

Exhibit 2750

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Official Transcript of the International Military Tribunal, in the matter of : The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering, et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany on 15 January, 1946, 1400-1700, Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding.

Mr. Eluyn Jones

In the meantime, Raeder was urging Hitler, as early as the 18th of March, 1941, to enlarge the scope of the world war by inducing Japan to seize Singapore. The relevant document is C-152, GB-122, at page 23 of the document book. There is just one paragraph which I would like to be permitted to read. The document describes the audience of Raeder with Hitler on the 18th of March and the entries in it, in fact, represent Raeder's own views:

"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U. S. A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England

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are thereby solved (Gum, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

"Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A.. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible".

The Japanese, of course, as events proved, has different ideas from that.

By the 20th of April, 1941, the evidence proved is that Hitler has agreed with this proposition of Raeder's of inducing the Japanese to take offensive action against Singapore. I refer the Tribunal again to Document C-170 and to an entry at page 56 of the document book, for the 20th of April, 1941.

A few sentences from that reads :

"Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Navy Supreme Commander asks the result of Matsuka's visit, and evaluation of Japanese-Russian pact. Fuehrer has informed Matsuka, 'that Russia will not be touched if she behaves friendly according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself Japan-Russian pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany, and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladivostok, and to cause her to attack Singapore."

Now an interesting commentary upon this document is found in the document C-66, at page 13 of the document book. The document C-66 has already exhibited as GB-81. I will refer the

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court to paragraph 3, at Page 13 of the document book.

At that time the Fuehrer was firmly resolved on a surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian attitude to Germany. This, according to reports coming in, was frequently changing, and there follows this interesting sentence:

"The communication to Matsuka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure and to ensure surprise."

The Axis partners were not even honest with each other, and this, I submit, is typical of the kind of jungle diplomacy with which Raeder associated himself.

Excerpt from the "Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany on 4 April, 1946, 1000-1300, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.

Wilhelm Keitel -- Resumed

Direct Examination -- Continued PP. 7110-7111

By Dr. Nelte (Counsel for defendant Keitel):

- Q. One more question regarding the war against America. The prosecution asserts that you influenced the Germans to wage war against America and accused you of participation in German efforts to involve America in the war. Would you like to make some statement regarding this?
- A. Document C-75 is an order by the high command of the armed forces, which contains directives for cooperation with Japan. Of course, I have participated in the drawing up of this order and signed it.

The other document 1881-PS. Regarding a conference

between the Fuehrer and Matsuoka, I do not know and I did not know anything of it at the time. I can only say the following for us soldiers.

In the course of all this time until Japanese entry into the war against America, there were two points of view that were our basic principles and those were the principles which Hitler emphasized to us. One was to prevent under any circumstances that America enter the war and consequently renounce military operations in the waters where Americans were present. Secondly, the thought that guided us soldiers was the hope that Japan would enter the war against Russia, and I recall that around November and the beginning of December 1941, when the advance of the German armies west of Moscow was halted, we, when we visited the front or accompanied Hitler, were asked several times by the generals: "When is Japan going to enter the war?" The reasons for so asking were that again and again Russian Far-Eastern divisions were being thrown into the fight around Moscow; that is to say, fresh troops coming from the Far East. That was 18 to 20 divisions, but I wouldn't want to say for certain how many it was, but I was present at Matsuoka's visit at Berlin and I saw him also socially but I did not have any conversation with him, and all the combinations that can be associated with this document 75 and which I have

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heard in my previous interrogations, are without any foundation for us soldiers and there is no justification for anyone's believing that we were guided by thoughts of bringing about a war between Japan and America.

In conclusion, I can only say that this order was necessary because some branches of the army have resisted the idea of giving Japan certain military secrets unless she were in the war.

Official Transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany on 1 April, 1946, 19400-1700, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.

Joachim Von Ribbentrop -- Resumed

Cross-Examination-Continued

By Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe:

(P.6915-6916)

- Q. Now, again, I want you to help me about one or two other matters. You have told us that you negotiated the anti-comintern pact back in 1936, and of course at that time the anti-Comintern pact -- and I think you said so yourself -- was directed against the Soviet Union. That is so, isn't it?
- A. Yes. It was more an ideological pact, which, nevertheless had certain political implications.
- Q. And that was extended by the tripartite part of the 27th of September, 1940? That was an extension of the first pact, was it not?
- A. It had in itself nothing to do with the first pact. That was a purely economic, and military pact.
- Q. Well now, the fact is -- and I think I can take this

quite shortly -- that you were urging Japan to enter the war quite early in March of 1941. Weren't you?

A. That could be, for an attack on England.

Q. Yes. I am taking it shortly because you have given your explanation. You say you were at war with England, and therefore you were entitled to see an ally in Japanese. That is your point is it not?

A. I don't believe I did anything other than what any other diplomat would have done either in England or Soviet Russia.

Q. I am not going to put any points to you on that actual facts, but it did occur to you quite early, didn't it, that if Japan came into war, then it was a possibility that the United States might be brought in shortly after? And you agreed, in April of 1941, that if the coming in of Japan produced the fact that Japan would be involved with the United States, you would be prepared to fight the United States too.

That is right, isn't it?

A. No, not in that phrasing. I believe I did everything I could, until the day of Pearl Harbour, to keep America out of the War. I believe that that is proved by many documents that I have seen here for the first time.