

**Assassination Records Review Board**  
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530  
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

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January 28, 1997

Mr. John Pereira  
Director  
Historical Review Group  
Center for the Study of Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505

Re: Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16  
(Oswald Pre-Assassination Files)

Dear John:

Under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994), the Review Board has the authority to "direct a Government office to . . . investigate the facts surrounding, additional information [and] records . . ." Section 7(J)(1)(C)(ii). Pursuant to this authority, the Review Board is seeking to resolve in a complete and comprehensive manner certain questions related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that CIA may have held prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. Accordingly, we request that CIA provide complete and comprehensive answers to the questions identified below.

On May 12, 1992, Director Robert M. Gates testified to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs regarding CIA's records on Oswald prior to the assassination. Mr. Gates testified that "[p]rior to President Kennedy's assassination, *CIA held only a small file* on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124 pages . . ." (*The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1972: Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1992) (emphasis added)* (copy enclosed). It is the Review Board's current understanding, however, that at the time of the assassination, CIA held at least three separate files (including soft files) on Lee Harvey Oswald: a 201 file (201-289248), an HTLINGUAL file, and an Office of

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Security file.<sup>1</sup> We have identified references to one or more other possible Oswald files including possible soft files designated as follows: CI/SI, CI/SIG, CI/LSN, and CS/LSN.

1. Please identify, as specifically as possible, *each* file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.
2. Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.
3. For the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please identify which records (and the total number that) were in the file at the time of the assassination.
4. To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

For each question, please explain the basis for the answer and the sources (records or persons) whom you consulted to answer the question. To the extent that you are not able to answer a question completely, please so indicate and provide the best reasonable answer. If, during the course of your research, you learn that any record relating to a pre-assassination file or record has been destroyed, please provide us with all available information related to the destruction of the records or files.

These queries should be interpreted in their broadest reasonable sense. To the extent that you question whether certain responses may be within the scope of our request, please let us know and we can advise you whether we would wish to include it. We anticipate that the responses to these questions will be referenced in CIA's Final Compliance Statement.

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
<sup>1</sup>One Office of Security file on Oswald (or relating to Oswald) may have been numbered 351-164. In addition, Margaret Stevens may have held an Office of Security "MS-" file on Oswald.

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We request that you make this information available to us by February 24, 1997. If this does not provide you with sufficient time, please let us know, in writing, by what date you believe you will be able to answer the questions fully.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. G. Marwell". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

David G. Marwell  
Executive Director

Enclosure

# THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

## HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON  
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. J. RES. 282

TO PROVIDE FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS  
RELEVANT TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

MAY 12, 1992

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1992

57-233

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office  
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20540

ISBN 0-16-039035-4

denied, you say postponed. I am curious as to how long the postponement will be. Will it be until the national security or privacy are no longer threatened? Do we want to require a mandatory review every two years?

Going along, some of the language is fairly broad. We had the exchange here a few moments ago about an intelligence agent. Then there is another section that gives us an exception—"an intelligence method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized."

The one that troubles me most, although I know there is a reason for it, but I just am concerned about the doors it may open, is "... an invasion of privacy of a living person, whether that person is identified in the material or not." I am concerned about that being used as a ground for requesting postponement of disclosure.

So I think, consistent with all that you have said here, I hope that you will give us the benefit of your second look at that Section 6 of this proposed Act.

Chairman GLENN. Thank you.

Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. No further questions.

Chairman GLENN. Good. Thank you very much. We may have additional questions. It has been a long session this morning here, and we have additional questions from other members or questions after we review. We would appreciate an early reply so it could be included in the record. Thank you very much. We appreciate.

Mr. STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much.

Chairman GLENN. The next panel is the Honorable Robert Gates, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Honorable William Sessions, Director of the FBI. Gentlemen, you have been very patient here this morning. I know we had told you you would be on by about 10:00 here. We are about an hour late on that, or a little over. We appreciate your forbearance this morning. We look forward to your testimony this morning.

Mr. Gates, if you would lead off, we would appreciate it very much.

#### TESTIMONY OF THE HON. ROBERT M. GATES, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on S. J. Res. 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and to describe the nature of the documents held by the Central Intelligence Agency that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Senator SASSER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Director could pull the mike just a little bit closer? Thank you.

Mr. GATES. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution, that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible Government documents relating to the assassination of

President Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.

Even before the introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older.

In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the history staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public.

This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we hold, but it is an earnest of my commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. Indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved a new CIA declassification guideline for our historical review program which specifically directs a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward-leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency today will make publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000 to 300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.

Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized, all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.

These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

Prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124 pages, some of which originated with the FBI, the State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see firsthand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and we are providing them to the National Archives.

The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald, some 33,000 pages, most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

The Committee has asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the documents originated with the FBI and about 20 percent originated from the State Department or elsewhere.

Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms, in part, overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27 percent originated with a variety of other U.S. Government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Although our documents do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require considerable effort to review, and as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway.

A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff

of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act which protect the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure, the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA.

However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

While I expect a large amount of the material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give an example of this type of material.

During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of CIA employees. These files contain fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping the information confidential.

Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip and rumor. Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of Government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program and I am committed to making it work. Even in a time of diminishing resources within the intelligence community, I have allocated 15 full-time positions to expand the

history staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to getting these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside non-governmental review. It is against this background that in response to the Committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only intelligence community concerns. I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the assassination materials review board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the executive director of the assassination materials review board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the executive director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth, and finally, Section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed.

