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THE UNITED STATES AND
SPAIN IN 1822

BY
WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON

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THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN IN 1822

DURING the second and third decades of the nineteenth century the magnificent empire of Spain in America split into states which proclaimed their independence of the mother-country. From 1810 to 1822 the rebellious colonists sent emissaries to the United States to seek aid and to plead for the recognition of their independence. But the government of the United States did not receive these envoys officially: it strove to remain neutral in the protracted struggle between Spain and her colonies. Meanwhile, in cabinet councils and in Congress the question was raised whether the executive or Congress ought to lead the way in recognizing the independence of the nascent states. This study, which considers the action taken by the United States in 1822 with regard to the recognition of the independence of these states, will accordingly deal with the immediate antecedents of the Monroe Doctrine message. It will be seen that the evidence at hand furnishes some ground for the view that Spain foresaw the promulgation of such a doctrine by the United States and hence warned England as well as other European powers against an American political system in contrast with the European system under the aegis of the Holy Alliance.

On January 30, 1822, the House of Representatives asked President Monroe for information concerning "the political condition" of the revolted provinces of Spanish America and "the state of war between them and Spain".¹ On March 8, 1822, the President responded by a special message, which was accompanied by documents illustrating conditions in Spain as well as in Colombia, Chile, Peru, Buenos Aires, and Mexico. After reviewing the policy which the United States had pursued towards the revolutionists, Monroe declared that five states of Spanish America were "in the full enjoyment of their independence"; that there was "not the most remote prospect of their being deprived of it"; and that these new governments had now "a claim to recognition by other Powers, which ought not to be resisted". Monroe affirmed that the delay of the United States in deciding to recognize the independence of these states had given "an unequivocal proof" to Spain, as well as to other powers, "of the high respect entertained by the United States" for the rights of the mother-country. He held that the spread of the insurrection over the Spanish dominions in America

¹ *Annals of Congress*, 17 Cong., 1 sess., I. 825-828.

would reconcile Spain to a separation from her colonies. He declared that the United States desired to act with the powers of Europe in regard to the recognition of Spanish-American independence. Cautiously the President declared that it was not the intention of his government to alter the friendly relations existing between the United States and the warring countries, but "to observe . . . the most perfect neutrality between them". The upshot of Monroe's message was the suggestion that, if Congress concurred in his views, it would see "the propriety of making the necessary appropriations" to carry them into effect.²

On March 19, 1822, the Committee on Foreign Relations, which had been considering Monroe's message, reported to the House that the nations of Spanish America were *de facto* independent. The judgment of the committee in favor of the recognition of their independence from Spain was based upon this alleged fact. An apprehension that the recognition of Spanish-American independence might "injuriously affect our peaceful and friendly relations with the nations of the other hemisphere" was lightly dismissed, while the hope was expressed that European nations might follow the example of the United States. It was maintained that the claims of Spain to sovereignty over the American colonies had been given "the most respectful attention". It was declared that recognition by the United States could neither affect Spain's "rights nor impair her means" in the accomplishment of her policy. With unanimity the committee declared that it was "just and expedient to acknowledge the independence of the several nations of Spanish America". The committee accordingly proposed two resolutions: first, that the House of Representatives concur with the President that the American provinces of Spain which had declared and were enjoying their independence "ought to be recognized by the United States as independent nations"; and, second, that the Committee of Ways and Means should report a bill making an appropriation which would enable the President "to give due effect to such recognition".³

The committee's report provoked a spirited discussion in the House. After a slight change in the phraseology of the first resolution, both resolutions passed the House on March 28, the first resolution being carried by a vote of 167 to one, while the second resolution was passed unanimously.⁴ Accordingly a bill was soon framed which made an appropriation for diplomatic missions to the independent nations south of the United States.⁵ After some hesita-

² *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV. 818, 819.

³ *Annals of Congress*, 17 Cong., 1 sess., II. 1314-1320.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1403, 1404.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1444, 1518, 1526, 1530.

tion, caused by the news that the Cortes of Spain had expressed its disapproval of the recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies by other nations,⁶ the Senate approved the policy of recognition. On May 4, 1822, Monroe signed a bill which appropriated one hundred thousand dollars to defray the expenses of "such Missions to the independent nations on the American continent" as the President might deem proper.⁷

By this act the United States announced its intention to acknowledge the independence of the revolted colonies of Spain in America which stretched from the parallel of forty-two degrees, north latitude, to Cape Horn. With the exception of the Portuguese monarchy seated at Rio de Janeiro,⁸ the North American republic was the first member of the family of nations to extend the hand of fellowship to the new Hispanic states. The significance of this acknowledgment has not been adequately noticed by historical writers in America or Europe.

In the spring of 1822, Spain's ambassador in the United States was Joaquín de Anduaga. The day after Monroe's message recommending the recognition of the independence of the Spanish-American provinces was transmitted to Congress, Anduaga sent to Secretary Adams a lively protest. He said that, after the immense sacrifices which Spain had made to preserve friendly relations with the United States, President Monroe's proposal had much surprised him. He declared that the condition of these provinces did not entitle them to such recognition:

"Where, then, are those Governments which ought to be recognized? where the pledges of their stability? . . . where the right of the United States to sanction and declare legitimate a rebellion without cause, and the event of which is not even decided?"

He declared that the nations of Europe should await the issue of the contest between Spain and her revolted colonies and thus avoid doing Spain a gratuitous injury:

"The sentiments which the message ought to excite in the breast of every Spaniard can be no secret to you. Those which the King

⁶ Adams, *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, V. 489.

⁷ *Annals of Congress*, 17 Cong., 1 sess., II. 2603, 2604. This recognition is discussed in Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, I. 85, 86; Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain, Diplomacy*, pp. 152-155; Paxson, *The Independence of the South-American Republics*, pp. 170-177; Latané, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America*, p. 61; McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, V. 42, 43; Turner, *Rise of the New West (The American Nation, vol. XIV.)*, p. 207.

