

HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
APO 234 c/o PM San Francisco

INTERROGATION NO. 502

DATE: 4 December 1945  
Tokyo

Subject: Organization of DAI HOMEI and JOINT PLANNING

Personnel Interrogated and Background of Each:

Lt Gen MIYAZAKI Shuichi - Graduate Military Academy and Army War College. Instructor at War College, 1934. 1938-39, Staff Officer with Army in CHINA, (Hankow), 1939-40, Regimental Commander with KWANTUNG Army, MANCHURIA. Instructor, War College 1940-41 (18 months), 1942-43, SOLOMONS Area; eventually assumed position as Chief of Staff 17th Army GUADALCANAL, 1943-44, Chief Secretary, War College. Sept-Dec 1944, position of command with KWANGTSI Army, South China, Chief 1st Section SAIBO HONBU since 14 Dec 44.

Lt Col WADA moriya. Served in 1st PHILIPPINES Campaign. Returned to TOKYO in August 1943 and has since served as a Staff Officer in SAIBO HONBU.

Where interrogated; Japanese War Ministry

Interrogators: Col Philip COLE, GSC  
Col Jermain F. RODENHAUSER, ORD

Interpreter; Lt Cmdr Walter NICHOLS, USNR

Allied Officers Present: None

SUMMARY

Lt Gen miyazaki confirms that DAI HOMEI did have a permanent working Staff in wartime, drawn from the offices of the C/S, the Inspector Gen J (Ground) Training, the Inspector General of the Air (Training) and the War Ministry. He discusses planning for the defense of LUZON and the decision to combine Army Air and Navy Air Forces subsequently. The interrogation ends with answers to several questions on Logistics Planning.

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Gen MIYAZAKI: If you will ask me pointed questions I will do my best to give you the correct answers on the basis of the work I have done in preparing for the interview.

Col COLE: I'll ask pointed questions all right.

Q. First of all, during the period 1944 to August 1945 - say about December 1944 - what titles did you have and what was your official capacity?

A. I was the Chief of the First Section of SAMBO HOMBURU, which is the section of SAMBO HOMBURU which is concerned with operational planning.

Q. What is SAMBO HOMBURU exactly?

A. That means, I was a member of the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, and I was head of the First section; that is a part of DAI HONEI.

Q. Did you have any other affiliation? Were you a member of any other staff besides that?

A. I had no other official duties.

Q. Did you have anything to do at all with RIKUGUN SHO?

A. There was no connection. SAMBO HOMBURU is concerned with operations whereas the RIKUGUN SHO is administration. The Army Department RIKUGUN SHO was responsible for organizing units, handling of personnel, equipping and in general, administration.

Q. I find people wearing two hats and sometimes three, and the thing I'm mainly interested in, is making clear to myself whether or not DAI HONEI actually had a permanent staff which was not concerned with anything else except the duties in DAI HONEI?

A. General speaking people in SAMBO HOMBURU did not concern themselves with duties performed in the RIKUGUN SHO. However there was one section called the 4th Section of SAMBO HOMBURU which was made up of personnel, the same personnel which formed the BUREAU OF MILITARY AFFAIRS in the RIKUGUN SHO.

Q. That had duties both in DAI HONEI and RIKUGUN SHO?

A. That is correct; the same personnel. In other words, this one office was considered to be the 4th office of SAMBO HOMBURU and also the BUREAU OF MILITARY AFFAIRS.

Q. They came under the War Ministry as well as DAI HONEI?

A. Yes. The first section of the first division of my office was concerned with studying actual warfare; the experience of lessons gained from past operations.

Q. What did the second section do?

A. That was purely planning operations. The people in the first section of the first division not only had the duty of studying lessons from past operations but the additional duty of taking charge of instruction on the basis of their training in the Army.

Q. Implementation of the lessons learned in the form of training?

A. Yes. We had a department called the KIOIKU HOMBURU (Training Department, General Staff) and these people in the First Section of the First Division were also the first section of the training department.

Q. Still in DAI HONEI?

A. No that is entirely different. They also wore two hats. The organization of the Army is designed for peacetime, and was divided into three sections; The RIKUGUN SHO, the SOMBO HONBU, and this KIOIKU HONBU--in other words, the Army Dept, the General Staff, and the Training Dept. Those three were independent, and each directly responsible to the Emperor. However, in war time DAI HONEI was made up of personnel taken from those three divisions.

