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Vol. 38

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

January 17, 1946

Washington, D. C.

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

KIMMEL, Rear Admiral Husband F. (resumed)

7071

E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

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PAGE REFERENCE TO:

Admiral Kimmel's statement that he took every
possible step for the security of Pearl Harbor
(Lines 18-25)

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Munson Report

7245-7299

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

PEARL HARBOR REPORT
I
Vol. 38

(5)

S. Con. Res. 27

Thursday, January 17, 1946.

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

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2 The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in
3 order. Does counsel have anything at this time for the record
4 before resuming the examination?

5 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, we have for introduction
6 into the record a large number of documents which we think
7 essential in order to completely cover the field, which have
8 been prepared; copies have been, I think, distributed or are
9 available for distribution by Mr. Hannaford of my staff and
10 as he will be leaving Washington on Saturday I would like to
11 have about an hour of the committee's time, either today or
12 tomorrow, to enable him to offer those documents in evidence
13 and if the Chairman will give the matter attention and let
14 me know some time during the day when that may be done, he is
15 prepared to go ahead with it at that time. It is a matter
16 that does not have to be decided now but some time during the
17 day. Most of these exhibits, if not all of them, are answers
18 to requests that have been made by different members of the
19 committee of us.

20 The Vice Chairman: Well, do the members of the commit-
21 tee have any views on this point? If we will have to take an
22 hour to do this, it seems to me we might just as well decide
23 now when to take it.

24 Senator Ferguson: I understand that this is to be done
25 in open hearing and that he will offer them while we are here

1 in session.

2 Mr. Richardson: Well, I noticed the other day that a
3 group of exhibits were offered and extended on the record by
4 the reporter without the committee being in actual personal
5 session. I do not know whether that would be permissible
6 practice with these. It is purely a formal introduction into
7 the record of these exhibits.

8 The Vice Chairman: Well, that occurred late one after-
9 noon.

10 Mr. Richardson: That is right.

11 The Vice Chairman: We had run over the usual meeting
12 time already and then it developed that certain exhibits were
13 ready to be presented to the committee and the committee, as
14 I recall, by unanimous consent agreed that counsel might sub-
15 mit those for the record, but personally I would think it would
16 be better if these could be presented when the committee is
17 in session so that we may have a description of them and know
18 what they are.

19 Mr. Richardson: Well, if, for instance, just by way of
20 suggestion, the committee could conclude to pause, for in-
21 stance, at 3:30 this afternoon Mr. Hannaford would be ready
22 to complete the presentation of those exhibits at the close
23 of this afternoon's hearing.

24 The Vice Chairman: Is there objection to that suggestion
25 on the part of counsel?

(No response.)

The Vice Chairman: The chair hears none. It will be so ordered.

Mr. Richardson: All right.

The Vice Chairman: Does counsel have anything further before resuming the examination?

Mr. Richardson: None, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything you want to present before counsel resumes his examination?

Admiral Kimmel: No.

The Vice Chairman: Counsel will now proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

(resumed)

- - -

Mr. Richardson: Admiral, referring to your compilation on retirement matters, which is noted in the record as exhibit 121, I note in the first paragraph the statement that a message came to you that, "Admiral Jacobs had been directed by the Acting Secretary of the Navy to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement."

I note then in the fourth paragraph of the letter:

"Subsequently I learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Official directing him to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement was not the Acting Secretary, but the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox."

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 What do you desire the record to show as to the signi-
3 ficance of the reference to the Acting Secretary and the re-
4 ference to the Secretary?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Technically the term "Acting Secretary"
6 as referring to Mr. Knox was perhaps correct. I was curious
7 to know the individual who had ordered Admiral Jacobs to
8 send this message to Admiral Greenslade for me and I inquired
9 of him who it was and he told me Mr. Knox. I wanted to know
10 who the individual was.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kimmell

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: Is there not a common understanding
3 dealing with departments of the nature of the Navy Depart-
4 ment, that the Acting Secretary, so-called, is not usually
5 the Secretary himself?

6 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, that is correct.

7 Mr. Richardson: And that was the reason for your
8 further inquiry?

9 Admiral Kimmel: When I made the inquiry, I did not
10 know who had given the order. I wanted to know. I found
11 that Mr. Knox had given it.

12 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, referring to your state-
13 ment which you read the other day, and referring to page
14 35, I want to ask you a question or two.

15 I asked you yesterday whether you had not concluded,
16 as the Commander of the Pacific Fleet to subordinate the
17 question of Hawaiian defense to the proposition of training.

18 I find in your statement this paragraph:

19 "I was not expected to discontinue training for all-
20 out security measures, concentrated on the defense of
21 the Hawaiian Islands, every time an alarming dispatch was
22 received from Washington predicting Japanese aggression in
23 Far East. Indeed, had I done so, the training program
24 would have been curtailed so drastically that the Fleet
25 could not have been prepared for war."

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Now turning to page 36, I find this paragraph:

"In 1941 we of the Pacific Fleet had a plethora of premonitions, of generalized warnings and forebodings that Japan might embark on aggressive action in the Far East at any one of the variously predicted dates. After receipt of such warnings, we were expected to continue with renewed intensity and zeal our own training program and preparations for war, rather than to go on an all-out local alert against attack."

Now, Admiral, you are not complaining, are you, because you received from Washington, what you call a "plethora of premonitions, generalized warnings and forebodings"?

Admiral Kimmel: I was merely stating facts.

Mr. Richardson: Well, the transmission to you as Commander of the Fleet of just such premonitions, warnings and forebodings as were sent you were precisely what should have been sent you from Washington for your information?

Admiral Kimmel: I was glad to have all of these warnings and forebodings, but the continued submission of these did not mean to me at any time that I was to go out on all-out security measures and abandon the training program.

What I was trying to emphasize was that in my correspondence with the Navy Department, and in particular in my letter of May 26th, I set forth my principal problem, and

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 my principal problem was to determine when to stop the
3 training program and to go to all-out security measures,
4 and that was what I wanted more than anything else, and
5 in a very definite form.

6 Mr. Richardson: And with the information that you had
7 at your disposal in Hawaii, preceding the attack and the
8 inferences which you drew from it, there came your decision
9 to proceed with the training program rather than with an
10 all-out alert for defense?

11 Admiral Kimmel: No, not entirely. I took the steps
12 which I have outlined in great detail, which I thought it
13 was possible and advisable to take, which I thought the
14 situation demanded.

15 Mr. Richardson: Precisely, but the steps which you
16 did take, and which you thought the situation demanded
17 put you on a training basis, rather than on an all-out
18 alert defense basis, did they not?

19 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir. The steps that I took were
20 all that I considered the situation justified at the time,
21 and the Fleet was on the alert at that time.

22 Mr. Richardson: Now, a word, Admiral, with reference to
23 the use of torpedoes, aerial torpedoes by the Japanese in
24 the attack.

25 You have referred to the letters of February and June

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 as informative to you as to the probability of such an
3 attack on your ships in Pearl Harbor with the depth of
4 water there present.

5 Now, all the Japanese did to have the aerial torpedo
6 to make the attack was to take some old Whitehead torpedoes
7 built back in 1931, and put some fins on them, so located
8 on the torpedo that when it struck the water, the fins
9 would bring it up to the surface and avoid the question
10 of shallow water, wouldn't it?

11 Admiral Kimmel: That was a device which the Japanese
12 used. It was a device which all the brains of our own Navy
13 Department, who had been seeking such a solution, had been
14 unable to arrive at. Any solution of any problem appears
15 simple when you get the answer, and the simpler the better
16 it is.

17 Mr. Richardson: The fins were made of wood, weren't
18 they?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I do not know. I think so. I never
20 saw one of them.

21 Mr. Richardson: And you feel that the use of wood
22 fins on a torpedo in the water, with those fins so slanted
23 as to bring the torpedo up to the surface as soon as possible
24 was a new development in the art of warfare comparable to
25 the use of radar?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, no, I do not go that far, but
3 this was a device which the Japanese discovered, and which
4 our own people had been unable to discover. I think it
5 cannot be compared in importance with the discovery of
6 radar.

7 Mr. Richardson: Admiral, on October 14, 1941, you
8 issued to your fleet what is known and referred to as
9 Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, Revised?

10 Admiral Kimmel: I did. That was not the first time
11 that was issued. I think that has been stressed here be-
12 fore.

13 Mr. Richardson: I understand that, but there was one
14 issued on October 14?

15 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

16 Mr. Richardson: And that is included in the compila-
17 tion known as Exhibit 44?

18 Admiral Kimmel: I presume so. I do not know what is
19 in Exhibit 44.

20 Mr. Richardson: Let me read you the second paragraph
21 of that letter.

22 "The security of the Fleet operating and based in
23 the Hawaiian area is predicated at present on two assumptions:

24 "(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke
25 war under present existing conditions, by attack on

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

"(1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft;

"(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel;

"(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor."

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Now:

"(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

"(1) a separate attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,

"(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in
operating area,

"(3) a combination of these two."

Now in sending that letter to your Fleet on October 14,
you sent that to them as indicating to them what your under-
standing was as to the basis for the security of the Fleet
in Pearl Harbor and Hawaiian waters at that time?

Admiral Kimmel: I think you will find substantially
the same wording in every issue of this 2CL41, the security
order.

Mr. Richardson: And that continued appearance of that
information in all of those confidential letters either before
or after the one of October 14 was because there was present
in your mind at that time that the matters mentioned in that
paragraph threatened the security of the Fleet?

Admiral Kimmel: We were covering, as I have stated several
times, all the possibilities that we could foresee, and we
were laying down a procedure, insofar as we could see, to
meet each one of these conditions that arose. When you
make plans you make plans to foresee everything possible,
not only the probable things.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Admiral, would a copy of these confidential Fleet letters to which we have been referring come to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations in due course?

Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes, he is furnished with copies of all these letters. You will note at the end of the letter the distribution is 5CM-41, and a great many letters and indications there, and if necessary, you can find from the then existing mailing list whether this was received in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I can tell you now that there is not the slightest doubt but that he did receive it.

Mr. Richardson: You were also transmitting these confidential Fleet letters to the Army in Hawaii?

Admiral Kimmel: I am quite sure they were furnished copies of this. I cannot swear to that now, but I am as certain as I can be of anything without investigating it.

Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, calling your attention to your testimony in the Roberts hearing, on page 366, I want to read to you a short excerpt from that. Commencing with question 376.

Mr. Matsen: That is the Navy Court.

Mr. Richardson: Let me correct that. The record that I am reading from is Admiral Kimmel's testimony before the Naval Court, commencing with Question 376:

"Question: Did you at any time as Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, question the advisability of maintaining the Pacific Fleet

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

in Pearl Harbor?

