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# Guinea

May 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

The basic unit of the NIS is the *General Survey*, which is now published in a bound-by-chapter format so that topics of greater perishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters—Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the *General Survey* coverage may be bound into one volume.

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*This chapter was written for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by March 1973.*

# Guinea

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


FIGURE 1. Structure of government. The parallel systems of party and government converge at both ends of the structure. At the top, authority centers on Sekou Toure; at the bottom, the local party cells constitute the local government. (U/OU)

# Government and Politics

## A. Summary and background (S)

The area of west Africa which now comprises the Republic of Guinea was the object of French military penetration and colonialization in the middle of the 19th century, but it was not until almost the 20th century that French colonial rule was consolidated. An event predating French rule, however, and one which has had an important long-term influence on Guinea's political development, was the Fulani conquest of the area in the 18th century. From their stronghold in the Fouta Djallon mountains in Moyenne-Guinee (Middle Guinea), the Fulani exercised feudal dominion over most other tribal groups, bringing Islam in their wake. Although internal rivalries progressively weakened their control, the Fulani aristocracy continued to furnish the country's elite during all but the final years of French rule, which lasted from 1891 to 1958. In Guinea, the Fulani remain the stronghold of Islam, through which they continue to exercise considerable, if subtle, influence on the predominantly Muslim population.

Between 1945 and 1956 political strength among Guinea's African population shifted dramatically from the Fulani aristocrats—who cooperated with and in turn were supported by the French—to a new party, the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG). After securing control of the territory in 1957 under the autonomy provisions of the French *Loi Cadre* (Framework Law) of 1956, which put France's African colonies irrevocably on the path to independence, the PDG led Guinea to independence in 1958, as the population voted overwhelmingly against membership in De Gaulle's French Community in a constitutional referendum held on 28 September 1958. France responded by immediately pulling out its administrative and technical personnel, supplies, and records, withdrawing all financial support, and cutting off trade. Although the French departure left economic chaos, a well-knit political party organization under the leadership of Ahmed Sekou Toure was already in place and assumed control of the country.

Since independence, Sekou Toure and the PDG have sought to achieve an extensive social and political revolution aimed at transforming Guinea from a traditional, tribalized African society into a unified modern state led by a socialist government. The regime's successes have been uneven and concentrated in the political and social spheres. The cost has been increasing restrictions on individual freedoms, creation of a heavily bureaucratic system, and economic stagnation.

As the only political party, the PDG has absorbed almost the entire adult population and is the key organization in Guinea. Its leaders hold all the positions of power in the government, and state policy is made by party and government bodies almost interchangeably. Although the PDG has successfully supplanted the traditional elite as the primary force in Guinean society and has made some progress in inculcating a sense of nationhood among the country's diverse ethnic groups, over 13 years of party indoctrination and unkept promises have also produced considerable apathy and disillusionment among the populace, even on issues which the public tends to favor, such as the President's attempts to deal with corruption. All this makes it increasingly difficult for the regime to marshal popular enthusiasm for its policies and tends to make the Guinean revolution more a matter of words than of substance for the mass of subsistence farmers and a growing number of better educated citizens.

A major contributing factor to popular disillusionment is the government's inability to deal with economic problems. The country continues to suffer from administrative deficiencies fostered in part by an ideological commitment to socialist policies which are not responsive to its problems. In their rhetoric, Toure and other leaders of the regime hold to the goal of establishing a socialist and egalitarian state. The pressure of events, however, is forcing the leadership increasingly to choose between adopting more rational economic policies or continuing on the road to an ever harsher authoritarianism in order to prevent the rise of



dissent at home and the exploitation of popular discontent by regime opponents within Guinea and abroad.

The events of November 1970—when Portuguese forces and Guinean dissidents launched an armed attack on Conakry—were a traumatic experience for Toure and have strengthened measurably the trend toward authoritarianism. Portugal, angered by Toure's support of insurgents fighting in Portuguese Guinea, aided dissident Guineans in organizing the attack for the purposes of freeing Portuguese prisoners held in Guinean jails, of striking at the rebel headquarters, and, hopefully, of toppling Toure. Toure survived, countered with an extensive political purge, and merged more solidly in control than ever.

During the next few years Toure faces the increasingly difficult problem of reconciling the conflicting demands of ideological commitment and harsh economic reality. He must try to strike a balance between his unique brand of socialism with its siege mentality and the pressing need to proceed with rational economic development in order to give some substance to the promises he has made to the people. Reliance on foreign aid and private foreign investment in the mineral extraction industry has so far been the answer. Foreign aid has helped Toure maintain the system of tight control over the highly bureaucratic and inefficient domestic economy, as well as to postpone needed economic reforms. But pressures for reform are almost certain to continue to grow, and it remains to be seen whether the nationalistic Toure will wish to remain dependent on so unreliable a base as the aid and investment of foreign governments.

## **B. Structure and functioning of the government**

### **1. Constitution (C)**

A constitution providing for a strongly centralized presidential system, guaranteeing an extensive list of civil rights, and providing for a possible future delegation of sovereignty to a supranational African organization was adopted at independence in 1958 and has never been abrogated.

From the outset, however, the constitution has been more honored in the breach than the observance and has not restrained President Sekou Toure from ruling exactly as he pleases. He promulgates laws as he sees fit, and he changes the structure or composition of the government at will. Toure's use of an extensive political purge and organizational changes during 1971 and 1972—ostensibly to protect his regime from

subversion—amply demonstrated this point. The most dramatic change, announced at the extraordinary National Congress of the PDG in April 1972, was Toure's naming his chief lieutenant to the newly created post of Prime Minister. None of the changes over the past 2 years has altered the concentration of political power in the hands of President Toure or greatly affected the way the government is run.

Under Guinean law the constitution can be amended by a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly or by referendum, initiated either by the President or by the National Assembly. In practice, however, this is an empty provision, since all political power is in the hands of Toure, who determines the role of the assembly in the political process and manipulates public opinion to suit his own purposes.

### **2. Central government**

#### **a. President (U/OU)**

The President of the Republic stands at the apex of the structure of government (Figure 1). He is elected for a 7-year term by universal adult suffrage and can be reelected. The minimum age is 35. There is no specific provision for succession, but in case the presidency becomes vacant the Cabinet continues to conduct state business until a new election is held. Ahmed Sekou Toure has been President since 1958, when Guinea became independent.

Constitutional provisions plus evolution of the Guinean system have concentrated broad power in the hands of the President. He is Chief of State and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; he exercises the administrative powers of government, assisted by a Cabinet which he appoints; he makes all major appointments to the armed forces and the public administration; and he conducts foreign policy. The President appoints the governors of the 29 administrative regions and, through them, is responsible for local law enforcement and public security. Although any draft laws submitted by the President are assured of passage by a compliant assembly, the bulk of Guinea's lawmaking is done by executive decree or administrative fiat. President Toure is able to govern in this manner because of his great prestige as the leader of Guinea's independence movement and his dual position as President and head of the only political party. This convergence of powers gives him control over all major instruments of authority. In the lower echelons the juxtaposition of government administrators and party officials is such that Toure can use the party and the bureaucracy to

watch each other and can bolster the power of either to suit his current policy.

Membership in the top level of the executive branch—the Cabinet—has since the late 1960's paralleled membership in the party's top body, the seven-man National Political Bureau. Cabinet ministries currently form seven "domains" of responsibility: the Presidential Domain; the Prime Minister's Domain; and domains for Finance and Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Interior and Security, Commerce, and Culture and Education. In addition, there are four ministers delegate, each responsible for economic development in one of the four geographic regions of Guinea. A number of other officials who were elevated from "Secretary of State" to minister, plus the governor of the Central Bank, were listed as Cabinet members following a June 1972 Cabinet shuffle.<sup>1</sup> Despite their titles, they occupy a lower level within the hierarchy and do not have equal status with the heads of domains. These second-echelon officials administer policies in specific fields related to their respective domains. For instance, within the Office of the Prime Minister are four subordinate ministers—one responsible for financial control, another for the people's army, a third for plans, and a fourth for foreign affairs.

Theoretically, heads of domains supervise government operations and make policy decisions. In practice, however, all important decisions are made within the framework of the party organization, specifically the National Political Bureau, and executed through the Cabinet's administrative system. Ministers are not responsible to the National Assembly; they must not be assembly deputies, and the election of a new assembly has little if any relationship to the composition of the Cabinet. Ministers are appointed by the President and serve at his pleasure.

#### **b. Legislature (U/OU)**

The legislature consists of a single house, the National Assembly, whose membership is elected at one time for a 5-year term. Since 1963 its membership has been set at 75. The party controls the assembly, which is viewed as the collective emanation of the will of the people rather than as an assembly of representatives from different regions. The National Assembly is supposed to meet in two short regular sessions each year, in March and October. Special

<sup>1</sup>For a current listing of key government officials consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

sessions may be held at any time at the request of the President of the Republic or after a two-thirds vote of the deputies. Actually, the assembly has not met regularly.

A Permanent Commission and a 10-member bureau are elected at the beginning of each legislative term to deliberate on government actions which take place between regular sessions of the assembly, although such deliberations in fact have no effect on policy decisions. Each commission serves for the full 5-year term of that assembly.

In practice, the assembly acts as an appendage of the party and a ratifying body for PDG policies. Any meaningful discussion of proposed legislation takes place within the party organization, following which the proposal is submitted to the National Assembly for perfunctory approval. The PDG also determines the composition of the assembly by drawing up one list of 75 candidates which it presents to the nation for election. The President retains the right to veto the nomination of any candidate. Of the deputies elected to the assembly in 1968, 32 were members of the Central Committee of the PDG, while six and seven were members of the executive bureaus of the party-affiliated labor and youth organizations, respectively. Twenty deputies were women.

#### **c. Judiciary (U/OU)**

PDG theory recognizes no separation of powers, and judicial power ultimately rests with the party. Along with the rest of the government, the judiciary is expected to uphold the will of the people as expressed by the party and be subject to party discipline.

One of Toure's early accomplishments was the abolition of customary tribal courts and their replacement by PDG-operated Popular Tribunals, which decide minor disputes at the village level. All legal costs are borne by the state. All judges, magistrates, and lawyers (including defense attorneys) are civil servants, and as salaried officials they are not expected to accept fees. There is a serious shortage of Guineans with legal training.

In its formal aspects, Guinea's judicial system has been carried over from the French. The court system has a simple structure. At the lowest level, 25 of the 29 administrative regions have a Justice of the Peace court. Of the other four regions, three have one Court of First Instance, while Conakry has two. The Courts of First Instance have a presiding judge, plus official prosecution and defense attorneys, and their jurisdiction runs the gamut of civil and criminal cases.

There are three higher courts, one of which is the Court of General Sessions in Conakry. This court has

original criminal jurisdiction in cases involving major offenses. Its presiding judge is designated by the president of the Court of Appeals, and it has two additional judges and four lay assessors chosen from a list prepared by the government. Appointments to the Court of General Sessions are for 1 year.

Another higher court, the Court of Appeals in Conakry, hears appeals from the lower courts in both civil and criminal cases. It has a president and a number of judges, all appointed by presidential decree. In some instances, appeals may be made from its decisions to the Supreme Court of Appeals.

The third higher court, the Supreme Court of Appeals, has five members and is headed by a president, who is assisted by four counselors from the Court of Appeals. The function of this court is merely to clarify the law and insure correctness of interpretation; it does not rule on the facts in a case. It hears appeals from all lower courts.

A separate High Court of Justice lies outside the regular judicial system and has jurisdiction only over crimes against the state; there is no appeal from its decisions. Its membership comprises the president of the National Assembly, who serves as president of the court, three Cabinet ministers, and three members of the National Assembly. The High Court of Justice has been used only twice. In April 1960 it tried a group of persons accused of plotting against the republic, and in November 1961 it tried 12 executives of the teachers union who were charged with subversive activities.

