

No. 2487

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- Against -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

DEPONENT: HASHIMOTO, Gun

My name is HASHIMOTO, Gun. I served as Chief Staff officer of the China Garrison Army from August 1936 to the end of August 1937. During that period the China Incident broke out. I am going to discuss the circumstances of those days.

1. Concerning the force and disposition of the China Garrison Army. There were the following units: 1 Infantry Brigade (2 Regiments), 1 cavalry company, one artillery regiment (two battalions), one engineering company 1 communication unit, military police, hospitals and the Special Service Organ (PEPIN, CHANG-CHIAKOW, TAIYUAN, CHINAN, TUNG-CHOW) The headquarters of the Army was in TIENTSIN. The headquarters of the Infantry Brigade was in Pepin. The headquarters of the 1st Infantry Regiment was in PEPIN, and the battalions were stationed in PEPIN, FENGTAI and TIENTSIN. Another small unit was in TUNG-CHOW. As for the 2d Infantry Regiment, its Headquarters and two battalions were stationed in TIENTSIN, (one battalion was in SHANHAIKWAN, and some units were in TANGKU, TANG-SHAN and CHINHUANGTAO,

which are situated along the railway line. The cavalry, artillery, and engineering units and the hospitals were in TIENTSIN. The headquarters of the military police was in TIENTSIN and some of its force were stationed in various other districts. Besides an officer attached to the Japanese Embassy was residing in PEPIN. He was under the direct command of ^{the} General Staff Office and was also subject to the command of the commander of the Army.

The advisers on military affairs had been dispatched to the 29th Chinese Army. The total force was about 7,000.

2. Concerning the Duties of the China Garrison Army

The China Garrison Army was charged with the same duties as those of the garrison armies of the other countries, these duties being based on the Protocol of the Boxer Incident of 1900. That is to say, it was charged with the security of communication lines from diplomatic establishments and PEPIN to ports and harbors and with the protection of the Japanese residents.

3. Concerning the names of the Commander and Chief officers of the China Garrison Army at the time of the outbreak of the Incident.

The commander was originally Lt. General TASHIRO, Kenichiro but he fell critically ill several days prior to the outbreak of the LUKOUCHIAO Incident and died on the 9th. Lt. General KOZUKI, Seishi was appointed his successor. The commander of the Infantry Brigade was Major General KAWABE, Shozo; the commander of the

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1st Infantry Regiment, Colonel MUTAGUCHI, Renya; the Commander of the 2d Regiment, Colonel SUGASHIMA, Ko; the Commander of the Artillery Regiment, Colonel SUZUKI, Sotsudo; the Director of the PEPIN Special Service Organ Major General MATSUI, Takuro; and the officer attached to the Embassy, Major IMAI, Takeo.

4. Concerning the disposition of the Chinese Army in North China before the outbreak of the Incident

The 29th Army under the command of SUNG WEN-LIN was disposed in TIENTSIN, PEPIN, CHANGCHIAKOW, PAOTING and TADING districts (one division was stationed in each of the above mentioned district). The ^{army} /under the command of YEN HSI-SHAN was in SHANHSI province, and the army under the command of HAN FU-CHU was in SHANTUNG Province. The Peace Preservation unit under the command of YINJU-KENG was in KIHTUNG District. The Central army was not stationed in North China. As I remember, exclusive of SHANHSI Province, the Chinese Army in North China numbered about 300,000.

5. Concerning the nature of KIHTUNG Anti-Communist Autonomy and the KIHTSA Political Affairs Committee

The KIHTUNG Anti-Communism Autonomy with YINJU-KENG as its chief, was evidently separated from the Nanking government and stood for an independent regime. The outstanding political object of this regime was the prevention of Communism. The KIHTSA Political Affairs Committee, with SUNGWEN-LIN as its chief, was the local self-governing body recognized by the Nanking government. Its fundamental principles had been carried out either by the instructions or through

the counsel of the Nanking government.

