

**Meno; a new translation from the text of Baiter, with an introduction, a marginal analysis and notes.**

Plato.

Oxford, J. Thornton, 1880.

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
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Plato - Meno - 1880

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THE  
MENO OF PLATO

A NEW TRANSLATION  
FROM THE TEXT OF BAITER

WITH

AN INTRODUCTION, A MARGINAL ANALYSIS  
AND SHORT EXPLANATORY NOTES


**Oxford**

JAMES THORNTON, HIGH STREET  
LONDON : SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, & CO.

1880

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*From the Family of  
Capt. [unclear]*

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## INTRODUCTION.



THE DIALOGUE takes its name from the principal interlocutor of Socrates, a Thessalian adventurer, living in close intimacy with Aristippus of Larissa, by whom he was sent with troops to aid the younger Cyrus in his expedition against Babylon, B.C. 401. On the failure of the expedition Meno was put to death after a year's tortures.

The Dialogue opens with a question from Meno as to whether Virtue can be taught, or how men can become virtuous; and its apparent purpose is to find an answer to this. But its real purpose seems to be to insist on the importance of accurately defining the terms employed on the opening of a discussion; thus Socrates makes several attempts to withdraw from the examination of the means to acquire virtue, and to substitute for it the question 'What is virtue?' (e.g. chpp. 2, 22, 42).

The Dialogue seems to fall into three divisions:—  
Ch. 1–13 consisting of various attempts made by Socrates to draw a satisfactory definition of virtue from



Meno, assisted by illustrative definitions of shape and colour; which attempts are frustrated by Meno's inveterate practice of mentioning particular virtues instead of giving a definition of virtue generally.

Ch. 14-21 explain and illustrate the theory of Socrates that all knowledge is but reminiscence of facts acquired by the soul in some previous existence.

Ch. 22-42 deal with the question originally propounded by Meno. 'Can Virtue be taught?' upon which Socrates enters with reluctance, being unwilling to postpone the question 'What is Virtue?' It is shown that Virtue can not be taught from the fact that there are no teachers of it, and the conclusion reached is that virtuous persons can give no account of their virtue or help others to acquire it, and that therefore virtue must be a gift from the gods.

# THE MENO.

## *Characters of the Dialogue.*

MENO.  
SOCRATES.

MENO'S SLAVE.  
ANYTUS.

**MENO.** Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is to be taught? or is it not to be taught, but to be got by training? or is it to be got neither by training nor by education, but does it come to men by nature or in some other way?

1.

Meno asks how virtue is to be acquired.

**Soc.** O Meno, the Thessalians were before now<sup>1</sup> famous among the Greeks, and were admired for their horsemanship and wealth; but now, as I think, they are admired also for their wisdom, and especially admirable are the inhabitants of Larissa, the fellow-citizens of your friend Aristippus.<sup>2</sup> Now Gorgias<sup>3</sup> has caused this for you; for on coming to the city<sup>4</sup> he captivated by his wisdom the chief men of the Aleuadae,<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Πρὸ τοῦ. Vide Jelf, *Grk. Gram.*, § 444, obs. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Aristippus. See Introduction, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Gorgias. Of Leontini. A travelling orator and teacher of Rhetoric (ab. 480–380 B.C.).

<sup>4</sup> Viz. Larissa.

<sup>5</sup> Aleuadae. A powerful aristocratic party in Thessaly.

one of whom is your admirer Aristippus, and of the other Thessalians. Particularly<sup>1</sup> he accustomed you to this habit, to answer fearlessly and outspokenly if any one ask you anything, as we should expect men of knowledge to do, probably because<sup>2</sup> he offers himself freely to any Greek who wishes to question him on any subject, and he answers every one.<sup>3</sup> But here,<sup>4</sup> my dear Meno, the opposite has come to pass; there has arisen as it were a kind of drought of wisdom, and there is a risk that wisdom has gone from hence to you. At all events, if you were to put this question to any of our people here, all would laugh and say Friend, possibly I seem to you to be a sort of blessed person, at any rate with regard to virtue, to know whether it can be taught or how it comes to men; but I am so far from knowing whether it can be taught or not, that I do not even happen to know what virtue generally is.

## 2.

I myself then, Meno, am in this position; I share the poverty of my fellow-citizens in this matter, and reproach myself as being absolutely ignorant about virtue; and when I do not know what a thing is, how should I know of what kind it is? or do you think it possible, if a person is absolutely ignorant of who Meno is, that this person can know whether he is handsome

Socrates asserts that he does not even know what virtue is,

<sup>1</sup> Καὶ δὴ καί. Jelf, § 724. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ἄτε with the participle introduces a probable reason. Jelf, § 704.

<sup>3</sup> Οὐδείς ὄσους οὐ (originally οὐδείς ἔστιν ὄσους οὐ) is used as a pronominal substantive = πάντες, and inflected through all cases. Jelf, § 822. i. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Viz. in Athens.

or wealthy, or even whether he is wellborn or even whether he is the opposite? Does it seem to you possible?

*Meno.* It does not. But do you, Socrates, really not even know what virtue is, and shall we report this of you at home also?

*Soc.* Yes, and not only that, my friend, but also that I have not even met any one else at all who knows, as I think.

and has never met any one that knew.

*Meno.* What? did you not meet Gorgias when he was here?

*Soc.* I did.

*Meno.* Then did not he seem to you to know?

*Soc.* I have not at all a good memory, Meno, so that I cannot say now, how he seemed to me then. But perhaps he did know, and you know what he said; remind me then how he spoke of it. Or if you will, speak for yourself; for I suppose you think as he does.

*Meno.* I do.

*Soc.* Then let us leave him alone, since in fact he is not here; but tell me yourself, I beg, Meno, what do you say virtue is? Speak, and do not grudge me your knowledge, that I may have told a most fortunate falsehood, if both you and Gorgias are discovered to know what virtue is, while I said that I had never yet met any one who knew.

*Meno.* Well, it is not difficult to describe it, Socrates. First, if you wish to know about a man's virtue,<sup>1</sup> it is easy to say that this is the virtue of a man,

3.

Meno then gives a catalogue of several kinds of virtue.

<sup>1</sup> To understand this description of the various virtues we must recollect that ἀρετή denotes 'excellence' simply (Lat. 'virtus'), and not only 'moral excellence,' which the English word 'virtue' denotes.

to be able to manage the affairs of the city, and in managing them to do good to his friends and harm to his enemies, and to be careful himself to experience nothing of the kind. Again, if you wish to know about a woman's virtue, it is not difficult to enumerate her qualities, viz. that she ought to manage her house well, looking after her household affairs and obeying her husband. And there is another virtue of a child, both girl and boy, and of an older man, and again, if you like, of a free man, and again of a slave. And there are very many other virtues, so that there is no lack of material for saying of virtue what it is. For according to each action and each age each of us has his virtue for the performance of each duty. And in the same way also, I think, Socrates, his vice.

*Soc.* Certainly I seem to have met with a wonderful piece of good fortune, Meno, if in searching for a single virtue I have discovered a kind of swarm of virtues in your keeping. But, Meno, to pursue this image of the swarms, if when I asked you about the essence of a bee, what it is, you were to say that they are many and of many kinds, what would you answer me, if I asked you, Do you then say that they are many and of many kinds and different from each other in respect of their being bees? or do they not differ at all in this respect, but in some other, for instance, in beauty or size or something else of this kind? Tell me what you would answer if thus questioned?

*Meno.* I should say that they do not differ at all, so far as they are bees, one from the other.

*Soc.* If I were then to say, Now tell me this, Meno ;

what do you say is this point, in which they do not differ at all, but are all the same? You would of course have some answer to make?

*Soc.* So it is then with regard to the virtues also; and even if they are many and of many kinds, at all events they all have some one general form the same in all cases by means of which they are virtues, keeping his eyes on which it is well I suppose for a person answering to explain to his interrogator what virtue is. Do you not understand what I mean?

4.

But Socrates calls for a general answer which will apply to all the virtues,

*Meno.* Certainly I think I understand; not yet however do I comprehend your question as I could wish.

*Soc.* Is it only with regard to virtue that it thus seems to you, Meno, that there is one of a man, but another of a woman and so on, or do you also think it to be so with regard to health and size and strength? do you think there is one health of a man, but another of a woman? or is there in all cases the same general form, provided it be health, whether it be in a man or in any thing else whatever?

*Meno.* I think the health of both man and woman is the same.

*Soc.* And their size and strength? provided a woman be strong, will she be strong with the same general form and the same strength? For by 'the same' I mean this; strength does not differ at all as regards being strength, whether it be in a man or in a woman. Do you think it differs at all?

*Meno.* Not I.

*Soc.* Then will virtue differ at all as regards being virtue, whether it be in a child or in an old man, in a woman or in a man?

*Meno.* Somehow I do not think, Socrates, that this is any longer like these other cases.

proving that  
virtue is the  
same in all  
men.

*Soc.* What? did you not say it was a man's virtue to manage the city well, and a woman's to manage her house?

*Meno.* I did.

*Soc.* Can a person manage well either a city or a house, or anything else, if he does not manage them temperately<sup>1</sup> and justly?

*Meno.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Provided persons manage justly and temperately, will they not manage with justice and temperance?

*Meno.* Necessarily they will.

*Soc.* Then both the woman and the man need the same qualities, if they are to be virtuous, viz. justice and temperance.

*Meno.* So it appears.

*Soc.* Well, a child and an old man being intemperate and unjust would never become virtuous, would they?

*Meno.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* But they would if they were temperate and just?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then all men are virtuous in the same way. For if in possession of the same qualities they become virtuous.

<sup>1</sup> *Σώφρων* literally signifies 'one of sound mind,' but it is frequently used to express 'one who has his desires under due control.'

*Meno.* It seems so.

*Soc.* Of course they would not be virtuous in the same way, if their virtue were not the same.

*Meno.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Since then the virtue of all men is the same, try to tell me and to recollect what Gorgias and you with him say it is? 5.

*Meno.* What else is it than to be able to rule men? if you want some one thing applicable to all cases.

*Soc.* That is what I want. But then is the virtue of a child, Meno, and of a slave, the same, to be able to rule their master? And do you think one who rules is still a slave?

*Meno suggests that virtue is to rule men. Socrates rejects this.*

*Meno.* I do not think that at all, Socrates.

*Soc.* No, for it is not likely, my good friend. Besides consider this point also. You say virtue is to be able to rule. Shall we not add to this, 'justly and not unjustly'?

*Meno.* Yes, I think so. For justice, Socrates, is virtue.

*Soc.* Is it virtue, Meno, or a kind of virtue?

*Meno.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* As with regard to anything else. For instance, if you like, with regard to roundness I should say that it is a kind of shape, not thus absolutely that it is shape. And I should say so for this reason, because there are other shapes as well.

*Meno.* And you are right, since I also say not only that justice is virtue, but that there are other virtues as well.

*And again Meno enumerates a list of virtues.*



*Soc.* What are they? Tell me, just as I also would tell you other shapes, if you bade me. Do you therefore tell me other virtues.

*Meno.* Courage then seems to me to be a virtue, and temperance and wisdom and munificence,<sup>1</sup> and very many others.

*Soc.* Again, Meno, we are in the same condition; again we have found many virtues while in search of one, in a different way than just now; but the one, which exists through all these, we are not able to discover.

6. *Meno.* No, for I cannot yet, Socrates, as you require, pick out one virtue applicable to all, as in the other cases.

Socrates then asks him to give an account of 'shape' which will apply to all shapes.

*Soc.* Probably not. But I shall be anxious, if I am able, to help us forward. For I suppose you understand that it is thus with regard to everything; if any one were to ask you as I said just now, what is shape, Meno? if you said to him that roundness is shape, and if he said to you as I did, is roundness shape or a kind of shape? you would say I suppose that it is a kind of shape.

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And would not the reason be, that there are other shapes as well?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if he were to further ask you of what kind the other shapes were, you would tell him?

<sup>1</sup> Μεγαλοπρεπεία signifies the spending of large sums in a suitable manner. A virtue of great importance in a Greek state, where much was done for the city by private liberality.

*Meno.* I would.

*Soc.* And again if he asked you in the same way about colour what it is, and on your saying that white was colour, after this the questioner answered, is white colour or a kind of colour? Would you say that it is a kind of colour, because there are other colours as well?

*Meno.* I should.

*Soc.* And if he bade you mention other colours, would you mention others, which are as much colours as white is?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* If then he pursued the discussion as I did, and said We are always arriving at a number of things, but do not treat me thus, and since you call these many things by some one name, and say all of them are colour, and this too though they are opposite to each other, what is this which comprehends the round no less than the straight, which you call shape, and you say the round is no more shape than the straight. Or do you not say this?

*Meno.* I do say so.

*Soc.* Well then, when you say this, do you then say that the round is no more round than straight, nor the straight more straight than round?

*Meno.* Certainly not, Socrates.

*Soc.* But you do say that the round is no more shape than the straight, nor the one than the other.

*Meno.* You are right.

