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Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

January 29, 1946

Washington, D. C.

Pages:..... 8958 to 9107

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF

PAGE

ZACHARIAS, Captain Ellis M. (Resumed)

8959

SMITH, Vice Admiral William Ward

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E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Tuesday, January 29, 1946.

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A. M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associated General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

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Witness Zacharias

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2 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

3 Captain Zacharias.

4 TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, U.S.N.,

5 (Resumed)

6 Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, we have one item that
7 we would like to take up first.

8 The Chairman: The counsel has something to take up
9 before you resume, Mr. Gearhart.

10 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, some time ago we
11 compiled a group of documents which relate to certain transfer
12 of information and inquiry between the United States and
13 other Governments. The file I hold in my hand is the photo-
14 stat of those documents.

15 There has been suggestion from individual members of
16 the committee that they would like to have us advise the
17 State Department that these various documents should be
18 called to the attention of the foreign governments, and
19 their permission obtained, as is required, for the publica-
20 tion of these documents.

21 We brought the matter, you recall, to the attention
22 of the committee at one time, suggesting that we felt
23 we should have the direction of the committee before we
24 formally advise the State Department to formally request
25 the foreign governments to release the documents.

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2 Now, I say just for what it may be worth, which is
3 probably nothing, as we go through these documents there
4 are only one or two that we can, by any particular stretch
5 of the imagination, feel are germane.

6 I have this suggestion:

7 If the committee is amenable to a direction to us to
8 secure the consent of the foreign governments to the publi-
9 cation of all of these documents, that then some method
10 be devised whereby any individual committee members who
11 are interested might examine this group and delete from
12 the number of documents, those that are not relevant to
13 this proceeding, so that the number that we have to ask
14 the foreign governments to O.K. and free, can be reduced
15 as much as possible.

16 But I would like now to have the committee give us
17 some direction as to what is to be done with reference to
18 the communications of the State Department to get the re-
19 lease of these documents.

20 The Vice Chairman: Let me inquire there, Mr. Richardson.
21 You have examined all of these documents?

22 Mr. Richardson: Yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: And it is your opinion that only
24 a few of them could, by any stretch of the imagination be
25 relevant or material to this inquiry?

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2 Now, I say just for what it may be worth, which is
3 probably nothing, as we go through these documents there
4 are only one or two that we can, by any particular stretch
5 of the imagination, feel are germane.

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8 secure the consent of the foreign governments to the publi-
9 cation of all of these documents, that then some method
10 be devised whereby any individual committee members who
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12 the number of documents, those that are not relevant to
13 this proceeding, so that the number that we have to ask
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17 some direction as to what is to be done with reference to
18 the communications of the State Department to get the re-
19 lease of these documents.

20 The Vice Chairman: Let me inquire there, Mr. Richardson.
21 You have examined all of these documents?

22 Mr. Richardson: Yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: And it is your opinion that only
24 a few of them could, by any stretch of the imagination be
25 relevant or material to this inquiry?

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2 Mr. Richardson: That was my feeling, as I read them.

3 The Vice Chairman: It would look to me like the com-
4 mittee would want very carefully to consider that before
5 we go to all the trouble of having the State Department
6 get the clearances of the foreign governments on something
7 that may not be even material or relevant to this inquiry.

8 I would think that the members who have indicated an
9 interest in this material, would assist the committee to
10 the extent of examining these things carefully, and confer-
11 ring with you and seeing if they can reach a decision to
12 comply with the suggestion that you here made.

13 Mr. Richardson: Well, Mr. Chairman, there is no need
14 of any further conference with us. I am perfectly willing
15 to turn this file over to any committeeman who wants to
16 examine it, and then it is up to the committee to tell us
17 which ones ought to be taken out.

18 The Vice Chairman: My point in that suggestion is
19 that a member interested may take this whole file and
20 examine it carefully himself, and then confer with you as
21 to your opinion as to which of those documents might be
22 material and point out to the member your reason for thinking
23 that others are not. In other words, try to get together
24 with the committee member and if the committee member feels
25 that he still wants to urge that all of it be brought in here,
why then the matter can be submitted to the committee again
for action on it.

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1 Witness Zacharias

2 Senator Lucas: May I inquire just that this is?

3 Mr. Richardson: Senator, it is a series of documents
4 that have to do with the troubled relations existing between
5 the United States and Japan and England and China.

6 The Vice Chairman: I might say personally what I am
7 afraid of is that we are getting such a mass of material in
8 here, much of it that is so remotely, if at all, related
9 to the subject under consideration, we are going to get
10 our record so terribly large that it will be difficult for
11 people interested in the matter to find the things that
12 are really material and important.

13 Mr. Richardson; Suppose, Mr. Chairman, that I turn
14 this over to Senator Ferguson who I think is more familiar
15 with them than anyone else.

16 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I will say that I have
17 gone over this and I have marked certain ones that I think
18 are material. I wanted them released prior to a witness
19 we had last week leaving the stand, but I will go over them
20 again.

21 The Vice Chairman: I am sure we will all appreciate
22 that.

23 Senator Ferguson: There were, I think, three places
24 that I marked for counsel that I was greatly interested in,
25 but the witness has gone from the stand and I couldn't use

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Witness Zacharias

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2 it for cross-examination.

3 Mr. Richardson: Then we may depend upon having further
4 information from Senator Ferguson.

5 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

6 The Vice Chairman: All right.

7 Mr. Richardson: Now I think Mr. Masten has a document
8 he wants to offer in evidence.

9 Mr. Masten: Yes.

10 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Masten may proceed.

11 Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, we have distributed to the
12 committee this morning a folder of documents, mimeographed
13 copies of documents, which is entitled "Material Relating
14 to 'Winds' Code".

15 The Vice Chairman: That is this document here?

16 Mr. Masten: That is correct.

17 The Vice Chairman: All right.

18 Mr. Masten: If you will look at the first two pages
19 you will find a table of contents of the documents that
20 are included in this compilation. Many of the documents
21 included have been previously introduced either in the
22 transcript or as exhibits, but it was thought for the
23 convenience of the committee it would be well to bring
24 them all together in one place.

25 If I may take a minute I would like to run down the

1 Witness Zacharias

2 index to show you just how it was compiled.

3 The Vice Chairman: Go right ahead.

4 Mr. Masten: Item No. 1, entitled "Data received con-
5 cerning establishment and nature of winds code", lists
6 dispatches all of which except item d have been previously
7 placed in the record or made an exhibit.

8 Under Section 2, "Dispatches and data relating to
9 monitoring for Winds 'Execute'", there are listed three
10 dispatches all three of which are either exhibits or have
11 been read into the record previously.

12 Item 3, entitled "Certification of Secretary FCC,
13 dated 8/18/44, with attachments as follows", is not now
14 in the record and is new material.

15 The Vice Chairman: All four of those messages?

16 Mr. Masten: All four of those items under No. 3.

17 The same is true of all of the items under No. 4 en-
18 titled "Material relating to weather Winds 'Execute' message
19 sent or received." Items a and b under that number include
20 all of the communications which have been received from
21 General MacArthur in this connection.

22 Items c, d and e include communications from the State
23 Department to the British, the Australians and the Dutch
24 regarding the monitoring for the winds message that was
25 carried on by those respective governments.

Witness Zacharias

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2 Items c, d and e may have to be supplemented by
3 further reports from the State Department but we have given
4 you here everything that we have received to date in that
5 connection.

6 Item 5, entitled "List of messages appearing in Committee
7 Exhibit 1 dealing with instructions to Japanese representa-
8 tives to destroy codes, sent through ordinary channels of
9 communication", is simply a list that was compiled on the
10 basis of the material in Exhibit 1 and I think is self-explana-
11 tory.

12 Item 6 consists of new material which has to do with
13 the question of file number JD-1 7001 in the Navy Department
14 and I think will be found self-explanatory upon examination.

15 In this latter connection I would like to read into
16 the record a memorandum dated 26 January 1946 from Lieutenant
17 Colonel Harmon Duncombe, the Army Liaison Officer, which
18 is as follows:

(2) 19 "MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON:

20 "Pursuant to the request of former counsel to the
21 committee, a comparison was made of the intercepted messages
22 in the Army Signal Intelligence Service file which had been
23 translated on 2, 3, and 4 December 1941 and those in the
24 Navy file translated on the same dates. The purpose of
25 the comparison was to ascertain whether the Army file contained

Witness Zacharias

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2 a message not in the Navy file. The comparison, which
3 was jointly made by the Army and the Navy, showed that each
4 message in the Army file was also in the Navy file.

5 "The results of the comparison were reported orally
6 to the former counsel to the committee at the time the
7 comparison was completed."

8 As you will see that memorandum also has to do with
9 the question of file number 7001..

10 Now, there may be additional material later in connec-
11 tion with the winds matter, in fact there are some dispatches
12 referred to in the statement by Captain Safford which have
13 been circulated to the committee which the Navy Department
14 is now endeavoring to find and deliver to us, and we will
15 make it available to you just as soon as they are received.

16 We would like to offer this compilation as Exhibit
17 No. 142.

18 The Vice Chairman: It will be received as Exhibit No.
19 142.

20 (The document referred to was
21 marked Exhibit No. 142.)

22 Mr. Masten: We would also like to offer two additional
23 documents from the Federal Communications Commission file,
24 the first of which is the page dated at the top December 5,
25 1941, and starts out as a memorandum to Mr. Sterling. We

1 Witness Zacharias

2 would like to offer that as Exhibit 142-A.

3 The Vice-Chairman: Exhibit 142-A?

4 Mr. Masten: Yes. In other words, we would like to
5 have Exhibit 142 as the basic exhibit for all this new
6 material.

7 The Vice Chairman: It will be so received.

8 (The document referred to was
9 marked Exhibit No. 142-A.)

10 The Vice Chairman: What is next?

11 Mr. Masten: That is all we have.

12 The Vice Chairman: All this is one exhibit, then?

13 Mr. Masten: Yes.

14 Mr. Richardson suggests that we mention at this time
15 that the material included in Exhibit 142, Item 3, and
16 this additional material which we have now marked as Exhibit
17 142-A, is only a part of the total material we have received
18 from the FCC but is the part that we felt was most relevant,
19 and if any of the other material becomes relevant we will
20 add it to the exhibit.

21 The Vice Chairman: All of this material in Exhibit 142-A
22 relates to the FCC?

23 Mr. Masten: That is correct.

24 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from
25 counsel, have you got in this new data you gave us this

Witness Zacharias

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2 Tokyo to Washington serial 8430 November 27, 1941?

3 Mr. Masten: If that is one of the dispatches referred
4 to in Captain Safford's statement as not being in the record
5 it is not yet included in this as we have not yet received
6 it from the Navy Department.

7 Senator Ferguson: You have not yet got that from the
8 Navy Department.

9 Mr. Masten: They are working on it but it has not yet
10 been received.

11 Senator Ferguson: Another one is OPNAV 282301. That
12 is not in either?

13 Mr. Masten: That is not in this compilation.

14 Senator Ferguson: Then on page 16 of the Safford
15 statement, 1, 2, 3, 4 OPNAV messages are marked priority,
16 two of them referred to priority, you don't have those in
17 the memorandum?

18 Mr. Masten: If those are dispatches referred to as
19 not having been introduced then they are not in this com-
20 pilation but all of them are being sought by the Navy and
21 we will let you have them as soon as we get them.

22 Senator Ferguson: But you haven't them now?

23 Mr. Masten: No, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: Is there anything further?

25 Mr. Richardson: No.

Witness Zacharias

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The Vice Chairman: Captain Zacharias, do you have anything you want to present to the committee before your examination is resumed?