This formal structure has been bypassed in recent years when crimes against the state have been involved. In March 1969 a special revolutionary tribunal was convened to try participants in an alleged plot by army officers to assassinate the President. Final action was taken in May 1969 by an extraordinary session of the party's National Council of the Revolution, which sat as a "Popular Revolutionary Tribunal." A special procedure was again used in January 1971 to try and sentence 150 individuals accused of involvement in the 1970 armed attack by sea on Conakry; this time it was the National Assembly which sat as a special tribunal. (For a discussion of the 1970 attack see Threats to Government Stability, below). During the summer and fall of 1971 over 140 "confessions" of alleged fifth columnists were read over *Radio Conakry* in what was described as a "people's trial." No formal tribunal was convoked, but in March 1972 the National Assembly issued a general statement certifying sentences announced previously over the radio.

### 3. Regional and local government (C)

There is no constitutional formula for local government, and the existing system has been carried over, with certain modifications, from the hierarchical system of local and regional administrators, assisted by advisory councils, in use before independence. The same hierarchical concept is common to both the government and the PDG. The parallel party and government organizations and the frequent political interference in purely administrative matters blur the lines of authority and responsibility and are a source of competition, friction, and inefficiency.

There are three levels of administration beneath the national level: regions, *arrondissements*, and villages. The 29 administrative regions are administered by governors, appointed and supervised by the President. Each governor has a dual role, in that he is the chief executive officer of the regional government while serving also as an agent of the central government. Because Sekou Toure stresses the unitary nature of the state, it is the governor's latter role which is emphasized. Each governor acts as a channel for information between the central government and local communities, and he has an intelligence function in that he is expected to be aware of and report to Conakry on activities in his region. Regional governors ostensibly are professional administrators, but in fact loyalty to Toure and their position in the party are the main criteria for appointment. Their status is equivalent to that of Guinean ambassadors and only slightly below that of Cabinet ministers. Governors are moved almost yearly, and an effort is made to rotate them among different tribal areas. The governor is a member of the PDG and an ex officio member of the bureau of the party federation for his region.

Governors are assisted by regional assemblies with advisory functions. These assemblies average 30 members each. Deliberative rather than legislative, their chief concern is the regional budget, and all their actions are subject to review by national authorities.

*Arrondissements* are headed by commandants who are appointed by the central government but who report to the regional governor. The commandant is also an ex officio member of the directing committee of the party section for his area. *Arrondissements* were created in 1959 by presidential decree, and the number in each region is determined by ethnic, economic, and geographic circumstances. The heads of the *arrondissements*—which totaled 209 in late 1972—inform their respective governors about local conditions and perform a key role in mobilizing local militia for defense purposes.

The local governmental structure is referred to by President Toure as the Local Revolutionary Authority. Each village, according to Toure's ideology, is to be transformed into a self-sustaining people's commune which will place a minimum number of demands on the central government. His instrument to achieve this is the party. Village government, as a result, is identical with the local party organization. About 8,000 PDG base committees (*comites de base*), each under the leadership of a popularly elected 13-man committee, direct most of the functions normally associated with a local government, plus additional ones. Each base committee is subdivided into 3-4 subcommittees responsible for the handling of such duties as law and order, public health, economic production, minor judicial functions, the collection of taxes, and, most important, the distribution of food rations. In short, they are a mirror of the national government organization. All party militants—almost the entire adult population—are supposed to attend committee meetings at least once a week. Each committee is to bring the "revolution" to the countryside and be the instrument for propelling the Guinean village into the modern world.

Two other institutions having some governmental responsibilities at the local level are the schools, renamed Centers of Revolutionary Education (CER), which theoretically are self-sustaining communities of students who combine work experience with academic subjects and ideological indoctrination; and Production Unit Committees, which are party cells designed to monitor production and stimulate revolutionary militancy in every sector of the economy and bureaucracy.

#### 4. Civil service (U/OU)

The functioning of Guinea's already inefficient civil service was further impaired during 1971 and 1972 by purges which included the arrest of many of the country's bureaucrats and intimidation of the rest. Reorganizations and personnel changes occur frequently. The Toure regime regards all data concerning the operations of the government—including the size of the bureaucracy—as state secrets. According to the most reliable estimates, there were some 30,000 civil servants in 1972, exclusive of state enterprises.

Guinea had to build its civil service almost from scratch and without the help of France, its former ruler. Jobs vacated in 1958 by departing Frenchmen were filled in large part by friends of the President. A small core of foreign-trained Guineans was available, and several thousand more were trained abroad during

the 1960's, but subsequent purges have virtually wiped out these groups, leaving the bureaucracy in the hands of party hacks and younger militants chosen for their loyalty rather than their technical competence. Most new appointees have been trained wholly within Guinea or in Communist countries.

Confusion in government offices is aggravated by the blurred lines of authority, inexplicable and sudden changes in the rules, and PDG interference in routine matters normally handled by the bureaucracy. The need for establishment of systematic procedures and increased reliance on technically competent personnel is readily apparent. Nevertheless, President Toure is suspicious of the technicians and intellectuals, fearing that once ensconced in the bureaucracy they may establish lines of advancement and power outside the party organization. Consequently, the party maintains careful watch over the civil service, stifling initiative and effective management by frequent interference in day-to-day operations of the government.


A 1959 presidential decree set forth in general terms the rights and responsibilities of government employees and regulations governing hiring, promotion, and benefits. These and subsequent modifications have been ignored by the leadership when convenient.

All persons permanently employed by the government, including the military and high officials, are considered civil servants, the military forces having been integrated into the civil service in 1969. The rationale for inclusion of the military was to insure that soldiers become full participants in the Guinean revolution. Civil servants are required to be Guinean citizens, although foreign nationals can be hired on contract subject to periodic renewal. A 1965 reform, one of many aimed at eliminating corruption within the government, established fairly rigid standards and called for adherence to the requirement that hiring be done by competitive examination. Enforcement of these rules, however, is lax.

Training—more ideological than technical—for civil servants is available at the National School of Administration. Government employees may join labor unions and theoretically may strike, but they seldom have done so. Equal treatment for men and women is guaranteed. Civil servants have no immunity from prosecution under civil and criminal law, however, and special importance is attached to protection of government secrets—a term which includes even the most insignificant information.


As salaried employees and representatives of the central government, civil servants constitute an economic elite which stands apart from the mass of

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


FIGURE 3. PDG electoral system (U/OU)

PDG members are grouped locally by village or urban neighborhood into about 8,000 local units, each led by a base directing committee. The entire local government structure administered by each committee is called the Local Revolutionary Authority (PRL) and referred to as a "people's commune." The PRL mirrors the national government by dividing responsibilities in the same way the Cabinet is divided. Each committee is elected for 1 year and consists of 13 members—11 elected by an assembly of local party members, plus the heads of the party's local youth and women's organizations. To be eligible for any PDG office, one must have served the party actively and loyally for at least 3 years. Private merchants may not be party officials. The base committee is the main transmission link between the masses and the party leadership and plays an important role in explaining policy, organizing the people, and providing for local defense.

The second-level organizational unit of the PDG is the section, one for each of the 209 *arrondissements*. Each section has a 13-man directing committee which serves for 2 years, but only 10 of the officers are elected directly. The three ex officio members are the presidents of the sectional youth committee and the sectional women's committee and the presidentially appointed commanding officer of the section. These 13 coordinate the activities of the base committees in their respective areas. Following the 1970 Portuguese-led attack on Conakry, section units became more active in providing local defense in the form of a people's militia.

Party organization at the regional level consists of 30 federations, one in each administrative region except for Conakry, which has two. The federations are assigned the pivotal roles of transmitting the PDG's national policies to the lower levels of the party and coordinating government and party operations. Each federation is headed by a 13-man bureau which serves for 3 years and is presided over by a presidentially appointed secretary. It is at this level in the hierarchy that presidential supervision becomes direct. The federal secretary is a key official in governing the country and, along with the regional governor, is held accountable for the loyalty and economic performance of the inhabitants in his area. The posts of governor and federal secretary have been a source of competition in the past, and Toure occasionally would set one against the other as a political tactic. The distinction between party and state, already fuzzy at the national and local levels, also seemed to be breaking down at regional levels by 1972.

The structure and relative prominence of the party's several deliberative and executive bodies on the national level have varied, but all exhibit a general pattern evident throughout the party organization. Day-to-day decisions are made by executive committees, followed periodically by ratification by congresses. As of the end of 1972, deliberative bodies consisted of the PDG National Congress and the National Council of the Revolution; the major executive bodies were the National Political Bureau (BPN) and the PDG Central Committee.

The National Congress is theoretically the highest authority of the PDG, with power to elect the BPN, to set general policy, and to decide organizational and political questions. In fact, however, it follows the dictates of President Toure acting through the BPN. Congresses hear reports from party leaders, reaffirm the mandate of officials, and issue decrees. Congresses are used to create a feeling of solidarity, disseminate

the party lines, and awaken enthusiasm for the PDG leadership. Many speeches attacking imperialism and praising Secretary General Toure usually are made, both by Guineans and by some foreign delegations—especially those from Communist and other “progressive” countries—who attend as guests. Although propaganda predominates, there is presumably some dialog between national leaders and lower level cadre.

Delegates to the special ninth congress held in April 1972 were drawn from the BPN, the Cabinet, members of the national committees for youth, women, and workers, the 13 members of the federation bureaus, and the heads of the PDG sections. Fewer foreign delegations were present at the ninth than during previous congresses, however. The intervals between congresses have varied. There was a 4-year gap between the eighth and ninth congresses; the 10th party congress is scheduled for April 1973.

The National Council of the Revolution (CNR), created in December 1962, ranks next to the party congress in importance and size. In theory it meets about once every 6 months and normally draws its membership from among the executive bureaus of the various party organizations. Foreign delegations are sometimes invited to attend the meetings also. The CNR grew in importance following its creation, and on one occasion—typical of the flexibility of most Guinean organizations—it even transformed itself into a party congress. It includes powers not normally a part of Western political parties. For instance, at its January 1969 session the CNR created several new high government offices and reorganized the army, the militia, and the national labor union center. The role of the CNR has declined in the early 1970's.

The seven-man BPN is the supreme executive body within the PDG and the locus of power. Sekou Toure as party secretary general presides over and dominates the BPN so as to insure that its political orientation corresponds to his own. Its members theoretically are elected by the National Congress, but in fact they are appointed by Toure, and their “election” is only a formality.

The centralized nature of the political system and the tendency of lower ranking officials to refer almost every decision to the BPN make that body a bottleneck. Each member of the BPN is also a government minister with wide-ranging administrative duties. Various schemes to decentralize have been tried, but they have all foundered on the leadership's reluctance to delegate any meaningful authority and on the shortage of administrative talent at lower levels. The decisions of the BPN have the force of law, and

any party section or federation executive bureau can be dissolved by it. The BPN also designates party candidates for election to the National Assembly—which is tantamount to naming the deputies.

The PDG Central Committee exercised little power following its creation in 1967, but at the ninth party congress in 1972 the committee's status was seemingly enhanced. Membership was cut from 45 to 25, and a flurry of decrees was issued in its name in the months following the congress. Ultimate authority, however, remains centered in the seven-man BPN, all of whose members are also members of the committee. The Central Committee has four working commissions: economic, social, education and culture, and organization.

Party officials at all levels are unpaid, but because holders of important offices usually are given government jobs, there is a lively competition for the office. Locally, the posts are filled through regular open elections. Above the base committee level, party officials are elected indirectly. Elections at each level are supervised by the executive bureau of the party unit immediately superior in the hierarchy. Results have occasionally been invalidated, allegedly on the grounds that the choice of winners reflected tribal influences.

#### *c. Affiliates (C)*

Affiliated mass organizations for youth, for women, and for labor are also part of the mechanism through which the PDG rules the country. These organizations mobilize their adherents behind PDG programs and policies, and provide new leadership talent. They also give these elements of society some sense of political participation and build loyalty to Toure. Perhaps more importantly, the party-sponsored groupings replace comparable groups common in traditional society and help the PDG create allegiances that transcend tribal lines. The youth movement and the women's organization have their own national committee and are guaranteed representation at all levels of the party structure. The labor unions are represented in principle in party posts and government administration. The formal organizations for youth and women parallel that of the PDG, and ultimate control over them is exercised by the PDG leadership.

