intentions of settling the affair. Without paying any heed they, on the contrary, prepared arms against the Empire and finally bombed our ship in Shanghai.

"The situation having come to this point, Japan, unable to have patience any longer, responded the bombing and in order to demand the Nanking Government's reconsiderations, a definite measure has had to be taken.

"And this measure is none other than to uproot China's anti-Japanese activities and to do away with the source of such disgraceful incidents, thereby realizing the friendly coalition among the three nations, Japan, China, and Manchukuo. Japan has no territorial ambitions whatever, etc."

The above statement may be called a declaration of war. Our motive at that time was not to overthrow the government of China but to repel the revolting army to demand the Nanking Government's reconsiderations, and the operational object was in the Chinese Army. This is an important point that is different from the cases of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars.

Thus, the motive of this incident has been vague from the start. To demand the Nanking Government's reconsiderations----- What if they shall not reconsider no matter how long it takes?

As a means of demanding their reconsiderations it is a matter of importance that Japan will make them understand her true strength by doing away with the aid of the British and the Russian influence in the back of China, to do away with the economic aid of Britain and the military aid of Soviet Russia. These two nations are similar to the Shira (Korean State) working in the background of the Rebel Kumaso.

As an operation at the time of the outbreak of this incident, we were of the opinion that the mopping up of the Peiping-Tientsin areas--an intermediate between non-expansion and all out operation policies--by striking a blow at the Chinese 29th Army and repelling them to the south of the Yung-Ling River, the problems of Chi-tung and Chi-sha would naturally be settled.

Therefor, the field of operation had to be expanded and our troops penetrated ----- and then to Shanghai and to the fall of Nanking. Then there was the miraculous landing at _____ by the Yanogawa Forces.

In speaking a little of our preparation for war, all the ammunition we had in preparation for a possible war with Russia was exhausted by the time of the fall of Shanghai in the attack of _____. Huge expense is necessary in a war for war supplies--especially for ammunition and airplanes. Moreover, airplanes are good for only about a year. It is an assemblance of the essence of science in the highest degree and is always necessary to have the most superior equipment and the highest power. Ammunition, again, not only takes up the highest expenditures in wars but the period of efficiency needs very close attention. There is no example where any country in the world has declared a war with perfect preparation in ammunition. This ammunition ran short for a time in the battle of Shanghai, causing our men to face a grave danger. This, of course, may have been partly because they were scattered in various areas for the sake of operations. At present the war production power has been expanded and there is no such necessity, but after we have started a war we must never forget to be prepared against Soviet Russia. We can never tell when an all out war with Russia might break out like the Chang-ku-feng incident. It is a taboed thing to be pessimistic by believing the so called Russian attitude toward Japan--that of non-aggression. When we put into consideration the possible war with Russia, our war production at the present is extremely inadequate. On the other hand, we are being troubled by problems pertaining to foreign exchange and import of goods.

Next, I wish to speak to you on Japan's statement of January 16. Based on Japan's statement of August 15, as I have related before, Foreign Minister Hirota, with the view to let Chiang Kai Shek surrender, had proposed the German Ambassador to mediate, and expressed our intentions of desiring peace in the event that China will join hands with Japan and Manchukuo in an anti-communist front. Thereupon, in the latter part of November, the German Ambassador asked Hirota in reply, "The Chinese side seems desirous of agreeing to Japan's proposal. Is there any change in the proposal?"

The first negotiation between the German Ambassador and Hirota was in the latter part of August, before the fall of Lo-tien-chen; and now it was the latter part of November, just before the fall of Nanking. At this day when there had already been a great change in the situation, it was obvious that it was impossible to go into negotiations based upon the former conditions.

Thus, after all, it was the 22nd of December when Hirota made the following reply to the German Ambassador: "At this time when there has been a great change in the situation, it is not possible to make the conditions agreed by the Chinese the basic conditions for a truce any longer. If the Chinese side will generally agree on the following terms, we shall be ready to go directly into negotiations. If the Chinese side should act contrary we shall have to deal with the incident from a new standpoint, etc."

Terms.

1. China shall abandon her pro-communist and anti-Japanese policies, and collaborate with both Japan and Manchukuo in an anti-communist policy.
2. Demilitarized areas shall be established in necessary regions, and special organs (wide-scale free government system) shall be set up in the said areas.
3. A close economic treaty shall be concluded among the three nations, Japan, Manchukuo, and China.
4. China shall make necessary reparations to Japan.

Then we demanded a reply by the end of the year, and also to dispatch a delegation either to Japan proper or to Shanghai for the purpose of truce negotiations based upon the above terms.

Of course, we had a feeling that the reply may be prolonged until about the 10th of January. The details of the above basic terms our government had in preparation are as follows:

Details.

1. China shall formally recognize the government of Manchukuo.
2. China shall abandon her anti-Japanese and anti-Manchurian policies.
3. China shall establish special areas in North China and Inner Mongolia.
 - A. Proper organs shall be set up in North China for the realization of co-existence and co-prosperity for Japan, Manchukuo, and China. This organ shall be given wide powers and shall specially strive for the realization of economic coalition among the three countries.
 - B. An anti-communist self-government shall be established in Inner Mongolia. Its international position shall be the same as that of Outer Mongolia.
4. An anti-communist policy shall be established, and China shall cooperate with Japan and Manchukuo in the execution of the same policy.
5. Demilitarized areas shall be established in occupied territories of central China. China and Japan shall cooperate in the maintenance of peace and order in Shanghai and in its economic development.
6. Japan, Manchukuo, and China shall conclude necessary agreements on customs duties, trade, air defense, transportation, and communications in connection with the development of natural resources.
7. China shall pay indemnity to Japan. (There are oppositions within our circles).
8. China shall recognize the stationing of Japanese troops for necessary terms in designated areas in North China, Inner Mongolia and Central China for the purpose of security.
9. Truce treaty shall not be negotiated until after the above agreement shall have been concluded.

Had China executed the above details faithfully, our government had secret intentions to cancel the article on stationing of troops for security and to cooperate and aid in the development of China. I believe you all are very indignant of such lukewarm terms and details. There has been a same tendency in the Diet meetings.

Thus it was January but there was no reply to the above principles from China, even delegates had not been dispatched, and there was no sincerity at

all. Within the circles of our government there had been, from the end of the year, suggestions to appeal for a conference before the Imperial presence, which resulted in the Imperial Conference of January 11. I understand that the Emperor had decided to go into a prolonged endurance war should the Chinese give up.

