

HOETTL Wilhelm Ver. 19

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SECRET CONTROL

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INCOMING

*G-2*

3 JULY 1945

TO: LONDON, BERLIN, AMZN  
INFO: SAINT & 109  
FROM: WASHINGTON

WASH-PARIS NR 20757, LONDON-ARIS 32357

DECLASSIFIED  
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act  
PL105-246

By: *5-4* Date: *4/8/2001*

SECRET CONTROL

RE AMZN 30 TO 109 LONDON-WASH 30/14.

STRONGLY URGE THAT HOSTIL MATTER NOT BE REVEALED TO RUSSIANS.  
NOW PREPARING REASONS AGAINST THIS MOVE FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION  
AND WILL SEND DETAILED CANL<sup>B</sup> MONDAY.

(30 IS 033 OUT 1362)

033 2919

SAINT

SECRET

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SECRET

27th July 1945

SUBJECT: Miscellaneous notes on the activities of the Japanese Intelligence Service in Europe.

SOURCE: SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Dr. HOTTL, Chief Referent group VI E. RSHA.

ITALY

1. In Italy the Japanese and the Italian intelligence Services shared certain common spheres of interest, especially in the Near East and in India. This led to a degree of collaboration far beyond the customary exchange of intelligence between the intelligence services of two allied nations. Several missions laid by SIM appear to have been planned and executed in conjunction with the Japanese. The intelligence produced by those missions benefited of course both partners. An SIM officer told Dr. HOTTL in 1944 that in India alone altogether 300 agents have been committed. Also the Italian Colonial police which was active in intelligence matters on the African continent maintained certain contacts with the Japanese the exact nature of which is unknown to Dr. HOTTL.

RUSSIA

2. The Japanese did extensive spying in Soviet-Russia, mostly from bases in the South-East, foremost among which was Rumania. The chief agents were as a rule Japanese press representatives and also members of the Japanese diplomatic staffs. Dr. HOTTL had the opportunity to observe that the situation was somewhat similar in Turkey. Besides, Dr. HOTTL learned from the reports of well informed persons on the spot, that Japanese intelligence was especially well represented on the Caucasus. Through Armenian contacts Dr. HOTTL learned that several Caucasian, esp Georgian groups in Germany drew substantial Japanese subsidies. This region was of particular intelligence interest to Japan because, as a prominent Georgian explained it to Dr. HOTTL, the Japanese look at the Caucasus as a boundary of their Western sphere of interest.

METHODS & RESULTS.

3. In all instances mentioned so far the Japanese operated with indigenous agents and only the net itself was managed by Japanese. In some isolated instances the Japanese managed to draw whole national groups into their service, but primarily they availed themselves of the services of paid agents. In Dr. HOTTL's opinion, also shared by competent members of the German Intelligence Service, the Japanese ND in Russia was highly successful. This view was shared e.g. by a British engineer in Budapest, chief agent of the British secret service in that city, who mentioned to one of Dr. HOTTL's agents that he considered the Japanese Intelligence Service in Russia was even better than the British Secret Service.

NACHRICHTEN-LADEN KLATT.

4. KLATT (at present held by SCI in Salzburg) got excellent material on Russia through the Japanese ND, provided Dr. HOTTL's supposition that KLATT worked with that organization, is correct.- See special report on KLATT -

*Handwritten signature/initials*

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JAPANESE SPYING ON GERMANY

- 5. Two outstanding characteristics of the working methods of the Japanese Intelligence Service were its lack of scruples in the choice of means and remarkable technical accomplishment in the execution of its missions. In summer 1943 the Japanese Intelligence Service succeeded in getting hold of the strategic plans of the German Army Group Nord against Russia. In the opinion of experts this was quite an accomplishment, unique and without precedent in German military history. The plans were found to have been photographed on micro-films. The films had been wrapped tightly around a thin piece of wire and inserted into the rim of a rubber preservative. Another part of the film had been inserted into the apertures of a brush where the bristles are set in wood. The film reels were about the size of a pin-head. This particular espionage mission had been laid on by the Manchurian legation and executed by 'national' Poles, who were found to be hiding their true identity in the garb of handmen for the legation. In the course of the investigation it transpired that the Japanese (like the British) made extensive use of the services of national Poles.

According to Dr. HOTTEL, it was incomprehensible to the German authorities what induces the Japanese to spy against their German allies, in particular since Ambassador OSHIMA had been kept au courant of Germany's plans by HITLER personally.

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One possible explanation, Dr. HOTEL believes, could be advanced, viz: that the Japanese Government which was known to put very little trust into OSHIMA's reportage - TOJO is supposed to have referred to OSHIMA at one occasion as a German spy - and tried to check up on him.

The case, incidentally, had no diplomatic sequel and the whole matter was hushed up as well as possible.

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HLEUGH (chief investigator of the RSHA), had been told to conduct the francup and put it on a legally sound basis, was attached to SCHELLENBERG. The three let no grass grow under their feet and in due time managed to uncover certain misdemeanors on the part of JOSEF. JOSEF, as it turned out, has been wanting to build a little home for himself in Berlin. He lacked ready cash and accepted the offer of SS Obersturmbannfuhrer VOLLMHEIM, group chief VI.C, to arrange for a cheap credit with a banking house in Prague. This rather innocuous transaction emerged, after the trio had given matters the proper slant, as a full-fledged case of bribery, implicating besides JOSEF, SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr. FILBERT and SS-Sturmbannfuhrer LAIBER. Pending investigation they were to drag on for years, JOSEF was relieved of his post and, in October 1942, SCHELLENBERG appointed deputy chief Amt VI.

- 6. SCHELLENBERG's appointment was to be a milestone in the history of the German espionage service. He has set his sights high: his aim was no less than the creation of an all-inclusive espionage service in Germany, doing away with the nefarious duality of political and military espionage, the latter the exclusive domain of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht through its Amt Abwehr. His endeavours towards that aim were at first none too successful. SCHELLENBERG himself was to blame for that. In his eagerness to clean the Augean stables of Amt VI his undue distrust of man and man's motives drove him too far. He purged most of the experienced group chiefs from his staff's and replaced them by young inexperienced men whose talents lagged considerably behind the enthusiasm they brought to the job.
- 7. In 1943 the personnel crisis had been finally overcome and the ascendancy of Amt VI within the RSHA began to make itself felt. It coincided with the appointment of Dr. KALTENBRUNNER to Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei. In contradistinction to HEYDRICH, KALTENBRUNNER evinced a lively interest in the foreign espionage branch of the RSHA, putting the full weight of his position behind the expansion of Amt VI and the improvement of its services. As a matter of course, the preferential treatment accorded Amt VI came into the open, and the former had to be headed a discrete sop in form of a slice of Abwehr III. Still, in spring 1944, after the merger with the military Abwehr had been consummated, SCHELLENBERG had risen to a position of uncontested power in the RSHA, a position he managed to reinforce in the aftermath of the 20th July.
- 8. To form a correct estimate of SCHELLENBERG's character, one must have known him over a considerable period of time. This might sound like a truism, if it were not for the fact that his character is of inordinate complexity, masterfully disguised. Snap judgements are bound to be either superficial or erroneous. E.g. to cast SCHELLENBERG in the common mould of a Nazi youngster carried up through a vagary of fate, would be missing the main point. Neither he nor KALTENBRUNNER conform to type, they are both sui generis.

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9. SCHELLENBERG is a consummate actor. He can turn on the charm and when he does, the impression of being face to face with a nice, harmless and quite ingenuitous young man is all but irresistible. SCHELLENBERG has a habit of looking the person he talks to deep into the eyes as if he were trying to convey: "look, what I am telling you here really springs from the depth of my heart; since you caught me in a weak moment I might as well confess to it". In real life SCHELLENBERG is an ice-cold, ever calculating realist, who leaves nothing to chance and who even in his 'weak moments' knows how to regulate the impression he sees fit to give. SCHELLENBERG knows what he wants, he knows how to get there if need be over corpses. For SCHELLENBERG the words 'friendship' and 'loyalty' bear no meaning, nor does he expect them from others.
10. The dream in SCHELLENBERG's life was the creation of one single espionage system omnipotent in the field of political decision and comparable to what he conceives the British Secret Service to be. To make this dream come true, he was willing to sacrifice everything, not excluding his health and the happiness of his family life. For years he had never, not even for a matter of hours, taken time off to relax and enjoy life.

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12 July 1945.

1. SUBJECT: A Character Sketch of SCHELLENBERG; Chief of Germany's Espionage Service.

SOURCE: SS-Sturmabfuhrer Dr. Wilhelm HOEPL, chief referent Group VI E, RSHA.

1. SCHELLENBERG's meteoric rise to power, despite the initial handicap of youth and a high party number, has been considered a remarkable feat by his admirers as well as by his detractors. To a very large degree it can be attributed to sheer ability and indomitable industry, the hallmarks of success in all free countries, but not necessarily in Nazi Germany where the accidents of race and political background weigh heavily.
2. SCHELLENBERG had his start in politics in his hometown Saarbrücken, where he taught "Weltanschauung" in the local unit of the Allgemeine SA. In 1934 he was taken on by the Sicherheitsdienst and posted to the personnel department of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Amt I). At that time the SD was still in its formative stage and consequently Amt I was of pivotal importance. Beyond the narrow confines of a second-ranking position, SCHELLENBERG held at first, he soon began to exert considerable influence. His conspicuous talent for organization did not escape the attention of the all-powerful chief of the Sicherheitsdienst, HEYDRICH, who soon took him under his wings. In the course of time the relationship SCHELLENBERG-HEYDRICH deepened and besides being counted among HEYDRICH's most trusted co-workers, he enjoyed the rare privilege of invitations to his chief's home. He stood high in the favor of Frau LINA, (HEYDRICH's wife whose frown sufficed to make the Kaiser shiver in his boots), so much so that it was generally expected he would marry the widow after HEYDRICH's death. Alas, with her husband's timely demise Frau LINA had outlived her usefulness for SCHELLENBERG.
3. SCHELLENBERG's career took a decisive turn in the direction of where his real talents lay when he was transferred to Amt IV (Gehobenes Standespolizei) and appointed group chief IV E. IV E (later IV A 3) was the counter-intelligence branch of the RSHA, the ideal proving ground for new and untried methods of espionage work developed on the enemy side. SCHELLENBERG never busied himself with routine Gestapo matters and his most outstanding attainment in that period, the abduction of two prominent British agents STEVENS and WEST (Venlo-Unternehmen), was an Amt VI undertaking, with SCHELLENBERG as the only Amt IV man taking a decisive part in the planning. At the time he moved to Amt VI, his reputation as a "Nachrichtemann" was established and, besides, he had worked himself up to a position of the, next to SS-Gruppenfuhrer MUELLER (Chief Amt IV), most powerful man in Amt IV.

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- 4. It seem worth while describing the circumstances surrounding SCHELLBERG's accession to power in Amt VI at some length, because they bring out some of his most salient characteristics, among them the conspicuous absence of moral scruples in pursuing his ends.

Already in 1940 HEYDRICH had made up his mind to oust the then chief of Amt VI - SS-Brigadefuhrer JOST - of whose abilities he had a low estimate. At that time the main stumbling block was SS-Brigadefuhrer Dr. STAHLMEYER, the most serious candidate a vacancy left by JOST. HEYDRICH who feared that STAHLMEYER cast his net even wider, decided for the lesser evil and on to JOST while waiting for more propitious circumstances in which to effect the change-over.

- 5. In Autumn 1941 the time appeared ripe. SS-Sturmbannfuhrer SCHELLBERG was appointed deputy chief Amt VI (he signed all official documents as 'Chef VI/V) and given the specific mission by HEYDRICH to build up a damaging case against JOST. SCHELLBERG went about this task with his customary circumspection. Regierungsrat SIEBERT who, together with Dr.

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He knowingly drove himself to a physical collapse and his gall bladder ailment is primarily due to overstrain.

- 11. SCHELLENBERG's private life, if there is such a thing, is impenetrable. He neither smokes, nor drinks, nor craves female companionship. He lives an ascetic's life and the emoluments of his position have never tempted him. He lived within the limits prescribed by his ration coupons and if his private secretary had not taken care of him, symptoms of malnutrition might have taken in serious proportions. His asceticism, however, did not stem from any higher ethical motives. He merely felt that continence would be his most powerful weapon in holding off his detractors who would gladly have seized upon just any circumstance liable to reflect upon his integrity.
- 12. SCHELLENBERG was inconsiderate not only to himself but also to his family. He divorced his first wife when her age made it appear likely that she would be unable to bear any more children. By all means he had to please his great protector HIMMLER, who liked to see his subordinate spend in a big way. In short order he begot three children in blind disregard of his wife's poor state of health. After the last child had been born the delivery happened to be particularly difficult. KALTENBRUNNER had to give a direct order to bring SCHELLENBERG to his wife's bedside.
- 13. His rivals, potential and actual, SCHELLENBERG fought with incredible pertinacity, single-mindedness and deliberation. In order to gain control over the military espionage system (Abwehr) SCHELLENBERG patiently went about gathering incrimination evidence against Admiral CANARIS and his closest collaborators. At the same time he went out of his way to prove to CANARIS that despite the prevailing spirit of competition, his feelings were those of a friend dealing with friends. No doubt SCHELLENBERG can claim major credit if in the wake of the VERBEEGEN incident (desertion of Abwehr personnel in Turkey to the British), KALTENBRUNNER was able to dethrone CANARIS and annex the Abwehr. After all it was SCHELLENBERG who had systematically gathered evidence to prove that close connections between the Abwehr and the enemy powers had grown beyond the experimental stage.
- 14. SCHELLENBERG never confided in the new chief of staff (the successor of the Abwehr), Oberst i.G. HANSEN. He either must have known about HANSEN's England connections or must have suspected their existence. His conduct, after the plot of the 20 July blow up, was certainly not prompted by disapprobation. As one of the very few leading men in Germany SCHELLENBERG clearly perceived that Germany's military fortunes were on the wane and he would not have hesitated to act on that conviction and strike a bargain with his opposite numbers. Therefore his dominant reaction upon the 20 July was one of potulance rather than of downright indignation. What irked him most was HANSEN's double-cross and to have been accorded pride of place on the liquidation roster of the new government.

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15. SCHELLENBERG's relations with KALTENBRUNNER, were short of cordial, as a type he did not appeal to KALTENBRUNNER, but that did not deter him. By every manner of means he tried to ingratiate himself with KALTENBRUNNER. In his personal contacts with the SS he frequently displayed a rather disgusting servility. In that respect he was typical product of the MEYERSON era: Never talk back to a superior and avoid telling him all the bad news. Needless to emphasize, SCHELLENBERG did not feel bound by any obligations of loyalty towards his chief.

16. HIMMLER entertained great personal esteem for SCHELLENBERG. He even nicknamed him: Benjamin. Whenever a suitable opportunity offered, SCHELLENBERG reported to HIMMLER direct. KALTENBRUNNER did nothing to stop that practice. He was much too phlegmatic to make an issue of 'trifles' and, besides, he did not consider SCHELLENBERG a serious opponent, although he suspected him of hatching out a plot in conspiracy with SS Obergruppenfuhrer BERGER, KALTENBRUNNER's implacable enemy.

- 17. To what extent SCHELLENBERG was actually able to influence HIMMLER's decisions is difficult to gauge. Although he was intellectually far superior to HIMMLER, his natural inclination not to come out into the open with his true convictions tended to minimize his influence. At the same time he developed a remarkable skill in instilling certain beliefs or opinions into HIMMLER, making him think that it was actually his own original idea which SCHELLENBERG had merely put into words.
- 18. As an established fact SCHELLENBERG fanned HIMMLER's already smoldering fire for KALTENBRUNNER. His weapons: the sly insinuation in preference to blunt accusations. An aside comment on KALTENBRUNNER's increasing power and independence, a passing remark upon his strong Austrian proclivities worked wonders with HIMMLER; and SCHELLENBERG knew it.
- 19. SCHELLENBERG had nobody in the world he could call his friend. When Regierungsrat Sebastian, one of his oldest friends, was subjected to criminal investigation, SCHELLENBERG dropped him like a hot potato. All chiefs of the Amt were SCHELLENBERG's sworn enemies, especially RUFER of Amt IV who could not forget that SCHELLENBERG at one time had been his subordinate. SCHELLENBERG's colleagues were of course keenly aware of his intellectual superiority. Moreover, they began to feel preponderance of SCHELLENBERG's two Amt (VI and VII Amt) in the SS. In the daily meetings of the Amt chiefs, SCHELLENBERG was the butt of their most merciless attacks and frequently he came back to his office like a broken man. Even in his own Amt nobody fully trusted him; with one exception; his faithful secretary Fraulein SCHLENKE.
- 20. SCHELLENBERG's enemies in Amt VI were SS-Sturmbannfuhrer SKORZENY and WANECK (VI E), SS-Standartenfuhrer Dr. KROCHEN and RAUPE. SKORZENY and WANECK were undoubtedly in the good graces of their fellow Austrian KALTENBRUNNER and SCHELLENBERG felt this very keenly. At the same time SCHELLENBERG never hesitated to ask for their help whenever he wanted something from KALTENBRUNNER which he dared not ask himself. Then again he played KALTENBRUNNER and SKORZENY out against each other with so much skill that he actually got close to bringing about SKORZENY's downfall. Quite likely SCHELLENBERG will claim now that he was a prisoner in his Amt, a mere puppet in the hand of KALTENBRUNNER's henchmen WANECK and SKORZENY. That is not true, however, both believed in direct action, disregarding channels and banking on SCHELLENBERG's notorious disinclination to face issue squarely. If he had been less of a coward, he could have forced both WANECK and SKORZENY into line by the sheer weight of his superior intellect and undoubtedly he would have found the backing of KALTENBRUNNER.

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1. Despite his manifold talents and his unabated self-entombment, SCHELLENBERG suffers from a bad case of inferiority/complex. This is important to bear in mind. In a great many respects SCHELLENBERG is unfit to stand on his own legs. What the casual observer may possibly take for feigned modesty, is in many instances due to lack of self-assuredness. SCHELLENBERG is unable to cope with many of the demands the routine of daily life rains and certain of his mannerisms typical for the 'Weltfreund Wissenschafter' are not put on but genuine.
2. From the point of view of professional accomplishment, SCHELLENBERG must be rated as belonging to the top layer of Germany's leading intelligence men, in fact, he probably heads the list. As a matter of fact his forte is not intelligence work as such, for which he lacks the practical foundation, but his outstanding knack for organization and imparting constructive ideas. SCHELLENBERG has made an exact science out of intelligence work. He would be the man to teach this science in a university. In spite of the above-mentioned limitations SCHELLENBERG has been most successful in organizing and maintaining his own information net, notably in Switzerland and in Sweden. His lack in practical experience, it seems has been amply compensated for by his acumen in judging people and by his judiciousness in dealing with them.
3. To strike the balance on the various elements that make up SCHELLENBERG's character:

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SECRET

10 July 1945

HDH

SUBJECT : Ant VI plans for post-war activation in Spain.  
SOURCE : SS-Strusbannfuhrer Dr. HOTTL, Chief Referent VI B, RSHA  
REFERENCE: Special Brief C.I. War Room, London

In entertaining suspicion that long range plans have been prepared by Ant VI, providing for continued espionage activities in Spain after the end of the war, Dr. HOTTL believes we are all on the same wavelength. Pointing out that conditions in Germany hardly favor a resumption of intelligence activities under the aegis ... of the old RSHA in any shape or form, he enumerated several reasons which tend to refute the assumption that in Spain, well disguised and amply provided with funds, a determined group of Ant VI officials bides its time, waiting for the inevitable lull in Allied vigilance to resume its activities.

1. A reorganization of AML ANT and A T VI from top to bottom was no doubt on the books and would have brought in its train a reshuffling of personnel on a big scale. This was merely the aftermath of the amputation of the RSHA into RSHA and the resultant disarray. If preparation for post-war activities had been on the agenda, Dr. HOTTL claims, he would have known about it. SCHULLENBERG will confirm, Dr. HOTTL states, that at no time, practically or accidentally, directly or by inference, has this subject, viz post-war activities of Ant VI from/neutral enclave, been broached. At no time, i.e. neither at Cruppenleiter meetings/nor in the course of private conversation with SCHULLENBERG or KUTTENBRUNNER.
2. Any plans on post-war activities of the above-mentioned type would naturally presuppose that somebody in Ant VI had the courage to admit frankly and openly that the jig was up and that plans should be laid with the inevitable contingency of Germany's military defeat in view. Up to the last moment operations in Ant VI were conducted on the spurious supposition that Germany could in the end force her enemies into a negotiated peace with a semblance of independence left to her. KALTENERUNNER was sold on this idea, SCHULLENBERG was not and actually did hatch post-war plans that can be summed up in one word: SCHULLENBERG.
3. The far-sighted few in the RSHA who were actually reconciled in their minds to Germany's inevitable defeat may conceivably have toyed with the idea of going underground. If they were both far-sighted and judicious they certainly realized that espionage activities of any kind would of necessity have to be connived at by the the Western Allies, unless they were to be directed against them. Assuming the latter, any activities directed against the Western allies, originating on Spanish soil, would hardly commend themselves to the Franco regime despite its known proclivities. This should be accepted as not-avoidant, Dr. HOTTL maintains.

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4. In the course of the shifting of personnel, after the events of the 20 July had precipitated the amalgamation of the Abwehr apparatus, Oberstleutnant I.G. KLEYNSTUBBER was sent to Spain. This may have given rise to the erroneous impression that Amt VI was beginning to lay the ground work for a post-war information net in Spain. According to Dr. HOTTL such implications could be read into KLEYNSTUBBER's assignment only in ignorance of the following circumstances:

4. a). Oberstleutnant I.C. KLEYNSTUBBER was not a man of SCHELLENBERG's confidence. The fact that he had fought in the Spanish Civil War with the Legion Condor and that he had good connections with the Falange may have qualified him for the job. The underlying consideration in transferring to Spain was, however, that SCHELLENBERG intensely distrusted officers who had held responsible positions in the Abwehr and who had been close to Oberst I.G. HANSEN. SCHELLENBERG once mentioned to Dr. HOTTL that he felt he could trust no one among the leading functionaries of the old Abwehr, with the exception of Oberst I.G. OHLETZ.

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Professionally highly gifted, though not devoid of imperfections.  
By all counts, a low character without standards of loyalty and common  
decency.  
A man who under no circumstances can be trusted.

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III

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I.O.'s Comment:

Ironically enough Oberst i.G. PHITZ was up to his neck in the conspiracy of the 20 July (see KUEBART report), whereas KLEYNERTHNER was suspected and disliked by Oberst ILNSEN because of the intimate connections he had with the SD (see ibid).

b. The official policy of Amt VI did not evince any partiality towards the Falango. The only Amt VI pipe line to that organisation, Dr. HOTTEL knows about, was possibly handled by Sturmbannfuhrer MOSIG (VI B, RSILA). Raimon SUNER, Franco's one-time Foreign Minister, worked for SCHELLENBERG on purely personal basis without political background (see special report on the SUNER connection.).

# 882

G. ✓

SECRET

SAINT LONDON FOR CORN

5 July 1945

TOP SECRET

SPEARHEAD AMSON

ROUTINE

Ref. your 722 of 30 June re BENTE and SMILG.

1. Your paragraphs two and three. These reports turned over to 12 Able George Documents section - believe now at CIA's documents section or Easy Dog Sugar.
2. Your para four. Saint Caserta notified 18 June of addresses two hiding places Italy.
3. Your para six. RUSSI last heard of at religious order hospital in Bellinzona.
4. Please send soonest OSBIS report on Dr. Walter Smith. Useful for BENTE interrogation.

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SML...TFP....

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SECRET G ✓

SAINT 110 BERN  
SAINT LONDON  
SPYMASTER AMSON

5 July 1945

TOP SECRET  
ROUTINE

Ref. your 856 of 3 July re Code SLMO.

1. Your para Baker - Slaves 57 to 58 very likely at one of two hiding places in Italy addresses of which already signalled Caserta.
2. Memoranda SLMO to MURKIN obtained from B-101 in German translation. Turned over to 12 Able George Documents center. Now probably at SHAF documents center, or Macy Dog Sugar.

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SEP.....EP.....

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INCOMING

SECRET

1899

3 July 1945

TO: SAINT, PARIS  
INFO: CASERTA, LONDON, AMBON  
FROM: SAINT, 110, BERN  
BERN-PARIS 13414.

Reur cable of 29 re HEBE CIAMO.

1. Decision re her expulsion not yet made.
2. CIAMO diaries 39 to 43 and believe all important info HEBE's possessions here obtained months ago. Diary 37 to 38 and important confidential memoranda CIAMO to HEBE which HEBE unable bring with her Switzerland seized by HEBE at clinic near PARIS. Despite all efforts have so far been unable obtain these papers. If HEBE can give clue re these missing documents would be most interesting.
3. Believe HEBE should be handled by HEBE not HEBE/3 view grave responsibility involved. Understand question her expulsion and control being handled high political and military levels.

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SAINT ✓

HEBE

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PRIORITY 115882

02 1737  
01 2127  
00 0045

HIGHING SECRET

317

C. ✓

2 JULY 1945

TO: SAINT, LONDON  
INFO: SAINT, WASHINGTON; SAINT, CASERTA; SAINT, NEW ORLEANS,  
ANNEN

FROM: SAINT, RHE, ED 550

RE: CASERTA 1913, CASERTA-PARIS 10904

REF LONDON PARIS 05497 BENT AMZ H AS TCB

1. DO NOT WANT LEDA CLARK IN ITALY. PRO CEASE WOULD RESULT IN POLITICAL UNREST AND LONG DELAY BUT TRIAL CHANCE IN CASERTA. TEDIUC MANIPULATIONS WITH AMZ H AS DO NOT FAVOR IS (SIC 419) ACTIVITIES THIS NATURE WOULD MAKE CLARK'S RELEASE IMPOSSIBLE. ALSO NECESSARY COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP PROTECTIVE HAVE ALL NEGOTIATIONS WITH AMERICANS IS (SIC) REVEALED TO ITALIANS.
2. OFFICERLY UNDERSTAND OF SPANISH SECURED DIARIES. IF THESE SUBJECT USEFUL ONLY FOR CASH AND DELIVERY INF. TRANSACTIONS BY SAINT BORN USING THREAT EXPLOSION AS CARRIER H.
3. ED-LANDERS ALSO INTERESTED CLASS B. SPANISH. THROUGH Y B AMAGE 0010 REPORT ON HIS OFFICIAL BR. LETTER LONDA.
4. REPORT STATES PENDING CLAIMS TRIAL (SIC) H AS FOR RELEASE REQUESTED IN BERLIN IF CLAIM REPRESENTATIVE OF ONE HAD NOT TO BE

(CONTINUED)

00027

2/11/45

SAINT  
EXEC

2 JULY 1945

RECORDS ITALIAN FOREIGN OFFICE PERIOD 1935 TO MID 39 INCLUDING PERSONAL DIARIES.

5. SEGNA ORDERED BY GEN HARSTER F. ACC HENRY FRAN PRETZ (PRETZ?) AND ENLID PUGGI TO ROME WHERE D. OBTAINS BUT U.S. DIARIES COLLECTED AND YARENTO VERONA, PUGGI ACTING IN DENIAL EDDA GIAN.

6. SEGNA T-EX 6 VOLUMES DIARIES DEPOSITED TO KALTENBENDER AT SD HQ IN BERLIN 8 OR 9 JAN 45.

7. DAY PRISON CAMP EXECUTION ENDA CALLED ON HARSTER WEARING DIARY IN SPECIAL BELT.

8. EIGHTH DAY OF EXECUTION HARSTER WAS MAKING SURVEILLANCE OF EDDA AT S. MALEDOSSINI HOME NEAR PARTA INFORMED SEGNA AND HARSTER THAT EDDA AND PUGGI HAD ESCAPED TO SWITZERLAND. PUGGI PICKED UP. LATER USED BY OSS TO CONTACT EDDA IN SWITZERLAND BUT WAS INTERFERED BY SWISS.

9. THRU SEGNA, HARSTER SENT FRANCISCOAN SUBJECT RADTE PANDIO TO EDDA WHO PROMISED TO KEEP DIARY SECRET UNTIL AFTER WAR WHEN SHE WOULD NEED CASH.

(763 IS OSS IN 2005)

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000 11100

SAINT

EXEC

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882

INCOMING

011537  
398023  
011539

0/3

SECRET

1 JULY 1948

TO: BERDING, ANZON  
INFO: 109  
FROM: 110, DENN

GERN-PANIC 10007.

RE 109'S ANSWER OUR ANZON 765 RE HEALTH.

1. FULLY AGREE WE SHOULD CLEAR OUR RECORDS WITH SIBERT AND SADES.
2. SUGGEST YOU PREPARE FORM OF INFO WHICH WE MIGHT HAVE READY TO PRESENT TO OUR R FRIENDS BUT THAT AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH SIBERT AND SADES DEFINITIVE ACTION BE TAKEN WHICH I TRUST WE CAN HAVE AT ANZON WITH 109 WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS.

(765 IS 030 BUT 1542)

00026

000 2175

SAINT  
EXEC

SECRET

#-882

WAR ROOM, LONDON

30 JUNE 1945

SECRET

SPLARHEAD, AMZON

FOLLOWING FROM SPECIAL INTERROGATIONS MONTPL

- A. ABOUT THREE MAY KALTENBRUNNER DISCUSSED PLANS OPERATING ILLEGAL NAZI ACTIVITIES IN MOUNTAINS WITH ROETTL AT STROLL.
- B. HOW THINKS THIS LAST MOMENT NOTION OF KING BASED ON EXPERIENCES THIRTY SEVEN AND THIRTY EIGHT AUSTRIAN NAZIS.
- C. KING WANTED HIDE OUT WITH FEW FRIENDS CONTACT SUGAR SUGAR LEADERS AND PARTY CHIEFS HE WAS SURE WOULD BE IN MOUNTAINS THROUGH THEM KEEP TOUCH NAZI PARTY REMNANTS AUSTRIA.
- D. HOW CLAIMS KING HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGED AND KNEW NO SPECIFIC PERSONS HE WOULD FIND IN MOUNTAINS. REPORTED GO WITH SCHMIDLER HIS CHAUFFEUR AND ONE OTHER ATTENDANT. PRESUMABLY WOULD USE SKORZENY COMMUNICATIONS.
- E. SKORZENY ALREADY HAD NETWORK SET UP WITH PERHAPS ONE HUNDRED HIS BEST MEN AND SUPPLIES HIDDEN STYRIA SALZBURG UPPER AUSTRIA.
- F. KING WANTED HOW TELL AMERICANS HIS COLLABORATION WITH HOW.
- G. WANTED OPERATE PLAN WITH KNOWLEDGE PROPOSED LEGAL GOVERNMENT PLANNED WITH GLAISE-HORSTENAU NEUBACHER ETCETERA.
- H. POINTED OUT THIS HAD WORKED SUCCESSFULLY BEFORE ANSCHLUSS. AIMED

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CONTINUED NEXT PAGE FROM PAGE 1

BRING NAZIS OVER TO BECOME LEGAL OPPOSITION WITHIN STATE.

I. HOW THINKS KING DISCUSSED THIS WITH GLAISE MUEHLMANN POSSIBLY  
RAHER.

00023

*2 pages*

1260

JBO

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000732  
201543  
000685

INCOME  
**SECRET**

G ✓

763

# 882

05 JUL 1945

TO: SAINT, BERN  
INFO: SAINT, CASERTA; SPEARHEAD, ANCON  
FROM: SAINT, LONDON

LONDON-PARIS 15197.

- A. WHEN AND WHERE IS FUDA CHANG TO BE EXPELLED FROM SWITZERLAND?
- B. SUGGEST ATTEMPT HAVE HER RETURNED TO SCI, MILAN.
- C. OUR AGENT BEETZ, OF ANT BUREAU C, CONDUCTED HOETTL, INFORMS SHE HAS CHANG'S DIARIES AND ANY RELATED DOCUMENTS HER POSSESSION IMPORTANT.
- D. BEETZ HOETTL BEING CLASSIFIED "CONTACT" HERE.

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TO BE DESTROYED  
ON 10-1-50

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SAINT ✓

END

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307010  
307050  
307055

ROUTING  
**SECRET**

# 882  
G.V.  
705

07 JUNE 1945

TO: 115, BERN; BERDING, AMZON  
FROM: 105, LONDON

LONDON-PARIS 35174.