The Youth of the African Democratic Revolution (JRDA) was created in 1959 when the PDG decided to establish a special party affiliate for all young people, regardless of their tribal origin. Although the JRDA is the only organized means of expression for Guinean youth, membership is neither compulsory nor universal. There are JRDA committees at all levels,





FIGURE 4. Members of the JRDA on parade in Conakry (U/OU)

including the national. Activities for males focus on ideological and paramilitary training, sports, and civic awareness (Figure 4), while the program for girls features classes in child care and homemaking. The youth organization is considered the vanguard of the revolution and is expected to furnish activities to drum up demonstrations, keep a watch on the population, and mobilize the people for party activities.

The JRDA cooperates with various international Communist youth groups, and there is a frequent exchange of delegations. A Cuban-built youth center was inaugurated in May 1972 during a visit by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. The camp is used to train Guinea's people's militia, which is associated with the JRDA. Communist countries were represented at the seventh JRDA Congress in March 1972.

Student discontent has not been a major threat to the Toure government. There was grumbling by students during 1972 over the heavy ideological content of their studies and government restrictions on their movements, however, and the growing number of students fleeing the country was of increasing concern to the leadership during the early 1970's. There is little reason to doubt the basic loyalty of the JRDA, on whose militancy Sekou Toure relies to promote his policies. At the same time, however, the JRDA is one of the more difficult regime props to control.

The PDG has organized the women of Guinea into a cohesive political force with a complete structure of women's groups paralleling the main party organizations. The women's organizations are

represented by a committee of 13 members, elected by a biennial congress. Women play a visible role in national life, frequently appearing in organized groups at public functions (Figure 5), and they form an important center of support for President Toure, who is committed to their liberation from the more binding aspects of traditional society. In return, the strength of their allegiance to Toure probably is unmatched by that of any other group. Women are well represented in the National Assembly, on the national committees of the JRDA and the workers confederation, and on the PDG Central Committee.



FIGURE 5. PDG women parading before the Presidential Palace (U/OU)

Labor unions, which are grouped in the National Confederation of Guinean Workers (CNTG), are also closely tied to the PDG, but party-labor relations have occasionally been stormy in the past. During the colonial period Guinean unions, led by Toure, played an active role in antigovernment activity. Since independence Toure has required labor to recognize the primacy of the party and become a docile adjunct of it. This has caused problems between Toure and some of the more doctrinaire leftists in the CNTG. In 1969 the CNTG was officially made a special section of the PDG, and by 1972 it was clearly only an adjunct of the party with no independent power base.

### 3. Electoral system (U/OU)

The electoral process is tightly controlled by Guinea's single political party. Elections within the party at the base committee level offer voters their only chance for a meaningful choice, because there is less interference from Conakry at this level. Conakry's control of the electoral process above the village level is more direct, and meaningful expression of voter preference is rare. There were, however, signs of opposition to party candidates in certain areas of Guinea in the local party elections in 1972. Such opposition is risky, but in at least one regional election in 1972 it was sufficiently deep rooted and widespread to affect the outcome.

The regime has received over 99% of the vote in all national elections since independence. Only the PDG list of candidates is presented, and local party authorities take steps to assure that it is approved. In the last national election, in 1968, the legal provisions for voting by secret ballot were often disregarded, and in some cases local officials made up their area's official results prior to the actual voting.

Little information is available about election laws and practices. The constitution establishes universal, direct suffrage by secret ballot, and it provides for general elections for the National Assembly and the President. President Toure's 7-year term expires in 1975, while the 5-year mandate of National Assembly deputies ends in 1973. Not mentioned in the constitution, but authorized by law, are elections for village, town, and regional councils. Specific election laws established by party decree are more significant than are constitutional provisions. Because of frequent changes in these laws, procedures vary from election to election. The BPN may declare candidates for local or national office ineligible, or it may void the election of winners. In 1963 the BPN expressed its displeasure over the election of 21 regional governors to the National Assembly by voiding their election and

decreed that, henceforth, regional governors and section commandants were no longer eligible for election to the National Assembly. Merchants were similarly declared ineligible for election in the 1968 National Assembly election because of their "exploitive mentality." The voting age was set at 18 years, beginning with the 1968 elections. The election law also provides for the security forces to assume control of the country on election day.

The first election held after independence was the presidential election of January 1961. A national conference of the PDG which met in 1960 unanimously nominated Sekou Toure as the only candidate. Over 99% of the 1,585,544 registered voters participated and voted for Toure.

In the 1963 National Assembly election, a single list of 75 PDG candidates was submitted to the voters. Each of the 30 party federations, meeting in a federation congress, nominated two candidates. In order to assure women a strong voice in the assembly, each of the 12 federations cited for merit at the 1962 National Congress was allocated an additional nominee, who had to be a woman.

Over 99% of the 2 million registered voters reportedly turned out for the 1968 national election, and all but 103 voted for President Toure and the PDG ticket. There were no other candidates for national office, despite the relatively simple requirements that a presidential candidate must be an eligible voter and must deposit a declaration of candidacy at the nearest regional capital. Some polling places reportedly did not even go through the pretense of distributing ballots.

In addition to reelecting Toure in 1968 the voters returned a 75-man PDG slate to the National Assembly. Although the slate was publicly nominated by the Central Committee, it probably was dictated by Toure and the BPN. A PDG slate of 870 regional candidates for seats in the 29 regional assemblies also was elected. The candidates were selected by the regional federations according to criteria established by the Central Committee. As in the case of the presidency and the National Assembly, nominations for the regional assemblies can also be made by a simple declaration of candidacy, but this has rarely happened.

## D. National policies

### 1. Themes and goals (U/OU)

National policies are formulated almost exclusively by President Toure. He has been somewhat utopian in his statements and has stressed the domestic themes of

a unified socialist state under one-party rule and rapid social and political development. Major foreign policy themes are African unity and Guinea's identification with the less-developed nations and their fight against "imperialism." Foreign help in achieving these goals is welcome as long as no conditions are attached by the giver which would compromise Guinea's independence.

Toure's principal domestic goal is to establish an egalitarian, socialist society, but like the Communist states whose example he frequently follows, this has led to the domination of all political life by a single powerful organization. As a consequence of the tight political control exercised by the PDG, Guinea has taken on the character of a police state—a trend which has been strengthened by Toure's reaction to the Portuguese-led attack on Conakry in November 1970.

In foreign policy, Guinea seeks to be the spokesman for "progressive" African states. Toure sees the less developed world as comprised of nations with interests distinct from the developed countries in both East and West. He endorses most programs that draw attention to the less-developed states and believes that unity and organization are the determinants of whether or not these states have a strong voice in world affairs—criteria that he also applies to Guinea's internal affairs.

Guinea is an active supporter of the long-range objective of a pan-African community of states. Guinea's aggressive pursuit of this goal has sometimes offended those moderate African states that still retain close economic ties with their former colonial rulers. Progress toward Toure's pan-African objectives has been slight, but by 1972, there were signs that opposition to Portuguese colonialism was an issue on which both moderate and radical states were finding common ground for action.

Implementation of Toure's domestic and foreign policies is hampered by a lack of experienced and reliable administrators, by frequent ineffectiveness of foreign aid programs, and by corruption. These factors, together with the crippling effects of recent political purges, have tended to produce makeshift policies, confusion, and sometimes counterproductive action.

**2. Aftermath of 1970 invasion (C)**

The attack on Conakry in November 1970 undertaken jointly by a Portuguese military force augmented by Guinean exiles had a dramatic effect on Guinea's domestic and foreign policies. It deepened Sekou Toure's already strong distrust of nonsocialist governments and was cited by him as proof that

Guinea was the target of a permanent imperialist plot. As a result, ties with Communist states were strengthened, while several major Western governments, including the United States, were accused of complicity either in the 1970 attack or in other efforts to subvert the Toure government.

Domestically, a sweeping purge of party and government officials was launched, resulting in hundreds of arrests and in the elimination from power of most officials who were suspected of favoring more moderate political and economic policies or closer ties with the West. They were replaced by younger PDG militants who were judged less corrupted by foreign influences. To justify the purges Toure introduced the concept of a fifth column, which now seems to occupy a permanent place in his lexicon. The fifth column is defined by Toure in almost classical Marxist terms and includes merchants, bureaucrats, and intellectuals who comprise what he terms Guinea's surviving bourgeoisie. This notion of a traitorous bourgeois class has been heavily emphasized by Toure only in recent years; earlier he had always denied that it applied to Africa. The now permanent nature of the struggle against this class provides Toure with a convenient justification for future purges.

By mid-1972 the worst of the mass arrests was over, and as Toure regained confidence in the ability of his regime to survive he called for increased attention to economic problems. At the ninth party congress in April 1972 he declared that the time had come to build the material base of socialism in Guinea. Toure has always stressed the need to increase economic production, but the tone of his 1972 remarks suggested that for the first time economic goals would in fact be given priority over short-range political considerations. Lack of economic progress previously had been excused as an inevitable result of the need to consolidate the "political revolution," but this line has worn very thin after 14 years of independence.

If Toure intends to follow through on his economic pledges, he will have to moderate the especially strident anti-Western tone exhibited by his regime during 1971. Guinea needs Western aid and markets, if development of the country's important minerals sector, Guinea's major resource, is to continue. The task of striking the right balance between the practical need for continued ties with the West and the anticapitalist and ideological content of his political program continues to be one of Toure's more challenging problems. Toure publicly claims the "imperialists"—meaning the developed Western states—seek his ouster in order to gain control of Guinea's mineral wealth; in fact, Guinea's richest

deposits already are being exploited by Western companies in partnership with the Toure government. Hence, Toure's politics, or at least its rhetoric, does not appear to be attuned to the realities of the country's economic situation—a fact that could be a future source of trouble for Toure. As of the end of 1972, however, it appeared that the regime was modifying in selected areas its hard line of the previous year.

### 3. Domestic policies (U/OU)

The PDG's pervasive control over the population has helped the party make each Guinean aware that he is part of a nation whose interests take precedence over individual or tribal concerns. Although much of the PDG program is merely rhetorical, and decrees from Conakry are frequently ignored by local leaders, official pressure to change the old order is strong. The point of application is the village, a concept which by itself is revolutionary in Africa, given the preoccupation of most African governments with urban areas and industrial growth, both as a matter of national pride and as evidence of economic development. The goal is the establishment at the local level of what Toure calls the Local Revolutionary Authority (PRL). These governmental units are essentially duplicates at the local level of Toure's national system of authoritarian leadership and have as their purpose the organization of self-reliant communes. Local militants are organized into brigades, production norms are set, and, theoretically, at least, decrees from Conakry are implemented.

The focus on the PRL's has been particularly strong since Toure decreed in August 1968 that Guinea must undergo a "cultural revolution." His statements about PRL's have often been confusing and contradictory, but he persists in claiming they will bring the revolution to the villages. One important, and perhaps intended, result of the emphasis on self-reliance is a decrease in the number of demands placed by local jurisdictions on the inadequate resources of the central government. The regime hopes the PRL approach will encourage production and thereby help solve Guinea's economic problems.

The regime attempts to develop a sense of national unity by mobilizing all party organizations and the media in a sustained campaign to indoctrinate the population in the virtues of socialism and of selected African—hence Guinean—values.

The government, through the PDG, controls all sources of information directed toward the Guinean people. There is only one newspaper in Guinea, the party paper *Horoya* (Freedom), and there is only one

radio station, the *Voice of the Revolution*. Neither deviates from the party line. The media are concerned primarily with broadcasting President Toure's words, explaining party policies, praising the President, calling for an end to corruption and for more economic production, and railing against Guinea's "imperialist" enemies. Government control of information available to Guineans is virtually complete, the obvious exception being foreign radiobroadcasts.

