

I submitted my opinion to the Premier saying that to attack and subsequently occupy the capital of China would only make the whole situation more serious than over and would create a considerable hindrance to the readjustment of China-Japan relations in the future. I suggested that peace should be sought before this campaign took place.

All the Councillors were of more or less the same opinion, and the government authorities seemed to have done their best in endeavoring to save the situation. However, what was lacking with the government authorities was a resolute determination to push through their policy, whereas the military action which was under the direction of the Supreme Command gained more influence every day and resulted in the further aggravation of the situation.

I think it was around this time that a peace negotiation was made through the good offices of Mr. Trautman, German Ambassador in China. All of the councillors were looking forward to the success of this negotiation, but the repeated efforts on the part of the Japanese government were frustrated. The Councillors did not participate in the deliberation of this peace negotiation and accordingly were not informed of its details. However, they eagerly expected the government, in an abstract manner, to accomplish this negotiation, until it proved in vain on the 16th of January.

Thus, the Councillors, whose duty from its inception had been nullified, became a mere nominal sinecure. The Councillors are charged with atrocities in Nanking, but they had neither the authority nor duty of controlling such an incident.

19. The circumstances in which I became Education Minister and the state of affairs during my tenure of office.

Prince KONOYE, from his sincere apprehension over the situation, and desiring to devise counter means against it, determined at the end of May to reshuffle his Cabinet, and selected as ministers the following members from the Cabinet Councillors. General UGAKI was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mr. IKEDA, Minister of Finance and concurrently Minister of Commerce and Industry; and myself Minister of Finance and concurrently Minister of Commerce and Industry; and myself Minister of Education. He then appointed Lt. General ITOGAKI as War Minister. I had some expectation for this renovated Cabinet, but Premier KONOYE, after the renovation made it his practice to confer on current problems only with the Five Minister Conference comprised of Ministers of War, Navy, Foreign and Finance, and other Ministers were not invited to the discussions.

At that time military operations were in progress, and as they were under control of the Supreme Command, the Cabinet had no authority to check them. Thus, while the Premier was indecisive military action gradually developed and reached as far as Wuchang, Hankow and Canton. During this time, the members of the Cabinet other than those of the Five Minister Council were not immediately informed of the latest state of affairs.

Under the circumstances, my position was merely the chief of the education administration, which was entirely outside the realm of current affairs, and all I did was to promote education and its administration.

20. My work as Minister of Education.

The Ministry of Education, as one of its fixed duties, shared with the Ministry of Home Affairs the task of keeping surveillance over the General Spiritual Mobilization Organization. Consequently, the Minister of Education had to write in magazines and make broadcasts in connection with educational matters, as part of his routine duties. The drafts of articles or broadcasts usually prepared by the staff of ministry in charge of such matter and the Minister only made them public. The work was executed along the customary line. I do not think there was anything which was planned with specific intention or departed from the customary practice.

Excerpts of some of my books were tendered to the Tribunal as prosecution evidence. To those I contend that if the whole book had been read, instead of excerpts, what I was aiming to explain would have been understood.

During the earlier period of my tenure of office as Education Minister, there were some in the Ministry who were inclined toward flattery or fanatically pleaded the true principle of the fundamental policy of our country; there were some who were inclined to agree with the Nazi ideology; on the other hand, there were still some submerged elements in the schools who followed communism.

This situation required competent persons who could regulate this confusion, and this was why I conducted personnel shifts among the Education Office Staff.

I also appointed competent people who could cope with confidence with the request from the military authorities and other government branches so that the evil practice of being obsequitous to such requests could be eliminated.

At that time, the Education Council had already been established (in 1937). This was the highest institution for the renovation of the education system and it comprised as Councillors the most prominent persons of learning and experience, both in and out of office. All the important problems of education were deliberate upon at this Council and the government policies on education were decided upon by its resolution.

The inception of the advocacy for compulsory education at the Youths School dates back to the beginning of the TAISHO Era when it was then only a Supplementary School.

In 1937, the Educational Administration Council made a report, in answer to the inquiry from the government about the question of Youths School. In January 1938, at the time of my predecessor, compulsory education was already decided upon at a Cabinet meeting. Then the question was again deliberated upon by the Education Council and according to its reply in July of the same year, it was arranged that an Imperial Ordinance be issued in April 1939 for its enforcement.

This new system was to give equal opportunity of education to all people and help to develop their natural gifts. It is entirely wrong to interpret this change as militarization of education.

The education system in Japan since the MEIJI Era had been formed after the European and American lives. While the system enjoyed certain popularity among the public, it offered more opportunity to the well-to-do class of people, and those of talent and faculty from the power classes found difficulty in developing their natural gifts. I perceived that this was contrary to our original program to let everyone gain his proper place, when the Educational Council submitted its decision that education in the Youths School should be made compulsory. I took this opportunity to develop the education of the working class of youths, and to give to those who showed good result in the Youths School ample opportunity to develop their talent.