Thus, on about the 14th of January, the Chinese side is said to have replied to the following effect:

"China is ready to start peace negotiations but the terms proposed by Japan are too abstract and it is difficult for us to reply." etc.

Then, you may say, what if we shall submit the above details. But such is not the best policy; it is only when the terms are abstract that there is any value or necessity of conferring and negotiating.

Such was the development, and finally, on January 16, a statement was issued. This statement, I believe, should have been issued by the end of the year, before the fall of Nanking.

Two reasons why the fall of Nanking--the fall of the enemy's capital--did not have the anticipated effect upon foreign countries were the bombing of the gunboat Panay, and the lateness in issuing the above statement. One reason why the statement was late is because there was an opposition in opinion, within the Army, on the China policy and the Konoye Cabinet, for a time, was about to fall.

Since there was no sincerity on the part of the Chinese, as has been related above, the Army considered it the major factor to overthrow the Chiang Regime first of all. And in order to do this, plotting should be proceeded within the occupied areas.

In the first place, unlike the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, this incident is not a war based chiefly on military operations, but should be a war based chiefly on political expeditions.

Therefore, the schemes in the occupied areas--the establishment of a rising political regime--were planned to be carried out after the fall of Nanking last fall by having WANG-KO-MIN set up a regime in North China.

In general, the influential persons of China were of the opinion that if Japan will strive to overthrow Chiang Kai-Shek to the last they should be obliged to rise and take a hand in the rising government. If, however, Japan will compromise with Chiang, they should only be killed for treason. So, they would not readily decide until Japan will show a definite attitude never to compromise with Chiang Kai-Shek.

I agree with them on this point, and this is one reason why it was necessary for Japan to clarify her basic principle on China.

This resulted in the statement of January 16, which had not been so clear. What was announced with the intention of making necessary explanations afterward in the form of talks by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, resulted in awkwardness as to be called lacking in distinctness.

The principles of the statement, in the first place, had been deliberated upon for about a month by one chief official from the Foreign Office, War Ministry and the Navy Ministry respectively. After forecasting what attitude Chiang Kai Shek will take toward Japan after Japan will have renounced the central government of the Chiang Regime, the statement at that time, had stated plainly our measures against him. However, a part of the above statement had been cancelled at the cabinet meeting for the reason that it was too long, resulting in an impotent conclusion as follows:

The Statement.

The Imperial Government has tried till this day to give the Chinese Kuomintang Government a last chance for retrospection even after the fall of Nanking.

However, the Kuomintang Government, not understanding our true intentions, stubbornly schemed hostilities toward Japan. Disregarding the people's sufferings from distress, China has no intentions to reflect upon establishing peace in all areas of East Asia.

Therefore, the Imperial Government shall not deal with the Kuomintang Government hereafter. We shall hope for the establishment and development of a new government that will truly collaborate with Japan, and by adjusting our relations we shall cooperate with that government for the establishment of a renovated China.

Japan, of course, shall continue to respect the territory and sovereignty of China and the rights and interests of the Powers in China. Japan is now charged with a great responsibility of peace in East Asia. The Government implores the people to put every effort in the execution of this important duty.

End.

Above is the full text of the statement.
Following is the outline:

1. Non-recognition of the Chiang Kai Shek Regime as the central Government of China. In other words, it means that Japan will not deal with the Chiang Regime in a general truce negotiation.
2. Establishment of a new government. Japan shall give all out support for this government.

However, this is improper because it has not clarified our attitude to be taken in the event the Hankow Government, or in other words Chiang Kai Shek should surrender, no matter under what conditions.

This, as I have previously related, had been stated in the draft. In any event, if the present Hankow Government should surrender, it will, of course, not be proper to deal with this government; but is it not possible to deal with them as a pro-Japanese district government? This should be deliberated upon at the Five Ministers Conference.

Moreover, the statement "Japan shall not deal with the Kuomintang Government hereafter" had originally been proposed by the Army and it had been "Japan shall not recognize the Chiang Regime as the Central Government hereafter---in the draft. This was changed because of opposition by the Foreign Office. The draft by the Foreign Office had been, "The Kuomintang Government, separated from the capital of Nanking, is recognized to have lost its powers. Therefore, Japan shall not deal with this government in the settlement of the incident".

Concerning the effect of the statement on the Chinese side, the Chinese have declared their attitude by saying, "The reply to Japan does not mean that China is trying to evade peace negotiations. Our government has discussed the terms proposed by Japan, but since there are foreign rights and interests in China things are very complicated, and we have only asked Japan for more complete terms. Peace with Japan is what we hope for, etc." I believe this to be China's scheme to guide her foreign policy on an advantageous line hereafter.

Now I would like to deliberate on the future after the fall of Hankow. There is nothing so difficult to forecast and so uncertain. None had thought, at about this time last year, that we would even send troops to seize Hankow. This may not be called a forecast, but it will not be very long before the major operations will come to a conclusion. However, this does not, at all, mean the conclusion of this incident.

Next will be the problem of forecasting whether Chiang Kai Shek will surrender or not after the fall of Hankow, and our attitude in dealing with this.

1. In case the Hankow Government does not surrender it will be called an anti-Japanese district government; but it is a question whether we should pursue them indefinitely and give them the finishing blow.
2. In case of surrender--surrender shall mean that Chiang Kai Shek will bow unconditionally, and therefore China shall abandon her pro-communist and anti-Japanese policies, and of course, participate in an anti-communist front with Japan. In this case, what ways and means shall be taken in uniting the new pro-Japanese government to be established in Hankow and the existing pro-Japanese regime in North and Central China? An autonomous government of federated provinces may be set up, or a powerful regime capable of including such a government may be established, and there are various other forms that may be considered. Anyway, the time will be ripe after the fall of Hankow, for establishing a central government, which should be centered around a character capable of winning the confidence of central and South China and to be popular with all of China. Unlike the case of Manchukuo, no government office will be taken by a Japanese, and Japan will do her utmost in the role of leadership. (This is the general outline decided at the cabinet meeting last fall).

Japan's government administration in North and Central China will be to put North China completely under Japan's control--to the same degree as Manchukuo--forming a defense area for Japan, China, and Manchukuo, and it will be necessary to develop the resources in this area for national defense.

Central China will be less important than North China, but will form an important base for the development of Japan's economic power. So it will be necessary to first secure our purpose in North China.

