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供 述 書

中華民國南京所在米國大使館附隨軍武官代理「  
アメリカ」合衆國陸軍參謀本部口附ダヴィド・デイ  
I・バレット大佐ハ左ノ如ク供述且陳述ス。

余ハ一九三七年（昭和十二年）七月中華民國北平  
所在米國大使館附隨軍武官補デアッタ。余ノ上官ハ  
陸軍、武官「ジョセフ・ダブリウ・スチルウエル」  
大將（當時大佐）デアッタ。一九三七年（昭和十二  
年）七月九日ノ朝「スチルウエル」大佐ハ北平ノ南西  
約十哩ノ所ニアル小サナ、城壁ノアル町テ中國人ニ  
ハ一般ニ蘆溝橋ト言ハレテキル宛平縣ヘ行クコトヲ  
余ニ命ジタ。ソノ町ノ近クニハ「マルコポーロ橋」  
トシテ一般ニ知ラレテキル橋ガアル。「スチルウエ  
ル」大佐ハ中華民國第二十九軍ト數日間ソノ附近テ  
演習中デアッタ日本軍トノ間ニ前日衝突ガ起ツタトイ  
フ報導ニ接シタノテ、余ニ對シ宛平ノ情勢ヨリ報告  
方ヲ命ジタ。

余ハ八時頃宛平ニ到着シタ所東門ハ閉鎖サレ防塞ガ  
シテアツタ。門ノ近クノ小サナ家が致軒破壊サレテ  
居タガ一見シタ所テハ町ノ外ニアル障地カラ打ツタ  
白砲彈ニ依ルモノラシカッタ。一、二ノ歩哨ガ城壁  
ノ上ニ見エタガ、市外ニハ中國兵モ一般中國人モ見

當ヲナカツタ。門ノ上ノ城壁上ニ居タ一人ノ歩哨ガ  
町ニハ入レナイト余ニ向ツテ叫ンダ

ソニテ余ハ城壁ノ東北端ニ沿ツテ殆ド市ノ眞北ニ當  
ル地點ニアル平漢線ノ所へ歩イテ行ツタ。其處テ鐵  
路ノ北側ニ日本軍ノ歩兵一個大隊ガ集結シテキルノ  
ヲ見タ。數人ノ歩哨ガ鐵路ノ土手ノ上ニキテ南方ニ  
アル宛平ノ町ヲ監視シテキタ。余ハ鐵路ノ土手ノ近  
クニ一、二ノ日本兵ノ死体ガ横タハツテキルノヲ見  
タ。

鐵路ノ土手ノ背後ニアル日本軍障地カラ余ハ次ニ城  
壁ノ西北端ヲ過ギテ、閉ツテハキタガ防塞ノ施シテ  
ナイ西門ヲ通ツテ宛平ノ中へ入ツテ行ツタ。數人ノ  
中國軍歩哨ガ市ノ眞西ノ「マルコポーロ橋」ノ上ト  
橋ノ兩端ノ近クノ地點ニ居タ。

市ノ中へ入ツテ余ハ縣公署ヲ訪レタ。其處テハ警官  
ガ一見シタ所城外カラ打ツタ白砲彈ニヨツテ生ジタ  
ラシイ損害ヲ余ニ示シタ。警官ハ縣長ガ北平テ市長  
ト協議中デアアル旨余ニ告ゲタ。警官ハ七月七、八日  
夜來ノ出來事ヲ余ニ説明シタ。此説明ハ余ガ讀ンダ  
コトノアル秦德純大將及王冷齋氏提出ノ供給書中ノ  
説明ト實質的ニ同一デアツタ。次テ余ハ北平ニ歸ツ  
タ。

余ガ市ト隣接地域ヲ臨檢中城壁上ノ中國歩哨ト鐵

路ノ土手蔭ノ日本軍トノ間ニ僅カナ散發的射撃ガ交換サレタ。

余ハ北平ニ歸ルト余ノ觀察シタコトヲ上記ノ通り具體的ニ「ステルウェル」大佐ニ報告シ、余ノ判定シ得ル範圍デハ衝突ハ小規模デアツテ一九三一年（昭和六年）九月十八日以來起ツタ多クノ衝突程ニ重大デハナイコトヲ述ベタ。尙余ハ支那側ニ攻勢的態度ノ兆候ヲ全然看取シナカツタノデ、日本側ノ眞實ニ希望スルナラバ事件ハ容易ニ解決出來ルト思フ旨ヲ述ベタ。