1. REUR AMZON 705. UNDERSTAND FROM FOREIGN SECRET  
AGREED IN PRINCIPLE OUR EXPLOSIVE UNDTL CASE FOR POSITIVE  
INTELLIGENCE.

2. BELIEVE THEREFORE YOU SHOULD DISCUSS WITH SECRET AND  
SANDS ALTERNATIVE ACTION AS OUTLINED YOUR CABLE PARA C AND ABIDE  
BY THEIR DECISION ON MATTER.

(705 IS OSS CUT 1542)

00023

003 2.30

SECRET  
EXC

SECRET

#882

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WAR ROOM, LONDON

30 June 1945

SECRET

SPEARHEAD, ACTION

- A. HOETTL SAYS FRED MEYER AMERICAN PARACHUTIST CAUGHT PROBABLY EARLY APRIL 1945. HIS WIRELESS OPERATOR ESCAPED.
- B. GAUBERT HOPER WANTED USE MEYER CONTACT TYROL AREA NAZI RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND PROBABLY AMERICANS ALSO.
- C. OSTUBAF HELPER OF HENSBRUCK STAFF OFFERED TURN OVER AMERICAN OPERATOR PREVIOUSLY CAPTURED TO HELP REESTABLISH CONTACT AMERICANS.
- D. MEYER AND A WILLIAM SLASH TAKE OPERATOR NOT CLEAR WHETHER NAME AS IN PBAAC CMA WERE HELPED BY HOETTL TO REACH SWISS BORDER.
- E. HOETTL DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THEY ARRIVED SAFELY AND DOES NOT KNOW DETAILS OF ATTEMPTED CONTACTS RESISTANCE MOVEMENT OR AMERICANS.

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JBO

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ENDING  
SECRET

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702  
G ✓

31 JUNE 1945

TO: SPEARHEAD, AMZN

FROM: CURN, LONDON

LONDON-PARIS 852/4.

REUR 055 AND DEETZ QUIZ REPORTS DATED 14, 16, 17 JUNE.

1. REPORTS ON DEETZ NEW TOP SECRET CONTROL.
2. REFER REPORT "THE ROMA AND DEATH OF UFFO CIANO" PARA 22. HAVE YOU ITALIAN FOREIGN OFFICE REPORTS PRODUCED BY DEETZ FOR AMT ROMAN C TO SEND TO LONDON SOonest?
3. REFER REPORT "ROMA AND EUGA CIANO IN SWITZERLAND" PARA 26. SEND SOonest CIANO'S PERSONAL FOREIGN OFFICE RECORDS.
4. REFER SAME REPORT PARA 29. SEND SOonest ADDRESSES & HIDING PLACES IN ITALY.
5. SUBJECT REPORTS SEND 001/2 WHERE ITALIAN LEADS WILL BE INVESTIGATED.
6. WHERE IS PUCCI?
7. VIEW CIANO DIARIES CALLED SWITZERLAND FOR TIME AND PLACE ENJOYED IN FROM SWITZERLAND OF EUGA CIANO. OTHER ROMA AND EUGA CIANO IN SWITZERLAND" PARA 5.
8. CASE TREATED CONTROL HERE. SEND C. INDICATE IS TO US NOT WARRON).

(055 15 055 OUT 1111)

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SECRET

✓ # 892

29 1223  
29 0315  
29 1305

INCOMING PRIORITY 904

29 JUNE 1945

TO: SPEARHEAD, WAZON  
FROM: S CARF, THIRD ARMY

- A. NEED IMMEDIATE CLEARANCE FRENCH FIRST ARMY TO HIT DOCUMENTS TARGET IN GERTSDORF AS STATED IN HITCHER'S HAND POUCHED CABLE TO TIRAN OF APPROXIMATELY JUNE 22. REF GENIT JAHN.
- B. AGENTS LISTS, CIANG DIARIES REPORTED INCLUDED IN HUGE CACHE.
- C. UNABLE ASCERTAIN WHERE WHERE RUSSIAN OR GERMAN MISSION TO FRENCH LOCATED.
- D. PLEASE COMMENT ON PROCEDURE.
- E. ABOVE REFERS TELEPHONE CALL WILLIAMS AND CHERUB TO SCHUMAKER AND FROST MORNING JUNE 29.

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OSS 2023

SA INT ✓  
EXEC

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2. S. SKORZEMY VS. DOERNER

There was a dispute about leadership between SKORZEMY and DOERNER, which ended with SCHILLERBERG's backing SKORZEMY and with DOERNER's being reduced to procuring material and taking care of technical matters.

LEIDL's own work was general training and sifting of personnel.

The school actually opened 3 October 43.

3. S. LEIDL IN VI E

People disputed about what LEIDL's next job should be; finally he was ordered to Vienna by SCHILLERBERG to work for VI E in setting up information sources in Austrian industries (?). Then he was given a special job at Agram at the beginning of 1944, to find out where TIXO was, and in general to get information on Communist circles. He was at Agram till the beginning of December 1944.

For communications, he used a courier (frequently himself), teletype, or W/T.

SKORZEMY was to indulge in an operation against TIXO in May, and LEIDL was to prepare the plan, but nothing came of it.

The 2nd Panzer Army Corps tried an operation, with Brandenburg Division personnel, in June 44, but lost most of the men.

4. VI E-S

In December 44, LEIDL came to VI E, after the customary row about his job, since VI S wanted him, and was given a new Referat VI E-S, in which he was to combine information from the various Landesreferate on the feasibility of operations in the Southeast. He had contacts with the RG 100 (Eic. Klara), and was supposed to take care of technical preparations for operations.

There followed a discussion of various circumstances:

5. VI E-S OPERATIONS IN ALBANIA

a) Operation with TETA.

With SCHAVDEVA, who was in Vienna, an operation for north-east Albania was planned under Estuf. TETA, an Albanian, in the Skanderbeg Division, with a Kommando of 3-4 men, plus a W/T man supplied by LEIDL, a Norwegian named HANSEN, who had been

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S E C R E T

- 4 -

trained at the school in Berlin. Arrangements were made with Kdo. Klara to drop the men at the beginning of March, but there were no planes, until the end of April, so nothing came of it.

Numerous Albanians had remained there, under agreement with SCHAVLEVA to fight against the Bolsheviks (these were men of the Skanderbeg Division). Contact with them was lost.

TELA left Vienna with 5 of his men, went to Klagenfurt, and tried to get through to Croatia (ultimate goal Albania): RICHARD left for Tyrol, possibly Schwarz.

TELA was supposed to meet people in the Skoplje-Nisueb-Histrovica area, where ADJIF BLJUNA and DOLJ were active. This whole group were Mohammedans: TELA was to contact them.

b) ALI DRGA Operation

This man, son of a leading Mohammedan of Kosovo, Ferid BEG DRAGA, who had retired into the mountains, was to go to Albania, but nothing came of this. HAHN, W/T man, who speaks Albanian and Serbian, and is a Volksdeutscher, was sent to Berlin and was to go with this operation.

c) SILSSI FARI Operation

This was also to go to Kosovo. Its head was a youth leader from there, who had unfortunately enriched himself in politics, but anyway had a big following. He was in Vienna, to which he had come with Hgr. E. No W/T operator was ready for this operation, but two Albanians were being trained for it.

d) TOPTARI Operation

This was to go to the Scutari-Tirana area. Its leader, TOPTARI, had been with the Wehrmacht, and worked with Hauptmann LIEGE. The operation was not sent because of inadequate preparation.

6. 13. OPERATIONS IN SERBIA

a) RINGELMEISTER (GASPAROVIC)

A Serb captain GASPAROVIC (cover name GATA DE ...), plus SS Ustuf SCHMIDT and 50 Serbs, were to run this operation. They were equipped with MP's and MG's, 3 W/T sets, 2 operators, one a Serb (LACK) with cover name LK. The group started from Sarajevo. A Cetnik Colonel BOGOLJ, commander of the East Bosnia Cetniks, shipped them through. They were to use RINGELMEISTER's W/T nets - stations at Belgrade and Nish and with his Commandos.

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S E C R E T

- 5 -

Not many reports came from them; mostly they were military, discussing their fights with the partisans. The operation was run in mid-January, and the people are still there. They had 250 gold napoleons, and were well equipped with W/T.

b) BECAREVIC Operation

This one was planned but not run. BECAREVIC was chief of the Serb Special Police, in charge of the anti-Communist section, and so worked willingly with the Germans. 40 of his police agents, from various Serbian cities, were to go with him. But the plan was held up by a three-cornered scrap among MILILOVIC, LJOTIC, and MEDIC, and BECAREVIC refused to wait for the end, and was sent to Istria. HANDEL told him to set up there an intelligence network to work against TITO. He is there now, with W/T and arms.

c) JANKO Operation

JANKO went alone to the Belgrade area to set up contact points, but he had no W/T set, and no information from him has come in since he went in January.

d) VUKOVIC Operation

He belongs to the LJOTIC strongly anti-Communist direction. His 30 Serbs and two W/T men were to go out in two groups and set up information reporting-points, but they stayed in Vienna till near the end, and then went west.

e) HASSLERVIC Operation (cover name DIMITRI)

This man, a leading Mohammedan youth movement man from the Sandjak, was an old fighter with STANJOKOVIC. He was to form points d'appui and arrange for slipping through persons to Montenegro, Albania, and to MILILOVIC. He was in the police HQ, Vienna. He got as far as Sarajevo, and HANDEL received frequent W/T reports from him -- e.g. that he had sent 5 or 7 of his people through from Sarajevo. Then came the retreat, and he went to Lgram, where he made an agreement with RAVENIC to cooperate with MILILOVIC, an old school pal of his at Belgrade, in the struggle against Bolshevism. RAVENIC offered him the command over the East Bosnia Ustaschi Army, which was disbanded, and ordered him to organize this area and to keep contact with Albania. This was planned for this spring. RAVENIC does not know that HASSLERVIC is working for the Germans.

With the last possible plane, HANDEL sent to HANDEL W/T a Volksdeutscher from Serbia named FRANZOESI, a student-friend of HASSLERVIC. No news has been received since it was heard that FRANZOESI had got through to the Sandjak and made contact with STROH, a HANDEL stay-behind man who was an Ustaschi captain

S E C R E T

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in Sarajevo, and was occupied in combatting partisans. FRANKOSKI was to set up contacts from the Croatian border.

f) KURGEL Operation (MULEC)

This man was of German descent, came from near Belgrade, had studied there and at Berlin, was in the Yugoslav Army, lived in Agram, knows Yugoslavia excellently. MLEBL got him to KRAMEN-STER. He was supposed to work with RAVENSKOVIC, a V-man from Montenegro, and was supported by DRJILOVIC, Montenegrin Prime Minister, at Agram. Dr. SLEDZELIJA, DRJILOVIC's secretary, is an expert on Montenegro. These people are in Croatia, with A/T outfits: their last reports were from Agram, about the beginning of May.

g) KARTUS Operation

This was an operation in Croatia, headed by Count HASSER, an ex-Communist, half-Jewish, who had fought with the reds in Spain (and had been a member of the Intelligence Service), then went to France, where he worked for the Austrian State Police under Dr. WEISER; and he continued his intelligence work after the Anschluss. He is a very able man. Shortly after the Anschluss he went to Yugoslavia, where he was active from 1941 to 1944. He is acquainted with the heads of the Ustasha, e.g. Col. LUBORIC, who had contact with HASSER (which MLEBL thinks might be exploited), and who had been ordered by HITLER to set up a resistance group; and Col. KRALJIC, who wanted an understanding with the Western powers; and Col. KRALJIC, (chief of the Croatian Intelligence), who had to accompany the Croatian Ministry of the Interior, evidently because of a report that he had been negotiating with the Western powers.

h) KLOPP (BUBNO) Operation

(This is presumably the operation of that name discussed in Para 30 of the Annex to Report 3 (MILAN KROV). It was a plan for an operation, via Agram, to place a liaison man with DRAGA KRALJIC. The agent was from the coast, had studied at the Welthandelhochschule in Vienna, and was married to a relative of KRALJIC. The agent had one A/T operator, A/T equipment, and money. His last report was from Agram, a request to V.I.S. for the exact location of KRALJIC (with whom V.I.S. was in contact still). MLEBL thinks the operation may not have got through.

i) ERWIN (cover name) Operation

Two Croats, one of them with the cover name ERWIN, and a A/T operator (cover name MAGDA), a Croat student, were to operate at Fiume, signalling to Agram, to get information about V.I.S. The operation was later changed to one of finding out about Communist activities in Istria. The men were in contact with Agram, whence messages were sent to Vienna by teletype.

SECRET

j) NOTE ON THESE OPERATIONS

REINDL remarks that MAREK would not have approved of sending KONRAD (KLASER) out; the operations in general were directed by HOFFEL, who gave REINDL a special task re Yugoslavia early in 1944.

7. OPERATIONS IN SLOVAKIA

Only recently (summer 1941) had Slovakia been transferred from Amt III to VI B. Contacts there were few. Later, efforts were made by the Jagdkommando to work there; they had a "resistance line" in Eastern Slovakia, but they were short of A/T equipment, and REINDL supplied them with batteries, and they agreed to send intelligence reports for the VI B people there, as well as any political information picked up by themselves, to VI B direct. This agreement was made in February 1944. VI B had five agents in Slovakia who used this method.

The Jagdkommandos had orders to stay behind in Slovakia, and may still be there. Their orders were extended to include also Moravia.

Dr. REINDL was a collaborator of the Jagdeinsatz Kommando there; REINDL does not remember the name of the Kommando. The Jagdeinsatz numbered 50-60 men, and had an agreement with the MILITARY Guard, by which some hundreds of MILITARY people were to be added to them. All these people were under Jagdkommando Suedost, center in Vienna.

8. ORGANIZATION OF THE JAGDEINSATZ

REINDL emphasizes the military nature of this organization, with SKORZENY as chief, BESSEKOW his Chief of Staff, and Ia, Ib, Ic officers under them. The various Jagdeinsätze connected with the corresponding Gruppen of Amt VI: Haupt Jagdkommando Suedwest with STUBBE of VI A; Jagdkommando Nordost with RAFF-GER of VI D, Jagdkommando Ost with HART of VI C; Jagdkommando Suedost with VI B, and also with the Turkey Section of VI C.

REINDL was liaison man between VI B, VI C, and Jagdkommando Suedost from the beginning of December 1944. He does not feel that the coordination worked well, primarily because of SKORZENY's essentially military interest in the operations.

9. ACTIVITIES AND TRAINING OF JAGDEINSATZ

In August or September 1944 SKORZENY received Hitler's orders to set up resistance movements and stay-behind groups in occupied (or liberated) Europe.

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SKORZENY was supposed to collaborate in political matters with VI.

For the Southeast, SKORZENY set up Jagdeinsatz for Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia-Serbia, (combined), Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey. There was none for Greece. Mardl cannot give exact figures on these; he estimates that they averaged a few hundred men each, but he points out that it is hard to say, e.g. whether a group of Ustacha operating with the Jagdverbände were actually part of a Jagdeinsatz or not.

Men in the Jagdeinsatz were trained primarily in arms, sabotage, guerilla warfare etc.; there was practically no political training.

10. ~~10.~~ TRAINING FOR THE DISSEMINATION OPERATION (SERBIA)

Hochart HELLENBERG, one of MARDL's men, was teacher at the evacuation quarters in an old Labor Service Camp on the Neusiedlersee (exact location forgotten), where training for this operation was given from mid-November 1944 to the end of January. HELLENBERG supervised the school; the people being trained in it had been with him at an SS school in the Reich.

11. ~~11.~~ Jaidhof <sup>Gfshl</sup> - HQ OF JAGDKOMMANDO SUDOST

This is located about 20 km. north of Ljevac, on the Danube, from the end of October 1944, when the Jagdkommandos were formed (from specialists formerly with the Brandenburg Division, most of whom voluntarily joined the Jagdkommandos and with them the SS), until about 1 April 1945, when the staff moved to Admont.

Most of the W/T operators for Jagdkommando Sudost were trained at Jaidhof -- c. 20-30 men, under a signals officer.

MARDL says that training in weapons was given by each Jagdeinsatz by itself, not through a central school.

12. ~~12.~~ ALBANIAN OPERATION UNDER JUREKES

The Jagdeinsatz Albanien, which had been located at Vienna, was ordered by Ostufaf BENESCH at the last minute to march via Croatia to Albania, with JUREKES conducting them. There were about 20 men, who, MARDL thinks, have gone into the mountains, but probably did not get far on their way. Planned to provide a W/T operator for them at the last moment.

13. ~~13.~~ FURTHER RE-TRAINING OF JAGDEINSAATZ

There was a training school for Bulgarians at Nikolsdorf on the Neusiedlersee, which was moved to a place (name unknown) northwest of Vienna.

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REIDL insists that there was no political training, and that even the leaders of the Jagdverbände had little or not any political qualification; he points to AUGUST of the Jagdeinsatz Albanien as an example -- a man from Hamburg who knew little about the Balkans. REIDL was supposed to supply the political coordination for operations, but the people he dealt with were military people, little concerned with politics.

Only in Slovakia, where Dr. PAVLOVSKY and REIDL were active, and in Rumania, did the Jagdverbände show much political sense.

14. RE. JAGDVERBÄNDE AS A SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

REIDL was much interested in procuring for VI E intelligence from the Jagdverbände, but had little luck. He did make a deal once to get information from Croatia, and there was some success with Slovakia. HASLJAGIC had contact with a man whom REIDL had planted for VI E in a Jagdkommando, and thus some information was procured.

15. RE. SKORZENY AND BEISSCH

REIDL recalls that SKORZENY came twice to the Jaldhof, and spoke with BEISSCH. Normally BEISSCH, who was directly under SKORZENY, would go to Berlin to report to him. BEISSCH had been a Major of the Luftwaffe, and had an unblemished record of Ostuf in the SS. He moved with the staff to account at the beginning of April.

16. RE. RESISTANCE PLANS

REIDL claims that the plans for resistance by the Jagdverbände were connected with military expectations in the Balkans, where e.g., HILLER prophesied in mid-December that by mid-January they would again be in Belgrade (he kept repeating the prophecy, with variations in the date).

In the event that Germany won the war, REIDL hypothesizes that the Jagdverbände, especially Jagdkommando Mitte, would have been used for a "Grossreinigung" -- a general clean-up -- within Germany, where he expected that the returning front fighters would have been in a mood to settle accounts with the NSDAP home front boys. In that case, the Jagdverbände would have become a palace guard for the Party. In Jagdkommando Mitte, he points out, the members are mostly young soldiers, of the SKORZENY desperado type, without political sense.

He says that after 20 July 1941, the Jagdkommando Mitte at Berlin went out under SKORZENY on a clean-up job, which he said (or implied) was that of an Umlegkommando.

S E C R E T

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17. 5. JAGDKOMMANDO PLANS IN AUSTRIA

FLANDL says he never discussed with SKORZENY his role in the Werewolf, but assumes he had some special position in it.

Jagdkommando Suedost was to stay behind in Upper and Lower Austria and form a resistance nucleus (which might be a Werewolf one) against the Russians. He does not know how many members actually remained behind, but he knows that BRENNER and his whole group had orders to stay there and be overrun.

FLANDL heard from STERNBERG (under BRENNER) at Admont that they intended to stay in the occupied zone, and that BRENNER was hunting for points d'appui there. FLANDL is sure that some caches at least are there. He insists that there were no similar arrangements for the other parts of Austria not occupied by Russians. He does not know Brif SIEBEL, and he knows of no Werewolf representatives (unless SKORZENY could be so regarded) who came to Jagdkommando Suedost.

18. 5. BESEKOW: VI S 2 and VI S 4

These were the Reforate that trained small-scale operations. VI S 2 had originally been under RADL, but was transferred to BESEKOW when RADL became SKORZENY's adjutant. BESEKOW already headed VI S 4.

Such training was developed prior to the invasion of Western Europe, and in particular from October 1943, after the return of SKORZENY from Italy and the feat of rescuing Mussolini. The maximum size of the groups would be 10-20 men, and usually they would include not more than a couple of men.

19. 5. ASSASSINATION PLANS

BESEKOW had left behind him a small organization of this type in France, the name of which FLANDL does not know, and this group tried to assassinate DE GAULLE.

About a year ago, BESEKOW planned an operation to assassinate STALIN; this was to start from Denmark, and had some connection with a Russian courier pilot -- obviously looking for the Germans -- who arrived about that time with a lot of documents. FLANDL claims not to know details, or whether the operation actually was tried.

FLANDL added that his chief activity in 1944 was to prepare a similar operation against TITO (he speaks of it as kidnapping, but the interrogator doubts that this was all that was involved). He says that individual agents were dropped to prepare for this operation, and that some had not been heard from.

S E C R E T

SECRET

- 11 -

VI S 2 originally controlled all operations for VI S, before the Jagdverbände were formed; then it was reduced to handling small-scale operations. VI S 4 had originally the task of preparing a stay-behind network in the expectation of invasion.

20. SCHMIDT SCHMIDTBERG

SCHMIDTBERG, according to HENDL, was very much opposed to SKORZHEY, who in his unorthodox way used to bypass SCHMIDTBERG and go to KALTENBRUNNER directly (as he bypassed KALTENBRUNNER for HIMMLER, and HIMMLER for HITLER!)

HENDL knew well a student-friend of SCHMIDTBERG, but has known SCHMIDTBERG personally since he came to the SA (after starting a legal career as Regierungsrat). SCHMIDTBERG was about 26 at the time, had rank of Ostuf, but shortly was running skilfully a Zentralabteilung in Amt I, issuing orders, and generally showing his outstanding ability. HENDL's eye fell on him, he went to HENDL's adjutant, continued to enjoy the favor of the Cds, and then became Gruppenleiter IV S, where he ran counter-espionage within Germany.

He was transferred to Amt VI, and, after JUST's dismissal, appeared as acting head of Amt VI (designated "VI V" - i.e. V Vertreter). After HENDL's death, SCHMIDTBERG began to report every two weeks or so to HIMMLER, whose favor he thus won, and eventually under KALTENBRUNNER he was confirmed as head of Amt VI.

SCHMIDTBERG, like HENDL, is a master at playing off possible rivals, a "taile und herrsche" man, who will never let anyone else grow too strong.

21. VI F; MICROFILMS

Microfilming was in charge of Oberst. "Hans" VOIGT, an expert photographer, who was at the evacuation quarters of VI F in Marienbad, and who HENDL thinks went south.

Description of VOIGT: age 35/36; 1.75 meters, prominent, blue-gray eyes, regular features, medium build, a "schonher Mann"; Saxon, with strong Saxon accent.

The Referent of VI F 4, Stuf. KREMER, expert on passport forgeries and money forgery, would also know about this. HENDL mentioned in passing a forgery operation called Unterdachern

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- 12 -

BERNHARD (the matter was not further discussed). Bernhart stayed in Berlin, then moved to evacuation quarters in Thuringia. LEIDL claims not to know details of the microfilming, but says in any case it was done only for Amt VI by VI P. He mentioned the good technical setup of the Kriminaltechnisches Institut, and says that in a dispute re competence between this and VI P, RAUBER-BRUNNER decided not only to maintain VI P but to expand it.

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TO  
FROM  
DATE



832

SECRET

G ✓

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109, LONDON

5 July 1945

FORGAN AND HEARSON : SAINT WASHINGTON

SECRET

BIRDING CROWN ALION

PRIORITY

1. Ref. your 946 re ROBERTL operation.
1. Dr. Wilhelm ROBERTL, SS Sturmbannfuhrer and Deputy Chief Amt VI Navy of NSDAP. Chief of organized German Intelligence network operating in Balkan countries against Russia.
2. Surrendered voluntarily to American forces after several attempts to contact American authorities in Switzerland.
3. Offered to turn ~~himself~~ over to American Forces network to be used against Russians. This probably based on well known German wish to embrace Eastern Alliance with Russians and thus try to restore <sup>so</sup> some of Germany's lost power.
4. ROBERTL's Centrale at Steyring now in American hands. Well equipped and well staffed by ROBERTL's associates.
5. To determine veracity of ROBERTL's claims as to existence of agents in Balkans, and to ascertain extent of net, Centrale sent on the air early June.
6. Contact was made with one agent in Bucharest and another in Belgrade. This on 5 June.
7. Initial traffic with both agents restricted to recognition signals and service messages.

00032

2 pages

SECRET

SECRET

x933

21 June 1945

SPECIAL INTERROGATION OF GESAFTLER GLENNER ALTEMBERG AND MANDL

1. CAREER

ALTEMBERG saw no point in his repeating his biography for the third time. As for recent activities, he stated he was given special tasks for the Ausserertiges Amt in Bulgaria after his retirement from Greece in November 1943; he was sick for six weeks from the end of July 1944, and at home in Heiningen; then he went to Vienna, where he remained almost till the Russians entered; 1-2 April he moved to Alt-Laussee, and then tried at the end of April to go to Fuchsl. He speaks with indignation of being picked up by the Americans, who "listigenweise" did not tell him he was being arrested, and of the fact that the members of his Dienststelle -- KLOBER, ROTHEI, THUEL, FAEDEL, JACARUS, and SCHULTE, who were picked up with him, have all, except ROTHEI, apparently been released.

2. Dienststelle ALTEMBERG

ROTHEI was ALTEMBERG's representative (deputy) there. The Dienststelle was organized 5-5 Sept 1944. It took care primarily (!) of finding quarters for and cooking for members of the exile governments, first in Vienna, then, in the course of the winter, for members of them who went to Kitzbuechl and Semmering, and finally in February to Alt-Laussee.

The Dienststelle stayed in Vienna officially till 1-2 April, though most of the people had gone. In addition to the dreary activities mentioned above it of course got some information from new arrivals from the Balkans; numerous Hungarians came over during the winter, and very few Bulgarians.

3. THE GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE

Each of the two governments -- Russian and Bulgarian -- had six to eight members; perhaps 100-150 hangers-on came from each country, and went to Kitzbuechl or Kirchbuelzen.

ALTEMBERG says that the Protokollstelle of the Ausserertiges Amt helped in quartering the people. KLOBER was also at Laussee.

The Bulgarian Government made some attempts to organize their people, and to take care of Bulgarian immigrants. There were plans to operate military units; at least the 3rd SS, but nothing came of it because of lack of arms; some units were to be in the Waffen SS, and were trained (at least the 3rd SS) at Doellersheim. Hstuf. STIER was liaison officer for the Waffen SS to the Bulgars and Russians in this matter.

00012  
2/19

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The governments had the political task of getting together their nationals in the Reich, and doing jobs of listening to Soviet broadcasts from Bucharest or Sofia and monitoring them.

4. Dienststelle Alt-Aussee -- Information and Communications

The Dienststelle supplied the government with its information, received from the press, prisoners, and persons crossing from the Balkans; and also from SD reports, which were given to the Dienststelle through ALBOK, though not in their entirety. This SD information was given informally. It was intended that BEISCHKA would be the liaison man between SD and Dienststelle at Alt-Aussee.

The Dienststelle had 18 people at Vienna, including secretaries and messengers; about ten were still together at Aussee.

There was little activity there, but a W/T net was established, which had poor connections with Berlin, and passed up reports from the various press services -- Reuters, etc. -- they also had a sender which they destroyed after one or two weeks; they sent one message to Berlin, asking for money, but got no answer. Previously they had W/T contact from Vienna with Berlin.

5. Auswaertiges Amt and Dienststelle

To the question whether KITTEL's assumption of power for the South had affected the Dienststelle, ALBOK replied indignantly that it had nothing to do with the Dienststelle; that there was no question of his acting independently of the Auswaertiges Amt at the end, but simply of his lacking contact with it.

6. Comment on Altbischoff

This person is thoroughly disagreeable and uncooperative; his information, as evidenced in this report, is practically worthless; his main aim is to turn an interrogator into a lecture on the shortcomings of the Americans in their dealings with him, and on the evils of Russian occupation.

1. ALBOK and VI F - SPECIAL INTERROGATION

ALBOK was with VI F from July 42 to the end of 43, with some intervening trips to Italy. VI F was still in Waldstrasse 6a. ALBOK was working on training in Waldstrasse school at Hohenbünde near Berlin, which became a Waldstrasse and a small W/T training school, and eventually was moved to Friedental.

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109, LONDON (CONT'D)

8. On 10 June Budapest sent message indicating situation difficult, prices high, Nazis being sentenced and executed. On 17 June Budapest sent message giving family information to operator at Central. No contact since that date.

9. Bucharest station was on air more frequently, most contacts being restricted to service messages and inquiries on fate of other members of chain.

10. On 21 June Bucharest sent message stating resistance movements including Iron Guard ready to start pouring into unit. Ammunition weak. Radio apparatus lacking but not completely intact and capable of action.

11. Contact also made with Bucharest on 25 and 26 June but limited to service messages.

12. Operations have been suspended temporarily due to necessity of consulting Russian authorities before launching any definite plan to start entire network operating.

TO: WFO  
FROM: BUREAU  
SUBJECT: ...

13. ROBERT and ANNA have given much information subject to <sup>SECRET</sup> <sub>SECRET</sub> Italian intelligence net. Careful exploitation of existing facilities should prove of great value to completely eliminate the current situation.

NR....NR....

16.00

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782

ONE

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MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

13 June 45

SECRET

SPRINGFIELD, ARIZONA

CONFIDENTIAL

*John G. ...*

1. HILDEBRAND BONTE HAS WORKED FOR GOVERNMENT SINCE 1941 IN THE ARMY.
2. WAS DETAINED IN CAMP FOR A PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS IN 1942 AS AN AGENT OF THE ENEMY.
3. HAS EXPERIENCE IN THE FIELD OF A. S. IN ITALIAN RELATIONS 36 TO 42 INCLUDING REPLYING TO CORRESPONDENCE.
4. WORKED IN ROOM AS AN AGENT TO BRING IN INFO, WIRELESS LOGS, INCIDENT KAPPLER.
5. SINCE 1943 HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH AGENTS AND TRANSLATE GERMAN DOCUMENTS.
6. SUBJECT ARRIVING ON THE ARMY GROUP AND WERE CASE.

00010

JEO  
JF

Source: Letter and to SPI Bureau, 13 June.

1743

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SECRET

# 882-

G-2

SAINT PARS FOR CASERTA

18 JUNE 1945

SECRET

SPEARHEAD

ROUTINE

- A. INFORMATION FROM A HEAD SOURCE AT PARIS DISCLOSES HIDING PLACE OF CIANO PAPERS
- B. COMO ITALY WITH FAMILY NAME SPINOLA. CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED EXCEPT THAT FAMILY BELIEVED TO BE RELATED TO ITALIAN INDUSTRIALIST BIANCHI.
- C. IN ROVERETO ITALY WITH FOUR IN PARIS SPANISH AMBASSADOR TO VATICAN. REPORTED
- D. PAPERS EXAMINING TO BE OF CHEMICAL NATURE INTEREST.

112

00009

R.P.P.  
O.B.P.

Source: incoming cable from Hitler Berlin No. 11, dated June 13.

1150

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SECRET

URGENT

*file  
Malvin*

18 0823  
18 0700  
18 0914

INCOMING

*G-2*

18 June 1945

TO: SPEARHEAD, AMZON  
FROM: HITCH, WELMAR

*short Int Am*

From DEWTE whose documents brought you by CH. WAS now disclosed  
2 other hiding places of CIAEO papers.

A. COME ITALY with family named BIANCHI. Cannot be further  
identified except that family believed to be related to Italian  
industrialist Bianchi.

B. In IMBARTANO ITALY with Pic di SAVOIA former Spanish  
Ambassador to Vatican.

C. Documents these 2 places believed at least equal value  
these already your possession.

D. Nothing in this telegram should allowed reach [redacted]  
in any form. Letter explains why.

00008

enc 1366

SALT  
ENC

SECRET

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SECRET

15 1040  
15 0700  
15 1125

703

INCOMING

15 June 1945

TO: SPEARHEAD FOR PHELPS, AMZN  
FROM: GOWN, LONDON

REF HONEY case also KALTENERUEBER.

- A. From BERN we have following "Reliable source reports that Colonel MASON and several of his staff are being held for interrogation. They are accused of intelligence with French and of venality. MASON is being questioned by Colonel WUELLI: auditor SWISS Military court of Appeals".
- B. Our comment. MASON Head of SWISS intelligence Service was according to KALTENERUEBER report from you SCHEIDENBERG's best source of info in SWITZERLAND.