*Soc.* What then is this of which shape is the name? Try to tell me. If then you were to say to

7.

the person who thus questioned you either about shape or colour, But I neither understand what you wish, my friend, nor do I know what you mean; perhaps he would be surprised and say Do you not understand that I want the same in all these cases? or would you not even be able to answer in these cases, Meno, if a person were to ask, What is there in the case of the round and the straight, and in the case of the other things, which you call shapes, the same in all cases? Try to tell me, that you may have some practice for your answer about virtue.

*Meno.* Not so, but do you tell me, Socrates:

*Soc.* Do you wish me to humour you?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And will you then tell me about virtue?

*Meno.* I will.

*Soc.* We must exert ourselves then; for the subject deserves it.

*Meno.* Certainly it does.

*Soc.* Come then, let us try to tell you what shape is. Consider then if you allow it to be this; for let us say this is shape, 'the only thing that always accompanies colour.' Does that content you? or do you want it described anyhow else? For I should be content if you described virtue to me in this way.

*Meno.* But this is silly, Socrates.

*Soc.* What do you mean?

### 8.

To this Meno objects that a person might not know what 'colour' was

*Meno.* Why that shape is according to your definition, that which always accompanies colour. Granted; but if a person were to say he did not know

Socrates defines 'shape' as 'that which always accompanies colour.'

what colour was, but was just as much at a loss about it as about shape, what do you think would be your answer?

*Soc.* I should answer the truth. And if the interrogator were one of the learned, disputatious, and contentious persons, I should say to him, I have spoken; and if I do not speak correctly, it is your business to take my statement and refute it. But if friends wished to discuss the matter as you and I are now doing, one ought to answer somewhat more mildly and more logically. And perhaps it is more logical not only to answer the truth, but also to answer by means of those terms which the questioner admits that he understands. And I will try to speak to you in this way. For tell me; do you call something 'end'? I mean something such as 'a boundary' and 'extremity'; I call all these something the same. But perhaps Prodicus<sup>1</sup> would differ from us. But you at any rate I suppose call something 'bounded and ended'? This is what I mean, nothing abstruse.

Socrates then defines shape as 'the boundary of a solid.'

*Meno.* Yes, I do, and I think I understand what you say.

*Soc.* Well then, do you call something a superficies, and something else a solid, as these terms are used in geometry?

*Meno.* I do.

*Soc.* Then you might at once understand me from

<sup>1</sup> **Prodicus.** A travelling teacher of morals, contemporary with Socrates. He laid great stress on the importance of distinguishing accurately between words of similar meaning. Hence the allusion to him in the text.

these examples, what I say of shape. For I say this of all shape, that that in which the solid ends is shape; summing which up I would say that *shape is the boundary of a solid*.

9. *Meno*. And what do you call colour, Socrates?

*Soc*. You are insolent, Meno; you give an old man the trouble of answering, but will not yourself say from recollection what Gorgias says virtue is.

*Meno*. But I will tell you, Socrates, when you tell me this.

*Soc*. Even if blindfold, one would know, Meno, from your conversation, that you are handsome and still have your admirers.

*Meno*. Why, pray?

*Soc*. Because you do nothing<sup>1</sup> but issue orders in your talk; as luxurious persons do probably because they are tyrannical, while in the prime of life. And perhaps at the same time you have convicted me of being unable to resist handsome persons. I will then humour you and I will answer you.

*Meno*. Do so by all means.

*Soc*. Shall I then answer you after the fashion of Gorgias, by which you would best follow me?

*Meno*. Do so; why not?

*Soc*. Do not you and he say that there are certain emanations from things according to the theory of Empedocles?<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἐπιτάττεις. Supply *ποιεῖς* from the word *ἐπιτάττεις*. Jelf, § 895. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Empedocles, a Sicilian philosopher, flourished about 450 B.C. He explained our perception of external objects by supposing that

And colour as 'an emanation from shapes commensurate with, and perceptible by, sight.'

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And pores, into which and through which the emanations pass?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* And some of the emanations fit some of the pores, some are too small or too big?<sup>1</sup>

*Meno.* It is so.

*Soc.* And do you not call something sight?

*Meno.* I do.

*Soc.* 'From this then understand what I say,' as Pindar says. For colour is an emanation from shapes commensurate with, and perceptible by, sight.

*Meno.* You seem to me, Socrates, to have given this answer very well.

*Soc.* Yes, for perhaps it is given according to your custom. And at the same time, I think, you perceive that you would be able to describe from it sound, what it is, and smell and many other such things.

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* For the answer, Meno, is high-flown, so that it pleases you more than that about shape.

*Meno.* It does.

*Soc.* But it is not the best, O son of Alexidemus, in my opinion, but the former is a better one. And I think you would not think it the best, if you had

certain emanations from them reached our minds through the organs of sense, which Socrates calls the 'pores,' through which these emanations pass.

<sup>1</sup> e.g. the emanation from an object at a distance is too small for our 'pore' of sight, and we cannot see it. Neither can we see an object distinctly which is too near the eyes, for then the emanation is too big.

B

not, as you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries, but if you would remain and be initiated you would think otherwise.<sup>1</sup>

*Meno.* Well, I would remain, Socrates, if you would tell me many such things.

## 10.

Encouraged by these patterns Meno defines virtue as 'delighting in beautiful or good things, and being able to procure them.'

*Soc.* Certainly I shall show no want of inclination, both for your sake and for my own, in saying such things; but I fear<sup>2</sup> that I shall not be able to say many such things. But come now do you try to perform your promise to me, saying of virtue as a whole what it is, and leave off 'making many out of one,' as jokers say on each occasion of those who break anything, but leaving it whole and unbroken tell me what virtue is. At any rate I have given you the patterns.

*Meno.* Well then, I think, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says, 'to delight in beautiful things, and to be able to procure them.' And I call this virtue, that desiring beautiful things one is able to procure them.

*Soc.* Then do you call one who desires beautiful things a desirer of good things?

*Meno.* Most certainly.

*Soc.* Do you say this because there are some persons who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Do not you think all men, my good friend, desire good things?

<sup>1</sup> This is merely a jesting way of saying that if Meno had the patience to wait while Socrates went deeper into the matter he would change his views.

<sup>2</sup> Ἰπῶς μὴ with the fut. indic. expresses a warning, ἴρα or ἴρατε being readily supplied by the mind. Jelf, § 812. 2.

*Meno.* No, I do not.

*Soc.* But some desire bad ?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* Thinking bad things to be good, do you mean, or knowing that they are bad, nevertheless they desire them ?

Socrates then proves that all men wish for good things.

*Meno.* I think both to be the case.

*Soc.* But do you think any one, Meno, knowing that bad things are bad, nevertheless desires them ?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* What do you mean by 'desiring' ? is it that they should accrue to himself ?

*Meno.* Yes, what else could it mean ?

*Soc.* Does he do so thinking that bad things benefit him to whom they accrue, or knowing that bad things injure their possessor ?

*Meno.* Some do so thinking bad things benefit, some knowing that they injure.

*Soc.* But do you think those who think bad things benefit, know that they are bad things ?

*Meno.* Certainly, I do not think this.

*Soc.* Is it not plain that these persons do not desire bad things, who are ignorant of them, but desire what they think to be good things, but that these are really bad ; so that those who are ignorant of them and think them to be good clearly desire good things. Is it not so ?

*Meno.* Perhaps they do so.

*Soc.* Well then, those who desire bad things, as you say, but think that bad things injure him to whom they accrue, know, I suppose, that they will be injured by them ?



*Meno.* Of course.

*Soc.* But do these persons not think that those who are injured are wretched so far as they are injured?

*Meno.* Of course they do think so.

*Soc.* And do you not think the wretched are unfortunate?

*Meno.* I do.

*Soc.* Does any one wish to be wretched and unfortunate?

*Meno.* I do not think so, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then no one wishes for bad things, Meno, if he does not wish to be such. For what else is to be wretched than to desire bad things and to get them?

*Meno.* Perhaps you are right, Socrates, and perhaps no one wishes for bad things.

## 11.

and that therefore to do so cannot be virtue.

*Soc.* Did you not just now say that virtue is to wish for good things, and to be able to procure them?

*Meno.* Yes, I did.

*Soc.* Then of this definition the 'wishing' belongs to all men, and in this respect one is no more virtuous than another?

*Meno.* It seems so.

*Soc.* But it is clear that if one man is more virtuous than other, his superiority must be in his power.

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* This then, as it seems, is virtue according to your definition, 'the power to procure good things.'

*Meno.* Indeed I think, Socrates, that it is as you now suppose.

*Soc.* Let us then see if you are right in this. For

Thus virtue, according to Meno's definition, is 'to be able to procure good things.'

perhaps your account is a good one. You say that virtue is to be able to procure good things?

*Meno.* I do.

*Soc.* And by 'good things' you mean, do you not, such as health and wealth? I mean to acquire gold and silver, and honours, and offices in a city? You do not mean by 'good things' any other than such things, do you?

*Meno.* No; but I call all such 'good things.'

*Soc.* Very well. Then to procure gold and silver is virtue, according to Meno, the hereditary guest<sup>1</sup> of the great king.<sup>2</sup> Do you add anything to this 'procuring,' Meno, viz. to procure them 'justly and holily'? or does it not matter to you, but even if a person procure them unjustly, do you equally call them virtue?

But this implies doing so 'with justice.'

*Meno.* Certainly not, Socrates, but vice.

*Soc.* By all means then, I suppose, as it seems, there must be in this 'procuring' justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue; if not, it will not be virtue, although virtue procures good things.

*Meno.* How could it be virtue without these qualities?

*Soc.* Then not to procure gold and silver, whenever it would not be just, either for oneself or for another, is not this 'inability to procure virtue also'?

<sup>1</sup> Πατρικὸς ξένος. Hospitality is always an important feature of an early state of civilisation. Among the Greeks a stranger was well received and hospitably entertained, and on his departure he exchanged tokens with his host, to enable them or their posterity to at any time recognise each other; and thus hospitality might be transferred as an inheritance from father to son.

<sup>2</sup> The 'great king' was a title always given by the Greeks to the King of Persia.

*Meno.* So it seems.

*Soc.* Then the procuring of such good things would be no more virtue than the inability to procure them: but, as it seems, whatever is done with justice will be virtue, and whatever is done without all such qualities, would be vice.

*Meno.* I think it must be as you say.

*Soc.* Did we not say before that each of these was a small part of virtue, justice, and temperance, and such qualities?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then, Meno, are you playing with me?

*Meno.* Why, Socrates?

*Soc.* Because, though I begged you just now not to break or cut up virtue into small pieces, and gave you patterns by which you should answer, you have disregarded this, and you tell me that virtue is to be able to procure good things with justice, and this you say is a part of virtue.

*Meno.* I do.

*Soc.* Then it follows from your admissions, that to do with a part of virtue whatever one does, this is virtue; for you say justice and each of these qualities is a part of justice?

*Meno.* What then?

*Soc.* I mean this, that though I begged you to describe justice as a whole, you are far from saying of it what it is, but you say that every action is virtue, provided it be done with a part of virtue, as if you had said what virtue is as a whole, and as if I should at

12.

and justice  
is a part of  
virtue.

Therefore  
to say that  
virtue is the  
power of  
procuring  
good things  
is merely  
saying that  
any act with  
virtue is  
virtue,

once recognise it, even if you cut it up into parts. You need therefore again from the beginning, as it seems to me, the same question, my dear Meno, 'What is virtue,' if every action with a part of virtue be virtue? for this is his meaning, when a person says that every action with justice is virtue. Do you not think you need again the same question, but do you think any one knows what a part of virtue is, without knowing virtue itself?

*Meno.* No, I do not think that.

*Soc.* For if you recollect, when I answered you about shape, we rejected I believe such an answer as attempted an explanation by means of terms still under investigation and not yet agreed upon.

*Meno.* Yes, and we rejected it rightly, Socrates.

*Soc.* Do not then, my good friend, do not you, while what virtue is as a whole is still under investigation, consider that by answering by means of parts of it you will make it clear to any one at all, or make anything else clear by speaking of it in the same way, but again you will need the same question, virtue being what do you say what you say of it? or do you think I am talking nonsense?

*Meno.* No, I think you are correct.

*Soc.* Answer then again from the beginning; what do you and your friend say virtue is?

*Meno.* O Socrates, I heard before I met you, that you do nothing but doubt yourself and make others to doubt; but now, as I think, you are bewitching and drugging and downright enchanting me, so that I have

which is  
useless as a  
definition.

13.

Meno complains that Socrates benumbs him, and makes

him forget  
all he knew  
about virtue.

become full of doubt. And you seem to me, if I must make a jest, altogether most like in form and other points this broad sea-fish the torpedo. For it makes whoever approaches and grasps it to grow numb; and you seem now to have made me something of this kind, viz. to be numb. For truly I am numb in mind and mouth, and know not how to answer you. And yet I have times out of mind made many statements about virtue and to many persons, and made them very well, as I think; but now I cannot even at all say what it is. And I think you are well advised in not sailing hence or leaving home; for if as a stranger in another city you were to act thus, you would be quickly driven away as a wizard.