These are the technical problems that I believe can be solved and that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.

Mr. Chairman, let me close with a comment on why I am personally committed to getting these documents out. Like all Americans old enough to remember that terrible day in 1963, and as several members of the Committee have alluded to, I also remember where I was and what I was doing.

I was a college student at William and Mary, and I can remember how the word spread like wild fire between classes of that horrible event. I made my way to Washington that weekend and stood at the intersection of Constitution and Pennsylvania Avenues, where I waited for hours to watch the President's funeral cortege. I will never forget it.

I entered public service less than three years later, heeding President Kennedy's inaugural call, a call I think many in my generation heard. He said then, "Now, the trumpet summons us again, not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need, not as a call to battle, though in battle we are, but as a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation, a struggle against the common enemies of man—tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself."

Mr. Chairman, the only thing more horrifying to me than the assassination itself is the insidious, perverse notion that elements of the American Government, that my own Agency, had some part in it. I am determined personally to make public or to expose to disinterested eyes every relevant scrap of paper in CIA's possession, in the hope of helping to dispel this corrosive suspicion. With or without legislation, I intend to proceed. I believe I owe that to his memory.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gates follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. GATES

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on S. J. Res. 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution—that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible Government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

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begin review for declassification immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved a new CIA declassification guideline for our Historical Review Program which specifically directs a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart.

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These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 33 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 documents originated with the CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and we are providing them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald—some 33,000 pages—most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20 percent originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 72 reels of microfilm. The microfilms, in part, overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27 percent of the documents originated with a variety of other U.S. Government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

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sary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

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But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.

Chairman GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Gates.  
Mr. Sessions.

**TESTIMONY OF THE HON. WILLIAM S. SESSIONS, DIRECTOR,  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; ACCOMPANIED BY  
DAVID G. LEITCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL,  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

Mr. SESSIONS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. I have a complete statement which I will file, and there are some diagrams which I will also make available for the record, and a photograph of the files themselves.

Chairman GLENN. Without objection, your entire statement will be included in the record.

Mr. SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to appear before you to testify about FBI investigative records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I applaud this process and your efforts. It is fundamental that Government exist to meet the needs of its citizens. An examination of these issues is directly related to satisfying the intense interest and concern of our citizens about the circumstances surrounding that tragic event some 29 years ago.

From the outset, I would like to state emphatically that I favor maximum disclosure, consistent with the law and the legitimate need to protect certain small but highly sensitive categories of information. I can assure you that the FBI will work cooperatively through the Department of Justice with both the Senate and the House to develop a comprehensive approach to these important issues.

As you know, the Government has conducted a number of reviews of the assassination. The Warren Commission, the House Assassinations Committee, and the Church Committee all conducted reviews that I believe can be best categorized as exhaustive. It is my understanding that the FBI provided massive amounts of information to those entities to help ensure that they accomplished their missions. Once again, we desire to be as helpful as we are able.

Immediately following the shooting of President Kennedy, the FBI began a massive investigation. An intense effort was made. Related investigations were conducted and much information was exchanged, as Director Gates has noted, between the various agencies. As is the case with all major investigations, thousands of pages of documents were created to record the results of these efforts and to facilitate the investigations.

Many different kinds of information were recorded in the FBI files. The results of thousands of interviews of witnesses, other individuals with possible helpful knowledge, and contacts with confidential informants were memorialized. Communications between the FBI headquarters and our field offices, and vice versa, were included, as were communications between the FBI and other agencies. Forensic reports were recorded. In all, FBI files relating to the

assassination contained over 499,000 pages of documents, with a few more pages added every time the FBI follows up on a new allegation or a new issue arises.

After Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act in 1974, the FBI began receiving requests for information relating to the assassination. By 1978, four years later, over 200,000 pages of material had been processed and made available to the public through the FBI's public reading room. Many authors, journalists, historians, and others have visited and revisited these materials, which remain available today as a valuable source of historic information.

I would like to briefly describe to the Committee a breakdown of FBI records relating in some way to the assassination. The FBI has four core files that relate directly to the investigation of the assassination. Our cooperation with the Warren Commission and the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby—those are the four core files. There are approximately 499,000 pages in these files, 263,000 of which are duplicate pages that were cross-filed, third agency records, and some FBI records that have not been processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.

Approximately 223,000 pages, or 94 percent of the records we have processed, have already been released to the public. In addition, the FBI has several other much smaller files as a result of other directly related investigations, such as the investigation of Marina Oswald, and these files comprise approximately 22,000 pages, 13,000 of which are duplicate, third agency, or unprocessed pages. Fifty-eight percent of these pages processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act have been released to the public.

Of the pages available in the FBI reading room on the main floor at FBI headquarters, approximately 189,000 pages, or 94 percent, are available in their entirety. The remaining 12,000 pages in the reading room reflect some degree of redaction. The information that has not been disclosed or that has been redacted to some degree falls within the exemptions that are enumerated in the Freedom of Information Act and the protections of the Privacy Act.

This includes information that, one, is classified on the basis of national security; two, would disclose the identities of individuals who specifically requested confidentiality; three, would disclose the identities of confidential informants or sources; four, is highly personal information about individuals; or, five, originated with other Government agencies and those agencies specifically requested that the information not be released based upon exemptions applicable to those particular agencies.