七月九日カラ廿五日ノ間、少クトモ五回余ハ宛平ヲ訪ネタ。ソシテ此ノ内少トモ二回ハ陸軍武官「ステルウェル」大佐ト同道シタ。此ノ訪問中余ハ宛平附近テ日支兩軍間ニ於ル小規模ナ戰鬥ノ證據ヲ見タシ又散發ノ射撃ノ音ハ聽イタガ實際ニ戰鬥ヲ見タコトハ一回モナカツタ。日本ガ希望スルナラバ事件ハ何時テモ解決サレタトイフコトハ此期間ヲ通ジテ余ノ確乎タル信念デアツタ。本件狀勢ニ門スル「ステルウェル」大佐ト余トノ數多クノ協議ニ於テ吾々ハ此ノ件ノ解決ガ假ニ北支ニ於ケル日本ノ軍事勢力ノ一層ノ擴大ヲ含シダトシテモ、支那側ガ本事件解決ヲ拒否スルトイフ徵候ハ何等見ラレナイトイフ點ニ付意見ガ一致シタ。

七月十二日頃「スチルウエル大佐ト余ハ事件ガ解決サレ、或ハ正ニ解決サレルコトニナツテ居テ、日本軍ハ宛平附近カラ撤退スル苦ダトイフ通知ニ接シタ。吾々ハ七月十四日ノ朝宛平ヲ訪レテ市ノ東方約一哩ノ地點ノ道路上ニ日本軍ノ集結シテセルノヲ見タ、此ノ軍ノ一部ハ北平ニ向ツテ道路上ヲ東へ實際ニ移動シテキタ。

吾々ハ宛平ヲ訪レテ全ク平靜ナコトヲ知ツタ。併シ乍ラ北平へノ歸途同方面へノ日本軍ノ撤退ハ一見シタ所停止シテキルノヲ認メタ。ソシテ一部ノ軍ハ再び西方へ移動シテキルノヲ見タ。七月七、八日夜來ノ情勢ガ惡化シタコトヲ示ス様ナ事ハ蘆溝橋内及其ノ周邊テハ何モ見聞シナカッタノデ、此ノ一見シタ所急激ナ進展ヲ説明スルノニ困却シタ。

七月二十八日ノ朝余ハ北平市南方地區ヲ日本軍飛行機ガ攻撃シテキルノヲ目撃シタ。余ハ北地區ハ北平ノ南約十哩ニアル南宛飛行場デアルト思ツタ。當日後程ニ南宛飛行場へノ城門ノ一ツニ通ズル道路ニ沿フテ中國軍歩兵ガバラバラニナツテ北平ニ向ツテ居ルノヲ見タ。是等ノ部隊ハ戰鬥ニ參加シタ様ニハ見受ケラレナカッタガ彼等ノ通常ノ軍隊組織ヲ亂ス様ナ何カノ事態ガ起ツタノデアラウ。

七月三十一日頃「スチルウエル」大佐ト余ハ南宛

飛行場へノ道路ガ通ル市ノ城門ノ外ニ出タ。門ノ南  
 約一哩ノ所ニ道路上ニ數百ノ人馬ノ死体ト多量ノ資  
 材ヲ見受ケタ。之ハ中國軍部隊ガ密集隊形ノ儘攻撃  
 セラレタコトヲ示シタ。道路ノ兩側ノ溝渠ノ中ヤ近  
 ク、野原ニハ未ダ生キテセル多量ノ負傷者ガ居タ。  
 夏ノ暑熱ノ爲腐敗シタ、數百ノ死體ハ日本軍ガ攻撃  
 シタ時中國軍ガ乗取ツテキタ貨物自動車ノ中ニ尙詰  
 込マレテアツタ。中國軍ハ不意ヲ襲ハレテ展開スル  
 暇ガナカツタコトハ明白デアツタ。死体ノ認識章ハ  
 部隊ガ第二九軍第三七班ノ特別旅団デアルコトヲ示  
 シテキタ。

七月廿八日ノ日本軍ノ北平攻撃ハ南カラ行ハレタ  
 コト、又此ノ中國軍ハ攻撃ヲ受ケタ時北方ニ移動シ  
 シテホタコト等ニ鑑ミ、中國軍ハ何等攻勢的意圖ヲ  
 持タズ單ニ北平城内ニ撤退ヲ求メテ居タノダト余ハ  
 信ズル。

