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


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
STATE  
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*Seneca*  
*from a herm of Seneca*  
*and Socrates in Berlin.*





SENECA  
ON   
BENEFITS  
TRANSLATED  
BY   
THOMAS  
LODGE

• M D C C C X C I X • P U B L I S H E D • B Y • J • M • D E N T •  
• A N D • C O : A L D I N E • H O U S E • L O N D O N • W • C •

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AND

SEVENTH

TRANSACTED

BY

THOMAS

JUDGE

### TO THE COURTEOUS READER

It was well done by nature (gentle reader) to give time, but ill done by men not to apprehend the same. How much thou hast lost in life in begetting vanities and nourishing them, in applauding follies, and intending them, read here; and begin now to apprehend this, that it is but lost life, that men live in entertaining vain things, and that no time is better spent, than in studying how to live, and how to die well. This shalt thou learn in our Seneca, whose divine sentences, wholesome counsels, serious exclamations against vices, in being but a heathen, may make us ashamed being Christians; when we consider how backward a course we have run from the right scope, by being buried in vain readings, besotted with self opinion, by apprehending vertue no more, but in a shadow, which serves for a veil to cover many vices. It is lost labour in most men nowadays whatsoever they have studied, except their actions testify that readings have amended the ruins of their sick and intemperate thoughts: and too pregnant a proof is it, of an age and time ill-spent, whenas after a man hath summed up the account of his days that are past, he findeth the remainder of his profits, he should have gotten in life, to be either ambition unsatisfied, or dissolution attended by poverty, or vain understanding bolstered by pride, or irksome

How to spend time well

The age called on by surfeit. I must confess that (had I affected it) I could have pickt out either an author more curious, or a subject more pleasing for common ears, to allure and content them. But seeing the world's lethargy so far grown, that it is benumbed wholly with false appearance, I made choice of this author, whose life was a pattern of continence, whose doctrine a detection and correction of vanities, and whose death a certain instance of constancy. Would God Christians would endeavour to practise his good precepts, to reform their own in seeing his errors; and perceiving so great light of learning from a pagan's pen, aim at the true light of devotion and piety, which becometh Christians. Learn in him these good lessons, and commit them to memory, That to be truly vertuous is to be happy, to subdue passion is to be truly a man, to contemn fortune is to conquer her, to foresee and unmask miseries in their greatest terrors is to lessen them, to live well is to be vertuous, and to die well is the way to eternity. This as often as I think upon, I find an alteration in my resolution, which heretofore hath too long time surfeited upon time-pleasing; I am armed against all worldly contempts, wherewith any may pretend to load me. My soul and conscience bearing me witness that my intent and scope was only to draw men to amendment of life, and to root out vain customs, that are too much engrafted in this age; what care I for attraction, which rather barketh for custom sake, than baiteth at me for fierceness? No soldier is counted valiant, that affronteth not his enemy, no philosopher constant, that contemneth not fortune; nor writer understanding

that scorns not detraction; I had rather be con- **A gentle**  
 demned for confirming men in goodness, than **jog at the**  
 flattering the world in folly. Gentle Reader for **reader**  
 thee I laboured, for thy good have I made  
 ' this admirable Roman speak English;  
 If it profit thee I have my wish,  
 if it displease thee, it is thy  
 want of judgement.

FAREWELL

## IN MOMUM

Si tamen usque juvat quae sunt bona carpere, Mome,  
Carpe haec, ut morsu sint meliora tuo.  
Quae liber iste tenet, forte ignorare videris,  
Quin lege, mox fies forsitan ipse bonus.  
Non in bicipiti quae vidit somnia narrat  
Parnasso, aut vanis ludit imaginibus :  
Nec prius usque novem nisi quae docuere sorores.  
Castalis unda tuae, nil docet iste liber.  
Vera sed hic rectae promit dictamina vitae,  
Et sapiens narrat qua bene dixit anus.  
Si malus ista leges, poterint non ista placere,  
Nec non ista probes, qui legis, ipse bonus,  
Vel non ergo legas quae sunt benedicta pudendis  
Nec lacera verbis, quae minus ipse capis.  
Vel lege nec carpas ; ut non male prodita dentes  
Jamque tibi gratulor, Mome, perire tuos.

# THE LIFE OF LUCIUS ANNÆUS SENECA

DESCRIBED BY JUSTUS LIPSIUS

## CHAPTER I

### *Of his country and parents*

It hath been an old custom to publish the lives of worthy men, and those whose wisdoms, writings and actions we admire, it doth not a little content us to know such other things as concerned or appertained unto them. I will therefore speak of Seneca as far as may be, and will collect and dispose all those things that concern this matter, both out of him self and divers other writers. It appeareth that he was born in Corduba, an old and flourishing colony in Andalouzie in Spain, and besides that, the chiefest in those regions. This doth Strabo testify in these words: Amongst all other cities of Hispania, Bætica, or Andalouzie, Corduba is enlarged both in glory and power by Marcellus' means: as also the city of Gaditana, the one by reason of navigations, and the societies of the Romans: the other, because of the goodness and greatness of the country; the river Bætis likewise conferring much hereunto. They praise it, and

The  
birth-  
place of  
Seneca

Of the city of Corduba therewithal prove it to be ancient, because it was Marcellus' work : which of them, was it his that was prætor, or the other that was consul? For Marcus Marcellus the prætor governed Spain, as Pliny testifieth, in the year of the city 585, although, as it seemeth, in peace and quietness; by which means the rather this colony of his countrymen was drawn thither, and happily the city both increased and adorned. For that it was not built anew, it appears by Silvius, who even in Hannibal's time called it Corduba. I had rather therefore ascribe it to him, than to the consul Marcellus, who in the year 601, governed the hither part of Spain, as it appears in the *Epitome*, and thou mayest gather out of Appian; and having worthily executed his charge in that place, triumphed over the Celtibers. He had therefore at that time nothing to do with Bætica, or our Corduba, which is in the farther part of Spain. But Strabo addeth more, The most chosen Romans and Spaniards inhabited this Corduba from the beginning, and into these places did the Romans send their first colony. Note this word chosen; for it was so indeed: and thereupon afterwards, as I suppose, it obtained this privilege, that it was called Colonia Patricia. Pliny testifieth it most plainly; Corduba (saith he) named the Patrician colony, and in Augustus' stamp of money, *Permissu Cesaris Augusti*, with his head on the one side, and then on the other side, Colonia Patricia. The cause of which title, in my opinion, is, because that that being both a fair and a rich city, it supplied the Roman commonwealth with fathers and senators. For now in Augustus' age they made choice of men out of every province to make up



the senate. Furthermore, Strabo saith, That the first colony was sent thither, which read thou with circumspection. For Carteia in the same country of Bætica, before this time had a colony planted in it by Lucius Canuleius praetor: but because they were not of the better sort, it was called Colonia Libertinorum, or the colony of the Libertines. Thou shalt read it in Livy, in the beginning of his 43rd book: yet mayest thou, and haply oughtest thou to defend Strabo, that those inhabitants were not sent from Rome or Italy, but that they were begotten by the Roman soldiers upon the Spanish women; and by the permission of the senate the bastards had their liberty given them and were planted in a colony. But Strabo expressly writeth, that a colony was sent thither. Enough of Corduba, and this was his country; but who were his parents? It appeareth that they were of the Annæan race, whose name seemeth to be given them in way of good fortune, ab Annis. The surname of Seneca likewise was fortunate. For the first, in my judgement, had this name given him, although Isidore think that he who was at first so-called, was born grey-headed. Undoubtedly Seneca, or as the Ancients write, Senica (for Senecio is derived à *Sene*) signified *γεροντίον* as Senecio doth. Let Nonius be seen in Senica. Hereunto I add that in another kindred also I find this surname: as in Accia in an ancient stone M. Accio Seneca. (Manlio Plauta ii. virg. Quinq.) But whether those of the race of Annæa were of the Spanish race, or were sent out of Italy in a colony, I dare not affirm; this only I say, that they were out of the order of knights: for so Seneca him self speaketh of him self

The  
lineage  
of  
Seneca

**Seneca's family** in Tacitus. 'Am I he that sprung from the order of knight, and in a provincial place, numbered amongst the chiefest peers of the city? Can it be amongst the nobles, that boast them selves of their long worthiness and antiquity, that my novelty should shine?' His father therefore, and happily his grandfather were knights and not above. For he presently maketh mention of his novelty; which he would not have done, if any of his ancestors had attained unto honours. But his father was known both by him self, and his writings to be Lucius Annæus Seneca, whom for the most part, they distinguish from the son by the title of Declaimer, in which kind he excelled. Divers declamations are extant, which were not his own but another man's, digested by him, which he distinguished by some titles and annotations, and by this means sufficiently expressed his mild and happy wit. He had to wife one Helvia, a Spanish lady, a woman of great constancy and wisdom as her son sufficiently describeth her in his consolatory book unto her. The father came to Rome in Augustus' time, and presently after his wife with her children followed him; amongst which was this our Seneca, as yet but very young. In that place lived he long and followed his affairs with the favour and good report of all men; and I think that he lived till about the later time of Tiberius; and hereunto am I persuaded, because he maketh mention of Sejanus' conspiracy in his books, and of other things that appertain hereunto. I let him pass, and return unto his son, of whom I have intended to speak.

## CHAPTER II

His  
brethren

*Of Lucius Annæus Seneca him self and his brethren,  
where he was born and when he was brought  
to Rome.*

IN Corduba was he born, and was translated from thence to Rome when he was a child; which he him self testifieth thus, where he praiseth his aunt. 'By her hands was I brought into the city, by her pious and motherly nursing I recovered my self after my long sickness.' If he were carried in her arms, it must needs be that he was but an infant, and thou seest that he was sick at that time likewise and was recomforted by her care and diligence. This think I happened in the fifteenth year or thereabouts, before Augustus' death, the argument whereof is Seneca's young years in Tiberius' time, whereof I must speak hereafter. The father therefore not long before that time came to Rome: he had two brothers and no sisters; which appeareth by his words unto his mother; 'Thou buriedst thy dearest husband by whom thou wert the mother of three children.' And these three were M. Annæus Novatus, L. Annæus Seneca, L. Annæus Mela; all born in such order as I have set them down. This appeareth by the inscriptions of the controversies where they are so set down, although by their surnames. But the eldest of these brethren presently changed his name, and was called Junius Gallio, because he was adopted by him. Which Gallio is oftentimes named by Seneca the father in his declamations and is called 'ours,' either by reason of their common country Spain, or of that friendship which was between them, were they

Of not likewise allied and akin? I know not, yet  
 Gallio suspect I it, by reason of this adoption. And this  
 Gallio it is who is called father by Quintilian and  
 Tacitus likewise, in the sixt of his *Chronicles*.  
 But this our adopted Gallio in the *Eusebian*  
*Chronicle* is called Junius Annæus Gallio, Seneca's  
 brother, and a worthy declaimer.

Was it by the name of both the families (which  
 was rare among the ancients, nay more, never heard  
 of) that it might appear into what family he entered  
 by adoption, and in what he was born by nature?  
 It appeareth manifestly, if the name and title be  
 true. He it is to whom our Seneca both sent and  
 wrote his books of *Wrath*, in which he calleth him  
 Novatus: yet the same man in his title of *Blessed*  
*Life*, calleth he his brother Gallio, and likewise in his  
*Epistles* his lord Gallio and that honestly, as him  
 that was his elder brother. Observe this therefore  
 that he seemed not to be adopted at such time as his  
 books of *Anger* were written, that is, when Caius was  
 alive, but afterwards, and that then he changed his  
 surname: but his youngest brother was Annæus  
 Mela so called by Tacitus, Dion and Eusebuis,  
 who was only a Roman knight (for he that was  
 the elder was a senator) who begat Lucan, a great  
 access to his greatness, as Tacitus saith. These  
 therefore were the three brothers, of whom Martial  
 witnesseth—

‘And learned Seneca’s house  
 That is thrice to be numbered.’

He calleth him learned (I mean the Orator) his  
 treble-house; his three sons called his families.

## CHAPTER III

Seneca's  
age and  
studies*His youth, his masters and studies*

HE came therefore to Rome when he was a child, and in that place ripened he his excellent wit in the best studies: his youth happened in the beginning of Tiberius' government, as he him self confesseth; and about that time, when foreign sacrifices were removed and abolished. This was in the fifth year of Tiberius and that of the city 772, which appeareth manifestly by Tacitus, who writeth that the sacrifices of the Egyptians and Jews were abolished. Seneca therefore about that time grew to man's estate, and was about some twenty or two-and-twenty years old. For that he was well stept in years in Augustus' time, hereby it appeareth; because he observed a comet or a flame before his departure; of which he saith: 'We saw before the death of Augustus such a kind of prodigy, which children could not so curiously observe.' His father in my opinion was he that first instructed him in eloquence, and this do his books of controversies and their prefaces testify. For why should not this worthy old man, who both directed and taught others, direct and instruct his own children in that kind? He did it, and left two of them most excellent and exercised in eloquence, Gallio and this our Seneca, for I have read nothing of Mela. This is that Gallio whom Statius commendeth for his sweet discourse:

'And thus much more, that from his happy line,  
He blest the world with Seneca divine,  
And brought to light that Gallio, whose grace  
And fluent speech the Commons did embrace.'

Seneca's  
teachers  
in philo-  
sophy

He that was the author of the book of the causes of corrupted eloquence, said that he had a certain resounding and pleasing eloquence, which he calleth the resounding of Gallio, meaning it by the son and not by the father. But our Seneca, besides his eloquence addicted him self to philosophy with earnest endeavour, and vertue ravished his most excellent wit although his father were against it. He him self divers times saith that he was withdrawn from philosophy, and that his wife was she that dissuaded him; yea and that she hated it he openly writeth in another place; yet did the son's desire and forwardness get the upper hand, for that he diligently and carefully heard the most famous and serious philosophers of that age, and namely Attalus the Stoic, Sotion one of the same sort, although he seemed to follow Pythagoras and Papirius Fabius, which he names likewise and praiseth with a grateful memory: he was Sotion's scholar in his younger years, and he writeth, 'And now, though a child I sat and heard Sotion.' Moreover he admired and honoured Demetrius the Cynic, conversing oftentimes with him in his elder days, and at such times as he served in court, both privately and publicly. For he made him his companion both in his walks and travels. Such was his forwardness in honest studies, yet his father broke him off, and in the interim caused him to follow the courts and to plead causes: which course, as it appeareth he continued long, yea even in Caius' time, being greatly favoured and famed for his eloquence. Undoubtedly there are no philosophical treatises extant, that were his before that time.

## CHAPTER IV

His  
public life*His honours and civil life*

His father likewise persuaded him to affect government and to make suit for honours. He therefore first of all was treasurer, in obtaining which office he acknowledges what helps his aunt had procured him. 'She (saith he) tried all her friends in my suit for the treasurership; and she that scarcely would endure to be conferred withal or publicly saluted, in my behalf overcame her modesty by her love towards me.' What woman this was and what husband she had, thou shalt learn by my notes: but when he was treasurer, I do not certainly know. For his years it might have been under Tiberius or it might be under Caius, but I intend not to define the matter. This had I rather say, that by Agrippina's means presently after his exile he got and exercised the prætorship. For thus saith Tacitus: 'Agrippina got at her husband's hand not only a release of Annæus Seneca's banishment, but also the prætorship, supposing that it would be pleasing to the common sort by reason of the fame of his study, and to the end that Domitius' childhood might be the better ripened by such a master, and that he might use his counsels under hope to attain that sovereignty.' Thou seest that he was suddenly made prætor, and hearest what praises and endowments, Tacitus unfeignedly honoureth him with. The love of the commons was gotten by that means. Because Seneca now was accompanied by every man's good words and favours, by reason of the excellency of his studies, and was desirous that under such and so great a master, that their

**Seneca** Domitius should be brought up and should be  
**as consul** addressed (and herein note his civil prudence) both to obtain the empire and to govern it. He therefore was prætor the year of the city 702, and was he not afterwards consul?

The law-books affirm the same to S. C. Trebellian, as Ulpian. In the time of Nero in the octaves of the calends of September, when Annæus Seneca and Trebellius Maximus were consuls, it was made irrevocable. The same is written in the elements of Justinian's *Institutions*. But they that made our holy-days make these substitute consuls (for ordinary they were not) the year of the city 715 which should be the year, and some few moneths before Seneca's death. Some men will perhaps doubt of the whole matter because Ausonius in his thanksgiving saith openly, 'The rich man Seneca, but yet, not consul.' Seneca likewise him self never maketh mention of this honour, although he wrote many Epistles at that time. I answer, for Ausonius it is to be understood, that it seemed to him to be an ordinary consulate; for our Seneca, that a silence is no denial. Furthermore I add this likewise; that the chronicle-makers seem to have digested their relations badly, for in that year undoubtedly he was not. For see here in the very beginning of the year, how Tacitus maketh mention of his cold entertainment by Nero; and how his detractors had diversely injured him; and how he him self with a confident oration came unto the prince, and desired viaticum, and resigned his substance: yet Cæsar permitted it not, and yet Seneca from that time forward, as Cornelius saith, changeth the prescripts of his former power, forbiddeth intercourse of courtiers, avoideth attendants, is



seldom seen in the city, and as if over-tired with sickness, keepeth him self at home intending only the study of wisdom. These are no proper actions of a new-made consul or a candidate, and his death that followed presently afterwards, forbiddeth us to consent hereunto. But what was it that learned men suspected thus? That which Tacitus writeth in that year was done by the consent of the senate lest a feigned adoption should in any sort further a public office, and lest in usurping heritages it should profit. But this appertaineth nothing to that of Trebellian, it hath another reference: if a man do examine those things likewise that are in Tacitus. I therefore consent that he was consul, but in another and a former time the certainty whereof I will not set down. But the perpetual honour of this man, and how he was both the teacher and governor of a prince undoubtedly worthy as long as he addicted him self to his counsels and admonitions, Tacitus concealeth not and nameth two to whom the prince was well inclined for his own profit. Murthers had prevailed except Afranius Burrus and Annæus Seneca had withstood them. These were the governors of the emperor in his younger years, and conformed in that equal society they had in government, and in divers sorts they had equal power. Burrus in his charge, in regard of warlike affairs and security in his manners: Seneca in his precepts of eloquence and honest affability, assisting one another, whereby they might more easily restrain the tender years of the prince if he despised vertue, by granting him pleasures. O laudable endeavour and consent! which is too rare in court, where every one for the most part will

He  
with-  
stands  
murthers

His desire to be so eminent that he desireth no second travels But to Seneca.

## CHAPTER V

*His private life, his wife, his children,  
his banishment*

WHETHER he acted any other thing in public, I know not; but privately I find, or at leastwise collect, that during his younger years he was in Egypt upon this occasion, because his uncle was præfect there: for he writeth of his aunt to his mother, ‘She will show thee her example, whereof I was an eye-witness.’ An eye-witness? He therefore associated his aunt in that navigation (of which he speaketh in that place) whenas his aunt returned from Egypt. And how could this be except he himself likewise had been in Egypt? Undoubtedly it was thus: and this is the cause why he curiously intermixeth many things of Egypt and Nilus, especially in his books of natural questions. Perchance he travelled out of Egypt into India by the Red Sea, and therefore would he comment upon India, upon that which was written by Pliny. But now he married a wife at Rome; which though it be uncertain to be so, yet the reason he had, children do approve it. For he maketh Marcus a wanton lad, with much praise and affection to his mother Helvia: neither is it to be doubted that he was his son, at leastwise his own verses will approve it where amongst his vows:

‘So may young Marcus, who with pleasing prate  
Contents us now in eloquent debate,  
Provoke his uncles, though in being young,  
In wit, in wisdom and in fluent tongue.’

For should I give way to those who attribute this to Marcus Lucanus, I find no reason for it; yet maketh he no mention of his former wife: not in these books I confess, what then? Nor of his brother Annæus Mela by name, had he not therefore a brother? Notwithstanding thou art to consider whether thou understand not this by his first wife: 'Thou knowest that Harpastes my wife's fool remained as an hereditary burthen in my family': what wife? his first wife? for the books of *Anger* seem to be written in a place well-known to us. But he married Paulina after his exile, a woman of great nobility, which as I tell thee, married him when he was old and powerful in the court: which very thing Dion likewise, or whatsoever he were in Dion, thought good to object against Dion, which is that being stept in years he hath married a young wench. Such were both of them, and Seneca himself testifieth it. 'This said I to my Paulina which commends my health unto me, it came into my mind that in this old man there is a young one that is forborn.' A young one? he means Paulina herself; for undoubtedly she loved her husband, as there in many places, he boasteth and that unfeignedly, which she expressed in his death, when in as far as in her lay she sought to accompany his soul with hers. Hereafter we shall see it. And these were his wives. The rest of his life quiet, and without offence, except only that grievous accident of his exile. For under Claudius the first year of his reign when Julia the daughter of Germanicus was accused of adultery (gods and goddesses, by Messaline!) and was driven herself into banishment: and Seneca if he had

His  
wives

**His banishment** become one of the adulterers, was exiled and sent into Corsica, I will not say whether it were upon a just cause, I could wish it were not, and happily Tacitus with me, who when he speaketh of his banishment, ‘Seneca was angry with Claudius it was supposed by reason of the injury that was done him.’ Note this injury; he therefore had received some. For who would otherwise be ignorant to interpret the accusations of that impudent harlot (I mean Messaline) and that my son beast Claudius? For, for the most part they practised no mischief but against good and innocent persons. He lived about some eight years or thereabouts in exile, ay, and constantly too; yea if we may believe himself, happily intending only the best studies, and the wholesomest meditations. For thus writeth he to his mother, that he is blessed amongst those things which are wont to make other men wretched. And afterwards (but I pray thee observe him) he worthily philosophieth, he addeth in the end and rouseth him self, Conceive what thou shouldest, think me to be joyful and addressed as it were in the best fortunes. But they are the best whenas the mind devoid of all thought intendeth him self, and sometimes delighteth him self in lighter studies, and sometimes mounteth into the consideration of the nature of him self and the whole world being desirous of truth. O man, O honest words which the author of Octavia’s tragedy would imitate: for it was not he (God forbid) in these verses in the person of Seneca:—

‘Far better lay I hid, removéd far  
 From envy’s storms amidst the Corsic shores,  
 Whereas my mind was far from any jar  
 Fixt on my studies, not on earthly powers :

O what content had I ! for never nature  
 Mother of all things, mistress of each creature,  
 Could grant no more, than to behold the heaven,  
 The sun's true motion and the planets seven.'

Allusions  
 in his  
 poetry

These are better, yea far truer than he hath written in his consolatory book to Polybius, overbasely and humbly. And is it impossible that our Seneca should write it? Oftentimes have I doubted it, and almost durst forswear it. Howsoever he was a man, and haply that writing was enlarged and published by his enemies, and haply they corrupted it: yet note this in Seneca's words abovesaid: That there he delighted him self in more slighter studies likewise, which I suppose should be poesy: and amongst them is *Medea*, which I am half assured was written in his exile, at such time as Claudius conquered Brittany, and therefore made he choice of that argument of Jason that he might intermix some of the ocean that was subdued. Is it possible that those verses in the chorus should have relation to any but Claudius?

'Spare me O gods, I do entreat for grace,  
 Long let him live secure that hath subdued.'

And again:

'The seas . . .  
 Enough already O you gods you have  
 Revenged you on the seas, now spare the power':

which he applied to Claudius, although he were living and will have the gods to spare the god in his poetical fiction.

His  
wealth

## CHAPTER VI

*His riches, his granges, his lands, his usury*

BUT presently after he returned from his exile, he grew again into reputation, being both at that time and before his advancement in court plentifully enstalled, for his father had left him rich; neither owed he all his wealth to his industry and forwardness. Hereupon to his mother: 'Thou being the daughter of a family, didst freely bestow thy bounty on thy wealthy children'; and he praises her liberality the rather, as he saith, because she bestowed it on her wealthy sons and not such as were needy. This before he came to court, but when he lived there he got mighty riches, or rather admitted them which thrust themselves upon him before he sought them. For he got much by the Prince's beneficence. For thus speaketh he unto Nero in our Tacitus: 'Thou (said he) hast given me great grace and immeasurable treasure; so that oftentimes I my self turn it oftentimes by my self; where is that mind which contenteth it self with a little? Doth he plant such gardens, and doth he walk about these manors without the city? and is he stored with so many acres of land, and with such mighty usury? Note gardens, manors, granges, fields and usury, and all these bountifully and abundantly.

Will you hear Tacitus' words once more, but from another man's mouth, and in another sense: 'Seneca's calumners,' saith he, 'accuse him of divers crimes, as that he as yet increased his mighty riches, which were raised above any private fortune, that he won and drew the citizens' hearts

unto him, and as it were exceeded the prince likewise in the annuity of his gardens, and the magnificence of his manor houses. And Suillus in the same Tacitus expresseth the measure of his riches likewise, with what wisdom, with what precepts of the philosophers, during these four years that he was in the Prince's favour, had he gotten three thousand HSS., that in Rome whole testaments and inheritances were taken and got hold on by his cunning and search; that Italy and the provinces were exhausted by his immeasurable usury. His estate amongst us should be seventy-five hundredth thousand crowns. These riches were almost regal, I confess it, but I condemn that which he annexeth, that it was gotten by unlawful means and deceit. Before he came to court, as I said, he had a great revenue; and what wonder is it that he increased the same in so mighty a court, and so great felicity of the Roman state? But he saith likewise that Italy and the provinces were exhausted by his usury; his meaning is, that he had money at use in divers places, and I suspect it likewise in Egypt. This gather I by his epistle; wherein he writeth that the Alexandrian fleet suddenly arrived, and that all men ran into the haven and to the shore, 'but I,' saith he, 'in this general hasty running of all men, found great pleasure in my slackness, that being to receive my letters from my friends, I made not haste to know in what estate my affairs stood in that place, and what they had brought. For this long time I have neither won or lost anything.' He had there his brokers or factors who followed his business; it was therefore in some great stock of money or in lands. For to have possessions beyond the seas

His  
usury

**His** was no new matter in that age wherein he lived, **gardens** and in so great abundance. Verily Dion amongst the causes of the war in Brittany reckoneth this up likewise, that whenas Seneca had upon great interest trusted the Britons with four hundred HSS., which in our reckoning amounteth to the sum of ten hundred thousand crowns, he called in for that whole sum of money at one time. Whether he spake this truly or no I know not; for every way he was a mortal and professed enemy of our Seneca. Yet telleth he no untruth, for there likewise had he money. Why now gardens and houses of pleasure? he had divers, and differently beautified. Juvenal toucheth it: 'The gardens of most wealthy Seneca.' He him self likewise maketh mention of his houses, Nomentanum, Albanum and Baianum; and without question he had many. He likewise had a house without the city, which continued the name for many years after, and was called Seneca's house in the region P. Victor. His household stuff also was envied at, and Dio objecteth, that he had five hundred tables of cedar with ivory feet, all of them alike and equal. This was a great matter if truly great (for this always ought we to be wary in Dion's objections) that he had so many tables, whereof any one is visually taxed and prized at the rate of an ample possession; for they must not have been so choice and so rare; but what if they were not? I deny not but that it was the custom of dissolute and lavish men to have such: for thus speaketh Martial of one of these—

'A hundred Moorish tables stand about  
With Lybic teeth, and golden plates do crackle  
Upon our beds.'



For in great banquets they set a table before every several man, (which is elsewhere to be noted), and to this end therefore they had divers. I do not therefore say I deny or doubt hereof. But because Seneca him self toucheth and reprehendeth this madness, yea, at such time as he was in court, and in his old age, and in these books of *Benefits* which he then wrote. What doth he not in his book of *Tranquillity*, about the beginning, openly deny that he took no pleasure in those tables that were conspicuous through variety of spots? Nor was wont to use them? Wonderful is this impudence, in a matter so evident and object to the eyes of that age, to dissemble or lie so openly. I cannot think it, especially if Dion report the same, or any other to whom Dion assigneth this office. For in another place have I noted, that these things seem to be adduced and urged against him, in some invective oration; and there by the way have I acquit him of the crime of his riches, which any man may read if he please. But rather let him read Seneca him self, who about this time published his book of *Blessed Life*, in which his project is to defend him self from those aspersions wherewith his enemies would have attained him. O excellent, O wise book; and more allowed in this behalf was the reproof, that was the means to bring it to light.

His  
luxury

## CHAPTER VII

*His manners, and first his abstinence, his truth, his safety, and piety.*

BUT his very manners refute this objection of his riches, and justify his use, and not abuse of them:

**His ab-** for what hath he offended in pride, excess, and  
**stinence** pomp? Let them tell us it, and we will be silent.  
What was he happily lavish, either in his diet or  
feasting? Let us hear him self professing openly;  
'Whenas I heard Attalus declaiming against vices,  
errors, and the infirmities of life, oftentimes have I  
had compassion of mankind, and have believed  
that he was sublimed and raised above human reach.  
When he began to traduce our pleasures, to praise  
a chaste body, a sober table, a pure mind; not  
only from unlawful pleasures, but also from super-  
fluous, I took a liking to temper mine appetite and  
belly. Of these instructions some have sithence  
dwelt with me, my Lucillius; for I came with a  
great alacrity to all things. Afterwards being  
reduced to a civil life, I stored up some few of  
these my good beginnings. Hereupon for all my  
lifetime after, I renounced all oysters and mush-  
rooms. Ever since for my whole lifetime I have  
abstained from injunction; since that time my  
stomach hath wanted wine, neither have I ever  
since, vouchsafed to bath my self.' Where was  
ever any such frugality in any other place, or by  
what name is it called? And this have I written  
of, in my commendation of Seneca, so let us not  
repeat it here; now as touching the rest of his  
life it was both serious and severe. The court  
corrupted him not, neither inclined he unto flattery,  
a vice almost familiar, and allied to such places.  
No: he unto Nero, 'Suffer me to stay here a  
little longer with thee, not to flatter thine ears, for  
this is not my custom: I had rather offend thee by  
truth, than please thee by flattery.' And being  
now ready to die, in Tacitus he willed them to  
make known to the prince, that his mind was never

inclined unto flatteries, and that this was known to no man better than to Nero, who had more often made use of Seneca's liberty than he had experience of his servitude. Moreover, what exaction and examination of his manners and life? Again he himself: 'I use this power, and daily examine my self when the light is out and my wife is silent, which is now privy to my custom. I examine the whole day that is past by my self, and consider both mine actions and words. I hide nothing from my self, I let nothing slip: for why should I fear any of mine errors? Whenas I may say, See that thou do this no more, for this time I pardon thee.' Can the study of wisdom appear either more greatly or more clearly? Finally, how often appeareth his piety and submission towards God I will set down one thing that I gathered from him: 'If thou believest me any ways, when I discover my most inward affections to thee, I am thus formed in all occurrents, which seem either difficult or dangerous. I obey not God, but I assent unto him; I follow him from my heart, and not of necessity. There shall nothing ever befall me that I will grieve at, or change my countenance for when it happeneth. I will pay no tribute unwillingly,' and many such like observed by me in my manuduction or physiology. Yea, some of that unstained piety that Tertullian and the Ancients call him ours. I have in my Fragments set down some of his counsels, let them make use of them. Furthermore, Otho Frigensis affirmed, that Lucius Seneca was not only worthy to be reputed a Philosopher, but also a Christian. And for these his eminent vertues' sake, even in that age there was a great good opinion held of him, yea

Quota-  
tions  
from his  
works

Destined and they destinated him to the empire. Tacitus  
to empire plainly writeth that this was set abroad, that the  
empire should be delivered to Seneca's hands, as  
to one that was guiltless, being chosen, by reason  
of the excellency of his vertues, to the highest  
dignity. O Rome, thou wert unworthy of this  
felicity; neither did God respect thee so well  
otherwise :

'If all the people might have leave to speak  
What one of them (how desolate soever)  
Would fear or doubt to honour Seneca  
Far more than Nero.'

Yet some there are that doubt of the reality of his  
vertues, and think them rather words and ostenta-  
tion. Did he not therefore in his death make it  
manifest how slightly he esteemed all human things,  
how he addicted himself to God?

## CHAPTER VIII

*His manful and constant life, set down out of  
Tacitus*

AND let us see the commodity thereof, but from  
whence should we gather it rather than from  
Tacitus, the most faithfulest of all other writers?  
Behold, I set thee down his own words. Hereafter  
followeth the slaughter of Annæus Seneca, most  
pleasing to the prince, not because he had manifestly  
found him guilty of treason, but to the end he  
might confound him by the sword, since his  
attempt in poisoning him, so badly succeeded. For  
only Natalis discovered no less. That he was  
sent to Seneca at such time as he was sick to visit

him, and to complain why he barred Piso of access unto him, that it would be better for them if they should exercise their friendship with familiar intercourse. And that Seneca answered, that mutual discourse and often conference would be profitable for neither of them both, yet that his safety depended on Piso's security. This was Granius Silvanus, the tribune of the Prætorial Band, commanded to relate unto him, and to inquire whether he knew these speeches of Natalis, and acknowledged his own answers. He either by chance or wittingly had returned that day out of Campania, and remained in a house of pleasure of his in the suburbs, above four miles off. Thither came the tribune about the evening, and beset the village with a troop of his soldiers. There discovered he unto him whilst he sat at supper with Pompeia Paulina his wife, and two other of his friends, what the Emperor's command was. Seneca answered, that Natalis was sent unto him, and that he complained in Piso's behalf, that he had bin debarred from visiting him, and that he by reason of his infirmity, and love of his quiet, had excused him self. But why he should prefer a private man's security before his own, he had no cause; nor that his mind was inclined to flattery, and that the same was best known unto Nero, who had more oftentimes made proof of Seneca's liberty than service. Whenas this answer was related by the tribune, in the presence of Poppea and Tigellinus, which were inward counsellors to this merciless prince, he asked him whether Seneca had prepared him self for a voluntary death. Then did the tribune confirm, that he discovered no sign of fear, nor appearance of dismay, either in his

The last  
message  
to Seneca

**The fatal sentence** words or countenance. He is therefore commanded to return, and to tell him of his death. Fabius Rusticus reporteth, that he returned not by the same way he came, but that he stept aside to Fenius the præfect, and told him what Cæsar had commanded, and asked his counsel whether he should obey him, and that he was advised by him to execute his charge, which was the fatal cowardliness of them all. For both Silvanus was one of the conspirators, and increased their heinous offences, to whose revenge he had consented; yet spared he both his speech and presence, and sent in one of the centurions to Seneca, to signify unto him the fatal sentence. He no ways dismayed hereat, called for the tables of his testament, which being denied him by the centurion, turning him self towards his friends, he testified unto them, that since it was not permitted him to remunerate their kindness towards him, yet testified he, that he left them yet that which of all others he esteemed most worthy, namely, the image of his life, whereof if they were mindful, they should carry away the fame of good learning, and of so constant friendship. And therewithal recallesh their tears, and calleth them to constancy now by speeches, now by expostulations, after a more intended manner; asking them, Where are the precepts of wisdom? where that premeditated resolution, which you have studied for so many years, against imminent dangers? For to whom was Nero's cruelty unknown? Neither remained there anything after the murder both of his mother, and brother, but to annex the death of his governor and master. Whenas he had in general said these or such like words, he embraced his wife;

and having somewhat tempered her against the present fear, he prayeth and entreateth her to moderate her grief, and not to make it continual. But in contemplation of her life that was virtuously led, to endure the lack of her husband with honest solaces. She contrariwise alleged that her self was sentenced to die also, and calleth for the executioner's help. Then Seneca loath to obscure her glory, and loving her entirely, lest he should leave her to the injuries of others, whom he so dearly loved, said, I have showed thee the proportions and images of life, but thou hadst rather have the glory of death. I will not envy thy example. Let the constancy be equal in us both in this so short a death, but thy renown will be far greater. After which words, both of them cut their veins at one time. Seneca in that his body was old and lean, by reason of his sparing diet, and that by this means his blood flowed more slowly; cut the veins of his legs and hams likewise. And being wearied with cruel torments, lest by his pain he should weaken his wife's courage, and he by beholding her torments should fall into some impatience, he persuaded her to step aside into another chamber. And in the last moment being no ways disfurnished of his eloquence, calling his writers about him, he delivered many things, which being discovered to the world in his own words, I intend not to alter. But Nero that had conceived no private hatred against Paulina, and being afraid lest the odiousness of his cruelty should increase the more, commandeth her death to be hindered. By the exhortations of the soldiers, her slaves and bondmen bind up her arms, and stop the blood, the matter being yet uncertain

Husband  
and wife  
wish  
to die  
together

**Death of Seneca** whether it was with her consent. For amongst the common sort (who are readiest to speak the worst) there wanted not some that believed, that during the time that she feared that Nero was implacable, she sought to accompany her husband in the fame of his death: but when more apparent hopes were offered, that then she was overcome with the sweetness of life, whereunto she added a few years after, with a laudable memory towards her husband. But her face and other parts of her body were grown so pale and discoloured, that it easily appeared that her vital spirits were much spent. In the meanwhile Seneca seeing the protraction and slowness of his death, besought Statius Annæus, a man well approved unto him, both for his faith in friendship, and skill in physic, to haste and bring him that poison which in times past was provided, and by which they were put to death who were by public judgement condemned amongst the Athenians; and having it brought unto him he drunk it, in vain, by reason that his limbs were already cold, and his body shut up against the force of the venom. At last he entered into a bath of hot water, besprinkling those his slaves that stood next about him, saying that he offered up that liquor to Love the Deliverer. Then put into the bath, and stifled with the vapour thereof, he was buried without any solemnity of his funeral: for so had he set it down in his will. Even then whenas being very rich and mighty, he disposed of his last will. Hitherto Tacitus. Neither will I repent my self if I insist lightly, and examine and illustrate his sayings. He saith, that this slaughter of his was most pleasing to the prince. For of long time he was aggrieved against this master and



teacher of his in goodness and equity, and his intent was to shake off that reign of reverence once, whereby he was restrained against his will, by cutting him off; yet had he otherwise sworn, as Suetonius witnesseth: He compelled Seneca his master, saith he, to choose his death, although when he oftentimes sought for viaticum at his hands, and surrendered up all his goods unto him: he had solemnly sworn that he was suspected without cause, and that he had rather die than that he would hurt him. He swore, that is, he deluded the gods also: he saith, Whenas his intent to poison him succeeded not: for he had attempted it; for so saith the same Tacitus in a former place, So we delivered poison unto Seneca by Nero's command, prepared by the hands of one of his freemen, called Cleonicus, but that it was avoided by Seneca, by the discovery of his libertine, or through his own fear, whilst he sustained his life with a spare diet with wild apples, and if he were athirst with running water. He goeth forward: or knowing of it; as if he had knowledge of the conspiracy, and the prefixed time. Likewise, he returned out of Campania, from some lordship of his there. And there truly oftentimes before his death lived he solitary, and in that place wrote many of his epistles to Lucillius. Four miles off, in some manor of his likewise, what was it: Nomentanum? This did Xitho Polentinus write, but upon mere conjecture, as I think. Neither doth Tacitus admit it, who speaketh of some four miles off the city; but Nomentum is at least twelve miles off. No signs of fear. Behold a death both worthy of a philosopher and a Stoic, which those things that follow commend. The image of his

Worthy  
of a  
philo-  
sopher

**His age** life: if Seneca I pray you were so absurd a fellow, as Dion speaketh, should this be spoken of his life in the shutting up? Would he thus dally and deceive his friends, and delude his familiars? Sometimes with speech, that is, gently and familiarly, being hardened against present fear. I write it not again rashly, yet some man may doubt, should it not be *mollitam*, that she was mollified, having relation to his wife? That which followeth seemeth to infer the same, when he requireth her to temper her sorrow; and that which he annexeth: thou seest, saith he, the portraiture of life. These, and divers others are Seneca's own words, or very like unto them, which were extant and well known, as presently after he saith: his aged body. By my reckoning he was some threescore and three or four years old. For that he was not older, Nero's words to Seneca convince, not spoken long time before that in Tacitus. 'But thou art both ripe in years, and sufficient for affairs, and the fruit of them, which thou canst not truly speak of the elder.' Calling his writers about him. O man! O mighty mind! To dictate that when he was a-dying that might help posterity. For it is not to be doubted but that they were such, and mere precepts both of constancy and wisdom. The argument is, because they were published; which should not be except they had been excellent. And because they were published, Tacitus omits them. O improvidently done! O that we likewise had but a touch of these swan-like songs. A bath of hot water: he meaneth some bathing-tub, and then first used he cold water when he should use it no more. Carried into his bath; that is, into his stove or dry bath, as I think: for he showeth that by the vapour and

acrimony of the heat, he was strangled. Even **His body** then when he was most rich and mighty : this is somewhat wherein Tacitus seemeth to carp at him, yet, if I conceive him rightly, Tacitus meant his funeral, and that he forbade the solemnities thereof, but how in that he made his last will. What, would Nero have broken his testament? who happily was appointed heir of the greater part thereof, and would suffer him self to lose nothing through negligence. Or doth he touch Seneca's patrimony herein? But dead words pass not far. Another man may find it.

## CHAPTER IX

*His body, his sickness, his form*

I HAVE ended, except it please you that I write somewhat of his body : for men delight, if I may so speak it, to take notice of the habitations and receptacles of great wits : his body from his childhood was but weak. This saith he of his aunt, after he was brought into the city : 'By her pious and motherly care, after I had been long time sick I recovered my health.' And in a certain epistle : 'Sickness had given me a long safe conduct, and suddenly invaded me. In what kind, sayest thou? And not without cause dost thou ask me this, since that there is not any one that is unknown to me. But to one kind of sickness I seem as it were destined; which why I should call by a Greek name I know not, for it may aptly enough be called Wheesing or Astme.' And presently after he addeth, 'All the incommodities or dangers

**His ill health** of the body have past by me. Behold an old man well exercised, when likewise being a young man, was exercised with distillations and rheums, by means whereof he seemed to be inclined to a consumption.' Himself again: 'That thou art troubled with often distillations and agues: it grieves me the more, because I have had proof of that kind of sickness, which in the beginning I contemned; for at first my youth could wear out the injury, and oppose it self boldly against infirmities, at last I was mastered, and was brought to that pass, that I my self was consumed by distillations. I was brought to an extreme leanness, and oftentimes had I a mind to shorten my days, but my careful and loving father's old years restrained me.' He writeth expressly enough of his leanness and consumption. Neither is it to be wondered at, that Caligula was so persuaded by a woman: for Dio writeth, Whenas Seneca had worthily and happily handled a certain cause in the senate, that this prince waxed mad red with anger, who only would seem to be eloquent, and bethought him self of taking away Seneca's life, which he had done if one of his concubines had not told him this, That in vain prepared he a death for him that was already dying, and was spent with a consumption. He gave credit to her; and this was the means of Seneca's safety. So true is that which he (what was a looker on?) wrote: Many men's sickness deferred their death, and it was a means of their security, that they seemed ready to die. But till his last hour he had but a dry and decayed body, why wonder we when either it was thorow his infirmities or his studies? And Tacitus likewise addeth a third cause, That his body was

attenuated by a slender diet. And that it was not beautiful, Seneca him self expresseth in another place, 'That thou requirest my books, I do not therefore think my self more eloquent, no more than I should judge my self fair because thou requirest my picture.' He toucheth that he was not, and that image, which is discovered of him by Fulvius Ursinus, showeth not a countenance worthy that mind; yet confirmed he his body, though weak, with more harder exercises, as in tilling the fields, and in digging of vineyards, whereof he maketh mention in a certain epistle of his, and in his *Natural Questions*, where he called him self a diligent digger of vineyards, and generally likewise of gardens, which he termeth his cunning.

His form  
and face

## CHAPTER X

*Those books of his that are extant*

THUS of the body only; neither had we any fruit by it, but great from his mind, and let us see them by an index.

His verses and poems, which undoubtedly and plentifully he wrote, he him self showeth that he penned them in his exile: and Tacitus then likewise when he was stept in years, and lived in court. For thus do his calumners object against him to Nero; for they objected against him that he got the praise of eloquence to him self only, and wrote verses very often, after that he knew that Nero was in love with them.

Oration of declamations he made many, and worthy one, yea, even in the senate, besides those

**His books** which he wrote to the prince, to be received likewise in the senate; neither doubt I but that the edicts unto the people, and the graver epistles were written or dictated by him.

His book of *Earthquake*, which, as he testifieth, he wrote when he was young, in the sixth of his *Natural Questions*, chap. 4. Thou shalt not want, for he hath handled the same matter again in the same *Questions*.

That of *Matrimony*, whether it were a book or an epistle I know not, but S. Jerome citeth it against Jovinian, lib. 1.

His *History* or *Compendium* out of Lactantius the 7th and 15th chaps.

His books of *Superstition* was undoubtedly one of his best ones, S. Augustine in his book *de Civitate Dei* praiseth it, and culleth somewhat out of it, and Tertullian maketh mention thereof in *Apologetico*.

His *Dialogues*, which Fabius nameth, and no more.

His moral books, Lactantius citeth them in his eleventh book, chap. 11, and in other places, and Seneca him self in his hundred and sixt Epistle in the beginning, and his Epistle one hundred and nine, he wrote it in his later time, as it appeareth there. O worthy work! And it grieves me that it is obscured.

His books of *Exhortations*: for there were many of them, as may be gathered out of Lactantius, and see our Fragments. Who thinketh that this likewise is not to be numbered amongst his best works? There are other, yet such that thou mayest not confidently ascribe to this man, as his books of notes, which seem rather to be his father's. Likewise

of *Causes*; for so an unknown chronicler among the Britons testifieth; he maketh mention of Seneca *de Causis*, wherein he saith that Cato defined the office of an orator thus: An orator is a good man that is exercised in eloquence. But this belongeth to the father also, and they are the books of *Controversies*; in the first book whereof, and in the very Preface thou shalt find that this of Cato's is cited there: and except I forget my self, thou shalt find it likewise in my Fragments, although these smaller things do not so much overslip me, as I suffer them to pass by me.

But hark you, sir, make we no reckoning of his Epistles to S. Paul?

Those that are now extant are not so much worth, nay, it is most certain, that they have all of them the same author, and that they were written, but by some scarce learned clerk in our disgrace. He travaileth and attempteth to speak Latin, whosoever it was that was the author: did they not therefore write one unto another? S. Jerome, S. Augustine, and Pope Linus more ancient than them both, aver it, and it is a passive opinion. And John of Salisbury likewise confidently writeth, They seem to be foolish, who reverence not him who, as it appeareth, deserved the familiarity of the Apostle. I therefore dare not wholly reject and contemn this; it may be there were some, but others than these, if these: I required the judgement of the best fathers.





LUCIUS ANNÆUS SENECA:  
OF BENEFITS



# LUCIUS ANNÆUS SENECA:

## OF BENEFITS

### THE FIRST BOOK

#### THE ARGUMENT OF JUSTUS LIPSIUS

I PLACE these books amongst the last of his philosophy, **The** although they have been planted in the forefront. But so it **Argu-** is if you consider the time; they were altogether written **ment** under Nero after Claudius' death. A certain argument whereof is, in that in the end of his first book he writes very contemptibly of Claudius, and traduceth his slight judgement: which he would not have done had he been living. The books are good; but in faith confused in order and the handling; which a man though circumspect shall hardly expedite: yet will we do our best. The first book beginneth with a complaint of ingratitude which is usual, and yet greatest amongst vices. Therefore saith he, That he will write of benefits what their force and property is. This handleth he until the fifth chapter. Then defineth he, that a benefit consisteth not in the matter, but the mind of him that bestoweth it, and hath his weight from him: he deduceth it by examples and arguments until the eleventh chapter. There proposeth he two members to be entreated of. What benefits are to be given; and how: the first he performeth in the end of the book; the other he deferreth till the book following.

#### CHAPTER I

AMONGST the many and manifold errors of such as both rashly and inconsiderately lead their lives,

Men's indifference in giving and receiving benefits there is nothing for the most part (most worthy Liberalis), that in my judgement is more hurtful; than that we neither know how to bestow, or how to receive benefits. For it consequently followeth, that being badly lent, they are worse satisfied, and being unrestored, are too lately complained of; for even then when they were given, even then were they lost: neither is it to be wondered at, that amongst so many and mighty vices there is no one more frequent than that of ingratitude. For this in my judgement proceedeth from divers causes. The first is, because we make not choice of such (on whom we are to bestow our benefits) as are worthy to partake them; but being to take bonds of any man, we diligently inquire after his lands and moveables: we sow not our seeds in a fruitless and barren ground, and yet without any election we rather betray, than bestow our benefits. Neither can I easily express, whether it be more dishonest to deny, or redemand a benefit. For such is the nature of this debt, that so much is to be received thereof, as is willingly repaid: but neither to will, nor to be able to perform a man's promise, is most loathsome, in this respect, because to discharge a man's credit, the mind sufficeth, though the means be deficient: for he restoreth a benefit that willingly oweth the same. But if there be a fault in them who are ungrateful even in confession of a favour, there is also some defect in us. By experience we find many ungrateful, and make more; because somewhiles we are grievous upbraiders and exactors: otherwhiles full of lenity in our liberality, and such that as soon as we have lent, repent us of the deed doing: otherwhiles complaining of men's faint correspondence, and

accusing them of some fault and offence they do unto us, how little soever it be. Thus corrupt we all thanksgiving and remuneration, not only after we have given our benefit, but whilst we are in giving of it. For which of us was content either lightly, or at one time to be required? which of us (when he but suspected that something would be demanded at his hands) hath not disdainfully frowned, or turned away his face, or pretended some business, and by long discourses, and purposely-produced speech without head or foot, forestalled the occasion of demanding a favour, and by divers subtile devices deluded hasty necessities, but being cunningly encountered in such sort as he must needly answer, hath not either deferred (that is) fearfully denied, or promised but difficultly, but with bended brows, and strained and reproachful words? But no man willingly oweth that, which he received not voluntarily, but extorted violently. Can any man be thankful unto him, who proudly either reproacheth a benefit, or wrathfully flung it to him, or (being over-wearied) gave it him to the end to avoid his further trouble? He is deceived whosoever hopeth to have a satisfaction at his hands, whom he hath dulled with delay, or tortured with expectation. A benefit is acknowledged according to the intent wherewith it is given; and therefore we ought not to give negligently. For every one is indebted to himself, for that which he receiveth of a neglectful debtor. Neither must there be slackness in our liberality, because whereas in all offices the will of the giver is highly esteemed, he that hath bin slow in benefiting, hath been long time unwilling. Neither ought we to bestow our benefits contumeliously;

maketh-  
ingrati-  
tude so  
frequent

Inforced-  
and  
extorted  
favour  
is not  
thanks-  
worthy

for whereas by nature it is so provided that injuries leave a more deep impression in our minds, than good deserts: and the last are suddenly forgotten, where the first are continually reserved in memory, what expecteth he who offendeth, whilst he obligeth another? His satisfaction and gratuity is sufficient if any man do but pardon his benefit. Neither is there any cause why the multitude of ungrateful men should make us slower to deserve well: for first of all, (as I said) we increase the same: furthermore, neither are the immortal gods deterred from their plentiful and ceaseless bounty: notwithstanding the sacrilegious and neglectful behaviours of men. They use their nature, and infuse their bounty on all things, yea even on those amongst the rest, that use the worst interpretation of their benefits and largess. Let us follow these as our guides, (as far as our human frailty will permit us) let us give benefits, not lend on usury. That man is worthy to be deceived, who thought upon requital when he presented his courtesy. But it was ill employed. Both our children and wives have deceived our hopes, yet do we both bring up the one, and marry the other: and so obstinate are we against experiments, that being overcome in war, and shipwrackt by sea, we give over neither: how much more becometh it us to be constant in giving benefits? which, whosoever giveth not, because he hath not received, gave that he might receive, and makes the cause of the ungrateful receiver justifiable, to whom in that sort at length it is absurd not to repay, although he hath power. How many are unworthy the light, and yet the day riseth to them? How many complain that they are born? Yet nature in-

creaseth mankind, and suffereth those to enjoy life, who loathe to possess it. This is the property both of a great and good mind, not to follow the fruit of benefits, but the benefits themselves, and after the evil to search likewise some good. What bounty were in this, to profit many, if no man were deceived? Now is it a vertue to give benefits, whereof there is no hope of recompense again, and of which the fruit is already received by a worthy man. So far should this thing be from deceiving us, or making us slow to perform so worthy a thing, that although my hope were utterly cut off for ever finding a grateful man, yet had I rather be exempted from receiving benefits from any man, than not to bestow them. Because that he which giveth not, is more faulty than he which is ungrateful. I will speak what I think: he that requiteth not a favour done him, sinneth more; he that giveth not, sooner.

The nature of a benefit is changed by the use

## CHAPTER II

If thou profusely wilt thy goods bestow  
 On every vulgar person thou dost know,  
 Full many favours must thou needly lose,  
 That one at length thou justly mayst dispose.

IN the former verse thou mayest justly reprehend both these two clauses; for neither must our benefits be profusely lavished on every man, neither can the prodigality and largess of anything be honest. especially that of benefits. For if thou givest them without judgement and discretion, they cease to be benefits, and admit any other

Nothing is lost that is rightly given name whatsoever you will give them. The sense following is wonderful, which repaireth the indemnities of many benefits ill-employed and lost, with one well bestowed. See, I pray you, whether this be not more true, and more correspondent to the greatness of a benefactor, to exhort him to give, although he were assured that he should employ no one gift well: for that is false. That many things are to be lost, because nothing is lost; the reason is for that he who loseth, had numbered it already amongst his desperate debts. The respect and manner in employing good deeds is simple and plain, they are only delivered out; if any one to whom they are trusted restore anything, it is gained, if no man yield satisfaction, there is nothing lost: I lent the same to the only intent to give it. No man registreth his good deeds in his book of debtors. Neither is there any exacting usurer (how extreme soever he be) that punctually impleadeth his debtor on the day and hour of his payment. An honourable benefactor never thinketh on the good turn he doeth, except he that hath received the same, refresh the memory thereof by repaying him: because otherwise it ceaseth to be a benefit, and becometh a debt. To bestow a favour in hope to receive another, is a contemptible and base usury. How badly soever thy former favours have fallen out, yet persevere thou in bestowing upon others. They are best hoarded in the hands of the ungrateful, whom either shame, or occasion, or imitation, may at length fashion to be grateful. Persevere continually, and cease not to be bountiful: accomplish that good work which thou hast begun, and perform the duty of a good



man. Relieve this man with thy goods, another with thy credit, that man by thy favour, this with thy good counsels, and wholesome precepts.

Benefits redoubled animates the most ungrateful

### CHAPTER III

WILD beasts (yea even they that are most savage) acknowledge the good that is done unto them. Neither is there any living creature so untamed and intractable, that with gentle handling, and careful nourishing, is not made gentle and familiar. Such as have the keeping and charge of the lions, may muffle and handle them without harm or danger. Meat so much humbleth the fierceness and haughty courage of elephants, that they refuse no servile and base burthens. Finally, all these brute beasts, so deficient in understanding, and esteem of the benefits they receive, at length are tamed and made humble by the frequent and daily access of the same. Is he ungrateful for one good turn? happily he will acknowledge a second. Hath he forgotten two? the third may perhaps bring him to remembrance of all the rest: he loseth the good that he doth, that believeth that he hath over-quickly lost the same. But he that persevereth in well-doing, and redoubleth his benefits one upon the neck of the other, extorteth an acknowledgement from the most obdurate and forgetfullest receiver. He dare not lift up his eyes against many good turns. Whithersoever he turneth himself in seeking to betray his own memory, there let him see thee beleaguer him on every side by thy bounty: The force and properties whereof I will discover unto thee, if

The first of all thou give me licence to expatiate in a word or two, and to touch certain things impertinent to this matter. Why is it that the ancients have feigned that there are three Graces, that they are sisters, having their hands in hands? and why are they pictured laughing, young, and tender in years, virgins, attired in loose garments, clear and transparent? To this some answer, That there ought to be three, because the one of them representeth him that bestoweth; the other, him that receiveth; the other, him that gratifieth and remunerateth the benefit. Others say, that there are three kinds of benefits, the one of those who bestow the same, the other of those that restore the same, and the third of those that receive, and therewithal requite good turns. Of these things judge as thou pleasest, the knowledge hereof full little profiteth us. What meaneth this dance of theirs, in which hand in hand they trip it always in a round? To this intent it is, because the order and process of benefits (that pass through their hands that give the same) is such, that they return again to the giver, and should wholly lose the grace of all which they should effect, if ever they should be interrupted: contrariwise, that they always retain their beauty, when they are united and hand-fasted together, and when they are restored and acknowledged in their time. Therefore paint they them laughing, because the countenances of those that will deserve well at any man's hands, should be smiling and pleasant, such as theirs is, who are wont to give or receive benefits. They paint them young, because the memory of benefits should not wax old. They feign them virgins; because they are incorruptible, sincere, holy, and

profitable unto all men; their garments shining, and transparent, because good works would be seen. Let him that will admire this miracle, invented by the fabulous Grecians; let him, that list, maintain that they are necessary and profitable: yet is there no man that will justify, that the names which Hesiodus hath given them are anyways pertinent to this fable, or that purpose; or that knoweth why he termed the eldest of them Aglaia; the second Euphrosyné; and the third Thalia. Each one hath thought good to wrest the interpretation of these words according to his own fantasy, and hath laboured to fashion them, and conform them to some congruency of reason. Notwithstanding Hesiodus hath given these young maidens that name, which was best liking to his humour. Homer also changed one of their names, and called her Pasithea, and saith, that she was married and espoused to a husband, to the end thou shouldest know that they were no vestals. I will find you out another poet that describeth them girt, and apparelled in thick and gross robes. Mercury also is painted by them; not for that device and good discourse giveth any lustre or esteem to benefits, but because it so pleased the painter to describe them. Chrysippus likewise (whose understanding is so sharp and subtile, and that searcheth and soundeth the very depth and secret of matters, he that pretendeth to speak of good customs, and conformeth his style to every man's understanding) farseth his whole book with these follies, insomuch as he speaketh very little of the manner of giving, receiving, or restoring benefits, in such sort as he mixeth not his fables amidst his discourse, but rather mixeth

Their  
names

The vanity of poets his discourse amidst his fables. For, besides these things which Hecaton hath written, Chrysippus maintaineth, That the three Graces are the daughters of Jupiter and Eurynomé, somewhat younger, but fairer than the Hours, for which cause they were given for companions to the goddess Venus. Chrysippus likewise maketh a mystery of the name of the mother of these Graces, saying; That for this occasion she was called Eurynomé (which in Greek signifieth a good patrimony) because it is the property of a great and ample patrimony to know well how to employ and bestow benefits; as if it were a matter of custom to give the name of mother after that she had children; or as if the poets assigned the true name of all things whereof they entreated. For even as the nomenclators or beadles (whose office it is to relate their names that ought to be solicited to purchase some dignity) sometimes make use of their boldness, instead of their memory, and forgetting the proper names of such as they should certify, forge another according to their own fantasy: so poets think it not pertinent to the matter to speak truth, but either compelled by necessity, or surprised with affection of consonancy, command each thing to be termed by that name that best beseemeth the harmony and cadency of their verses. Neither are they to be blamed herein, because they enlarge the matter with some new device of their own: for the first poet that shall speak of them, will give them what name he pleaseth. And to prove this to be true, behold this name of Thalia (whereof principally all of them make mention) which in Hesiodus is one of the three Graces, and in Homer one of the nine Muses.