⁸ Portugal recognized Buenos Aires in 1821. *Registro Oficial de la República Argentina*, I. 569, 570; Pereira da Silva, *Historia da Fundação do Império Brasileiro*, II. 280.

of Spain will experience at receiving a notification so unexpected will be doubtless very disagreeable."

With indignation the minister announced that the recognition of the independence of the revolted provinces by the United States could "*in no way now, or at any time, lessen or invalidate in the least the right of Spain to said provinces*", or the right to employ any means in her power "*to reunite them to the rest of her dominions*".⁹

On March 12, 1822, Anduaga sent to his government a copy of Monroe's message and of his protest. "It is difficult to describe", said Anduaga, "the general applause with which this message has been received here without distinction of party." He affirmed that this message had been referred by the House of Representatives to the Committee on Foreign Relations merely as a matter of form; the United States, after having secured the cession of Florida from Spain, had virtually decided to recognize the independence of all the revolted provinces.

Although this action was foreseen by all intelligent persons at the time when the treaty of 1819 was negotiated, yet my indignation has been aroused by the perfidy and the effrontery of the government of the United States, which, after having secured from Spain the greatest and the most shameful sacrifices, has recognized these provinces, thus doing exactly what Spain by her fatal condescension wished to prevent.¹⁰

To appreciate the attitude which the Spanish government took towards this policy proclaimed by the United States, it should be remembered that, in 1822, Ferdinand VII. ruled Spain not as an absolute king, but as a constitutional monarch. In accordance with the constitution framed in 1812, the administration was in the hands of a responsible ministry. In important affairs the king was advised by a council of state composed of forty members. The legislative authority was vested in the king and in a Cortes composed of one house.¹¹ On February 13, 1822, the extraordinary Cortes had passed a decree concerning Spanish America which provided that the government should send commissioners to the revolted colonies who were to receive and to transmit to Madrid the proposals of the insurgents. This decree announced that the treaty signed at Córdoba on August 24, 1821, by the royalist commander, Juan O'Donjú, and the revolutionary leader, Agustín de Iturbide, which

⁹ *Am. St. P., For. Rel.*, IV. 845, 846. The reply of Adams is found, *ibid.*, p. 846.

¹⁰ Anduaga to the secretary of state, March 12, 1822, Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5.

¹¹ The constitution of 1812 can be found in Dublan and Lozano, *Legislación Mexicana*, I. 349-379.

provided for the independence of New Spain from Old Spain, was illegal and void. This important decree provided that Spain should inform other governments "by means of a declaration" that she would always view the partial or absolute recognition of the independence of her transatlantic provinces as a violation of treaties.¹² The Spanish ambassadors at important European courts were instructed to bring to the attention of these courts the policy which Spain had thus formally announced.¹³

The government of the United States had apprehended that the policy of recognition might provoke Spain. On March 9, Adams sent to John Forsyth, the American ambassador at Madrid, a copy of Monroe's message. Adams told the ambassador that, if the Spaniards were displeased at this message, he was "to give every necessary explanation concerning it, and particularly that it resulted from a disposition in no wise unfriendly to Spain".¹⁴ Soon after the news of Monroe's message reached Madrid, Forsyth heard that Francisco Martínez de la Rosa, a moderate liberal who was the Spanish secretary of state,¹⁵ had spoken of that message as hostile to Spain and had described the report of the committee of the House of Representatives as "an attack upon legitimacy". Of his conversation with that minister in regard to the policy of the United States towards Spanish America, Forsyth said:

He spoke with a great deal of warmth on the subject, said it was what, from the friendly conduct of the Spains to the United States they could not have expected,—in no state of circumstances could it have a friendly effect on the interests of this Govt.—that it appeared from the message itself, that, not satisfied with taking this step ourselves, we had been and still were instigating other Governments to do so likewise, and that the measure was adopted upon information incorrect in itself, and derived from sources of doubtful authority. . . . He considered it particularly injurious to Spain at this moment when they were about setting on foot a negotiation with the different parts of Spanish America.—He concluded by expressing an opinion that the Spanish-Americans were unequal to self-government and that their

¹² *Colección de los Decretos y Ordenes Generales expedidos por las Cortes*, VIII. 272-274.

¹³ On the instructions to the ambassadors to England and Spain respectively, see Onís to Castlereagh, May 27, 1822, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Correspondence, Spain, 262; Argaiz to Nesselrode, St. Petersburg, March 6/18, 1822 (copy), Archivo General de Indias, Estado, Audiencia de México, 23. With regard to France and Prussia, see Torres Lanzas, *Independencia de América*, primera serie, V. 412.

¹⁴ State Dept. MSS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Instructions to Ministers, 9.

¹⁵ On conditions in Spain, see Altamira, "Spain (1815-1845)", in the *Cambridge Modern History*, X. 224-226.