The most serious apprehension of Japan at that time was the disturbance of ideological circles. There was a time when communism spread widely among the people and once it became the tide of public opinion; then there was a time, later when people followed Nazism or Fascism. This trend gave rise to complications between the liberalism which had also existed at that time and caused a terrible state of chaos.

The several unfortunate incidents which arose from the current situation at that time were due to the disturbance of thought on the part of the people. On the other hand, the rise of the Nippon spirit tended to create a dogmatic nationalism, which from its lack of ubiquity, was apt to fall into extreme rightism and was pregnant of much danger. The cause of this defect was due to the fault of perfunctory education which had a tendency of making the people lose sight of ideological independence and lofty ideas. In order to reform this, I advocated that the imperial virtue of benevolence and tolerance, which had been the basic spirit from the time of the foundation of our country, should be borne in mind and cultivate in it an ubiquitous character which was welcome in all the modern civilized countries of the world. Imperial admonition was my guiding principle when attending to this work, inasmuch as the imperial admonition was teaching us the basic principle of humanity with His Majesty's generosity, and I considered that that was the code that the people should observe. This principle which had been the basic spirit from the time of the foundation of the Empire was entirely different from militarism not only was it just the contrary to militarism, but it was the one essentially required for the correction of the defect in ideological circles at that time.

21. Military Training in Schools

The history of physical exercise in military style which was eventually turned into military training dates back many years ago, but I am not going into its detail now. I had heard of some conflict between the education institutions and the military authorities with regard to military training in the schools, but neither of the parties had my sympathy, inasmuch as the whole conflict seemed to be due to their narrow views.

It was quite natural that school education placed its importance in cultivating the spirit of discipline and cooperation by training. But as the result of the training depended on the character of the person who was in charge of training, there were instances when the training was executed in excess of the above object. On the other hand, there were several cases where, on account of lack of proper understanding on the part of the school authorities, liberalism was regarded as synonymous to a sloven life and students were left in an irregular and slatternly existence. Another fearful tendency was communistic ideology, which, combined with some of the political plotters caused deterioration of the student's spirit by abetting them into the habit of disdaining such virtues as discipline, moderation, cooperation and diligence, all of which were indispensable to the promotion of the culture of a nation.

During the earlier period of my Education Ministership, these fearful tendencies were gaining influence, much to my regret. There were frequent occasions when students were arrested and detained by the police on the charge of disturbing public order. These types of students were given to slandering the training in the schools as being militarization of school education. There were some even among the teachers and professors who encouraged students toward such tendencies.

I changed the system of training in the schools in such a way so as to observe moderation between the above two extremes and with it I tried to promote the lofty ideals of the students.

The reformation of the system of the Youths School was an act of equalizing the right and duty of education. By the reformation, there was no increase in hours allotted for training and there was not the slightest evidence to show that the education was militarized.

Military training in the schools was a part of the school education and from the viewpoint of educational administration it should not have exceeded this category. This was my principle in coping with this training, and so any request from the army authorities which attempted to bring it out of this category met my refusal.

There were occasions when in compliance with the request of students and school authorities, the use of modern weapons was introduced in training, but this decision was an autonomous disposition of the school authorities in view of the students' request, and was not done by the request of the Education Ministry.

While I was Education Minister, I placed importance on cultivating the moral element rather than promoting the skill of combat. This moral element served to reveal the Emperor's virtue of benevolence.

Defense Document No.

That is to say, by training I taught students to cultivate their morals rather than to cultivate the habit of depending on armed force.

23. National Spirit General Mobilization

The National Spirit General Mobilization system had been established at the time of the First KONOYE Cabinet and its object was to straighten the national spirit against the state of affairs after the outbreak of the China Incident. It had been established before I became the Education Minister.

Its central executive organ was civilian comprised of people of learning, fame and experience which had been placed under the charge of the Departments of Home Affairs and Education. Its main object was the improvement of the people's daily life and spiritual restraint.

Later, there was a tendency for the policy of this central executive organ to become dogmatic. The HIRANUMA Cabinet, desiring to follow its policy properly, established a committee system with the chairman of the committee to be selected from among the cabinet ministers, to pursue a basic policy, and all the people of learning and experience both in and out of office were requested to deliberate so that the committee could submit its opinion to the government.

In my capacity of Education Minister, I was recommended to the chairmanship of this committee, but most of the actual work was handled by the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet. The committee and staff included many civilians, especially women, and deliberated on renovation and curtailment of daily living.

However, in spite of its primary objective, the discussion tended to delve into current problems, diverting from its original purpose of cultivating the fundamental character of the people in order to be worthy of associating with the modern world.

