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Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, I had nothing to do with it.

Senator Ferguson: Nothing to do with that.

Did you know whether or mot there had been a special line run to Colonel Bratton's home so that he might get the winds message if it came in?

Colonel Sadtler: I did not know of a special line.

I knew that the FCC had been given his telephone numbers so he could be reached at any time, day or night, by telephone, if that message came in.

Senator Ferguson: But you did not know of any special line?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Was there any special set-up about the winds code as far as you were concerned?

Colonel Sadtler: Except the arrangement that we made with the FCC to monitor that frequency, and the special arrangements that were made by both the Army and Navy to attempt to catch that message.

Senator Ferguson: Now, when you talked to Admiral Noyes, did he call you, or did you call him?

Colonel Sadtler: He called me the first time.

Senator Ferguson: Did he say why he was calling you?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, he said, "The message is in."

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Senator Ferguson: At that first conversation, did he say whether it was with the British or the Dutch, or Russia?

Colonel Sadtler: He said it was between Japan and Great Britain.

Senator Ferguson: . All right. Did you ask him whether it was between America and Japan at all?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Just Japan and Great Britain? Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, what did that mean to you?

That there was going to be war between Great Britain and

Japan? How was America concerned with that message?

Colonel Sedtler: Senator, these intercepts are a very difficult thing to obtain. You either get it or you don't get it. It is very easy to get part of a message, and I assumed that having gotten the British part, that they had somehow missed the American part, and thought no more about it.

I knew that those Haruna messages were being sent back to Tokyo, indicating destruction of codes at various consulates in the United States and Great Britain, Singapore, Hongkong, and therefore that the indication was that there was going to be a break between Japan and Great Britain and there must necessarily be one between Japan and the

		1	Witness Sadtler Ouestions by: Senator Ferguson
	h4	2	United States.
		3	Senator Ferguson: So you felt the British part meant
		4	a break also with the United States, and that is why you
		5	became so concerned?
		6	Colonel Sadtler: In view of everything that had gone
		7	before, yes, sir.
Larry 2pm		8	Senator Ferguson: And you were concerned, as I under-
		0	stand it, because you went to General Gerow?
		10	Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.
	WARD	11	Senator Ferguson: And told him about it?
	a PAU	12	Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.
	r. was	13	Senator Ferguson: And told him about it. You went
	HINGTO	14	to Miles or Bratton, which was it?
	0	5	Colonel Sadtler: Both.
	1	0	Senator Ferguson: Both. To Miles and Bratton. How
	1	7	did you get in to see Colonel Bedell Smith, the secretary
	1	8	to General Mershall?
	1	9	Colonel Sadtler: Just walked in his door.
	2	0	Senator Fergumon: Why did you want to see him on this
	2	1	code message?
•	2	2	Colonel Sadtler: Colonel Smith was Secretary of the
	2	3	General Staff and he had direct access to General Marshall.
	2	4	Senator Ferguson: And you felt that this was a message
	2	5	that should reach General Marshall?
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Witness sedtler

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Witness Sedtler

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

States destroyed except the one left in the Embassy in Washington, Japanese Embassy in Washington. That meant that we were going to have war in a very short time.

Senator Ferguson: And at one time I think you used the expression "within 48 hours"?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, that is not my expression. Senator Ferguson: Well, now:

"Just before that meeting, Mr. Gaston asked me what I thought about war being declared, and I said that I thought they would have war within 48 hours. He turned to Captain Redman who represented Admiral Noyes at that meeting and asked him what he thought and he said he agreed with Colonel Sadtler."

You are testifying.

Colonel Sadtler: That is true, yes, sir, but I have since verified it with Captain Redman, and Mr. Gaston, member of the committee, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, said it to Captain Redman, and Captain Redman replied, "I think we will have 48 hours," and I have just been reversed.

Senator Ferguson: You agreed with Captain Re dman? Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What date was that?

Colonel Sadtler: That was December 4.

Witness sadtler

Questions by: senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: December 4. Then you did feel that there would be war within 48 hours of December 4? Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then you were not surprised when the war came at one o'clock, one o'clock Washington time?

Colonel Sadtler: Not a bit, no, sir. I was only surprised that the attack was in Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson: I see.

You were not surprised that there was an attack? Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, why were you surprised that there was an attack in Hawaii?

Colonel Sadtler: During the entire --

Senator Ferguson: That is where the Fleet was, wasn't it?

Colonel Sadtler: Where the Fleet was was no concern of mine. I didn't know where it was.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

Colonel Sadtler: All the discussion that I heard in the War and Navy Departments, I never heard the word Pearl Harbor or Hawaii discussed in connection with an attack by Japan on the United States in the event of war. There was

There was a great deal of conversation about the Philippines, Indo-China and the Panama Canal.

Witness Sadtler Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did you know as late as the 5th, General Miles had sent a message to Panama after the war warning message, after the message of the 27th telling them that when the break of diplomatic relations became imminent they would notify them?

Colonel Sadtler: I did not know of that message, sir. Senator Ferguson: Well, it is to this effect:

"U.S.-Japanese relations strained. Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent."

Signed "Miles."

Do you know how such a message could be sent on the 5th after you had told him that the wind message was in, and you had discussion about the destruction of codes?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir; I don't recall that message to Panama at all, nor should it have been my business to have even seen it, except as officer in charge of Army communications.

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield? Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: The 48-hour incident occurred 24 hours before he saw the winds message, so-called winds message. That was at the meeting on Thursday. I mean the conversation was at the security meeting 24 hours before the call from Noyes, as I understand it.

Witness Sadtler Questions by: Senator Ferguson hll Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, Mr. Murphy, yes, sir. Senator Ferguson: You told us about Colonel Bratton 3 discussing it with you, that the discussion of these codes, 4 the wind code message, and so forth, meant war? 5 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir. 6 Senator Ferguson: Didyou ever hear that there were any 7 files destroyed or lost? 8 Colonel Sadtler: I heard some gossip to that effect, 8 yes, sir. 10 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, I want to ask you, down 11 in the Army, how you determine between gossip and non-gossip, 12 the real thing. You say you heard it by gossip. 13 Colonel Sadtler: In 1923, I think --14 Senator Ferguson: No, no. 15 Colonel Sadtler: I mean 1943, I think it was at Fort 18 Bragg, North Carolina, in a casual conversation with General 17 Isaac Spalding, he told me that nothing could be found about 18 Pearl Harbor because the records had been destroyed. 19 Senator Ferguson: Who was Spalding? 20 Colonel Sadtler: General Isaac Spalding. 21 Senator Ferguson: Did he tell you anything more? 22 Colonel Sadtler: And he told me that Colonel Bissell, 23 Jack Bissell, J. T. Bissell, had told him that he had des-24 troyed certain evidence, certain documents. 25

tion of Carter Clarke got started?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir. I was just told to appear

before it. I appeared before it twice, to be exact.

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12,383 Witness Sadtler Questions by: Senator Ferguson Mr. Keefe Senator Ferguson: Do you know why the Army Board didn't investigate that gossip? Colonel Sadtler: No, sir. Senator Ferguson: Did you tell the Army Board that? Colonel Sadtler: I don't think so. I don't know, sir. Mr. Murphy: It wasn't mentioned in that hearing. Senator Ferguson: You don't think you told the Army Board? Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, I did not. Senator Ferguson: That is the only knowledge that you have concerning the missing of any files or papers in the War Department? Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir. Mr. Keefe: Will the gentleman yield? Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: I am interested in knowing whether or not this thing that you refer to as gossip is that which my boys have always referred to in the service as being "scuttle-butt"?

Colonel Sadtler: That is another name for it.
Mr. Keefe: Isn't that the same thing?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Saying "according to scuttlebutt", so and so, that is what you refer in the service as meaning gossip?

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Witness Sadtler Questions by: Senator Ferguson Mr. Keefe

Senator Ferguson: Do you know why the Army Board didn't investigate that gossip?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you tell the Army Board that?

Colonel Sadtler: I don't think so. I don't know, sir.

Mr. Murphy: It wasn't mentioned in that hearing.

Senator Ferguson: You don't think you told the Army Board?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, I did not.

Senator Ferguson: That is the only knowledge that you have concerning the missing of any files or papers in the War Department?

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Mr. Keefe: Saying "according to scuttlebutt", so and so, that is what you refer in the service as meaning gossip?

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Witness Sedtler

Questions by: Mr. Keefe Senator Ferguson

Colonel Sadtler: Well, it is referred to by a lot of names, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: That is quite a familiar word, isn't it? Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, not "scuttlebutt", in the Army; it is a Navy term.

Mr. Keefe: That is a Navy term.

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: One of my boys was a Marine and he was always referring to "scuttlebutt".

Senator Ferguson: Now, I want you to explain part of your testimony about this message of the 7th. It isn't clear to me:

"The circumstances attending that message are about as follows:" --

You are testifying.

"I sent the inquiry, with the approval of the General Staff, inquiring as to the operation of radar on December 7. Upon receipt of that message Colonel Colton, Acting Chief Signal Officer, personally took a copy of it into General Marshall's office. I gave a copy to General Gerow. Colonel Colton, upon his return from General Marshall's office, said that he wanted all copies of that message collected and held intact as, inasmuch as radar and the damage done at Pearl Harbor were secret at that time, the information was

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Witness Sadtler Questions by: Senator Ferguson not to be disclosed. General Gerow kept his message and I think that Colonel Handy had it and he held it."

Senator Ferguson: What were you talking about?

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator give the page of the record and where from?

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: That is Volume 2 of the Clarke Report. Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What were you talking about? That isn't clear to me.

Colonel Sadtler: We were trying to find out whether our radar sets were working in Hawaii at the time of the attack.

Senator Ferguson: Well, did you make an investigation on that question as to whether or not the radar was working just prior to the attack?