Central to Toure's reeducation campaign is the insistence that the colonial experience destroyed Guineans' pride in their culture and that restoration of that pride must be a key objective of national policy. The traditional culture is extolled, with emphasis placed on local arts, crafts, music, and dancing. Guinea's renowned *Ballets Africains* and *Djoliba* carry the regime's cultural message to foreign countries. The intent is to instill in Guineans a dignity and pride in their own culture and to impress on foreigners that Guinean society is authentic and not just a reflection of foreign patterns.

Toure believes that in order for Africans throughout the continent to establish truly sovereign societies based on African values, these societies must cease to mimic foreign ideas, reorganize themselves politically, and deal with the still crippling dependence of many states on their former colonial rulers. In the regime's view, the Guinean experience has demonstrated the validity of this approach. The PDG in the 1950's successfully combined a popular awareness of the goal of liberation from French rule with a highly effective organization to achieve political independence. The next step, says Toure, is a "qualitative" jump forward toward realization of a truly indigenous social organization based on African, not foreign, values. It was to make this "qualitative" advance that the Guinean cultural revolution was proclaimed. Its methods are ideological education and increased domestic militancy. These methods are often harshly applied, however, and offer few material inducements.

Other social policies are aimed at achieving educational reforms, gaining literacy in an indigenous language, eliminating the deprecatory attitude toward manual labor, and bridging the gulf between urban and less sophisticated rural inhabitants. Programs to effect these changes have frequently aroused popular discontent because of the emphasis on social control.

Educational reforms have entailed the imposition of government control over all schools and students, revision of the curriculum to deemphasize classical French training, and rapid expansion of educational

facilities and enrollment. The ultimate goal is establishment of Centers of Revolutionary Education as self-sustaining in which agricultural production theoretically is combined with political indoctrination. Toure's preoccupation with ideological indoctrination may, in the long run, make the schools as unresponsive to Guinea's actual needs as they were under the French system during the colonial era.

PDG policies aimed at eliminating tribal allegiances include participation in government by individuals from all major tribes and rotation of government personnel outside their own tribal areas. The political security of the leadership is another objective of the rotations. The scheduling of important party meetings in all parts of the country and frequent tours of interior areas by national leaders are part of the effort to break down tribal and regional parochialism and wipe out attitudes associated with former hereditary tribal aristocracies.

To further social equality the PDG encourages members of those groups who have little status in the traditional tribal system (youth, women, unmarried men, and those traditionally associated with servant classes) to participate in party affairs and rise through the party structure by loyal performance. The goal is to replace traditional groupings with party organizations, thereby making the PDG the final arbiter and sole sanctioning body for all important activities. The PDG's substantial success in achieving this goal confirms its claim to be a revolutionary leader among African political parties. The party has demonstrated its commitment to equal treatment of all elements of the society by providing better opportunities for women, ordering students and city workers to the countryside to work on farms, and compelling the military to participate in civic action projects. Toure's determination to prevent the emergence of special interest groups with loyalties outside the party is evident in his harsh treatment of the surviving remnants of the merchant class and in the barrage of propaganda warning against the emergence of a bourgeoisie.

Guinea's economic goals include the creation of a viable modern economy, improvement of living standards, and control of all economic life by Guineans. These goals are to be achieved via a planned economy, but Guinea has never had an effective national plan. In a kind of reverse Marxism, Toure has declared that Guinea's economy must be based on its politics, and he appears confident that economic goals can be reached by taking correct political decisions. Guinea has had two multiyear economic plans, but these have been more

compendiums of hopes than effective instruments for national planning. The development of a new 5-year plan is to be the sole item on the agenda at the 10th PDG Congress, scheduled for late spring 1973.

Although Toure rants against capitalism and foreign investment, Guinea's substantial mineral resources are being exploited in cooperation with large foreign companies. Despite his revolutionary rhetoric, Toure has largely fulfilled his promises to the private investors. The government needs outside aid in exploiting these resources because Guinea lacks the required capital, market outlets, and expertise. The earnings derived from the sale of the ores and metals will continue to be the government's major source of foreign exchange for some time to come.

Toure is counting heavily on returns from the extraction of minerals to allow continuation of many of his domestic experiments, such as his decision in 1960 to create an independent Guinea currency, now called the syli. The government has repeatedly asserted that earnings from bauxite deposits at Boke will provide the required foreign exchange beginning in 1973; that Soviet rights to bauxite deposits at Kindia will satisfy demands for payment of back debts by the U.S.S.R. and its East European allies; and that development of untapped iron ore deposits in southeastern Guinea, when exploited, will insure economic momentum through the 1980's. If the benefit to the government of these mining enterprises falls short of Toure's expectations, however, his followers are likely to be even more disillusioned, particularly if consumer shortages and demands for economic sacrifices continue.

The government insists on strict concession agreements with foreign developers allowed to operate in Guinea. Most agreements provide for progressive Guineanization of the work force and for tight controls on foreign exchange and on the repatriation of profits.

Although the structure of the economy is changing, Guinea is still predominantly an agricultural country. The regime has not been successful in its attempts to collectivize agriculture, and subsistence farming continues to provide the largest portion of the total national output produced by the private sector.

Purchase of agricultural products is by state monopolies, while distribution of consumer goods is controlled by regional committees directly subordinate to party federation officials. These controls, combined with the chaotic management of the distribution system and drastic restrictions against private traders, contribute to the continuing shortage of consumer goods. Furthermore, policies which make the Guinean currency nonconvertible at the legal rate, plus serious

domestic inflation, have led to extensive blackmarketing and smuggling. Although the citizenry has borne such hardships stoically, the potential for an explosion against the regime exists. Despite the economic problems created for Guinea by its withdrawal from the French-controlled African franc zone in 1960, the regime defends the national currency as a symbol of independence. It regards as not fully independent those African countries which are unwilling to pursue independent monetary policies and whose currencies are part of a larger currency area, such as the franc zone.

**4. Foreign policies (S)**

Toure's ideological views place his government alongside Communist nations on most international issues. Nevertheless, the regime has reiterated and frequently demonstrated by its actions its determination to avoid becoming dependent on any power, Communist or otherwise, and to pursue its own interests. These interests mainly are the security of Guinea and the long-range goals of national development and African unity. Pursuit of these goals, entwined as they are with sensitivities arising from a recent colonial past, the search for an authentic African identity, and the need for foreign economic aid, has frequently resulted in tensions which strain Guinea's relations with its neighbors and other nations. Toure is careful, however, to balance off worsening relations with one major power by making friendly moves toward a rival power. Shrewd application of this technique since independence has preserved considerable freedom of movement for Toure and gained for Guinea substantial amounts of foreign aid.

**a. Relations with African states**

Guinea's close ties with Communist states and hostility toward Paris have caused some problems with its moderate neighbors Senegal and Ivory Coast and contributed to its political isolation. Conakry favors a unified African military command and has traditionally supported a much tougher position on the question of the Portuguese territories than have most other African governments. Another complicating factor has been Toure's practice of harboring dissidents or exiles from other African countries. Most notable among these was Ghana's late President Kwame Nkrumah, who was granted asylum following his ouster in 1966 and resided in Guinea until his death in 1972. Withdrawal from the franc zone and establishment of a national currency not backed by gold have cut off most legitimate regional trade.

Guinea took its first tentative step toward African unity in 1958 when it joined Ghana in a "union" of the two countries, which was expanded in 1960 to include Mali. Few steps were ever taken to implement the agreements, however, and a few years later the union was declared defunct by Guinea.

In January 1961, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali joined Morocco, the United Arab Republic, and the Provisional Government of Algeria in forming the Casablanca Group. This organization took a militant stand on African questions and set up an African High Command. The Casablanca Group never functioned effectively, however, and was finally dissolved in the summer of 1963 on the grounds that it had been overtaken by the formation of the Africa-wide Organization of African Unity (OAU). Toure strongly supported the establishment of the OAU, but since its creation he has frequently expressed disappointment over its lack of militancy and leadership in African affairs.

The overthrow of two radical west African leaders who generally shared Guinea's pan-African, anti-colonial views—Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in February 1966 and Modibo Keita in Mali in November 1968—also thwarted Guinea's African policies. In recognition of their past association as revolutionary brothers, Toure promptly gave sanctuary to Nkrumah and declared him a co-President of Guinea, but the title was strictly honorific. Nkrumah's presence in Conakry ruled out a reconciliation between Toure and the military junta that ousted Nkrumah or with the junta's civilian successors, the Busia government.

Busia's overthrow in January 1972 and Nkrumah's death the following April opened the way for an improvement in relations. Toure's feelers met with a positive response in Accra, suggesting that both countries desired an end to the years of hostility and recrimination. Toure's move was part of a general diplomatic offensive designed to improve Guinea's relations with African states and to refurbish his government's image in the wake of the unfavorable publicity generated by the intensive domestic political purges of 1971. Relations with Ghana were reestablished in February 1973.

Relations with neighboring Mali have had their ups and downs, reflecting for the most part Toure's attitude toward its rulers. One immediate result of Nkrumah's overthrow and Guinea's growing isolation was Toure's decision in 1968 to establish even closer ties with Modibo Keita in Mali. This trend was short lived, however, because of an army coup in November 1968 which toppled Keita's leftist government. Despite Toure's distrust of Mali's new military rulers

and his suspicions of French involvement in the coup, he did not break diplomatic relations and cautiously avoided antagonizing the new regime. Relations gradually warmed after an initial period of coolness, and they were cordial in late 1972. Toure particularly appreciated the Mali regime's immediate support after the 1970 invasion.

Relations with Liberia and Sierra Leone are generally good, but there are occasional disputes over trading concessions, tribal matters, and illicit border crossings. Liberian President Tolbert has followed the example of his predecessor, the late President Tubman, in sparing no effort to maintain cordial relations with Guinea and Toure. Tolbert visited Conakry soon after succeeding to the presidency in July 1971, and he took an active part in OAU efforts in 1972 to mediate the Guinea-Senegal dispute. Toure reciprocated, and his only two journeys outside Guinea since 1966 were to Monrovia in mid-1972.

Guinea's relations with Sierra Leone have been very close since Siaka Stevens became President in May 1968. Toure had provided a haven from which Stevens plotted against the military regime in Freetown. Then in March 1971, Toure dispatched Guinean troops to help Stevens regain control, following an ineptly staged coup by the Sierra Leone army commander. A secret defense agreement was hastily signed, about 200 Guinean troops were sent to Freetown, and Guinean MIG-17's buzzed the city in a show of support. Toure's help proved crucial, and a grateful Stevens emerged more solidly in control than before. A contingent of about 50 Guinean troops was continuing to act as Stevens' bodyguard in early 1973.

Guinea's relations with Portuguese Guinea are unique because of the anticolonial rebellion that has been going on there for almost a decade. Conakry is the headquarters of the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), and is the port of entry for most of the supplies being provided the insurgents by Communist nations. The organization controls its own transport for moving supplies from Conakry to bases along Guinea's northwest border, and it operates its own hospital near Boke. Toure had permitted the PAIGC considerable autonomy in running its operation from Guinea, but following the assassination of PAIGC leader Amilcar Cabral in Conakry on 20 January 1973, Toure began to assert more control over the organization's activities in Guinea. Toure's moves strained relations between the two, and in early 1973 rebel combat troops stationed in Conakry began relocating to the "liberated" territories. Only a small headquarters staff remained in Conakry to handle

incoming supplies. There are compelling reasons on both sides to patch up the quarrel, however, and no significant diminution of Guinean help is expected.

The fact that Conakry was the location for a meeting in April 1972 of the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization resulted in much favorable publicity for the PAIGC (Figure 6). Toure pushed other African governments hard for more concrete demonstrations of support for the anti-Portuguese struggle following the 1970 Portuguese-led attack on Conakry, and in 1971 the African Liberation Committee of the OAU opened a subregional office in Conakry. Toure believes that other African governments are not doing enough to aid the liberation movements, and he advocates a coordinated African effort to oust Portugal from the continent. The Guinean Party Central Committee proposed to Senegal in late October that both countries aid the PAIGC militarily. Toure's desire to broaden the struggle in Portuguese Guinea is motivated in part by his fear that Guinea alone would bear the brunt of future Portuguese retaliation, as it did in 1970. Toure, who sees himself as a leader of the anticolonial struggle in Africa, also gives strong diplomatic and propaganda support to other liberation movements whose goal is the ouster of the Portuguese from all of Africa.