## CHAPTER IV

BUT lest I should seem to incur the same fault myself, which I reprehend in others, I will relinquish all these things, which are so far from the matter, that they no ways concern the same; I only pray thee to defend my cause, if any man shall tax and reprehend me for this, that among the rest I have not spared to reprove Chrysippus, being a man so great, (but yet a Grecian) whose understanding is so acute and subtile, that it oftentimes confoundeth and puzzleth itself: for even then when he seemeth to aim at the best, and to affect anything: he only pricketh, but pierceth not; toucheth, but teacheth not. And what subtilty or sharpness, I pray you, is herein? Of benefits then we are to entreat, and to set down an order and direction in this vertue, which chiefly concerneth human society: we are to prefix and set down a law of living, lest inconsiderate facility in giving, grow in favour under the colour of benignity; lest this observation, whilst it tempereth liberality, (which must neither be defective nor superfluous) restrain the same wholly. Men are to be taught to receive with thankfulness, and to restore with the same correspondence, and to procure (in regard of those that oblige them with any benefit) not only to be equal with them in will, but to overcome them with greater gratuity: because that he who is obliged to acknowledge a good turn, requiteth not the same, except his remuneration exceed the giver's merit. These are to be taught to impute nothing; they to owe more; the one not to upbraid; the other

Chry-  
sippus'  
trivial  
subtilty

more and more to acknowledge. To this most honest contention of overcoming one benefit by another so doth Chrysippus exhort us, that he saith, that it is to be feared, lest because the Graces are the daughters of Jupiter, it be reputed sacrilege to grow unthankful for good turns, and injury be thereby offered to so amiable damosels.

Teach thou me somewhat that may make me more forward to do good unto all men, and more thankful unto those that have done me good offices. Tell us something whereby the will of those that oblige by their bounty, and of those who are obliged, are answerable, and made competent: so as the benefactors keep no account or memory of their good deeds, and those that shall receive the same, put them not in oblivion, but perpetually remember them. And let us leave these follies and toys to poets, whose project is to delight the ear, and to invent a pleasing fable. But they that will heal men's disfigured and vicious minds, that serve to maintain faith in human things, and desire to engrave the memory of good turns in the hearts of men; let them speak seriously, and employ their utmost forces: except thou happily think that it is possible by a slight and fabulous discourse, and by old wives' tales, that a thing so pernicious, and so much abominable in the world, (as is the general abolition of debts, and an acquittance of all good deeds) may be prohibited.

## CHAPTER V

BUT as I insist not on those things which are of small importance, so is it likewise necessary that I

endeavour myself to make this well known, that first of all we ought to learn how much we are obliged, when we have received a benefit. One man acknowledgeth himself indebted for the money he hath received, another for a consulate, another for the office of priesthood, another for the government of a province; yet no one of these things is properly a benefit, but only the mark and sign of a benefit or merit. A benefit cannot be touched by the hand, but is carried in the heart.

**Bounty**  
not  
touched  
by the  
hand, but  
graven in  
the heart

There is much difference betwixt the matter of bounty and bounty itself: For this cause neither gold nor silver, (nor any other thing we receive at our friend's hands) is the true and real benefit, except his will only that bestoweth the same. The rude and ignorant sort observe only that which is seen by the eyes, or thrust into the hands, or which is delivered them, or they possess; and contrariwise, they make little account of that which in reality of truth they ought most to prize and praise also. These things which we possess, these things which we see, and wherein our covetousness is so engaged, are frail and uncertain: and either fortune, or injustice can take them from us: but a benefit remaineth, although the matter whereby it is made manifest, be lost and extinguished. Undoubtedly that thing is well done which no force can defeat or diminish. I have redeemed (sayest thou) my friend from the hands of pirates, and him hath another enemy surprised and put in prison. Although this enemy hath defrauded and acquitted me of the use of this good work, yet can he not extinguish the good work itself. I have saved some men's children from shipwrack, or have delivered them

The per-  
petuity  
of a  
benefit

from the force of the fire, and these hath either some sickness or other casual injury violently taken from me. Yet remaineth that without them, which is given in them. All those things then which improperly usurp the name of benefits, are but the means and instruments, by the which the will of a good friend is expressed. The like appeareth in many other things, so as it falleth out, that the true thing is in one place, and the sign and resemblance thereof in another. The emperor or chieftain of an army giveth a chain of gold to some one soldier of his that approved his value in some difficult enterprise, moral or civil: a crown unto another that first scaled the enemy's wall, or for that he saved a citizen's life. I ask you now what precious thing hath this crown in it? what is this embroidered gown or garment which is given to noblemen's children? These ensigns of magistracy, the axe and rods, what value are they of? what profiteth the judge's tribunal, or his painted carriage? None of all these things are honour, but only signs of honour. In the like manner that which is offered to the eye, is not the good work or benefit, but only a lustre and sign of the same.

## CHAPTER VI

WHAT therefore is a benefit? It is a benevolent action which causeth and yieldeth pleasure by that good it communicateth to others, inclined and disposed of itself, and of her proper motion, to that she doth. A benefit therefore consisteth not in that which is either done or given, but in the



mind of him that either giveth or doeth the pleasure. And hereby mayest thou understand, that there is a great difference betwixt these two, because the benevolence is always good; but that which is done, or given, is neither good nor evil. It is the mind that valueth small things; illustrateth and exemplifieth obscure things; and contrariwise, setteth light by those things which are most esteemed and precious. Those things which we desire and long after most, have a neutral and indifferent nature, and are neither good nor evil. That which is most materially to be considered, is, whether the mind that governeth them aimeth and impelleth them, from which all things have their form. That then which is reckoned, or given, is not the benefit, no more than the honour of the gods dependeth not on those beasts that are sacrificed unto them, (how costly and sumptuously soever they be) but in the piety and rectitude of those minds which worship them. For which cause the good and vertuous men, who have nothing to present the gods with but a cake and an earthen vessel, are held for religious. And contrariwise, the worser sort are not exempted and acquitted of impiety, although they have imbrued the altars with much blood and sacrifice.

Wherein  
a benefit  
con-  
sisteth

## CHAPTER VII

IF benefits consisted in those things which we receive, and not in the will wherewith they are given: so much the more greater should they be, the greater the good turns are which we have received. But this is false; for sometime he

True piety and bounty obligeth us more that hath given a little magnificently; that hath equalled the riches of kings by his value and richer mind: that giveth a little, but freely; that forgetteth his own poverty and necessity, whilst he respecteth mine; that had not only a will to help me, but a great desire to favour me; that when he gave a benefit, thought that he received the same; that gave without hope of recompense, and received as though he had not given; that not only sought occasion to do good, but laid hold on the opportunity, whereby he might profit others. Contrariwise these things which either are extorted from the giver, or seem to fall from his hands that giveth them. although they seem highly prized and of great appearance, yet, as I said, they are unworthy of thanks, because a gift is much more gratefully accepted and reckoned of that cometh from a free and liberal hand, than from a full and rich-fisted pennyfather. It is but a small thing he hath given me, but he could not give me more. But that which the other hath given me, is far more worth: yet doubted he; yet delayed he when he should give; yet grumbled he in bestowing; yet gave he presumptuously, excusing himself by many circumstances, and would not please him to whom he lent his goods. Finally, that which he gave me, was not so much to give it me, as to bestow it on his ambitious thoughts.

## CHAPTER VIII

WHENAS many men offered many presents to Socrates, each one according to their possessions

and possibilities: one of his poorest scholars, **Socrates** whose name was *Æschines*, came unto him, and **and his pupil** said: I find nothing worthy thyself, that I may give unto thyself: and in this one only kind I find myself to be poor. That one thing therefore which is only in my possession, I offer thee, which is myself; beseeching thee to accept of this gift such as it is, and to consider that they which have given thee many things have reserved much more to themselves. To this Socrates answered: Who doubteth but that thou hast offered me a great present, were it not that thou valuest and esteemest thyself so little, I will therefore take care to restore thy person to thyself, better than at this time I receive him from thee. By this present of his, *Æschines* exceeded *Alcibiades* (a man as mighty in mind as in means) and all the liberalities of all the most richest young men of Greece.

## CHAPTER IX

THOU seest how a good mind findeth matter of liberality, even in the greatest gall and torment of misery. *Æschines* (methinks) reasoneth thus in himself: Think not Fortune, that thou hast prevailed anything against me in making me poor, be thou never so refractory; yet will I find a present that is worthy Socrates; and since I cannot give anything that is thine, or thou hast given me, I will give mine own, myself, and the best of me. You must not think that *Æschines* valued himself basely to himself, that knew none more worthy present besides himself without himself. This ingenious young man found out the means, how he might

**A** make Socrates his, by giving him what he was.  
**notable** We are not to respect the value of these things that  
**lesson** are given, but the vertue of him that giveth. A  
**of an** subtile and politic man willingly giveth audience to  
**ethnick** those that demand and propose unreasonable suits,  
 and intending no ways to help indeed, nourisheth  
 their fraudulent hope with deceitful words. But  
 yet worse is his opinion, that with proud language,  
 grave and severe looks, hath disdainfully set out  
 the sum of his riches. For they that make a  
 show to respect and reverence a man on whom  
 Fortune smileth, are the first that detest and seek  
 to do him mischief; and such notwithstanding,  
 that if they had the power, would themselves do  
 that which the other did. Some there are that  
 not privately and behind their backs, but openly  
 and to their faces have scorned and mocked at  
 other men's wives, and yet have abandoned their  
 own to those that loved them. There are women  
 likewise, that in these days accompt those married  
 men rustic, inhuman, and of froward condition,  
 that will not suffer their wives to get up into their  
 caroches, and prance through the streets to be  
 gazed at by the passers-by. That man who is not  
 noted for entertaining a mistress, or for courting  
 his neighbour's wife, him do these matrons  
 accompt base in condition and heart; base in  
 choice and election, and only worthy to court  
 their basest chambermaids. Hence is it, that in  
 these days adultery is reputed the most honestest  
 method and manner (that is) to wed a woman.  
 Some had rather consent never to entertain  
 marriage, than not to have such a woman to his  
 wife, that was not debauched from her husband.  
 There is neither measure nor rule in men's

expense. They contemn another man's poverty, and fear none but their own: they dread no other evil, they never pardon injury, they tyrannize over the weaker sort, and outrage them by force or fear. For to see provinces sacked, the chair of justice sold, and judgements set to sale to him that will give most, is not to be wondered at, since it is permitted by the law of nations to sell that thou hast bought.

for all  
good  
Chris-  
tians

## CHAPTER X

BUT the subject whereof I entreat, hath so much distracted and transported me, that it hath carried me further than I thought. Let us in such sort endeavour to end out of this life, that our sins may not seem to be rooted and settled in the same. Hereof our ancestors and predecessors complained, hereat we ourselves are aggrieved; and for this will our successors sigh, because good customs are abolished, impieties have pre-eminence, and human affairs grow worse and worse, and men leave no wickedness or sin unsought after. And the worst is that these vices do and shall remain in the same place, although they be a little moved here and there, as the floods of the sea, which when the tide cometh, are carried out into the ocean, and upon the ebb are contained awhile on the brim and bank of the river. In this time shall adulteries be more frequent than any other vice, and modesty shall turn loose and libertine. In another age the fury of banqueting shall flourish, and the indecent abundance of kitchens: the shops wherein so infamously men's patrimonies

All  
vices the  
children  
of in-  
gratitude

are sold and bartered. Another time shall come of immeasurable and unbridled curiosity in apparelling the body, and painting the face, which external fuke shows how foul and filthy the soul is internally. At this time great men abusing their authority, shall be both audacious and insolent. At another time men shall flesh themselves with public and private cruelties, and in the furious madness of civil dissension, whereby every sacred and sanctified thing is profaned. The time will come wherein drunkenness shall be honoured, and he shall be esteemed most vertuous and gallant that hath sucked in the greatest excess of wine. Vices continue not always in one and the same place, they agree not well together, they change time and place, they urge and give chase one to another. In a word, we may always boldly say thus of ourselves, that we are evil, that we have been evil, and (unwillingly I speak it) we always shall be. In all times there will be murtherers, tyrants, thieves, adulterers, robbers, church-breakers, and traitors, and the least of all these is the ungrateful man, except it be that all these are the children of ingratitude, without which scarcely any evil enterprise hath been plotted or performed. Beware and esteem thou this as the most grievous and greatest of crimes, let him not take hold of thee; and in another man pardon the same as if it were the slightest of all others. For in effect all the injury that he did thee consisteth in this, that thou didst lose thy good deed: but comfort thyself with this, that thou didst not lose the better part thereof, which is, the honour to have given the same. But even as we ought to be well advised, not to employ our favours on

those that will not heartily and freely acknowledge the same, so ought we sometimes to hazard a benefit, although we are out of hope of acknowledgement or satisfaction. And not only when we are afraid that they will be ungrateful, but also then when we shall be most assured that they have already bin approved and known for ungrateful. Even as if I can, I am undoubtedly bound to restore unto a father (provided that it be not with any hazard of mine own fortunes) his children whom I had saved from a great peril: so likewise ought I to defend a vertuous and worthy man, and second him in the danger wherein I shall find him, though it be with the loss and expense of mine own blood. If likewise by my outcry I can deliver a man from the hands of thieves, (although he be unworthy of any favour) I ought never to repent myself if by my words I have saved a wicked man's life.

Of three  
sorts of  
benefits

## CHAPTER XI

IT followeth now that we declare what sorts of benefits we ought to give, and after what manner we ought to give them. First of all let us give things necessary, then profitable, thirdly agreeable, and permanent. Let us begin with that which is necessary. For we accompt ourselves far more beholden to him that hath given us our life, than to him that enlargeth our honours or instructeth us in vertues. Never will he esteem it a thing according to the value if he can easily slight it over, and say, Take it to thee, I want it not, I am contented with mine own. So doing thou wilt

The not be obliged to restore that which hath bin necessary given thee, but thou wilt disdain it and cast it away. But amongst those things which are necessary some hold the first place, and they are those without which we cannot live. Others hold the second: and they are those without which we ought not to live; others the third, without which we would not deserve to live. The first of this note are, to be delivered out of the enemy's hands, exempted from a tyrant's wrath and proscription, and other perils, which being both divers and uncertain beleaguer and besiege man's life. Which soever of these we shall have prevented or cut off, the more greater and terrible it is, the greater thanks shall we receive. For they will bethink them from what evils we have delivered them, and the precedent fear of danger which they have had, reviveth their remembrance, and giveth life to the desert fore-past, when they bethink themselves from how many miseries they are delivered. Yet hereby is it not intended if we should maliciously defer or deny our succours to him that is in any danger, to the end that fear should give a greater weight to our benefit or merit. In the second rank are those things without which truly we may live, but live so miserably, as death were better than the life; of which kind are liberty, modesty, and a good mind. In the last place we rank those things, which alliance and parentage, familiar conversations, and long use, hath made us always repute and accompt most dear and precious: as our children, our wives and houses, and all these things whereunto we have so much addicted and dedicated our hearts and desires, that we had rather die than divide ourselves from their



company. After these necessary things succeed those that are profitable, whose nature and argument is far more ample and diverse. Here entereth money, (not superfluous but sufficient to entertain an honourable means of life) here entereth honour and the good carriage of affairs, to the end to attain to greater matters. For nothing is more profitable than to be made profitable to a man's own self. The rest is but even great abundance and superfluity which spoileth men, and maketh them effeminate. But when we would intend to do a pleasure, we must provide that the opportunity may make it more pleasing; that the thing we intend to present be not common and ordinary; that few men have had the like in times past, and that as few yet in these our days can match the pattern: and if it be not rich in itself, at least let the time and place, wherein we give the same, cause it to be more highly prized. Let us bethink ourselves what present we might make, that might yield some pleasure and contentment, that might be more oftentimes seen and handled, to the end that so often as he should take my present into his hands, so oftentimes he should have and hold me in his remembrance. We ought likewise to beware that we send not unseemly presents; as to a woman, or an old and impotent man, toils or other necessary instruments of hunting; to a country clown books; or nets to him that is studious and addicted to his book. Contrariwise also we ought to be very circumspect, lest thinking to send some agreeable present, we send to every one such thing as may reproach him of his infirmity; as wine to a drunken man, and medicines to a sick man. For this beginneth to

The profitable

Things resemble rather an outrage than a present, if that  
of con- which is given do tax the imperfection of him that  
tinuance receiveth the same.

## CHAPTER XII

IF it be in our election to bestow what we list, let us present such things as may continue longest, to the end that the good which we do, and gifts we bestow, may be lasting and of long continuance. Because amongst those that receive, there are few so thankful that they remember them of that they have received, except they have it always in their sight. And the ungrateful also, when the present and favour is always in their eyes, are thereby drawn into the memory thereof, which suffereth them not to forget themselves, but rendreth and redoubleth the memory of him that gave the same. So much the rather therefore let us seek out things that are of continuance, because we ought never to upbraid a benefit, but suffer the present itself to quicken and revive decaying memory. More willingly will I give silver plate than ready money, more willingly statues, than apparel, and such things as in a short time are worn out by use. Few there are that remember to give thanks after they have pocketed the present. Many there are that no longer make estimate of a good turn, than whilst they may make use thereof. If therefore it possibly might be so, I would not that my gift should be consummate, or worn out of memory, my desire is it should be extant, and of long continuance, and accompany my friend and live jointly with him. There is no man so foolish that had need to be taught, that he should not invite his

friend, and present him with the public shows of fencing, and baiting of savage beasts, whenas these proclaimed sports have been performed and shown, or sommer suits for winter time, and winter garments in heat of sommer; we need no more than common-sense to make us know what is fitting and acceptable. We must respect the time, the places, the persons, because in the moments of time, or occasion, some things are grateful and ungrateful. How much more acceptable is it if we give that, which the person to whom we give hath not, than that wherewith he is abundantly stored? if we present him with that which he hath long sought and could not find, than that which is merchandable and easily bought in every place? Our gifts ought rather to be exquisite and rare, than precious and rich, and such and so extraordinary, that he that seemeth to have least want of anything by reason of his abundance, may accept and hold them dear for their rarity and novelty. Were they but common apples which in a short space by reason of their abundance would be displeasent to the whole world, yet if a man make a present of them in their prime ripeness, and when there is a scarcity of them, they will be far more acceptable and esteemed. These presents likewise are not without honour, which either no man else hath presented them with, or we ourselves have not given to any other.

lie longest  
in the  
receiver's  
memory

### CHAPTER XIII

WHENAS Alexander of Macedon after his Oriental victories had raised his thoughts above human

The true  
difference

reach; certain ambassadors were sent unto him in the behalf of the Corinthians, to congratulate his victories, and to present him with the title of a free citizen of Corinth. Which offer of theirs when Alexander had scornfully derided, one of the ambassadors said unto him: Consider, noble Prince, that we have never imparted this privilege of our city at any time to any else, but thyself, and invincible Hercules. Which when Alexander had heard, he thankfully entertained the honour they had offered him, sumptuously feasted, and gratefully embraced the ambassadors, conceiving thus, and contemplating, not what they were who offered them their city, but who he was to whom they had first presented the same before him. This man who was so addicted, and drunken in glory: (whereof he neither knew the nature nor the measure,) following the traces of Hercules and Liber, yet not content himself to bound his ambition within the limits where they ceased, he respected what companions in honour the Corinthians had presented him with; And thereby finding himself to be compared with Hercules, he thought that already he was possessed of heaven, which vain and fruitless hope he foolishly embraced. For tell me, I pray you, wherein might this mad fool in anything resemble or compare himself with Hercules, who had but happy temerity instead of resolution and value? Hercules achieved no conquest for his own particular interest: he traversed the whole world, not desiring possessions, but revenging injuries. What desire of conquest, or affection of profit, could this enemy of evil men, this protector of good men, this pacifier both of land and sea in any sort

conceive or have? But this man from his young years was a thief, a forager of countries, the ruin both of his friends and enemies, who held it for his chiefest happiness to be a terror to all mortal men; remembering not that not only the most cruel beasts, but also the most feeble and coward, are redoubted, and feared for their pernicious venom.

betwixt  
Hercules  
and  
Alex-  
ander

#### CHAPTER XIV

LET us now return unto our purpose. That benefit which is given to every man, is grateful to no man. No man will ever think that a taverner or hostler entertaineth him as a friend. No man supposeth himself to be invited by him that furnisheth a feast to entertain a whole city. For a man may say, What pleasure hath he done me? he hath favoured me no otherwise than he would a stranger, or an enemy, or the basest fellow, or player, he might have met withal. But he thought me more worthy or better esteemed than any other? nothing less: that which he hath done is but to content his own humour and infirmity. If thou desirest that thy presents may be acceptable, make choice of some rare thing. Who will accompt himself obliged for a courtesy which is done unto every man? Let no man interpret these things in that nature as if I would restrain men's liberality, and repress them more than reason required. I will not so bound the same that it may not be general, or employed where a man pleaseth; yet my desire is that it should not be extravagant or misemployed, but justly intended. A man may so sort his good turns, and so honestly distribute

Means to  
fashion  
men

the same, that they who have received them, although they be many, may suppose that they are not favoured in common, but in particular. Let every man have some familiar note, whereby he that receiveth may conjecture that he is more inwardly respected by him that bestoweth the benefit. Let us give him an occasion to say: I have not received more than that other man, but that which was given me came with a freer bounty and good will. I have received the same present which another man had, yet I more speedily and readily than he, whereas he long before had merited the same. Some there are that have had the same favours, yet not delivered with the same gratulatory speeches, nor presented with the like courtesy from the benefactor. This man received after he had entreated for his benefit, but I, when I was besought to accept the same. Such a man received a rich present; tis true: but he could more easily give recompense; for being as he is a man of many years, and without heirs, he promiseth great hopes to the benefactor. But that which I received is of more esteem, because that which he hath given me is without all hope of restitution. Even as a curtizan so divideth herself amongst many, that each one hath a particular insinuation and proof to be more favoured than the rest: So he that desireth that his courtesies should be esteemed, ought to bethink him, not only in what sort he may oblige all men unto him, but how every one may have something whereby he may think that he is preferred before the rest. For mine own part I desire not to restrain any man from distributing his liberalities as him listeth: the more and greater his largess

is, the more honourable and praiseworthy they be; yet wish I notwithstanding that his bounty should be bounded with judgement. For these things that are given rashly and without consideration, are never well reputed or accompted of. For this cause if any man should think that in commanding this, I would by this means banish and exterminate liberality, and should not afford the same limits large enough; undoubtedly he hath made but little use and received less profit of these my instructions. For is there any vertue that I have more prized? or whereunto I have more incited men than to that? to whom appertaineth these exhortations and instructions more than to me, who by liberality would establish and assure a firm commerce and society amongst men?

to acceptance  
and  
gratuity

## CHAPTER XV

HAPPILY thou wilt inquire how far bounty ought to be limited, for that it is certain, that no action or design of the soul can be decent or honest, although it hath had his original from a just will, but that whose weight and just measure is transformed into vertue? To this I answer, that here I only pretend, that liberality ought not to be prodigal or misemployed. Then is it that a man should be glad to have received a good turn, (yea willingly, and with open hands:) when reason and judgement hath addressed it to their hands, who are worthy of the same, when by temerity of fortune, or by heat of courage, it is not unprovided and disfurnished of good counsel, and when a man may take pleasure to show it to the world, and

**A** treasure but no benefit profess himself to be the author. Wilt thou esteem that for a benefit which thou hast received from such a man's hands, whom thou art ashamed to name? Contrariwise, how much more agreeable are those good turns unto us, how inwardly are they grounded and ingrafted in our memories (from whence they are inseparable), when they content us, and make our thoughts more pleasing, in imagining from whom, than what we have received? Crispus Passienus was accustomed to say, that he more esteemed other men's judgements, than their gifts, and other men's gifts, than their judgement; and annexed this example; I had rather (said he) have Augustus's judgement, yet love I well Claudius's bounty. But for mine own part, I think that no man ought to desire a benefit at his hands, whose judgement is deficient and idle. What then? should not that which Claudius gave be received? why not? but in such manner as if thou hadst received it from Fortune's hand, which thou mightest imagine might suddenly become a misfortune. But why sayest thou should we separate those things which are so united? because we cannot call that a benefit which wanteth his principal part, that is, to be done and given with heartiness and deliberation. A great sum of money, if it be not given prudently, and with a will grounded on reason, is a treasure, but no benefit. Finally, there are many things which we may receive, and yet not be obliged for them.



## THE SECOND BOOK

### THE ARGUMENT OF JUSTUS LIPSIUS

He assumeth and entreateth of another part, how benefits are to be given. He giveth many precepts hereupon; that we bestow them willingly, speedily, and without dubitation. That some things are to be given openly, other some things secretly. Then what they are which are hurtful, if they be not given, although they be demanded, and yet not dishonest, and such as may breed future infamy. Then that the persons ought to be esteemed both of him that giveth, and him that receiveth, that both of them may be decent. Another part of the book: How he that receiveth should behave himself, from whom he receiveth, and how, especially gratefully. By occasion he decideth what it is that maketh men ungrateful: pride, avarice, envy: Finally, in many words he disputeth of gratitude, and proveth that it consisteth on will, whereas wealth and means wanteth.

The  
Argu-  
ment

### CHAPTER I

LET us look into and examine that (most worthy Liberalis) which as yet remaineth of the first; that is to say: In what manner we ought to bestow a benefit. To the better performance whereof I shall in my opinion set down the most expedite way and means. So let us give as we would receive a good turn. But above all things what we do, let us do willingly, speedily, and without hesitation or doubting: Ungrateful is that benefit that hath long time stuck betwixt his fingers that

Who giveth the same, that a man seemeth hardly to part  
 dallieth withal; and delivereth in such sort, as if he had  
 in bounty, robbed himself of it. Yea if we cannot give so  
 loseth soon as we would, and that we are enforced to  
 his gift delay our benefit, let us strive at leastwise by all  
 the means possible, that it be not supposed, that  
 we have hung long time in deliberation or sus-  
 picion, whether we should give or no: he that  
 doubteth, is next to him that denieth, and de-  
 serveth no thanks for the same. For since in a  
 benefit there is nothing more agreeable than the  
 will of him that giveth the same, he that in delay-  
 ing giveth us to understand that he giveth against  
 his will, in effect giveth nothing, but rather knew  
 not how to keep it from his clutches, that drew  
 it from his hands. Divers there are that are  
 bountiful for shame sake: but those pleasures  
 that are readily bestowed, that are given before  
 they are demanded, that are unattended by any  
 delay (except it be the modesty of him that  
 receiveth the same) are far more agreeable. First  
 of all it behooveth us to prevent every man's  
 desire, and afterwards to follow the same. But  
 the best is to prevent and present our favours  
 before they be sought after. And for that an  
 honest man blusheth always for modesty when  
 he demandeth anything, whosoever he be that  
 remitteth and excuseth him of this torment, re-  
 doubleth and multiplieth the pleasure. He  
 received not gratis, that received when he de-  
 manded. Because (according to the opinion of  
 the gravest authors and our ancestors) there is  
 nothing that costs so much, as that which is  
 bought with prayers. Men would more sparingly  
 tender their vows unto the gods, if they should

do it openly; and rather desire we in secret to pray and perform our vows unto them, because our desire is that our thoughts should be only known unto them. Bis dat  
qui cito  
dat

## CHAPTER II

THE words are distasteful, and full of disturbance, for a man of honour (with abashed and abased look) to say, I beseech you. Labour thou then to excuse thy friend herein, and whomsoever else thou intendest to oblige unto thee by thy bounty. How forwardly soever a man give, that giveth after he is entreated, let him know this lesson, that he giveth too late. Endeavour therefore to divine and foresee every man's will; and when thou understandest the same, discharge him of the grievous necessity of asking. Know thou that that benefit is most pleasing, and of longest perpetuity in man's memory, that comes unsought for and undemanded. And if happily thou hast not had the opportunity to prevent his necessity, yet at leastwise intercept the reasons and motives which he should use in requesting thy courtesy: thou oughtest to make him believe by thy readiness and forwardness, that thou hadst a desire to do him friendship before he demanded the same. And as meat which is presented a sick man in due season profiteth him much; and simple water being given in time of necessity, is sometimes of as much worth and value as a medicine: even so a pleasure although it be but little and small in value, if it be freely and fitly given, if it be done in due time, and fitting to the occasion, valueth

Terms  
befitting  
a liberal  
mind

and commendeth itself the more, and surmounteth the estimate and worth of a rich and precious present, which hath been long time devised and dreamt upon. It is not to be doubted, but that he who so readily distributed his largess, performed the same as willingly. And therefore with joyfulness fulfilleth he that he intended, and thereby giveth testimony of his good mind.

### CHAPTER III

THE immeasurable silence of some, and their slowness in speech (the first-born breed of sullenness and sottish gravity) hath made many men lose their benefits, notwithstanding their great worth and value. For although they promise with their tongues, they deny in the carriage of their eyes. How far better were it to accompany good works with good words, and to give credit to the good office thou doest with familiar and courteous language? Challenge him that requireth aught at thy hands, for this cause, that he hath deferred so long time to make use of thee, in forming against him this familiar quarrel: I am much displeas'd with thee, for that thou hast not acquainted me sooner with that which thou desirest at my hands, for that thou hast used too many ceremonies and circumstances in requiring my help; for that thou hast employed a third means for that which thou mightest have commanded thyself: for mine own part, I hold myself most happy and contented, that thou hast sought to make proof of the good affection I bear thee. From henceforth if thou be pressed with

any necessity, command and claim whatsoever is mine as thine own: Let this one error pass, I pardon thy rusticity. Hereby shalt thou make him esteem and value thy noble mind more, than all that he came to claim at thy hands, how precious soever it be. Then doth the benefactor's vertue most manifestly appear, then is his bounty remarkable, whenas the other passing from him, shall depart muttering to himself: Great hath been my gains this day; it more contents me that I have found him such a man, than if the benefit had been redoubled unto me by any other way, for to a mind such as this is I shall never yield retribution or condign satisfaction.

A lost  
courtesy  
to receive  
after  
much  
craving

#### CHAPTER IV

BUT many there be, that by the bitterness of their words, and the crabbedness of their looks, make their favours odious, by using such speech, and expressing such pride, that it repenteth him that demanded the courtesy, that he hath obtained it. It falleth out oftentimes likewise, that after the promise made, there are some delays and procrastinations: yet is there not anything more loathsome and distasteful, than when a grace is once granted, to be enforced to go and redemand it again. The favours we intend, ought not to be deferred, which cost more sometimes in their recovery than in their promise. This man must thou beseech to put his lord in remembrance, that man to receive the favour for thee; thus one simple gift (by passing thorow many men's hands) is diminished and lessened very much, and he

Refusal hath least satisfaction that hath made promise  
 is better thereof. For they, whom afterwards we must  
 than in- importune, get the better part of the thanks. If  
 certainty therefore thou wilt have thy gifts to be acceptable  
 and grateful, thou must procure that they pass  
 thorow their hands that sought the same untouched  
 and entire, and (as they say) without any deduc-  
 tion. Let no man intercept, let no man detain  
 them; there is no man that in that which thou  
 art to give, can purchase any credit, but that he  
 impaireth and diminisheth thine.

## CHAPTER V

THERE is nothing more tedious and irksome to a man, than to hang long in suspense. There are some that had rather that the hopes of their pretensions were scanted, than delayed. And many there are (too foully possessed of this vice) that with a depraved ambition protract and defer those things they have already promised, to no other end, but to increase the number of those that solicit and sue to them. Such are these ministers of kingly majesty, who take delight in the admiration, which other men conceive of their greatness and pomp, who think themselves disabled in their power, if by many delays and longer procrastinations they make not every man understand how powerful and graced they be. They perform nothing speedily, they despatch nothing at once. Their injuries are headlong and sudden, their benefits silly and slow. Wherefore think that most true which the comic poet saith :

‘Dost thou not so much of thy thanks diminish,  
As thou delayst thy benefit to finish?’

**True  
liberality  
is im-  
patient of  
delay**

From thence arise those complaints which ingenious sorrow expresseth, Do speedily, if thou wilt do anything; and Nothing is more dear: I had rather thou shouldst have utterly denied me. Such manner of discourse use they at that time that are wearied with a long delay, which maketh them already contemn and hate the good, which they heartily expected. Can they for this be esteemed ungrateful? Even as that cruelty is the greatest that bringeth out and protracteth the pain, and to despatch a man of life quickly, is in some occasions a kind and sort of mercy (because in the end the last torment draweth with itself the remainder of itself, and the time precedent, is the greatest part of the punishment that succeedeth :) so the less time I am held in suspense, the greater thanks owe I for the favour I receive. The expectation of things, how good and honest soever they be, is both tedious and displeasent: and whereas there are many benefits which are a total remedy to some instant necessity; he that suffereth the indigent either to be tortured by delay, whom forthwith he could despatch, or maketh him languish in expectation, and grow forlorn before he compass the favour, abuseth his own benefit, and lays violent hands on his own good work. All true liberality is addressed and expedite, and it is the property of him that doth willingly, to do quickly. He that giveth later than he should do, and wearieeth out both time and occasion, before he assist and succour the indigent, witnesseth by his actions, that he had never a will to succour him. And by this means looseth he in

The one benefit two most important things, that is to  
 manner say, time, and the argument of his friendly inten-  
 of giving tion and will, because to will a thing over-late, is  
 maketh the gift not to will it at all.

## CHAPTER VI

IN all affairs (*Liberalis*) that which importeth most, is the manner and fashion of speaking or doing anything. Celerity hath done much, delay hath defrauded more. Even as in weapons of all sorts, the edge and point both of the one and of the other, are of the same force and keenness as the rest are; but there is a great difference in them, if they be enforced by a brawny and forcible arm, or managed by a faint and feeble arm. It is one and the same sword, that slightly raceth and rudely pierceth thorow: that which most importeth, is the strength of the arm that governeth it. The like may be said of that which a man giveth; the only difference is, in the manner of giving. O how precious, and how sweet a thing is it, to encounter with a benefactor, that consenteth not to be clawed with acclamations and thanksgivings! and that as soon as he bestoweth a benevolence, forgetteth the same! for to reprove him to whom thou art most beneficial, and to intermix injuries and outrages with courtesies and good turns, is no less than madness. Benefits therefore are not to be exasperated or intermeddled with any distaste or misliking. Though happily thou hast something that thou hast reason to reprehend him in, reserve it till another time more proper and convenient.



## CHAPTER VII

Inforced  
courtesy  
hath no  
merit

FABIUS VERRUCOSUS called that disgraceful courtesy, which was presented by a niggardly hand, gravelly and stale bread; which a hungry man must of necessity take, yet can hardly eat. Tiberius Cæsar being requested by Marcus Aelius (who had been prætor) to discharge him of those many debts, wherein he was engaged: Cæsar commanded him to set down the names of all his creditors. This is not properly to give, but to summon them to whom he owed anything to composition. As soon as he had received the register of their number, he wrote a schedule wherein he commanded to pay his prodigal nephew's debt and gave it to him, and therewithal so bitter and contumelious a reprehension, as the poor man was so much dismayed, that he neither knew that he had received any money for his creditors, from the emperor's hands; or any favour for himself: he delivered him from his creditors, but obliged not him unto himself. Some motive there was that guided Tiberius herein; and in my judgement, that he did, was to the end, that no man should importune him more in such like requests; and this happily was an effectual way, thorow the shame and reproof of one man to repress the disordinate desires of covetousness in all other men. Yet he that giveth a benefit, must absolutely follow a far different way.

## CHAPTER VIII

By any means procure thou, that whatsoever thou intendest to give, may be adorned with all that

The twofold manner of employing benefits which either may make thy gift more acceptable, or better received: for otherwise thou dost no good work, but disclose and reprehend an hidden error. And that I may express by the way (in my judgement) what my opinion is herein, methinks it is a thing ill-beseeming a prince, to give a favour with an affront and infamy: nevertheless, for all this Tiberius could never by this manner of dealing fly that which he feared: for many others came afterwards and besought him in the same sort, and for the same relief as Aelius did, all whom he commanded to inform the Senate, in what manner they had spent that money they had borrowed, and thereupon gave them certain sums of money. This is no liberality, but a censure; this is no succour, but a principal tribute. Because that cannot be esteemed a good work, which I cannot call to memory without blushing, and disgrace: I am sent to the judge, to obtain that which I required, I was enforced to suffer a criminal process.

## CHAPTER IX

THE wise men therefore, and such as are authors of wisdom, advise, that some benefits are to be given openly, other some secretly. Those are openly to be given, which may honour and magnify him that receiveth them, such as are military presents and dignities, and whatsoever other gift, which the more public and notorious it is, the more honourable it becometh. Again, those gifts, which neither promote nor advance a man's fortune, nor augment his reputation, but

only succour his infirmity, his necessity, and ignominy : must be given so secretly, that he only may take notice thereof that hath the benefit and assistance thereby. And sometimes also we ought to deceive him that we intend to relieve, in such a sort as our gift may come unto his hands, and yet he ignorant from whom he received the same.

Favours  
are to  
be done  
in secret

## CHAPTER X

ARCESILAS (as it is reported) being advertised, that a poor friend of his (who concealed his necessities, as much as in him lay) was fallen sick, and yet notwithstanding would not discover the poverty he endured in his sickness; bethought him that he should not do amiss, to relieve him secretly. For which cause, under colour to come and visit him, he left a bag full of money under the sick man's pillow; to the end that the poor fool (being more bashful than wise) might rather think that he had found that which he desired, than that he received it as a benefit. What then? should he not know (sayest thou) from whom the favour came? No. At the first let him be ignorant thereof, sith the not knowing thereof is a better part of the good work. Afterwards I will do him many other pleasures, I will give him so many other things, that in the end he shall perceive who was the first author of them: finally, he shall not know that he hath received, and I shall understand that I have given. Methinks thou tellest me, that this is nothing. I answer thee, that it is insufficient, if so it be, that by thy good work thou seekest interest and

An  
inviolable  
law in  
doing  
good

praise : but if thou desirest to do it in that kind, that it may be more and better profitable to him that receiveth the same, thou wouldst content thyself to be a witness, that thou thyself didst it. Because thou seemest not to take pleasure in doing thy good work, but desirest to make it known, that thou hast done the same : I will (sayest thou) that he know that I did him the good turn. This is to seek out a debtor. But my desire is (sayest thou) that he should know it. Tell me why? If it be more profitable for him that receiveth the benefit, not to know whence it cometh ; if it be more honest, and more agreeable that he know it not : wilt thou not in this point be of our opinion ? I will that he know it. Thou wouldst not then save a man's life if the night were dark. I deny not but that upon some just occasion it may be lawful for a man to take some contentment in his thankfulness that hath received a benefit. But if then when it is needful to assist and succour our friend, we perceive that he should receive some disgrace thereby, if the good that we do him, shall sort to his indignity, except it be done secretly : We ought not to insinuate or make known our good turns. Were it answerable to honesty to tell him that it was I that have given it him ? whereas by the precise and principal precepts I am forbidden at any time to upbraid him, or to refresh the memory of my favour done unto him : For this is an inviolable law betwixt him that giveth, and him that receiveth, that the one ought incontinently to forget the good he hath done, and the other ought to have a continual remembrance of that which he hath received. There is nothing that more tireth

and travaileth a good mind, than to be oftentimes reproached and upbraided with those pleasures which have been shewen him.

Secrecy  
must  
accom-  
pany  
benefits

## CHAPTER XI

IT contenteth me much to make a public narration of that exclamation which a certain Roman used, who had been saved by one of Cæsar's friends (during the time of the proscriptions of the Triumvirate) who being unable any further to endure his pride, most manfully cried out thus; Redeliver me I pray thee to Cæsar, and the power of justice: 'How long wilt thou reproach and upbraid me saying, I have saved thee, I have delivered thee from death? If I forget not my self, I must confess that thou gavest me life; but if I remember me of thy often reproaches, I cannot conceive but that thou hast given me death. I owe thee nothing, if thou hast saved me to no other end, but to make an ostentation of thy vanity. How long wilt thou lead me about for a spectacle to men, and a torture to myself? how long will it be ere thou suffer me to forget my hard fortune? Had I been led in triumph by the enemy, it had been but one day's miserable spectacle. Never ought we to disclose that which we have given: he that upbraideth a courtesy redemandeth it. We must not importune, we ought never to refresh the memory of a former pleasure, but by seconding it by another. Neither ought we to disclose it unto others. Let him that hath done the good office, conceal it: let

Bounty him that hath received the same, disclose it.  
 must be Otherwise it may be said unto him as it was to  
 accom- one who publicly vaunted and boasted of the  
 panied pleasures he had done. Happily (said he that  
 with had received the gift) thou wilt deny but that  
 love and thou hast received again that which thou gavest  
 charity me; and as the other asked him when? he  
 answered; Many times, and in many places: as  
 if he should say; As oftentimes, and in as many  
 places as thou hast vaunted thereof vainly; what  
 need hadst thou to speak it? or usurp upon  
 another man's office? Another man might have  
 done it more honestly, who reckoning up the  
 good he hath received at thy hands, might praise  
 thee in divers things, which thou canst not, or  
 doest not discover. At leastwise thou wilt  
 say of me, that I am ungrateful, if concealing  
 thine own bounty and desert, I make it not  
 known who have received the same. But this  
 ought not to be; but rather, if any should relate  
 before thee, what good thou hast done me, and the  
 evil I commit, in not confessing thy goodness, thou  
 oughtest presently to make this answer: Truly he  
 is most worthy of far greater benefits, which I  
 know that I have better will, than power to per-  
 form. Which speech we ought to utter, not with  
 flattering dissimulation, or feigned pretence, or as  
 some men do, who make a show to reject that  
 which they would fain draw unto them. Briefly,  
 we ought to use all kind of sweetness and courtesy,  
 as much as in us lieth. The husbandman should  
 lose all his labour, if after he hath cast his corn  
 into the ground, he make no more reckoning of  
 that which he hath sowed. The corn cannot come  
 to maturity without much manuring and regard;

nothing can bring forth fruit, if from the beginning to the end it be not laboured and handled with due industry. The same condition is of all benefits. Can there be a greater care, and more circumspect diligence in this world, than that which the parents have over their children? and yet their pains should be lost, if so be they should abandon them in their infancy: if their devoir and paternal piety should not nourish them long, and tenderly protect that unto the end which nature hath recommended unto them. All other benefits are of the self-same condition; except thou helpst them, thou lovest them. It is a small matter to have given them. We must likewise nourish them. If thou wilt have them thankful who are obliged unto thee, thou must not only give them bountifully, but love them heartily. But especially (as I said) let us have a care that we offend not their ears; admonition is tedious, reproach engendereth hatred. There is nothing so much to be avoided in giving a benefit, as for a man to show himself proud. Whereto serveth an arrogant and disdainful look? to what end are swelling and reproachful words? Thine own good works will sufficiently praise thee; we ought to alien from us all vain boasting. The actions will express themselves when we are silent. That which a man giveth proudly, is not only displeasent, but also odious.

Pride  
maketh  
charity  
nothing

## CHAPTER XII

CÆSAR gave Pompeius Pennus his life (if it may be said, that he giveth life that taketh it not away).

Inso-  
lence of  
great  
fortune

Afterwards, when he had absolved him, and the other humbled himself to give thanks; Cæsar presented him his left foot to kiss. They that pretend to excuse him, and deny that it was done by way of insolence, say, that he did it but to show his gilded buskins; or rather, or more rightly, his buskins of gold, enhanced and enriched with precious pearls. In so doing, what outrage might there be? What evil was it for a man (although in former times he had been consul) to kiss gold and pearl, since no better place might be found more seemly and honest in Cæsar's person for him to kiss? A man only born to change and reduce the manners of an absolute and free state into servitude, worse than that of the Persians: he thought it a small matter that an old senator, who in times past had been graced with so many and great honours, should in the presence of princes in submissive sort lie prostrate before him, after the manner of a vanquished enemy before the feet of the conqueror. This was he that endeavoured to find something out more baser than the knee, whereby he might subject and suppress the liberty of Rome. Is not this to tread the majesty of a commonweal under foot? Yea with a left foot will some men say (and very answerable to the purpose). For he had not showed himself villainously furious and insolent enough, to have taken his fair buskins to assist and sit in judgement upon the life of one who had been a consul, if the Emperor had not also thrust his studs and golden buttons into a senator's mouth.



## CHAPTER XIII

con-  
verting  
benefit  
to injury

O PRIDE of great fortune! O pernicious folly! O how happy is he that is not constrained to receive any pleasure at thy hands! O how well art thou instructed to convert each benefit into injury! How much art thou delighted in outrage and excess! O how ill do all things beseem them! O how highly raisest thou thyself, to abase thyself more lowly! O how approvest thou, that thou acknowledgest not those goods wherein thou takest so much pride! Thou corruptest whatsoever thou givest. I would ask thee therefore for what cause thou thus forgettest thyself? what perverteth both thy looks and the habit of thy countenance? hadst thou rather go masked than show thy face open? most pleasing are those courtesies which are given with a kind, smiling, and pleasing countenance, which when my superior gave me, he exulted not over me; but as much as in him lay showed me all the benignity and favour that he could imagine, and abasing himself so far as to equal himself with me, he disclothed his gifts of all kind of pomp, he observed a fit time, wherein rather he might help me upon occasion, than in necessity. In one and the same sort, in my judgement, we may persuade these men that they lose not their benefits through insolence, if we shall prove unto them that their benefits do not therefore seem more great, because they have been given with insolent and tumultuous speeches; and that they themselves cannot for so doing seem greater in any man's eyes; and that the greatness of pride is but vain, and such, as that it draweth the things of most esteem into hatred and contempt.

Discre-  
tion in  
bene-  
volence

## CHAPTER XIV

SOME things there are which prove so harmful and prejudicial to those that receive the same, that to deny them, and not to give them, proveth to be favour and benefit. This say I, because we ought rather to intend the profit, than the affection and will of those that require our favours. For oft-times we wish and labour for those things that are damageable unto us. Neither can we judge how harmful it is, because our affection blindeth and perturbeth our judgement; but when the desire is pacified and allayed, when that ardent impression and impulsion of the mind (which exileth from itself all good counsel) is extinguished and abated, then abhor we those pernicious authors of those unhappy and evil gifts. Even as to sick men we deny water, and to those that are melancholy and loathe their lives, a knife; or to such as are in love, all that which their inflamed and ardent affection, or rather desperation, doteth after. So ought we to persevere diligently and humbly in denying and refusing all that which may do much harm to those who miserably and blindly demand it at our hands. Furthermore, it importeth every man to have a care and observation, not only of the beginning of his gifts, but of the end and issue also, which they ought to have; and so procure, that they may be such things, that not only give content in the receiving, but delight also when they are received. Many there are that say, I know that this will not be profitable unto him, but what shall I do? He entreateth me, and I cannot deny his suit; let him look unto it, he shall com-

plain of himself, and not of me. Thou abusest thyself, and art deceived: it is of thee and none other (and that justly) he will complain, as soon as he shall recover his senses and perfect wits; and that passion which perturbed and inflamed his mind, remitteth and ceaseth. And why should he not hate such a man who assisted him to his damage and danger? To condescend unto his request that asketh that which will be harmful unto him, is a cruel bounty, and a pleasing and affable hatred: let us give such things as may please more and more by their use, and that may never breed any damage. I will not give money which in my knowledge shall be given unto a harlot, because I desire not to be partaker in any dishonest action, or in evil counsel. If I can, I will at leastwise retire him; if not, I will not bolster or further his sin. Whether it be choler that transporteth him farther than becometh him, or heat of ambition misleadeth him from the securest course, I will not so far forget myself, that hereafter he may say, He hath killed me with kindness. Oftentimes there is very little difference betwixt a friend's gift and an enemy's wishes and execution. All the mischief an enemy can wish us, the foolish affection of a friend may bring us: there is nothing more absurd (and yet this oftentimes falleth out) than not to know a difference betwixt hate and favour.

Limitations in bounty

## CHAPTER XV

LET us never give anything that may redound to our disgrace and damage. And since the greatest

**Respect of persons** friendship we can intend to any man, is to make him equal with ourselves, and suffer him in every sort and jointly to enjoy our goods and fortunes; so ought we equally to advise him to the good and honour of us both. I will give unto him in his necessity, yet in such manner and measure, that I will shun mine own misery: if I see him in danger of life, I will succour him; provided always, that I be ascertained of mine own security: except I shall be the ransom of some great man, or some affair of greater importance. I will do no good turn that I would be ashamed to ask; I will not greaten that which is of small value; neither will I consent, that such a thing, which in itself is of much worth, should be received with little estimation: for even as he loseth the grace and remuneration of his good work, that registereth the same in the book of his accompts; so he that showeth how great the pleasure is which he hath done, prizeth not, but reproacheth and dispraiseth his pleasure he hath done. Let every man have a respect to his faculty and forces, lest either we give more or succour less than is answerable to our abilities. Let us also have a respect and esteem of the person and quality of him to whom we give; because there are some gifts that are of less value than the greatness of him that giveth the same requireth; and other some which are not answerable to the merit of him that receiveth the same. Confer therefore and compare with thyself the conditions of him that giveth, and him that receiveth, and examine the qualities of that which is given (whether it be little or much) in respect of him that giveth the same; and whether likewise thy

present be too little for him that receiveth, or whether he be incapable of so much.

Circumstances  
in giving

## CHAPTER XVI

THAT furious and outrageous Alexander (who never settled his thoughts but on great and mighty enterprises) foolishly gave a city to a certain follower of his; who measuring his own unworthiness, and desirous to discharge himself of the envy he might incur, by receiving so great a benefit, came unto Alexander, and told him, that neither in fortune or condition he deserved so much. To whom Alexander answered: I respect not what becometh thee to receive, but that which in honour becometh me to give: a speech that in appearance was both kingly and heroical, but in effect most fond and foolish. For all those things which are a man's own, become not other men to receive or accept; but it importeth us to consider what that is which is given; to whom, when, why, in what place, and other circumstances, without which thou canst not justify thine action. O proud and insolent creature! If it becometh not him to receive this thy gift, as little befitteth it thee to give the same. There ought to be a difference and proportion both of persons and dignities, as whereas there is a measure in vertues every ways, as greatly sinneth he that exceedeth, as he that giveth too little. And although this beseemeth thee, and thy fortune hath raised thee so high, that thy royal gifts are no less than cities (which with how greater mind mightest thou not have taken, than lavishly distributed) yet is

There must be a proportion in good works there some more less, than that thou shouldest hide and bury a city in their bosoms.

## CHAPTER XVII

DIOGENES the Cynic required a talent at Antigonus' hands, and being repulsed by him, besought a penny: to which he answered, That it was too little for a Cynic to ask, or a king to give. This was but a bare and idle cavil: for hereby found he out an invention to give neither: in the penny he respected and had reference to his kingly majesty; in the talent to the Cynic: whereas he might have given a penny as to a Cynic, and a talent as he was a king. I must needly grant, that there are some things of so great value, that they should not be given unto a Cynic, yet is there nothing likewise so little, that a liberal and courteous king cannot honestly give. But if thou ask my opinion herein, I cannot but allow Antigonus' action: for it is an intolerable error in those who make profession to condemn money, afterwards to beg it shamefully. Thou hast proclaimed open war against wealth and riches, thou hast publicly protested thy hatred against money: This habit hast thou taken on thee, and this needly must thou personate. Unworthily and wickedly shalt thou do to hunt and haunt after money, under pretence of so laudable a poverty and necessity as thou professest. It concerneth each man therefore to have as great a regard and respect of himself, as of him to whom he would do a pleasure. I will use our friend Chrysippus' similitude of the play at ball, which undoubtedly falleth either

through his default that serveth the same, or his that receiveth it : then doth the ball keep his due course, whenas betwixt the hands of both the gamesters, it fitly flieth to and fro, being served by the one, and reinforced back again by the other : yet ought a good tennis-player to serve either easily or strongly, according as he perceiveth his companion to be further or nearer off him. The same reason is there in good deeds : for if they be not answerably applied to the person of him that giveth, and him that receiveth, they will never slip from the hands of the one, or come into the possession of the other, according as they ought to do. If we pass the time with an exercised and cunning gamester, we will strike the ball more boldly and stiffly : for on which side soever it is bandied, an expedite and nimble hand will return and strike it back. Contrariwise, if we play with a novice and young learner, we neither will strike it so stiffly, nor level it so strongly ; but serving and striking it gently, we will give the ball to his hand ; and if we rebandy it back, we return it as gently. The same manner must we observe in doing our good works : let us teach some how to receive them, and judge it a sufficient recompense, if they endeavour themselves to be thankful, if they are, if they will be thankful. For oftentimes we make them ungrateful, and help to keep them so, as if our good turns were every way so great, that there might not be a thankfulness which might in any sort equal them. The same pretend those malicious gamesters, that deceive and chase their contrary party here and there, to the spoil of the game, which cannot be maintained and continue, except there be consent and conformity between

betwixt  
the giver  
and the  
receiver

**The condition of a perfect and absolute well-giver** them both. There are divers of so perverse and devilish a nature, so proud, and imputative in that they bestow, that they had rather lose that which they lent, than to seem that they have received the same. Were it not a more better and friendly course to suffer them to acquit their devoir towards us, and to favour and succour them, when they would acknowledge the goods which they have received at our hands? To take all in good part, and at such time as they should only give thanks in words, to give them as favourable audience as if they satisfied us, and to allow that he who findeth himself obliged to us, should have the means to recompense us? That usurer is commonly hardly thought of, if he exacts his debts rudely. He likewise is worse thought of, if then when his money is tendered him, he will not receive it, but deferreth to admit the payment. A benefit is as worthily received back again when it is returned, as it is given honestly, when it is undemanded. The best well-doer is he, that hath done a courtesy freely, and never sought requital, that took a pleasure whenas any man could freely repay that which he had friendly lent and given, and utterly forgotten, and that receiveth not as a return of his favour, but as a grace and remuneration.