"Answer: When I took command of the Fleet I knew of the disagreement between Admiral Richardson, my predecessor, and the authorities in Washington on the advisability of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. He told me himself. I agreed with Admiral Richardson in general, but when I took command of the Fleet we had been for sometime without much gunnery, due to the fact that no adequate training target facilities were present in the Hawaiian area, and when I took command we had just about succeeded in completing the transfer of that material from the Coast. I did not make any protest, any formal protest against maintaining the Fleet at Pearl Harbor at any time. I did, in conversation with the Chief of Naval Operations in June of 1941, point out to him the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor as a Fleet base. The various elements that entered into it are well-known. I repeated substantially the same thing to the President when I had an interview with him, and the substantial point of the conversation was that so far as an air attack on Pearl Harbor was concerned, the only real answer to an air attack was not to have the Fleet in port if and when the air attack came, that it took from two to four hours to sortie, and once an air attack started the attack would be completed before we could change in any degree the disposition of the

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Fleet. I pointed out the chances of blocking the entrance,
3 the single entrance that we had, and the danger from the oil
4 storage as it was at that time, and I do not recall anything
5 other than that at the present time, although there probably
6 was. These were factors which were well-known to the President
7 and Chief of Naval Operations prior to any statement by me.

8 "I accepted the conditions at Pearl Harbor. That was
9 one of the reasons why repeatedly in correspondence I requested
10 to be kept informed of developments."

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

12 Mr. Richardson: "Question: In other words, does the
13 Court understand that you concurred with your predecessor
14 in that the Fleet should not be kept at Pearl Harbor?"

15 "Answer: In general, yes.

16 "Question: And you so expressed your opinion in con-
17 versations with the President and Chief of Naval Operations?"

18 "Answer: I did not definitely recommend that the
19 Fleet be withdrawn at the time of my conversation, because
20 I wanted to get some training in. I accepted the situation
21 but pointed out the dangers that existed so long as the
22 Fleet was in Pearl Harbor.

23 "Question: Did you at any time make any recommendations
24 as to the withdrawal of the battleships and carriers or
25 battleships alone from Pearl Harbor?"

Witness Kimmell

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 "Answer: Not that I recall.

3 I just wanted to ask you, Admiral, whether today you
4 regard that as an accurate statement of the situation as thus
5 discussed and reported?

6 Admiral Kimmel: I think so.

7 Mr. Richardson: Admiral, I want to call your attention
8 to Exhibit 37, page 1, a dispatch from OPN to "All Naval
9 Districts". You are familiar with that?

10 Admiral Kimmel: I am.

11 Mr. Richardson: Let me read it:

12 "PERSONNEL OF YOUR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SHOULD
13 BE ADVISED THAT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT FROM PAST EXPERIENCE
14 SHOWS THE AXIS POWERS OFTEN BEGIN ACTIVITIES IN A PARTICULAR
15 FIELD ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS OR ON NATIONAL HOLIDAYS OF
16 THE COUNTRY CONCERNED, THEY SHOULD TAKE STEPS ON SUCH DAYS
17 TO SEE THAT PROPER WATCHES AND PRECAUTIONS ARE IN EFFECT."

18 Do you agree with the statement thus made, that
19 Saturdays and Sundays and holidays were days of more probable
20 attack than other days of the week by Axis powers?

21 Admiral Kimmel: I want to say first that I never saw
22 this dispatch until after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In
23 fact, I never saw it until I came to Washington. The
24 dispatch is addressed to the Commandant of the Naval Districts.
25 It was never sent to me. I have no recollection of ever having

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 been warned by any agency that Saturdays and Sundays were
3 a time of particular danger for a surprise attack.

4 However, I was familiar with, in general, with the
5 activities of the Axis powers; but I didn't then consider
6 that Saturday and Sunday were particularly a time when the
7 Axis would choose for such a surprise attack, and I am not
8 convinced even today that such a time was any more than a
9 coincidence.

10 Mr. Richardson: Was it discussed at any time between
11 you and the members of your staff?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Not to my recollection. I have no
13 recollection of ever having discussed that with members of
14 my staff, or anybody else.

15 Mr. Richardson: Let me call your attention to Exhibit 16,
16 which purports to be a memorandum for the President, dated
17 November 5, 1941, from Stark and Marshall, which memorandum
18 came to you by letter on November 14, 1941, as shown in the
19 record as Exhibit 106. You are generally familiar with what
20 I am talking about?

21 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

22 Mr. Richardson: Let me read an excerpt from page 2:

23 "At the present time the United States Fleet in the
24 Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot under-
25 take an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific.

AL-7

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened
3 by withdrawing all naval vessels ***"

4 There is a notation at the bottom of the page that there
5 was inserted after the word "all" the word "practically", so
6 that it should read:

7 "*** practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic
8 except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited
9 offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant
10 tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now
11 considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the
12 Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the
13 United Kingdom to lose the battle of the Atlantic in the
14 near future.

15 "The only existing plans ***"

16 Here there is a notation at the foot of the page "two
17 preceding words struck out, and handwritten word 'current'
18 substituted", so that it would read:

19 "The current plans for war against Japan in the Far
20 East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the
21 British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and
22 the British and Dutch East Indies."

23 You received that communication?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I did.

25 Mr. Richardson: You agree with the statement of fact

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 therein contained?

3 Admiral Kimmel: With the statement of fact? I don't
4 understand you, sir.

5 Mr. Richardson: I will put it differently. Have you
6 any comment to make upon that language as to whether you
7 agree with it or not? Let me carry it through --

8 Admiral Kimmel: I don't quite understand the question.

9 Mr. Richardson: The statement is made that the U.S.
10 Fleet is inferior to the Japanese Fleet. Do you agree with
11 that?

12 Admiral Kimmel: That was correct.

13 Mr. Richardson: And that the U.S. Fleet cannot undertake
14 an unlimited strategic offensive in the Pacific. Do you
15 agree with that statement?

16 Admiral Kimmel: That was correct.

17 Mr. Richardson: The statement is made that to enable
18 you to do so you would have to withdraw strength from the
19 Atlantic.

20 Admiral Kimmel: That was correct.

21 Mr. Richardson: That such an offensive by the Pacific
22 Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage. Do you
23 agree with that?

24 Admiral Kimmel: That was correct.

25 Mr. Richardson: That the result of such withdrawal might

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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well cause the United Kingdom to meet with disaster. Do you agree with that?

Admiral Kimmel: That was a matter of opinion. I think it was perhaps accurate.

Mr. Richardson: And that the current plans for war against Japan were to conduct a defensive war in cooperation with the British and Dutch for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies.

Admiral Kimmel: That was correct insofar as I knew it, so far as any facts were available to me.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Now, we discussed very briefly, yesterday, Admiral, the question of the report to you by Captain Layton of your staff, with respect to the change in Japanese call signs on November 1st.

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Do you recall Captain Layton stating to you in connection with the communication Intelligence Summary of December 1, 1941, that the change in the Japanese call signs "indicated a progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale"?

Admiral Kimmel: I don't recall that exact language, but I have no doubt that language was used in the Summary which was submitted to me.

Mr. Richardson: And do you recall that at the time he submitted it to you with his communication Intelligence Summary that you underlined the sentence I have quoted in red pencil?

Admiral Kimmel: I can't recall whether I underlined that myself, or whether Captain Layton underlined it. It was a phrase that would and should have been called to my attention, and I have no doubt it was.

Mr. Richardson: And it was a practice when particular words were called to your attention for you to underline them?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Admiral Kimmel: A practice for me to underline then?

Mr. Richardson: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: If something struck my mind as being of particular importance, I might underline it. I think it is equally possible that Captain Layton himself underlined it. I don't quite get the significance or importance of whether I underlined it or whether Captain Layton underlined it.

Mr. Richardson: Well, there wouldn't be, Admiral, any particular distinction if the underlining was done when you two were conferring about it. What I am more interested in is what the significance was of underlining it.

Admiral Kimmel: Well, I would say that the significance of underlining it was that that was probably the most important part of that particular communication, and either I underlined it to get the significance when I was rereading it, or Captain Layton underlined it before he brought it to me, or he may have underlined it after I had completed my conversation. That I can't say now to save my life.

Mr. Richardson: Now, we discussed yesterday also briefly what I clumsily referred to as the lost carrier fleet.

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: One of your staff was Vice Admiral.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 McMorris?

3 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

4 Mr. Richardson: He was a captain then?

5 Admiral Kimmel: He was a captain in charge of the
6 War Plans Section of my staff. He had several very able
7 officers assisting him in that section.

8 Mr. Richardson: Have you read his testimony in the
9 Hewitt investigation?

10 Admiral Kimmel: I don't now recall whether I have
11 read his testimony in the Hewitt investigation or not. I have
12 read a great deal of his testimony.

13 Mr. Richardson: Well, I want to call your attention
14 to this language:

15 "Taking into consideration the general situation and
16 all other information at hand, we were extremely disturbed."

17 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct, yes.

18 Mr. Richardson: You would agree with that conclusion
19 on his part?

20 Admiral Kimmel: We were disturbed; certainly we were
21 disturbed, not only on November 27 and succeeding days, but
22 disturbed -- I was disturbed all the time I was in command
23 of the Pacific Fleet.

24 Mr. Richardson: Yes, but, Admiral, this discussion of
25 Admiral McMorris had reference to the particular report to

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 you by Layton with respect to the lost fleet around the
3 1st of December, did it not?

4 Admiral Kimmel: I am unable to state that unless I
5 read his testimony. If you say he was referring to that,
6 I presume he was.

7 Senator Lucas: Will counsel tell me what he is reading
8 from?

9 Admiral Kimmel: I have tried to the best of my
10 ability to set forth just what I knew, and just what signi-
11 ficance I attached to these traffic analysis reports.

12 I have tried to indicate that so far as I was con-
13 cerned there was no lost fleet. There were ships and types
14 of ships which we were unable to identify, and we had no
15 reason to suspect that there was a lost fleet containing
16 the six carriers any more than we had reason to say there
17 was a lost fleet containing, we will say, 75 percent, or
18 80 percent of Japanese naval forces.

19 Mr. Richardson: If the fleet that we speak of as a
20 lost fleet was still in home waters in Japan, or in the
21 China Sea, it would not be as important to you as though
22 that fleet was in the neighborhood of Hawaii, would it?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Certainly not.

24 Mr. Richardson: I read now from page 321 of the
25 Hewitt report, statement by Vice Admiral McMorris:

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 "Mr. Sonnett. Well, I take it, Admiral you recall
3 no specific discussion of the lack of information con-
4 cerning carrier divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese fleet
5 on or about December 1st, 1941, and prior to the attack?

6 "Vice Admiral McMorris: I do not so recall, but I
7 do recall that during this general period the information
8 as to the locations of Japanese fleet units was far from
9 as specific as desired. But I do not recall that lack of
10 information. Taking into consideration the general situa-
11 tion and all other information at hand, we were extremely
12 disturbed."

13 Admiral Kimmel: Extremely disturbed?

14 Mr. Richardson: Were you extremely disturbed at that
15 time about the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Yes. I wanted to know where the
17 Japanese carriers were.