While I strongly favor maximum disclosure under the law, there are certain types of information that are particularly critical to successful law enforcement investigations and national security; for example, information that is properly and appropriately classified, information that would identify confidential sources, and information that would disclose sensitive investigative techniques or the types of information the disclosure of which could negatively impact upon our ability to fulfill our mission. Information in FBI files that has not been disclosed publicly falls largely within these descriptions of information.

In any case, I believe it is extremely healthy for the country to have these issues aired and to be resolved. The public interest dic-

f. b.~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~CIA SP  
RE

RECTIONS

CSI 97-062

31 January 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fred Wickham  
DO Focal Point  
for JFK Board


Lee Strickland  
DA Focal Point  
for JFK Board

FROM: John F. Pereira  
Chief, Historical  
Review Group

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16  
from JFK Board

1. Attached is "Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files)", which was received from the Assassination Records Review Board on 29 January 1997. The request is for additional details related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that may have existed in the Office of Security and in the DO.

2. Please advise how you would like us to respond to this request. We are asked to make the information available to the Board by 24 February 1997.



John Pereira

Attachment

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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27 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson  
Historical Review Group  
Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Information Management Branch  
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

REFERENCE: CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997

1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched this request from the Assassination Records Review Board relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed in Mr. Marwell's letter to the Historical Review Group, the following responses are provided to those three questions pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

Question 1: (U) Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Response: (U) At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald,

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When Separated From  
Secret Attachment

CL BY: 0605636  
CL Reason: 1.5(c)  
DECL ON: X1  
DRV FROM: COV 1-82

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and the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

(U) In your request specific mention is made of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files.

(U) Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from [redacted] of the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

**Question 2:** (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

**Response:** (U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

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(U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project that involved opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China [redacted] and South America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information referred to the Directorate of Operations.

(U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This compilation of information was received from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

- a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"
- b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960
- c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors
- d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors
- e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961
- f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

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(U) The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors which reflected limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of OS. Efforts to locate this listing or determine the disposition have been unsuccessful.

(U) Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. [redacted] of this office at one time was assigned to the Security Analysis Group and recalls the Defector Machine Listing. From her recollection, this machine listing was approximately one and one-half inches thick and was in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained limited information on each name.

(C) The Special Investigations Branch of Investigations Division is the current operating component encompassing most of the Security Analysis Group functions still conducted in OPS. [redacted] of this office was queried regarding office holdings relating to the Defector Machine Listing. Ms. [redacted] had no knowledge of the listing and suggested [redacted] as a resource. [redacted] CIC Liaison Officer, could not recall the listing, opined it may have been destroyed, and suggested contacting [redacted] of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC).

(C) CIC assumed many of the functions previously conducted by the Security Analysis Group. [redacted] was queried regarding the possibility the Defector Machine Listing may have been transferred to CIC during the realignment of duties. [redacted] advised the Defector Machine Listing could not be located in CIC holdings; and he has made inquiries with Directorate of Operations counterparts regarding the listing.

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(U) The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

- a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959
- b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"
- c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959
- d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959
- e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959
- f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"
- g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"
- h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960
- i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961
- j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

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- k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas
- l. Note to CI/ SI dated 28 September 1961
- m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961
- n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure
- o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961
- p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962
- q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure
- r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months Leaves Soviet 'Home'"
- s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

(U) In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

- t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald
- u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)
- v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

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- w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963
- x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963
- y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

**Question 4:** (U) To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

**Response:** (U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents on this person increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

(U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

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(U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to

detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

(U) [redacted] of the OPS/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. [redacted] made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer [redacted] retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on [redacted]

3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes) and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been conducted for the purposes of this request. Our efforts were concentrated on the pre-assassination time frame.

4. (U) This review was conducted by [redacted] OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.

Attachment

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**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

On 8 April 1994, the complete set of SRPOINTER and HTLINGUAL security support files and indexes held by the Office of Security were destroyed in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the approved Records Control Schedules 31-76 and 31-83 and by the Office of General Counsel.

S E C R E T

OGC-94-51066

6 April 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]  
Information Review Team  
Office of Security

VIA:

Robert J. EATINGER  
Assistant General Counsel *TJC*  
Litigation Division

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Information Management Officer  
Office of General Counsel

SUBJECT:

HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction

1. This responds to your memo of 9 February 1994 requesting confirmation that the security support files of the HTLINGUAL project are not the subject of a current litigation, investigation, or other inquiry that would preclude their destruction pursuant to normal guidelines for records of this type. A review of OGC files located no currently active cases involving the HTLINGUAL project. Therefore, OGC poses no objection to destruction of the files if authorized by your approved records disposition schedule.

2. For your information I have attached a copy of a March 1990 memorandum in which OGC provided guidance to the DO regarding destruction of MCHAOS and HTLINGUAL project files. According to that memorandum, files pertaining to HTLINGUAL may be destroyed only if: (1) they meet the criteria for destruction on the applicable NARA approved records disposition schedule; (2) are not responsive to a FOIA or Privacy Act request currently being processed by the office concerned; and (3) do not document the initiation, implementation, and termination of the projects, or constitute files on U.S. persons of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value which the Agency is required to maintain. As the attachment indicates, NARA's requirement that the SSCI concur in any proposed destruction has already been met.