## CHAPTER XVIII

SOME there are that not only give a benefit proudly, but also receive it disdainfully, which ought to be avoided. But now let us pass over to that other part, and entreat therein, how men should behave



themselves in receiving benefits. Whatsoever act of virtue consisteth on two persons, exacteth as much from the one, as from the other: whenas thou hast diligently examined what the father ought to be, thou shalt find it no less difficulty to conceive what the son ought to be. There are some duties belonging to the husband, and some also that appertain unto the wife. These deserve one and the same rule and measure, which (as Hecaton saith) is very hard to observe and keep. A hard matter is it to perform that which honesty commandeth, yea that also which nearest approacheth honesty: for we are not only tied to perform the same, but to perform it with reason. She it is that must be our guide in the way we are to hold. The things of smallest moment, and those of greatest importance, are to be governed by her counsel; and as she counselleth, so ought we to give. And first of all she will advise us this, That we ought not to receive a favour at every man's hands. From whom then shall we receive? To answer thee in a word; It is from those to whom we would have given. For more carefully ought we to make choice of those from whom we would receive, than of those to whom we would give: For lest many inconveniences happen, (which are wont to follow) know this, that it is a grievous torment to be indebted and obliged to him, to whom thou wouldest owe nothing. And contrariwise, it is a thing most pleasing and agreeable, to have received a benefit at his hands, whom although he should offer thee hard measure, thou couldest both love and affect: But the greatest misery for a good and shamefast man is to love and to be obliged to such

**Reason is  
the guide  
and dis-  
poser of  
liberality**

We  
ought  
not to  
receive

a man as he can neither fancy nor favour. Here must I needly and oftentimes advertise thee, that I speak not of those truly wise and vertuous men, which take pleasure in that which they ought to do, and are lords of their own minds; that prefix such laws unto themselves as best liketh them; and having prefixed them, keep them: but of these imperfect men, that are willing to follow vertue, whose affections and passions are forcibly impelled to obey reason. I ought then to make an especial election and choice of him from whom I would receive a pleasure; and it concerneth me much more carefully to choose and diligently seek out such a one to whom I will impart my benefit, than such a one to whom I will trust my money: because that to the one I am not bound to restore any more than I have received, and having repaid my debt, I am acquitted and discharged out of his books: but to the other I must repay more than I have received, and having recompensed the good he hath done me, yet is not this my entire obligation: the friendship must continue and flourish between us. For after I have remunerated his kindness, I am tied to renew and refresh it again: and above all things the law of friendship admonisheth me, That I receive not a kindness from any that is unworthy. Such is the right, such is the sacred law of benefits (from whence friendship taketh his original). It is not always in our choice (as Hecaton saith) to refuse a pleasure, and to say I will not accept it: we ought sometimes to receive a benefit against our minds. A tyrant will give thee somewhat; and so cruel and outrageous is he, that if thou refusest his present, he will account it no less than

an injury and indignity: To this wilt thou say, shall I not accept the same? make reckoning that this king is a thief, and a pirate, (since in mind he is no better than a thief, or a pirate) what shall I do in this case? I see that he is unworthy that I should owe him anything. To this I answer then, when I say that thou art to make thy choice of him, to whom thou wilt be obliged, it is not intended in a case of so great violence and fear; because where these prevail, election perisheth: but if thou be at thine own choice, if thou hast liberty to elect what thou listeth, then hast thou means to make use of that which best pleaseth thee. But if the necessity of occasion restrain thy election, know this, that thou dost not receive, but obey: no man is obliged in receiving a thing which he cannot refuse; if thou desirest to know, if I would have that thou givest me, bring to pass that I may refuse what thou offerest me: But he gave thee thy life: it skilleth not what the thing is which is given, but whether he that gave, and he that received the gift, gave and received the same willingly. Thou art not therefore my defender, because thou hast saved me. Poison sometimes hath been a medicine, and yet for all that, it is not numbered amongst those things that are wholesome. Some things there are, which although they profit us much, yet they oblige us not.

at every  
man's  
hands

## CHAPTER XIX

A CERTAIN man that came with a resolution to kill a tyrant, gave him a stroke whereby he opened him

The  
intent  
makes  
the deed

a dangerous impostume. For this the tyrant gave him no thanks, although by wounding him he had healed him of a sickness, whereon his physicians durst not lay their hands. Thou seest there is no great moment in the thing itself, because he seemed not to have given a benefit, who with an evil intention procured his profit. Fortune it was that wrought the good, and from the man it was the injury came: we have beheld a lion in the amphitheatre, who calling to memory one of those who had been condemned to fight against wild beasts (because in times past he had been his governor) protected him from the fury of the rest. Shall we not then say that the succours which the lion gave was a benefit? No; because he neither had will to do it, neither did it to the intent to do good. We are to repute and rank him with this beast, who attempted to cut off the tyrant's life. Both this gave life, and the other also, but neither this nor that a benefit; because it is no benefit, or good work, which I am enforced to receive. It is no benefit that maketh me indebted to him I would not. First must thou give me the freedom and power of myself, and next the benefit.

## CHAPTER XX

MEN have oftentimes debated and disputed of Marcus Brutus, whether he ought to accept a grace, and receive a pardon at Julius Cæsar's hands, who in his judgment deserved not to breathe or live. What reason moved Brutus to conspire and kill him, I will express and handle

in another place. For mine own part, although I esteem Brutus in all other things a wise and vertuous man, yet meseemeth that in this he committed a great error, and neglected the doctrine of the Stoics; who either feared the name of a king, (whereas the best and most happiest estate of a city is to live under a just and vertuous prince) or hoped that liberty would be had there where so great a reward was prefixed to those that commanded, and those that served; or imagined that such a city as this might repossess her ancient honour, and former lustre, when virtue and the primitive laws were either abolished, or wholly extinguished; or that justice, right, and law, should be inviolably observed in such a place, where he had seen so many thousand men at shock and battle, not to the intent to discern whether they were to obey and serve, but to resolve them under whom they ought to serve and obey. Oh how great oblivion possessed this man! how much forgot he both the nature of affairs, and the state of his city! to suppose that by the death of one man there should not some other start up after him, that would usurp over the commonweal; whereas after so many kings slaughtered, either by the sword, or by lightning, they grew vassals and subjects to a tyrannous Tarquin; yet ought he to have accepted his life, and yet for all this notwithstanding was he not obliged to repute and esteem him as his father, for that injuriously and against all right he had usurped the authority, to give him his life; for he saved him not, who slew him not, neither gave he him life, but dismissed him from dying.

**Marcus  
Brutus  
com-  
mitted  
an error**

## CHAPTER XXI

What  
to do  
when a  
benefit is  
offered

THIS rather, and more rightly, may be drawn into some question, what a poor captive should do, whenas a man prostituted in body, infamous and dishonest in speech, offereth to pay down the price of his ransom? Shall I suffer myself to be redeemed by so impure and base a wretch? and again, when I am discharged, what thanks shall I return him? Shall I live with an impudent and scurrilous fellow? shall I not live with him that hath redeemed me? no truly, for herein standeth my opinion. Even from any such a one would I receive the money which I would employ for my redemption, yet so would I receive it as money upon interest, not as an act of courtesy. I will repay him his money, and if after that I shall find him in any danger, or pressed by necessity, I will relieve his wants, prevent his danger, yet contract no such friendship with him, as should be correspondent betwixt men of equal vertue. Neither will I reckon him for such a one as hath saved my life, but make accompt of him as an usurer, to whom I know I must repay back again that which I have borrowed. Contrariwise, if there be some worthy and vertuous person, from whom I should receive a courtesy, yet ought I not receive the same, if I knew that thereby he should incur any detriment, because that I am assured that he is addressed (though it be to his own hindrance, nay which is more, to the hazard of his life) to do me a pleasure. I understand that he is resolved (knowing me to be accused of a capital crime) to plead my cause, and to undertake my defence,

though it be to his disgrace, and the displeasure of his prince. I should show myself an enemy unto him (if endeavouring himself to undergo danger for my sake) I should not perform that which is most easy for me to accomplish, that is, to entertain the damage myself, without his detriment or danger. Here Hecaton setteth down an example (which is no ways answerable to the purpose) of Archelaus, who would not receive a certain sum of money which was offered him by a young man, who was subject to the government of his father, because he would not offend the covetous and niggardly parent. What did Archelaus herein that was worthy praise? Is it because he would not receive that which was stolen from his father? Is it because he would not entertain the gift, lest he should be tied to recompense, and restore it again? What modesty or vertue used he in not accepting other men's money? But leaving this, if it be necessary to set down an example of a generous mind, let us make use of Græcinus Julius, a man of rare vertue; whom Caius Cæsar put to death for this cause only; in that he was a better and honester man, than any one ought to be, who should live with and under a tyrant. This man, at such time as he received a certain quantity of money from the hands of his friends (who contributed and levied the same to defray the charge and expense of those public plays which he prepared) refused a great sum of money which Fabius Persicus sent unto him. His friends which respected not him that sent the money, but only the money that was sent, reproved him, because he would not accept the same. Will you (said he) have me receive a benefit from such a **by an unworthy person**

**He that covertly desireth to receive a kindness** man, whom I would not pledge, although he offered me the cup? And whenas Rebilus (one who sometimes had been consul, yet of no less infamy) had sent him a greater sum of money, and instantly entreated him to command his servants to receive the same: I pray you (said he) pardon me, for Persicus offered the same, and yet I accepted it not. Whether is this to receive presents, or to examine the receivers?

## CHAPTER XXII

WHENAS we determine to receive anything, let us receive it with a gladsome countenance, expressing thereby the pleasure which we take, and manifesting to the benefactor how thankfully we accept the same, to the end that he may gather the present fruit of his good work. For it is a just cause of gladness to see a man's friend contented; and more just to be the cause of his contentment. Let us make it known unto him that his presents were very pleasing unto us, let us express the affections of our will, not only in his own hearing, but in every place wheresoever we be. For he that receiveth a good turn with gladsome acceptance, hath already satisfied the first payment of the requital.

## CHAPTER XXIII

SOME there are that will not receive but in secret, they admit not witnesses of the good which is done unto them. Believe thou that such men have very bad and base minds: even as he that



doeth a good turn, ought not to publish the same, or make it known, but inasmuch as he knoweth that he that receiveth the same will conceive a contentment thereby: so he also that receiveth the same ought to make it publicly known. Receive not that which thou art ashamed to owe. Some there are that secretly, and in corners, and by whisperings in the ear, give thanks for the good they have received: this is not modesty and shamefastness, but an undoubted sign of their will and intent to deny the benefit. He that giveth thanks in secret, and admitteth no witnesses of the good he hath received, is ungrateful. Some there are that will borrow money, provided that it be not in their own names, neither certified by obligation, nor signed by witnesses. They that will not that any man should have notice of the good is done unto them, resemble such men. They are afraid to make it known, to the intent they may be thought rather to have obtained the same by their own vertue, than by another man's liberality and assistance. Such as these are, are least officious unto those by whom they hold their lives and dignities, and whilst they fear to be esteemed for such as are bounden and obliged to their benefactors, they undergo a more grievous imputation, and are justly called ungrateful. hath but  
an evil  
intention

## CHAPTER XXIV

SOME other there are that detract and scandalise their benefactors, and of these there are some, whom it were better to offend currishly, than befriend courteously. For showing themselves openly to

An ad-  
monition  
against  
the vice  
of in-  
gratitude

be our mortal enemies, they pretend thereby to make men think that they are obliged to us in nothing. There is nothing that more carefully we ought to intend, than this, that the memory of those who have in any sort succoured us, be not at any time extinguished in us, we must from time to time renew and refresh it. He cannot give thanks, that forgetteth what he hath received; and he that carrieth a good turn in memory hath already satisfied it; neither ought we to receive a courtesy nicely, neither submissively or humbly: for if in receiving a man show himself cold and negligent, (whereas the benefit that cometh first, is the most pleasing and acceptable) what will he do afterward, when he showeth himself so cold in the greatest heat of that which he hath received? Another receiveth disdainfully, as if he said, I have no need, but since thou so far pressest me, I will do what thou requirest. Another receiveth so carelessly that he leaveth his benefactor in suspense, whether he saw or felt what was given him. Another scarce moveth his lips, and proveth more ungrateful than if he had held his peace. That weight should our words have as the greatness of our benefit requireth, and boldly should we say; Thou hast obliged me more than thou thinkest. For there is no man that is not contented to hear his courtesies amplified, and made great by good reports: Thou canst not imagine how great the pleasure is thou hast done me, yet hope I to make it known unto thee, how much more I prize thy good turn, than thou esteemest. He that burdeneth himself with that which he hath received, is instantly grateful as if he said thus: So much esteem I the benefit which I have

received at your hands, that I shall never have the means to make you satisfaction, at leastwise I will publish this in all companies, that if I requite it not before I die, it shall only be for this cause that I want means to make requital.

How  
to be  
thankful

## CHAPTER XXV

FURNIUS never won Augustus Cæsar's heart more, or knew better by any means to make him his own (whereby he might compass all that which he demanded at his hands) than at that time, when (having obtained his father's pardon, who had been a party in Antonius' action) he said unto him: Only this one injury (Great Cæsar) have I received at thy hands, which is, that by thy means I live, and by thy means I die, without grateful acknowledgement of that thanks I owe thee. What mind may be more thankful than his, who in no sort satisfieth himself with his own thankfulness, but utterly despaireth to equal the good he hath received? By these and such like speeches let us so endeavour, that our will be not restrained or hidden, but be apparent and manifest every way. And although silence obscure our words, yet if we be so affected as we ought to be, our interior thoughts will appear in our outward countenance. He that will be thankful, no sooner receiveth the courtesy, but conceiveth and bethinketh him how he may make requital. Chrysippus saith, That he that accepteth any friendship, resembleth him that is addressed and ready to run for a wager, and standeth in the list, expecting the signal, whereupon he might speedily

Causes of ingratitude set forward. And truly, he that receiveth, had need to be a swift footman and a great competitor, to the intent he may overtake his benefactor, who began the race before him.

## CHAPTER XXVI

LET us now consider and examine what most of all maketh men ungrateful. Truly it is either an overweening of our selves, and an ingrafted error in men to admire and applaud both themselves and their actions, or else it is covetousness or envy. Let us begin with the first. There is no man but is a partial and favourable judge of himself: and thence it is, that he supposeth that he hath deserved all things, and if anything be given him, he receiveth it as a debt or duty; and moreover, supposeth himself to be disgraced, and undervalued. He gave me this (saith he) but how late? But with how much travail and entreaty? How many more things might I have obtained in the meanwhile, had I but fawned on such a man? or attended that? Or had I intended mine own profit? I looked not for this, I am numbered amongst the baser sort: supposed he that my value and merit deserved so little? More honestly had he dealt with me, had he presented me nothing at all.

## CHAPTER XXVII

CNÆUS LENTULUS the augur, whose wealth and riches no man could equal, before that his frank-

lins waxing wealthy and great, made him seem self-opinion, poor, and in the waning, (for this man saw four thousand sestertia of his own; and fitly said I so, covetousness, and for he did no more than see them) was as shallow envy in wit, as base in mind and courage. For although he were as covetous as covetousness itself, yet sooner vented he his money than his words; so weak and wanting was he in uttering what he should. This man being obliged to Augustus for all his advancement and fortunes (to whose service he had brought nothing but distressed beggary, under the title of nobility) having obtained the government in the city (both for the favour he had with the emperor, and the money held in his own possession) was wont oftentimes to complain himself unto Cæsar, That he had retired him from his studies, and that he had not given him so much as he himself had lost by giving up his study of eloquence. And yet amongst other graces, Augustus had done this for him, that he had delivered him from other men's scorns, and his own fruitless labour. But covetousness consenteth not that a man should be thankful: for unbridled hope is never satisfied with that which is given. The more we have, the more we covet; and covetousness engaged amidst a heap and multitude of riches, is more incensed and forward. Even as the force of a flame is a thousand times more fiercer, the more violent and greater the fire is from whence it blazeth: so ambition suffereth not a man to rest upon the measure of that honour which heretofore he would have been ashamed to have wished for. No man giveth thanks for being advanced to a tribuneship, but complaineth, that he is not preferred to the dignity of a prætor:

The endless desire of men is never glutted neither doth this suffice him, but that he must needs be consul: neither will the consulate content him, except he possess it more than once. Ambition still presseth forward, and understandeth not her own felicity, because she respecteth not whence she came, but whither she is addressed. Of all these vices which hinder our gratuity, the most importunate and vehement is envy, which tormenteth and vexeth us with comparisons of this nature: He bestowed thus much on me, but more upon him, and more speedily also. Finally, the envious man negotiateth no man's business, but favoureth himself against all men.

## CHAPTER XXVIII

How much more wisely and virtuously were it done, to engreaten and dignify a good turn received, and to consider and know, that no man is ever so well esteemed by another, as he esteemeth and prizeth himself. I should have received far more; but it was not for his ease to give me more: his liberality was to extend to more than my self. This is but a beginning: let us take it in good part, and urge on his mind to further favours, by showing our selves thankful for the good we have received: he hath done but a little, but he will do it often: he hath preferred that man before me, and me also hath he preferred before many others. This man cannot equal me either in vertue or honesty, yet in his carriage and actions he hath something more pleasing than is in me. By complaining my self I shall never be held worthy of a greater good, but shall rather show, that I am

unworthy of that which I have already received. There was more courtesy done to those lewd fellows: what is this to the purpose? How seldom is fortune bountiful with judgement? We daily complain, that men that are least vertuous are most fortunate. Ofttimes the hail and tempest that overpassed the lands of a wicked and ungodly man, hath beat down the corn of the best and uprightest men. Each man (as in all other things, so in friendship) hath his chance and fortune. There is no benefit so fully good, that malignity and envy cannot impugn and detract; there is no courtesy so scanted and barren, but a good interpreter may enlarge and amplify. Thou shalt never want a subject or cause to complain of, if thou behold benefits on the weaker and worser side.

Remedies  
against  
unthank-  
fulness

## CHAPTER XXIX

SEE, I pray you, how some men (yea, even those who make a profession of wisdom) have unjustly censured, and unindifferently esteemed the goods, and those graces which they have bestowed upon us. They complain because we equal not elephants in bulk of body, harts in swiftness, birds in lightness, bulls in force. They complain that beasts have substantialler hides than we, that fallow deer have a fairer hair, the bear a thicker skin, the beaver a softer. They complain that dogs overcome us in smelling, that eagles in seeing, that crows in outliving, and many other beasts in facility of swimming. And whereas nature permitteth not, that some properties should be united in one and the same creature (as that swiftness of body should be

Man and the beasts matched with mightiness in strength) they suppose themselves injured, because man was not composed of these divers and dissident goods; and blame the gods for neglecting us, because they have not given us perpetual health, invincible vertue, and exemption from vices, and certain foreknowledge of things to come: yea and so far are they plunged in impudence, that they scarcely temper themselves from hating nature for making us inferior to the gods, and not equal with them in their divinity. How much more better were it for us to return and reflect upon the contemplation of so many and so mighty benefits which we have received at their hands, and to yield them thanks, for that it hath pleased them to allot us a second place in this most beautiful house, and to make us lords of all earthly things? Is there any comparison betwixt us and those beasts, whereof we have the sovereignty? All whatsoever nature denieth us, she cannot conveniently bestow upon us. And therefore whosoever thou art that doest so undervalue man's fortune and chance, bethink thee how great blessings our sovereign parent hath given us. How many beasts more forcible than our selves have we yoked, and brought under our subjection? how far more swifter creatures have we overtaken, and how no mortal thing is secured and exempted from our strokes and power. So many vertues have we received, so many arts, and in conclusion, such a mind and spirit, that in that very instant wherein it intendeth a thing, in a moment it attaineth the same, and more swifter than the stars foresee long before the course and motion they are to observe and hold in time to come. Finally, such a plenty of fruit, such store



of wealth, and such abundance of things heaped one upon another. Although thou take a view of all things, and because thou findest no one thing entire which thou hadst rather be, pick out such several things as thou wouldst wish to be given thee out of them all. So when thou hast well weighed the loving kindness of nature, thou shalt be forced to confess, that thou wert her darling: and so is it indeed. The inmortal gods have and do love us entirely, and (which is the greatest honour that could be given) they have placed us next unto themselves. Great things have we received, neither were we capable of greater.

He answereth to a secret objection

### CHAPTER XXX

THESE things (my Liberalis) have I thought necessary to be spoken, both because it concerned me to say somewhat of great benefits when we were discoursing on small; and also because the boldness of this horrible vice floweth from thence into all other things. For unto whom will he be thankful for good turns; or what benefit will he esteem great and worthy the requiting, who despiseth the highest benefits? To whom will he confess himself indebted for his health and life, that denieth that he hath received his being from the gods, to whom he prayeth daily for the same? Whosoever therefore giveth instructions of thankfulness unto men, negotiateth the affairs of men and gods; to whom, being unpurveyed of nothing, and freed from the desire of affecting or coveting anything, yet to them may men notwithstanding be both acknowledging and thankful. There is no cause

Whether interior thanks-giving is sufficient why any man should lay the blame of his thankless mind upon his own weakness or poverty, and say, What shall I do? How or when may I find any possibility to remunerate and acknowledge the benefits of my superiors, the lords of all things? To requite is an easy matter: for if thou beest a niggard, thou mayest requite without expense; and if thou beest slothful, without labour. In that very moment wherein thou art obliged, if thou listest, thou mayest make even with any man whatsoever, because that he who willingly hath received a benefit, hath restored the same.

### CHAPTER XXXI

IN my opinion, that doctrine (which the Stoics place amongst their extraordinary paradoxes) is not so wonderful and incredible, That he who willingly hath received a benefit, hath restored the same. For inasmuch as we measure all things by the mind, look how much a man is minded to do, so much hath he done. And forasmuch as piety, faithfulness, and uprightness, and finally all virtue, is perfect in itself, although a man could not remunerate an act, yet may he be thankful even with his will and heart. As oft as any one compasseth and obtaineth his purpose, so often he reapeth the fruit of his labour. What purposeth he that bestoweth a benefit? To profit him to whom he giveth the same, and to content and delight himself: if he hath finished that which he intended, and the good turn he intended me be come to my hands, and both of us are mutually affected with joy and contentment, he hath ob-

tained that which he sought: for his intent was not to have anything in recompense, for then had it been no benefit, but a bargain. Well hath he sailed that hath attained the haven whereunto he shaped his course. The dart that hitteth the mark it was aimed at, hath performed the office of a steady hand: he that doth a good turn, meaneth to have it accepted thankfully; if it be well taken, he hath his desire. But he hoped for some profit thereby: this was no benefit whose property is to think no ways of remuneration. That which I received, if I accepted and entertained the same with the like good affection as it was given me, I have requited it: otherwise the thing that of itself is best, were in worst case. To the end I should be thankful, I am sent to Fortune: if I cannot satisfy for want of her succour, my good mind shall satisfy a good mind. What then? Shall I not endeavour my self to the uttermost to make recompense? Shall I not seek opportunity of time and matter, and labour to fill the bosom of him, at whose hands I have received anything? Yes. But yet the world went ill with good doing, if a man might not be thankful, even with empty hands.

## CHAPTER XXXII

HE that receiveth a good turn (saith he) although he hath taken it with never so thankful a mind, yet hath he not consummated and performed his duty: for there is a part which remaineth, which is of restitution. As at a tennis-play it is somewhat to receive the ball cunningly and diligently; but he

An objection and similitude is not termed a good gamester, except he be such a one as returneth and striketh back the same as fitly and readily, as it was served to him. This example is far different and impertinent: and why? because the praise hereof is in the motion and agility of the body, not in the mind. And therefore it is requisite, that the whole should be laid forth at large, where the eye must be judge. Yet will I not for all that deny him to be a good gamester that receiveth the ball as he ought to do, though he strike it not again, so the fault be not in himself. But although (saith he) there be nothing deficient in the art of him that playeth, because he hath performed a part, and can likewise perform that part which he hath not done, yet is the game itself imperfect, which is consummated in taking and returning the ball back again by turns. I will no longer refell this; let us suppose it to be so; let somewhat be deficient in the game, and not in the gamester: so in this also, whereof we dispute, there wanteth somewhat in respect of the thing that was given, to which some condign satisfaction is due, although in respect of the mind there be nothing deficient. He that hath gotten a mind answerable to his own, hath performed as much as in him lieth that which he would.

### CHAPTER XXXIII.

HE hath given me a benefit, and I have accepted it no otherwise than he himself would have it received: now hath he the thing that he sought, and the only thing that he sought, I am grateful. After this there remaineth the use of me, and some profit

from a grateful man. This is not the remnant of an imperfect duty, but an income and accession to a perfect one. Phidias maketh an image: the fruit of his art and knowledge is one thing, the commodity of his workmanship and labour another: the property of his art is to have made the statue, but of the workmanship to have made it with profit. Phidias hath perfected his work, although he hath not sold it: a threefold profit reapeth he by his work; the one in his conscience and conceit, and this he receiveth as soon as his work is finished; the other of his fame; the third of his profit, which shall accrue unto him either by favour, or by sale, or by some other means. So the first fruit of a benefit is the conscience and contentment a man conceiveth, that he hath well finished the same; the second is of reputation; the third of those things which may be made reciprocal one unto another. Whenas therefore a benefit is thankfully accepted, he that bestowed it, hath already received recompense, but not satisfaction as yet: I therefore owe that which is without the benefit, and in receiving it kindly and thankfully, I have satisfied the same.

Grateful  
accept-  
ance is  
a kind  
of satis-  
faction

#### CHAPTER XXXIV

WHAT then? (saith he) hath he requited a favour that hath done nothing? He hath done much, he hath repaid good will with as great good will, and (which is a certain sign of friendship) he hath done it with an equal affection. Moreover, a debt is satisfied one way, and a benefit another. Thou art not to expect that I will show thee my pay-

**What a** ment. This affair is managed from will to will.  
**benefit** That which I say unto thee shall not seem harsh  
**signi-** and distasteful to thee, although at first it fight against  
**fieeth** thine opinion, if thou conform thy self unto me, and  
 imagine that there are more things than words.  
 There are a great number of things without name,  
 which we note not by their proper titles, but such  
 as are both foreign and borrowed: we call the  
 foot whereon we walk, a foot; the foot of a bed,  
 the foot of a hanging, and the foot of a verse: we  
 call by the name of dog, both a hound, a fish, and  
 a star: for we have not words enough to give a  
 proper name unto everything; and therefore when  
 we have need we borrow. Fortitude is a vertue  
 that contemneth just dangers: or it is a science to  
 repel perils, or to know how to sustain them, or  
 how to provoke them: yet say we, that a fencer  
 is a stout man, and a wicked slave, whom rashness  
 hath animated and enforced to contempt of death.  
 Parsimony is a science to avoid extraordinary ex-  
 pense, or an art to use a man's estate and substance  
 moderately; and yet we call him a very sparing  
 man, which is of a niggardly and pinching mind,  
 whereas notwithstanding there is infinite odds be-  
 tween moderation and niggardise. These are of  
 divers natures, and yet for want of words we are  
 enforced to call both the one and the other a  
 sparer; and him likewise strong who despiseth  
 casualties with reason, as that other also, who runs  
 headlong upon dangers without judgement. So  
 a benefit, as we have said, is a bounteous action,  
 and that very thing which is given by that action,  
 as money, a house, a garment; the name of them  
 both is all one, but the vertue and power of them  
 far different.

## CHAPTER XXXV

GIVE care therefore, and thou shalt presently perceive, that I say nothing that is contrary to thy opinion. That benefit or good turn which is finished in the doing of it, is requited, if we take it thankfully. But for that other which is contained in the thing, we have not yet requited it, but we intend to requite it: we have satisfied good will with good will, and we owe still a thing for a thing. Therefore, although we say, that he hath given thanks that hath willingly received a benefit, yet will we him that hath received to restore some such like thing as he hath received. Some of the things we speak do differ from common custom, and afterwards another way they grow in use and custom again. We deny, that a wise man receiveth any wrong, and yet the man that striketh him with his fist shall be condemned of injury and wrongdoing. We deny, that a fool hath any goods of his own, and yet if a man steal anything from a fool, we will condemn him of felony. We say that all fools be mad, and yet we cure them not all by elleborus. Even unto those very men whom we term mad we commit both suffrages and jurisdiction. So likewise say we that he hath requited a good turn that hath received it with a good mind; but yet nevertheless we leave him still in debt, to make recompense even when he hath requited. Our so saying is an exhortation, and not a remitting of the good turn. Let us not fear, neither (being depressed with an intolerable burden) let us faint in mind. Goods are given me; my good name is defended, my misery is

**Requit** taken from me, I enjoy life and liberty, dearer  
**and** than life: and how shall I requite these things?  
**payment** When will the day come that I may show him  
 my good will again? This is the day wherein  
 he hath showed his. Take up the good turn,  
 embrace it and be glad, make account that thou  
 owest not that which thou hast received, but that  
 which thou mayest requite. Thou shalt not adven-  
 ture on so great a thing, as that mischance may  
 make thee unthankful. I will propose no difficulty  
 unto thee: be of good courage, shrink not for fear  
 of pains and long servitude: I delay thee not, it  
 may be done with things that thou hast already.  
 Thou shalt never be thankful except thou be  
 instantly: what wilt thou therefore do? Must  
 thou take arms? Perchance thou must. Must  
 thou sail over seas? Likely yes: and even then  
 also when the storms threaten thee with shipwrack.  
 But wilt thou restore a benefit? Take it thank-  
 fully, and thou hast requited it; not so as  
 thou shouldst think that thou hast  
 paid the same, but so as thou  
 mayst owe it with the  
 more heart's ease.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK



## THE THIRD BOOK

### THE ARGUMENT OF JUSTUS LIPSIUS

He discourseth of ungrateful men, what they be, and whether they are to be punished, or called before the judge. He denieth it by a curious disputation, and addeth, that their punishment is in hatred, infamy, and in the mind itself. Afterwards upon occasion he debateth whether a lord should be grateful to his slave? Or receive a benefit at his hands? He affirmeth; and this very plentifully, because in those days there was often use of servants. Hereunto he annexeth; whether the son giveth his father a benefit? He disputeth on both sides, but affirmeth the affirmative.

The  
Argu-  
ment

### CHAPTER I

NOR to render thanks for benefits received (my *Æbutius Liberalis*) is both loathsome in itself, and hateful in all men's opinion. And therefore such as are themselves ungrateful, complain of ungrateful men: and so are we fashioned and addressed to the contrary of that we ought to do, that there are some who become our capital enemies, not only after benefits received, but for the very favours they receive. I cannot deny but that this happeneth unto some by reason of the corruption of their nature: to many, because that the interposition of time extinguisheth the remembrance. For those things that were fresh in memory with them, while they were newly done, do in process of time wear

That out of remembrance. Concerning which sort of which is men, I know that thou and I have otherwhiles com-  
 explained of disputed, whereas thou maintainedst that it were  
 by most better to call them forgetful than ungrateful. Shall  
 men he therefore be excused of ingratitude because he  
 hath forgotten, whenas no man can forget, except  
 he be ungrateful? There are many sorts of ungrate-  
 ful men, as there are of thieves and murtherers,  
 whose fault is one, but in the parts there is great  
 variety. Ungrateful is he who denieth that he hath  
 received a good turn, which hath been done him:  
 ungrateful is he that dissembleth: ungrateful is he  
 that maketh not restitution: and the most ungrate-  
 ful of all is he, that forgetteth a favour hath been  
 shown him. For they, although they requite not,  
 yet are they indebted, and some certain impression  
 of the good turn (hoarded up in their corrupt con-  
 sciences) is extant with them. And upon some  
 cause they may at length dispose themselves to  
 gratuity, if either shame shall put them in mind,  
 or some sudden desire to proceed honourably: such  
 as for a time is wont to awaken itself in men of  
 the worst disposition, if any easy occasion should  
 invite them. But never can he become thankful  
 who hath forgotten the whole benefit. And  
 whether thinkest thou him worsen, in whom the  
 thanks of a good turn is lost, or him in whom the  
 very remembrance perisheth? Faulty are those  
 eyes that fear the light, but blind are they that  
 see not at all. Not to reverence and love one's  
 parents is impiety, and not to acknowledge them  
 is madness. Who is more ungrateful than he,  
 who having received such a courtesy as he ought  
 to treasure up in the foremost part of his memory,  
 and continually meditate thereon, hath laid it so

far aside, and neglected it, that he groweth wholly ignorant thereof? It appeareth that he never be-  
 thought him of restitution, that suffered oblivion  
 so far to usurp upon him.

is ex-  
 exercised  
 by all  
 men

## CHAPTER II

IN a word, to the requiting of a good turn there needeth vertue, time, ability, and favourable fortune. He that remembereth a friend is thankful without expense: he that performeth not this (which to achieve neither requireth labour, nor charge, nor felicity) hath no covert or patronage to conceal himself in. For never meant he to be thankful, who cast a benefit so far from him, that it neither survived in his sight, nor his remembrance. Even as those things which are in use, and are managed and handled daily, are never in danger of soil or rusting; and those which are out of sight, and use (so as they have lain by, as unnecessary) do gather soil by continuance of time: so that which frequent cogitation exerciseth and reneweth, is never wrought out of memory, which looseth and forgetteth nothing, but that, which she respecteth and looketh not back unto very often.

## CHAPTER III

BESIDES this cause there are other also, which sometimes conceal the greatest merits from us. The first and chiefest cause of all others, is this; that being always continually busied with new desires, we have an eye and regard, not to that

Other causes of ingratitude we have, but what we require, intente, not on that which is in our present possession, but on that we affect and fancy most. For whatsoever is at our command, is base and contemptible. Whence it followeth, that as soon as the desire of new things hath made that light which we have received, the author also thereof is slenderly respected. So long as those things which a great lord hath given us, have been pleasing and well-liking unto us, we have loved and courted him, and confessed openly that our state was founded and raised by him; but if any new ambition assault us; if our mind fall into admiration of other things, and earnestly affect the same (as the manner of mortal men is, after great things to desire greater) we straightways forget that which in times past we called a benefit: we neither respect or look into those things, which have advanced us before others, but those things only wherein other men have had the fortune to outstrip us. But it is impossible for any man, both to repine and envy, and to be thankful: for to envy, is the property of a complaining and discontented man, but to give thanks is the property of him that is well pleased. The second cause of ingratitude is, because none of us make any accompt, but of that present time which speedily passeth and fleeteth before our eyes; and few or none are they that cast back their minds to think on things past. By means hereof it falls out, that schoolmasters, and their good deeds, are buried in oblivion, because we wholly lose the remembrance of our infancy. Hereby it cometh to pass, that we forget all those things which are bestowed upon us in our youth, because we never think upon the same. No man accompteth that

which he hath been, as it were a thing past, but as a thing lost. Thus the desire and apprehension of things to come, defaceth the memory of things past.

Remem-  
brance of  
kindness  
received

#### CHAPTER IV

IN this place must I give testimony of the Epicure's upright judgement, who continually complaineth, for that we are ungrateful in regard of things past, for that we recall not to memory whatsoever benefits we have received, neither number them amongst pleasures, whenas there is none more certain contentment, than that which cannot any more be taken from us. The goods and pleasures that are present are not as yet wholly assured; some casualty may intercept and cut them off. Those things that are to come, are uncertain and doubtful: that which is past is laid aside amongst those things that are in safety. How then can any man acknowledge the good that is done him, who hath forgotten the whole course of his life? The apprehension and consideration of things present, and the memory of things past, maketh a man grateful; he that attributeth most to hope, yieldeth least to memory.

#### CHAPTER V

EVEN as (my Liberalis) there are certain things which being once apprehended, continue still in memory; and some things that to know them, it is not sufficient to have learned them, (for the

Reasons  
to  
approve

science of them is forgotten, except it be continued) I mean Geometry, and the course of celestial things, and of such which by their subtilty do easily slip out of our memories: so the greatness of some benefits suffer them not to be forgotten. Some lesser and more in number, and divers in time, are easily buried in oblivion; because, as I said, we handle them not often, neither willingly acknowledge what we owe unto every man. Hearken what speeches suitors and suppliants use: there is not any of them, but saith, that he will for ever keep in mind the favour done him; every man protesteth and voweth himself to be at commandment, and if any more submissive speech, whereby he may engage himself, may be found out, he spareth it not. But within a little while after, those gallants esteem their former words as too base and illiberal: and finally, they grow to that point (which as I suppose every one the lewdest, and most ungratefulest attaineth unto) that is, to forget the same. For even as ungrateful is he that forgetteth, as he is grateful that remembereth him of a benefit.

## CHAPTER VI

YET the question is whether this so hateful vice should be left unpunished? and whether this law which is exercised in declamatory schools, should be ratified also in the city, whereby a man may call an ingrateful man in question? Sure it seemeth a matter worthy the censure of justice, in all men's judgements. Why not? since certain cities also, have reproached other cities for the loans and

favours they have done them, and redemand from posterity that which they have lent to their predecessors. Our ancestors, those mighty and vertuous men, required satisfaction only from their enemies; as for their benefits, they gave them with a great mind, and lost them with as great. There is not any nation in the world, except the Medes, that have thought fit to implead an ingrateful man, or call him in question. And this is a great reason why none should be granted, because by mutual consent we punish misdeeds; and for murder, witchcraft, parricide, and breach of religion, have here and there enacted divers punishments, and in all places some: but this most frequent crime is nowhere punished, and everywhere improved. Neither absolve we the same: but whereas the judgement of a thing uncertain is difficult, we have only condemned it with hatred, and left it amongst those things which we refer to the justice and judgement of the gods.

that in-  
gratitude  
is not  
punish-  
able by  
law

## CHAPTER VII

BUT many reasons offer themselves unto me, whereby it appeareth that this error and crime is not punishable by law. First of all, the better part of the benefit should perish, if a man should have an action allowed him, as he hath for lending money, or for bargains of hiring, and letting out. For this is the greatest grace of a benefit, that we have given it, although we should lose it, that we have referred all to the courtesy of the receivers. If I arrest him, and call him before the judge, it beginneth to be a debt, and not a benefit. Again,

**Judge and conscience** whereas it is a most commendable thing to requite, it ceaseth to be honest, if it be of necessity. For no man will commend a thankful person, more than him that hath restored a thing which was committed him to keep, or discharged his debt without being sued. Thus corrupt and deface we two things (than which in human life there is nothing more worthy) that is to say, a grateful man, and a bountiful giver. For what honour, I pray you, shall he have in this, if he giveth not a benefit, but lendeth it? or in that, if he requite, not because he will, but because he must of necessity? It is no glorious thing to be grateful, except it be a matter unpunishable to be ungrateful: moreover, this inconvenience would ensue, that all courts would scarcely serve, and suffice this one law only: who is he that might not sue? who is he that might not be sued? all men prize and praise their own doings, all men enlarge those things they have employed upon others, be they never so little. Besides, whatsoever things fall into knowledge of the judges, may be comprehended by them without giving them infinite licence and liberty. And therefore the condition of a good cause seemeth to be better if it be restored to a judge, then if it be remitted to compromise, because the judge is bound unto an order, and hath his certain bounds limited him, which he may not exceed; but the umpire's conscience being free and tied to no terms, may both add, and take away, and order the sentence, not as law and justice counselleth, but according as humanity and pity shall move. An action of ingratitude would not oblige the judge, but set him at liberty to rule things as he listed. For it is not certain what a benefit is; again, how



great soever it be, it were much to the matter how favourably the judge would construe it. No law defineth what an unthankful person is. Ofttimes he that hath restored as much as he hath received, is unthankful, and he that hath not requited, is thankful. There be some matters also which some unskilful judge may dismiss the court of, as in cases where the parties confess a deed, or no deed, where the opening of the evidence despatcheth all doubts. But whenas reason must give judgement between two persons which debate, there ought our understanding to use conjecture and divination, and whenas a thing which only wisdom ought to determine, falleth in controversy, a man cannot (in that case) take a judge of the number of those whom the prætor chooseth, and such a one as is enrolled in the Register of the Judges; because he hath the rents and riches which a Roman knight ought to have.

Circumstances alter cases

## CHAPTER VIII

THIS thing therefore seemed not to be very unmeet to be made a matter in law, but that no man could be found to be a competent judge in the case; which thou wilt not wonder at, if thou consider thoroughly what puzzle and difficulty he should find who should enter into the overruling of such cases. Some one hath given a great sum of money; but such a one as is rich; but such a one as shall not feel the want thereof. Another hath given, but with the hazard of foregoing his whole inheritance. The sums are alike, but the benefit is not the same: yea, let us add yet further; this man laid down money for him that was adjudged

How are benefits to be weighed? a slave unto his creditor; but where he had it at home lying by him. That other gave as much; but he took it up upon interest, or borrowed it with much entreaty, or deeply endangered himself to him that lent it. Thinkest thou that there was no difference betwixt him that bestowed his benefit at his ease, and that other that borrowed to give the same? Some things are made great in time, and not the greatest. It is a benefit to give a possession whose fertility may ease the dearth of corn; one loaf of bread in time of scarcity is a benefit. It is a benefit to give whole regions, through which many rivers may run, able to bear ships. It is a benefit to those that are dried up with thirst, and scarce able to draw them breath through their dried jaws, to show them a fountain: who shall distinguish these one from another? who shall weigh them throughly? hard is the determination of that case, which requireth the force of a thing, and not the thing itself. Although they be the same, yet being differently given, they weigh not alike. This man did me a good turn, but he did it unwillingly; but he complained that he gave it, but he beheld me more proudly than he was accustomed, but he gave it so late, that it had been better for me if he had quickly denied me. How can a judge make an estimate of these things? whereas the speech, the doubt, and the countenance of a man may destroy the grace of his merit?

## CHAPTER IX

WHAT shall we say of some things, which because they are much desired, are held for benefits? and

of others, which are not esteemed by the common sort, for such, although they are greater than they seem. Thou callest it a benefit to have given a man the freedom of a most rich and wealthy city, to have made a man a knight, and to have placed him on the fourteenth scaffold, destinated for the Roman knights, to behold the plays and public spectacles? and to have defended him upon an indictment of life and death: but what think you of it to have given a man good counsel? to have hindered him from executing a wicked enterprise? to have wrung the sword out of his hand, where-with he would have slain himself? to have comforted him in his sorrow by wholesome counsels? and to have brought him back to the fellowship of life, from his wilful seeking and longing to accompany his deceased friends in death: what think you it to be, to sit by a sick man's bed, and since his evil came by fits and at certain hours, to have waited a fit time to give him meat? and to have bathed his veins with wine when he fainted? to have brought him a physician even then when he expected to die? who is he that can justly value these things? what judge shall he be that shall command these benefits to be recompensed with the like? Some man perchance hath given thee a house, but I have foretold thee that thine own is falling down on thy head. He hath given thee a patrimony: but I a plank to float upon, and save thy life in shipwrack. He hath fought and hath been wounded for thy cause: but I have given thee thy life by my silence on the rack. Whereas a benefit is given one way, and recompensed another: it is a hard matter to make them equal.

Real and  
seeming  
benefits

No day  
limited for  
requiting  
a benefit

## CHAPTER X

FURTHERMORE, there is no day limited for recompensing a good turn, as there is for money lent : he therefore that hath not as yet requited, may requite. For tell me in what time may a man discover another to be ungrateful? The greatest benefits have no probation at all, they for the most part are hidden in the consciences of two. Shall we bring the world to that pass that we may not do a good turn without testimony? What punishment then shall we destinate for the unthankful? shall we prefix one for all, where the benefits are different? or unequal punishments, either greater or lesser, according to each man's benefit? Go to then, let the penalty be pecuniary : why? Some benefits concern life and are more greater than life; what penalty will you pronounce against them? less than the benefit? that were not indifferent : equal, and so capital? what more inhuman, than that the issue of benefits should be bloody?

## CHAPTER XI

CERTAIN privileges (saith he) are given unto parents. And as there is an extraordinary consideration had of these, so is it reasonable also that a respect should be had of other benefits. We have hallowed and sacred the condition of parents, because it was expedient that children should be bred and brought up. They were to be encouraged to this travail, because they were to undergo an uncertain fortune. It could not be said unto them, which is spoken unto those that give benefits, Be

wary in thy choice to whom thou givest : if thou hast been once deceived, seek out henceforward such a one as is worthy of thy benefits, and succour him. In breeding and bringing up children, the parents' judgement prevaieth little, all that they may do is but to wish well, and hope the best. Therefore that they might the more willingly adventure this chance, it was reason that some prerogative should be given them. Again, the case standeth otherwise with parents, for they both do and will bestow benefits upon their children, although they have done never so much for them already : and it is not to be feared that they will belie themselves in giving : in others it ought to be examined, not only whether they have received, but also whether they have given. But the merits of these consist in their confession ; and because it is requisite for youth to be ruled, we have constituted, as it were, certain domestical magistrates over them, under whose government they should be restrained. Again, the benefits of all parents was equal and alike, and therefore it might be valued after one rate, but the rest were divers, unlike, and infinite odds was between them, and therefore could they fall under no compass of law ; so that it was more fitting to let them all alone, than to make them all equal.

The case  
of parents

## CHAPTER XII

SOME things cost the givers much ; and some are much worth to the receivers, and yet stand the givers in nothing. Certain courtesies are done to friends, some to strangers, and (although the gift

As the  
qualities  
of benefits  
are divers

be one) yet is it better employed on him that then thou beganst to know, when thou undertookest to succour him. This man giveth succours; that ornament; these other consolations. Thou shalt find some that imagine nothing more pleasing in this world, or more great and agreeable, than to have a friend that may succour, and to whom he may discover his miseries and calamities. Again, you shall find some man more jealous of his honour, than his security, and other some that suppose themselves more indebted to him, by whose means they may live in repose, than to him by whose means they might live in some honour and estimation. These things therefore would fall out greater or lesser, according as the judges' mind were bent to the one, or to the other. Besides I choose my self a creditor: I oftentimes receive a benefit at his hands, from whom I would not; and sometimes I am obliged ere I know thereof. What wilt thou do? wilt thou call him ungrateful that had a good turn cast upon him before he knew it, and if he had known thereof would not have received it? and wilt thou not term him unthankful which howsoever he received thy good turn, in no sort requited it?

### CHAPTER XIII

SOME man hath done me a friendship, and afterwards the same man hath offered me an injury. Whether am I tied by one courtesy to suffer all injuries? or shall I be acquit, as if I had acknowledged the same, because he hath defaced his former benefit by his succeeding injury? how then

canst thou determine whether the pleasure he hath received be greater, or the outrage that is afterwards offered him? The day would fail me if I should attempt to prosecute every difficulty. We (saith he) make men slower to do good, when we challenge not the things that are given, but suffer the deniers to escape unpunished. But you must bethink your self of this also on the contrary part, that men will be much loather to receive benefits, if they should stand in peril of process thereby, and if their innocence be no ways assured. Moreover, by this means we our selves shall become loather to do men good, for no man willingly giveth unto those, who are unwilling to receive. But whosoever is provoked to pleasure others of his own good nature, and for the worthiness of the thing itself, will give willingly also even unto such as shall think themselves no more beholding to him than they list: for the glory of that office is diminished, which carrieth a promise with it.

so also  
are they  
diversly  
esteemed

#### CHAPTER XIV

So shall there be fewer benefits; yea but they shall be truer. And what harm is it to have the rashness of benefiting restrained? For this even intended they that constituted no law for the same: that we should more circumspectly give, and carefully choose those on whom we bestowed our favours. Consider diligently to whom thou givest, so shall there be no suing, so shall there be no calling back or repetition. Thou art deceived if thou think that any judge can help thee. There

The greatest things cannot be requited is no law that is able to set thee clear again. Only have thou an eye to the thankfulness of the receiver. By these means benefits hold their authority, and are magnificent: thou defilest them if thou make them a matter of law: in debt it is a most justifiable speech, and answerable to the law of all nations, to say, Pay that which thou owest. But this is the foulest word in benefiting that can be, to say, Pay: for what shall he pay? He oweth his life, his greatness, his honours, the assurance of his fortune, his health. The greatest things cannot be requited. At leastwise (saith he) let him repay somewhat of like value. This is it that I said, that the estimation of so noble a thing should perish, if we make a merchandise of benefits. The mind is not to be incited to avarice, to process, or debate: he runneth into these things of his own accord. Let us withstand them as much as we can, and cut off the occasions of complaining.

## CHAPTER XV

I WOULD to God we could persuade them not to receive again the money they had lent, save only of such as were willing to repay. Would to God the buyers were never obliged to the sellers by any promise, nor bargains and covenants were ratified under hand and seal; but that faith should rather keep them, and a mind observing equity. But men have preferred profit before honesty, and had rather enforce others to be faithful, than behold them faithful. Witnesses are employed, both on the one and the other side. This man lendeth his money upon interest to many, whom he causeth to be



bound by public instruments. That other is not contented with sureties, except he have a pawn in hand. O loathsome confession of human fraud, and public wickedness! Our seals are more set by than our souls. To what purpose are these worshipful men called to record? why set they to their hands? namely, lest he should deny that which he had received. Thinkest thou these men to be upright, and that they would maintain a truth? yea, but if they themselves would instantly borrow money of any man, they cannot get it, except they be obliged after the same manner. Had it not been more honesty to let some pass with the breach of their credit, than that all men should be mistrusted of unthankfulness, and perfidiousness? Avarice wanteth but one only thing, which is, that we should do no man good without suretyship. It is the property of a generous and magnificent mind to help and profit others; he that giveth benefits, imitateth the gods; he that redemandeth them, is as the usurers. Why then abase we our selves to those vilest sort of rake-hells, by resembling them?

He reprehendeth double dealing

## CHAPTER XVI

BUT if no action be liable against an ungrateful person, the number of the ungrateful will be the more? nay rather they will be the less; for men will be more advised in bestowing their benefits. Again, it is not expedient to have it known to the world, what a number of unthankful persons there be: for the multitude of offenders will take away the shame of the deed, and a common crime will cease

The  
multi-  
tude of  
offenders

to be accompted a reproach. Is there almost any woman in these days that is ashamed of divorce, since the time that certain of the noble ladies, and gentlewomen, have made accompt of their years, not by the number of consuls, but by the number of their husbands; and depart from them to be married, and are married to be divorced? So long as divorce was rare, so long was it feared, but after that few or no marriages were continued without divorce, the often hearing of it taught them to use it. Is any woman nowadays ashamed of whoredom, since the world is grown to that pass, that few take a husband but to cloak their whoredoms? Chastity is an argument of deformity: where shall a man find a woman so miserable, or so loathsome, that will content herself with one pair of adulterers? except she have for every hour one, and yet the day is not long enough to suffice all, except she be carried to one friend, and dine with another, nay she doteth, and is too much of the old stamp, that knows not that the keeping of one leman is good wedlock. Like as the shame of these faults is vanished at this day, since the sin began to get large scope, so shalt thou make the thankless sort both more and more bold, if they may once begin to number themselves.

## CHAPTER XVII

WHAT then? shall the thankless person escape unpunished? what then? shall he be unchastised that hath no piety? the malicious, the covetous, he that followeth and feedeth his own desires, he that delighteth in cruelty? Thinkest thou that they

shall be unpunished which are so hateful? or supposest thou that any punishment is more grievous than public hatred? It is a punishment that he dare not take a good turn at any man's hands, that he dare not do a good turn to any, that he is a gazing-stock to all men, or at leastwise supposeth himself to be so, and that he hath lost the understanding of the thing that was singularly good, and singularly sweet. Callest thou him unhappy that wanteth his eyesight? or him whose ears are deafened by the means of sickness? and doest thou not accompt him wretched, that hath lost the force of benefits? He feareth the gods, who are witnesses against all ungrateful men, the knowledge he hath how he is intercepted and excluded from benefiting, or doing courtesies, burneth and vexeth him inwardly: finally, this very punishment is great enough for him, that (as I said before) he cannot reap the fruit and enjoy so pleasant a thing. But he that is delighted, and contented in that he hath received a good turn, enjoyeth equal and perpetual pleasure, and rejoiceth in beholding the mind of him that gave, and not the thing was given. A good turn continually delighteth a thankful man, an ungrateful man but once. Besides this, let either of their lives be compared with other. The one is always sad and sorrowful, and walketh like a cheater, and fraudulent person, who respecteth not the duty he oweth to his parents which begot him, nor of those friends that bred him up, nor of those masters which instructed him. The other is always joyful and merry, expecting an occasion to yield satisfaction, and conceiving a great joy in this very affection, not seeking means to make that appear less which he hath received, but how he may satisfy more fully

maketh  
the crime  
less  
odious

**Benefits,** and honourably, not only his parents and friends,  
**duties,** but also other persons of meaner reckoning. For  
**and** although he hath received a benefit at his bondman's  
**services** hands, he considereth not from whom, but what he  
 hath received.

## CHAPTER XVIII

ALTHOUGH it be a question amongst some (amongst whom Hecaton is one) whether a bondman can benefit his master or no. For there are some that distinguish after this manner: That certain things are benefits; certain, duties; and certain, services. They say that we ought to call that a benefit which we receive from a stranger, and we term him a stranger that is not born to do us any pleasure, except he please. They name that, duty, which appertaineth properly to a son, a wife, and those persons who are provoked by alliance, and tied by offices, to assist. They term that, service, which belongeth to a slave or bondman, who is brought to this exigent by the condition of his fortune, so that he cannot in any sort challenge his superior for anything, whatsoever he hath done unto him. This notwithstanding whosoever denieth, that bondmen may not sometimes do their masters a good turn, is ignorant of the law of nature, for it concerneth us to consider, of what mind he is that giveth the benefit, not of what state or calling. Vertue hideth herself from no man, she entertaineth and accepteth all men, she inviteth all, gentlemen, franklins, bondmen, kings, and banished men; she chooseth neither house nor revenue, but is contented with the bare name. For what safeguard should there be against casualties, or what great thing

could the mind promise it self, if fortune could change a certain and settled vertue? if the bondman giveth not a benefit to his master, neither doth any subject to his king, nor soldier to his captain, for what skilleth it, in what state of subjection a man be, if he be under one which is sovereign? For if necessity, and fear of extremity do bar a bondman from attaining the name of desert, the same also will bar him that is under a king, or a captain, who have the like power over him, although it be under a different title: but men gratify their kings, and give benefits to their captains, therefore slaves may do courtesies to their masters: a bondman may be just, valiant, and courageous; ergo, he may also give a benefit. For this proceedeth only from vertue, and so may bondmen give their masters benefits, as they have oftentimes made them their benefits. There is no doubt but that a bondman may do a courtesy to any man, why then may he not give favour and pleasure to his own master?

That those in subjection may confer benefits

## CHAPTER XIX

BECAUSE (saith he) he cannot become his master's creditor, if he should give him his money; yet otherwise he daily obligeth his master unto him: he followeth him in his journeys, he ministereth unto him in his sicknesses, he reverenceth him with great care, and labour: yet all these (which would be thought benefits if another should do them) are but services as long as a bondman doeth them: for that is a benefit (and is only rightly so called) that a man doeth, who was at liberty not to do it. But a bondman hath not the power of refusal, thus

Inbenefits  
there is  
neither  
bond nor  
free

giveth he, and lendeth he nothing, but is only obedient to that which is commanded him: neither can he boast of his doing, because he could not refuse to do the same. Even under these terms will I conquer thee, and confute thy opinion, and so far will I plead the bondman's cause, that in divers acts he shall be esteemed free. Meanwhile, I pray you tell me, if I show you a slave fighting courageously without fear of death, in defence of his master's life, and without respect of his own, wounded with infinite blows, yet suffering his blood to stream from his deep wounds, even to the last and uttermost drops, to the end that his master in the meantime may find an opportunity to escape, purchasing the means by his own death, to win so much time as he may, to save his master's life: wouldest thou deny that he did his master a friendship, because he is his bondman? If I show thee one, that by no tyrannical premises could be corrupted, or threats terrified, or torments feared, to betray his master's secrets; but as much as in him lay, removed all suspicions that were surmised, and employed all his forces to express his faith: wouldest thou deny (because he was a bondman) that he did his master a good turn? See rather, if it be not so much the greater kindness, as the example of vertue is rarer in bondmen; and consequently, so much the more worthy thanks: for that whereas superiority is commonly hated, and all constraint esteemed grievous, yet the love of some one toward his master, hath surmounted the common hatred of bondage. So then, for that cause it ceaseth not to be a benefit because it proceeded from a bondman: but therefore is it greater, because bondage itself could not deter him from doing the same.

CHAPTER XX

Stone walls do not a prison make

HE is deceived, whosoever thinketh that servitude taketh possession over the whole man; the better part of him is exempted. The bodies are bred and subject to their masters, but the mind is privileged in it self: it is so free and restless, that it cannot be restrained in this prison, wherein it is enclosed: it cannot be held from using his forces, and performing great matters, and passing beyond all bounds, as companion of the celestial gods. It is the body therefore that fortune hath submitted to the master, this bought he, this selleth he: that interior part cannot be bought or sold, or suffer servitude. Whatsoever issueth from that is free: for neither can we command them all things, neither can our bondmen be compelled to obey us in all things: they are not bound to execute that which shall be prejudicial for the common weal: they are not tied to assist any wicked and insolent action.

CHAPTER XXI

THERE are certain things which the laws neither command, nor forbid to be done: in these hath a bondman matter of benefit. As long as he doth that which his master may justly command him to do, it is called and is service; when more than is necessary for a servant to do, a benefit: when it passeth into the affection of a friend, it ceaseth to be called a service. There are certain things which a master is bound to furnish his servant with, namely, with meat, and drink, and raiment: but no man will call this a benefit. But if he have given him all that he would, if he have nourished him

**Service** as a free man, if he have instructed him in the  
**and** liberal sciences: this ought to be called a benefit.  
**benefit** The same contrariwise may be said in the person  
of a bondman: whatsoever it be that exceeded  
the duty and rule of a bondman's service, it is not  
done of awe and command, but voluntarily and  
willingly, is a benefit, provided always, that it be  
such, that it may merit the name, when another  
foreign person shall do it.

## CHAPTER XXII

A BONDMAN (as Chrysippus saith) is a perpetual hireling: now even as he giveth a benefit, when he performeth more than that day's work to which he was hired; so whenas the bondman (by reason of the love and affection he beareth his master) surpasseth the terms of his miserable fortune, and performeth some extraordinary and brave enterprise, which might be held honourable in one more happily born, and surmounteth the hope and expectation of his master, then is it a benefit, which is found in his own house. Seemeth it a matter just and indifferent to thee, that if we be displeased with those that do less than their duty, we should not be thankful unto them, that perform more than either they should or are accustomed? wilt thou know when it is no benefit? then it is, when it may be said, what if he would not do it? But when he performeth that which he might lawfully refuse, it is praiseworthy in him that he had a will to do it. A benefit and an injury are contraries. The slave may pleasure his master, if he may receive an injury at his hands: and yet there is an express judge appointed to hear the complaint of



bondmen against their masters, who may contrary and repress their cruelty, lust, and hard dealing, and chastise the covetousness of those lords, who refuse to allow their slaves ordinary food, and necessary garments. What then? doth the master receive a benefit at his bondman's hands? yea, a man, from a man: to conclude, he hath done that which was in his power, he hath given his master a benefit; it is in thy choice whether thou wilt receive it from a bondman. But who is so great whom fortune may not compel to stand in need even of the basest and poorest of his people? Now will I relate many and different examples of benefits, and some also contrary to one another. Some one slave hath saved his master's life, another also gave him his death. Another hath delivered his master at the instant when he should die, and (if this be but a small matter) by losing his own life hath saved his master's. There have been some that have helped their deaths, and others that have preserved them by beguiling them.