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SALVT  
EXEC

SECRET



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ABB/jj

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, U.S. Army

D-158538

*11/14 1014*  
HARTMANN, Wolfgang (Wolf) Justin, Dr

890,300

*ajwt  
Feb 55*

*14MD*

*68169883*

CIC CENTRAL FILE

Born on 22 October 1894 in HARTENREIT/Main. HARTMANN resided in 1954 at MUNICH 13, Seidalerstrasse 5/II. During World War I SUBJECT performed military service in Turkey, after which he was a prisoner of war in Egypt. From 1919 to 1921 HARTMANN attended the University of MUNICH. Then studying law at the University of ERLANGEN. SUBJECT received his doctorate on 22 June 1922. Prior to 1924 HARTMANN was a member of the "Brigade Ehrhardt" and the Deutschnationale Volkspartei. After 6 November 1933 SUBJECT was a member of the SA. (B-2)

For an undetermined period, HARTMANN resided in Argentina. SUBJECT served in the Wehrmacht from 1940 to 1945, attaining the rank of Hauptmann or Major. From 1940 to 1943 HARTMANN was a company commander in the Brandenburg Division, serving on the Eastern Front. (B-2)

Since 1945 HARTMANN has resided in MUNICH, living on a pension received as a disabled war veteran and on income from his writings. (B-2) In February 1953 SUBJECT was described as a writer opposed to the remilitarization of Western Germany, and, as such, a personality of interest to the Verlag der Nation, the official publishing house of the NDP. HARTMANN may have been considered a possible sympathizer by the NDP. (F-6)

Since 1952 HARTMANN has been a contact of members of the IFC. (B-2)

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*file in*  
D-206391

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

FILE: IV-34193; D-158538 11 February 1955

SUBJECT: HARTMANN, Wolfgang (Wolf) Justin, Dr.

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: Mr. BOENAU

1. REFERENCE: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 27 July 1954.
2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 11 February 1955.
3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Source "A" is Technical Coverage, evaluated B, covering the period 28 July 1954 to 28 January 1955. The preparing agent for this report is Special Agent Leon V. PEARCE.
4. REMARKS:
  - a. With reference to paragraph 5, attached Summary of Information, a detailed translation of all correspondence received from the persons listed failed to reveal any information of CI interest.
  - b. With reference to paragraph 3c, 1st Indorsement, Subject and file as above, dated 27 July 1954, Ernst zu EIKERN, due to a prolonged illness, failed to visit X-0186-IV in MUNICH, and X-0186-IV has no idea as to when zu EIKERN might visit him. Any future developments regarding this issue will be reported.
  - c. Region IV, MUNICH, is of the opinion, from coverage of German Intelligence targets, that SUBJECT's association with Gerhard SCHECHT, Hermann MUELLER aka Rudi SCHULZ, or Dr. Walter HARBICH is not anything other than personal. These associations, since early

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Ltr: Hqs, Reg IV, 66th CIC Gp, APO 108, US Army, dated 11 February 1955, Subject: HARTMANN, Wolfgang (Wolf) Justin, Dr.

1953, have been very intermittent and insofar as can be determined, nothing of an official nature transpired.

d. Technical Coverage on SUBJECT was discontinued on 28 January 1955.

Incl: SOI dtd 11 Feb 55

JOSEPH G. MC GINN  
Maj CE  
Commanding

HINES/PEARCE/apk/MM 7246-006

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11 February 1955

REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

IV-34193

BARTMANN, Wolfgang (Wolf) Justin, Dr.

1. Fritz VATTER, Aternweg 4, KRUMBACH 32UPU04, Germany, expressed regret that SUBJECT could not attend the meeting of the Brandenburgers on 22 August 1954, at BENSHEIM 32UMA70, Germany. VATTER stated that "Comrade HEINZ (Frederich Wilhelm HEINZ) had delivered a very good address and he expressed regret that HEINZ is being hunted down in such a mean way. HEINZ had forwarded a four-page statement to VATTER and the other members of the Brandenburgers in which he set forth his case in detail. HEINZ received many letters containing manifestations of loyalty from former comrades, friends and acquaintances from home and abroad but stated that he was particularly happy about VATTER's and John WERNER's assurances of loyalty to him. VATTER described HEINZ as being a humane, noble and just superior to "all of us" - no matter whether soldier or officer. VATTER extended his and Gretl's regards.

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-2

2. Hedwig HEINZ, Wiesbadenerstrasse 27, MANN nca, Germany, extended birthday greetings to SUBJECT and an invitation for him to visit the family. A note signed by Fr. W. HEINZ (Frederich Wilhelm HEINZ) stated that he had sent his regards to SUBJECT via SCHACHT, who had visited him. If certain plans materialized, HEINZ was to visit MUNICH 32UPU93, Germany, soon and would come to see SUBJECT, adding that there was a lot to talk about. HEINZ expected to start writing a book shortly after the first of the year and "finally take in the crop of fifty years", probably with Ernst KLATT, STUTTGART 32UNV10, Germany, who had impressed HEINZ as an individual and as a publisher.

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-2

3. SUBJECT received a letter from Florentine FRANZ, signed Florentine and Willy FRANZ and daughter Elfriede HIRSCH, Fragestrasse 25, LEIPZIG 33UUS19, Germany, dated 8 December 1954, thanking him for a copy of his book, "Ein Glanz lag ueber der Stadt" (Splendor Spread Over the Town), which he had presented them. FRANZ wrote that she could understand why Bernd POISS, who "took to quite a different trend", did not like the book.

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-2

4. SUBJECT received a letter dated 28 October 1954, bearing the return address of Dr. W. STIEBER, Thernasiusstrasse 2, LEIPZIG, Germany, but written in LIEBSTADT nca, Germany, signed by Inge, in which she stated that she had

(Continued)

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REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

IV-34193

HARTMANN, Wolfgang (Wolf), Justin, Dr.

learned through Pitt ZIESEL that SUBJECT was working very hard. She and "Sti" (apparently her husband, W. STIEBER) have to move to LEIPZIG for professional reasons. Inge wrote that she participated in the fair at LEIPZIG, which she enjoyed very much. "Sti" added a note to the effect that he planned on visiting MUNICH in the new year, adding that such must eventually be done. He also asked if SUBJECT had heard from LAJOS, ANNI, WERNER and SAUTER. Both persons addressed SUBJECT as "Hadschi".

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-2

5. SUBJECT was also in communication with the following personalities; however, such communication consisted of either personal greetings or those of a business nature regarding the publishing of SUBJECT's books:
- a. Andreas WOEPS, Am Wehrhahn 47, DUESSELDORF 32ULB47, Germany.
  - b. Ellen THOFEHRN, Walterschoferstrasse 1, BERLIN/ZEHLENDORF 33UUU92, Germany.
  - c. Iris DODERER, Austria.
  - d. Sadok SELIM, Schiltacherstrasse 24, STUTTGART/KALTENTAL 32UNV1C, Germany.
  - e. Peter SCHNEIDER, Chairman of the Frankenbund E.V. (Franconian Association for the Knowledge and Cultivation of the Franconian People), Steinertstrasse 19, BAMBERG 32UPA32, Germany.
  - f. E. A. SATOR, Kroatengasse 10, WUERZBURG 32UNA61, Germany.
  - g. Maria FIEROLA, SALO/BRESCIA nca, Italy.
  - h. Peter GROENDAHL, Sicherwall 7, BIELEFELD 32UMC66, Germany.
  - i. R. OLDENBOURG, German Editor of "Who's Who in Germany", Lotzbeckstrasse 2a, MUNICH, Germany.
  - j. Maximilian B. TISCHLER, Editor's Office, Austrian Caritas-Journal, MATTSEE near SALZBURG 33TUN59, Austria.
  - k. Erika SCHEDEL, LANGFUERT am MAIN nca, Germany.

(Continued)

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REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

HARTMANN, Wolfgang (Wolf) Justin, Dr.

- l. Hermann SAUTER, Marienkrankenhaus, LUDWIGSHAFEN/RHEIN-MUNDENHEIM 32UDV58, Germany.
- m. Hanna FEGERT, Paradiesestrasse 24, SCIEWAEBISCH-GMUEND 32UNV50, Germany.
- n. Mia WOLFF, Niederwerrnerstrasse 52, SCHWEINFURT 32UNA84, Germany.
- o. Doctor Walter ZAWADIL, Schwindstrasse 18, BAYREUTH 32UPA83, Germany.
- p. Alfons von CZIBULKA, Klugstrasse 58, MUNICH, Germany.
- q. Ernst LUDWIG, Theatinerstrasse 11, MUNICH, Germany.
- r. Herr NICKLES, Buergermeister, WUERZBURG, Germany.
- s. L. SCHULZE, Magazinstrasse 15/16, BERLIN, Germany.
- t. Gasparetto JORICK, Dottore im Legge, SALO nca, Italy.
- u. Dieter WERTHOEVER, Nattruperstrasse 162, OSNAUBRUECK 32UMC39, Germany.
- v. Rudolf SCHICK, 700 Riverside Drive, NEW YORK, New York
- w. Barbara ZENNIG, Annastrasse 4/I bei PARSEVAL, GARMISCH 32TPT56, Germany.
- x. Verona ESCHENBACH, Arois Strasse 52/I, MUNICH, Germany.
- y. NARICKE, Pionier-Klinkestrasse 10, RENDSBURG nca, Germany.
- z. Therese OERTEL, Dall'Armistrasse 11, MUNICH, Germany.
- aa. Richard Th. HAAS, Herongracht 553, AMSTERDAM-C, Holland.

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-2

6. The files of Region IV, MUNICH, Germany were examined and revealed no information regarding the personalities mentioned above, with the exception of the following:

- a. File number IV-22840 re: R. OLDENBOURG; file number IV-24367 re: Frederick Wilhelm HEINZ; and file number XII-2130 re: Dr. Walter ZAWADIL, all of which files have been forwarded to Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, (Continued)

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11 February 1955

IV-34193

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REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

HARTMANN, Wolfgang (Wolf) Justin, Dr.

STUTTGART, Germany.

- b. Central Personality Index Card on file indicated that Fritz VATTER, 3 $\frac{1}{2}$  Mattenhausen, Kreis KRUMBACH, born in 1881, had joined the NSDAP (National Socialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei - Nazi Party), the SA (Sturm Abteilung - Storm Troopers) and the DAF (Deutsche Arbeiter Front - German Labor Organization). He held the rank equal to that of Second Lieutenant in the SA. The foregoing information had been extracted from VATTER's own registration on an original CIC questionnaire.

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LDB/apd

27 July 1954

BRIGADE IV, 66th CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

FILE: D-158538; I7-34193

HARTMANN, Wolfgang (Wolf) Justin, Dr.

1. SUBJECT's personal data is as follows:

a. HARTMANN, born 22 October 1924 in MANNHEIM, is single. He is of Protestant religion, and German nationality and resides in MUNICH 380093, Germany, Fainlerstrasse 9/II. He received a Doctorate of Law from the University of DUISBURG, Germany on 22 June 1922.

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-2

b. On 21 October 1926, he was accused of sedacy. However, this was never proven. On 17 December 1939, SUBJECT was listed as a writer. On 20 December 1939, it was noted that, HARTMANN had written many books and specialized in books for youth. On 23 September 1943, he was listed by the Spruchkammer (Denazification Court) X, MUNICH, as eligible for the Christmas Amnesty of 1943. On 30 March 1951, HARTMANN applied for a passport to travel to Switzerland and Italy. On 4 April 1951, the Munich Municipal Police furnished an attestation of non-objection to issue SUBJECT a passport. On 5 June 1953, HARTMANN's passport A 00497/51, issued on 5 April 1951, was extended until 4 April 1956.

SOURCE: "B"

EVALUATION: B-2

c. Since 1936, HARTMANN had been registered with the German Labor Office, MUNICH, as a self-employed writer. He entered the German Army in 1940 and remained there until 1945. On 3 November 1945, HARTMANN registered as unemployed with the German Labor Office, MUNICH, and has not been registered as employed to date. According to an examination of HARTMANN by the Governmental Office for Pensions, he is 30 percent disabled by bronchial catarrh. HARTMANN is a disabled war veteran.

SOURCE: "C"

EVALUATION: B-2

d. On 5 December 1947, HARTMANN was tried by the Spruchkammer X, MUNICH, and was convicted as a Mitlaufer (Follower). This conviction was cancelled by the Christmas Amnesty of 1948 on 23 September 1949.

SOURCE: "D"

EVALUATION: B-2

e. HARTMANN was a student of philosophy at the University of MUNICH

4 - Hq, 66th CIC Group, USARMC  
1 - Central File

1 - Reg IV, File

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By: SLH Date: 4/18/2001

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NO. 10 THIRD ARMY

13 July 1945

SECRET

ROUTINE

G ✓

NO. 10 THIRD ARMY

- A. Re HORTTL interrogation. State American parachutist MEYER Fred MEYER caught probably early April Innsbruck.
- B. Warroom notified, signals no trace MEYER OSS sources.
- C. Is it certain MEYER American.

*Handwritten scribble*

TFP

BHR

SOURCE: Inc sig London \*\*\* 494 800 12 July 1945

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AUTH: CG Third US Army  
DATE: 16 July 1945  
INIT: ✓

HEADQUARTERS  
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY  
INTELLIGENCE CENTER  
APO 403

#882

INTERROGATION REPORT No 18

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Interrogation Section

16 July 1945

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1. The W/T Net of Gruppe VI E of the RSHA  
(Based on a questionnaire submitted by  
SCI, USFET)

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 18

1. The W/T Net of Gruppe VI E of the RSHA

(This report was prepared in answer to a questionnaire submitted by SCI, US Forces, European Theater.)

Preamble. Dr Wilhelm HOETTL, source for the answers to the questionnaire, has been a member of the SD since 1938. He is an Austrian and a former professor of modern history at the University of WIEN.

He was ousted from his position with the SD Leitabschnitt WIEN at the beginning of 1942, but was recalled by KALLENBRUNNER in February 1943. He became deputy chief of Gruppe VI E of the RSHA, and in March 1944 he was sent to HUNGARY as chief representative of Amt VI and political adviser to Ambassador VEESENHAYER.

Additional information on Amt VI given by HOETTL has appeared in Third US Army Interrogation Reports Nos 15 and 16, and Third US Army Special Interrogation Report No 1.

Answers to the Questionnaire.

Did the Hauptbeauftragte of a given country always direct the W/T net?

Under the system used in the Southeast (Gruppe VI E), the Hauptbeauftragte always directed the W/T net of his respective country.

The institution of a Hauptbeauftragte dates back to the period when JOST was chief of Amt VI. At this time it had become a standing practice, especially in VI E, to post a Hauptbeauftragte with each country in which an intelligence net was to be operated.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Ant III (Continued)

Occasionally in the General Survey of the Situation in Germany (Reichslagebericht), the most comprehensive report submitted by Amt III, gentle hints were dropped on the subject of "prostitution of the law in GERMANY."

An especially touchy subject was the well-known hobby of HITLER and HIMMLER to all lawyers and everything reminiscent of jurisprudence. Once the results of this stand had to be mentioned even in the cautious reports of Amt III. That was after HITLER's "speech against the lawyers," when the Lagebericht had to touch on the in operation and ire of all those still engaged in the administration and maintenance of the law.

Generally the Referat committed many sins of omission. Especially the ever-increasing lawlessness, which finally became equivalent to absolute anarchy, was never commented on by this sub-section.

THIERACK, the Minister of Justice, as well as FREISLER, the president of the People's Court, enjoyed the complete support of Amt III, and that in spite of continuous, strongly negative reports from the agencies collecting information.

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(3) Party

Activities of Referat III A 4, the NSDAP Referat, were surrounded with special secrecy. All intelligence involving party activities had to be kept a strict secret from the Gauleitungen, as well as the superior Party command echelons. The intention behind this activity was of course a supervision of all aspects of Party operations.

Reports were full of indications of unpopularity, inefficiency, and corruption. No action could be taken, however, since such reports could not be transmitted to the proper agencies. Material collected by III A 4 should be of considerable historical interest, however.

b. Gruppe III B

(1) Public Health

The Health-Referat was of no great importance and its personnel of rather poor quality. Reports were of a purely informative nature. Conclusions reached, until the very end, were that the German population in spite of the war and frequent bombings was in an excellent state of health. This was brought out especially in comparative studies with the first World War.

A pet project of III B was the mass X-ray survey (Gesamtgeraetunter-suchung), carried out by Professor HONLERSACK. The good professor had a whole battery of motorized X-ray apparatus under his control and with their aid succeeded in X-raying the whole German population and even large sections of the German minority in the various Balkan countries. His findings were then submitted to the proper Health Office, which could supervise the work of curing the diseases and defects indicated by the X-ray studies. This method proved of great preventive value.

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3. Ant III (Continued)

(2) Nationality

(a) Purpose and Guilt

When an allotment of criminal and moral guilt is made among the various sections of the SD, the Referat Nationality (Volkstum) should receive a large share. Behind the harmless title it was responsible for all crimes committed against foreigners within GERMANY and German-occupied EUROPE. This includes treatment of foreigners singly and in national minority groups.

In this field the SD had practically unlimited power, and also a large share of that executive control which is usually attributed to the police sections. The inhuman treatment meted out to national groups, such as Czechs and Poles, was based on recommendations made by the SD Referat, III B. The III B Referate in the various Abschnitte were also entrusted with the determination of national origin (Volksdeutsche).

(b) Applications

The inhuman and brutal application of these doctrines took two specific forms. On one hand we find the enforced elimination of part in national groups (either directly by physical extermination or indirectly by appropriate educational and psychological measures), and on the other hand the forced Germanization of other groups. A large share of the responsibility for all these measures rests with III B.

III B for instance decided, in the field of education, that in so-called "predominantly German" territories, Czech children could attend only grade-schools, while all intermediate and advanced schools were to be visited by Germans only. Conversely the decision as to who was Czech and who was German also rested with the SD. These measures were designed to make the reappearance of Czech intellectuals impossible for all times.

We also find that the SD arbitrarily decided that certain families, which had long been absorbed by the Czechs and had accepted Czech nationality, were declared Germans, had to move to GERMANY, and were forcibly re-made into Germans.

The SD followed similar lines in questions of the resettlement of minorities along the boundaries of GERMANY. Many sins were committed there as well (for instance, in the resettlement of Slovanes, etc.).

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(c) Results

In the question of the treatment of the slave laborers, III B and Stapo worked hand in hand. Many joint orders of Amt III and IV existed on these questions. Even in counter-intelligence close cooperation prevailed, counter to the usual practices. Many of the under-cover agents among foreigners worked both for Amt III and Amt IV. The Lageberichte concerning these topics indicated a perennially intransigent stand.

Strong criticism of all organizations thinking along different lines was the recurring tenor of these reports: III B demanded a visible differentiation between German and foreign workers and treatment of the latter consistent with their alleged inferiority.

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B. Art III (Continued)

When the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (the Nazi trade union) attempted to extend its benefits to foreign laborers, the SD objected. Even the designation - non-German comrades-in-work (nicht-deutsche Werkgenossen) - invented by the DAF to raise the morale of the slave laborers, was rejected by the SD.

III B was also the representative of the most radical point of view concerning the children of non-Germans. It was largely due to its insistence that the law concerning compulsory abortions in the case of pregnancy of a female slave-worker, was promulgated.

(3) III B and German Minorities

One of III B's main concerns was the fate of the German minorities in foreign countries. Here the SD worked on the principle that every German, no matter where he found himself, was entitled to preferential treatment as compared to other nationals.

For the future it was planned to create a continuous German area extending from RUMANIA to the ADRIATIC Sea. This strip of all-German territory was to be the barrier across which no non-German nation could penetrate into the heart of Europe.

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The dislike and hatred of National Socialism and GERMANY evinced recently by many members of Southeastern European States is due to a large extent to an understanding of these imperialistic German aims.

(4) III B vs Amt VI

The strong preoccupation with national minority problems within Amt III can also be traced to a desire on the part of this agency to gain greater influence in foreign countries and on the conduct of German foreign policy. Certain countries, such as those of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, were always claimed by Amt III as belonging within its sector of responsibility. The same holds true for SLOVAKIA, which only very recently was taken over by Amt VI, and with that fell into the realm of foreign political intelligence.

The divergent opinions on these topics, as held by Aemter III and VI, gave rise to continuous frictions and conflicts between the two branches of the SD. These frictions sometimes reached serious proportions as in the case of the various Befehlshaber der Gipo und des SD in the territories concerned.

While Amt VI considered all territory outside of the official German border as non-German, regardless of its occupation by German military forces, Amt III held fast to the tenet that HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA, certain parts of JUGOSLAVIA, etc were parts of GERMANY proper (Inland) and therefore falling under its jurisdiction. It therefore organized its intelligence net in these territories similar to its net within GERMANY itself. This of course gave rise to strong protests from the side of Amt VI and finally KALTENBRUNNER was prevailed upon to favor the latter!

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3. Ant III (Continued)

(5) The Men in Charge

The Gruppenleiter of III B, SS Standartenfuhrer Dr. EILICH, was a man utterly without ability. His experience (in a field without ever having had a practice) either in questions of public health or of nationality problems was nil. In spite of his ignorance (or maybe because of it) his is the main responsibility for the crimes mentioned above.

c. Gruppe III C

(1) Extent

This section was indubitably the largest of the whole SD. It was of very great importance, especially during the war and the contingent necessity of preventing a cracking of the home-front. Its exhaustive surveys and reports (Lageberichte) included almost all phases of German life and have reached fantastic proportions.

(2) Efficacy of the SD as an Intelligence Service

Based on the Hauptabteilungen II/1 and II/2 of the old SD-Hauptamt, the original purpose of internal intelligence was the uncovering of all the weaknesses, faults, and unexpected or undesirable results of an authoritarian regime. Lacking other means of popular expression and being aware that continued existence hinged on a combination of popularity of the dictatorship and brutal repression of all its opponents, the SD was to provide a means for the attainment of these two ends.

Success could have only come if this information service could not only point out these faults and weaknesses of the system, which made it unpopular, but at the same time could submit, and be assured of their acceptance, suggestions for alleviation of these unpopular measures as well as for other necessary reforms. Such a service could have been constructed properly within the framework of theoretical ideologically consistent Fascism but not of political National Socialism.

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The RSHA provided a level on which the measures of repression could be coordinated and carried out effectively. No similar scheme existed for the constructive part of the program. As a matter of fact very few of the positive suggestions and reforms ever suggested were ever approved by the highest authorities, and fewer still translated into actuality.

At the same time another factor must be considered and that is that strict adherents to a doctrine such as National Socialism cannot allow themselves to be swayed by popular opinion. And with such a static outlook pervading the minds of its officials, the SD could not hope to provide a receptive ear for the likes of the populace.

With these considerations in mind it becomes obvious why the internal SD, and especially III C, in spite of its extensive network and its large number of expert agents never succeeded in actually influencing the fate of the German people. Where all decisions are made at the top, a constructive intelligence service is self-destructive and only the repressive aspects of such an agency can be permitted to subsist.

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3. Ant III (Continued)

A large proportion of III C reports were devoted to the ever-increasing educational level of German schools as well as to the ever-increasing amount of juvenile delinquency. This question was treated in detailed reports by all Abschnitte in 1942 under the title "Juvenile delinquency and lowered moral standards in the third year of the war" (Jugendverwerlosung und sinkende Moral im dritten Kriegsjahr).

The results of this survey were so damning that III C never did publish the comprehensive report it had planned. It can be imagined that with the further progress of the war conditions became even worse.

Ant III never did approve of the Hitler Youth movement and the doctrine represented by it of education by youth of the same age as those to be educated. The constant criticism of the HJ was the cause of ever-deteriorating relations between leaders of this movement and the SD and with it of the SS in general.

(5) Customs

Even after the outbreak of war, the SD still continued to give support to all engaged in the perpetuation of ancient customs. The Referat Volkskultur, concerned itself with all societies and clubs engaged in the practice and preservation of ancient customs and costumes.

(6) "Spiritual Aid"

Another separate Referat dealt with spiritual help to the population (Seelische Betreuung). Its main activities were diatribes against the DAF and the KdF Program (Strength through Joy), mainly at subordinate levels.

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(7) Press and Propaganda

Of special importance during wartime was the field of activity concerned with questions of press and propaganda. This sector was one of the most extensive concerns of the SD. Its apparatus was so large and so well organized that reaction to all measures of German and allied propaganda could be gauged almost instantaneously.

The main customer for reports of this sort was to be found in GOEBBELS and his Propaganda Ministry. He has been reported as having said upon several occasions that his work would have been impossible without the efficient service of the SD. In reality he paid very little attention to the findings of the SD and continued to conduct propaganda exactly as he pleased.

Still the information service in this Refurat was excellent. The chief, SS Sturmbannfuehrer von KIELPINSKI, ran his organization like an efficiently-run newspaper of major importance and his results were accordingly good.

His influence was greatest in the field of the official weekly newspaper (Deutsche Wochenschau), put out by the Propaganda Ministry. But even here his influence was only short-lived. In 1944 an ordinance appeared stating that henceforth only positive criticism could appear from the press and propaganda Refurat.

The Gruppenleiter III C, SS Standartenfuehrer Dr. STREIBER, was a man of somewhat retiring demeanor, but with the soul of a fanatic. The position and measures taken by his Gruppe are his complete responsibility.

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3. Ant III (Continued)

(3) Science

The Referat Science (Wissenschaft) had no constructive functions. Again it was only concerned with the effects of laws and ordinances as far as these concerned science and learning. Under consideration here was of course not objective science, but the bastard brood of 100 percent National Socialist Science. All attempts of German science however feeble, to loosen the shackles met with the strictest opposition in the reports of III C.

Of the greatest importance for German science was the fact that III C had a great deal of influence in the selection of university professors. The appointment of all instructors, associates, and professors had to be approved first by III C. In this fashion the strictest control could be maintained and it was insured that only fanatical Nazis were appointed to these positions.

In problems concerning students, closest cooperation existed between III C and the NS Studentenbund (Nazi Student's League). This friendly relation was to a large extent due to the influence of the head of the Studentenbund, Dr SCHEEL, who at the same time was a member of the SD.

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(4) Education and Religious Life

The juxtaposition of education and religious life (Erziehung und religioeses Leben) within one of the Referate of III C did not make for homogeneity of subject. The religious life part of it was added only recently.

Before fall 1943 there existed a special Referat for church affairs (Kirchenreferat) which, however was transferred to the Stapo last at that time. The following year showed that under the new system the churches would be treated only from a police point of view, and no intelligence would be forthcoming from them.

Therefore a new Referat III C 5 was created in 1944, to take charge of the intelligence aspects of the problem, while all other considerations connected with religion came under the jurisdiction of III C 4, the Erziehungsreferat.

On questions of church problems, III C has always been completely intolerant, radical, and completely anti-religious. For once the NSDA found common ground with the Party Chancery. BORTANN and his advisor on church affairs, Ministerialrat Dr KRUEGER, were of an opinion similar to that of III C.

III C made determined attempts to support all trends promising to take the place of the established churches and their services. Questions of neo-pagan festivals (harvest-thanksgiving celebrations - Herbstadvent; solstice celebrations - Sonnenwendfeiern, et al) received serious consideration and whole-hearted support. The Catholic Mass was to be replaced by a so-called morning-devotional (Morgengebeter).

Educational problems were further sub-divided into the sectors School and Hitler Youth (Schule und Hitlerjugend). An interesting point came up with the proposed introduction all over GERMANY of the Austrian-type Hauptschule instead of the Prussian Mittelschule. The former left a certain possibility for individual education, while the latter was the prototype of the strict, disciplined, mass institution, with military flavor. The SD of course favored the latter.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Ant III (Continued)

d. Gruppe III D

(1) Field of action

III D was second only to III C in size. The field of economic intelligence had always been the personal province of OHLENDORF, the Chief of Ant III. His Gruppenleiter III D (SS Stabsartenführer iR SEIBERT) was an absolute zero and so he continued to exercise effective control over this sector until the end.

His organization was very extensive, especially on the lower levels (Abschnitte) and thus III D had its informants and agents in every single cranny of German economic life. The information reaching III D about German economic life was both profound and sound.

OHLENDORF, as was common within the SS, used the influence gained thereby for the enhancement of his personal power and glory. It was, however, unavoidable that in its control over German economic life the SD as well should gain in stature.

(2) First Nexus of SD and State

This was not so noticeable in the Ministry of Armaments (SPYER) or the Ministry of Agriculture (BACKE), but became very pronounced in the Economic Ministry (FUNK). Here OHLENDORF was engaged in a systematic campaign, and finally even managed to become Secretary of State HEYLEN's second in command.

This was the first case of an SD official gaining an important post within the machinery of the State proper. How much the enormous organization of the SD, especially in this field, aided him in the fulfillment of his official duties is difficult to judge. Generally OHLENDORF was liable to place his personal advantage in the foreground. Also it is hard to see what positive action he could have taken on the many reports criticizing the pitiful state of German economy.

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e. Gruppe III G

III G (Gesellschaftsnachrichtendienst - society intelligence service) was formed to provide intelligence by employing persons in "high society."

There were absolutely no factual justifications for the creation of this Gruppe in 1944. There already existed a section within Amt VI (VI Kult) with similar aims, and in Amt IV the Nachrichten or N-Referat fulfilled the same functions. The real reason for the creation of the new agency was once again an attempt by Amt III to gain some influence on foreign affairs.

At first III G, which originally had been called III E, was small. It was intended to be a trial balloon to test the reaction of Amt IV and VI. When these agencies chose to merely ignore an attempt which they considered childish and ridiculous, Amt III misconstrued their reaction as an indication of future non-interference and commenced to really start its enterprise in great style. Each Abschnitt was staffed with a Referent for III G. The aid of Referenten on other III topics was enlisted in order to obtain as large a number of contacts as possible. Still the expected results were not forthcoming.

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3. Amt III (Continued)

There were numerous reasons for this state of affairs. The leadership was incompetent. The opportunities were small. In 1944 GERMANY had almost no direct contact with the rest of EUROPE. The number of persons traveling into foreign countries from GERMANY was getting smaller. Similarly, fewer and fewer foreigners came to visit GERMANY. Thus opportunities to enlist members of International Society and similar groups (the purpose of the Referat) were few and far between.

VI Kult was suffering under similar disadvantages but at least, due to the excellent foreign information service of Amt VI, all persons travelling into Germany from foreign countries were known and could thus be tapped for intelligence purposes.

The chief of III G, SS Sturabannfuhrer Dr WEGNER, an officer of mediocre ability, brought no qualification of background to his position. His right hand and driving force, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer GERN, was at best a second-rate confidence man.

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f. Evaluation of Results Achieved

(1) The Lageberichte

If an appreciation of the importance and influence of Art III on the conduct of German affairs is desired, the question of quality and objectivity of reports submitted looms large. The institution of the so-called Lageberichte dates back to the period immediately following the outbreak of the war. The abschnitte were ordered at that time to submit a daily survey of the situation in their sector to the NSHQ at BERLIN. Later the periods elapsing between reports was extended considerably.

(2) Objectivity of Spot Reports

Those reports, based on the intelligence gathered by the Ausstellungen (smallest SD unit), and on information gleaned from the agents under the direct control of the Referent at abschnitt-level, generally gave an absolutely correct and objective picture of the situation. This was true in the beginning, at least.

(3) Changes at the lower level

Later on some experienced Referenten learned that their objective reports never reached publication in their original form, but were changed, toned down, and made more palatable to those in power. Some of the Referenten therefore resigned themselves to the fact that truth was not wanted and so started to color their own reports and changed the trend of their recommendations. In this fashion they saved their superiors the trouble of having to do so later on.

Others reacted in exactly the opposite manner. Realizing that their reports would be toned down, no matter what they wrote, they decided to paint things blacker than they really were. Thus, they argued, even after the usual change at the next echelon enough of the truth would remain to provide an approximation to reality.

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8. Part III (Continued)

GOEBBELS and BORMANN evinced the most interest for these reports. They at least received them without any sections having been cut out. There even existed a liaison officer of the SS with BORMANN, one SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Lt Justus BEYER. His influence with BORMANN was non-existent.

(8) Fundamental Difficulties

A further important disadvantage can be found in the overdeveloped centralization of the Nazi State. Instead of allowing sufficient power to the Abschnittsleiter, so that certain hard to settle difficulties could be settled right then and there, everything had to go through the SS. Usually that was the end of the problem, but in those cases the difficulty simply disappeared while going through channels.

In the few cases where a decision was hard to come, for example involving the Gauleiter, the latter blamed the Abschnittsleiter for being bowled out and for all other difficulties, and his relation with the SD officer deteriorated even further. If there were any complaints from the Gauleiter, however, HEYDRICH simply used to fire his Abschnittsleiter.