6. Concerning the attitude taken toward China by the China Garrison Army which was instructed by military authorities in TOKYO.

The China Garrison Army strove tirelessly for the promotion of economic and cultural cooperation with Manchukuo and at the same time worked for the elimination of the threat of Communism, instead of presenting a political or military threat to China.

When I took up the post of Chief of Staff Officer of the China Garrison Army, I went to the Military authorities in TOKYO to report my appointment. In the General Staff Office, as well as in the War Ministry, I was told to strive for the promotion of friendly relations with China.

7. Concerning the plan of operation against China and preparations on the part of the Chinese Garrison Army before the outbreak of the Incident with regard to any operation against the Chinese Army

The military authorities in TOKYO gave no instructions whatsoever to the China Garrison Army.

As we did not consider waging war with China at all, we did not work out a plan of operation against the Chinese Army. However, for the purpose of satisfactorily discharging the duties of the Garrison Army in case of emergency, that is, to protect diplomatic establishments and Japanese residents and to secure communication lines, various units worked out a garrison plan. This was, so to speak, a plan of passive defense. Now I shall emphasize the fact that the China Garrison Army made no preparation for

operations against the Chinese Army.

(a) As stated above the China Garrison Army had no plans for operations against the Chinese Army, but the outbreak of the LUKOUCHIAO Incident did not warrant optimism. Such being the case, it was not until 16, July that the China Garrison Army worked out such plans for operations as to enable the army to be equal to any emergency. This could not be said to be an over-all plan of operations against the Chinese Army. It was the plan of operations against only the 29th Army.

- (b) The China Garrison Army was no more than a simple garrison unit without the transport corps and automobiles essential for the task action of the army. Therefore, offensive warfare was impossible for this army.
- (c) Such war supplies as arms, ammunition, provisions, etc., essential for operation were not provided in full for the army, nor did the army hold any stock other than a regular supply.
- (d) The principal object of the education and training of the China Garrison Army in peace time was to form forces as well-equipped and powerful as those at home. We did not aim at the Chinese forces.

VIII. I will relate here the relationship between the China Garrison Army and the Kwantung Army.

As a result of the conclusion of the Tangku Truce Pact between the Kwantung Army and the Chinese Army, the Kwantung Army had been taking a responsible part in North China problems. However, in April, 1936, in accordance with the order of the central authorities, affairs concerning the truce pact were transferred from the Kwantung Army to the China Garrison Army, together with several other matters. Thus, the duties of both armies were made quite clear. Since then both armies kept to their respective spheres of duty, hence no trouble whatever has occurred between these two armies.

IX. I will describe here feelings between the Japanese and the Chinese forces and also between these two nations.

As members of the Japanese army, we strove, in accordance with the national policy of friendship between Japan and China, to convince the Chinese army of our desire to strengthen the ties of amity with the Chinese army.

While the majority of the higher classes of the Chinese army well realized the necessity of Sino-Japanese cooperation and made efforts to achieve it, the lower officers and soldiers did not thoroughly understand the intentions of their seniors, and anti-Japanese speech and behavior has never ceased. In particular after the Suiyuang and the Hsian Incidents, the underground activity of the Communist Party grew more intense and, accordingly, there was no gain saying the fact that the Chinese army was greatly influenced by this agitation.

The feelings of the Japanese and the Chinese people at that time were, to our regret, not conducive to friendship, in spite of the indispensability of maintaining friendly relations between two nations.

Following is an enumeration of some substantial examples:

On September 18, 1936, when the Japanese and the Chinese forces were on the march at Fengtai and passed each other on the road, a clash was about to break out originating from blows assailed by a Chinese soldier on a draught horse of the Japanese army. However, this was settled quietly, thanks to an appropriate measure taken by the leading officers of both armies.

Also, military communications between Peipin and Tientsin were often broken. There were, in addition, cases of insults to the Japanese flag in some places.