Q. It still leaves me bewildered as to whether or not DAI HONEI is really an entity all by itself.

First of all, have you a copy of this document? (Indicating organization chart introduced by Col COLE). It was made by Major OGATA?

A. I don't have a copy but I understand it.

Q. I'd like an English translation of it made by a Japanese.

A. I'm not certain, but I think this chart was turned over to the Allied Headquarters accompanied by a translation.

Q. That is perfectly true, but I have lost track of it myself. It was given to FEAF, one copy of the English translation only, and I couldn't get that.

What is the literal translation of this line here? (Pointing to First Section of 1st Bureau of DAI HONEI).

A. These are the same people as those in the first section of the office of the Inspector General of (Military) Training.

Q. Exactly what is meant by the pronoun "these"?

A. These people in my section ( ) are the same as the personnel of the first section of the Training Department.

Q. What did the Training Department work under--the Training Department of what?

A. As I explained, there was the SAMBO HONBU, the RIKUGUN SHO and this (Note: evidently referring to KIOIKU HONBU) was an entirely separate organization in the Main, responsible to the Emperor as was the SAMBU HONBU and the RIKUGUN SHO.

Q. Then where do they fall in here? Here is SAMBO HONBU, a part of DAI HONEI, and here is RIKUGUN SHO. Where is the TRAINING DEPT?

A. This was a peacetime chart; I will draw another. (Note; A rough pencil chart showing wartime setup was drawn and submitted). The way it was set up in peacetime: Here is the Emperor; under him you have the Army and Navy. On the Army side of the chart you have three sub-sections, all of which are directly responsible. On the Naval side I am not certain exactly how it was set up; but there is no DAI HONEI in peacetime; in wartime you get personnel taken from SAMBO HONBU and the KIOIKU SHOGUN. You get personnel taken from all these branches, put into one group called the RIKUGUN. The Navy does the same thing.

Q. And this becomes the DAI HONEI?

A. Yes.

- Q. I'd like to get into a particular operation and construct a picture in my mind of how the planning was carried out here in these headquarters. In other words: The First-Division of the Army General Staff.

We are told, on the first page, (of Memo. previously submitted by Gen. MIYAZAKI that about December 1944 you became concerned in operational guidance after the termination of the operations on LEYTE. The operations on LEYTE had had a certain result; therefore the task became to decide what to do next, in subsequent operations in the PHILIPPINES. I understand from Gen NISHIMURA, that the plan of TERAUCHI for the defense of the PHILIPPINES from the Ground Forces point of view, was completed fully decided upon, before it was ever given to the Navy, so that the Navy would have an opportunity to make a plan that would march along with it?

- A. I am not certain exactly. I was in CHINA when that plan was drawn up and Can't be certain as to what the relation was between the Army and Navy.

- Q. What was the military situation in the PHILIPPINES at the time you came in?

- A. At the time I came to SAMBO HONBU the situation as regards the battle for LEYTE on land had become very complicated and very difficult for three reasons: 1. In the first place shipping between LUZON and LEYTE--transportation--was practically impossible by sea; therefore 2. it was impossible to reinforce our troops on LEYTE; 3. We had been using and expending a great number of airplanes from LUZON and MINDANAO, and it was impossible to replace them.

- Q. When was this?

- A. This was on the 14th of December, when I took office. For those three reasons, when I came to office in SAMBO HONBU, the situation had become very difficult. Shortly afterwards it became evident that you planned to land on LUZON, because you sent heavy forces, which appeared to be composed of what appeared to the Japanese to be landing forces, through the SURIGAO Straits, landing on NEGROS, landing on MINDORO and indicating the intention of landing on LUZON.

- Q. What was the time difference between the time when you made up your minds you had lost LEYTE--and the time of our actual landing on LUZON? How much time, in other words, did you have to plan what you would do on LUZON?

- A. We decided that we'd lost the battle for LEYTE in the middle of December. Since the landing on LINGAYEN took place on January 9, we had less than one month. We didn't expect the landing until the end of January and were surprised at such an early landing.

- Q. When did you make the plan for the defense of LUZON?

- A. In going on a subject like that it would first be necessary to explain that the original plan for the defense of the entire PHILIPPINES area was made by Field Marshal TERAUCHI in the PHILIPPINES. At the time the operation took place, I was back in SAIGON. At the time we actually came in contact with the enemy, General YAMASHITA was in direct command. There I could not say at what time it would have to be a definite battle for LUZON.

- Q. I am trying to get the picture of you sitting around a table here in TOKYO, estimating the military position in the PHILIPPINES and making decisions as to what would be done. I want you to describe what you did?