*Soc.* You are a cunning fellow, Meno, and you have almost deceived me.

*Meno.* Why, pray, Socrates?

*Soc.* I know why you have drawn a picture of me.

*Meno.* Why, do you think?

*Soc.* That I should draw one of you in return. For I know this about all handsome persons, that they like having their pictures drawn. For it is profitable to them; for I suppose even the pictures of the handsome are handsome. But I shall not draw a picture of you. But I, if this torpedo being itself numb, thus makes others to be numb, am like it; if not, I am not. For I do not make others to doubt, being myself free from doubt, but doubting myself more than anyone, thus I make others also to doubt. And now about virtue; what it is, I do not know; you, however, did perhaps know before you grasped me, but now you are like one

Socrates says  
that he is  
equally at a  
loss himself,

who does not know. Nevertheless I wish to investigate it with you, and to join you in the search as to what it is.

*Meno.* And how, Socrates, will you search for a thing of which you absolutely do not know the nature? for which of the things you are ignorant of will you keep before you in your search? Or even if you do meet with it exactly, how will you know that this is what you did not know? 14.

*Soc.* I understand what you mean, Meno. Do you see how sophistical a theory this is that you are drawing out? Since thus it is impossible for a man to search for either what he knows or for what he does not know. For he would not search for what he knows; for he knows it, and such a person has no need to search; nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what he will search for.

but that they must proceed with the search for virtue in spite of not knowing what they are in search of.

*Meno.* You do not think this a good theory, do you, Socrates?

*Soc.* I do not.

*Meno.* Can you tell me how it is not?

*Soc.* I can, for I have heard both men and women who are wise about divine matters—

*Meno.* Saying what?

*Soc.* A true, as I think, and beautiful theory.

*Meno.* What is it, and who are they that say it?

*Soc.* They that say it are those priests and priestesses whose business it has been to be able to give an account of what they take in hand; and Pindar and many other poets say it, as many as are inspired. And

Socrates then propounds the theory that the soul has learnt all things in previous existences,

what they say is this. Now consider if they seem to you to say truly. For they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time comes to an end, which they call dying; at another time it again comes into being, but is never destroyed. We must therefore pass our lives as holily as possible; 'For from whomever Persephone has received satisfaction for ancient guilt, their souls she gives back in the ninth year to the sun above, from whom proud kings and men swift in strength and mighty in wisdom will spring; and for the rest of time they are called by men holy heroes.'<sup>1</sup>

## 15.

and that  
what we call  
learning is  
merely recol-  
lection.

Probably therefore because the soul is immortal and has often come into being, and has seen things on earth and in Hades and all matters, there is nothing which it has not learnt; so that there is no wonder if it is able to recollect, both with regard to virtue and other things, at all events what it knew before. For probably because all nature is akin, and the soul has learnt all things, nothing hinders a person by recollecting one single thing, which men call learning, from discovering everything else, if he be manly and does not faint in the search; for to search then and to learn is entirely recollection. We must not believe, therefore, this sophistical theory of yours; for it would make us lazy, and is a pleasant one for cowardly men to hear; but the theory I have just stated makes men active and diligent in search. Believing which to be true, I wish to search with you for what virtue is.

<sup>1</sup> A fragment by Pindar.

*Meno.* Certainly, Socrates; but do you indeed say this—that we do not learn, but that what we call learning is recollection? Can you teach me that it is so?

*Soc.* I said just now, Meno, that you are a cunning fellow, and now you ask if I can teach you; I who say there is no teaching but recollection, in order that I may at once be shown to contradict myself.

*Meno.* No indeed, Socrates, I did not speak with that view, but from habit. But if you can anyhow demonstrate to me that it is as you say, do so.

*Soc.* Well, it is not easy, but still I am willing to exert myself on your behalf. But call me one of these numerous attendants of yours, any one you like, that I may demonstrate it to you on him.

This theory Socrates illustrates on one of Meno's slaves,

*Meno.* Certainly. (*To a slave.*) Come hither.

*Soc.* Is he Greek, and does he speak Greek?

*Meno.* Certainly he does, he was born in my house.

*Soc.* Watch then, whether it seems to you that he is recollecting or learning from me.

*Meno.* I will watch.

*Soc.* Tell me, boy, you know that a four angled space is like this?


*Slave.* I do.

*Soc.* Has a four angled space all these lines equal, being four in number?

*Slave.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Has it not also these lines through the middle equal?


*Slave.* Yes.



16.  
by drawing a 4 ft. square and showing the slave that each of its sides is 2 ft. long, and asking him how long will be the side of an 8 ft. square.



*Soc.* Might not such a space be both greater and smaller ?



*Slave.* Certainly.

*Soc.* If then this side be of two feet and this of two, of how many feet would the whole be ? Look at it in this way, if it were on this side of two feet, but on this only of one, would not <sup>1</sup> the space be once two feet ?

*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then since it is of two feet on this side also, does it not become twice two feet ?

*Slave.* It does.

*Soc.* Then it becomes twice two feet ?

*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* How many then are twice two feet ? Reckon and tell me.

*Slave.* Four, Socrates.

*Soc.* Could there not be another twice as big as this space, but like it, with all its lines equal as this has ?

*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* Of how many feet will it be ?

*Slave.* Eight.

*Soc.* Come then, try and tell me how long each of its sides will be. For the side of this one is two feet, what will be that of the space twice as big ?

*Slave.* Clearly, Socrates, twice as long.

<sup>1</sup> ἄλλο τι or ἕλλο τι ἤ is an elliptic expression used in the sense of 'nonne.' Jelf, § 875. e.

The slave answers that it will be 4 ft. long.

*Soc.* You see, Meno, that I teach him nothing, but ask everything; and now he thinks he knows what sort of line it is from which the eight foot space will come. Do you not think so?

*Meno.* I do.

*Soc.* Does he know then?

*Meno.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* But at least he thinks that it comes from the double line?

*Meno.* Yes.


*Soc.* Watch him then recollecting in order, as he ought to recollect.

Now tell me, do you say that the double space comes from the double line? I mean a space like this, not long on this side, and short on that, but let it be equal everywhere like this one here, but twice as big, viz. of eight feet. But see if you still think it will come from the double line.

17.

But a line of 4 ft. is shown to produce a square of 16 ft.

*Slave.* I do.



*Soc.* Does not this line then become twice as long as this, if we draw from this point another as long?


*Slave.* Certainly.

*Soc.* From this then, you say, will come the eight foot space, if there were four such?

*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* Let us draw then from it four equal lines. Is not this what you say the eight foot space is?

*Slave.* Certainly.



*Soc.* Are there not in it these four spaces, each of which is equal to this four foot space?

*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* How big is it then? is it not four times as big as this?

*Slave.* Of course.

*Soc.* Then is four times this twice as big?

*Slave.* No, indeed.

*Soc.* But how many times as big?

*Slave.* Four times.

*Soc.* Then from the double line, boy, a space not twice but four times as big comes.

*Slave.* You are right.

*Soc.* Four times four is sixteen, is it not?

*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* But from what line does an eight foot space come? does not one four times as big come from this?

*Slave.* It does.

*Soc.* And this four foot space from this half line?


*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well, is not the eight foot space double of this one here ( $\triangle BCD$ ), but half of this ( $\triangle AEF$ )?

The slave then says that the side of the 8 ft. square will be 8 ft. long.

*Slave.* Certainly.

*Soc.* It will come from a line longer than this (AB), but shorter than this here (AE), will it not?




*Slave.* I think it will.

*Soc.* Good. For answer what you think. And tell me, is not this line here of two feet, and this of four?

*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the side of the eight foot space must be longer than this two foot line, but shorter than this four foot one.



*Slave.* It must.

*Soc.* Try then to tell me how long you say it is.

*Slave.* Three feet.

*Soc.* Then if it is to be three feet, let us add on half this (BD) and it will be three feet? for here are two (AB), and here is

But this is shown to produce a 9 ft. square.

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one (BD); and so from this point here are two (DE), and here is one (EF); and this is the space you speak of?

*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well then, if it is three feet on this side and three feet on this, is not the whole space three times three feet?

*Slave.* Apparently.

*Soc.* But how many are three times three feet?

*Slave.* Nine.

*Soc.* But the double space was to be of how many feet?

*Slave.* Eight.

*Soc.* Then the eight foot space does not come even from the three foot line?

*Slave.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* But from what line? try to tell us exactly; and if you do not wish to count, still show us from what line.

*Slave.* But indeed, Socrates, I do not know.

### 18.

*Soc.* Do you notice, Meno, to what point in his recollection he is already advanced? Because at first he knew not indeed what the side of the eight foot space is, just as he does not yet know, but then he thought he knew it, and answered boldly as if he knew, and did not think he was in doubt; but now already he thinks he is in doubt, and as he does not know, so he does not even think he knows.

*Meno.* You are right.

*Soc.* Is he not then better off with regard to the matter of which he was ignorant?

*Meno.* Yes, I think he is.

*Soc.* Then by making him doubt and grow numb as

Socrates says that this numbing process has benefited the slave, for it has made him conscious of his own ignorance.

the torpedo does, we have not done him any harm, have we ?

*Meno.* No, I think not.

*Soc.* At all events we have done something useful, as it seems, for his discovery of how the matter stands ; for now he would gladly investigate the matter as he is ignorant of it ; but then he thought he could easily, to many persons and on many occasions, give a good account of the double space, that it ought to have a side twice as long.

*Meno.* So it seems.

*Soc.* Do you think that he would have attempted to investigate or learn what he thought he knew, though he did not know it, before that he fell into doubt from considering he did not know it, and desired to know it.

*Meno.* I do not, Socrates.


*Soc.* Then he has been benefited by being numbed ?

*Meno.* I think so.

*Soc.* See then what he will discover in consequence of this doubt by investigating with me, though I do nothing but ask him questions and do not teach him ; and watch whether you can find me teaching and explaining anything to him, and not constantly asking for his opinions.

*Soc.* For tell me, you boy, is not this our four foot space ? you understand ?


*Slave.* I do.



19.


Socrates shows that the 8 ft. square must be described on the diagonal of the 4 ft. square.

C




*Soc.* And should we add this other one here equal to it?

*Slave.* Yes.



*Soc.* And this third here equal to each?

*Slave.* Yes.



*Soc.* Should we not fill in also this one in the corner?

*Slave.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Would not these four spaces be equal?

*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well then ; how many times this one is the whole figure ?

*Slave.* Four times.

*Soc.* But we want to have a space twice as big; do you not remember?


*Slave.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Does not this line from corner to corner cut in half each of these spaces?

*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* Are not these four lines equal, comprehending this space?

*Slave.* They are.



*Soc.* Consider then how big is this space (CBDE)?

*Slave.* I do not understand.

*Soc.* Has not each of these lines cut off within half of each of these four spaces? Is it not so?

*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* How many such are there in this (BCDE)?

*Slave.* Four.

*Soc.* And how many in this (ABCF)?

*Slave.* Two.

*Soc.* And four is what of two?

*Slave.* Double.

*Soc.* Then of how many feet is this (BCDE)?

*Slave.* Of eight.

*Soc.* From what line is it?

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*Slave.* From this (CB).

*Soc.* From the one that reaches from corner to corner of the four foot space?

*Slave.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the Sophists<sup>1</sup> call this the diagonal, so that if this be called the diagonal, from the diagonal as you say, O slave of Meno, would come the double space.

*Slave.* Certainly, Socrates.

## 20.

*Soc.* What do you think, Meno? Has he given in answer any opinion not his own?

*Meno.* No, they were all his own.

*Soc.* And yet he did not know, as we said just before.

*Meno.* You are right.

*Soc.* These opinions then were in him, were they not?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then there are in a person who does not know what he is ignorant of true opinions about the matters of which he is ignorant?

*Meno.* It appears so.

*Soc.* And now these opinions have just been stirred up in him as if in a dream, and if any one should ask him these same questions many times and on many occasions, you know that at last he would know about them as accurately as any one.

*Meno.* Probably.

*Soc.* Will he not know without any one teaching

<sup>1</sup> The Sophists at Athens in Plato's time were a class of men who gave lessons for money in grammar, mathematics, &c.

Meno allows that knowledge of the right answer has been in the slave's soul all the time, and that he has been brought to recollect it by the questions of Socrates.

him, but asking him questions, by recalling the knowledge of himself?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is not to recall knowledge in oneself to recollect?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then the knowledge, which he now has, he has either received at some time or other, or has always had?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then if he always had it, he was always possessed of knowledge; and if he received it at some time or other, he could not have received it in his present life; or has any one taught him geometry? for he will do these same things about all geometry, and all other branches of learning? Has any one taught him all things? For I suppose you ought to know, especially since he was born and bred in your family.

*Meno.* But I know that no one has ever taught him.

*Soc.* But has he these opinions or not?

*Meno.* He must have them, it seems, Socrates.