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Captain Zacharias: I think I would like to clarify
3 one of my statements yesterday regarding the word "when"
4 about which I was questioned by Senator Lucas.

5 I couldn't quite make his point and since thinking
6 it over, I feel that he wanted an explanation of what I
7 meant by "when."

8 If so, the word "when" applied to two things; one a
9 Sunday morning, and the other a time when submarines were
10 discovered in the Hawaiian area. That would cover the
11 meaning of the word "when" in my statement that I advised
12 Admiral Kimmel as to where, how, and when such an attack
13 would take place.

14 Senator Lucas: That still does not satisfy the Senator
15 from Illinois.

16 The Vice Chairman: Is there anything further, Captain?

17 Captain Zacharias: Nothing further.

18 The Vice Chairman: I believe it is Mr. Gearhart's
19 time to inquire. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire,
20 Captain.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Captain, as I understand your testimony,
22 the substance of your conversation with Admiral Kimmel and
23 the purpose of your going to his office or headquarters to
24 discuss anything with him, was to point out that in your
25 opinion, as an experienced Intelligence officer, and also

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Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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as an experienced line officer in the Navy, that the Japanese, if they chose to attack us, would commence hostilities by an attack upon our fleet; is that not correct?

Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir. Of course, that discussion evolved from my discussions with Admiral Kimmel regarding the report that I had sent in to Admiral Stark regarding my conversations with Admiral Nomura and then the discussion of the incident of October 16, 1940, which I described in detail yesterday.

From there we went into a discussion of the general situation which might arise, and the things that would be inherent in it.

Mr. Gearhart: After you had pointed out to him that in your opinion, they would commence hostilities by an attack upon our fleet, the next topic of conversation naturally was "Well, assuming that to be true, what should we do about it," and you suggested that we install or inaugurate patrols?

Captain Zacharias: That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart: Which caused the Admiral to say that he didn't have the equipment or the men to maintain extended patrols for any length of time?

Captain Zacharias: He didn't qualify it. He said,

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 "Well, we have neither the personnel nor the materiel
3 with which to make such a patrol."

4 Mr. Gearhart: Well, the maintenance of a patrol
5 which is adequate as a defense against surprise attack,
6 you could expect a tremendous attrition upon the planes
7 that are used, could you not?

8 Captain Zacharias: The patrol planes?

9 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

10 Captain Zacharias: Yes, you could. However, it is to
11 be expected that an alert patrol would be able to get in
12 a report by radio before it is shot down.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Well, I don't mean attrition by war-
14 fare especially, but attrition from the mechanical stand-
15 point.

16 Captain Zacharias: That is correct.

17 Mr. Gearhart: A certain number of planes will always
18 have to be under repair, a certain amount of parts will
19 become worn, and have to be replaced, so unless you have
20 a large number of planes, as a reservoir, any patrol under-
21 taken with 50 or 60 planes available would necessarily be
22 a limited operation, limited as to time, would it not?

23 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir, but although
24 limited in forces available for that work, they nevertheless
25 could be used and restricted to the most probable area

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1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 or sector.

3 Mr. Gearhart: Well, was there a most probable area?

4 Captain Zacharias: In my opinion, as I stated, I
5 expected, fully expected, that an air attack would be launched
6 down-wind, and as the prevailing wind in Hawaii is from
7 the northward sector, it would come from that direction.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Well, you knew that if any Japanese
9 fleet should sail into that area, that it would have to
10 travel several thousand miles, didn't you.

11 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

12 Mr. Gearhart: You also knew that the Japanese were
13 already installed in the Marshall Islands, and in other
14 Pacific Islands, from which they could make a quicker
15 movement toward the Hawaiian Islands?

16 Captain Zacharias: But they would suspect that that
17 would be the locality in which we would be most interested.

18 Mr. Gearhart: In other words, it being more probable
19 that they would come from the Marshalls or from some other
20 islands in that area, therefore they would reduce, by coming
21 from that area, the element of surprise?

22 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Gearhart: And if they came from the north, the
24 element of surprise would be emphasized rather than de-
25 tracted from?

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1 Witness Zacharias Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Captain Zacharias: Well, it wasn't the unexpected
3 area in my mind.

4 Mr. Gearhart: In other words, you selected that point
5 as a probable initiation of attack because it was the
6 improbable one?

7 Captain Zacharias: From the standpoint of what the
8 Japanese would estimate us to do.

9 Mr. Gearhart: In other words, you were trying to
10 think as a Jap would think.

11 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Now, Admiral Kimmel explained to you
13 that he only had a limited number of planes available for
14 this purpose of reconnaissance, and you urged him to do
15 everything he could to get the Washington authorities to
16 supply him with more planes, didn't you?

17 Captain Zacharias: He didn't explain that he had a
18 limited number. He said "We have neither the materiel
19 nor the personnel with which to carry out such a patrol,"
20 and as I indicated, I replied, "Well, Admiral, I feel you
21 better get them because that is what is coming."

22 Mr. Gearhart: You knew that both Admiral Kimmel and
23 General Short were asking for more and more planes at all
24 times?

25 Captain Zacharias: I did not, sir.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: You didn't know that Harry Hopkins was sending them across the Atlantic rather than sending them to the Pacific?

Captain Zacharias: No, sir.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I object to that statement.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, the Senator from Illinois has a perfect right to object, but I would like to know.

Senator Lucas: What is the basis for the assumption, and why bring Harry Hopkins into this program at this late date?

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Witness Zacharias

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Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: Why, certainly the Senator from Illinois
3 is not so uninformed as not to know that Harry Hopkins was
4 doing the allocating of those materials at that time.

5 Senator Lucas: Well, is there any proof in this record
6 to that effect?

7 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, there is in this record as well as
8 in the record of the American people.

9 Senator Lucas: Well, I challenge the statement.

10 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Gearhart will proceed in order.

11 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, do I understand then
12 that the ruling of the chair was that the Congressman was not
13 in order?

14 The Vice Chairman: I ruled that the gentleman from
15 California may proceed in order, which is a proper parlia-
16 mentary expression to use.

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

18 The Vice Chairman: And is used all the time in the Sen-
19 ate and in the House.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, that was a very adroit one because
21 nobody knows when they hear that ruling whether the objection
22 is sustained or is not sustained. However, we will proceed
23 in order.

24 The Vice Chairman: The gentleman from California will
25 proceed in order.

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: You were informed that there was a muni-
3 tions assignment board, weren't you?

4 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir, I was aware of that.

5 Mr. Gearhart: And you were also aware of the fact that
6 Harry Hopkins was a member of that board, weren't you?

7 Captain Zacharias: I do not recall that I did, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Well, he was and if there is any doubt in
9 the mind of the Senator from Illinois now it is now in evi-
10 dence by my assertion.

11 Senator Lucas: Of course, that makes it so.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Well, I am giving the Senator from Illi-
13 nois an opportunity now to say it is not true if it is not
14 true and I will accept his word for it.

15 Senator Lucas: I am not going to argue with the Con-
16 gressman. He has testified all the way through in these hear-
17 ings.

18 Mr. Gearhart: You knew that under Lend-Lease we were
19 supplying the British and other people who were fighting Hit-
20 lerism with planes?

21 Captain Zacharias: I knew we were furnishing a great
22 many supplies and including planes, too.

23 Mr. Gearhart: And you naturally knew as an American
24 citizen that which the Senator from Illinois pretends is not
25 in evidence, that some agency of the government had to allo-

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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cate to the different theaters of operations and to the different countries that were involved all the munitions that we produced of various kinds, including airplanes, didn't you?

Captain Zacharias: That was a matter of policy to which I gave no question at all.

Mr. Gearhart: Then as a naval expert, one who has had a great deal of experience in intelligence work, which involves a further study of the question of what is an appropriate supply, do you think that the number of planes that Admiral Kimmel had and General Short had were a sufficient amount to defend that island in the likelihood of an attack from the Japanese?

Captain Zacharias: Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have stated that the number of planes were insufficient. I prefer to take their opinion on that point.

Mr. Gearhart: Because they were closer to the problem.

Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, when did you first reduce to writing the substance of your conversation with Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Zacharias: The first time was when I presented the memorandum to Admiral Draemel on March the 17th, 1942, just about a year after I had the conversation with Admiral Kimmel.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: Was there anything in that conversation
3 that you had with Admiral Kimmel which marked it in your me-
4 mory so that you can say now that your memorandum prepared
5 a year later was accurate in every detail?

6 Captain Zacharias: I would like to say that this whole
7 question was something that was uppermost in my mind. There
8 were no important duties to becloud it in any way. It was
9 something that had been of interest to me for the past twenty
10 years. Therefore, there is every reason why I should have
11 remembered every detail of that conversation with Admiral
12 Kimmel and I might say, on the other hand, that he had many
13 other matters which were his concern, and I grant the pos-
14 sibility for the reason for him not having remembered the
15 details of that conversation.

16
17 However, I do want to emphasize that this whole question
18 was one to which I was giving full attention all my spare time
19 in contacts with the Fleet Intelligence Office at Pearl Harbor
20 and the District Intelligence Office in the City of Honolulu.

21 Mr. Gearhart: To whom did you say you prepared that
22 memorandum? For whom did you prepare it?

23 Captain Zacharias: It was prepared as a result of a con-
24 versation which I had with Admiral Draemel, then the Chief of
25 Staff to Admiral Nimitz, and it was made up upon his recom-
mendation when he said, "I agree with ninety-nine per cent of

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 what you have said and I wish you would write this up for me
3 as a memorandum so I can present it to Admiral Nimitz and let
4 him go over it at his leisure."

5 That was the sole purpose of the preparation of that
6 memorandum and I would like to emphasize at this time that
7 there was no inclination on my part to air my views regarding
8 this previous conversation that I had had with Admiral Kimmel
9 in March of 1941.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Did you take any steps after your conver-
11 sation with Admiral Kimmel, when he told you he did not have
12 sufficient equipment to undertake a patrol of the type that
13 you recommended, did you take any steps to communicate your
14 views to Washington authorities?

15 Captain Zacharias: Not regarding the lack of planes. I
16 think I furnished a copy of that memorandum to Admiral King.

17 Mr. Gearhart: After the conversation, a year after the
18 conversation with Admiral Kimmel.

19 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Well, at the time you talked with Admiral
21 Kimmel and at the time he told you he could not undertake such
22 a reconnaissance you did not carry your ideas to any other
23 source but remained silent on the subject for a year?

24 Captain Zacharias: In replying to that, sir, I would like
25 to emphasize that I was a commanding officer of a ship of the

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Pacific Fleet, which were my primary duties and having once given Admiral Kimmel my views as a student of Japan I knew that, - I felt that he knew that I was in the vicinity, available at any time should he desire any further advice on the subject.

Mr. Gearhart: But if Admiral Kimmel told you: he did not have sufficient equipment to undertake such a reconnaissance, you knew that equipment could be secured from higher authority. Did you thereafter take the matter up with any authority --

Captain Zacharias: No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: (Continuing) -- by letter or by conversation?

Captain Zacharias: No, sir, I did not. That was not a part of my function.

Mr. Gearhart: Was your original conversation with Admiral Kimmel a part of your function?

Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir. As I stated yesterday I was the senior officer on active duty, who had studied the Japanese language and Japan. I was the one who had interviewed Admiral Nomura and had made a semi-official report to Admiral Stark, in which I knew Admiral Kimmel would be interested. I was the one who participated in that event of October 16, 1940, which I knew would be of interest to Admiral Kimmel.