余ハ一九三一年（昭和六年）十月ヨリ一九三四年  
 （昭和九年）十月迄米國十五歩兵聯隊ト共ニ中華民  
 國天津ニ駐屯シテ居タ。其ノ間余ハ同聯隊ノ情報將  
 校補ト情報將校ヲ命ゼラレタ。一九三六年（昭和十  
 一年七月）再ビ在北平米國大使官附隨軍武官補トシテ  
 中國へ歸任シテ再來引續キ中華民國ニ在勤シタ。天  
 津ニ駐在シタ三年間及ビ日本軍ノ宛平攻撃前北平ニ

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在勤シタ年間ニ於ケル任務ノ性質上、余ハ此ノ期間中中華民國ニ於ケル日本軍ノ行動ヲ觀察スルノニ絶好ナ機會ヲ得タ。

前記期間中中國軍ニ對スル日本軍ノ行動ハ傲慢テ攻勢的デアリ且多クノ場合其ノ行動ハ中華民國ノ主權ニ對スル侮辱ト直接ノ冒瀆デアツタト思フ。

一九三一年（昭和六年）十月末或ハ十一月ノ初メニ於テ少クトモ一週間ノ間中國巡警ト天津陸屯日本軍トノ間ニ衝突ガ起キタ。日本側ハ是等ノ衝突ガ天津日本租界隣接地區ニ屯スル中國警察ノ行動ニ依リ挑發サレタト主張シタ。余ハ事件ノ結果日本軍ノ採ツタ手段ヲ親シク觀察シタガ余ノ意見デハ其手段タルヤ事件ノ重大性ガ正當ト認メルモノヨリモ遙ニ苛酷ニシテ且大規模ナモノデアツタ。事件ニ起因スル緊迫期間中、或時日本軍ハ支那市街トシテ知ラレテキル天津ノ大キナ重要地域ヲ攻撃シ得ル位置ニ展開シテ居タ。展開シタ日本軍司令官ハ或日ノ午后四時余ニ日本軍ガ該地域ニ對シツル日ノ午后六時三十分ニ攻撃ヲ開始スル旨通告シテキタ。然シ攻撃ハ行ハレナカツタ。何故カ余ハ其ノ理由ヲ知ラナイ。

一九三二年（昭和七年）一月ノ最初ノ數日間日本軍ハ山海關ヲ攻撃占領シタ。日本軍ハ當時山海關駐屯ノ中國軍側ガ攻勢的行動ヲ採ツタカラ攻撃ヲ加ヘ

1946-

タト主張シタ。余ハ日本軍ガ山海關ヲ占領シタ二、三日後ニ同市ヲ訪レテ情況ヲ綿密ニ問ホシタ。

余ハ中國軍ガ事件ヲ挑發シタトイフ證據ナル證據ヲ發見出來ナカツタ。此處テモ日本軍ノ探ツタ手段ハソノ原因如何ニ想ラズ、事件ソノモノノ重要性ニ比シテ全然釣合ガトレテ居ナイニ思ハレタ。

余ノ考テハ一九三七年（昭和十二年）七月初週宛平附近ニ於テ日本軍ガ行ツタ夜間演習ナル行動ハ故意スル挑發的ナモノデアツタ。日本側ハ當時日文間ニ存在シタ緊迫シタ關係ト新ル演習中ニ起リ得ル誤解及摩擦ノ可能性ヲ知ラナイ筈ハナカツタ。滿洲カラ萬里長城ノ南方地域ヘノ日本軍大部隊ノ移動ガ日本軍ノ宛平攻撃後廿四時間ニ開始サレタトイフ事實ハ、宛平攻撃ガ日本ノ中華民國ニ對スル宣戰ヲ布告セザル戰爭ノ第二段階ニ對スル用意周到ニ準備シタ言譯デアツタコトヲ暗示シテキル。每一段階ハ一九三一年（昭和六年）九月十七日、十八日ノ夜奉天ニ於テ開始サレタノデアツタ。

署名 陸軍大佐

デビッド、デト・バレット

右ノ者一九四六年（昭和廿一年）六月 日本  
官ノ面前ニテ署名シ宣誓セリ。

陸軍大佐 トマス・エツチ・モロ



1946

A F F I D A V I T

COLONEL DAVID D. BARRETT, General Staff Corps, U. S. Army, Acting Military Attache, Embassy of the United States of America, Nanking, China, deposes and states as follows:

I was Assistant Military Attache of the Embassy of the United States of America, Peiping, China, in July 1937. My commanding officer, the Military Attache, was General (then Colonel) Joseph W. Stilwell. On the morning of 9 July 1937, Colonel Stilwell directed me to proceed to Wanpingsien, generally referred to by the Chinese as Lukouchiao, a small walled city about ten miles southwest of Peiping near which is located the bridge commonly known as the "Marco Polo Bridge." Colonel Stilwell directed me to investigate and report on the situation at Wanping, as he had been informed that a clash had taken place there the day before between forces of the Chinese 29th Army and Japanese troops who had been conducting maneuvers in the vicinity for several days.

I arrived at Wanping about 0800, and found the east gate shut and barricaded. Some small houses near the gate had been demolished, apparently by mortar fire from positions outside the town. One or two sentries were visible on the city wall, but there were no Chinese soldiers or civilians to be seen outside the city. A sentry posted on the wall above the gate shouted to me that I could not enter the city.

I then walked around the northeast corner of the city wall to the Peking-Hankow railway at a point approximately due north of the city. There I found a battalion of Japanese infantry assembled along the north side of the railway. A few sentries were posted along the top of the railway embankment observing the city of Wanping to the south. I observed one or two dead Japanese soldiers lying near the railway embankment.

From the Japanese position behind the railway embankment I then proceeded past the northwest corner of the city wall

and into Wanping through the west gate which was shut, but not barricaded. Some Chinese sentries were posted on the Marco Polo Bridge just west of the city and at points near the ends of the bridge.

Inside the city, I visited the office of the Hsien Magistrate where police officials showed me damage apparently caused by mortar fire from outside the walls. The police officials informed me that the Hsien Magistrate was in Peiping consulting with the mayor. The officials gave me an account of what had happened since the night of July 7-8. This account was substantially the same as that contained in the affidavits presented by General Chin Te-chun and Mr. Wang Len-chai, which I have read. I then returned to Peiping.

During the time I was visiting the city and adjacent areas, there were only a few scattered shots exchanged between Chinese sentries on the wall and Japanese troops behind the railway embankment.

On my return to Peiping, I reported to Colonel Stilwell what I had observed substantially as noted above, and stated that as far as I could determine the clash had been on a very small scale and was not nearly so serious as many other clashes which had occurred since September 18, 1931. I further stated that I believed the incident could easily be settled if the Japanese really so desired, as I had observed absolutely no signs of any aggressive attitude on the part of the Chinese.

On at least five different occasions between 9 July and 25 July, I visited Wanping, and on at least two of these occasions I accompanied the Military Attache, Colonel Stilwell. During these visits, I observed evidences of fighting on a small scale near Wanping between Chinese and Japanese forces, but at no time did I actually see any such fighting although occasionally I heard a few shots fired. It was my firm conviction during this period that the incident could have been settled at any time the Japanese so desired. In many discussions of the situation

between Colonel Stilwell and myself, we agreed that we could see no indications whatsoever that the Chinese would refuse a settlement of the incident, even if it involved further extension of Japanese military authority in North China.

On or about 12 July, Colonel Stilwell and I were informed that a settlement of the incident had been or was just about to be affected and Japanese forces were to be withdrawn from near Wanping. We visited Wanping on the morning of 14 July, and observed Japanese forces assembling on the road at a point about a mile east of the city. Some of these troops were actually moving east on the road toward Peiping. We visited Wanping and found all quiet there. On our way back to Peiping, however, we observed that the withdrawal of Japanese forces toward the city had apparently been halted and we saw some troops moving west again. We were at a loss to explain this apparently sudden development as we had seen or heard nothing in or near Lukouchiao which would indicate any aggravation of the situation which had prevailed since the night of 7-8 July.

On the morning of 28 July, I observed Japanese planes attacking an area to the south of the city of Peiping. I estimated this area to be the Nanyuan Airfield, about ten miles south of the city. Later in the day, I observed Chinese infantry straggling in to the city along the street which runs to one of the gates leading to the Nanyuan Airfield. These troops did not appear to have been engaged in combat, but something had evidently occurred which had disrupted their normal military organization.