*Soc.* But if he has them without having received them in his present life, is not this at once plain that he had them and had learnt them in some other period?

*Meno.* It seems so.

*Soc.* Is not this the period when he was not a man?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* If then during the time when he is and during the time when he is not a man, there will be in him true opinions, which on being roused up by questioning

become knowledge, will not his soul have learnt them during eternity? For it is plain that during all time he is or is not a man.

*Meno.* It seems so.

Thus Socrates shows the importance of investigation to recall to us our knowledge.

*Soc.* Then if the truth of things is always in our soul, must not the soul be immortal, so that you must confidently attempt to investigate and recollect, whatever you do not happen to know now, that is whatever you do not happen to remember?

*Meno.* I think, Socrates, you speak well, I know not how.

*Soc.* Yes, I think so too, Meno. And yet in other respects I should not very vehemently support the theory; but that by thinking we ought to investigate whatever one does not know, we should be better and more manly and less lazy than if we thought it impossible to discover, and thought we need not investigate what we do not know, for this I should contend zealously, if I were able, both in word and deed.

*Meno.* And this too I think you say well, Socrates.

22.

*Soc.* Are you willing then, since we are agreed that anything of which one is ignorant ought to be investigated, that we should attempt together to find out what virtue is?

Meno proposes to go back to the original question, 'Can virtue be taught?'

*Meno.* Certainly. However, I would most gladly investigate and hear about the question I asked at first, whether we must attempt it as being a thing that can be taught, or on the supposition that virtue comes to men by nature, or in what other way it does come.

*Soc.* Well, if I were master, Meno, not only of myself, but also of you, we should not have inquired whether virtue can be taught or not, before we had first investigated what it is. But since you do not even attempt to master yourself, in order forsooth that you may be free, but attempt to rule and do rule me, I will give way to you; for what are we to do? it seems then that we must consider of what kind a thing is of which we do not yet know what it is. If you will do nothing else, yet relax somewhat at all events your rule over me, and suffer it to be considered by supposition, whether it is to be taught or how it is to be acquired. Now I mean by the phrase 'by supposition' the following:—just as geometricians often consider, whenever one asks them, for instance, about a figure, if it is possible for this triangular figure to be inscribed in this circle, one of them might say, 'I do not yet know if this figure is such, but I think I have as it were a sort of supposition useful for the matter as follows:—if this space is such, that when a person has stretched it along the line given here, it falls short by such a space as is the part stretched along, one result seems to me to follow, and a different one if this cannot be done.<sup>1</sup> By forming a supposition therefore I am willing to tell you the result about its inscription in the circle, whether it is impossible or not.'

To this Socrates consents, prohe may start from a supposition as to what virtue is.

<sup>1</sup> *Εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ . . . παθεῖν.* This passage appears so corrupt that no satisfactory translation or explanation of it can be given. However the general sense is clear enough: if a geometrician is asked whether a certain triangle can be inscribed in a certain circle, he might answer, 'Without knowing more about the triangle I cannot say, but if it is of a certain size it can be inscribed, if not it cannot.'

## 23.

Supposing  
virtue to be  
knowledge,  
obviously  
it can be  
taught.

Thus then with regard to virtue, since we neither know what it is nor of what kind it is, let us by forming a supposition consider whether it is to be taught or not, saying thus, if virtue be which of the qualities of the soul, would it be to be taught or not to be taught? First, if it be different from or like knowledge, is it to be taught or not? or, as we just now said, to be recollected? Let it not matter to us which word we use. But is it to be taught? is not this plain to every one, that a man is taught nothing but knowledge?

*Meno.* I think so.

*Soc.* At any rate if virtue is knowledge, it is plain that it might be taught.

*Meno.* Of course.

*Soc.* Then we have soon got away from this point, that being so and so it can be taught, but being so and so it cannot.

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then next, as it seems, we must consider whether virtue is knowledge or different from knowledge.

*Meno.* Yes, I think this is next for consideration.

*Soc.* Well then; do we not say that virtue in the abstract<sup>1</sup> is good, and does not this supposition abide with us, that it is good?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then if there is any other good thing apart from knowledge, perhaps virtue would not be a kind of

<sup>1</sup> *ἄβρο* is specially used in Attic Greek to express the abstract idea. Jelf, § 656. 2.

The next  
question is,  
'Is virtue  
knowledge?'  
for if it is it  
can be  
taught.  
Now, virtue  
is good,

knowledge ; but if there be no good thing which knowledge does not comprehend, in suspecting it to be a kind of knowledge we should be right.

*Meno.* It is so.

*Soc.* And are we good by virtue ?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if good, useful ; for all good things are useful, are they not ?

and all good things are useful.

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* And virtue then is useful ?

∴ virtue is useful.

*Meno.* Necessarily from our admissions.

*Soc.* Then let us consider, taking each separately, what kind of things they are that are useful to us. Health, we say, and strength and beauty and wealth too ; these and such things we call useful, do we not ?

24.

All useful things require prudence to render them useful.

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* But these same things sometimes are also injurious. Do you disagree or agree with me ?

*Meno.* I agree with you.

*Soc.* Consider then, under the guidance of what, is each of these useful, and under the guidance of what, is it injurious ? Is it not when a right use guides that it is useful, and when it does not, that it is injurious ?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then let us now consider the qualities of the soul. Do you call something temperance and justice and courage and docility, and memory and munificence and the like ?

*Meno.* I do.

*Soc.* Consider then whether as many of these as

you think are not knowledge but different from knowledge, are not sometimes injurious, and sometimes useful; for instance, whether courage is courage if prudence is absent, or, for example, a kind of rashness; when a man is rash without sense, is he not injured; but when with sense, is he not benefited?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well, is it so also with temperance and docility? When learnt and disciplined with sense, are they useful things, when without sense, injurious?

*Meno.* That is very true.

*Soc.* In a word, then, do not all the undertakings and endurances of the soul, under the guidance of prudence, end in happiness, but under the guidance of imprudence end in the opposite?

*Meno.* It seems so.

*Soc.* If then virtue be a quality in the soul and it must be a useful thing, it must itself be prudence, since all the qualities of the soul by themselves are neither useful nor injurious, but with the addition of prudence or imprudence become injurious and useful. According to this argument, virtue being useful must be a kind of prudence.

*Meno.* I think so.

25. *Soc.* And the other things, wealth and the like, which we said just now are sometimes good and sometimes hurtful, just as prudence guiding the rest of the soul makes its qualities useful, and imprudence makes them injurious, in the same way does the soul using

∴ virtue is a kind of prudence.

and guiding these rightly make them useful, but using them wrongly make them injurious?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And the prudent soul guides rightly, but the imprudent wrongly?

*Meno.* It is so.

*Soc.* Thus then we can say that in the case of the man everything else depends on his soul, and that the qualities of the soul itself depend on prudence, if they are to be good; and by this argument the useful would be prudence. And we say that virtue is useful?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then we say that virtue is prudence, either wholly or partly?

*Meno.* I think what you say, Socrates, is right.

*Soc.* Then if this be so, the good would not be so by nature.

and ∴ virtue does not come by nature.

*Meno.* I think not.

*Soc.* For otherwise I suppose the following would be the case. If the good were so by nature, we should have, I suppose, persons who would distinguish those young men who have good natures, whom we should take on their showing and guard in the acropolis, having set a stamp on them far more than upon gold, that no one should corrupt them, but that when they reached manhood, they might be useful to their cities.

*Meno.* At any rate it is probable, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then since the good do not become good by nature, do they do so by teaching?

26.

*Meno.* I think it must be so. And it is clear,



Socrates, by the supposition, if virtue is knowledge, that it can be taught.

*Soc.* Perhaps indeed. But I fear we have admitted this wrongly?

*Meno.* Well, I thought just now it was right.

*Soc.* But I fear it ought to seem right not only 'just now,' but in both the present and the future, if there is to be anything sound in it.

*Meno.* Well then; what have you in view that you disapprove of it and are doubting lest virtue should not be knowledge?

*Soc.* I will tell you, Meno. For the statement that it can be taught, if it be knowledge, I do not withdraw as incorrect; but consider if I seem to you to be doubting with good reason, that it is not knowledge. For tell me this. If anything whatever, not only virtue, can be taught, must there not be both teachers and learners of it?

*Meno.* I think so.

*Soc.* Well then on the other hand, should we not be right in conjecturing that a thing, of which there were neither teachers nor learners, could not be taught?

*Meno.* True. But do you not think there are teachers of virtue?

*Soc.* No, at any rate though often searching if there be any teachers of it, and using all my exertions, I cannot find any. And yet I search in company, and with those whom I should think most skilled in the matter. Particularly opportunely, Meno, has Anytus<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Anytus, chiefly remarkable as having been the most prominent of the accusers of Socrates, was the son of a wealthy tanner.

But yet it does not seem teachable, for there are neither teachers nor learners of it.

here taken his seat by us, that we may give him a share in our investigation. And with good reason should we give him a share in it. For this Anytus in the first place is the son of a wealthy and wise father, Anthemion—who became wealthy not by chance nor at the gift of any one, like Ismenias the Theban, who has lately inherited ‘the wealth of a Polycrates,’<sup>1</sup> but acquired his riches by his own skill and attention, seeming moreover in other respects not to be an overweening citizen nor pompous and disagreeable, but an orderly and well-behaved man; further he reared and educated this son of his well, as the mass of the Athenians think; at all events they choose him for the most important offices. It is right then in such company to search for teachers of virtue, whether there are any or not, and who they are.

Socrates seals then app to Anytus, who has just come up, to know if there are any teachers of virtue.

Do you then, Anytus, join us, myself and your friend Meno here, in our inquiry about this matter, who would be teachers of virtue. Look at it thus. If we wished Meno here to become a good physician, to whom should we send him as teachers? Should we not send him to the physicians?

27.

If we wish to get a person taught anything we send him to professed teachers of it.

*An.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And what if we wished him to become a good shoemaker, should we not send him to the shoemakers?

*An.* Yes.

<sup>1</sup> Τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα. Polycrates was tyrant of Samos, and renowned for his wealth. Hence ‘the wealth of a Polycrates’ passed into a proverb for an immense fortune. Ismenias is totally unknown.

*Soc.* And so on?

*An.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Tell me this again about the same cases. We should do well, we say, in sending him to the physicians, if we wish him to become a physician? When we say this, do we mean that we should be wise in sending him to those who profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who ask pay for this very thing, giving themselves out to be teachers of any one who will go to them and learn? Should we not send him rightly with this in view?

*An.* Yes.

*Soc.* Is it the same with regard to flute-playing and the rest? It is great folly for those who wish to make a man a flute-player to be unwilling to send him to those who promise to teach the art and ask pay for doing so, but to give trouble to some other persons, by his seeking to learn from those who neither profess to be teachers, nor have any learners at all in this branch of learning, which we expect whomever we send to learn from them? Does not this seem to you very unreasonable?

*An.* Yes truly, and ignorance besides.

28.

*Soc.* You are right. Now then you may discuss with me the case of our friend Meno here. For he, Anytus, has long been telling me that he is desirous of this wisdom and virtue, by which men manage their families and cities well, and look after their own parents, and know how to receive and dismiss both citizens and strangers in a manner worthy of a good

Thus those who wish to learn virtue should go to the Sophists.

man. With regard to this virtue then consider to whom we should be right in sending him. Is it plain according to what we have just said that we should send him to those who profess to be teachers of virtue and announce themselves as open to receive any Greek who wishes to learn, having fixed and asking pay for this?

*An.* And who are these you speak of, Socrates?

*Soc.* Why, you know I suppose that they are such persons as men call 'Sophists.'

*An.* O Hercules, do not speak of them, Socrates. May such madness seize none of my relations, none of my kinsmen or friends, neither citizen or stranger, as to go to these men and be corrupted, since they are obvious corruption and destruction of their associates.

But Anytus maintains that Sophists rather corrupt than improve their pupils,

*Soc.* What do you mean, Anytus? do these alone of those who claim to know how to confer some benefit differ so much from the rest, as not only not to benefit, as the others do, whatever one entrusts to them, but even on the contrary to spoil it? and for this do they openly demand to receive money?

I know not how to believe you; for I know that one man—Protagoras<sup>1</sup>—acquired more money from this wisdom than Pheidias,<sup>2</sup> who produced such splendidly beautiful works, and ten other sculptors. And yet you make a marvellous statement, if menders of old

29.

<sup>1</sup> **Protagoras** was the first who called himself a Sophist, and taught for pay.

<sup>2</sup> **Pheidias.** The most famous sculptor of Greece (fl. 460-432 B.C.)

shoes and repairers of clothes could not escape detection thirty days if they returned the clothes and shoes worse than they received them, and if they did so, would soon die of hunger, but Protagoras escaped detection from the whole of Greece for more than forty years while corrupting his associates and sending them away worse than he received them. For I think he died when almost seventy years old, and was engaged in his art for forty years; and in all this time up to this very day he has suffered no loss of reputation; and not only Protagoras, but very many others have done the same, some before him, and some now still alive. Are we then to say according to your theory, that they knowingly deceive and corrupt the young, or that they do it unwittingly? and shall we consider these persons, whom some say are the wisest of men, to be so mad?