18 Mr. Richardson: Were you extremely disturbed about it?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I won't say I was extremely
20 disturbed. Had I been extremely disturbed in it, I would
21 have -- might have deduced that they were headed for Hawaii.
22 Is that what you are trying to drive at? I was not dis-
23 turbed to that extent, and neither was Captain McMorris,
24 as shown by his testimony before numerous other boards.

25 I am unable to interpret Captain McMorris' testimony

1 Witness Kimmel .

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h6

2 as to exactly what he meant. I am quite sure that Captain
3 McMorris will be able to speak for himself, and I under-
4 stand he is on the list of witnesses to be called here.

5 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, let me read you fur-
6 ther from page 363.

7 Admiral Kimmel: Does that answer your question?

8 Mr. Richardson: I think so. Let me read this to
9 you further from page 363 of the Hewitt report, answers
10 given by Vice Admiral Smith, who was also on your staff.

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

12 Mr. Richardson: Referring now to the whereabouts of
13 the lost carrier fleet, as I put it:

14 "Mr. Sonnett: Does --"

15 I guess I will read the preceding question.

16 Senator Brewster: Give the page each time.

17 Mr. Richardson: I did. 363.

18 "Vice Admiral Smith: Now, I see nothing very alarming
19 in those dispatches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the
20 traffic will be very light, radio traffic, and on the next
21 day it is very heavy, right up to the 6th of December. The
22 fact that you don't hear from the second fleet, he doesn't
23 originate any message, doesn't necessarily mean he is on the
24 way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercises
25 maintain radio silence. We had a very large force, almost

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h7

2 half of the Pacific Fleet in May 1941 proceeded to the
3 Atlantic, and no traffic was heard from them for a period
4 of some six weeks, so the absence of radio traffic from
5 the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.

6 "Mr. Sonnett. Does it indicate that they are at sea,
7 Admiral?

8 "Vice Admiral Smith. It indicates the probability
9 that they are at sea."

10 Do you agree with that conclusion?

11 Admiral Kimmel: Not entirely. They may have been at
12 sea. They may have been in port. The only thing we knew
13 was that we were receiving a great deal of traffic. We
14 knew a great deal of traffic was being exchanged, and we
15 were unable to identify it.

16 Now, Admiral Smith's testimony and Admiral McMorris'
17 testimony was given without benefit of recent examination
18 of the daily summaries which were submitted to me, and
19 which they themselves saw at the time, and the best answer
20 to their impressions and their testimony here is that during
21 all of this period prior to December 7, never once did
22 any of them suggest to me that the carriers might be on
23 the way to Pearl Harbor.

24 Mr. Richardson: Did you know, Admiral, anything about
25 at the time, a conference of destroyer commanders conducted

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 by Admiral Bloch following the receipt of the warning mes-
3 sage of November 27?

4 Admiral Kimmel: I don't recall whether I knew of
5 any such conference prior to December 7th. It would have
6 been a natural thing for him to do, and when he spoke of
7 his destroyer commanders, he spoke of those destroyers
8 which were assigned to him for use in the defensive sea
9 area.

10 It would have been a perfectly proper thing for him
11 to do, particularly in view of my order to exercise ex-
12 treme diligence in the operating areas against submarines
13 and to bomb all suspected submarines contacted.

14 Mr. Richardson: If he, in his conference, warned
15 his destroyer commanders following the warning message of
16 November 27 that something might happen and they should
17 be on the alert that in your opinion was precisely what
18 he should have done?

19 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct, yes. I tried to
20 warn them myself, and I tried to warn them in positive
21 language.

22 Mr. Richardson: Do you recall, Admiral, that he
23 reported to you what he had told his destroyer commanders?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I don't recall that he told me any-
25 thing about it. There was no reason why he should. I

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h9

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2 would assume that he had done some such thing. I had a
3 right to assume so.

4 Mr. Richardson: Did you ever, following the receipt
5 of the warning message of November 27, ever advise the
6 Chief of Naval Operations that you had decided not to
7 operate any long-distance reconnaissance, but intended to
8 concentrate on your training program?

9 Admiral Kimmel: The Chief of Naval Operations was in-
10 formed in correspondence the means available for long-dis-
11 tance air reconnaissance in Pearl Harbor, that we were
12 unable to maintain a reconnaissance for more than a short
13 time, that in order to have a reconnaissance, we had to
14 know within narrow time limits, the time of attack, and
15 we had no means in Hawaii to make that reconnaissance over
16 indefinite periods.

17 Mr. Richardson: Now, you were in effect, through the
18 disposition of your task forces, maintaining in effect,
19 such a reconnaissance in the west and southwest sectors
20 of Oahu, were you not?

21 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, we were, and we did that incidental
22 -- not incidental, it was a factor which was considered
23 in this situation, and we took advantage of everything we
24 could to make a reconnaissance.

25 Mr. Richardson: But you did not detail a single patrol

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h10

plane to make any kind of reconnaissance in the entire north and northwest sector from Oahu either on December 6 or December 7?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Richardson: Admiral, would it have been practicable for you to have detailed either destroyers or submarines for the purpose of maintaining a distant patrol in any of those sectors?

Admiral Kimmel: The Naval Court of Inquiry went into that question very thoroughly. To maintain an effective reconnaissance by surface vessels or by submarines -- the use of surface vessels for such a purpose was, to my mind, highly inadvisable. We had no unimportant units out there which we could afford to sacrifice for that purpose. You will find in the record that we tried to get a bunch of vessels which might have been useful for such things. We were never able to get them.

The only thing we had were surface vessels which, in my mind, were far too valuable to put out on a wide arc and had they been put out there, they would have been destroyed in detail by the attacking force with never a chance. The submarines might have been used if I had had submarines available to do it with.

At the time of Pearl Harbor and immediately preceding

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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it, I had a patrol of submarines off Wake and Midway. We had not a sufficient number of submarines to maintain more than patrol. I mean a sufficient number available for operation at that time.

In about the early days of November, or it may have been the latter part of October, it was decided, with my approval and the approval of the Navy Department, to send a large number of submarines to the West Coast ports in order to have installed a distilling apparatus. We found that the time the submarine could stay at sea was dependent upon the amount of fresh water they had available, and by putting in an improved distilling plant, they were able to increase the time by something like 50 to 75 percent.

And they were balancing then the supply of water against the supply of fuel oil and other things which enabled them to remain at sea.

For that reason a large part of the submarines which were attached to the Pacific Fleet proper were in the West Coast ports at that time, and I recall specifically that Admiral Withers, who was examined before the Naval Court had told me he was having great difficulty in maintaining the patrol of these four submarines off Midway and Wake and the reliefs for them.

You will also be interested to know that in the, oh,

Witness Kimmel

questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 within two or three months preceding Pearl Harbor, we had
3 sent successive detachments of submarines to the Asiatic
4 Fleet where we believed they could be of more use because
5 they were closer to the Japanese homeland. Therefore we
6 had very few submarines available at this time.

7 Mr. Richardson: How many did you have?

8 Admiral Kimmel: My recollection of the figures is
9 that there were four, on patrol off Midway and we had
10 either four or five in Pearl Harbor being held there, who
11 had recently returned from Midway, and were having a rest
12 and recreation period and getting ready to go out and
13 relieve these fellows at Midway.

14 Mr. Richardson: The patrol of submarines at Midway
15 and the outlying islands was at your order?

16 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

17 Mr. Richardson: You removed them from the Hawaiian
18 area and sent them on to the Midway area?

19 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

20 Mr. Richardson: You could have brought them home any
21 time you wanted to?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, any time I considered it
23 desirable to do so, but I did not consider it desirable to
24 do so, and I think they were performing very useful serv-
25 ice off Midway and Wake.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Is it your position, Admiral, here that you were instructed by the Navy Department to continue your training programs?

Admiral Kimmel: I made no such statement. I made the statement that the Navy Department knew throughout the year that I was continuing the training program and that when in their opinion, with all of the information they had here -- I thought the least they could do was to give me a definite time, either by supplying me with all of the information, or by giving me orders.

Mr. Richardson: Well --

Admiral Kimmel: I repeated and I repeat again, that what we needed was information or orders, and what I wanted to determine above everything else was when to stop the training program, and when to go on all-out security measures.

Mr. Richardson: And did you ever sent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations asking that question ever?

Admiral Kimmel: I gave it in language which I am unable to improve upon to this day in my letter of May 26 and I believe in terms which cannot be misunderstood by any human being.

Mr. Richardson: Well, let's change our question.

Did you ever ask Naval Operations in Washington after November 1, 1941, whether you should continue your training

Witness Kimmel

questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 program, or whether you should go on an all-out defense
3 of Hawaii?

4 Admiral Kimmel: No, I didn't ask them that question;
5 but I would like to invite your attention to a statement
6 I made at page 35 of the paper which I read before the
7 committee the other day.

8 "Admiral Stark testified before the Naval Court of
9 Inquiry that he did not intend that the Pacific Fleet
10 should discontinue its training program upon receipt of
11 this dispatch, two weeks before the attack."

12 That is on November 24 -- was the dispatch referred to.

13 Mr. Richardson: But, Admiral you didn't know that
14 before the attack, did you?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Didn't know that Admiral Stark felt
16 that way?

17 Mr. Richardson: Yes.

18 Admiral Kimmel: I knew it in every way that I could
19 deduce it from the dispatches that I had received.

20 Mr. Richardson: Was it a serious question that you
21 had to consider and decide, whether you would continue the
22 training program or concentrate on Hawaiian defense?

23 Admiral Kimmel: It was a serious decision to make to
24 stop all training and to go to all-out security measures.
25 I never conceded that the Pacific Fleet was placed in

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Hawaii to defend the base at Hawaii. I thought the
3 Pacific Fleet was there, I still think the Pacific Fleet
4 was there to conduct offensive operations, and by offen-
5 sive operations to afford a measure of security for the
6 Fleet -- for the base, I mean.

7 Mr. Richardson: Don't you think it is unusual,
8 Admiral, if you had such a serious decision to make in
9 November, 1941, that you didn't ask the Chief of Naval
10 Operations in Washington, in an appropriate way, for his
11 up-to-date conclusions on this very important question?

12 Admiral Kimmel: From his dispatches and from his
13 letters to me I felt I would get nothing more than he had
14 already given me, and in his letter of November 25, which
15 came to me on December 3, you will see the language which
16 was quoted there.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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3 Mr. Richardson: Well now, Admiral, referring again to
4 the so-called war warning message of November 27, what did
5 you do with respect to the defense of Pearl Harbor and Hawaii
6 after November 27 in response to that message?

7 Admiral Kimmel: I think I have set that forth in the
8 statement there.

9 Mr. Richardson: In other words, the statement you have
10 made in your statement is your answer to that question?

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

12 Mr. Richardson: You refer at one place in your statement
13 to your desire to see the actual decoded messages which were
14 being received in Washington.