Inner Mongolia will be the same as North China in that it forms an anti-Communist area and it will be necessary for this region to have a self-governing organ. So naturally our troops will be stationed in necessary areas to cooperate with the a real organization of China--peace maintenance troops--in the maintenance of peace and order. The unarmament zone is established because bandits are always rampant in China. It is, of course, necessary to secure Inner Mongolia in preparation for a war with Russia, but it will be disadvantageous for Japan to provoke a war on her now. This is because we shall have to divide our troops in the North and the South to attack both China and Russia. If, however, a war with Russia is unavoidable, it will be necessary for Japan to select a proper chance after her armament and production shall have been expanded--this should be after Showa 17 (1941).

This concerns with foreign policy, but we shall recognize the rights and interest of Britain to a certain degree and have her cut all relations with Chiang Kai Shek, and it is most important that we further strengthen our anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Italy.

The next most important thing is the problem of renovation within our government in preparation for the execution of the so-called continental policy against China. For Japan, who has started the management of Manchuria, to make an advancement into continental China, it will necessitate the rousing of redoubled effort on the part of our people. One reason why our country has originally been unsuccessful in colonial policies lies in the lack of national strength, especially in the power of production. This recent example could be seen in South Manchuria. Japan, at that time, being unable to completely manage this area, finally had to come to the Manchurian Incident, which all accounts to the lack of productive power.

What was the consequence of the Siberian Expedition--the advancement of our troops to the Baikal? This, too, resulted in the same manner.

The change of industrial management--from free to controlled--must not be a temporary phenomenon. It will be absolutely impossible to attain our purpose in our racial development through free economics. All this could be attained only through the enforcement of the general national mobilization law.

My discussion will wander from the subject, but we would have been extremely advantageous in our operations had we put the general mobilization law into motion six months before the outbreak of hostilities in the present incident.

Of course, this was in reality a matter of impossibility. In the Russo-Japanese War, our people, soon after the Sino-Japanese War, had already been determined that a war with Russia was inevitable. A veteran lieutenant-colonel, (Officer in charge of mobilization in the War Ministry), had already declared in June, 1903 (Meiji 36) (six months ahead of the declaration of war), the necessity of putting into a motion a law similar in content to the present national mobilization law. I perfectly approve of this action.

In the present incident, an Imperial Ordinance pertaining to the enforcement of part of the national mobilization law was promulgated in August last year. At that time the organs of the Natural Resources Bureau (not the executive organs) had been incomplete, and on top of this, there had been a misunderstanding between the Planning Board, and finally resulted in the establishment of a joint organ on October 25. Therefore an industrial mobilization law was passed at the temporary Diet Session in September, and in January of this year a factory supervision law was at last issued. This all goes to show how slow our government activities are.

Now we shall come back to our main subject. There is still the necessity in our country to renovate the organs of our government as well as the political party problems and the National Spirit Mobilization Central Alliance, etc. These may be achieved only through the Pan-Asiatic Movement, (racial movement), and it will be of vital importance in guiding our younger generation.

Then in February this year an article had been published in newspapers about the returning home of relieved soldiers. It is true that some soldiers had been sent home. But to give you the facts, there had been gradual mobilizations after that, and it seems that rumors had been rampant that this was in preparation for a war with Russia. I would like to say a word on this point.

To put oppression upon the Chinese in succession would only result in strengthening their determination, so the Army decided it the best policy to contemplate a while after the fall of each city to give the Chinese a chance for internal corruption. Therefore, a part of the reserves and second reserves were sent home; but since then, it was necessary to change the plans of operation so naturally this had to be stopped. This had some relation with the establishment of the new regime declared in the statement of January 16.

The pro-Japanese Governments are located in North and Central China, but communications between these two are cut off at Suchow, a strategic point on the Tientsin-Pukow railway line, which makes things utterly inconvenient. In order to secure convictions, therefore, the unexpected attack on Suchow began. On one hand, the difference between the Chiang Government and the pro-Japanese Government is so incomparably great that one of these strategic points had to be secured for dealing a blow on the Chiang Government. On the other hand, we became pressed with the necessity of strengthening the pro-Japanese Government. Thus, contrary to expectations, it became necessary to use a large number of troops. Naturally, as previously stated, there had to be a change in plans regarding the question of relieving troops.

Lastly, I wish to say something regarding the rumors concerning peace negotiations. There are rumors going around at large that England, Germany, etc. are going to mediate between Japan and China. However, as previously related, the fundamental attitude of our Empire toward the Incident is as indicated in the January 16 declaration. Regarding the circumstances which gave rise to these, it seems that during the period covering the tenth semi-annual term (January, March, and in April), figures clearly showed a letdown in trade, (the estimated imports amounting to ¥ 3,000,000,000 had to be reduced to something like ¥ 2,500,000,000), while intensification of economic control became necessary, this being eventually carried out, and then of course the fact that the Cabinet members, UGAKI and IKEDA are seriously concerned regarding the opening of peace negotiations--these it seems have been the causes for such rumors, but so far as I am concerned, these have to be confirmed.

Our country will still, hereafter, require a fairly huge budget. We must surmount the difficulties, though of course we must be prepared for an increase in military supplies, and I think this is not the place to take up the question of negotiating for peace.

Recently, Chiang Kai-Shek has sent a certain person to Japan to "feel out" possibilities for peace negotiations. And it seems that this man is conducting work with the details of the peace conditions mentioned previously as the basis for his negotiations.

Regarding his attitude, I have heard that China: (1) will abandon its anti-Japanese policy; (2) will substantially recognize Manchuria; (3) will recognize the self-government of Inner Mongolia; (4) is against the establishment of demilitarized zones in North and South China; (5) is against stationing of troops in China by Japan; (6) is against immediate participation in the anti-Communist Pact; (7) is in favor of an anti-communist policy; (8) approves severing relations with the Communist Party; (9) would like to be pardoned from paying an indemnity; (10) is for economic development; and (11) Chiang Kai-Shek will retire from public life following reconciliations.

According to what I have heard, China's attitude is as stated above. Of course, I don't know the real facts, but China evades what Japan specifically aims at. Moreover, it is asking too much to try to bring about an agreement based on the Chinese ideas listed above just when Hankow is about to be stormed. Of course our Cabinet Conference will not lend them an ear.