For some years Guinea's relations with Senegal and Ivory Coast have been seriously strained. Although specific incidents have over the years produced acute tensions, the continued poor relations result more from basic differences of philosophy and temperament between President Toure on the one hand and Presidents Senghor of Senegal and Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast on the other. Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny have advocated free enterprise and close ties with France and the West, while Toure has emphasized socialism, close ties with Communist governments, and Africanization. There also are basic difference in attitudes toward South Africa. Toure regards dialog with South Africa, as proposed by Houphouet-Boigny in 1971, as a betrayal of Africa's interests.

Tensions among the three leaders also are increased by the fact that among the hundreds of thousands of Guineans who have fled to neighboring countries for economic or political reasons, some are actively working for Toure's overthrow. In 1966 Guinean exiles in Abidjan formed, with help from the Ivory Coast Government, the Guinean National Liberation Front in an attempt to unify all anti-Toure exiles. The refusal of authorities in Dakar and Abidjan to return anti-Toure exiles to Guinea and to end completely the



FIGURE 6. The U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization visits Guinea in April 1972. (top) Opening meeting of the committee at the People's Palace. (center) Members of the PAIGC in fatigues at the opening meeting. (bottom) Committee members at a PAIGC school. (C)

activities of Liberation Front members on their soil has not helped smooth relations with Conakry.

Relations between Guinea and Senegal were further embittered by their dispute following the Portuguese-led attack on Conakry in 1970. Senghor's unwillingness to extradite Guinean exiles charged with complicity in the attack resulted in a propaganda war

and various retaliatory measures in the diplomatic and economic fields, and it prompted Toure to complain to the OAU. After several mediation efforts by a special OAU committee of African leaders, a public reconciliation was reached in Monrovia just before the 1972 OAU summit in Rabat. The exile question undoubtedly was also discussed at a meeting in Guinea in July 1972 between Toure and Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny. Although no agreements were announced, the fact that the meeting—the first between the two men in 9 years—took place at all indicates a desire on both sides to seek improved relations. Any lasting reconciliation with either Senghor or Houphouet-Boigny, however, depends on their willingness to eliminate exile activity within their countries.

Sekou Toure's concept of African unity allows for regional organizations, but only if such groupings are not vulnerable to pressure and manipulation by foreign powers. An example of one organization that does not meet Toure's standards and is consequently condemned as an expression of neocolonialism is the French-inspired Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization. Toure would participate gladly to see Africans exert more control over their financial affairs. A common African currency not based on the French franc or the English pound, for example, would not only be ideologically sound, according to Toure, but would offer him a politically acceptable way to revamp Guinea's financial structure, which now depends on the unbacked and virtually worthless Guinean syli.

Toure favors a regional grouping combining both French- and English-speaking African countries, and he has supported moves in that direction, notably at discussions in Monrovia in April 1968. He supports the idea for the same reason that France opposes it: because economically powerful states such as Nigeria would overshadow France's main backers in Africa and probably diminish French hegemony among its former colonies. As with all African groupings, the crucial test for Toure is whether an organization is free from control, formal or otherwise, by non-Africans.

Guinea has not taken a position on the newly formed Organization for the Development of the Senegal River composed of Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania. For political reasons Toure gave rhetorical support to its predecessor organization, the Organization of Senegal River States, which had the same purpose and included Guinea. Toure's dispute with Senghor in 1971 forced the other three members to regroup without Guinea in order to make any progress toward approving and implementing



development plans. Mali and Mauritania were careful not to exclude the possibility of Guinea's joining the new organization in the future if it so wishes, however.

**b. Relations with Communist states**

Guinea has diplomatic relations with all Communist countries, and most of them maintain diplomatic missions in Conakry. The U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, and Cuba support significant military and economic assistance programs in Guinea. Trade with Communist countries continues to be fairly heavy. Several hundred Guineans are studying in Communist countries, and well over a thousand Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban technicians work in Guinea.

The relatively close relations which Guinea maintains with most Communist countries were further strengthened in 1971 and 1972. Toure rhetorically placed Guinea in the forefront, along with the Communist states, of the world socialist camp and claimed an important role for Guinea in the fight against world imperialism. Both the U.S.S.R. and China renewed their political support of the Toure regime during 1971, and Communist aid commitments, physical presence, and role in Guinea's security services were all expanded. Guinean delegations visited the U.S.S.R., China, East Germany, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Albania during 1971. The Hungarian President visited Conakry in December 1971, a high-level delegation of the CPSU attended the 25th anniversary of the PDG in May 1972, and Cuban Premier Fidel Castro paid an official visit, also in May. The Communist-front World Peace Council awarded its 1971 peace prize to President Toure. On the economic side the U.S.S.R. began implementing an agreement concluded in 1969 under which the Soviets agreed to provide \$92 million in aid as their share of a joint project for exploiting the bauxite deposits near Kindia.

The Communist states were the first nations to offer aid and recognition when Guinea became independent in 1958. Since that time they have extended over \$300 million in economic aid to Guinea and have provided economic advisers as well. The raid on Conakry and Portugal's role in the invasion were cited by Toure as conclusive "proof" that Guinea was the target of a permanent imperialist plot. Toure bitterly condemned not only Portugal but gradually extended his condemnation to five major Western powers, including the United States. Expecting new attacks, Toure turned to the U.S.S.R. and the other Communist states for help, especially military aid. The Soviets seized the opportunity and were able to

enlarge their foothold in Guinea at minimum risk and cost. Sizable shipments of military supplies, including additional MiG's, tanks, and radar-controlled guns, were sent to Toure, along with more Soviet technicians to advise on radio operations, gunnery, and construction of military fortifications. Moscow also gave political and propaganda support to the Guinean cause.

The 1970 raid on Conakry has worked to the benefit of the Communist nations—particularly Cuba and the Soviet Union—because it heightened Toure's security fears and prompted him to establish closer relations with these nations. Nevertheless, Toure continues to insist—and justifiably—that he is not a puppet.

Conakry's relations with Moscow have not always been entirely smooth, although Toure's ideological proclivities and his need for Soviet aid have usually prevented a serious breach in relations. On two occasions, in 1961 and 1969, Toure ordered the Soviet ambassador to leave because of alleged involvement with Guinean dissidents. In addition, a Soviet vice consul was quietly expelled in January 1972, because of Guinean suspicions about his local contacts.

The presence of an almost permanent Soviet naval patrol off the coast of Guinea since mid-December 1970 adds a new, important dimension to U.S.S.R.-Guinea relations. The patrol, usually consisting of two or three warships and a support vessel, was provided by Moscow in answer to Toure's appeals for help after the Portuguese attack. The Soviet ships have free access to Conakry harbor and have broadened their mission to include visits to other west African capitals.

China is the only major power which has had a consistently good reputation with Guineans, who admire the unobtrusive and hard-working Chinese technicians—numbering some 500-600 in late 1972. The Chinese took advantage of a crisis in U.S.-Guinean relations in late 1966 to strengthen their position. A climate of mutual trust has been created over the years with the extension of unfettered aid on generous terms. The Chinese have concentrated mainly on agricultural and hydroelectric projects, but they also built a cigarette and match factory and are reported to have established a small arms repair facility. Many Guineans, including President Toure, are impressed by China's revolutionary ideology, the apparent similarity of China's problems with those of Guinea, and the exemplary behavior of Chinese technicians. Moreover, China has thus far managed to avoid the charge of attempting to subvert the Guinean Government—a charge which Toure has leveled at one time or another against every other major aid donor. Peking responded to the 1970 invasion of

Conakry with additional aid. An exchange of military delegations in mid-1971 was followed by small Chinese shipments of military supplies to Guinea, but the U.S.S.R. remains by far the major provider of arms aid.

Guinea also maintains good relations with other Communist countries. North Korea has given token aid, and a military delegation visited Conakry in **March** 1971, although no aid agreement seems to have been signed. Guinea signed a cultural agreement with North Vietnam in 1966, while proclaiming its support for Vietnam's fight against U.S. imperialism. Conakry's close contacts with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam constitute recognition in all but the formal sense. Guinea has relations with all Eastern European nations, including East Germany, whose mission to Conakry was raised to ambassadorial level in September 1970. Almost all of the Communist states of Europe provide Guinea with some form of aid.

Cuba has good revolutionary credentials in the eyes of the Guinean leaders, who view Fidel Castro as a successful revolutionary. The visit of Fidel Castro to Conakry in May 1972 highlighted the steadily developing relations between the two countries. The number of Cubans working in Guinea and the extent of Havana's aid expanded in 1971 and 1972, probably as a result of the events of November 1970 and Toure's desire to keep the foreign aid program to Guinea as broadly based as possible. Cuba provides some military assistance and assigns advisers to train Guinea's militia and security services. In 1972 the Cubans constructed and began operating a special militia training center north of Conakry in 1972 and began work on improving Conakry airport. Militia members also are sent to Cuba for training. Cuba is believed to rank third, after the U.S.S.R. and China, in the number of advisers and technicians assigned to Guinea. In late 1972 there were an estimated 370 Cubans in Guinea, some of whom are connected with Havana's support of the Conakry-based PAIGC.

#### *c. Relations with Western states*

Guinea's relations with the West in general have alternated between periods of cordiality and periods of dramatic tensions. Basically, Guinea's leaders view reliance on Western aid as a step backward toward colonialism. Relations are further confused by the fact that the regime's frequent public attacks on various Western governments often coincide with private assurances to those governments with which it still has diplomatic ties that Guinea desires good relations.

These assurances are usually motivated by purely economic considerations, while Toure's Marxist predilections account for his hostility to the capitalist world. A complete break with the West is unlikely because Toure still recognizes the need for Western capital and technical help and sees the West as a useful counterbalance to the Communists. Shrewd manipulation of East-West rivalries has brought extensions of over \$500 million in foreign aid to Guinea since independence.

No period of tension has been more dramatic than that which followed the 1970 attack on Conakry. The raid and its aftermath led to an erosion of the Western position. The staff of the U.S. mission was reduced because of Guinean harassment, and tight restrictions were imposed by Guinea on the activities of remaining diplomats. As of early 1973 the United States, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland were the only Western governments operating embassies in Conakry. Government dealings with Western nationals, including representatives of Western mining concessions, were often arbitrary and harsh. Dozens of foreigners, particularly German and French citizens, were abruptly arrested or expelled. The U.N. development program to Guinea was crippled by expulsion of most of its personnel. Radio and press denunciations of NATO, U.S. "imperialism," capitalism, and neocolonialism were made almost daily, beginning in July 1971, but by early 1972 overt manifestations of the hostility, particularly the radio denunciations, had subsided.

West Germany, whose standing in Conakry had been deteriorating since early 1970, was an early casualty of the November 1970 attack. Toure charged Bonn's ambassador in Conakry with complicity in the raid and the West German Government with supplying arms and uniforms to the attackers. Toure also claimed that Bonn had assumed control of the anti-Toure exile movement following Conakry's diplomatic break with Paris in 1965. Relations were broken in January 1971, and all West German nationals were ordered out of the country.

Economic self-interest has dictated the reestablishment of normal relations with the United States, and this probably softened anti-U.S. actions taken during the postinvasion period. Since the mid-1960's, U.S. aid, especially P.L. 480 food, has been crucial to the Guinean economy, and private U.S. investment is a prime factor in developing Guinea's bauxite, on which the regime pins its hopes for economic advancement in the 1970's. Conakry's regular submission of its annual P.L. 480 request in December 1971 was one of the

early signs that, despite public attacks, Guinea wanted economic cooperation with the United States to continue.

U.S.-Guinean relations had worsened steadily during 1971, as Guinean charges of U.S. subversion and meddling became more explicit. U.S. membership in NATO, Washington's refusal to condemn Portugal in the United Nations, and Toure's conviction that the United States, as an ally of Portugal in NATO, at least had foreknowledge of the Portuguese plans—all contributed to the strains. Virtually all important Guinean officials overly friendly to the United States and the West were among those arrested during the purge. The climate of suspicion made it impossible for the small Peace Corps program to continue. At one point the U.S. aid program was referred to as a cover for U.S. intelligence activities.