**Examples  
of benefits  
done by  
bondmen**

### CHAPTER XXIII

CLAUDIUS QUADRIGARIUS in the eighteenth book of his *Chronicles* reporteth, that when the city Grumentum was beleaguered, and brought into a desperate estate and extreme misery: that two slaves fled unto the enemy's camp, and performed an action worthy their labour and peril: for after the city was taken, and the victorious enemy ranged and revelled everywhere, these two slaves (who knew all the by-ways) were the first that set forward to make booty of that house wherein they had served. And having surprised their mistress, they rudely

A noble  
deed of  
two  
bondmen

drove her before them : and being demanded what woman she was, they answered that it was their mistress, who had in times past most cruelly handled them, and that they dragged her out, to bring her to her death : and by this policy having gotten her out of the city, they carefully hid her. But afterwards when the Roman soldiers were satisfied with pillage, and reduced to their former discipline and manners, these slaves likewise returned to their former servitude, and gave their mistress her wonted liberty. In acknowledgement whereof she presently set them both at liberty, and was not ashamed to receive her life at their hands, over whom she had absolute power both of life and death : could she have more cause of contentment than hereby ? for had she been otherwise preserved, she had but received an ordinary courtesy and vulgar clemency, (which is many times usual amongst soldiers) but being preserved after this manner, it was a noble story, and an everlasting example, to both the cities. In so great confusion of the surprised city, when every one minded his particular safety, all fled from her, except her own fugitives. And they to express with what mind and intention they practised their former flight ; fled from the conquerors, to the captive ; pretending the countenance of murderers, which was the greatest point in that benefit. So much thought they it better to seem murderers of their mistress, lest than that she should have been murdered indeed : it is not believe me, it is not, I tell you, the act of a servile mind, to buy a noble action by the fame and opinion they gain of their wickedness : Caius Vettius, the prætor of the Marsians, was led unto his death ; his bondman drew the sword of that

very soldier that dragged him, and first of all slew his master, and afterwards (it is time, saith he, to enfranchise and deliver my self, since now already I have set my master at liberty) at one stroke thrust himself through. Show me any man that hath preserved his master more magnificently.

Faithful  
bondmen

## CHAPTER XXIV

CÆSAR besieged Corfinium, and Domitius was shut up in the same, who considering his danger, commanded a slave of his (who was practised in physic) to give him poison: and perceiving that by all means he sought occasion not to do it, Why delayest thou (saith he) as if all this were in thy power? armed, I entreat thee to yield me death. Hereupon his slave promised to perform it, and gave him a harmless potion to drink up, wherewith being laid asleep, he came unto his son and said, Command me to be kept in sure hold, till by the event thou understandest, whether I have given thy father poison or no. Domitius lived, and was saved by Cæsar; but yet his bondman had saved him first.

## CHAPTER XXV

DURING the time of the civil wars, a bondman hid his master who was proscribed, and having fitted his rings on his fingers, and put on his garment, he presented himself to the sergeants, and told them that he required no favour at their hands, but that they boldly might perform that which they were commanded; and therewithal held out

In- his neck for them to hew off. How great a man's  
 formers part was this for a slave to be willing to die for  
 under his master in such a time, as it were rare fidelity  
 Tiberius not to wish his master's death? in public cruelty  
 to be found gentle? in public perfidiousness faithful?  
 when great rewards were published for every one  
 that would betray, to desire death as the reward  
 of his fidelity?

## CHAPTER XXVI

I WILL not overslip the examples of our age: under  
 Tiberius Cæsar there was an ordinary licence, and  
 almost a public rage in appeaching and accusing,  
 which (far more grievous than any civil war)  
 consumed and destroyed both the senate and  
 nobility. Exceptions were taken against drunken  
 men's words, and things spoken in jest were cen-  
 sured in earnest: nothing was secure, and all occa-  
 sion of cruelty was pleasing; neither now expected  
 men what their penalty should be who were accused,  
 where all were punished after the same sort. In  
 that time Paulus who had been a prætor beforetimes,  
 supped at a certain banquet, having on his finger a  
 rich stone, whereon was engraven the image of the  
 Emperor Tiberius: I should play the fool too  
 much if I should seek for some more cleanly words  
 to express unto you, how he took the chamber-pot:  
 this was presently observed by Maro (who was  
 one of the spies, and most noted informers of that  
 time). But his slave (against whom this treason  
 was plotted) secretly stole away the ring from his  
 master's finger who was drunk: and whenas Maro  
 afterwards would take witness of those that were

at the banquet, how Paulus had handled his members (not to be named without modesty) with the emperor's image, and importuning them to subscribe to that accusation, the slave showed before all the company, that his master's ring was on his finger. Whosoever shall term this man a slave, he should also call that other spy an honest guest.

Hasty words

CHAPTER XXVII

UNDER Augustus Cæsar, men's words were not as yet dangerous unto them; yet began they already to displease: Rufus, a senator, as he sat at supper, wished that Cæsar might not return in safety and health from that progress he then intended; and added this furthermore, that all the bulls and calves of the country desired no less: some there were that diligently observed his words: the next morning, as soon as it was day, a servant and bondman of his, that had attended at his feet, reported unto him those words he had spoken in his drunkenness the night before, and counselled him presently to go and seek out Cæsar, and to be his own first accuser. According to this his counsel his master met Cæsar at his first coming down. And when he had sworn unto him that he was not well in his wits over night, and wished that the evil he had uttered might fall upon him, and upon his children, and besought Cæsar that he would pardon him, and receive him into his favour again: after that the emperor had assured him that he would willingly do it; No man will believe, said Rufus, that thou hast admitted me again into thy

**True nobility** favour, except thou give me somewhat, and thereupon he required no small sum of money, at reconciled Cæsar's hands, and obtained the same, who therewithal said unto him, For mine own sake I will endeavour never to be angry with thee without an occasion. Cæsar behaved himself honestly in pardoning him, and besides annexed this liberality to his clemency. Whosoever shall hear this example reported, he must needly praise Cæsar, but it must be after he hath praised the bondman. Except you mean that I should show you that he was made free for this service he did. He was so; but not without ransom, for Cæsar had paid the money for his freedom.

## CHAPTER XXVIII

AFTER so many examples, is there any doubt but that a master may sometimes receive a benefit at his bondman's hands? why should the person rather lessen the dignity of a thing, than the thing ennoble the person? All men have the same beginnings, and the same original; no man is more noble than another, except it be such an one that hath a better wit, and is more apt to good arts. They that set forth their pedigrees, and their ancestors in a long row, interlined with many branches of collateral descents on the forefront of their houses, are rather noted than noble: we have all of us but one parent, which is the world, whether it be by famous, or bare descent; every man conveys his first pedigree from it. There is no cause why these should deceive thee, who when they reckon up their ancestors: wheresoever some noble

name faileth them, they presently feign a god. is not  
 Despise no man, though his pedigree be worn out in the  
 of remembrance, and he smally furthered by un- pedigree  
 friendly fortune, whether our predecessors were  
 freemen, or bond, or foreigners. Courageously  
 advance ye your minds; and whatsoever baseness  
 lieth in the way, leap ye over it. Great nobility  
 attendeth for you at the last. Why with pride  
 are we lifted up unto so great vanity, that from  
 servants we disdain to receive benefits; and look  
 upon their sort, forgetting deserts? Doest thou  
 call anyone a servant, thou being a servant of lust  
 and of gluttony, and of an adulteress, yea a common  
 slave of adulteresses? Callest thou anyone a servant?  
 Whither now art thou dragged by these grooms;  
 who bear about this thy litter? Whither do these  
 in livery cloaks, who counterfeit a soldier-like, and  
 no vulgar attire indeed: whither, I say, do these  
 carry thee abroad? to the door of some door-  
 keeper, to the gardens of some, who doth not  
 indeed bear office in ordinary. And yet deniest  
 thou, that a benefit can be given to thee by thy  
 servant, to whom it is a benefit to have a kiss from  
 the servant of another man? What so great dis-  
 cord of mind is this? At the same time thou  
 despisest and reverencest servants. Within doors  
 thou art imperious and outrageous, base abroad;  
 and as well contemned, as contemning. For never  
 do any more abase their minds, than they who  
 wickedly lift them up: and none are more ready  
 to tread upon other men, than they who have  
 learned to proffer reproach, by receiving it.

From  
small be-  
ginnings

## CHAPTER XXIX

THESE things were to be spoken to repress the insolency of men depending upon fortune, and to approve the right of a benefit to be given by a servant, that also it might be approved to be given by a son. For it is in question, whether children at any time can give greater benefits to their parents, than they have received. This is granted, that many children have been greater, and more mighty than their parents, as also better and more vertuous than they: which being true, it may be also that they have done more for them that bred them; whereas both their fortune was greater, and their will better: but whatsoever it be (saith he) that the son giveth the father, it is less than his father hath done for him, because of duty he oweth this power of giving to his father. So as he can never properly be overcome in benefits who hath given another the means to exceed him in the same. For some things take their beginning from others, and yet they are greater than their beginnings, neither is anything therefore greater than that from whence it had his beginning, for that it could not have grown to that greatness except it had begun. There is almost nothing but far exceedeth his first original. Seeds and grains are the causes of all that which groweth in this world; yet are they the least parts of those things which come of them. Look upon the Rhine, look upon Euphrates, finally do but observe all other rivers so renowned, and what are they if you estimate them by their headsprings from whence they flow? whatsoever they be feared for, whereinsoever they be renowned, they have purchased it in their course and progress. Take away roots



and the forests will never grow nor overspread, <sup>how</sup> neither shall the tops of the mountains be covered <sup>great</sup> with woods. Look upon these timber trees, whether <sup>things</sup> you regard their great height, or their wonderful <sup>do grow</sup> solidity and broad spreading of their branches, how small a thing, in comparison of these, is that which the root in small and tender spreadings comprehendeth. The temples are builded upon their foundations, as also these great walls of Rome are, and yet that which was first laid to sustain this whole work, lies hidden under earth. The like falleth out in all other things. The greatness that they attain unto in time, doth always obscure their beginnings. I could not have attained to anything, if the benefit of my parents had not gone before; yet followeth it not for all this, that that which I have obtained is less than that same which gave me the means to acquire it: except my nurse had suckled me in infancy, I could have performed none of those things, which I have sithence acted by my counsel and valour, neither should I have obtained this dignity and honour, which I have risen unto by civil and military demerit: but wilt thou for this cause more prize my nurse's first endeavours, than the great acts I have achieved by my so many vertuous attempts? And then what difference wilt thou find herein, considering that I could not increase in honour, without the tender care of my nurse, no less than without my father's benefit?

## CHAPTER XXX

BUT if I owe wholly to my beginning, whatsoever I more can do, think you that neither my father

**A father's benefit** is my true beginning, nor my grandfather indeed. For always there will be somewhat more ancient, from which the original of the nearest original may descend. But no man is said to owe more to them that are unknown, and to ancestors which have been before memory of man, than to a father. But, I owe more, if my father, because he hath begotten me, oweth this very thing unto his ancestors. Whatsoever I have done for my father, how great soever it be, it is nothing to be esteemed in respect of the benefit he hath done me, for I had not bin, had he not begotten me. And by the same reason, if any man hath healed my father, being sick and ready to die, I should be able to do nothing for him that were not to be esteemed less, than the benefit he did unto my father: for had he not received his health, my father had never begotten me. But see if this carry not a more likelihood of truth, that the things which I could both do, and have done, should be esteemed as mine own, and in mine own power, and at mine own will. That I am born (if thou consider what a thing it is in itself) thou shall find it a small and uncertain matter, and the common subject of good and evil, and undoubtedly the first step to all things; but yet not therefore greater than all, because the first. I have preserved and kept my father alive, I have preferred and exalted him to the highest degree of honour, and have made him a prince in his city: I have ennobled him, not only by those my vertuous enterprises, which I have honourably achieved; but also have given him an assured means to advance himself, I have put into his hands an easy means to obtain much honour and glory: I have heaped together upon him dignities and

riches, and all whatsoever men's ambition can desire. And where I surpassed all others in authority, I submitted myself to him: tell me now, I pray thee, if thou couldest do all these things, except it were by thy father's means? I will briefly answer, and tell thee, that it is altogether so, if to the performance of so many worthy things it sufficed only to be born. But if to live well and vertuously a naked life is the least part, and if thou hast but given me that which is common to me, with brute beasts, yea, with the least, the most despised, and the most loathsome: I beseech thee attribute not that to thyself, which proceeded not alone from thy benefits, although in some sort also, it cannot either breed or be without thine. Suppose that for the life which thou hast given, I have restored thy life: in so doing likewise I have surmounted thy benefit, because I know what I give, and thou that which thou receivedst: whereas I gave thee life, not for my pleasure's sake, or with my pleasure, when seeing it is so much more estimable to be able to retain and conserve life, than to receive the same, by how much it is less dreadful and terrible to die, than to apprehend the fear and conceit of death.

Father  
and son

## CHAPTER XXXI

I GAVE thee a life, that thou mightst presently use: thou gavest me a life, when I knew not whether I should enjoy it, or no. I gave thee life, when thou wert in danger of death: thou hast given me life, to the end I might die. I have given thee a consummate and perfect life: thou hast engendered

Not to  
live, but  
to live  
well

me deprived of reason and judgement, and no otherwise but to be a burthen to others' arms. Wilt thou know how small a benefit it is to give life in such sort? If thou hadst cast me forth, then in that case it had been injury to have begotten me. Whereby I gather, that our begetting by father and mother, is the least benefit that can be, except other things accompany it, that must prosecute the beginning of this benefit, and so ratify the same by other offices. It is no good thing to live, but to live well. But you will say, I live well: yea, but so I might also have lived ill: therefore this only is thine, that I live. If thou imputest unto me a life in it self, naked and destitute of counsel, and boastest thereof, as if it were a good and great thing: think with thy self, that thou imputest to me such a good, which is common as well to worms and flies, as to me. Moreover, not to vaunt of any other thing, but only in that I have endeavoured my self to learn the liberal sciences, to the end I might direct the rest of my life in the right way: if I live discreetly by this means, thou hast in this received a greater benefit than thou gavest me. For thou gavest me unto my self both rude and ignorant, and I gave my self to thee such a son, as thou mayst rejoice that ever thou begottest me.

## CHAPTER XXXII

My father nourished me: if I do no less for him, herein I am more beneficial unto him, because he not only conceiveth joy, in that he is nourished, but because he is nourished by his son, and greater

pleasure and contentment he receiveth in my good will, than he doth in the gift it self. The meat which he gave me, only nourished my body. What if a man hath so far advanced his own fortunes, that either for his eloquence, his justice, or his chivalry, he should grow famous in foreign countries, and had also made his father highly renowned, and so by his lustre dispelled the obscurity and cloudy darkness of his base birth: hath he not, think you, herein bestowed an inestimable benefit upon his parents? Should any man ever have known Ariston and Gryllus, had it not been for Xenophon and Plato their sons? Socrates exempted Sophroniscus his name from oblivion and death. It were too long to reckon up all the rest, who live by no other means, but, in that their children eternised their memories, by their own famous actions. Whether did Agrippa the father (who after his son's greatness was scarcely known in Rome) give a greater benefit, or Agrippa the son to his father, who alone was honoured with a naval crown, (which was the greatest honour that was accustomed to be given to men of war) who raised so many sumptuous buildings in the city, which both exceeded all former magnificence, and were never equalled by any after? Whether did Octavius give his son Augustus the Emperor a greater benefit, or the Emperor Augustus to his father, although the shadow of adoptive father had in some sort obscured the benefit of Octavius? What joy and contentment had he conceived, if after the extirpation of a civil war, he had seen him command and govern the Roman Empire in security and peace? Who doubteth, but that he could hardly

Sons' benefits to fathers

Scipio's  
courage

acknowledge his own good, or sufficiently believe the same, and as often as he considered his own mean estate, conceive that such a man as he could be born in his house? Why should I now prosecute the rest, whom oblivion had already swallowed up, except their children's glory had delivered them out of this forgetful darkness? Moreover, we inquire not whether any son hath given greater benefits to his father than he received at his hands; but, whether any son can yield greater? And although the examples of those which hitherto I have related, do not as yet suffice and satisfy, neither surpass the good which they have received at their fathers' hands; yet nature may make us see that hereafter, which hath not as yet been seen by the ages forepassed. If one only benefit cannot surmount the greatness of parents' deserts, it may be that many put together may outstrip them.

### CHAPTER XXXIII

Scipio, then but a boy, in a certain battle set spurs to his horse, and charging the enemy, saved his father's life: and is it but a small matter, when, to make good the place where his father fought, he contemned so many dangers, that he pressed so many great captains, that he brake through as many opposites as he found before him: in the first service that ever he had seen, and being as yet but a raw soldier, he set forward and charged before the oldest servitors, and performed many valorous actions, far exceeding the forces of his age? Add hereunto, that he defended his father,

being accused of a capital crime, and delivered him from the conspiracy of his mighty enemies, that he gave him a second and third consulate, and other honours also, which they who before time have been consuls, might wish and crave for : and seeing him poor, gave him those goods which he had gotten by right of war, and that which a man who maketh profession of arms esteemeth most honourable also : he enriched him with those spoils which he had gotten from his enemies. If this as yet seem but little unto thee, thou mayst add the provinces which he gave him, and the governments and extraordinary charges, which were afterwards continued unto him by his means. Add further, that after he had razed so many great cities, how this brave man (the defender and founder of the Roman Empire, that was to be extended from the east unto the west, without a rival) ennobled him the more, who was already noble. Say that he was Scipio's father, yet undoubtedly the common and ordinary good that parents do in begetting children, hath been far surmounted by Scipio's incomparable piety and vertue, who I know not whether he brought the city more defence or honour.

and the  
honour  
he did  
to his  
father

## CHAPTER XXXIV

THEN if these examples seem little unto thee ; admit that some man hath delivered his father from torments, suppose that he himself had suffered the same to deliver him. For thou mayest dilate and extend the children's benefits as far as thou wilt. Whereas contrariwise the father's benefit in pro-

**The** creation is not only simple and easy, but further  
**on may** not voluntary also in him that giveth : what need  
**surpass** we so many words? The father hath given  
 being to those, to whom he knoweth not whether  
 he hath given being or no, wherein he hath his  
 wife a comfort and partaker, wherein he respecteth  
 the law of his country, the praise and reward of  
 parents, the perpetuity of his house and family,  
 and all things rather than him to whom he gave  
 the same : what if any one (having obtained wis-  
 dom) hath informed and instructed his father  
 therein, shall we now grow in question whether  
 he hath given anything greater than he received?  
 Considering that he hath given his father a happy  
 life, having received at his father's hands but a bad  
 life only ; but saith he, it is the father's benefit  
 whatsoever thou doest, or whatsoever thou canst  
 return unto him again. So is it the benefit of my  
 master, if I have profited in liberal studies : and  
 yet we may transcend and surpass those goods, we  
 have received from those, who have taught us, as  
 we also do their benefits, who have taught us to  
 read, and to know our first elements. And  
 although without them no man can learn anything,  
 yet all that which he hath afterwards learned is  
 not the inferior to the same : there is a great  
 difference betwixt the first and the greatest things :  
 neither therefore are the first comparable to the  
 greatest because without the first the greatest can-  
 not be.

### CHAPTER XXXV

**IT** is time now, if I may so term it, to produce  
 some pieces of our own coin. He that hath



bestowed such a benefit, above which there may be somewhat found better, may be overcome in benefits: the father gave life unto his son, but there is something better than life, so the father may be overcome in a benefit by the son, because the son may give something better and greater than the father. Furthermore, he that hath given life to another man, if once or twice he were delivered by the same man from death, he hath received a greater benefit than that which he gave; so the father hath given life; but if he be oftentimes delivered from the peril of death by his son, he shall receive a greater benefit than he gave him. He that hath received a good turn, the more he needeth that which he hath received, he hath received the greater goodness: but he that liveth, hath more want of life, than he that is not born (as of whom he cannot properly say, to have need of anything). The father therefore hath received a greater good turn, if he hath received life at his son's hands, than the son from the father, in that he is born: but the parent's benefits cannot be surmounted by these good offices, the child performeth unto him, why? because he hath received his life from his father, which had he not received he could not have given a benefit. This is then but common to the father, and all those who have at any time given life to any man. For had they not received life, they could not have returned beneficial gratitude: Therefore greater satisfaction is not intended to the physician, though the physician likewise is wont to give life; nor to the mariner though he hath saved from shipwrack, so that a man may surmount the benefits both of the one and the other, who hath by any means saved our lives;

the  
father's  
benefit

Vertue is of a noble disposition and consequently then the benefits of our parents may be also exceeded: if any man hath done me a good turn which serveth me to no use, except it be assisted and seconded by the favours of divers other persons, and if afterwards I have done him another courtesy, that hath no need of other men's assistance, I have given a greater good turn than that which I have received: the father hath given life to his child, which he should lose instantly, were it not sustained by divers other succours: but if the son hath saved his father's life, he hath given him such a life, as hath no need of any other assistance to sustain itself of itself, ergo the father receiving life at his son's hands, receiveth a greater benefit, than that was which the father hath given him.

## CHAPTER XXXVI

THESE things destroy not the reverence which is due unto parents, neither make they their children to become worse unto them, but rather better: for vertue is of a glorious and noble disposition, and deserveth to outstrip the foremost. The piety and affection of children will be more forward, if they may hope to surmount the kindness and favour their parents have done them. If this should happen to parents willing and glad of the same (because in many things it is for our own good to be overcome) whence can we imagine to ensue so acceptable a contention, whence so great happiness to parents, as to confess that they cannot equal their children's benefits? If we be not thus minded, we give our children means to excuse themselves,

and we shall make them more slow and retchless in acknowledging their fathers' benefits, whereas we ought to excite them the more, and say unto them, Do this, worthy children. An honest contention is raised betwixt parents and their children, to know which of them hath given the greatest benefits, or who hath received the most. The fathers have not therefore prevailed, because they have given the first. Take heart young men worthy yourselves, take heed you lose not your courage to overcome those who desire no other thing than to be overcome: you want no captains to undertake so brave a conflict, and to encourage you to follow them, who command you but to go the same course for to obtain these victories, which they have often gained against their parents.

A worthy rivalry

## CHAPTER XXXVII

*ÆNEAS* overcame his father in courtesy, for his father carried him in his arms when he was an infant (a weight neither dangerous nor heavy) where the other bare him on his shoulders, laden with age, through the midst of the armed enemy, and through the falling ruins of his city, at such time, as the devout old man embraced betwixt his arms his domestic gods, and the sacred relics of his house, loading his son's shoulders with more than his own person, yet went he onward with much ado: carrying him through the flames and ruins of the city (what is it not, but the piety and love of a son may perform) and bringing him out of all danger, ranked him afterwards amongst the gods, and placed him in the number of those first

Dutiful  
sons founders of the Roman Empire, to be honoured and revered with them. The young men of Sicily overcame and surmounted their fathers. For at such time as Mount *Ætna* was so highly inflamed, that it vomited fire upon the cities and neighbouring plains, and had consumed the greater part of the isle, they carried their fathers thence upon their backs: it is believed that the fire miraculously separated and divided it self, and that the flames retiring themselves on both sides, opened a large passage to suffer those vertuous young men to travel through it, to the end that without danger they might safely perform their great attempt. *Antigonus'* son also overcame in this kind, who whenas in a great battle he had discomfited his enemy, transferred the treasures and wealth of the conquest to his father, and with it gave him the Empire of *Cyprus*. This is a kingdom in mind to refuse government, when it is in thy hands. *Titus Manlius* also overcame his lordly and imperious father; who although he had been driven out of his father's house for a time, and sent into the country, because in his youth he was somewhat hard in apprehension, yet came he to the tribune of the people (who had adjoined his father to appear in person to answer to a capital crime) and asking him what time of appearance, he had assigned his father. The tribune hoping that he would betray his hated father, supposing that he had done herein a thankful office for the young man, he suffered him to see, (amongst other crimes he accused him of) how he had banished and driven him out of his house: which when the young man discovered, getting him alone in a secret place, he drew his dagger which he had

hidden in his bosom, and said; Except thou swear to revoke this personal adjournment of my father's, I will thrust thee through with this weapon: it lieth in thy power to choose which of these two ways, my father shall have no accuser. The tribune swore and kept touch with him: but he made it known in an assembly of the Roman people, why he had desisted from this accusation. It had not been possible for any other man to have overruled the tribune after this manner, and to escape unpunished.

**Fight  
valiantly,  
young  
men**

## CHAPTER XXXVIII

DIVERS examples might I produce of many other memorable children, who have delivered their parents from danger, that from a base degree have raised them to high estate, and from the meanest and ignoblest race of men, have given them eternal and indefinite honours: it cannot be expressed by any force of words or faculty of wit, how great a work it is, how praiseworthy, and how perdurable and lasting in men's memory; justly to be able to say, thus much I have obeyed my parents: I have fulfilled their commandments in whatsoever it were, either right, or wrong; I have showed my self observant and submissive, in this only thing I have been wilful, that I would not be overcome by them in benefits: fight valiantly therefore, I pray you young men, and though you were defeated, yet reinforce the fight anew. These that overcome shall be happy. They that shall be overcome shall be no less blessed; what person can ever receive more honour than that young man, who

**A worthy** may say unto himself, (for it is not lawful for him  
**vaunt** to say it to another) I have overcome my father  
 in well-doing? Is there any old man more  
 happy, than he that may vaunt in all places, and  
 before the whole world, that he hath been  
 overcome by his son in well-doing and  
 benefiting? What greater happi-  
 ness is there for a man so  
 to yield unto himself?

### THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK

## THE FOURTH BOOK

### THE ARGUMENT OF JUSTUS LIPSIUS

HE handled curious matters for the most part, but (according to his usual custom) intermixed with those that are profitable. He demandeth, whether a benefit or favour may be simply in it self desired? He proveth the affirmative against the Epicures, who measured all things by their profit. Amongst other arguments he teacheth by this, that the gods also give benefits, which he proveth very amply against those that deny the gods. Then he removeth some objections, which seem to teach, that profit is common in benefiting. And so he cometh to thanksgiving, and showeth that it is only to be yielded in regard of honesty, not of profit. Then he demandeth whether a benefit is to be given to him whom thou knowest will be ungrateful: he distinguisheth in this point, and partly affirmeth, and partly denieth.

The  
Argu-  
ment

### CHAPTER I

OF all those things (my *Æbutius Liberalis*) whereof we have entreated, there is nothing so necessary to be known, or (as *Sallust* saith) more carefully to be taught, than that which is now in hand; namely, whether to give a benefit, and to restore the like, be things which ought to be desired for the love of them selves. Some men there are which respect not honesty, but for profit sake, and admit not vertue without advantage (which hath nothing magnificent in it self, if it hath anything that is mercenary). For what is more

Vertue  
not to be  
followed  
for profit

loathsome, than for a man to make reckoning how much we ought to estimate an honest man, whenas vertue is neither invited with gain, nor terrified with loss, and is so far from corrupting any with hope or promise, that contrariwise she commandeth men to spend all their substance on her, and for her sake; and more often contenteth her self with that which is given freely without demand? To follow her, a man must tread all profit under foot: whithersoever she calleth, whithersoever she sendeth, he ought to go, without respect or interest of his estate or private affairs: and sometimes also he must set forward with the hazard of his own blood and life, neither must he ever refuse her commandments. What reward shall I then have, sayest thou, if I do this thing valiantly, or that thing gratefully? Only this, that thou hast done it; vertue promiseth thee nothing beside her self. If any profit casually befall thee, account it amongst thine accessory good haps. The price of honest things is in them selves; if then that which is honest be to be desired for it self, and a benefit being honest, the condition thereof cannot be different from honesty, because they are both of one nature. But that the thing which is honest is to be desired for it self, it is often and abundantly proved already.

## CHAPTER II

IN this point I must wage war with the nice and effeminate troop of Epicures, that talk of philosophy only at their banquet, with whom vertue is the vassal and handmaid of vicious pleasure; them she obeyeth, them she serveth, them she beholdeth



preferred above her self. There is no pleasure (saith he) without vertue. But why is voluptuousness advanced before vertue? Thinkest thou we dispute of the order between them? no, the question is of the whole matter, and the power thereof, it is not vertue if it dance attendance after delight. The chiefest place is hers, she it is that must lead, command, and have the chiefest place: thou biddest her ask the watchword. What skilleth it thee? saith the Epicure. I also maintain, that a blessed life cannot be without vertue. I condemn and contemn the pleasure it self which I follow, and to which I have made my self a bondslave, if vertue be removed from it. The only question is in this, whether vertue be the cause of the chiefest good, or the chiefest good it self. Admit that this be the only thing in question, thinkest thou that there is but the only change of place and order only between them, that breedeth the difference? This is a very confusion, this is a manifest blindness, to prefer the last before the first. I am not displeased because vertue is placed after pleasure, but because it is any ways or at all compared, or paralleled with pleasures. Vertue is the despiser and enemy of delight, and estrangeth her self far from her, more familiar with labour and sorrow, more fitly to be inserted into manly incommodities, than into this effeminate felicity.

The chief  
question

### CHAPTER III

THESE things (my Liberalis) were to be spoken of, because a benefit, (whereof we now entreat) is an act of vertue, and foul shame it were to give it for

**Prefer the  
worthiest** any other respect, than to have given it only. For if we do a courtesy in expectation of a recompense, then should we do it to the wealthiest, and not to the worthiest. Now we prefer a poor man unable to requite, before a rich man. It is no benefit that hath reference to fortune, or hope of interest. Besides, if only profit should entice us to do good, they should do least good, that have most means. Such as are rich men, powerful men, and kings, because they have least need of other men's help. But the gods likewise should withdraw their so many liberalities, which without intermission, day and night they pour upon us. For why, their proper nature and being sufficeth them in all things, and maketh them abundant, secure, and inviolable every way. To none therefore should they give their benefits, if their only cause of giving proceeded from no other intention, than to think on them selves and their own private commodities. This is no benefit, but a loan upon use, to respect not where you may best bestow it, but where you may place it most gainfully, whence you may most readily receive it. Which intention, seeing it is far estranged from the gods: it followeth that they are divinely liberal. For if the only cause of giving a benefit, were the giver's profit, and no profit is to be hoped or expected by God at our hands; there is no cause why God should be bountiful unto us.

#### CHAPTER IV

I KNOW well what answer is made hereunto, which is, that God bestoweth no good upon us, but is altogether careless and regardless of us, and not

daring to cast his eyes upon this world, busieth himself about other matters or (which seemeth to the Epicure to be the chiefest felicity) he doth nothing, neither do benefits or injuries touch him. He that thus saith, heareth not the vows of those that pray, neither the cries nor vows which every one maketh, as well in private, as in public, lifting up their joined hands unto heaven: which undoubtedly would not be done, neither would all mankind consent unto this madness, to implore a deaf deity, and invoke such gods as had no power to help them, if they knew not assuredly that the gods give benefits, sometimes of their own proper motion, otherwhiles upon prayers; that it is they, from whom we receive so many great graces in their due times and seasons, and that by their assistance we are put out of fear, of such imminent and eminent mischiefs, as daily threaten us: who is he that is so miserable, and rejected by heaven? who is he that is so disgraced, and born to continual affliction and travail? that hath not sometimes felt these great favours and liberalities of the gods? Do but behold, I pray you, even those who incessantly complain of their miseries, and who live so malcontented with their fortunes, yet shalt thou find, that they are not wholly exempted, and destitute of succours from heaven, and that there is no man on whom there hath not fallen some drops from this sweet and gracious fountain. Thinkest thou that it is a small matter which is equally distributed to all those that are born in this world? And (to omit those things which the gods bestow at their pleasure, with all proportion of measure) is it a small matter that nature hath given us, when she hath given us her self?

The  
kindly  
fruits of  
the earth

## CHAPTER V

DOETH not God bestow all benefits upon us? From whence then hast thou all those things whereof thou art possessed? which thou givest? which thou deniest? which thou keepest? which thou takest unjustly? From whence come the infiniteness of things that delight the eyes, affect the ear, and please the understanding? From whence is this abundance, that furnisheth our riotous excess? For they have not only provided for our necessities, but we are tendered by them even unto delicacy also. From whence have we so many trees, bearing sundry sorts of savoury fruit, so many wholesome herbs, for the maintenance of our healths, such variety of meats, strong for all seasons through the whole year, that an idle sluggard may find by casualty sufficient sustenance upon the earth to feed and nourish him? Whence come so many sorts of beasts? whereof some are bred on the earth, other some in the water, and others descending from the air, to the end there might not be any part of nature, that should not be tributary unto us of some rent. The rivers likewise, whereof some environ the plains with their pleasant revolutions and roundness, other stream thorow their hollow and navigable channels, bring us merchandise from foreign seas, of which some at certain prefixed times take wonderful increase, so as the sudden force of the sommer's flood moisteneth and watereth those grounds which are situate and planted under the drougthy and burning zone. What shall I say of the veins of some medicinal waters? What shall I speak of

the bubbling and boiling up of hot baths even upon the very shores ?

The  
bounty  
of God

‘And what of thee O mighty lake, and thee  
Proud billowed Benac swelling like the sea.’

## CHAPTER VI

If a man had given thee a few acres of land, thou wouldest say that thou hadest received a benefit at his hands, and deniest thou that the unmeasurable extent of the barren earth is no benefit? If a man should give thee money, and fill thy coffer (for that seemeth a great thing in thy sight) thou wouldest term it a benefit. And thinkest thou it no favour, that God hath hidden so many metals in the earth, spread so many rivers on the sands, which floating, discover ingots of massy gold, silver, brass, and iron, which he hath hidden everywhere; that he hath given thee means and knowledge to find it out, by setting marks of his covert riches on the upper face of the earth? If a man should give thee a house enriched with marble pillars, if the cover thereof were resplendent, and painted with gold and goodly colours, thou wouldest highly esteem this present of his: God hath builded thee a great palace, without any danger of fear or falling down, wherein thou seest not little pieces, smaller than the chisel itself, wherewith they were carved, but entire huge masses of precious stone, all fastened and fashioned after a divers and different manner, the least piece whereof maketh thee wonder at the beauty of the same: the roof whereof shineth after one sort by day, and after another by night: and wilt thou then deny that

**The bounty of God** thou hast received any benefit at all? Again, whereas thou settest great store by that which thou hast, thinkest thou (which is the point of a thankless person) that thou art beholding to nobody for them? Whence hast thou this breath which thou drawest? Whence cometh this light, whereby thou disposest and orderest the actions of thy life? From whence hast thou thy blood, in the motion and flowing whereof thy natural heat is maintained? Whence come these meats, which by their delicate tastes and pleasing savours, invite thee to eat far more than thy stomach can digest? Whence come these things which awaken thy pleasures and delights, when thou art wearied? Whence cometh this quiet and repose, wherein thou rotest and witherest away? Wilt thou not say, if thou beest thankful:

‘From God springs this repose, and evermore  
 Him for my God I’ll honour and adore.  
 Upon his altar, to perform my vow,  
 A firstling lamb my pastures shall allow:  
 For he it is, as thou dost plainly see,  
 That yields my wandring team their pasture free,  
 He lets me tune at pleasure, as they feed,  
 My country lays upon mine oaten reed.’

It is that God, which hath not only permitted us to feed a small number of neat, but that hath filled the whole world with great troops of cattle, that nourisheth all beasts which wander here and there, in so many and divers places; that giveth them new pastures in sommer time, after they have eaten up their winter provision: which hath not only taught us to play upon a reed, and after some manner to tune a reed, and delightfully sing to it; but also hath invented so many arts, so many

varieties of voices, and so many sounds, to yield sundry tunes, some by force of our own breath, and some by a borrowed and external air. For thou canst not call those things ours, which we have invented, no more than thou canst call it our own doing that we grow, or that the body hath his full proportion, according to his determinate times. Now our teeth fall in our infancy, anon after we pass into an age, which in a few years giveth us all our increase, again, ripe age after our young and springing years, making us become more strong, settlcth us in a perfect and manly age. Finally, we are come to the last period, which maketh an end of the care and course of our life. The seeds of all ages and sciences are hidden in us from our birth, and that great Workman God produceth out of the hidden all natural instincts.

The  
great  
Work-  
man

## CHAPTER VII

It is nature, saith he, that communicateth and giveth me all these things. Understandest thou not that in speaking after this manner, thou changest the name of God? For what else is nature but God, and a divine being and reason, which by his searching assistance resideth in the world, and all the parts thereof? As often as thou listest thou mayest call him, sometimes the Author of all things, and sometimes Jove (most good and most mighty). Thou mayest also well term him the Thunderer, and Establisher, who had not that name given him, because (as the historiographers write) that after the Romans had made their vows unto him, he reinforced their hearts, and discomforted armies in

One God under many names their behalf: but because all things stand and are established by his benefit, he is therefore so called. Thou shalt not also lie, if thou call him Destiny, for whereas fate and destiny is but an immutable ordinance, which holdeth all causes tied and chained together: he it is that is the first of all, and he on whom all the rest that follow do depend. Thou mayest fit him with any other names whatsoever thou wilt, provided that they signify and contain the force and effects of celestial things. In brief, he may have as many names, as he hath attributes of graces, wherewith he besteadeth us.

## CHAPTER VIII

OUR men likewise suppose that he is Father Liber, that he is Hercules and Mercury. Father Liber, because all things have had their being and original from him. Because that by his means we first of all found out, and knew the power and vertue of seeds, which should afterwards nourish us with a sweet and honest pleasure. Hercules, because his force is invincible, which when it shall be wearied in performing actions, and producing inferior things, shall return into fire. Mercury, because it is he from whom reason proceedeth, and the judgement, numbers, ranks and order of things, and all those sciences, which we term liberal. Whithersoever thou turnest thee, there shalt thou see him meet with thee: nothing is void of him. He himself filleth his work to the full. Thou prevailest nothing then (thou ungratefulest man of the world) when thou avowest, that thou art no ways indebted to God, but to Nature: for neither is Nature without God, nor



God without Nature. Both these two are but one, and differ not. If thou shouldst confess that thou owest to Annæus or to Lucius, that which Seneca hath lent thee, thou shouldst only change the name, but not the creditor. For whether thou callest him by his name or surname, it is always one man. Call him then as thou pleasest, either Nature or Fate, or Fortune, it makes no matter, because they all are the names of the selfsame God, who diversely useth his divine providence. Even as Justice, Integrity, Prudence, Magnanimity, Temperance, and the goods and vertues of the soul. If any of these please thee, it is then the soul that pleaseth thee also.

God  
hath no  
need of  
our gifts

## CHAPTER IX

BUT lest by these discourses I should wander, I say that God bestoweth many and mighty benefits, expenses without hope of interest or recompense: for he hath no need of our tributes, neither can we also give him anything. A benefit therefore ought to be desired, for the love of it self; the only thing that is respected therein, is the profit of the receiver: herein let us employ our selves, forgetting our own private commodities. You say (saith he) that we ought to make diligent election of those on whom we will bestow our benefits, (considering the labourers and husbandmen themselves, will not commit their seeds unto the sands) which if it be true, we regard in giving benefits, as we do in labouring and sowing our land: for to sow is not a thing that should be desired only of it self. Furthermore, you ask us to whom we ought to give our benefits? which should not be done, if to

The method of restitution give a benefit were a thing to be desired of it self, in what place soever, after what manner soever it was given, it was a benefit: for we follow that which is honest, for no other respect; but for the use of it self. Yet although no other thing be to be followed, we require what we shall do, and when, and how, for that honesty consisteth of these circumstances. When therefore I make choice of a man on whom I will bestow a courtesy, I do it to the end that I may never fail to do a benefit. Because if it be bestowed upon an unworthy man, it can be neither honest, nor a benefit.

## CHAPTER X

To restore a thing which a man is put in trust withal, is a thing to be desired of it self; yet ought I not to restore it always, nor in all places, nor at all times. Sometimes it skilleth not whether I deny, or whether I restore the same in all men's sight, I will respect his profit to whom I am to restore it, and perceiving that by my restitution I shall do him injury, I will deny him his right. The same will I do in a benefit: I will see when I give, to whom I give, how I give, and why I give. For nothing is to be done without reason: it is no good turn, except it be done upon reason, because reason ought to accompany all honest things. How often have we heard men, that have reproved their own inconsiderate largess, and cast forth these words, I had rather have lost it, than to have given it to such a one. It is the most villainous manner of losing that may be, for a man

to give foolishly and without consideration: and it is much more distasteful to have employed a benefit badly, than not to have received any. For it is another man's fault, if we receive not, but it is our own, that we made better election and choice in bestowing it. In making my choice, I will respect nothing less than thou thinkest, namely from whom I shall receive satisfaction. Oftentimes he that never requiteth is grateful, and he ungrateful that hath made requital; my estimation aimeth at nothing but the mind and heart. And therefore will I overpass the rich unworthy man, and will bestow my courtesies on the poor good man: for in his greatest wants he will be thankful, and when all things fail him, his mind and true heart shall not fail him. I seek to raise no profit for my courtesies, neither affect I pleasure or glory: I content my self that I can pleasure one man. I will give to this only intent and end, that I may give that which I ought: and that which I ought to do, is not to be done without choice and election; which, of what quality it shall be, do you ask me the question?

Bestow  
courtesies  
upon the  
poor good  
man

## CHAPTER XI

I WILL choose an honest, simple, mindful, and grateful man, that usurpeth not upon another man's fortunes, nor niggardly hoardeth up his own, or intendeth evil unto any man. When I have made this election, although fortune hath left this man no power to yield any satisfaction, yet have I accomplished my desire, and obtained my wish. If profit or base consideration maketh me liberal, if I

Gifts  
that can-  
not be  
required

profit no man, but to the end that he may pleasure me: I will not give a gratuity to him that travelleth into divers and foreign countries: I will not give unto him that will be always absent; I will not give unto such a one, who is so sick, that there is no hope of his recovery, I will not give, whereas I am dying my self, for I shall have no time to receive friendship again. But to let thee know, that a benefit is a thing that ought to be desired for the love of it self: we succour strangers, that are upon the instant cast upon our coasts, and will presently depart for another: we must give and rig ship to such a one that hath suffered shipwrack, that it may carry him back again into his own country. He departeth suddenly, scarcely knowing him that was the author of his safety, and making no reckoning evermore to return or revisit him again. He assigneth the payment of his debt unto the gods, and beseecheth them, that since he hath no means of satisfaction, that it will please them to be thankful in his behalf: meanwhile the conscience of a barren benefit doth content us. Seest thou now, that at such time when we are at death's door, we make our last will and testament, and dispose our goods and possessions, although we can reap no profit thereby? How much time is spent: how long are we secretly deliberating how much and to whom we shall give? For what skills it to whom we give, if we shall receive of none? And yet we never give anything more diligently, we never more travail and rack our judgements, than whenas setting all profit aside, we only set honesty before our eyes: for so long are we evil judges of our own offices, as long as hope, fear, and pleasure (the dishonestest vice of

all) depraveth our judgements. But when the assurance of death hath made us lose the hope of all things, and hath sent a just and uncorrupted judge to give sentence, then seek we out the most worthy, to whom we may deliver our inheritance; neither dispose we anything with more circumspection and regard, than those our possessions which appertain no longer unto us.

Good  
deeds  
not to  
be done  
but for  
vertue's  
sake

## CHAPTER XII

AND undoubtedly, even then conceiveth a man the greatest contentment, when he thinketh with him self; I will make such a one more rich than he is, by giving him a piece of my possessions: I will increase the honour and nobility of his house: in brief, if we never give, but when we hope to receive again, we must die intestate. Thou maintainest (saith he) that a benefit is a debt unrepayable: but a debt is not a thing to be desired for it self, ergo, benefiting or good doing, is not a thing to be desired of it self. When we call it a debt, we use a comparison and translation. So likewise say we that the law is a rule of just and unjust; and yet the rule is not to be desired as a thing of it self, but we are constrained to use these words, the better to express our intent and meaning. When I say a debt, it is to be understood as a thing trusted. Wilt thou know all? I add further, unrepayable, which shall never be satisfied; although there be not any debt, but either may or ought to be paid. It is so far from it, that we ought to do a pleasure for our profit sake; that for the most part (as I have said) we ought to do it,

The profit of a good conscience though it were to our loss and peril. As for example; I rescue a man circumvented by thieves, to the end he may be permitted to pass in security: I defend a guilty person, disgraced and oppressed by the credit of his adversaries, and purchase to my self the displeasure and faction of great men for my labour, to receive perchance by the means of the same, accusers, the disgraces and miseries I freed the poor man of: whereas I might have been party against him, or beheld afar off, and with all assurance the debates and contentions which were entertained by other men: I give caution for my friend adjudged, and suffer not execution to be served upon his goods, but offer my self to be bound for him to his creditors, and to save him from the prescription, I come in danger to be outlawed my self. No man determineth to buy a place near Tusco, or Tiburtine for his health sake, or for the sweetness of the air, and avoiding the summer heats, that debateth for how many years he shall buy it: but when he hath bought it, he must keep it. The same reason is in benefits. For if you shall ask me, what profit will accrue thereby: I will answer, a good conscience. Askest thou what profit is yielded by benefiting? I ask thee likewise, what profiteth it to do justly, to live innocently, to be valiant and stout in honourable dangers, to live chastely, to be temperate, if thou seekest any other interest than them selves?

### CHAPTER XIII

To what end continueth the heaven his daily and usual course? To what end is it, that the

sun enlargeth and shorteneth the day? All these are but benefits, for they are made for our profit. Even as it is the office of this universe, to turn about and dispose of the order of all things : as it is the office of the sun, where he may arise, and where he may set, and to perform all these fair, profitable, and wholesome effects for our sake, without hope of any profit from us : so is it the duty of one man, amongst other things, to do good unto another. Askest thou me, why he giveth these benefits? Forsooth to this end, that he may not be upbraided with giving nothing, and that he may not lose the occasion of well-doing. But all your pleasure and delight, is to accustom your delicate bodies to a lazy idleness, and to long for a security, resembling that of sleep, to couch and lie hidden under a close covert and arbour, and to entertain the dulness of your decayed minds, and to honour them with sweet and agreeable thoughts, which you call tranquillity, and repose of spirit, to pamper your unwieldy carcasses while they wax wan with meats and drinks, in the caves and cabinets of your gardens. Contrariwise, we feel a pleasure truly worthy a man in giving benefits : although that they breed us much sorrow and labour, provided they set them out of trouble for whom we do them : although they be full of danger, provided that we relieve others from their misery : although all be to the loss and diminution of our substance, provided that another man's poverty and necessity be relieved. What have I done to receive benefits at another man's hands? When I have received them, I must employ and bestow them. A benefit respecteth not our particular, but only his profit to whom it is given ;

The sun  
shines on  
the evil  
and on  
the good

The will  
and the  
deed

otherwise we give unto our selves, and not unto others. And by this reason many things which breed another man great profit, lose their grace, because they are done for gain. The merchant is very profitable for the city, the physician for the sick, and the regrater for goods that are to be sold. But because all these are not profitable to any, but to enrich them selves, they oblige not those who receive good by them.

#### CHAPTER XIV

IT is no benefit that is employed to profit. This will I give, this will I take, is but open sale and chaffering. I will not call her modest that repulsed her lover, to the end to enkindle his love the greater, that feared the law or displeasure of her husband: for as Ovid saith,

‘She gave that did not give because she could not.’

Not undeservedly is she numbred amongst the dishonoured women, that rather consecrateth her honesty to fear, than to the respect of her own self: in like manner he that hath given a benefit to the intent he might receive a requital, hath not given it. Shall we say that we do good unto beasts, when we fatten them for our service, or nourish them to yield us food? That we do good to our fruit-trees, or the gardens, wherein they grow; when we dig about them, lest through dryness or hardness of the earth (if they were not well looked unto, or timely, and oftentimes removed) they should grow barren and withered? no man manureth his fields for this cause only; because to



labour is a thing good in it self: nor doth any other business, without hope of interest or gain. A covetous thought, and addicted to gain, will never breed in us a desire to do good: but a humane and liberal heart, which after it hath given anything, desireth still to give more, and redouble new courtesies upon the old: a heart that thinketh not what profit shall arise to him that giveth: for otherwise it is a base contemptible and abject matter to do good unto another, for a man's particular interest and profit: what magnificence is it for a man to love him self? to think on nothing but his own thrift? to travail no ways but for him self? But the true desire of doing good unto another, withdraweth us from all this; and laying hold on us, draweth us to our loss, and disdaining our particular good, highly rejoiceth in the act of well-doing only.

A  
generous  
heart

## CHAPTER XV

CAN it be doubted, but that injury is contrary to a benefit? Like as to do an injury is a thing to be esteemed and shunned of it self; even so to do good is a thing to be coveted for it self. In the one the fear of dishonour hath more power over us, than all the recompenses that may move us to do anything that is evil: and in the other the appearance of honesty, which hath great power and efficacy of it self, sufficiently inviteth us. I shall not lie if I say that there is not any one but loveth his own, and that there is not any man of so mortified a will, that conceiveth not a great contentment, to see him whom he hath oftentimes pleased, and hath not a desire to further him

**Benefit breeds benefit** farther, because he hath done for him once before. Which thing could never come to pass, except we naturally took pleasure in our good deeds. How oftentimes mayest thou hear some say, I cannot abandon him whose life I have saved, and whom I have already drawn out of danger? he beseecheth me to maintain his cause against his adversaries, who have great favour and authority: I will not: but what shall I then do? See you not how in this case there is a certain peculiar vertue and power that constraineth us to succour him, and further to do him this good in his utmost necessity; first, because it behoveth us to do it; secondly, because beforetimes we have done him the like pleasure? And although at the beginning we had no reason to succour him, yet at this time we will assist him, because we have already done it at another time. So far is it that profit should impel us to do a pleasure, that contrariwise we persevere to maintain and nourish those things that are unprofitable, and conserve them for the only love we bear to our own benefits. And if we have been unhappy in doing pleasure to any one, yet is there as great reason to pardon him, as to forgive our graceless children.

## CHAPTER XVI

THESE Epicures confess that they themselves do yield thanks, not for that it is honest so to do, but because it is profitable, yet with little labour we may easily approve that it is far otherwise. For by these very arguments, whereby we prove, that to give benefits is a thing to be desired in it self;

by the same also we shall gather and conclude this: That it is a thing most assured, and from whence we gather all our proofs for all this dispute, that we prize not honesty, but only because it is honest. Who therefore dare draw it into question, that to remunerate a courtesy is not an honest thing? who is he that detesteth not an ungrateful man, who is only unprofitable to himself? But what wilt thou say of him (when thou hearest it reported) who is ungrateful and unthankful to his friend for his many and mighty benefits? how wilt thou endure him, and interpret it, whether he have played an dishonest part in so doing, or that he hath dealt fondly, in omitting that which was for his commodity and profit? I think thou wilt accompt him a wicked man, and imagine that he rather deserveth some punishment, than needeth an overseer to order his estate to his profit. Which thing should not fall out so, unless honesty were a thing both honest and to be desired of it self. Other things perhaps have not their excellence and dignity so apparent, and have need of an interpreter to express whether they be honest or no. But this is so apparent and so beautiful, that it cannot be doubted, but that the clearness thereof will shine very brightly. What thing is so laudable, what so equally entertained and allowed in all men's judgements, as to be thankful for benefits?

An un-  
grateful  
man  
neither  
feareth  
nor  
oweth

## CHAPTER XVII

TELL me what cause induceth us hereunto? Is it gain? It is impossible, for he that despiseth not

The evil the same is ungrateful. Is it ambition? It cannot be, because to repay that which a man oweth, is no matter of glory, or occasion to bring it. Is it fear? The ungrateful man hath none, and therefore the commonweal prefixeth no laws for giving thanks, because that nature hath sufficiently commanded us, and enjoined us to be grateful. As also there is no law that bindeth us to love our parents, nor to tender and cherish children. It should be but lost labour to constrain us, to do that whereunto nature summoneth us of her self. And like as no man needeth to be incited to self-love, because he hath it by kind: so is no man to be exhorted to follow honest things of him self, vertue is so pleasing and gracious of her own nature, that the wickeder sort also have a certain instinct to approve the better. Who is he that would not seem to be bountiful? who is he that desireth not to be accompted good, even when he doth most wickedness and wrong? and when he hath most exercised his tyranny and cruelty, would not shadow the same under some surface of justice, that striveth not also to make men think that he hath done good unto those whom he hath most of all offended? And therefore they suffer themselves to be entertained at their hands, whom they have most of all afflicted, and feign themselves to be good and liberal, because they cannot approve themselves such: which they would not do, except the love of honesty, which is to be desired for it self, compelled them to seek a contrary reputation to their corrupt manners, and to conceal and cloak their wickedness, the fruit whereof is desired, but the thing it self is shameful and odious to them: neither is there any man so far estranged and

sequestered from the law of nature, and degenerated from manhood, that would be naught for his mind's sake only. Ask any of these gallants that live by rapine and spoil, if they had not rather get their goods by any honest means, than by robbing and stealing? He that enricheth himself by spoiling and killing passengers, will rather wish to find those things he hath purchased, than take them by force; you shall find no man but had rather enjoy the fruits of his wickedness, without performing the wickedness it self: we have this great benefit at nature's hands, that vertue permitteth each man's mind to be illuminated with her beams; and they which follow her not, have a full view of her.

The  
vice of  
ingrati-  
tude

## CHAPTER XVIII

AND to let thee know, that the affection of a grateful mind is to be desired for it self, it is certain that ingratitude ought to be fled and eschewed in it self. Because there is nothing that so much dismembereth and dissipateth men's friendship, as this vice. For in what other thing are we secure but in this, that we are helped by mutual offices, and interchangeable friendships? by this one and only commerce of benefits our life is not only assured, but better defended against all sudden incursions. Single us alone, what are we? but a prey and sacrifice for ravenous beasts, neither is there any blood more vile or easier to be spilt: for other beasts have sufficient force to maintain and defend themselves. Whatsoever beasts are bred to wander up and down, and to lead a solitary and separated life, are armed;

He is un- weakness girteth in and galleth man on every  
grateful side: the force of his nails, the sharpness of his  
teeth hath not made him terrible to the rest, being  
naked and infirm: society assureth and defenceth  
him. Two things hath she given him, to wit,  
reason and society, which make him (although he  
be exposed to all other dangers) most powerful  
and puissant. And thus he, that being alone and  
separated, was the least and feeblest of all the rest,  
is become the master of all things. Society gave  
him the dominion over all living creatures, society  
whereas he was born for the land, hath transmitted  
him into a sovereignty of another nature, and made  
him lord of the sea likewise. Society hath re-  
pressed the violence of infirmities, purveyed  
succours and assistance for old age, and given  
comfort against sorrow. She it is that giveth us  
forces, and animateth us to resist fortune. Take  
society away, and thou shalt extinguish and cut off  
the unity of mankind, whereby life is sustained.  
But you take it away, if you bring to pass that a  
thankless mind is not to be esteemed for it self:  
but because that he ought to fear, lest a greater  
mischief befall him. For how many ungrateful  
men are they, that may be ungrateful without  
punishment. To conclude, I call him ungrateful  
whosoever is grateful for fear.

## CHAPTER XIX

No man of sound understanding hath ever feared  
the gods, for it is a madness to fear these, from  
whom we receive all our good and happiness,  
neither doth any man love those whom he feareth.

Finally, thou Epicure, thou hast disarmed God, **who is grateful for fear** thou hast despoiled him of his arms and power, and lest he should be feared by any man, thou hast turned him out of the world. Being then after this manner begirt and environed with a strong and impregnable wall, separated and retired out of the sight, and touch of mortal men, thou oughtest to have no fear of him, because he hath no means to do either good or evil. But remaining alone betwixt the space and distance, which is between one heaven and another, abandoned of all company of creatures and men, disfurnished of all things, he is out of danger of the ruins of the world, which he seeth fall above him, and about him, not making any reckoning of our vows and prayers, neither having any care of us. And yet such as he is, thy desire is that we should think that thou worshippest him, and that thou owest him as much reverence, as thou doest to thy father. All which thou doest, in my judgement, to this end only, that thou mightst not be accompted ungrateful: or if thou doest it not to this end, if thou wilt not have us suppose that thou art thankful, because thou thinkest that thou hast received no benefit at his hands, and that happily thy little atoms and mites, which thou hast fantastically coined in thy brain, have rashly and unsurely formed and fashioned thee such as thou art, why doest thou worship him? It is (thou wilt answer) for the excellency of his great majesty, and for his wondrous nature; I put the case that this be thus, at leastwise thou doest it without hope of any good, and without any persuasion or appearance of profit. There is therefore somewhat that is to be desired for it self, the dignity whereof

Profit inviteth and draweth thee to love the same, and  
 and truly, that is honesty. For what is more honest  
 gratitude than to be grateful? the matter of this vertue  
 extendeth it self as far as our life.