*An.* They at least are far from being mad, Socrates, but far madder are those young men who give them money; and still madder are those who trust young men to them—viz. their relations; but maddest of all are the cities, which suffer them to enter and do not drive them forth, whether it be a stranger or a citizen that attempts such actions.

30.

*Soc.* Has any one of the Sophists injured you, Anytus, or why are you so bitter against them?

*An.* No indeed, I never associated with any one of them, nor would I have allowed any one of my family to do so.

*Soc.* Then are you entirely without experience of them?

though he confesses he has had no experience of them.

*An.* Yes, and may I remain so.

*Soc.* How then, you strange person, can you know about this matter, of which you are entirely without experience, whether it has in itself anything good or bad?

*An.* Easily; at any rate I know who these men are, whether I am without experience of them or not.

*Soc.* Perhaps you are a prophet, Anytus, since I should wonder from what you say, how otherwise you know about them. However, we are not inquiring who these are, to whom Meno should go to become worse; for we will grant, if you like, the Sophists to be the persons; but now tell us of the others, and do a good service to this hereditary comrade of yours, by telling him to whom he should go in a city so big as this to become accredited with the virtue which I have just now described.

*An.* Why have you not told him yourself?

*Soc.* But I have mentioned those whom I thought to be teachers of these matters, but I am talking nonsense, as you say; and perhaps you are right. But do you in your turn say to whom of the Athenians he should go. Mention the name of any one you like.

*An.* What need is there to hear the name of one man? For whatever Athenian gentleman he may meet, every one will make him better than the Sophists will, provided he will attend to him.

*Soc.* Have these gentlemen become such by chance, having learnt from no one, yet nevertheless being able to teach what they themselves have not learnt?

31.

Anytus then says that virtue may be learnt from any καλὸς καγαθός.

D

*An.* These I assert have learnt from their predecessors, being gentlemen. Do you not think there have been many good men in this city?

*Soc.* I do, Anytus, and I think there are here good politicians, and moreover have been as many as there are. But there have not been any good teachers of their own virtue, have there? For this is the point of our discussion, not whether there are or are not virtuous men here, nor whether there have been formerly, but we are considering all this time whether virtue can be taught. And in considering this we are considering the following, whether virtuous men both now and formerly have known how to transmit to others also the virtue, by which they are themselves virtuous, or whether this cannot be transmitted by man, nor acquired by one from another? This is what I and Meno are all this time investigating.

32. Consider it then thus according to your theory. Would you not say that Themistocles<sup>1</sup> was a virtuous man?

*An.* I should, most of all men.

*Soc.* Well then, would you not say that he was also a good teacher, if ever anyone was a teacher of his own virtue?

*An.* I should think so, provided he wished to teach it.

*Soc.* Well, do you think he would not have wished others to become gentlemen, and especially his own

<sup>1</sup> **Themistocles.** Founder of the naval power of Athens. Victor of the battle of Salamis, 480 B.C.

But Socrates shows that Themistocles did not teach it to his own son.

son? or do you think he was envious of him, and intentionally did not transmit to him the virtue by which he himself was virtuous? or have you not heard that Themistocles got his son Cleophantus taught to be a good rider? at any rate he used to stand upright on horseback, and hurl darts in that position, and perform many other wonderful feats, in which his father had him trained, and he made him wise as far as good teachers were concerned. Have you not heard this from our elders?

*An.* I have.

*Soc.* Then no one would have found fault with his son's nature as being a bad one.

*An.* Perhaps not.

*Soc.* Well then; have you ever heard from young or old that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, became a virtuous and wise man like his father?

*An.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then are we to think that he wished to train his own son in these matters, but in his own wisdom to make him no better than his neighbours, provided virtue be teachable?

*An.* Perhaps not, indeed.

*Soc.* Then this man, whom you allow to be one of the best of our ancestors, was not such a teacher of virtue as you describe; but let us take another, Aristides,<sup>1</sup> son of Lysimachus. Do you not allow that he was virtuous?

**33.**

Neither did  
Aristeides,  
Thucydides.

<sup>1</sup> **Aristeides** is styled by Herodotus (8. 79) 'the best and justest man at Athens.'



*An.* I do, by all means.

*Soc.* Well, he also trained his own son Lysimachus, best of all the Athenians, as far as teachers went, but do you think he made him a better man than anyone else? For I suppose you have been with him, and see what kind of man he is. But if you like, let us take Pericles, a man so conspicuously wise, you know that he brought up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus?

*An.* I do.

*Soc.* Well, these sons, as you know, he taught to be as good horsemen as any Athenian, and he trained them to be as good as any one in music and gymnastics and other matters, as far as art is concerned; but did he not wish to make them virtuous men? I think he wished it, but I suspect it is not teachable. But that you may not think that few only, and those the worst of the Athenians, are incapable in this matter, consider how Thucydides brought up his two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, and how he trained them well in other respects, and how they were the best wrestlers of the Athenians. For he gave one to Xanthias, and the other to Eudorus; and these men I suppose were considered the best wrestlers of that time. Do you not recollect?

*An.* I do, by hearsay.

34.

Thus we may suspect that virtue is not teachable.

*Soc.* Then it is clear that he would never have taught his sons these things, where he had to teach at some expense, and have not taught them, where he could have made them virtuous men at no expense, if it were teachable. However, perhaps Thucydides was a

bad man, and had not a very large circle of friends, both Athenians and allies? and yet he belonged to a powerful family, and had great influence in the city and among the other Greeks, so that, provided this were teachable, he would have found out whoever was likely to make his sons virtuous, either some native or some stranger, if he had no leisure himself owing to his state occupations. However, friend Anytus, I suspect that virtue is not teachable.

*An.* Socrates, you seem to me to speak ill of men very easily. I should advise you, if you will be guided by me, to be cautious; since perhaps in any other city it is easy to do good or harm to men, but in this one it is very easy. And I think you know it yourself.

*Soc.* O Meno, Anytus seems to me to be angry, and I am not at all surprised, for he thinks in the first place that I am speaking ill of these men, in the second place he imagines that he is one of them. But if ever he were to know what to speak ill of a person is, he would cease being angry, but now he does not know; but do you tell me, have we not gentlemen with us?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Well then, are they willing to offer themselves as teachers to young men, and to allow that there are teachers, or that virtue is teachable?

*Meno.* No indeed, Socrates, but at one time you might hear from them that it is teachable, at another time that it is not.

*Soc.* Shall we say then that these persons, by whom

35.

This is a point about which there is great uncertainty,

not even this point is admitted, are teachers of this matter?

*Meno.* I think not, Socrates.

*Soc.* Well then, do these Sophists, who alone profess it, seem to you to be teachers of virtue?

*Meno.* No, and I especially admire this in Gorgias, that you would never have heard him making this profession, but he laughs at others, when he hears them professing it; but he thinks he ought to make men clever in speaking.

*Soc.* Then do you not think the Sophists are teachers?

*Meno.* I cannot say, Socrates. For I feel as most people do; at one time I think they are, at another I think they are not.

*Soc.* Do you know that not only to you and other statesmen does this seem at one time teachable, at another not, but do you know that Theognis the poet says the same thing?

*Meno.* In what words?

36.

*Soc.* In his elegiacs, where he says 'Drink and eat with those, and sit with those, and please those, whose power is great, For from the good you will learn good things; but if you mix with the bad, you will lose what sense you have.' Do you know that in these lines he speaks as if virtue was teachable?

*Meno.* At any rate it seems so.

*Soc.* But in another passage he slightly changes his tone. 'If,' says he, 'intelligence could be made and placed in a man,' he describes how those who could do

as may be  
seen from  
the contra-  
dictory  
statements  
of Theognis.

this 'would carry off many and great rewards,' and 'never has a bad man sprung from a good father, if he listens to wise words. But by teaching you will never make a bad man good.' Do you notice that he contradicts himself about the same matters?

*Meno.* It seems so.

*Soc.* Can you then tell me of any other matter at all, the professed teachers of which not only are not allowed to be teachers of others, but are not even allowed to know it themselves, but to be bad with regard to the very thing which they say they teach, while those who are allowed to be gentlemen at one time say it is teachable, at another time that it is not? Would you say that those who were thus perplexed were properly teachers of anything at all?

*Meno.* Indeed I should not.

*Soc.* Well then, if neither the Sophists nor the actual gentlemen are teachers of the matter, is it clear that no others are?

*Meno.* I think no others are.

*Soc.* If there are no teachers, are there also no learners?

*Meno.* I think it is as you say.

*Soc.* Did we agree that a matter, of which there were neither teachers nor learners, was not teachable?

*Meno.* We did.

*Soc.* Then do there seem to be no teachers of virtue anywhere?

*Meno.* It is so.

37.

If there are neither teachers nor learners of virtue, how can it be teachable?

*Soc.* And if there are no teachers, are there no learners?

*Meno.* It seems so.

*Soc.* Then would virtue not be teachable?

*Meno.* It appears not, provided we have investigated it rightly. So that I am now wondering, Socrates, whether there ever are any virtuous men, or what would be the manner of the production of those who become virtuous.

*Soc.* Perhaps, Meno, I and you are bad sort of men, and Gorgias has not sufficiently trained you, nor Prodicus me. More than anything then must we give heed to ourselves, and search for whoever in any way whatever will make us better—and I say this with reference to our recent search, how ridiculously it has escaped us that not only when knowledge guides are things done rightly and well by men—or perhaps the knowledge how virtuous men become so has also escaped us.

*Meno.* What do you mean by this, Socrates?

38.

*Soc.* This; we rightly admitted this, at all events, that virtuous men must be useful, because it could not be otherwise. Did we not?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* And that they will be useful, if they rightly guide us in matters, this also I suppose is a good admission?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* But that it is impossible to guide rightly, if

But it was a mistake to say that only prudence or knowledge could guide directly (see ch. 24), for 'correct opinion' is as good a guide as knowledge.

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one is not prudent, in this we seem to have agreed wrongly.

*Meno.* What do you mean by 'rightly'?

*Soc.* I will tell you. If a person knowing the road to Larissa or anywhere else you like, were to set out and guide others, would he not guide them rightly and well?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But what if a person had a right opinion what the road is, but had never been by it and did not know it, would not he also guide rightly?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And as long as he has a right opinion about what the other has knowledge of, he will be not a whit a worse guide, thinking the truth, but not being certain of it, than one who is certain of it.

*Meno.* Not a whit.

*Soc.* Then true opinion is not at all a worse guide to correctness of action than prudence. And this is what we left out just now in our investigation as to virtue, what kind of thing it might be, saying that only prudence was a guide of right action; but then true opinion was so too.

*Meno.* It seems so.

*Soc.* Then correct opinion is no less useful than knowledge.

*Meno.* Only inasmuch, Socrates, as that the possessor of knowledge always gets what he wants, but the possessor of correct opinion sometimes does, and sometimes does not.

39.

When the causes of correct opinion are examined and it is 'chained down,' it becomes knowledge.

*Soc.* How say you? Does not the possessor of correct opinion always succeed, as long as he holds correct opinions?

*Meno.* It seems to me it must be so, so that I am wondering, Socrates, if this is so, in what respect knowledge is much more valuable than correct opinion, and why the one is one thing, the other another.

*Soc.* Do you know why you are wandering, or am I to tell you?

*Meno.* Pray tell me.

*Soc.* Because you have never paid attention to the statues of Dædalus; but perhaps there are none in your house.

*Meno.* Why do you say this?

*Soc.* Because these also, unless they are fastened, run away and desert their possessor, but if they are fastened, they stay with him.<sup>1</sup>

*Meno.* What then?

*Soc.* To possess one of his productions unfastened is not worth much, like a runaway slave, for it does not stay with you, but to possess one fastened is worth a great deal. For the works are very beautiful ones. With reference to what then do I say this? with reference to true opinions. For true opinions, as long as they stay with one, are a beautiful thing and work all manner of benefits; but they will not stay long, but run away from the mind of man, so that they are not worth much, until one fastens them down by an examination of their cause. And this is, friend Meno,

<sup>1</sup> This obviously refers to automata, supposed to have been made by Dædalus, a mythical Greek sculptor.

recollection, as we agreed before. But when they are fastened down, first of all they become knowledge, and then abiding. And for this reason knowledge is more valuable than correct opinion, and knowledge differs from correct opinion in being fastened.

*Meno.* Indeed, Socrates, it seems to be something of this sort.

*Soc.* And in truth, I too am speaking not from knowledge, but from conjecture. But that correct opinion and knowledge are something different, this I do not at all think is conjecture, but if I should say I knew anything else, and I should say I knew but few things, this I should class as one of the things that I know.

**40.**  
Thus a  
virtuous  
man is so  
either by  
correct  
opinion or by  
knowledge.

*Meno.* And you are right, Socrates.