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

16 Mr. Richardson: Do you take the position here that it
17 was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to send to
18 commanders in the field the precise documents by way of informa-
19 tion that come in to the office at Washington or their com-
20 piled judgment of what those dispatches mean?

21 Admiral Kimmel: I felt that the Commander in Chief of
22 the U. S. Fleet and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific
23 Fleet, which positions I occupied at the time, were entitled
24 to every scrap of information they had in Washington, and how
25 or in what form that information was supplied to me, or
supplied to the Commander in Chief, I think is unimportant,

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 it is whether or not the information was supplied.

3 Mr. Richardson: Do you think, Admiral, that there should
4 have been sent to you the specific dispatches themselves?

5 Admiral Kimmel: I didn't care whether they were sent by
6 dispatches, by letter, by courier, or by any other means that
7 they wanted to send them. I felt that in order to get -- I
8 will say this today that I feel that in order to get the
9 meaning out of dispatches, referring particularly to Pearl
10 Harbor and to the Pacific situation, it would have been very
11 much better to give me the text of the dispatch. That I
12 didn't at any time in this statement intend to insist upon.
13 What I did intend to insist upon was that I was entitled to
14 all the information, whether in summarized form, all the
15 essential information which had to do with the Pacific
16 situation.

17 Mr. Richardson: What did you understand, Admiral --

18 Admiral Kimmel: And I thought I was getting all that
19 information.

20 Mr. Richardson: What did you understand, Admiral, as
21 to the scope of the interception of messages that was being
22 conducted by the Intelligence stationed at Hawaii?

23 Admiral Kimmel: I knew that the Intelligence stationed
24 at Hawaii was detailed primarily and almost exclusively on
25 what we have termed traffic analysis, that all of their

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

resources were devoted to that end. When they got a message, such as this light message, as I think it has been referred to, where they talked about burning the flares, and lights in the windows, and things of that kind, they undertook to decode that more as a matter of interest and exercise, with entirely inadequate facilities for decoding it. They had no facilities for decoding it.

Mr. Richardson: Then it was your understanding that at no time were they in position to intercept and decode these messages that were referred to here as magic?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. Incidentally, I think, in regard to this light message, I think you will find some testimony before the Hewitt Board, Hewitt Board of Investigation, that that light message was in fact decoded and translated in an understandable form by one o'clock on December 6, 1941, and that that was here in the Navy Department at that time. That type message that these young fellows out in Hawaii were doing their best to break and which they were unable to break until, I understand, they got some tips from the Japanese Consulate.

Mr. Richardson: What do you consider, Admiral, to have been the significance of the so-called Morri message?

Admiral Kimmel: I don't know. I never heard a thing about that. Never knew any such message existed until after

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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the attack was over. I recently seen in the newspapers, if you want me to tell you what I saw in the newspapers --

Mr. Richardson: No, if you didn't see it before the attack I am not interested in it.

Admiral Kimmel: All right, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Now, on page 67 of your statement you advanced the idea that if you were conducting a partial patrol confined to a single sector that would immediately become known to Japan and completely neutralize the advantage of such patrol in that sector.

Now, if I correctly interpret your position in that regard, then it would necessarily follow, would it not, Admiral, that this reconnaissance that was being conducted in the west and southwest sector would make it pretty certain that no Japanese attack would come from that sector under that reconnaissance, wouldn't it?

Admiral Kimmel: I think that the form of reconnaissance that we conducted in the west and southwest sector from the airplane carriers and from planes operating from Midway and Johnston and from Wake, was much less liable to be known in Japan than any search conducted by planes based on Oahu.

Mr. Richardson: Well, there would be no possible way, would there, except through Japanese espionage in Hawaii, of Japan knowing about a patrol in the north section?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Admiral Kimmel: Well, the Japanese espionage in Hawaii would have been able to determine about the north sector. What I am talking about is that planes taking off from carriers at sea and planes taking off from Midway and Wake and Johnston, the knowledge of that would have been much less liable to get into Japanese hands than anything which originated on Oahu and, according to the northern sector, it would have to come from Oahu.

Mr. Richardson: Well, now, I have just a question or two, Admiral.

Admiral, isn't it fair to state that the information contained in the war warning message of November 27 was a fair compilation of the general, specific information which had been given to you in the two or three preceding messages in late October and November? Isn't it in effect a summarized compilation of the information you had in the messages which immediately preceded it?

Admiral Kimmel: It is a summarized compilation, but it was more definite and more restrictive than the previous messages were.

Mr. Richardson: Now --

Admiral Kimmel: It indicated not an attack in any direction but an attack in one of, I think it was, four specified directions.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Did you ever in all of your experience as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet ever see another dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which was designated a war warning in words?

Admiral Kimmel: My answer to that -- I have prepared a little memorandum here because I thought something like this might come up.

On July 3, 1941 I received the dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations in which it was stated that the Japanese Fleet was so deployed that it was capable of movement either north or south, that a definitive move by the Japanese may be expected during the period July 20-August 1.

On July 25 I received another dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations in which the Chief of Staff joined. This told me of the economic sanctions that the United States was about to impose and continue. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff do not anticipate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means, but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities.

In the letters of the Chief of Naval Operations to me there appear the following which I detailed on page 33 of my statement and which I repeat:

"What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess."

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

(Memorandum of May 14, 1941.)

An open rupture was described as a possibility on July 24, 1941.

"Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual."

(July 31, 1941)

"Also the seriousness of the Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate."

(August 21, 1941)

"I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender."

(August 28, 1941)

"I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse."

(September 23, 1941)

My reaction, and the reaction of all of the people, insofar as they communicated their feelings to me, were that this term "this is a war warning" added little, if anything, to the message of November 27. "This is a war warning", merely, "This is to be considered a war warning" merely characterized the information which it contained and the information which

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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it contained was the thing that we considered most. I had never heard the term used in naval parlance before "This is to be considered a war warning". I considered all the messages -- not all -- but a great many of the messages that I received during the years as war warnings, and the addition of these five letters which are now pointed to as a cure-all for every deficiency that might have accrued to Washington in this matter, did not have any such effect on me, nor did it have any such effect on any of my associates in Pearl Harbor.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: Well, then, your answer to my question
3 as to whether you ever saw another message from the Chief of
4 Naval Operations stating that the message was a war warning
5 in those words, your answer would be "No"?

6 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct. I not only never saw
7 that before in any correspondence with the Chief of Naval
8 Operations, I never saw it in all my naval experience.

9 Mr. Richardson: And did it occur to you, since it was
10 such an extraordinary term, that you might inquire from the
11 Chief of Naval Operations what he meant by using it?

12 Admiral Kimmel: That is just the trouble. I did not
13 consider it an extraordinary term.

14 Mr. Richardson: Now, one further question, Admiral.

15 In your statement in a number of cases you refer to in-
16 formation from Washington.

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Richardson: Can you detail just what you meant by
19 "Washington" for us? Did you mean the Chief of Naval Oper-
20 ations or the Secretary of the Navy or State or War or the
21 President or who?

22 Admiral Kimmel: So far as I was concerned in my offi-
23 cial capacity I referred to the Navy Department. I used the
24 term "Washington" to include by implication, if you will, the
25 fact that the War Department, in my humble opinion, had just

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 as much responsibility for notifying General Short of activi-
3 ties that might affect Hawaii in any degree as the Navy De-
4 partment had in notifying me.

5 Mr. Richardson: Well, then, in fact your reference to
6 Washington meant any of the high command at Washington who
7 were in a position to give you information either through
8 your naval department or through the War Department?

9 Admiral Kimmel: I looked to the Navy Department for my
10 information. I took all the information I could get either
11 from the Navy Department or from the War Department and I
12 considered every bit of this information, and in that connec-
13 tion I considered the information in General Short's message
14 from General Marshall and I noted on the 29th that the orders
15 that were given to General Short by General Marshall in Hawaii
16 were also given in almost exactly the same terms to the West-
17 ern Defense Command, which indicated that General Marshall
18 must have considered the Western Defense Command in as much
19 danger of attack as he considered Hawaii.

20 Mr. Richardson: Well, right along that line, Admiral,
21 a question occurs to me that I have overlooked. If the mes-
22 sage of November 27th or its equivalent went to all of our
23 naval commands on our West Coast, - Puget Sound, San P edro
24 and whatever others there are there, should there have been,
25 in your opinion, any different interpretation placed upon that

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 dispatch by those posts than you were entitled to place on it
3 in Hawaii?

4 Admiral Kimmel: My recollection of that, the addressees
5 for that message --

6 Mr. Richardson: I am referring to the message of the
7 27th. Who would that message go to, Admiral?

8 Admiral Kimmel: This message went from the Chief of Naval
9 Operations to action of Commander-in-Chief Asiatic and Com-
10 mander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet. It went for information to
11 the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic and to special Naval observ-
12 ers. That did not go to all the other Naval commands. Those
13 were the ones that that message of November 27th was confined
14 to, and Admiral Hart in the Asiatic was faced with a consider-
15 ably different situation from the one I had in Hawaii and that
16 was meant to cover both.

17 The Vice Chairman: If counsel will permit, I think it
18 is shown that the parallel War Department message went to
19 these commanders to whom you have referred.

20 Mr. Richardson: That will be brought out.

21 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct, sir. That is what I
22 was referring to a moment ago.

23 Mr. Richardson: Now, one final question, Admiral.

24 Admiral Kimmel: The message to which I referred a few
25 minutes ago was from the Chief of Naval Operations to Com-

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 mander Pacific Northern and Pacific -- to the two commandants
3 on the West Coast as I understand it here.

4 Mr. Richardson: That would include Panama?

5 Admiral Kimmel: No. Pacific Northern Coastal Frontier
6 and Pacific Southern Coastal Frontier, naval coastal frontier.
7 That is where this message went to and it was for information
8 of CINCPAC and Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier.

9 Now, in the text of the message it says, "Army has sent
10 following to Commander Western Defense Command," and this was
11 the message which was sent to me for information.

12 Mr. Richardson: Is there any indication that the mes-
13 sage went to Panama?

14 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, information Pacific Naval Coastal
15 Frontier -- Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, I guess that is
16 what that is. They have got these abbreviations which I am
17 a little bit rusty on right now.

18 Mr. Richardson: Now, a final question, Admiral.

19 You will agree, will you not, with reference to this Pearl
20 Harbor attack question that we have been discussing that if
21 the information which you had and those deductions which you
22 as a skilled naval commander should have made warned you of
23 the immediate danger of an attack at Pearl Harbor, that no
24 amount of negligence at Washington should have prevented you
25 from offering all the defense you could?