Lastly, I wish to reiterate that our fundamental attitude towards the Incident is found in the declaration of January 16. There has been an alteration since the declaration of 15 August, last year. Hereafter, also, it will be difficult to say that there will absolutely not be any more alterations, depending on the changes in the situation. However, I think that the point regarding the establishment of a new regime is something that should remain absolutely immovable.

8 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR FILES -

Document # _____

Manchurian Colonization Investigation Committee - a short-lived Cabinet Advisory Committee which held its first meeting on 16 August 1939 and its last 30 October 1939. Its official duty under the Imperial Ordinance which created it was to report to the Cabinet its opinions on the establishment of a fundamental policy of Manchurian Colonization. It drew up "A General Policy of Manchurian Colonization". (See exhibit C to memo of J. F. Munroe to D. L. Waldorf dated 10 April 1947)

Among the members were -

Izumura, Michiyo	-	Justice Vice-Minister
Nishio, Foshio	-	Secretary of Transportation Ministry

C. T. COLE
Cmdr., USN

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

20 March 1947

MEMORANDUM

To: Lt. D. L. Waldorf
From: Cndr. Cole
Subject: Decorations awarded to Witnesses

1. The memorandum from Mr. Lopez dated 11 March 1947 lists four decorations awarded to one NISHIO, Chuzo (Dec. No. 2971, p. 65).
2. Information is desired as to whether the said NISHIO, Chuzo, is the same person as the NISHIO, Toshizo, who has been called as a witness for the defendant KIMURA. The curriculum vitae of NISHIO, Toshizo (Case File No. 51) indicates that he received a number of decorations not mentioned in Dec. No. 2971. It is requested that an investigation be conducted on this point and a report made to the writer.

C. T. COLE
Cndr., USN

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RESUME OF CASE NO. 51

NISHIO, Toshizo (Juzo)
(General - retired)

- Serial No. 1 CIS files - 17 Nov. 1945. Subject's brief military career.
- Serial No. 2 SCAP press release dated 2 Dec. 1945. Subject was concurrently Inspector General of Military Training and member of the Supreme Military Council in 1938; appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China in 1939; became Governor of Tokyo in 1944.
- Serial No. 5 CIS files. As with any other Commander-in-Chief in China during Japanese aggression, Subject should be held responsible for acts of the Japanese Army in China.
- Serial No. 6 Memorandum from Major Barnard. A review of File No. 51 reflects it contains information which may be of interest to Groups B and C.
- Serial No. 8 Interrogation report dated 17 Jan. 1946; reveals Subject's brief military career; describes the gradual spread of communistic ideas into the Japanese Army; reveals the strength of the Japanese Army in China and Manchuria during 1932.
- Serial No. 11 Interrogation report dated 21 Jan. 1946. Chief of Kwantung Army in 1934; reveals the activities of the Kwantung Army when Subject became connected with it.
- Serial No. 12 Interrogation report dated 8 Feb. 1946. Reveals the functions of the Supreme War Council.
- Serial No. 13 CIS files. Additional biographical report.
- Serial No. 14 Interrogation report dated 12 Feb. 1946. Reveals the discussion of the most important meeting of Supreme War Council which was held December 1941.
- Serial No. 15 Interrogation report dated 11 Feb. 1946. Reveals how Subject became member of Supreme War Council.
- Serial No. 16 Interrogation report dated 14 Feb. 1946. Reveals Subject's duties as Commander-in-Chief at Nanking in 1939.

- Serial No. 17 Interrogation report dated 13 Feb. 1946. Reveals when Japan finally decided to go to war; reveals the military machine of 1936.
- Serial No. 18 Interrogation report dated 5 Feb. 1946. Reveals Subject's relation with ARAKI, MUTO, and MAZAKI.
- Serial No. 19 Interrogation report dated 7 Feb. 1946. Reveals the activities of the Kwantung Army.
- Serial No. 21 Interrogation report dated 18 Feb. 1946. Reveals information on General SATO.
- Serial No. 26 Analysis of Doc. Evidence, Doc. No. 644. Subject implicated in confidential record of Manchurian Affairs.
- Serial No. 28 Analysis of Doc. Evidence, Doc. No. 789. Subject implicated in Economic Monopolies.
- Serial No. 29 Analysis of Doc. Evidence, Doc. No. 1242. Subject implicated in file containing reports concerning propaganda programs to be carried out in North China.
- Serial No. 30 Summary of evidentiary facts made by Subject: Subject - NAGANO.
- Serial No. 31 Summary of evidentiary facts made by Subject: Subject - SHIMADA.
- Serial No. 32 Summary of facts by Subject re DOIHARA.
- Serial No. 33 " " " " " " ITAGAKI.
- Serial No. 34 " " " " " " HATA
- Serial No. 36 " " " " " " TOJO
- Serial No. 37 Complete personnel records of Subject.
- Serial No. 38 Subject's military career in China.
- Serial No. 39 Subject resigned as Assistant Chief of Staff in 1936.
- Serial No. 40 Brief resume of the previous seven interrogation reports of Subject.
- Serial No. 42 Analysis of Doc. Evidence, Doc. No. 1685. Subject implicated in conspiracy to wage aggressive warfare in China and violation of Nine-Power Treaty.

Serial No. 43 Analysis of Doc. Evidence, Doc. No. 1673. Subject implicated in reports of the Mukden Special Service Agency.

Serial No. 44 Analysis of Doc. Evidence, Doc. No. 2626. Subject implicated in File of Operational and Garrison Duty Documents relating to Manchurian Army.

For additional information see:

IPS Case File No. 51 - NISHIO, Toshizo (Juzo)
(General - retired)

Witness called by:

KIMURA

CURRICULUM VITAE

IPS File No. 51

On 9 January 1946, the records of the Personnel Section, Cabinet Secretariat, were examined at the Diet Building, Tokyo.

Complete personnel records of the subject were micro-filmed. Photostatic copies, together with translation, are on file as Exhibit #659, File #51.