KALTENBRUNNER followed a different line: he instructed his subordinates to establish good relations with the Gauleiter, at all costs, in order to be able to gain advantage of him at a later date (Um einzuwickeln).

Certain special reports, usually classified Geheim Reichsmache and with a very small distribution were slightly more successful. These reports were usually in the form of a memorandum, and KALTENBRUNNER usually did everything in his power to insure their receipt by the desired person (usually HITLER).

Another factor which must not be forgotten is the inadequacy of the human material involved. Most SD officers were young fanatics without the detachment and background necessary for the efficient conduct of an intelligence service.

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(9) Conclusions

Some of the results deriving from the factors discussed above have already been discussed. As a final conclusion one might say that our III had the inherent capability of serving as an instrument of collecting objective and factual intelligence as well as of evaluating and utilizing this intelligence effectively. The reasons preventing it from ever assuming that function, however, were stronger by their very nature than those favoring that development.

To put the same conclusion slightly differently: under the National Socialist regime some of the faults inherent in this regime made the collation and evaluation of objective internal intelligence as well as its utilization impossible. The most important of these reasons was the fact that such a service would carry in it the seed of self-destruction (which leads to the discovery that effective internal intelligence in all its aspects is only possible under a system very far removed ideologically from the Nazi State. It would be idle to ask whether such a state would have any need of an effective internal intelligence service).

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

Art III (Continued)

(4) Coloring by Indoctrination

Such measures, of course, detracted from the objectivity of the Lageberichte as handed down by the Abschnitte. As a rule, however, these reports still gave a correct estimate of the situation. This holds true only of the purely informative part of the report, the so-called morale report (Stimmungsbericht). The second part, dealing with suggestions and recommendations was no longer objective.

In conferences, directives, and by all other means, the various Referenten had been indoctrinated with official doctrine. Anything that did not meet with the full approval of the general line of Art III had no chance of acceptance. Especially during HIMMLER's reign no voices of opposition were suffered in the organization. Thus robbed of all individuality, Referenten became no more than mouthpieces for official Art III policy.

(5) Muzzling to prevent offence to the highly

An added difficulty of great import was the fact that reports against leading personalities of the Reich or criticisms of measures effected by them necessarily indicated the person under consideration. Officially no names were mentioned, but it was only too obvious who was meant at all times. But among the personalities leading HITLER'S GERMANY, there was not one of sufficient stature to be able to bear criticisms of his person.

Obviously the RSHA was in no position to change matters any. For that reason all reports had to go through HIMMLER's hands. HIMMLER as the supreme chief of all intelligence services then would have had the duty to inform HITLER, the final authority, of all short-comings of the system uncovered by this intelligence service.

But HIMMLER was not the man to risk an open break with anybody who still had some vestige of power. Therefore no reports against leading personalities ever penetrated beyond HIMMLER, unless it was for his own purposes.

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(6) HITLER takes a Hand

HITLER's strong adherence to certain prejudices was well known. It did not pay to annoy an opinionated boss with such power. Thus few reports ever left the RSHA without bearing the indirect but ever present imprint of HITLER's personality and ideas, even before reaching his exalted presence.

But even those few objective reports which went through the mill of the RSHA unscathed never created as much as a stir in official circles. They found their final resting place in HITLER's desk. They might be used for some future intrigue, but to accomplish the thing for which they were intended - very rarely indeed.

(7) Dissemination

All Lageberichte, provided they did not implicate any leading personalities, were sent to all Ministers, all Reichsleiter of the Party, and most other officials of equal rank. They were no longer objective in the least, and simply reproduced official policy in most cases. Even here enough of the truth remained to make them uncomfortable reading for some. Goebbels III resorted to the device of leaving out of the appropriate report all sections even vaguely connected with the Minister or official to whom a particular copy was sent.

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4. Amt IV (Continued)

Without any moral scruples, even without any conception of moral values, cunning to the point of brilliance, with socialist leanings and definite pathological tendencies, he was the prototype of the Gestapo man. He succeeded in eliminating from the leadership of the Stapo anybody who could possibly provide cause for conflicts. At the same time he succeeded in completely pleasing HIMMLER, to whom he bore a definite resemblance in his character.

d. Organization of Amt IV

Organizationally Amt IV was of slightly different structure than the other Aemter of the RSHA. It consisted of only three Gruppen - A, B, and C. Under the Gruppen there were subdivisions called Abteilungen, which were then followed by the usual Referate. The inclusion of Abteilungen within the organizational scheme has been attempted in other Aemter, but had never been officially adopted there.

5. Amt V

The Amt controlling the activities of the Criminal Police (Kripo) never became a full-fledged member of the Security Services of the State. It was mainly concerned with routine processes of criminal investigation. Although its members had been taken over into the SS and it had officially been made part of the Sipo in connection with HIMMLER's complete control of all police services, the amount of actual penetration remained slight. Especially in the lower levels the Kripo was still a police organization to the exclusion of all other tendencies.

There was a certain amount of cooperation between Amt IV and Amt V at intermediate and high echelons but until the end almost no connection existed between Amt V and the two SD Aemter.

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6. Ant VI

d. Early History (Foreign Intelligence under JOST)

(1) The Beginning

The beginnings of a political intelligence service outside the confines of GERMANY can be traced back to 1937. In this year Ant III of the SD Hauptamt began the establishment of an information net in various countries of South-Eastern EUROPE, as well as in CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA.

(2) Two Patterns

At that time SS Brigadefuehrer JOST was Chief of Ant III, while the newly formed Hauptabteilung III/3, charged with foreign intelligence, came under the command of Dr FILBERT. His name is intimately connected with almost all phases of German intelligence operations during this first period.

Work in AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA was not organized according to a strict and uniform pattern, while activities in the other countries were planned according to a scheme which was to retain its validity for many years, in spite of many defects and shortcomings.

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4. Amt IV (formerly SD Hauptamt Gestapo)

a. Stapo Membership and Party Affiliation

Amt IV was by far the most dreaded section of the whole RSHA. As the high Command of the Stapo (Secret Police) its reputation inside and outside of Germany was probably the worst of all the institutions of the National Socialist State. It is a paradox, however, that originally its members were by no means selected for their adherence to the ideological tenets of Nazism.

On the contrary, the number of so-called alte Kämpfer within its ranks, as well as former members of the para-military organizations of the NSDAP, such as SS, SA, NSKK, etc was comparatively small. This was changed only when all its officials were taken over into the SS in line with HIMMLER's attempts of complete SS domination of all police services.

b. Quality of Work performed

Nor did the Gestapo, contrary to popular belief, work particularly efficiently as a secret police. The former Austrian Secret Police, which was absorbed almost fully into Stapostelle WIM was a much more efficient organization.

The reason for the Gestapo's peculiar effectiveness must be sought in the type of personnel it employed. The average Stapo official was below average in intelligence, but endowed with cunning and filled with boundless brutality. Quite a few of this number were men with criminal or pathological records or tendencies.

All of them were united in the desire to be the willing tools of the state and to engage in the suppression and complete elimination of all opposition tendencies. The fact that the state happened to be a National Socialist one was purely incidental. They would have served any other master with the same loyalty, using the same means, as long as it would have given them the same power of life and death over the average citizen.

Of course National Socialism was particularly fitted to produce that atmosphere of utter lawlessness and all-pervading fear which made the Secret Police thrive and perpetuated its reputation.

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c. MUELLER, Typical Gestapo Man

All these tendencies can be easily observed by a consideration of Amt IV's last chief, SS Gruppenfuehrer MUELLER. With an undistinguished background, he had been a small official within the Bavarian Political Police, when somehow HEYDRICH's attention was attracted to the little man. HEYDRICH, certain that here was a man who would do his bidding, took him to BERLIN with him.

He rose steadily and finally became the successor of Dr BAST, the previous head of the Stapo under HEYDRICH. While the Henagan was still alive, MUELLER was his closest confidant and most willing creature. With his death he assumed complete control over his organization and succeeded in modeling it completely after his own ideas.

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6. Art VI (Continued)

The Hauptvertrauensleute in the other countries of the European SOUTH-EAST were not of such high caliber. Yet, during this time of easy military victories, even comparative bunglers at the game succeeded in working successfully in the lush field of the German-controlled Balkans.

Many German firms attempted to branch out into the SOUTH-EAST during this period and their activities provided added backdrops for intelligence operations.

A less far-reaching apparatus of high quality had been set up by the SD Leitabschnitt WIEN, which also controlled certain information-gathering activities in SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE in that period.

This uncoordinated and un-authorized activity was looked upon askance by the central office in BERLIN, and after the personnel changes in fall 1941, the net which had been established from WIEN was smashed by the appropriate Laendergruppe.

(b) Near East and RUSSIA

Intelligence operations in the Near East were of minor importance at that time. Only when this region became the focal point of military operational planning and concrete preparations for moves in this area had been made by the General Staff did intelligence activities swing into high gear. Work against SOVIET RUSSIA had top priority.

The Gruppenleiter, Dr GRAEFE, with the RUSSELAND Referat SS Stabsgruppenfuehrer Dr HENGELHAUPT, had met with good initial successes in his work and had managed to establish several intelligence lines with contacts in the interior of the SOVIET UNION. This constituted a rather remarkable achievement, since only a year previously, at a meeting between SD and Abwehr representatives in PRAGUE, the observation had been made that not a single source of information within the USSR was available to the German intelligence services.

This prompted total intensification of effort, since, at that time (late 1940-early 1941), the military High Command needed certain information for their operational plans which could only be obtained through secret sources. In the SOUTH of the USSR, especially the UKRAINE, the VI Referat of the Leitabschnitt WIEN, had succeeded in establishing certain contact, with HUNGARY and RUMANIA as bases.

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(3) Progress to the Half Way Mark

The following paragraphs will attempt a rough survey of the state of German foreign intelligence operations as of fall 1941, the date of JOST's removal. These activities had come under Gen VI since 1939 and can only be discussed very incompletely here. Nevertheless a comparison between the work done under JOST and the completely different activities under SCHELLENBERG at a later date might be of certain interest.

(a) SOUTH-EAST

The greatest progress had been made in work in SOUTH-EAST EUROPE where all the prerequisites for successful operations could be found. Of added advantage was the fact that almost all these countries had come under German control or direct German influence and that therefore they proved sufficiently tractable, especially during this period of German military ascendancy.

Among the Balkan countries ROMANIA had risen already to the distinction of providing the most fertile ground for intelligence purposes. Here the very able SS Hauptsturmführer von BOHLSCHLINGH controlled operations in his capacity as Hauptvertrauensmann. He was ably assisted and later succeeded by the equally qualified SS Hauptsturmführer WÄPPEL (now in Allied hands). BOHLSCHLINGH was removed at the instigation of the Foreign Office after the attempted revolt of the Iron Guard. Laboring under the disadvantage of having a mind and opinions of his own he suffered the usual fate, was degraded, and remained incarcerated for several months, as prisoner of the Stapo.

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(c) FAR EAST

No attempt had been made to prepare the ground for intelligence operations in the Far East while this would have still been possible. Therefore the accomplishment of this task, when required, was faced with insurmountable obstacles. It would have been necessary to operate across a part of the world controlled either by the Russian or the English enemy. To make things even worse the police attaché at TOKYO, SS Standartenführer WEISINGER, turned out to be a complete failure.

(d) SOUTH

There were absolutely no operations directed at the South of EUROPE. Here Amt VI was strictly limited by an order from HITLER stating that all espionage activity in the country of the Italian ally was prohibited. This also precluded all chances of penetrating into NORTH AFRICA. Only with the German move into TUNIS was this situation changed and an Einsatzkommando dispatched.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

JOST and FILBERT—then Gruppenleiter VI A and JOST's closest collaborator and the most able man in the section—as well as Obersturmbannführer VOLLHEIM, Gruppenleiter VI C, and another SS officer were accused of having accepted bribes. This trumped-up charge was used to remove them from office. JOST, after a long investigation, was found guilty and relieved in October 1941.

b. Ant VI under SCHELLENBERG

(1) SCHELLENBERG appears

(a) Background

JOST's removal had been planned by HEYDRICH and had been expected for a long time previously. Shortly before, HEYDRICH had placed SS Sturmbannführer SCHELLENBERG, one of his trusted underlings, into Ant VI as JOST's deputy. SCHELLENBERG had come from Ant IV (Slapo), where as Gruppenleiter IV E he had gained quite a reputation. Only thirty years old and of comparatively low rank, he had risen to great prominence and had become MUELLER's unofficial deputy.

This position had been founded on SCHELLENBERG's famous exploit known as the VENLO affair. In the course of this enterprise SCHELLENBERG and some officers of Ant VI had succeeded in kidnapping the two chief agents of the British Secret Service in HOLLAND (BEST and STEVENS) and in abducting them across the border into GERMANY.

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(b) Plans and Personality

SCHELLENBERG's posting to Amt VI marked a complete change in direction for this agency and it became obvious that JOST's days as its head were numbered. To fully understand the growth of Amt VI under SCHELLENBERG a comprehension of his personality is necessary.

He did not belong to the alte Kämpfer. He joined the NSDAP and SS at a relatively late date. He received his start as a subordinate EGO in Amt I in the personnel section. With a keen understanding of the potentialities of this section he knew how to place himself in the foreground and soon HEYDRICH's watchful eye had become aware of the young man.

The latter soon accepted SCHELLENBERG into his inner circle, in order to, as he put it, "train the youngster himself." The human relationship between the two became ever closer, SCHELLENBERG became one of HEYDRICH's most trusted confidants.

The boss also introduced his new protege into the circle of his family, where SCHELLENBERG soon so ingratiated himself, that everybody expected him to marry HEYDRICH's widow (after the latter's assassination). But by then SCHELLENBERG had become far too clever. A dead HEYDRICH was no longer of any interest to him.

To fathom SCHELLENBERG's true character is not very easy. It is certain that he was driven by an all-consuming ambition. He did not hesitate to climb over the dead bodies of his adversaries and even of his friends, as long as this way led towards his goal. Concepts such as friendship, honesty, or sincerity were unknown ideals to him. Nor did he expect them from others.

On the other hand, as far as his personal life is concerned, he was utterly beyond reproach. His manner of life was almost that of an ascetic. He neither drank nor smoked, and worked twenty hours straight for days on end.

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(b) Plans and Personality

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

(e) WEST

In the West of EUROPE certain good work had been done. The occupation of FRANCE, HOLLAND, and BELGIUM simplified matters and provided new bases for future operations. This period was, however, comparatively rich in jurisdictional disputes between Ant VI, which insisted on its mission of controlling all political intelligence work, and certain local Sipo agencies which did not wish to cede this prerogative.

Work of very high quality emanated from SPAIN and PORTUGAL, including TANGIER, where opportunities abounded at that time.

(f) NORTH

Results from the Scandinavian countries were not of such high level. Occupation of NORWAY and DENMARK did not bring with it a substantial improvement.

(g) US and UK

Intelligence operations outside of EUROPE had just begun. No results had come from NORTH AMERICA yet, while rather solid spade-work had been done in SOUTH AMERICA. Ant VI never succeeded in penetrating the UK proper.

(h) SWITZERLAND

Due to its unique geographical and political position, SWITZERLAND became a hotbed of intelligence operations. Nevertheless the net established by Ant VI was not of a very good quality. Exceptionally good work and connections were established by SS Hauptsturmfuhrer GROELL, then VI Referent at SD Abschnitt INNSBRUCK (later Hauptvertrauensmann ITALY). These activities were on his own hook and met with displeasure at the BERLIN office.

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(i) Conclusions

In concluding it may be said that as a general political information and intelligence service the SD at that time (approximately two years after the outbreak of the war) was a failure. It did not meet even the minimum requirements of the political or military high command.

On the other hand it must be said that, contrary to popular belief, the German authorities did not then, or at any other time, particularly care for or appreciate the work done by this service. Certain agencies such as the Foreign Office actually (if usually surreptitiously) sabotaged the intelligence services wherever and whenever possible. A further drawback was the fact that HEYDRICH considered evaluation of reports and their final dissemination his exclusive province. He failed to transmit certain important reports if these, for some reason or other, did not agree with his ideas.

(j) JOST and cohorts

Chief of Amt VI at that time, JOST was the personification of the "little man" and did not possess the stature necessary for the execution of the tasks required of him. He was easily influenced and his office was actually run by a small circle of close collaborators, whose prime consideration was their own importance and who were beset by professional jealousy. As a man he was absolutely straight, even probably too decent for a job such as his. Ironically enough, his downfall was caused by an accusation of personal dishonesty.

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6. Art VI (Continued)

But he did succeed in bringing all the other sections of the Abwehr under his control, for the newly-created Amt III under Oberst HANSEN was practically under his own personal command. It probably would have taken years and not months to weld effectively the Abwehr and the political intelligence service together. The Abwehr had a great deal more personnel, and was disorganized, unwieldy, and difficult to control.

It is to SCHELLENBERG's credit as an executive that he managed to effect what measures of unification and control he did in so short and difficult a period.

(b) Removal of HANSEN

According to his own statement, he never trusted HANSEN. He saw in him an awkward competitor who would interfere with the achievement of his aims sooner or later. It is not so certain, however, that he saw through HANSEN completely.

SCHELLENBERG was certainly beset by suspicions long before 20 July 1944 and stated his opposition and dislike of HANSEN publicly before that time. The latter of course reciprocated these feelings most heartily. He would have certainly delighted in the planned liquidation of SCHELLENBERG in the course of the 20 July Revolt.

But SCHELLENBERG was on his guard, and even during the most critical hours he managed to keep a clear head and turn things to his own advantage. And at that he was anything but heroic. But by playing his cards right, he succeeded in arresting HANSEN (instead of, as it had been planned, the other way around) and to add spice to his triumph he followed this by the arrest of Admiral CANARIS.

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(1) SCHELLENBERG in Complete Control

After these experiences he never trusted anybody in Amt III who could possibly become dangerous to him. Of the old guard he only kept Oberst i G OHLETZ in his position, for he knew that in spite of doubtful ability, the latter would cheerfully do his bidding.

All the other survivors of 20 July, such as Oberstleutnant i G KLEYN-STUEEBER, never succeeded in gaining their chief's confidence. He removed them from their posts and dispatched them to agencies in the field. But now SCHELLENBERG had reached the threshold of his power. Now he was chief of the complete political and military foreign intelligence service. It now remained to reorganize this service according to his own plans.

c. Final Organization of Amt VI

(1) Gruppe VI A (Administration and Organization)

(a) Functions

The idea of this section originating with Dr FILLERT, who had already prepared the structure in somewhat similar form. After a period of inefficient and incapable management, SCHELLENBERG decided to call in a man who had made a reputation for himself in Amt I.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

SHELLENBERG was beyond any doubt the most capable of all the section chiefs in the RSHA. In some respects, such as his knowledge and appreciation of the human character, he was even the superior of KALTENBRUNNER, his chief.

SHELLENBERG had one goal in mind from the very beginning: he wanted to become the head of the German intelligence service, but of an intelligence service of his own making and one that was to include all ramifications of his own ideas. To further this end he dedicated all his restless energy and sacrificed his health and his private happiness. It was as if he had become the personification of this idea. That in spite of all this he did not succeed can not be blamed on him. He failed because of the human inadequacy of his collaborators and the lack of understanding of his superiors.

(2) Ant VI Before the End

It would be beyond the framework of this report to discuss in detail all the various stages of development which Ant VI was subjected to under SHELLENBERG. Only a survey of the organization immediately before the collapse will be given below. There is only one phase which will be given consideration in detail: the incorporation of the military intelligence service and the role played by SHELLENBERG in this enterprise.

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(a) Absorption of Abwehr

It had always been HEYDRICH's great and undying ambition to obtain control over the Abwehr. In the same process he wanted to destroy its chief, Admiral CANARIS, whom he had always regarded as the personification of the military's hate against his person, his SD, and his secret office. SCHELLENBERG became his trusted helpmate in these designs. As a matter of fact it can be said that the latter really was the spiritus rector of the scheme, for no one but he could work as unflinchingly and with the steeled determination necessary for carrying out this idea.

SCHELLENBERG had been collecting damning evidence against the Abwehr and against CANARIS and with HEYDRICH's death he decided to place all this evidence at HEYDRICH's successor's disposal. One can not be sure whether he really believed in this assertion, but he gave KATZBACH sufficient to understand that the British Secret Service had managed to penetrate the highest councils of the Abwehr, supposedly with CANARIS's tacit approval. It now behooved him to back up these accusations with more concrete proof, since only certain circumstantial evidence had come to light so far.

His opportunity came when several Abwehr agents in TURKEY, who had been suborned by the British, officially switched their allegiance in favor of the Allies. With this material KATZBACH succeeded in forcing CANARIS' removal and the creation of a unified German Secret Service (einheitlicher deutscher geheimer Meldedienst) under his command.

Now SCHELLENBERG's hour had struck and he readily proved himself adequate for the task of supervising the transfer and unification. He emerged victorious from the fight against MUELLER (head of Amt IV) who claimed large parts of Abwehr for his section. He had to agree to a certain compromise by which a part of III F—the only part of Abwehr so treated — came under the jurisdiction of Amt IV, IC31a.

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6. Amt VI (Continued)

As a Leitabschnittsfuehrer at STUTTGART for many years he and his VI Referent had managed to create a number of information channels to FRANCE and SWITZERLAND. Through this work he had come in actual contact with some of the problems of Western EUROPE and for this reason it did not take him long to grasp the essence of his new position in spite of his late arrival at Amt VI (1943).

(b) FRANCE

Gruppe VI B's intelligence net in FRANCE was excellent, but only prior to and during the German occupation of this country. In VICHY the Gruppe had Dr REICHELT, a very able man, as their representative. The chief agent stationed in PARIS was SS Standartenfuehrer BICKLER. He was very gifted and probably the greatest expert on French affairs in GERMANY. He had been born in ALSACE, had been the lawyer of ROOS, the leader of the Alsatian autonomy movement who had been executed by the French.

After the occupation of FRANCE, HITLER ordered him into the Waffen SS since he had his own opinion about GERMANY's policy towards FRANCE and made no bones about his convictions. He then came to the SD and became a very valuable man, in spite of having no particular ability for pure intelligence work.

But his profound knowledge of French affairs and his clear realization of GERMANY's mistakes in her dealings with FRANCE soon made him the most important expert on FRANCE in all of the RSHA. As could be expected his plans for a more reasonable policy towards FRANCE were not approved and so he found himself more and more in opposition. Exhaustive reports (Grossberichte) prepared by him were forwarded to HITLER, but did not cause any appreciable results.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

The different organization in AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA can be explained by the fact that operations there were entrusted to the indigenous Nazi or pro-Nazi parties, which frequently had a structure reminiscent of the NSDAP in GERMANY.

Intelligence organizations in other countries were usually activated as follows: an attempt was made to enlist the services of a thoroughly versed expert in the affairs and history of the country to be administered. This man usually had the complete confidence of Ant III, and generally also was a member of the SS.

The operative was then dispatched to the country where he was to operate, with the title of Hauptvertrauensmann (chief confidential agent). His activities were camouflaged by the device of sending him in the guise of a businessman employed by the local branch of a German business establishment.

This method soon became stereotyped, and the usual mistake of always following the same pattern was made here as in all other German intelligence operations. Thus certain firms which were used for this purpose soon suffered under the reputation of being nothing more than cover agencies of the German secret service. (This disadvantage became especially acute since the Abwehr showed a similar lack of imagination and used the services of the identical enterprises).

Firms, such as the large house of SCHNEIDER & Co, the German Luftansa, the foreign branch offices of the Reichsbahn, and the offices of certain steamship lines, soon became known all over the world, and especially in the Balkans and the Near East as the centers of the German intelligence service.

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(c) SPAIN and PORTUGAL

The organization set up by VI B in SPAIN had become static and more or less inactive. A similar state of affairs existed in PORTUGAL. The man entrusted with its operation, a so-called police liaison officer (Polizeiverbindungs-fuehrer) - not a Police Attache since the Portuguese had not accredited such a position at the Embassy - proved completely incapable. He was a pure policeman with no ability or interest in intelligence work.

Furthermore work in all of the Iberian Peninsula, as well as at TANGIER suffered under ever increasing pressure from the side of the allies. SPAIN and PORTUGAL were asked to expell the German Intelligence agents, some of whom had become rather well known through their activities.

STEINLE was also charged with command over Gruppe Mil B. This section controlled the intelligence network of the former Abwehr in SPAIN and PORTUGAL. This net was comparatively large but of poor quality. A reorganization of the KO in both countries had been planned and the first steps had already been taken and new operatives sent to the scene.

(d) SWITZERLAND

Not much progress had been made in SWITZERLAND. The Hauptvertrauensmann, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Hans DAUFELDT (captured), ex-embellged as Vice Consul at LAUSANNE, proved to be an absolute nincompoop. The Swiss Referat therefore only continued its existence because of a line operated by SCHELLENBERG himself, which produced excellent results. The Militaerisches Amt had suffered a very serious setback in SWITZERLAND. It had lost (in connection with the 20 July plot) the services of its most capable representative, Prince AUERSPERG. AUERSPERG had been disguised as the assistant air attache at BERNE.

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Amt VI (Continued)

As an expert for organizational and efficiency problems, SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr SANLBERGER had become as famous as he had become feared. After his stay with Amt I he had served as assistant to the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, ITALY, and then joined Amt VI. SANLBERGER was certainly very able and exceedingly ambitious but as Gruppenleiter VI A, he continued making his old mistake of over-organizing everything.

Gruppe VI A offered ample opportunity for this weakness. All the organizational plans for Amt VI originated with this Gruppe. Their schematic diagrams always represented some future Utopia and never corresponded to the actual state of affairs. Otherwise SANLBERGER ran his show very efficiently. He managed to have his way in conflicts with other sections about personnel questions. The not inconsiderable foreign and domestic funds under his control (he was also in charge of the Kassenabteilung for the whole of Amt VI) were in tip-top shape at all times.

SCELLENBERG too took a very personal interest in the financial affairs of his section. He suffered from the fear that one day his position would be compromised by the machinations or even the negligence of one of his subordinates.

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(b) Referat VI Kult

After a short spell as an independent Gruppe, VI Kult became a Referat subordinated to Gruppe VI A. The reason for the establishment of VI Kult was to find new sources for Amt VI by the inclusion of persons active in cultural and educational endeavors travelling to and from GERMANY. Some of this personnel was then to be put at the disposal of the sub-sections dealing with the various countries (Ländergruppen).

The creation of such a service had only become necessary because all VI Referate at the various SD Abschnitte had been discontinued in order to make for a more central organization. By gaining in centralization they had lost out on the recruiting of new agents and a distinct gap had been created.

VI Kult therefore attempted to bridge this gap by dispatching representatives to the most important Abschnitte. The quality of work done by VI Kult remained sub-standard until the end. The explanation for this is to be found in the inferior leadership at the top.

(c) Mil A

Towards the end of 1944 SANDBERGER also became head of the Gruppe Mil A. The duties of this section in Mil Amt corresponded exactly to those of VI A in Amt VI.

(2) Gruppe VI B (Western EUROPE)

(1) General

Gruppe VI B which dealt with the countries of Western EUROPE and Western AFRICA, was among the best sections in Amt VI. SS Standardenführer STEIMLE, like SANDBERGER a member of the so-called SWABIAN Clique in Amt VI, was an exceptionally gifted section chief. He had an uncanny gift for pure intelligence operations.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

It is fairly certain, however, that the same agent was employed by the British as well and received his pay from both sides (It is even possible that the Italians employed the identical man). His material is supposed to have been of great value, in spite of or perhaps because of his connections.

Great attention was paid to the emigreés in GERMANY, such as the Grand Mufti HUSSEINI and the former Iraq president, al-GHILANI. Close collaboration existed between these personages and the groups controlled by them in the field of intelligence operations. Whether any active work was done in connection with these groups could not be ascertained (by HOETTL).

(d) IRAN

Ant VI succeeded in accomplishing an interesting experiment in IRAN. During 1940 two young SS officers, by the name of GAMOTHA and MAYER, were dispatched to TEHRAN as employees of SCHNEKER in order to give them an opportunity to study language and country. This was done with the idea in mind of using these two men as agents at some later date.

But the two young men soon had acclimated themselves, and now commenced to do some intelligence work on their own hook. They not only engaged in the collection of pure intelligence but also began to dabble in the political field, and achieved remarkable results, much to everybody's surprise.

A number of insurrections of the Iranians against the USSR was instigated by them. (MOLOTOV has stated that these activities were one of the main reasons for the move of the Red Army into Iran). All these activities had been done on their own responsibility and without the previous knowledge or approval of Ant VI.

MAYER was later arrested by the British and sent to Cairo, while GAMOTHA managed to return to GERMANY. The intelligence net organized by them, however, continued in operation and close contact was maintained with IRAN. It is known that several groups were dropped over Iran, and although some of their personnel were caught, the remainder succeeded in continuing operations.

GAMOTHA's successor in IRAN was SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Martin KURENIS. He had been dropped by parachute together with a group of agents. The Russians attempted to suborn KURENIS, but he refused their offer. Facing certain arrest he committed suicide.

Part of his group was taken into custody, but the remainder succeeded in evading capture and is thought to be still hiding among the various tribes with whom GAMOTHA worked.

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(e) FAR EAST

Similarly the Far East received systematic treatment within Art VI. The Leiter, SS Sturmabfuhrer WEIRUCH, now in allied hands, created a separate institute and staffed it with a number of scientists and politicians who had been working on problems of this region and especially on JAPAN.

There was no direct intelligence connection with either JAPAN or CHINA, however. The only contact was the official one through the police attache at TOKYO, who in turn remained in contact with the police attache accredited to the puppet government at NANKING.

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

Ant VI (Continued)

(3) Gruppe VI C (RUSSIA and NEAR EAST)

(a) SOVIET RUSSIA

As far as inherent importance was concerned, Gruppe VI C was considered the prime concern of Ant VI. Credit for this state of affairs was due largely to its former Leiter, SS Sturmbannführer Dr GRAEFE. (GRAEFE and the best Gruppenleiter of Ant III, SS Sturmbannführer Dr GERGERBACH were both killed in an automobile accident).

GRAEFE had built up his section systematically and concentrated his main effort against SOVIET RUSSIA. An organization for the collection of intelligence was created, which went far beyond the customary scope of Ant VI. All conceivable methods were employed to obtain information about the SOVIET UNION. A whole special organization was created which was to achieve these ends through the interrogation of PW and the employment of renegade Russians (Unternehmen Zeppelin). Led by SS Obersturmbannführer Dr ROSENER, an able and well-trained officer, this operation achieved very good results.

Not content to leave a good thing alone, GRAEFE changed the organization and leadership of Zeppelin constantly, so that finally it had only a fraction of its previous value.

The methodical work of GRAEFE, the long period of training of certain Russians employed by him, and their familiarity with radio operations really paid dividends. A number of successful parachute operations ensued, especially concentrated in the CAUCASUS. It is believed that radio connection with some of these agents continued until the end.

The Leiter of the Russia Referat, Dr HENGEHAUPT, was an exceedingly quiet and dispassionate man with a scientific turn of mind. He was indubitably the right man for work which had to be planned well in advance and from a long-range point of view. He possessed very good information about the USSR and had given his superiors an unadorned and - for GERMANY - unfavorable picture of the situation from the very beginning.

He was not listened to, of course, and HITLER even transferred him once, as punishment for his constant admonitions and destruction of the political leader's fond illusions. It is to be assumed that during the last months of the war the work of the Russia Referat was further intensified.

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(b) TURKEY

A similarly successful Referat had been established in TURKEY by the Referent, SS Sturmbannfuhrer SCHUBACK. He was assisted by two extremely able intelligence operatives, SS Sturmbannfuhrer BOYZISCH at ANKARA and SS Sturmbannfuhrer WOLF at ISTANBUL. Both had been camouflaged as members of the German diplomatic missions. They had succeeded in establishing an intelligence net which continued in operation even after GERMANY had been forced to withdraw all official connection from TURKEY.

(c) Near East

The Near East never proved to be quite as fertile for German intelligence operations. During 1944 a lot of work was lavished on that sector without achieving commensurate results. The main source of information was a Levantine agent with an extensive organization under his control.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No. 14

6. Art VI (Continued)

To show the state of affairs in the section the following example is indicative: VI D tried for five years to establish an intelligence net in EIRE, in order to use that country as a base for operations against the UK proper. The establishment of this EIRE net was never completed and VI D never had a single wireless connection with ENGLAND or with the UNITED STATES.