Colonel Sadtler: I talked to Colonel Powell in Hawaii on the night of December 7 and asked him the question as to the operation of his radar and he did not answer as it was secret and he said he would let us know later, and the next day Mr. Bundy gave me permission to send that message — I think it was Bundy because he accused me of being in charge of it — to find out whether the radar was working in Hawaii on the morning of December 7. We sent a telegram

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Witness Sadtler Questions by: Senator Ferguson to make an inquiry. The reply to the effect that it was working came in and was delivered to me and I gave it to Colonel Colton, who took it in to General Marshall personally.

When he came out he said, "I want all copies collected and held intact so that this information cannot get out."

That was merely a precautionary move to preserve secrecy as to the effect of what happened in Pearl Harbor and also the secrecy of radar at that time.

Senator Ferguson: In other words, that radar was working that morning was to be held a secret? That was to be held a secret?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir. Any information regarding radar was to be held a secret.

Senator Ferguson: That is what you had in mind by that testimony?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: It was to be held a secret, that radar had been working?

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I don't think we should draw inferences.

Senator Ferguson: You tell us what you meant again. Colonel Sadtler: We were trying to find out whether

radar was working on December 7 and when the information came in we wanted to keep it as secret as possible, any

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Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

information regarding radar:

Senator Ferguson: Not necessarily that it had been working but the fact that radar was there was to be kept a secret?

Colonel Sadtler: All right.

Now, did you know what was done with those messages, did you file them, or keep them?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir. Those messages are on file today.

Senator Ferguson: They are on file?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever keep a diary or a log sheet in your office?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir. I have kept some notes.

Senator Ferguson: Do you have those notes?

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know where they are?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you have any in a safe? Did you at one time state that you may have had them in a safe? In your Clausen affidavit I notice that you say -- have you got the Clausen affidavit? I will get it.

Have you identified as much as you can who Spalding was and who Bissell was?

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2 was on duty in G-1. 3 4 other in G-2? 5 Colonel Sadtler: Yes. 6 Senator Ferguson: Just a moment. 8 8 10 in North Carolina. 11 12 13 14 15 was overseas at the time. 16 17 were both in Washington? 18 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir. 18 20 in G-1? 21 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir. 22 23 24 Bissell, we call him. 25

Witness Sadtler Questions by: Senator Ferguson Colonel Sadtler: Bissell was on duty in G-2. Spalding ' Senator Ferguson: One was in G-1, Intelligence, and the Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield? Mr. Murphy: For a correction. I think you will find spalding wasn't in Washington but he was under a tree down Colonel Sadtler: May I explain that at the time of December 7 Colonel Spaulding was in Washington in G-1. Bissell was in G-2. In 1943 the conversation was I think at Jackson or Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Colonel Bissell Senator Ferguson: At the time of Pearl Harbor they Senator Ferguson: One in Intelligence and the other Senator Ferguson: Now, what is Bissell's first name? Colonel Sadtler: He has three initials. J. T. Jack

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir. General Vandenburg is head of G-2. Bissell was. That is an entirely different Bissell. Senator Ferguson: An entirely different Bissell. "I have not collected any such material in a safe deposit box although I thought I had done so." Senator Ferguson: How would a man think that he had done Colonel Sadtler: Because I thought I had. Senator Ferguson: Can you account for that kind of thinking, that you had collected it and put it in a safe

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, because there are none in there now, and I looked to find them, so I couldn't have

Senator Ferguson: I see. What you mean is you thought you had put them in the safe deposit box but when you went there to look for them you didn't find them and then you

Senator Ferguson: Have you tried to think since where

Colonel Sadtler: I had a little tin box I used to keep

Senator Ferguson: Now, they were there on the 7th, then?

Senator Ferguson: Well, when do you consider that

Senator Ferguson: Did you make any memorandums in rela-

Colonel Sadtler: I made some notes on the whole subject,

Senator Ferguson: You made some notes on the whole subject. Now, when did you make those notes?

Witness Sadtler 1 Questions by: Senator Ferguson 3 Colonel Sadtler: After talking with General Drum in 3 New York. 4 Senator Ferguson: And what year was that? 5 Colonel Sadtler: 1942. 8 Senator Ferguson: In 1942 after the happening of this 7 event you made a memorandum putting down on paper these 8 various things that happened so that you would be able to 9 remember them? 10 Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir. (5) Senator Ferguson: What conversation had you with Drum? 12 Colonel Sadtler: I told him the story. 13 Senator Ferguson: You told him the story? 14 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir. 15 Senator Ferguson: What was that, an investigation? 0 16 Colonel Sadtler: No, sir. 17 Senator Ferguson: And who was General Drum? 18 Colonel Sadtler: Commanding General of the Eastern 19 Defense Command of the First Army. 20 Senator Ferguson: Do you know how that conversation 21 came about that you related the story to him? 22 Colonel Sadtler: He just asked me one day what happened. 23 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield? Get General 24 Drum's assignment at this time. Where is he now? 25 Colonel Sadtler: He is retired now.

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Mr. Murphy: Is he retired or is he in a military position? Isn't he Military Aide to Governor Dewey?

Colonel Sadtler: That I don't know, Mr. Murphy. At that time he was Commanding General of the Eastern Defense Command.

Mr. Richardson: Better be careful. That is a serious charge. You better be careful about it, Mr. Witness.

Senator Ferguson: Now, may I have the last answer read?

(The last question and answer were read by the reporter.)

Senator Ferguson: Is that correct, is that all you

want to say on that?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir, that is about all.

Senator Ferguson: Then when you told him did you at that time make this memorandum?

Colonel Sadtler: It was the time that I was being relieved from duty at Governors Island to go to the Second Army at Memphis, Tennessee, and that was around about the latter part of 1943, about November.

Senator Ferguson: Then how did this get into your tin box here in Washington?

Colonel Sadtler: I had this little box with me, to carry with me. I am not sure that it was ever in the tin box, Senator.

	1	Witness Sadtler Questions by: Senator Ferguson
	2	Senator Ferguson: Well, now, was what you put on the
	3 .	memorandum the same as you are testifying to here, do you
	4	know?
	8	Colonel Sadtler: Essentially, yes, sir.
	8	Senator Ferguson: Do you have any other memorandum?
	7.	Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.
	8	Senator Ferguson: That was the only one and you haven't
	9	any idea now where that could be or what happened to it?
	10	Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.
WARD	11	Senator Ferguson: Did you ever make any investigation
& PAUL, WASHINGTON, D	12	of one of the cable companies in relation to any messages?
	13	Colonel Sadtler: I don't think I understand the
	14	question, sir.
	15	Senator Ferguson: Did you ever make any investigation
O	16	in relation to any files of a cable company?
	17	Colonel Sadtler: I don't recall any, no, sir.
	18	Senator Ferguson: Did you ever go to any of the various
	18.	intercepting monitoring stations or did you know of anyone
	20	going to inspect their files as to whether or not any wind
	21	message did come in?
	22	Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, I did not.
	23	Senator Ferguson: You know nothing about that?
	24	Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.
	25	Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar with the so-called

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C	1	Witness Sadtler Questions by: Senator Ferguson
	2	pilot message?
	3	Colonel Sadtler: Only in a general way.
	4	Senator Ferguson: Well, what was the general way?
	6	Colonel Sadtler: That there was a long message coming
	6	in on Saturday.
	7	Senator Ferguson: And when did that first come to your
	8	attention, that the long message was coming in and there
	9	would be a time of delivery?
	10	Colonel Sadtler: There was never any notice came to
	11	me of any hour of delivery.
	12	Senator Ferguson: No, not the specific hour, but that
	13	there would be a time of delivery. Did you ever see the
	14	pilot message?
	15	Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.
	18	Senator Ferguson: Did you ever hear about it?
	17	Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.
	18	Senator Ferguson: What did you hear about the pilot
	18	message?
	20	Colonel Sadtler: That there was a long message coming in.
	21	Senator Ferguson: Is that about all?
	22	Colonel Sadtler: Except that we would keep people on
	23	at night to see that the thing was received.
	24	Senator Ferguson: Well, then, sometime prior to the
	25	long message coming in you had information that it was coming

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson Witness Sadtler in and you kept your staff on at night to intercept it? Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, I hadn't kept anybody on to intercept it. It was to be covered at night until the message was intercepted. And I think we can thank one civilian, Mr. Rowlett, who stayed down and did that work of his own accord with Colonel Schukraft. I think they are better witnesses than I am on that question. Senator Ferguson: You didn't make any plans in the Department to have someone stay on? Colonel Sadtler: I knew there would be someone on. Senator Ferguson: Were you concerned at one time about getting messages out to the theaters? Colonel Sadtler: On what subject, sir? Senator Ferguson: On the question of alerting them. Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, except as the Army Communications Service would handle those messages. Senator Ferguson: Not that you were personally talking with any other officers about the various services to be notified? Colonel Sadtler: No, sir. Senator Ferguson: You had no such conversations? Colonel Sadtler: No, sir. Senator Ferguson: That is all.

The Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

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Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: May I have the book of affidavits again, the Clausen Report.

Colonel Sadtler, you gave an affidavit to Colonel Clausen, did you not?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Here at Washington on the 13th day of August 1945?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, if I understand your testimony here today, it is that Admiral Noyes called you on the morning of the 5th of December 1941 and in substance told you that the message was in, referring to the wind execute message?

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And you explained to us how you definitely recalled the date because of the meeting which you had had the day before?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: If I understand your testimony here it is that you immediately informed General Miles?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And he sent for Colonel Bratton? Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And Colonel Bratton pulled out a slip of paper from his pocket and asked what words were used on

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe Witness Sadtler care to discuss it further with you? 2 Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir. 3 Mr. Keefe: And you left? 4 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir. 5 Mr. Keefe: That is the story that you tell us here today? 6 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir. Mr. Keefe: Now, in this affidavit which you gave to 8 Colonel Clausen you say this: 9 "I made the recommendations to General Gerow and General 10 Smith on 5 December 1941, as stated on pages 253 and 254 of 11 the transcript mentioned, without getting additional informa-12 tion from Admiral Noyes, on my own initiative and without 13 informing any representatives of G-2." 14 That is correct, isn't it? 15 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir. 16 Mr. Keefe: (Reading) 17 "I was alarmed by the series of Japanese diplomatic 18 and consular intercepts which I had been reading over a 19 considerable period of time -- " 20 And you have referred to these intercepts with reference 21 to the destruction of codes? 22 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir. 23 Mr. Keefe: (Reading) 24

" -- and the mounting tension, and the information which

Admiral Noyes had just given me. Accordingly, after I had conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I went to my office, which was also in the Munitions Building, and personally typed a proposed warning which I intended to recommend be sent to the overseas commanders, and which warning read substantially as follows and quoted herewith from memory:

"C.G. - P. I., Hawaii - Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future Stop Take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur Stop Notify the Navy. Marshall."