- A. I will explain what happened in detail: At the time, although DAI HONEI was studying the problem of the defense of this whole area--the Southern Area and the PHILIPPINES--it was not up to DAI HONEI to direct the defense of LUZON because that was the direct responsibility of the Field Commander. Therefore we did not concern ourselves with telling him how to run the operation because he was in a position to know how to handle it--a better position than we were. Our main object was, in this particular campaign, the supply of airplanes since we had had so many losses in the operations at LEYTE. Therefore we studied the problem as to whether we should reinforce the air force at LUZON or not, and in order to study this more closely, I myself, on December 22, flew to MANILA for liaison purposes.

Q. What did you find when you went to MANILA with respect to the situation in air strength?

A. At the time I landed in MANILA, I found that Gen YAMASHITA's headquarters had already completed their plans for the defense of LUZON Island after studying the problem. We believed the landing would come very soon. Originally we had a plan drawn up for the defense of LUZON in case we lost LEYTE.

Q. Who drew that up, TEREMUCHI or DAI HONEI?

A. I think both of them planned it. The principal feature of this plan was the defense of the Southern region of LUZON Island. However, at the time I arrived in MANILA, I found that they had been studying the campaign that would follow and decide that it was not a sound principal, to defend the Southern part of LUZON. Just when I arrived they had changed to a new plan as a result of this study.

By the time I arrived, at the end of December, we had changed our plan so that we could retreat into the hills with a larger part of our forces--the hills around BAGUIO. We would leave a portion of our forces to defend the CLARK FIELD area, and a third force was to concentrate East of MANILA. We were just beginning to change the dispositions at the time I arrived, on the basis of that plan. I previously said that, whereas the original plan to defend the Southern part of LUZON had been with the idea of repelling an invasion, the idea now was to just hold off as long as possible.

Q. That was the military situation as you found it, What was the situation with respect to air strength?

A. We believed that when the AMERICANS landed on LUZON Island it wouldn't take them long to capture the airfields. Despite the fact that General YAMASHITA had tremendous forces on the island, those airplanes operating from newly captured fields would begin offensive operations in preparation against the next offensive operation which might be against CANTON, FORMOSA or the RYUKYUS therefore it became necessary for us to build up enough air strength to defend the probable areas of attack in the next operation, and for that reason it was naturally ill advised to send any reinforcement of planes to LUZON.

Q. Lets go back a little bit: What did you find was the actual existing situation at that moment with respect to what air power they had left in LUZON?

A. I am not certain of the numbers of planes we had, but I think it was several hundred. However the figure isn't comparable to the number of planes you had.

Q. Do I understand that there were several hundred Army Planes in LUZON that were operational?

A. Yes, they were servicable planes, but this figure includes both Army and Navy Planes.

Q. Were the Navy planes operational? Did they have pilots and were they ready to take the air?

A. I could investigate the matter and give you an exact figure.

Q. I don't want an exact figure; I just want to know the impression you got when you got out there. That was a part of your decision: you went down there to find out what the situation was. I want to find out what you found; that is all?

A. Although we had several hundred planes, I believe we had so few in comparison to you that it was just impossible to try, in terms of comparison.

Q. All right, what did you plan to do with them?

A. Most of the planes were fighters, and the others were special attack planes which were escorted by the fighters. I believe that we intended to use all of them to repel an invasion when it came.