On or about 31 July, Colonel Stilwell and I went outside the gate of the city through which the road runs to Nanyuan Airfield. About a mile south of the gate, we found hundreds of dead bodies of men and horses and quantities of materiel lying on the road, indicating that a Chinese unit had been attacked while in close column. Numerous wounded, still alive, were in the ditches on both sides of the road and in the nearby fields.

Hundreds of corpses, rotting in the summer heat, were still jammed in the trucks in which Chinese troops had been riding when the Japanese attacked. It was evident that the Chinese unit had been taken by surprise and had had no time to deploy. Identification badges on dead bodies indicated that the unit was the Special Brigade of the 37th Division, 29th Army.

As the Japanese attack on Peiping on 28 July came from the south and this Chinese unit was moving north when attacked, I believe the Chinese troops had no aggressive intentions whatsoever and were seeking merely to withdraw within the gates of Peiping.

I was stationed in Tientsin, China, with the 15th U. S. Infantry, from October 1931 to October 1934, during which period I was assigned as Assistant Intelligence Officer and Intelligence Officer of the regiment. I returned to China again in July 1936 as Assistant Military Attache of the Embassy of the United States of America in Peiping, and have served in China ever since. The nature of my duties during the three years I was stationed in Tientsin, and during the year I served in Peiping prior to the Japanese attack on Wanping, afforded me an unusually fine opportunity to observe the conduct of Japanese troops in China during this period.

I consider that the conduct of the Japanese troops towards the Chinese during the period referred to was arrogant and offensive, and that their actions in many instances constituted an insult to and direct violation of the sovereign rights of the Chinese nation.

During a period of at least seven days, either late in October or early in November of 1931, clashes occurred in Tientsin between Chinese police and Japanese forces stationed in the city. The Japanese alleged that the clashes were provoked by the actions of Chinese police stationed in an area adjacent to the Japanese concession in Tientsin. I personally observed the measures taken by the Japanese as a result of the incident and, in my opinion, they were far more severe and on a much larger

scale than the importance of the incident justified. At one time during the period of tension resulting from the incident, Japanese military forces were deployed in a position from which they could have attacked the large and important area of Tientsin known as the Chinese City. The Japanese officer in command of the force deployed informed me at 1600 one afternoon that Japanese forces would begin an attack on the area in question at 1830. The attack never took place. Why, I do not know.

During the first few days of January 1932, Japanese forces attacked and occupied the city of Shanhaikuan. The Japanese alleged they had attacked because of aggressive actions on the part of Chinese forces stationed in Shanhaikuan at the time. I visited Shanhaikuan two or three days after the Japanese occupied the city and made a careful investigation of the situation. I was unable to find any definite proof that Chinese forces had provoked the incident. Here again the measures taken by the Japanese appeared to me out of all proportion to the importance of the incident itself, regardless of the causes thereof.

In my opinion, the action of the Japanese in conducting night maneuvers near Wanping during the first week of July 1937 was deliberately provocative. The Japanese could not but have been aware of the strained relations then existing between Japan and China, and of the chances for misunderstanding and friction which might arise during such maneuvers. The fact that movements of large Japanese forces from Manchuria to areas south of the Great Wall began within a period of twenty-four hours after the Japanese attack at Wanping inevitably suggests that the Wanping incident was the carefully prepared excuse for the second stage of Japan's undeclared war on China, the first stage having been begun at Mukden on the night 17-18 September 1931.

Subscribed and sworn to before  
me this 18<sup>th</sup> day of June, 1946.

Thos H Morrow  
COLONEL THOS. H. MORROW

David D. Barrett  
COLONEL DAVID D. BARRETT

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No.

1946

Date

18 June, 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Affidavit of Col. D. D. Barnett, re:

Japanese troop movements and conduct at Marco Polo Bridge ~~after~~.

Date: July 1937 Original (x) Copy ( ) Language:

English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Aggression in China.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Sworn Affidavit of Col. David D. Barnett, U.S. Army, who was asst Military Attache at PEIPING in July 1937. <sup>eyewitness</sup> Includes description of situation immediately after the Marco

Analyst:

A. Wiers  
WW

Doc. No.

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Palo Bridge Incident, and other  
eyewitness accounts of subsequent  
Chinese and Japanese troop movements.

End

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Sworn affidavit of Col. David D. BARRETT, U. S. Army, who was Assistant Military Attache at Peiping in July 1937. Includes eyewitness description of situation immediately after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and other eyewitness accounts subsequent Chinese and Japanese troop movements.

Analyst: Lt. Wilds

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