Now, is that statement correct?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And you want us to understand that to be your testimony here before this committee?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That you did prepare such a warning message? Colonel Sadtler: I did, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And you did it because of the mounting tension and flow of information which you had together with the winds execute message which you believed was the true winds execute message at that time?

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

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Witness Sadtler Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: You were very apprehensive that war was going to strike immediately?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And I understood your apprehension that war would come to the United States was based in part at least upon the fact that the Japanese code word that was being sent out from the consular offices here in the United States indicated the destruction of all codes and ciphers and secret papers except the one code here in the Embassy at Washington; is that correct?

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: Your affidavit further says:

"I have since checked with my office staff at the time and they have no recollection of the drafting of this proposed warning message. I did not show it to anyone. I do not know where the message is mow, and I made no copy at the time. After I had typed this message, I conferred with General Gerow and General Smith as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I did not show them the warning message I had typed."

What became of your message?

Colonel Sedtler: Thatis what I don't know, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Your mind doesn't reach back that far?

Colonel Sadtler: I how that I had it, and I thought

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Witness sadtler Questions by: Mr. Keefe I had put it away to keep, and when I went to look for it, it was gone. Mr. Keefe: You knew you had put it away? Colonel Sadtler: I put it away for safekeeping. Mr. Keefe: Why wasn't the message sent? Colonel Sadtler: General Gerow informed me that he thought they had been adequately warned, and General Smith refused to discuss it any further. Mr. Keefe: Did you suggest to General Gerow that a message of that character should go? Colonel Sadtler: No. I talked to him to the effect that the winds message was in and didn't he think there should be some warning sent out.

Mr. Keefe: Did you discuss this particular message

Colonel Sactler: No, sir.

that you had drafted?

Mr. Keefe: Then I understand your testimony to be that you asked him whether he did not think that an additional warning should be sent.

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And he advised you that in his opinion they had sufficient warning?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And when you told that to General Smith --

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Witness sadtler Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Did you have it in your hand when you talked to General Gerow?

Colonel Sadtler: I think so, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You perhaps went back to your office and from that point on you do not recall what became of that proposed message?

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct.

Mr. K eefe: It never became an official message because it never was sent?

Colonel Sedtler: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: With the approval of the proper authorities? Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, in this affidavit that you gave to Colonel Clausen, you say this:

"I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen, dated respectfully 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941."

Now, I want you to listen to this next:

"I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this subject:

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"General Gerow: - 'I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer, and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of magic. I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chlef of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection I did not receive prior to 7 December, 1941, motification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese winds code. If I had received such a message or notice thereof I believe I would not recall the facts, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the facts, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened."

If I understand your affidavit, you state, "I believe the comments by General Smith contained in his affidavit are correct statements of fact."

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

In his affidavit he says he has no recollection that you ever talked to him at all, and believes you are entirely mistaken.

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: How can you make a statement that you did talk to him, before this committee, and make an effidavit before Colonel Clausen that you believed that Colonel Smith or rather General Gerow, is correct, when he says he doesn't believe that you talked to him at all, and that you must be mistaken? You seem to be taking two different positions in the same affidavit.

Colonel Sadtler: I realized when I got through talking to Miles that I had made no impression to the effect that the winds message was in in view of the Haruna messages going back to Tokyo and the reason I went to Gerow was to arouse somebody that I thought should be aware of what was happening.

I made no impression on Gerow at the time I was there and for that reason I went to Colonel Smith, and he shut it off to the effect "I don't care to discuss it further."

I don't believe I made any impression on any one of those three men.

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Witness Sadtler

Questions by:Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Well, I can well believe that and I think that is the absolute truth that you are telling us now, Colonel Sadtler, but the difficulty that confronts me is the affidavit which you gave to Colonel Clausen.

Colonel Sadtler: Isn't that essentialy what Is aid just now?

Mr. Keefe: Well, General Gerow says, "I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken", and you say in your affidavit that you believed the comments of General Gerow contained in his affidavit are correct statements of fact.

Colonel Sadtler: Insofar as he goes I think they are essentially absolute statements of fact.

Mr. Keefe: All right.

Colonel Sadtler: I am absolutely positive that General Gerow said that to me.

Mr. Keefe: All right. Now, we get down to this, Colonel Sadtler, that your interpretation of this affidavit and the one that you would like to have this committee understand is that when you said you believed that General Smith and General Gerow in their affidavits stated correct statements of fact that you are of the impression that they could not recall or recollect that you talked to them at all and that, perhaps, that was a correct statement of fact, is that it?

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Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Colonel Sadtler: Practically that, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: But you mean to tell this committee presitively and without any question at all of faulty recollection is that you did talk to both of them as you have indicated here?

Colonel Sadtler: Absolutely I talked to both of them.

Mr. Keefe: Do you remember the circumstances under which this affidavit was given to Colonel Clausen?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Will you state them?

Colonel Sadtler: It was in a room in the Pentagon Building. He sent for me and asked me to come up and talk to him, as I recall it.

Mr. Keefe: Well, tellme just what took place.

Colonel Sadtler: He showed me the affidavits of Gerow and Smith and asked me to comment on them, which I have done. Anything further that I cared to add to the testimony or anything that I wanted tosay that could help clear up anything.

Mr. Keefe: Now, I note that you added onto this affidavit this language, in your own handwriting I assume it is.

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kesfe: (Reading)

"Other than the persons mentioned, namely, General Miles, Colonel Bratton, General Gerow, Colonel Smith and whoever may have been in General Miles' office at

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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the time, to the best of my recollection up to December 7, 1941 I did not give any other person the information I received from Admiral Noyes."

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And that is your testimony today, Colonel? Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, in this statement you say, - a statement given to Clausen:

"I deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given to
General Clarke to the effect that I could not get the
execute message from Admiral Noyes and reiterate that
other than making the telephone call, as testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I made no further efforts to obtain the execute message mentioned by Admiral
Noyes."

Now, did you have a discussion with Colonel Clausen as to the testimony of everybody that had testified that seemed to contradict your statement?

Colonel Sadtler: I do not recall all the conversation with Colonel Clausen but if that is what it says, that is correct.

Mr. Keefe: Well, as a matter of fact, then, in reading your affidavit meticulously it impresses me that it is not exactly correct because you have testified to us that you

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did go back to Admiral Noyes after you had talked with General Miles and Colonel Bratton, at the direction of General Miles I assume, to get verification of the message.

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That is in addition to the telephone call?

Colonel Sadtler: That is the telephone call.

Mr. Keefe: What is that?

Colonel Sadtler: That is the telephone call.

Mr. Keefe: Oh, you did not go; you just called up?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Oh, I see. Well, then, that clears it up, Colonel. You did not actually go to Noyes' office then?

Colonel Sadtler: No. sir.

Mr. Keefe: You simply called him on the phone and asked for verification?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And did not get it?

Colonel Sadtler: That is right.

Mr. Keefe: And you did not want to give the impression that Noyes had refused to give you that message?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: He said he was going to a meeting and was busy and you did not press the matter thereafter?

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

Questions by: The Vice Chairma:

Mr. Keefe: Well, personally I want to thank you. We have at least got one witness that has some clear recollection without refreshing. That seemed to be the case in each case. Thank you.

The Chairman: Any further questions?

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a few questions in connection with the questions asked you by Senator Ferguson.

Now, this conference that you spoke of in response to Senator Ferguson's question with Redmond, Gaston and whoever else it was, that was on December 4, 1941?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: That was the time that the question of forty-eight hours was discussed?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: That was the day before the socalled winds execute message was supposed to have reached Admiral Noyes?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir, that is correct.

The Vice Chairman: So that this conference in which the forty-eight hour question was mentioned had nothing to do with the winds execute message at all?

Colonel Sadtler: Nothing at all, no, sir.

The Vice Chairman: And : whatever discussion occurred

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

there in which the forty-eight hour question was mentioned was solely with relation to the information you had about the burning of Japanese codes?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir, and the other information that had gone before, Mr. Cooper.

The Vice Chairman: But it had nothing to do with any winds message?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, not a thing.

The Vice Chairman: All right. Now, your reason for thinking that war with Britain would also probably mean war with the United States was because the Japanese were destroying their codes in both the United States and in Britain?

Colonel Sadtler: And in British possessions, yes, sir,

The Vice Chairman: Yes. And that had nothing to do with any winds message at all?

Colonel Sadtler: N?ot a thing, no, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Now, this message written by you on December 5th which is mentioned in your affidavit to Colonel Clausen, I believe you state was never shown to General Gerow or General Miles or Colonel Bedell Smith or Colonel Bratton.

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: You did not show it to anybody else?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

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Witness Sadtler

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

The Vice Chairman: You simply wrote it out and kept it yourself?

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: And did not show it to any of these other officers.

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Now, you never did see the so-called winds execute message and all you know about it is what Admiral Noyes told you?

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: You never did at any time see it? Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

The Vice Chairman: And as far as you know of your own knowledge there never was any winds execute message received?