- Q. Were they left there for that purpose?
- A. Yes, they were left there.
- Q. The Navy planes, too?
- A. Yes, all of them.
- Q. What happened to them?
- A. All the planes were lost, a great number of them in special attacks upon the invading fleet. Also a great number were lost as a result of destruction on the ground by your bombing and strafing.
- Q. Who commanded the Navy planes that were on LUZON? Who had operational control of them?
- A. I believe that Vice Admiral FUKOTOIE had command over the Naval planes since he was in command of the 10th Air Fleet.
- Q. Where was he--down in SINGAPORE?
- A. No, he was down in LUZON at the time I went down there, but just prior to the landing I believe that Vice Admiral FUKOTOIE went to SINGAPORE and that he is still there. Also Vice Admiral OAMISHI had command of a group of Navy planes which were withdrawn to FORMOSA and which carried out raids on LUZON, during operations, from FORMOSA.
- Q. What were the command relationships between those two admirals and General YAMASHITA? What did General YAMASHITA have to do in case he desired to get what we called "ground cooperations" from those Navy planes?
- A. Of course General YAMASHITA had no control over the Naval forces, but it was a joint operation, and although TOKYO wouldn't know just exactly how this cooperation was carried out, I believe it was very close--a well arranged by them in the field; therefore SAIBO HOMBU would not know. Of course I am speaking of the way it was set up.
- Q. I'd like to ask how you think close cooperation and coordination could be obtained in the field if it didn't obtain in TOKYO? How did you have any right to expect any close cooperation and coordination in the field if you didn't even know in TOKYO how it was going to be effected and made no provision for it?
- A. To give an explanation of how the Army and Naval air forces were used in these joint operations, the decisions were made in TOKYO as follows: In the case of attacks, TOKYO would issue orders for a certain target to be attacked by both Army planes and Navy planes. The method of attack to be decided by the commanders in the field. However in the case of defense, you have a different problem because you can't tell which way the enemy's coming from or what situation would develop; so in planning TOKYO would issue orders that, if the enemy would come from a certain direction or from another direction, they would give a general plan of attack, a plan of how such an attack on an invading force should be carried out, but could not, of course, decide when or exactly how it could be carried out, and that had to be left to the commanders in the field. They decided exactly the number of planes to be used, and the decision made in TOKYO was only a question of deciding that both Army and Navy planes would be used.

- Q. It's just a suggestion on the part of the IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF to the commanders in the field that it would be a good thing if they would coordinate their air forces? Then do I understand that your decision was, that the "several hundred" planes, Army and Navy, which you found there--operational planes and pilots--should be left there to do as well as they could to support the ground forces in defense against the invasion; that they should not be reinforced but left more as a sacrifice?
- A. It is as you suggested: No planes were sent to reinforce those already on hand, and those there were left to defend the island against an attacking fleet. The reason for not reinforcing the air forces there was that they had such a problem of maintenance and supply since, particularly, most of our heavy equipment and installations had been withdrawn or were to be withdrawn with the troops.
- Q. That, then, was the decision that was made with respect to how the air should be utilized. What about the Navy? What was the situation with respect to any help that they could expect from the Navy at that time?
- A. You mean, just the Naval service forces or air forces?
- Q. I mean the IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY; what was it going to do about helping to defend LUZON?
- A. We had no hope of support from the Navy because after the defeat in the Second Battle of the PHILIPPINES in October, at which time the Navy had done everything it could to support, the Navy was withdrawn to the West and South to SINGAPORE.
- Q. How was it planned to utilize Air power and Naval power in coordination in your plan of defense of the continent of Asia?
- A. By the end of the war of course there was Practically no Naval power to speak of; therefore we couldn't count on any Naval support whatsoever. Regarding air support for operations along the CHINA coast, about the only place we could defend satisfactorily from the air point of view was SHANGHAI because we had certain air strength in the SHANGHAI Area. We could also send air strength from FORMOSA and from KYUSHU to cover operations in that area. As far as CANTON was concerned, the situation was not so very good for the Japanese because we could only provide a portion of the forces in TAIWAN for air cover there. We also had ground air force strength in the CANTON area, but down in the southern part it was very small strength, not in great numbers. Aside from that I don't know how they supported with airplanes.
- Q. I'd like to have you expand that, especially with respect to having cooperation between the Army and Navy. How did they do that?
- A. We decided to handle it in the following manner: In FORMOSA we had a detachment of Naval air strength and a certain amount of Army air strength. The Naval air forces in FORMOSA were put under the direct command of the commander of the Army Air Forces.
- Q. Who was he?
- A. Lt Gen YAMAMOTO.
- Q. He was Commanding General of all ground forces in FORMOSA or just the air power?
- A. He was the Commander of the 8th Air Division.
- Q. He inturn was, I believe under the command of the Ground Area Army Commander?
- A. Yes, he was.