(b) SOUTH AMERICA

The picture looked slightly rosier in SOUTH AMERICA. Using SPAIN and PORTUGAL as relay bases, certain rather good connections could be established. The political developments in the countries of SOUTH AMERICA progressively weakened these contacts, however. Similar development ensued in SWEDEN. The government expelled all known German agents (that included operatives of both the Abwehr and the SD).

One contact, probably the best of the lot, was not affected by this order, however. This connection had been established by SCHELENDORF personally and was through a Swedish newspaper publisher, who at the same time was owner of a shipping line. The newspaper was supported financially by both the SD and the Foreign Office.

(5) Gruppe VI E (Southeast EUROPE)

(a) General

As the oldest Gruppe in Art VI, the section dealing with the countries of Southeastern EUROPE was in possession of a rather efficient intelligence net. These connections could be kept alive, at least partially, even after the Russian occupation of these countries.

Of prime importance in this context was the collaboration between the SD and the conservative and reactionary parties in these countries. Especially after occupation, when these parties were forced to go underground, this collaboration became very intimate and effective.

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(b) Post-hostilities Status

The men responsible for the intelligence connections, which in certain countries include ties with personalities in or near the governing circle were usually the Hauptvertragsleute in the various nations. Several of the intelligence nets, left behind after the German withdrawal, did not succeed in re-establishing radio communications with the central office. The net in BULGARIA, for instance, though still in existence, was no longer in contact with the communications control of VI E.

In other countries as well, only parts of the intelligence net were controlled by the local radio outlet, towards the end. The remainder had to continue operations without either receiving directions or being able to transmit findings and results.

(c) WANECK

The Leiter of Gruppe VI E, SS Obersturmbannführer WANECK, played a disproportionately important role within unit VI. This was not so much due to his ability as it was to his close connections with Dr KALTENBUNNER. SCHELLENBERG was afraid of WANECK's influence, especially since the latter had been able to put something over on him on several occasions.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

WEIRAUCH's most valuable collaborator was the former director of the propaganda office of the State Railway at TOKYO (Leiter der Reichsbahnwerbezentrale TOKIO), SS Obersturmfuehrer LEO. LEO was one of the foremost experts on Japanese affairs in GERMANY, perhaps even in EUROPE. He had studied in JAPAN for many years and had received his doctor's degree there, a rare achievement.

WEIRAUCH and LEO always followed a strongly anti-Japanese course. This inclination could also be detected from their reports. A number of memoranda submitted to the highest echelons of the government clearly expressed these leanings and warned the government not to have any illusions about the altruism of their allies.

These reports seem to have had a certain measure of success but caused the displeasure of HIMMLER.

WEIRAUCH and LEO's forte was not so much strict intelligence as it was thorough knowledge of JAPAN and all phases of Japanese life. During the last few months KALTENBRUNNER attempted to put the JAPAN Referat in direct contact with officials of the Japanese embassy. To further this end several meetings were held with both KALTENBRUNNER and OSHIDA in attendance.

(f) RAPP and Mil C

GRAEFE's successor as Leiter of VI C was SS Obersturmbannfuhrer RAPP. Contrary to usual practice he was not put in charge of Abteilung Mil C, since the area of activity of this section did not correspond to that of VI C (Mil C included beside the USSR, the Near East, and the Far East, also South Eastern EUROPE and the Scandinavian countries).

RAPP, who was very ambitious without having any special qualifications, (he was formerly Leitabschnittsfuehrer MUECHLER) attempted to gain control over these areas as well. He was stopped short, however, by the determined opposition of SS Obersturmbannfuhrer WANECK (now in Allied hands), the Gruppenleiter of VI E.

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(4) Gruppe VI D (West)

(a) General

This sub-section was by far the weakest link in Amt VI. Its sphere of operation included ENGLAND and the British Empire as well as the Scandinavian Countries and the Americas. The personnel employed in the Gruppe was mediocre at best. The position of Leiter VI D was held for the first few years by SS Obersturmbannführer DAUFELDT. He was a playboy, whose only qualification for the job consisted of his good knowledge of the English language.

Successes in the two main fields - ENGLAND and the US - were non-existent under DAUFELDT. Not much improvement was noted after SS Obersturmbannführer Dr PAEFFGEN had been appointed as DAUFELDT's successor. PAEFFGEN's qualifications were, if that is possible, even poorer than those of his predecessor.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Lat VI (Continued)

The radio section of VI F had always been its greatest concern. Especially during the war it became increasingly more difficult to obtain the proper personnel and material for an efficient operation of these services. The first Gruppenleiter VI F, SS Sturmbannführer RAJICKS (later courtmartialed by HEYDRICH), had laid the foundation for an extensive wireless section.

With the great development of the foreign intelligence service the existing installation soon became insufficient and a new and enlarged system of radio transmitting and receiving stations had to be established.

(b) The HAVELINSTITUT

The first step was the creation of the HAVEL INSTITUT, under the direction of SS Sturmbannführer SIEPEL. Later the installations were enlarged even further. Before the collapse the following high-power transmitters, exclusively for intelligence broadcasts, were in operation:

Central Transmitter WANNSEE  
KIRCHSASSEN  
MARLENBAD (MARLANSKE LAZNE)  
GDYNIA  
BABELSBERG  
RIGA - ASSERN  
OSWITZ  
HICKERSBERG  
BALBERG  
KAHLENBERG

Each one of these transmitters was equipped with the latest improvements and could signal on as many as 20 channels simultaneously. Nevertheless this number was still not sufficient. Through the assistance of numerous agents by parachute, new radio nets had to be established almost daily.

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(c) New Developments

The Institut was not only concerned with these high-power transmitters. Its construction section (Bauteilung) manufactured radio sets for agents and produced these sets on an assembly line basis. Research was one of the section's prime concerns.

VI F had some of the top experts in the field of communications at its disposal. Certain inventions had been made, especially during the last few months which were really remarkable. In addition for the small (agent's) transmitter had been developed which permitted the transmission of whole pages of text within the space of only a few seconds. This would have revolutionized the whole field of agent's transmissions.

Another apparatus was an automatic scribbler and descrambler for secret transmissions. Great steps forward had been made in voice transmitter and receiver sets as well. (a new set was developed of great value for the commitment of agents in rugged terrain, mountains etc). With the aid of the new set (range up to 50 km) airplanes could remain in touch with agents dropped over and hiding in this type of terrain. Also the establishment of contact with these agents and the exact location of their position was vastly facilitated.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

WANECK was one of the oldest members of the foreign intelligence service, but had no practical experience whatsoever. His activities were limited to executive desk work.

(d) ITALY

Until the end of 1944 the ITALY Referat, including the subsection dealing with the VATICAN, also belonged to Gruppe VI E. (These sub-sections were separated from VI E. when this office moved to WFM, and were then attached to VI B). Work in ITALY, in spite of great advantages, was handicapped for a very long time because it had to work in an underground fashion.

As has already been mentioned, a strict order by HITLER prohibited all intelligence activities in ITALY. Nevertheless after MUSSOLINI's overthrow several good sources of information were established in ROME. They were of no political consequence, however, since the reports received were completely anti-fascist and opposed MUSSOLINI's reconstitution.

This stand, of course, was counter to the official German policy and did not meet with approval in the eyes of the high. Excellent work was done by the former Hauptvertrauensmann of ITALY, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer iR GROEBL (later killed by partisans), and by the police attache with the Embassy in ROME, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer KATTEME.

After the loss of ROME the main effort of intelligence activities was transferred to the North. In this process these activities came under the control of the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in ITALIEN, SS Gruppenfuehrer Dr HARSTER. One of the greatest career men in the SS, HARSTER jealously guarded his rights and powers. But even during this period reports from ITALY were usually rather objective and exposed some illusions.

The time given for the establishment of an intelligence net to the VATICAN was too short to achieve telling results. An added disadvantage was the arrest of SS Obersturmbannfuehrer ELLING by the Americans. He had been slated to become the SD Vertrauensmann at the VATICAN.

In its political ideas the VATICAN Referat represented the opinions voiced by the German Ambassador von WEIZSACKER, i e, sharply opposed to those of the Foreign Office and of HIMMLER and HITLER.

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(6) Gruppe VI F

This Gruppe was entrusted with the provision of all technical prerequisites for all other sections of the Amt and was consequently of great importance. Its organization reflects its purely technical nature.

(a) Radio Sections

Referate VI F 1 and VI F 2 were both concerned with the radio receiving and transmitting stations serving the Amt. The former was charged with the operation of these installations, while the latter was entrusted with their construction and research in the field of wireless transmission. They jointly controlled the so-called HAVELINSTITUT, designated VI F (II).

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

(7) Gruppe VI G

(a) Purpose and Commander

Gruppe VI G was one of the most recent innovations in Ant VI. It bore the title of the Scientific Methodical Research Service (wissenschaftlich methodischer Forschungsdienst). Under this imposing title the section attempted to enlist German scientific research for intelligence purposes.

The man who was called upon to head the new section was a young Viennese scientist, SS Sturmabfuhrer Dr KRALLERT. He brought with him the highest qualifications for the position. As far as background and ability are concerned, KRALLERT indeed held a unique position in Ant VI and the whole RSHA.

In spite of the novel field and the relatively short time at his disposal, KRALLERT succeeded in achieving amazing results. His first job was the coordination of the maze of frequently conflicting research institutes and stations. Towards the end he had achieved complete control.

Simultaneously the SD had founded certain research agencies of its own, such as the already-mentioned Institut fuer Ostasien und Japan, the Forschungsdienst Ost (see Institut under Dr SCHNEIDER), another research section for the Near East, one for the Balkans, etc. All these research services were placed at KRALLERT's disposal.

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INCOMING

**SECURITY**

171205  
170930  
171300

**SECRET**

098

17 July 1945

TO: SPEARHEAD AMXON  
FROM: SCARF THIRD ARMY

*G-2*

Your 423 refers

- A. Think can brief EBETZ here but copy CHERUB's report written WIESBACHEN be most helpful. Send with body.
- B. Wednesday arrival FREISING okay.
- C. FELIX house part of quiz center FREISING where special cases housed. Lt. FLEX must be contacted before EBETZ delivered there. Phone Monster 583 ask for FLEX.
- D. What disposition planned for EBETZ after present exploitation?

(423 is OSS OUT 2479)

*882*

038 2074

SAINT  
EXEC

DECLASSIFIED  
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act  
PL105-246

**SECRET** 00048

By: SLH Date: 4/18/2001

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

NWC-00179

CONFIDENTIAL

27 July 1954

REGION IV, 66th CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY FILE: D-198538; IV-34193

HARTMANN, Wolfgang (Wolf) Justin, Jr.

from the winter semester of 1919 until the winter semester of 1920/1921. On 22 April 1921, his name was removed from the student roster of the University of MUNICH.

SOURCE: "E"

EVALUATION: 3-2

- 2. Ludwig KRAMER, house manager of Daimlerstrasse 5, MUNICH, stated that he has known HARTMANN for the last 20 years. HARTMANN lived with his mother and sister, Stasi, at this address. His mother died during the war and his sister in 1951. HARTMANN now resides at the same address with a housekeeper. HARTMANN writes plays and novels and soldes for a newspaper. His associates are very limited. He seldom is away from his home in the evening. He is not known to be active politically. He is often out of MUNICH during the daytime in clear weather. He is a great lover of nature. In addition, weather permitting, HARTMANN travels to the Bavarian mountains for the day. Visitors at HARTMANN's residence are seldom. He associates with a few old friends and lives a very reticent life.

SOURCE: "F"

EVALUATION: B-3

- 3. SUBJECT and his sister, Stasi, now deceased, travelled throughout the world between World War I and World War II. Stasi spoke many languages and was considered a person of exceptional intelligence.

SOURCE: "F"

EVALUATION: B-2

- 4. Since December 1952, no continuous association between SUBJECT and personalities of the Institut fuer Gegenwartsforschung (Institute for Current Research -- IFC) have been observed. SUBJECT's address has not been used for a mailing address of the IFC. No political activity by SUBJECT has been noted.

SOURCE: "G"

EVALUATION: B-2

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PL105-246

By: SLH Date: 4/16/2001

-2-

4 - Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
1 - Central File

1 - Reg IV, File

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HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

15582

S: 23 July 1954  
10 JUN 1954

9-158538

SUBJECT: HARTMANN, Wolfgang (Wolf) Justin Dr

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region IV, 66th CIC Group  
APO 108, US Army

1. It is desired that a discreet investigation be conducted on Dr Wolfgang (Wolf) Justin HARTMANN, born on 22 October 1894 in MARKREUTH am Main, residing at MÜNCHEN 13, Daimlerstrasse 5. A member of the BRANK Office, SUBJECT is associated with the Institut fuer Gegenwartsforschung.

2. During World War I, HARTMANN performed army service in Turkey. Following the war SUBJECT was a prisoner of war in Egypt, and subsequently lived in Argentina for several years. During World War II HARTMANN served in the Brandenburg Division. The commanding officer of a Stabskompanie in August 1940, SUBJECT became commanding officer of 2 Kompanie II Battalion, Lehrregiment Brandenburg in February 1941. HARTMANN was wounded in the hand while serving with 2 Kompanie in Russia in the summer of 1941. In late 1941 SUBJECT was commanding officer of 3 Kompanie II Battalion Lehrregiment Brandenburg at LUDOV. In January 1943 HARTMANN was a member of z.b.V 800 of the Brandenburg Division. SUBJECT allegedly attained the rank of Major.

3. In October 1952 HARTMANN reportedly acted as a letter drop for Gerhard WACHS, Paul GROSS, (Dr Willi HORN), Sergei FROLOV or the Institut fuer Gegenwartsforschung. In view of this, technical coverage on SUBJECT was instituted. In December 1952 a member of the BRANK Office, HARTMANN kept in contact with Gerhard WACHS and Hermann WILHELM from the Institut fuer Gegenwartsforschung in WIESBADEN. In February 1953 SUBJECT was described as a writer opposed to the remilitarization of Eastern Germany, and, as such, a personality of interest to the Verlag der Nation, official publishing house of the NKP. HARTMANN may have been considered a possible sympathizer by the NKP.

4. A sister of HARTMANN by the name of Stasi HARTMANN resided in 1943 at MÜNCHEN 13, Daimlerstrasse 5.

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R

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D-158538

Subject: HARTMANN, Wolfgang (Wolf) Justin Dr

5. Of particular interest is information concerning HARTMANN's personal data, military and intelligence experience, employment record, political affiliations, and Soviet Zone connections (residence, travels, relatives, political, social, or business).

6. Your report should reach this headquarters prior to 23 July 1954.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LEROY,

ANDREW H. HAVRE  
Capt, AGC  
Adjutant

AMU/ank/Stgt 9342-7392

M/R: Self-explanatory.

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TO BE FORWARDED TO THE  
ADJUTANT GENERAL  
1 JUL 1954

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*P.C.*

JPRS: 3831

6 September 1950

ADOLPH EICHMANN, NAZI LEADER AND ISRAELI PRISONER

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## FOREWORD

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Following is a translation of two articles on Adolph Eichmann published in three issues of the German-language periodical Stern (Star), Hamburg. Date of issue, pages, and authors are given under individual article headings. Photograph captions are appended.<sup>7</sup>

### ADOLPH EICHMANN

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Robert Pendorf

Ever since Adolf Eichmann was arrested by an Israeli commando squad in Buenos Aires on 11 May, the press has been circulating the most contradictory stories about this arrest action and about Eichmann's underground existence since 1945. The scene of these wild tales is sometimes set in Damascus and Kuwait, though it has been proved that Eichmann was never there; other reports seem to create the impression that they issued directly from the interrogation center near Tel Aviv, which so far no one except Commander Selinger, the Israeli chief investigator, has been able to enter. German news magazines and dailies let their special correspondents feed them the most incredible details, ranging from Eichmann's abduction from Syria, where he was supposed to have dealt in arms, to the adventurous description of the chase which the Israeli agents staged to catch the murderer of their people during the last 15 years. On 23 May, Israel's Prime Minister Ben Gurion announced that Eichmann had been apprehended. On the same day Israeli Minister of Justice Rosen declared that the time, place, and circumstances of his arrest were top secret and would never be announced. But on the very next morning, our Stern reporter discovered in Buenos Aires the trail of the man who had called himself Ricardo Klement and who in reality was Adolf Eichmann. The cover name and the first three photos of camera-shy Eichmann reached the world press through Stern magazine. It was Stern reporters who succeeded in finding Eichmann's personal notes and the photo album of the Eichmann family; the family had vanished in the meantime. Thus, Stern magazine is the only publication in the world which can tell the complete postwar story of the man whom American Justice Jackson called "the darkest figure of this century" at the Nuremberg trials.

The occupants of the "island" were all employed as lumber jacks by the firm of Burmann and Co. -- all except a Red Cross nurse by the name of Ruth, who cooked for the men and took care of them. Eichmann, alias Heninger, shared a room with Eduard Tramer, who is a post office employee today.

Here is what Tramer told our Stern reporter Wiedemann. "I shared a room with Otto Heninger. He was what you might call a "good buddy." The thing we like particularly about him was his great sense of justice. He always took great pains to make sure that the food portions were divided in a fair fashion. He never joined us in our evening card games. He seemed to be more intelligent than the rest of the fellows who stayed at the 'island.' I remember that he talked with a slight Austrian twang."

Eduard Tramer further stated that Heninger always wore an old, converted Wehrmacht uniform and an old, green hunter's net. According to Tramer, he lived a more retiring life than the others; he was close-mouthed and rather reticent in his conversations -- a sort of lone wolf.

A short time before the currency reform, Eichmann-Heninger's employer, the firm of Burmann and Co., went bankrupt. What was left was taken over by another lumber firm by the name of Braun, which however likewise did not weather the currency reform for long. The lumber jacks were out in the cold.

Eichmann took a room in the home of war widow Anna Lindhorst in Altensalzkoth, leased a patch of grass behind her house, and began to set up a small chicken farm there. Says Mrs. Lindhorst, reminiscing: "He built the coops himself. He was a very handy man."

He paid his rent for the room and the land punctually; he lived a good life; the occasional visits by an elegant, platinum-blond lady were so handled that neither Mrs. Lindhorst, nor innkeeper Helms, where the blond was staying, got the impression that she was Heninger-Eichmann's mistress. Nelly Krawietz was her name -- and the facts about her could be found out only in Baltimore, USA, for that is where she was from.

Nelly Kuhn, the widow Krawietz, nee Bauer, from Frien on Lake Chiem, was the first person with whom Eichmann came into contact after his escape from the camp at Oberdachsletten. Eichmann's companion on this escape was the Waffen-SS Sergeant Kurt Bauer, Nelly's brother; it was he who told Eichmann to look up his sister in Frien.

Nelly was a widow -- her husband had been killed in action -- and she found the escapee rather nice. She found a place for him in one of the farm homes there, but the many American military police in Frien were on Eichmann's nerves after a few days:

he told Nelly that his name was Eichmann, that he was involved in the persecution of the Jews, and that he would like to go to North Germany. He told her he had a contact there.

Nelly did not know where to place this name "Eichmann." He told her nothing. Obediently, she bought a train ticket for him, accompanied him to Hamburg, and then they went their separate ways.

Eichmann went to Eversen and registered as Otto Heninger at the local town hall.

The people in Prison say that Nelly thereafter devoted her time to attractive Americans, but her soft spot for Heninger-Eichmann drew her away and she went north, to Luensburg Heath. Says Nelly today: "I was alone, and he was alone...I always brought him something to eat, too."

In 1930, she received a letter from Eichmann. Content: thanks for your help; I am going to the Soviet Zone to give myself up to the Russians. They will either use me in their setup or they will execute me. At any rate, I am dead to the rest of the world. And here is a sentence Nelly remembers word for word: "If you do not hear from me within 4 weeks, you can make the sign of the cross over my name."

Nelly heard no more from Eichmann. In 1953, she went to America and married delicatessen store owner George Kuehn in Baltimore. She is widowed once more and still lives in Baltimore, where she told Stein reporter Kolarz about her adventure with Eichmann.

The meaning of Eichmann-Heninger's last letter is quite clear: he was ready to go overseas and was trying to wipe out his traces.

But to Mrs. Linchorst -- in whose altensalzkoth home he lived until the spring of 1950 -- he told an entirely different tale one night. He said he was getting ready to leave shortly for Norway or Sweden, where he hoped to work in his trade -- electric machine-building. The chickens were supposed to be picked up by Mr. Friersleber -- which actually happened later on.

And then Otto Heninger, alias Adolf Eichmann was suddenly gone. He was on his way to Argentina and the little village community forgot him. Nobody ever asked for him -- not while he was there, nor after he had left. Nobody had ever looked for him at Eversen, on the edge of Luensburg Heath; nor did anybody look for him later on in Argentina.

He was one of the principal war criminals; as such, he was carried on many black lists; still, his family could for years live with him under his own name.

Why?

Why -- for decades -- did apparently no government agency, no secret service systematically try to catch and bring in

justice a man like Adolf Eichmann who had been branded as murderer of European Jewry in dozens of books, brochures, articles, and document collections?

Perhaps because the death columns of European Jews were, to be sure, set in motion by Hitler and his helpers, but because in 1944 the laziness, shortsightedness, and lack of understanding of neutral, Allied, and even Jewish agencies even prolonged this death march? And because Eichmann knows more about this than many of the participants might want him to know?

Eichmann's "national socialist political attitude" was correctly described as "unconditional" in an efficiency rating of the SS. From 1932-1937, he worked his way up to officer in charge of the zionism desk of the SD /Sicherheitsdienst -- SS Security Service/ Main Office; in the process, he adopted his Fuehrer's dictum "The Jews are our misfortune" as a sort of irrevocable basic truth.

In view of this "realization," it irked the young, ambitious SD desk officer that the highly desirable emigration of the Jews was being hampered by all kinds of red tape.

Eichmann made it his mission to remedy this paradoxical situation. He suggested the creation of a "Central Agency for Jewish Emigration" whose direction he took over and in which all agencies were represented whose stamps, permits, and papers a Jew needed in order to leave the German Reich.

The first scene of action of this central agency was Vienna, where Eichmann set up a production-line ticket-window system, which reduced the previously endless paper shuffling to a few days. There it had taken a Jew months to get an exit permit, he could now get it in a very short time.

During these years, Eichmann was the very model of a correct, diligent official; he dealt with his Jewish customers in an aloof but polite manner; of course, in the excitement of day-to-day business, he once slapped Dr. Loewenherz, chairman of the Vienna Jewish cultural community; but when he slapped him another time in the presence of his subordinates, he immediately apologized. Besides, the personnel of his bureau consisted mostly of Viennese who, true to their easy-going nature, were quite peaceful most of the time.

#### Deportation to Freedom

Eichmann worked things the same way later on in Prague; there too his goal was to expedite as many Jews abroad as possible; but the methods of course had become a little rougher by that time.

The headquarters of the Central Agency of Jewish Emigration was housed in a requisitioned Jewish villa. The Jews were standing in long lines in its halls and rooms, for a

reason whatever, they were insulted, beaten, and pushed. They could go to their chief rabbi, who would take their complaints to Eichmann, but this did not do them any good.

And they were cleaned out thoroughly. At that time, the road to freedom began for the Jews with a detailed property listing, down to their last suit of clothes. Their cash was transferred to blocked accounts in one of the two German banks operating in Prague; their real estate and other property were confiscated.

In the meantime, the Gestapo would be studying the passport of the emigration-ready Jew. If it found the slightest hint in the passport that the exit permit applicant had concealed an account abroad -- a trip to Switzerland for instance sufficed to create such a suspicion -- the particular Jew was clapped in jail and mistreated until he reported all his foreign bank accounts and ordered his banks abroad to transfer the money to Germany.

Eichmann left this job to the Gestapo. He himself was always dressed elegantly and wore civilian clothing most of the time; he moved about in Czech society and negotiated with the bank representatives about the evaluation of the Jewish real estate holdings; the amount of the contributions depended on these holdings; or he forced rich Jews to finance the emigration of poor relatives and to handle the contributions for the latter.

Once a Jew had run through this mill, there were movers and shipping companies waiting to charge him a stiff price, for at that time emigrating Jews could still take furniture with them.

As a result, most of the Jews were at the end cleaned out, except for a few personal things and some pocket money. And that is also why they were nowhere welcome.

This was the beginning of a deadly misunderstanding and failure. Outside Germany, people did not comprehend the fear and misery of the Jews in Hitler's Reich. The entry visas were hoarded out very sparingly; the issue of such a visa was made contingent upon a so-called "ready cash fund" [security] because the European countries did not want to admit people who would later on become a financial burden to the government.

Only Argentina and Chile were somewhat magnanimous in those days. The US and Canada were somewhat less open-hearted; but the European countries did not see what was about to happen.

Probably no more than 50,000 Jews found the road to safety through Eichmann's Central Emigration Agency in Vienna. Hundreds of thousands did not get any visas and were left to wait for a hideous fate.

Eichmann saw that his emigration business did not have much of a chance of ridding the Reich of the Jews. He began to think about a different solution. He is one of the inventors of the abstruse plan of making the island of Madagascar a reservation for Jews. The men in the "Reich Security Main Office" discussed this brainstorm for months; finally the man charged with devising the "final solution" realized that there was very little chance of their ever getting Madagascar for this purpose.

But Eichmann stuck to the idea of a "Jewish reservation" and he finally got one -- a place called Theresienstadt. This town on the Eger River actually became a miniature Jewish state. Hermetically sealed off from the outside world, it had its own government, its own police, its own currency and stamps; 20,000 Jews lived there like on an island, until well into the war, under relatively bearable conditions. Of course, they were not always the same Jews; new ones came and the others left -- to go to the Auschwitz gas chambers.

Finally, Eichmann hit on the idea of moving them from the "German sphere of influence" to Polish Galicia. But here he ran into the determined resistance of "Governor General" Kari Frank, who was busy de-Jewing the conquered Polish territories. Frank forbade Eichmann to enter the Government General.

The founding of the Jewish reservation at Theresienstadt was the last act in the history of the final solution which was not yet aimed at the systematic physical annihilation of the Jews.

Then began the organized mass murder. In Argentina, a dozen years later, Eichmann had this to say on the subject: it was indeed horrible, but it was necessary; after all, the Fuehrer had ordered it. And he, Eichmann, anyway had nothing to do with their annihilation; he was not a destroyer; he was just riding herd on the Jews and corralling them; he did no more than any Allied transportation officer whose job it was to move bombs to airfields and who never knew whether these bombs would hit bridges and soldiers or women and children.

Who is this Eichmann, who figured out these formalistic excuses for himself?

Is he a blood-thirsty boist, a perverted mass murderer like Hamann or a slayer like Pleil? Is he a Nero whose power was his downfall, to whom human lives meant nothing if they stood in the way of his ambitious plans?

Did he personally hate the Jews whom he turned over to the gas chambers by the hundreds of thousands?

Beast or "Good Buddy?"

No, that is not the kind of man Eichmann is.

Today, temporary post office employee Eduard Tramer, with whom Eichmann worked together in the forest under the assumed name of Otto Heninger, calls him a "good buddy." Tramer's wife Ruth still cannot grasp the fact that her wedding guest Otto Heninger is supposed to be a "murderer."

"He was always so quiet and reticent," she tells us. "He was really romantic." And then she recounts how Heninger-Eichmann used to love to take long walks in the woods and how he used to play the violin in front of the barracks in the evening. He played classical music -- Schubert and Beethoven. And she told how Eichmann drew back when another Red Cross nurse by the name of Eva used to listen to him play the violin every night; but that was only a pretext, supposedly, for this girl was really "trying to pick him up." "My wife and kids are still in Czechoslovakia. I'd have to be a real heel to betray my wife like this." That is what Eichmann allegedly replied when Ruth asked him whether he was really not at all interested in Eva.

Widow Anna Lindhorst in Altensalzkoth, Landkreis Celle, in whose home Heninger-Eichmann lived until 1950, today says the same thing the Argentine Jew Francisco Schmidt says. Eichmann lived in Schmidt's home in Olivos from 1954 until 2 months prior to his abduction. Both maintain that he was a correct, punctual payer, and a pleasant roomer.

And Klaus Eichmann, his oldest son, a few days ago wrote an open letter to his father who is being held captive in Israel. In it he said: "I cannot accept the accusations against you. But even if they were true, you will always be my father, and I will always be your eldest son. I will never desert you."

Who then in this Adolf Eichmann, whom some people call the "darkest figure of this century," while others say that he was a good buddy, a romantic at heart, a faithful husband, a loving father, and a punctually paying, pleasant roomer?

We get some indication from the talks Mercedes employer Ricardo Klement had in Buenos Aires with the few intimates who knew about his past as Adolf Eichmann.

"I harbor no personal hatred for individual Jews," he said. "I always treated the Jews I met in an entirely correct fashion, based on respect -- of course, only in line of duty."

And then he told about his visit to Palestine. "In the fall of 1937, I stood on Mt. Carmel and looked down on the oil tanks of Haifa and the land of Palestine. Now, I am an idealist myself, and I was highly impressed by what I saw at that time in the way of Jewish construction and tenacious will to live."

He harbored no personal hatred; his relations with the men who were struggling with him for the lives of their coreligionists he termed "correct" -- "of course only in line of duty." And he speaks of his "idealism." Once he told someone "We fought with open visors." And when the man wanted to know the meaning of correct attitude and open visor in a situation where he (Eichmann) was facing defenseless people, while himself holding unlimited power -- people who were destined for a horrid death -- Eichmann replied quite excitedly: "But I had nothing to do with that part of it. The dirty work was done by the SS Management and Administration Bureau. We did not fight with daggers and poison; we fought with intellectual weapons." And when you ask him about the type of intellectual weapon he used, Eichmann gets lost in the same old race philosophy; he tells the old waves' tale about the "Wise Man of Zion" who allegedly rule the world, and finally he says: "Well, anyway, it was not for me to ask any questions. I had taken an oath on the flag and I had to obey. The political leadership of the Reich had ordered the final solution of the Jewish problem and I was entrusted with its implementation. I was a soldier and I had to obey. Do you understand that?"

This is the schizophrenia of this man. Reading his notes and listening to reports about the conversations he had with others, we can believe him when he asserts that he is still convinced that his mission was necessary and that he behaved correctly. He is a conscientious, painstaking bureaucrat -- though a murderer bureaucrat.

Eichmann knew exactly what was happening to the people he was "coralling." A few months after the start of the campaign in Russia, Gestapo Chief, SS Group Commander Heinrich Müller sent him to Minsk to take a look at the methods with which the "Jewish problem was being solved" there.

Here is Eichmann's report on his trip. "It was a very cold and rather cloudy day when I arrived at the place where the action detachment had chosen. I was freezing, though I wore a leather coat that reached down to my ankles. There was a big ditch running across the field. It looked like an antitank ditch to me; I stepped up closer and saw that about half of the ditch was filled with corpses -- naked corpses of men, women, old people, and children. Then another bunch of Jews was marched over. There were about 150 of them. In all this cold weather, they had to strip down to nothing and they had to step on the corpses in the ditch. Everything went on amid weird silence. Nobody complained, nobody cried.

"At the last moment, when the execution squad was cocking its submachine guns, I noticed how a Jewish woman grabbed a child -- about one or 2 years old -- and took it into her arms;



she turned around as though she wanted to shield the child. I felt like jumping down and saving the child, but I was too late. The bullets were whistling all over the place; the child was hit in the head and its brain splattered on my coat.

"I had my driver take me back to my billet and we removed the blood and brain stains. I realized quite clearly that this was an inhuman solution and I went to Berlin immediately in order to report to Mueller what I had seen and to ask him whether we could not find a more humane method.

"Mueller listened to my report and then he gave me a long look; I did not know whether he pitied me for my weakness or whether he despised me for it."

A few months later, a "more humane" method was found; once again Mueller thought it necessary to let Eichmann take a look at this method. He sent him to Lublin, where buses were being used for the extermination of the Jews; the exhaust gases of the engines were piped into the interior of the bus; as Mueller put it, "the whole thing is over and done with in 3 minutes."

Eichmann went to Lublin and found that Mueller's information was incorrect. Eichmann was shown a bus into which about 80-100 Jews had been squeezed. The door was closed and the driver asked Eichmann to join him in the cab, and off they went. After a few minutes, the people inside began to scream. The driver suggested Eichmann take a look inside through the peephole in the rear wall of the driver's cab. There was a light burning inside the bus, where the Jews were fighting a life and death struggle. They had been under way for 5 minutes but the noise inside the bus was still going on.