Transcript of the translation is as follows:

NISHIO, Toshizo

Date of Birth:	31 October 1881
Domicile:	Tottori Prefecture
1902 Nov. 22	Graduated Military Academy; Ordered to be a probationary officer.
1903 June 26	Appointed 2nd Lt., Inf. and attached to 40th Inf. Regt.
1903 Oct. 20	Conferred the Senior Grade of the 8th Court Rank.
1905 Feb. 1	Promoted to 1st Lt., Inf.
1905 Mar. 10	Conferred the Junior Grade of the 7th Court Rank.
1906 Oct. 27	Relieved of present duties; Attached to the Military Academy Student Unit.
1906 April 1	Conferred 5th Class Order of the Golden Kite; Received, at the same time, the Russo-Japanese War Medal; Decorated with the 6th Class Order of the Single Rays of the Rising Sun.
1907 Oct. 26	Attached to the Military Academy Student Unit.
1907 Dec. 10	Ordered to enter Army General Staff College.
1907 Dec. 21	Relieved of present duties; Attached to 40th Inf. Regt.
1909 Dec. 15	Promoted to Captain, Inf.; Relieved of present duties; Appointed Company Commander, 40th Regiment (Inf.)

1910 Feb. 21 Conferred the Senior Grade of the 7th Court Rank.

1910 Dec. 9 Relieved of present duties;
Appointed to Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry.

1912 Aug. 13 Relieved of present duties;
Appointed to go to Germany to study military affairs.

1913 May 31 Decorated with 5th Class Order of the Sacred Treasure.

1914 Aug. 23 Attached to General Staff Headquarters

1915 Feb. 15 Released from the above position;
Assigned to the General Staff Headquarters as a Staff Member.

1915 Mar. 3 Appointed instructor at the Army Medical School.

1915 Mar. 20 Conferred the Junior Grade of the 6th Court Rank.

1916 Jan. 21 Released from his primary and secondary duties;
Appointed instructor of military science at Army General Staff College.

1916 Mar. 22 Appointed a member of the General Staff Headquarters.

1915 Nov. 7 Conferred the 4th Class Order of the Sacred Treasure
(Granted ¥400 for services in 1914-1915 War)

1916 Nov. 15 Promoted to Major, Infantry.

1915 Nov. 10 Decorated with the Medal of Grand Ceremony of Accession.

1918 July 24 Released from secondary duty.

1919 Mar. 19 Appointed as member of General Staff Headquarters.

1919 April 15 Released from his principal and secondary duties;
Appointed Assistant Officer at War Ministry and Secretary to War Minister.

1920 April 10 Conferred Senior Grade of 6th Court Rank.

1920 May 10 Ordered to go to China.

1920 Aug. 10 Promoted to Lt. Col., Inf.

1920 Nov. 2 Decorated with Small Cordon of Rising Sun
(Granted ¥2,100 for meritorious service)

1922 April 1 Released from his principal and secondary duties;
Appointed to the 10th Inf. Regt.

1923 April 1 Released from his duty;
Appointed instructor of military science at the
State College.

1923 Aug. 6 Promoted to Colonel, Infantry.

1923 Sept. 30 Conferred 3rd Class of Merit, with the Order of
Sacred Treasure.

1923 Nov. 9 Conferred the Junior Grade of 5th Court Rank.

1923 Nov. 28 Appointed to Naval Staff College as Training Officer.

1925 Mar. 18 Released from his Primary duty and appointed Commander
of the 40th Inf. Regt.;
Released from added duty.

1926 Mar. 2 Released from his primary duty;
Made a head of 1st Section of General Superintendent
Department of Education.

1926 April 9 Appointed a member of Military Technical Council;

1928 Oct. 25 Attached to the Staff for Soldiers in connection with
Grand Ceremony of Accession.

1928 Dec. 12 Appointed a member of the Military Communication
Research Department.

1928 Dec. 28 Decorated with Senior Grade of 5th Court Rank.

1929 Feb. 28 Appointed to the Inspection Office by special order.

1929 Aug. 1 Promoted to Army Major General

1929 Aug. 1 Relieved as member of the Military Technical Council.
Appointed the 39th Infantry Brigade Commander.

1930 Aug. 1 Attached to Ordnance Main Depot.

1932 April 11 Appointed Head of 4th Department at the Staff H.Q.

1933 April 10 Appointed Chief of Staff on the occasion of Grand
Military Review on the Emperor's birthday.

1933 Aug. 1 Promoted to Lieutenant General.

1933 Sept. 4 Conferred 2nd Class of Merit with the Order of Sacred
Treasure.

1933 Sept. 1 Decorated with Junior Grade of 4th Court Rank.

1934 March 5 Appointed Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army and Head of Special Service in Kwantung Army.

1935 Aug. 15 Appointed Japanese delegate at the Japan-Manchukuo United Economic Commission.

1936 March 23 Released as Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army.

1936 March 23 Appointed Vice Chief of Staff.

1936 May 28 Released as Japanese delegate at the Japan-Manchukuo United Economic Commission.

1936 April 8 Appointed member of Investigation Committee of Resources.

1936 May 1 Appointed to serve in Imperial Household Ministry.

1936 May 12 Appointed to the Council for Reconstruction of Education and Religion.

1936 Dec. 1 Appointed Director of the General Affairs Section at the General Staff Headquarters.

1937 Feb. 1 Released as director of the General Affairs Section of General Staff Headquarters.

1937 Mar. 1 Released from his own duties;
Appointed Commander of the KONOYE Guard Division.

1937 Mar. 25 Released as member of the Investigation Committee for Resources.

1937 April 1 Released from being a Service Officer in the Imperial Household;
Released from his own duties.

1937 Aug. 16 Appointed Commander of the 2nd Army.

1938 April 30 Released from his own duties.

1938 April 30 Appointed Educational General Superintendent and a member of the Council of Military Affairs.

1938 Nov. 1 Given a Silver Cup.

1939 Aug. 1 Promoted to General.

1939 Aug. 15 Decorated with 3rd Court Rank, Junior Grade.

1939 Sept. 12 Appointed General Commander of the Army sent to China.
Relieved of principal and secondary duties.

1939 May 22 Appointed Commander of the 3rd Army as well.

1941 March 1 Appointed member of the Supreme War Council.

1949 Sept. 1 Appointed Chairman of the Committee for the temporary
Festival of Yasukuni Shrine - Oct. 1941.

1940 April 29 Decorated with 1st Class of Merit with the Order of
Golden Kite;
Conferred 3rd Court Rank, Senior Grade.

1943 May 3 Put on the list of reserve forces.

1944 July 25 Appointed Governor of Metropolis of Tokyo and the head
of Sea Communication Bureau, and the head of the judgment
hall of local seamen.

Made high official 2nd Class.

1945 March 10 Appointed additionally Ammunition Officer at the
Ammunition Department and Inspection Officer at the
Ammunition Department.