CL BY [2171358]  
DECL OADR  
DRV FM SEC 13-87

S E C R E T

**S E C R E T****SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction**

3. I apologize for the delay in responding to your request. Please let me know if I may be of further assistance.



**Attachment:  
As Stated**

**S E C R E T**

S E C R E T

**SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction**

DCI/OGC/REG [REDACTED] /skd/76195 (6 Apr 94)

**Distribution:**

Original - Addressee  
1 - OGC Registry

S E C R E T

APR 06 '94 03:17PM USGOVERNMENT

OGC-90-50611  
19 March 1990

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** C/OIT/IME

**FROM:**   
Chief, Litigation Division, OGC

**SUBJECT:** Destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL Project Files

**REFERENCE:** Request for Authorization to Retain or Destroy Questionable Records: 141C's for MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL Projects, from IMS/MPG/IRMB, dated 18 December 1989

1. The referenced request seeks concurrence for the destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL files in accordance with routine records destruction schedules approved by the National Archivist. Subject to the qualifications set forth below, the proposed destruction can proceed without legal objection.

2. On several occasions over the past 12 years, DO/IMS has proposed that the Agency identify and destroy MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL records in accordance with routine records destruction schedules. The major reason not to do so has been the existence of litigation that has necessitated retention of those records. With the settlement of the National Lawyers' Guild litigation, a major obstacle to routine records destruction appears to have been eliminated.

3. That case alone, however, does not govern the records retention or destruction of MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL files. In addition, destruction may proceed only in accordance with the records disposition authorization provided by the Archivist on 17 March 1978. (Job Nos. NCI-263-77-18 and NCI-263-78-1). The approval given by the Archivist is subject to essentially the following conditions: (1) files and documents that are the objects of FOIA and Privacy Act requests, or those involved in any other litigation, are not to be destroyed; (2) files that document the initiation, implementation, and termination of the projects, and other files on U.S. persons of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value which the Agency is required to maintain, are not to be destroyed; (3) no disposal will occur prior to review and concurrence of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

4. In reviewing the materials you have provided, I have been able to conclude that then SSCI Chairman, Birch Bayh, in several separate letters dated 6 April 1978, informed the DCI that the Committee had no objection to the implementation of the records disposal lists approved by the Archivist. In my

view, therefore, condition number (3) has been satisfied. Accordingly, with the exception of the case of Hurwitz v. United States, there appear to be no ongoing court cases relating to MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL files that necessitate the retention of those materials. All HTLINGUAL materials relating to Leo T. Hurwitz, therefore, should be retained. In addition, any records pertaining to Dr. Sidney M. Peck (Peck v. CIA) should be retained. I am not aware of any other matters that would require retention of the files at the present time, but you should contact the Agency's FOIA Coordinator to determine if there are any outstanding FOIA or Privacy Act requests relating to MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL that should not be destroyed. If so, materials should be retained in accordance with the requirements of the Records Disposal List. Finally, of course, information that the Agency must maintain that is of foreign intelligence value also should not be destroyed.

4. I would also point out that the terms of the National Lawyers Guild settlement require that all agencies of the Federal Government, including the CIA, shall not use, release or disclose, within or outside the Government, certain information relating to the National Lawyers Guild and its subunits. Accordingly, if there is CIA information derived from the FBI's investigation relating to the National Lawyers' Guild, Agency records, files or indices must be appropriately marked so as to permit implementation of the settlement agreement. This means that, to the extent MHCHAOS records are not isolated but are contained in other Agency files, some means of ensuring that the information is not disseminated must be made.

5. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.

cc: C/ALD/OGC



9 February 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: OGC/Litigation *STEVE*

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Information Review Team

SUBJECT: Files Scheduled For Destruction

1. On 7 February 1994, this office was given direction by Mr. Archibald, Legal Advisor for the Office of Security, to deal directly with your office in reference to the attached.

2. If you have any questions about the attached, please feel free to call on (40615). Your prompt assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

3. Thank you for your coordination and cooperation in assisting the Records Control Schedule Analysts; [REDACTED] (40615) and [REDACTED] (40616).

[REDACTED]  
Information Review Team

SECRET

'9 December 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]  
Office of Security, Legal Advisor

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Information Review Team

SUBJECT: HT LINGUAL Security Support Files/SR POINTER  
Files

1. On 7 December 1993, this office coordinated with [REDACTED] of DO/IMS, on (47411), in reference to the HT LINGUAL Security Support Files/SR POINTER Files. I asked [REDACTED] if his office had any problems with our office destroying these files as they were within our guidelines for destruction. He responded by saying that they had retired their files in 1991 and would have to look into it further. On 8 December 1993, Mr. [REDACTED] called to say that his office, DO/IMS, had no problem with us destroying our support files to their HT LINGUAL project as they destroyed their files in the late 1980's. The few files they retired in 1991 were on the Administrative and Policy issues of HT LINGUAL.

2. Since the DO no longer has a need for the information in these files (list is attached) and has essentially approved their destruction, we have supplied to you copies of our own Security Records Control Schedule which verifies that these files meet destruction criteria. As you can see though, by the comment on the SR POINTER Files, we need to be sure there is no litigation open before we destroy.

3. In light of paragraph 2, our office now awaits OGC approval. Your coordination with OGC in this effort is greatly appreciated. Please note, destruction of these files include the SR POINTER name index which is currently utilized by this office for the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act (PA) cases. Destruction of this index will aid in decreasing unnecessary review and research on part of FOIA and PA.

4. Thank you. If we can be of any assistance to you, please call either [REDACTED] on (40268), [REDACTED] on (40615) or [REDACTED] on (40615).