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Admiral Kimmel: Certainly, if I had had anything which
3 indicated to me the probability of an attack on Hawaii then
4 there would not have been any trouble about what I did out
5 there in Hawaii. The messages which came to me, and particu-
6 larly this message of November 27th, were carefully gone
7 over, not only by me but by a great many intelligent people
8 and they got the same meaning out of it that I did. Now,
9 when a number of people of the intelligence of members of my
10 staff and my principal task force commanders who saw these
11 messages and this particular message, too, and had seen
12 everything else that I had gotten, including my correspond-
13 ence with Admiral Stark, when they did not get the meaning
14 out of it then there must have been something the matter with
15 the message and the people who originated the message.

16 Mr. Richardson: Well, over and above those messages and
17 the meaning of those messages it is your contention, is it
18 not, Admiral, that you did not have enough information avail-
19 able to you to warrant you in doing otherwise than you did?

20 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

21 Mr. Richardson: I have no further questions, Mr. Chair-
22 man.

23 The Chairman: Before the hearing began the committee
24 adopted the procedure by which questions from the committee
25 would alternate from the center toward each end. If it is

1 Witness Kimmel

2 agreeable to the committee the chair would like to reverse
3 that procedure during the remainder of the examination of
4 Admiral Kimmel and give the end man of this group a break by
5 beginning at the end and going toward the center. Is there
6 any objection to that?

7 Mr. Murphy: I object to that, Mr. Chairman. I do not
8 think that there should be any variance on any particular wit-
9 ness. Having adopted a procedure I do not think there should
10 be any change as to one of the most important witnesses that
11 is before us.

12 The Chairman: Of course, if there is objection the chair
13 will not do it.

14 The chair wishes to say that on account of his necessary
15 absence yesterday and his inability to hear the testimony given
16 by Admiral Kimmel on the examination by counsel he asks that
17 he may be passed until he can look over the testimony so that
18 he will not in his questioning duplicate what has already been
19 brought out. Therefore, Congressman Cooper of Tennessee will
20 be recognized.

21 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, it is the plan to con-
22 tinue to 12:30, is it?

23 The Chairman: That is a matter for the committee. We
24 decided while the two houses were not in session that we would
25 go to 12:30. There will be no legislation today, I suppose,

Witness Kimmel

1
2 in the Senate. I don't know about the House. There may be
3 some bills introduced and speeches but it will probably be
4 a relief to the committee to be in session while they are
5 made.

6 Senator Brewster: Well, Mr. Chairman, as the chairman
7 is the only gentleman who has had the privilege of making a
8 speech in the Senate since we have reconvened I appreciate his
9 modesty, but I think --

10 The Chairman: If the Senator calls what I said the other
11 day a speech I would like to have a description of one of
12 them that I really do make.

13 Senator Brewster: From certain questions which were
14 raised on the chairman's side of the Senate the other day about
15 very important matters that one of the Senators who is usually
16 regular wished to bring up I would be glad if I could be pre-
17 sent there to see just what he has in mind.

18 The Chairman: The only question brought up the other
19 day was whether bills and resolutions should be introduced
20 prior to the President's message and I rather indicated that
21 if the President's message was not ready by today that we
22 would take the halter off and let Senators introduce bills
23 and resolutions, but so far as I know there is no legislative
24 business.

25 Senator Brewster: I refer more specifically to Senator

Witness Kimmel

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2 Green of Rhode Island, who indicated that he had a matter of
3 great importance to bring up. I would like to know what it is.

4 The Chairman: The matter of great importance was a re-
5 solution which he proposes to introduce along with Senator
6 Smith of New Jersey authorizing the appointment of a commit-
7 tee to look into the question of a Presidential successor.
8 There will be no action taken on it. He just wanted to in-
9 troduce it.

10 Senator Lucas: I think the Senator from Maine is about
11 ready to make a speech on the floor of the Senate. I think
12 the chairman ought to withdraw the remark.

13 The Chairman: Well, whatever the committee wants to do
14 about going on after 12 is all right.

15 Senator Brewster: Without indicating any agreement with
16 the Senator from Illinois, because I do not think I have made
17 many speeches and I haven't any in mind today, but I do think
18 that we could make an exception on this particular day in
19 view of the discussion and I would appreciate it if you would.
20 I felt from what the Chairman said the other day on the floor
21 about going forward today if the Presidential message were
22 not received. I appreciate the superior knowledge in pos-
23 session of the chairman as majority leader to determine it,
24 but I would personally be glad to have the opportunity of
25 going on the floor at twelve o'clock today to see what goes on.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Chairman: We might as well then, under the circum-
3 stances, agree to adjourn today at twelve. That is not a
4 precedent that we will set, however.

5 Senator Brewster: Not at all.

6 The Chairman: Congressman Cooper.

7 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I desire to inquire
8 briefly.

9 Admiral Kimmel, you served in the Navy more than forty
10 years?

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

12 The Vice Chairman: And at the time of the attack on
13 Pearl Harbor you were one of the senior officers of the Navy?

14 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: Very few were senior to you in
16 length of service in the Navy at that time, weren't there?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Well, yes, I think that is a fair state-
18 ment.

19 The Vice Chairman: And on December 7, 1941 you held one
20 of the most important commands in the Navy?

21 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

22 The Vice Chairman: You received considerable communi-
23 cations from the Navy Department during the period of time
24 that you were in command of the Pacific Fleet?

25 Admiral Kimmel: I did.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: There has been presented to the com-
3 mittee a compilation including letters of Admiral Stark and
4 Admiral Kimmel to and from each other. The pages of this com-
5 pilation are not numbered but according to my count there are
6 241 pages in this exhibit No. 106.

7 Admiral Kimmel: I presume that may be correct.

8 The Vice Chairman: Which is copies of communications
9 from Admiral Stark to you and from you to Admiral Stark.

10 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

11 The Vice Chairman: That would certainly show that there
12 was a considerable volume of correspondence between you two
13 gentlemen?

14 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

15 The Vice Chairman: There has also been presented as
16 exhibit 37 in this hearing a document showing basic exhibits
17 of dispatches of the Navy Department. Those pages are num-
18 bered and show that some 46 pages are included here. An ex-
19 amination of that document also shows that many of those dis-
20 patches went to you as Commander of the Pacific Fleet. That
21 would also indicate, wouldn't it, that the correspondence and
22 dispatches from the Navy Department to you and from you back
23 to the Navy Department was quite voluminous during the period
24 of time that you were in command of the Pacific Fleet?

25 Admiral Kimmel: I might add that that is only a part of

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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the correspondence, of the total correspondence. It includes substantially all the so-called personal correspondence, which was really official, but in addition to that there was a great deal of official correspondence which has not been presented to the committee.

The Vice Chairman: So that, then, it is true that there was a great volume of correspondence and dispatches passing between the Navy Department and you?

Admiral Kimmel: Undoubtedly. Yes, sir, that is right.

The Vice Chairman: You also kept informed from all sources available to you as to the situation existing between this country and Japan, didn't you?

Admiral Kimmel: I did, indeed.

The Vice Chairman: Did you consider war with Japan as inevitable?

Admiral Kimmel: Beginning when?

The Vice Chairman: At any time in your life have you considered war with Japan inevitable?

Admiral Kimmel: In the few months before Pearl Harbor I thought war with Japan was highly probable. At no time did I reach the final conclusion that war was inevitable.

The Vice Chairman: Then your answer is that you never did at any time consider war between the United States and Japan as inevitable?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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Admiral Kimmel: That is right. I thought it highly probable.

3

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The Vice Chairman: Well, when did you reach the conclusion that it was highly probable?

5

6

Admiral Kimmel: Oh, I should say by the time I became Commander-in-Chief.

7

8

The Vice Chairman: And that was in February of 1941?

9

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

10

The Vice Chairman: From that time on you considered that war between the United States and Japan was probable?

11

12

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

13

The Vice Chairman: Or did you say highly probable, which?

14

Admiral Kimmel: Maybe I said highly probable, yes; highly probable.

15

16

The Vice Chairman: Did you ever consider that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor?

17

18

Admiral Kimmel: I made estimates of the situation from time to time. Had I considered that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent at any time my course of action would have been considerably different from what it was. I set out from the time I became Commander-in-Chief to do everything within my power to make Pearl Harbor secure against a Japanese attack. I felt it was the part of prudence, it was our most important base in the Pacific outside the continental United States, but

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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I have testified here, I put into my statement that I did not consider an attack on Hawaii any more than a remote possibility at the time that it came and that I had to make a choice of how I was going to employ my forces.

Does that answer your question, sir?

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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The Vice Chairman: I would like you to be a little more specific as to whether you at any time considered or was definite in your own mind that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor.

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Admiral Kimmel: I thought it was a possibility. I at no time considered that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent, if that is what you mean.

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The Vice Chairman: You never did at any time consider that an attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor was imminent?

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Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

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The Vice Chairman: You considered that an attack on Pearl Harbor might be possible, but you did not at any time think it was probable?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes. In a campaign, and the ups and downs of a campaign my opinion on the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor might very well have changed considerably. I was looking forward in all of my efforts to any and all eventualities and under all of these eventualities to be able to hold Pearl Harbor, to hold the Hawaiian Islands.

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21
The Vice Chairman: But if I understand you correctly -- and I want to try to understand you --

22
Admiral Kimmel: I want you to understand me, sir.

23
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The Vice Chairman: That is my whole purpose in asking you these questions. My only purpose in serving on this committee is to try to find the truth about Pearl Harbor.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, and I hope you get it.

3 The Vice Chairman: You were one of the head men there.

4 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, and I will give you everything I
5 know.

6 The Vice Chairman: I think you ought to be in a position
7 to tell us considerable about it.

8 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

9 The Vice Chairman: Then I would like to know, if it is
10 appropriate, as to whether you at any time thought Japan was
11 going to attack Pearl Harbor.

12 Admiral Kimmel: No, I did not.

13 The Vice Chairman: You did not?

14 Admiral Kimmel: Prior to December 7.

15 The Vice Chairman: All right. Then of course the
16 attack that did come on December 7 came as a great surprise
17 to you?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I was surprised when it came. I
19 did not think it was coming.

20 The Vice Chairman: Then having reached the conclusion
21 that the war was highly probable between the United States
22 and Japan, where did you think the first attack would probably
23 come?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I think I have stated that in my state-
25 ment. I expected the attack, any attack that eventuated after

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 November 27, to be confined to the Far East.

3 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman.

4 The Vice Chairman: Senator Brewster.

5
6 Senator Brewster: For the purpose of assisting, I would
7 like to have the reporter mark the passage where Admiral
8 Kimmel spoke about taking every possible step for the security
9 of Pearl Harbor as either the present examiner or others I
10 am sure will want to refer to that. Perhaps the reporter can
11 already locate it now, the statement he made a few questions
12 back about taking every possible step for the security of
13 Pearl Harbor.

14 Do you recall the answer?

15 The Vice Chairman: I recall the answer.

16 Senator Brewster: I would just like to have it marked,
17 that is all.

18 The Vice Chairman: I hope the reporter will please note
19 that. I did not consider it exactly responsive to the question
20 I was then asking and that is the reason I did not pursue
21 it further. I might ask some other questions about it.