"Why don't take a peek inside," said the driver to Eichmann.

But Eichmann could not. He was simply scared. He tried to force himself but just as he turned, he saw a hand clawing at the window; then he asked the driver to stop because he wanted to get out. "Take it easy, we'll get this done in a jiffy," said the driver. They made a U-turn on the wide highway and drove back to camp. It took a full 15 minutes until all was quiet in the bus.

Eichmann did not even wait until all the corpses had been hauled out of the bus. He dashed to his car and immediately returned to Berlin. Once again he reported to Mueller and once again he asked him that an effort be made to devise a method which "would not expose the participants to such tremendous psychological strain."

The participants -- of course Eichmann did not mean the Jews, who were being tortured to death in this manner; he meant the drivers and the SS personnel -- in other words, the murderers.

Stern magazine did not invent this description and it did not take it from any eye witness reports that have been published so far; this is all taken from Adolf Eichmann's personal notes and from the verbal repetition of talks Eichmann had with friends in Argentina.

When Eichmann reported to Mueller for the second time and again asked for a "more humane" method, Mueller -- as Eichmann told his friends -- "once again gave me that long, I might say fatherly look; with this enigmatic fellow, I never knew what this look really meant. Perhaps I should have been ashamed for having been so soft -- for, after all, this was a problem whose solution was vital as far as Germany was concerned. After all, the Jews had declared war on us through Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann."

Nothing describes the real personality of the then SS Major Eichmann better than these two incidents, told by himself. One is really reluctant to make any comment at all on this.

And though we can hear Eichmann's shaky voice on tape as he keeps emphasizing that he was no destroyer, that he had only rounded up the Jews, it is clear that Eichmann knew exactly what was happening to the shipments which always ended up at the concentration camp railroad stations at Auschwitz, Majdanek, or Treblinka.

In the meantime, a chief clerk from the "Office of the Fuehrer" by the name of Viktor Brack had found the method which -- according to a document of 25 October 1941 now in our hands -- was approved by SS Lieutenant Colonel Eichmann, desk officer for Jewish Problems in the Reich Security Main Office: annihilation of the Jews in the gas chambers.

No one can contradict Adolf Eichmann, the correct bookkeeper of death, when he says today: "What happened to the Jews after I had rounded them up was really none of my business." But here is the catch: only those could be gassed who had been "rounded up" by Eichmann. The gas chamber was only the last stop; and the engineer of the train going there was named Adolf Eichmann.

We have a whole series of eye witnesses who can tell us about what really happened in the extermination camps.  
Last Stop: Auschwitz

In his scientific report on the "final solution," the British historian Gerald Reitlinger describes operations at the Auschwitz death factory, whose four gassing installations with corpse elevators leading to the cremation ovens were "fully operational" in May 1944.

The gas chambers were camouflaged as shower rooms and were located underground; they were covered with well-manicured lawns dotted with mushroom-shaped cement statues. These figures had openings through which the SS medical sergeants, after unscrewing the lids, dropped Zyklon B in the form of amethyst-blue crystals; the latter dropped through a metal shaft into an acid container in the gas cellar, so that lethal gases were generated.

Here is Reitlinger's report, based on eyewitness accounts. "The gas slowly poured through the holes in the insertion shafts. Most of the time, the victims were jammed together much too tightly to notice this right away; but in some cases, there were so few of them in the room that they would sit on the floor; this gave them a chance to get a look at the showers, out of which there was no water coming, and at the floor, which oddly enough did not have any water drainage channels. Then they noticed the gas and in wild panic they would press away from the lethal columns and throw themselves at the huge iron gate with the little window, where they piled up into a single, blue, sticky, blood-soaked pyramid, clawed and knotted into each other in death."

"Twenty-five minutes later, the electric suction pumps removed the gas-saturated air; the big iron gate was opened, and the men of the Jewish special squads entered; they wore gas masks and rubber boots, and were equipped with water hoses. The first thing they had to do was to nose the blood and excrements away and to pull the knotted corpses apart with slings and hooks. This was the prelude to the gruesome search for gold and the removal of hair and dentures, which the Germans considered critical war materials. Then came the trip with the elevator or rail car to the ovens and the mill, which ground the cremation remnants into fine ash; then came the trucks which dumped the ashes into the river. This was the routine procedure in cases where a crematory had to handle only 200 or 300 victims; but in the summer of 1944, the death factory was not working so orderly. Let me quote Dr. Bendel's statement in Lueneburg.

"Now begins the real hell. The special squads try to work as fast as possible. In mad haste they pull the corpses by their wrists. They look like devils. Men who earlier had human faces are no longer recognizable. A lawyer from Salonika, an electrical engineer from Budapest -- they are no longer human beings. And during all this time, people are being shot in front of the graves -- people who could no longer be jammed into the gas chambers because they were overcrowded. The job is over after 1 1/2 hours and once again, crematory No 4 has finished off a shipment."

But the devilry did not consist only in the fact that Jews were being used for the hideous work in the gas chambers and crematories; these men were merely postponing their own execution by a few weeks.

This organized murder was accompanied by another, perhaps even more cruel tragedy whose consequences can still be seen today. Eichmann's roundup men regularly used the existing Jewish organizations to corral the Jews for death transports.

In Vienna and Prague, Eichmann had reestablished the Jewish organizations and institutions in order to have someone to deal with and give orders to. Now once again, Jewish councils and a Jewish police were set up in the ghettos of the Polish cities, these bodies were soon almost as dreaded as the SS. For they decided on who was to be deported to the extermination camps whenever the Germans demanded a shipment of people.

The Jewish councils delivered the goods; they were thus forced to become the tools of the SS extermination machine -- perhaps in the hope of being able to save a few people here and there, perhaps in an endeavor to win a period of grace for themselves. When they recognized too late what they had been misused for, most of these Jewish councils voluntarily went to the gas chambers. Few survived.

But the burning hatred of the surviving victims still follows these Jewish councils and policemen, far beyond their nameless graves.

And it is hatred which today stands between those who at the height of the extermination wave implored their own people on the other side of the front lines for help and those people who replied to them with a bookkeeper's arguments about proper accounting and so on -- completely misunderstanding the horrible things that were going on.

The most shocking document of this tragedy is the report on the end of the Hungarian Jews.

Hungary was an ally of Germany but it was not rabidly antisemitic. Of course, the younger Jewish men had been drafted for a sort of forced labor and under miserable conditions had to dig fortifications in the East; but the other Jews lived more or less unhindered lives, so that Hungary became a refuge for the Slovak Jews and the few Polish Jews who had escaped from the Polish ghettos; all of these people were threatened with deportation and gassing.

A Jewish aid and rescue committee handled the smuggling of people across the border and the lodging and care for refugees. With the help of German counterintelligence agents stationed in Budapest, this committee operated a well-organized border service to neutral countries, especially

to Istanbul, through which information was exchanged and money could be obtained for aid drives.

And then came 19 March 1944; the German army occupied Hungary and in its wake came Adolf Eichmann to organize the "final solution" in Hungary too. He found willing helpers in the Hungarian Arrow-Cross men -- the Hungarian fascists -- who had come to power in Hungary after the German occupation.

The rescue committee was used to negotiate with the Germans as a result of its contact with the helpful German counterintelligence men. The committee now decided to send two negotiators to the SS -- they were Dr. Reszoe Kastner and Joel Brand.

These two men first contacted Eichmann's right-hand man, SS Captain Dieter Wisliceny. They knew that Wisliceny had once before let 50,000 Slovak Jews go for 100,000 Dollars.

#### Human Slave Trade

They asked Wisliceny whether there was any chance to negotiate -- "on a business basis" -- for a cancellation of the order deporting Jews to Auschwitz. Wisliceny said yes and offered 100,000 Jews for emigration, but asked for 2 million Dollars -- 10% as downpayment in Hungarian Pengoe, which was 6.5 million Pengoe or Reichsmark.

Frantically the rescue committee tried to rustle up the sum. In the meantime, the Hungarian gendarmery was herding the Jews into ghettos all over Hungary. At one time, Kastner turned over 3 million Pengoe and another time he turned over 1 1/2 million Pengoe. He was assured that 600 Jews, for whom a ship had been made ready at Constantia, could emigrate to Israel.

And then Kastner and Joel Brand had to face Eichmann. The latter offered them a fantastic deal: one million Jews for 10,000 trucks, and few tons of tea and coffee.

Eichmann offered a million human lives from Hungary, Slovakia, and Germany -- wherever desirable. What Kastner and Brand did not know was that Eichmann could hardly drum up that many Jews at that time.

Eichmann further suggested that Brand go aboard to lay the groundwork for the barter. Eichmann declared that he would wait with his deportations -- but no more than 2 weeks.

A German courier plane brought Brand to Istanbul. Kastner and the committee in Budapest were anxiously waiting for news.

There was no news forthcoming.

In Istanbul, Joel Brand reported what was in store for the Hungarian Jews. But the representatives of the Jewish Agency, the Zionists, the orthodox, the Mepai -- they all were bickering among themselves; each group negotiated separately

with Brand and besmirched the other groups; they did not realize that every hour lost meant several hundred human lives snuffed out.

Brand did not even want trucks; he wanted primarily a guarantee, a written statement, which he could show as proof that negotiations are in progress; he wanted a chance to gain time to stop the extermination machinery, even if only for a few hours. He got nothing.

The Jewish organizations were unable to hide Brand, who did not have any Turkish visitor visa, even for one day; but in Budapest, right under the noses of the SS, they were hiding thousands.

They sent Brand on to Aleppo; they did not prevent the British from arresting him and holding him for months. Of course, Brand was well treated and was even invited to parties. On one of these occasions, he met Lord Moyne, British Minister of State for the Near East.

Brand implored him for help. And here is Lord Moyne's reply: "What on earth am I going to do with a million Jews? Where am I going to put them?" Lord Moyne paid for this remark with his life; he was murdered by Jewish terrorists in 1944.

After some months, Brand met Teddy Kolley, then as today a close aide of David Ben Gurion, Israel's prime minister today. But all he got from Kolley was sympathy.

In the meantime, Eichmann's 2-week deadline had run out. In Budapest, Kastner tried to calm Eichmann who was furious. The deportations began. At a hellish rate, quite without precedent in the history of Jewish extermination, the Jews were being shipped to Auschwitz from the ghettos in the provinces. The gas chambers were barely able to handle this influx and worked day and night.

The rescue committee in Budapest was sending cables to the Allies, asking that the rail centers, via which the transports were being routed, be bombed. Nothing was done.

Kastner was fighting for the 600 emigrants Wisliceny had allowed him. Eichmann let them go, in installments. He demanded lists of names.

That was an inhuman task. How do you pick 600 for survival out of 500,000? The committee despaired in the face of this life-and-death judgment role it was supposed to play. But without a list, Eichmann would not release anyone. And so, the committee drew up the lists.

The people were actually picked up in the provincial ghettos; they were selected at random. The SS drivers were bribed to bring more along.

Becher was furious. He did not come all the way to the Swiss border to listen to such lectures. Becher left. Kastner sent him telegrams which sounded hopeful; he implored Saly Mayer to give some sort of assurance in order to keep the negotiations going and to delay the deportations. After all, it would not be necessary to follow through on these guarantees.

Saly Mayer coolly rejected the suggestion. He was accustomed to keeping his promises and would therefore not agree to anything he could not deliver on.

Kastner told the Germans that the delay was caused by foreign currency difficulties and arranged for further negotiations at the border. Saly Mayer declared he had been authorized "not to say 'No' to the suggested deal." Well, then why don't you say yes, begged Kastner. Mayer maintained that he could not do that. Again, failure.

The same happened on the third try. Mayer offered Becher 15 million Swiss francs, but on a blocked account, to be collected after the end of the war. Becher knew that this meant nothing.

The deportations to Auschwitz, which had been suspended temporarily, now were resumed.

More than 500,000 Jews were living in Hungary when the final solution was begun there. A third of them survived the war, including several thousand who were saved by the rescue committee which -- in addition to its human slave trade with the SS -- managed to hide thousands, made Aryans out of thousands of others with the help of forged papers, and provided thousands more with forged passports of neutral powers for protection.

After the war, Kastner and Brand reported on their rescue work; they were convinced that it would have been possible to make a deal with Eichmann and Becher and that more people could have been saved; their reports are laced with bitter accusations against those who were sitting snug and safe, who did not see or did not want to see all the horrors, and who did not help the way they could have helped.

Since that time, the tragic story of the final solution in Hungary has been a festering wound which is still hurting the Jewish people. Those who were not on the rescue lists and managed to survive nevertheless now hate those who put names other than theirs on these lists. Those who were desperately trying to save lives and were haggling with the devil, now hate those they feel deserted them at the time.

And the latter reply by accusing those, who at the time were dealing with Eichmann and his final solution men, of treason and collaboration.

Slandorous pamphlets against Dr. Kastner were distributed in Israel. He was charged with being a hangman of the SS; to save his own skin, he was said to have sent thousands to the gas chambers.

Kastner fought back and sued the slanderers, but the latter were acquitted in Israel in 1955 and the 270-page long verdict confirms their charges.

The feud of the pro-Kastner and con-Kastner forces caused the downfall of the Israeli government coalition at that time; the election campaign following soon thereafter was overshadowed by this one campaign issue.

On 4 March 1957, Kastner was shot down on a Tel Aviv street in broad daylight.

Nine months later -- in January 1958 -- the Israeli Supreme Court announced its review verdict: Kastner was fully rehabilitated. Too late.

The passions and hatreds in this dispute run hotter than ever before.

This may be the reason why the search for truth was handled on the Israeli end in such a self-hearted manner, if it was pushed at all. This was not done to shield people who railed at the time -- that argument could not be proved; but perhaps it was not done out of a feeling that the punishment of one man was not worth stirring up and dragging into this entire mess of accusations and counteraccusations arising out of this gruesome historical episode; it was not worth starting a monster trial.

And might not such a trial create in murder organizer Eichmann a whipping boy on whom many survivors to both sides could shift their responsibility and guilt?

Israel is a young country; it needs peace and quiet for its construction; it has its hands full defending itself against its neighbors who are its mortal enemies.

Even at this early stage, we can see that the Eichmann trial would again fan the flames of the this entire hate-packed fight over what was right or wrong in the past, what was honorable or dishonorable.

#### Confessions in Marginal Notes

Many Jewish newspapers express the hope that the trial will clear up the events of those days in the past. Joel Brand has come forward and volunteered as a witness; there is no doubt that he will repeat his accusations against people like Sally Mayer and David Ben Gurion, who left him and Kastner in the lurch at the time. And we can be sure that Eichmann will say: "If at the time you had only...then I would have..."



It seems that an attempt was made to avoid all this. That is probably why Eichmann was able to lead a comparatively quiet and peaceful life -- until he was finally caught. It remains to be reported how he was actually caught.

Life with his family in Tucuman in northern Argentina was almost idyllic for Eichmann.

Father -- or rather, Uncle Ricardo -- ranged through the wild mountains, tall in the saddle or on mule back; the two older sons -- 16-year old Klaus and 12-year old Horst -- hunted small animals, fished in the clear mountain streams, and went to school, as did 10-year old Dieter. And the three of them bore the name Eichmann.

Their mother did not use that name quite as openly. She did not have an Argentine identity card; when asked for her name, she gave her maiden name, which was Liebl. But hardly anyone ever asked her; since she was living with the "Austrian engineer" Ricardo Klement, she was simply "Mrs. Klement" to the few people the family was in contact with. Finally, she called herself Catalina Klement.

In the spring of 1953, the hard but peaceful life in the mountains of Tucuman ended. The Capri Company, which was doing preparatory work for power plant construction for the government there, went bankrupt. The government contracts of the firm ran out and the company was dissolved; and Eichmann/Klement was unemployed.

But this man was a careful planner; he had provided for just such an event and had saved up money. He would have liked to stay in the north, in this beautiful and almost impassable wilderness. But his chances of finding a job there were slim, and he had to feed a family of five.

He returned to Buenos Aires. In the suburb of Olivos, he rented a modest and slightly damp apartment in the house at Chacabuco No. 4261. (The Argentine capital has streets with house numbers running up to 20,000.) The owner of the house was a certain Francisco Schmidt; he was a Jew and is still full of praise for this quiet, orderly, and punctually paying tenant.

Jobwise, Ricardo Klement did not have much luck at first. For a few months, he worked as clerk in a fruit juice store; then he opened up a small laundry but went bankrupt -- even German diligence and efficiency could not prevail against Japanese and Chinese competition. Finally he found a job as warehouse and shipping manager in a small Argentine metal goods factory.

He made 2,500 pesos, which was about 350 marks at the end of 1953. That was not much, but his two older sons, both of whom wanted to become engineers, occasionally managed to earn some money.

But this office job did not suit Eichmann/Klement. He wanted to be his own boss; he preferred to live outdoors and would have liked nothing better than having a very small group of people around him.

Early in 1954, he found what he was looking for. He became manager of a rabbit ranch. The farm was called Siete Palmas; it was located 70 km from Buenos Aires, in an out-of-the-way little village by the name of Joaquin Gorina.

His cozy family life had come to an end -- Uncle Ricardo was able to visit his family only on weekends -- but down on the farm, he was once again his own boss; he had a decent salary and he was able to earn a commission if he could sell the angora skins for a good price to the middlemen -- most of whom were Jews.

He had much time to himself in Joaquin Gorina and did much reading; he preferred informative books on atomic physics, astronomy, biology, and contemporary works; fiction he did not like, with one exception: he loved South German and Austrian folk literature, especially the kind that contains many local slang passages. That really buoyed up his spirits and soothed his emotions.

He needed that sort of recreation, for his emotions were not at peace. In almost all books he read, he wrote marginal comments which often fill the entire margin of the page. And every time, he relates the reading matter subject matter of the book -- even if it was on atomic physics -- to the past, his past.

Something odd turns up here. As soon as his comments on the margin and on the flyleaf get to the point where he writes about his activities in the last years of the war, his otherwise neat and regular script becomes unsteady, confused, and completely different. One can tell that this is still the same man writing only with the help of a few characteristic words he uses again and again, such as when he uses "believably" where he actually means "probably."

It is not remorse that makes his hand unsteady as he thinks back to the shipments of thousands of thousands of defenseless people whom he sent to Auschwitz. It is rather the somber feeling that the justification he has tailored for himself and which he cultivates assiduously does not quite suffice to cover what he did at that time.

But he obviously forces himself with all his might to believe in this justification. What this justification really consists of we can see from the marginal notes on the books and on the flyleaves, which he made during his long reading hours at the Siete Palmas (Seven Palms) rabbit ranch.

Until 1954, Eichmann managed to make a living, even though a modest one; but he was astonishingly successful in remaining unpursued and undiscovered. First, as lumber jack in North Germany, then as surveyor in Argentina, and finally -- after a few stops in between -- as manager of the "Seven Palms" rabbit ranch in the little village of Joaquin Gorina, about 70 km from Buenos Aires.

This was the sort of job he really liked: he was dependent and he was his own boss in a deserted region. He had much time to himself on the rabbit ranch. He used his spare time to read and he read his books thoroughly; he made numerous marginal notes which throw a characteristic light on the twisted and oddly immature thinking of this man.

For instance, he writes the following on the flyleaf of the book Das Atom / The Atom by Dr. Fritz Kahn.

"Like other books on the same subject, I 'digested' this book mentally and found in it a marvellous confirmation of the national socialist 'belief in God' -- the so-called 'God-belief'. And I am warning my children to put all this under the same heading, because this 'God-belief' is remotely related to the materialistic teachings of communism, i.e., to Leninist materialism, which is derived from Marxism.

"Marxist-Leninist doctrine teaches materialism, which is cold and lifeless.

"'God-belief' on the other hand is hearty, natural, and always alive.

"But unfortunately I must fear that, considering the mental preoccupation and ignorance of my three sons, all this will only be chaff to them. And this I regret."

His sons, who are obviously bright, since they do not know what to do with the unadulterated ideological trash of their father, are no longer with Eichmann at that time. The family continued to live in Olivos and looked forward to Uncle Ricardo's visits on weekends.

Eichmann maintains the fiction of being Ricardo Klemoné, a cousin of the missing Adolf Eichmann, though at least the two older sons must have realized by now that "Uncle Ricardo" is their father.

But they join in this hide-and-seek game, for they know that their father is being sought as a war criminal. Eichmann himself had told them -- though, of course, in his own way.

He told them what he himself had thought up as his excuse or justification: their father was being sought; he would be charged with horrible deeds, but all that was not true; he was never anything but a conscientious official who did what he was told but who never killed one single person.

Eichmann-Klement stepped up this intrafamily propaganda campaign about his innocence after he once more became a father in the spring of 1956. Vera Eichmann brought a son into the world who was registered officially as an illegitimate child under the maiden name of the mother, i.e., Liebl. He is baptized Ricardo Francisco -- Ricardo for the assumed name of the father, and Francisco for the priest who in 1950 obtained a Vatican passport for Eichmann and thus aided him in his escape to Argentina.

The birth of this child triggered a sort of self-justification mania in Eichmann. He wants to prevent the child from growing up in the belief that he has a mass murderer or at least an executioner for a father. He tried to set his older sons straight on this score and he was successful, but now, in the hope of finding confirmation for his opinion, he tried something for the first time which he had carefully avoided in the past.

He admits to friends who he is and engaged in endless talks. He reads everything that was published after the war about his sphere of activity -- the "Jewish problem." Desperately, he clings to the only thing he can cite as justification for his activities: his oath on the flag, performance of duty, obedience to orders. Eichmann's relentless hatred descends on anyone who strayed from this path, anyone who in the last hours of the "Thousand-Year Reich" placed human feelings above unconditional obedience.

The man, to whom feelings such as hatred have been alien until then, who soberly and coldly sent hundreds of thousands of human beings to a horrible death, now develops unbridled passion when the basis for his self-justification is shaken.

He read the book Die letzten Tage der Reichskanzlei /The Last Days of the Reich Chancery/ by Gerhardt Boldt and finds that author Boldt was not loyal to his Fuehrer to the very last breath.

We can gather Eichmann's opinion on this from his marginal notes. The text of the flyleaf begins with the words: "A young frontline officer (Boldt) in January 1945..." Eichmann crossed out the words "frontline officer" and writes "scoundrel" over it. He makes this change throughout the book. Wherever Boldt's name occurs in the book, Eichmann changes it to "scoundrel," "traitor," or "s.o.b."

In one passage, Boldt reports that in the last days prior to the end of the Reich, high SS leaders, until then snooty and arrogant, suddenly became very small and needed someone to lean on. And here is Eichmann's marginal note. "The author of this book is a damn stupid anus. Boldt is a swine." And elsewhere, Eichmann wrote: "The author should be skinned alive for his low-down treason. With such skunks we were bound to lose the war."

And finally we have Eichmann's "resume" on the last pages of the book.

"1. Everyone can live the way he pleases.

"2. But then, one should not try to play officer -- because:

"3. Being an officer means doing one's duty in accordance with the oath to the flag."

And here again we find the straw of "duty" which Eichmann clings to and in whose defense he generates a passion and a vocabulary that he did not have at the time he was coldly and lethally solving the "Jewish problem."

He also read the statements of his erstwhile friend and subordinate Dieter Wisliceny at the war crimes trials. And he becomes hotly furious over the fact that Wisliceny, like many others, blames many things on missing Eichmann in order to save their own skins. Henceforth, he calls Wisliceny in his correcting marginal notes only a "miserable pig" and an "anus with ears."

Furiously he also denies Wisliceny's report on a sentence which he, Eichmann, is supposed to have said in the last days of the war: "...and if it has to be, I'll gladly jump into the pit, happy in the knowledge that 5 million Jews are going to be killed along with us."

The wording is accurate, except for one word, Eichmann agrees. He said "enemies of the Reich," not "Jews"; and in this form, the sentence was quite sensible, he maintains, for "if our enemies are smashing our Reich, I will of course be glad about every enemy who gets killed." Then comes a long explanation why he could not have said "5 million Jews" -- because more Jews were killed. He does not understand that it makes a difference whatever whether 2, 3, 5, or 7 million were killed; he simply does not want to understand this.

Friends and acquaintances who used to talk to him in Argentina at that time describe him as a man who had broken down inside; he had recognized his unspeakable guilt, but he did not dare admit it to himself; stubbornly he kept looking for formal excuses in order not to have to judge himself.

Occasionally, during the long and empty hours on the "Seven Palms" rabbit ranch, he ventures close to the brink of confession, though he tries to mollify himself with endless excuses and ifs and buts.

#### Eichmann's Conscience

He notes the following down: "I am gradually getting tired of being a lonely wanderer, having to live between two worlds. The voice of my heart, which no man can escape, always tells me to look for peace. I would also like to find peace with my former enemies. Perhaps this is part of our German

character. And I would be the last man who would not be prepared to surrender to the German authorities, if I did not have to consider the fact that the public interest in this matter is still too great to permit a clear and objective handling of the case.

"Far be it from me to want to question the ability of the German courts to arrive at a just verdict; but I still do not quite understand the legal status of a man who used to receive orders and who had to follow these orders in accordance with his oath of office, even though these might have been harsh orders.

"I was never anything but a faithful, loyal, decent, correct, and hard-working SS man and official in the Reich Security Main Office; I was always moved only by idealistic considerations for my fatherland, of which I had the honor to be a part. Deep inside I was never an s.o.b. or a traitor.

"Despite conscientious self-examination, I must find that I was neither a murderer nor a mass-murderer. And neither were my subordinates.

"But, to stick to the truth closely, I myself would like to say that I was accessory to murder, because I passed on the deportation orders, which I myself received from someone else and...because at least a portion of these deported people were killed, though by an entirely different agency...

"I said that I would have to admit that I was an accessory to murder, if I wanted to be really strict with myself. But I still cannot see clearly whether I have the right to do so in the face of my subordinates.

"I am therefore still locked in an internal struggle for, after all, as a former subordinate official, receiving orders from others, I could of course not be holier than the Pope. One must understand that.

"My subjective attitude toward things that actually happened at the time was my belief in the national emergency preached at the time by the Reich leadership. Besides, I also had an increasing belief in the need for a total war, because I had to believe increasingly in the constant announcements of the government of the German Reich at the time to the effect that it would be victory in this total war or downfall for the German nation. On the basis of this understanding, I did my duty with a clean conscience and a trusting heart."

So much for Eichmann on Eichmann.

A truly frightening document -- this attempt of his to hide behind the oath on the flag, duty, and obedience. It is even worse than the confessions of the perverted butchers in the concentration camps who -- totally dull and completely unable to realize what they were doing -- thought that human life meant nothing.

Eichmann was neither perverted nor dull; according to his own credible testimony, he was rather sensitive. Still, this man quite knowingly signed the deportation orders which meant death for many hundreds of thousands. A macabre example of the total misunderstanding, the total perversion of the original Prussian concept of duty, which placed the sense of responsibility of the subordinate above obedience and of which only one half -- blind obedience -- remained under the swastika.

This sort of deadly, murderous adulteration of this concept is the factor Eichmann falls back on as he tries to justify himself with "Oath on the flag" and "duty." This is a hopeless try. For Eichmann was not so dumb and primitive as to be unable to realize what he really was -- with or without orders from higher up. He was an executioner and he knew it as long as he was that at that time he had neither inhibitions, nor the desire to claim that he was forced to do all this by orders from higher up. And he will have to shoulder the responsibility for this.

The rest of the history of this executioner can be told quickly. By the middle of 1958, the peaceful life on the "Seven Palms" rabbit ranch was over. The firm was dissolving this part of its operation and Adolf Eichmann was unemployed once again.

But he had made plans for just such a contingency. He had laid money aside, not only for living, but also for the construction of a home.

This forced period of unemployment came at a good time and gave him a chance to carry out his dream of a home of his own. He bought some swamp land far from the city of Buenos Aires, near Bancalari, on Garibaldi Street.

Helped by his grown sons, he drained the land and began to build his house. He did not build it in the local style; no, he built it as though it had to last 1,000 years. The foundations were 1.2 m thick (instead of the customary 40 cm) and the walls were 60 cm thick (instead of 20 cm).

#### Home without a Future

Before he started building, he prepared painstakingly exact plans -- employing the same sort of minute exactitude which with 1½ decades earlier he had dispatched shipments to Auschwitz. Weeks in advance, he drew up a work schedule for each day: first, the western wall, then the door frames, and what not.

At that time -- at the end of 1958 -- he probably felt almost 100% safe. At any rate, he made no special efforts to hide his identity. His wife bought the building materials for the house, but she now began to call herself by her real name. A bill from the Cabora Construction Materials Company, dated 17 December 1958, is made out to a "Senora Liebl de Eichmann."

While work on his pillbox-like house progressed slowly, Eichmann tried to get another job. In March 1959 he found one. Mercedes-Benz of Argentina was advertising for jobs; Eichmann alias Klement applied and was hired.

Once again his organizing talent came to the fore; in a few months, he worked his way up to the highest pay grade for medium-level employees; in rapid succession, he was given three raises and made such good money that he was able to have his home in Bancalari finished in March 1960; he was able to move in.

There he lived for not quite 2 months; then came the day which he no longer feared -- after it had failed to come for 15 years: the day on which he was seized by the hands of those whose loved ones he had sent to Auschwitz or Treblinka.

As always, he had taken the bus to the Mercedes plant in San Justo; he did his day's work and took the company bus; on that day -- 11 May 1960 -- the bus was an hour late on account of a union meeting at the Mercedes plant; Eichmann did not reach the last stop, where he usually got off and caught another bus to Bancalari, until dusk.

As always, he went from the stop of the Mercedes bus to the stop of the 195 bus line to San Fernando-Bancalari; he was accompanied by a Hungarian fellow worker on that day. Eichmann bought cigarettes at a newsstand -- and was seen no more. Twelve days later, Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion announced in the Knesseth, the Israeli parliament, that Eichmann was being held in Israel.



ISRAEL WILL HANG EICHMANN

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Egon Vacek

Stern magazine correspondents followed Eichmann's trail over two continents. They found out how and where he had been hiding since 1945: as Otto Heninger in North Germany, as Ricardo Klement in Italy and Argentina. At the same time, a reporter team of Stern magazine flew to Tel Aviv. Egon Vacek reports on how Eichmann is being held prisoner in Israel; he also reports the reaction of the Jews to the idea: "Our murderer is among us."

"What is love?" one little boy asked another little boy in Tel Aviv. "Do you know what love is?" "Yes. That's when my parents go to the bedroom." "And then?" "Then they shut the door." "And then?" "Then they talk German..."

The Jewish doctor, who had emigrated from Germany in the thirties, looked at me quizzically. "I bet you know that joke. No? That's an old one. We used to tell it here during the Nazi era. But after that it was no longer true. Next to Hebrew, German used to be the most-talked language in our Babel of languages here. But now, all of a sudden, the joke is back in circulation again."

This week in Israel we ran into a wall of icy politeness, open contempt, immeasurable hatred, or -- worse yet -- deathly silence, when we told people where we were from. Eichmann's arrest had opened up old wounds. In the bars, the people would get up from their tables and sit down somewhere else when they found out that we were from Germany. On the beaches, they changed beach chairs. "You are all a bunch of Eichmanns," we were told, and: "All Germans ought to be killed." The people who said this were older people.

The young people faced the "Eichmann case" and the "German case" in a more objective fashion. They too of course had their outburst of fury. The big attraction in Israel is the Tel Aviv symphony orchestra. One of its concerts almost had to be called off because the conductor insisted that the chorus in Gustav Mahler's Second Symphony sing English instead of German. The libretto had to be translated; the performers had to learn the new words, and, according to music critics, the whole thing sounded abominable. Still, there was not a word of criticism on this in the Israeli newspapers. There is little call for German these days.

Did I say: little call? Marlene Dietrich sang recently at Tel Aviv's largest movie house which holds over 2,000 people. There had been excited debates prior to her performance. Should she sing in German or should she not? Marlene sang German. She sang not only of Johnny's birthday, she sang not only songs from the old movie "The Blue Angel," she also sang "Lili Marlene." The orchestra seats were filled mostly with older people; despite the sticky weather, they had come in their dark suits and ties and long evening gowns -- something that is quite unusual in Israeli customs. They sang the old songs from long-dead Berlin days and the tears were streaming down their faces. "I'm gone to love from head to toe..."