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Therefore, it was from a sense of duty that I took it upon
3 myself to go over and have a talk with him.

4 Mr. Gearhart: At that time you were the commander, were
5 you not, of the USS Salt Lake City?

6 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

7 Mr. Gearhart: As such you were not detailed to intelli-
8 gence work at that time, were you?

9 Captain Zacharias: Only insofar as I had been previous-
10 ly importuned by a former Director of Naval Intelligence that
11 because of my past experience and interest, although I was go-
12 ing to sea duty, it was hoped and desired that I would con-
13 tinue active as an Intelligence officer no matter where I was
14 or what duty I was performing. I merely followed that re-
15 commendation.

16 Mr. Gearhart: At the time that you held this conversa-
17 tion with Admiral Nomura were you an Intelligence officer or
18 were you just a naval officer, a friend of his?

19 Captain Zacharias: I was commanding officer of the Salt
20 Lake City at that time in the San Francisco area. I had pre-
21 viously discussed the proposed visit of Admiral Nomura with
22 Admiral Richardson and told him that I expected to talk to
23 him because of my intimate acquaintance with Admiral Nomura
24 and Admiral Richardson expressed a desire for a copy of the
25 report which I told him I would make out after the conversa-

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 tion and send in to the Chief of Naval Operations.

3 Mr. Gearhart: Now, as an expert in naval strategy and
4 as an Intelligence officer and informed with respect to such
5 things you knew what the Japanese problem was in the event
6 they undertook hostilities against the United States?

7 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: That problem was to immobilize our Fleet
9 until they could consolidate their conquests and install
10 themselves into position, is that not correct?

11 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir, and specifi-
12 cally, too, I felt that they had as their objective seriously
13 disabling at least four battleships.

14 Mr. Gearhart: It would have been a rather dangerous
15 operation for the Japanese to attempt conquests in the South-
16 western Pacific if the American Fleet was on its flank and in
17 fighting trim?

18 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir. As I explained
19 yesterday, that although we had in the Pacific 102 ships as
20 against the Japanese 180, they would certainly feel that by
21 the time we had assembled an expeditionary force with which to
22 make an offensive movement across the Pacific we could have
23 the rest of our Fleet around in the Pacific even if it had to
24 go around the Horn.

25 Mr. Gearhart: And even though the Japanese did have far

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 more ships numerically speaking in the Pacific than we had,
3 they had their responsibilities, other responsibilities than
4 facing an American Fleet alone and would have further respon-
5 sibilities in the event they were to move through finally in
6 the Pacific, is that not correct?

7 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir; and I might add
8 that in all our problems, Fleet problems at War College and
9 the general consideration it was taken for granted that in the
10 event of hostilities between the United States and Japan they
11 would most certainly capture Guam and attempt to capture the
12 Philippines regardless of whatever else they did.

13 Mr. Gearhart: And whatever they did do, each operation
14 required ships?

15 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Therefore, they did not have 160 vessels
17 of different kinds to direct against our approximately a
18 hundred vessels of different kinds at Hawaii?

19 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

20 Mr. Gearhart: And assuming that we would immediately re-
21 inforce our Fleet by transfers from the Atlantic, - and they
22 had to assume the worst, of course, - it became apparent from
23 their standpoint, did it not, that they had to immobilize a
24 considerable number of our ships before they undertook any
25 operations in the Southwestern Pacific?

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, and as I have indi-
3 cated previously.

4 Mr. Gearhart: And when they undertook this attack upon
5 Hawaii they undertook a very risky operation, did they not?
6 As it turned out it worked all right for them but I mean as
7 they contemplated it and looked forward to the operation.

8 Captain Zacharias: All things being equal it may be con-
9 sidered a very dangerous operation, as was indicated by the
10 extract that I read into the record yesterday, which is page
11 47 of the papers furnished to the committee, but we felt that
12 they knew the exact situation existing in Hawaii and could to
13 some extent discount the danger that they might encounter.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Well, as a matter of fact whether it was
15 very, very dangerous or whether it was less dangerous or not
16 dangerous at all, it was absolutely necessary for Japan to
17 commence this war/that way, as you pointed out.

18 Captain Zacharias: In order to have a chance of victory,
19 that is correct.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Now, the Hawaiian Islands are very small
21 and the harbors are very limited and the Fleet based on Hawaii
22 was necessarily concentrated, with the ships very close to-
23 gether under all circumstances, is that not correct?

24 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

25 Mr. Gearhart: And the Fleet at Hawaii proper would be a

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 far better opportunity for immobilization by a successful at-
3 tack than they would have been if the Fleet had been scattered
4 between San Francisco, Monterey Bay, Los Angeles Harbor,
5 Long Beach and San Diego?

6 Captain Zacharias: I think the important point in there
7 was that that gave the Japanese a better opportunity to de-
8 stroy the aircraft which would be a menace to the force that
9 was bringing the planes over and thereby reduce the danger
10 to the Japanese force, than would have existed if they would
11 have had to attack another area. As it turned out they did
12 immobilize practically every aircraft in Hawaii.

13 Mr. Gearhart: And by knocking out our battleships they
14 immobilized our Fleet and compelled it to immediately drop
15 its offensive plans as set forth in WPL-46 and the Rainbow,
16 and go on a defensive operation, didn't they?

17 Captain Zacharias: Of course, I felt immediately after
18 Pearl Harbor that the Japanese had not destroyed any vessels
19 which we would use in the operations that would be needed in
20 the immediate future, such as the raids which we began. Those
21 battleships, of course, would be vitally necessary at a later
22 date, when we began the expeditionary forces.

23 Mr. Gearhart: That being true how do you account for the
24 fact that the Japanese pilots went right after the battleships
25 and their damager to the cruisers was slight in comparison?

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Captain Zacharias: Because the Japanese had in mind
3 disabling all the battleships because they would represent the
4 ultimate force that would be brought to bear against the Japan-
5 ese in the Western Pacific.

6 Mr. Gearhart: But they were not considering about ulti-
7 mate forces as much as they were considering the immediate re-
8 sult, were they not? Is that not true?

9 Captain Zacharias: The immediate result was to disable
10 the battleships, yes, sir.

11 Mr. Gearhart: The immediate result they were after was
12 to immobilize the American Fleet for a considerable length of
13 time.

14 Captain Zacharias: That is correct.

15 Mr. Gearhart: To give them time sufficiently long for them
16 to consolidate their conquests in the Southwest Pacific.

17 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Now, they immobilized our Fleet, as they
19 set out to, by immobilizing our battleships, didn't they?

20 Captain Zacharias: I was differentiating between the of-
21 fensive and defensive actions on our part, but I agree to what
22 you say, sir.

23 Mr. Gearhart: In other words, if their attack had been
24 unsuccessful against Hawaii, the very temper of the American
25 people, I think, would have been such as to require an immed-

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 late attempt by the American Fleet to go to the relief of the
3 Philippines, is that not correct?

4 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

5 Mr. Gearhart: And if we went to the relief of the Philip-
6 pines it would have to be by an American armada undertaking
7 the task, wouldn't it?

8 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

9 Mr. Gearhart: That would have to include battleships,
10 would it not?

11 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Gearhart: And, therefore, by immobilizing our bat-
13 tleships they immobilized the American Fleet right then, not
14 eventually, is that not correct?

15 Captain Zacharias: As far as early movements were con-
16 cerned that is correct, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Now, by concentrating our Fleet in
18 this limited area around the Hawaiian Islands and in that one
19 harbor that they have over there that is at all important,
20 did we not offer the Japs a temptation to come there and with
21 one fell swoop to immobilize our whole Fleet and accomplish
22 something which would have been difficult to accomplish if
23 the Fleet had been scattered along the Pacific Coast as ad-
24 vocated by others and naval strategists?

25 Captain Zacharias: Well, that is a matter of policy,

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 undoubtedly, based on information which was not at my dis-
3 posal. I prefer not to comment on that.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Well, I don't want you to take sides be-
5 tween one set of officers and another set of strategists, but,
6 in passing on it, the Japs could not have hit the Pacific
7 Coast and knock out and immobilize our full Fleet if our
8 Fleet was scattered, with only four carriers, could they?

9 Captain Zacharias: I think the important consideration
10 is this: If the Fleet had been at some point on the West
11 Coast the Japanese would not have been in a position to im-
12 mobilize the aircraft at our disposal, which would have re-
13 sulted in a very sizable aircraft force being sent out
14 against the forces which had to come in to make this attack,
15 and would have created a very dangerous situation for the
16 Japanese fleet which had come over. In addition to that they
17 would have had to travel twenty-five hundred miles further
18 than Hawaii, which would put them in a position strategically
19 vulnerable because of the location of the air forces at
20 Hawaii and Dutch Harbor to the northward.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Well, now, we have defined the problem
22 that the Japanese had with our Fleet based at Hawaii. Can
23 you define the problem that would have been theirs if they
24 were contemplating hostilities against the United States if
25 our Fleet were scattered between San Francisco and San Diego?

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Captain Zacharias: We did contemplate that in our Fleet
3 problem No. 14 in 1932, in which I participated as commanding
4 officer of a destroyer and was required to make up an estim-
5 ate of the situation and a decision. At that time I arrived
6 at the conclusion that the Japanese would begin hostilities
7 with an air attack on our Fleet wherever it was and also dis-
8 able by an air attack, if possible, the facilities at Hawaii
9 on their way home.

10 At that time, 1932, we did not have dispersed along the
11 West Coast or in close proximity the air bases which we had
12 in 1941 and which I have indicated would have created a much
13 more dangerous situation for the Japanese at that time than it
14 would have in 1932. However, I give you that to indicate
15 that we have thought in terms of this air attack for a long
16 time.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Well, if our Fleet was scattered along the
18 Pacific Coast the air defense problem would be reduced to one-
19 half in that they would only have to patrol 180 degrees,
20 whereas around the islands they have to patrol 360 degrees,
21 is that not correct?

22 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir, provided we
23 did not take into consideration a favorable sector from which
24 they might approach.

25 Mr. Gearhart: And in the event that they set upon the

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 idea of immobilizing our Fleet scattered as I described along
3 the Pacific Coast, they would have to send at least four naval
4 contingents to cover each one of the ports where the American
5 Fleet might be at that moment in harbor?

6 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

7 Mr. Gearhart: And, furthermore, is it not a fact that
8 we had permanent installations of radar along the Pacific
9 Coast?

10 Captain Zacharias: I do not recall the state of the radar
11 installations at that time.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Well, there is one other thing that I
13 would like to conclude by asking you about: In the course of
14 your remarks you used the phrase "surprise inspections".

15 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Gearhart: I think you were discussing some operation
17 that was being used frequently in the Hawaiian area, were you
18 not?

19 Captain Zacharias: Those surprise inspections were in-
20 spections made by division commanders of ships, or higher au-
21 thority, by sudden visits to the ships they wished to inspect,
22 with an announcement only late the night before that they
23 were coming the following morning. This, of course, was for
24 the purpose of keeping up materiel conditions of the ships.
25 What prompted my remark this afternoon when I was visiting

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 with some of the staff at Fleet headquarters, was the chang-
3 in; situation which made me feel that a little more attention
4 should be directed toward the surprise attacks rather than
5 these materiel conditions at that time.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Now, you were coming into Hawaii on
7 December 7th, weren't you, as commander of the USS Salt Lake
8 City?