## CHAPTER XX

BUT in this good, saith he, there is some profit likewise : for in what vertue is it not? But that is said to be desired for it self, which although it have some commodities without it self, is notwithstanding well pleasing and acceptable, even when those commodities be removed and taken away. It is profitable for me to be thankful, yet will I be thankful although it be to my harm : what seeketh he that is thankful? Is it to the end that his acknowledgment may get him new friends, and more benefits? what if in so doing he should purchase other men's displeasure? if a man be assured that he shall gain nothing in restoring the good which he hath received, but contrariwise that he shall lose much of that he hath already gotten, and hoarded up in his coffers ; would he willingly light upon this loss? undoubtedly, that man is ungrateful that fixeth the eye of his desire upon a second good turn, when he satisfieth the first, hoping to make profit of that pleasure, whereof he acquitteth him self. I call him ungrateful that sitteth by a sick man, and continually attendeth by him, because he is to make his last will and testament, or hath so much leisure as to think of any inheritance or legacy. Although he do all things which a good friend (or such a one as is mindful of his duty) ought to do, if he conceive



in him self any interressable hope, he layeth a snare, or as a fisherman armeth his bait ; if he expect and linger after the death of the party, and hover about his carcass like carrion crows, which stand spying near at hand for the fall of some cattle by the rot, he will give an occasion for each man to think, that he doth but expect the death of his good friend, and doth but hover and haunt about his person. A thankful heart conceiveth no pleasure, but in the only vertue of his good intent.

Two  
sorts of  
thankful  
men

## CHAPTER XXI

WILT thou know that this is true, and that a thankful man is not corrupted by profit? there are two sorts of thankful men. He is said to be thankful, that maketh satisfaction in some sort for that he hath received. This man peradventure may vaunt him self, he hath somewhat whereof to boast, and to speak of. He likewise is called thankful, that hath received a benefit with a good mind, and oweth it with as good. This man hideth him self in his own conscience: but what profit may he reap of an affection so deeply hidden? But that other man, although he wanteth means to do more, yet is he thankful: he loveth, he oweth, he desireth to yield satisfaction, what ask you more? he is not wanting to him self. A workman is a workman, although he want his tools to exercise his art; and a cunning musician is a musician, although his very voice cannot be heard for muttering and noise that is made about him. I will give thanks for the good that is done me: after this there remaineth something for me

The  
mind and  
intent  
crowneth  
the action

to do, not that I may be thankful, but really acquit of my obligation. For oftentimes he that recompenseth is not thankful, and contrariwise, many that do it not, are thankful. For as of all other vertues, so the whole estimation of this hath reference to the mind, if she be observant of that which concerneth her, whatsoever otherwise is deficient, is the error of fortune. Even as a man ceaseth not to be eloquent, although he be silent, nor strong, although his hands be bound and fettered, neither a good pilot, although he be upon the firm land, because he wanteth no perfection in his science, although there be some impediment that letteth them from using the same. Even so also is he thankful, that hath only a will to be thankful, and hath no other witness of his willingness, but him self. Nay I will say thus much more, sometimes even he is thankful, which seemeth unthankful, and whom misdeeming opinion traduceth for the contrary. Wherein then repositeth this man his trust, but in his conscience, which rejoiceth in it self, although it be oppressed, which reclaimeth and gainsayeth all that eloquence can urge, or favour detract: and repositeth all things in her self? And though she seeth never so huge a multitude of men that reprove her intentions, she maketh no reckoning of the contrary opinions, but thinketh to justify her self in her own secret judgement. And albeit she perceive, that her faithfulness bear the punishment of perfidiousness, yet she abateth no whit of her courage, neither is abashed thereat, but standeth still aloft, above her punishment.

## CHAPTER XXII

The  
beauty  
of vertue

I HAVE (saith he) that which I would, and that which I desired: I have not as yet repented me, neither will I ever repent my self: neither shall fortune (how adverse soever she be) fix in me this pusillanimity, as to make me say: What is that I intended? whereto hath my goodwill now profited me? It profiteth me when I am on the rack: it profiteth me being in the midst of the fire, which if it should be applied to every member of my body, and by little and little should environ and devour the same on every side, although my body (fraughted with a good conscience) should be put into a flaming fire, and tortured and burned therein, yet would the fire be pleasing to me because thorow it my spotless faith would shine and appear. I will now once more reinforce that argument which I have used in times past. Why is it, that when we die we are desirous to be grateful? Why examine we every particular man's deserts? Why endeavour we to refresh the memory of all our life past, to this intent, that we might seem to be forgetful of no man's kindness? At that time there remaineth nothing for hope to linger upon, and yet standing at the pit's brim, our desire is to depart this world, to every man's satisfaction. The reason is, because the proper act of thanksgiving draweth with it a most great reward of it self, and the force of vertue is very great, to draw men's hearts unto it, and the beauty of honesty so environeth and surpriseth men's minds, that it ravisheth them with the admiration of the light and brightness thereof, yea many commodities ensue thereby. For the life of such as are honest

**Starry influences** is more secured and innocent, which is accompanied with a thankful soul, and out of fear. Nature had dealt unjustly with us, if she had made us partakers of so great a benefit, with misery, danger, and uncertainty. But, consider I pray you, although thou mightst easily, and without danger attain very often to this vertue by an assured and easy way, whether thou couldst not find in thy heart to make thy way thereunto, by inaccessible rocks, through stony ways, full of serpents and savage beasts.

### CHAPTER XXIII

YET ought we not to say, that a thing should not be desired for the love of it self, because it is accompanied with some foreign profit that attendeth it. For we see almost daily, that the fairest things are accompanied with accessory endowments, but yet so as they draw these commodities after them; and they themselves go before. May it be doubted, but that the course and circular motion of sun and moon, do temperate this dwelling-place of mankind by their divers changes? Or that by the heat of the sun, all bodies are cherished, the earth is relaxed and opened, superfluous moistures abated, and the irksomeness of winter that bindeth all things allayed, or that by the effectual and piercing warmth of the moon the ripening fruits are moistened? Or that the fruitfulness of man is answerable and correspondent to her course: or that the sun by his proper motion maketh the year discernible, and the moon by her circumvolution in shorter space maketh the month. But admit you

take these vertues from the moon, were not the sun of it self worthy to be beheld and admired in our sight, though he did but swiftly pass before our eyes? Were not the moon to be admired by us, although she ran by us but as an idle star? When the heaven by night time darteth out his lights, when we behold such an infinity of stars shine upon us, who is he that is not ravished to behold them? Who is he that seeing him self to be surprised by so great a wonder, hath leisure at that time to think on the good and profit that they bring? Behold, these stars that glide aloft in the still firmament, after what sort hide they their swiftness, under an appearance of a standing and immovable work? How much is done this night, which thou observest only for a reckoning and difference from the days? What a troop of things are unfolded under this silence? What an order of destinies doth this certain bond bring forth? These things which thou beholdest no otherwise, but as matters dispersed for beautifying, are every one of them occupied in working. For thou canst not imagine that the seven planets only have their designed motions, and the rest stand fixed, will comprehend the motion of very few. But there is an infinite number of gods, which are far severed and withdrawn from our sight, which both go and come. And of those which are subject to our sight there are divers, that have obscure motions and hidden courses. What then shouldst thou not be stricken with admiration to behold so huge a work, yea though it ruled thee not, preserved thee not, cherished thee not, engendered thee not by his winds, and moistened thee not by the air?

The  
admirable  
beauty  
of stars

Vertue  
not under-  
stood by  
him

## CHAPTER XXIV

Now, even as these things, although they have their first and principal uses, and are both necessary and profitable for our life, yet it is the majesty of them that occupieth the whole mind: Even so all vertue (and especially the vertue of gratefulness) yieldeth very much profit, yet will it not be loved for the same; for it hath yet a further thing in it, neither is it sufficiently understood by him, which accounteth it amongst gainful things. Is a man thankful because it concerneth his own profit? Ergo, also he is thankful, but for so much as implieth his profit. Vertue entertaineth not a covetous and base-minded lover, she will be courted with open hands and a liberal heart. The ungrateful man thinketh thus: I would fain requite the courtesy I have received, but I fear the charge and expense, I fear the peril, I am afraid of displeasure, I will rather do that which is more profitable and secure for me. One and the same cause and reason, cannot make a man thankful, and ungrateful: as their actions are diverse, so their intentions are different. The one is ungrateful although it behoveth him not, because it is for his profit, the other is grateful although it be against his profit, because he ought so to be.

## CHAPTER XXV

WE are resolved to live conformable and agreeable to nature, and to follow the example of the gods. But in all that whatsoever the gods do, they follow nothing else, but the reason of doing that

they do, except happily thou imaginest, that they receive the fruit of their labours out of the smoke of entrails, and the odour of the incense which is consumed in their sacrifices. Consider how great things they achieve and compass daily, with what abundant fruits they replenish the earth, with how seasonable and favourable winds (fitly serving to convey us into all foreign coasts) turn they and move they the seas, with how many and sudden showers mollify they and moisten they the earth, and replenish the dried veins and fountains, and renew them by infusing nutriment, by the hidden and secret spring-heads. All these things do they without any recompense, and without any profit that may accrue unto them. This example also ought our reason to observe (if it disagree not from this pattern and precedent) lest it follow honest things, as if hired and engaged. Let us be ashamed to sell the least courtesy that we do. The gods expect no recompense for that they do. If thou wilt imitate the gods (saith he) thou must pleasure even those that are unthankful: for the sun riseth upon the wicked, and pirates have the sea open unto them.

who  
looks  
to the  
profit

## CHAPTER XXVI

IN this place they demand whether a good man may employ his benefits on an unthankful man, knowing him to be such a one? Give me leave to speak somewhat by the way, lest I be entangled with a doubtful question. There are, according to the opinion of the Stoics, two sorts of ungrateful men. The one ungrateful, because he is a fool, and

Two sorts of ungrateful men wanteth judgement; but he that is a fool, is consequently evil, and an evil man is replenished with all kinds of vices, and therefore is ungrateful. In like manner we term evil men intemperate and dissolute, covetous, prodigal, and malicious, not that these great and notorious vices are incident to every evil man, but because they may be, and are in them, though undiscovered. The other is ungrateful, which in all men's judgement and voices is termed so, and for that by nature he is prone and inclined thereunto. To that ungrateful man, that so is not free from this vice, as he is free from no vice, a good man may do a courtesy and kindness: for should he but reject those of this condition, he should do good unto no man. But unto this ungrateful man, which is a defrauder of benefits, who naturally hath his heart addicted to ingratitude, he shall no more give a benefit, than to trust his money to a bankerout, or leave a pledge in his hands, who hath heretofore defrauded many others of their right. We call him coward who is a fool; for this followeth those wicked persons, who are indifferently seased of all kinds of vices: but properly we account and call him a coward, who naturally is affrighted with the least trifling noise he heareth. So a fool hath all vices, but is not naturally wicked unto all: one is subject to avarice, the other to prodigality and outrageous expenses, the other to shameless petulancy and wantonness.

## CHAPTER XXVII

THEY then are deceived, who question with the Stoics after this manner. What then, is Achilles



a coward? What then, is Aristides (to whom Justice gave his name) unjust? What then, is Fabius (who by cunctations and delay, restored his decaying commonweal) rash? What then, feareth Decius death? is Mucius a traitor? is Camillus a forsaken? No, we intend no such matter; neither say we that all sorts of vices are so inseparably united in all men, as in some there are particular faults, and they more eminent. But this we say, that a foolish and wicked man is subject and inclined to all vices, insomuch as we acquit not the bold man of fear, nor discharge the prodigal man of niggardise. Even as man is naturally endowed with all his five senses, and yet all men are not so quick-sighted as Lynceus: so he that is a fool hath not all vices, so vehement and disordinate as some of them, have some vices. All vices are in all men; yet are not all of them eminent in every man. Nature impelleth one man unto covetousness, this man to lust, that man she addicteth to wine, or if not as yet addicted, yet is he so formed, that his disposition draweth him thereunto. For this cause (that I may return unto my purpose) I say that there is no man that is not stained with ingratitude, and that is evil: for he hath all the seeds of wickedness in him, yet properly he is called ungrateful, who is more inclined to that vice. On such a one therefore will I bestow no benefit. For like as he hath very little care of his daughter, that marrieth her to a contumelious and often divorced husband: and as he is esteemed an ill husband and householder, who preferreth to the stewardship of his house, and government of his patrimony to one already condemned for ill managing his master's business:

He that  
is a fool  
is consequently  
evil

The  
wheat  
and the  
tares

And as he committeth a great folly, and maketh a mad will, that leaveth such a one tutor and governor of his heir, that hath been a spoiler, an overthrow of innocent orphans: So shall he be reputed to bestow his courtesies very inconsiderately, who maketh his choice of ungrateful men, on whom he may bestow that which is sure will be lost.

### CHAPTER XXVIII

THE gods also (saith he) give many things to ungrateful men: but these, had they prepared for the good, yet befall they the evil also, because they cannot be separated. And more reason is it to profit the evil for the good's sake, than to abandon the good for the evil's sake. So those things thou speakest of the day, the sun, the intercourse of winter and sommer, the temperate sweetness of the spring and autumn, the rains, the water-springs, and the ordinary blasts of winds, were devised by the gods for all men in general, they could not sever and separate them, only for those they intended good to. The king giveth honours to those that are worthy, but he oftentimes yieldeth public largess, and presents of victuals to those that deserve it not. The thief, the perjured man, the adulterer (provided always that he be a citizen) received the public largess of wheat, which is monthly given to the people of Rome, without respect of his manners; when there is anything that is to be bestowed simply, as upon a courtizan, and not upon a good citizen, both the good and bad receive the same indifferently. God

likewise hath given some things in general to all mankind, from whence no man is excluded. For it could not be, that the winds should be favourable to the good, and contrary to the wicked. It was the good and profit of all nations, that the seas were open and navigable, for the good of the merchants' traffic, and to extend the kingdom of mankind. Neither could there a law be prefixed to the rain, that it should not as well water and overflow the lands of the wicked and unjust. There are certain things which are common, both to the one, and to the other. Cities are built, as well to entertain the good, as the evil: the monuments of learned men's wits are published and vented abroad, to be read as well to the reprobate, as the vertuous. Medicine ministereth help even to the most debauched. No man ever concealed the composition of wholesome medicines, for fear lest the unworthy should be healed. Seek thou a strict account and valuation of persons, in those things which are given severally unto a man, as a man worthy, and not in these things which confusedly admit the common sort. For there is a great difference betwixt choosing a man, and not repulsing him. The law is open to all men, the murderers themselves envy the peace, and they which have stolen another man's goods, recover their own. Such as are quarrellers, and ready to strike any man in time of peace, are defended from the enemy, with a wall in time of war. Those that have most oftentimes offended the laws, are maintained and conserved with all assurance, under the authority thereof. In brief there are some, though of that nature, that they could not be applied to some

cannot be  
separated

**A distinction** persons in particular, except they were granted unto all in common. There is no cause therefore, why thou shouldest dispute of these things, whereunto we are publicly induced. That which in my choice and judgement I would give to any vertuous man, I will carefully provide that I cast it not away on such a one, whom I know to be ungrateful.

## CHAPTER XXIX

WILT thou not then (saith he) give counsel to an ungrateful man, who would take thine advice in his affairs: nor permit him to draw water out of thy fountains: nor show him the way if he be out of it? or wouldst thou do these things for an ungrateful man, yet refuse him afterwards all other sorts of good? I will distinguish in this point, or at leastwise I will endeavour to distinguish the same. A benefit is a profitable work, but every profitable work is not a benefit. For some things are of so small moment, that they deserve not the name of a benefit. Two things must concur in making of a benefit. First, the greatness of the thing, for some things there are, that undergo the measure of this name: whoever accounted it a benefit, to have given a shive of bread, or a piece of bare money, or to have permitted a neighbour to enter and kindle fire in his house? And yet sometimes these things do a man more pleasure than far greater: but the baseness of them diminisheth their reputation, even then, when the necessity of the time maketh them needful. Again, we ought to consider that which is

principal and of greatest force ; which is first of all, that I do it for love of that person, to whom I would give my benefit, and whom I account worthy to receive the same. Finally, that I do it with a good will, and that I feel in myself a great joy and pleasure that I do it. Of which points there are none at all in these things that we speak of ; for we bestow them not as upon worthy men, but carelessly as small things, and we give it not unto the man, but unto humanity.

Honour  
en-  
kindleth  
good  
spirits

### CHAPTER XXX

I DENY not but that sometimes I may bestow some things on those that are unworthy for other men's sakes. As oftentimes in the pursuit of honours and dignities, the ancient nobility of houses hath been the cause, that those men were preferred, who were unprofitable, and of base estimation, before those that were learned and of good spirits. Not without cause is the memory of great vertues sacred ; and many men affect goodness with greater delight, when they perceive that the honour of good men dieth not with them. What merit made Cicero's son consul, but the memory of his father ? What thing is it that caused Cinna of late (returning from the enemy's camp) to be honoured with the consulship ? why was Sextus Pompey, and the rest, that have borne the name of the Pompeys, preferred in the like manner, but for the excellency and vertue of one only man, whose greatness was so great, that his ruin and death could raise so many of his posterity, to so worthy estimation ? What made Fabius Persicus

The lately (that was so hateful in the most abjectest honour men's eyes, that they disdained to kiss him) attain of good men unto the priesthood of so many colleges, but only the fame of the Verrucosians and Allobrogicks, and of those three hundred, that opposed one family against the intrusion of their enemies in their country's defence? So much are we indebted unto vertues, that we ought to respect them, not only while they be present, but also when they are most distant and out of sight. Even as those vertues wrought this effect, that they profited not only one age, but left their benefits behind them to all ages: so let us not be grateful to one age only. This man hath begotten noble children, he is then worthy of good turns whatsoever he him self is, because he hath brought forth such. Another is born of noble ancestors, whatsoever he him self is, let him be shrouded under the shadow of his ancestors. Like as obscure and unclean places are lightened by the repercussion of the sunbeams, so let idle and unworthy men be illustrated by the light of their forefathers.

### CHAPTER XXXI

IN this place, my Liberalis, I intend to excuse the gods. For sometimes we are wont to say, Whereat aimed the providence of the gods, when they committed the government of a kingdom to Arrhidæus' hands? Thinkest thou it was given him? It befell him for his father's and his brother's sake. Why gave she the empire of the whole world to Caius Caligula, a man so insatiate of man's blood, that he commanded the

same to be shed before his eyes, as if he had a desire to drink and devour it with his mouth? What, thinkest thou that this greatness was given him for his own merit? No, it was given to his father Germanicus; it was for his grandfather's, and great grandfather's sake, and to others no less famous men their predecessors, although they led a private and ordinary life. What, when thou madest Scaurus MamerCUS consul, didst thou not know, that he received with open mouth the monthly excrements of his unchaste chambermaids? For did he dissemble? Would he seem to be pure? I will relate unto thee a speech of his own, which was ordinary in every man's mouth in my remembrance, and was commended in his own presence: Asinius Pollio being on a time laid upon his bed, he said unto him (but with words unworthy to be named) that he would do that unto him, which he had rather suffer him self. And seeing that Pollio was displeas'd therewith, and that he began to bend his brows: If I have spoken any evil (said he) I would it might fall upon me and on my head. This saying of his he him self blaz'd abroad. Hast thou admitted a man so openly shameless and impudent to the maces, and tribunal of consuls? Verily when thou bethoughtest thee of that old Scaurus, the prince or prime man of the senate in times past, thou couldst not suffer his race and posterity to be abas'd or extinguish'd.

dieth  
not with  
them

## CHAPTER XXXII

EASY it is for us to perceive how the gods deal more favourably with some for the merits and

The deserts of their fathers, and predecessors, and with other some for the towardness that shall be in their children, and children's children; and in those that hereafter shall descend from their posterity. For they know the successive order of their works, and they have an infallible science of all those things which are to pass thorow their hands, although they are far remote from our knowledge and understanding. The things that we suppose to be casual and sudden, are foreseen and familiar to them. Let these be kings (say they) because their ancestors have not been, but imagined it to be a true kingdom, to be just and abstinent. And because they have not used the commonweal for their profits, but dedicated their persons to the service and increase thereof. Let these men reign because some good man was their great grandfather, whose mind was greater than his fortune, who in civil dissensions chose rather to be vanquished, than to vanquish; because it stood with the profit of the commonwealth. His goodness could not be requited all this while. In respect of that man, let this man have pre-eminence over others, not because he is of knowledge and ability how to use it, but because the other hath deserved it for him: for peradventure this man is in body misshapen, in countenance loathsome, and will be a slander to the place and persons of his advancement. Now will men find fault with me, and say, that I am blind, and rash, and ignorant where to bestow the things that are due to the chiefest and excellentest persons. But I know that the giving of this thing to the one, is a satisfaction of it to the other, to whom it was due long since. Whereby do they know such a certain man, who was such a con-



temner of glory, when it followed him, that he adventured upon peril with the same countenance that others escape it, and that never made difference betwixt his own profit and the profit of the commonwealth? Where is this man? who is he? how know you him? These reckonings of such receipts and payments are striken out of my books. I know what and to whom I owe. To some I make payment after long time, to other some I give aforehand, or else I deal with them according as occasion and the utility of my commonwealth requireth.

Hope and  
expecta-  
tion

### CHAPTER XXXIII

SOME things I will then give to an ungrateful man, yet will I not give it for his own sake. But if (saith he) thou knowest not whether he be thankful or ungrateful; wilt thou expect until thou know the same? or wilt thou not lose the opportunity of giving the benefit? It is too long to expect: for (as Plato saith) it is hard to conjecture what a man's mind is, and not to expect is rashness. To him we will answer, that we will never expect a certain comprehension and knowledge of things, because it is a difficult matter to find out the truth; but that we follow that way whereunto the similitude of truth leadeth us. All men's offices and actions proceed this way; under this hope we sow our lands: thus fail we, thus undertake we war, thus marry we, thus bring we up our children; whereas the event of all these is uncertain. To those things address we our enterprises, whereof we believe that we may hope the best. For who

**Dare not, have not** can warrant a rich harvest to him that soweth, a safe port to him that saileth, victory to him that warreth, a modest wife to him that marrieth, toward children to him that begat them? We follow those things whereunto reason induceth us, not those whereunto truth draweth us. If thou expectest to do nothing except thou be secured of the good success, if thou lingerest until such time as thou hast found out the truth, thy life will become unprofitable and idle, neither shalt thou ever dare or attempt anything: whilst the appearance of truth impelleth me to do this or that, I will not fear to give a benefit to him, who in my opinion and in all likelihood, will approve himself thankful.

#### CHAPTER XXXIV

MANY things may chance (saith he) whereby we may take a bad man to be good, a good man to be bad, because the appearances of things whereunto we give credit, do oftentimes deceive us. Who denieth this? But I find nothing else, by which I should govern my thoughts. By these footsteps must I pursue the truth; more assured I have none. This will I endeavour to examine with all diligence, neither will I assent unto them over quickly. For so may it fall out in war, that being deceived by some false appearance, I may aim mine arrow against my fellow-soldier, leaving mine enemy untouched and in safety, but this both seldom times falleth out, and not by mine error: whose purpose was to wound mine enemy, and defend my fellow-citizen. If I know him to be

ungrateful I will give him no benefit. But he A wise man's part cozened me, he deceived me; here is no fault of him that giveth, for I gave it as to a thankful man. But if (saith he) thou hast promised to do a man a pleasure, and afterwards thou findest him to be ungrateful, wilt thou give it or no? if thou doest it thou offendest willingly, for thou givest to him, thou oughtest not to give: if thou deniest, in this case likewise thou offendest, because thou performest not that which thou hast firmly promised. Your sect in this place staggereth and trippeth, and that proud promise of theirs, that a wise man never repenteth himself of that which he hath done, neither ever reformeth his actions, nor changeth his counsel, beginneth to be shaken. A wise man changeth not his counsel, as long as the cause and circumstances continue the same, as they were when he determined. And therefore never repenteth he himself in anything, because nothing could be better done at that time than was done, nor nothing better ordered than that which was ordered. Finally, all things he undertaketh, he attempteth them with this condition, if nothing fall out that may interrupt his sage designs. And therefore say we, that all things befall him to his wish, that nothing hath betided him contrary to his expectation, because he presumeth in his mind, that sundry things may fall out which may cross his purpose. Fools are they, that are too confident, and who promise unto themselves overperemptorily, that fortune will favour them, but a wise man considereth her both ways: he knoweth very well what sway error beareth, how uncertain worldly things be, and how many things hinder men's determinations: he followeth variable for-

The tune, and the hazards of human affairs, with an law of uncertain and doubtful hope, expecting with as- bounty sured counsel the uncertain ends thereof. But the conditions, without which he beginneth and enterpriseth nothing, warrantise him sufficiently herein.

### CHAPTER XXXV

I HAVE promised to do a pleasure, except there fall out some occasion whereby I am letted from giving that I intended: but what if the commonweal command me to give that unto her which I have promised my friend, if a public law be made that no man shall do that which I have promised my friend to perform? I have past my word to give thee my daughter in marriage, and afterwards thou art convicted to be a foreigner, with whom we are forbidden to contract matrimony. The law that prohibiteth that, defendeth also my cause: then shall I break my word, then shall I be justly taxed with inconstancy, if all the circumstances continuing as they were when I promised, I neglect to perform the same: because otherwise whatsoever thing is changed, giveth me liberty to determine anew, and dischargeth me of my former obligation. I have promised to plead thy cause, and afterwards I find that the prosecution thereof will in the end redound to my father's prejudice. I have promised thee to take a long journey with thee, but afterwards upon better instructions, I understand that the way is dangerous and full of thieves. I intended presently to come and visit thee about thine instant business,

but my child's sickness, or my wife's falling in labour, kept me at home. All things ought to be in the same estate, they were, when I promised thee, if thou wilt that my faith be obliged unto thee. But what greater change may there happen than if hereafter I am informed that thou art an ungrateful and wicked man? That which I gave thee, as to a worthy man, I will refuse thee as a man unworthy, and furthermore I shall have a just cause to be angry with thee, because thou hast deceived me.

is limited  
by circum-  
stances

## CHAPTER XXXVI

YET will I nearly examine the greatness of that I have promised. The value of the thing, which I have promised to bestow, shall give me counsel. If it be a small matter, I will give it; not because he is worthy, but because I have promised. Neither will I give it as a benefit, but only to redeem my word, and hereafter will I take better heed, and by my loss I will chastise my rashness in promising; and to the end I may have a more feeling and sensible apprehension of the same, and henceforward be more circumspect in that I speak, I will (as the common proverb saith) pay a fine for my tongue. But if it be a thing of greater price, I would not (as Mæcenas saith) spend two hundred and fifty thousand crowns, to buy mine own blame: I will diligently compare both these things between themselves. It is something to keep a man's word when he hath promised, and again it importeth very much to take care that we give to such a one as deserveth the same: yet

He is must we consider how great our promise is: if  
 out of it be a thing of small value, I will give it as though  
 his wits I winked thereat. But if it may be either greatly  
 to my loss, or greatly to my shame, I had rather  
 excuse myself once for not doing it, than con-  
 demn myself always for giving it. In brief, all  
 the weight of the matter consisteth (as I say) in  
 this, to know of what value and estimate the pro-  
 mise is that I have made. For I will not only  
 retain that which I have rashly promised, but I  
 will redemand also that which I have given amiss.  
 He is out of his wits, that binds his faith for an  
 error.

## CHAPTER XXXVII

PHILIP of Macedon had a valiant and brave soldier,  
 who had faithfully served him in all his wars, to  
 whom in remuneration of his vertue, he had often-  
 times given a good part of that which he had taken  
 from the enemy, and encouraged him with rewards,  
 he being a man of a mercenary mind. It fortuned  
 that this soldier was shipwrackt and cast away at  
 sea, and that the tempest and billows cast him on  
 the shore near to a certain Macedonian's dwelling-  
 place, who being advertised of this his fortune, ran  
 unto him, and recovered him to life, being well-  
 nigh dead. He carried him unto his own house,  
 he lodged him in his own bed: he entertained  
 this forlorn man so carefully and kindly, that he  
 recovered his forces, he maintained him thirty days at  
 his own charge, he relieved his necessity, and gave  
 him money and means to bring him back again to  
 the army. This soldier, upon his departure, told  
 him this very often; If I ever chance to see my

prince again, I will requite this thy kind entertainment. Certain days after being arrived at the camp, he failed not to tell Philip of his unhappy shipwreck, but he concealed who had succoured him, and forthwith besought him to give him a certain man's lands, and this was his heritage who had so graciously entertained him, and with so much care and diligence had preserved him from death. You may see (by the way) how kings now and then (but especially in war), give many things, their eyes being shut: no one man alone is able to satisfy so many armed desires; there is not any man that at one time can be a good man, and a good general. How shall so many thousands of insatiable men be satisfied? what shall they have if every man may keep his own? This said Philip to himself, when he commanded him to be put in possession of those lands he demanded. This man thus violently thrust out of his possessions, smothered and smoothed up this injury, not as a clown, but with much silence and sufferance, contenting himself with this, that though they had usurped his possessions, they had not restrained him of his liberty, and privily wrote a short and stout letter unto Philip, wherein he discovered the injury which was done him, upon the reading whereof, Philip was so displeased, that he presently commanded Pausanias to restore the land to the former lord, and as for the other reprobate and dishonest soldier, ungrateful guest, and covetous castaway, to brand him in the forehead, to witness that he was an ungrateful and unthankful guest. Truly, he was worthy, not that these letters should be written, but engraven on his forehead, that expelled and exposed his host, like to a naked and shipwreckt wretch, on that very shore, where

that  
binds his  
faith for  
an error

Why once he had succoured him. We shall afterwards see what more greater punishment he deserved: meanwhile those goods were to be taken from him, which he had so injuriously usurped. And who would be moved at his punishment, who had committed such a heinous crime, that might be the cause, that no man hereafter would count miserable the misery of the most miserable?

### CHAPTER XXXVIII

SHALL Philip be constrained to perform his word unto thee, because he hath promised thee, although he ought not to do that, though he injure another man, though he commit a heinous crime, although by this one act of his, he locketh up the havens, and shutteth up the ports against those that are shipwrackt? It is no point either of lightness or inconstancy, for a man to forsake a known and condemned error. And a man ought ingeniously to confess and say, I thought otherwise, I am deceived. But this is a perseverance in an arrogant foolishness to say, That which I have spoken once, whatsoever it be, I will abide by it, and make good my word. It is no shame to change a man's opinion, when the business is changed. Go to, if Philip had left him in possession of these demesnes, and that sea-coast which he had gotten by his shipwrack, had he not barred all miserable men from relief? It is better (saith he) that thou shouldest carry throughout my kingdom these letters engraven in thy most shameless forehead, more worthy to be written in thine eyes. Show



thou in thy punishment, how sacred a thing the table of hospitality is. Let all the world read this my law, enregistered in thy countenance, by which is decreed, that it is no capital matter, to entertain any miserable person into a man's house. So shall this constitution of mine be more strongly ratified, than if I had engraven the same in brass. was to be punished

### CHAPTER XXXIX

WHY then (saith he) did your Zeno, when he had promised a certain man to lend him five hundred pence, and had found him to be insufficient, and not able to repay him, contrary to the advice of his friends, who counselled him not to do it, he persevered in trusting him, because he had promised him? First there is one condition in a debt, another in a benefit. If I have lent my money to an evil debtor, yet I have means to recover it again: I may call any debtor into justice, when the term of payment is come, and if he break or play the bankrupt, I shall have a portion of my debt, but the benefit is wholly lost instantly. Moreover, this is the act of an evil man, that of a bad husband. Again, neither would Zeno have persevered to credit him, if the sum had bin greater, it was but five hundred pence; put case (as it is commonly said) that he had spent it in a sickness, it was so much worth not to revoke his promise. I will come to supper (although it be cold) because I have promised, but if it snowed or were bad weather, I would not step out of my doors. I will arise out of my bed to accompany

The  
condition  
of the  
promise

a bridal, because I have promised (although I have not sufficiently slept or digested my meat) but not at all, if a fever surprise me. I will come and give my word for thee, because I have promised, but not if thou wouldest make me stand bound for an uncertain thing, or if thou wilt bind me to the Exchequer. I tell thee there is always a secret condition implied: so I be able; so it be lawful. If thou wilt have me keep my promise, set the matter in the same state that it was in when thou demandedst, that it was in when I promised. It can be no point of lightness to disappoint one, if there happen any alteration by the way: why wonderest thou if I change my counsel, when the conditions of my promise are changed? I am ready at this time to be the same I was then, if thou show me all things in that estate I left them. We promise to make appearance for my friend, yet is it not performed. For if there be any one that is hindered by force, or by a lawful cause, he is excused by essoine.

## CHAPTER XL

THE same also will serve for an answer to this demand; whether a courtesy is to be requited in any wise, or whether a benefit be every way to be restored? I am bound to yield a thankful heart, but sometimes mine infelicity suffereth me not to make requital; and sometimes his felicity, to whom I am indebted: for what can I, being poor, restore to a king or a rich man? whereas some suppose it to be an injury to receive a benefit, and benefits do

always burthen the receiver with other benefits. What other satisfaction can I make unto such a person, than to be willing to acknowledge their goodness? For I ought not to reject his new benefit, because I have not satisfied for the former. I will receive as willingly as it is given me: I will offer my self unto my friend as a sufficient matter, to exercise upon me all his good thoughts, and liberality. He that will not receive new courtesies, is offended with the old. Ay, but I render not the like: what is that to the purpose? the delay is not in me, if either occasion fail, or ability be wanting: when he did me a pleasure, he had the means and the commodity. He that hath done it, is either a good or an evil man; if he be a good man, my case and cause is good enough; if he be an evil man, I will not plead before him: neither think I it meet also to be over hasty in yielding recompense, contrary to the minds of those who have done us pleasure, or that we importune them to receive, when they are unwilling to take it. It is no requital of a good turn, to render that which thou hast willingly received, to him that is unwilling to accept the same. There are some, who if a friend send them some little present, do suddenly after requite them with another, to the end they may vaunt they are not any ways obliged. This is a kind of refusal, when a man will make requital so soon, and by this means deface so suddenly one present by another. Sometimes also I will not restore a benefit, when I am able; namely, when I shall detract more from my self, and do my self more hindrance, than I shall profit him; whenas he shall feel him self nothing amended by receiving it, and I

may alter  
the  
counsel

**A** hasty shall find my self greatly impaired by forgoing it.  
**return** He then that hasteth to restore and requite a kind-  
 ness, hath not the mind of a grateful man, but of  
 a debtor. And to conclude in few words,  
 he that is desirous to pay over soon,  
 doth owe unwillingly; he  
 that unwillingly oweth,  
 is ungrateful.

THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK

## THE FIFTH BOOK

### THE ARGUMENT OF JUSTUS LIPSIUS

**The**  
**Argument**

THE two special parts being concluded and determined, How a benefit should be given, and how it ought to be received : He saith that he passeth over to certain things, that are not so much in the matter as of the matter, and both near and united to the same. Then annexeth he certain questions, and first of all this : Whether it be a loathsome matter to be overcome in benefits ? He denieth that he may be overcome, and approveth him to be always equal, that is desirous to make recompense in good will, if in act he cannot. The second question is : Whether any man may give himself a benefit ? He denieth it, yet argueth the matter on both sides. The third question he useth is, Whether any man according to the Stoics' doctrine may be called ungrateful ? he affirmeth and teacheth it. His fourth question is, Whether all are ungrateful ? he saith no ; although he confess many. Then as depending of the said question : How far and whither we are bound one for another, as the son for the father, and such like ? He answereth by a distinction, and rather denieth. The fifth question is, Whether an displeasing benefit may be given to a man unwilling to receive ? It may. The last question ; Whether a benefit may be redemanded ?

### CHAPTER I

IN these my former books, me thought, I had consummated and accomplished my principal intent, whenas I had entreated and discovered, after what manner a good turn is to be done, and in what

**An extra-ordinary commendation**

sort it is to be received, because these two points are the poles, on which the sphere of this discourse is moved. Whatsoever I entreat of, or linger on further, is not of the necessity of the matter, neither much impertinent thereunto, which we ought to follow, not only whither it leadeth us, but also whither it inviteth us. For continually there will some arguments arise, that will allure and entertain our mind with the sweetness thereof, which is rather not necessary than superfluous. But since you will have it so, having ended all that which appertained to the matter, let us persevere to search out these things, that are annexed unto it, but not coherent, which whosoever doth curiously look into, neither performeth a matter of great moment, neither loseth his labour. But unto thee (my *Æbutius Liberalis*) who art a man of the best nature, and so inclined to courtesy, no praise of these benefits may suffice: I never saw any man so favourable an esteemer of the smallest good offices, as thou art. And thy bounty hath already attained so far, that thou esteemest the courtesy done unto thy self, which is employed on any other man. Thou art always ready to give satisfaction for the ungrateful, lest any man should repent him of his bounty and kindness: and so far art thou from all arrogancy and ostentation, so desirous art thou to disburthen those whom thou hast obliged, that whatsoever thou bestowest on any man, thou wouldest not seem to have given it as a benefit, but to have repayed it as a debt. And therefore, such things as thou bestowest after this manner, return unto thee more plentifully. For commonly good turns attend upon him, that intendeth not to redemand them. And as glory

and reputation, do most of all fasten upon, and follow those who fly from the same; so the fruit of benefits is more graciously correspondent unto those as give men leave to be thankless, if they list. It shall not be through thy default, but that they who have received benefits at thy hands, may freely redemand the other, neither wilt thou refuse the former, which are either suppressed or dissembled by thee. The intent of a generous man, and such a one as hath a noble mind, is so long to forbear, and wink at an ungrateful person, until he hath made him thankful: neither will this manner of dealing deceive thee ever; for naturally vices submit themselves unto vertue, and lose their courage, if thou hasten not too much to hate them.

A shame  
to be out-  
done in  
well-  
doing

## CHAPTER II

THOU conceivest likewise a singular pleasure, to hear this magnificent saying, that it is a shame to be overcome in giving benefits, which whether it be true or no, it is wont to be inquired upon a good ground, and I think it far different from that which thou imaginest. For never needest thou to fear any affront or dishonour in suffering thy self to be overcome in the noble competency of vertuous actions, if so be thou forsake not thine arms, but being once overcome hast a will to overcome again. Every man in a good purpose hath not the same forces, the same faculties, and the same fortune: which only temperateth the ends of the best actions. The will of him that keepeth the right way, deserveth to be praised, although a more swifter runner hath set foot before him.

The good  
man is  
never  
vanquisht

It is not in this case as it is in the public prizes, set out for spectacle, wherein the victory proclaimeth the better man; although in them also casualty hath often preferred the worst. When we speak of duty, and both the one and the other desire to acquit themselves fully; if the one of them hath had more means, if he have had matter at hand correspondent to his mind, if Fortune hath permitted him to do what him listeth: and contrariwise, if the other hath had as good a will, although that which he hath restored is of less value than that which he hath received, or if he have not satisfied at all, yet if he have a good mind to make a future satisfaction, if he bend him self wholly to that business, if he duly think on nothing but the same, he is no more overcome than he that dieth manfully fighting, whom his enemy could sooner kill than put to flight. That which thou supposest to be dishonourable or dishonest, cannot befall a good man; that is to say, to be vanquished: never will his heart fail him, never will he give over, he will be always ready to acknowledge even until the last hour of his life. He will do in this station, and will confess him self to have received great benefits, and will protest that he hath a desire to repay them with the like.

### CHAPTER III

THE Lacedemonians forbad their citizens to fight at buffets or brasses, where he confessing him self to be vanquished, doth show him to be the weaker man. The runner that first obtaineth the goal,



outstrippeth his companion in swiftness, but not in courage. The wrestler that hath fallen, and been foiled three times, hath lost the palm, but hath not yielded it to his adversary. Whereupon the Lacedemonians being desirous above all other things, that their citizens should be invincible, they inhibited and forbad them the use of all such games, in which the victory is given not by the opinion of the judges, or by the issue of the game, but by the voice of him that yieldeth, and his that commandeth him to submit and yield. Vertue and a good heart give unto all men that which the Lacedemonians do observe amongst their citizens, vertue and good will yieldeth all men that they shall never be vanquished, because even amongst those that are overcome the mind continueth invincible. No man therefore saith, that the three hundred Fabii were conquered, but slain. And Regulus was captain amongst the Carthaginians, but not conquered, and all else whatsoever oppressed by the force and weight of enraged and cruel Fortune. The care is all one in benefits: he that hath received more great, more precious, and more often, is not for all this vanquished. It may be that the benefits of one, are overcome by those of another, in respect of those things that are given, and are received. But if thou wilt make a comparison betwixt the giver and him that receiveth (whose minds must be estimate also by them selves) there is neither of them shall have the palm. For we are accustomed to say, that he who is wounded in divers parts, and he that hath but a slight hurt, have departed on even hand from the combat, although one may seem to have received the foil.

The mind  
continueth  
invincible

The will  
to recom-  
pense

## CHAPTER IV

No man therefore can be overcome in benefits, if he know that he oweth, if he have a will to recompense, and if that which he cannot attain in act, he equalleth in mind and will. This man, as long as he is constant herein, as long as he hath a good intent, approving his grateful mind by outward signs : what skilleth it on whether part more presents may be numbered ? Thou hast the power to give much, and I only the power to receive the same : good fortune is on thy side, and good will on mine, yet am I so equal with thee, as some naked, or slightly armed, are equal to some that are armed at all points. No man therefore is overcome in benefits. For every one is as thankful, as he would be. For if it be an affront and dishonour to be overcome in kind offices, we ought not to receive a benefit at mighty men's hands, to whom we can in no sort yield any satisfaction. I speak of kings and princes, whom fortune hath entertained in that estate, that they may do much, and bestow great largess, but they cannot receive but very little, and far inferior to their own gift. I say, kings and princes, to whom notwithstanding, there may be service done, whose greatness and power is not sustained but by affection, and the common consent which their subjects have to obey them. But there are some that are unattainted with any covetousness, that are scarcely touched with any human desires ; to whom Fortune herself can give nothing. I must needs be overcome by Socrates in benefits. I must confess the like of Diogenes, who marched naked amidst the

riches and most precious movables of the Macedonians, and trampled their kingly treasures under his feet. Did not he then (yea and that deserved) both in his own eyes, and other men's sight (whose eyes were not sealed up from seeing the truth) seem more eminent above him, under whose greatness all things lay subject? He was then more powerful and more rich than Alexander, who at that time possessed all things, for there was more that this man would not receive, than he was able to give.

redeem-  
eth the  
want

## CHAPTER V

IT is no shame to be overcome by such as these, for neither am I less valiant, though you match me in fight with an enemy that cannot be wounded. Neither therefore can the fire burn less, if it light upon a matter inviolable by fire. Neither therefore hath the tool lost his force in carving, if the stone be so hard that it cannot be pierced, and if naturally it be so rebellious against all things that are hard, that it will rather break in pieces than yield. The same do I answer of a thankful man it is no dishonour for him to be overcome by the benefits which he hath received at their hands, whose fortune is so great and mighty, and vertue so excellent, that it hath barred all return of benefits unto him. We are from the most part overcome by our parents, for so long do we hate them, as long as we judge them to be troublesome and insupportable, and as long as we understand not their benefits. Whenas our years have taught us some experience, and we begin to perceive, that they ought to be beloved by us, for those things for

Equal yet  
unequal

which they were disliked; I mean their admonitions, their severity and diligent oversight of our inconsiderate youth: then are they snatched and taken from us. Few there are that have lived so long as to reap the true fruit of their children's towardness, the rest have felt a burthen by them, and discontent: yet is it no shame for children to be surmounted by their parents. And why should it be shameful to be surmounted by them, since it is no disgrace to be vanquished by any whatsoever? For sometimes we are equal and unequal to one and the same person; we are equal in good will, which is only required, which we only promise and profess: but we are unequal in fortune, for want whereof, if a man be hindered from being thankful, he ought not for that cause to be ashamed and blush, because he is vanquished. It is no dishonour to be unable to overtake, so a man pursue and follow still. Sometimes we are enforced before we have restored the old, to crave new benefits. Neither therefore surcease we to ask, or demand we disgracefully and dishonestly, because we run further in debt, before we be able to repay the former, because the fault is not through our default, but for that disability preventeth our gratuity. But some thing will fall out other ways, which will keep us from satisfying, yet will we not be overmatched in mind, neither will we be shamefully overcome in these things, which are not in our power.

## CHAPTER VI

ALEXANDER King of Macedon, was oftentimes wont to boast, that never any man could overcome him

in benefits. There is no cause why this over-**Socrates**  
haughty-minded prince, should cast his eyes on **and**  
the Macedons, Greeks, Carians, Persians, and **Archelaus**  
other nations which were bound unto him by way  
of conquest. He should not think that that great  
kingdom, which extended itself from the furthest  
confines of Thrace, to the banks of the unknown  
sea, had given him the means to accomplish and  
do this. Socrates himself might vaunt that he  
had done as much, and Diogenes also, by whom  
he was overcome. Why should he not be over-  
come that very day, wherein the man swelling  
above measure with human pride, he saw a man  
to whom he could neither give, nor from whom  
he could ever take anything? King Archelaus  
entreated Socrates to come and visit him; to  
whom (as it is reported) Socrates returned this  
answer: That he would not come unto him from  
whom he should receive a benefit, which he could  
not requite again. First of all, it was in his power  
not to receive anything: secondly, it was he that  
began to give a benefit. For he came unto him  
upon his request, and gave that which the king  
could never equal or satisfy. Moreover, Archelaus  
was to give him gold and silver, but was himself  
to receive the contempt of gold and silver. Could  
not Socrates therefore requite Archelaus' courtesy?  
Had he not equalled the good which he was to  
receive, had he made him see a man perfect in the  
skill of living and dying, knowing the true ends of  
them both? If he had taught the king (who saw  
not at mid-day) the secrets of nature, whereof he  
was so ignorant, that upon a day when the sun was  
in eclipse, he caused the doors of his palace to be  
shut; and (as men were wont to do in time of

Of mourning and great misery) he cut off his son's  
eclipses hair: how great a benefit had it been if he had  
drawn him laden with fear out of the lurking-  
places where he lay hidden, and had encouraged  
him, saying, This is no defection or obscuring of  
the sun, but the encounter of two planets, when-  
as the moon, shaping her course more lower than  
the sun, hath placed her orb under him, and by  
her interposition holdeth his light obscured from  
our sight: sometimes covereth no more than a  
small part of his body, when in the conjunction  
she passeth no more but on one side; otherwhiles  
she eclipseth a greater part of his light, when she  
setteth herself in his front, and before him; other-  
whiles she covereth him wholly, if with a just and  
equal counterpoise, she entirely settle herself oppo-  
site betwixt the sun and the earth: yet the swift-  
ness of these stars shall suddenly separate the one  
from the other, the earth hereby shall recover her  
light: and this order shall continue in all ages to  
come. There are certain and destinated days,  
wherein the moon shall by her intercourse hinder  
the sun, not from shooting forth the fulness of his  
beams. Stay but a while, and thou shalt suddenly  
see him break forth, thou shalt see him discharge  
himself of the moon as it were of a cloud, and  
(shaking off as it were those impediments that  
detain him) thou shalt see him send forth his  
desired light most freely again. Might not  
Socrates then have requited Archelaus, if he  
had given him instructions how to govern his  
kingdom? As little as you make of it, it had  
been a great benefit in Socrates, and greater any  
ways than Archelaus could have given him. Why  
then said Socrates thus? Forsooth, because he

took a pleasure to pass the time in figurative, merry, and jesting discourse, he mocked the whole world, but especially great men, and had rather deny him subtilly, than arrogantly and proudly. He said that he would receive no benefits at his hands, to whom he could not return an answerable recompense. He feared happily lest he should be compelled to take that which he would not, he feared lest he should receive something that were unworthy Socrates. But some man will say, that he might have denied the same, if he misliked it, but by this means he had incensed an insolent king against him, who would have all that which came from his hands, highly esteemed. It is nothing to the purpose, whether thou refusest to give any thing to that king, or receive ought at his hands, he construeth and conceiteth the one repulse, as badly as the other, and to a proud man it is more distasteful to be disdained, than not to be feared. Wilt thou know what he truly and really intended, he would not entertain a voluntary servitude, whose liberty a free city could not endure.

Socrates'  
real  
reason

## CHAPTER VII

WE have, as I suppose, sufficiently debated upon this part, whether it were a dishonour to be overcome in benefiting. Which whosoever draweth in question, he knoweth that men are not wont to give themselves benefits; for it hath been manifest that it is no shame for a man to be vanquished by him self. Notwithstanding amongst some Stoics, this also is brought in question, whether a man may give him self a benefit, and whether he ought

That a man cannot to yield him self thanks? The causes why this matter seemed to be disputable, were these that follow: We are wont to say, I thank my self, and I can complain of no man but my self, I am angry with my self, and I will be revenged of my self, and I hate my self, and many other such things besides, whereby every one speaketh of him self, as if it were of another. If (saith he) I can hurt my self; wherefore can I not benefit my self likewise? Besides, if those kindnesses which I have bestowed upon another, should be called benefits, why should they not retain the same name, if they were employed on my self? Had I received them of another, I should owe the same, why then had I given them to my self, should I not owe them to my self? why should I be ungrateful to my self? whereas it is no less dishonourable and dishonest for me, then to be niggardly to my self, then to be cruel and tyrannous toward my self; and neglectful of my self? As infamous is the bawd of another's beauty, as she that setteth her own to sale: we reprehend a flatterer, and an applauder of other men's sayings, and such a one as is always ready to yield a false lustre and laud to every thing: So likewise is he most justly reprehended that pleaseth him self, admireth him self, and (if I may say so) flattereth him self. Vices are not only hateful, when they sin abroad, but when they are retorted upon themselves. Whom wilt thou more admire than him that governeth him self; and that always carrieth in his hands the bridle of his own motions and affections? It is more easy to govern barbarians, and such as are impatient of foreign government, than to contain a man's mind, and make it



subject to it self. Plato (saith he) thanketh Socrates because he taught him. Why should not Socrates thank him self for teaching him self? Marcus Cato saith: That which thou wantest, borrow of thy self. Why can I not give it my self, if I can lend it my self? There are innumerable things wherein custom of discourse divideth us from our selves. We are wont to say, Let thou me alone, I will speak with my self, and I will pull my self by the ear: which if they be true, even as any man ought to be angry with him self, so ought he to thank him self: as he may rebnke him self, so may he praise him self: as he may harm him self, so may he profit him self. An injury and a benefit are contraries: if we say of any man, He hath wronged him self, we may likewise say, He hath done him self a good turn.

benefit  
himself

## CHAPTER VIII

No man is indebted to him self, but by the order of nature; we must first owe, before we pay. There is no debtor without a creditor, no more than there is a husband without a wife, or rather a father without a son. There must be some one to give, if there be any to receive. It is neither to give, nor receive, to turn out of the right hand into the left: even as no man beareth him self, although he move and remove his body: as no man, although he had pleaded his own cause, is said to have been his own advocate, neither raiseth he a statue to him self, as if he had been his own patron. As the sick man, whenas by his own

**Two persons necessary** diligence he hath recovered his health, requireth no recompense from him self: so in all affairs, yea even in those wherein a man hath deserved best of him self, yet ought he not yield him self thanks, because he hath not any to whom he may yield thanks: and if I grant thee that any man may do him self a pleasure: I say, that in giving the same, he receiveth also. Admit I grant thee that any one receiveth a pleasure from him self; in receiving the same, he satisfied for the same likewise. This cloaking and changing of persons (as the common proverb runneth) is made in thine own house, and passed away forthwith as a feigned and idle debt. For he that giveth is none other than he that receiveth, and both are but one. This word, to owe, hath place, but between two several persons: how then may it consist in him only, which in that very instant requiteth when he is obliged? Even as in a bowl or ball there is neither high nor low, nor first nor last, because that in tossing and turning the same, the order of these things are changed: so as that they which went behind are now before, and those things that fell, mount up again; and all things in fine return unto one point, in what sort soever they be removed; even so must thou think that it falleth out in man: when thou hast changed him into divers fashions, he is but one and the same man. He hath beaten him self: he hath no man to sue for doing him injury. He hath bound and shut him self up in prison: he cannot complain of the injustice and force he had done unto him self. He hath gratified him self, and hath forthwith restored, even when it was done, and a-doing. Nature, the mother of all things, is said to lose nothing; for whatsoever is

taken from her, returneth to her again; neither <sup>to a</sup> can anything perish, because it can find no place <sup>benefit</sup> where to issue out of itself, but returneth thither from whence it departed. But what resemblance (saith he) hath this example to our matter in question? I will tell thee: Put case thou be ungrateful to thy self, the benefit will not be lost, because he that gave it retaineth it still: put case thou wilt not receive it, it is in thy possession, before it is repaid thee. Thou canst lose nothing, for that which is taken from thee, is notwithstanding gotten for thee. The wheel is turned within thy self; receiving thou givest, and giving thou receivest.

## CHAPTER IX

A MAN (saith he) must do good unto him self, and consequently he must be thankful to him self. First, that is false whereon the sequel dependeth. For no man giveth him self a benefit, but obeyeth his own nature, by whom he is composed and framed to love him self, whence there groweth in him an especial care to avoid those things that are harmful, and to desire those things that are profitable. For which cause, neither is he liberal, that giveth to him self, nor pitiful, that pardoneth him self, nor merciful, that is touched with his own miseries. That which (were it employed on other men) might justly be called liberality, clemency, and mercy: in regard of our selves, is but nature. A benefit is a voluntary thing, but to profit a man's self, is a necessary matter. The more benefits a man hath given, the more bountiful is he. Who ever was applauded for succouring

**absurdity** An him self? for delivering him self out of the danger of thieves? no man giveth him self a benefit, no more than he entertaineth him self in his own house, no man giveth to him self, no more than he lendeth to him self. If any man giveth him self a benefit, he always giveth, he giveth without intermission, he can never keep just reckoning of the number of his benefits. How can he then return a recompense, whenas in that very thing wherein he satisfieth, he giveth a benefit? for how can he discern whether he give or restore unto him self a benefit, whereas the matter concerneth but one only man? I have delivered my self out of danger: have I given my self a benefit? Once more I preserve my self in peril, do I my self a good turn, or do I restore it? Moreover, although I should grant that first, that we give a benefit to our selves, yet will I not grant the consequent. For although we give, we owe not. Why? because we presently receive: first, must we receive a benefit, and then owe it, and then requite it. But here is no time of owing, inso-much as we receive again without any delay. No man giveth but to another man, no man oweth but to another man, no man restoreth but to another man. All that which in this sort requireth two persons, cannot be done in one.

## CHAPTER X

**A** BENEFIT is that whereby something is profitably given, but this word, to have given, appertaineth to others. Shall he not be supposed to be a mad-man, that saith, he hath sold anything to him self?

because a sale is an alienation of a man's substance and right, and a translation thereof unto another. But even as in selling, so in buying anything we ought to make a real surrender of the thing, and to leave that which a man hath, to suffer another to enjoy the same. Well, if benefiting be of the same nature, then can no man benefit him self, because no man can give ought to him self. For then should two contraries concur in one, so as giving and taking should be all one thing. But there is great difference betwixt giving and taking. And good cause why, considering that both these words are placed as contraries, the one against the other, but if a man may give him self a benefit, there is no difference betwixt giving and receiving. I said a little before, that there were some words that appertained to others, and are so formed that their whole signification departed from our selves. I am a brother, but another man's brother: for no man can be his own brother. I am equal and like; but to some man: for who is equal with him self? That which is compared, is not to be understood without another; that which is united, cannot be without another: if both, that which is given, is not without another, so likewise a benefit is not without a receiver. And this appeareth in the word it self, wherein this is contained to have benefited. But no man benefiteth him self, no more than he favoureth him self, or taketh part with him self: I might prosecute this thing longer, and with larger examples, and why not? whenas a benefit is numbered amongst those things, which require a second person. Some things which are honest, praiseworthy, and of great vertue, have no place, but with another. Faithfulness and in-

No man  
can be  
his own  
brother

**The last** tegrity is commended and praised by every man,  
**reason** and are esteemed amongst the greatest blessings  
 which appertain to mankind, and yet have you  
 ever heard, that any man hath been faithful to  
 him self?

## CHAPTER XI

I COME now to the last part. He that requiteth a good turn, must employ somewhat of his own, as he doth who repayeth the money he oweth: but he layeth out nothing who satisfieth him self, no more than he giveth, who giveth to him self. A benefit and a remuneration must pass from one unto another: for in one person there is no vicissitude or change: he therefore that requiteth a good turn pleasureth him again, from whom he hath received anything. He that is grateful to him self, whom profiteth he? him self? But what man is he that thinketh not that acknowledgement of a favour is in one place, and the benefit in another? He that requiteth him self, profiteth him self; but what ungrateful man was there ever that would not do this? nay rather who was not ungrateful that he might do this? if we (saith he) ought to thank ourselves for that we have done well, we ought likewise to yield some recompense to our selves. But we say, I thank my self, because I married not that wife, and for that I contracted not society with that man. When we say thus, we praise our selves, and to approve our fact, we abuse the words of those that give thanks. A benefit is such a thing which may not be restored, even then when it is given, he that giveth him self

a benefit, cannot choose but receive that which he gave. Ergo, it is no benefit. A good turn is entertained at one time, and recompensed at another; and in a benefit the thing that is most probable, and of greatest repute, is, that he forgetteth his own profit to do another man good, and taketh from him self, to give unto a second; this doeth he not that giveth him self a benefit. To give a benefit is a sociable thing. It joineth that man's favour, and obligeth this man's friendship: to give to a man's self is no sociable thing, it joineth no man, it obligeth no man, it encourageth no man to say, This man deserveth to be honoured, he did such a man a good turn, and will do me the like. A benefit is that which a man giveth, not for his own sake, but for his to whom he giveth it: he that giveth him self a benefit, giveth it for his own sake. Ergo, it is no benefit.