Independence, instead of being accelerated, would be retarded by this act of our Government.¹⁶

In reply Forsyth defended the action of his government; he said that the message itself explained the basis for the recognition of the independence of the Spanish-American colonies; he affirmed that the attitude of Spain herself would determine whether or not this policy would injure her; he maintained that, if the Spaniards were "disposed to yield to circumstances and act prudently, it could do them no injury". Forsyth also told Martínez de la Rosa that, in communicating with certain other governments in regard to Spanish America, the United States had desired "that other powers more remotely concerned in the question, should express an opinion on it at the same time with ourselves, with a view to its effects on the policy" of Spain. Further, he alleged that the action of the United States had been taken in ignorance of the projected negotiations of Spain with her revolted colonies. Martínez de la Rosa's declaration that the Spanish Americans were unfit for self-government was met with the statement that, if this were true, they were not fit to live under the Spanish constitution.¹⁷

A multitude of documents in the archives of Spain testify that Spanish statesmen were grievously vexed at the policy announced by the United States and that Spanish diplomats anxiously strove to counteract the influence of that policy. On April 21 Ferdinand VII. sent an order to the council of state urging it to consider President Monroe's message to Congress of March 8; on the following day this state paper was referred to a committee.¹⁸ On May 1 this startling message was discussed by the council of state. The majority of the councillors were of opinion that Anduaga had acted properly in regard to the message; that he should be ordered to absent himself from Washington without demanding his passports; and that he should protest energetically against the recognition of the independence of any of the transatlantic provinces of Spain. Further, the council decided that Spain should act circumspectly; that she should abstain openly from any measures which might indicate hostility towards the United States or provoke a war; but that she should quietly take every possible measure to improve her position by strengthening her navy.¹⁹

Meanwhile, Martínez de la Rosa had sent special instructions in

¹⁶ Forsyth to Adams, May 20, 1822, State Dept. MSS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Despatches from Ministers, Spain, 20.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Archivo Histórico Nacional, Actas del Concejo de Estado, 25 D.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

regard to Monroe's message to the Spanish envoys at various European courts. On April 22 he addressed identical despatches to Spain's ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. These ambassadors were reminded of the decree of the Spanish Cortes of February 13, 1822; and they were directed to protest vigorously against the policy of recognition proposed by President Monroe.²⁰ Three days later the Spanish secretary of state wrote instructions for the ambassadors in France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, England, Sweden, Holland, and Denmark informing them that Spain desired to counteract the effects of Monroe's message.²¹

To the chief legations of Spain in Europe there was also sent a paper which was entitled "a sketch of the condition of the different provinces of Spanish America according to the latest reports". This sketch was to be used in dealing with the cabinets of the various governments or in influencing public opinion in the different countries. It presented a Spanish version of conditions in the revolted provinces, a version which was in sharp contrast with the account presented in the message of President Monroe. In Mexico, the prestige of Agustín de Iturbide was declining; the complete triumph of the revolutionists in that country was problematical. On the Pacific coast of South America, José de San Martín was not in accord with his lieutenants; he had antagonized many Chileans, and made himself odious to the people of Lima. In the provinces of la Plata, the influence of the revolutionists did not extend far beyond the city of Buenos Aires; the rural provinces were distracted by factions; and Paraguay was in the grasp of a despot. In northern South America, Spanish generals were gaining victories; and a report was in circulation that Bolívar the liberator had died. Santo Domingo was torn by factions, while Cuba and Porto Rico were furnishing proofs of devoted loyalty to the mother-country.²² In fine, those facts were marshalled in this sketch which supported the contention of the Spanish government that the revolution in America was doomed to fail.

On May 6, 1822, Martínez de la Rosa addressed identical instructions to the Spanish ambassadors in London, Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin. These ambassadors were informed that the principal objects of their diplomacy should be:

That the government to which you are accredited should not recog-

²⁰ Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5.

²¹ Draft, *ibid.*

²² "Estado de los diferentes países de América según las últimas noticias", *ibid.*

nize, directly or indirectly, the *de facto* governments existing in the dissident provinces of America.

That it should not send to them, or receive from them, any public agents; or establish any diplomatic relations with them.

That it should give to the manifesto of his Catholic Majesty the most explicit and favorable reply which can be obtained with regard to its disposition to respect the rights of the Spanish nation in her American provinces by maintaining an absolutely passive position during the negotiations which are to be initiated by means of commissioners, and by not recognizing the independence of these provinces.

Spain's ambassadors at the courts of the Allies were also informed that, in the judgment of the Spanish government, the United States was about to recognize the independence of the revolted colonies. To neutralize the effects of this recognition these ambassadors were furnished with certain general arguments. They were directed to point out how badly the United States had treated Spain after that nation had sacrificed the Floridas. They were to comment upon the policy of the United States that aimed to isolate itself from European powers, and that wished to incite the American colonists to separate themselves from the nations of Europe. They were to intimate that the policy of the United States towards Spanish America was due to a desire to secure as a reward for the recognition of the new states special commercial advantages and privileges.

Special arguments were furnished for presentation to particular courts. To the courts of Austria and Prussia two special arguments might be presented: one, that it was wise to strengthen the stability of legitimate governments and not to furnish a new theatre for revolution in America; the other, that the recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies would probably lead to the grant of special commercial privileges to some maritime power. To Russia might be given the intimation that she would gain special commercial advantages by the conservation of Spain's sovereignty in the New World. It was declared that the United States viewed the Russian settlements in America with jealousy and enmity. With regard to France, it was suggested that the emancipation of Spain's colonies in America would promote the emancipation of the French colonies; while it was intimated that, if Spain succeeded in pacifying the insurgents, France would secure many commercial advantages. It was urged that, if the Spanish colonies were emancipated, other nations than France would secure from the new states special commercial advantages. It was suggested that France, "the natural ally of Spain", should have a special interest in the preservation of Spanish rule in America. To England it might be argued that the

recognition of the independence of the new American states was not in harmony with the policy of neutrality which that power had followed during the struggle between Spain and her colonies; and that recognition by England would indicate that English policy had been frustrated by the United States.

The doctrine and the conduct of the United States furnish convincing proof that because of their inclinations, interests, and policies the European colonies which become independent in America have a strong interest in seeing that the nations of Europe do not retain there any colonies or establishments subject to their rule. England is perhaps the power most interested in giving to this ulterior consideration its due weight. . . . The recognition of the independence of the dissident provinces will at once injure her international relations and will not improve the commercial relations of England with those regions.