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: All right, thank you.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: Colonel, as I understand it then, because you had a phone call from Admiral Noyes about which there was some doubt and concerning which you could not get confirmation you, who had charge of the collection of data and not the evaluation or analysis of data, took it upon yourself to go to the Chief of War Plans and the Secreta ry of the Chief of

2 other possessions, is that right? 3 4 5 ing message of November 27th? 6 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir, I knew about that. 7 8 9 message? 10 Short had sent into the WarrDepartment. 11 12 sage, "This is a war warning" on the 27th? 13 14 15 8830. 16 17 Colonel Sadtler: No, sir. 18 19 of November to General Short from General Marshall? 20 21 22 he was on a sabotage alert? 23 24

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Witness Sadtler Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Staff in order to have a message sent out to Hawaii and the

Colonel Sadtler: That is essentially correct, yes, sir. Mr. Murphy: Did you know at that time of the war warn-

Mr. Murphy: Did you read, - you had read the Navy's

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir. I knew the one that General

Mr. Murphy: Well, did you know about the Navy's mes-

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, I knew nothing of that mes-

Mr. Murphy: Did you know about the message of the 24th of November that hostilities might commence at any moment?

Mr. Murphy: Did you know about the message of the 27th

Colonel Sadtler: To which General Short replied that

Mr. Murphy: I am not talking about his reply. I am talking about the message of Marshall to Short, did you know about that?

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

you the kind of a message that should go cut, is that it?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Well, you expected that he would take your

Mr. Murphy: And you expected General Gerow, after you

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, I don't identify it, no, sir.

Mr. Murphy: So that you, not knowing that there had been a warning message on the 24th of November and the Army message of the 27th of November and the Navy message of the 27th of November, were feeling disturbed that no warning message had gone out, is that right?

Colonel Sadtler: I thought that additional warning should go out, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Well, did you know what had gone out? Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: So that you took it upon yourself, not knowing what the Chief of Staff and the other officers in charge
of such functions had done and not knowing what the Navy officers in charge of such functions had done, decided that you
would write the kind of a message that should go out, is that
it?

Colonel Sadtler: I intended that to be some sort of a model that if they wanted to send a message they could use that to start out with.

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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suggestion that a message should go out?

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Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

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tion from General Gerow you then went to the Chief of Staff's office, is that right?

Mr. Murphy: And then when you didn't get any satisfac-

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Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

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Mr. Murphy: Now, did you tell the Chief of Staff at that

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time that you had already conferred with General Miles and you had already conferred with General Gerow? Did you ever

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tell that to Colonel Smith?

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Colonel Sadtler: I think you mean Colonel Smith, the

Secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

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ter with General Miles, Chief of Army Intelligence, G-2, and

Mr. Murphy: You told him that you had discussed the mat-

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that you had already discussed the matter with General Gerow

didn't he then tell you, Well, don't bother me about it", or

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and that you did not get any satisfaction from them and

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something to that effect?

Colonel Sadtler: Essentially, yes, sir.

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Mr. Murphy: Yes. Now, then, we come to your conversation with General Drum. I would like to get some more details

on that. This material that you got was of a highly confi-

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Witness Sadtler

dential nature, wasn't it?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And what did you tell General Drum about th? Did he have any right to know about this magic? Colonel Sadtler: He had been my commanding General.

Mr. Murphy: I don't ca re what he was. You knew that he did not have any right to know about magic, didn't you?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir, I knew that.

Mr. Murphy: Yes. And did he as your commanding General presume as your General to ask you to reveal such information to him?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir. It was the time of my relief from duty under General Drum to go to duty with the Second Army.

Mr. Murphy: All right.

Colonel Sadtler: And he said -- he asked me, "Weren't you on duty in the Chief's office at the time this trouble occurred?"

Mr. Murphy: What else?

Colonel Sadtler: And asked me to tell him the circumstances.

Mr. Murphy: And did you discuss magic with him and the messages?

Colonel Sadtler: I told him about the winds message.

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exactly, but I essentially told him what was done at that

Mr. Murphy: What else?

Mr. Murphy: Did he tell you why he wanted to know?

Colonel Sadtler: I don't know, sir, I have forgotten

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

time about that, what had happened.

Mr. Murphy: And then after you talked with him you went

out and made a memorandum?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir. I left for Tennessee almost

immediately.

Mr. Murphy: B ut you have already told us that after

you talked to General Drum you made some notes. That is what

you said in this record.

Mr. Richardson: A few months later he said.

Colonel Sadtler: I don't know whether it was the same

day or a week later or a month later.

Mr. Murphy: After you talked to General Drum you made

some notes. Why did you make the notes? Did General Drum

suggest it or not?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: He suggested that you make some notes?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Did he say why?

Galonel Sadtler: He said, "You had better remember this."

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Mr. Murphy: What is that?

Colonel Sadtler: He said, "You had better remember this."

Mr. Murphy: Yes. What else?

Colonel Sadtler: That is all.

Mr. Murphy: And was it he who suggested you make notes?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Did you tell General Drum about magio?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, I don't think so.

Mr. Murphy: You mean you just confined it to that one incident?

Colonel Sadtler: I don't recall telling him anything else, no, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, you have already testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and you have testified before this Board that you felt on the 4th of December 1941, twenty-four hours before any talk of a conversation with Admiral Noyes, that you felt war was coming in forty-eight hours.

What was there about the winds intercept that you singled out, since you felt it was coming the day before, that you would talk about only that one instance to General Drum? How do you explain that?

Colonel Sadtler: I can't explain it, sir.

Mr. Murphy : Well, have you any idea?

Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

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Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: The gentleman from Wisconsin said your memory was clear. Now I would like to have your memory on it. Why would you discuss that one little incident when you said you felt the "haruna" messages meant war, when you knew the consuls were being told to destroy their codes, when you knew the ambassador was being told to destroy his codes, when you felt that war was coming, why would you single out this one incident to talk to General Drum about?

Colonel Sadtler: I cannot answer that question, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Who brought up the subject?

Colonel Sadtler: When I went in to say good-bye to General Drum he asked me the circumstances surrounding the events at Pearl Harbor at the time.

Mr. Murphy: You said you only told him about one little incident after he asked you about the conditions surrounding Pearl Harbor. Is that so, now? He asked you what were the conditions surrounding Pearl Harbor and out of all this important mass of detail you just singled out one little item. Is that so?

Colonel Sadtler: The winds message, Mr. Murphy, as I said before, was the most important message that I think I ever handled in my life.

Mr. Murphy: Why? Will you tell the committee? Colonel Sadtler: The whole thing. We knew on the 29th,

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

ew knew of the disappearance of the Japanese fleet, we knew of Mr. Hull's ultimatum, we knew on December 1st these code machines were being destroyed, we knew the "haruna" messages and then this final winds message came in to cap the whole olimax.

Mr. Murphy: Now, what 111 the winds message mean to your You said before in your testimony that it meant a break in diplomatic relations.

Colonel Saitler: It meant destruction of codes, papers, and so forth.

Mr. Murphy: Weren't they already lestroyed?

Colonel Saitler: That was the final word and to me that everything had happened, because that winds ressage was also predicated upon the fact, upon the interruption of international communications that they would certainly have.

Mr. Murphy: But, sir, didn't you already testify that there were sixteen "haruna" messages?

Colonel Saitler: No, sir, I 111 mat. I said after that date there have been found sixteen. I am two or three at that time.

Mr. Murphy: But at any rate you 111 asy -- let me get it exactly. Let me get your exact words.

The Chairman: Go ahead and answer it if you can.

Mr. Murphy: Page 250.

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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The Chairman: It seemed to be in the form of a question

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that required an answer.

Mr. Murphy: You 111 expect a leclaration of war on the 30th of November, dian't you?

Colonel Saitler: Well, we expected something to happen.

Mr. Murphy: Well, didn't you say before the Army Board that we were of the opinion there might be a declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday, November the 30th?

Colonel Saitler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphys (Reading)

"This, as you all know, proved to be a "dud" and on Monday, December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began coming in from Tokyo telling the consuls to destroy their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their directive. If I recall correctly, that word was 'Haruna'. It is the same name as that battleship that Collin Kelly was alleged to have sunk.

"About December 3, Tokyo notified the embassy pertaining to the destruction of their codes at once."

Now, if you had all those messages that the consuls were to destroy their codes and if you had on the 5th the message about the embassy burning their codes, what did the winds

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Colonel Saitler: Yes, sir.

Well, they were not destroyed then on the Mr. Murphy:

intercept do?

Colonel Saitler: It capped the climax.

Mr. Murphy: In what way?

Colonel Saitler: That everything is here. Now we have the whole thing.

Mr. Murphy: What was here that you 111 not have before? Colonel Saitler: Nothing, not a thing. Now there was nothing but the winds message, which was a message that we had been straining every nerve to get, we had everybody listening for that message.

Mr. Murphy: You 111 intercept certain messages after the 5th, did you not?

Colonel Saitler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Yes. Were the codes destroyed when you were intercepting those messages?

Colonel Saitler: Practically all the codes were destroyed except the one in the Japanese embassy.

Mr. Murphy: Weren't you kept busy all day on the 5th and on the night of the 5th and all day on the 6th and on the e vening of the 6th and on Sunday intercepting messages?

Colonel Saitler: That is correct.

Mr. Murphy: New messages?

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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5th, were they?

Colonel Saitler: What was not lestroyel on the 5th?

Mr. Murphy: You said that it capped the climax. The message to destroy the codes came on the 5th. You still received intercepted messages the afternoon of the 5th and the night of the 5th and the 6th and the 7th?

Colonel Saitler: That is true, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Well, if that capped the climax they did not destroy the codes, did they? Do you understand me?

Colonel Saitler: Yes, sir, I understand you perfectly, but they had destroyed practically all of their codes by that time except the one in the Japanese embassy.

Mr. Murphy: Well, you knew that there were messages to different parts of the world that we intercepted, too, did you not?

Colonel Saitler: Not at that time I did not, no, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Will you give me exhibit 1? Will you show that to the witness?

Mr. Richardson: If he doesn't know why show him anything?

Mr. Murphy: Do you know about the message of December 7th coming in?

Colonel Saitler: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: About relations with Englani?

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Colonel Sattler: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: You don't know about that?

Colonel Saitler: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: You don't know that we did interdept a message on the 7th of December about relations between Japan and England not being in accordance with expectations?

Colonel Saitler: No, 8 ir, I do not; that is correct.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then., in view of all of that you still say that you only told General Drum about that one little message?