9 Captain Zacharias: We were originally scheduled to re-
10 turn on the 5th of December, but that was on the regular train-
11 ing schedule which we were to take up when we left port, but
12 which was changed when we found that we were going to Wake
13 Island, so our delay was due principally to the necessities of
14 re-fueling on that trip, a little bad weather that we en-
15 countered and the duty that we were performing, so that we did
16 not arrive until the morning of the 8th of December.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Well, naturally as a naval officer you
18 were tremendously interested in what had transpired at Pearl
19 Harbor on the 7th?

20 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Everybody was talking about that and no-
22 thing else. Did you make a visit to Pearl Harbor on the 8th?

23 Captain Zacharias: I did, sir.

24 Mr. Gearhart: You saw the results of their attack?

25 Captain Zacharias: I did, sir.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: I wonder if you heard discussed at that time anything about inspections having been ordered or having been in process on any of the ships that were in the harbor at the time of the attack?

Captain Zacharias: I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: What did you learn as to what was the fact with respect to inspections of various kinds that were being engaged in at the time of the attack?

Captain Zacharias: Well, this is only hearsay and I have no basis for expressing it other than that there was much discussion about one or more ships being opened for a surprise inspection on Monday morning.

Mr. Gearhart: Monday morning? You mean after the attack they were still opened?

Captain Zacharias: They were opened on Saturday or Sunday -- on Saturday, or before the attack on Sunday morning, so that they would be ready for the inspecting party when they arrived on Monday morning. As I say, I have no knowledge of the facts regarding this.

Mr. Gearhart: When you use the phrase "opened for inspection" are you referring to the voids of the larger ships?

Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Battleships have voids?

Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

1319

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: Cruisers have voids?

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Captain Zacharias: Some, yes, sir.

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Mr. Gearhart: But destroyers do not, is that correct?

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Captain Zacharias: That is correct.

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Mr. Gearhart: And when the voids are opened the battle efficiency of a battleships and a cruiser is reduced somewhat, is it not?

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Captain Zacharias: Those voids are for the purpose of giving additional stability to the ship. Therefore, when water is allowed to enter them the stability of the ship is greatly reduced and enhances the chances of capsizing.

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Mr. Gearhart: But if water enters into any one void and is properly sealed, the water is confined to that particular void, is that not true?

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Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: And the ship therefore will not sink as a result of having been pierced by a torpedo in a single or one or two voids?

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Captain Zacharias: That is true, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, did you hear in the discussion that the voids on some of the battleships were opened for inspection at the time the torpedo attack occurred?

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Captain Zacharias: Those were the rumors.

Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Well, wasn't it a well-substantiated

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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rumor in view of what happened to the Oklahoma?

Captain Zacharias: So it would appear, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: In fact, it capsized because of the torpedoes and the letting of water in unequally in the ship, is that correct?

Captain Zacharias: I don't know about the Oklahoma but I think it has been brought out that the Bureau of Ships made a study of the situation pertaining to those ships and found that only one ship was affected by that condition. I cannot remark on the correctness of that statement.

Mr. Gearhart: The report was a little bit unsatisfactory to me when it said that the fighting efficiency of one ship was reduced because of the condition of the inspection. I do not know how to interpret that, and the ship they referred to was the California.

Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: But the fighting efficiency of one ship can be improved by having its voids open when a battle is on?

Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, I had a letter from one of the Annapolis students who heard you speak down in Annapolis and ever since you said something about that yesterday I have been trying to find that letter and I haven't been able to find it, but it compels me to ask you were your addresses that you delivered

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 down there at that time written? Were they prepared ad-
3 dresses in writing?

4 Captain Zacharias: They were delivered from notes and
5 after the question yesterday I found my notes last night and
6 discovered that the statement was with regard to the importance
7 of Intelligence, if I may refer to the notes, which I have.
8 This was a lecture delivered to the midshipmen on the 20th
9 of November 1942 in which I stated, in the course of emphasiz-
10 ing the importance of Intelligence, that:

11 "Full appreciation of Intelligence would have pre-
12 vented the surprise at Pearl Harbor. Intelligence knew
13 what would happen, where and when and more will be heard
14 later about the failure to grasp the basic psychology
15 of the Japanese which was largely responsible for the
16 success of the Japanese attack."

17 I think that is the substance of the point in question.

18 Mr. Gearhart: I believe that is all. Thank you very much,
19 Captain.

20 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson of Michigan will in-
21 quire, Captain.

22 Captain Zacharias: Sir?

23 The Vice Chairman: I said Senator Ferguson of Michigan
24 will inquire now.

25 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

1922

Witness Zacharias:

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Captain Zacharias, were you familiar
3 with our policy as far as our diplomatic relations with Japan
4 were concerned?

5 Captain Zacharias: I think so, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Were you one of the men who saw the
7 intercepts of the Japanese code as far as it related to our
8 international or our relations with Japan?

9 Captain Zacharias: I had seen many of them at times
10 previously but none at the time near the Pearl Harbor attack.

11 Senator Ferguson: When did you leave the Intelligence
12 branch here in Washington?

13 Captain Zacharias: I left Washington the last time in
14 1936, when I went to two years sea duty. My next Intelligence
15 duty was as District Intelligence Officer in San Diego from
16 June 1938 until November 1940. During that period I made one
17 trip back to Washington on duty for a period of about three
18 or four weeks to discuss the situation and details with Ad-
19 miral Anderson, then the Director of Naval Intelligence.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, if I understood you correctly
21 then, you knew that we were intercepting Jap diplomatic mes-
22 sages?

23 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: And you knew that how early, what year?

25 Captain Zacharias: Well, of course, I indicated that I

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 was engaged in cryptanalytic work, particularly of the Japan-
3 ese, as far back as 1924.

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, were you familiar with the actual
5 messages at any time? Did you know that we had received a
6 dead line message on the 29th?

7 Captain Zacharias: No, sir, I did not have knowledge of
8 those.

9 Senator Ferguson: You did not have any knowledge of that?

10 Captain Zacharias: No, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Did you have the so-called ship move-
12 ments knowledge that is in exhibit 2? I want to show you sev-
13 eral messages.

14 Captain Zacharias: Well, they had continually been inter-
15 ested in movements of ships, all of our ships.

16 Senator Ferguson: But if you will look on page 12, the
17 one I think that was referred to yesterday. Now, that is
18 dated September the 24th, 1941 and according to our informa-
19 tion on the bottom of it it was translated on October the 9th.
20 Are you familiar with that message?

21 Captain Zacharias: I had not seen it before, no, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: Would that indicate that Japan was
23 plotting our harbor for an air attack?

24 Captain Zacharias: I think that would have reinforced my
25 views regarding the preparation.

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Isn't that the thing that such a mes-
3 sage would indicate? Isn't that the only thing that such a
4 message could indicate?

5 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: How do you account for the fact that
7 it would not be translated from September 24th to October the
8 9th when our diplomatic intercepts were being decoded the
9 day, many times, that they were received? In fact, I know of
10 no case when they were not translated the same day.

11 Captain Zacharias: I think that is one -- I look upon
12 that as one of the organizational deficiencies.

13 Senator Ferguson: I want to ask you about the organi-
14 zational deficiencies. Will you explain that to us?

15 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

16 Senator Ferguson: What you mean by the "organizational
17 deficiencies"?

18 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield on one thing that is
19 in the record? You said the diplomatic messages were trans-
20 lated on the same day. That is not quite so. In fact, the
21 winds code was not translated for a period of about two weeks
22 after, the original winds code itself.

23 Senator Ferguson: I want to ask the witness whether or
24 not the winds code was considered diplomatic. It was not in
25 purple code, as I understand it.

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Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Mr. Murphy: It is in the intercepts, in the diplomatic intercepts. It is in Volume 1 or 2, it is in that book there on page 154. You will find a period of ten days.

Senator Ferguson: It tells exactly when they were received here and many of them were translated on the same day. It was one known as the code of the Jap Diplomatic 1, not the purple code.

Were you familiar with the difference between Jap Diplomatic 1 and purple?

Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir. I think that at this time there was a limited number of personnel available to do such work as you have here and the allocation of it was a result of an agreement between the Army and the Navy and the delay which is indicated here is undoubtedly due to one of two things: Either insufficient personnel with which to cover all of the traffic or improper selectivity.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Now, in that same exhibit will
3 you look at page 22?

4 Captain Zacharias: (After perusing document) Yes.

5 Senator Ferguson: If that had been decoded and on
6 the desk of one of the naval officers by noon, or by 2
7 o'clock Saturday, the 6th, would that message have been
8 significant as to an attack on Pearl Harbor? Particularly
9 page 23?

10 Captain Zacharias: Only as something leading up to
11 it. It does indicate a little further concentration of
12 espionage activities, but there is nothing there beyond
13 what we already knew, that they were trying to keep in
14 the closest possible touch with our ship movements.

15 Senator Ferguson: Did not that also indicate that
16 they were following up the message that you saw on page
17 12?

18 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir. It is an intensification
19 of the espionage activities which would have had a signifi-
20 cance.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, that was received by our
22 Communications on the 3rd of December, 1941.

23 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Now, look at page 27, the one on
25 the 6th from Honolulu to Tokyo, where they talk about, in

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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the first sentence, "Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment."

Then the last sentence, "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places."

What does that indicate?

Captain Zacharias: That would have been extremely significant that an attack was in preparation.

Senator Ferguson: Well, that was in our possession, as shown by the message itself on the 6th.

Now, I want to ask you, how the selectivity of these messages could have been exercised, so we could have pulled out a message like that, and have seen that they intended to attack Pearl Harbor, and even do it by a surprise attack. What method is there in the Department for selecting such a message to get a translation of it quickly, particularly since on the morning of the 6th, we had a pilot message that we were going to get an answer to our declaration of the 26th, and it would be in 14 parts, and there would be a time of delivery? Are you familiar with those messages?

Captain Zacharias: Not the contents of the messages, but in general.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Now, that being true, and expecting on Saturday that there was, as they had expressed before, "something automatically would take place, wouldn't it be significant that on the day we were anticipating an answer that we were not decoding immediately all messages sent on that day, because that could be a fatal day? Do you see what I have in mind?

Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir that is correct, but it is possible that there were personnel limitations there. That point, I think, can be better covered by the officers actually engaged at the time in this work.

Senator Ferguson: Well, would there be anything unusual on that kind of a day to work all personnel around the clock?

Captain Zacharias: Considering the situation existing at the time, I would say that that is correct, sir.

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1 Witnezz Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not we
3 were alerted here in Washington on that day?

4 Captain Zacharias: I do not know, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: You say that the message on page 27
6 is a very significant message that they would attack Pearl
7 Harbor. I wish you would look at the whole message.

8 Captain Zacharias: Yes.

9 Senator Ferguson: Give us your opinion on it.

10 Captain Zacharias: That would lead to the conclusion
11 that there had been previous discussions by the Japanese
12 of the feasibility of an air attack and that this did presage
13 something.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now were you familiar with the
15 fact that Japan was about to attack the Kra Peninsula on
16 Sunday, or Saturday?

17 Captain Zacharias: I was not aware of that.

18 Senator Ferguson: You were not aware of that?

19 Captain Zacharias: No, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Would that fact have been significant,
21 that on Saturday we had received the message from the British
22 Admiralty, from Winant who was our Ambassador there, to
23 the Secretary of State, which went to our Navy, and to
24 others, that some 60-odd ships were moving on the Kra
25 Peninsula about 14 hours away?

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Captain Zacharias: That would depend upon other information available at the time. The Kra Peninsula, while being a direct menace to Singapore, I cannot say at this time and would not have been able to say whether or not that in itself would involve Japan in a war with the United States.