If these provinces become independent, it is almost certain that the United States will derive greater profit from that event than England. To this probable outcome many causes will contribute: such as the geographical location of the United States; its form of government; the greater resemblance of that government to the governments established in Spanish America; and the American interest which will constrain the United States to counterbalance the European interest in America.²³

Obviously, Spain wished to inhibit any action by the European powers which would favor the independence of the states that were rising beyond the Atlantic.

In May, 1822, Martínez de la Rosa addressed to Spain's ambassadors at the principal European courts his manifesto concerning the condition of the revolted colonies in America. He reminded the powers of Europe that Napoleon's usurpation in Spain was the fundamental cause of the revolution in the American colonies—a revolution which the Spanish government anxiously wished to terminate. These powers were informed that, in accordance with the action of the Cortes, Ferdinand VII. had selected certain commissioners to proceed to the transatlantic provinces so that they might receive the proposals of the revolutionists and transmit them to Madrid:

His Catholic Majesty does not present himself to the revolted colonies as a monarch who is angry with his offending subjects, but as a father who wishes to act as a pacific mediator in the dissensions of his children. . . . His Catholic Majesty flatters himself with the hope that this frank and generous conduct will save the American provinces from ages of misery and destruction: that it will prevent civil war and anarchy from obstructing the progress of their civilization and culture;

²³ "Instrucciones reservadas á los Representantes de S. M. en Londres, París, Viena, Petersburgo, y Berlin, Madrid, 6 de Mayo de 1822", Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5.

that it will prevent the depopulation, poverty, and immorality resulting from those large political oscillations which condemn one generation to misfortune without assuring repose or happiness to succeeding generations. . . . It is impossible to measure this influence [of American affairs in Europe] or the alteration which it will produce in the reciprocal relations of the Old and the New Worlds; but his Catholic Majesty does not hesitate to affirm that the negotiation which will determine the destiny of the Spanish-American provinces and will arrest the blind and impetuous course of revolution will be one of the greatest of blessings for the civilized world. . . .

Perhaps there will be some shallow minds who will consider that a nation has been founded and a solid and stable government established in each American province which has declared its independence; and who, without considering the obstacles of any sort, or the principles of public law, or the best-known maxims of the law of nations, believe that the *mere fact* that a province has separated from the state of which it forms a legitimate part and that it maintains an isolated and independent existence invests it with the right to be recognized by other nations as an independent power.

But fortunately the governments of Europe have learned by sad experience the effects which are produced by such an overthrow of principles; they realize that the consequences of spreading such principles are not less fatal to legitimate governments than to the integrity of nations; and they are acutely aware of the effects upon Europe of sanctioning in America, as some persons pretend to do, the indefinite right of insurrection.

Consequently his Catholic Majesty believes that there are interested in this problem other nations besides those which possess transatlantic colonies and establishments to which the same theory might be applied which some persons desire to legitimate with regard to the Spanish provinces in America; for he considers this affair to be intimately connected with those conservative principles which afford security to all governments and guarantees to society.

It was argued that Spain, rich, powerful, yet inoffensive, would influence the European balance of power favorably. It was declared that Spain was now convinced of the necessity of a more liberal colonial policy: since the establishment of the constitutional government, Spanish laws and regulations had favored the emigration of foreigners into the Spanish provinces in America and freedom of commerce with those dominions.

By these simple and natural means his Catholic Majesty is enabled to remove the only obstacle which could prevent perfect harmony between the policy of Spain and the policy of other [European] nations. The Spanish government, solid, stable, and recognized as a faithful observer of treaties, is disposed to negotiate with the revolted colonies in America and offers to other nations the greatest commercial opportunities: under these circumstances, even though the question were reduced to a simple calculation of financial advantage, it would be impossible to designate an object which could serve as a counterpoise on the other side.

While Spain is trying to terminate a domestic misunderstanding, the inviolable respect which she entertains for the rights of other nations inspires her with a just confidence that she will be treated with the same consideration. She cannot even suspect, in regard to the powers which deserve to maintain friendship and harmony with her, that any rash step will be taken which might imply a supposition that the question is already solved, the decision of which belongs only to Spain in the exercise of those legitimate and recognized rights which she has never renounced. The very measures which have been taken to induce the powers of Europe to recognize the independence of the revolted colonies of America will afford to the cabinets of the Allies a signal occasion to sanction the fundamental principles upon which are founded the integrity of national territory, the peace of nations, and the morality of governments.²⁴

This exposition was originally prepared in accordance with the decree of the Cortes dated February 13, 1822. Although it was not completed until after the news of Monroe's message of March 8 had reached Spain,²⁵ yet neither that provocative message nor the government of the United States was mentioned therein. To that message this exposition was, nevertheless, in part, a counterblast. When this exposé of Spain's policy became known in Madrid, it gave rise to a conjecture that Spanish America was "to be restored to its ancient dependence. And the United States is to be taught obedience to the maxims of Government prevailing in civilized and enlightened Europe."²⁶ This exposition of the policy of the constitutional government of Spain towards her revolted colonies was published at Madrid; it was transmitted to the courts of the Allies; but to contemporaries in the United States, it remained almost unknown.²⁷ Although a translation of this important document was

²⁴ "Manifiesto sobre el estado de las Provincias disidentes de América, en Madrid, Mayo de 1822", Archivo General de Indias Estado, América en General, 5. It may be interesting to consider in connection with this manifiesto the views concerning Spanish America expressed by John Quincy Adams in a letter to A. H. Everett, December 29, 1817, in the AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, XI, 113, 114. Perhaps the clearest statement in regard to the principles underlying the policy pursued by the United States towards the revolution in Spanish America, however, was made on August 24, 1818, by Secretary Adams to President Monroe; see "Memorandum upon the Power to Recognize the Independence of a New Foreign State", by Mr. Hale, *Senate Document No. 56*, 54 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 2, 53. In part, this is also found in Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, I, 78, 79.