Colonel Saitler: No, sir, I will not. I think that is about all we discussed, though, as to what happened in Washington at that time.

Mr. Murphy: Now, what happened to your notes?

Colonel Saitler: I ion't know, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Well, you certainly don't want to create any inference that anybody in Washington is responsible for your notes being destroyed, do you?

Colonel Saitler: I do not, sir.

Mr. Murphy: How many times did you talk to Captain Safford before you were a witness?

Colonel Saitler: I have never talked to Captain Safford but once or twice in my life and that was before December 7, 1941.

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Did you talk to anybody about this except General Drum?

Colonel Saitler: You me an discussed what has happened?

Mr. Murphy: About the winds intercept, yes, or your notes?

Colonel Saitler: I remember telling General Carter Clarke the story.

Mr. Murphy: Now, about Carter Clarke: That has come into the record three times and the Clarke exhibit is not in the record as yet.

As-I understand it, you were talking to General Spalling and General Spalling gave you some gossip about certain papers being destroyed, did he not?

Colonel Saitler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Did you learn that General Spalling learned it from Bissell?

Colonel Saitler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And did you learn that Bissell learned it from Friedman?

Colonel Saitler: No, Bir.

Mr. Murphy: Did you learn where Bissell got it?

Colonel Saitler: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Are you familiar with the Clarke report that investigated that whole incident and dismissed it?

Colonel Saitler: I am familiar with the part of my tes-

Witness Saitler

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

timony and I listened to General Spalding when he gave his testimony.

Mr. Murphy: In other words, you had heard from General Spalling certain things and then the gossip you got from General Spalling, who did you give it to?

Colonel Saitler: It is going to get down to Mr. Friedman, isn't it?

Mr. Murphy: It is going to get to wherever you put it.

Colonel Saitler: I did in conversation with Mr. Friedman
tell him that, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: It was you then who told Friedman? Colonel Saitler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And then Friedman told other people?
Oblonel Sadtler: That is right, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: So that you are the one responsible for: Friedman having this so-called information, is that right? Colonel Saitler: That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: May I see the Clarke report, please? I refer to your testimony. You testified before General Clarke on the 14th of July 1945, is that right?

Colonel Saitler: I think that is about right, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: You were questioned by Colonel Gibson;

(Reading)

"Colonel Sattler; you realize that you are under oath

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

and you are fully aware of what your rights are?

"Colonel Saitler: Yes.

"Colonel Gibson: I want to ask you first if you ever saw a so-called Winds execute message?

"Colonel Saitler: I did not.

"Colonel Gibson: To your knowledge, was such a message ever in the War Department?

"Colonel Sattler: It was not.

"Colonel Gibson: And all that you know about that message and all contact that you had with it is in your former testimony?

"Colonel Saitler: That is right. I might further add that the information came from Admiral Noyes.

"Colonel Gibson: Mr. William F. Friedman has testiflet before Admital Hewitt of the Department of the Navy recently as follows: Then if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sattler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hain't himself seen a copy but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. "

You were the one, then, that told --

Colonel Saitler: I did not. Those words were Mr. Fried-

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Witness Saitler 2 man's words. Mr. Murphy: Well, he said you did. 3 Colonel Saitler: Mr. Friedman tells it in his words. Mr. Murphy: (Reading) 5 "Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had been told by somebody that the mospies of the Winds execute message 8 had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall? 9 "Colenel Saitler: 10 nial of that statement made by Mr. Friedman because, as 12 far as I know, that message was never in the War Depart-13 ment and I never made any statement that General Marshall 14 ordered 1t destroyed or that anyone told me that General 15 Marshall ordered it destroyed. 16 "Colonel Gibson: When 111 you return to luty in 17 Washington this last time? 18 "Colonel Saitler: About March 28, 1944. 19 "Colonel Gibson: After your return during the fol-20 lowing summer and fall on occasion did you visit with Mr. 21 Friedman? 22 "Colonel Saitler: Yes. 23 "Colonel Gibson: And did you visit about Pearl 24 Harbor, amongst other things?

Questions by: Mr. Murphy I will make an absolute flat 10-

"Colonel Saitler: Yes. We had discussed what had

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Witness Saitler

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

happened at that time."

So that you lid talk to more than Drum, lin't you? You did say Friedman, did you not, before?

Colonel Saitler: Yes, I talked to a lot of people who I assured would get this message.

Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

"Colonel Gibson: Did some of those discussions take place in Mr. Friedman's office?

"Colonel Saitler: Well, I assure they ili because I have been in his office several times. I had talked to him on occasions about what had happened, not only in his office but at his house.

"Colonel Gibson: At some time did somebody tell you that messages pertaining to the Pearl Harbor affair were being destroyed?

"Colonel Saitler: Yes. Some time during 1943 General Isaac Spalding at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, told me something to the effect that J. T. B. Bissell had told him that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been destroyed. " That is what General Spalling told you, was it? Colonel Saitler: That is correct, yes, sir. Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

Is it possible that you told that " Colonel Gibdon:

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

мувнишетой, в.

to Mr. Friedman in one of your conversations?
"Colonel Saitler: It is possible.

"Colonel Gibson: You have been an old friend of Mr. Friedman for many years?

"Colonel Saitler: I have known him for over 25 years.

"Colonel Gibson: This Colonel, now Brigatier J. T.

B. Bissell, that you speak of, to you know him personally? "Colonel Sattler: I to not.

"Colonel Gibson: To your knowledge have you ever met

"Colonel Saitler: Yes. I have met him casually but I doubt if I would recognize him today if I saw him."

I will try to out this down.

Now, you typed this so-called message that you spoke to the gentleman from Wisconsin about, you typed it yourself, didn't you?

Colonel Saitler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: You 114 not have your stenographer type it? Colonel Saitler: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, on December 1st you tried to dissuade General Olmstead from going to Panama because you thought that there would be war there then, did you not?

Colonel Saitler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: That is December 1st?

Colonel Saitler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: You said:

"On December 1, when General Oldsteal was raking preparations to go to Panama, I attempted to dissuate him from his trip because I felt positive that war would be declared before he returned and I thought that it was his duty to be in Washington."

You 111 say that before General Clarke?

Colonel Saitler: That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, Colonel Saltler, youwere asked this question:

that you told him that you had heard that in addition to the Winds execute message being ordered destroyed by General Marshall, there was a second message that was ordered destroyed by General Marshall. This second message was a message which was the result of a message sent by the War Department a day or two after Pearl Harbor to the Signal Officer, Colonel Powell, asking him whether the radar installation in the Islands was in operative order at the time of the attack, and the answer came back in the affirmative. Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had heard that the message of inquiry relative to the working of the radar installation in the Islands or the answer

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thereto had been destroyed?" Your answer was, "I did not."

So that you were not responsible for that part of the gossip?

Colonel Saitler: Absolutely not, no, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And the fact is that radar message is down in the files of the War Department now, is it not? Colonel Saitler: Yes, sir. That was collected for secrecy at first, as I have explained before.

Mr. Murphy. Right. That is all, Colonel.

Mr. Kaufman: Mr. Chairman, counsel for General Short requests that I ask a question of the witness.

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Kaufman: Counsel for General Short would like to have me inquire from the witness as to whether he had seen the reply of General Short to the November 27th message? Colonel Saitler: That would be the sabotage?

Mr. Kaufman: Yes.

Colonel Saitler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Where did you see it for the first time? Colonel Saitler: In the War Department.

Mir. Kaufman: Ar ound the date that it was received? Colonel Saitler: I imagine so, yes, sir. I have forgotten exactly when but I do recall seeing it before Pearl Harbor.

Questions by: Mr. Reefe

Mr. Kaufman: That is all.

Mr. Keefe: One question on that, Mr. Chairman. I was going to ask that same question because I thought that you had attempted to say something with respect to the message from General Short to General Marshall of the War Department with respect to his being alerted only against sabotage.

It impressed me that you were cut off by Mr. Murphy and did not get to say it.

Now, as a matter of fact to I understand that at the time you became so apprehensive and felt that a message should go out to Short, was that because you had seen this message which set forth that he was only alerted against sabotage?

Colonel Saitler: No, sir, I had no reason to single General Short at Hawaii out to get a warning. I thought that they all should be warned because I personally thought that if the Japs attacked it would be the Panama Canal.

Mr. Keefe: Well, then the fact that he had sent in a wire and you knew about it, that he was only alerted against sabotage 414 not make any particular impression on you?

Colonel Sattler: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: All right.

Colonel Saitler: Except that I knew he had not --

Mr. Keefe: I just want to get that clear.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I want to get that olear.

Witness Saitler

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

General Short sent more than one sabotage message. D14
you see both of them?

Colonel Saitler: I don't recall but one.

Mr. Murphy: Well, if he stated --

Mr. Richardson: Well, if he only saw one why go into the second?

Mr. Murphy: I want to know which one he saw.

Colonel Saitler: The one I saw was about -- I imagine

1t was about a hunirel worls.

Mr. Murphy: A hundred words?

Colonel Saitler: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: That is all.

Colonel Saitler: It was not a long message.

Mr. Murphy: That is all.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Colonel, for your cooperation. The committee appreciates your attendance here.

(Witness excuse 1.)

The Chairman: Who is the next witness?

Mr. Richardson: Commander Schulz.

The Chairman: Commander Schulz, come around, please.

(Witness sworn by the chairman)

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TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER L	ESTER	ROBERT	SCHULZ
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(sworn by the chairman)

Mr. Richardson: Will you state your full name, please? Commander Schulz: Lester Robert Schulz.

Mr. Richardson: How long have you been in the Navy, Com-

Commander Schulz: Since June 1930, beginning as a midship-

Mr. Richardson: Were you in Washington furing November and December 1941?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. Richardson: What was your assignment for duty in Washington during the first week of December?

Commander Schulz: I was under instruction in the Office of Naval Communications for communication intelligence. That was my permanent assignment. However, I was on temporary duty under verbal orders at the White House as a communications assistant to the Naval Aide, then Captain Beardall. Also, I had gone to Warm Springs in the same capacity the previous week end. Thus, my return to Washington I believe was Tuesday of that week.