For example of the pro-Japanese feelings on the part of higher ranking Chinese officers, even when trouble had broken out and there were many bloody incidents at the front, although their emotions were becoming more and more excited, relations between the higher ranking men of both armies were as friendly and calm as usual. Mr. Sung Che-yuan even attended alone and unguarded the funeral of army commander

TASHIRO held in the Japanese concession on the 16th of July. He cried bitterly before the spirit of the dead over losing such a close friend.

X. Concerning the conflict between the Japanese and Chinese armies at Lukouchiao.

The Lukouchiao accident was neither a planned strategical move nor a challenge on the part of the Japanese side. The following will prove this fact:

(a) The army commander, TASHIRO, had been ill in bed one month before the outbreak of the accident, had been growing worse day by day, and had finally died on July 9. If there had been any planned conspiracy on the Japanese side, it would have been better to change the army commander at once.

(b) Brigade Commander KAWABE, the most responsible man, was not on the scene on the day of the accident, having gone to Shanhaikuan for an inspection.

(c) On the day of the incident the troops in Peipin had gone to Tung-chow for maneuvers and only one company of troops was left in Peipin. This was not enough to indicate that the incident had been planned.

(d) A battalion out of the infantry regiment in Tientsin was also dispatched to Shanhaikuan for maneuvers.

(e) Since the unit which was holding maneuvers at Lukouchiao had no live shells, and consequently could not return fire when shot at by the Chinese, they, therefore, retreated from the place to Mt. Ichimonji for refuge.

(f) The place where the company was holding maneuvers was strategically a very disadvantageous lowland surrounded by Yuanping and Jangwangaleo where the Chinese garrisons were located. Under such disadvantageous circumstances, it would have been very dangerous for the Japanese to initiate a disturbance.

The objective circumstances were very disadvantageous, rather dangerous, for the Japanese side as I have said above. It was impossible for the Japanese army to challenge the Chinese army under such conditions.

XI. Concerning the maneuvers and the location of maneuvers of the Japanese army.

The stationary troops in the North China of the countries had had their own maneuvering grounds under an agreement with the Chinese side in accordance with the protocol of the Boxer Uprising of 1900 (Meiji 33). Also, in accordance with an agreement with the Chinese, the Peipin troops had grounds in Tung-chow, and the Fengtai troops had both a parade ground at the north side of the barracks and maneuver grounds on a plain, three kilometres west of the barracks. The stationary troops in Tientsin or other places also had maneuver grounds. This was the case not only of the Japanese army but also of the troops of other countries.

It is true, as Witness Chin Te-chun said, that the Japanese army carried out their maneuvers without any notice to the Chinese side. However, there was no obligation to give such notice. The protocol had given the troops of foreign countries the right to maneuver without notice. But in May of 1937, the Chinese side wanted to be informed about night maneuvers, since they excited people and caused social uneasiness. If notified, Chinese authorities could forecast maneuvers to the people and relieve anxiety. We agreed to this request and decided to give notice of night maneuvers beforehand. As for the night maneuvers of July 7, as I found out after the incident had ended by inquiring through the special service agency, that it was clear that the Chinese had been notified.

XII. Concerning the measures taken by the Japanese army after they had learned about the Lukouchiao accident.

The military authorities approved the first report from the front that a committee of Japanese and Chinese would investigate actual conditions.

On July 8, in the morning, they heard from the front that the "ICHIKI" battalion had attacked the Chinese army in Lungwangmiao. The authorities stopped action at the front at once and ordered the battalion to wait for the further instructions.

The military authorities held a staff conference and determined to settle the problem without allowing it to spread any more. They issued orders to their units in accordance with this decision, telegraphed the decision to central headquarters, and awaited orders. At the same time, they took steps to get Brigade Commander KAWABE back to Peipin. When he passed Tientsin, I instructed him by telephone to put a stop to actions at the front according to the policy and to settle the trouble on the spot. In order to avoid misunderstandings of the policy of the military authorities, I also dispatched a staff there.