[REDACTED]  
Information Review Team

Distribution:

Original - [REDACTED]  
cc - [REDACTED]

CL BY (2039256)  
DECL OADR  
DRV FM SEC 13-87

SECRET

RCS  
31-83

NEW SYSTEM	FILES IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	VOLUME	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
28	<u>Security File Review Log.</u>			
	Lists of security files received by External Activities Branch personnel in connection with external activities, requests, and cover and documentation matters.			TEMPORARY. Destroy when 6 months old.
29	<u>Security Duty Office Reporting Files.</u>			
	Security Duty Office events reports. Duplicate copies of reports prepared by Security Duty Officers concerning individuals who contact the Agency. (Published in the <u>Federal Register</u> , CIA-51, Notification of Systems of Records, Privacy Act of 1974. The <u>Federal Register</u> must be amended if the system is changed or discontinued.)			TEMPORARY. Destroy 5 years after cutoff. Cut off at end of each calendar year, hold in current files area for 2 years, transfer to AARC for 3 years, then destroy.
30	<u>Security Duty Office Operational and Instruction Files.</u>			
	<p>a. Copies of survey reports, guard post instructions, and duty officer rosters.</p> <p>b. Record copies of requests for telephone backstopping.</p>			<p>TEMPORARY. Destroy when superseded obsolete, or no longer needed.</p> <p>TEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after cutoff. Cut off when backstop arrangement is terminated, hold in current files area for 3 years, then destroy.</p>
31	<u>Security Support Files.</u>			
	Record copies of correspondence and reports on operational activities in connection with Office of Security projects.			TEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after cutoff. Cut off at termination of project, hold in current files area for 1 year, transfer to AARC for 2 years, then destroy.

RCS

31-76

SCHEDULE ITEM NO(S).	NEW ITEM NO.	FILES IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	VOLUME	DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
		<p><b>SPECIAL PROJECT MATERIAL</b></p> <p>Record copies of reports pertaining to the SRPOINTER Project. (Discontinued).</p>			<p>Temporary. Hold in current file area until litigation concluded then destroy.</p>

## Security Support Files for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files

[REDACTED]  
Mail Intercept Program  
[REDACTED]

99358 PROJECT CHAPERON  
OS-PROJECT POINTER  
PROJECT SETTER SFN 159144  
PROJECT SETTER  
SRINDIAN SFN 507356  
PROJECT SRINDIAN  
SR POINTER/REDSKIN  
SR POINTER  
PROJECT SR POINTER  
PROJECT SR POINTER Cuban Watch List  
SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL Material Duplicated from CI Staff.  
Report JAN 29 75  
Draft Memorandum on Background of SR POINTER Prepared  
23DEC74  
OS Personnel Directly and Indirectly Involved with SR  
POINTER  
WESTPOINTER SFN 583870  
PROJECT WESTPOINTER  
SSD Mail Cover  
U.S. Post Office Liaison  
File with no name related to Mail  
SR POINTER INDEX  
VOL 1 SFN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL  
VOL 2 SFN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL  
VOL 3 Record of BANJOES Received  
VOL 4 PROJECT HT LINGUAL Clearance #90079 29NOV56-29NOV63  
VOL 5 SR POINTER General Admin and Policy April 63  
VOL 6 Original SR POINTER Documents  
VOL 7 Documents Reviewed by [REDACTED] OGC  
VOL 8 SR POINTER SFN 119144 Informant BANJO  
VOL 9 PROJECT SR POINTER Admin 11JUN52-5FEB58 #77826  
VOL 10 HT LINGUAL Statistics SFN 119144  
VOL 11 SR POINTER GENERAL SFN 93466  
VOL 12 PROJECT Outline and Cronology #77826  
VOL 13 Record of BANJOES Received (VOL 6)  
VOL 14 SR POINTER Statistics JAN68-MAR70  
VOL 15 SR POINTER  
VOL 16 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Policy 18JAN62-  
29MAR63  
VOL 17 SR POINTER 13MAR70 #90079  
VOL 18 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Ploicy 27JUL54-  
19DEC61  
VOL 19 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 1FEB56-2SEP58 Memos to CI  
Staff  
VOL 20 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 9SEP58-15AUG60 Memos to CI  
Staff

## Security Support Files for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files

VOL 21 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 26AUG60-6JUN62 Memos to CI Staff  
VOL 22 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 25JUN62-25MAR64 Memos to CI Staff  
VOL 23 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 2JUL53-27DEC57  
VOL 24 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 8JAN58-22DEC58  
VOL 25 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 7JAN59-22DEC60  
VOL 26 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 3JAN61-27DEC61  
VOL 27 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 23JAN63-2MAR64  
VOL 28 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 25MAR64-23DEC64  
VOL 29 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 4JAN66-29MAR67  
VOL 30 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 30MAR67  
VOL 31 FANFOLD Coding System #90079  
VOL 32 Watch List JAN66  
VOL 33 #90079 DC Survey  
VOL 34 #94866 Radio Moscow  
VOL 35 SFN 77826 PROJECT SR POINTER Post Office Department, Relations With  
VOL 36 PROJECT DAYLIGHT SFN 243550  
VOL 37 Review of HT LINGUAL Project Outline 10AUG59  
VOL 38 POINTER

**SR POINTER Information**

HT LINGUAL- A DO project. Opening U.S. citizen's mail going to other countries (mostly Soviet Union) & mail incoming from other countries (1950's). Most mail was opened in NY. Actual opening & monitoring of mail assigned to OS with info turned over to the DO.