Mr. Richardson: You were under Admirel Beardall? Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. Richardson: Who others of the Navy were occupying the same duty, a similar duty there under Beardall?

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Mr. Richardson: About what time did he come?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, I do.

Corranter Schulz: On the 6th of December, I believe the morning of the 6th there was an Ensign Carson who was sent up to assist me. Actually he performed no duties that day and was simply being instructed and informed as to what his duties would be.

Mr. Richardson: What is your present assignment now? Commander Schulz: I am under orders at present to be executive officer of the Indiana, a battleship.

Mr. Richardson: Were you on duty at the White House in Admiral Beardall's office there on the night of December 6, 1941?

Corranter Schulz: I was on duty in the White House. Admiral Beardall had no fixed office in the White House at that time. He conducted his business for the most part in the Navy Department in the Navy Builling and I was given a small office in a corner of the mail room, a clesed office, but it was not a place used by Admiral Beardall.

Mr. Richardson: That was at the White House? Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, it was.

Mr. Richardson: Do you recall Captain Kramer coming to the White House on the evening of December 6th to deliver any papers?

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Corranter Schulz: Between 9 and 10; I should say about 9:30.

Mr. Richardson: In the evening?

Cormander Schulz: In the evening, yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Who was there besides you?

Commander Schulz: No one else of the Navy.

Mr. Richardson: To whom, if anyone, did Captain Kramer hand his papers?

Commander Schulz: He handed them to me. They were in a looked pouch.

Mr. Richardson: Was that the customary way in which dispatches that were being delivered there were delivered?

Commander Schulz: Material of that category was so delivered.

Mr. Richardson: What did you do with the locked pouch when 1t was handed to you?

Commander Schulz: I took it from the mail room, which is in the office building, over to the White House proper and obtained permission to go up on the second floor and took it to the President's study.

Mr. Richardson: Did you go alone?

Commander Schulz: I was accompanied by someone from the usher's office and announced to the President. However, then I was alone.

Mr. Richardson: But Captain Kramer 111 not go with you?

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Cormander Schulz: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson: How long from the time the papers were placed in your hands by Captain Kramer was it before you went to the President's study?

Corranter Schulz: About five minutes I would say.

Mr. Richardson: Who did you find in the study when you arrived there?

Corranter Schulz: The President was there seated at his lesk and Mr. Hopkins was there.

Mr. Richardson: That is Mr. Harry Hopkins?

Corrander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. Richardson: You knew him?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir. I had met him the previous Tay.

Mr. Richardson: And you knew the President? Commander Schulz: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Was the pouch still locked?

Commander Schulz: I had a key to the pouch. I do not recall just when I unlocked it. In all likelihood it was after I was in the study, however.

Mr. Richardson: What did you do after you entered the study?

Commander Schulz: I was announced and I informed the President that I had the material which Captain Kramer had

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Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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brought and I took it out of the pouch.

Mr. Richardson: Did you make any further statement at the time with reference to the material, as to your having been told that it was important or ngt?

Commander Schulz: That I do not recall, sir, but I believe that the President was expecting it. As I recall, he was.

Mr. Richardson: Why? What makes you believe that? Was there anything said, I mean, that would indicate that?

Commander Schulz: When Admiral Beardall instructed me to stay and weet Mr. Kramer and receive the material, he told me of its important nature.

Mr. Richardson: Now, wait just a moment there.

Commander Schulz: And my recollection was also that it was of such importance that the President expected to receive 1t.

Mr. Richardson: Before Captain Kramer came did you have a talk with Aimiral Beardall with reference to the possibility of papers being delivered in the immediate future?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, I did. That is why I stayed. Mr. Richardson: What did Admiral Beardall say to you? Commander Schulz: He told me that during the evening Captain Kramer would bring up some magic material and that I was to take it and give it immediately to the President and

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Witness Schulz

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

he gave me the key to the pouch so that I could take it out and deliver it.

Mr. Richardson: That is the substance of your conversa-

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is right.

Mr. Richardson: Well, now, when you presented the material to the President was it in the pouch?

Commander Schulz: To the best of my recollection I took it out of the pouch and handed it to him. The papers were clipped together. There were perhaps fifteen typewritten pages and they were fastened together in a sheaf and I took them out of the pouch and handed them to the President personally.

Mr. Richardson: You know now what we mean when we talk about the first thirteen parts of the fourteen part message; you know what I am talking about?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Are you able to state now whether among the papers which were delivered to the President there was this thirteen parts of what was eventually the fourteen part message?

Commander Schulz: No, sir, I cannot. I did not read the message. I have only learned of its substance through information that has been divulged during this inquiry, from

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Witness Schult-

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

newspapers and so on.

Mr. Richardson: All right. Now, what happened when you delivered these papers to the President? You remained there? Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, I remained in the room.

Mr. Richardson; What happened?

Commander Schulz: The President read the papers, which took perhaps ten minutes. Then he handed them to Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. Richardson: How far away from the President was Mr. Hopkins sitting?

Corranter Schulz: He was standing up pacing back and forth slowly not more than ten feet away.

Mr. Richardson: Did the President read out loud when he was reading the papers?

Commander Schulz: I do not recall that he did.

Mr. Richardson: All right. Now go ahead and give us in detail just what occurred there, if you please, Commander.

Commander Schulz: Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned towards Mr. Hopkins and said in substance -- I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance, "This means war." Mr. Hopkins agreed and they discussed then for perhaps five minutes the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their leployment and --

Can you recall what either of them said? Mr. Richardson:

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Witness Schulz

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

Corranter Schulz: In substance I can. There are only a few words that I can definitely say I am sure of, but the substance of it was that -- I believe Mr. Hopkins mentioned it first, that since war was irrinent, that the Japanese intended to strike when they were ready, at a moment when all was most opportune for them --

The Chairman: When all was what?

Commander Schulz: When all was most opportune for that. That is, when their forces were most properly deployed for their advantage. Indo-China in particular was rentioned, because the Japanese forces had already landed there and there were implications of where they should move next.

The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese Emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indo-China, in effect requesting their withdrawal.

Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was un-Dubtelly going to come at the convenience of the Japanese it was too bad that we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President noiled and then said, in effect, "No, we can't to that. We are a temocracy and a peaceful people." Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said, "But we have a good record. "

The impression that I got was that we would have to stand

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Witness Schulz

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

on that record, we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came.

During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The only geographic name I recall was Into-China. The time at which war might begin was not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion there was no indication that tororrow was me cessarily the day. I carried that impression away because it contributed to my personal surprise when the news did come.

Mr. Richardson: Was there anything said, Commander, with reference to the subject of notice or notification as a result of the papers that were being read?

Commander Schulz: There was no mention made of sending any further warning or alert .. However, having concluded this Alscussion about the war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was then determined, - I do not recall exactly, but I believe the White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theater.

Mr. Richardson: Now, that was from what was said there that you i raw the conclusion that that was what the White House operator reported?

Witness Schulz

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Questions by: Mr. Richardson

Corrander Schulz: Yes, sir. I did not hear what the operator said, but the National Theater was mentioned in my presence and the President went on to state, in substance, that he would reach the Airiral later, that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the Admiral paged or otherwise when in the theater where I believe the fact that he had a box reserved was mentioned and that if he had left suddenly he would surely have been seen because of the position which he held and undue alarm might be caused and the President did not wish that to happen because he could get him within perhaps another half an hour in any case.

Mr. Richardson: Was there anything said about telephoning anybody else except Stark?

Commander Schulz: No, sir, there was not.

Mr. Richardson: How did he refer to Admiral Stark? Commander Schulz: When he first mentioned calling him he referred to him as "Betty".

Mr. Richardson: Was there any further discussion there before you left?

Commander Schulz: No, sir. To the best of my knowledge that is all that was discussed. The President returned the papers to me and I left the study.

Mr. Richardson: That is all you know about it? Commander Schulz; Yes, sir, that is all.

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Mr. Clark: No questions.

The Chairman: Mr. Lucas? Mr. Murphy?

Mr. Murphy: Commander, you just flew in from (California,

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. Murphy: You got off the plane within the last hour or so ?

Oppmander Schulz: No, sir. I arrived at the National Airport at about nine o'clock this morning.

Mr. Murphy: Did you ever commit any of this material to writing at any time?

Commander Schulz: No, sir, I have not.

Mr. Murphy: You have no notes whatsoever?

Corranter Schulz: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Well, I would like to have you just relax yourself justa little bit; you are tense. No other questions.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewster?

Senator Brewster: I will pass at this time.

The Chairman: Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. Gearhart: Were there any other high ranking Army or Navy officers that called at the White House that night that you know of?

Commander Schulz: Not to my knowledge, sir. However, I was not in that part of the White House, except during this

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Witness Schulz

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

half hour, where I would have seen ther.

Mr. Gearhart: Your office was in the annex near the executive end of the building?

Corranter Schulz: I believe that is what it is called, sir. It is the annex over towards the State Department.

Mr. Gearhart: That is right. And where is that office to which you have referred? In the basement?

Commander Schulz: It is on the basement level, yes, sin I haven't been in it now for over four years but I believe it is on the street level, however, on the side on which you come in on.

Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Your particular room was off of the mail receiving room?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. Gearhart: How long 111 you remain on luty that night? Commander Schulz: Until about 10:30.

Mr. Gearhart: And when 114 you return to duty the next day?

Commander Schulz: The next day after the news of the attack; I called Admiral Beardall after I had heard the news and then came back to the White House.

Mr. Gearhart: Arriving at the White House at what time? Commander Schulz: About four o'olock I would say, sir. Mr. Gearhart: That 1s all.

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The Chairman: Mr. Ferguson. Senator Ferguson: I just want to take the situation af-

ter you left the President's study. You then returned, as I understand it, to the mail room?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Ferguson: And the mail room had these long tables in it?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is right.

Senator Ferguson: Now, was Captain Kramer sitting at those tables when you went back, at one of the tables?