The di-  
gression  
justified

## CHAPTER XII

SUPPOSEST thou that I lie and grow deficient in that which I promised in the beginning? sayest thou that instead of performing some laudable thing, I run at random, and thinking to do well, have lost my labour? Expect a little I pray thee, and thou shalt say this more truly, as soon as I have led thee into these labyrinths, from whence, when thou hast escaped, thou shalt attain no more, than to fly those difficulties into which it was in thine own choice not to descend: what profit receivest thou to unloose those knots which thou hast expressly knit with much travail, to the end thou mightest,

Stoic when thou hast tied them, busy thy self to loosen  
 para- them? But even as some of them are so fastened  
 doxes (for delight and merriment sake) that it is a hard  
 matter for an unskilful man to loosen them, whereas  
 he who hath tied them, may easily slack them,  
 because he knoweth the stops and entanglings  
 thereof, and yet notwithstanding those have some  
 pleasure in them, for they try the sharpness of  
 men's wits, and awaken them to more diligence:  
 so these things which in appearance are subtile and  
 deceitful exile security, dulness and sloth from  
 men's minds, to which sometimes easy passages  
 are to be laid open, in which they may wander,  
 sometimes somewhat difficult and dangerous is to  
 be set in their way, through which they may  
 hardly creep without travail, or in which they  
 may not walk without difficulty. It is said that  
 no man is ungrateful, and this is thus concluded.  
 A benefit is that which profiteth, but no man can  
 profit an evil man, (as you Stoics say) therefore an  
 evil man receiveth no benefit, and consequently  
 also he cannot be ungrateful. Furthermore, a  
 benefit is an honest and profitable thing: with a  
 wicked man there is no place, either for that  
 which is honest or profitable, therefore not for a  
 benefit, which if he cannot receive, he ought not  
 to restore, and therefore is he not ungrateful.  
 Again, as you say, a good man doth all things  
 justly; if he doth all things justly, he cannot be  
 ungrateful. A good man restoreth a benefit, an  
 evil man cannot accept it. Which if it be so,  
 neither any good or evil man is ungrateful: and  
 consequently, this name of ungrateful is but a  
 frivolous and imaginary name in this world. There  
 is but only one good with us, and that is honesty.



This cannot an evil man apprehend, for he ceaseth **refuted** to be evil, if vertue enter into him, but as long as he is evil, no man can give him a benefit, because good and evil things are at odds and cannot be reconciled: therefore no man profiteth him, for whatsoever befalleth him, he corrupteth it with evil use. For even as the stomach being troubled and corrupted by long sickness, and oppressed by choler, changeth whatsoever meats it receiveth, and converteth all the nutriment it receiveth into the cause of his grief: even so a blinded mind, whatsoever thou committest to him, it maketh the same his burthen, his bane, and the occasion of his misery. They then which have most riches, and possess most goods, are subject to most storms and tempests, and the less find they themselves, the more they fall into a greater occasion of impiety and disturbance; nothing therefore may befall the evil that may profit them, nay rather, nothing that doth not hurt them. For whatsoever befalleth them, they convert into their own nature, and those things which in outward appearance are pleasing and profitable, if they were given to a better man, are pestiferous and harmful to them. Therefore also can they not give a benefit, because no man can give that which he hath not, and for that they want a will to do good.

### CHAPTER XIII

BUT although all this were true, yet may an evil man receive such things as have a similitude and resemblance of benefits, which being unrecompensed,

**Words defined** he shall be justly termed ungrateful. There are goods of the mind, goods of the body, and goods of fortune. Those goods of the mind are such, as foolish and bad men are incapable of them. To these is he admitted, who can both receive the same, and is tied to restore them; and if he restoreth them not, he is ungrateful. And this is not our constitution only. The Peripatetics also (who prefix such large and ample bounds to human felicity) say, that the smaller sort of benefits befall the evil men, that whosoever restoreth not, he is ungrateful. We therefore esteem them no benefits, which cannot better and ennoble the mind, yet deny we not, but that they are commodities, and such as are to be desired, these may an evil man give, and receive from a good man; as money, garments, honour, life, which if he requite not, he falleth into the name of an ungrateful man. But how call you him ungrateful, for not restoring that, which thou deniest to be a benefit? There are some things, which although they are not truly such, yet for the similitude and likeness they have with them, are comprehended under the same word. So call we a box, both of that which is of gold, as that which is of silver: so term we him unlearned that is not wholly rude, but as yet untrained and taught in higher discipline: so he that seeth a man ill clothed, and in ragged garments, saith that he hath seen a naked man. These are no benefits, yet have they a resemblance of benefits. As these are but benefits in appearance, so seemeth he to be ungrateful, yet he is not ungrateful. This is false, because that he that giveth, and he that receiveth calleth them benefits. So also he that hath de-

ceived under pretence and colour of a true benefit, **The will**  
 is as ungrateful as he is held to be a poisoner, **and the**  
 that giveth a stupefying medicine, when he believed **deed**  
 it was poison.

#### CHAPTER XIV

CLEANTHES urgeth this more vehemently; although (saith he) it be not a benefit which he receiveth, yet is he ungrateful, because he would not have restored it, although he had received it. So is he a thief (yea even then before he hath polluted his hands) because he is already armed to kill, and hath a will to spoil and murder: wickedness beginneth not, but is exercised and opened in the action. That which he received was no benefit, but was so called. Sacrilegious persons are punished, although they lay not their hands on the gods. How (saith he) may a man be ungrateful towards a wicked man, whenas a benefit cannot be given to a wicked man? Verily in that respect, because he receiveth of him some of those things, which amongst vulgar and ignorant persons are called goods, whereof, if evil men have abundance, he also in the like matter ought to be grateful, and restore those things, whatsoever they be, for good, whereas he received them for good: he is said to owe another man's money, both he that oweth gold, and he that oweth leather coined with the public stamp, such as was current amongst the Lacedemonians, that standeth instead of ready money: in that kind thou art obliged, in the same to yield satisfaction.

A rotten  
society

## CHAPTER XV

WHAT benefits are, and whether the greatness and dignity of a name so honourable should be employed in this abject, and humble matter, it appertaineth not to you, a true benefit belongeth unto others. Compose you your minds to the resemblance of a true benefit, and whilst you say that thing is honest, whatsoever it be, if it be reputed and esteemed for honest, esteem and praise that: even as (saith he) no man in your judgement is ungrateful, so again by your reckoning all men are ungrateful. For as you say, all fools are evil men, but he that hath one vice is possessed of all, and all men are fools and evil, therefore all men are ungrateful. What then? doth not the reproach generally light upon all mankind? Is it not a public complaint that benefits are lost, and that there are few which requite not evil, for such as have deserved well? neither hast thou cause to conceive that this is our particular misconceit, or deceit, and that we alone repute all things evil, and depraved that fall not out even and just, with the rule of right. Behold I know not what vein it is, or whence it is sent, which crieth not out of the philosopher's house, but from the midst of the multitude, condemning people and nations.

'Nor from the host the guest can be secured,  
Nor from his son-in-law the father freed,  
Nor brother from his brother be assured:  
Both man and wife have either's death decreed.'

But this now is more, benefits are turned into banes, and their blood is not spared, for whose defence we ought to spend our own. We follow and gratify benefits with sword and poison. At

Civil  
strife

this time it is reputed dignity and greatness, to violate and spoil a man's country, and to oppress her with her own authority. He that hath not trodden the commonwealth under his feet, supposeth himself the basest and ignoblest in the same. These armies that were levied by her, are armed against her, and her imperious voice is applauded and listened to, that saith, Fight against your wives, draw your swords against your children, destroy your temples, raze down your houses, and cast your household gods on the ground. You that should not enter Rome (no not to triumph) without permission and command of the senate, and to whom bringing home their victorious armies, audience was given in the senate without the city walls, enter the city now with displayed ensigns, murdering the citizens, and bathed in the blood of your nearest kinsfolks. Let liberty be silent amidst these warlike ensigns. And let that conquering nation, and that people which hath established peace thorow their whole empire, and driven wars out of their provinces, and allayed all terror and fear, now besieged and terrified within their own walls, be afraid of their own standards and eagles.

## CHAPTER XVI

UNGRATEFUL was Coriolanus, too late pious and penitent after his wickedness committed: he laid aside his arms, yet so laid he them aside, that it was in the height and midst of civil parricide. Ungrateful was Catiline. It is a small matter with him to surprise his country, except he utterly

Ungrateful Romans ruin it: except he lead the regiments of the Savoys and Dalphinoys to spoil the same; and these enemies whom he had levied on the other side of the Alps, had satisfied and glutted their old and mortal hatreds: except the Roman captains had paid their long-due anniversaries of infernal sacrifice to the sepulchres of the Gauls. Ungrateful was Caius Marius, who was raised from a common soldier to a consular: who except he had equalled the Roman funerals with the Cimbrian slaughters, except he had not only given a sign of civil slaughter and murder, but him self had been the murderer, he would have supposed that his fortune had been changed very little, and that he had not grown greater: but was buried in his former obscurity. Ungrateful was Lucius Sylla, who healed his country with harder remedies than the dangers were; who when he had marched from the tower of Præneste to the gate Collina, through the blood of slaughtered soldiers, waged new battles in the city, executed new slaughters, and slew two legions (O cruelty) after victory, and (that which was most impious) when he had driven and gathered them into a strait, he murdered them notwithstanding, after he had faithfully promised them their pardon, and invented a proscription (O sovereign gods) that he who had slain a Roman citizen, should not only be discharged and exempted from punishments, but receive reward, and which is more receive the reward done to him that preserved a citizen. Ungrateful is Cnæus Pompey, who for his three consulships, for his three triumphs, for so many honours; which for the most part were thrust upon him, during his immature and young years, returned the commonweal this requital,

that he seized others of the possession of the same, supposing thereby to discharge himself of that envy, that might be conceited against his greatness and authority, if that which were lawful for no man might be admitted in many, whilst he longed after extraordinary changes and commands, whilst he distributeth provinces, to make choice of that which best liked him, whilst in such sort he divided the commonweal into the hands of the tribunes, that two parts thereof remained always in his own house, he reduced the Roman people to that extreme, that they could not be discharged or secured, but by their servitude and loss of liberty : ungrateful was he, who was both Pompey's enemy and conqueror, who drew the war from the uttermost bounds of Germany and France, before the walls of Rome. He it was (that pretending popularity, and so great love and tender care of the commonalty) that pitched his tents in the Flaminian round, nearer than the place where Porsenna encamped. True it is that he tempered the power which the law of arms and victory allotted him, and performed that which he was wont to say, and never slew any, except such a one as was armed and addressed to fight against him. But what importeth all this? The rest exercised arms more cruelly than he did, yet were they satisfied at length, and laid them down, but this man sheathed his sword quickly, but never laid it aside. Ungrateful was Antony towards his Dictator, whom he pronounced to be justly slain, and assigned to his murderers great provinces and governments : and having torn and tired his country with proscriptions, incursions, and civil wars after so many evils, he decreed that,

Un-  
grateful  
Romans

**Ungrateful Rome** that generous commonweal, which in times past had given liberties, exemptions, and particular privileges to the people of Achaia, and the Rhodians, and many other famous cities, should herself become tributary, not to Roman kings, but to infamous eunuchs and geldings.

## CHAPTER XVII

THE day would fail me, if I should reckon up all those that were ungrateful, even with the utter destruction of their countries. And no less endless labour would it be, if I should begin to relate how ungrateful our commonweal hath been towards the best, and most tenderly affected citizens she had, and how as often she hath sinned in ingratitude herself, as others have sinned against her. She sent Camillus into exile, dismissed Scipio, banished Cicero after Catiline's conspiracy, she razed his house, spoiled his goods, and exercised against him all those cruelties which Catiline himself could have done, had he been conqueror. Rutilius, in reward of his innocency, was banished into Asia, to live there in obscurity. The Roman people denied Cato the prætorship, and would never grant him the dignity of a consul. In brief, we are all of us generally ungrateful. Let every one examine him self; there is not any man that will not complain of some one's ingratitude. And it cannot be that all men should complain, except there were some cause also to complain of all men. All men therefore are ungrateful. Is this all? and are they thus only? All are covetous, the world likewise is subject to avarice, all are



malicious, all fearful, and they especially who seem to be most confident. Furthermore, all men are ambitious, and all men are wicked: but thou must not be displeased and aggrieved hereat, all of them are mad. I will not recall thee to uncertainties, as to say unto thee, see how ungrateful youth is. Who is he (be he never so innocent) that wisheth not that his father had breathed his last? who is he (how modest soever he be) that gapes not after his death? who is he (how religious and pitiful soever he be reputed) that thinketh not of his father's death? what husband so feareth the death of a good wife, as he counteth not the gain he shall receive if she die? what man is he, I pray you, who being entangled in the law, and delivered by another man's diligence, that bethinketh him of so great a benefit any longer, than until a second action? This is confessed, and certain without all exception: is there any man that dieth without complaining? who at his last gasp dare say thus:

‘My days are done, now have I brought to end  
The course of life, that Fortune did me lend’?

Who dieth not unwillingly? who departeth not mournfully? But this is the part of an ungrateful man, not to content him self with the time that was lent him. The time will always seem short unto thee, if thou reckon the same. Think that the chiefest good is not in time, and how little soever it be, take it in good part. It addeth nothing to thy felicity, if the day of thy death be prolonged, because by delay life is not made more blessed, but more long. How much better is it to give thanks unto the gods for those honest pleasures, which we have received, and not to busy our selves

All men  
are mad

**The limits of obligation** in numbering other men's years, but to esteem our own thankfully, and to put them in the accompt of our gains: hath God thought me worthy of this? this sufficeth me: might he have given me more? but this also is a benefit. Let us be thankful to the gods, let us be thankful to men, let us be thankful unto those that have done us any courtesy, and thankful to those likewise who have done any kindness to any of ours.

### CHAPTER XVIII

**THOU** obligest me infinitely (sayest thou) when thou sayest ours; prefix therefore some end. He that bestoweth a benefit on the son, as thou sayest, bestoweth it likewise on the father. First, I ask where, and whither, and afterwards I desire thee likewise to inform me, whether a pleasure done unto the father, be likewise done unto the brother, to the father, the uncle, the grandfather, the wife, the son-in-law? Tell me where I should end, how long wilt thou that I follow the order and pedigree of so many persons? if I have tilled thy land for thee, have I not done thee a pleasure? if I have quenched the fire that would have burned thy house, or if I have repaired it, for fear it should fall upon thee, shall I not give thee a benefit? if I save thy slave's life, shall I impute it unto thee? If I preserve thy son, hast thou not received a benefit at my hands?

### CHAPTER XIX

**THOU** settest down unlike and different examples, because that he who tilleth my land, giveth not

the benefit to my land, but to me : and he that under-proppeth my house, lest it should fall, doth the pleasure to me : for the house it self is without sense. I must needs be in his debt, because none else is. And he that manureth my land, doth it not to deserve well of the soil, but of my self. The same will I say of my servant, for he justly appertaineth to me ; it is for my profit he is preserved, and therefore I am indebted for him. My son is capable him self of a benefit, and therefore he receiveth it ; I am glad of the favour done him, it concerneth me somewhat, yet am I not obliged. Yet would I have thee answer me, who thinkest thou art not indebted, whether thy son's good health, felicity and patrimony appertaineth to the father ? He shall be more happy if his son be whole and safe, and unhappy if he lose him. What then ? he that is made happier by me, and delivered from the peril of a mighty infelicity and misfortune : hath he not received a benefit ? no (saith he) for certain things are bestowed upon others, which extend also unto us ; but everything ought to be required at his hands, on whom that is bestowed : as money is required at his hands who borrowed the same, although the same came in some sort into my hands. There is no benefit, the profit whereof toucheth and extendeth not to our neighbours, and sometimes also to those that are farthest off from us. The question is not whether the benefit be transferred from him to whom it is given, but where it is first placed, thou must always redemand it from the principal debtor, and he that ought it first. What then I pray thee ? sayest thou not thou hast given me my son, and if he had perished I should not have lived ? gavest thou not

Who  
owes the  
benefit ?

**Resolu-  
tion** a benefit for his life, whose safety thou preferrest before thine own? At such time as I saved thy son, thou falledst down at my feet; thou diddest pay thy vows unto the gods, as if thou thy self hadst been preserved. Diddest thou not cry out after this manner, The same hast thou done in succouring my son as in saving mine own person: make accompt that thou hast saved two, and me especially: why sayest thou this, if thou receivest no benefit? because although my son hath borrowed money, which I will repay unto his creditor, yet shall not I be indebted: and if my son hath been taken in adultery, I may haply be ashamed, yet shall not I therefore be the adulterer: I say that I am bound unto thee for my son, not because I am, but because I will offer myself unto thee a voluntary debtor. But a great pleasure hath befallen me by his safety; inestimable is the profit I conceive thereby, and which is more, I have escaped the grievous wound and corrosive of being childless. The question is not now, whether thou hast profited me; but whether thou hast given me a benefit; for a living creature, an herb, a stone profit me, yet give they me no benefit, which is never given but by such a one as is willing. But thou wilt not give unto the father, but to the son; and in the meanwhile thou knowest not the father; when therefore thou sayest, Have I not therefore given a benefit to the father, because I have saved his son? Argue thou this contrariwise: how could I therefore give a benefit to the father, whom I neither knew, or ever thought upon? and why falleth it not out sometimes, that thou shalt hate the father mortally, and yet be desirous to save his son's life? Wouldest thou say that thou gavest a

benefit to the father, whose mortal enemy thou wert at that time? But laying aside these questions which I entreat of by way of dialogue, I will now answer like a lawyer: and say, that the mind of the giver is to be respected. He gave him the benefit to whom he intended it; even as if he did it in honour of the father: the father received the benefit, not the son; so is not the father bound for a benefit bestowed upon his son, although he envy it. Yet if occasion be offered, the father shall not do amiss, to be willing to give somewhat, not that he is constrained by necessity to pay anything; but that he might have found a sufficient cause to begin to do a pleasure. A benefit therefore ought not to be redemanded at the father's hands, for a courtesy done unto the son: and if he voluntarily show himself grateful for the same, he ought rather to be esteemed just than thankful. For otherwise there would never be an end; if I give a benefit to the father, the mother, the grandfather, the uncle, to the children, kinsfolk, friends, servants, and country: where then beginneth a benefit to rest? For methinks I am fallen into an argument which the Grecians call Sorites, which hath never an end, because it drudgeth on, and stealing forward by little and little, ceaseth not continually to pass on further. Men are wont to debate upon this matter: two brothers are at deadly feud the one against the other, if I preserve the one, have I profited the other, who will be sorry that his brother hath escaped with life? There is no doubt but that it is a benefit, although it be against his will that receiveth the same: even as contrariwise, he hath not given a benefit, that profited against his will.

A thing  
neither  
profitable  
nor  
hurtful

## CHAPTER XX

CALLEST thou that (saith he) a benefit wherewith he is offended and vexed? many benefits have a harsh and distasteful appearance; as when we cut and cauterise to heal, and imprison to amend. We ought not to respect whether a man be sorry for a benefit received, but whether he ought to rejoice. The coin is not bad, which a barbarous and ignorant person accepteth not for current and rightly stamped money. He hateth the benefit and yet he receiveth the same, if it be profitable unto him, and he that hath given the same, hath done it to the end that it should be profitable: it makes no matter though a man receive a good turn with an evil will: so to let us turn this the contrary way: a man hateth his brother, whose life importeth and profiteth him much, him have I slain. This action of mine is no benefit unto him, although he say it is and rejoice thereat. Most traitorously doth he hurt, who receiveth thanks for doing harm. I do then see something is profitable and is therefore a benefit, hurtful and therefore is no benefit. Behold I will give that which is neither profitable nor hurtful, and yet it is a benefit. I have traversed a desolate place, and found some man's father stark dead, and have buried his body, neither have I profited him that was slain, (for what concerneth it him after what manner he were consumed?) neither was it profitable for his son, for what could he gain hereby? I will tell you what he hath gained, he hath discharged by my means a necessary and solemn office. I have done that to his father, which he him self would have done: nay more,

which in duty he ought to do. Now if I did it not for common piety and humanity's sake only, as I might have buried any other dead man's body, but knew the carcase and thought upon the son at the same time, and did it for his sake, then is it a benefit. But if I bury a dead man that is unknown to me, no man is indebted to me for this office, because it was but a point of public humanity. Some one will say unto me: Why art thou so busy to inquire who it is to whom thou hast done a pleasure, as if thou wouldst hereafter redemand the same? There are some that judge that it should never be claimed again, and allege these causes. The unworthy receiver will not require the same to be redemanded, the thankful and worthy receiver will of himself yield recompense. Besides if thou hast given to a good man, be not too earnest in claiming it, lest in demanding the same thou do him wrong; as if he would not have satisfied thee of his own free will. If thou hast given it to an evil man, have patience. Corrupt not thy benefit with redemanding the same, and of a courtesy make it no debt. Besides, that which the law biddeth not to be redemanded, it forbiddeth. These things are true, as long as nothing urgeth me, as long as fortune enforceth me nothing, I will rather crave than ask again. But if it be to save my children's lives: if my wife be in danger of hers, if the liberty and good of my country constraineth me to go thither whither I would not, I will command my bashfulness, I will protest that I have endured all things before I would be enforced to demand succours at an ungrateful man's hand. In brief, the necessity of receiving a good turn, shall overcome the shame

may be a  
benefit

The limits of law and promise of claiming it; when therefore I employ a benefit upon a good man, I so give it as if I would never redemand the same, except necessity enforce me: but the law (saith he) not permitting to demand, forbiddeth to claim.

## CHAPTER XXI

THERE are many things which neither have law nor action, to which the custom of human life, more powerful than any law, giveth entrance. No law commandeth us to discover our friends' secrets, neither doth any law in like manner tie us to keep promise and our word with our enemy. What law tieth us to perform that which we have promised to any man? yet will I justly complain of him that hath discovered my secret, and be displeased with him that hath given me his word, and hath not kept it. But thou (saith he) makest a debt of a benefit. Nothing less: for I do not exact it, but redemand it; neither do I redemand it, but admonish: neither shall my extremest necessity enforce me to this, to come unto him with whom I shall be forced to use long contestation. Whoso is so far plunged in ingratitude, that he will not be content to be advertised and admonished, I will let him pass, neither will I think him worthy to be enforced to be thankful. Even as the usurer raketh not upon those debtors, whom he knoweth to have played the bankerouts, or to be so poor that nothing is left them to lose that may make them ashamed: so will I overpass some that are publicly and obstinately thankless; neither will I redemand a benefit at any



man's hands, but from him only from whom I shall not take away by force, but freely receive it.

Admonish  
gently the  
slack

## CHAPTER XXII

MANY there are that neither know how to deny the good they have received, nor to restore it when it is needful: who are not so good as the grateful, nor so evil as the ungrateful: slack and idle debtors, yet not evil. These will I not challenge, but admonish: and since they forget their duty, I will make them remember themselves, so as they will presently answer me in this sort: Pardon me, I pray you, in good faith I knew not that you had need hereof: for had I thought so much, I had offered it you of my self: I beseech you account me not ungrateful, I remember well what kindness you have done unto me. Why should I fear to make these men better to themselves, and to me also? I will bind whomsoever I can from sinning, much more my friend from offending, and especially against my self. I give him another benefit, if I suffer him not to be ungrateful, neither will I rudely upbraid him with the good turns he hath had of me: but as mildly as I can will I only refresh the memory of them, to the end he may have occasion to restore me some such pleasure: I will pray him to do me a good turn, to the end he may understand that I do it to redemand mine own. Now and then will I use sharp and bitter words, if I conceive any hope that he may be amended: for a desperate person, who hath lost all shame, I will not exasperate him, lest of an ungrateful man I

**Jog the sleepers** make him mine enemy. For if we remit and forbear to admonish sharply, and call on those that are ungrateful, we shall make them more slow to requite our courtesies. But some that may be amended, and who may be made good, if anything touch their conscience: shall we suffer them to be lost for want of admonition, wherewith the father hath sometimes corrected his son, and the wife recalled and reclaimed her straying husband, and a friend refreshed the languishing faith of his friend?

### CHAPTER XXIII

SOME there are that so sleep, that they are not to be awaked by striking, but by jogging. In like manner there are some that want not the will to yield satisfaction, but they are too slack and slow in the performance thereof, let us awaken it. Be not thou the cause that thy benefit be converted into an injury. Thou shouldst injure me, if thou wouldst not redemand the pleasure, which thou hast done me, for this cause, that I might become ungrateful. What if I know not what thou wantest? what if distracted by occupations, and employed other ways, I have not observed the occasion? show me what I may, and what thou wouldest. Why despairest thou, before thou triest me? why art thou so hasty to lose both thy benefit and thy friend? whence knowest thou that I will not, or I know not, or whither my mind or means be deficient; make trial of me. I will advise and admonish him then, not bitterly, not openly, but so modestly, that he may think that of him self he

hath called the matter to memory, and was not put in mind by me. A benefit forgot

## CHAPTER XXIV

A CERTAIN old soldier, who had used some violence towards his neighbours, was drawn in question before Julius Cæsar, and seeing him self overcharged, and like to lose the process: Cæsar (saith he) remember you not how you once sprained your ankle in Spain near to Sucro, a river of Valentia? when Cæsar had answered him that he remembered it well, the soldier continuing his purpose, said thus: Do you remember likewise, that being couched under a tree, that gave but little shadow, and desirous to rest your self, to fly the heat of the scorching sun, in a barren and rocky soil, in which there was not but that only tree, that grew from amongst the craggy cliffs, there was one of your soldiers that spread his cloak under you. When Cæsar had answered, Yea marry, why should I not remember it? for when I was nigh dead for thirst, because I was not able to go to the next spring, by reason of my foot, I would have crept thither upon all fours, but that a soldier of mine, a man both stout and valiant, brought me water in his helmet. Emperor (said this soldier) do you now know that man, and that helmet, if you see them? Cæsar answered, that he knew not the morion, but that he knew the soldier very well, and further said (displeased, as I suppose, for that he interrupted the pleading of the cause, to listen to that old story which he had told him), I am sure thou art not he.

Cæsar and Tiberius Cæsar (said the soldier) I blame thee not, in that thou hast forgotten me, for when this was done, I was whole and sound, afterwards I lost an eye at the battle of Munda, certain splinters of my skull were taken out of my head, neither would you know the helmet if you should see it, for it was cleft in pieces by the stroke of a Spanish curtelax. Hereupon Cæsar commanded that he should not be troubled any further, and gave unto his soldier those small parcels of land, through which the way lay, that made this strife betwixt him and his neighbours.

## CHAPTER XXV

WHAT then? should he not re-challenge the benefit at the emperor's hands, whose memory was confused through the multitude of his affairs? whose great fortune in disposing of his army, suffered him not to remember and reward every private soldier? This is not to redemand a benefit, but to resume it again, being ready at hand, and laid up in a good place, and yet if a man will have it, he must stretch out his hand. I will therefore redemand the same, if I be constrained to do it, either by necessity, or for his sake, of whom I must require it. A certain familiar of Tiberius Cæsar, pretending some suit unto him in the beginning of his empire, began his speech thus: Sir, remember you not? to which he answered before he uttered any further tokens of their former and ancient friendship, I remember not what I was. From such as this prince was, not only should a good man forbear to ask recompense

Moderation to be used

of former courtesies, but also he ought to desire and procure that he might forget them utterly. He disdained the memory and knowledge of all those persons, who he reputed either for his friends, or equals, before his empire, his only desire was that they should respect that present fortune and authority, wherein he was placed, that only would he have to be thought upon, that only to be spoken of, he reputed his ancient friend for a busy inquisitor. It is better to redemand a pleasure thou hast done in times past in time and place, than to require and crave anew. Moderation of words is to be used, that the ungrateful man, whatsoever cannot pretend to have forgotten them. If we lived amongst men of science and conscience, we might hold our peace and expect, and yet it were better to give them notice of our affairs, and the estate of our necessities. We pray unto the gods, who know all things, our prayers obtain not that which we demand, they only advertise them of that which we would entreat at their hands. That priest which speaketh in Homer, representeth unto the gods the honour which was done unto them: and those altars which were devoutly addressed, and dressed for them, to the end they might be favourable to his petitions, and attentive to his prayers. It is a second vertue, both to be willing to be admonished, and to be able to entertain good advertisements. The mind is to be reined softly this way and that way, few there are that are perfectly governed by the same, but they that by honest advertisements return into the right way, hold the second place; and from these we ought not to take the guide that conducteth them. The eyes that are shut have a

The will is to be awakened lest it languish sight, but without use, which then grow in use, when the daylight (which the gods send us) calleth them forth and awakeneth them to perform their offices. Instruments and tools lie by and serve no uses, except the workman move them, and employ them in his labour: meanwhile there is a good will in his soul, but either idleness or delight benumbeth it, or the ignorance of his art makes him err. We ought therefore to amend our will, and not to suffer it through despite to languish long time in error: but following the custom of schoolmasters, who instruct young children, we ought patiently to endure, and discreetly to pardon them, if they have forgotten anything through defect of memory. And even as in telling them a word or two, they fashion them to construe their whole lesson: so by some little admonition we ought to reclaim such as are forgetful, and fashion them to acknowledge a benefit.

#### THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK

## THE SIXT BOOK

### THE ARGUMENT OF JUSTUS LIPSIUS

AGAIN continueth he his questions after the manner of **The** Chrysippus. First he inquireth whether a benefit may be **Argu-** taken away? he differently disputeth thereupon, yet concludeth that the use thereof may be taken away, but not the benefit it self. His second question is, whether we be indebted to him, who either profited us willingly or ignorantly? he denieth. His third is, whether we be obliged to him that profited us for his own sake? if only for himself, he denieth it; but if for mine also, he admitteth it. He mixeth subtilties with examples. The fourth is, whether it be lawful to wish another man an evil turn, to the end thou mayest restore him his benefit? it is not lawful, and he condemneth it. He openeth another way of restitution, even to those that are happy, yea to kings, by counsels, admonitions, and doctrines.

### CHAPTER I

THERE are some things (my Liberalis, the worthiest of men) which are only drawn in question to exercise the spirit, and have no use in them. There are other things also, which not only move delight, whilst they are disputed upon, but after they are debated, are greatly profitable unto us. I will present thee with all sorts of them. Thou mayest as it pleaseth thee advise me, either whether I shall finish those that are begun, or that I present

**Whether** them only on the theatre, for show and ostentation  
**a benefit** sake : and although thou commandest them to be incontinently relieved, yet will there some profit arise thereby : for although there are some things which are unnecessary to be spoken of, yet it availeth us somewhat to know them. I will therefore be at thy disposition and beck, and shape my proceedings according to thy pleasure : some will I debate upon more amply, other some will I cast out headlong from off this theatre.

## CHAPTER II

THE question is whether a benefit may be taken away. Some deny that it may, for a benefit is nothing but an action, even as the gift is one thing, and the giving another, and he that saileth one thing, and the navigation it self another thing. And although the sick man be not without sickness, yet is not he that is sick and the sickness it self all one : so the benefit it self is one thing, but that which cometh to each one of us by the benefit, is another thing. A benefit is a thing incorporeal, which cannot be frustrated, the matter thereof is tossed hither and thither, and changeth his master. When therefore thou takest the same away, Nature itself cannot undo those things she hath done. She stoppeth the course of her benefits, but cutteth them not off. He that dieth, yet hath lived, and he that hath lost his sight, hath formerly seen. It may be brought to pass, that those things that are come to us may not be, but that they may not have bin, it is impossible ; but the part of the benefit, and the most certain is that which was. Some-



times we hinder the use and long possession of a benefit; the benefit it self cannot be razed out. Though Nature summon all her forces to this end, yet hath she no power over that which is past. Thou mayest take away the house thou gavest me, the money thou lendedst me, the slave I bought, and whatsoever else, wherein the name of a benefit consisteth, but the benefit it self is stable and immutable, no force can effect this, that the one hath not given, and the other hath not received.

## CHAPTER III

MARCUS ANTONIUS (as the poet Rabirius setteth it down) seeing his fortunes translated to Augustus, and that no other refuge was left him, but the privilege of death, and that that also (except he took hold of the present occasion) would quickly be taken from him, cried out in my opinion most heroically,

‘That only now I have,  
Which I to others gave.’

O how much might he have had if he would? These are the most assured riches which will continue at one stay, in whatsoever inconstancy and levity of human fortune, which the greater they be, the less envy will they have. Why art thou so sparing of that thou hast, as if it were thine own? thou art but Fortune’s factor. All these things which thus puff us up, that inflame us with pride, that seem to make us more than man, cause us to forget frailty. These therefore which you keep within iron walls, with armed

**Seek that** hands, these goods which you have purchased with other men's bloods, and defended with your own, for which you rig forth whole navies to stain the seas with blood, for which you beleaguer cities, and yet ignorant, what store of weapons Fortune hath prepared against those, who are opposed against her; these for which two ambitious, pretenders of empire (the laws of affinity, friendship and confederacy being broken) have so oftentimes caused the world to be so crushed and confounded, are not yours: they are but as things in trust left in your hands, and shall suddenly be translated to another master. That enemy, from whom you have pillaged them, or some successor of his enmity and hatred shall come and force them from thee. Askest thou me how thou mayest make them thine own? I answer thee, By well bestowing them. Be provident therefore in thy affairs, purchase unto thy self an assured possession of those things which can never be taken from thee: thy riches shall not only be more secure, but also more honest: that which thou admirest and prizest so much, that which in thy judgement maketh thee rich and powerful, as long as thou detainest it in thy hands, retaineth no other title but the villainous name of avarice, as for example, thy house, thy slave, thy money; but after thou hast given them, they are accounted and reckoned for benefits.

#### CHAPTER IV

· THOU confessest (saith he) that sometimes we are not obliged and indebted to him, of whom we

have received a benefit: ergo, it is taken from us. **which cannot be taken from thee**

There are many causes which discharge us of the obligation, whereby we are tied for the good we have received, not for that it is violently taken from us, but because it is corrupted by another means. A certain man defendeth me, being accused and guilty of some capital crime, and afterwards useth infamous violence to my wife, and ravisheth her; he hath not taken away the good that he did me, but opposing an equal injury to the same, he dischargeth me of my debt; and if he hath hurt me more than he profited me before, the good turn is not only extinguished, but I have free liberty both to complain, and to revenge, where, in comparison of the benefit, the injury over-weigheth it: so the benefit is not taken away, but overpressed and drowned. What? are not some fathers so hard-hearted and wicked, that it is both lawful and rightful to loathe and shun them, and not to acknowledge them? have they therefore taken from them that which they gave them? nothing less, but the impiety of succeeding times, hath taken away the commendation of every former office and kindness: the benefit is not taken away, but only the thanks, which ought to be acknowledged for the same, and it is brought to pass, not that I have it not, but that I owe it not. If a man lend me money, and afterwards burn my house, his debt is satisfied by my damage; I have not paid him, and yet I owe him nothing. Even so standeth the case here: though a man hath done me some friendly good turn, though he hath dealt with me somewhat liberally, yet if afterwards he many ways use me proudly, contumeliously and cruelly, he hath left me at that

How a  
benefit is  
drowned

stay that I am as free from him, as if I had never received anything at his hands, for the fault is his own, and he him self hath violated his own benefits. The landlord cannot constrain his tenant to pay his rent (although the deeds remain in force uncanceled) if he tread down his corn, fell down his fruit-trees, not because he hath received that which he covenanted, but for that he him self is the cause that his tenant cannot satisfy him. So is the creditor oftentimes endamaged towards his debtor, if he take more for some other pretext, than that which he lent did amount unto. The judge sitteth not between the creditor and debtor to say only this, Thou hast lent him money: what then? thou hast driven away his cattle, murdered his servant, taken possession of his land, which thou never paidest for; when all these things shall be well-considered of and valued: depart thou a debtor, who camest a creditor. There is therefore a just rating and valuation betwixt benefits and injuries to be made. Oftentimes the benefit remaineth, and we are not obliged to satisfy the same, if he that gave it repented him self afterwards, if he say he was unhappy in that he gave the same, if when he gave he sighed, or bent his brows, if he believe he hath lost and not given: if he hath done it for his own profit, or at least not for mine; if he hath not ceased to insult, brag and boast everywhere, and make his benefit bitter and distasteful to the receiver. The benefit therefore remaineth, although it be not due, even as certain monies are due, but not exacted, because the creditor hath no law to recover them.

## CHAPTER V

Questions  
of balance

THOU gavest a benefit, and afterwards diddest an injury: there is both a thanks due to the benefit, and a reward for the injury, for I owe him no thanks, nor he me any punishment, the one satisfieth the other. When we say, I have satisfied his benefit, we say not thus, that we have restored that which we received, but this for that; for to restore, is to give one thing for another. Why not? because every payment restoreth not the same, but as much in value: for we are said to have satisfied our debt, although we have paid silver for gold, and although we pay no money at all, but either by assignment to other, or by way of exchange we make our satisfaction. Methinks thou tellest me that I lose my labour: for what profiteth it me to know, whether that which is not due remaineth still in obligation? These are but impertinent subtilties of the lawyers, who say that no man can acquire the possession or dominion of an inheritance, but only the goods thereof, as if the heritage were ought else, than those things which are in the inheritance. I had rather thou shouldest distinguish me this (which may be pertinent to the matter) namely, whenas the same man had done me a courtesy, and afterwards offered me an injury, whether I ought to requite his kindness, and notwithstanding revenge my self for the injury offered me, and make a several satisfaction, as it were, for two different debts, or recompense the one with the other, and not to take any more care of it, so as the benefit be taken away by the injury, and the injury by the benefit. For I see that this is observed in the courts of

Matters  
of law and  
of judge-  
ment

pleas, what the resolution of your school is, you your selves know. The actions are several, and conformably to the course of our pleadings, so answerably are we dealt withal. For otherwise there should be a great confusion in the judgement-seat and course of law: if he that should leave in my custody goods or money in trust, should afterwards steal from me, I should enter my suit of felony against him, and contrariwise he plead against me, for the money left in trust with me.

## CHAPTER VI

THOSE examples (my Liberalis) which thou hast proposed, are contained under certain laws which we must needs follow, for one law is not confounded with another, each one keepeth his one way. As for the matter in trust, there is a distinct action, so is there also for the theft. A benefit is not subject to any law, only I that received the same, am the arbitrary judge thereof: I have authority to compare together, how much good another man hath done me, or what damage I have received by him: whether I be indebted more unto him, or he obliged more to me. In judging by law and ordinances I have not any power, thither must we go, whither they lead us. But in matter of benefit, all the power and privilege is mine own, and therefore I judge them, and separate not the actions, I summon the benefits and injuries before one judge: otherwise thou shouldest command me at one and the same time, to love and hate one and the same person, to complain of him, and to give him thanks, which

nature cannot permit: nay rather by comparing the benefit and wrong together, I shall see whether anything be owing me of surplusage. Even as he that imprinteth other lines aloft upon my writings, taketh not away the former letters, but only razeth and hideth them: even so an injury that succeedeth a benefit, blemisheth it so, that it cannot appear.

Whether  
a benefit  
can be  
done un-  
willingly

## CHAPTER VII

THY countenance (to whose direction and beck I submitted my self) beginneth to frown, and thou bendest thy brows upon me, as if I strayed from my purpose, methinks I hear thee say:

‘Whither so far disjoined from the port,  
Dost thou upon thy right hand sail before  
Ply hitherwards, unto this haven resort,  
And leave the main, and love and like the shore.’

Pardon me, I can keep no nearer. If therefore thou thinkest that I have satisfied and sufficiently debated on this matter: let us pass onward to the other, and examine whether we be indebted to him that hath done us a pleasure against his will. I might speak this more plainly, but that the proposition ought to be more confused, to the end that the distinction which followeth presently after, should show that we dispute both the one and other point: that is to say, whether we are bound unto him that hath procured our good, and meant it not, and also whether we be beholden to him, that hath done us good, and knew it not. For if any man by compulsion hath showed us any kindness, it is a matter so manifest that he

A benefit  
implies a  
will to  
do good

obligeth us not, that there need no words to be spent to this purpose. And the said question may easily be answered, and whatsoever may be objected of the same nature, if we often convert our thoughts to this general principle. That there is no benefit but that which is accompanied with a good thought towards us; and such a thought and intent likewise, as is both friendly and bountiful. And therefore we thank not the rivers although they bear great ships, and with a large and perpetual channel, fleet along to furnish us with commodities, and although wooing the wondering eye, and full of dainty fish, they steal along and moisten our fattened fields: neither will any man judge that he is indebted to Nilus, or displeased therewith, if it hath overflowed and drowned his land, or too slowly grown to ebb: neither doth the wind befriend us, although it blow a gentle and prosperous gale, nor the victuals we eat, although they be profitable and wholesome. For he that properly will give a benefit, must not only profit me, but have a will to do me good. Therefore men are not indebted to dumb beasts, yet how many hath the swiftness of a horse delivered out of danger? nor to trees, and yet how many troubled with heat hath the shadow of their branchy arms delivered and covered from the scorching sun? what concerneth it me whether he that did me good, know not that he doeth it, or be not able to know it, when both of them wanted will to do it? And what difference is there, whether you command me to owe a benefit to a ship, or a chariot, or a spear, or to such a one, who, as these, had no purpose to do good, but was profitable unto me only casually?



## CHAPTER VIII

A MAN may receive a benefit unwittingly, but no man doth good without knowing of the same: Even as many men have been healed of their infirmities, by some casual accident, and yet for all that they are no true remedies: as some men have recovered their health by falling into a river in an exceeding cold day: as a quartan ague hath been driven from some men by whipping, and a sudden fright hath disappointed the expected hour of an ague, by fixing the imagination on another distasteful evil, and yet none of these, although they have been the cause of recovery, can be said but to be a sovereign remedy: so some men profit us while they would not, or rather because they will not do us good, yet are we not indebted to them for the benefit. What if fortune hath altered their pernicious counsels, and drawn them to a better end? Supposest thou that I am any ways bound unto him, whose hands striking at me, light upon and hit mine enemy: who would have hurt me, except he had swerved? Ofttimes a witness whilst he manifestly forswearth him self, hath detracted from their credit who were true witnesses, and hath made the judges to commiserate the prisoner, supposing that it was but some slanderous circumvention and conspiracy. Ofttimes the very great power and authority of the adversary, hath delivered the delinquent out of the judge's hands, who would not condemn him upon the credit and favour of the accuser, which other ways they had convicted by the justice of the cause. Yet did not these give a benefit, although they profited; for the question is, whereat the dart

but it  
may be  
received  
unwit-  
tingly

Ignorance in receiving absolves from blame was aimed, not where it lighted, and it is the mind, and not the event, which distinguisheth a benefit from an injury. Mine adversary, whilst he speaketh contraries, and offendeth the judge by his pride, and rashly dismisseth one of his best witnesses, giveth great advantage to my cause. I ask not whether he erred to pleasure me, because his intention was to hurt me.

## CHAPTER IX

VERILY, to approve my self grateful, it behoveth me to have a will to do that which he hath done: if he would that I should take it for a benefit, he ought to have a will and intent. For what is more unjust than that man who hateth him, that hath kicked him in a throng, or soiled him with dirt, or thrust him thither, whither he would not? But what other thing is there that may exempt him from the blame whereas there is an injury in the action, than that he knew not what he did? The same thing that privilegeth the one from being judged to have done injury, exempteth the other also from being thought to have done a pleasure. It is the will that maketh us either friends or enemies. How many hath sickness discharged from warfare? Some have been letted from being oppressed with the ruin of their own houses, by keeping their day of appearance at the suit of their enemies. And some by shipwrack have escaped the hands of pirates, yet are we not obliged to these misfortunes for any benefit, because casual events have no correspondence with amity; not to our enemy, who would trouble us by

process, and detain us under arrest. It is no good deed that proceedeth not from a good will, except he that gave it acknowledge it. Hath a man pleased me and know not of it? I owe him nothing. Did he do me good when he would have hurt me? I will do the like to him.

Ignorance in giving can claim no gratitude

## CHAPTER X

LET us return again to the first point: Thou wilt that (to the intent I should be thankful) I should do somewhat, and yet he that did me kindness, hath done nothing. Let us speak now of the second. Thou wilt have me very forward to gratify him willingly, although in the giving he had no goodwill or intention to give. For what shall I say of the third, whose injury is exchanged into a benefit? If thou wilt have me to owe thee a good turn, it is not enough for thee to be only willing to do me good: but to make me unbeholding to thee, it is enough that thou meanest it not towards me. For the bare will cannot make a benefit. But even as that should not be a benefit, if a good and free will were abandoned by fortune; so likewise is it not a benefit, if the will marcheth not before the fortune. For if thou wilt have me beholding to thee, thou must not only do me good, but also thou must do it with a will to profit.

## CHAPTER XI

CLEANTHES useth this example: I sent, saith he, two boys into the Academy to seek out Plato,

Good will and good fortune and to bring him unto me. The one of them sought him out in all galleries and porches, where he was wont to walk, and ran through all other places wherein he had any hope to find him out, and at length being weary with his way, and frustrate of his hope, returned home. The other stood gazing at the next juggler, or mountebank, or whilst he wandreth up and down and playeth with his fellows and companions, seeth Plato passing by, and found him whom he sought not. I, saith Cleanthes, will commend that boy who performed that he was commanded, to his uttermost, and will chastise that other who was more fortunate in laziness. It is the will that is the lawful mistress of these actions, the condition whereof must be considered, if thou wilt have me to be thy debtor. It is a small matter to wish a man well, except thou pleasure him; it is a small matter to have pleased, except thou hadst a will to do it. For put case a man had a will to give, yet gave not, undoubtedly I have his heart, but not his benefit which consummateth and perfecteth both the thing and the will. Even as I owe him nothing that would have trusted me with his money but did not: so will I be a friend, but not obliged to him, that would have done me a courtesy but could not: and I shall have a will to do him good, because he had a will to pleasure me. Notwithstanding if fortune be so favourable unto me, as that I may have the means to give him anything, it shall not be to gratify his courtesy but to give him a benefit. It shall be his duty to yield me thanks, and the beginning of the debt shall be derived from me.

## CHAPTER XII

The  
difference  
betwixt  
a benefit  
and a  
bargain

I PERCEIVE now already what thou meanest to demand: thou needest not to tell me, thy looks express thy thoughts. Are we indebted in any sort to him (sayest thou) who, to profit him self, hath done us a pleasure? For of this thing oft-times I hear thee complain, that there are some men, who reckon that kindness to be done unto another, which they give to them selves. I will satisfy thee herein, my Liberalis: but first of all I will divide this little question into two parts, and separate that which is just from that which is unjust. For there is a great difference whether a man giveth us a benefit for his own sake, or for our behoof, or for his own and ours. He that solely respecteth his own commodity and profit, and profiteth us notwithstanding (because otherwise he cannot further him self) seemeth, in my judgement, to be all one with him who provides provender and sommer fodder for his cattle; or him that feeds his captives liberally, to the end they may be the better sold; or him that fattens and curries his oxen, to make them more vendible; or that master of skirmish and defence, who exerciseth his family of fencers with great care, and adorneth them most diligently, to the end they may get him maintenance. There is a great difference (as Cleanthes saith) betwixt a benefit, and a negotiation of bargaining.

## CHAPTER XIII

AGAIN, I am not so neglectful or evil, as to forget my acknowledgement towards him, who in being

A benefit profitable unto me, was as provident and careful  
 may to procure his own good. For I do not exact  
 profit the this, that without respect of his own estate, he  
 giver should advance mine: but rather I wish that the  
 benefit which is given me, should most of all  
 redound to his profit that gave me the same. As  
 long as he that gave the same had a respect unto  
 two in giving it, and divided the same betwixt  
 him self and me, although he for the most part  
 possess the same, if he admit me as a co-partner  
 with him, if he thought on two: I am not only  
 ungrateful but unjust, except I rejoice that he found  
 profit by that which was profitable to me. It is  
 an effect of excessive malice, not to call that a  
 benefit, except it be such a thing as returneth the  
 giver thereof some incommmodity. I will answer  
 him after another manner, who giveth the benefit  
 for his own sake: why wilt thou say that thou  
 hast rather profited me, than I pleased thee?  
 Put case (saith he) that I cannot otherwise obtain  
 a magistracy, except I redeem ten captive citizens,  
 amongst a number of others that are in thralldom  
 and servitude: shalt thou owe me nothing when  
 I have delivered thee from servitude and bonds?  
 yet will I do this for mine own sake. To this I  
 answer: Herein doest thou somewhat for thine  
 own sake, and somewhat for mine. It is for  
 thine own sake that thou redeemest me, and  
 for my sake that thou chooseth me. For it is  
 enough for thee in regard of thine own profit,  
 to have redeemed any whatsoever. I therefore  
 am indebted to thee, not because thou hast re-  
 deemed me; but because thou chooseth me: for  
 thou mightest have attained as much by another  
 man's redemption, as thou dost by mine. Thou

dividest with me the profit of the thing, and makest me partner of that benefit which should profit two. Thou preferrest me before others, thou doest all this for my sake: if therefore the redemption of ten captives should make thee prætor, and we were only ten captives, none of us should any ways be indebted unto thee, because thou shouldest have nothing that were withdrawn from thy profit, that thou mightest impart to any of us. I am no malicious interpreter of a benefit, neither desire I that the pleasure should redound only to my self, but to thy self likewise.

but not  
if meant  
to profit  
him only

#### CHAPTER XIV

WHAT therefore (saith he) if I had commanded all your names to be cast into lots, and your name amongst the number of such as were to be ransomed, were admitted to pass, shouldest thou owe me nothing? undoubtedly I should be indebted unto thee but very little. And what this is I will let thee know, thou doest somewhat for my sake, because thou admittest me to the fortune of redemption: because my name was registered amongst the rest. I owe this to fortune that my name was drawn amongst the rest, to thee that it might be drawn. Thou gavest me an entrance to a benefit, the greater part whereof I owe unto fortune: but the ability I had to be indebted to fortune, that owe I to thee. As for those who set sail on those curtesies they do to others, I will wholly overpass them: because they respect not to whom they give, but for what advantage they gave, and such a benefit as this returneth every way to his hands that gave the same. A certain man hath sold me

That which I bought I owe not corn. I cannot live except I buy the same, yet am I not obliged to him for my life because I bought the same: neither estimate I how necessary it was without which I could not live, but how freely it was bestowed, which I should not have had except I had bought it. In the conveyance whereof unto me, the merchant thought not how much succours he should bring me, but how much profit he should breed unto him self. That which I bought I owe not.

## CHAPTER XV

IN this manner (saith he) thou wilt say that thou art no ways indebted to the physician, except it be for some small fee, nor to thy master, because thou hast paid him some money: but amongst us we yield them much reverence, and offered them more love. To this I answer, that there are some things more precious than we prize them. Thou buyest at the physician's hands an estimable treasure, to wit, thy life and health: from thy master and instructor in good arts, liberal studies, and the certain ornaments and riches of thy mind. To these therefore we pay not the price of that they give us, but the reward of their labours, because they serve us, and abandon their own particular affairs to attend ours. They receive the reward, not of their merit, but of their travail. Another answer may be given to this, more answerable unto truth, whereof hereafter I will entreat, when I have first of all made it apparent how this may be disproved. Certain things (saith he) are more worth than they were sold for, and therefore although they are bargained for and bought, thou



owest me somewhat over and besides for them. First of all, what skilleth it how much they are worth, whenas both the buyer and seller are agreed upon the price? Again, he sold it not at his own price and valuation, but at thine: it is more worth (saith he) than it was sold for; but it could not be sold for more. And the time is it that giveth the price unto all things, when thou hast praised them to the uttermost, they are worth but as much as may be gotten for them; besides, he oweth nothing to the seller, that hath bought it cheap: moreover, although these things are more worth, yet is it no thanks to thee, considering that the estimation of these things dependeth not upon the use and effect of them, but upon the custom and scarcity of them. What pay dost thou allot him that crosseth the seas, and having lost the sight of land, cutteth thorow the middest of the waves an assured and direct course, and foreseeing future tempests, even then when there is greatest appearance of security, commandeth suddenly to strike the sails, to stoop the top-sails, and to be addressed to endure the sudden assault of a storm? yet pay we the reward of so great a merit, no otherwise than with an ordinary fare. How much valuest thou a lodging in a desert, a shade in a shower, a stove or fire in cold weather? yet know I how much I shall pay for this, when I come to mine inn. How greatly befriendeth he us, that keepeth our house from falling, that underproppeth it with great cunning, and upholdeth it in the air, being cleft and windshaken from the very foundation: yet neither the supporting nor undersetting cost me very much. The wall of a city keepeth us in safety from our enemies, and the sudden incursion

Real  
worth and  
current  
worth

The manner of giving a due of thieves. Yet is it well known what wages the mason deserved by day, that builded those fair towers and strong bulwarks, that were raised for the public security of the inhabitants.

## CHAPTER XVI

IT were an endless matter for me, if I should gather together those plenty of examples, whereby it might appear that there are great and precious things, which cost us very little. What then? why is it that I owe some great matter to my physician and master, and fail in the satisfaction of that which they have worthily deserved? Because, of a physician and schoolmaster they become our friends, and oblige us not by the art they sell us, but by their gracious and familiar good will. To the physician therefore (who doth no more than touch my purse, and numbereth me amongst one of those his patients, whom he ordinarily walketh to, and visiteth, prescribing me without any particular affection, what I ought to do, and what I ought to eschew:) I owe no more, and am no whit indebted: because he visiteth me not as a friend, but for that I had enjoined him to come unto me: neither have I cause to reverence my master, if he hath made no more account of me, than of one of his ordinary scholars, if he thought me not worthy of private and peculiar care; if he have never settled his thoughts upon me, and when generally he imparted his knowledge to the rest of his scholars, I rather gathered from him, than learned of him. What is the cause then, why I should owe so much unto these? Not because that which they sold is more

worth than we bought, but because in particular they have given us something overplus. This physician bestowed more labour on me than he was bound to do, he had more care of me than of his reputation and credit, he not only contented not him self to prescribe me remedies, but also vouchsafed to apply and minister them. In the meanwhile he sat carefully by me, and succoured me, and prevented the suspected time, and rigour of my access; no office distasted him, no pain disliked him; if he had seen me bemoan my self, he was sorrowful. Amongst all those that called him, he had a particular care of me, he implied no other time in visiting the rest of his sick patients, than such wherein my infirmity remitted and gave him opportunity. To this man I am not tied, as to a physician, but as to a friend. Again, that other schoolmaster took great care and pains in teaching and instructing me; and besides those lessons and common lectures which he communicated to all particularly, he reformed me in some points of importance, he quickened my spirits by good exhortation, and sometimes by praises he animated me in my studies, and sometimes by admonitions discussed my sloth. Furthermore (if I may so speak it) he by the hand of his industry drew out and whetted my hidden and heavy wit, too much drowned in the prison of my body, neither lingeringly and subtilly dispensed he his knowledge, to the end I might have longer use and need of him, but desired, if he might, to communicate unto me at one instant, all that which he knew. Ungrateful am I, except I love him as one of my most grateful and truest friends.

may  
make it  
a benefit

A benefit  
must be  
peculiar  
to one

## CHAPTER XVII

WE allow always somewhat (over and above the ordinary rate we buy at) to merchants and sailors (even in the most mechanic and basest trades and offices) if we perceive some extraordinary diligence in the service we employ them in, and to the master of a ship and workman of a base price, how base soever they be, although they be but day-hirelings, we allow some overplus above his pay. Unthankful then is he, that in the best arts, which either preserve or adorn man's life: that supposeth him self to be no more indebted, than for that he covenanted. Add hereunto that the tradition of such studies uniteth and allieth minds together, when this is done, both the physician and the schoolmaster have received the reward of their labour, but their affections and good minds rest yet unsatisfied.

## CHAPTER XVIII

WHEN Plato had crossed a certain river in a ferry-boat, and the ferryman had exacted nothing for his passage, supposing that it had been done for his honour's sake, he said unto the ferryman, that Plato owed him a good turn; but anon after perceiving, that with no less diligence he freely transported many others: Friend, said he, thou hast now discharged me of that obligation, whereby I held my self tied and bound unto thee. For to the end to make me thy debtor, for anything thou givest me, thou art bound not only to give it me, but to give it me solely, as to my self: for that which thou

givest unto a multitude, thou hast no reason to redemand at a private man's hand. How then? Is there nothing due for this? nothing, as for one in particular, I will pay with all that I owe thee withal.