1945 June 9 Released as Ammunition Officer and Inspector at the
Ammunition Department.

1945 June 10 Appointed General Superintendent to Kanto Shin Etsu
Area and the Governor of the Metropolis of Tokyo.

1945 Aug. 21 By request released from his own duties as well as
other duties he was performing at the same time.

NISHIO, Toshizo (Juzo)

Additional information, not included in the Curriculum Vitae, which was obtained from a review of CIS files:

1903 Graduated Military Academy with highest honors.

1904-05 Participated Russo-Japanese War with 40th Infantry.

1910 Graduated Army Staff College, 2nd in class.

1920-21 Adjutant, War Ministry.

1923-24 Instructor in military science, Army Staff College.

1926-28 Chief, 1st Section, Office Inspector General of Military Training.

1930 Attached to Central Ordnance Depot; concurrently Chairman, Military Inquiry Committee, War Ministry.

1932 Chief, 4th Bureau, Army General Staff.

1937 March Commander, Imperial Guards Division.

1937 Aug. Sent to North China on secret mission.

1938 April Inspector General of Military Training; concurrently Member Supreme Military Council.

Typical staff officer, quiet, modest, and without political affiliations. Formerly spoken of as authority on Japanese war plans with respect to Russia. Reputed to have been drafter of "Compendium of Combat" (Santo Kyo), army handbook. (21,104).

(Source: Report of Ital. Mil. Attache in Tokyo for May 1938, OSS FEI. Attended a conference at the Palace held by the Emperor on 16 January 1945. Source: FCC, Daily Report, 16 Jan. 1945).

Chief of the Kanto Munitions Intendance Bureau.

(Source: FCC, Daily Report, 16 July 1945.)

He inspires much faith in Japanese military circles for his military and political ability; may become the future head of the new central government of China, as already a Japanese General has become head of the Manchu State.

(Source: Italian Consular Official)
JICA North Africa, carded BR 21 February 1944.

He hates Communism and also hates Japan's great capitalist families, principally because the latter disputed mastery of Japan with the Army. His great friend is General Sa. ITAGAKI whom he has used to soothe offended financiers while he quietly extended the Army's grip on industry. Of ITAGAKI, NISHIO once said: "I'll do the fighting; let ITAGAKI do the office work."

(Source: OSS FE)

Issued appeal to the inhabitants of the City (Tokyo) to exhibit an "exemplary attitude" and confront "all difficulties, even death."

(Source: FCC Daily Report, 8 August 1944.)

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A review of ATTIS files revealed the following additional information concerning NISHIO:

July 25, 1944 Appointed Governor of Tokyo with the additional duties of Chief of the Yokohama Court of Admiralty, Superintendent General of the Kento-Shinetsu Regional Bloc; Chief of the Yokohama Sea Transportation Bureau.

Jan. 7, 1945 Appointed president of the Association to Protect Decentralized Children.

(Source: "Prominent Persons in Japan and Japanese Dominated Areas," ONI, 14th N.D., Aug. 1945.)

ASAHI SHIMBUN Files reveal the following:

1939 Commander-in-Chief of expeditionary forces in China.
1938 Visited Germany on military mission (no date)
1939 Director of Military Education.
1941 Promoted to full General.
Personally reported to Emperor on progress of war in China.

Miscellaneous information re: NISHIO, Toshizo

File No. 51, Ser. 5 - The name of NISHIO, Toshizo appears on the U. S. War Crimes list prepared by State, War and Navy Departments.

Ser. 1 - In January 1944 was Military Judicial Administrator of South Seas Areas.

(Note: Typical staff officer, quiet, modest, and without political affiliations. ... Drinks heavily and turns taciturn and sour. Hates communism and also hates Japan's great capitalist families, principally because the latter disputed mastery of Japan with the army.)

NISHIO, Toshizo

Request by: KIMURA, Heitaro

Address: Sugamo Prison, Tokyo

Facts to be proven by witness are that while General KIMURA was a member of Supreme War Council, it was in a position of no importance, and other pertinent facts.

The testimony is relevant in that it tends to prove that KIMURA took no part in important decisions.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

20 March 1947

MEMORANDUM

To: Lt. D. L. Waldorf
From: Cmdr. Cole
Subject: Decorations awarded to Witnesses

1. The memorandum from Mr. Lopez dated 11 March 1947 lists four decorations awarded to one NISHIO, Chuzo (Doc. No. 2971, p. 65).

2. Information is desired as to whether the said NISHIO, Chuzo, is the same person as the NISHIO, Toshizo, who has been called as a witness for the defendant KIMURA. The curriculum vitae of NISHIO, Toshizo (Case File No. 51) indicates that he received a number of decorations not mentioned in Doc. No. 2971. It is requested that an investigation be conducted on this point and a report made to the writer.

C. T. Cole

G. T. COLE
Cmdr., USN

25 March '47

NISHIO, Chuzo is the same person as NISHIO, Toshizo. The Japanese characters can be read either Chuzo or Toshizo.

The decorations, which were listed in Doc. No. 2971 and not listed in subject's curriculum vitae, are mentioned in the Official Gazette that subject did receive the said awards.

91 Shimajima

*A. Shimajima
Investigative Division*

Case # 51

RE : NISHIO, Toshizo
General (retired)
STATUS : Pending

Memorandum for the Files:

On 4 December 1945 CIS files reflect the following information on personnel indicted as War Criminals and ordered apprehended 3 December 1945:

Inspector General of Military Training, concurrently Member Supreme Military Council, 1938. Appointed Commander-in-Chief Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China, 1939. Supreme Military Council 1941. Governor Tokyo Metropolitan Area, 1944. As with any other Commander-in-Chief in China during Japanese aggression he should be held responsible for acts of the Japanese Army in China.

He appears on the U. S. War Crimes List prepared by State, War and Navy Departments.

He qualifies under Paragraph 7-a, of Joint Chiefs of Staff Basic Directive for Post Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper of 3 November 1945.

JAMES J. GAINES, JR.
Capt., Inf.

4 December 1945

CASE NO. 51

RE: NISHIO, Toshizo

STATUS: Pending.

MEMO FOR THE FILE:

Source: Not stated.

From : NIPPON TIMES #16780, 4 December 1945

INFORMATION:

"NISHIO, Toshizo. This retired General was concurrently Inspector General of Military Training and member of the Supreme Military Council in 1938. In 1939 he was appointed Commander in Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China. In 1944 he became Governor of Tokyo."