*Soc.* Well then, am I not right in this, that true opinion guiding performs the duty of each action no worse than knowledge.

*Meno.* In this too I think you are right.

*Soc.* Then correct opinion will be no worse than knowledge nor less useful for actions, nor is the possessor of correct opinion worse than the possessor of knowledge.

*Meno.* It is so.

*Soc.* And the virtuous man has been admitted by us to be useful.

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* Since then men would be virtuous and useful to their cities, if they would be so, not only through knowledge, but also through correct opinion, but



Neither of which come by nature, or can be acquired,

neither of these belongs to men by nature, neither knowledge nor true opinion, nor are they to be acquired—or do you think either of them comes by nature?

*Meno.* I do not.

*Soc.* Then since they do not come by nature, neither would the virtuous be so by nature.

*Meno.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Since then it does not come by nature, we are to consider next, whether it is teachable.

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* Did it not seem to be teachable, if virtue were prudence?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if it were teachable, did it seem to be prudence?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And if there were teachers of it, did it seem to be teachable, if there were not, to be not teachable?

*Meno.* It did.

*Soc.* But have we agreed that there are not teachers of it?

*Meno.* We have.

*Soc.* Have we agreed then that it is neither teachable nor prudence?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But we agree that it is a good thing?

*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* And we agree that what guides rightly is useful and good.

and virtue is not knowledge, for if it were it could be taught, which has been shown to be impossible.

*Meno.* By all means.

*Soc.* And we agree that these two things alone, true opinion and knowledge, guide correctly, possessing which a man is a correct guide. For the results of chance are not done by human guidance; but that by which a man is a guide to correctness, is these two things, true opinion and knowledge.

*Meno.* I think so.

*Soc.* Then since it is not teachable, virtue is not any longer knowledge? 41.

*Meno.* It seems not.

*Soc.* Then of the two things which are good and useful the one has been dismissed, and knowledge can not be a guide in political action.

Therefore statesmen and virtuous men are guided by 'correct opinion,

*Meno.* I think not.

*Soc.* Then it is not by any wisdom nor as being wise that such men guide their cities, I mean Themistocles and his friends and those whom Anytus here spoke of lately. Wherefore they are not able to make others like themselves, probably because they are not what they are through knowledge.

*Meno.* It seems to be as you say, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then if it is not by knowledge, it remains that it is by correctness of opinion, by the use of which statesmen correctly govern their cities, with the same relation to certainty that soothsayers and prophets have; for these persons also say many true things, but *know* nothing of what they say.

*Meno.* Perhaps it is so.

*Soc.* Is it right then, Meno, to call these men

and hence  
are called  
'inspired'  
because they  
can give no  
reason for  
their success.

'inspired,' who unintentionally are successful in many important things which they both do and say?

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Rightly then we should call 'inspired,' the soothsayers and prophets whom we just now mentioned, and all poetical persons; and statesmen no less than these we should say are 'inspired' and 'possessed by the god,' being breathed upon and occupied by the god, whenever they succeed in saying many important things, though *knowing* nothing of what they say.

*Meno.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And women, I suppose, Meno, call virtuous men 'inspired'; and the Laconians, when they extol a virtuous man, say, 'This man is inspired.'

*Meno.* And they seem at any rate to speak correctly, Socrates. And yet perhaps Anytus here is displeased at your saying so.

*Soc.* I care not. With him, Meno, we will have a discussion some other time.

#### 42.

The conclusion is therefore that virtue is not innate or teachable, but is given to virtuous men by the gods.

But if we now in all this discussion have rightly investigated and spoken, virtue would neither come by nature nor be teachable; but springs up by divine lot without intention, in whomsoever it does spring up, unless any statesman be such as to make another a statesman. And if he be, perhaps he might be said to be amongst the living such as Homer said Teiresias<sup>1</sup> is amongst the dead, saying of him that 'he alone has a soul' (of those in Hades), 'but the shades glide

<sup>1</sup> *Teiresias.* The most famous soothsayer of antiquity.

about.' The same at once would such a man be towards virtue, as a truth to a shadow.

*Meno.* You seem to me to speak very well, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then from this consideration, Meno, virtue obviously springs up in us in whom it does spring up, by a divine lot; but the certainty about it we shall then know, when we endeavour to find out what virtue is in itself, before we consider how it springs up in men. But now it is time for me to go somewhere, but do you convince our friend Anytus here of what you are yourself convinced of, that he may be better tempered; since if you will convince him, you will somewhat benefit the Athenians.

## PERSONS REFERRED TO.



(N.B. The Nos. refer to the Chapters.)

ALEUADÆ, 1	MELESIAS, 33
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## XVI.

FREE GOVERNMENT.—ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT.—TYRANNY.—  
DESPOTISM.—ANARCHY.

A FREE government is not a government in which liberty prevails, or in which there is an absence of inconvenient restraints and oppression on the part of the sovereign power; but a government in which there is a plurality of rulers, and fixed laws respected by the administrative authority.\* A free government is thus opposed to an arbitrary or despotic government, such as the Roman, French, or Austrian empires. In this sense, Hume<sup>1</sup> opposes free states to absolute monarchies, and Rousseau speaks of 'the difference between *free* and *monarchical* states;'<sup>2</sup> *i.e.* between states where the sovereignty belongs

<sup>1</sup> 'The provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than those of free states.' Part i. Essay 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Contrat Social*, liv. iii. ch. 8. According to Sir James Mackintosh, 'as general security is enjoyed in very different degrees under different governments, those which guard it most perfectly, are by way of eminence called *free*. Such governments attain most completely the end which is common to all governments. A free constitution of government, and a good constitution of government, are therefore different expressions for the same idea.' *On the Law of Nature and Nations*, p. 60. However, one who thought with Hobbes that absolute monarchy is the best form of government, would probably not call *that* a free constitution. On the difference between free and despotic governments, see likewise Bentham's *Fragment on Government*, p. 113.\*

\* *Fixed laws respected by the administrative authority.* This condition is not recognised by Austin. Sir James FitzJames Stephen (*Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity*, p. 171, goes so far as to declare that 'democracy has, as such, no definite or assignable relation to liberty;' but this can hardly be admitted, for the reason given by Mr. James Mill in the passage quoted above (p. 100), which is almost conclusive for this purpose, though justly criticised by Sir G.

C. Lewis on other grounds. An absolute despot will naturally put down whatever displeases him; a more numerous body are pretty sure to present variety in their likes and dislikes, so that the practices which they will agree to suppress or enforce, will, *ceteris paribus*, be comparatively few. It is true on the other side that the despot may be indifferent to practices very hateful to the majority, but which do not touch him personally.—W.

\* And Austin's 6th Lecture (*Student's Austin*, p. 112). He says: 'They who distin-



## CHAPTER V.

Of the real and nominal price of Commodities, or of their price in Labour, and their price in Money.

**EVERY MAN IS RICH OR POOR ACCORDING TO THE DEGREE IN WHICH HE CAN AFFORD TO ENJOY THE NECESSARIES, CONVENIENCES, AND AMUSEMENTS OF LIFE;** only a small part of which can be supplied by a man's own labour; the greater part must be derived from the labour of other people, and which he must purchase; hence labour is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities, p. 30.

*The real price of everything is the toil and trouble of acquiring it.*<sup>1</sup> What is bought with money is purchased by labour, as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body. The money saves us the toil, and contains the value of a certain quantity of labour. *Labour was the first price, the original purchase money, that was paid for all things: by it all the wealth of the world was purchased, and its value is equal to the quantity of labour which it can command,* p. 31.

'**WEALTH,**' as Hobbes says, '**IS POWER,**'<sup>2</sup> *i.e.*, it may afford a man the *means* of acquiring power, by giving him the command of other men's labour; and his fortune is greater or less according to the quantity of other men's labour which it enables him to command, p. 31.

Though labour be the real measure of the exchange-

<sup>1</sup> Adam Smith does not make any distinction here between value and price. Modern economists regard the latter as a particular case of the former. Observe that the toil and trouble of the acquirer may have been less than the toil and trouble of the producer. Value may be defined as 'The ratio in which commodities are exchanged against each other in the open market.' (Cairnes.) Therefore there can be no such thing as a general rise or fall in values.

*Leviathan, Part I. cap. x.*

**ESTATES IN REMAINDER.**

41

**Rules for the creation of valid remainders.**

1. There must be some particular estate precedent to the estate in remainder, (or)

Every estate in remainder requires a particular estate to support it.

2. The remainder must commence or pass out of the grantor at the time of the creation of the particular estate.

3. The remainder must vest in the grantee during the continuance of the particular estate, or eo instanti that it determines.

[These rules are based upon the feudal principle that an estate of freehold cannot be created to commence in futuro, but ought to take effect at once either in possession or remainder. The whole estate—i.e. the particular estate and the remainders—passes from the grantor to the grantees by the livery of seisin.

The above rules also imply another, that the feudal seisin must never be without an owner; thus in the case of a grant to A, for twenty years and one year after the end of such term to B, in fee, the remainder would be void on account of the feudal seisin reverting to the grantor after A's term.]

Remainders are also divided into—

**I. Vested and II. Contingent.****Vested remainder. Definition.**

**I.** *'If an estate, be it ever so small, be always ready from its commencement to its end to come into possession the moment the prior estates happen to determine, it is then termed a vested remainder.'*—Will. R. P. p. 245, 10th ed.

**II.** **A contingent remainder** is a future estate which waits for and depends on the termination of the estates

26 *Chief Real Property Statutes.*

1856.  
19 & 20 Vict.  
c. 108, s. 50.

If the term of a tenant has determined, and the tenant refuses to deliver up possession, the landlord may enter a plaint in the County Court for recovery of possession. This is limited to cases where the rent does not exceed 50*l.* per annum. Ste. 296.

19 & 20 Vict.  
c. 120.

*An Act to facilitate leases and Sales of settled estates.*  
[21 & 22 Vict. c. 77.]

(2) Chancery in certain cases authorized to permit leases for certain long terms, for agricultural, mining, and other purposes.

(5) Any lease granted under the Act may be surrendered to be renewed.

(11) The Court may authorize the sale of settled estates and the timber thereon.

(32) **Any person entitled to the possession of an estate for life under a settlement may demise the same for any term not exceeding twenty-one years, under certain conditions. Tenants by the courtesy and in dower may demise for twenty-one years.** Ste. 252, 253, 263, 266, 279, 288, 478.

1858.  
21 & 22 Vict.  
c. 77.

Act to amend the Settled Estates Act, 1856. Ste. 479.

21 & 22 Vict.  
c. 94.

An Act to amend the Copyhold Acts. Ste. 224, 630, 642, 645.

1859.  
& 23 Vict.  
c. 35.

*An Act to further amend the law of Property.*

(1) A licence given to any lessee or assignee to extend only to the permission actually given.

(2) Restricted operation of partial licences.

(3) Assignee of part of reversion to have the

## CONTRACTS MADE 'LITERIS.'

49

## 2. 'A persona in personam transcriptio.

When the sum which Titius owes me is entered in my journal as advanced to you (this substitution being of course made at the suggestion of Titius).

According to Theophilus the 'nomen transcriptitium' always effected a novation: 'Prior obligatio extinguebatur; nova autem, id est litterarum, nascebatur,' but the case related by Val. Maximus, viii. 2. 2, goes to prove that this was not always the case.

Gaius tells us that it was questioned whether aliens were bound by this contract or not, because such an obligation belonged to the civil law.

Sabinus and Cassius held that in the case of a 'transcriptio a re in personam' even aliens were bound.

'These literal contracts . . . seem never to have had any great importance. They remained in use for the mutual transactions of the "argentarii" (or brokers), long after they had become obsolete for other persons. But before the time of Justinian they had disappeared altogether. In the Corpus Juris there is no literal contract, properly so called, no use of writing as the formal ground of an obligation. That some formal ground was necessary, that a mere informal agreement of two persons was not sufficient to establish a full legal obligation, was the general principle of the Roman law, though subject to some ancient and important exceptions.'—Hadley's 'Introduction to Roman Law,' pp. 216, 217.

'In the Literal or Written Contract, the formal act by which an obligation was superinduced on the convention, was an entry of the sum due, where it could be specifically ascertained, on the debit side of a ledger. The explanation of this contract turns on a point of Roman domestic manners, the systematic character and exceeding regularity of book-keeping in ancient times. There are several minor difficulties of old Roman Law, as, for example, the nature of the Slave's Peculium, which are only

## 4. Write out in full :—

Imper. mood of <i>fero</i> .	Imper. mood of εἶμι.
Imperf. subj. of <i>patior</i> .	Pres. opt. pass. of σιγάω.
Perf. indic. of <i>absum</i> .	1st aor. imper. mid. of σημαίνω
Fut. perf. of <i>proficiscor</i> .	Fut. ind. act. of μένω.
Pres. subj. of <i>dignor</i> .	Paulo-post fut. of λέγω.