U.S. protests of the allegations initially were met with private assurances that these were not official views but simply charges by individuals that required further investigation. By this approach Toure evidently hoped to keep his options open. This ambiguity, which has characterized U.S.-Guinean relations almost since independence, results largely from ideological factors. Close ties with the United States do not easily harmonize with Guinea's more militant revolutionary posture, and Sekou Toure is careful that no one appears more militant than he. The public denunciations satisfied the ideological requirement that the United States be condemned as part of the "imperialist conspiracy," while the private assurances were designed to salvage a basis for continued cooperation.

Toure has avoided staking his personal prestige on a pro- or anti-U.S. policy, and on those occasions when anti-Americanism or suspicion of Westerners was stimulated by events—as in 1970-71—the Guinean leadership has permitted and even encouraged the expression of popular emotions. A crisis in 1966 led to demonstrations at the U.S. Embassy and expulsion of the Peace Corps. U.S. aid was reduced at that time and now consists only of a small P.L. 480 program.

The government's attitude toward France is ambivalent. Cultural and language ties remain, but emotions aroused in the preindependence political campaigns and by France's brusque withdrawal after the 1958 referendum aggravated anti-French feelings. The break in 1958 caused hostility on the French side as well, and it was not until January 1959 that France extended diplomatic recognition. Relations hit a low point in the spring and summer of 1960, when Guinea created its own currency free from ties with the French franc. Guinean charges of French complicity in a plot

to overthrow the government further aggravated relations and delayed the exchange of ambassadors until April 1961.

The Guinean Government made a concerted effort to strengthen ties with France in the wake of charges by Toure in late 1961 that Soviet representatives were engaged in subversive activity. Guinea was interested in finding new sources of foreign aid, both to make up for anticipated Soviet cutbacks and to assert its independence of Communist countries. Toure has frequently employed this tactic whenever Guinea's relations with one or another major aid donor have soured.

Basic suspicions between France and Guinea remained, however, and their fragile relations were again shattered in late 1965, when Toure accused France and Ivory Coast of engineering and financing a plot to overthrow his regime. Diplomatic ties were broken and have not been reestablished. Guinea made overtures to France in late 1967, but the suspicion that Paris was involved in the Mali coup of 1968 revived old animosities. France's pro-Biafra sentiments during the Nigerian civil war also were viewed as evidence of French neocolonialist designs on Africa.

The familiar pattern of Guinean overtures and French caution, followed by a dramatic event precluding reconciliation, was repeated in 1970. Talks on longstanding financial differences were held early in the year, touching off speculation about eventual normalization of political ties. The Portuguese attack on Conakry in November and subsequent Guinean charges of French complicity dashed hopes for progress toward better relations. French nationals living in Guinea were a particular target of the Toure regime during the 1971 purges. Some French nationals were released from Guinean jails in December 1972, however, and the time may be ripe for a cautious resumption of contacts with Paris.

Guinea retains diplomatic relations with a number of other Western countries and is an active participant in various international organizations. In line with its anticolonial foreign policy and its solidarity with the other African states, Guinea broke relations with the United Kingdom in December 1965 over the Rhodesia question. Unlike France, the United Kingdom accepted Toure's overtures in 1967 for better relations, and diplomatic relations were reestablished a year later. As a member of the United Nations, Guinea is primarily interested in colonial issues, particularly Portuguese activities in Africa, and in the problems of underdeveloped countries. Guinea began a 2-year term as one of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council in 1972.

## E. Threats to government stability (S)

The hostility directed toward Guinea by France and its African client states—both at the time Guinea opted for independence and since—has induced among Guinean leaders a profound sense of isolation and suspicion that is often described as paranoid by outside observers. As far as Toure is concerned, foreign subversion, particularly by the "imperialists," is a fact of Guinean life. Portuguese involvement in the November 1970 raid is seen by him as dramatic proof of this view. The regime also has always had an appreciation of the propaganda value of the charges of alleged subversion and has employed them to explain away regime failures and to justify Toure's constant demands for more sacrifices and greater militancy. This tactic has never been fully successful, however, and there is considerable popular discontent with the regime.

### I. Discontent and dissidence

Popular dissatisfaction focuses on the stagnant economy and the burdensome measures imposed by the government to promote its economic plans and maintain tight political control. Economic stagnation and economic difficulties are all the more glaring because of the nation's large mineral reserves and its agricultural land suitable for a variety of crops. The popular reaction to the government's poor performance has not been open hostility; the tight political controls imposed by the regime inhibit the development of an effective internal opposition. Some disaffected Guineans leave the country illegally. Others retreat to the interior or to the family farm, where government mismanagement and restrictions on individual freedom have less impact. The disaffection of young people and students appears to have been a particular problem for Toure in the past few years, calling into question the effectiveness of the regime's pervasive indoctrination programs in the schools.

Merchants in particular are dissatisfied with regime policies. Prior to November 1964 many merchants, traders, and market women were active in party affairs and won local election to top offices. As the regime's socialistic economic policies began to be implemented, however, their disruptive effects on the economy created popular dissatisfaction and growing demands for reform. On the defensive, the regime singled out the merchants as the scapegoats, and they became the principal targets of the November 1964 anticorruption drive and the first group against whom dismissal from party membership was used as a punishment. Among

those merchants disciplined were many of Lebanese extraction. The small (about 1,000) Lebanese community has never been fully integrated into Guinean life, and the Lebanese are regarded by the regime as exemplifying the exploitative, bourgeois mentality, although Toure probably does not feel they are a subversive threat.

One of the most difficult and persistent problems confronting Toure and the PDG is how to reconcile the differences between the political leaders who have risen through the party ranks and individuals, loosely defined as technocrats, who have reached positions of authority in the regime by virtue of their competence in a particular area. Both groups are party members, but the latter are generally less involved in party affairs, favor more pragmatism in economic policies, are more informed about the world outside Guinea, favor closer ties with non-Communist countries, and are better educated than many PDG officials. The politicians cling to Marxist slogans and emphasize loyalty as the principal criterion for advancement. They are distrustful of the outside world, favor curbing foreign investment, and advocate a more militant line for the party.

Toure tends to favor party regulars over the technocrats, because he sees the latter as a potentially antirevolutionary class of entrepreneurs whose interests often coincide with those of foreign capitalists. Frequent cases of corruption on the part of heads of enterprises or technocrats who deal with foreign firms have confirmed Toure's bias. In early 1969 a number of technically oriented middle-level officials were removed from office during a general purge. The finance and economic ministries were hardest hit. According to Toure, these elements constituted a national bourgeoisie that was helping foreign imperialists undermine the revolution. Appointments were henceforth to be made on the basis of political reliability. The even wider purge of 1971 finished what the purge of 1969 left undone and settled, at least for the time, the question of which group would prevail.

Despite Toure's success in maintaining tight political controls, the basic economic dilemma remains: how to revive Guinea's stagnant economy and promote rational economic development without creating a favored group of technically skilled individuals who would not be responsive to party slogans and discipline. There have been many false starts in the past, but finally in mid-1972 Toure appeared to be sufficiently confident of his political position to give serious attention to the economy. He announced that it was "time to build the material

base for socialism in Guinea" and ordered the drafting of a new 5-year plan. In a speech to the diplomatic corps Toure invited foreign help in achieving Guinea's economic goals and did not appear embarrassed by the fact that only a few months earlier he had described Western aid programs as vehicles for foreign espionage. His apparent readiness to seek greater foreign help in 1972 was tantamount to an admission that the demands for belt-tightening of the last decade and a half had taxed the patience of the people and risked the security of his regime.

Nevertheless, there are political dangers associated with a serious effort to deal with the nation's economic problems, since this would almost inevitably require increased foreign aid and provision of individual incentives to producers. This then would mean the position of the moderates and the technocrats would be strengthened and Toure would be vulnerable to charges from party militants that greater foreign involvement in the economy was a betrayal of the revolution. That charge was previously leveled at Toure because of his decision to allow foreign investors to provide some \$250 million for the development of Guinea's bauxite industry, one-half of which came from U.S. sources. Toure is an accomplished politician and manipulator of opinion, however, and he gives every appearance of being able to prevent his critics from coalescing into an organized opposition which would threaten his continued domination of national life.

In terms of power, the military is the greatest potential threat to the security of the government. Over the years the army ranks and the officer corps have been demoralized by purges, by lack of material and moral support from the government, and by President Toure's frequent insistence that professional military duties give way to civic action projects—such as roadbuilding—that are more befitting a "people's army."

Toure has always been wary of the coup potential of the armed forces. Following the army coup in Mali in 1968 he seemed particularly concerned about the loyalty of his own forces and took additional steps to subject them to party discipline. In early 1969 Toure disclosed an alleged military plot and arrested the deputy chief of staff of the army, the commanders of the small air force and navy, and scores of lower ranking personnel. Nine plotters were eventually sentenced to death. These moves coincided with his decision to upgrade the militant and more politically reliable 8,000-man militia, which was designated by Toure as the "defender of the revolution." Toure strengthened the militia further following the

November 1970 raid, crediting that body with driving out the attackers. He was critical of the army's poor showing and subsequently purged several ranking army officers, including its commander. Militia officers were even transferred into the regular army officer corps. Together the 1969 and postinvasion arrests represented a complete purge of the military command staff. Toure also has tried to insure that the other branches of the security service remain apart from army influence and control. Despite these provocations, the Guinean military shows no signs of willingness to challenge the government, although it still has the capability of being a threat to the regime.

Toure's precautionary moves have had the predictable effect of creating jealousy among the services and morale problems within the army. Nevertheless, they also have prohibited the concentration of military power in the hands of a single establishment or the creation of an elitist-minded officer corps similar to those that have intervened in the politics of many neighboring states. There are almost no professional military cadres. The principle of civilian control of the military is well established, and military personnel are considered civil servants.

Conflicts among other elements of the society undoubtedly exist. Even revolutionary Guinea must contend with divisions between youth and their elders, wage earners and subsistence farmers, and recently graduated students and older party members with less formal education. The conflicts are masked, however, because of the pervasive organization of the party, and Toure's tight control precludes popular expression of opposition to regime policies.

Ethnic rivalries also are present, but the regime's policy of absorbing ethnic leaders into the PDG and of downplaying loyalties has reduced the subversive threat from this factor. The political parties which opposed the PDG in the 1950's were constituted along ethnic lines; the PDG's principal competitors were two Fulani-backed parties. Because of the loss of their former commanding position, the Fulani are suspected by Toure of playing a prominent role in antiregime activities. Ethnic loyalties among the population are still strong, and PDG leaders closely monitor the activities of Fulani and other tribal groups for any sign of antigovernment activity. There is little likelihood that any ethnic-based group within Guinea could develop sufficient strength or popular support to overthrow Toure in the foreseeable future.

The extent of popular discontent can be measured by the number of Guineans who have fled the country since independence, most of them illegally. Estimates

run as high as one-sixth of the population. Ironically, emigration acts as a safety valve, removing the most seriously disaffected from the scene. Although popular dissatisfaction is potentially dangerous, civil disturbances sufficient to threaten the regime's survival would probably occur only if there should emerge an opposition leader with some visible support within the army, the police, or the militia. Economic hardship by itself has not been sufficient to provoke a flash revolt, and the average Guinean probably will not act against the regime unless he sees a realistic alternative to rule by Sekou Toure.

**2. Subversion**

**a. Permanent "imperialist" plot**

Sekou Toure equates all those who question his views, no matter how slightly, with subversives. He is continually on guard against all forms of plotting, but because of past experiences with colonialism and his general political outlook his primary preoccupation is with subversion from the "imperialists," particularly Portugal and France. Since independence five major subversive plots—only one of them with Communist links—have been exposed. The four "imperialist"-inspired plots are considered by Toure to be episodes in a continuous attempt to subvert his government. The most recent episode, which took place in November 1970, was the most serious threat to date and the only one in which foreign military elements participated directly. The shock waves were still being felt in Conakry in late 1972.