22 Senator Brewster: It varies, as I understood it, with
23 what previously has been said with respect to the respective
24 responsibilities. That is why I thought it was significant
25 and it ought, at any rate, to be noted in the record, and I
shall want to ask about it. I will ask the reporter to note

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 that.

3 The Vice Chairman: Along the line of the question I
4 asked before the Senator from Maine intervened, I understood
(6) 5 you to say, Admiral, that you considered that if war did come
6 between the United States and Japan, that Japan would probably
7 first attack in the Far East. Is that correct?

8 Admiral Kimmel: As nearly as I can recollect my feelings
9 at that time, I was not at all sure that Japan was going to
10 attack the United States when it did. The information that I
11 had indicated to me, and to my associates, that the war would
12 probably -- that Japan's next move would be to go into Thailand,
13 and that it was by no means certain that they were going to
14 attack the United States. I do not mind saying that one of
15 the reasons why I felt Japan was not going to attack the
16 United States was because it was national suicide for them
17 to do so. I never at any time wavered in my belief as to
18 that, not even immediately after Pearl Harbor, I had no
19 doubts.

20 The Vice Chairman: What do you mean by "immediately
21 after Pearl Harbor you had no doubts"? As to what?

22 Admiral Kimmel: That Japan was going to be wiped off
23 the map before the end of the thing.

24 The Vice Chairman: I see.

25 Admiral Kimmel: Now I did not know of the Japanese

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 "mad dog" attitude, as I have heard some people express it,
3 that they were of a state of mind where they were going to
4 strike out regardless of how much they got hurt, or how much
5 they hurt anybody else.

6 The Vice Chairman: In other words, you thought they
7 would have too much common sense to attack the United States?

8 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

9 The Vice Chairman: Well, at least in that respect I
10 think you and Admiral Stark are in agreement.

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

12 The Vice Chairman: I believe it was Admiral Stark who
13 expressed in somewhat those words that he gave them credit
14 for having too much common sense.

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

16 The Vice Chairman: To jump on the United States.

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

18 The Vice Chairman: And that was your view of it?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I never dissociated myself from that
20 view, and I could not conceive -- well, I never have understood
21 why they were so lacking in -- well, common sense, yes.

22 The Vice Chairman: But having reached the conclusion
23 in your mind that war with Japan was highly probable, if that
24 did occur, why, it had to start somewhere, didn't it?

25 Admiral Kimmel: That is right, it had become highly

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 probable, I mean that I had reached that conclusion due to
3 the information which I had received as to their actions.
4 But even "highly probable" does not mean inevitable, and I
5 thought there would be and there should be forces in Japan
6 which would be able to see this thing.
7

(7)
8 The Vice Chairman: Well, had not there been more or less
9 a general feeling, Admiral, in the Navy for many years that
10 it was probable there would sometime be war between Japan
11 and the United States?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Well, yes, there had been a good many
13 people in the service who felt that war with Japan and the
14 United States would come. It started back in my earliest
15 recollection of this when Mr. Hobson back in about 1904 indi-
16 cated that, and various writings in all the years since
17 then indicated it.

18 The Vice Chairman: Are you one of those in the Navy
19 that entertained the view that war between Japan and the
20 United States was sometime probable?

21 Admiral Kimmel: Was sometime probable, you say?

22 The Vice Chairman: Probable, yes.

23 Admiral Kimmel: I never reached the stage where I thought
24 war with Japan was inevitable.

25 The Vice Chairman: Well, did you think war was going
to occur between Japan and the United States?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 Admiral Kimmel: I thought there was a very good chance
3 of it, as I told you before here.

4 The Vice Chairman: All right.

5 Admiral Kimmel: Eventually. What I wanted to know
6 above everything else was when it was going to start.

7 The Vice Chairman: I am satisfied many people would have
8 liked to have known that. They did not send out any message
9 as to when it was going to start, did they?

10 Admiral Kimmel: Pretty nearly.

11 The Vice Chairman: And based on that, why, the Navy
12 Department issued you an order, did it not?

13 Admiral Kimmel: Sir?

14 The Vice Chairman: Based on that information which you
15 say was pretty nearly a notice, the Navy Department issued
16 you an order?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, they issued me certain information
18 and certain advice.

19 The Vice Chairman: Did not they issue you a direct order,
20 Admiral?

21 Admiral Kimmel: The only direct order in the message
22 which I received was this "execute an appropriate defensive
23 deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in
24 WPL-46", and I carried out that order to the best of my
25 ability.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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3 The Vice Chairman: You have issued and received many
4 orders during your service in the Navy, haven't you?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

6 The Vice Chairman: Did you regard the dispatch you
7 received on November 27, 1941 as an order from the Navy De-
8 partment?

9 Admiral Kimmel: The part "execute an appropriate defensive
10 deployment", certainly.

11 The Vice Chairman: All right.

12 Admiral Kimmel: And I executed it in a way that I
13 thought would best meet the situation.

14 The Vice Chairman: I had one more question I wanted to
15 ask back along the line of inquiry I was making before going
16 to that message that we have just referred to.

17 You stated here yesterday that you considered that the
18 best minds of the Navy were at Pearl Harbor at the time of
19 the attack.

20 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I consider there were no better
21 minds in our Navy, or any other Navy, than at Pearl Harbor
22 at the time of the attack.

23 The Vice Chairman: Did any of those best minds expect
24 an attack on Pearl Harbor?

25 Admiral Kimmel: So far as I know, they did not - not
at the time it came.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 The Vice Chairman: Well, did they expect an attack on
3 Pearl Harbor at any time, as far as you know?

4 Admiral Kimmel: I do not like to speak for a body of
5 men like that, but insofar as they expressed their views to
6 me, I think they shared my views fairly completely.

7 The Vice Chairman: You were in command of all of them?

8 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

(8) 9 The Vice Chairman: And none of them ever expressed any
10 view to you that indicated they expected an attack on Pearl
11 Harbor?

12 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

13 The Vice Chairman: Now you were asked some questions
14 about --

15 Admiral Kimmel: (Interposing) At the time it came, I
16 am talking about.

17 The Vice Chairman: Did anybody expect an attack on
18 Pearl Harbor at any time, as far as you know?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Not at any definite time, no. They
20 shared with me the idea we should be prepared for eventualities
21 out there, and the situation might change and it might develop
22 into a time when we could expect an attack on Pearl Harbor.

23 The Vice Chairman: But up until December 7, 1941,
24 you and none of the other so-called best minds stationed at
25 Pearl Harbor expected an attack on Pearl Harbor?

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

3 The Vice Chairman: All right. Now you were asked some
4 questions about conversation between you and Captain Zacharias.

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

6 The Vice Chairman: He was an officer under your command
7 at the time?

8 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

9 The Vice Chairman: And you stated that you did have a
10 conversation with him in March of 1941, and you did not recall
11 that he said anything to you about expecting an air attack on
12 Pearl Harbor, is that correct?

13 Admiral Kimmel: That is right. I made such a statement
14 as that.

15 The Vice Chairman: Did you have any conversation with
16 him at any other time other than March, 1941?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Not that I now recall.

18 The Vice Chairman: You had no other conversation with
19 him at all, that you remember?

20 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I cannot recall every conversation
21 I had with every officer in Pearl Harbor, but so far as I
22 knew, Captain Zacharias never expressed any idea that an
23 attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent at any time to me. He
24 may have expressed such sentiments, I do not know.

25 The Vice Chairman: Now, then, Admiral, you say that when

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 you received the message of November 24, 1941 from the
3 Chief of Naval Operations you considered that with the
4 Senior Officers of your command.

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

6 The Vice Chairman: And that all of them concurred with
7 you in the view that there was not anything in that message
8 to cause you to anticipate any trouble at Pearl Harbor?

9 Admiral Kimmel: To anticipate an attack on Pearl Harbor.

10 The Vice Chairman: All right.

11 Admiral Kimmel: An air attack on Pearl Harbor.

12 The Vice Chairman: Well, any other kind of attack on
13 Pearl Harbor?

14 Admiral Kimmel: You are talking about the message of
15 November 24 and not the message of November 27 now? You
16 said the 24th.

17 The Vice Chairman: I said I expect to ask you a few
18 questions about both, but I now have before me the message
19 of November 24, and to refresh the memory of both of us I
20 will just read it.

21 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, are you going to go
22 on? We are a little past our hour now.

23 The Vice Chairman: I beg your pardon. We will suspend
24 at this point to 2:00 o'clock, Admiral. Thank you for calling
my attention to that.

25 (Whereupon, at 12:03 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed
until 2:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

(resumed)

The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. Richardson: Nothing, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything you want to present before the examination is resumed?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, I have.

The Vice Chairman: You may proceed, sir.

Admiral Kimmel: I think I may have left the wrong impression in regard to these torpedoes by leaving the statements about these long vanes and large rudders, that putting these long vanes and large rudders was the only thing necessary to make these torpedoes run in shallow waters.

As I told you, I had never seen the torpedoes but during the noon recess Admiral Smith informs me that he did examine the torpedoes and, incidentally, Admiral Smith is an officer who has had a great deal of experience with torpedoes and understands them very well.

He said in addition to putting long and staunch vanes on and rudders on these torpedoes it was necessary to greatly strengthen the after bodies. That in our experiments in dropping torpedoes the trouble was that the shock of impact would

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 break the torpedoes in two and, therefore, before these old
3 torpedoes were suitable for dropping from an airplane they had
4 to have their after bodies very greatly strengthened, prac-
5 tically rebuilt.

6 Also, the other factor in connection with it and probably
7 the most difficult was to get a gyro. The gyro, as you know,
8 was the agency by which the torpedo was kept on a straight
9 course and this gyro had to be completely rebuilt and strength-
10 ened so that when a torpedo struck the water the gyro neither
11 upset nor carried away completely, in either event making the
12 torpedo entirely inoperative, and in justice to our own Navy
13 Bureau of Ordnance I think that I should make that statement.

14 Mr. Richardson: Well, Admiral, in commenting on it what
15 difference would the depth of water have to do with the effect
16 on the torpedo of dropping it to which you have referred? If
17 it broke in two it would break by reason of striking on the
18 surface of the water, wouldn't it?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

20 Mr. Richardson: Well, would it make any difference
21 whether the water was forty feet or eighty feet deep?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Well, there is something in that, but to
23 make these torpedoes effective to drop them from airplanes all
24 these things had to be done and these old torpedoes, moderniz-
25 ing them to make them suitable for dropping from airplanes, was

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 not merely a question of putting more vanes on them. That is
3 the point that I was trying to make.