"And now I am going to sing a song I learned in exile," said Marlene. Exile, emigration -- the handkerchiefs in the orchestra section came out in force. Later on, I saw many of the audience sitting in the sidewalk cafes on Dizengoff Road. They were talking German. "Do you remember when we..." The radio brought the latest news about Eichmann. The news reports begin and end with Eichmann, it seems. The reports, especially from abroad, are long, but they say little.

In the evening there was knock on my hotel room door. It was a journalist of the big Israeli newspaper Ha'Aroez /The Land/. "I hear you're from Germany. Any news about the Eichmann case?" Haviy Kunaar's question is rhetorical. He knows that we know more and that we have an interesting document in our suitcase. This morning, the communist newspaper of the country had reported that two German journalists had tried to smuggle a coded letter into Eichmann's cell. But they failed.

"That's all a lot of nonsense, oh?" asked Haviy Kunaar.

"No, not all of it. We do have a letter addressed to Eichmann. But we did not want to smuggle it to him. We were supposed to hand it to the Israeli authorities. They have been refusing to accept it for a week now."

"And where is that letter now?"

We told him something that could no longer be kept secret now. We told him that 2 hours after our landing in Tel Aviv, we had reported to an Israeli government agency that he had a letter from Klaus Eichmann to his father. This letter had been sent to Stern magazine in Hamburg openly and we had agreed to deliver it, only on the condition that it be handed to an official Israeli agency.

We wanted to hand it to Minister of Justice Rosen, whose ministry is responsible for handling the Eichmann case. The secretary of the minister told us: "The minister will see you in Jerusalem at five." As we crossed the hotel lobby, the porter motioned to us. "There was a call for you from the Ministry of Justice. Mr. Rosen regrets. He has an important meeting to

attend." We contacted Police Colonel Selinger who is in charge of the investigation. "Mr. Selinger regrets. He definitely does not want to see any more newspapermen."

We contacted Mr. Nahmias, the Tel Aviv police chief, to whom Klaus Eichmann had addressed the accompanying letter. The police chief's office told us: "Israeli regulations do not allow officials to accept personal letters. Why don't you send the letter by mail?"

After a week, we handed the letter to Mr. Landor, the Israeli government press chief. He finally agreed to route it to police chief Nahmias. Landor actually passed the letter on. He mailed it to Nahmias, who lives in a house next to Landor's office.

Later, Police Commissioner Nahmias told Israeli newspapermen: "Yes, I did get a letter from Klaus Eichmann, addressed to his father." "Are you going to send the letter on?" "Will Eichmann be permitted to read what his oldest son wrote to him?" Nahmias ducks the question. He would route the letter to Police Colonel Selinger, who is in charge of the interrogations. And Selinger indicates: Eichmann will not get the letter -- at least not yet.

In the letter, Klaus Eichmann, 25, states that he had found out that Uncle Ricardo Klement is his father. And since that happens to be the case, he would of course remain his son; he would stand by him and look out for the family; he would keep watering the flowers in the garden of their home in Buenos Aires. And, oh yes, daughter Monica has a cold.

There is nothing sensational in this letter. Still, we asked the press office to handle this confidentially. We do not want to be the mouthpiece of the Eichmann family and we do not want to be their messenger boys. We only thought that the government agency might be interested in the passage where Klaus Eichmann writes that the family had been taken to safety. Safety, indeed!

British and American newspapers had written that the Israelis had also kidnapped the Eichmann family in order to make Eichmann talk, if necessary.

The letter was photostated in the Israeli documents center at Yad Vashem. That is where the "leak" seems to have occurred.

Haviv Kanaan looked at his watch rather nervously. "I've got a deadline to make. Thanks a lot for the story." And he ran out. The story that Stern magazine did not publish until much later is hawked by newsboys all over Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa: "Stern correspondents bring letter to Eichmann." The evening papers round out the story. For 2 days the roles are reversed. We no longer hunt information, we issue information. From Germany, we get the first reprints of the Stern

reports on "Eichmann's last years." We give them to the newspapermen. The press has enough material for the next 3 days. "Stern magazine discovers Eichmann's trail since 1945." "Stern tells how Eichmann was able to flee to Argentina." "Stern says Eichmann was easy to catch." The reports furnish the headlines for the front pages.

All this commotion also had its good sides: our Israeli fellow newspapermen would like to reciprocate. This is how we get information which the censor would not pass.

How did a German news magazine manage to come up with an impressively detailed report, yes, even a sketch? Eichmann is sitting in an underground interrogation camp somewhere along the extension of the takeoff strip of Lydda Airport. Stern was even able to give the location of the drainage pipe in the cell. Well, now: Eichmann is not really sitting there. He was never there. And along the takeoff strip of Lud (Lydda) Airport, there is no underground interrogation camp of the Israeli Secret Service. Adolf Eichmann sits in a Taggart fort north of Haifa.

Sir Charles Taggart was a British police officer in India. When the Arab terrorists stepped up their attacks on the Jews and British in 1936, the British mandate government ordered Sir Charles Taggart to build about 50 forts on the Indian model. These 50 forts were built in two series. First, we have the long, flat type with square towers for use in the plains; and then we have a somewhat higher and narrower fort, with higher towers, for use in the mountains.

Eichmann is in a flat-type Taggart fort which was specially furnished for this purpose. During the first days of his arrest, he was not held in this fort; it is assumed that he was held at the Haifa police station. Here is what some of his guards told us about his environment and about the way he is guarded.

After a thorough screening of personnel files at police headquarters in Tel Aviv, the men were picked for Eichmann's guard. In addition to their professional ability, all men had to meet the following requirements: they must not speak or understand German and they must not have lost any relatives in German concentration camps.

Still, there must have been a leak somewhere. The guards did not find out until later what their job was going to be. An old police sergeant then reported to police chief Nahmias and asked to be reassigned. His mother, he said, had been killed in a German concentration camp and he could not be sure that he would not lose self control if he were to face her murderer -- Eichmann.

The guards were divided into three detachments which were not to have any contact with each other; the guards lived like prisoners themselves in the Taggart fort. The first detachment watches Eichmann in his cell, 24 hours a day. It is not armed but consists of strong policemen with jiu-jitsu training. One guard is in the cell at all times.

The second detachment guards the cell block and the vicinity of the fort. The third detachment is the "supply unit." It is responsible for food and clothing. In addition, a doctor is on duty all the time. The guard in the cell has orders always to keep at arm's length from Eichmann.

The guard shifts are unusually short, since the guards are supposed to be highly alert when on duty. Eichmann is allowed to communicate with his guards only in sign language when he wants something. Eichmann answers instructions by saying: "Yes Sir." And after he has gotten what he wants, he must say "Thank you very much."

The cell furniture consists of a wooden table, a wooden chair, and an iron bed whose legs are cemented into the floor. There is a mattress and a woolen blanket on the bed. The temperature in the cell is "certainly far less hot than outside." In Haifa, the temperature at the time was 35° C.

The authorities have worked out regulations that apply for any wish Eichmann could possibly think up. Everything Eichmann requests, all his doings, are entered in a "logbook" and all entries are checked for any suspicious regularities. There is no fixed daily schedule: Eichmann gets his breakfast, lunch, and supper at varying times; the daily 5-hour interrogation is also shifted around.

Eichmann "can see the sun through a small window in the roof." But a light is constantly burning in the room, Eichmann sleeps well; he wakes up early. When he wants to go to the washroom, there is a "special alert" for two squads of guards. The guard detachments are reinforced at that time. Eichmann may shave with an electric razor but the voltage has been reduced and the switch is beyond his reach. He can use a steel mirror.

He gets his meals from the guard kitchen. The cell guard picks out a plate at random. Eichmann has good appetite and eats his meals completely. In the morning, he gets tomato salad, one egg, white cheese, marmalade, coffee or tea, and white bread. Lunch consists of several courses and he always gets meat; in the evening he gets approximately the same as in the morning. He gets cigarettes every day.

Upon his request, he was given German books from the prison library -- but only with neutral topics, i.e., novels. Eichmann:

is allowed to wear glasses for his written statements during the interrogation and during the reading hours. Then he must return his glasses. Several times during the day, he gets a chance to move around a little outside his cell.

Eichmann must clean his own cell with a rag and he must also wash the two khaki suits he was given by the Israelis. He is "cooperative" during his interrogations. With his knowledge, all his talks are recorded on tape. The Israelis say that Eichmann has not yet asked for counsel.

If you ask for the reason for this extremely careful protection, the Israelis will tell you each time: "Your Skorzeny plucked Mussolini from a mountain stronghold and a newspaper man slipped Goering a poison capsule at Nurnberg."

The Israelis intimate that Adolf Eichmann will only play a secondary role in his trial. His case is quite clear and the verdict is certain. Israel has abolished the death penalty in all cases but two: for espionage and high treason in wartime and for Nazi war criminals. Until now, the young state has not had to execute anyone. That is why there was no exact idea as to how a possible death sentence against Eichmann would be carried out.

The letters to the editor in the Israeli newspapers are full of gruesome suggestions: let him die of thirst in the Negro quarter, torture him to death. But in the meantime, the writers of these letters to the editor have realized that even the most inhuman execution method could not constitute atonement for Eichmann's guilt. People are becoming more sensible and -- as always in juridical disputes -- go back to British law. This means that Eichmann will be hanged.

The principal accused before the Jerusalem tribunal will be antisemitism throughout the world, as a warning to countries which once again are persecuting Jews because of their religion or which -- like the East bloc states -- prevent their emigration to Israel.

Shortly before we took the plane back, I talked at Lydda Airport to a Israeli stewardess of the Israeli airline "El Al." "You know what they call our airline now?" she giggled. "The Lindbergh Air Lines." (Lindbergh's baby was kidnapped and killed.)

Tension in Israel finds expression in the first Eichmann jokes.

APPENDIX. PHOTOGRAPH CAPTIONS

No. 27

Page 14. Adolf Eichmann had shaken the dust of Europe from his boots as he rode his white stallion "El Bravo" through the gorges of the northern Argentine Province of Tucuman in order to survey the land for the construction of a power plant. But the bookkeeper of death could not escape his own past.

Page 15. Organized racial mania began in 1935 with the "Law on the Protection of German Blood and German Honor." The horrible end was the besmirching of German honor through the gas chambers of Auschwitz, which Eichmann fed hundreds of thousands of victims.

Page 16. No one suspected who was hiding behind the name of Otto Heninger.

Page 16, top, left. Adolf Eichmann lived as Otto Heninger in this farm house in Kreis Celle until the spring of 1950.

Page 16, left center. Yes, that's Heninger, stated his old landlady Anna Lindhorst and her son Willi in Altensalzkoth, Kreis Celle, when Stern reporters showed them pictures of Jew-destroyer Eichmann.

Page 16, lower left. The Eichmanns and their son Klaus in Vienna in 1938.

Page 16, large photo. Adolf Eichmann as Otto Heninger (in circle) -- wedding guest at wedding of lumber Jack Eduard Tramer in 1948.

Page 17, large photo. In 1937, Eichmann, who had studied Hebrew, visited Palestine. He stated that he was "highly impressed by Jewish construction because he was an idealist."

Page 17, small photo. We enlarged this tiny photo found in Eichmann's papers to the large photo above. It shows Eichmann in Haifa.

Page 18. A 1939 efficiency report credits SS Captain Adolf Eichmann with pronounced personal toughness. He did not lack toughness later on, when he was hunting Europe's Jews and had them carted off to extermination camps. His "attitude toward national socialist ideology" always remained as stated in his file: "unconditional."

No. 28

Pages 16 and 17. These two photos belong together -- on the right, Adolf Eichmann's youngest son, who is 4 years old; he is shown waiting in vain for his father in front of the house in Bancalari. Above, two Jewish children who fell victim to the extermination mania of the "final solution men." Henri Fannin's letter to the readers will tell you why we are showing these two photos -- the pity-arousing photo of the innocent little boy and

the horrible picture of the innocent victims of his father -- before presenting our report on Adolf Eichmann.

Page 58. A document of Eichmann's guilt: women and children, stripped of their clothing, on the way to the gas chamber in the Treblinka death camp.

No. 29 .

Page 36. North of Haifa, in a Taggart fort of this kind, Adolf Eichmann has been interrogated daily for 5 hours for the past 3 weeks. In 1936, the British mandate government ordered police officer Sir Charles Taggart to build 50 forts in Palestine in order to combat the Arab terrorist raids against the Jews and British. Here -- not in the secret mysterious underground interrogation camps -- Eichmann is waiting for his day of judgement.

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(f) Signal Intelligence and Cryptanalysis

A separate signal intelligence service under VI F was discontinued in 1943. All long range intercept work was henceforth to be done by the Foreign Office (Sechhausdienst). With the discontinuation of signal intercept, the deciphering section as well lost much of its value. This section was staffed by men trained in the tradition of the famed Buero RONGE (RONGE was the celebrated head of espionage in the Austro-Hungarian Empire). His pupil, Oberst FIGL, employed in VI F was known as the best cryptanalyst in GERMANY. The task of this section, after it had been narrowed down considerably was the development of new radio codes, which were of the highest quality.

(g) Mil E and Mil G

After the absorption of the Abwehr, the corresponding apparatus of Amt Mil was combined with that of Amt VI (Abteilungen Mil E and Mil G). The quality of the Abwehr's services in this field was not high. In extent, however, they were much larger, since each Amt had its own technical section.

At the end, Gruppe VI F as well as the Abteilungen Mil F and G were headed by Oberstleutnant BOENING. He was an experienced scientist, with a long but undistinguished record with the technical services of the Abwehr.

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(b) Planned Operations

All this work was just the beginning, the laying of the foundation for the German Intelligence Service of the future. To this end the aid of all scientists and experts who were in any way connected with the glory of foreign countries and their peoples was to be enlisted. A certain amount of this work had already been done

For instance, the Reichsstiftung fuer Landeskunde (State Endowment for Geographical Science) had been formed to include all societies, institutes, and research agencies for geography, geopolitics, foreign economics, and political science generally. SCHEIDTKE had been appointed Chairman of the Endowment and had named KRALLEERT its executive manager. Its implicit purpose was the placing of the combined knowledge of all its experts at the disposal of German intelligence.

The scientists, philosophers, and economists who could not be enlisted immediately were registered and their names placed on file. A similar sifting process was going on in German economic life, so that all experts on foreign politics, geography, history, culture, and economics could be put to use. In the case of East ASIA and JAPAN, for instance, this process had already become fairly well advanced.

At the same time VI G collaborated actively with the few remaining foreign institutes in GERMANY, and those in other countries which could still be contacted. A concrete result of this collaboration was the compilation of a collection of maps which did not have their equal anywhere else in GERMANY. KRALLEERT's special maps, collected and surveyed in the USSR and the SOUTH EAST as part of a special military mission, are probably unique.

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Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act  
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By: SLH Date: 4/16/2001

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No. 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

(8) Gruppe VI S

(a) General Appreciation

S in this designation is an abbreviation of sabotage and as such defines the functions of this section. The Gruppe had been founded in 1943, and was therefore comparatively undeveloped, but had already reached a position of considerable importance. This can be explained by the fact that VI S had at its disposal a considerably larger and better pool of material and personnel than any other section in the ICIIIa.

Main credit for the attainment of these lavish appropriations goes to the Gruppenleiter, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer SKORZENY. After the abduction of MUSSOLINI, SKORZENY became one of the most popular men in GERMANY by means of very skillful propaganda. He was shrewd enough to use this popularity for the enlargement of his section. He succeeded in continuously increasing his influence, in drawing on personnel inside and outside of the SS, but failed to give his section a feasible organizational structure.

All the activities of VI S, as well as VII D, which was added later, gave the impression of utter confusion, where nobody knew what anybody else was doing. Thus VI S never reached that effectiveness, even in its largest enterprises, which might have been expected from the means at its disposal.

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(b) VI S and SKORZENY

To make matters even worse, SKORZENY's exploits had made him HITLER's declared favorite and so he continuously received orders from HITLER over the head of HIMMLER and KALTENBRUNNER, for a veritable stream of operations. These special tasks, of course, drew him away from methodical work and so the disorganization in VI S grew worse and worse.

SKORZENY was entrusted with special military tasks during the desperate offensives in the West and later again in the East, at which time he had whole divisions, with their generals under his control. All this of course was quite conducive to the development of SKORZENY's megalomania, which had already reached dangerous proportions under the influence of GOEBBELS's propaganda after the GRAY SASSO operation.

(c) Scope of Operations

The real field of operations, which was to come under control of VI S was of an exceedingly varied nature. Its main task was to be the creation of disturbances and panic in the rear areas of military operations. This was to be achieved by the execution of sabotage actions, as well as by the removal of important personages by assassination.

In addition VI S was called on to furnish personnel and plans for a number of military operations of an especially difficult nature. To give an example, when BUDAPEST was under siege by the Red Army and had become completely encircled, river boats were to break through the blockade and bring ammunition and supplies into the beleaguered city. Incidentally, the operation turned out to be a complete failure.

As far as other commitments behind the lines is concerned, it would be exceedingly difficult to give an exact appreciation. It is even doubtful whether SKORZENY himself would be able to give an account of all operations conducted under the auspices of VI S.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Amt VI (Continued)

Not only the already-mentioned disorganization within the central office contributed to this state of affairs, but also the nature of the operations. It frequently happened that subordinate agencies planned and executed an operation completely on their own, without any coordination with other similar agencies or with the central office.

Most of the operations were still in the planning stage and the agents were still being trained in the various sabotage and radio schools at the moment of collapse. Nevertheless it is fairly certain that a number of operations had already started in various countries. All these activities, as far as is known, were purely of a sabotage nature (called Z - Zerstoerung, destruction). So far no actions of the other kind (assassinations) have become known.

(d) Material at SKORZENY's Disposal

SKORZENY's equipment was fabulous. The most modern weapons and explosives were at his disposal. What he could not get through channels was got through extra-legal means. His reputation and prestige gave him privileges not accorded to others. Even during the period of acute gasoline shortage, SKORZENY always could call on as many airplanes as he needed for his operations.

The human material which came under SKORZENY's control belonged to the elite units of the German Armed Forces. Hundreds of fanatical veterans from Waffen SS and the Army (Brandenburg Division) belonged to the special organizations of VI S (Jagdverbande, etc). To this pool were added the selected units controlled by Mil D (FAK, etc).

SKORZENY wanted to model his troops on the corresponding institutions of the British Service, completely forgetting, however that these institutions had been the result of an organic development which had lasted for centuries. Modeled along British lines, preparations were also made for so-called commando operations (Kommando Unternehmen). Their purpose was to be the execution of extremely dangerous and difficult tasks, in cooperation with the various services of the armed forces.

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(e) SKORZENY and the Werwolf

SKORZENY was also given a special task in the organization of the WERWOLF. It is to be expected that, contrary to his chief in this enterprise, SS Obergruppenfuehrer PRUETZMANN, SKORZENY had managed to make thorough preparations for such activities. His organization would of course have been the most fitted for such activities. In the last analysis their capabilities rest on the establishment of large dumps for weapons and explosives.

It is almost beyond any question that such underground dumps do exist in various parts of GERMANY and in those parts of EUROPE previously occupied by the Germans. With such storage sites at their disposal an organization can put its predetermined plans into operation even without central direction.

(f) SKORZENY's Personality

As far as SKORZENY's personality is concerned, he is a rather primitive type. He has neither exceptional talents, nor unusual political experience or ideals. He is a soldier who is brave to the point of reckless defiance of death and who has succeeded in gathering around himself a group of young and similarly disposed men who blindly followed him in whatever he did.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No. 15

6. Part VI (Continued)

The ablest man in this section was Dr SCHAEFFNER (home in HEILBRON) who was able to produce amazing results in spite of the inadequate means at his disposal. SIEPE's successor was SS Sturmbannfuhrer FROESS, not quite as efficient a man as his predecessor.

(d) Other Technical Aids

Referat VI F 3 was concerned with the production of all other technical aids, necessary for the operation of an intelligence service. To this field belonged all sabotage devices, such as bombs, infernal machines, etc; also special weapons, devices for obtaining entry and exit, etc.

During the most recent period several new inventions were added: a special pistol with tracer device (Leuchtstahl) for firing at night, a miniature pistol for assassinations (20 rounds, caliber 6.35 mm), etc. VI F 3 also controlled a chemical sub-section. It was concerned with the manufacture of secret inks, poisons, etc. Referat VI F 3 was SS Sturmbannfuhrer LASSIG, an old hand with considerable experience.

(e) False Papers

Referat VI F 4 was charged with the manufacture of all false documents, such as passports, etc. The falsification of passports had been developed to a fine art. Upon several occasions agents with counterfeit passports were sent out to foreign police and consular agencies, with the only purpose of testing the quality of their false papers. Not once was suspicion aroused.

The best samples of workmanship were to be found in false Spanish passports, also in the passports of certain South American countries. VI F 4 also contained a photographic laboratory, engaged in the development of miniature cameras, as well as in microphotography.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

(h) Jagdverbände

SKORZENY was not particularly interested in the above sections of VI S. His particular fondness was for the Jagdverbände, units organized along military lines. Their origin dates back to 1944, when SKORZENY was ordered by HITLER to establish organs of underground resistance throughout EUROPE.

SKORZENY visualized the Jagdverbände in this role and commenced a large expansion program. Their organization was as follows: immediately below SKORZENY was a Chief of Staff (SS Obersturmführer von FOLKENSTEIN, killed in action on the Eastern front at the beginning of 1945), with an I-a (G-3), I-b (G-4) and I-c (G-2).

This staff controlled the so-called Jagdkommandos:

- Jagdkommando MITTE
- Jagdkommando SUEDEST
- Jagdkommando NORD
- Jagdkommando OST
- Jagdkommando SUEODST
- and the SS-Fallschirmjaeger Btl 500 and 600.

Each Jagdkommando in turn was subdivided into Jagdeinsatz according to geographical subdivisions. Jagdkommando SUEODST, for instance had the following sub-units

- Jagdeinsatz UNGARN (HUNGARY)
- Jagdeinsatz SLOWAKEI (SLOVAKIA)
- Jagdeinsatz SERBIEN-KROATIEN (SERBIA-CROATIA)
- Jagdeinsatz BULGARIEN (BULGARIA)
- Jagdeinsatz ALBANIEN (ALBANIA)
- Jagdeinsatz RUMAEINIEN (ROMANIA)
- Jagdeinsatz GRIECHENLAND (GREECE)
- Jagdeinsatz TUERKEI (TURKEY)

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Commanders of Jagdkommandos were equivalent to battalion commanders.

The extent of the activity of Jagdverbände was larger than that of the regular organizations of VI S. The training of personnel was accomplished by the various Jagdkommandos, frequently even of the smaller Jagdeinsatzgruppen on their own responsibility.

The aim of establishing an all-European resistance movement was never fulfilled. Reasons were the insufficient time allotted and the fact that SKORZENY and his officers considered all problems from a purely military angle and showed no understanding or skill in the treatment of the alignment of political forces. This was enhanced by the insistence of the various sub-sections of West VI on their exclusive privilege of doing political work in foreign countries.

WANECK succeeded in having KALTENBRUNNER issue a directive instructing VI S and Mil B to come to full agreement with VI E on all operations in South Eastern EUROPE. This was to prevent the Jagdverbände from committing political blunders in this area.

The problem was very acute since all intelligence agencies, that is VI E, VI S, and the Leitstelle II Suedost (the Mil B successor of Abwehr II in the Balkans) had to draw on the same pool of national groups in the Balkans for their operatives.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

(g) Organization

Referat VI S 1 - Administration - was commanded by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer SCHEIEL. He was called on to head the actual commitments in the South Eastern sector.

Referat VI S 2 was headed by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer RADL, who was also SKORZENY's deputy. VI S 2 was charged with the operational planning and actual execution of all operations.

VI S 3 under SS Hauptsturmfuehrer BRAMFELDT was in charge of all schools.

VI S 4 was to be the headquarters for all small operations. Its functions and those of S 2 were combined to an increasing extent. It was commanded by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer BESEKOW.

The most important part of VI S was that commanded by RADL. Central control over all commitments was to be maintained through this section, not always feasible under the existing disorganization. RADL was not only SKORZENY's administrative assistant but also his closest collaborator. He was informed of all the latter's plans and intentions.

He was no great light in his chosen fields, and so sections VI S 2 and VI S 4 lost more and more ground to their competitors, the SS Jagdverbaende. RADL did not particularly object to this state of affairs, for although not under command of VI S 2, the Jagdverbaende were still SKORZENY's babies and subject to RADL's indirect influence in this manner.

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VI S 2's objective was the commitment of small groups behind the Allied lines (either by infiltration or by air drop). These groups were to be coordinated with measures of the Army Command and were thus to be of assistance to military operations. Oddly enough all these operations were planned for some future time when the German armies would once more be on the offensive. The personnel for these sabotage groups was mainly recruited from among nationals of the countries in which the future operations were to take place.

These men were then trained in the special schools of VI C 3 (such as instruction in demolitions, special weapons, radio transmission, etc). No very large commitments had been started by 9 May 1945, but the first phase of operations in various countries commenced by that time.

The system of schools, as has already been mentioned, was rather extensive, but was dwarfed by that of the Japoverbände. Instruction was usually very spart and training was not particularly thorough (especially wireless communications). VI B for instance, gave much more thorough training.

BRAMFELDT, the head of the school system was a conceited ignoramus. He had been chosen by SKORZENY because of his record as having been German pistol and pentathlon champion, and thus a popular figure in GERMANY.

The most efficient section was the small one of VI S 4. BRECKOW was not brilliant, but diligent and energetic and thus had quite a bit of success. His Kleincinsatz were generally individual operations, involving one man or very small groups. Their purpose was either operational reconnaissance or sabotage. Acts of terrorism were also primarily controlled by this section. Not much had to be done in this field outside of planning, however.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

Although, after the reorganization, all penetration activities and suborning of agents and their utilization (Funksolde) were to be controlled by Amt IV, VI Z nevertheless continued certain activities in this connection. In spite of these unauthorized activities, FREUND succeeded in executing his mission to the satisfaction of all concerned.

(11) Gruppe VI H

This Gruppe was very short-lived. It was dissolved in 1942. Its function had been the collection of intelligence through the subordination of political opposition parties and movements. Its head had been SS Standartenfuehrer Dr KROCHER.

d. Reports and Conclusions

(1) General Appreciation

There is no doubt that of the reports submitted by the NSDA to the highest German authorities those of Amt VI were the most numerous. These reports were as a rule in a completely objective vein and also succeeded in presenting a thoroughly correct appreciation of the situation in the countries under consideration. Considering this wealth of superior intelligence material it is completely incomprehensible for the uninitiated why the German authorities persisted in committing political and military blunders of a catastrophic variety. A description of the tenor and distribution of Amt VI reports may be of help in the solution of this puzzle.

(2) Lageberichte

Two kinds of reports are of interest in this connection. The first were certain periodic reports of a comprehensive nature concerning events and the situation in their respective countries by the various Referenten. These reports were usually of a routine nature and sent out through channels. From Referent to Gruppenleiter to KATZENBUNDE to HEMLER.

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(3) Special Reports

The other, and far more important type of report, were the special reports. These were written by the Referent whenever he considered a political occurrence of sufficient importance to warrant drawing his superior's attention to this happening and its consequences.

Usually these reports were based on the factual material sent in by the agents resident in the country in question. This material was then sifted, collated and edited and usually commented upon by the Referent.

The latter based his comments on his knowledge and experience of the questions and his general background as an expert on the country under consideration. Conclusions reached, lessons to be learned, and future action to be taken generally were part of the Referent's commentary. The special report was addressed to the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (KALTENDRUNNER) through the appropriate Gruppenleiter.

Experienced Referenten, whose work had already earned them with a certain reputation, marked the so-called action-copy (Verfuegung, the first copy of the original report) with a suggestion as to when the report was to be distributed to by KALTENDRUNNER.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

In conclusion it can be said that the Jagdverbände were of no political importance and had only started to emerge in military value. Only preliminary steps, such as the construction of dumps and explosives, had been accomplished. Some of the scattered groups maintained radio communication with their Jagdkommando until the very end.

Within the framework of the Jagdkommando Suedost work had progressed the furthest in CROATIA. There close ties had been established with the projected underground organizations of OSTARSKIA. Towards the end relations were no longer quite as cordial. The commander of the Jagdeinsatz was a man without any political acumen and had lost the approval of Col LUKORIC, the Croat representative.

(i) Mil D

The last of SKORZENY's wide-flung activities was his command of Mil D (the successor to Abwehr II). In spite of this identity on the top, relations between the agencies of VI S and Mil D were by no means without friction. SKORZENY appointed Major LOOS as his deputy for Mil D and attempted the complete elimination of all opposition within this agency.

He paid special attention to the technical sub-section of Mil D since he regarded it as the core of the anti-Nazi opposition (this was the agency which had supplied the explosive used in the attempt of 20 July 1944). In spite of his appointment of Major EHMANN, one of his closest confidants, as its commander,, the situation did not change materially until the very end.

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(9) Gruppe VI Wi T

In 1942 SCHELLENBERG founded a special Referat - VI Wirtschaft - which was later enlarged to the status of a Gruppe. Called Wirtschaft und Technik (Economics and Technology), this section was under the command of SS Stabsartenfuhrer SCHMIED. The original plan was to utilize German internal economy for intelligence purposes, but later the stress was switched to problems of inventions and technical improvements. Relatively little is known about these activities.

The original function of VI Wi was a simple one. Under SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Dr ZEIDLER it consisted in using connections to German business establishments in the placing of members of the SD in foreign countries. Thus camouflaged as German business representatives, the agents would then engage in their intelligence activities.

Abteilung III Wi of the Abwehr was also incorporated into VI Wi T. This was true only for the central office. The IV Wi Referate of the various Asts were absorbed by the appropriate Stabs Stellen.

(10) Referat VI Z

This was a Sonderreferat concerned with those activities of Abteilung III F, Abwehr, not incorporated into Ast IV (Stabs), 1944. Conducted by Oberstleutnant Milo FREUND, a narrow-minded but ambitious intelligence officer, this section tried to regain part of its lost ground. Its main task was to conduct security checks of the German intelligence services and to counter-act, utilize, and destroy operations of Allied intelligence agencies.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

As has already been mentioned these agreements were broken in short order. Very few members of the SD had the advantage of diplomatic immunity, while Ant VI found its sweet revenge in further publicizing its opinion of German foreign policy and its representatives.

Here we see one of the weakest points in the whole structure of the German intelligence service. A competent agency, the Foreign Office, was not interested in the information service operated by the SD. And on the other hand HIMMLER operated the SD merely as some kind of personal information bureau.

(b) The Liaison Officers

To counteract these tendencies to a certain extent the Office of Liaison Officers was created. The material collected by the SD was to be presented to SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Gebelhart WAGNER, as representative of the SD with the Foreign Office. His opposite number was SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr ROEDER, as representative of the Foreign Office with the RSHA.

The post of SD Liaison Officer with the Foreign Office had existed for some years, while that of the Foreign Office Liaison Officer with the RSHA was a comparatively new creation. It was an upshot of one of the already mentioned armistice conferences.

This particular conference had been called after a few months of intensive conflict. In the course of the meeting ROEDER agreed to WAGNER's appointment and promised better cooperation in the future. WAGNER was one of the most shady and disgusting characters within the SD, while ROEDER on the contrary was a very capable and fair-minded officer.

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(c) Subterfuge as Solution

KALTENBRUNNER realized very soon that the regular methods of presenting foreign intelligence material (as described above) would not lead to any concrete results. He therefore decided to use the indirect approach and to contact HITLER (who after all was the only man with sufficient power to order any radical changes).

He ordered that Ambassador HEWEL was to be included in the distribution of all important reports. HEWEL, as the Liaison Officer of the Foreign Office with HITLER's Headquarters, yielded considerable influence, and could usually count on HITLER's listening to what he had to say. KALTENBRUNNER was a personal friend of HEWEL's and all important reports emanating from Unit VI now reached the latter with a personal note of his friend. The Ambassador then submitted these reports to HITLER at a propitious moment.

After HEWEL became incapacitated as the result of an automobile accident, KALTENBRUNNER established a new contact. He used SS Gruppenfuehrer FEGELEIN, who as HEWEL's personal liaison officer with HITLER's Headquarters played a similar role.

Contrary to HEWEL, who was a capable diplomat, however, FEGELEIN was nothing but a good-looking cavalry officer. KALTENBRUNNER flattered his vanity by convincing him that these reports could change Germany's fate and that thus the sole responsibility had been placed in his (FEGELEIN's) hands. Hallowed, FEGELEIN henceforth did KALTENBRUNNER's bidding.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

It is important to note that there was no standard distribution and that HIMMLER was the final recipient of all reports (every report sent to KALTENBRUNNER had to be translated by him to HIMMLER). HIMMLER was under no compunction to re-transmit these reports either up (to HITLER), across (to other Reich Ministers or their equivalents) or down (to other agencies of the SS or the RSHA).