SR POINTER- OS name for HT LINGUAL.

WESTPOINTER- Opening mail in San Fransico (also known as MK SOURDOUGH). Targeted the Chinese.

PROJECT INDIAN- Targeted mail to/from

BANJO- Actual letters (copies) intercepted.

PROJECT SETTER- Mail opened in New Orleans, targeting South America.

Project was exposed in Rockefeller Commission report.  
Project names release with JFK info.

CONFIDENTIAL

06 December 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]  
 Services Team Leader

FROM: [redacted]  
 Services Team

SUBJECT: Transfer of POINTER and related files

REFERENCE: Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993 from  
 Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT) to [redacted]  
 (OGC)

Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993,  
 from [redacted] (OGC) to [redacted]  
 [redacted] (C/IRT)

1. On 30 November 1993, Investigations and Services Branch (I&SB) received a copy of an Office of General Counsel (OGC) memorandum, dated 23 November 1993, wherein [redacted] advised that it would be prudent for I&SB to transfer the below list of files to the Information Review Team (IRT).

2. In accordance with this memorandum, I&SB (3S04) (Stafford) transferred the below list of files, on 06 December 1993, to [redacted] (C/IRT) via [redacted] (G20 Stafford).

3. Therefore, as of 06 December 1993, I&SB considers itself absolved of the responsibility as custodian of the files. Conversely, as of 06 December, IRT assumes the responsibility as custodian of the files.

FILES TRANSFERRED FROM OS/I&SB TO OS/IRT:

- 1. HT LINGUAL (BANJO) ..... 0119144
  - 2. WESTPOINTER ..... 0583870
  - 3. SR POINTER ..... No case number visible
  - 4. [redacted] FILE ..... No case number visible
  - 5. PROJECT INDIAN ..... No case number visible
- (Continued on next page)

WARNING NOTICE  
 INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
 OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL BY 0701140  
 DECL OADR  
 DERV FRM COV 1-82

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(Continued)

6.	HT LINGUAL .....	0090079
7.	SR POINTER/OS PERSONNEL .....	No case number visible
8.	HT LINGUAL .....	0090079
9.	PROJECT HT LINGUAL .....	0090079
10.	HT LINGUAL .....	0090079
11.	SR POINTER .....	0077826
12.	SR POINTER .....	0093466
13.	SR POINTER (BANJO) .....	0119144
14.	SR POINTER (BANJO) .....	0119144
15.	WATCH LIST .....	No case number visible
16.	HT LINGUAL .....	0119144
17.	DC SURVEY .....	0090079
18.	PROJECT DAYLIGHT .....	0243550
19.	SR POINTER (CUBAN WATCHLIST) .....	No case number visible
20.	HT LINGUAL (BANJO) .....	0119144
21.	HT LINGUAL .....	No case number visible
22.	SR POINTER (BANJO) .....	0119144
23.	RADIO AMATEURS IN USSR .....	No case number visible
24.	FANFOLD CODING SYSTEM .....	0090079
25.	SR POINTER (MAPS) .....	No case number visible
26.	RADIO MOSCOW .....	0094866
27.	PROJECT CHAPERON .....	0099358
28.	SR POINTER .....	No case number visible
29.	MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAM .....	No case number visible
30.	SR POINTER .....	0090079
31.	PROJECT OUTLINE CHRONO/SR POINTER .....	0077826
32.	[REDACTED] .....	0156003
33.	US POST OFFICE LIAISON .....	No case number visible
34.	SSD MAIL COVER .....	No case number visible
35.	PROJECT SETTER .....	0159144
36.	SR POINTER/REDSKIN .....	No case number visible
37.	SR POINTER .....	No case number visible
38.	OS PROJECT POINTER .....	No case number visible
39.	RECORD OF BANJOES .....	No case number visible
40.	SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL .....	No case number visible
41.	SR POINTER .....	No case number visible
42.	HT LINGUAL .....	No case number visible
43.	SR POINTER .....	0090079
44.	ORIGINAL SR POINTER .....	No case number visible
45.	SR POINTER/BANJO .....	0119144
46.	SR POINTER/BANJO .....	0119144
47.	SR POINTER/BANJO .....	0119144
48.	HT LINGUAL .....	0119144
49.	SR POINTER .....	No case number visible

(Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 50. PROJECT HT LINGUAL .....0090079
- 51. PROJECT SR POINTER .....0077826
- 52. SR POINTER .....0093466
- 53. SR POINTER .....0093466
- 54. SR POINTER .....No case number visible
- 55. BANJO .....No case number visible
- 56. [REDACTED] .....No case number visible
- 57. [REDACTED] .....No case number visible
- 58. STOLEN AGENCY CREDENTIAL.....No case number visible
- 59. SR POINTER .....0090079

[REDACTED]

OS/I&SB

[REDACTED]

OS/IRT

(C)

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

REMOVAL OF SRPOINTER FILES FROM 3S04 STAFFORD TO G20 STAFFORD

FROM: <u>C/IRT</u> <u>G20 Stafford</u>	EXTENSION <u>40285</u>	NO.  
		DATE <u>23 Nov 93</u>

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

1. OS/Legal Advisor	11-24	11-27	JSA	<p>Len -</p> <p>I have been advised that the SRPOINTER files are a subgroup of the HTLWVHTE files. I recently recommended to OS that it coordinate with the DO's, IMOs, and the Agency's FOIA Office to determine the ultimate disposition of these files. In the interim, I agree that it would be prudent to allow your office to retain these files. Please call me if you'd like to discuss this matter further.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">JSA</p>
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. Please call when signed. Thank you.				
15.				

SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL

23 November 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted] OS Legal Advisor  
6N20 Stafford Building

FROM: [redacted]  
Chief, Information Review Team  
Office of Security

SUBJECT: Removal of SRPOINTER Files from 3S04  
Stafford (I&SB) to G20 Stafford (IRT)

1. Per a telephonic conversation with [redacted] of the OS/Investigations and Services Branch (I&SB), this memo will formally request a transfer/relocation of the noted SRPOINTER files to OS/Information Review Team (IRT).

2. I&SB is currently holding the SRPOINTER files as [redacted] formerly an I&SB Security Officer, served as the OS referent, as well as for his historical perspectives of the files. [redacted] has since retired and it has been informally agreed that IRT will serve as the focal point holder of the files.

3. A formal transfer will serve to alleviate I&SB's role as an "intermediary" in the occasional to frequent use of the SRPOINTER files for IRT's formal responses to Freedom of Information and Privacy Act requests. Additionally, as IRT serves as the focal point for other public and Agency requests, it is necessary to reference these files.

4. Your concurrence is required per C/I&SB instructions for a formal move of the SRPOINTER files from 3S04 Stafford to G20 Stafford.

Concurrence: [redacted]

\* See note on route

WARNING NOTICE  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL BY 2129112  
DECL OADR  
DERV FRM COV 1-82

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**ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL  
USE ONLY**

**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT (Optional)

Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

FROM		Extension		NO.
J. Barry Harrelson Historical Review Group/CSI (2E20 IPB)		31825		CSI 97-210
				DATE
				9 May 1997
TO (Officer designation, room, and building)	DATE		OFFICIAL'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. John Pereira, C/HRG (2E20 IPB)	9 May 1997		JP	
2.				
3. <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">                    </span> C/IMB, OPS (1S12 Stafford)				
4.				
5. J. Barry Harrelson CSI/HRG (2E20 IPB)				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				

## ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

CSI 97-210  
9 May 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Management Branch  
Office of Personnel Security

VIA: Chief, Historical Review Group  
Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson  
Historical Review Group  
Center for the Study of Intelligence

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

REFERENCE: A. Memo for C/IMB, dtd 27 Feb. 97,  
Same Subject  
B. Memo for DA/DO IROs (CSI 97-062),  
dtd 31 Jan 97

The following actions need to be taken to complete the Agency's response to the JFK Board's Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files):

a. Response to Request: CIA has to provide an official response that will become a part of the public record. The response should be a releasable version of your memorandum of 27 February 1997; according to the classification markings, most of the text is unclassified. I recommend that you send me an annotated copy indicating what can be released. I will prepare the response and coordinate it with you. Also please review the attachments to the memorandum for **possible** release. The JFK Board **may** consider documentation of the destruction of potentially relevant files as assassination records. HRG will handle any additional coordination (OGC, DO, etc.) required.

b. Transfer of Oswald's OS File(#0351164): The original Office of Security subject file on Oswald currently held by the Office of Personnel Security should be transferred to the Historical Review Group. The file will be incorporated into the Agency's JFK Assassination Collection and reviewed for release under the JFK Act of 1992. Most documents in this file will probably be duplicates of documents in the HSCA sequestered material held by HRG, however, under the JFK law all "Oswald" files are considered assassination records. The ARRB staff has asked for access to the file when practical.


ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

## ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

✓c+ Defectors File (#0341008): The ARRB staff has requested access to the parts of the Defector File that contain the Oswald documents, items a-f, listed in your 27 February memorandum. (We were unable to locate documents "e" and "f" in the HSCA sequestered collection.) Assassination- and Oswald-related documents in this file will most likely be declared assassination records. HRG will handle any third Agency coordination required.

Please let me know when it will be possible to give the ARRB staff access to the files. The access is considered for back-ground purposes only, and any notes taken will be reviewed by your staff and HRG. If a file is considered sensitive, access can be restricted to one ARRB staff member and monitored by your staff. The review can take place either at your office or in HRG. If you any questions, please give me a call, secure 31825.

  
J. Barry Harrelson

## ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

DCI/ESI/HRG/JBHarrelson:bas/x31806 (9 May 97)  
g:hrg/req#160S.doc

## Distribution:

Original - Addressee  
1 C/IP&CRD  
1 [REDACTED], OGC  
1 - C/HRG  
1 - B. Harrelson  
1 - HRG File



5 June 1997

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Review of OS Records on LHO and Defectors

FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC

1. Over the course of three half days, 29 May, 2 and 4 June, 1997 ARRB Staff member Michelle Combs reviewed the Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald and a multi-volume file collection entitled "Defectors." These were made available by [redacted] in OS offices in Stafford Building.

2. At the request of OS, the undersigned was present during the review. Mrs. Combs took notes of items of interest and put yellow stickies on a number of documents. She advised [redacted] that she (Mrs. Combs) would write a memorandum on what she had done and pass it to Mr. Gunn. Further, she advised that Mr. Gunn might want review the files personally.

3. [redacted] stated she would keep these files segregated within her office for quick retrieval if we wanted to see them again.

Gary  Breneman

27 October 1997

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Information Management Branch  
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: OSWALD, LEE HARVEY  
AIN: 0351164

1. The Office of Personnel Security was tasked on 31 January 1997 by the Historical Review Group/Center for the Study of Intelligence (HRG/CSI), via the Directorate of Administration/Information Review Office, with researching pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The tasking was generated by the John F. Kennedy Board's desire to review and declassify relevant material. The results of this review were forwarded to the HRG/CSI on 27 February 1997.