4 The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your statement on
5 that?

6 Admiral Kimmel: That is all I have, sir.

7 The Vice Chairman: Admiral Kimmel, this morning I asked
8 you a few questions about your conversation with Captain
9 Zacharias. At that time I did not have before me the photo-
10 static copies of certain documents that have been presented
11 here to the committee with respect to Captain Zacharias and
12 at the conclusion of the morning's session counsel handed me
13 this copy which is the only one before the committee. It is
14 headed, "Notes, correspondence and reports relating to Pearl
15 Harbor and events leading up to it", and quite a number of
16 items are listed on the front page, but I will pass on down
17 to an item appearing about the middle of this page, which
18 I will read to you:

19 "March 1941: Conversation with Admiral Kimmel,
20 CinCPac" -- that was you -- "and his Chief of Staff,
21 Captain," it looks like, "W. W. Smith, U.S.N."

22 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

23 The Vice Chairman: (Reading)

24 "Regarding Nomura, notifying of surprise attack on
25 our fleet by Japanese in case hostilities eventuate. De-

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 tails of this conversation are covered in a personal
3 and confidential memo to Chief of Staff, to CinCPac,
4 Rear Admiral Milo Draemel, U.S.N., for presentation to
5 CinCPac (Admiral Nimitz) and dated March 17, 1942, copy
6 attached."

7 Then I turn over to this copy to which he refers in that
8 note. I will not take time to read all of it but in the
9 fourth paragraph of this headed, "Personal and confidential
10 memorandum for Admiral Draemel, March 17, 1942," I read you
11 as follows:

12 "Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral
13 Kimmel and Captain Smith during the course of an hour
14 and a half conversation with them of the exact events to
15 take place on 7 December not only as to what would hap-
16 pen but also how and when. My only error was that the
17 Japanese were after four battleships and they got five."

18 Do you recall any such statement as that, or any informa-
19 tion of that nature given you by Captain Zacharias?

20 Admiral Kimmel: I think there is very little I can add
21 to my previous testimony on that subject. In the past few
22 days I heard of this memorandum and I had read that memorandum
23 before I testified before this committee and if you want me
24 to clarify any of my previous statements I will be pleased to
25 do so, but I am willing to let it stand as it is.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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The Vice Chairman: Well, in questions asked you by counsel and those which I asked you you stated that you did not remember --

Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

The Vice Chairman: (Continuing) -- any conversation with Captain Zacharias along this line.

Admiral Kimmel: I remembered a conversation with Captain Zacharias.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: But I have now tried to refresh your
3 memory.

4 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

5 The Vice Chairman: If it is worth anything in that
6 respect.

7 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

8 The Vice Chairman: By reading you what appears in this
9 memorandum prepared by him, which has been presented to this
10 committee for whatever it may be worth.

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

12 The Vice Chairman: And I am now asking you whether he
13 said to you what he states there, or anything like that.

14 Admiral Kimmel: He did not. And furthermore, I would
15 have paid very little attention to any man who told me in
16 March of 1941 that an attack was going to occur on the Pacific
17 Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

18 The Vice Chairman: I might say, Admiral that certain
19 members of the committee requested that Captain Zacharias'
20 name be added to the list of witnesses to appear here.

21 Admiral Kimmel: I would be very glad to have you hear
22 him.

23 The Vice Chairman: I was not one of those that made the
24 request, but the request was made.

25 Admiral Kimmel: All right.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 The Vice Chairman: However, that was a long time before
3 this thing even came to our attention.

4 Admiral Kimmel: I would like to invite attention to
5 one thing. The date of his memorandum was nearly a year after
6 his purported conversation with me.

7 The Vice Chairman: I think that is correct. I think
8 his memorandum is dated March 17, 1942. But my purpose in
9 asking you and inviting your attention to it was I wanted
10 you, if you felt prepared to do so, to give a direct answer
11 as to whether that was said to you or not.

12 Admiral Kimmel: I thank you very much, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: Then, Admiral, just before the noon
14 recess I was in the act of asking you some questions about
15 the message of November 24, 1941 that was addressed to you
16 along with several other responsible naval officials.

17 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

18 The Vice Chairman: And you received the message?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I received the message.

20 The Vice Chairman: This message states:

21 "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with
22 Japan very doubtful."

23 That is a definite statement, isn't it?

24 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

25 The Vice Chairman: You had no doubt that that was the
fact?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

Admiral Kimmel: Very doubtful.

The Vice Chairman: I say, you have no doubt that I stated the fact?

Admiral Kimmel: I believed it, if that is what you mean.

The Vice Chairman: You believed that anyhow before you received this, did you not?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I should say that is true.

The Vice Chairman: All right. And at least that stated a clear statement of fact of the Navy Department to you?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: "This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movement their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction" - now that states a definite fact?

Admiral Kimmel: "In any direction", yes, that is what it says.

The Vice Chairman: -"a surprise aggressive movement in any direction".

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: That is a very definite statement of fact?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: Then following that, "-including

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform Senior Army Officers their areas."

That was a definite statement and request?

Admiral Kimmel: I would like to invite your attention to the fact that the "surprise aggressive movement in any direction" is somewhat qualified by the statement "including an attack on Philippines or Guam."

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 The Vice Chairman: Of course, Admiral, after all
3 that is a question of construction.

4 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

5 The Vice Chairman: It is a question of your construc-
6 tion; it is a question of the construction of the Navy
7 Department?

8 Admiral Kimmel; But nevertheless, it is there.

9 The Vice Chairman: And it is a question of construc-
10 tion that I or anybody else might give to it?

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

12 The Vice Chairman: But the words are there?

13 Admiral Kimmel: That is right. The words are there.

14 The Vice Chairman: All right.

15 Admiral Kimmel: " -- including an attack on Philip-
16 pines or Guam" is also there.

17 The Vice Chairman: All right. If I say I am going
18 to take a trip to my home, including a visit to one or two
19 other points, the fact that I include a reference to one or
20 two other points does not change the fact that I said I am
21 going home, does it?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I suppose not.

23 The Vice Chairman: All right.

24 Admiral Kimmel: But in this case, "surprise aggressive
25 movement in any direction including an attack on the Philip-

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h2

1
2 pines or Guam," you are entitled to your own opinion, sir,
3 and I do not want to change that, but when you say "includ-
4 ing the Philippines or Guam, it seems to limit the ideas
5 of the man who is sending it to the vicinity of the Far
6 East somewhere.

7 The Vice Chairman: Well, anyhow it states "a surprise
8 aggressive movement in any direction"?

9 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

10 The Vice Chairman: It says that?

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

12 The Vice Chairman: Then following that, "including
13 attack on Philippines or Guam."

14 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

15 The Vice Chairman: Now, it is your interpretation, and
16 you gave the construction at the time you received it that
17 those last quoted words, "including attack on Philippines
18 or Guam," qualify or limit the previous statement?

19 Admiral Kimmel: To a degree, yes.

20 The Vice Chairman: I might say to you that I questioned
21 Admiral Stark about that.

22 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: And I recall I questioned Admiral
24 Turner, who is the man who wrote the message --

25 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h3

The Vice Chairman: --and their construction is entirely different from yours.

Admiral Kimmel: I have no doubt of that.

The Vice Chairman: So after all, it is a difference of opinion on that point?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: They stated, as I recall, that that meant just what these words said to them.

Admiral Kimmel: I think so, too.

The Vice Chairman: "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction." Now it is your view that the following words qualify or limit them?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, but I would like to call your attention again to the fact that this message of November 24 was followed three days later by the message of November 27.

The Vice Chairman: Yes. If you will indulge me a moment I am hoping to get to that. I am just trying to take the cold words that appear on the printed page of this message and discuss them with you. That is my only purpose of inquiring about this dispatch here.

Admiral Kimmel: I should be pleased to do just what you want, sir, but this message stood undiluted for only three days. At the end of three days I had another message.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h4

1
2 The Vice Chairman: All right. It also states,
3 "Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an
4 already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action."

5 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

6 The Vice Chairman: The words "tense situation" are
7 there are they not?

8 Admiral Kimmel: The "tense situation" I cannot say was
9 anything new.

10 The Vice Chairman: The situation had been tense for
11 some time?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

13 The Vice Chairman: And according to the words of
14 this message it was still tense?

15 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

16 The Vice Chairman: All right.

17 "Guam will be informed separately." That concludes
18 the message.

19 Well, now, what did that message mean to you, Admiral?

20 Admiral Kimmel: That message meant to me to do what-
21 ever I could to be prepared for anything that might make --

22 The Vice Chairman (interposing): If you will pardon
23 me at that point, I do not know whether you have quite
24 finished your statement or not, but this message does not
25 tell you to do anything except notify the Army, doesn't it?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h5

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

The Vice Chairman: It was not directed to you on any point except to notify the Army?

Admiral Kimmel: That was information.

The Vice Chairman: Purely an information message?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

The Vice Chairman: And it referred to aggressive movement in any direction, and "tense situation" and so on?

Admiral Kimmel: There is one thing that might be considered a directive in there.

The Vice Chairman: What is that?

Admiral Kimmel: That is the "utmost secrecy necessary."

The Vice Chairman: It might be. Yes, that is true. It might be.

So, as I understood you to state in response to the previous question I asked you, that message meant to you that you were supposed to do whatever you thought was necessary to take care of the situation?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

The Vice Chairman: And you accepted it as a warning to that extent, that you understood you were supposed to do whatever is necessary to take care of the situation?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, that is right.

The Vice Chairman: Then, I invite your attention to

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h6

1
2 the message of November 27, 1941, which was addressed to
3 you, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, and sent to two
4 other officers for information?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

6 The Vice Chairman: It was sent directly to you and
7 Admiral Hart?

8 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

9 The Vice Chairman: And of course you received it?

10 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

11 Now, in connection with this message of the 24th, in
12 a letter to me sent by Admiral Stark on November 25, 1941,
13 he said, in a postscript:

14 "I held this up pending a meeting with the President
15 and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with
16 Mr. Hull, and it was only after a long talk with him that
17 I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the
18 gravity of the situation."

19 That I take to mean the message of the 24th, which you
20 have just been talking about.

21 The Vice Chairman: What is the date of the letter
22 that you are referring to now?

23 Admiral Kimmel: November 25.

24 The Vice Chairman: All right.

25 Admiral Kimmel: "Will confirm it all in today's meeting

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h7

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as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. Also, I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

"I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I know is that we may do most anything and that is the only thing I know to be prepared for. Or we may do nothing. I think it is more likely to be anything."

Certainly, when I received that it qualified to a considerable extent the dispatch which I had received before on the 24th.

The Vice Chairman: When did you receive that?

Admiral Kimmel: On the 3rd of December.

The Vice Chairman: The 3rd of December?

Admiral Kimmel: I did, yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Still even what Admiral Stark stated there indicated that the situation was still quite

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h8

tense and serious, did it not?

Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

The Vice Chairman: It did not detract any from that?

Admiral Kimmel: No, that is right.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

Admiral Kimmel: But it was concerned much more with what we should do than what Japan was expected to do to us.

The Vice Chairman: But it still emphasized that the situation was tense and serious?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

The Vice Chairman: And it did not retract anything that had been said to you in the message of the 24th?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, he states, "I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know that I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area, as the most likely."