²⁵ Martínez de la Rosa to Spain's ambassadors in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, April 22, 1822, A. G. I., *ubi supra*. See further, Torres Lanzas, *Independencia de América*, primera serie, V, 442, 443.

²⁶ Forsyth to Adams, June 23, 1822, State Dept. MSS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Despatches from Spain, 20.

²⁷ A copy of this manifiesto was sent to Forsyth by Martínez de la Rosa on June 21, 1822. Forsyth sent a copy of the manifiesto to Adams on June 23, *ibid.* On August 17, 1822, Niles mentioned a manifiesto purporting to contain the views of Spain in regard to Spanish America; but he did not consider it as genuine, and hence did not publish it. *Niles' Weekly Register*, XXII, 386.

published in the *British and Foreign State Papers* more than fifty years ago,²⁸ yet its historical import has not been appreciated, so far as the writer is aware, until the present day.²⁹

Soon after the news of Monroe's message reached Paris, Spain's ambassador, the Marqués de Casa Yrujo, sought Vicomte Matthieu de Montmorency, the French minister of foreign affairs, to remind him that Spain had declared the treaty of Córdoba null; to declare that she retained all her rights over her transatlantic provinces; and that she expected France, "in accordance with the principles of legitimacy", not to follow the suggestions which had been made by the United States in regard to the independence of the revolted colonies. At once Montmorency assured the marquis that, with regard to these colonies, France would not follow the example of the United States.³⁰ On May 9 the Spanish secretary of state sent to Casa Yrujo a copy of the manifesto concerning the Spanish-American colonies with instructions immediately to bring this state paper to the attention of the French government.³¹ Hence, on May 20, Casa Yrujo sent a copy of this manifesto to Montmorency.³² On May 24 Casa Yrujo reported to his government a conference with Montmorency regarding the recognition of the Spanish colonies in which he had used the arguments furnished in the circular instructions of May 6. According to the ambassador's report, after speaking of the probable policy of England towards Spanish America, Montmorency said:

"That France would be glad to see Spain employ the only measure which offered a hope of the best results for Spain, for Europe, and for America, that is, to send to Mexico one of our *infantes*. He indicated to me that France would lend us all the aid necessary to carry out this plan."³³

In fact, during the age of the congresses, the favorite solution of France for the vexatious problem of the Spanish colonies was the

²⁸ *British and Foreign State Papers*, IX. 889-894.

²⁹ The manifesto is noticed by Stern, *Geschichte Europas seit den Verrträgen von 1815 bis zum Frankfurter Frieden von 1871*, II. 277, 278.

³⁰ Casa Yrujo to Martínez de la Rosa, April 16, 1822, Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5. Gallatin's account of the reception of Monroe's message in Europe is found in Adams, *Writings of Albert Gallatin*, II. 240. Certain Parisian newspapers commented upon the policy of the United States towards Spanish America; see especially, *Le Courrier Français*, April 13 and April 15, 1822; *Le Journal des Débats*, April 17, 1822; and *La Gazette de France*, April 27, 1822.

³¹ Martínez de la Rosa to Casa Yrujo, May 9, 1822, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado, 6846.

³² Casa Yrujo to Montmorency, May 20, 1822, *ibid.*

³³ Casa Yrujo to Martínez de la Rosa, May 24, 1822, Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5.

establishment of monarchies in America under Bourbon princes, who might hold their kingdoms as appanages of Spain.³⁴

Perhaps the hope of inducing Spain to accept such a project was partly responsible for the intimation which was given to Casa Yrujo by a subordinate official in the department of foreign affairs to the effect that France would not pledge herself to refrain from recognizing the independence of the revolted Spanish colonies for an indefinite period.³⁵ Replying to Spain's manifesto early in June, Montmorency informed Casa Yrujo that France would make no premature decision; her attitude towards Spain was too amicable to allow her to entertain any other desire than that the discussion in regard to the Spanish colonies should terminate without injuring the interests or the prosperity of Spain.³⁶

Early in June, 1822, the question of the recognition of the independence of the new governments in America was also seriously considered at the court of Francis I. by the Austrian councillor of state, Friedrich von Gentz, and by Prince Metternich.³⁷ This momentous question was also the subject of conversation between Metternich and Spain's minister at the court of Vienna, Mariano de Carrero. On June 8, Carrero reported to Martínez de la Rosa that Metternich had expressed his disapproval of the revolts in Spanish America and of all steps which looked towards the recognition of the *de facto* governments.³⁸ Possibly it was a vivid recollection of the action of the North American republic in regard to the independence of the Spanish colonies that provoked Gentz to say of the United States on September 21, 1823: "This ill-omened stranger has already nestled deeply enough into every nook and cranny of the old continent."³⁹

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At the court of Prussia Monroe's message caused conferences between the Spanish ambassador at Berlin, Joaquín Zamorano, and Count Bernstorff, the foreign minister of Frederick William III.

³⁴ See further Casa Yrujo to Evaristo San Miguel, November 28, 1822, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado, 6844; Villanueva, *La Monarquía en América: Fernando VII. y los Nuevos Estados*, pp. 136, 137, citing the French archives; *Oeuvres Complètes de Châteaubriand*, XII. 397.

³⁵ Casa Yrujo to Martínez de la Rosa, May 24, 1822, Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5.

³⁶ Montmorency to Casa Yrujo, June 9, 1822, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado, 6846.

³⁷ *Tagebücher von Friedrich von Gentz*, III. 49, 50.

³⁸ Carrero to Martínez de la Rosa, June 8, 1822, Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5.