(4) HIMMLER as the final arbiter

From the above it can be seen that HIMMLER was the best and most correctly informed man with regards to the foreign political situation within GERMANY. He rarely made the proper use of this powerful knowledge. This was a question of personal character.

He knew very well that the SD (especially its foreign branch) was exceedingly well informed and that this information had been channeled to him in objective and undisguised fashion. That he did not utilize this information to any great extent is to be explained by HIMMLER's fundamental nature.

His prime objective was the strengthening of his power within GERMANY, without, however, openly interfering with anybody who was in HITLER's good graces.

The classic example of this behavior is the relation between HIMMLER and RIBBENTROP. The latter had come into conflict with HIMMLER on numerous occasions. As SS Obergroßführer, he was of course subordinate to the Reichsführer SS, but did not let a single occasion pass without showing open insubordination.

Nevertheless HIMMLER never credited RIBBENTROP openly. The Foreign Minister had HITLER's unqualified support (for reasons unknown to anybody), and that was sufficient for HIMMLER. That does not mean that HIMMLER did not use every method of intrigue and activities behind the scene against his adversary.

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(5) SD and Foreign Office

(a) General Atmosphere

Due to HIMMLER's methods, most reports sent to him by Amt VI did not produce any results. A similar situation prevailed with regard to the reports sent to the Foreign Office. Ever since the SD had started to create a foreign intelligence organization, perennial conflict existed between this service and the Foreign Office. This constant state of open warfare was interrupted by occasional periods of external amity.

Whenever the situation became so acute that no further work could be done by either partner, the two chiefs, - RIBBENTROP and REYDOLCH or KALTENBRUNNER - met in conference and agreed to some sort of temporary cessation of hostilities. Nobody took these agreements very seriously and a short time later merry sniping had again been resumed by all concerned. The basis for these agreements was usually permission by the Foreign Office to install SD agents under the cover of diplomatic immunity, while Amt VI agreed to soft-pedal its criticisms of German foreign policy as practiced by RIBBENTROP and his cronies.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

Thus HIMMLER usually was the first man in GERMANY to obtain a complete picture of important developments. His information preceded RIEBENTROP's usually by a matter of hours. HIMMLER used this time lag to his own advantage. Usually he simply handed such sensational news to HITLER in a pointed manner, but without any further remarks.


Ant Mil had the usual distribution for its reports, but also included in its lists the OKW, the Wehrmachtsfuhrungsstab, the General Staff and the Commanders of Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The following diagram indicates the channels of dissemination for routine Periodic and Special Reports of Ant VI.

*[Faint, illegible text or diagram]*

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Channels of Distribution for Amt VI Reports



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6. Part VI: (Continued)

(6) HITLER's Appreciation of Intelligence Reports

In this fashion a true and unvarnished picture of the situation was presented to HITLER occasionally. Nevertheless he rarely took advantage of this opportunity and hardly ever adjusted the conduct of foreign affairs accordingly. The main reason for this behavior was to be found in HITLER's nature. He really believed he was appointed by Fate and did not need the counsel of mere human beings.

Another reason for his disregard of SD reports was his ignorance of the true importance of intelligence work as a whole and his distrust of such activities. On the few occasions when he followed the recommendations made by the SD, things turned out entirely to his advantage. For instance his original plan for the complete occupation of HUNGARY, the action of 19 March 1944, called for active military participation by RUMANIA and SLOVAKIA. Promises to that effect had already been given to ANTONESCU and presumably to TISO. Such action by her arch-enemies would, beyond any doubt, have brought HUNGARY to offer active resistance to this occupation.

The SD submitted a report embodying these considerations, and for once HITLER followed its recommendations. The occupation was carried on by German troops exclusively, and no armed Hungarian resistance was offered.

(7) Distribution to other agencies

A certain number of reports were also submitted to GOERING (their number decreased considerably during the last few months) and to ROSENBERG. After the increase in GOEBBEL's power after 20 July he too was included in the distribution list. This was also done from considerations of pure expediency. GOEBBELS was known to be ready to join any anti-RIBBENTROP coalition and thus was considered a potential ally in the SD-Foreign Office controversy.

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(8) The "ECMOPT" Reports

Besides these regular reports, a type of periodic and comprehensive survey had been instituted recently. These surveys, called ECMOPT Berichte, went to a very small number of top-echelon personalities. They were written by the well-known journalist SS Stabschefmischer Er Giselher WIRSING (now in allied hands) who had been called to Amt VI by SCHULLENBERG.

In his reports WIRSING used and collated the information obtained from various sources in all countries. The ECMOPT reports appeared once a month on the average, and in their clear and objective way of considering world affairs belong among the best material which came from the NSIA.

(9) Speed of Dissemination of Secret Reports

One of the great advantages of Amt VI information was its speed. Since the Referenten had radio communication with their chief agents, speedy transmission of important news items was guaranteed. These flash reports were sent by wireless to the Referent, and then immediately handed on to the Gruppenleiter. Thence, flashes were sent on by high-priority teletype (Blitzfernschreiben) to REISELEITER and KATZBERGER. Intelligence transmission was very rapid even during the period of heavy air attacks within GERMANY proper as well (in this case radio and not teletype was used).

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
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
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7. Ant Mil (Continued)

The Reorganization of the Abwehr  
(Line of Reorganization is towards the right)



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\_\_\_\_\_ Direction of change, contribution, or absorption  
 [ ] New agency

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INTERROGATION REPORT No. 15

7. Ant Mil

a. Formation

Ant Mil was created during the spring and summer of 1944 to absorb those parts of the Abwehr which still retained a semblance of independence (other parts had been annexed outright by already existing agencies of the RSHA). Its formation was the culmination of a campaign which the SD had been waging for years to obtain complete control of all German intelligence agencies.

With the absorption of Abwehr, military intelligence as well as political intelligence had come under control of the RSHA, and shortly thereafter under the direct command of SCHEIDTKEGGER.

Oberst HANSEN, the Chief of Abwehr I, was appointed First Chief of Ant Mil. After a few weeks, however, the events of 20 July gave SCHEIDTKEGGER his long expected opportunity. HANSEN was removed and the Chief of Ant VI assumed complete control over all intelligence operations.

b. The Old Abwehr

As long as the Abwehr had been independent under Admiral CANARIS and under the aegis of the OKW it had consisted of two parts. The Ausland Abwehr, an agency of only theoretical importance under Admiral BUERKNER, and the Ant Abwehr, the real military intelligence branch under Admiral CANARIS.

c. Transformation

The following chart shows the final result of the various reorganizations of Abwehr during Spring and Summer of 1944. Wherever possible the original and the final form are indicated.

During this reorganization, the Abwehr (with the exception of Ant Ausland Abwehr, which was transferred into the Adstabsgruppe Ausland and remained under OKW control) was transferred almost entirely to the RSHA, where an agency was taken over intact, or was split up among several new agencies, or parts of an agency were absorbed by already existing agencies of the RSHA.

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7. Ant Mil (Continued)

This organization and designation was mirrored in the Frontaufklarungs-kommandos with Army and the Frontaufklarungsstruppe with Corps. All these various Frontaufklarungs units were controlled by the appropriate military echelons, i.e. for a Frontaufklarungskommando, the I-ec with the appropriate Army. At the same time a certain amount of administrative control was exercised by Mil F.

The process of reorganization of these short-range tactical intelligence units had been by no means completed. All sorts of intermediate organizational forms existed. For instance Army Group SOUTH and Army Group E were both served by the same Leitstelle II. Certain divisions controlled Frontaufklarungsstruppe, etc.

In the higher echelons there existed discrepancies between Mil B and Mil F, between Mil F and VI F and VI S, and between the RSHA and the OKW.

(d) In Neutral Countries

No reorganization took place in the ROs. These abwehr agencies in countries allied to or controlled by Germany continued in existence in their old form. The only difference was that they now reported to Ant Mil and the RSHA instead of to Ant abwehr and the OKW.

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Ant VII

During the past few years Ant VII led such a shadowy life that many people began to doubt its very existence. It did lose a lot of personnel in the course of the war and its dissolution had been planned several times, but was never carried through. Its organization was rather unfortunate. It owed its creation, like many other institutions within the Sipo, to personal considerations.

After the reorganization of the RSHA, the former Amtchef of Amt II, SS Oberfuehrer Dr SIX, found himself without a job. The new Inlandrat (Amt III) was headed by his former subordinate OHLERHOFF. Not to offend SIX a new Amt was created, and he was made head of Amt VII, also called Amt Wissenschaft (Science).

Practically, of course, science in GERMANY was represented in III C, and science in foreign countries in VI G. Therefore there never was any real justification for the creation of Amt VII at all, other than to give SIX a proper position.

It is therefore not surprising that SIX, his three Gruppenleiter, and all their personnel (men who had been with SIX in the old Amt II) really had no other job than to take care of the library, the files, and the available maps.

The library was of excellent quality, however, and the files were very comprehensive and useful. They had been compiled from the card-indices of all the various Aemter.

After SIX's transfer to the Foreign Office no successor was appointed. SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr DITTEL was entrusted with the direction of the Amt, as Vertreter.

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7. Ant Mil: (Continued)

(1) Ant Abwehr

The chart shows that in the course of the reorganization, the I and II branches of Ant Abwehr, as well as part of Abwehr III were formed into Mil Ant. The remaining parts of Abwehr III were absorbed by Ant IV and Ant VI.

In detail Abwehr I was transformed into Mil B and Mil C. The administrative branches of Abwehr, called Abwehr Z became Mil A. Abwehr II was made into Mil D. As for Abwehr III, most of it went to Ant IV. Certain parts of Abwehr III F (penetration of Allied intelligence services) were subordinated to VI Z, while Abwehr III bi was united with Reford VI Wi T. The Frontaufklarungstruppen were centrally controlled by a section called Gruppe VI F in Ant VI and by Abteilung Mil F of Ant Mil, which were identical agencies.

(2) Abwehr agencies in the Field

At the next lower level the old Abwehr had controlled the following agencies:

Abwehrstellen (ast) and Abwehrleitstellen (alst) in occupied territory.

Abwehrstellen and Abwehrleitstellen in each Wehrkreis Abwehrstellen with each Army Group

Kriegsorganisationen (K O) in neutral countries friendly to or controlled by GERMANY.

The above four types of agencies were all subdivided into sections I, II, and III, called Gruppen. These Gruppen corresponded functionally to those Abteilungen of Ant Abwehr bearing the same Roman numeral. In the reorganization the following changes were made:

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(a) In Occupied Territory

Asts and Alsts in occupied countries, where still existing, were dissolved. They were to be reorganized along the lines outlined below for agencies within the Wehrkreis.

(b) At Wehrkreis-Headquarters

Asts and Alsts in the various Wehrkreise were dissolved. In their stead a new organization, called Kommandoneidgebiet (KMG) was created. It took over all I-type activities of the old ast or alst (~~organisations~~).

No substitute for Gruppe II was envisaged. Gruppe III was split. Its purely military functions were taken over by the abwehr officer (AO, Counter-Intelligence Officer) with Wehrkreis Headquarters. All other functions were transferred to the appropriate Stapo (Leit) Station (especially III F - penetration and III hi). Personnel was divided up accordingly.

(c) At Army Group

Abwehrstellen with Army Groups had always carried the designation I, II, or III, according to their function. Reorganization here merely took the form of a change in designation. Abwehrstellen I became Leitstellen fuer Frontaufklaerung I, Abwehrstellen II were called Leitstellen fuer Frontaufklaerung II, and Abwehrstellen III received the designation Leitstellen fuer Frontaufklaerung III.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No. 15

11. The Staff of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Continued)

The latter finally acceded to these requests and appointed his friend, SS Sturmabfuhrer Dr DILLENBERGER, a former judge in UNTERDEN. Though slightly more reasonable than his predecessors, DILLENBERGER continued their policy of having each small infraction punished by his courts.

The court was very severe. Small misdemeanors, which would have been disregarded by other courts, were punished in the Sipo Court by long prison sentences or by transfer to the so-called rehabilitation units of the Waffen SS. The nature of these organizations is too well known to be discussed here. They were supplied by all organizations within the Police, the SD, and the SS.

Final review of all cases rested with HIMMLER. He made it his policy to review automatically all cases involving SS or police officers. Any mild sentence was changed to a more severe one. He also instituted the nice custom of punishing the judge who had pronounced a mild sentence as well. Thus it has happened that an officer, sentenced to disciplinary action by the RSHA Court had his sentence revoked by HIMMLER, and the accused, judge, and prosecutor sent to the penal unit. It can easily be understood that no SS judge dared to go counter to these clearly-expressed wishes of his lord and master.

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b. Schools

The problems of education and of obtaining suitable new blood were considered very important in the Security Police. Only the last few years of the war brought first a reduction and finally a complete stoppage of these endeavors. Plans, however, continued to be worked on.

Planning reached considerable proportions with the reorganization of the various levels (Laufbahn) in Sicherheitspolizei and SD, as propounded in 1943. This reorganization permitted the following four levels:

- The intermediate (Mittlere)
- The intermediate-upper (Mittlere Gehobene)
- The upper (Gehobene)
- The leading (Leitende).

(1) The intermediate

The Mittlere Laufbahn included all small officials, as well as the Unterfuehrer (NCOs) in the SD. The last stage of this level was SS Sturmscharfuehrer, or the corresponding civil-service rank.

(2) The intermediate-upper

The Mittlere gehobene Laufbahn included most of the officials with a high-school education, as well as the corresponding SS and SD officers. It corresponded to that of the company officer in the army. The final rank was that of SS Hauptsturmfuehrer or the appropriate civil service position.

(3) The upper

The gehobene Laufbahn had as its prerequisite a certain amount of university education. The highest rank was that of SS Sturmbannfuehrer or the corresponding civil service rank.

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9. Ant N

This Ant was a very recent creation. It had been formed during 1944, while previously its tasks had been assigned to a Gruppe in Ant II (II D). With the extension of the communications network of the RSHA, the creation of a special staff section meeting these requirements had become necessary. Ant N had under its control all communications nets used by the RSHA or any of its agencies. The main means used were radio, teletype, and telephone.

During the time of its greatest expansion, the teletype net alone had several hundred extensions. This does not include the numerous Geheimschreiber automatic encoding and decoding teletype machines. The radio net reached its greatest extent with the greatest advance of the German troops. Sipo units were attached to various military echelons and frequently their only means of contact with the central office was by radio communication. The telephone net was also well developed.

An interesting innovation was the so-called Konferenzapparat. KALTENBRUNNER and all his Amtschefs had one of these telephones, as had several ministers and other high functionaries. The number of extensions was very small (maybe about 50). There was only one central, automatic switchboard, and by dialing a two-figure number any of the other subscribers could be contacted, without having to go over the various office switchboards. This ensured both speed and secrecy of the conversations on this net.

The personnel in this section consisted of technical experts. The Amtleiter, SS Standartenfuehrer SIMSONI, was a communications specialist, while two Referenten, WALTHER and ZANKS, were experts on teletype and radio, respectively.

10. Art San

Art San was of even more recent origin than Art II. It never had a chance to develop and so no appreciation of the work of the Medical Section, or of its chief, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr STROHSCHNEIDER, can be given. STROHSCHNEIDER was a close personal friend of KALTENBRUNNER and had come to the RSHA from the Waffen SS.

11. The Staff of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD

The following four institutions were under the direct command of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei:

- The Court (Gericht)
- The Schools (Schulen)
- The Attaches (Attachegruppe)
- The Aides (Adjutantur)

a. Court

The court with jurisdiction over all members of the RSHA and its agencies had been previously under the control of the chief of Art I. This had given rise to complaints and friction. Due to the great power and legally unrestricted functioning of the court, the Amtschef I had a most potent weapon in his hand. The other section chiefs protested about this inequitable distribution of power and wanted the creation of a court responsible only to KALTENBRUNNER.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

11. The Staff of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Continued)

In SOFIA, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr HOFFMANN, an official of average intelligence but with sound political information.

In BUCHAREST, SS Sturmbannfuehrer RICHTER. He had first been adviser for Jewish affairs at the legation. As such he gained the confidence of the German minister, von KILLINGER, and was appointed police attache.

In BRATISLAVA, SS Sturmbannfuehrer GOLTZ, a secret police man, of less than average ability.

The police attaches at TOKYO and NANKING have already been mentioned.

In LISBON, the office of police liaison officer (Verbindungsfuehrer) had been created, since the Portuguese government did not approve of the presence of a police attache. The duties of the liaison officer were equivalent to those of an attache. However, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer WILHAT, who had been appointed to the post, proved a total failure and had to be recalled.

All police attaches had been with the Gestapo previously. It proved very difficult therefore to enlist their aid for intelligence purposes. Even if they showed interest and understanding for this field, it was not so easy to receive permission to work for Amt VI, since Amt IV guarded its prerogatives jealously.

Yet, with KALPENBRUNNER's assistance, it was possible to obtain their cooperation for political intelligence work. Since all of them had rather extensive intelligence nets with trusted agents at their disposal, results obtained through this source were usually of good quality.

Leiter of the Attache Gruppe was SS Stabssturmfuehrer Dr ZINDEL. He was also Secretary General of the Internationale Kriminalpolitische Kommission (IKPA, International Commission for Criminal Police, a non-political, international association for the furthering of methods and operations of the criminal police).

Most European states were members of the association. KALPENBRUNNER was its last president. ZINDEL was a very unimportant person, and had nothing to say either in his position as the head of the Attachegruppe, or as Secretary General of the IKPA.

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d. The Adjutantur des Chefs der Sicherheitsabteilung und des SD

HEYDRICH, who was a great lover of pomp, always insisted that he have a large and well staffed section of personal adjutants and aides. These aides all had to resemble him in appearance, i.e., they were tall, blond, and handsome. In HEYDRICH's time the adjutants had great influence and power.

With KALTENBRUNNER's advent this situation was changed radically. All the old personnel was removed with the exception of SS Obersturmbannführer SCHEIDLER, previously concerned with the administration of funds. Elevation to the position of adjutant gave no corresponding increase in influence. KALTENBRUNNER's personal aid, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. MALZ, who had his desk in front of his chief's office also was utterly without power or influence. His main job was to bring various reports to KALTENBRUNNER for his signature.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Befehlshaber and Kommandeure der Sipo und des SD (Continued)

In certain cases a certain special task could be handled by a special section, especially for distinct military sectors (for instance VI Z). Besides these VI Abteilungen, the office of the Untersuchungsleiter (Investigating Officer) was created, who in turn reported to SS Richter DILLERSPENGER.

In this type of organization the Befehlshaber wielded considerable power, since all the Kommandeure were responsible to him and he controlled all field agencies of Stapo, Kripo, and SD through them. This new institution of Befehlshaber was to be organized within GERMANY as well. The organization was completed first in the frontier Wehrkreis and towards the end had been accomplished in the remainder of GERMANY.

At the moment of collapse, therefore, a Befehlshaber had been appointed for each Wehrkreis, who in turn controlled several Kommandeure for the various subdivisions of his region. (The office of Inspekteur had been abolished and replaced by that of Befehlshaber). The Stapo (Leit) Stellen, Kripo (Leit) Stellen, and SD (Leit) Abschnitte were maintained for the time being, but subordinated to the headquarters of the Kommandeure.

4. Hochere SS und Polizei Fuehrer (HSSPF)

As has already been mentioned the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD were under control not only of the RSHA, but also of the local Hochere SS- und Polizeifuehrer. (with exception of ITALY where there existed the specially created office of Hoehster SS und Polizeifuehrer, held by HESSLER's long-time chief of staff, SS Obergruppenfuehrer WOLFF).

The Hochere SS und Polizeifuehrer in turn controlled, besides the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, a Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei (BO - controlling Schupo, rural police, fire police and water police, as well as other routine police installations). They were responsible to HIMMLER exclusively and have as a matter of fact been called "little HIMMLERS."

All SS Hauptstaetcheffe could, however, issue directives. This was of practical importance only in the case of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (RSHA) and of the Chef der Ordnungspolizei (Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei). Theoretically the other SS Hauptaemter, such as Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt, Hauptamt SS Gericht, and Fuehrungshauptamt, were on the same command level.

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5. Subordinate Agencies

a. Types of Agencies

The smallest administrative unit within the Sipo was the Auspostelle. This terminology was used for Stapo, Kripo, as well as SD. These Auspostellen were controlled by the already discussed (Leit) Stellen of Kripo and Stapo and (Leit) Abschnitte of the SD.

The border police, which also belonged to the Sipo was organized into Grenzpolizeikommissariate, and at certain border control posts Grenzpolizeistellen. These border police agencies were in turn controlled by the local Stapo (Leit) Stelle. The next higher echelon was known as the Inspektor der Grenzpolizei, who however was usually identical with the appropriate Befehlshaber der Sipo and des SD.

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III. High Command Echelons of the SD

1. First Phase

During the first organizational phase the echelon immediately subordinate to the SD Hauptamt was that of the SD Oberabschnitt, commanded by an SD Oberabschnittsfuehrer. During this stage there was no direct command relationship between such headquarters and the Stapo and Kripo. The Secret Police as well as the Criminal Police received their orders directly from their respective headquarters in BERLIN.

2. Inspektore der Sipo und des SD (IAS)

In the course of the first reorganization and with the creation of the RSHA new agencies were formed to take charge of the coordination between SD and Sipo at the level below that of the national headquarters. These were the offices of the Inspektore der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Inspectorates of the Security Police and the SD).

The jurisdictional area of such inspectorates corresponded to that of the former Oberabschnitte, which was generally equivalent to that of a Wehrkreis.

Theoretically the Inspekteur had complete control over the Stapo-polizei (Leit) Stellen, Kriminalpolizei (Leit) Stellen, as well as the SD (Leit) Abschnitte within his region. Since, however, the unification had been completed only on paper, the various imperial headquarters still continued to exercise their influence on their subordinate agencies directly. (ie, the Stapo Stellen continued to receive their orders directly from Amt IV or its Gruppen, without any regard to the Inspekteur, and Amt III and V continued to control their agencies in a similar fashion).

Thus the Inspekteur was used only as a transmitting agency of the center, without having any powers of command. In this respect their headquarters resembled those of the Hoehere SS- und Polizeifuehrer, which had but an administrative function at that time. (This situation was changed at a later date). The Inspekteur, incidentally, was on the staff of the Hoehere SS - und Polizeifuehrer.

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3. Befehlshaber and Kommandeure der Sipo und des SD

In the course of the occupation of foreign countries Einsatzkommandos der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD were put into operation. These Einsatzkommandos were attached to each army in the form of Einsatzgruppen.

After the consolidation of the military position and the complete occupation of these countries a new agency was created. This was called the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (BdS). This was the highest Police and Security Echelon in the country and in turn controlled a number of Kommandeure der Sipo und des SD in various parts of the country (KdS).

The headquarters of these Befehlshaber and Kommandeure were organized along new lines and no longer simply controlled the various Stapo and Kripo Stellen or SD Abschnitte. They were organized along the lines of the NSIA, and were subdivided into so-called Abteilungen, I, II, III, IV, V and VI, with a function similar to those of the respective Auster within the commanding echelon. The center Mil, VII, N, and San had no direct representation with the Befehlshaber and Kommandeure.

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5. Subordinate Agencies (Continued)

The leading personalities within foreign countries were all ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter, or V-Leute.

c. Oath

The so-called Verpflichtungserklärungen (Oaths of Office) were of two kinds. One was for the use of hauptamtliche or ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter, while the other was used for V-Leute.

The first part of the oath was identical in both cases. It included a statement that no use whatsoever would be made of information or experience gained while serving with the SD. Then followed the declaration:

In the first case: "If I should commit a treasonable act, either consciously, or unconsciously, in spite of this solemn oath, then I give my superiors the right to punish me in any way (they see fit)."

("Werde ich trotz des Schwures bewusst oder unbewusst zum Verräter, so gebe ich meinen Vorgesetzten das Recht mich in jeder Weise zu bestrafen").

In the second case: "If I should commit a treasonable act, either consciously, or unconsciously, in spite of this solemn oath, I do so in the knowledge that I should expect measures by the Secret Police."

("Werde ich trotz des Schwures bewusst oder unbewusst zum Verräter, so weiss ich, dass ich staatspolizeiliche Massnahmen zu erwarten habe.")

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Towards the end a so-called *Sondervorpflichtung* (Special Contract) was created. It was to be used for persons high in public life. At the end of this declaration the following formula was included:  
"I furthermore realize that in case I should meet with difficulties because of this activity, the *Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD* and his subordinate agencies will take me under his protection." ("*weiteren wird mir bekannt gegeben, dass der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD mit seinen Dienststellen mich in Falle von Schwierigkeiten, die ich durch diese Tactigkeit bekomme, in seinen Schutz nimmt.*").

Towards the end, these oaths and declarations were no longer taken seriously. Because of the many solemn oaths which every German had been subjected to in the course of existence, even this, unusual one lost its importance.

Generally, it can be said that obedience depended on the persons in question. Some of the most important agents of the SD had never been asked to sign any declaration of this kind, since their relation was based on a personal one to some member of the SD proper. This was especially true in foreign countries. It was prohibited to take any written declarations whatsoever outside of GERMANY.

For this reason most of the V-Leute had never signed this oath. Here too it was of no importance, for usually the *Hauptvertrauensmann* had selected his own collaborators and organized his intelligence net with their help.

*H. G. Major*  
for KGB  
AC of S, G-2

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5. Subordinate Agencies (Continued)

Collaboration between the various Befehlshaber and their headquarters, the RSHA, was not always of the best. Conflicts of responsibility between the various Aemter were quite common. This led to constant friction.

An added obstacle were those Befehlshaber, who, trusting in their own omnipotence, decided to skip their next echelon and to report directly to KALTENBRUNNER, in order to prove their great ability and knowledge. Others decided to make up to the RSPF and to conspire against the RSHA. Since HIMMLER's approval was necessary for appointment or removal of a Befehlshaber, KALTENBRUNNER could not always prevail against his rebellious subordinates.

Similar difficulties arose with various Hoehere SS- und Polizeifuehrer. They reported directly to HIMMLER, using the material which they had obtained from the Befehlshaber der Sipo und des SD. This parallelism was not abolished by HIMMLER. On the contrary, he rather furthered this divergence. It was entirely according to his motto Divide et impera.

b. Classification of Officials and Informants

The following categories of collaborators existed in the SD:

- Hauptamtliche SD-Angehoerige (full time members of the SD, including auxiliaries)
- Ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter (part time, non-paid collaborators)
- Vertrauensleute (Operativos)
- Zutraeger (called Agenten in foreign countries) (Agents)

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(1) Hauptamtliche Mitarbeiter

The first type included all members of the SD (also members of the SS), while the auxiliaries included men drafted for the duration of the war, so-called SD-Angestellte (employees), who were full time employees of the SD without being members of the SS as well as officials on detached service from other branches. This category also included the federal office help.

(2) Ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter

The second type consisted of members of the SS, who had been detached for service with the SD (operationally, but not administratively). They were unpaid, and generally followed a civilian profession. There were also some men in this category who had been retained in their original SS units.

(3) Vertrauensleute

The third category included all those persons who, after a solemn oath, had been accepted into the service of the SD. Their activities resembled those of the ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter, with the exception that they did not belong to the SS. (It did occur however that trusted and successful V-Leute were taken into the SS).

(4) Zutraeger und Agenten

The fourth group was the most numerous one. As a rule it consisted of paid agents, while groups (2) and (3) usually served from idealism. These paid agents were more important in the services of Amt IV and VI, while Amt III usually tended to employ ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter and V-Leute.

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Organization of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. (RSHA)

Chef des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes

Attache Gruppe

SS Standartenfuehrer Dr ZINDEL

Gericht

SS Sturmabannfuehrer Dr DILLENSPENGER

Schulen

SS Oberfuehrer Dr FISCHER

Adjutantur

SS Sturmabannfuehrer SCHEIDLER

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Ant I

SS Oberfuehrer und Oberst der Polizei MURLINGER

Geschaeftsfuehrer

SS Hauptsturmfuehrer ERGENZINGER

Gruppenleiter I A

SS Sturmbannfuehrer WANNINGER

Gruppenleiter I B

SS Sturmbannfuehrer ZIRPINS

Gruppenleiter I C

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer GSCHWEND

I Militaerisches Personal

Oberstlt HUEBNER

Ant II

SS Oberfuehrer SPACIL

Geschaeftsfuehrer

SS Sturmbannfuehrer GRAETZ

Gruppenleiter II A

SS Sturmbannfuehrer KREKLOW

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Gruppenleiter II B

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr BERGMANN

Gruppenleiter II C

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer HAFKE

Ant III

SS Gruppenfuhrer und Genlt der Polizei OHLENDORF

Geschaeftsfuhrer

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer SCHAEFER

Gruppenleiter III A

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer HOEPPNER

Gruppenleiter III B

SS Standartenfuhrer Dr EHLICH

Gruppenleiter III C

SS Standartenfuhrer Dr SPENGLER

Gruppenleiter III D

SS standartenfuhrer SEIBERT

Gruppenleiter III G

SS Sturmbannfuhrer WEGENER

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Ant IV

SS Gruppenfuehrer und Genlt der Polizei MUELLER

Geschaeftsfuehrer

SS Sturmbannfuehrer PIEPER

Gruppenleiter IV A

MUELLER

Gruppenleiter IV B

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer LISCHKA

Gruppenleiter IV C

SS Oberfuehrer und Oberst der Polizei SOMANN

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Art V

i V SS Oberfuehrer und Oberst der Polizei PANZINGER (i V: in Vertretung or deputy)

Geschaeftsfuehrer

SS Sturmabannfuehrer KANT

Gruppenleiter V A

SS Standartenfuehrer und Oberst der Polizei WEINER

Gruppenleiter V B

SS Standartenfuehrer und Oberst WEINER

Gruppenleiter V C

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr SCHULZE

Gruppenleiter V D

SS Standartenfuehrer Dr ing HEES

Gruppenleiter V Wi

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr FILBERT

Kriminalpolizei Institut

Kriminalbiologisches Institut

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Ant VI

SS Brigadefuehrer und Gennaj der Polizei SCHELIENDEIG

Geschaeftsfuehrer

SS Hauptsturmfuehrer HARTMANN

Gruppenleiter VI A

SS Standartenfuehrer Dr SANDBERGER

Gruppenleiter VI B

SS Standartenfuehrer STEINLE

Gruppenleiter VI C

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer RAPP

Gruppenleiter VI D

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr PAEFFGEN

Gruppenleiter VI E

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer WANECK

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Gruppenleiter VI F

Oberstlt BOENING

Gruppenleiter VI G

SS Sturmbannfuehrer Dr KRALLERT

Gruppenleiter VI S

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer SKORZENY

Gruppenleiter VI W T

SS Standartenfuehrer Dr SCHMIED

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Amt Mil

SCHELLENBERG

Geschaeftsfuehrer

HARTMANN

Abteilungschef Mil A

SANDBERGER

Abteilungschef Mil B

STEIMLE

Abteilungschef Mil C

Major i G OHLETZ

Abteilungschef Mil D

SKORZENY

Abteilungschef Mil E

Oberstlt BOENING

Abteilungschef Mil F

Oberst i G BUNTROCK (Frontaufklaerungstruppen)

Abteilungschef Mil G

BOENING (?)

Lehrregiment Kurfuerst

Major PARTL

Sonderkommando Dora

Major GERICKE

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Amt VII

i V SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr DITTEL

Geschaeftsfuhrer

SS Untersturmfuhrer BRUEDERLE

Gruppenleiter VII A

SS Sturmbannfuhrer BURMESTER

Gruppenleiter VII B

SS Sturmbannfuhrer MUEHLER.

Gruppenleiter VII C

SS Sturmbannfuhrer RICHTER

Amt N

SS Standartenfuhrer SANSONI

Geschaeftsfuhrer

SS Hauptsturmfuhrer MAUSOLF

Referent N/Fc

SS Sturmbannfuhrer WALTHER

Referent N/Fu

SS Hauptsturmfuhrer MARKS

Amt Sanitaet

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr STROHSCHNEIDER

Geschaeftsfuhrer

SS Untersturmfuhrer SCHERZINGER

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
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Organization of Sicherheitspolizei und SD



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