The Vice Chairman: As a matter of fact, they did all of them except attack Russia, did they not?

Admiral Kimmel: Eventually, yes.

The Vice Chairman: They did everything he mentioned there except what he says about Russia?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h9

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2 Admiral Kimmel: But that limits the perspective,
3 after all, considerably.

4 The Vice Chairman: There isn't anything in there that
5 said that they were not going to do anything that he indi-
6 cated in the message of November 24?

7 Admiral Kimmel: But I think any reasonable man would
8 take that as a qualification.

9 The Vice Chairman: Well, of course, some men did not.
10 You say you did.

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

12 The Vice Chairman: That is the point I am getting at.

13 Then inviting your attention to the message of November
14 27, to the words "this dispatch is to be considered a war
15 warning," you say you never knew of that language being
16 used in any other message in your 40 years' experience in
17 the Navy?

18 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

19 The Vice Chairman: Why do you think responsible offi-
20 cials of the Navy Department sent that message to you?

21 Admiral Kimmel: You mean now, or when I received it?

22 The Vice Chairman: At the time you received it. Why
23 did you think the Chief of Naval Operations, the head of the
24 United States Navy, and responsible officials working with
25 him said those words to you?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h10

Admiral Kimmel: Well, I think I have covered that very thoroughly in the statement I made. I do not know how I can add to that any, sir.

The Vice Chairman: I have no doubt, Admiral, you have done that to your complete satisfaction, but unfortunately I am sorry it is not completely satisfactory to me, and I am hoping that I might be able to get some further information from you on it.

I would still like to know why you thought the head of the United States Navy would say those words to you if they did not mean anything.

Admiral Kimmel: They did mean something.

The Vice Chairman: All right. What did they mean?

Admiral Kimmel: They meant that they were a characterization of the rest of the message which came to me.

The Vice Chairman: Did you accept it as such?

Admiral Kimmel: On, yes.

The Vice Chairman: But you still state, as I understood it, in effect, that the inclusion of the words "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning," did not mean anything, did not carry much weight with you?

Admiral Kimmel: I think it added very little to the message.

The Vice Chairman: It added very little to the message?

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: And you do not know this, I suppose, and that is why the head of the United States Navy would put those words into such a message? You do not think that they would amount to anything?

Admiral Kimmel: I will put it this way: It did not mean to me, nor to my associates, what Admiral Turner and Admiral Stark they were intended to mean. I have told in great detail, I think, what those messages meant to me.

Incidentally, sir, before I brought this statement of mine down here, I asked various members of my former staff, who happen to be here in Washington, Admiral Smith, Admiral Delaney, Admiral Murphy, Admiral Kitts, Admiral Pye, who was one of my task force commanders -- those were all that happened to be available in this area -- to read this statement, and to indicate to me any place that I had made an error, an over-statement or an under-statement, and they agree that factually the statement of what occurred, what we thought and what we did at the time is a correct statement.

Mr. Murphy: Does the gentleman yield for just one question?

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Do I understand that all of these admirals

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman
Mr. Murphy

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have gone over the statements you have given to the committee and agreed with it before you submitted it to the committee?

Admiral Kimmel: That is correct. I asked them to check it. If there was anything wrong I wanted to know about it.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: In that connection, was that statement
3 written by you?

4 Admiral Kimmel: This statement is, to my mind, the same
5 story that I attempted to tell to the Roberts Commission.

6 The Vice Chairman: With all deference to you, Admiral,
7 I asked: Did you write this statement?

8 Admiral Kimmel: I will answer your question, sir, if
9 you will give me an opportunity. I will try to, at least.

10 Senator Brewster: I think he is entitled to that courtesy,
11 Mr. Chairman.

12 The Vice Chairman: All right.

13 Admiral Kimmel: I presented the same thing, if not in
14 the same words, to the Naval Court of Inquiry. This statement
15 was prepared under my direct supervision. I had the assistance
16 of counsel and I had the assistance and criticism of various
17 other people in getting it up. This is my statement. I had
18 a great deal of assistance in preparing it. I am not a
19 literary genius and I couldn't have submitted it in the words
20 that it is here.

21 But the ideas, the facts and everything that is in it
22 are mine.

23 The Vice Chairman: But you did not write the statement?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I wrote various parts of it. I will
25 say that the words, I was assisted there. The ideas are mine.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: But you did not write or dictate
3 the statement yourself?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Not all of it, no.

5 The Vice Chairman: All right; thank you.

6 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, may I ask, has that
7 question been asked of other witnesses who appeared here?

8 The Chairman: The record will show whether it has or
9 not.

10 Senator Brewster: I think it is regrettable, and I
11 hesitate to comment, but I think that as to all the people
12 who have appeared here we have recognized that the statements
13 were composite products, and I never before heard that
14 criticism.

15 The Vice Chairman: The only reason I thought of asking
16 the question was because the Admiral himself stated that
17 he conferred with all of these other officers that he named
18 in the preparation of this statement. I think it is a
19 perfectly logical and reasonable question for me to ask --
20 how much of this statement then is Admiral Kimmel's statement.

21 Admiral Kimmel: Every bit of it is mine.

22 The Vice Chairman: And how much of it was prepared,
23 suggested or dictated by someone else. He said it was a
24 composite thought and idea of all these officers he conferred
25 with, so I am just trying to find the fact.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 Admiral Kimmel: I tried to give you the fact.

3 The Vice Chairman: All right. I thank you.

4 Senator Brewster: I didn't understand his statement
5 to be as you stated it. I don't want that implication to
6 appear. He stated that he submitted this to a variety of
7 officers on the staff and they indicated their concurrence.
8 That was his statement. About his counsel, and others, that
9 was assistance.

10 The Vice Chairman: I hadn't thought anything about it
11 until the gentleman from Pennsylvania asked him the question
12 as to whether this was the result of conferences with all
13 these other officers named by him and he said yes.

14 Now, Admiral, getting back to the message of November
15 27 that I was seeking to secure some information about, I
16 would like to ask you, with your permission, once more what
17 you think the words "this dispatch is to be considered a
18 war warning", what those words mean?

19 Admiral Kimmel: At the time I received it, and in
20 conjunction with the rest of the dispatch, the part of that
21 dispatch which appealed to me, "and an aggressive move by
22 Japan is expected" --

23 The Vice Chairman: Pardon me, I dislike to interrupt,
24 but I am asking this simple question, what these words I
25 quoted, "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning",

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 what they meant to you, Admiral.

3 Admiral Kimmel: It meant -- I am trying to tell you, sir.
4 I am trying to tell you what this dispatch meant to me. It
5 meant to me that war was going to eventuate in the Far East.

6 The Vice Chairman: That is all it meant to you?

7 Admiral Kimmel: That is what I got out of it.

8 The Vice Chairman: All right.

9 "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization
10 of conditions in the Pacific have ceased."

11 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

12 The Vice Chairman: That was a clear statement of fact,
13 wasn't it?

14 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

15 The Vice Chairman: You knew that from what it says here?

16 Admiral Kimmel: That is what it says.

17 The Vice Chairman: "and an aggressive move by Japan
18 is expected within the next few days."

19 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

20 The Vice Chairman: That is a clear statement?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

22 The Vice Chairman: And you accepted that for what it
23 says?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

25 The Vice Chairman: "***the number and equipment of

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
3 indicates an amphibious expedition against either the
4 Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo."

5 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

6 The Vice Chairman: That was a clear statement as to
7 what the indications appeared to be?

8 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

9 The Vice Chairman: "Execute an appropriate defensive
10 deployment".

11 That is a clear order to you, isn't it?

12 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

13 The Vice Chairman: "Execute an appropriate defensive
14 deployment."

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

16 The Vice Chairman: Did you do that?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

18 The Vice Chairman: Completely?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I did. You must read the rest of it.

20 The Vice Chairman: "preparatory to" --

21 Admiral Kimmel: "carrying out the tasks assigned in
22 WPL-46."

23 The Vice Chairman: Yes. That is the end of the sentence.

24 Admiral Kimmel: I executed an appropriate defensive
25 deployment preparatory to executing the tasks assigned in

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

WPL-46.

The Vice Chairman: So you complied with that order?

Admiral Kimmel: I complied with that order and I took every precaution in the Hawaiian area that I thought the situation justified and the probabilities demanded. The Fleet was on the alert. The use of the patrol planes I have given in great detail here, my reasons for taking the steps I took, and I have also given in great detail my reasons for the disposition of the Fleet at the time, in the days before and at the time of the attack.

The Vice Chairman: Then it states:

"Inform District and Army authorities."

You did that?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: "A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."

Now, I understood you to state, Admiral, that even if you had understood that Japan was going to attack that you would not have moved your battleships out of the harbor.

Admiral Kimmel: Will you please show me that?

The Vice Chairman: I got the impression from what you stated in response to a question asked here.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 Admiral Kimmel: I don't recall making such a statement
3 as that.

4 The Vice Chairman: Just a moment. I think I can find
5 my note here.

6 I will ask you this question: Did you state you would
7 not have taken the battleships out of the harbor even if you
8 had expected the attack was coming?

9 Admiral Kimmel: If I had expected the attack was coming --
10 and when did I find out that the attack was going to come?

11 The Vice Chairman: Well, I just want to ask you this
12 question: Did you state you would not have taken the battle-
13 ships out of the harbor if you had expected the attack?

14 Admiral Kimmel: I may have made a statement that if I
15 had received this information on the morning of December 7,
16 when I wouldn't have had time to get them out, that I would
17 not have taken them out. Other than that I have no recollection
18 of making such a statement.

19 The Vice Chairman: I understood you to say you would
20 have sent smaller craft out but would have kept battleships
21 in the harbor probably for use of their anti-aircraft guns.
22 Did you say anything like that?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I made that statement, and I made
24 that statement because -- I predicated that on receiving the
25 knowledge of an attack too late to do anything else, and I

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 predicated it on the chances of getting the battleships
3 caught in the channel on the way going out and blocking the
4 whole channel, and the various other considerations.

5 That was on the basis of receiving the information so
6 late that, by one o'clock, I couldn't have completed a de-
7 ployment.

8 The Vice Chairman: But if you had --

9 Admiral Kimmel: I stated in other places that if I
10 had received the information a day or two days before then
11 I certainly would have taken the ships to sea.

12 The Vice Chairman: All right.

13 I believe you stated that you did not consider it the
14 duty of the Fleet to defend Pearl Harbor?

15 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

16 The Vice Chairman: Well, wasn't it your duty to defend
17 yourself so far as you could?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes; and it was my duty to do
19 everything I could to destroy any enemy forces. But that
20 is quite a different thing from being tied down to have to
21 remain in one vicinity for the defense of that particular
22 locality.

23 The Vice Chairman: Now, you stated on page 27 of your
24 statement to this committee, the statement that you have
25 here, "The so-called 'war warning' dispatch," towards the