

INTERROGATION NO. 499.

DIVISION OF ORIGIN: Military Analysis Division SUBJECT: Shipping Supply -- Philippines

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Lt. Col. YAHEI, Towama - 1933 was in officers school and in 1941 graduated from the War College. From 1941 to 1945, connected with the shipping, attached to shipping headquarters. Hiroshima until April 1944; at this time, the YAHEI was transferred to Manila and remained there until 2 January 1945.

Where interviewed: Room 805, Meiji Building
Interrogator: Lt. Col. Em. M. SHINE
Interreter: Mr. Harvey Colton
Allied Officers present: Lt. T. T. Pinkstaff
Summary: None

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INTERROGATION

- Q. In the Philippines, was your job still connected with Shipping?
 A. Yes
- Q. Was the original plan to use the Philippines to supply troops farther South?
- A. Up to May 1944, it was to be used to supply Halmahera and down to New Guinea, but in June 1944, it was impossible; so from this time on all supplies were used in the Philippines.
- Q. Were you able to get the supplies you needed in the Philippines up
- to to June 1944?
- A. Up to August 1944, we were able to, but from September 1944 on, air and sea blockade prevented our getting through.
- Q. As of June 1944, what percentage of supplies needs in the Philippines arrived?
- A. About 60%.
- Q. What plan of distribution did you have for getting supplies into the hands of troops after they reached the Philippines?
- A. Manila received goods from Japan and Saigon, this was shipped in smaller boats to Mindanao, Leyte, and Cebu. On the island of Luzon, it was delivered by trucks. Trains were used to a certain extent but due to the lack of coal, mostly vehicles were used. As a result of this, the supplying so large an area, Manila contained considerable store of supplies.
- Q. Did these trucks used in transporting supplies belong to supply units or the divisions receiving the supplies?
- A. They belonged to transportation units.
- Q. Did you transport supplies direct to the divisions or establish dumps and have the divisions send back for them?
- A. From the main depots, like Manila, supplies were taken to division dumps and from there moved by small hand carts to the troops.
- Was 100% supplies delivered to the division dumps by truck?
- A. Up to the time of the American landings in Leyte, Yes; but fearing the next step would be Luzon, all available means were used and considerable amounts were moved around the Luzon coast in small boats.
- Q. Were supplies piling up on beach due to lack of transportation to move them or our air action?
- A. Originally there was enough trucks to move supplies but after the Leyte landings, the supplies coming into Luzon caused a definite shortage, but no additional trucks were received.
- Q. How many days supply did you issue a division at one time?
- We concentrated principally on fuel, ammunition, food and clothing. The plan was to maintain one months supply of these items.
- Q. Were you able to maintain a one months supply on hand at all times?
- A. Prior to the time of the blockade we were able to do this, but from June 1944 on, we were not able to have this amount on hand.
- Q. Was the Army able to fill all your requirements, if not, why and what items were critical?
- A. Food and fuel were the most critical items, the reason being the increased personnel and the supply ships being sunk.
- Q. What effect did bombing have on your supply dumps?
- A. Soon after supplies were brought in they were disbursed but there was considerable loss at the docks from mir attacks.

INTERROGATION NO. 499 (Cont'd)

- In over-all losses from the time goods left Japan until they arrived in Luzon, what % do you estimate you lost by bombing?
- 50% A. Then after the supplies were received in army dumps, what % did you
- lose by bombing?

 A. About 50% In other words supplies that were coming from the main land suffered heavy lesses and even after they arrived bombing destroyed more, so that nearly a 100% loss was considered in getting to the base, but once supplies were received in dumps and disbursed the loss from air action was practically nil, a
- Q. What effect did.air action have on your truck convoys supplying
- A. Practically none, because they moved at night in groups of 2 and 3.
- Q. Did this slow down your supply line and to what extent? A. It definitely slawed up the supply but due to bombing on larger
- installations they got through with only time lost.
- What effect did air action have on personnel working in supply
- A. It didn't bother morale any but caused loss of working hours to a great extent.
- Q. On troops who lost their equipment by air action prior to landing and joined units already in combat, how were they then reequiped?
- A. They were re-supplied only with small arms from army dumps but toward the end they were unable to supply them even with small arms.
- Were your plans of pperations ever changed due to lack of certain
- A. The original plan was to supply Leyte with the present stock of supplies on Luzon, but around the middle of December after heavy losses at Leyte we quit supplying the island realizing it was lost. We figured the dwindling supplies that were on Luzon then would be needed to supply Manila, but after being bombed in Manila, the supplies were moved to San Fernando and later when troops landed
- all possible supplies were moved to the hills and we carried on as best we could.
- Q. Due to all these supply losses, how did this affect the combat
- A. Shortage of materials, especially food, reduced the morale of troops about 50%.
- W. Did all troops that left from other areas to go to Luzon leave with full equipment, field paeces, etc.?
- A. Yes Q. How many tons of supplies a day were required to maintain a division in fighting (15,000 men)?
- A. About 300 metric tons for 15,000 men.
- Q. How far, as a rule, does a division place their dumps from the front line?
- A. About 24 kilos (15 miles).
- What type of transportation was used to move supplies to troops in
- Trucks were used from main dumps to temporary dumps and from temporary dumps to troops, horse carts were used. (3)

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