A general  
benefit

## CHAPTER. XIX

THOU deniest then (saith he) that he giveth me a benefit, that freely and without recompense transported me over the river of Po. True it is he doth me some good, but he giveth me no benefit, for he doth it for his own sake, or at leastwise not for mine. In sum, neither doth he him self judge that he giveth me a benefit, but he doth it either for the commonweal's sake, or for his neighbours' sake, or for his own ambition's sake; and for this expecteth he some certain other commodity, than that which he is to receive from every private person. What then (saith he) if a prince should give immunities to all Frenchmen, and discharge all Spaniards of paying tribute, should not every one of them in this case be particularly bound unto him? Why should they not be obliged? undoubtedly they cannot be otherwise, yet not for a particular, but for a part of a public benefit. But (sayest thou) he never thought on me. At that time when he did so much good unto all men, he had no particular intent to give me the city, neither addressed he his purposes to my profit: wherefore then should I be obliged to him in anything, who no ways thought on me at such time as he was to act that which he intended? First whenas he bethought him self to do good unto all the Gauls,

To me he thought also of me, because I was a Gaul, and yet not comprehended me, although not by my proper name, yet under the public name of the nation. Again, I shall not be tied to him, as if the good were properly and particularly mine, but as one that partaked his favour amongst the commonalty. I will not satisfy as in mine own behalf; but I will contribute as for the common good of my country.

## CHAPTER XX

IF a man lend a sum of money to my country, I will not say that I am indebted to him, neither will I acknowledge it as my debt, although I sued for a public office, neither also if I were sued as a debtor; yet will I contribute my part in payment of this debt. In like sort, I deny that I am debtor for the favour that is done unto all my nation, because he gave it me, yet not for me; and in such manner gave it me, that in giving the same he knew not whether he gave it me, yea or no: yet know I that I must pay some portion thereof, because the good by one means or other appertaineth to me, and tieth me to requite it. It must be done for me that shall oblige me. In the same sort (saith he) neither owest thou anything to the moon or sun; for they are not moved for thy sake: but whereas they are moved to this end, that they may preserve all things, they move for me also, for I am a part of the universe. Moreover, our condition and theirs are different: for he that profiteth me, to the intent that by my means he may further him self, gave me no benefit, because

he made me the instrument of his profit. But the sun and moon, although they do us good, yet to this end profit they us not, that by our means they should profit them selves: for what can we befriend or further them in?

Choice  
and com-  
pulsion

## CHAPTER XXI

I SHALL know (saith he) that the sun and moon have a will to profit us, if they had the power not to be willing: but they cannot surcease to stay their motion, neither can they abridge or intermit their accustomed travel. See by how many ways this may be refelled. A man is not therefore the less willing, because he cannot be unwilling, nay, rather it is a great argument of a firm will, not to be able at any time to change. A good man cannot choose but do that which he doth: for he shall not be a good man except he do it. Therefore a good man bestoweth no benefit, because he doth that which he ought to do, but he cannot do otherwise than that which he ought. Besides, there is much difference whether thou sayest, He cannot choose but do this, because he is compelled: or, He cannot be unwilling to do it. For if he must needs do it, I am not tied unto him for his benefit, but to him that compelled him. But if the necessity of his willingness proceed of this, because he hath nothing better that he can will, then is it he him self that compelleth him self. And so, look for what thing I should not have been beholding to him, as compelled by others for the same; shall I be beholding to him, as to the compeller of him self? This will make them cease (saith he). I

Com-  
pulsion  
of nature

pray you think a little on this matter : what man is he, so void of understanding, that will deny that it is no willingness in him that acteth anything, which is not accompanied with danger of impediment in performance, or altering it self to the contrary, seeing that on the other side no man may of right seem so willing, as he whose will is so assuredly certain, that it remaineth eternal and immutable? If he be willing, that may anon after be unwilling: shall not he be thought to be willing, who is of that nature that he cannot be unwilling?

## CHAPTER XXII

BUT (saith he) let them stand still, and leave to move if they can. It is as much as if thou saidst, that these stars which are separated by so great distances the one from the other, that are ranged in so goodly an order, to conserve and entertain the whole world in his entire, should abandon their places, that the planets being troubled with a sudden confusion, should intercheck and come one against another, and having broken the repose and concord of all things: that the heaven it self should fall into an irreparable ruin, that the course of so violent a swiftness, which had promised to be never interrupted, should stay in the midst of his way: that the heaven and stars, that moved them selves of late, the one after the other, in so just a measure, that equally and by agreeable seasons tempered the whole world, should be burned and consumed in a sudden flame: that so great a variety of all things should be dissolved and abolished, that they should return into one, that the fire should seize



all, that afterwards a darksome and heavy night should obscure this world, and that finally a bottomless gulf should devour and swallow this great number of the gods. We must not admit an evil so pernicious; it must not cost so dear to prove thee a liar. The stars have power to give thee all this in despite of thy self: they finish their courses and ordinary revolutions for thy great profit, although there be another more great and original cause that moveth them.

The immutable will of the gods

## CHAPTER XXIII

FURTHERMORE add thou this, that there is not any foreign cause that may constrain the gods: their eternal and inviolable will is that which serveth them for a law: they have established that which they intend not to alter. They therefore cannot seem to do anything against their will: for whatsoever cannot end or cease to be, they would have to continue still; neither do the gods repent them ever of their first counsels. Undoubtedly they cannot stand still, or run a contrary course, yet not for all this do they keep their wonted course out of weakness, because their own force keepeth them in the same purpose still; yet observe they not the same of weakness, but because it becometh them not to alter or err from the best course, and because they have determined so to go and shape their courses. Most certain it is, that amongst their first ordinances they established, in disposing all things, they likewise had a care of us, and conceived some special regard of man. They

The gods  
minded  
us before  
they  
made us

therefore cannot seem to shape their courses for their own cause only, and to accomplish their own works for their own selves, because men also are a part of their work. We are then obliged to the sun and moon, and the other powers of heaven for the good they do us. For although they have more great ends for which they rise and set than only for us, yet aiming at greater, they help us also purposely. And for this cause we are obliged unto them, because we did not light upon their benefits without their knowledge, to whom they gave them, but they knew certainly that we should receive them. And although their intentions be more eminent, and the fruit of their travail more great and pertinent, than to nourish and conserve mortal things: yet so it is, that in the first beginning of the world, they have employed their thoughts on our profit, they have prefixed such ordinances and laws unto the heavens, that it evidently appeareth what care they had of us, and that it was neither their least nor last. We owe our parents honour and reverence, yet many of them matched and married without desire to beget children. The gods cannot seem to be ignorant of that they ought to do, whereas they have suddenly provided us of nourishment, and all other things that are necessary for us; neither carelessly created they them, for whom they created so many things. For Nature minded us before she made us: neither are we a work of little importance, that she could make us by chance, as doing something else. See how great a power she hath given into our hands: consider how the condition of command, which she hath given to man, is not only over men. See what liberty our bodies have, to wander and traverse

over many places. See how she limiteth them not within any certain bound of land, but sendeth them into all places, yea, into every corner of the world. Consider the confidence of human understanding: see how they only either know or seek the gods, and raising their minds aloft, they converse with, and contemplate those divine influences continually. Believe then that man is not a rash or unthought-upon work. Nature amongst her greatest works hath nothing whereof she may more vaunt, or to whom she may vaunt of her workmanship, or that she would replenish with more great glory. How great a madness is this to call the gods in question about their own blessings? How can he be thankful to them, whose curtesies he cannot requite without charge: who denieth that he hath received them from the gods, which will both give always and receive never? What refractory and perverse mind hath he, that will not be grateful or beholding to any, because his liberality extendeth to such a one, as denieth the good that is given him, and to term the continuation an immutable order of their benefits, an argument of one that giveth of necessity? and to say, I care not for his curtesies, let him keep them to him self, who requireth them at his hands? And an infinite sort of other such like purposes, proceeding from an impudent mind, which thou mayest pack and number with these: yet shall not he deserve the less at thy hands, whose beauty redounds unto thee, even whilst thou deniest it, and of whose benefits even this is one of the greatest, that he is ready to relieve thee, even then when thou complainest most against him.

They  
are good  
even to  
the un-  
thankful

The  
benefit  
of good  
training

## CHAPTER XXIV

SEEST thou not how parents in their children's most tender infancy, constrain them to suffer those things patiently, which are most healthful for them? With diligent care they nourish their tender bodies, and still them when they cry, and swathe them when they struggle; and lest continual slackness might make them grow awry, they bind them straight to make them grow right: when their infancy is past, they present them liberal sciences, threatening them with the rod if they be negligent: and finally, when they grow to more maturity, they teach them to be sober, and counsel them to do nothing that should breed their shame: they fashion them in good manners, and if their youth as yet be not liable to obedience, forcibly they constrain that by awe which counsel could not effect: at last, having attained to full growth and maturity, and to have a feeling of their own government, if either by intemperance or fear, they reject the counsels and remedies, which are given them for their profit, they use greater violence and servitude. So that the greatest benefits which we receive of our parents, is at such time as we know them not, or when we refuse them wholly.

## CHAPTER XXV

To this sort of ungrateful men, and such as refuse benefits, not because they desire them not, but for that they would not remain indebted, they are like, who contrariwise will be over-grateful: who wish that some adversity and mishap may befall those

to whom they are obliged, to the end they may have an argument and occasion, to let them know how needful they are of the benefit, and what desire they have to make restitution. The question is, whether such sort of men do well to desire and wish the same, and whether their desire be honest? These kind of thankful men, in my judgement, resemble them very much, who, inflamed with lascivious love, do wish their lover banishment, to the end they might accompany her in her distress and departure: or wish to see her in necessity, to the end they might relieve her misery: or to see her sick, to the end they might sit by her, and tend her: and finally, which under profession of love, do wish whatsoever her enemy would have wished unto her. Assuredly the issue of this foolish love and capital hate are well near all one. Into this very inconvenience do they fall, who wish that their friends were in misery, to the end they might afterwards relieve them, and make way to benefiting, by doing them wrong, whereas it were much better utterly to desist, than to seek occasion to do a curtesy by means of wickedness. What if a master of a ship should pray the gods to send them cruel storms and tempests, that by the danger his art might be held more gracious? What if an emperor should beseech the gods, that a great multitude of enemies might besiege his camp, and with sudden assault fill full the trenches, and raze down the ramparts, and (to the great amaze of his army) advance their colours even in the very entrance of his fortifications, to the end he might receive more honour and glory, in succouring his army in this great danger, and at that very instant, when his whole camp imagined the

A  
perverse  
kind of  
good-will

A lesser wrong is no less wrong field to be lost, and the army discomforted: all these convey their benefits by a detestable way, who call the gods to plague him, whom they themselves would profit, and to hate them, whom they themselves would relieve. Inhuman and perverse is the nature of this grateful mind, which wisheth evil unto him, whom he cannot honestly forsake.

## CHAPTER XXVI

My wish (saith he) hindereth him no ways, because I wish the peril and remedy both at once. This is as much as if thou saidst that thou hast committed some small fault, but that thou sinnest lesser, than if thou shouldest wish him danger without remedy. It is mere wickedness to plunge a man into a river, to the end to draw him out, to ruinate that thou mayest rectify, to imprison, that thou mayest deliver. The end of an injury is no benefit, neither is it a part of kindness to withdraw that from one, which he him self had laid upon him. I had rather thou shouldest not wound me, than that thou shouldest not heal me. Thou mayest deserve my thanks, if thou healest me, because I am wounded, but not if thou wound me to the end I may be healed: the scar never pleased, but in comparison of the wound, for the healing whereof we so rejoyce, that we had rather not to have been wounded: if thou shouldest wish this unto him, that had never done the good turn, the vow were inhuman, but how much more inhuman were it to wish it him, to whom thou art indebted for a curtesy.

Better to  
owe well  
than to  
pay ill

## CHAPTER XXVII

I WISH that (saith he) at one and the same time I may yield him some succour. First, that I may prevent thee in the midst of thy wish; thou art already ungrateful. I hear not as yet, what thou intendest to do for him, yet know I well, what thou wouldest he should endure: thou wishest that care, fear, or some greater mischief should befall him, thou desirest that he may want help, and this is against him. Thou desirest that he may need thy help; this is for thee, thou wilt not succour him, but pay him satisfaction. He that hasteth the matter thus, would him self be paid, not pay. So that the only thing that might seem honest in thy vow, is dishonest and ungrateful, to wit, not to be willing to owe anything. For thou desirest not, that thou mayest have ability to requite a courtesy, but that he may have need to implore thy help. Thou makest thyself his superior, and (which is a heinous wickedness in thee) thou castest him down at thy feet, that hath deserved well at thy hands. How much better is it to owe with an honest good will, than to pay by an evil means? If thou shouldest deny that thou hast received, thou shouldest sin less, for he should lose nothing more than he had given. But now thy intent is, to bring him under thy subjection, even with the loss of his own fortunes, and to be drawn to that disaster by the change of his estate, that he must lie lower than his own benefit. Wilt thou that I report thee for a grateful man? Wish it in his presence, to whom thou wilt yield profit. Terrest thou this a wish, which is as well divided

An impious wish between a friend, as an enemy? which undoubtedly an adversary or enemy would have made, if the latter points only were excepted? Mortal enemies also have wished, that they might surprise certain cities, to the end they might preserve them, and to overcome some enemy of theirs, to the end they might pardon them: neither therefore are their vows other than hostile, in which, that which is most courteous and calm, succeedeth cruelty. To conclude, what kind of vows judgest thou them to be, which no man would wish less prosperous unto thee, than he for whom thou vowest them? Thou dealest most injuriously with him, to whom thou wishest, that the gods should hurt, to the end he may be helped by thee; and impiously also with the gods themselves, for thou puttest over the cruelty to them, and reservest the humanity to thy self. Shall the gods be injurious, to the end thou mayest be courteous? If thou shouldest suborn an accuser, whom afterwards thou wouldest remove; if thou shouldest entangle him, in some suit of law, to the end thou mightest deliver and discharge him thereof; there is no man that would grow doubtful of thy impiety: what difference is there, whether this thing be attempted by fraud or by vow? saving that thou seekest more powerful adversaries for him. Thou canst not say, What wrong have I done unto him? Thy vow is either fruitless or injurious, nay rather it is wrongful, although it be not successful. Whatsoever thou effectest not, it is God's mercy, but whatsoever thou wishest is mere injury. The matter is plain enough. We ought no otherwise to be displeas'd with thee, than if thou hadst effected it.



## CHAPTER XXVIII

A more  
honest  
vow

IF vows (saith he) had been any ways available, they had prevailed in this, that thou shouldest be in safety. First of all, thou wishest me an assured peril, under an uncertain help. Again, suppose both are certain, yet that which hurteth is foremost. Furthermore, thou knowest the condition of thy vow: a tempest hath surprised me, uncertain of either haven or help. How great a torment supposest thou that it was for me to have wanted them, although at length I recover them? to have feared, although I be preserved; come to trial, and drawn in question, although I were acquitted? There is no end of fear so pleasing, that a solid and unshaken security is not more acceptable: wish that thou mayest restore me a benefit when I have need; not that I may have need. If that thou wishest, were in thy power, thou thy self wouldest have done it.

## CHAPTER XXIX

How far more honest is this vow: I desire he should continue in that estate wherein he might always distribute benefits, and never need them. Let the means and matter which he so bountifully useth in giving and assisting, so follow and second him, that he never want occasion of giving benefits; or repent him of that he hath given. Let the multitude of grateful men stir up and provoke his nature (of it self prone enough to humanity) to mercy and clemency. Whom let him never want to befriend, nor have need to try. Let him be

The  
part of a  
true well-  
wisher

merciless to none, and have no need of being reconciled to any man. Let Fortune persevere to be so equally favourable unto him, that no man may be grateful unto him, but in mind and acknowledgement. How far more just are these vows, which defer thee not in expectation of any occasion, but make thee presently grateful! For what letteth us to be thankful to those that are in prosperity? How many means are there, whereby we may yield satisfaction to those to whom we are obliged, although they be happy! Faithful counsel, diligent conversation, familiar speech are pleasing, without flattery, ears diligent, if he would deliberate, secret, if he would trust, familiarity in conversation. Prosperity never raised a man so high, that by so much the rather he had not want of a friend, by how much he had affluence in all things.

### CHAPTER XXX

THIS hateful and damnable occasion is every way to be detested and driven far from us. Must thou needs have the gods displeased, to the end thou mayest be grateful? And understandest thou not, that hereby thou sinnest more, because he to whom thou art ungrateful hath the better fortune? Propose unto thy mind imprisonment, chains, stink, servitude, war, poverty; these are the occasions of thy vow: if any man hath covenanted with thee, by these he is dismissed. Why rather wouldest thou not have him mighty and blessed, to whom thou art most indebted? For what (as I said) forbiddeth thee to be grateful even unto

those that are endued with the happiest estate, whereas thou hast ample and several matter and occasion to express thy self? What that men pay debts even unto those that are the wealthiest? neither will I constrain thee against thy will. Truly, although most powerful felicity hath excluded all things, yet will I show thee what thing it is that greatest estates are poorest in, and what things are deficient to those that possess all things. Truly such a one that will speak truth, that will vindicate a man astonished and amazed amongst flatterers, and drawn from the knowledge of truth, by the very custom of hearing rather pleasing than profitable counsels, from the company and consent of deceitful men. Seest thou not how extinguished liberty and faith transformed to servile obsequiousness, drive them headlong to their ruin, where no man persuadeth or dissuadeth him according to his conscience, but each man striveth who may flatter most, and the only office and contention of all his friends is, who can deceive him most pleasingly? They knew not their own forces, and whilst they suppose them selves to be so great, as they hear they be, they brought upon them selves unnecessary wars, and such as should hazard their whole estates, they break the true and necessary concord, and feeding their own wrathful spleen, which no man revoked, they drew many men's blood, being at last like to lose their own; whilst they seek to get uncertainties for certainties; and think it no less disgraceful to be persuaded, than to be overcome, and suppose those things to be perpetual, which being brought to the highest, do most of all stagger. They overturned great kingdoms upon themselves and theirs, neither under-

The  
evils of  
flattery

The ruin of greatness stood they in that stage glistening both with vain and transitory goods, from that time forward that they should expect very great adversities; since when they could hear nothing that was true.

## CHAPTER XXXI

WHEN Xerxes proclaimed war against Greece, there was no one but enkindled and incited his proud and forgetful mind, to what fickle and frail things he trusted. One said that they would not endure the first message of the war, and that upon the first rumour of his approach, they would turn their backs. Another that it was not to be doubted, that not only Greece would be overcome by that huge multitude, but that it might be overwhelmed: that it was more to be feared, lest they should find their cities desert and desolate, and the vast solitudes left to them, and the enemies flying, not having no opposite whereon to employ his so puissant power. Another, that the whole world was not sufficient for him, that the seas were too narrow for his navy, his camp for his soldiers, the fields to embattell his cavalry, nay scarce the heaven large enough to contain the shafts that should be darted from every hand. When after this manner many things were tossed and talked of on every side, which incited the man, too much enraged and besotted with esteem of him self, Demaratus the Lacedemonian was only he that said, that that very multitude so disordered and so mighty, which was so pleasing unto him, was most of all to be feared by him that conducted them, because they were rather cumbersome than strong, that over

great things can hardly be ruled, neither endureth that long, which cannot be governed. Presently, said he, upon the first encounter, the Lacedæmonians will come and present themselves unto thee upon the first mountain, that thou wouldest pass, and will make thee know what they are: three hundred soldiers shall make stand these so many thousand men; they shall plant themselves strongly in the passages, and defend the straits committed to their charge, and stop them up with their bodies: all Asia shall not remove them from their places. A few men shall sustain so great affront of war, and the charge almost of all mankind that intendeth to rush in upon them. When Nature changing her laws, hath made thee pass into Greece, thou shalt stick in the strait, and shalt esteem thy future damages, whenas thou shalt think how much the straits of Thermopylæ cost thee. Thou shalt know that thou mayest be put to flight, when thou understandest that thou mayest be stayed. Haply in divers places they will give thee passage, and retire, as if carried away after the manner of a torrent, whose first forces overfloweth with great terror, afterwards they shall muster and charge thee on every side, and shall overpress thee with thine own power. True it is that is said, that thy show of war is greater than these regions can contain, which thou intendest to conquer. But this thing is against us: for this very cause will Greece overcome thee, because she is not able to contain thee, and thou canst not use thy whole self. Moreover (which is the only safeguard of things) thou canst not prevent or be present at the first assaults, neither second those that begin to retreat and decline,

in the  
false-  
hood of  
flatterers

**The reward of truth-speaking** neither sustain and confirm those things that fall to ruin: thou shalt be vanquished long before thou shalt perceive thy self to be overcome. Furthermore, thou art not therefore to suppose that thine army is invincible for this cause, because the number of them is unknown, even unto him who is their leader. There is nothing so great that cannot perish; and though other occasions wanted, yet would the owner thereof be the cause of his own destruction. The things that Demaratus foretold came truly to pass. He that thought to enforce both heaven and earth, and he that changed whatsoever withstood him, was driven to a stand by three hundred soldiers. And so Xerxes being defeated and overthrown on every side thorow all Greece, began to learn how much difference there was betwixt a multitude and an army. Xerxes therefore being more miserable in his shame than in his loss, gave Demaratus thanks, for that he alone had told him the truth, and permitted him to require what he would: he desired that he might enter Sardis, the greatest city of Asia, in a chariot triumphant, having an upright tiara on his head, an ornament which the kings did only use to wear. Worthy was he of this reward, before he demanded it, but how miserable was that nation, among whom there was not one man that would speak the truth unto the king, except he would not speak truth unto him self.

## CHAPTER XXXII

THE Emperor Augustus banished and confined his daughter, that was grown so impudent, that her

modesty exceeded this common course, and blazed abroad the whoredoms of the imperial house, as how she had admitted whole troops of adulteries, spent the whole night in banquets here and there in the city, how she had soiled and sinned with her adulterers, in that very court and judgement seat, from whence her father had published laws against adulteries, her daily haunt and concourse to Marsyas' stall, whereas from an adulteress she became a common strumpet, and required the liberty of all licentiousness, under an unknown adulterer. These things which a prince ought as well to conceal, as to punish (because the dishonour and disgrace of some things oftentimes redoundeth to him who would punish the same) he unable to conquer his displeasure published abroad. Afterwards some few days past, when remorseful shame had supplied the place of his displeasure, lamenting that he had not obscured those things in silence, which so long time he was ignorant of, till it was loathsome for him to speak it, he oftentimes exclaimed, None of these things had befallen me, if either Agrippa or Mæcenas had lived. So hard a thing is it to him that had so many thousands at his beck, to supply the want of two. His legions are slain, and forthwith new are levied: his navy defeated, and within few days anew floated: fire had defaced and consumed the common buildings, and better were raised than those that were burned; but all his lifetime he could not find any to supply Mæcenas' or Agrippa's places. What shall I think? Did there want such to succeed them, or that it was his error, who had rather complain than seek friends? There is no cause we should imagine that Agrippa and Mæcenas

The  
value  
of two  
men

**lesson for upright counsellors** A were wont to speak truth unto him, who had they lived, had been amongst his dissemblers. It is the manner of kingly dispositions, in contumely of the living, to praise those that are lost, and to give them the honour of speaking truth, from whom they are now out of danger of hearing any more.

### CHAPTER XXXIII

**BUT** that I may return unto my purpose: thou seest how easy a thing it is to be thankful to those that are happy, and are planted in the height of human riches. Tell them not that which they are willing to hear, but that they should be contented always to hear. Let sometimes a true word enter their ears which are filled with flatteries: give profitable counsel. Thou askest what thou mayest do for a happy man? Bring to pass that he be not too confident in his fortune, that he may know, that many and faithful hands must sustain the same. Is the favour little thou bestowest of him, if thou shalt once drive him from this foolish confidence, that his power shall be always perdurable, and shalt teach him that these things are transitory, that casually yield, and fleet away with greater forwardness, than they come, neither return by those means, whereby they attained their felicity? That oftentimes there is but little difference betwixt the greatest and lowest fortune. Thou knowest not the value of friendship, if thou understandest not, that thou shalt give him very much to whom thou givest a friend, a thing not only rare in houses but in ages, which is nowhere



so deficient, than where it is supposed to be most abundant. What thinkest thou, that these books of thine, which scarce thy remembrancers, or registred memory, or hands can comprehend, are the names of thy friends? These are not thy friends which in great troops knock at thy doors, who are disposed according to the first and second admissions to visit. This is an old custom of kings, and those that counterfeit majesty, to number a multitude of friends. It is the property of pride to make great account of his door, and touch of his threshold, to give it as a favour to sit nearest to his closet, that thou step the first foot into his house, in which besides there are many doors, which exclude those that are admitted to enter.

Few  
friends,  
many  
flatterers

## CHAPTER XXXIV

THE first amongst us that commanded their troops should be separated, and that some should be received in secret, other some with many, and other some with all men, were Caius Gracchus, and after him Livius Drusus. These therefore had their first friends: they had their second also, but never any true. Callest thou him thy friend, whom thy servants successively admit to salute thee; or can this man's faith be apparent unto thee, who entereth not, but slippeth and throngeth into thy doors, that are so hardly gotten open? May that man press in to thee with full use of his liberty, which may not salute thee with God save thee, a common and usual word to all persons, yea, even to those that are strangers; but in his turn? To whomsoever therefore of these thou shalt come

Where the true friend is entertained whose salutation shaketh the city: know thou likewise, if thou mark it, that although thou see the streets besieged with a great assembly of people, and the passages locked up with the press of those that go and come to salute thee, yet that thou comest to a place filled with men, but void of friends. A friend is sought in the breast, not in the court of thy house: there must he be entertained, there retained, and in the very entrails must he be lodged. Teach him this, thou art grateful. Thou esteemest very basely of thy self if thou art unprofitable, except it be to one in affliction, or if thou think thy self unnecessary in time of prosperity. Even as thou demeanest thy self wisely both in doubtful, adverse, and prosperous affairs, that in doubtful thou handlest them wisely, in adverse constantly, in prosperity moderately: so likewise mayest thou show thy self profitable in all things in thy friend's behalf. Although thou neither forsake him in his adversities, neither with his misery; yet in so much variety many things may fall out that thou shouldest not wish, which will afford thee matter to exercise thy faith. Even as he that wisheth riches to any man, to this end, that he him self may partake a part thereof, although he seem to wish for him, hath a respect unto him self: so he that wisheth his friend any necessity, which by his assistance and faith he may relieve (which is the part of ungrateful man) preferreth him self before his friend, and maketh so great accompt, that he should be miserable, that he him self might be grateful, for this very cause is him self ungrateful. For he would disburthen him self, and discharge him self of a burthen too heavy to sustain. There is a great difference, whether thou hastenest to

give thanks to the end thou maist restore a benefit, or to the end thou mightest not owe it. He that will be grateful will apply him self to his friend's commodity, and desireth that he may have a fit opportunity. He that desireth nothing else, but that him self may be discharged, desireth by any means to accomplish the same, which is an argument of a most evil will.

An un-  
grateful  
wish

### CHAPTER XXXV

THIS too much hastening say I, is the act of an ungrateful man, this can I not more manifestly express, than if I should repeat what I said. Thou wilt not restore a benefit thou hast received, but thou wilt fly from it. This seemest thou to say: When shall I be rid of this fellow? I must endeavour by all the means I can, that I may not be beholding unto him. If thou shouldest wish that thou mightest pay him with his own, thou shouldest seem to be very dishonest and unthankful, but this thou wishest is far more wicked. For thou cursest him, thou desirest that mischief might fall on his head, whom thou shouldest accompt both holy and sacred. No man as I think would doubt of the impiety of thy mind, if thou shouldest openly wish him poverty, if captivity, if famine and fear. And what difference is there whether this be thy voice or thy vow? wish any of these in thy right wits. Go to now, and suppose this to be a point of thankfulness, which the most ungrateful man would not attempt, that were not grown so far as to hate but only to deny his benefit.

The  
precedent  
reasons

## CHAPTER XXXVI

WHO would entitle Æneas by the name of pious, if he would have his country sacked, to the end he might deliver his father from captivity? who would not imagine the young men of Sicily unnatural, if to show good example to their children, they had wished that Etna burning with an immeasurable force of fire above custom should give them occasion to express their piety by carrying away their fathers out of the midst of the fire? Rome is nothing indebted unto Scipio, if he wished the continuance of the Carthaginian wars: nor beholding to the Decians who saved their country by their own slaughter, if they had formerly wished that extreme necessity should make place for their constant devotion. It is the greatest disgrace for a physician that may be, to wish for business. Many who increased and exasperated diseases, to the end they might cure them with greater glory, could not afterwards expel them, or to the great agony and vexation of the miserable patients, have at last overcome them.

## CHAPTER XXXVII

THEY say that Callistratus (for truly Hecaton testifieth of him) when he departed into exile, into which the seditious and intemperately free city, had expelled many with him: when a certain man wished, that the Athenians might be enforced to recall their banished men, was much distasted with such a return. Far more manly and full of magnanimity was that of Rutilius, for

whenas a certain man comforted him, and assured him that civil war was intended shortly, and that in few days all banishments should be reversed, What evil (saith he) have I done thee, that thou wishest me a worser return, than I had a departure? I had rather my country should be ashamed of my banishment, than bewail my return. This is no exile where no man is more ashamed thereof, than he that is condemned: even as they performed the duty of good citizens, that would not recover their native homes with a public slaughter, because it was more fitting that two should be punished unjustly, than all perish publicly; so observeth he not the affection of a grateful man, who wisheth that he who hath deserved well at his hands should be oppressed with difficulties, which he might redeem. Who although he think well, wisheth evil. It is a poor excuse and a weak glory to extinguish a fire, which thou thy self hath kindled. In some cities a wicked wish hath been reputed for a wicked crime.

are confirmed  
by example

## CHAPTER XXXVIII

TRUE it is that Demades in Athens condemned him that sold necessaries for funerals, whenas he had proved that he wished for great gain, which could not befall him, except it were by many men's deaths. Yet is it wont to be demanded whether he were worthily punished. Perhaps he wished, that he might not sell unto many, but that he might sell dear; that they might cost him little which he was to sell. Whereas negotiation consisteth on that which is bought and sold, why

One man's pleasure wrestest thou his vow one way, whereas profit is in both? Besides thou mayest condemn all that are in this negotiation, for all will the same, all wish the same in their hearts: thou wilt condemn the most part of men. For who hath not profit by another man's incommodity? The soldier wisheth for war: dearth of corn sets up the husbandman. The greatest lawyers desire most pleas. A sick year is the physician's harvest. Such youths as are prodigal and dissolute, rich the merchants of delicate wares. Let houses be neither hurt by fire or tempest, the carpenter may betake him to his rest. One man's vow was excepted at, where all men's are alike. Thinkest thou that Arruntius and Haterius and all others that professed the art of executorship had not the same vows and wishes, as the masters of funeral ceremonies and they who were ministers in burying the dead? yet know not they whose death they wish: they desire that some one of their nearest familiars should die, in whom for friendship sake they had most hope. No man liveth by the loss of those: whosoever differreth the other undoeth them. They therefore wish, not only that they may receive that which they have deserved by base servitude, but also that they may be freed of a grievous tribute. It is not therefore to be doubted, but that these men rather wish that which is condemned in one man. They by whose death any profit may accrue, are hurtful to them by their life. Yet all these men's vows are as well known as unpunished. To conclude let each one take counsel of him self and examine his inward conscience, and see what he hath secretly wished, how many vows are they which we are ashamed to con-

fess unto ourselves? how few which we dare justify and effect before a witness? is another's prejudice

## CHAPTER XXXIX

BUT everything that is to be reprehended, is not to be condemned as this vow of a friend, whereof at this present we entreat, abusing his goodwill, and falling into that which he flieth from. For whilst he hasteneth to express a grateful mind, he is ungrateful. This man saith, Let him fall into my hands, let him want my favour, let him neither be secure, in esteem, or safe without me, let him be so poor and miserable, that whatsoever is restored him, may serve him instead of a benefit. And this in the hearing of the gods. Let domestic treasons circumvent him, which I alone may suppress. Let a potent and heavy enemy assault him, deadly foes, and they armed, charge him, a creditor and accuser urge him.

## CHAPTER XL

SEE how just thou art: thou haddest wished him none of these, except he had given thee a benefit. To overslip the rest more heinous, which thou committest by returning the worst for the best: truly thou are faulty in this, that thou expectest not the proper time of everything, which, who so followeth not, sinneth as much as he that preventeth it. Even as a benefit is not always to be received, so it is not to be restored in all seasons. If thou shouldest restore it me, when I required it not, thou shouldest be ungrateful; how far more

Instruc- ungrateful art thou, if thou compellest me to desire  
 tions to it! Expect: Why wilt thou not suffer my  
 take benefit to rest in thy hands? Why grieveth it  
 thee to be obliged? Why art thou so hasty to  
 level thy account with me, as if thou haddest to  
 deal with a cruel usurer? Why seekest thou my  
 trouble? Why incensest thou the gods against  
 me? How wouldest thou exact thy debt, if thou  
 satisfy in this sort?

## CHAPTER XLI

ABOVE all things therefore, my Liberalis, let us learn this to owe benefits securely, and to observe the occasions of restitution, and not to seek them, and let us remember ourselves, that this very desire to discharge ourselves speedily, is the act of an ungrateful man. For no man willingly restoreth that which he oweth unwillingly, and that which he repineth to keep by him, he rather judgeth it a burthen than a benefit. How much better and juster were it, to bear the deserts of our friends in memory, and to offer them, and not to press them, nor to think ourselves too much in their debt, because a benefit is a common bond, and linketh two together. Say I care not how thy benefit returneth to thee. I desire thou shouldest receive it cheerfully, if any of us both be threatned with necessity, and it be given us by a certain fate, either that thou be compelled to receive thy benefit again, or I to take another; let him give still that was wont to give. I am ready, 'there is no delay in Turnus': I will show this willing resolution, as soon as time shall happen; in the mean space the gods shall be my witnesses.



## CHAPTER XLII

OFTENTIMES, my Liberalis, I am wont to note this affection in thee, and as it were, touch it with my hand, that thou fearest and frettest, lest thou shouldest be tardy in any office. Anxiety becometh not a grateful mind, but contrariwise an assured confidence of him self. The conscience of true amity should put this care out of our minds. It is as great a vice to receive again that which thou oughtest not, as not to give that which thou oughtest to give. Let this be the first law of a benefit given, that he which gave the same, may make choice of the time when he is to receive it back again. But I fear me, lest men should speak sinisterly of me: He doth badly that is grateful rather for reputation and fame sake, than for conscience and honesty. Thou hast two judges of this thing; thy self whom thou canst not deceive, and him whom thou canst. What then if no occasion shall happen? Shall I always be indebted? Thou shalt be indebted, but openly indebted, but willingly indebted, but with great contentment shalt thou behold the gage laid up by thee. He repenteth him self of a benefit received, that is sorry that as yet he hath not requited it. Why should he that seemed worthy to bestow a benefit on thee, be reputed unworthy to have thee his debtor?

oppo-  
tunity  
in re-  
quital

## CHAPTER XLIII

GREAT are their errors, who believe it to be the act of a great and generous mind to do many courtesies, to give and fill another man's bosom, and enrich his house, whereas sometime it is not a

Requite great mind, but a great fortune that doth it.  
 not un- They know not how much more great and hard  
 season- a matter it is somewhiles to receive, than to lavish  
 ably courtesies. For to the end I may detract from  
 neither, because both of them when they are done  
 out of vertue are equal: it is no less proper to  
 a noble heart to owe, than to give, yet more  
 laborious is this, than that, as the keeping of  
 things received requireth more diligence, than  
 doth the giving of them. We therefore ought  
 not fear, that we restore not time enough, nor  
 hasten to do it out of season, because he sinneth  
 as much that hasteneth to recompense a good turn  
 out of due time, as he that requiteth not when the  
 opportunity is offered him. It is laid up with me  
 for him, neither fear I in his, nor in mine own  
 behalf. He is wholly assured, he cannot lose  
 this benefit, but with me, no not with me also.  
 I have given him thanks, that is as much as I  
 have requited him. He that thinketh very much  
 upon the restoring of his debt, imagineth that the  
 other thinketh upon his satisfaction too much. It  
 behoveth him to be prone to do both the one and  
 the other, if he will receive a benefit again, let us  
 tender it, and deliver it willingly, if he had rather  
 continue it in our custody. Why should we dig  
 up his treasure? Why refuse we to keep it?

He is worthy to do what he listeth.

Touching opinion and report, let  
 us so prize them, as that  
 they should attend us,  
 and not lead us.

# THE SEVENTH BOOK

## THE ARGUMENT OF JUSTUS LIPSIUS

LIKE unto the first : certain questions, and yet things profitable, intermixed with subtile. That in the beginning serious : that curiosity is to be restrained, and too much desire of knowledge ; that the mind is rather to be applied to manners and vertue, that is, to wisdom. After this a question, upon occasion of the word, Whether any man may give ought to a wise man, whereas all things are his ? He saith that he may, because he possesseth all things in mind, but not in use. Another, whether he that hath endeavoured or assayed to restore a benefit, hath restored it. He hath : yet notwithstanding he teacheth him to endeavour again and again. The third, whether thou art to restore that thou hast received from a good man, to the same man being now evil. Thou shalt restore it, but with caution, not that he use them wickedly or to his own or another man's harm. The fourth, whether he that giveth, ought to forget him self of that benefit he hath bestowed. By no means : nay, more he saith he may keep the same in memory, yea, and sometimes exact it. The last, how grateful men are to be borne withal, with a pleasing, mild, and great mind.

The  
Argu-  
ment

## CHAPTER I

COURAGE my Liberalis ;

‘Now have we got the shore, I will not here  
Tire thee with long discourse, or task thine ear  
To lingering proëms, or dilated words.’

The remainder this book concludes, and the matter being spent, I look about me, not what I

Truth shall say, but what I have not said: yet accept  
 lieth thou in good part whatsoever is the remainder,  
 hidden whereas it is reserved to thy self. Had I had an  
 intent to polish my work, it should have increased  
 by little and little, and that part had been reserved  
 till the conclusion, which every one would have  
 longed for, although he had been satisfied. But  
 whatsoever was most necessary, I presently  
 gathered and congested into the beginning of the  
 book: now if anything hath escaped me I recollect  
 it. Neither truly if thou ask me, do I think it  
 much pertinent to the matter, whereas those things  
 are spoken which governed manners, to prosecute  
 the rest, which were invented, not for the cure of  
 the mind, but for the exercise of the wit. For  
 Demetrius the Cynic (a man in my judgement  
 great, although he were compared with the  
 greatest) was wont very worthily to say this:  
 That it is more profitable for thee, if thou re-  
 member a few precepts of wisdom, and have them  
 in use and readiness, than if thou learnedst many  
 things, and hadst not the ready use of them. For  
 (saith he) like as that man is a worthy wrestler,  
 not that hath perfily learned all the tricks and  
 sleights, which he shall seldom have occasion to  
 make use of against his adversary: but he that is  
 well and diligently exercised in one or two, and  
 intently expecteth and waiteth occasions of  
 them, (for it skills not how much he knoweth, if  
 he know so much as sufficeth for the victory) so  
 in this study, many things delight, but few over-  
 come. Although thou be ignorant what cause it  
 is, that moveth the ocean to ebb and flow, why  
 every seventh year impresseth an alteration and  
 sign in our age, why the latitude of a gallery to

those that behold it afar off, keepeth not his proportion, but gathereth his ends or sides into a narrowness, so as the farthest spaces of the pillars are joined in one: what is it that separateth the conception of twins, and joineth their birth: whether one act of conception be divided into two distinct creatures, or else they are begotten at several conceptions: why their destinies be different who are born twins together, and their conditions prove so greatly different, whose birth was one, or at least in the same instant. It shall not much hurt thee to overslip those things which neither thou canst know, nor is profitable for thee to know. Truth lieth covered and hidden in the depth: neither can we complain of the malignity of nature, because the invention of any thing is not difficult, but only of that which yieldeth us not any fruit, except the only invention thereof: whatsoever should make us better or more blessed, nature hath either laid open before us, or near unto us. If the mind hath contemned casualties: if she hath raised her self above fear, and with greedy hope embraceth not things infinite, but hath learned to ask riches of her self: if she hath cast out from her the fear both of gods and men, and knoweth that there is a very little to be feared from men, neither anything from God: if contemning all things whereby life is tortured, whilst it is most adorned, he hath attained so much, that it manifestly appeareth unto him, that death is no matter of any mischief, but the end of many: if he have consecrated his mind unto vertue, and thinketh that way plainest whithersoever she invite him: if he be a sociable creature, and born to community: if he respecteth the world as one

in the  
depth

All house, and openeth his conscience to the gods,  
 vice is and liveth always as it were in public: if more  
 villainous afraid of him self than others, being discharged of  
 these tempests, he hath retired him self to an  
 assured and quiet repose, he hath consummated a  
 very necessary and profitable science. The rest  
 are but the delights of leisure: for now is it  
 lawful (the mind once withdrawn into safety) to  
 expatiate and arrive at these also, which rather  
 yield ornament than courage to our minds.

## CHAPTER II

THESE are the things which our friend Demetrius  
 willeth him that is proficient to lay hold on with  
 both hands, to abandon them never, nay, rather to  
 affix them to him self, and make them a part of  
 him self, and by daily meditation to be instructed  
 so far, that these wholesome instructions may  
 present them selves before his eyes freely; and  
 being desired for, might be at hand at all times  
 and places, and that instantly that distinction  
 betwixt good and evil may be remembered,  
 whereby he may know, that neither there is any  
 vice, which is not villainous, nor any good which  
 is not honest. Let him dispose his actions by this  
 rule of life: according to this law let him execute  
 and exact all things, and judge those the most  
 miserable amongst men (how rich and refulgent  
 in wealth whatsoever) that are slaves to their  
 belly and lust, whose minds are benumbed with  
 slothful idleness: let him say unto him self,  
 Pleasure is frail and fleeting, she is quickly  
 wearied of her object; the more greedily she is

devoured, the more hastily is she disposed to a contrary desire : she is always of necessity accompanied with repentance or shame : there is nothing in her that is honourable or vertuous : there is nothing in her that is either noble or worthy the nature of a man, who would resemble the gods. It is a bare thing, proceeding from the most loathsome and vilest ministries of our bodies, shameful in the end. This is the pleasure that is worthy a man and a noble mind, not to fill and flatter the body, not to provoke his lustful desires, which are least hurtful when they are most quiet : but to live exempt from the passions of the mind, especially of that which enkindleth the ambition of those men, who entertain quarrels and contentions among themselves, and also of that intolerable passion, which coming from high, hath made us believe all that of the gods, which report and fables have forged, and hath planted this opinion in us, to measure them by our own vices. This equal, dreadless, and never-loathing pleasure doth this man enjoy, whom we hear fashion and describe, who (as I may say) being skilful both in divine and human laws, contenteth him self with the things that are present, and dependeth not on those that are future : for never liveth that man in assurance that doateth on uncertainties. Exempted therefore from mighty cares, and such as distract the mind, he hopeth nothing, he coveteth nothing, he hangs not on expectation, but contenteth him self with his own : neither suppose you that such a man is contented with small riches ; for all things are his : yet not in such sort as they were Alexander's, who although he had conquered as much as to the

**The  
pleasure  
that is  
worthy  
a noble  
mind**

**The wise man only** shore of the Red Sea, yet wanted he more than he left behind him from whence he came. Those very countries, which either he possessed, or had conquered, were not his. Whenas he had sent Onesicritus the general of his galleys to discover the ocean, and to search out further war in an unknown sea: did it not sufficiently appear, that he was poor, who extended his wars beyond the limits of nature, and thrust himself headlong through his blind covetousness into a vast, unattempted, and boundless sea? What skills it how many kingdoms he hath violently taken, how many he hath given, how many countries he hath loden with tributes? He wants as much as he desireth.

### CHAPTER III

NEITHER was this Alexander's error only, whom happy temerity enforced beyond the tract of Bacchus and Hercules, but of all those whom fortune hath made greedy by over-glutting. Run over and reckon up Cyrus and Cambyses, and all the progeny of the kings of Persia, whom wilt thou find contented and satisfied with his empire? that ended not his life in thinking on some further project? Neither is this to be wondered at, what so falleth into a covetous hand, is forthwith exhausted and hidden: neither skilleth it much, how much thou throngest into that which will never be satisfied. The wise man is only he that is master of all things, neither costeth it him much to keep them. He hath no ambassadors to send beyond the seas, nor camps to pitch in his enemy's



country, nor garrisons to dispose in convenient fortresses, he needs no legions or troops of horsemen. Like as the immortal gods, without the assistance of any arms, do govern their kingdoms, and entertain their greatness in all assurance, without disturbance, or forsaking the place high and eminent wherein they repose: even so the wise man executeth and governeth his offices, although they have a large extent without tumult, and beholdeth all other mankind, being him self the powerfullest and best of all under him self. Mock him as thou listest, yet is it a matter worthy of a generous spirit, after thou hast in mind diligently considered both east and west, whereby also thou mayest penetrate into the remote and most retired solitudes, whenas thou hast beheld so many living creatures, such affluence of all things which beautiful nature most blessedly lavisheth, to break into this discourse, beseeming a god, All these things are mine. So cometh it to pass that he desireth nothing, because there is nothing which is not his.

is master  
of all  
things

#### CHAPTER IV

THIS is that (sayest thou) that I expressly willed; I have overtaken thee now, and intend to see how thou wilt rid thy self of these encumbrances, wherinto thou art wilfully fallen. Tell me, how may any man give ought to a wise man, if all things are his? For that also which he giveth him is his own. A benefit therefore cannot be bestowed upon a wise man, who can have nothing given him which is not his own: yet say you, a man may

How can a gift be made give somewhat unto a wise man. But know this, that I demand the like in respect of friends. You say that all things are common amongst them, therefore can no man give anything to his friend: for he giveth that which is common to him. There is no cause but that somewhat may be both a wise man's, and his that possesseth it, to whom it is given and assigned. In civil law all things are the king's: and yet those things whose entire possession appertaineth to the king, are distributed amongst several lords, and each thing hath his possessor. Therefore may we give the king our house, our bond-slave, and our money: neither for all this are we said to give him his own. For to kings appertaineth the power over all, but to several men the property. We call them the bounds of the Athenians, or Campanians, which otherwise the neighbours by private termination distinguish amongst themselves: and all the lands belonging to this or that man, are the commonweal's, and yet each part hath his determinate owner, we therefore may give our lands to the commonweal, although they be said to be the commonweal's, because in one sort they are theirs, in another sort mine. Can it be doubted, but that a slave, and whatsoever substance he hath is his master's? Yet may he give him a present. For a man cannot therefore say that the servant hath nothing, because he could not have, if so be his lord said he should not; neither therefore faileth it to be a present, whenas he gave it willingly, because it might be taken from him, although he would not. Even as we have approved that all things appertain unto a wise man (for we are already agreed in this point) so we

must at this present express, that we have more to the matter than we need, to give liberally unto him, wise whom we confess to be the master of what we man? have. All things are the father's, which are in the possession of his children; yet who knoweth not that the son also may give his father somewhat? All things appertain unto the gods, yet have we sacrificed at their altars, and offered many times in their temples. That therefore which I have, faileth not to be mine, because it is thine, for one and the same thing may be thine and mine. He (sayest thou) is a bawd, that is the owner of common harlots, but a wise man is owner of all things, and amongst all things the prostitute are comprehended: therefore a wise man is a bawd. In like manner they forbid him to buy, for they say no man buyeth his own, but all things appertain unto a wise man, a wise man therefore buyeth nothing. In like manner restrain they him from borrowing anything, because no man payeth interest for his own money. Innumerable are the things they contend and cavil about, whereas notwithstanding they fully conceive what is spoken by us.

## CHAPTER V

UNDOUBTEDLY in such sort conclude I all things to be a wise man's, that each one notwithstanding remain master and lord of that he hath, even as under the government of a good prince: the king possesseth all things by regal authority, and every private man by particular tenure and title. The time will come when we shall prove this; mean-

How a while let this suffice for this question, that I may  
 man may give a wise man that, which in one kind is his, in  
 receive another mine : neither is it a strange matter that  
 his own somewhat may be given him, who is lord of all.  
 I have hired a house of thee ; in this house there  
 is something thine and something mine. The  
 house it self is thine, the use of this house is mine.  
 Thou therefore shalt neither touch the fruit, if  
 the farmer forbid thee, although they grow on thine  
 own soil, and there should be a scarcity of corn ;  
 or famine :

‘Alas, how all in vain shalt thou  
 Behold another’s mighty mow.’

That grew in thine own ground, was stacked in  
 thine own barn, and must be stored in thine own  
 garners. Thou shalt not enter my hired tenement,  
 although thou be lord thereof, neither shalt thou  
 carry away thy slave, which is my hireling ; and  
 if I hire a wagon of thee, thou shalt take it for a  
 kindness, if I give thee leave to sit in thine own  
 wagon. Thou seest therefore that it may so be,  
 that man receiving that which is his own, may  
 receive a courtesy.

## CHAPTER VI

IN all these things which I lately recited, both  
 one and the other are masters of one and the same  
 thing. But how? Because the one is the lord of  
 the thing it self, the other of the use. We say  
 that these books are Cicero’s, and Dorus the book-  
 seller saith those very same books are his, and  
 both these are true, the one challengeth them as

the author thereof, the other as the buyer, and rightly are they said to appertain to both; for the right is in both of them, yet not after the same manner. So may Titus Livius receive in gift, or buy for money his own books at Dorus his hands. I can give that to a wise man, which particularly appertaineth unto me, although all things be his. For since after a kingly manner he possesseth all things freely, and the propriety of everything is distributed to every particular person, he can receive a present, he can owe, and buy, and hire. All things are Cæsar's, yet nothing but that which is his own patrimony and particular domains is returned into his exchequer: all things are subject to his sovereign power, but his peculiar heritage is properly his own. The question is, what is his, and what is not his without diminution of his empire. For even that which is adjudged to be none of his, is in another sort his own. So a wise man in mind possesseth all things, but by law and right only that which is his own.

as a  
gift of  
courtesy

## CHAPTER VII

BION somewhiles in his arguments concludeth all men to be sacrilegious, sometimes no man. When he would cast all men from the rock, he saith, Whosoever hath taken away or lavished that which appertaineth to the gods, and converted the same to his own use, is sacrilegious: but all things are the gods': whatsoever every one taketh away, he taketh it from the gods, to whom all things appertain: therefore whosoever taketh away any thing, is sacrilegious. Again, when he would have

**How it possible** temples broken open, and when he commandeth that the Capitol should be pillaged without fear or vengeance of the gods, he saith, That no man is sacrilegious, because that whatsoever is taken out of that place, which appertaineth to the gods, is transferred into another place, which appertaineth likewise unto the gods. To this it is answered, that true it is that all things are the gods', but that all things are not dedicated to the gods, and that sacrilege is observed and committed only in those things, which religion and devotion hath consecrated to the gods. So say we likewise, that the whole world is the temple of the immortal gods, only worthy to contain their majesty and magnificence, and yet that profane things are different and distant from sacred, and that it is not lawful to act all things in a corner of the earth, that hath been called a temple, which we may lawfully do in the sight of heaven, and view of all the stars. Undoubtedly the sacrilegious cannot do any injury to God, whose divinity hath planted him without the shot; yet is he punished, because he hath done it, as it were, to God: for both our and his own opinion obligeth and maketh him subject to the penalty. Even as therefore he seemeth to be sacrilegious that taketh away any sacred thing, although whithersoever he transferreth that he hath taken away, it is within the limits of the world: in like manner a man may rob a wise man, for that is taken from him, not which is his, as he is master of all things in this world, but that whereunto he had a peculiar title, which he reputeth and useth as his own in several. That other possession he acknowledgeth, the other he would not have though he might: and into this discourse will he break,

which the Roman Emperor uttered, whenas for his vertue and good government, so much land was decreed and allotted him, as in one day he could environ with his plow: You have not need (saith he) of such a citizen, that hath need of more than one citizen's living. How much more worthy, thinkest thou, was this man in refusing this gift, than in deserving it? For many great captains have broken and defaced other men's bounds, but never a one of them hath limited his own.

## CHAPTER VIII

WHENAS therefore we behold a wise man's mind, powerful over all things, and spreading his empire over all the whole world, we say that all things are his, whenas we refer him to the right of daily custom, he shall be taxed by the poll, if the cause so require. There is a great difference whether his possession be estimated by the greatness of his mind, or by his revenues; he would hate to be lord over all these things whereof thou speakest. I will not reckon up Socrates, Chrysippus or Zeno, and such other great personages, who in this are greater, because envy obscureth not the praise of such, who have lived in times past. A little before I made mention of Demetrius, whom nature, in my judgement, seemeth purposely to have bred in our time, to show that neither we could corrupt him, nor he correct us. A man (though him self deny it) of exact wisdom, and of firm constancy in those things which he determined, yea and of that eloquence which best fitted matters

The prizes of luxury of greatest strength, not polished or painted in words, but proof, cutting his causes with great courage, according as the heat carried him. I doubt not but the divine providence gave this man such a life and such ability in discourse, to the end our age might want no good example, nor reproach

## CHAPTER IX

IF some one of the gods would deliver all our goods into Demetrius' possession upon this condition, that it might not be lawful for him to give it away, I dare aver it, he would refuse them, and would say, I will not entangle my self with this inextricable weight: I will not plunge this man so clean and free from avarice, into this deep bog and sink of these things. Why bringest thou me the mischiefs and infelicities of all men, which I would not receive, although I could give them away presently, because I see many things which I might not honestly give? I will contemplate those things which dazzle the eyes of kings and nations. I will behold those things for which you spend your bloods, and hazard your souls. Set before mine eyes the chiefest spoils of superfluity, whether it be that thou wilt unfold them in order, or (as it is better) deliver them in gross. I see a vaulted roof most cunningly carved with curious variety: and the shells of divers the most loathsome and sluggish creatures bought at excessive prices. Wherein that very variety which most pleaseth, is made of counterfeit colours, according to the similitude of the things themselves. I see in the same place tables and wood, estimated at no less



than a senator's substance, by so much more and de-  
precious, by how much the infelicity of the tree bauchery  
had writhed and wrested it into infinite knots. I  
see in the same place vessels of crystal, whose  
brittleness enhanceth the price. For amongst  
ignorant men, the pleasure of all things is aug-  
mented, even by that very danger, which should  
cause us hate them. I see pots and vessels of  
murrhine, as if superfluity and riotous expense had  
not been sufficiently prized, if they had not vomited  
in great vessels of precious stone the excessive wine  
they had drunk to one another's health. I see  
pearls not severally fitted for every ear one; for  
now the ears are accustomed to bear burthens,  
divers of them are tied together, and if there be  
but two, a third is hanged under them. The  
madness of women had not sufficiently brought  
their husbands into subjection, except they hanged  
at either of their ears the worth of two or three  
men's patrimonies. I see silken garments (if they  
may be called garments) wherein there is nothing  
that may cover either their bodies, or at leastwise  
their shames; which when a woman hath put upon  
her, she may scarcely swear that she is not naked.  
These for a great sum, are by way of commerce  
fetched from foreign nations, that our matrons may  
show no more of themselves to their adulterers in  
their chambers, than in public.

## CHAPTER X

WHAT doest thou avarice? How many things are  
they, which in value surpass thy gold? All these  
things which I have reckoned up are of more

The honour and better price. Now will I recognise thy riches, the plates of both metals, at which our covetousness is dazzled. But the earth which produced whatsoever was profitable for our use, hath drowned these metals, yea, and with her whole weight hath cast her self upon them, as upon hurtful and hateful things, which could not come to light: but to the common hurt of all nations I see that iron is taken out of that very darkness, whence gold and silver were had, to the end that neither instruments for mutual slaughters, neither price for the murtherers should be wanting, yet have these things some matter of esteem in them. There is somewhat wherein the mind may follow the error of the eyes. I see these patents, these indentures, and obligations, the empty images of covetousness, certain shadows of sick avarice, by which they deceive the mind, that delighteth in the opinion of transitory things. For what are these? What is interest? What day books and usury, but certain names of human covetousness, which nature never heard of? I can complain of nature, because she hath not hidden gold and silver deeper, because she hath not cast a heavier burthen on them, than that it might be removed. What are these registers, these computations, and sailable time, these bloody usuries of twelve for a hundreth? They are voluntary evils depending on our constitutions, in which there is nothing that may be subjected to the eyes, or held in the hand, the dreams of vain covetousness. O how wretched is he, who taketh delight to read over the great rental of his patrimony, or large domains to be tilled by his bondmen, or infinite herds of cattle, that need whole countries and kingdoms to feed

them, or his family greater than warlike nations, and private buildings, that in bigness exceed great cities! When he hath well examined these things, whereby he hath disposed and spread out his riches, and made him self proud; if he compare that which he hath with that which he desireth, he is a poor man. Let me go, and restore me to those riches of mind: I know the kingdom of wisdom to be great and secure: so enjoy I all things as all men may enjoy theirs in particular.

of  
luxuri-  
ous life

## CHAPTER XI

WHEREAS therefore Caius Cæsar gave Demetrius two hundred talents, he smiled and refused them, not deeming the same of such value, as he might justly glory that he had refused them. O gods and goddesses, with how small a thing would he either have honoured or corrupted such a mind! I must testify for so worthy a man: I have heard a great matter reported by him, that when he had wondered at Cæsar's indiscretion, in that he thought that he could be changed for so slight a matter, he said thus: If, said he, he had intended to tempt me, he should have tempted me with his whole empire.