UNDEVELOPED LEAD:

Review Nippon Times "morgue" for possible further information.

JOE B. ALEXANDER
2nd Lt., Inf.

FILE:

REPORT BY: D. L. Waldorf

RE : NISHIO, Toshizo, General (Retired)

DATE: 19 January 1946

STATUS: Pending

Inspector General of Military Training, concurrently Member Supreme Military Council, 1938. Appointed Commander-in-Chief Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China, 1939. Supreme Military Council, 1941. Governor Tokyo Metropolitan Area, 1944. As with any other Commander-in-Chief in China during Japanese aggression he should be held responsible for acts of the Japanese Army in China.

He appears on the U. S. War Crimes list prepared by State, War and Navy Departments.

He qualifies under Paragraph 7-a of Joint Chiefs of Staff Basic Directive for Post Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper of 3 November 1945.

PENDING

(Counter Intelligence Justification Files reflected the above indicated information concerning subject.)

CASE NO.: 51-

Report by William A. Hardy
Special Agent, CIC

RE : NISHIO, Toshizo (Juzo)

STATUS: Closed

DATE : 15 January 1946

A review of CIS Files reveals the following additional information concerning the Subject:

1881	Oct.	Born Tottori Prefecture; m. Toshiko, 3rd daughter of Tadatoshi Sakai.
1903		Graduated Military Academy with highest honors; 2nd Lt., Infantry
1904-05		Participated Russo-Japanese War with 40th Infantry
1905		1st Lt., Infantry
1909		Captain, Infantry
1910		Graduated Army Staff College, 2nd in class
1916		Major, Infantry
1920		Lt. Col., Infantry
1920-21		Adjutant, War Ministry
1922		Attached to 10th Infantry Regiment (Okayama)
1923		Colonel, Infantry
1923-24		Instructor in military science, Army Staff College
1925		Commander, 40th Infantry Regiment (Tottori)
1926-28		Chief, 1st Section, Office Inspector General of Military Training.
1929		Major General; Commander, 39th Infantry Brigade
1930		Attached to Central Ordnance Depot; concurrently Chairman, Military Inquiry Committee, War Ministry
1932		Chief, 4th Bureau, Army General Staff
1934		Chief of Staff, Kwantung
1936	Mar.	Vice Chief, Army General Staff
1937	Mar.	Commander, Imperial Guards Division
1937	Aug.	Sent to North China on secret mission
1938	April	Inspector General of Military Training; concurrently Member Supreme Military Council
1939	Aug.	General
1939	Sept.	Commander in Chief, Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China
1941	Mar.	Member Supreme Military Council
1943	May	Retired from Army

Typical staff officer, quiet, modest, and without political affiliations. Formerly spoken of as authority on Japanese war plans with respect to Russia. Reputed to have been drafter of "Compendium of Combat" (Santo Kyo), army handbook. (21,104).

(Source: Report of Ital. Mil. Attache in Tokyo for May 1938, OSS FEI. Attended a conference at the Palace held by the Emperor on 16 January 1945. Source: FCC, Daily Report, 16 Jan. 1945.)

Chief of the Kanto Munitions Intendance Bureau.

(Source: FCC, Daily Report, 16 July 1945)

He inspires much faith in Japanese military circles for his military and political ability; may become the future head of the new central government of China, as already a Japanese General has become head of the Manchu State.

(Source: Italian Consular Official)
JICA North Africa, carded BR 21 February 1944.

He hates Communism and also hates Japan's great capitalist families, principally because the latter disputed mastery of Japan with the Army. His great friend is General S. Itagaki whom he has used to soothe offended financiers while he quietly extended the Army's grip on industry. Of Itagaki, Nishio once said: "I'll do the fighting; let Itagaki do the office work."

(Source: OSS FE)

Issued appeal to the inhabitants of the City (Tokyo) to exhibit an "exemplary attitude" and confront "all difficulties, even death."

(Source: FCC Daily Report, 8 August 1944.)

A review of ATIS files revealed the following additional information concerning subject.

July 25, 1944 Appointed Governor of Tokyo with the additional duties of Chief of the Yokohama Court of Admiralty, Superintendent General of the Kanto-Shinetsu Regional Bloc; Chief of the Yokohama Sea Transportation Bureau.

January 7, 1945 Appointed president of the Association to
Protect Decentralized Children.

(Source: "Prominent Persons in Japan and Japanese
Dominated Areas," ONI, 14th N.D., Aug. 1945.)

Asahi Shimbun Files reveal the following:

1939	Commander-in-Chief of expeditionary forces in China.
-	Visited Germany on military mission (no date)
1938	Director of Military Education
1939	Promoted to full General
1941	Personally reported to Emperor on progress of war in China

All readily available sources of information on Subject have
been checked.

NISHIO was confined in Sugamo Prison on 12 December 1945.

Pending requests for additional investigation, case will be
considered administratively closed.

CLOSED.

NISHIO, Chuzo

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CLASS OF DECORATION</u>	<u>ACHIEVEMENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDING MINISTRY</u>
29 Apr. 1934	Grand Gorden of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Military Order of the Golden Kite - 1st Class	China Incident	War Ministry
2 May 1936	Chingyuan-Chang 1st Class (Manchukuo)	Japan and Manchukuo Amity	Foreign Ministry
23 Dec. 1937	Gros KreuzAdler Order	Japanese-German Amity	Foreign Ministry
2 Nov. 1938	Granted set of silver cups	Japan-German Agreement	"

NISHIO, Toshizo

The following excerpts from the Narrative Summary of the Record relate to NISHIO:

<u>Narrative Summary Page</u>	<u>From cross-examination of MINAMI</u>	<u>Transcript Page</u>
2997	NISHIO was his Chief of Staff, and on December 9, 1935, NISHIO issued a document with MINAMI's authority about propaganda in North China, and MINAMI had heard that he had sent it to the Vice Minister of War.	19,997
	This document was Exhibit No. 1242, and provided for propaganda on the advance into China.	19,998
	Despite the reading of this document, MINAMI contended that during the whole time he was in command of the Kwantung Army he did nothing hostile to the Chinese Government.	20,000
3012 3013	MINAMI, on 16 April, 1947, testified that: The fact that he strictly prohibited crossing of the Great Wall to maintain law and order was well known to chief of staff NISHIO and his deputy ITAGAKI. A part of the army or some small units might have crossed the border and he had heard rumors to that effect, but the Kwantung Army was never given permission to cross the border.	20,075

1 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR NISHIO, Chuzo (KIMURA witness) FILE:

NISHIO, Chuzo is called as a witness by ITAGAKI and will testify on the Manchurian and China Incidents phase. KIMURA is calling him to testify that while KIMURA was a member of the Supreme War Council it was in a position of no importance, the relevancy of the testimony being to prove that KIMURA took no part in important decisions.