- Q. It was a clear case of the Naval aviation going under Army command?
- A. In the OKINAWA operations those Army and Navy Air Forces would be used to attack your shipping in this area, in the KYUSHU area. The 6th Air Army and the 5th Air Fleet were both put under the command of the CINC combined Fleet so that they were directly under Naval Command, and he coordinated attacks by either force on any point in the OKINAWA Islands so that here we had the 6th Air Army under Naval Command and down there in FORMOSA we had the Navy under Army Command.
- Q. In making that arrangement, was any opposition experienced from the commanders involved?
- A. I know of no objections to the plan voiced by the commanders.
- Q. What Naval authority in TOKYO had to approve this plan for FORMOSA?
- A. The Naval General Staff would have to issue the order.
- Q. In other words the Chief of Staff of the Navy gave his approval to that plan, is that true?
- A. The Chief of the Naval Staff would have issued the order.
- Q. Who made the proposal to him?
- A. The Naval General Staff and the Army General Staff held conference and decided at that conference the best way to work it out.
- Q. Was GUNREIBU CHO himself present at that conference?
- A. I don't think the Chief of the Naval General Staff had to be present. Once the decision was made it was submitted to him for his approval for him to issue the order.
- Q. Who sold him the idea?
- A. I was an advocate of this plan, but there also were naval personnel at this conference who were of the same opinion.
- Q. I want to know who approached the "old man" and said, "We have decided to take your planes away from you in FORMOSA and give them to the Army". I'd like to know what his reaction was. I've been a staff officer myself for many years, and I know that sometimes there is difficulty in putting such things across?
- A. I don't think there was any trouble getting the Chief of the Naval General Staff to approve the plan because when you are operating in a large area involving sea and land, the Navy is free to operate in any direction--it can attack one place one day and move off and attack another place next day, whereas the Army is not as mobile. Therefore it is very difficult to speak of joint operations as an actual condition in all phases throughout a whole campaign when you are operating in a large area such as the South Seas area, so that if you had such a proposal made when you were operating in the Southern Islands, you probably will have a great difference of opinion of the subject.

However, by the time the battle area had narrowed down to this area (Note: area indicated was in and around the home islands defense area) all the principal locations of operation were already settled. We knew we might have to fight in SHANGHAI, TAIWAN, KYUSHU. In this particular instance it was already settled for them because they knew it was OKINAWA. Therefore it was perfectly obvious that the best plan was to utilize every means available in a joint operations against the enemy and against specified targets. Therefore I don't think that the same difference of opinion would arise in consideration of a similar situation in a larger area so that, no matter who proposed the idea everybody had this opinion due to the exigency of the situation.



Q. I have heard it said by Japanese Naval aviators and Naval officers generally that they considered that the Naval pilots were far superior to Army pilots and that the utilization of Naval aircraft in general was better planned and better executed than was the utilization of Army air power. I should have thought that that idea would have caused obstacles to a plan whereby the Naval aviation would come under the operational control of the Army aviation. I'd like to know what you feel about the respective efficiency of the two air forces, Army air force and the Navy air force?

A. At the beginning of the war the Navy air forces' principal objective was attacking ships. Therefore they designed planes for such purposes and trained their pilots for such tactics. Whereas the Army's principal purpose was overland operations and bombing of targets, so that their airplanes were designed and their pilots were trained for those specific purposes. Therefore at the beginning of the war, naturally the Navy was much better than the Army in its method of attack and general tactics regarding shipping. However, towards the end of the war, as the result of a gradual process in which the Army became more and more involved in attacks on surface craft, I think the difference was narrowed down.

Col COLE: I have only gone through the first three of these sheets, and I am going to have to come back again to have some discussion about "4" and "5".

(NOTE: A supplementary interrogation was arranged between Gen MIYAZAKI and Col COLE for 0900 hours 5 December 45).

(NOTE #2: The above is transcribed from stenographic notes. The questions following were not recorded but are reconstructed from longhand notes taken at the conference).

Q. What assignment did the General hold in the Japanese Army just before the war, in 1941?

A. I was instructor in the Army College.

Q. When the Japanese decided they were going to fight the United States, was their basic organization and equipment of the Army based largely on experiences in MANCHURIA and CHINA? Did they think the kind of fighting up there was the kind they would experience as they went further South?

A. Naturally there would be a great difference in fighting a country like the United States or in the Southern islands. Therefore our experience in fighting CHINA was not much service to us as it did not take into consideration the relative strength of the CHINESE Army as compared to the strength of the UNITED STATES.

Q. What I'm getting at is this: You know the AMERICAN army wasn't in MANCHURIA or CHINA or the continent. Did you feel initially that what had been successful against CHINA was adequate to make a drive into the South before you encountered the UNITED STATES?

A. We had belief in this. One point I forgot to mention: We had to take into consideration the nature of the terrain. No matter where we fought, as long as we did not run into the AMERICAN Army, we felt we would do all right, but now we had to go to the PHILIPPINES area where we knew we'd meet AMERICANS.

Q. How different were these organizations in equipment and organizational setup: Those set up here in the PHILIPPINES and those in MANCHURIA and CHINA? E, G, what was the difference between the 46th and the 23rd Armies?