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Senator Ferguson: Did you have any knowledge as to what was the arrangement between the United States and Britain and the Netherlands in relation to an attack on one being considered an attack on all?

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Captain Zacharias: No, sir, I did not.

Senator Ferguson: You had no such knowledge?

Captain Zacharias: None whatever.

Senator Ferguson: It would have depended upon that situation, would it, as to what appraisal or evaluation you would have given the movement on the British possessions?

Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you anticipate that if they attacked one that they would attack both, or did you have no facts upon which you could base that?

Captain Zacharias: I had not facts, but I always felt that the Japanese, being the opportunists that they were, and the fact that they had always made their advance prepared to retreat a little to placate anyone who might dislike it,

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 I could only speculate as to the probable effect that that
3 would have on my opinion at that time.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that the Japanese maps
5 showed that there were supposed to be carriers where some
6 of our battleships were, and that that may have made a
7 difference on the concentration on the battleships? You
8 indicated before that you thought they were equally alert
9 to getting our aircraft as they were to getting the battle-
10 ships.

11 Captain Zacharias: The aircraft on shore, I meant.
12 I did not mean the Naval aircraft.

13 Senator Ferguson: You did not mean the Naval aircraft?

14 Captain Zacharias: No, sir. That was the aircraft
15 on shore, because they would be the only ones available to
16 go out against the Japanese forces, or to intercept the
17 attacking planes. It would be impossible to launch the
18 aircraft from the carriers in the harbor.

19 Senator Ferguson: That is true.

20 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: What about the carriers themselves?

22 Captain Zacharias: Well, they would look upon the
23 carriers as probably just as important as the battleships.
24 But knowing that they were cognizant of the movements of
25 our ships I think they well knew that no carriers were in

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 there on the morning of December 7.

3 Senator Ferguson: Do you know anything in relation
4 to a down wind sector? Does that mean anything to you?

5 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Where was that sector?

7 Captain Zacharias: I do not know about a message --

8 Senator Ferguson: (Interposing) Not a message, but
9 a certain territory around Hawaii.

10 Captain Zacharias: Well, the down wind sector, of
11 course, is a small sector on either side of the direction
12 of the wind. That is the sector within which we might expect
13 an attack to come, because of the necessity of the attacking
14 forces to have the best chance of getting away.

15 It was felt that they would launch their planes from
16 up wind in that comparatively small sector in order to let
17 them come in with a greater speed, and when the forces re-
18 treated up wind, that is away from Hawaii, it would slow
19 down any planes, it would slow down to the greatest extent
20 any planes that might come out to attack those forces.

21 Therefore it could be expected that an attack would
22 be launched from this down wind sector, so-called, in order
23 to get the best results in the shortest possible time, and
24 to give the greatest protection to the attacking forces.

25 Senator Ferguson: You said you had a conversation with

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Admiral Nomura before he came over here, in fact before he arrived here in Washington.

3

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Captain Zacharias: I did, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Was there anything in that conversation that indicated to you that war was imminent?

7

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Captain Zacharias: There was not, sir. I was convinced that he would do his utmost to prevent it.

9

Senator Ferguson: At that time you trusted him?

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Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir, because of his statement in 1921, and which he reiterated at that time on February 8, 1941, that he felt that if Japan and the United States went to war it would mean the finish of the Japanese Empire and a great loss to the United States.

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Senator Ferguson: Did he say anything on the day that you talked to him in 1941 about that?

17

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Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir, he did. I asked him if he still felt that way and he said he did.

19

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Senator Ferguson: Then there was nothing in that conversation that was significant, as far as Pearl Harbor was concerned, or an attack on Pearl Harbor?

22

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Captain Zacharias: No, sir, there was not.

Senator Ferguson: In fact I take it, from your statement there, that it would be all negative, that it would indicate that war would not be imminent?

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Captain Zacharias: That he would do his best to prevent
3 it.

4 Senator Ferguson: And in your opinion was he a strong
5 man in government in Japan, that his views would mean a lot
6 on the question of war?

7 Captain Zacharias: He was. He was a very unusual
8 Japanese in many ways, and I might say that he was the only
9 Japanese extant who had expressed himself regarding the
10 potential power of the United States, because that was
11 something they never wanted to hear, or disliked to hear.

12 It so happens that when other Japanese who had been
13 over here in official capacities ventured the opinion that
14 the war potential of the United States might make it impossible
15 for them to win a war against the United States it always
16 brought them into disfavor.

17 Admiral Nomura was the only one who seemed to be able
18 to keep his position even after stating such things.

19 Senator Ferguson: Would that bring you to the con-
20 clusion that it would have been a good thing for us to be
21 bold with our forces on Hawaii, that we should have indicated
22 that we anticipated an attack, that we were alerted to
23 full strength both in Washington and in Hawaii, rather than
24 to say that we were to do nothing that would arouse the
25 population?

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Captain Zacharias: Well, that was a matter of policy
3 which was probably based on more information that I had
4 available.

5 Senator Ferguson: But with what you knew, what would
6 your answer be?

7 Captain Zacharias: My knowledge of the Japanese makes
8 me feel that they respond better to certain things than they
9 do to others, and one of them would be a situation that
10 would not invite an attack by them. That was why I was
11 concerned about the situation in March, 1942, which caused
12 me to prepare, or to initiate the conversation with Admiral
13 Draemel and prepare the memorandum for Admiral Nimitz,
14 because of the local situation and the defensive attitude
15 that we were taking at that time which, to my mind, invited
16 the Japanese to come back. That, of course, eventuated
17 in less than 3 months when the battle of Midway took place.

18 The attitude to which I refer was expressed in the
19 press in such terms as "We can defend the islands". Anyone
20 knowing the Japanese would realize that that would immedi-
21 ately create in their minds a doubt on our part as to
22 whether or not we could defend them. I would have preferred
23 to say "We wish the Japanese would come back. We will hit
24 them with everything we have." That would have had an
25 entirely different effect upon them than a pronouncement that

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 we can defend the Hawaiian Islands.

2
3 Senator Ferguson: Was your ship, the SALT LAKE CITY,
4 alerted fully to war on the 6th, your particular ship?

5 In other words, you were the Captain of that ship.

6 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Were you alerted to war?

8 Captain Zacharias: I was alert myself on December 5,
9 when I received a report that a submarine had been sighted
10 in the Hawaiian area. As you recall, that was one of the
11 contingencies, the unmistakable signs that I indicated to
12 Admiral Kimmel, that the Japanese would be ready to strike.

13 Therefore --

14 Senator Ferguson: (Interposing) As I understand it,
15 you were alert because you knew there was a sub around,
16 not that somebody alerted you?

17 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Go ahead. You started to say "There-
19 fore".

20 Captain Zacharias: That evening, from 6:00 o'clock
21 to midnight -- this was the 5th of December, Friday night --
22 I sat at my radio listening to the short wave transmissions
23 from Japan, hoping to pick up something which would give me
24 further indications of what they intended, but all I could
25 hear was scrambled conversation. We were then enroute to

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Pearl Harbor. I did nothing, other than the condition
3 of readiness 3 in which we were placed at the time, to alert
4 the ship any further.

5 Of course, under way the Captain is in his emergency
6 cabin all the time, which is really a part of the navigating
7 bridge, where the officer on deck can have him on the bridge
8 within two seconds.

(7) 9 Senator Ferguson: But there was no specific alert
10 given to your ship?

11 Captain Zacharias: There was not, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Now we have evidence before us that
13 General Hayes A. Kroner, the Chief of the Intelligence
14 Branch, War Department, G-2, from July 1941 up to the time
15 of the Japanese attack, had not personally received the
16 intercepts of the Jap codes either in Exhibit 2 or Exhibit 1,
17 or the others. Could you explain what the set-up would
18 be that would keep him from having that information? You
19 were familiar with the set-up here, were you not?

20 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir. I did not know about
21 that specific instance, but it might be an indication of
22 one of the organizational deficiencies which I had in mind
23 and which had been considered over a great number of years
24 and on which effort had been made to bring about a change.
25 That is the allocation of the cryptographic work to a

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 purely technical bureau such as the Office of Naval
3 Communications and Signal Intelligence Service of the Army.
4 Those are purely technical organizations which have the
5 facilities and personnel for picking messages out of the air.
6 After that their function would seem to cease, and there-
7 fore the decrypting, translating, evaluating and dissemination
8 of information in such dispatches is a purely Intelligence
9 function.

10 For that reason I had made consistent efforts over
11 many years to have that function placed directly under the
12 Office of Naval Intelligence, but without results.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, why would they place evaluation
14 under Communications rather than under Intelligence?

15 Captain Zacharias: That is one of the things that I
16 could never understand, because Intelligence is the receptacle
17 of all information and would be the only organization in
18 either the Army or Navy where all information was available,
19 and particularly background information such as on the
20 Japanese. That appears to have contributed largely to some
21 of the things that took place, because the evaluations were
22 made by certain War Plans Officers without a background
23 knowledge of Japan and the Japanese, and they could not
24 possibly have at their disposal all the information available.

25 Senator Ferguson: Do you know how often they would

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 change the heads of Intelligence in the Navy?

3 Captain Zacharias: That is another organizational
4 deficiency that I would like to defer. I might say that in
5 the past five years we have had seven directors of Naval
6 Intelligence.

7 Senator Ferguson: If you knew that, how is it possible
8 for the director to get the background information and really
9 intelligently operate as an Intelligence Officer?

10 Captain Zacharias: It is not possible.

11 Senator Ferguson: Before December 7, 1941, we had a
12 change, as I remember here in the evidence, in March, and
13 one on October 15, which was the day before the change in
14 the Jap Cabinet.

15 Captain Zacharias: That was when Admiral Kirk was
16 relieved by Admiral Wilkinson.

17 Senator Ferguson: Kirk took the place of Anderson
18 and Anderson had been relieved by an acting man, so we
19 really had three in that year.

20 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: How would it be possible, from your
22 experience in Intelligence, for an officer as director of
23 Naval Intelligence to get the background and to be able to
24 intelligently evaluate intelligence under those circumstances
25 and under those changes?

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Captain Zacharias: As I said before, it is not possible. That is one of the points that I would like to emphasize, regarding the training of officers for Intelligence work. There has been a general misconception that because an officer is intelligent he is a good Intelligence officer. That is not correct. As indicated by Senator Brewster yesterday in reading from one of the papers, I wish to emphasize that Naval officers are trained fundamentally not to be Intelligence officers, because of the qualifications that are attached thereto. That does not detract one bit from the capabilities of these officers as Naval officers, but it is a misconception to believe that because an officer is intelligent he will make a good Intelligence officer.

WARD & SYLVESTER WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Why shouldn't a man, if he makes a good Intelligence officer, receive his promotions and receive high rank. Why do we treat Intelligence, which is, as I understand, to tell you the strength of the enemy, when you may go to war, or when you may not, and where you may go to war -- aren't those all very, very important questions?

Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir. It is actually a specialty of same comparable importance as the Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Senator Ferguson: But what have been the conditions in our Navy?

Captain Zacharias: I might say that there has been entire disregard of the fundamental requirement for Intelligence, but that is not a reflection on those who made the decisions, because they were not in a position to judge properly.

If you will examine that letter of mine written on January 27, 1942, which is a part of the exhibit which I sent into the Chief of Naval Operations, via the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet at that time, I have indicated clearly why we must have better selectivity and training for officers doing Intelligence work, and unless we do that, I think we will never change the situation with

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 which we have been confronted in the past.