On July 8, at 6 P.M., the general staff, by telegram, ordered adherence to the non-spreading policy, and especially the avoidance of the use of force to prevent the spreading of the incident.

The military authorities made a plan for settling the problem at the actual place and delivered it to headquarters. Then I went to Peipin and showed the plan to the Chinese authorities, who agreed to it and signed it on the same date. The main points are as follows:

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(a) The representatives of the 29th Army will proclaim their responsibility for the incident, express their regret to the Japanese, and punish the responsible people.

(b) Since the Chinese army is too near to the Japanese army in Fengtai and incidents are apt to occur, there will henceforth be no troops in Lukouchiao and Lungwangmiao, and a Peace Preservation Corps will maintain security.

C) As this incident was mainly led by the "Blue Shirts Society" and other Communist or anti-Japanese associations, the Chinese authorities will consider a counter-plan to control them thoroughly. Thus, the treaty was signed and sealed, but the Chinese authorities did not soon carry out the treaty's promises.

Observing conditions, the headquarters instructed the Army as follows.

The following are the basic principles involved in settling the situation:

- (A) To request at least the following points to be performed on the 19th of July.
- (1) Sung Che-yuan shall express his regret formally.
 - (2) Punishments of the responsible are to extend to the dismissal of Feng Yeh-an.
 - (3) Troops in Papaoshan shall retreat from that point.
 - (4) Sung Chu-yuan shall sign the conditions of the settlement presented on the 10th of July.
- (B) If the Chinese Army does not perform these request of ours in the period allowed, our Army will stop negotiations on the spot, and the Japanese Army will punish the 29th Army. In order to do that, the Japanese authorities will mobilize troops at home at the end of the time limit and dispatch them to North China at once.
- (C) After the time limit, even if the Chinese side does yield and agree to perform our requests, the 29th Army is to retreat to the right bank of the River Yungting.
- (D) Since Japan wants to limit the situation to North China and settle the trouble on the scene, we request the Nanking Government to restore the Central Army to its former state, to stop the challenging actions against Japan, and not to interfere with settlement at the actual scene. Thence, we sent the above instructions to the Chinese authorities. Sung Che-yuan accepted them, came to Tientsin himself on July 18, expressed his regret to the Army Commander, and presented the provisions for the control of the Communist and other anti-Japanese associations mentioned in the above agreement.

Thus, the Chinese side, though they accepted our offer, failed just as before to try to carry out its terms. Especially they delayed the carrying out of the items of the agreement concerning the Chinese Army's evacuation. To the contrary, disgraceful affairs came out one after another in various places, and we did not find them at all sincere.

13. I shall speak about the disgraceful affairs during the confrontation of both sides.

On July 11: On Marco Polo Bridge the Chinese Army fired at us illegally and we had ten casualties (six of them killed).

On July 13: The Chinese Army fired unlawfully at Japanese Army Troops passing Nanyuan and Hotzun, and we had ten casualties (five of them killed).

On July 16: The Japanese Army, while passing by the vicinity of Anping, was fired upon by the Chinese Army. Fortunately, there were no casualties.

On July 20: On I WENTZU-SHAN, the Chinese Army fired unlawfully at Japanese Army Troops and we had four casualties (one of them killed).

On July 25: The Chinese Army fired unlawfully at Japanese soldiers who were repairing the communication line at Langfeng. There were fifteen casualties on the Japanese side (four of them killed).

To prevent the occurrence of such an untoward incident, we had given them advance notice of the repair work and had begun to work. The attack was, therefore, malicious.

On July 26: The Kwangan-gate Incident occurred. In this case also, we gave them advance notice, and, with their consent, one of our battalions passed through the Kwangan-gate in order to return to the camp in the Castle of Peking for the purpose of protecting our residents. On the way, the Chinese Army shut the door of the walled city and attacked the Japanese soldiers who had already entered. This was a most malicious attack. We suffered seventeen casualties (two of them killed, and, in addition, two journalists killed).