5. Give instances in both Greek and Latin of *De monstrative, Interrogative, Possessive, and Reflexive Pronouns*; and give the meaning of *quidam, quisquam, quis quis, quisque, quis*; and of *πόσος, ποῖος, πότερος, τόσος οἶος, ὅσος, ὅστις*.

6. Illustrate by examples the cases governed by *doni gaudeo, credo, doceo, obliviscor*,—*τυγχάνω, ἔπομαι, ποιεῖν ἀκούω, ἔχω*.

7. What is meant by *ablative absolute, apposition, attraction, contraction, cognate accusative*?

8. Illustrate by examples the meaning of, and cases governed by, *ante, circa, ab, super, prae*,—*ἐπί, ἀντί, μετά ἀπό, πρός*.

## 9. Distinguish—

<i>si velit, si vellet.</i>	ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ, αὐτὸς ὁ ἀνὴρ..
<i>ejus caput, suum caput.</i>	ἄλλα, ἀλλί.
<i>metuit te, metuit tibi.</i>	ἦ, ἦ, ἦ ἦ.
<i>nobis interest, nostrā interest.</i>	ἔστησε, ἔστηκε.
<i>amatum iri, amandum esse.</i>	ἵνα βλέψεις, ἵνα βλέψης.

## 10. Translate into Latin :—

- He said he would come whenever he was wanted
- He said, I will come whenever I am wanted.
- He sold the house for as much as he expected.
- He exhorted his soldiers not to lose the opportunity of freeing their country.
- The first Consuls were elected at Rome in the two hundred and forty-fifth year after the building of the city.

14

*Examination Papers.*

4. 'The principal cause of phonetic degeneracy in language is when people shrink from the effort of articulating each consonant and vowel.'

Are there any phenomena of phonetic change which cannot be fully explained in this way?

5. Apply the principles of comparative philology to an examination of the following words:—*ἄρκτος, βάρβαρος, γίγνομαι, δαήρ, δέσποινα, εἰμί, ἥλιος, ἦπαρ, ἵππος, μοῖρα, ὄστέον, πίπτω, ποιός, ὕβρις, ὕπνος.*

6. Trace the decay of the Latin diphthongs.

7. Explain the various ways in which the perfect tense is formed in Latin. Illustrate from Greek.

8. By what arguments has the existence of the digamma been established? In what authors are traces of its use to be found?

## No. XIII.

1. What is the locative case?

2. Analyse the forms *amaverimus, lapidum, alicubi.*

3. Explain the formation of *calumnia, convicium, drachma, facilumed, sepulcrum, stolidus, Vertumnus, auctumnus.*

4. Give some account of the formation of adverbs.

5. Explain, with instances, Anacoluthon, Zeugma, Pleonasm, Irony.

6. Translate the following sentences, so as to show the meanings of the middle voice:—

(1) *πᾶν σοι φράσω τὰληθῆς οὐδὲ κρυψομαι.*

(2) *καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐδίκαζε, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐδικαζόμεθα· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐπεψήφισε, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐψηφίζόμεθα· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔλεξε ἡμεῖς δὲ διελεγόμεθα.*

100 *Historical and General Questions.*

2. Trace the establishment of the Roman rule over Italy, *or* over Spain, Gaul, and England.

3. What was the nature and value of the influence of the Papacy when at its height ?

4. Estimate the importance in European history of the Edict of Nantes and its Revocation.

5. What changes in the boundaries of European states would be introduced by adopting the principle of Nationalities ?

6. What do you know of any *three* of the following : —Themistocles, Demosthenes the Orator, Pyrrhus the Epirot, Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator, Herod the Great, Agricola, Charlemagne, Hildebrand, Francis Bacon, Grotius, Burke ?

7. Sketch briefly, fixing as many dates as you can, any *two* of the following :

(a) The Wars between Greece and Persia.

(b) The Crusades.

(c) The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as an age of discovery.

(d) The Thirty Years' War.

(e) The French Revolution and the First Empire.

## CXX.

1. Trace the territorial increase of Prussia, since it became a kingdom. What are its claims, apart from the sword, to the first place in Germany ?

2. 'It is the tendency of every nation to depreciate the share of its allies in any common achievement.' Illustrate from the military history of Rome and of England.

3. The most effective national boundaries under various conditions of civilisation.

*Arithmetical.*

4. A bankrupt pays 5s. 9d. in the pound; if his assets were 500*l.* more, he would pay 6s. 5d.: what are his assets and his debts?

5. Find the present worth of 122*l.* 16s. due 7 months hence at 4 per cent.

6. Potatoes are bought at 10½*d.* the stone, and have to pay a duty of 1*l.* the ton; if they are sold at 1½*d.* the lb., what is the profit per cent.?

7. Find the compound interest on 5000*l.* for 4 years at 5 per cent.

8. Find the value of 3840 articles at 19s. 11¾*d.* each. Three purchasers divide them in the proportion of 3, 4, 5: what will each pay?

9. Extract the square root of 196, 3⅔ - 1⅘.

10. I sell out 12500*l.* from the Three per Cents. at 96; I invest one-third of the proceeds in Egyptian Six per Cent. Bonds at 125, and the remainder in land which yields 2¼ per cent. net. What is my difference in income?

11. What quantity of Turkey carpet is required for a room 20 feet 4 inches long, and 18 feet 8 inches broad, allowing a margin of 2 feet 8 inches all round? Find also the number of tiles each 8 inches by 4 which will be needed to fill this margin.

---

 XXVII.

1. Find by Practice the cost of 4 cwt. 2 qrs. 12 lbs. at 4*l.* 13s. 4d. per quarter.

2. Reduce ¾ of 1*d.* to the fraction of 17s. 6d.; and find what fraction 6 oz. 15 dwt. is of a lb. Troy.

3. Simplify:

$$(i) \frac{7}{1 - \frac{2}{3 + \frac{3}{4}}}; \quad (2) \left\{ \frac{3\frac{1}{2}}{7} + \frac{2}{10\frac{1}{2}} - \left( \frac{5}{1\frac{1}{2}} \text{ of } \frac{1}{2} \right) \right\} + \frac{1}{2}$$



*the Law of Real Property.*

10. 'So that, in process of time, copyhold tenure must disappear from our present modes of holding land.' Explain this historically.

Ste. 645. Williams 356-358.

11. Trace and account for the gradual conversion of strictly servile occupation into certain and heritable tenure.

Ste. 214 *et seq.* Williams R. P. 336-339. Digby 41 *et seq.*, 109, 213-222.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS.

(Stephen's 'Commentaries,' 647-693, 7th ed.; 666-712, 6th ed.)

1. Distinguish carefully between a corporeal and incorporeal hereditament, and comment on the principle adopted as the basis of division.

Ste. 647. Austin 372, 708. Williams 10. Digby 229.

2. 'In the transfer of incorporeal property, when alone and self-existent, formerly lay the distinction between it and corporeal property.' Explain this.

Williams 11, 231. Ste. 511. Digby 128, 331 (7), 328 (4).

3. Define an easement, and distinguish easements from profits. Is a right to draw off water from a well *in alieno solo* a profit or an easement?

Ste. 648. *Race v. Ward*, 4 Ell. and Bl. 702. Goddard on 'Easements' 1, 2. Digby 127.

4. Sketch the history, and give an outline of the leading principles, of the law relating to rights of common.

Digby 134-137. Ste. 649-657. Lord Hatherley in *Warrick v. Queen's College*, L. R. 6 Chan. App. 720. Maine's 'Village Communities' 85 *et seq.* Elton's 'Law of Commons' ch.

*The Old Testament.*

67

**Enhakkore** (*Spring of the crier*), where God provided Samson with water from the jawbone of an ass.

**Gilgal** (*Rolling*), where Joshua circumcised the second time the children of Israel.

'And the Lord said unto Joshua, This day have I rolled away the reproach of Egypt from off you. Wherefore the name of the place is called Gilgal unto this day.'

**Holkath-Nazzarim** (*The field of the strong men*), where twelve men of Judah encountered twelve men of Benjamin, and none of either party survived. This event was the prelude to a battle in which Joab and the men of Judah defeated Abner.

**Jehovah-jireh** (*God will provide*), the scene of Abraham's meditated sacrifice of Isaac.

'My son, God will provide himself a lamb for a burnt-offering.'

**Jehovah-nissi** (*Jehovah my banner*), an altar built by Moses to commemorate the defeat of the Amalekites by Joshua at Rephidim.

**Jehovah-shalom** (*Jehovah is peace*), an altar built by Gideon when he received the divine call in Ophrah.

'And the Lord said unto him, Peace be unto thee; fear not: thou shalt not die.'

**Mahanaim** (*Two hosts*), where Jacob met a host of angels on his return from Padan-aram.

'And when Jacob saw them, he said, This is God's host; and he called the name of that place Mahanaim.'

**Peniel** or **Penuel** (*The face of God*), where Jacob wrestled with an angel.

'And Jacob called the name of the place Peniel; for I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved.'

**Perez-Uzzah** (*The disaster of Uzzah*), where Uzzah was struck dead on touching the ark of God which David was removing to Jerusalem.

Many halting-places of the Israelites had names conferred on them by Moses to commemorate particular events: such were *Narah bitter*, *Massah temptation*, *Meribah strife*, *Taberah burning*, *Kibroth Hattaavah graves of lust*, *Hormah utter destruction*.

2. How comes it that a country can support in comfort a population many times larger than it could formerly support in comparative discomfort? and how does the fact affect the alleged 'tendency' of population to outrun the means of subsistence?

Explain carefully the ambiguity attaching to the word 'tendency' as here employed.

The word 'tendency' in the phrase 'tendency towards a certain result' may signify—

1. 'The existence of a cause which, if operating unimpeded, would produce that result' (e.g. in this sense a man has a greater 'tendency' to fall prostrate than to stand erect).

2. 'The existence of such a state of things that that result may be expected to take place.' (In this sense man has a greater tendency to stand erect than to fall prostrate.)

In sense 1, Population has a 'tendency' to increase beyond subsistence; i.e. There are in man propensities which, if unrestrained, lead to this result.

In sense 2, Subsistence has (in the progress of society) a 'tendency' to increase at a greater rate than population, or, at least, with a continually *diminishing inferiority*.—See *Whately, Lectures on Political Economy*, ix. 248-250.

3. Cheap labour makes cheap food; cheap food stimulates population; the increase of population makes labour still cheaper—where are we to stop?

F. 174. M. ii. 15. 7.

4. What would be the general results in the following cases:—

(1) Capital and population remain stationary, and a sudden improvement takes place in the arts of production?

(2) Population rapidly increases while capital and the arts of production remain stationary?

(1) M. iv. 3. 4. (2) M. iv. 3. 1.

endeared himself both to the soldiers and the general, and, on Hasdrubal's death, was unanimously elected to the chief command.<sup>1</sup>

**4. Hannibal's character.** Fearless, yet prudent in danger; powerful in body and active in mind; careful of his soldiers, and strict in discipline, Hannibal possessed all the qualities of a great commander. He was moderate, nay abstemious in his bodily habits, modest in dress, and only conspicuous for his arms and horses. By sharing every danger with the meanest soldier, he endeared himself to his men: and he was always the first to enter the fight, and the last to leave it. Livy is rather liberal to him on the score of vices: here they are—*inhumana crudelitas, perfidia plus quam Punica,*<sup>2</sup> *nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullus deum metus, nullum jusjurandum, nulla religio*—no conscience at all.

**5. WAR BEGINS IN SPAIN, B.C. 220.—**Hannibal, with a view of causing the Romans to take up arms, determines to attack the Saguntines— people by treaty<sup>3</sup> independent both of

<sup>1</sup> *Prærogativam militarem.*] The tribe which voted first in a Roman election was called *prærogativa* (*præ* and *rogo*) and it generally carried the votes of the tribes which followed it; for it was chosen by lot, and the lot was supposed to be under the especial care of the gods. On the whole subject of *Comitia*, vide *Dictionary of Antiquities*, s. v.

<sup>2</sup> *Punica fides.*] A proverbial expression among the Romans for 'bad faith.' They were not much better than the Carthaginians themselves. With regard also to the charge of cruelty, Livy does not bring forward throughout his book a sufficient number of instances to justify it: and though Hannibal is charged in the same way by other historians, it is very doubtful if their accounts are authentic. Livy does not call the treacherous massacre of 2,000 Capuans by Marcellus cruel!

<sup>3</sup> For an account of this treaty, see p. 9, note.

## 44 SYNOPSIS OF THE ANNALS OF [BOOK III.]

'e cetero senatu'—to remedy the existing anomalies in the law; and this commission was 'modicum in præsens levamentum.']

29. Honours of Nero, son of Germanicus.

Nero, one of the sons of Germanicus, now entering on manhood, was commended to the Senate by Tiberius; who obtained for him relief from the vigintiviratus,<sup>1</sup> and that he should be a candidate for the prætorship five years before the legal period: 'non sine irrisu audientium.' 'Additur Pontificatus.' He was soon after married to Julia, daughter of Drusus, an event which gave as much joy as the engagement of Sejanus' daughter to the son of Claudius did displeasure.