3 Senator Ferguson: You mentioned yesterday, in rela-
4 tion to, let's call it the boldness of an officer, or the
5 capacity of an officer to evaluate something for a superior
6 officer, that some men just do not have the capacity to
7 evaluate and actually tell the superior officer the meaning
8 of what he has.

9 Captain Zacharias: That is correct sir, and that is
10 what I tried to do for Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Nimitz.

11 Senator Ferguson: Could that prior to the 7th have
12 been one of the cases that we didn't really get out of
13 what we intercepted and what we had the real significance,
14 and permitted an attack without our knowledge that it was
15 coming?

16 Captain Zacharias: That is quite true, sir. The
17 improper selection of officers for Intelligence duty is
18 one, I look upon as one organizational deficiency. The
19 allocation of evaluation functions to the Communications
20 Officer and Signal Intelligence Service is the other, and
21 a third one -- well, I won't bring that in at this time.

22 Senator Ferguson: Does it have anything to do with
23 this?

24 Captain Zacharias: We have mentioned it already. The
25 War Plans Officers undertaking the functions of evaluation

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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and dissemination instead of the Chiefs of Intelligence taking that over.

Senator Ferguson: Now, that brings me to this point, that sometime during 1941, it was decided that certain people would get the information, that is, it would be given to the War Plans, it would be given to the Chief of Naval Operations, it would be given to the Secretary of the Navy, it would be given to the President of the United States, it would be given to the Secretary of State, in the raw, you might call it, so that evaluations would not go to them from the men who had been trained and who had the history of the situation.

Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did that fact not alone place the responsibility for the evaluation of our intelligence in those who got it in the raw, and did not take the evaluation of those who had the history and who were trained to give evaluation?

Captain Zacharias: I would say that it would tend to take away the functions of the Chiefs of Intelligence who should have been the sole, should have had the sole responsibility for the evaluation and presentation to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff and at Pearl Harbor, the Fleet Intelligence Officers instead of

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 the War Plans Officer.

3 I would like to point specifically to that because,
4 as has been reported, it was the War Plans Officer on the
5 Staff of the Commander in Chief who stated in a conference
6 between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, when asked
7 whether there was any probability of an air attack on Pearl
8 Harbor, he stated there was none.

9 Now, he was an officer, an excellent officer, but he
10 did not have any background knowledge of Japan or the
11 Japanese, or their psychology. In other words, he did not
12 have full information at his disposal on which to make such
13 a decision, and unconsciously that would be bound to effect
14 the decision of the Commander in Chief, and I feel that he
15 is entitled to better information and advice than he
16 received there, all of which was inadvertent and due solely
17 to the organizational deficiency, and I feel confident that
18 if the Fleet Intelligence Officer had had the sole responsi-
19 bility for stating his evaluation to the Commander in Chief
20 and had been allowed to do so, we would have had an entirely
21 different picture.

22 Senator Ferguson: Now, you stated this morning that
23 the attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was a hazardous
24 attack. Of course, all attacks in war are hazardous, isn't
25 that true?

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Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir, and they discuss that
3 fully in this extract from the book that I read yesterday.

4 Senator Ferguson: Now if the Japanese knew that we
5 were fully alerted -- and as I understand it their intelli-
6 gence was rather superior on Hawaii, they had intelligence
7 officers all over the Island?

8 Captain Zacharias: They knew everything that was
9 going on.

10 Senator Ferguson: They knew everything that was going
11 on. Therefore we should have assumed that they knew every-
12 thing that was going on, isn't that correct?

13 Captain Zacharias: That is correct.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now, if they knew everything that
15 was going on, the next thing they would have to find out
16 would be whether we knew that they knew what was going on;
17 isn't that correct?

18 Captain Zacharias: That is correct.

19 Senator Ferguson: If we did know what was going on
20 and were fully alerted, it would be an extraordinarily
21 hazardous thing, would it not?

22 Captain Zacharias: That is true.

23 Senator Ferguson: If they knew that we just passed
24 it over and didn't do anything, for instance, stopped our
25 radar at 7 in the morning, and had our ships coming in

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1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 from the Coast unarmed, at the same time that we were
3 not alerted, they had these messages, as I have shown you,
4 what hazard were they taking?

5 Captain Zacharias: I would say they were confident
6 that they were taking none, and that they knew every detail
7 of information as to the operation of the radars, the times
8 at which they were under operation, and other things that
9 were of importance to them.

10 Senator Ferguson: In your opinion, how could the
11 fact that on the morning of the 7th we fully alerted Hawaii,
12 Pearl Harbor, to a full alert for an attack, how could that
13 have in any way been a detriment to the United States? That
14 would be four or five hours before they left their ships.

15 Suppose they found out we were then fully alerted,
16 wouldn't that be a great benefit to the United States,
17 that they would get that knowledge?

18 Captain Zacharias: It would have, sir. It might
19 have served the purpose of preventing -- of calling off
20 the attack.

21 Senator Ferguson: If they knew we were fully alerted?

22 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Now, I showed you the ad in a
24 newspaper this morning.

25 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: You obtained from your file
3 another ad in a newspaper. I want to show you these ads.

4 First, I want to show you the cloud above, with
5 the white spot on it, and the bottom part of the "J" in
6 "Jashion," and some of the words. Have you got an extra
7 copy of that?

8 Captain Zacharias: I have a small one.

9 Senator Ferguson: What does the bottom of that "J"
10 indicate in the Japanese or Chinese characters?

11 Captain Zacharias: The bottom part would be the numeral
12 1.

13 Senator Ferguson: Not 7?

14 Captain Zacharias: No, sir. The bottom part is simply
15 that straight line.

16 Senator Ferguson: I don't mean the bottom; I mean
17 the entire -- will you take this interpretation. This is
18 an advertisement published by the Hawaiian Star Bulletin,
19 December 3, 1941. That is before the Pearl Harbor attack.

20 Take the other sheet that I hand you. The reason I
21 ask you is that you are familiar with the language, and
22 we have indications here from some of these messages that
23 they were using the want ads and other ads to get certain
24 signals or certain information.

25 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir, but I don't think I

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 would attach much importance to it.

3 Senator Ferguson: You don't?

4 Captain Zacharias: No, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, look down over the sheet that
6 has been interpreted there, and see whether or not there
7 is any truth -- or whether they are false -- those inter-
8 pretations.

9 Captain Zacharias: I checked on --

10 Senator Ferguson: You must have checked on that ad.

11 Captain Zacharias: I did, sir. In Hawaii, this was
12 brought to my attention, and we checked first to see if
13 these were the names of silks, and I was told that there
14 was a silk for each one of these names, That led to the--

15 Senator Ferguson: Take the "Yippee."

16 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir. In consideration of
17 those --

18 Senator Ferguson: What kind of silk is that?

19 Captain Zacharias: In consideration of those various
20 unusual silks, it led to the investigation of who had inserted
21 the ad in the paper, particularly because in another paper,
22 in the Honolulu Star Bulletin on six different days,
23 November 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 26, there appeared in the
24 personal column, a phrase, "Yippee," which also appears in
25 this silk ad, "Please call me on phone, urgent."

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 On checking with the newspaper office, it was found
3 that this ad was registered in the name of a man named
4 Tmayer, giving a certain address.

5 Further investigation disclosed that no such person
6 was at the address given, or in any directory in Hawaii.
7 But the Intelligence Officer was unable to run down any-
8 thing further regarding these advertisements, but it did
9 leave the impression that it was very suspicious, particu-
10 larly because the ad was made up in Hawaiian importing
11 company, which was a Japanese house, and turned over to
12 the newspaper for publication.

13 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether there was a
14 silk known as Tip-Hi? That is the second one.

15 Captain Zacharias: Only through inquiries that there
16 was such a silk. I don't know now whether that is true.

17 Senator Ferguson: What does the word "Juno" mean;
18 what is the interpretation of that? What is the interpreta-
19 tion given on the ad I gave you? Will you look and see
20 on the one I gave you?

21 Captain Zacharias: Juno means "Sunday" in Japanese.
22 That is not correct.

23 Senator Ferguson: That is not correct?

24 Captain Zacharias: No, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: What is the word for Sunday?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson
Senator Lucas

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2 Captain Zacharias: Nichiyobi.

3 Senator Lucas: What is "Monday" in Japanese?

4 Captain Zacharias: Monday?

5 Senator Lucas: Yes.

6 Captain Zacharias: Getsuyobi.

7 Senator Ferguson: The reason I am asking you about
8 these ads, you thought they were significant, and had looked
9 them up and our Intelligence officers had looked them
10 up; isn't that true?

11 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Did you find that their intelligence
13 was such that they were using certain ads to convey certain
14 messages?

15 Captain Zacharias: It was my impression that they
16 were, particularly in Japanese newspapers. The reason for
17 insertion in the English language newspapers was in order
18 to reach agents who were not Japanese and who we knew were
19 operating in Hawaii at the time. That is, Germans and
20 Italians.

21 Senator Ferguson: In other words, they were reaching
22 them by ads in American newspapers, and this could have
23 been one of those ads?

24 Captain Zacharias: That is correct.

25 Senator Ferguson: You thought at one time that it was

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 such an ad?

3 Captain Zacharias: I did, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did you get anything from it?

5 Captain Zacharias: No, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Would the interpretations put on
7 the one which I gave you, give you any more knowledge on
8 it?

9 Captain Zacharias: No, sir. These have been analyzed
10 very thoroughly, and the conclusion was that there was
11 nothing we could understand from them. That still did not
12 remove the possibility of them being an instrument for
13 conveying information.

14 Senator Ferguson: In other words, unless you had
15 the code words, you couldn't determine that they were
16 significant?

17 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

18 Now, in order that there might not be any doubt
19 about this translation "Juno" meaning Sunday, the word
20 "nichiyobi" is composed of two characters, "nichi," meaning
21 Sunday, and "yobi" - "day". Likewise Monday is composed
22 of "getsuyobi," which is Monday, and "yobi" which is
23 "day".

24 Mr. Murphy: May I suggest that somebody reading this
25 record is going to have to read all this to get down to

Witness zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1
2 what they are looking for.

3 Senator Ferguson: Was this part of the Intelligence
4 system that you were looking at -- were any of our other
5 officers looking at these ads?

6 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir, very much so. I was
7 in frequent consultation with the officer in charge of
8 investigation in the 14th Naval District located in
9 Honolulu.

10 Senator Ferguson: That was now Commander W. B.
11 Stevenson. Had you any other advertisements that you
12 looked over?

13 Captain Zacharias: No, sir. These are the only ones.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now, there is one more question.
15 Why did you get a certificate from Munson that you had
16 made a statement to him in October -- it is the last page
17 of your sheet. That was in July of 1942. There is a certi-
18 ficate, as I read it, that you did tell Munson this story
19 about, this item about an attack on Sunday morning, and he
20 was making an investigation for someone here in Washington
21 and had credentials to see everything and hear everything?

22 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Why did you get the certificate?

24 Captain Zacharias: That was done upon the advice of
25 my wife, who, through womanly instinct, felt that at some

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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future date the subject might come up for discussion and there might be some short memories.

Senator Ferguson: Is your wife an intelligence officer also?

Captain Zacharias: She is my adviser on strategy.

Senator Lucas: I don't know why you would need that. Your memory is not short.

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

The Vice Chairman: It is now 12 o'clock. We will recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 2:00 o'clock p. m., of the same day.)

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

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The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

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Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will now inquire, Captain.