14. Concerning the military action of mobilization and massing of the Japanese Army after the occurrence of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. In the morning, on July 8, our stationary Army in China decided not to allow the incident to spread and at the same time not to request for an increase in the Kwantung

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Army, but to mass the main power of the Stationary army around Fengtai and Tanchou for the worst. This was arranged to prevent expansion of the incident. Nevertheless, on July 10, in the Central Headquarters of the Chinese Army, the mobilization of the air force was ordered, and four divisions were commanded^{to} gather at the north line of Honan province.

On July 12, it was ordered to mobilize the units in the province of Honan, Hoped, Anhwei and Kiangsu, and to mass them along the Lunghai railway and Peiping-Hangkow railway.

On July 14, Canton air force and army were dispatched. Thus the Chinese showed a tendency toward advancing north; therefore, the position of our stationary army became dangerous. Headquarters in Tokyo, put the 20th Battalion of Korea, as well as the mixed brigade of the Kwangtung Army, a mechanized brigade, some air units and other auxiliary units^{under} command of the Commander-in-chief of the Stationary Army in China. These units came to north China in succession after about the July 12. Then Central Headquarters massed the 20th Army in the district of Tangshen and Shankuikwan (after that one part advanced to Tientzin); units of Kwangtung Army, in the vicinity of Shuni, north of Peking; the main forces of the regular stationary army, in Fengtai; and a part of the same army in Tunchow.

Afterwards negotiations with the Chinese were continued.

After the stationary army in China came to take decisive steps other divisions in Japan proper were mobilized. Specifically on July 27, 3 divisions were ordered to mobilize. On the 29th, the mobilization was completed and they were transported to north China

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in succession. It was on August 15 that the first of these divisions arrived in north China.

15. Concerning the motives of our Stationary army for deciding the systematic attack against Nanyuan and the actual beginning of hostilities.

After the malicious, disgraceful incidents at Langfang, Kwangan-gate, etc., had broken out in succession, more serious incidents might occur and dangerous consequence might fall upon us if the Japanese side remained patient any longer. In view of that possibility, we decided it proper to punish the Chinese in order to protect our right and to force the 29th army to reconsider its actions. We thus determined to attack, but we did not attack without warning.

On July 25, as soon as the Langfang Incident broke out, we sent notification asking the Chinese side to reconsider. Again on the 26th, when we met with the Kwangan-gate Incident, we sent an ultimatum, leaving room for reconsideration, but we received no answer to that. Thereupon on the 28th we carried out the attack against Nanyuan. Notification sent after the Langfang Incident were as follows:

"It is regrettable that both our forces have come into collision at last, forced by unlawful fixing on the part of your forces against a part of the Japanese forces, which had been despatched to protect communication lines at Langfang on the night of the 25th.

"Such a situation has been caused by your lack of sincerity in enforcing the conditions agreed upon with our forces and by your

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continued belligerent attitude. If your forces wish to keep
this outbreak from spreading, ^{you} first immediately order
the troops near the Marco Polo Bridge and Papaoshan to retreat to
Changsintien by tomorrow noon and that part of the 37th division
in Peipin to move from the walled city of Peipin to the western
district of Yungting River by noon of the 28th through the north-
ern districts of the Peipin - Hankow Railways. They must be
accompanied by the other troops of the 37th division who are in
Hsiynan. Thereafter you must begin the gradual transportation
of these troops toward Pacting.

If your forces do not act upon our advice, we shall consider
your forces as lacking in sincerity, and we shall, therefore, be
forced to take suitable action. In that event your forces will
be charged with responsibility for anything that occurs."

I cannot relate the note which was, issued after the Kwang-
armen incident, since I have no record, but I remember that, by
and large ^{they} urged a reply to the above related note within a time
limit.