In the early morning hours of 22 November a commando force of about 300 to 400 men, consisting of Portuguese Army and Navy regulars and a smaller group of Guinean exiles, was ferried ashore at Conakry from unmarked Portuguese naval vessels clearly visible from the port area. Although the Portuguese and the exiles acted together, each seemed to have different objectives. The Portuguese forces, black African commandos most likely recruited originally to combat PAIGC, struck the Conakry headquarters of that rebel movement. The attackers were unsuccessful in their attempt to kill the rebel leader, but they did manage to free several Portuguese prisoners held in a Guinean military camp. The Guinean exiles, on the other hand, were out to topple the regime, and they hoped that their presence would spark a popular uprising against the President. Portugal supported the operation because, in addition to striking at PAIGC, it offered a chance to overthrow Toure, who allows PAIGC to operate from bases inside Guinea.

The Portuguese contingent handled its tasks skillfully and professionally. The force and the rescued prisoners had withdrawn to the waiting ships less than 24 hours after the landing. The exile contingent, however, was rounded up by Toure's security forces after waiting in vain for an uprising. For almost a year the regime pressed a witch hunt for subversives and suspected supporters of the invaders. Figure 7 shows a display of arms captured from the invaders.

The exile contingent was recruited under the banner of the Guinean National Liberation Front (FLNG), a loosely organized dissident group whose main centers of activity are in Paris, Dakar, and Abidjan. FLNG, the only known organized opposition to Sekou Toure, draws its support from among the over half million Guineans living outside the country. Its leadership consists mostly of politicians who lost out to Toure in the preindependence power struggle and of defectors from the Toure government. FLNG made its first public appearance in Abidjan in March 1966. At that time it had the covert support of the French Government and the open backing of the Ivory Coast Government, which was sharply at odds with Toure.

FLNG is a heterogeneous grouping beset by perennial financial problems and by chronic disputes over questions of tactics and leadership. Prior to November 1970, FLNG tactics centered on propaganda and occasional infiltration efforts, and the front showed little capacity to affect events within Guinea. Broke and ineffectual, FLNG turned for aid in early 1970 to the Portuguese, who wanted to get even with Sekou Toure for his unrestricted aid to




FIGURE 7. African leaders at OAU meeting in Lagos inspecting arms captured from invaders in late 1970 (C)

PAIGC, the successful insurgent organization that controlled a part of Portuguese Guinea. The November raid was the result.

Since the attack, FLNG seems to have reverted to its previous ineffective state. Lisbon, which suffered politically from the raid, apparently has withdrawn its backing, although it probably maintains some contacts with the exiles against the possibility of future cooperation. The likelihood of such cooperation would be increased if PAIGC scored significant military or political successes in its skirmishes with the Portuguese. Continued lack of foreign backing probably will force FLNG to revert to previous tactics, including renewed efforts to assassinate Toure. FLNG's leadership appeared to be in a state of flux in mid-1972, as the various factions sought to shift the blame for the failure of the raid and to reorganize the movement. Moreover, the extensive arrests in Guinea following the 1970 attack almost certainly destroyed the bulk of FLNG's organizational assets within the country. Whatever support FLNG has in Guinea rests mainly on kinship solidarity. Bitterness on the part of relatives of those purged following the 1970 raid may have produced a number of silent sympathizers for FLNG's cause.

The regime maintains that "imperialist" plotting predates the raid on Conakry, and as proof the government points to a series of incidents which occurred in the middle and late 1960's. An assassination attempt in June 1969 while Toure was riding in an open car with Zambian President Kaunda was publicly attributed to the "imperialists." President Toure also linked "imperialists" (particularly France) with the military coup in Mali in 1968 and warned that their next target was Guinea.

In March 1969 an alleged conspiracy by army officers to assassinate Toure resulted in a general purge of military and government officials. President Toure viewed the conspiracy as merely a continuation of the abortive 1965 plot—allegedly engineered and financed by Ivory Coast and France—to overthrow his government. The 1965 conspirators counted on intervention by the army in support of a general uprising against the government, but they were arrested before the plans were put into action.

Government accounts of the 1965 plot hit hard at the theme of outside direction of counterrevolutionary elements within Guinea—a theme that Toure seized upon in 1971 when he charged several Western countries with conducting espionage operations in Guinea, aided by opponents of the regime. The charge of foreign direction was also leveled at the participants in an anti-Toure plot uncovered in April 1960, shortly

after Guinea's creation of its own currency, a symbolic last step in the break with France. Arms caches were discovered in neighboring territories still under French control, and Toure charged that the aim was to foment a Fulani tribal uprising with covert French aid.

In all these cases, the active plotters were few in number, and personal ambition rather than ideological issues played a large role. Most of the plotters appeared to favor dramatic actions that they hoped would trigger a general uprising or military intervention. In each case the regime exposed the plots before they could achieve any results and meted out harsh punishment. Although many Guineans are dissatisfied with the regime in varying degrees, there is little indication that they have any serious organization or capability for overthrowing it. However, an isolated, unpredictable event such as an assassination of Toure remains possible and could spark a general uprising.

*b. Communist-inspired subversion*

Since independence Guinea has had extensive political, economic, cultural, and educational contacts with both European and Asian Communist countries, and these ties generally have boosted the prestige of those countries in Guinean eyes. Toure has not given the Communist nations carte blanche, however, as was evident by his vigorous reaction to what he believed were subversive contacts between certain Guinean radicals and Soviet diplomats in the early 1960's. The representatives of the Communist states probably have little incentive to engage in activities which would risk jeopardizing their generally favorable situation in Guinea.

Toure keeps careful watch on Communist, particularly Soviet, activities, and has reacted strongly to any hint of unauthorized involvement in Guinea's internal affairs. Toure has leveled charges of subversion against the Soviets on at least three occasions, although he has succeeded in linking them directly with only one specific plot. In 1961, during a period of popular discontent over poor economic conditions, leftwing leaders of the teachers union publicly criticized the Toure government for failing to improve conditions since coming to power. The government reacted by arresting two top union officials and five teachers. Secondary school students in Conakry and in some interior towns then staged a sympathy strike in support of their teachers. Fearing the protest might spread, the government called out the militia, which was able to break the strike but only by resorting to brutal measures. Convinced that the

Soviet Union had aided and encouraged the strikers. Toure expelled the Soviet Ambassador in December of that year and curtailed Communist propaganda activity. However, full diplomatic ties were soon restored. In 1969 relations with Moscow again entered a period of chill. Toure requested the withdrawal of the Soviet Ambassador after he learned of contacts between Soviet Embassy officials and individuals involved in an attempt to assassinate the President. In 1972 a Soviet Vice Consul was expelled under circumstances which suggested he had been charged with espionage and subversion.

The U.S.S.R. has provided credits and technical aid in many fields, including education, medicine, and industry. Participation in the bauxite mining project near Kindia also adds to long-term Soviet leverage. In addition, the Soviet Union gives large amounts of military aid to Guinea. The Eastern European countries are active and influential in the fields of labor, education, information, and youth activities; they also provide technical aid in various areas, including civil aviation, mining, medicine, and hydroelectric development. There are frequent exchanges of delegations in these fields, and many Guineans associated with them are trained in Communist countries. All these activities present the Communists with opportunities to cultivate a susceptible cadre within the regime.

Several Communist-front and Third World solidarity organizations are active in Guinea, and some have regional offices in Conakry. The regime does not permit Guinean organizations to belong to the major Communist-front organizations such as the World Federation of Democratic Youth or the World Federation of Trade Unions, but it does send large delegations to international meetings sponsored by these groups. The main interest of the PDG is in African and Third World affairs, and the PDG is a member of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization and of the Afro-Asian and Latin American People's Solidarity Organization. Guinea disseminates their propaganda in its press and radiobroadcasts.

China was slower than the European Communist countries in offering aid to Guinea, but it has stepped up its aid program since 1964 and has been improving its political and propaganda position. Careful not to leave themselves open to charges of subversion, the Chinese have concentrated on technical aid programs, especially in agriculture, where they feel they have a particular competence. The Chinese have sought to influence Guinea's political direction by paying special attention to the information media and the

youth organization. A portion of Guinean youth is particularly susceptible to the Maoist views on militancy and revolutionary purity, perhaps finding they have some relevance in light of the malfeasance and favoritism practiced by many PDG section and federation leaders.

Because the Chinese have scrupulously refrained from any actions Guinea might construe as interference in its internal affairs, the regime probably does not regard their activities as having a dangerous subversive potential. Nevertheless, the ever-suspicious government does monitor these activities, and should the Chinese move too openly to establish their influence—particularly within the militia, which Toure views as a primary bulwark of his strength—they can expect the President to react as strongly as he did against the Soviets in late 1961.

#### F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

Guinea is a police state ruled by a strongman whose position depends largely on the effectiveness of his disciplined political organization, on an extensive network of private informers, and on six separate security services, all of them are controlled by the President. Two of the services, the police and the gendarmerie, are formally assigned the major responsibility for police duties; however, the military, the Republican Guard, and the militia have police-type duties among their responsibilities. In addition, a special security organization was formed in mid-1972 to protect the President and act as a riot police force.

Most of the conditions traditionally associated with a police state are present in Guinea to varying degrees. President Toure trusts no one and is ready to believe rumors of betrayal by subordinates whose loyalty had previously been unquestioned. Consequently, the fear of denunciation and arbitrary arrest is ever present among the general populace and among those nearest Toure. Individuals and organizations vie to prove their dedication to the revolution. Tight restrictions on information and travel have been imposed, and there is no truth but that which is expounded by the President.

Control of the population is facilitated by a mandatory system of identity cards issued by the National Police. Information contained on the cards which often are required at checkpoints established throughout the country, includes the individual's home region, *arrondissement*, and local PDG committee, his date and place of birth, his photograph and fingerprints, and his signature. To obtain a card the citizen must produce a birth certificate, a



certificate of residence issued by his local party committee, and a tax receipt. New national identity cards were issued in April 1972.

Numerous changes in the lines of authority that accompanied the political upheavals during 1971, combined with the secretiveness of the Guinean system, have severely limited the amount of current information available on the organization of Guinea's police and security service. Following the 1970 attack on Conakry, responsibility for the direction of Guinea's defense was placed in the hands of a newly created High Command. A separate committee with overlapping membership was created to coordinate the orders of the High Command and the activities of the various federation headquarters. The Ministry of Interior and Security was represented on the Coordinating Committee, but apparently not on the High Command. Subsequent reorganizations have cast doubt as to the continued functioning of these bodies. Most organizational changes since January 1969 have increased the directness of presidential control, brought the regular military more firmly under the umbrella of the PDG, and augmented the power of the paramilitary organization at the expense of the regular army.

**I. Police**

The two organizations whose primary duties are normally associated with a police force are the National Police Force and the gendarmerie. The police are responsible for maintaining law and order, and are most active in urban areas, particularly Conakry. Their chain of command is not known precisely. Presumably the police general staff still exists, although it was not specifically mentioned in the flurry of decrees issued immediately following the 1970 attack. The police are responsible to the President through the Minister of the Domain of Interior and Security. Locally, each of Guinea's 29 administrative regions has its own police commissioner, who is under the jurisdiction of the respective regional governors. Police commissioners also exist at the *arrondissement* level.

The 1,500-man National Police Force performs ordinary police functions—investigation of crimes, traffic control, and law enforcement. It includes a number of specialized police and security units, such as the *Surete Nationale*, the Economic Police Force, and immigration and customs inspectors. Many of these have overlapping functions.

The Economic Police Force was created in 1963. Charged with the suppression of economic crimes, fraud, and speculation leading to price fluctuations, it

has been accorded the right to search and seize. The Economic Police assume particularly active roles during the anticorruption campaigns announced periodically by the leadership. The Economic Police are not effective, however, because they are subverted, through bribes, by those they should control.