With exception of going into his record in connection with the Supreme War Council, it is believed that the analysis sheet covering NISHIO bearing on the Manchurian and China Incidents phase will suffice.

25 January, 1946

- Q. The Japanese were constantly occupying Chinese territory, isn't that true?
- A. All this resulted in repelling Chinese counter attacks.
- Q. Didn't the Japanese forces at any time initiate an attack?
- A. Yes, in certain parts or regions.
- Q. What parts or regions?
- A. It would be difficult to state exactly in what regions the Japanese forces initiated an attack, in view of the wide area covered and to prepare for an eventual attack by Chinese forces attacks would have been initiated by Japanese commanders on the spot in various localities.
- Q. You say "would have been", do you mean attacks were made at those places?
- A. As I said before, it would be difficult to state just where attacks were initiated. When TOKKEN had been occupied my orders were not to advance south towards TSINAN but Chinese troops crossing the Yellow River and infiltrating into TOKKEN-TSINAN region necessitated attacking them. They were repulsed and this led to the occupation of TSINAN. To protect Tsinan it was necessary to protect the railway line running south in the direction of the SHANTUNG-KAINGSU border.
- Q. General, you stated that the first army and part of the second army traveled south on both sides of the HANKOW PEKING railroad, isn't that so?
- A. Yes, until the enemy was dispersed.
- Q. At what point?
- A. At JUNTOKU.
- Q. What is the distance between JUNTOKU and PEIPING?
- A. Between 300 and 400 kilometers.
- Q. What strategic places, if any are located between those two points between Juntoku and Peiping?
- A. The junction of the TAIYUAN railway with the Peking Hangkow railway at SHINCHIACHUANG as an important place from the point of view of communications.
- Q. What was the population of SHINCHIACHUANG at that time?
- A. Judging from the size I would say it was a town of some 100,000, but this is a Chinese town and they may have had 150,000.

25 January, 1946.

- A. There is nothing special between the two places.
- Q. From a military point of view are there places within those two points of strategic value?
- A. No.
- Q. What is the population of Juntoku?
- A. I don't know as I've never been there.
- Q. Is it a large or small place from the standpoint of population?
- A. It is a town, but I don't know its size.
- Q. What is the distance between Juntoku and Kaifeng?
- A. Perhaps 150 to 200 kilometers.
- Q. Is Kaifeng a large town or city?
- A. It is a rather big town.
- Q. About how many people would you say?
- A. I am not sure, but perhaps it is 200,000 more or less.
- Q. Are there any important places between Juntoku and Kaifeng?
- A. There is a town called SHINGO between Juntoku and Kaifeng.
- Q. Are there any other towns between those towns?
- A. Towns and villages, but I don't remember their names and population.
- Q. Did the Japanese forces at any time occupy Kaifeng?
- A. Yes, about the end of May or early in June.
- Q. What year?
- A. 1938.
- Q. How far had those armies gone down along the Hangkow railroad during 1937?
- A. I think it was near Juntoku.
- Q. About what time did the Japanese forces arrive there - that is, what date?
- A. About the 25th of October.
- Q. Did the Japanese forces meet the Chinese forces at any point between Juntoku and Peiping?
- A. Fighting occurred with HOTE as a center and Chinese troops were repelled and retreated south.
- Q. This was early in October, 1937?
- A. Yes.

Q. To what point?

A. After the Hote battles there were no serious occasions. The Chinese forces retreated over the great wall towards Taiyuan. Some of these Chinese forces retreated south along the Peking-Hankow railway line.

Q. How far?

A. They retreated south of TAIYUAN and towards SHINGO on the railway line and no big battles were fought below SHINCHUACHUANG.

Q. Did those two Japanese armies continue to advance south?

A. Yes, to Juntoku.

Q. General, if the Japanese forces were advancing between the places just mentioned and in view of the fact that there are very few towns between some of those places through which the Japanese forces proceeded would you not say that the Japanese forces were on the offensive at the time, that is, that they were taking aggressive action against the Chinese forces?

A. The object of all attacks is to defeat and disperse the enemy and attacking retreating forces is a fundamental principle of military strategy.

29 January, 1946

- Q. General, you said that you heard rumors in connection with the inner group of young officers who it is alleged planned what took place at Mukden in 1931. Will you tell us please what you recall now in connection with those rumors?
- A. I don't remember because I didn't pay much attention to the rumors.
- Q. General, you might not have paid any attention to these rumors, but what were the rumors in this connection?
- A. The rumors were to the effect that groups in Tokyo were in contact with groups in the Kwantung army urging them to exceed their authority and instructions in certain matters.
- Q. What were those matters?
- A. I don't know just what these matters were as these are merely rumors that I heard, however, I am certain that the Kwantung army command was not implicated in these matters.
- Q. Then General according to the rumors you heard at that time, there must have been a division within the Kwantung Army as to what should be done regarding matters in Manchuria.
- A. There must have been differences of opinion amongst members of the staff but I do not know just what these differences were.
- Q. General, I am not asking you what you know about the differences, but what you call rumor or hearsay told you about those differences?
- A. I don't know just what these differences were that were being rumored about.
- Q. From the rumors you heard, General, would you say that there was a division between the younger officers and older officers in the Kwantung army?
- A. There may have been differences of opinion, but I have never heard of this matter being discussed in the Kwantung army.
- Q. Well, General, I would like you to tell me, based upon the rumors that you heard at that time, what some of these differences were no matter where you heard them?
- A. I have never heard of what these differences were. I really don't know. I merely know that there was a difference of opinion. There must have been as a result of the collusion between elements in Tokyo and elements in the Kwantung Army.
- Q. What elements in Tokyo were in collusion with elements in the Kwantung army in Manchuria.
- A. I know nothing about this at all.
- Q. From the rumors you have heard about this matter, General, would you say these elements in Tokyo were military men, navy men, or civilians?
- A. I believe they were military men according to rumors.