This resolution to wage war was not directed against China
as a whole, but against only the 37th division, which was the
most characteristically anti-Japanese of the units in the 29th
Army. This was simply because of the fact that the army had
truly intended to limit its activities even when operations were
started. Especially, since the withdrawal of the 37th division
had been demanded as shown in the aforesaid notification, it was
but natural for the Japanese army to conclude that she had a right
to leave other divisions at Tientsin and in the neighborhood of

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peking. This determination of the army was reported to the Central Headquarters. The Central Headquarters agreed to this and issued an order for the commencement of a movement.

In the order, however, there was a clause which instructed the army "not to go beyond the line along the river Yungting-ho". By this clause the army understood that the Central Headquarters had not abandoned the hope of settling the question at the spot.

16. I should now like to tell the reasons for the non-expansion policy of the army and also to discuss the attitude of the Central Headquarters.

The reasons for which the army had taken the non-expansion policy might be stated briefly as follows: It was considered improper to change the great policy of the state which had been to bring about good relations between Japan and China, simply because of a military conflict at a certain locality. Moreover, the Japanese Army stationed in China never thought of going into war with that country, and, consequently had no preparation for such a war. Again, we considered that if we opened war against China, it would grow into a racial conflict and that the conflict might be a prolonged war, due to the vastness of the Chinese territory. So, we determined to avoid a war with China as long as possible. Fortunately, the leaders of the Chinese Army, the other party of our negotiation, also had a "non-expansion" principle, and we believed that we would be able to reach a peaceful agreement, I have already mentioned in fragments the fact that various measures were taken by Central Headquarters just in the same manner to prevent the expansion^s

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of the affair. In particular, commander KAGETSU, on his arrival there to assume his new post, gave instructions to persist in the "non-expansion" policy. Again, Chief of the General Affairs Section of the General Staff NAKAJIMA, and Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry SHIBAYAMA were sent to the front to obtain full understanding of the non-expansion policy of the Central Headquarters, on the part of the entire army, at the front,

17. I shall relate a strange event which happened while the Japanese and the Chinese forces were face to face at the front. After the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, there were persons who often discharged guns from the flank to tempt the Chinese to open fire illegally which both the Japanese and the Chinese forces were in a state of mutual suspense. It was repeated almost every evening. I heard rumors that it was probably done by Chinese students or by Communist elements. I think there existed a third party's intrigue to provoke a conflict between the Japanese and the Chinese forces.

18. I should like to add one thing to what witness Chin Te-chun has told about the establishment for the sake of the strengthening of military power. Mr. Chin Te-chun misunderstood the facts. One infantry battalion was stationed in Iengtai. However, our barracks were in railway property belonging to a railway station, and, since the area was small and inconvenient for sanitation as well as for drilling, we asked to borrow some land in the neighbourhood as a new ^{site} for our barracks. However, the authorities of the Hopei-chahar Regime shirked their responsibility under the pretext

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that Chinese nations' opposed the move. Therefore we asked a few Chinese natives and discovered that their answer was favorable to us. Accordingly, we negotiated with the Chinese authorities, but the authorities ordered the Head of the Yuanping-hsien to compel the natives to write a document opposing us.

Definite denial was not given to this request and as time went on the matter was left as it was. The conversation between Mr. Chin and myself written in Mr. Chin's oral statement is a pure fabrication. I met Mr. Sung She-yuan once only to urge him.

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On this 25th day of March 1947

At TOKYO

DEPONENT HASHIMOTO, Gun (Seal)

I, ONO, Kisaku hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At TOKYO

Witness: (Signed) ONO, Kisaku (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

HASHIMOTO, Gun (Seal)

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Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon of the Defense Language Branch,
hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the
above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a
correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of
the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan

Date 11 April 1947

(AFFIDAVIT OF HASHIMOTO, GUN)