Immigration and customs inspectors are present at all important border-crossing points. They cooperate closely with the gendarmerie units patrolling the borders and with the *Surete*. Detachments are on duty in Conakry at the port and at the international airport. Entry and exit are tightly controlled, and border authorities are particularly alert to smuggling attempts and to border crossings by anti-Toure personnel.

Guinean police appear to be reasonably effective in maintaining order; however, police recruits are not as well trained and equipped as those of the other uniformed services. Recruits are sent to the Police Training School at Kankan, which is estimated to have trained about 360 recruits between 1959 and 1966. Details on the availability of laboratory and technical aids to investigation, such as fingerprinting and ballistics, are not available, but such aids are believed to be minimal.

President Toure relies heavily on the 1,000-man National Gendarmerie to maintain order, particularly in rural areas. Its duties also include maintenance of internal security. It provides normal police services for much of the population and controls the country's borders. (The army also has some responsibilities for border control, particularly along the border with Portuguese Guinea.) The gendarmerie is headed by a chief of staff, who coordinates its activities with other services in the Combined Staff. Coordination also is required with the governor of the region in which units are located. The gendarmerie is divided among five squadron areas, following the general pattern of the country's four major geographic regions plus Conakry. Squadron headquarters are located at Kindia, Labe, Kankan, Nzerekore, and Conakry. Within each squadron area the gendarmerie is organized into city brigades, frontier brigades, and mobile platoons. Because the gendarmerie is lightly armed, has limited transportation equipment, and is widely dispersed throughout the country, coordinated action is very difficult. It is a moderately well-trained force, however, and can perform its mission capably during normal times. The gendarmerie is treated by Toure as a separate, select group among the branches of the armed forces. Toure's favoritism was indicated in February 1970, when control of Guinea's only effective communications network, which serves the

army, police, gendarmerie, and regional government officials, was transferred from army to gendarmerie control. The gendarmerie seems to have performed to the President's satisfaction since 1970 and has kept him well informed about events within the interior. Gendarmerie recruits are selected from the army and sent to the gendarmerie training school in Conakry.

The exact function of the approximately 1,200 Republican Guard is not known, but the Guard falls under the Minister of the Domain of Interior and Security and directly under the control of the *Surete Nationale*. The Guard's duties have previously included protection of the President, other government officials, and government installations. Important political prisoners were often placed in the Guard's custody. Toure reorganized his personal bodyguard after 1970, increasing his reliance on Cuban and Soviet advisers and purging several Guineans from this elite group. It is not known precisely how these changes affected the duties of the Republican Guard. There are Guard troops in each administrative region. The force lost its job as guard of the Presidential Palace to the special security force organized in 1972.

The 8,000-man militia, a paramilitary organization attached to the PDC, has important police functions although it is not a regular police force. Administrative control of the militia rests with the Minister of the People's Army. Normally it is used on ceremonial occasions to help organize demonstrations and keep order. In some villages where there are no regular security forces, the militia appears to have a primary role in maintaining law and order. Militia tactics include the setting up of roadblocks and checkpoints to examine work and travel permits, and it has been empowered to make arrests. Many militiamen are armed during alerts. The militia is especially important to the regime as an instrument for reporting on the movement and activities of the population. Informal sources, such as members of the militia and party informants, provide the regime with much of its most important information.

## 2. Intelligence and security services

The 1971 purges enhanced the role played by the intelligence and security services. By 1972 their status was quite high, and all other ministries paid deference to the Ministry of Interior and Security. The regular intelligence and security force is active and effective in monitoring the diplomatic community. Judging from the quick exposure and suppression of even the slightest manifestation of anti-Toure activity, the

security services are effective in protecting the regime against subversion. Cubans are the principal advisers to the intelligence and security services, as well as to the Presidential Security Force. An estimated 40 Cubans were serving as advisers as of August 1972.

Included in both the PDC and the militia are irregular systems of informants who report directly to the President and to the police. These individuals often are not paid but provide information as a service to the party. President Toure has the largest network of informants, who operate outside the regular channels of the security services to help him keep tabs on his ministers and other important Guineans. This network, probably organized along family lines, appears to be quite effective.

The *Surete Nationale* is the principal body specifically organized to provide intelligence and to act as the investigative element against subversion. It monitors internal political activity and maintains surveillance over the activities of the foreign community. Because of Toure's suspicions and fears of possible threats to Guinea's independence and sovereignty, surveillance and investigation—both of foreigners and of Guineans—are important functions of the *Surete Nationale*. Mail is censored, phones are tapped, travel to the interior and abroad is carefully controlled through visas and permits, a curfew for foreigners is enforced, and official contacts between foreign diplomats and Guineans must be approved in advance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Checkpoints are established on the outskirts of Conakry and throughout the country, and planned long absences from one's home area must be cleared in advance by local party and police officials. The police traffic section—a unit responsible for highway security outside the towns, especially in the Conakry area—was renamed the Commissariat of Public Roads and placed under the control of the *Surete* in 1966.

Military intelligence functions were the responsibility of the *Deuxieme Bureau* of the army until early 1970, when that bureau was abolished. There is no evidence that the bureau was reestablished following the 1970 attack. Since its demise, President Toure has relied primarily on the *Surete Nationale*, border-control units of the gendarmerie, and the reporting of various informers to provide him with most of the intelligence he considers important. Collection of intelligence on Guinean exiles and on foreign countries has probably been assumed by the *Surete*, whose officials also advised Sierra Leone President Siaka Stevens on security matters following Stevens' takeover in 1968.

### 3. Countersubversive measures and capabilities

The Guinean security services have, on the whole, proved themselves loyal to the government. Open dissidence has been effectively suppressed on those rare occasions when it has occurred. The allocation of security duties among several different organizations (and the care taken to see that no one individual or group accumulates power sufficient to threaten the President) has given Toure alternative means of control should one organization prove wanting. For instance, Toure ordered a special army unit from Conakry to Faranah in 1972 when local officials and security forces proved either unable or unwilling to suppress public disorders during and after an election dispute. When army units failed to respond effectively to orders during the 1970 raid on Conakry, Toure depended on local militia units and the gendarmerie to repulse the invaders. Both units seemed to perform to Toure's satisfaction.

The government possesses the ability to move a few hundred troops to strategic places within the country. Transport aircraft are available, and there are airfields at the important interior towns. About 200 Guinean troops were moved overland by truck to Freetown, Sierra Leone, during a government crisis in that country in 1971.

The overall effectiveness of the security forces and their ability to protect the regime are attested to by the fact that no internally inspired coup plot has ever been implemented. Such plots, which included some contrived by Toure for political reasons, have been exposed at an early stage.

### G. Selected bibliography (U/OU)

Political turmoil and government suspicions have prevented field research in Guinea during recent years. The few comprehensive treatments which exist are in the French language and often are dated.

Arcin. *La Guinee Francaise*. Paris, 1907. Old, but still the basic work on Guinean ethnic groups.

Attwood, William. *The Reds and the Blacks*. New York: Harper and Row, 1967. Includes an interesting account of Ambassador Attwood's tour in Guinea (1961-63).

Carter, Gwendolen. *African One-Party States*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960. Guinea is one of several states treated. Useful in helping assess Toure's one-party system.

Department of the Army. *Area Handbook for Guinea*. Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1961. A comprehensive, detailed survey of Guinea but somewhat dated.

Morrow, John H. *The First American Ambassador to Guinea*. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1968. Interesting, modern history, but conditions have changed considerably since it was written.

Riviere, Claude. *Mutations Sociales en Guinee*. Paris: Editions Marcel Riviere, 1971.

Suret-Canale, Jean. *La Republique de Guinee*. Paris: Editions Sociales, 1970. The best and most detailed available study of modern Guinea, despite the obvious leftist political outlook of the author, a French sociologist with Communist sympathies who spent 5 years in Guinea (1958-63) as a teacher.

## Chronology (u/ou)

1945

October

France grants political rights to African colonies, and Guinea elects representatives to French parliament for first time.

1946

October

African Democratic Rally (RDA) is founded by left-of-center African politicians from French colonies.

1952

Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG), Guinean branch of the RDA, is reorganized and Sekou Toure becomes secretary general.

1957

March

PDG wins 57 of 60 seats in Territorial Assembly and forms territorial cabinet. This assembly later becomes first National Assembly of the Republic of Guinea.

1958

September

In referendum Guinea rejects membership in French Community.

October

Guinea proclaims independence.

1960

February

FRIA (now FRIGUIA) alumina processing complex begins operations.

July

Three-Year Plan inaugurated.

1961

January

Sekou Toure elected to 7-year term as President of Guinea.

November

Leftwing "teachers plot" against government is exposed, followed by subsequent loosening of Guinea's close ties with Communist countries.

1964

November

In response to continuing economic decline, Toure decrees Guinea's "fundamental law of the revolution," which calls for greater state control of economy.

1965

October

Plot to overthrow the Toure regime is uncovered. Toure charges Ivory Coast and France with complicity and breaks relations with both.

1966

March

President Toure offers Kwame Nkrumah haven in Guinea after Nkrumah is overthrown by Ghanaian Army.

October

Guinea's Foreign Minister is detained in Sierra by Ghanaian officials as hostage for return of Nkrumah to Ghana. Toure holds United States responsible because minister was taken from U.S. commercial airliner. Issue resolved through OAU mediation.

1968

January

National elections held; Sekou Toure reelected President of Guinea by near-unanimous vote.

September

Guinea signs \$64.5 million loan with IBRD to finance exploitation of Boke bauxite deposits by Western consortium.

1969

January

Toure establishes political committees in Guinean Army, deemphasizes its military role, and increases its involvement in civic action programs.

March

About 40 military and civilian officials arrested in connection with alleged coup plot.

June

Toure narrowly escapes assassination during state visit of Zambian President Kaunda. Assailant is killed by security forces.

1970

November

Guinean exiles and Portuguese forces stage commando raid on Conakry, hitting the headquarters of the rebel movement opposed to Portuguese rule in Portuguese Guinea and freeing Portuguese prisoners captured by the rebels and held in Guinean Army camps.

December

Soviet naval vessels take up patrol off Guinea coast in response to Toure request.

1971

January

Toure charges West Germany with complicity in the 1970 attack on Conakry; all West German nationals are expelled from Guinea and relations are broken.

National Assembly sentences 92 persons to death and 72 to life imprisonment for their alleged part in 1970 attack.

SECRET

**March**

Guinea and Sierra Leone sign mutual defense agreement. Guinean troops immediately sent to Freetown to protect President Stevens from mutinous army troops.

**June**

Hundreds of Guineans and some foreigners arrested and interrogated. *Radio Guinea* airs extensive confessions which assert that U.S. and major Western powers were engaging in spying and subversion.

**1972**

**April**

Ninth National Congress of PDG announces government reorganization and points to economic development as principal concern for 1972.

**April-May**

Two brief visits to Liberia by President Toure mark first time in several years he has ventured outside Guinea.

**May-July**

Unusually large number of foreign dignitaries visit Guinea, including Cuban Premier Castro and Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny.

**1973**

**January**

PAIGC leader Amilcar Cabral assassinated in Conakry.

## Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	FOREIGN	ENGLISH
BPN.....	<i>Bureau Politique National</i> .....	National Political Bureau
CER.....	<i>Centres d'Enseignement Revolutionnaire</i> .....	Centers of Revolutionary Education
CNR.....	<i>Conseil National de la Revolution</i> .....	National Congress of the Revolution
CNTG.....	<i>Confederation Nationale des Travailleurs de Guinee</i>	National Confederation of Guinean Workers
FLNG.....	<i>Front de Liberation Nationale de Guinee</i> .....	Guinean National Liberation Front
JRDA.....	<i>Jeunesse de la Revolution Democratique Africaine</i>	Youth of the African Democratic Revolution
PAIGC.....	<i>Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde</i>	African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde
PDG.....	<i>Parti Democratique de Guinee</i> .....	Democratic Party of Guinea
PRL.....	<i>Pouvoir Revolutionnaire Local</i> .....	Local Revolutionary Authority
RDA.....	<i>Rassemblement Democratique Africain</i> .....	African Democratic Rally