³⁹ *Briefe von und an Friedrich von Gentz*, vol. III., part II., p. 49. For the views of Gentz and Metternich on Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, see Robertson, "The Monroe Doctrine Abroad in 1823-1824", in the *American Political Science Review*, VI. 559-561.

At an interview in the end of May, Zamorano urged that Spain had an incontestable right to her transatlantic colonies; and he maintained that the action of the United States in regard to recognition was premature. Zamorano reported to Martínez de la Rosa that Bernstorff declared that Prussia would adhere to her policy of opposition to the recognition of the independence of any of the revolted colonies.⁴⁰

On May 30 Zamorano sent to Count Bernstorff a copy of Spain's manifesto on Spanish America.⁴¹ In the Prussian minister's reply dated June 7, he declared that the status of that vast and rich country would have a decisive influence upon the fortunes of two hemispheres. The nations which were friendly to Spain desired that she would find means to reconcile her rights with the real needs and the legitimate wishes of her American colonists.

The cabinet of Madrid ought to recollect that, on more than one occasion, when the allied courts expressed their wishes and their desires with regard to the Spanish colonies, they manifested a friendly disposition to aid Spain by all those measures which might re-establish order, peace, and happiness in Spanish America. These courts entertain the same desire for the success of the system which his Majesty, the king of the Spains, now proposes to follow for the pacification of the Spanish colonies. . . . If this system enables his Catholic Majesty to attain his end, it will be a benefit to all Europe and the allies of Spain will agree to sanction it.⁴²

⁴² Bernstorff to Zamorano (copy), June 7, 1822, *ibid.*

At a conference which he subsequently held with Bernstorff, the Spanish ambassador evidently received the assurance that Prussia would treat the revolted provinces in America as colonies of Spain.⁴³

In the end of May, Spain's ambassador at St. Petersburg, Pedro Alcántara Argaiz, expressed to the Russian chancellor, Count Nesselrode, the surprise and displeasure of Ferdinand VII. at the action of the United States in regard to Spanish America. The Greek Capodistrias, adjunct secretary of foreign affairs and an opponent of Metternich's policy, evidently intimated to Argaiz that it would now be difficult for Spain to negotiate with the *de facto* governments in Spanish America.⁴⁴ On June 10 Argaiz sent to Nesselrode a copy of Spain's manifesto touching the condition of the revolted

⁴⁰ Zamorano to Martínez de la Rosa, April 30, 1822, Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5.

⁴¹ Zamorano to Bernstorff, May 30, 1822 (copy), *ibid.*

⁴³ Zamorano to Martínez de la Rosa, June 8, 1822, *ibid.*

⁴⁴ Argaiz to Martínez de la Rosa, June 2, 1822, *ibid.* On Capodistrias see "Aperçu de ma carrière publique, depuis 1798 jusqu' à 1822" *Sbornik Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva* (publications of the Imperial Russian Historical Society), III. 289, 290.

colonies.⁴⁵ Two days later Argaiz addressed to the Russian chancellor a letter enclosing two confidential notes which concerned Spanish America. In one of these notes the ambassador drew his arguments mainly from Spain's circular instructions of May 6.⁴⁶ In the other note, Argaiz spoke of "the conception which his Catholic Majesty entertained of the noble character of his august ally, the Emperor Alexander", and of Ferdinand's recollections of "the equitable and conciliatory policy" which the emperor had followed in other matters relating to the Spanish colonies. Then Argaiz criticized Monroe's message, evidently recapitulating the protests which he had made in his interview with Nesselrode:

The content of the message of the president of the United States has furnished sufficient arguments to destroy the unfavorable impression which the inaccurate narration of the facts there mentioned will produce. In the documents designed to furnish a justification for that message the statement is made that no news has yet been received from Mr. Prevost, commissioner of the United States at Lima. It is therefore natural to conclude that we do not yet know with exactness the actual condition of that province. . . . According to the admission of the president himself, the news which the American government has in regard to Mexico is not more authentic. A private letter from a citizen of the United States is . . . a shaky foundation for the opinion which that government has formed in regard to the condition of that vast country. . . .

Not only is the political and the military condition of Spain's dominions beyond the seas as presented in this message inaccurate; but the inferences which have been deduced therefrom are pernicious and the maxims there developed are contrary to public law. . . . The keen discernment of your excellency will have comprehended all the inconveniences attached to the adoption of such a theory in regard to the insurrection of any integral part of a state as well as the disadvantages which would result if America sanctions maxims opposed to those principles which are professed in Europe. What will be the result if the powers of Europe that are interested in the conservation of order and in the maintenance of the fundamental maxims of the law of nations allow this unexpected conduct on the part of the United States? In particular, should those nations which possess colonies regard the question which is agitated in Spain to an extent as their own? And if one or two maritime powers favor the emancipation of the provinces of Spanish America in order that they may derive all the advantages arising therefrom, will this suit the interests of the nations of the Old World?

Accompanying this critique was a report of the condition of Spanish America based upon information which had been received by Spain. In conclusion, the imperial government was asked to re-

⁴⁵ Argaiz to Nesselrode, May 29/June 10, 1822 (copy), Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5.

⁴⁶ "No. 4" (copy), *ibid.*

spect the rights of Spain and to refrain from any action which might interfere with her attempt to pacify the revolted colonies by amicable negotiations.⁴⁷

Count Nesselrode's reply was made on June 25, 1822:

I have placed under the eyes of the emperor, my master, the communications which you have addressed to his Majesty's cabinet in regard to the measures adopted by the United States for the recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies of America.

His Catholic Majesty ought not to question the desire which the emperor entertains of seeing this beautiful and rich part of the Spanish dominions prosper under the laws of a monarch whose paternal solicitude has for a long time been occupied with the mode of assuring them a peaceable and happy future.