2. During the Information Management Branch's (IMB) research in response to the above tasking it was noted that Volume V of the Oswald files was not on the shelf where Volumes I-IV and VI-VII were located. A search of the entire area where the volumes had been maintained failed to locate Volume V. The IMB Files Section was subsequently charged with conducting an all out search for the missing volume. The search failed to find Volume V.

3. In July 1997, the Oswald files were reviewed page by page prior to being turned over to HRG/CSI and another attempt was made to locate Volume V or to locate persons who might know what happened to it. Volume V was not located nor were any persons located who were knowledgeable of its status.

4. During the complete review of the Oswald files no time gap was apparent and no one was located who could recall ever seeing Volume V. This would suggest that either Volume V had been consolidated into other volumes or that Volume V never existed, but that a numbering error resulted in what should have been Volume V being labeled as Volume VI. The use of Roman numerals on the cover of the volumes might have caused this error to occur.

## Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

24 December 1997

*file*

Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn  
 Executive Director  
 Assassination Records Review Board  
 600 E. Street, N.W. (2nd Floor)  
 Washington, D.C. 20530

CIA-16  
 RECEIVED

QUESTIONS  
 ALL

Dear Dr. Gunn:

2000

Re: Request for Additional Information and Records  
 No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files) and  
 No. CIA-IR-24 (Defector File)

This is a partial response to the ARRB's referent request for pre-assassination files this Agency may have had on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is believed the following comments and two enclosed documents fully respond to the Office of Security questions. The DO response is pending.

1. At Tab A is a 22 December 1997 memorandum containing information from the Agency's Office of Personnel Security which provides details about the files it had on Oswald prior to the assassination plus when and why they were created. These include the Office of Security file on Oswald, a general file on Americans who had defected to another country and information about HTLINGUAL files.

2. Also enclosed at Tab B is a 27 October 1977 memorandum from the Office of Personal Security which explains the numbering of that Office's file on Oswald. In particular, it explains why the "missing" volume V may never have existed.

3. An ARRB staff member has reviewed the Oswald Security file and the file on American defectors.

4. The Oswald Office of Personnel Security file and those pages of the defector file deemed relevant by the ARRB staff member have been forwarded to HRG for review and will be processed according to current release guidelines.

If you have any questions about this response, please advise.

Sincerely,

J. Barry Harrelson

22 December 1997

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. Pursuant to ARRB "Resquet No. CIA-16, the Office of Personnel Security conducted research for and existing pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The following responses are provided to those questions which pertain to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

**Question 1:** Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

**Response:** At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. One file entitled "Defectors File" (#0341008), contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald, and the second file was Office of Security subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

2. Within the ARRB request is specific mention of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files. Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

**Question 2:** For other than the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

**Response:** As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

3. HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project involving the opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In the Office of Security this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. The Office of Security actually conducted the opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information being referred to the Directorate of Operations.

4. The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This file contained information was from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

- a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"
- b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960
- c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

- d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors
- e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961
- f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

5. The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors and provided limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of the Office of Security. Efforts to locate this listing or determine its disposition have been unsuccessful.

6. Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. An employee of this Office was, recalls the Defector Machine Listing as being approximately one and one-half inches thick and in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained the limited biographic data on each name.

7. The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

- a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959
- b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"

- c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959
- d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959
- e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959
- f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"
- g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"
- h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960
- i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961
- j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter
- k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas
- l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961
- m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961
- n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure
- o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961
- p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962
- q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure
- r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months

Leaves Soviet 'Home' "

- s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

8. In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

- t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald
- u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)
- v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)
- w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963
- x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963
- y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

**Question 4:** To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

**Response:** It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of



documents increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

9. Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

10. The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

11. A representative of the Office of Personnel Security /Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. He made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

*file cy*

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE IN FULL  
2000

16 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk  
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson  
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM

SUBJECT: CIA-16, Oswald Pre-Assassination Files

1. This is further to my letter of 24 December 1997 in response to referent request.

2. That letter, was a partial response which provided the Office of Personnel Security's information. The Directorate of Operations' (DO) response was still pending. The DO response was provided on 2 September 1998 and it is attached.

3. Please note that both responses are contained in the Agency's Compliance Declaration dated 2 September 1998 at Attachment V(2).

4. This completes the Agency's action on CIA-16. If you have any questions about this matter, please advise.

Sincerely,



J. Barry Harrelson

Encl. A/S

DO Response to Board Request CIA - 16  
Oswald Pre-Assassination Files

The Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO records to determine if there were any additional files containing pre-assassination records relating to Oswald. Research identified a document in the Oswald 201 which appeared to be a file inventory. The document identified CI Staff as the file custodian. CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were incorporated into the 201.

Prior to establishing a 201, any documents received would have been placed in an operational interest file. We found no reference to the existence of an operational file. If such a file had existed, however, it might not have been registered in the central index. It was standard procedures that upon opening a 201, the documents from an interest file would be transferred to the 201.

Given that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files under court order, and no record was made of what files existed. We did not review all of the DO record system to destroy all copies of material which may have been derived from HTLINGUAL material. We know, for instance, that there are HTLINGUAL items related to Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection

In sum, the 201 on Oswald contains all the information we are aware of that we had prior to the assassination.