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TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, U.S. NAVY,

7

(Resumed)

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Mr. Keefe: Captain Zacharias, did you ever at any time tell Admiral Kimmel that a Jap air attack would be made on Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December, 1941?

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Captain Zacharias: I did not, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: In your conversations with Admiral Kimmel did you state anything more than your opinion based upon your study and your experience in Intelligence?

14

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Captain Zacharias: I did not, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: That in the event of a breakdown of diplomatic relations Japan would attack the Fleet wherever it might be and, in your opinion, the attack would come from the north and would take place probably on a Sunday morning?

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Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

22

Mr. Keefe: Is that all that you ever told Admiral Kimmel?

23

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Captain Zacharias: That is the substance of it, with the addition of the earliest indications and the unmistakable signs.

25

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: Of the submarines?

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3 Captain Zacharias: Of the submarine appearing in
4 the operating area.

4

5 Mr. Keefe: Now you had a discussion with Mr. Munson?

5

6 Captain Zacharias: I did, sir.

6

7 Mr. Keefe: A civilian?

7

8 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

8

9 Mr. Keefe: In October 1941?

9

10 Captain Zacharias: I did, sir.

10

11 Mr. Keefe: You understood Mr. Munson had been sent
12 to Hawaii to make an investigation of conditions there by
13 someone in authority at Washington?

11

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14 Captain Zacharias: I did, sir.

14

15 Mr. Keefe: Did you learn under what authority he
16 was acting?

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17 Captain Zacharias: I endeavored to ascertain that but
18 he consistently refused to disclose it, other than to
19 produce the letter signed by Admiral Stark as Chief of
20 Naval Operations to open up everything to him.

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21 Mr. Keefe: Because of the letter which he carried
22 representing his credentials, signed by Admiral Stark, you
23 advised him of whatever information you had in the inter-
24 views which he had with you?

21

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25 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

25

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: When you had this conversation with Mr.
3 Munson did you relate to him the same information that you
4 had given to Admiral Kimmel back in March of 1941?

5 Captain Zacharias: I did, sir, and in addition I indi-
6 cated to him the circumstance about the arrival of the third
7 envoy in Washington, as to what would take place, and I
8 learned over the radio while at sea that the Ambassador to
9 Peru, the Japanese Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington
10 on the 2nd of December, 1941.

11 Mr. Keefe: Did you prophesy or predict or state to
12 Mr. Munson that, in your opinion, the Japs would attack
13 on Sunday, December 7, 1941 at Pearl Harbor?

14 Captain Zacharias: I did not, sir.

15 Mr. Keefe: Did you tell him any more than you had
16 previously told Admiral Kimmel, with the additional of the
17 information to which you have just alluded?

18 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir, I did. He was interested
19 in the question of whether or not there would be an armed
20 uprising in Hawaii or on the West Coast in the event of
21 hostilities. As I have previously testified, I told him
22 that because of my belief that the hostilities would commence
23 by an air attack on the Fleet, because of the necessity of
24 secrecy on the part of the Japanese, they would not have
25 been able to disseminate the necessary information on which

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 to base an uprising or extensive sabotage, and therefore
3 he could forget about those two items.

4 Mr. Keefe: I have read the report which appears in
5 the record of these proceedings, of January 17, in which
6 is set out the report of Mr. Munson, and the reason for
7 asking you these questions is because I do not find in his
8 report any reference or suggestion of a proposed air attack
9 upon Pearl Harbor.

10 You have read that report, haven't you?

11 Captain Zacharias: I have seen his report, but I do
12 not know why he did not include it.

13 Mr. Keefe: The fact is, as far as my question is
14 concerned, he did not include it, did he, in his report?

15 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir. However,
16 he did authenticate, in July 1942, for me the fact that
17 I had given him those details.

18 Mr. Keefe: All right. Now you graduated from the
19 Naval Academy in 1912?

20 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: Did they have an organization at the
22 Academy at that time known as the "Green Bowlers"?

23 Captain Zacharias: I did not know of any such organi-
24 zation and heard of it only recently.

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Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Keefe: How did you happen to hear of it recently?

Captain Zacharias: It came up in a discussion of a group of Naval officers and later I saw an account of it in a recent publication of the Army and Navy Bulletin in which the editorial of that paper concluded that it was an organization of not much importance or influence.

Mr. Keefe: How long have you been a Captain in the U. S. Navy?

Captain Zacharias: Since July, 1939.

Mr. Keefe: Have you been up for promotion since then?

Captain Zacharias: Not under a regular Selection Board of the Navy. I might add that these Selection Boards as such were discontinued during wartime.

Mr. Keefe: The thought just occurred to me, in all frankness, Captain Zacharias, that here is a graduate of the Naval Academy of the class of 1912, he has been a Captain since 1939, who has rendered distinguished service both in the line and in Intelligence and he is still a Captain when others have been carried on to considerably higher rank; is there any reason for that, that you know of, or are conscious of today?

Captain Zacharias: I appreciate the thought and I might add that that never has been a consideration with me and will so remain. Why I was not promoted is something

1 Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Keefe
The Vice Chairman

2 within the knowledge of the former Chief of Bureau of
3 Personnel and the former Chief of Naval Operations.

4 Mr. Keefe: Thank you. That is all.

5 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I ask two questions?

6 The Vice Chairman: May I ask a question first?

7 Mr. Murphy: Surely.

8 The Vice Chairman: Wouldn't any other officers,
9 Captain, have anything to do with promotions besides the
10 Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Chief of
11 Naval Operations?

12 Captain Zacharias: I am not entirely familiar with
13 the methods by which promotions were made during wartime.
14 It was something different from the process of selection
15 for promotion as established by the Congress.

16 The Vice Chairman: Doesn't the Commanding Officers
17 under whom officers serve have some power of recommending,
18 and so on?

19 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir. They make out periodic
20 reports of fitness of the officers concerned. My reports
21 for service at sea have been uniformly excellent as can be
22 noted in the record.

23 The Vice Chairman: One reason that prompted me to ask
24 that question, I recall Admiral Richardson testified here
25 that he included Admiral Kimmel on his list for Commander of

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Stark stated that he had in-
3 cluded Admiral Kimmel on his for that. And that carried
4 a promotion. So I was just wondering whether Commanding
5 Officers did make recommendations that had something to do
6 with the question of promotions.

7 Captain Zacharias: I think that he was referring to
8 his position as a member of the Selection Board which passed
9 upon the record of all officers coming up for consideration
10 for promotion.

11 The Vice Chairman: Of course, I don't know about the
12 Navy and you do, but I got the impression that Admiral
13 Richardson had submitted a list of names for the position
14 of Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Admiral
15 Kimmel was included on that list, and Admiral Stark, I got
16 the impression with regard to him that he had a list that
17 he had made up which included Admiral Kimmel for the position
18 of Commander of the Pacific Fleet.

19 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir. I think that was probably
20 a special list of those eligible for Commander in Chief
21 and not in the general run of selection for promotion.

22 The Vice Chairman: Well, I had also understood that
23 in the Army probably a list of names was submitted for
24 special assignment which carried with it a promotion and
25 the appointing authority selected one of those names on that

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: The Vice Chairman
Mr. Murphy

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2 list.

3 Captain Zacharias: That is quite true.

4 The Vice Chairman: So I had assumed that Commanding
5 Officers had some function to perform in the preparation
6 of those lists and had something to do with the question
7 of promotion. I am just asking for information.

8 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir. The only part the
9 Commanding Officer plays is to submit the periodic reports
10 of fitness which go into the record of that officer and
11 kept in the Bureau of Personnel which are later considered
12 by the Board when they meet regularly for considerations of
13 that kind.

14 The Vice Chairman: Well, in fairness to you as a
15 witness before us here, I will ask you, do you want to give
16 the committee any further information with respect to the
17 question asked you by Mr. Keefe about your promotion?

18 Captain Zacharias: Why, no, sir. I would rather not
19 inject that into the question at all.

20 The Vice Chairman: All right.

21 Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire.

22 Mr. Murphy: I have two questions, Captain.

23 You testified this morning, Captain, that you talked
24 at Annapolis to the student body on the question of Intelligence
25 and I assume from your past experience plus the fact that

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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you were selected to address the student body that you can answer this question quite satisfactorily: What is the significance of the destruction of codes by an expected enemy at a time when international relations are tense between our nation and the supposed enemy?

Captain Zacharias: It means that that nation intends to resort to hostilities in the country in which the codes are destroyed.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Zacharias

questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: Do you know of any teaching anywhere in
3 the Naval Academy, or anywhere in the United States Navy
4 that would justify an admiral in charge of the fleet in
5 saying that the destruction of codes was a matter of little
6 importance, or not of vital importance? Do you know of
7 any books, any pamphlet, or any address anywhere in your
8 lifetime where you ever heard that until this case?

9 Captain Zacharias: There is nothing of that nature
10 on which he could base it unless he had information that
11 was specially available to him.

12 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, all of the text books and
13 the authorities are to the effect, are they not, that the
14 destruction of codes by an expected enemy at a time when
15 relations are tense, is a very good indication of the
16 probability of war?

17 Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: That is all.

19 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman -

20 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson of Michigan will
21 inquire.

22 Senator Ferguson: Captain, what is your present
23 assignment with the Navy?

24 Captain Zacharias: I am still attached to the office
25 of the Secretary of the Navy, the Administrative Office of

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 the Navy Department, where I was attached at the time I
2 was engaged in the project of conducting a psychological
3 warfare campaign against the Japanese High Command. That
4 has not been changed as yet.

5 Senator Ferguson: Is that considered an assignment
6 in the Intelligence Branch?

7 Captain Zacharias: It is not, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: It is a special branch in that
9 section of the Navy office?

10 Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir. It is more in the light
11 of ability, being attached to the Administrative Office,
12 and that assignment was simply to facilitate the handling
13 of my records while I was on this other special duty.

14 I might add that the last word I had from the Secretary
15 was to wait further word from him.

16 Senator Ferguson: On your new assignment, if there
17 is to be one?

18 Captain Zacharias: I don't know as there is a new
19 assignment yet in prospect, but I am waiting, and covering
20 the situations and occasionally making out estimates and
21 memorandums for him.

22 Senator Ferguson: Now, do you want to add to or sub-
23 tract anything from your testimony, or do you want to change
24 it in any way?
25

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Captain Zacharias: Nothing whatever.

Senator Ferguson: Is there anything that you think of that you could tell this committee that would help us in the solution of the problem now before us as to how this surprise attack could have taken place in Pearl Harbor in December, on December 7, 1941?

Captain Zacharias: There is nothing that I can add to what I termed as organizational deficiencies, which had some effect and which I feel should be remedied in the future in order to add better security to the nation.

Senator Ferguson: Have you an opinion on the unification of the Intelligence in all the services?

Captain Zacharias: I have long advocated a joint intelligence agency for the purpose of handling all intelligence.

I made a plan, made up a plan in 1942 which contemplated such an organization and would have incorporated in time of war all intelligence agencies under a joint committee, and directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In peacetime such an organization would have to be a little differently constituted, but there should be something in my opinion to coordinate all of the efforts, eliminate duplication, and assure us that all information is available to those who might require it.

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Isn't it important that in peacetime the Navy has all of the intelligence has and that the Army all that the Navy has, and the Marines, including all of the services, so that evaluation will include the evaluation of all pertinent facts?

Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Can you get that under a system such as we had in the two services prior to the 7th of December 1941?

Captain Zacharias: The likelihood is that some information would not reach those who should be using it.