Ferdinand VII. ought to be convinced by the slight attention which has been paid in Europe to the proceedings of the agents of the revolted American provinces and by the communications which his cabinet has received from several European courts, that the resolutions of the Allied powers will not tend to decide before the proper time, or against the wishes of Spain, the question to which she attaches such legitimate importance. In this conjuncture, as in all others, the emperor will not depart in the least from the principles of loyalty, of justice, and of moderation which direct European policy and which he has had occasion to develop more than once in his relations of friendship with your august sovereign.⁴⁸

Such was the response of the author of the Holy Alliance, whose influence Spain hoped to use to thwart any measures which England might be projecting with regard to the Spanish colonies.⁴⁹

Monroe's message naturally provoked correspondence between the Spanish ambassador in London, Luis de Onís, and Lord Castlereagh, the English secretary for foreign affairs.

On May 7, 1822, Onís addressed a note to Castlereagh containing observations upon that message which were drawn mainly from his instructions of April 22. The Spanish ambassador di-

⁴⁷ "No. 3" (copy), Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5.

⁴⁸ "No. 5" (copy), *ibid.* Monroe's message recommending the recognition of the independence of the Spanish-American states was also the subject of conversation between Henry Middleton, the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, and the Russian government. To one of Russia's ministers Middleton expressed the hope that this message "might be correctly understood by the Emperor". He expressed the conviction that this step could only have been taken after a full and mature consideration of the subject and that such action was to be expected because of the geographical and commercial position of the United States. The reply of the Russian minister led Middleton to believe that he "in some degree assented to the justness" of his observations, Middleton to Adams, July 8/20, 1822, State Department MSS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Despatches from Russia, 9. For the views of Nesselrode, as expressed to Tuyl in July, 1822, see "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington, 1818-1825", in the AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, XVIII, 341-342.

⁴⁹ Martínez de la Rosa to Argaiz, May 10, 1822, A. G. I., *ubi supra*.

rected attention to the decree of the Cortes of February 13, 1822. He declared that Ferdinand VII. wished to preserve harmony with the King of England in regard to Spanish America while his cabinet prepared and transmitted "an exposition, or manifesto, disclosing more fully the rights and views of Spain in regard to the most important question which the president of the Anglo-American republic has resolved to precipitate".

Such is the nature of the message of the president of the United States that it furnishes sufficient reasons to blot out the impression which it might produce. The facts presented as a basis for the solution of the problem are either distorted or lack the necessary exactness. . . . But if the military and political condition of our provinces in America as described in that message is false, the consequences deduced therefrom are absurd and the maxims enunciated are contrary to the fundamental principles of public law. What would be the results of accepting such a theory in regard to the insurrection of any integral part of a state? What would be the evils produced by sanctioning principles in America which are contrary to the principles that are sanctioned in Europe? And what would be the result of such an irregular and risky conduct upon the policy of those nations, which not only possess a common interest in the preservation of order and in the conservation of the maxims of international law, but also hold colonies and hence ought in a degree to consider the question which is now being agitated in Spain as their own problem?

The Spanish ambassador expressed the hope that England would not fail to perform the duties arising from her close alliance with Spain; and that she would not respond favorably to attempts by the United States to secure common action between the two Anglo-Saxon nations in regard to the Spanish colonies.⁵⁰ On May 27 Onis sent to Castlereagh the manifesto expounding Spain's policy in regard to Spanish America.⁵¹ At the instance of his court, he again animadverted upon the attitude of the United States towards the independence of the Spanish colonies:

Forgetting in regard to Spain every principle of legality and good faith, the government of the United States is disposed to recognize the dissident provinces. But in the same state paper which announces its intention, it declares what are its principles in this transaction. In reality, this declaration affects all the powers of Europe, particularly England.

A government which casts aside the classic principles upon which the legitimacy of nations and the integrity of empires are founded; a

⁵⁰ Onis to Castlereagh, May 7, 1822, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Correspondence, Spain, 262.

⁵¹ The note of Onis to Castlereagh, May 27, 1822, bears this endorsement, "Chevr. de Onis, May 27, 1822. Enclosing a Manifesto notifying that Spain is on the point of deputing commissioners to South America to treat with the Insurgent provinces", *ibid.*

government which seems to demand as a justification for *the right of recognition* only the simple and material existence of *fact*; a government which hardly learns of the revolution of New Spain . . . before it believes that there is established a solid and stable state whose legitimacy it should hasten to recognize; in fine, a government which, departing from the policy followed by other nations, not only works without their concurrence, but emphatically declares that its peculiar position encourages it to work in isolation without considering its international relations or awaiting the decision of other powers which have solicited it in vain, is not and cannot be a government that should influence by example the policy of other nations. Otherwise, a great truth would be unveiled to its eyes: there would appear in the future an *American* interest absolutely divergent from the *European* interest—an interest which would begin to ignore openly the principles of public law and even certain rules of convenience and decorum which have hitherto been respected by all civilized nations.⁵²

This communication was followed by conferences between Castlereagh and Onis in which the Spaniard protested against any action by England which might favor the recognition of the independence of Spanish America.⁵³ Finally, on June 28, Castlereagh made a formal statement of his views: he assured Onis that England's "solicitude" for an amicable adjustment of the differences which existed between Spain and her colonies was "unabated" although her hopes of such an auspicious result had been "diminished" by the events which had happened from 1810 to 1822. Castlereagh declared that the king of England had learned with "satisfaction" that Ferdinand VII. had resolved to initiate negotiations with the revolted colonies upon a new basis.