## CHAPTER XII

SOMETHING therefore may be given to a wise man, although all things be his: so likewise nothing letteth but that something may be given to a friend, though we say that all things are common amongst friends. For in such sort are not all things common

Owner-  
ship, pos-  
session,  
and right

betwixt me and my friend, as they are with a partner, so as my part and his should be all one: but as children are common to their fathers and mothers, who having two betwixt them, have not each of them one, but two apiece. First of all I will make him know whatsoever he be that will be co-partner with me, that there is nothing common betwixt him and me: and why? because this association cannot be but amongst wise men, who only understand and practise the use of true friendship; the other are no more friends than they be co-partners. Again, goods are common in divers kinds. The sieges in the theatre ordained for knights, appertain to all the knights of Rome; and yet in these, the place that I sat in is mine own. If I have yielded up my place to any, although I give him place in a thing common to all, yet seemeth it that I have given him somewhat. There are things which appertain to some men, under certain conditions: I have my place amongst the knights, not to sell, not to hire, nor to possess continually; but only to this end, to behold the public sports. I shall not therefore lie, if I say I have a place amongst the knights; but when I come into the theatre, if the places be all taken up, yet in right have I a place there, because it is lawful for me to sit there: and I have it not because it is occupied by those, who have as much title to the place as my self. Suppose the case is the same amongst friends. Whatsoever our friend hath is common to us, yet the property is his that possesseth it: I cannot use it against his will. Thou mockest me, (sayest thou) if that which appertaineth to my friend be mine, I have liberty to sell the same: but I have no liberty; for thou canst not sell my

knight's place, yet is it common to thee, with those of the same order. It is no argument therefore that a thing is not thine, because thou canst not sell it, because thou mayest not consume it, because thou mayest not change it for worse or better : for it is thine, although it be thine but upon a condition. I have taken the place, yet hast thou it nevertheless.

**Power  
and per-  
formance**

### CHAPTER XIII

NOT to dally or delay with thee any longer, one benefit cannot be greater than another : but those things whereby a benefit may be given, may be greater and more ; into which benevolence may extend it self, and so please it self : as lovers are wont, whose many kisses, and closer embraces increase not, but exercise their loves. This question also that ensueth, is fully debated in our former, and therefore it shall be shortly handled : for the arguments we have used in the other questions, may be employed here. The question is, whether he that hath done his best to restore a benefit, hath given satisfaction. That thou mayest know, sayest thou, that he hath not satisfied, he hath done all he can to recompense him : it appeareth therefore that that thing is not done, because he had not the means to do it, as he hath not paid the silver which he ought unto his creditor, who, to perform the same, had sought him everywhere, and could not find him. Some things are of that condition, that they must needs be effected, and in some things it is as much to have attempted what a man could, as to have effected the deed. If the physician hath done

**Duty and debt** his uttermost to heal his patient, he hath performed his part. The orator although his client be condemned, if he have showed the uttermost of his art, hath not lost the honour of his eloquence. The general and captain, although conquered, is commended, if in as much as in him lay, he proceeded with prudence, industry, and fortitude, he hath attempted all means to recompense thy courtesy, but thy felicity letted him. No calamity hath fallen upon thee, whereby thou mightest make trial of his true friendship. He could not give unto a rich man, sit by a healthful man, succour a happy man. He was thankful unto thee, although thou receivedst no benefit. Besides, intending this matter always, and expecting the time and opportunity of this same; he that hath spent many cares to this end, and employed much diligence to find an occasion of requital, hath endeavoured more than he whose fortune it was, to make satisfaction suddenly.

#### CHAPTER XIV

THE example of the debtor is far different from this, who hath done little in gathering in his money, except he hath paid it: for there his importunate creditor standeth over his head, who suffereth not a day to pass without interest; but here thou art matched with a bountiful creditor, who when he shall see thee trotting up and down, careful and pensive to satisfy, saith unto thee,

‘Dislodge this care from out thy breast.’

Cease to be so urgent in thine own trouble: I am wholly satisfied. Thou dost me injury, if thou

thinkest that I desire anything more at thy hands : I am fully possessed of thy good mind. But tell me (saith he) wouldst thou say that he had restored a benefit that had only been thankful? By this reckoning he that hath requited, and he that hath not satisfied are of like reckoning. Contrariwise, put case ; if any other hath forgotten the benefit he hath received, and hath no ways endeavoured him self to requite the same : wouldest thou say that he had requited? But this man (of whom we speak) hath wearied him self day and night, and renouncing all other offices only to think upon this, hath wholly intended satisfaction, and laboured that no occasion should overslip him. Shall therefore the like respect be had of him, that hath cast away the care of returning gratuity, as of him that never thought of ought else? Thou dealest unjustly with me, if thou exactest that recompense at my hand, when thou seest my mind ever addicted to content thee. To be short ; put case thou wert in captivity, and that to ransom thee (having engaged all my goods unto a creditor, who had taken them in assurance of the money which I borrowed for thee) I put forth to sea in a sore stormy winter, by coasts and promontories beleaguered by pirates ; and furthermore suffered all the perils that may chance even in a peaceable sea, and after that having traversed all the deserts, which all men living fled, and sought to find thee ; and coming at last to the pirates, from whose hands already another had discharged thee : wilt thou deny that I have not requited thy goodness, if in undertaking this journey, I have by shipwreck lost that money which I borrowed for thy ransom? If I fall my self into that captivity from

**Will and  
accom-  
plishment**

**Requital goes not by numbers** whence I would deliver thee; wilt thou not confess that I have been thankful unto thee? Yet undoubtedly the Athenians called Harmodius and Aristogiton tyrant-quellers, and Mucius' hand left upon the enemy's altar, was as much as if he had slain Porsenna: and vertue likewise wrestling against fortune, although the intended action was not effected, was always honoured. He hath performed more, who hath followed flying occasions, and ever hunted after new by which he might be thankful, than he whom the first occasion made grateful, without pain or travail.

## CHAPTER XV

HE hath (saith he) employed two things for thee, his will and goods: thou likewise owest him two. Worthily mightest thou say this unto him, that had only yielded thee an idle will, but thou canst not speak it to him, who both willeth, and endeavoureth and leaveth nothing unattempted, for he performeth both, as much as lieth in his power. Again, a number is not always to be equalled by a number, for sometimes one thing over-valueth two. Therefore so forward and desirous a will to make restitution, standeth instead of the benefit. But if the mind without the act be not sufficient to requite a benefit, no man is thankful to the gods, on whom there is nothing bestowed but the will, we can (saith he) give nothing to the gods but our will, but if I have no other thing to give him to whom I am obliged, why should I not be reputed grateful toward men, in yielding herein that, more than which I cannot give unto the gods?



## CHAPTER XVI

A  
generous  
rivalry

YET if thou ask me what I think, and wilt subscribe unto mine answer, let this man judge that he hath received the benefit, and that man know that he hath not requited it. Let the one release the other, and the other confess the debt. Let this man say I have it, and that man I owe it. In all controversies, let us respect the common good, let ungrateful men be exempted from excusations, to which they may fly, and under which they may colour their refusal. I have done all that I could. Do it now likewise. What, thinkest thou our ancestors were so imprudent, that they understood not that it were an unjust act to set no difference between him, who had spent the money he had borrowed of his creditor in riot and sports, and him, who either by fire or thieves, and by any other misfortune, both lost his own and other men's? Truly they admitted no excuse, to the end that men should know that faith was to be observed every way. For it was better that a just excuse amongst few should not be accepted, than that all men should attempt any. Thou hast done all thou canst to satisfy. Let this suffice him, and thee a little. For even as he is unworthy to receive any requital, who suffereth thy serious and sedulous endeavour to slip away unregarded; so likewise art thou ungrateful, if thou think not thy self more freely obliged to him, who taketh thy goodwill for payment, and by this means acquitteth thee of that thou owest. Lay not hold of this, neither contest, yet seek thou occasions of restitution. Requite the one, because he asketh it, the other, because he releaseth thee. Repay this

Folly is a sickness of the mind man, because he is wicked, and the other, because he is not evil. And therefore thou hast no cause to think this question may stand thee in any stead : whether he that hath received a benefit from a wise man, when he is wise, is bound to restore it afterwards, when he is become foolish, and shall no more be a good man. For thou wouldest restore a thing committed to thy trust, which thou haddest received from a wise man, yea and to an evil man wouldest thou satisfy that he had lent thee : why then likewise wouldest thou not restore a benefit ? Because he is changed, shall he change thee ? What if thou hadst received anything from a man in health, wouldest thou not restore it when he were sick, whereas we are always most obliged to our friend when he is weakest ? Truly this man is sick in mind, let him be helped, let him be borne withal, folly is a sickness of the mind. To the intent that this may be the better understood, methinketh it good to use some distinction herein.

## CHAPTER XVII

THERE are two kinds of benefits, the one which a wise man cannot give, but to a wise man ; and this is an absolute and true benefit : the other vulgar and of little value, whereof the use is ordinary amongst us ignorant men. Of this there is no doubt, but that, that I ought to restore it to him I owe it, whatsoever he be, whether he be become a homicide, a thief, or an adulterer. There are laws to punish crimes and bad actions : the judge better chastiseth these, than an ungrateful man. Let no man make thee bad, because he is bad

him self. I will fling away my benefit to a wicked man, and restore it to a good man; to the one, because I owe it, to the other, lest I should be in his debt.

Two  
kinds of  
benefits

## CHAPTER XVIII

OF the other kind of benefit there is some question, which if I be not capable to receive, except I be wise, I ought not likewise to restore but to a wise man. For put the case I should tender it, yet cannot he receive it, for why he is not capable of it, but hath lost the science how to use it. What if you command me to bandy back the ball to a maimed man's hand, it is but a folly to give him that hath no power to receive? And that I may begin to answer thee to thy last speeches, I will not give him that which he cannot receive, yet will I recompense the good he hath done me, although he cannot receive it. For I cannot oblige any man, but him that receiveth, yet may I be discharged, if I give satisfaction. Cannot he make use thereof? Let him look to that, the fault shall be in him and not in me.

## CHAPTER XIX

To restore, saith he, is no other thing, but to deliver it to his hands that ought to receive it. For if thou owest wine unto any man, and he willeth thee to pour the same into a net or sieve, wouldest thou say that thou haddest repaid him, or wouldest thou return him that, which whilst it is restored, is spilt between both? To restore, is to

**When to restore** give that which thou owest to him, to whom it appertaineth, and that hath a will to receive the same; this is the only thing I ought to perform. That he may receive, that which he received, at my hands, is now a further charge. I owe him not the custody thereof, but the acquittal of my faith: and far better is it, that he have it not, than that I should not restore it. I will presently satisfy my creditor, although I know that he will suddenly send that I owe him unto the stews. Although he assign it over to be satisfied to an adulteress, I will pay it. And if he would pour the money, which he is to receive, into his bosom, being untied, yet will I give it. For I must repay it, yet am I not bound either to keep or defend it. I ought carefully to keep the good I have received, and not that which I have restored. As long as it remaineth with me, I will see it shall not be lost, but if it be called for, it must be satisfied, although it should slip out of his hands that received it. I will restore it to a good man, when it shall be profitable for him, to an evil man when he shall demand it. Thou canst not, saith he, redeliver a benefit unto him in such a sort as thou receivedst it, for thou receivedst it from a wise man, thou repayest it to a fool. Neither is it embased by me, but by him. I will render that which I have received, and if he recover his wisdom, I will redeliver it entirely, such as I received it; as long as he is evil, I will render such a one as he may receive. But (saith he) what if he be not only made evil, but cruel and enraged as Apollodorus or Phalaris were, wilt thou restore the benefit thou hast received at his hands? Nature suffereth not so great a change in a wise man, for falling from

the best into the worst, it must needs follow also, that some impression of goodness remaineth in him, even in his wickedness. Vertue is not so much extinguished in men, but that she impresseth some marks, which cannot be defaced by any change. Wild beasts that have been brought up amongst us, whenas they break out into the woods, retain some part of their former tameness, and look how much they be wilder than the tamest beasts, so much are they tamer than the wildest beasts, and such as never were made tractable by man's hand. No man hath ever fallen into extreme wickedness, that hath ever stuck unto wisdom: he is tainted more deeply, than that it may be wholly washed out, and changed into any other colour. Furthermore, I ask thee whether he, of whom we speak, be only savage and cruel in mind, or if he take pleasure to procure the ruin and public misfortune of the whole world. For thou hast proposed unto me Apollodorus and Phalaris the tyrant, whose nature, if an evil man have in himself, why should I not restore him his benefit back again, to the end I may be wholly acquit of him for ever? But if not only he delighteth and taketh pleasure in human blood, but exerciseth his insatiable cruelty on all ages, and rageth not for anger, but of a certain thirst and desire he hath to shed blood; if he killeth children in their father's presence, if not contented with a simple death, he tortureth them, and not only burneth those that are to die, but scorcheth them: if his altar be always soiled with new murders and massacres? It is a small matter to keep back a benefit from such a one. Whatsoever it was, whereby he and I were linked and united together: that hath been dis-

The  
impress  
of vertue

Duty  
towards  
a tyrant

solved, by reason that by his cruelty and tyranny he hath broken the rights and laws of human society. If he had done anything for me, if I had received any good at his hands, and afterwards he had taken arms, and made war against my country, whatsoever he had deserved he had lost, and to be thankful to him, would be reputed a heinous crime. If he assail not my country, but be tedious to his own, and doing no injury to my nation, he persecuteth his own: notwithstanding that so great impiety of his mind, dissolveth the bonds whereby we were united: and if this be not sufficient to make him mine enemy, at leastwise I shall have occasion to loathe and hate him, and the respect of duty which I ought to bear to the common good of men, deserveth to have more power over me, than the obligation that I owe to one particular person.

## CHAPTER XX

BUT although this be so, and that I may freely act whatsoever me listeth towards him from that time since, whereby violating all laws, he hath brought to pass, that nothing may be unlawfully attempted against him, yet believe I that my actions must be so limited, that if the good I intend in my benefit, shall neither augment his forces to the destruction of all men, neither confirm that power which he hath already, that is to say, that I may do it without the ruin of the commonwealth, I will restore his benefit: I will save his child being an infant. What doth this benefit wrong any of those whom his cruelty dis

membereth? I will not furnish him with money to pay the soldiers of his guard. If he shall want either marble or rich raiment, it shall be no ways prejudicial to any man, that shall supply his excess and superfluity. Soldiers and furniture I will not help him with. If he request me in way of great kindness, to send him cunning comedians and curtizans, and such other delights as may temper his cruelty, I will willingly offer them. Though I would not send him armed galleys and ships of war, yet would I send him wherries and covered barges, and other such like things wherein kings take their pastime, when they intend to sport themselves upon the sea. And if the hope of his amendment were utterly lost, yet with the same hand that I give benefits to all men, I will return him his; because the best remedy for such evil dispositions is not to be, and it is best for him to be dead, whose life will never be reclaimed nor rectified. But seldom is so great wickedness seen, it is rare; and reputed always for strange and wonderful, they are feared as the gaping and openings of the earth, or as great fires which burst forth from the deepest caves of the sea. Let us therefore leave these, and speak of those which we detest without horror. To this evil man whom I may find in every market-place, whom private men fear, will I return the benefit I have received: I must not make my profit of his wickedness. Look what belongs not to me, let it return to him that oweth it, be he good or be he bad. How diligently should I examine these things, if I should not restore but give? This place craveth a merry fable.

Limits  
of giving  
to such  
an one

Debts to  
the dead

## CHAPTER XXI

A CERTAIN Pythagorist had upon his credit bought a pair of clownish shoes of a cobbler (a great matter I warrant you), some few days after he came unto the shop, to make satisfaction, and when he had long time knocked at the door, there was one that answered him : Why lose you your labour ? That cobbler you seek is carried out and burned. This may be a grief to us which lose our friends for ever, but not to you that know that he shall be born anew. Thus jested he at the Pythagorist. But our philosopher carried home his three or four pence very merrily, shaking them divers times in his hand, as he went homeward. Afterwards accusing him self of the pleasure he had conceived in non-payment, and perceiving how much that little gain of his was pleasing to him, he returned to the shop, and said unto himself ; He liveth to thee, pay thou that which thou owest. With that word he thrust the four pence into the shop at a cranny of the wall, where the closing of the panel was shrunk ; chastising him self for his cursed avarice, lest he should accustom him self to detain another man's goods.

## CHAPTER XXII

SEEK thou then to whom thou mayest return that which thou owest, and if no man require payment at thy hands, call thou thy self to account. It appertains not to thee, whether he be good or evil. Restore and accuse thy self, not forgetting how offices are divided between you. Have we com-



manded to forget thee, we have enjoined him to remember; notwithstanding he deceiveth him self, that thinketh that when we say, that he who hath given the benefit, should never think more on the pleasure he hath done; that we would have him entirely lose remembrance of the honestest thing that may be done in this world: we command some things more strictly than we ought, to cause them to return to their true and particular proportion, when we say that he must not remember our meaning is, that he must not publish it abroad, he ought not to vaunt, he should not reproach. For some there are that make the courtesies they have done, their table-talk amongst their companions; of this talk they when they are sober, of this they talk being drunk, this discover they to strangers, this commit they to their friends. That this inordinate and reproachful memory might be repressed: we commanded that he that had done the courtesy to his friend, should never remember it, and commanding him more than he could perform, we persuaded him to silence.

## CHAPTER XXIII

As oft as thou distrustest those over whom thou hast command, thou mayest exact far more than thou needest to the end that that may be performed which is sufficient. Every hyperbole aimeth at this issue: that by a lie a man may attain unto the truth. He therefore that said,

‘That did exceed the snow in whiteness,  
And did surpass the winds in lightness.’

That which could not be said, to the end the most

What it that could be, should be believed. And he that  
 means to said,  
 forget a benefit  
 done

‘More fixed than these rocks, more headlong than this  
 torrent,’

did not think that he should persuade this, that any one was so immovable as a rock. This excessive and superlative kind of speech never hopeth so much as it dareth; but it affirmeth incredible things, to the end it may attain unto credible. When we say, Let him that hath given a benefit forget it; our meaning is, that he should be as one that had forgotten it: let no man perceive that he hath remembrance thereof, or that his memory is awakened. When we say, that we ought not to redemand a benefit again, we do not wholly take away the means of redemanding it; for ofttimes evil men have need of an exacter, and good men also of an admonisher. Why then, shall I not show an ignorant man the opportunity of requital? shall I not discover my necessities unto him? why either should he belie him self, or be sorry that he knew it not? now and then let some admonition be intermixed; yet such as is modest, which neither savoureth of importunity or matter of plea.

## CHAPTER XXIV

SOCRATES in the hearing of his friends said, I had bought me a cloak had I had money. He required of no man, he admonished all: the contention was, who should supply him. And why not? For how small a matter was it that Socrates

received? but it was a great matter to be worthy **Be sparing in demands** to be such a one, from whom Socrates would receive. He could not more mildly chastise them. I had (said he) bought me a cloak had I had money. After this whosoever was the forwardest he gave too late: for Socrates was already in necessity. For these intemperate exactors' sakes we forbid the redemand of benefits, not that it should never be put in use, but that it might be done modestly and sparingly.

## CHAPTER XXV

ARISTIPPUS having sometimes taken pleasure in good favours and perfumes, said: Beshrew these effeminate fellows that have defamed so worthy a thing. The same must be said, Evil betide these wicked and importunate exactors of their benefits, who have extinguished so worthy an admonition amongst friends: yet will I use this love of friendship, and will redemand a benefit from him from whom I would have requested it if I had need, who will receive it instead of another benefit. If he have means to requite that which I have done for him, I will never say in way of complaint,

'I took thee up cast up upon this shore  
Forlorn and poor, and that which made me more  
I made thee partner of my princely state.'

This is no admonition, but rather a reproach: this is no less than to bring benefits into hatred: this is the direct means to make it either lawful or delightful to be thankless. It is enough, and

**How to bear with ungrateful men** too much to refresh the memory with submissive and familiar words;

‘If I have ought demerited from thee,  
Or ought well liking hath appeared in me.’

Let the other likewise say, How can it otherwise be, but that thou hast deserved? Thou hast entertained me in thy house, after that by tempest I was cast on shore, denied of all supplies, shipwrackt and poor.

## CHAPTER XXVI

**BUT** (saith he) we have done no good, he dissembles, he is forgetful, what should I do? Thou proposeth a very necessary question, and in which it becometh us to conclude this discourse, How ungrateful men are to be borne withal? Truly with a peaceable, mild, and great mind. Let never so inhuman, forgetful, and ungrateful man so offend thee, that the delight of thy bounty be extinguished in thee, never let injury enforce these speeches from thee: I would I had not done it. Let the infelicity of thy benefit content thee likewise. It shall repent him ever, if thou hitherto repent thee not. Thou must not be grieved as if some new casualty had befallen thee, thou oughtest rather to wonder if it had not happened. One is affrighted with labour, another with charge, another with danger, and another with unseemly bashfulness, lest in his requital he acknowledge that he hath received. Some forget their duty, another is idle in his affairs, another over-busy. Mark how the immeasurable desires of men do always gape and grasp after money. Thou wilt

not wonder then to see no man addressed to requite where no man receiveth enough, which one of these is of so firm and solid a mind, that thou mayest safely trust thy benefits with him. This man is mad with lust, that man serveth his belly, another is wholly addicted to lucre, whose substance thou hardly mayest equal: this man is sick with envy, another with such blinded ambition, that he is ready to run upon the sword's point. Add hereunto dulness of mind and old age, and contrariwise the agitation and perpetual tumult of an unquiet breast. Annex hereunto the too much esteem, and insolent pride of a man's self, for which he is to be contemned. What should I speak of their contumacy, that incline to the worst; or of their inconstancy and levity, that are settled in nothing? Add unto these headlong temerity and fear, that never giveth faithful counsel, and a thousand errors wherewith we are entangled, the boldness of the most cowards, the discord of most familiars; and (which is a common mischief) to trust to uncertainties, to loath things in possession, to wish for those things which we may not any ways hope to attain.

Never  
expect  
gratitude

## CHAPTER XXVII

SEEKEST thou for faith, a thing so peaceable amidst the passions of the mind, that are most restless? If the true image of our life were presented before thine eyes, thou wouldest suppose that thou sawest the pillage of a great city taken by assault, wherein without respect of shame or any justice, the enemy instead of counsel useth force and violence, as if by public proclamation he were permitted to exer-

**All men are robbers** cise at his pleasure all kind of outrage. Neither fire nor sword is spared, murders and mischiefs are not punished: religion it self, which hath oftentimes amongst the armed enemies saved their lives, who humbled them selves at her feet, cannot now contain those men that are set upon pillage: the one forcibly defaceth the goods of a private house, another of a public: that man stealeth profane things, and that man sacred; the one breaks up, the other passeth over. This man being discontented with the straitness of the passage, overthroweth that which stoppeth his way, and makes his profit of this ruin. This man spoileth without slaughter, that man beareth his booty in a bloody hand: there is no man but catcheth something from another. Amidst this greediness of mankind, I fear me thou art too much forgetful of our common fortune, who seekest to find a grateful man amongst so many robbers. If thou art aggrieved that there are ungrateful men, be sorry that there are some luxurious men, be vexed because there are covetous men, be displeased because there are impudent men, be angry that there are deformed, sick and pale old men. This vice I confess is grievous and intolerable, that breaketh the society of men, that divideth and destroyeth that concord whereby our weakness is supported; yet so common is it, that he him self who complaineth against it cannot avoid it.

## CHAPTER XXVIII

**BETHINK** thy self, whether thou hast been thankful to every one of those to whom thou art obliged,

whether any of those pleasures that have been done thee, are lost; whether thou hast always remembered the benefits which thou hast received from others, and thou shalt see, that those things which were given thee when thou wert a child, were forgotten by thee ere thou wert a stripling, and that those things which were bestowed on thee in thy youth, continued not in thy memory until old age. There are some things which we have lost, some things we have rejected, some things have vanished out of our sight by little and little, and from some things we our selves have turned our eyes. But to excuse thy weakness, first of all memory is frail, and cannot long time apprehend so great a number of affairs; it must needs lose as much as it entertaineth, and overwhelm the elder with the later. So cometh it to pass that the authority of thy nurse prevaileth little with thee, because succeeding years have laid the benefits she hath done thee, far from thy thought. Hence groweth it that thou yieldest no reverence to thy master: so cometh it to pass, that whilst thou art busied in labouring for a consulship, or pretendest a priesthood, thou forgettest him that once gave thee his voice to be a quæstor. Happily if thou diligently examine thy self, thou shalt find that vice whereof thou complainest in thine own bosom: thou doest amiss to be angry with a public crime, and foolishly to be angry against thy self; to absolve thy self forgive others. By thy sufferance thou mayest make him better, but worse by thy reproaches: thou must not harden his heart; let him, if any shame be left in him, retain it still. Ofttimes public and notorious reproaches exile that doubtful modesty, which a man would retain. There is no

Hast  
thou been  
always  
grateful?

**Can a benefit be lost?** man feareth to be that which he is seen to be : shame once discovered is lost.

## CHAPTER XXIX

I HAVE lost a benefit. Shall we say we have lost those things which we consecrate to good uses? A benefit ought to be numbered amongst those things that are consecrated; provided that a man hath well employed the same, although it be badly requited: if he have not showed him self such as we hoped he would be, let us be such as we have been, let us be unlike unto him; the wrong was then done, and now it appeareth. An unthankful man is not accused by us, but with our own disgrace, because the complaint of the loss of our benefit, is a sign it was badly given. As near as we can let us plead his cause with our selves, and say happily he could not, peradventure he knew not, perhaps he will do it hereafter. The wise and patient creditor sometimes recovereth his debt which he reputeth lost, in forbearing his debtor, and giving him time: the like must we do; let us nourish the languishing faith of those that forget them selves.

## CHAPTER XXX

I HAVE lost my benefit. Thou fool, thou knowest not the times of thy detriment. Thou hast lost, but when thou gavest; now the matter is discovered. Even in these things which seem to be lost, moderation hath profited very much. As



the infirmities of the body, so those of the mind are to be handled gently; oftentimes that thing which patience and delay hath discovered and unfolded, is broken by his pertinacy and stubbornness that haleth the same. What need these reproaches? What need these plaints? What needs pursuit? Why dost thou acquit him? Why dismissest thou him, if he be ungrateful? Now oweth he thee nothing; what reason is there to provoke and incense him, whom thou hast many ways pleased, to the end that of a doubtful friend he may become an assured enemy, and to give him means to defend his cause the better by procuring thine own shame? There be some will say, I am sure there is some great matter in it; but what it is I know not, that he could not abide him to whom he was so much indebted. There is no man that in any sort complained of a superior, but stained, though he could not deface his greatness and honour, neither is a man content to feign trifles, when he seeks for credit by the greatness of his lie.

Conquer  
evil by  
good

### CHAPTER XXXI

How far better is that way whereby the hope of friendship is reserved to him, and the opinion of our friendship likewise, if he be thankful and entertain a better thought? Incessant goodness conquereth evil men; neither is there any man of so hard and hateful a mind against those things that are to be beloved, that loveth not those, who even in their greatest wrongs continue good men, to whom he beginneth to owe this also,

The  
magna-  
nimity of  
the gods
 that he sustaineth no displeasure at their hands for not requiting. Reflect thy thoughts therefore upon these: there is no correspondence held with me: what shall I do? even that which the gods the best authors of all things do, who begin to bestow their benefits on those, that know not whence they come, and persevere also to do good to those that are ungrateful. One chargeth them with little regard of us, another that they have unjustly dispensed their graces, another thrusteth them out of his world, and leaveth them there alone in sloth and heaviness, without light or doing anything; another saith that sun (to whom we owe this, that we have distinguished the time between labour and rest, that being delivered from darkness we have escaped the confusion of a perpetual night; for that by his course he tempereth the year, and nourisheth our bodies, and hasteneth our harvest, and ripeneth our fruit) is some stone or globe of casual fires, and call him anything rather than god. All this notwithstanding, the gods like good parents that smile at the injuries of their little children, cease not to heap benefits upon those who suspect that they are not the authors of all benefits, but with an equal hand distribute their blessings amongst all nations, reserving only to themselves the power to do good. They water the earth with timely showers, they move the seas with fitting winds, they distinguish times by the course of the stars, they weaken both winters and summers by the gracious intercourse of gentler winds; they pardon and mildly wink at, and suffer the errors and sins of our sinful souls. Let us imitate them; let us give although many things have been given in vain,

yet let us give unto others, let us give even unto those by whom we have sustained the loss : no man forbearth to build a house for fear it should be ruined, and whenas fire hath consumed the place of our abode, we suddenly lay a new foundation again ere the floor be half cold, and ofttimes we build cities in that very place where they were destroyed and sunk : so constant and confirmed is the mind to good hopes ; men's labours would cease both by land and sea, if they had not a will to re-edify and re-attempt the ruins that were past.

The  
mark of  
a mighty  
mind, to  
lose and  
give

## CHAPTER XXXII

HE is a thankless man : he hath not injured me but him self ; I had the use of my benefit when I gave it, neither therefore will I give more slowly but more diligently ; what I have lost in him I will recover in others : yea, to this man also will I give a benefit again, and like a good husbandman, with care and labour I will conquer the barrenness of the soil ; I have lost my benefit, and that man his credit with all men. It is not the action of a generous mind, to give and lose ; this is the mark of a mighty mind, to lose and give.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH AND LAST  
BOOK OF BENEFITS

LODGE'S 'Seneca' was published as a folio in 1614. The present edition, which has been edited by Mr. W. H. D. ROUSE, formerly Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, is a reprint from the folio containing 'The Workes of Lucius Annæus Seneca both Morrall and Naturall.' The spelling has been modernised, except where it testified to ancient pronunciation, and old grammatical forms have been left alone. The Editor has added the Glossary and Marginalia, using Lodge's own marginal notes wherever it was possible to do so. An earlier translation of the present work, 'Concerning Benefyting, that is to say, the dooing, receyving, and requyting of good turnes,' appeared as early as 1578, in black letter, by A. Golding, another famous contemporary of Shakespeare, to whom only in a less degree than to Lodge the great dramatist was indebted.

I. G.

August 8, 1899.

## NOTES

HERE are gathered together all those marginal notes of the translator's which have any interest, together with a few by the editor, which last are enclosed in square brackets. Misprints in the text have been tacitly corrected; but a few are mentioned in the notes, where the correction is a conjecture.

*The numbers at the beginning of paragraphs refer to the pages.*

- ix Strabo, lib. 3.  
x line 5.—Pliny, lib. 43.  
x line 17. *Over the Celtibers.*—[I have inserted the first two words.]  
x line 26.—Pliny, lib. iii. cap. 1.  
xii Tacitus, lib. 14.  
xii *Consolatory book.*—[*De Consolatione.*]  
xiii *Testifeth.*—*Cons. ad Hel.* cap. 16.  
xiii *These three.*—*Ad Hel.* cap. 2.  
xv *To Rome.*—*Epist.* 113.  
xv *By Tacitus.*—*Lib. Annal.* 14, *in fine.*  
xv *We saw.*—*Quæst.* i. cap. 1.  
xvi *Names.*—*Epist.* 49.  
xvii *Acknowledges.*—*Cons. ad Hel.*, cap. 16.  
xvii *Tacitus.*—xii. *Annals.*  
xx *I find.*—*Consolat. ad Helviam*, cap. 21.  
xx *Natural Questions.*—lib. 6, cap. 17.  
xxi *Thou knowest.*—3 *de ira*, cap. 1.  
xxi *This said.*—*Epist.* 104.

xxii *My son beast Claudius.*—[I have no idea what Lodge wrote here. The preface is very carelessly printed. 'My sonne' would seem to have taken the place of an adjective, such as 'whoreson.']

xxiii *Brittany.*—[i.e. Britain.]

xxiv *Thou.*—cap. 2.

xxiv *Tacitus.*—lib. 14.

xxiv *Suillus in Tacitus.*—lib. 13.

xxv *Epistle.*—*Epist.* 77.

xxviii *Whereas.*—*Epist.* 108.

xxviii *Unto men.*—II *de Comment.*

xxviii *In Tacitus.*—18 *Annal.*, 3 *de ira.*

xxix *If thou.*—*Epist.* 96.

xxx *Tacitus.*—15 *Annal.* [cap. 65.]

xxx *If all.*—Juvenal, *Satire* 10.

xxx *Slaughter.*—[*Tac. Ann.* 15, 60.]

xxxvii *Sickness.*—*Cons. ad Helv.* cap. 16, *Epist.* 54.

xxxvii *Astme.*—[The text reads 'astine,' which I do not understand.]

xxxviii *Himself.*—*Epist.* 78.

xxxix *Seneca.*—*Epist.* 104.

xxxix *Epistle, etc.*—*Epist.* 112 ; *Nat. Quæst.* iii. cap. 7.

xxxix *Tacitus.*—lib. 14.

xli *S. Jerome.*—*De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis.*

xli *S. Augustine.*—*Epistola*, 53 *ad Maced.*, *et de Civitate Dei.*, cap. 10 ; *De Passione Divi Pauli*, lib. 8 ; *Polycarp*, cap. 13.

5 *If thou, etc.*—Accius the poet's saying.

8 *Others say.*—Chrysippus' opinion.

16 This hath some consonance with the alms which the widow and the Pharisee gave in the Temple.

18 *Some there are.*—In this place Lipsius and Anicetus observe a defect which may be conjectured by the small conformity between the antecedent and subsequent reason.

18 *That man.*—A sin more imitated in this age than any virtue.

29 *That no action.*—[‘No’ has been omitted by error, as the context shows ; the Latin text has the negative.]

33 (Chapter ii.).—Urbanity in a heathen inimitable by Christians, as the Christian world is carried in these days.

46 Homer hath always somebody to smooth his errors.

52 (Chapter xvii.).—Although these Pagans had not a perfect knowledge of the vertue of wilful poverty, yet had they some resemblance and smack thereof, and in particular there was a sect of them called Cynics, that were of this profession, amongst whom Diogenes was one, that required this alms at Antigonus’ hand.

59 *Tarquin.*—This was the seventh and last King of the Romans, called (and that justly) by the name of Tarquin the Proud. He died a banished man out of his country, and deprived of his kingdom.

67 *Four thousand sestertia.*—[Should be 400,000,000 sesterces.]

68 *His mind.*—[‘Mind’ is restored from the Latin (*animus*) : it lacks in Lodge’s text.]

70 These will be the better understood if we note that which Galen saith, in the beginning of his treatise ‘De Usu partium,’ where he saith : That those creatures whom nature endowed with forces to defend them selves from their enemies, are not endowed with swiftness to fly, as it appeareth in the elephant. And contrariwise to those she hath denied forces to defend them selves, them hath she provided of swiftness to fly from their contrary, as, for example, the hart and the hare.

70 *So many vertues.*—It is not intended that the same thing which the soul desireth should presently come to hand, but that by the means and semblance which is so daily formed in the soul, it may enjoy and use the same in some manner.

74 *Saith he.*—That is Chrysippus.

75 *I will, etc.*—Here he resolveth this question by Chrysippus’ one example.

75 *He that hath gotten.*—The bountiful mind that is seconded by a thankful and grateful mind, hath for his own part all that which is to be desired by him.

77 *All fools be mad.*—A Stoical opinion.

79 He termeth all sin equal, according to the doctrine of the Stoics, but all the Fathers and Christian religion teacheth otherwise.

87 The Roman prætor was wont to commit some affairs of importance to be determined to a certain number of chosen men, selected out of the order of the knights.

89 *Fourteenth scaffold.*—These degrees or places of knight-hood amongst the Romans were not obtained by antiquity, but by diligence and favour : so may you gather from our author here, and from Justus Lipsius, *Lib. de Amphitheatro*, cap. 14.—[The words should be translated, ‘placed within the fourteen (select) rows,’ which were set apart for the Equites.]

96 I pray God these pagan errors, together with divorce, be not crept into England.

114 *To live well.*—A Christian doctrine from a heathen Stoic.

118 *Law.*—*Lex. Papia* or *Poppæa*.

131 *Benac.*—[Virgil, *Georgics*, ii. 160.]

132 [Virgil, *Ecl.* i. 6.]

132 *Neat.*—[The text has ‘meate,’ doubtless a misprint, which I have corrected : Seneca *paucas boves.*]

142 *Regrater.*—*Mango* is one that properly selleth slaves, young boys or girls, as their old custom was.

148 *Fear'd the gods.*—It is not intended that the just man hath no fear of God, if fear be taken for one of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost : but this place is to be understood of that fear, which is not compatible with that love where-with good men love God, but with him is a servile fear, which is not of children, but of slaves.—[I have inserted ‘of’ before ‘that,’ and changed the next word to ‘fear.’ It is printed ‘love,’ an obvious error.]

155 *Gods.*—A Stoical error, who ascribed deity to the stars.



164 *Three hundred*.—These were of the Fabian family.—[The ones alluded to above were Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Ovicula Cunctator, who fought against Hannibal; and Q. F. Max. Allobrogicus, who conquered the Allobroges when consul B.C. 121.]

165 *Hast thou*.—This speech is objected, not to Liberalis, but to Providence.

166 *Now . . .*—From hence to the end of the chapter all is disjointed.

176 *Fever*.—[The text has ‘favour,’ doubtless a misprint: *febricitavero*.]

182 *Buffets or brasses*.—[Written ‘braces.’] *Pancratiastes* was he, that not only with naked hands and fists, but with his feet and whole body entertaineth the fight.

*Cestus* was he, that with armed hand, or heavy buttons or weights of brass, iron, or lead, charged his adversary. [*Cestus* was the name of the loaded glove, not of the man.]

188 *Moon*.—This is against astronomy. Never was eclipse at full moon naturally, but in Christ’s death supernaturally.

189 *Merry*.—[The text reads ‘a figurative mercy,’ which is nonsense. I have emended it. The Latin is *Vir facetus et comis per figuras sermo procedere solitus erat*.]

197 *Beginning*.—He said in the beginning of the first chapter of this fifth [*printed first*] book, that although he had not to entreat of things necessary, yet the labour should not be lost.

200 *Box*.—And yet is called a box, from the box-tree, of which boxes first were made: it answers to the Greek word *πυξίς*.

203 *Coriolanus*.—This was a valiant captain amongst the Romans, who being banished upon certain occasions out of the city (as Titus Livius reporteth in his second book, *Ab urbe Condita*), was so skilful to enter and insinuate him self amongst the Volscans, that levying an army of them, he began to invade his country, until being moved by his mother’s prayers and tears, he ceased from the battle.

203 *Catiline*.—This was another rebellious citizen of Rome, who levying an army both of his natural countrymen and strangers, intended to destroy the same, had he not been

prevented by Cicero's wisdom, as Sallust witnesseth in the wars of Catiline.

204 *Caius Marius*.—This was another Roman citizen, who being obscurely born, and of a rustic conversation, became consul in Rome seven times, and overcame a nation called the Cimbrians, and afterward being incensed against his citizens, for banishing him for a certain space into Africa, he committed huge murders in the city.

204 *Cnæus Pompey*.—He was exercised in the affairs of the commonwealth, when he was but twenty-three years old.

205 *Flaminian round*.—The Romans had in their city three round courts, or circles, whither they resorted to see their sports and plays, whereof this was one which was therefore called the Flaminian circle or round, because a consul called Flaminius built the same.

205 *Porsenna*.—This was a king of the Etrurians, who waged war against the Romans to install Tarquin the Proud, and planted his colours as Julius Cæsar did, near to the Flaminian round or theatre.

205 *Dictator*.—Dictator was the highest dignity and magistracy that was in the Roman commonweal. See Aldus in his book *De legibus Romanis*.

206.—All these were valiant citizens of Rome, who employed themselves in many notable services, and received disgraces for their good deserts. This island is not exempt from such little precedents.

207 [Virg. *Æn.* iv. 653.]

209 *There is no benefit*.—Mark a glimpse of charity, even in a pagan.

227 *Restore*.—[The word *reddere* means to 'render' a due, not merely to give back; this is the sense intended by 'restore.']

229 [Virgil, *Æn.* v. 162.]

256 *Stink*.—[Lat. *sordes*, i.e. 'squalor, miserable state.']

258 [The construction is: 'forgetful to what fickle things he trusted.']

259 *Thou understandest*.—[I have inserted 'thou.']

261 *That very court*.—[I have corrected 'every' to 'very.']

263 *Hands*.—[The literal translation is : 'Think you those books, which scarce the memory or the hands of thy remembrancers can hold, are books of thy friends?']

268 *Executorship*.—[This should be 'legacy-hunting,' *captandorum testamentorum artem*.]

270 *There is no delay in Turnus*.—[Turnus was a chief of the Rutuli whom Æneas fought against. The phrase is become a proverbial catch, like 'Barkis is willing.']

274 *Delight*.—He meaneth that many things delight the understanding, and there are few things that conquer the will.

279 *Wise man*.—Under this name wise man, he intends to signify thorough the whole body of this discourse, the same which it signifieth in the Book of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, and Wisdom, where this word wisdom signifieth vertue or justice; and the name of wise man is in this sense a virtuous or just man.

283 *Rock*.—This was the Tarpeian Rock, whence heinous offenders were headlong cast down.

288 *Usuries*.—These were called centesima, which was a kind of usury amongst the Romans: the creditor was wont to give his debtor 100 crowns, and for the use thereof he paid for every month a crown for his interest, till a hundred months were past; at the end whereof he returned the principal to his creditor.

292 *The general*.—[Here Lodge has run two sentences into one, the first being an example not of returning a benefit, but of doing duty. 'The general although conquered is commended, if prudence, industry, and courage have done their part. One has done all he could to recompense thy courtesy, but,' etc.]

299 *Made tractable*.—[I have written 'made' for 'many,' which I do not understand.]

303 [Virgil, *Æn.* xii. 84.]

304 [Ovid, *Met.* xiii. 801.]

305 [Virgil, *Æn.* iv. 373.]

306 [Virgil, *Æn.* iv. 317.]

## GLOSSARY

- Achaia*, a district in the N. of the Peloponnese. The name was given to the Roman province of Greece. *addressed*, ready, 60.
- Aeneas*, son of Anchises, fled from the sack of Troy, bearing his father on his shoulders.
- Aglaia*, brightness.
- Agrippa*, M. Vipsanius, B.C. 63-12, a general and statesman, right-hand man of Augustus.
- Agrippina*, wife of the Emperor Claudius, and mother of Nero.
- Alcibiades*, about B.C. 450-404, an Athenian statesman and general, famous for beauty, power, wealth, genius, and profligacy.
- Alexander the Great*, son of Philip of Macedon and Olympias, born at Pella B.C. 356, King 336-323, crossed the Hellespont 334, battle of the Granicus 333, founded Alexandria 331, conquered Darius at Gaugamela 331 (Arbela), invaded India 327.
- amate*, amaze, 37.
- Amphissa*, in Locris, near Delphi.
- Antigonus*, a general of Alexander the Great, afterwards King of Asia. There were other kings of the same name.
- Antiphon*, one of the ten great Attic orators, B.C. 480-411.
- Antonius*, Marcus, the Triumvir, born about 83 B.C., an enemy of Cicero, partisan of Cæsar, defeated at Mutina 43, Triumvir with Octavianus and Lepidus 43, defeated by Octavianus at Actium 31, fled with Cleopatra, killed himself 30.
- Apollodorus*, tyrant of Casandrea, from B.C. 379 onwards, a most cruel man.
- Archelaus*, King of Macedon B.C. 413-399.
- Arceilas*, a Greek philosopher, flourished B.C. 250, president of the Academy after Crates.
- Aristippus of Cyrene*, founder of a school of philosophy, 4th century B.C.
- Aristides*, a statesman of Athens in the 5th century B.C., called the Just.
- Arrhidæus*, half-brother of Alexander the Great,

- an imbecile, murdered  
B.C. 317.
- Asinius Pollio*, C., an orator,  
poet, and historian, B.C.  
76—A.D. 4.
- Augustus*. See *Octavius*.
- Bacchus*, god of wine. He  
is fabled to have come  
from the East, and to have  
wandered over great con-  
tinents.
- Bætis*, the Guadalquivir, in  
Spain.
- Bankerout*, bankrupt, 188.
- beholding*, beholden, obliged,  
132.
- being to take*, having to take,  
2.
- Benac*, Benacus, Lake Garda.
- Bion of Borysthenes* in  
Scythia, 3rd century B.C.,  
a Cyrenaic philosopher,  
famous for his wit.
- Cæsar*. See *Octavius*.
- Cæsar*, C. Julius, the Dic-  
tator, B.C. 100-44.
- Caius Cæsar*, called Caligula,  
or the Little Boot, by  
the soldiers when he was a  
child, son of Germanicus  
and Agrippina, third Em-  
peror of Rome, A.D. 37-41.
- Caligula*. See *Caius Cæsar*.
- Camillus*, M. Furius, a hero  
of early Roman history, a  
great warrior, five times  
Dictator.
- capital*, thorough-going, 251.
- caroch*, coach, 18.
- Carteia*, Tartessus, in S.  
Spain.
- casualty*, chance, 130.
- Chrysippus of Cilicia*, a  
famous Stoic philosopher,  
B.C. 280-207.
- cithern*, a lute or small  
harp, 34.
- Claudius*, fourth Roman  
Emperor, ruled A.D. 41-54.
- Claudius Quadrigarius*, a  
Roman historian, 1st cen-  
tury B.C.
- Cleanthes*, a Stoic philoso-  
pher of the 3rd century  
B.C., head of the Stoic  
school after Zeno.
- Commagena*, N.E. district of  
Syria.
- commodity*, advantage, 128.
- condign*, worthy, 35.
- consummate*, used up, 24.
- contrary*, oppose, 103.
- Corduba*, Cordova, in Anda-  
lusia, Spain.
- Corfinium*, in Samnium.
- Coriolanus*, C. Marcius, a  
hero of early Roman  
history, exiled by his  
country, then turned  
against it, and was only  
dissuaded from sacking  
Rome by the entreaties of  
his mother and his wife.
- corrosive*, wound, 210.
- correspondence*, acknowledg-  
ment, doing the other  
part, 2.
- Crispus Passienus*, husband  
of Agrippina, stepfather  
of Nero.
- Cydnus*, a river in Cilicia.
- Cynics*, a sect of philosophers  
which professed contempt  
for appearances, and lived  
on the barest necessaries.
- Dalphinoys*, Dauphinois.
- Decius Mus*, P., the name of  
two generals who devoted  
themselves to death in  
order to save the army, in  
accordance with a pro-  
phesy.

*Demetrius of Sunium*, a Cynic philosopher, 1st century A.D.

*depart*, part, 96.

*devoir*, duty, 45.

*differ*, put off, 268.

*Diogenes of Sinope*, a Cynic philosopher, about B.C. 412-323.

*discover*, reveal, 92.

*election*, choice, 2.

*embase*, debase, 298.

*enstalled*, possessed of an estate, xxiv.

*Epicures* or *Epicureans*, followers of Epicurus, who taught that men should live 'according to nature.' His system soon degenerated into licence and sensuality.

*essoine*, a legal excuse, 176.

The Latin is *vis maior*.

*esteem*, estimate, 148.

*ethnick*, heathen, 18.

*Euphrosyne*, Joy.

*expedite*, explain briefly, 1.

*Fabius Maximus Cunctator*, Q., a general who outwore Hannibal by his patience, and so saved Rome.

*Fabius Verrucosus*, Q. Fabius Maximus, also called Cunctator, the famous opponent of Hannibal, died 203 B.C.

*factor*, agent, 223.

*farmer*, hirer, 282.

*farse*, to stuff, 9.

*Flaminian round*, Circus Flaminius.

*for why*, because, 297.

*forwardly*, willingly, 33.

*franklin*, landowner, 66.

*fake*, dye, disguise, 20.

*Gracchus*, C. Sempronius, tribune of the people, B.C. 123, murdered in a riot.

*Graces*, personifications of health, life, and beauty; there were proverbially three.

*gratitude*, gratitude, 4.

*gravelled*, knocked down, dumbstruck, 37.

*gross*, thick, 9.

*Grumentum*, in Lucania.

*hale*, drag out, 311.

*hand-fast*, unite, 8.

*happily*, perchance, 157.

*Harmodius* and *Aristogiton* formed a plot against the sons of Pisistratus, who were despots of Athens, murdered one of them, and were killed B.C. 514.

*Haterius*, Q., a senator and rhetorician of the 1st century A.D.; perhaps the same as the legacy-hunter mentioned on p. 268.

*Hecaton of Rhodes*, a Stoic philosopher, disciple of Panætius. He wrote on Virtues, Goods, Ends, and other things.

*Hercules*, national hero of Greece. His labours were undertaken at the bidding of Eurystheus. They were: (1) Nemean lion; (2) Lernean hydra; (3) Arcadian stag; (4) Erymanthian boar; (5) cleansing of the stables of Augeas; (6) Stymphalian birds; (7) Cretan bull; (8) mares of Diomedes; (9) Queen of Amazons' girdle; (10) oxen of Geryones; (11) golden apples of the Hesperides; (12) Cerberus brought up

from Hades. After death he was deified. He travelled far and wide, and set two pillars, one on either side of the Strait of Gibraltar, as the bounds of his wanderings.

*Hesiod*, a didactic poet of Greece, about the 8th century B.C.

*Hours*: 'The poets feign the sun had a certain number of hand-maids, which he called the Hours.' See *Ovid*.—*Lodge's note*.

*husband*, thrifty person, manager, 175.

*illustrate*, to make bright, 15.

*imputative*, one who reckons at a high value, 54.

*impute*, put down to an account, 11.

*incommodity*, disadvantage, 127.

*incontinently*, at once, 222.

*indifferent*, impartial, 90.

*ingenious*, ingenuous, frank, 17.

*interessable*, interested, 151.

*Jupiter*, king of the gods.

*largess*, bounty, gifts, 136.

*least*, lest, 23.

*leman*, lover, paramour, 96.

*let*, hinder, 152.

*Liber*, Bacchus, god of wine. On p. 26 his travels and wanderings are alluded to.

*Libertines*, the sons of freed slaves.

*list*, like, 9.

*Livy*, Titus Livius of Patavium, B.C. 59—A.D. 17, historian of Rome.

*Lucanus*, M. Annæus, of Corduba, A.D. 39-65, nephew of Seneca, and a poet.

*Mæcenas*, C. Cilnius, a statesman and adviser of Augustus, and patron of letters, died B.C. 8.

*manure*, till, 142.

*manuring*, cultivation, 44.

*Marsyas*, a satyr, that challenged Athena to a musical contest, failed, and was flayed. There was a statue of him in the Forum of Rome.

*member*, division, 1.

*merchandable*, purchasable, 25.

*Mercury*, messenger of the gods, and guide of the ghosts to the underworld.

*Misenum*, a promontory in Campania.

*mow*, heap, rick, 282.

*Mucius Scævola*, C., called the Left-handed. He was one of a band who swore to murder Porsenna, and failed; but to show his contempt for pain, put his right hand in the fire and let it burn. Porsenna pardoned him.

*muffle*, muzzle, 7.

*Munda*, in Spain, where J. Cæsar defeated the sons of Pompey, B.C. 45.

*murrhine*, murra, a sort of precious stone or alabaster, 287.

*Muses*, nine patron deities of the arts and sciences.

*Nero*, fifth Roman Emperor, reigned A.D. 54-68, proverbial for cruelty and vice.

*nice*, fastidious, 126.

*nice*; to make it nice is to be coy, 38.

*nicely*, fastidiously, 64.

*niggardise*, stinginess, 76.

*Nomenclators*: 'There were in Rome certain men whose office it was to carry by heart the names of the citizens, who during the election of publick offices were always assistant.'—*Lodge's note*.

*Octavius, C.*, B.C. 63—A.D. 14, great-nephew of Julius Cæsar, on adoption by him took the name of C. Julius Cæsar Octavianus. At Cæsar's murder he was but twenty, yet with great tact and skill organised the party of revenge, conquered his enemies, and after the battle of Actium, B.C. 31, became Emperor. His imperial title Augustus was given him. B.C. 27.

*ought*, owed, 291.

*Papirius Fabianus* (not Fabius), a Roman rhetorician and philosopher under Tiberius and Gaius.

*penny-father*, skinflint, 16.

*perfectly*, perfectly, 274.

*persever*, persevere, 256.

*pestered*, crowded, 34.

*Phalaris*, tyrant of Agrigentum in Sicily, 6th century B.C., a man of horrible cruelty.

*Phidias of Athens*, the greatest sculptor of antiquity. His most famous statues were those of Zeus

at Olympia, and of Athena at Athens.

*Philip*, founder of the Macedonian empire, reigned B.C. 359-336.

*Plato*, the Athenian philosopher, and friend of Socrates, B.C. 429-347. He taught in the Academia, hence his school were called Academics.

*Pliny, C. Plinius Secundus*, the Elder, author of a huge work on all things under heaven and in it, called a Natural History, A.D. 23-79.

*poll*, head, 285.

*Porsenna*, an Etruscan chieftain who besieged Rome during the legendary period.

*post alone*, quite alone, 34.

*pretend*, claim, sue for, 309.

*prevent*, forestall, 22.

*proe*, prow, 47.

*provoke*, incite, urge, 98.

*puissant*, mighty, 148.

*Pythagoras of Samos*, a Greek sage and mystic, 6th century B.C. He taught transmigration of the soul, and founded a religious brotherhood.

*Pythagorist*, a Pythagorean.

*Quintilianus, M. Fabius*, a Spaniard, the most famous of Roman rhetoricians, A.D. 40—about 118.

*Rabirius*: 'This was a noble poet that wrote the Civil Wars, and commended by Ovid.'—*Lodge's note*.

*race*, scratch, 38.

*refell*, refute, 245

*regrater*, retailer, 142.



*Regulus*, M. Atilius, fought against Carthage, taken prisoner B.C. 256, when he is said to have been sent to Rome to treat for ransom. He advised the Romans to leave the prisoners to their fate, and returned to death.

*require*, ask, 3.

*retchless*, reckless, 121.

*rich*, to enrich, 268.

*Rutilius Rufus*, P., statesman and orator, and held several military and civil offices. As proconsul of Asia he was so just and firm, that the tax-men hated him, and impeached him, and got him banished, B.C. 92.

*sacred*, sanctified, 90.

*sailable*, assailable, *i.e.* time for distraint (?), 288.

*Sallust*, C. Sallustius Crispus, a Roman historian, B.C. 86-34.

*Sardis*, capital of Lydia.

*scantle*, diminish, 36.

*Scipio Africanus Major*, P. Cornelius, conqueror of Hannibal at Zama, B.C. 202, and one of Rome's greatest men.

*seased*, sessed, possessed, 158.

*seize*, put in possession, 205.

*Sejanus*, Ælius, a creature of Tiberius, a tyrant and sycophant, executed A.D. 31.

*shive*, chive, slice, 162.

*Sicyon*, a city near Corinth to the west.

*siege*, seat, 290.

*sixt*, sixth, x.

*skin*, matter, 99.

*leight*, trick, 274.

*sent*, jest, gibe, 35.

*Socrates*, the celebrated dialectician and philosopher of Athens, B.C. 469-399.

*Sorites*, a heap of syllogisms, the conclusion of the one forming the premiss of the next.

*Sotion of Alexandria*, a philosopher, 1st century A.D., teacher of Seneca.

*Stattius*, P. Papinius, 1st century A.D., a poet and friend of Seneca.

*Stoics*, a school of philosophy founded by Zeno, which professed to be indifferent to all things except virtue and vice. It produced many noble characters.

*stout*, outspoken, courageous, 173.

*Strabo*, about B.C. 54-A.D. 24, wrote a History and a Geography.

*submiss*, submissive, 306.

*Tacitus*, C. Cornelius, 1st century A.D., wrote *Annals* and *Histories* of the Roman Empire, with other works.

*temper*, moderate, 11.

*Thalia*, Bloom.

*Thermopylæ*, a pass from Thessaly into Locris, betwixt the mountains and the sea, where Leonidas and 300 Spartans held the host of Xerxes at bay, and were all slain, B.C. 480.

*thorow*, through, 38.

*Tiberius*, second Roman emperor, ruled A.D. 14-31, a cruel and morose man, but able.

*Tiburine*, Tibur, a place near Rome.

*Titus Manlius*, son of M. Manlius Capitolinus, saviour of the Capitol, and afterwards accused of aiming at a despotism.

*toils*, snares, 23.

*toward*, desirable, worthy, 168.

*Triumvirate*, a league of Octavianus, Lepidus, and Antony, B.C. 43, when they divided the world betwixt them, and proscribed their personal enemies for death.

*Troglodytes*, cave-dwellers of the Red Sea coast lands.

*Tusco*, Tusculum, a place near Rome.

*undergo*, fall short, 162.

*unhappy*, unlucky, 144.

*unpurveyed*, unprovided, 71.

*vent*, let go, 161.

*Venus*, goddess of love and beauty.

*very*, true, 127.

*Vestals*, a sisterhood of six at Rome, sworn to virginity for thirty years, who tended the sacred fire in the temple of Vesta.

*Vettius Scato* (Caius in some MSS. of Seneca), a general in the Marsic War B.C. 90, defeated two Roman consuls.

*whenas*, when, 16.

*whereas*, where, 31.

*wink*, to shut the eyes, not to see, 172.

*Xenophon of Athens*, a literary man and soldier of fortune, who led the Ten Thousand safe home from Babylonia B.C. 401-399.

*Xerxes*, son of Darius, King of Persia, invaded Greece, and was defeated at Salamis B.C. 480.

*Zeno of Citium* in Cyprus, founder of the Stoic philosophy, 3rd century B.C.



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