Senator Ferguson: Now, wasn't it true that Mr. Munson represented some other agency outside of the Army and Navy when he came out working on intelligence?

Captain Zacharias: I don't know, sir. I was never able to establish the source of his representation.

Senator Ferguson: Well, you have in the last sheet of your report -- do you have it before you there?

Captain Zacharias: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: The word that he was -- well, did you say "possibly" or "presumably"?

Captain Zacharias: I presumed that he was a representative of the President. I did not know.

Senator Ferguson: Why did you presume it? Was there

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Senator Ferguson
Mr. Murphy

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1 any facts?

2 Captain Zacharias: No, sir. His refusal to tell
3 me, and his -- quite properly so -- and his coming out as
4 a civilian with a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations
5 to have things opened up to him. That did not bear --
6 have any bearing on the information that I gave to him,
7 or the expression of my opinion to him.

8 Senator Ferguson: Have you ever talked to him as
9 to why he left out of his report to the Secretary of State
10 the facts of what you told him about the attack on Sunday?

11 Captain Zacharias: No, sir, I have not. At the time
12 I saw him in 1942, I had not seen his report, and I haven't
13 seen him since then, as I recall.

14 Senator Ferguson: So you have no knowledge on it?

15 Captain Zacharias: That is correct.

16 Senator Ferguson: That is all.

17 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, one other question.

18 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

19 Mr. Murphy: Captain, do you know of any rule in the
20 Intelligence field or any authority or any reason after an
21 admiral of the fleet gets a war warning, and thereafter
22 from December 3 on gets several messages in regard to
23 code destruction, do you know of any reason for his not
24 making that information available to the Commanding General
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Witness Zacharias

Questions by: Mr. Murphy
Mr. Richardson

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at Hawaii?

Captain Zacharias: I am not in a position to answer that, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Well, are there any rules that prohibit the handing over of code destruction messages to your counterpart in the other service, when you are expecting a war?

Captain Zacharias: I am not aware of any.

Mr. Murphy: All right. That is all.

Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The Vice Chairman: Counsel will inquire.

Mr. Richardson: Captain, following out the inquiry of Congressman Murphy briefly, you regard information with reference to code burning as being of the first importance?

Captain Zacharias: Of the highest importance.

Mr. Richardson: And you would regard it as the duty of any competent Intelligence service to place that information in the hands of people in the field from whom action was expected?

Captain Zacharias: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson: And you would expect those people in the field to extend that information to all persons with whom they were associated, who could be helpful in defending the interests of the United States?

Witness Zacharias

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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Mr. Richardson: That is all.

The Vice Chairman: Are there any further questions?

(No response)

The Vice Chairman: I believe you have already been asked, Captain, if you have any further information or knowledge you desire to give to the committee.

Captain Zacharias: I have nothing else.

The Vice Chairman: On behalf of the committee, I thank you for your appearance, the information you have given to the committee, and your apparent desire to be helpful in bringing to the attention of the committee, all information you have on the question here under consideration.

You may now be excused, sir.

Captain Zacharias: Thank you very much.

(Witness excused)

The Vice Chairman: Counsel may proceed.

Mr. Richardson: I would like, Mr. Chairman, to present to the Committee, Admiral Smith.

The Vice Chairman: Admiral Smith will please come forward.

Admiral, will you please be sworn.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM WARD SMITH

(Admiral Smith was duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. Richardson: Admiral Smith, what is your full name?

Admiral Smith: William Ward Smith.

Mr. Richardson: How long have you been connected with the Navy?

Admiral Smith: It would be 41 years next June.

Mr. Richardson: You are a graduate of Annapolis?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir; Class of 1909.

Mr. Richardson: Are you still in active service?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Smith

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Richardson: You are the Admiral Smith who was Chief of Staff for Admiral Kimmel for the Pacific Fleet in the summer and fall and winter of 1941?

Admiral Smith: I am.

Mr. Richardson: You are the Admiral Smith referred to here in the testimony of the previous witness, Captain Zacharias?

Admiral Smith: I am.

Mr. Richardson: Were you present at any conversation between Captain Zacharias and Admiral Kimmel during 1941?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. Richardson: And was the time and place of that conversation that which was named by Captain Zacharias?

Admiral Smith: The exact date I do not know but it was after Admiral Kimmel transferred his headquarters from the Pennsylvania to shore; I should say approximately 1 April, possibly at the time given by the last witness.

Mr. Richardson: How long had you known Captain Zacharias?

Admiral Smith: I knew him slightly at the Naval Academy. I was a first classman when he was a plebe. I have seen him from time to time since but have never served in the same organization with him.

Mr. Richardson: Your relations with him have always been

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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friendly?

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Richardson: And how long had you known Admiral Kimmel?

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Admiral Smith: I first served with Admiral Kimmel in the summer of 1939 and from then on until after Pearl Harbor. I had known him, had met him on one or two occasions previously, but had never been with him, never had served with him.

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Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, will you advise the committee of what your recollection is of this conversation at which you were present and referred to by Captain Zacharias as having taken place in Honolulu on or about April 1st, 1941?

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Admiral Smith: I remember the meeting very well but Captain Zacharias is in error when he says that Kimmel sent for me. Zacharias came to my office and I took him down to the War Plans office where I knew Kimmel to be at the time. So far as I recollect, no one else was present. Kimmel was studying war plans.

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I introduced Captain Zacharias and had the impression at that time that they had never met before. The meeting, to my recollection, did not last an hour and a half but I believe more likely fifteen minutes and during this meeting Admiral Kimmel did most of the talking.

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After the first few minutes of the conversation, which

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 concerned the Jap situation as it existed at the time, Admiral
3 Kimmel questioned Zacharias on the characteristics of some of
4 the Japanese leaders, naval leaders. He had already had from
5 Admiral Hart very good reports of these leaders and Admiral
6 Hart's information turned out to be correct.

7 Admiral Kimmel then asked about the efficiency of oper-
8 ations of the Japanese fleet? And, as I recall, Captain
9 Zacharias could give him no information on that. We already
10 knew that he probably could not since none of our Intelligence
11 officers or no students, language students, had ever been able
12 to get about in Japan to see the things they would have to
13 see to learn something of the operations efficiency and gun-
14 nery of the Japanese fleet.

15 The conversation was brief and as I recall it when
16 Zacharias left Admiral Kimmel was disappointed and said to the
17 effect that he had gained no new information.

18 Now, to cover this meeting more thoroughly I would like
19 to refer to a few items mentioned by Captain Zacharias.

20 Mr. Richardson: Before you do that might I ask you,
21 Admiral, to state how the meeting came about?

22 Admiral Smith: Captain Zacharias came to my office and
23 asked to see Admiral Kimmel and tell him that he had had a
24 great deal of Intelligence duty and I believe he just came from
25 Naval Intelligence and had brought the Salt Lake City and had

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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just joined up, as I remember.

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Mr. Richardson: Go ahead.

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Admiral Smith: I listened to that testimony, I might say, with astonishment. It struck me as the testimony of clairvoyance operating in reverse. I am absolutely positive that at this meeting there was never mentioned the question of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, a submarine attack or the question of seaplanes arriving in merchant ships and taking off from the nearby islands.

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There are two statements in this testimony, one where Zacharias is alleged to have told Kimmel that an air attack was certain and Kimmel replied, "How can I prevent this?"

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Now, those words do not sound like Kimmel to me as I know him. This was a subordinate officer just joining up and I believe that Kimmel knew very little about him.

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The next statement, that when he informed Admiral Kimmel about an air attack, - about a reconnaissance to five hundred miles and when Kimmel replied that he had neither men nor materials to carry out such reconnaissance and that Captain Zacharias states that he replied, "You had better get them, Admiral, for that is what is coming."

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Had any officer of any rank ever made a statement like that to Kimmel it would have been so impressed upon my memory that I would never have forgotten it, and I do not recollect

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 that statement.

2 Now, Captain Zacharias states also that Captain Smith
3 has since discussed, - since Pearl Harbor has discussed this
4 meeting, this air attack with others on several occasions. I
5 would like to know with whom I held those discussions and
6 where. I am certain that the matter passes out of my mind.

7
8 Never since that meeting was Captain Zacharias in my of-
9 fice, I never saw him with Admiral Kimmel, he was never at a
10 meeting of the staff though he probably did have meetings with
11 the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Captain Layton. I have never
12 heard his name mentioned in staff meetings.

13 Now, as for this Sunday business, that was not ques-
14 tioned. A Sunday attack had been discussed as far back as
15 1935 when I was Fleet Operations Officer to Admiral Reeves
16 and the Fleet was in San Pedro. Admiral Reeves feared a Sun-
17 day attack but we were lying in an open harbor with no pro-
18 tection whatever. Officers and men had their families there,
19 so that on Sunday morning probably half of the officers and
20 half of the men would be on shore. There was no protection
21 against submarines.

22 At Pearl Harbor it was different after we left Lahaina
23 Roads. Very few had their families in Honolulu. There was a
24 net at the gate; there was no danger from torpedo attacks from
25 submarines.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 As for the attitude of McMorris, that he was preoccupied.
3 I can believe that he was often preoccupied. It may be that
4 this reflects the fact that Kimmel had more confidence in his
5 own Intelligence officer, Captain Layton, than he had in Cap-
6 tain Zacharias or in anyone else and I think this is confirmed
7 by the fact that after Admiral Nimitz took over the Fleet he
8 kept Captain Layton on as his Fleet Intelligence Officer
9 throughout the war.

10 As for Mr. Munson, I never heard of him until a few days
11 ago. I doubt that he represented the Chief of Naval Opera-
12 tions because it was customary and a matter of courtesy when
13 a special agent was arriving at Pearl Harbor for the Chief of
14 Naval Operations to notify the Commander-in-Chief in advance
15 of his coming. No such notice was received to the best of my
16 knowledge and I did not know that Mr. Munson had ever been in
17 the Pearl Harbor area.

18 As for the statement to Mr. Munson that he can forget
19 sabotage and consider only an air attack, I do not see how
20 sabotage could be overlooked. We all knew that the Islands
21 had many Japanese spies in them, some as consular agents and
22 some as priests. I know the Army was afraid of sabotage. I
23 talked to many civilians who spent their lives in the Islands
24 and it was their opinion that the most dangerous Jap was the
25 one born in Honolulu and taken at a very early age to Japan,

1 Witness Smith

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2 educated there and brought back to the Islands in early man-
3 hood. They said that that type of Jap could never be con-
4 verted to the American system.

5 If I may touch upon a few other statements it may clear up
6 questions in the minds of the committee.

7 Halsey was not delayed in his return to Pearl Harbor.
8 There was no haste in his return to Pearl Harbor. It was
9 natural for him to return at an economic speed so as not to
10 consume too much fuel. He had to fuel his destroyers from his
11 heavy ships regardless of weather conditions and there was no
12 need for him to be back in Pearl Harbor on the 5th of De-
13 cember, no necessity for his arriving at that time. The bal-
14 ance of his force, including his three battleships, did re-
15 turn on the 5th of December as they were scheduled.

16 As for the reason for the search to the south: It is
17 true that the weather in the north after you get a few hundred
18 miles north of Midway is likely to be very thick. I had six
19 months in the Aleutians and believe I understand that weather;
20 it also may be very rough, but the Japanese fleet had to fuel
21 en route and fueling in the water is not always easy, but it
22 must be remembered that two carriers had been reported in the
23 Marshalls, not very far away. That was an Intelligence report.

24 Our best Intelligence, except for the absence of radio
25 interception, was that the Japanese main carrier strength was