Lt Col WADA: I was in the PHILIPPINES Campaign and can tell you all about it: Our first divisions in the PHILIPPINES were initially made up of forces which had operated in CHINA. We were defeated; therefore new forces, with new equipment and new tactics--entirely fresh divisions--were brought in, and eventually we won Victory.

Q. How were they different in training and equipment and how was this training received in such a short period?

A. The forces sent down the second time were given much larger air support, also greater covering firepower in the form of mountain artillery and heavy guns; the 10 cm. cannon, 15cm. mortars and 24cm. mortars.

Q. By the time capture of the PHILIPPINES had been accomplished, was any effort then made to change the equipment of these divisions in the South to equipment with which you had had such success up there (Note; indicating BATAN and CORRIGIDOR)?

A. We decided and had intended to equip all forces in the field the same way. That was impossible. In addition, their equipment was considered unsatisfactory, but we could do nothing about it.

Q. I understand most of the equipment used in 1941 and 1942 came mostly from CHINA. Is that true?

A. I don't know.

Q. As these organizations moved into combat, I understand they carried enough ammunition for one week's continuous fighting--24 hours a day--and about the same amount of supplies on the theory that, at the end of that time, the rear bases would begin to bring supplies in, and that after about three weeks they would begin to move in additional supplies for front-line Armies. Is that true?

A. There may have been cases where they took enough ammunition and supplies for one week's operation into combat, but generally speaking military stores taken with them were not considered sufficient.

Q. If not, how soon were they to be resupplied--i. e., they had to be backed up, as they would use food and ammunition, etc, taken with them very quickly. If they were not to be resupplied with ammunition, did they expect that what they captured in the way of British and Dutch equipment would be utilized by them and be sufficient?

A. The original plan called for the immediate establishment of a supply depot of food and ammunition in the area of action. However, the original plan did not take in such a large area. The SOLOMONS, for example, was an entirely new deviation. In unsupported places we had to supply forces as best we could. We couldn't supply all the forces in the new areas. I want to bring up the question of food: Even in peace time it was necessary to import rice from French Indo-China. Therefore it was impractical for Japan to supply her armies from the homeland. As we moved into captured areas it became the rule for the occupying forces to buy up their food except for special items which were small enough to be shipped from Japan.

Q. I understand; you had to get rice from FRENCH INDO-CHINA not only for the Armies but also for the homeland. You didn't intend to make as big an expansion. Where then was the perimeter to which you were to go?

A. I am not certain but I think the general boundary would be down through PALAU, NETHERLANDS, NEW GUINEA, ABOEIA, DUTCH EAST INDIES, up across the Southern tip of THAILAND.

Q. How about Burma?

A. That was planned afterwards.

Q. Before you started the war with us--the decision was made rather abruptly, just a few months before war started--did the Japanese estimate they had sufficient equipment and supplies to back up the operations south and east? What was their opinion--how big a shoestring were they operating on?

A. I don't think they believed they had sufficient supplies.

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- Q. But they went ahead anyway?
- A. I don't know exactly what the people who planned the original campaigns thought, but don't think they believed they had enough.
- Q. How much logistical planning was done by the General Staff before these campaigns were started?
- A. The Japanese were naturally aware of the fact they had to go into logistics of the situation. I don't think they entered into it deep enough.
- Q. Was it a natural thing for the Japanese military commands to look down upon logistics and think more of the glory of the fighting man and "the devil with the poor soldier struggling with problems of supply"?
- A. It must be amazing to you to observe the way we operate despite realization of the situation. I think the real reason for this is the United States Being supplied from a point of view of natural resources; that where you are able to do that, the Japanese cannot. Therefore we were faced with a situation whereby we were forced to go ahead whether we were supplied or not.
- Q. I can't understand your launching such vast enterprises without proper support. If a man went into a duel, he would naturally expect to take with him the proper support in the way of a sword or pistol. What was your outlook on logistical support?
- A. This is going into the problem of military supplies again: Naturally there were bound to be people, including myself, who thought chances of winning were slim. However, that isn't for the military to decide; if it is decided to wage war, then it is our job to fight the war; if the war is called off, then we call it off. If there is war, it is a fundamental consideration that we fight that war to the best of our ability.
- Q. In other words, you realized it - others realized it: TOJO, perhaps, was one of these. You just said, "the devil with it, we'll go ahead anyhow."
- A. Yes, we could do nothing else.

NOTE: Appendix "A" Japanese Army GHQ Chart (DAI HONEI) is not available at this time. Will be available at a later date.