H. Cath. My. may rest assured that, whilst these measures are in progress, the king his master will abstain, as far as possible, from any step which might prejudice H. Cath. M's endeavors for the termination of His differences with the said Provinces; but H. Brit. My. would not act with the candour and explicit friendship which He owes to His Ally the king of Spain, were He not, under present circumstances, to warn Him of the rapid progress of Events and of the danger of delay. H. Cath. My. must be aware that so large a portion of the world cannot, without fundamentally disturbing the intercourse of civilized Society, long continue without some recognized and established relations: That the State which can neither by It's Councils nor by It's arms, effectually assert It's own rights over It's dependencies so as to enforce obedience, and thus to make Itself responsible for maintaining their relations with other Powers, must sooner or later be prepared to see those relations establish themselves from the overruling necessity of the case, under some other form.⁵⁴

⁵² Onis to Castlereagh, May 27, 1822, P. R. O., *ubi supra*.

⁵³ Castlereagh to Onis, June 28, 1822, *ibid.* This correspondence between Onis and Castlereagh is mentioned by Paullin and Paxson, *Guide to the Materials in London Archives for the History of the United States*, p. 172.

⁵⁴ Castlereagh to Onis, June 28, 1822, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Correspondence, Spain, 262.

To this significant note which intimated that, if the estrangement between Spain and her colonies continued, the recognition of the independence of these colonies by England would be inevitable, the ambassador of Spain made no response.⁵⁵ It is evident that upon Castlereagh, as later upon Canning,⁵⁶ the example of the United States was not without influence.

Some effects of the action of the United States in regard to the independence of the revolted Spanish colonies were apparent in the congress of the Allies at Verona. In a "memorandum on the necessity of some further recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies" which was presented to this congress on November 24 by the Duke of Wellington, a reference was made to the action of the United States in recognizing the independence of the Spanish-American governments; and, after referring to Castlereagh's note to Onis of June 28, it was suggested that the depredations of pirates who lurked in the harbors of Spanish America would compel England "to some farther recognition of the existence *de facto* of some one or more of these self-erected governments".⁵⁷ In general, the replies which were made by the Allies announced their adherence to policies already announced. On behalf of the Emperor Alexander, Count Nesselrode repeated the sentiments of his note to Argaiz of June 25, and declared that Russia would take no action which would prejudice the question of the independence of Spanish America.⁵⁸ Prince Metternich avowed Austria's intention not to recognize the *de facto* governments until Spain had voluntarily and formally renounced her sovereignty over the revolted American colonies.⁵⁹ Prussia expressed her dislike for governments which were based upon revolutions and averred that a civil war and the resolutions of the Allies were preparing a crisis in Spanish affairs which might terminate the struggle between Spain and her revolted American provinces.⁶⁰ While referring with approval to the views presented by England, France expressed a desire for the pacification of

⁵⁵ *Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington (in continuation of the former series)*, I. 387.

⁵⁶ Stapleton, *Some Official Correspondence of George Canning*, I. 51. Comment upon the policy of the United States towards Spanish America was made in the *Courier*, April 9, 1822; and in the *Times*, April 10, 1822.

⁵⁷ *Despatches of Wellington (in continuation of the former series)*, I. 386-388.

⁵⁸ Villanueva, *La Monarquía en América: Fernando VII. y los Nuevos Estados*, pp. 172, 173, citing the French archives; *Oeuvres Complètes de Châteaubriand*, XII. 45.

⁵⁹ Villanueva, *La Monarquía en América: Fernando VII. y los Nuevos Estados*, p. 171; *Oeuvres Complètes de Châteaubriand*, XII. 45. See also *Tagebucher von Friedrich von Gentz*, III. 113.

⁶⁰ Villanueva, *La Monarquía en América*, pp. 173, 174; *Oeuvres Complètes de Châteaubriand*, XII. 45.

Spanish America; she suggested that the most desirable mode of solving the problem of the status of Spain's colonies would be a general measure by the Allies which would reconcile necessity with legitimacy.⁶¹ Thus the problem of the recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies that had been precipitated by the United States helped to widen the rift, which, because of the projected intervention in Spain,⁶² had appeared between the Continental leaders of the Holy Alliance and England.

This study shows that the intention of the United States to recognize the independence of the revolted Spanish colonies was announced by the concerted action of the executive and Congress. As an entire family of new states was ultimately recognized, this action occupies a unique place in the annals of American diplomacy. In the light of subsequent history, the forecast of revolutionary tendencies in Spanish America which was made in Spain's manifesto protesting against the action of the United States seems prophetic; for the protracted revolution against Spain, 1810-1826, evidently fastened upon the Spanish-American people the habit of revolution. With regard to the relations between the New World and the Old, this paper reveals that in 1822 there was a difference of opinion between England and the Continental members of the Holy Alliance concerning the future status of the revolted Spanish colonies in America: England leaned towards the recognition of their independence; France wished to arrange a compromise between Spain and her colonies; while Austria, Prussia, and Russia wished to preserve Spain's dominions and sovereignty intact. The reactionary attitude of the motherland suggests that, even under the liberal constitution, there were some peninsular diplomats who wished to appeal to the Holy Alliance for the maintenance of Spain's suzerainty over her crumbling empire. It is obvious that, in the minds of certain Continental statesmen, Monroe's message of March 8, 1822, awoke a spirit of apprehension, or even of antagonism. Spanish statesmen, in particular, feared that, in regard to Spanish-American problems, the influence of the United States might ultimately counterbalance the influence of the Holy Alliance. The acknowledgment of the independence of the rising states of Spanish America in 1822, breathing defiance of the sacred doctrine of legitimacy, provoked a stronger protest from the chanceries of Continental Europe than the President's message to Congress of December 2, 1823, announcing the Monroe Doctrine.

WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON.

⁶¹ *Oeuvres Complètes de Châteaubriand*, XII. 46, 47; Villanueva, *La Monarquía en América: Fernando VII. y los Nuevos Estados*, pp. 169-171.

⁶² *Despatches of Wellington (in continuation of the former series)*, I. 555-559, 562-573, 611-615.