Gormanier Schulz: It is my recollection that he was.

Senator Ferguson: And then did you return to Captain Kramer this wouch? Is that your recollection?

Commander Schulz: That is my recollection. The happenings during that particular period are somewhat hazy but I know that I 111 not have the papers the next day. Further, I hain't too suitable a place to put them during the night because of their high secrecy classification.

Senator Ferguson: You had worked in the Naval ONI so that you knew how secret these papers were and how valuable they were?

Cormander Schulz: I was in the Cormunications Division rather than ONI.

All right, Corrunications. Senator Ferguson:

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Witness Schulz

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Commander Schulz: However, I knew of their nature and their general source because of their importance.

Senator Ferguson: And, therefore, you wouldn't have cared to keep them at home or where you stayed and you did not leave them anywhere in the White House?

Commander Schulz: I would not have kept them under any circumstances, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: So that is your reason for saying that you gave them to Commander Kramer, or he was Captain at that time, was he?

Commander Schulz: I am not sure of his rank but it is the same Captain Kramer.

Senator Ferguson: What was your grade at that time?

Commander Schulz: I was a Lieutenant at that time.

Senator Ferguson: And you would say that you were in all about one hour or one-half hour, I think you said, in the President's study?

Oppranter Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Ferguson: Now, 114 you have any other conversation that night later with Commanier Beariall?

Commander Schulz: I recall having talked on the telephone to then Captain Beardall after I had shown the papers to the President.

Will you give us that conversation? Senator Ferguson:

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Commander Schulz: I do not remember the exact words.

However, the purpose of the call was to inform him that I had received the papers, the President had seen them and I had carried out my instructions; then I would be free to go home.

Senator Ferguson: And you did get home about what hour that night?

Commander Schulz: I left the White House at about 10:30.

Senator Ferguson: Did Admiral Beardall ask you for the details of the conversation of what the President may have said?

Commander Schulz: I don't recall that he did, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you do not recall telling Admiral

Beardall at any time this conversation that you have related

here?

Commander Schulz: I never told anyone during the course of the war of any conversation being held that night in the President's presence.

Senator Ferguson: And to whom have you repeated this conversation?

Commander Schulz: I have repeated it since to you and to Lieutenant Commander Baecher and the gentleman who was with you at the time; I did not know his name.

Mr. Murphy: By "you" you mean who?

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson?

Witness Schulz

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Commander Schulz: I mean --

Mr. Murphy: You mean you told Senator Ferguson about this before tolay?

Senator Ferguson: This is Mr. Morgan.

Cormander Schulz: No, sir, not before today. Immediately preceding my coming to the chair; within ten minutes before I care to the chair here.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Morgan was present and Corranter Baecher was present?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is right.

Senator Ferguson: Now, had you talked it over with any one else prior to that?

Commander Schulz: No, sir, I have not.

Senator Ferguson: Now, can you tell us whether or not that was the first week of your assignment there, so that you had not been with the President prior to his Warm Springs trip and this particular week in the White House?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct. My first association with the White House in any capacity was on the Erilay of the week before, when I male the trip to Warm Springs. I did not go to the White House at that time. The first time I was ever in the White House was on the 5th of December.

Senator Ferguson: Now, on the 5th of December 1111 any ressages core in to your knowledge?

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Witness Schulz

Quest ions by: Sen. Ferguson

Commander Schulz: There was one message. I had that in my custody. As I recall it was given to me by Captain Beardall and had already been shown to the President. At least it was given to me only for custody and it concerned the reported burning of Japanese consular codes. It care to re on a normal Navy Department secret message form. Its original source, I recall, was from Australia but I to not know and to not recall who actually originated the message.

Senator Ferguson: Did it say anything about the Japanese destroying a code machine in Batavia or sending it back to Tokyo to you recall?

Corranter Schulz: No, sir, no rachine was rentioned.

Senator Ferguson: No machine was mentioned in that particular message?

Commander Schulz: No.

Senator Ferguson: Now, outside of that ressage have you any information as to any messages delivered to the President?

Commander Schukz: No, sir, there were no others.

Senator Ferguson: Now, is this the only conversation or the only words that you heard from the President, that you have given us, in relation to the Pacific or the Japanese question?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct, the only words. Senator Ferguson: Nothing at Warm Springs, any messages

there or any conversations about the Far East?

Commander Schulz: No, sir, I had no such material or information there.

Senator Ferguson: And you heard no conversations by the President there?

Commander Schulz: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, there is one thing I am not entirely clear on and that is when the President said that he did not want Admiral Stark, or "Betty", as he referred to him first, called from the National Theater because it would, in your language, arouse people, or what was the word?

Corrander Schulz: It wight have caused public alarm.

Senator Ferguson: Public alarm?

Commander Schulz: Or at lest speculation.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, and there was one thing said about that he didn't want that to happen for another hour?

Commander Schulz: He made no statement as to when it would be all right that public knowledge might be all right. His statement, his words were, in effect, that he would reach the Admiral later. The matter of it being another hour is my own observation based on the fact that the theater eventually was going to close that evening.

Senator Ferguson: So the President did not use the words "another hour"?

WARD & PAUL. WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Schulz

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Commander Schulz: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you took that to mean that he would get him after the show?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Ferguson: Now, to you have any knowledge as to whether the President did reach Adriral Stark that/hight or not?

Commander Schulz: No, sir, I do not know.

Senator Ferguson: And as I understand it then, you iid not work or go to the White House on the morning of the 7th?

Commander Schulz: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And will you tell us who was the President's Naval Alle on Sunlay morning, if youhave any knowleige on 1t?

Opmander Schulz: Captain Beardall was the Naval Aide at that time, on that morning.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. To your knowledge, this other gentleman, the other Lieutenant, - and I did not catch his nare.

Cormander Schulz: The officer who was my assistant was Ensign Carson.

Senator Ferguson: Is that Carson?

Commander Schulz: C-a-r-s-o-n. Crson was not there that morning either. He had only reported for work the pre-

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson Witness Schulz ceding day and was not yet fully instructed. Senator Ferguson: And to your knowledge then he was real-

ly not authorized to handle this locked pouch, is that correct Corranter Schulz: He had never been left there alone for such an assignment before.

Senator Ferguson: Now, there is only about one other thing and that is when did Admiral Beardall first tellyou to remain there that night to receive this special message for the President?

It was about four o'clock. The time Corranter Schulz: 1s not exact --

Senator Ferguson: Near the time.

Commander Schulz: It was late in the afternoon, before the Aimiral left himself.

Senator Ferguson: What time did Admiral Beardall leave? Commander Schulz: I do not recall exactly but about 5:30 I should say.

Senator Ferguson: And you were the only one that remained on futy or did Carson s tay with you?

Commander Schulz: No, sir, Carson left also and I rerainet.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, when 111 you first learn that you were going to be a witness here?

Commander Schulz: I learned definitely only on the 12th

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Witness Schulz

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

of this month; that is about three days ago. I had previous indication about the 1st of December, when I was informed by Lieutenant Commander Baecher that because of my having been on duty at the White House at that time that I might be called. I did not receive definite word.

Senator Ferguson: Were you then here in Washington? Commander Schulz: No, sir. I was in Bremerton, Washington, the Puget Sound Navy Yard at that time.

Senator Ferguson: Was Baecher there or 111 he telephone you?

Commander Schulz: He telephoned to me.

Senator Ferguson: And did he ask you to hold yourself in readiness for a call?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, in effect.

Senator Ferguson: Parton me?

Commander Schulz: In effect to expect to come.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. And did you tell him at that time what you knew?

Commander Schulz: Not in as great detail as I have to-Try, but I mentioned the fact that I had received the material from Captain Kramer and that I had personally delivered it to the President and stayed there while he read it.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. And have you been called by any other Board or anyone else to get your story, to get your

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Witness Schulz

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

version of what happened?

Commander Schulz: No, sir, I have not.

Senator Ferguson: This is the first time that you have testifie??

Corranter Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Ferguson: Now, 111 anyone else call you and tell you that you might be a witness?

Corrander Schulz: No, sir, no one has.

Senator Ferguson: You were on the Indiana when you got word to come into San Francisco to get off?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, I was. The ship was at sea and we received orders from the Bureau of Personnel that I proceed here for this purpose.

Senator Ferguson: And your ship pulled into San Francisco? Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, the ship came into San Franclsco yesterlay morning.

Senator Ferguson: You took a plane and landed here at nine o'clock this morning?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

The Vice Chairman: When are you going back?

Commander Schulz: Sunday or Monday I would think, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I have two questions.

You say you talked to some Mr. Morgan and Senator Fergu-

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Witness Schulz

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Where was that? son.

Commander Schulz: That was in the hall just beyond the large door over there.

Mr. Murphy: With only those two persons present before you came into the presence of the corrittee?

Commander Schulz: And Lieutenant Commander Baecher.

Mr. Murphy: Naw, then, one other question. Did you know anything about the President dispatching a ressage to the Emperor on the night of December 6th, the Emperor of Japan?

Commander Schulz: I knew that a message had been sent since during the discussion with Mr. Hopkins the President mentioned that he had sent a message to the Emperor and he made a point of the fact that he had sent it to the Emperor as chief of state and not to Tojo as Premier. He had sent the message to the Emperor and such mention of it as was made in my presence concerned only Indo-China.

Mr. Murphy: But that had been sent, apparently, before the conversation that you heard down there?

Commander Schulz: Whether it had actually been sent I do not know, but I know the President had drafted it.

Mr. Murphy: That is all.

Mr. Reefe: Just one question.

Commander, you made a statement that you believed that the President was expecting this ressage. Did I so under-

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Witness Schulz

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

stand you?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is what I said.

Mr. Keefe: All right.

Commander Schulz: And such was my impression.

Mr. Keefe: Now, I would like to pursue that just a little bit further.

Commander Schulz: My reason for telling that was that Adm iral Beardall, knowing its importance and knowing that it was coming out, told the President to expect it during the evening.

Mr. Keefe: How did Admiral Beardall know that it was coming?