Sallustius Crispus.

30.

L. Volusius and C. Sallustius Crispus died at the end of the year. The first, of an old family, but never hitherto 'præturam egressa,' had lent honour to it by having been Consul and one of the Triumvirate 'legendis equitum decuriis.'<sup>2</sup> The second, a grand-nephew of the historian, by whom he had been adopted, was of an equestrian family; and though well able to have attained the highest honours, had preferred to imitate Mæcenas, and 'sine dignitate Senatoriâ multos triumphalium consulariumque potentia anteire.' He was a man of great ability, and after the death of Mæcenas was 'præcipuus cui secreta imperatorum inniterentur,'—e.g. he was 'interficiendi Postumi Agrippæ conscius.'

A.D. 21.

31.

Corbulo and Sulla.

Tiberius IV. Drusus II. Consuls, 'patrisque atque filii collegio annus insignis.' Tiberius retreated to Campania.<sup>3</sup> Drusus found an opportunity of gaining popularity by composing the quarrel between Domitius Corbulo, 'præturâ

<sup>1</sup> The Vigintiviratus was a kind of Police-board, which had charge of the mint, of the mending of streets, of crimes ending in mortal violence, &c.

<sup>2</sup> This power, 'recognoscendi turmas equitum, was transferred by Augustus to a Triumviratus.

<sup>3</sup> Tacitus says—'Longam et continuam absentiam paulatim meditans, sive ut amoto patre Drusus munia consulatûs solus implet.'

and the other less, erroneous : and, therefore, since to hit exactly on the mean is difficult, one must take the least of the evils as the safest plan ;<sup>1</sup> and this a man will be doing if he follows this method.

We ought also to take into consideration our own natural bias ; which varies in each man's case and will be ascertained from the pleasure and pain arising in us. Furthermore, we should force ourselves off in the contrary direction, because we shall find ourselves in the mean after we have removed ourselves far from the wrong side, exactly as men do in straightening bent timber.<sup>2</sup>

Natural bias to be taken into account.

But in all cases we must guard most carefully against what is pleasant, and pleasure itself because we are not impartial judges of it.

And especially the universal bias towards pleasure.

We ought to feel in fact towards pleasure as did the old counsellors towards Helen, and in all cases pronounce a similar sentence : for so by sending it away from us we shall err the less.<sup>3</sup>

Well, to speak very briefly, these are the precautions by adopting which we shall be best able to attain the mean.

<sup>1</sup> ' Δεύτερος πλοῦς is a proverb,' says the Scholiast on the Phædo, 'used of those who do any thing safely and cautiously, inasmuch as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about their preparations for the second cautiously ;' and he then alludes to this passage.

<sup>2</sup> That is, you must allow for the *recoil*.

' Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret.'

<sup>3</sup> This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics, regarding pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.

The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have no difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred such suffering for her sake : still, fair as she is, home she must go that she bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity.

This exactly represents Aristotle's relation to Pleasure : he does not, with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as Paris would risk all for Helen), nor does he with the Stoics call it wholly evil (as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused had ' banished all the beauty from her cheek '), but, with the aged counsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness resolves to deny himself ; he ' Feels her sweetness, yet defies her thrall.'

evidence, all subordinate to them by means of others), whenever we try to show on its own evidence that which is not self-evident, then we beg the question. . . .

**Prior Analytics II. 23, §§ 1-4.**

65.

How then terms are related to one another, in respect of conversions, and the being more eligible or more to be avoided, is manifest. We ought now to state that not only are demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms formed by the figures described above, but rhetorical syllogisms also, and generally speaking all belief whatever, and belief arrived at by whatever method. For we arrive at all our beliefs either by syllogism or from induction.

Induction then, and the inductive syllogism, is to prove the major term of the middle<sup>1</sup> by means of the minor; for instance, if B is the middle of the terms during Cæsar's absence at Alexandria, and without his

<sup>1</sup> The *middle term* in this description seems to mean the term which is such in extent. The major is the most general of the three, and is proved of the middle by examining the minor, which consists of all the individuals that compose the middle. We must make sure whether our minor term does include all the individuals of the middle—*εἰ ἀντιστρέφει τὸ Γ τῷ Β καὶ μὴ ὑπερβαίνει τὸ μέσον*—if we are to have a valid *induction*, as Aristotle understands the word. It is clear that such an induction can easily be put into syllogistic form:—

All men, horses, and mules are long-lived,

All the gall-less animals are men, horses, and mules;

∴ All gall-less animals are long-lived.

Many logicians regard this induction as the only perfect type; but Mill's idea of induction is not the same as Aristotle's: he examines *some* of the individuals composing the middle, and endeavours to lay down canons, which will enable us rightly to infer the 'major of the middle by the minor,' though it is not so convertible with the middle—is only a part of the middle.

knowledge, he was appointed master of the horse through the influence of the dictator's friends. Then he considered that in virtue of his office he might fairly live with Hippias,<sup>1</sup> and give the tribute horses to the *mimic* actor Sergius. At that time he had selected as his place of residence, not the house which he has at present such difficulty in retaining, but that of Marcus Piso. But why should I dwell upon his decrees, his robberies, the inheritances which he gave to his adherents, or seized from their lawful owners? It was want of money which compelled him; he knew not where to turn his steps; he had not yet received his large inheritance from Lucius Rubrius, or Lucius Turselius; he had not yet succeeded as heir with such rapidity to the property of Pompeius and many others who were abroad. His only chance of living was in robber-fashion—to have whatever he could steal.

But all this we may pass over, as betokening a hardier kind of villany: let us speak rather of the most degrading class of his misdemeanours. With your capacious swallow, your vast stomach, your gladiator-like strength of frame, you had consumed such quantities of wine at the marriage-feast of Hippias, that you could not help puking on the following day in the presence of the Roman people. It was a thing to make one blush at hearing it, to say nothing of beholding it. If it had happened to you at supper in the midst of your enormous draughts, who could fail to think it scandalous? But he, in an assembly of the people of Rome, in the midst of public business, being master of the horse, who might not even belch without disgrace, actually filled his own lap and the whole tribunal with the fragments, reeking with wine, of what he had eaten over night. But this he confesses himself to be one of the things of which he is ashamed: let us proceed to his more noble acts.

Cæsar returned from Alexandria, happy in his own

<sup>1</sup> The play on the word Hippias, derived from ἵππος, a horse, is untranslatable.



advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm weakened the stability of their order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front, their measured tread shook the ground, their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation, their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd as, slowly and with a horrid carnage, it was pushed by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the height. There the French reserve mixed with the struggling multitude, and endeavoured to sustain the fight; but the effort only increased the irremediable confusion; the mighty mass gave way, and like a loosened cliff went headlong down the steep; the rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and eighteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill.

192. To the Earl of Chesterfield.—7th January, 1755.—Seven years, my Lord, have now passed, since I waited in your outward rooms, or was repulsed from your door; during which time I have been pushing on my work through difficulties of which it is useless to complain, and have brought it at last to the verge of publication without one act of assistance, one word of encouragement, or one smile of favour. The shepherd in Virgil grew at last acquainted with love, and found him a native of the rocks. Is not a patron, my Lord, one who looks with unconcern on a man struggling for life in the water, and, when he has reached ground

racés also undoubtedly have the same origin, especially the Raeti, whom their very country has rendered savage, so that they retain nothing of their ancient [customs]<sup>1</sup> except the sound of their language, and not even that uncorrupted.

Of the passage of the Gauls into Italy we are told this: in the reign of Tarquinius Priscus<sup>2</sup> at Rome, the supreme government of the Celts,<sup>3</sup> who form the third part of Gaul,<sup>4</sup> was in the hands of the Bituriges; they gave a king to the Celtic nation.<sup>5</sup> This was Ambigatus, a man greatly distinguished<sup>6</sup> by his merit and good fortune both private and public, for in his reign Gaul was so productive both in fruits of the earth and in men that the overflowing population seemed hardly capable of being governed. He being now himself of a great age, and desiring to relieve his kingdom of the too-oppressive multitude, declared that he would send his sister's sons, Bellovesus and Segovesus, two enterprising young men, to whatever settlements the gods should grant<sup>7</sup> them by augury; let them encourage<sup>8</sup> as great a number of men as they pleased to go with them, so that no nation might be able to resist them in their progress. Then the Hercynian forests<sup>9</sup> were assigned by the lots<sup>10</sup> to Segovesus; to Bellovesus the gods granted the much more pleasant route into Italy. He

34.

<sup>1</sup> *Ex antiquo* [more].

<sup>2</sup> *Regnante*: B.C. 616–578, A.U.C. 147–185.

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix.

<sup>4</sup> *Quae pars Galliae tertia est*: for the grammar, *of. p. 40, n. 7*: for the fact, Caes. *B. G. I. i. 1.*: 'Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli, appellantur.'

<sup>5</sup> *Celtico*: *cf. τὸ Περσικόν, &c.*

<sup>6</sup> *Praepollens*: *cf. 'praepotente,'* last ch.

<sup>7</sup> *In quas dedissent sedes*: *i.e. in eas sedes, quas.* *Cf. i. 38, 'haec de priscis Latinis aut qui ad Latinos defecerant capta oppida;'* *xxix. 6, 'ut mos est qui diu absunt;'* *xxxi. 41, 'caesi captique quos equites ab agmine fugientium interclusere.'*

<sup>8</sup> *Excirent*: p. 39, n. 4. *Qua*: p. 17, n. 2.

<sup>9</sup> *Hercynii saltus* or 'Hercynia silva:' described by Caesar, *B. G. vi. 25*: it was nine days' journey wide and sixty long. It is now called the Black Forest. *Saltus* is a woody glen, but sometimes, as here, hardly means more than 'forest.'

<sup>10</sup> *Sontibus*: p. 47, n. 8.

4. It is used in sentences which imply iteration or indefinite frequency.

5. It is the mood of subordinate clauses in *Oratio Obliqua*.

### CONSECUTION OF TENSES, CLAUSES ETC.

1. Primary tenses follow Primary, and Historical follow Historical.

2. The Primary tenses are Present, Future, Perfect

Historical tenses are Pluperfect, Aorist.

N.B. The Perfect Indefinite or Perfect without *have* in Latin is equivalent to the Greek Aorist.

3. The Optative mood in Greek supplies the Historical tenses of the Subjunctive; i.e. all the optative tenses are historical, all the subjunctive primary.

N.B. The three marks of a historical tense in Greek are:

1. Augment; 2. Dual in *-ηρ*; 3. Third person sing. and plur. of middle and passive in *-ο*. Of these marks the optative has the two latter.

4. A wish may be expressed in Greek by pure optative, or with *ὡς*: *ὡς* etc.; in Latin by *utinam* etc., with subjunctive, or rarely by subjunctive alone.

### Conditional Clauses.

The following are the more ordinary types.

I. Possibility, i.e. when the condition is assumed.

*εἰ τοῦτο λέγεις, ἀμαρτάνεις* } If you say this, you err  
*Si hoc dicis, erras* }

*εἰ τοῦτο λέγεις, ἀμαρτήσῃ* } If you say this, you will err  
*Si hoc dices, errabis* }

II. Slight Probability, i.e. when there is a slight reason to expect the fulfilment of the condition.

*εἰὰν τοῦτο λέγῃς, ἀμαρτήσῃ* } If you say this, you will err  
*Si hoc dicas, errabis* }

*εἰὰν τοῦτο λέγῃς, ἀμαρτάνεις* } If you say this, you err  
*Si hoc dicas, erras* }

*FOR UNPREPARED TRANSLATION.* 15

(b) Accepi tuas literas, quas legi libentissime plenissimas amoris, humanitatis, officii, diligentiae. His igitur respondebo: sic enim postulas. Recentissimas te meas literas habere ais, et scire vis tuas ego quas acceperim. Quaedam ab Appio constituta rescidi. Stomachatur ille. Hoc idem est ac si medicus, cum aegrotus alii medico traditus sit, irasci velit ei medico, qui sibi successerit, si, quae ipse in curando constituerit, mutet ille.

CICERO, *Epist.*

*DEBUERAS ABSTINUISSE, CAPER.*

(c) Vite nocens rosa stabat moriturus ad aras  
hircus, Bacche, tuis victima grata sacris.

MARTIAL, iii. 24.

*FOENUM HABET IN CORNU.—DEVICE OF HANNIBAL.*

21. Primis tenebris silentio mota castra; boves aliquanto ante signa acti. ubi ad radices montium viasque angustas ventum est, signum extemplo datur, ut accensis cornibus armenta in adversos concitentur montes. et metus ipse relucentis flammae ex capite, calorque, iam ad vivum ad imaque cornuum adveniens, velut stimulos furore agebat boves. quo repente discursu, haud secus quam silvis montibusque accensis, omnia circum virgulta ardere; capitumque irrita quassatio, excitans flammam, hominum passim discurrentium speciem praebebat. qui ad transitum saltus insidendum locati erant, ubi

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