Commander Schulz: It had been -- it is my understanding that it had been received in the Navy Department and was being worked on. It, of course, takes time, some time to obtain the English text in such a message.

Mr. Keefe: Were you aware of the fact that there was a so-called pilot message?

Commander Schulz: No, sir, I was not.

Mr. Keefe: I would like to see if we can get that cleared up. You have no knowledge yourself as to the fact that there was a pilot message which came in some time around about noon on the 6th, which indicated that a long ressage was going to be sent to the Japanese ambassafor?

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Witness Schulz

Questions by: Mr. "eefe

There is evidence before the committee that that pilot ressage was delivered to certain people around about three o'clock. Do you know whether it was delivered to the White House by the Navy that afternoon?

Commander Schulz: I have no knowledge of that, sir. I did not receive it or see it personally.

Mr. Keefe: At least Aimiral Beardall before he left indicated to you that they were expecting a message in reply from the Japs?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, a message at least. He 111 not indicate the substance, but a message, which was a decode.

Mr. Keefe: An important message?

Commander Schulz: And an important message.

Mr. Keefe: And did he indicate to you that he had a dvised the President that there might be such a message?

Commander Schulz: I don't recall that he did, no, sir.

Mr. Keefe: All right. Now, when the President got through reading it, as I understood your testimony he showed it to Hopkins and said, "This means war" and Hopkins concurred.

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir. The words may not be exact but that is the substance.

Mr. Keefe: Then the discussion went on between Mr. Hopkins and the President as to possibly where the Japs might strike and you mere wher discussions of Indo-China?

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Witness Schulz

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Commander Schulz: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe? But there was mo mention of Pearl Harbor or Hawa11?

Commander Schulz: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Or any other places that you recall?

Commander Schulz: No other places that I recall, none that I recall.

Mr. Keefe: Do you recall with any legree of certainty, Commander, just what the conversation was with respect to the transmission of this message direct to the Emperor of Japan and how that came into the conversation?

Commander Schulz: It came into the conversation when the disposition of forces in Indo-China was mentioned and the way it care in was that in this ressage to the Erperor it is my understand that the presence of Japanese forces in Indo-China was mentioned and that the -- I have never read the ressage, if I may say, Congressman, I would like to have you understand that, - but, however, I recall mention being made, the President quoting from this message that he drafted to the effect that he had told Hirohito that he could not see how it could be held that there was any langer to peace in the Far East as far as the United States was concerned if there were no Japanege forces in Into-China.

Witness Schulz

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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In other words, we were not going to attack Into-China, nor was anyone else. Therefore, the presence of Japanese forces in Into-China was for an aggressive purpose or for ulterior purposes on the part of the Japanese. We ourselves held no threat for Into-China.

That also is, in substance, but I do remember that point being brought out.

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Witness Schulz

Mr. Keefe: Did you get the impression from that conversation that the message to the Emperor had been sent, or was going to be sent?

Commander Schulz: I cannot recall that definitely, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now when the President said he wanted to get in touch with "Betty", did he seem to know where "Betty" Stark was that night?

Commander Schulz: No, sir; not initially, at least, because I recall that he started to place a telephone call for Admiral Stark.

Mr. Keefe: Then did word come back that Admiral Stark was at the National Theater? Is that what I understood you to say?

Commander Schulz: Word came back that that was where he might be reached. Personally I have no knowledge that he was there, but the President was informed that that was where the Admiral had either left word or else someone who could get in touch with him expected to find him there.

Mr. Keefe: And then the President indicated that he would not bother calling him to the phone, that he would get him later after the theater was over?

Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct. Mr. Keefe: That is the impression you got? Commander Schulz: Yes, sir.

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Questions by: Witness Schulz and arouse some public discussion, or alarm. Hopkins? Mr. Keefe: That is all. question? The Chairman: Senator Ferguson. Senator Ferguson: What year? Commander Schulz: 1934, sir. Commander Schulz: You are welcome. The Chairman: You are excused. Admiral Rochefort. The Chairman: Admiral Rochefort, come forward, please. The Vice Chairman: It is Captain Rochefort.

Mr. Keefe Senator Ferguson Mr. Keefe: That is because he felt Admiral Stark's leaving his box in the theater might cause some speculation Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that was my impression. Mr. Keefe: Now when you got to the President's study the only people who were there were the President and Harry Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct. Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I just ask a Senator Ferguson: You are a graduate of Annapolis? Commander Schulz: Yes, sir, that is correct. The Chairman: Thank you again, Commander. Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to call

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Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH JOHN ROCHEFORT,

UNITED STATES NAVY

(Captain Rochefort was duly sworn by the Chairman.)
The Chairman: What is your rank?

Captain Rochefort: I was about to thank you, Senator, for promoting me. I am actually a Captain.

The Chairman: Oh, yes. You are not averse to a real promotion if it comes your way, I suppose.

Captain Rochefort: I would appreciate it, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Captain, will you state your name?

Captain Rochefort: Joseph John Rochefort.

Mr. Richardson: How old are you, Captain?

Captain Rochefort: Forty-six years, sir.

Mr. Richardson: How long have you been in the Navy? Captain Rochefort: Since 1918, sir.

Mr. Richardson: When were you first assigned to Hawaii?
Captain Rochefort: You mean my first trip there, sir?
Mr. Richardson: Yes.

Captain Rochefort: The first trip was in 1920 -- 1921.

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	. 1	Witness Rochefort Questions by: Mr. Richardson
	2	Mr. Richardson: How long were you there then?
	3	Captain Rochefort: Approximately two months.
	4	Mr. Richardson: When did you next go to Hawaii?
	5	Captain Rochefort: In 1924.
	8	Mr. Richardson: And how long did you stay that time?
	7	Captain Rochefort: Approximately the same length
	8	of time, sir.
	9	Mr. Richardson. Then when did you return there on
	10	regular assignment?
	\$ 11	Captain Rochefort: In April, 1939, when the Hawaii
	p 12	Detachment was formed.
	r ₹ 13	Mr. Richardson: And in what capacity?
	¥111 14	Captain Rochefort: At that time on the staff of
	15 15	Commander Scouting Force, who was also Commander Hawaiian De
	16	tachment.
	17	Mr. Richardson: What changes occurred in your assign-
	18	ments thereafter?
	19	Captain Rochefort: In May of 1941, I received dispatch
	20	orders to report to the Commandant 14th Naval District for
	21	duty.
	22	Mr. Richardson: That would be Admiral Blach?
	23	Captain Rochefort: That would be Admiral Bloch, sir.
	24	Mr. Richardson: Right.
		Cantain Rochefort: In personal correspondence

Captain Rochefort: In personal correspondence

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

I was informed that my duty there would consist of Office in Charge of the Communications Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Richardson: When did you assume those duties? Captain Rochefort: In June, 1941.

Mr. Richardson: How long did you remain in that capacity? Captain Rochefort: Until October, 1942.

Mr. Richardson: Who was there in your unit when you took charge?

Captain Rochefort: Approximately 10 officers and 20 men at Pearl Harbor, and an additional 10 officers and approximately 50 to 60 men in the outlying stations.

Mr. Richardson: What was the name of your unit as it was known at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Rochefort: After I arrived there, we changed the name slightly and called it the Combat Intelligence Unit, 14th Naval District.

Mr. Richardson: What were your duties during November and December, 1941?

Captain Rochefort: Very briefly, sir, to find out about all of the Japanese Neval cryptographic systems.

Mr. Richardson: What experience had you had in connection with cryptographic work?

Captain Rochefort; During the period 1925 to 1927, I

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was in charge of all cryptographic work for the Navy Department in Washington. I had had subsequently three
years in Japan as a language officer, and on various staffs
during various war problems had carried out cryptographic
research.

Mr. Richardson: Do you speak Japanese? Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Proceed, and give us a little detail as to the scope of your duties with your assignment in Hawaii.

C ptain Rochefort: The primary duty consisted of intercepting all Japanese naval traffic, and of attacking all the Japanese naval systems contained in that traffic with the exception of one system, which was being worked on in Washington, and in Cavite.

Along with that, we had organized a radio intelligence unit, whose duties were to obtain all information available from the Japanese naval traffic by means other than cryptanalysis.

We also had in the unit a mid-Pacific direction finding unit with stations in Dutch Harbor, Samoa, Pearl Harbor and Midway.

Mr. Richardson: What Japanese codes and ciphers were in use by Japan during November and December that it was

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Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

your duty to intercept?

Captain Rochefort: Of the regular systems, that is, the systems used for any considerable period of time, approximately 8 to 10, in addition to which there would be several what we called minor systems, or systems used for specific purposes, such as a Fleet problem.

Mr. Richardson: And what field was covered by those codes and ciphers that you were intercepting?

Captain Rochefort: All Japanese naval traffic of all descriptions, including personnel matters, engineering matters, operational intelligence, direction finding, in short, all types of naval communication, including ship movements.

Mr. Richardson: Ship locations?

Captain Rochefort: Ship locations would be incidental. That is, they would be contained in the traffic.

Mr. Richardson: Now, were there any Japanese naval codes that you could intercept, but could not translate at Hawaii?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: How many?

Ceptain Rochefort: In terms of volume of traffic, perhaps 90 percent.

Mr. Richardson: Let me see if I get it accurately.

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Out of all the interceptions that you had with reference to Japanese naval operations, you were only able to decode and therefore understand at Hawaii approximately 10 percent of that traffic?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: You were not able there to handle by deciphering what is known as the purple code?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir. That was a diplomatic system.

Mr. Richardson: Give me the designations of the other codes there that you could not handle.

Captain Rochefort: Diplomatic or naval, sir?

Mr. Richardson: Well, both.

Captain Rochefort: I will put it this way:

We were not handling any of the diplomatic systems. We were directed to attempt to process all naval systems with the exception of one, which I previously mentioned.

Mr. Richardson: Was the fact as to what section you were expected to handle and decode the result of a working arrangement between you and Washington?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Was it true that messages might be intercepted by you that you were unable to decode?

Captain Rochefort: Naval. yes. sir.