What was most urgently required under the circumstances was to ask the people to undertake a severe introspection into their daily mode of living, concentrate upon the cultivation of the spirit of endurance and improvement of their daily life, respect social morality and help them to bring about efficiency in their work.

In order to realize the above, I established a day of self-introspection. I decided that the first day of every month be called the "Serving Day" and requested the people to lead a life of restraint on this day. There was an opinion at that time that in view of the current situation, the 7th of every month, the day of the outbreak of the China Incident would be a better day for

"Servin~~g~~ Day". However, my opinion was that "Servin~~g~~ Day" should be disconnected with the current state of affairs. My intention was to use this day for permanently promoting the basic standard of living of the people, and in order to get the people to understand this principle, I made the first day of every month the day for self-introspection. Thus I tried to prevent everything from coming under the influence of the current situation.

I wish to add that the National Spirit General Mobilization was entirely different in nature from National General Mobilization and Student Mobilization. The National Spirit General Mobilization was merely a part of the daily life renovation movement.

24. International problems while I was the Education Minister.

My duty as Education Minister was limited mainly to education administration, and the general international problems were outside the scope of my work. I have no recollection whether such matters as Premier KONCYE's declaration of the Establishment of the New Order or Foreign Minister ARITA's declaration was debated at the Cabinet Meeting.

My non-association with the international problems was more conspicuous at the time of the HIRANUMA Cabinet. In fact, I knew nothing about those matters at that time, inasmuch as all the important problems were discussed and decided at the Five Minister Conference.

Japan-German Cultural Agreement was first proposed to me by the Foreign Office and then Japan entered into this agreement. The agreement concerned culture only and had no political significance.

Exchange of boys between Germany and Japan was planned and executed before my acceptance of the Education Ministership. The first group returned home after my assumption of office. I did not see in this party anything more than an ordinary social visit of a tourist party. I wanted to send a similar party not to Germany alone, but to all other civilized countries, but could not realize it.

The Khasan and Nomonhan Incidents were reported to the Cabinet Meeting as being mere skirmishes between the border garrisons of both countries. The Education Minister was not concerned in the disposal of such incidents. Only one thing was clear that the government desired an amicable settlement and the army acted from the beginning to end in conformity with this policy. That was why those incidents did not become serious subjects of discussion at the Cabinet Meeting.

I did not know anything about the Tripartite Pact and the Wang-Chin-wei government. I did not even know how they were discussed or made. As for the stationing of troops in French Indo-China and the problems concerning

the Lesser Southern Group of Islands and Hainan Island, I had not the slightest idea of what was going on.

25. Cabinet Councillor at the ABE and YONAI Cabinets.

It was quite a long time after the formation of the ABE Cabinet that I was asked to become a Councillor of that Cabinet. (I think it was in December 1939). I had known that a Cabinet Councillor was merely a nominal post and that I could not be of any material service to that Cabinet, so I first declined to accept it but the Premier was so persistent that I had to accept it after all. The ABE Cabinet resigned en bloc after two months of my acceptance of this post, and so I did not even have a chance of talking to the Premier.

When the YONAI Cabinet was formed, I was asked to become its Home Minister. However, my view was as I have stated above, and furthermore, the state of affairs was so aggravated at that time that I considered it was impossible for anyone except those who held strong influence over the military authorities, to exercise an effective administration to cope with the situation, and so I refused to accept it.

Then I was asked to become its Cabinet Councillor, but as my view was unchanged since the ABE Cabinet, again I declined to accept it. But when I was persistently asked by him to list my name among the Councillors only for nominal purpose, I could not very well refuse it and became a Cabinet Councillor.

As my assumption of the post had taken place under such circumstances, I remained its nominal member and actually did not do any work. I did not even know what was going on in the cabinet. It was, however, conceivable that both the ABE and YONAI Cabinets were opposed to the Tripartite Pact and that they were eager to put an end to the China Incident.

26. My attitude toward the Second KONOYE Cabinet

It was in September 1940, about two months after the formation of the Second KONOYE Cabinet that Mr. Tomita, Chief Cabinet Secretary unexpectedly visited me and asked me to become a Cabinet Councillor of the Second KONOYE Cabinet.

I had been told that the establishment of the Grand Rule Assistance Association and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact were going to be disclosed shortly. These were the two important domestic and foreign problems, over which I had had serious apprehensions for sometime in the past. Since those two problems were to be realized, it meant that my apprehension could not remain mere apprehension, but developed into something very serious. I decided that I could not assist the Cabinet which was to commit those mistakes. In fact, the things were so serious that I thought I had to make a very careful consideration about it. I confided these considerations to Mr. Tomita and told him that I could not accede to his request.

Defense Document No.

On the evening of the same day, Prince KONOYE visited me at my house and repeated his request. We had a hot discussion for more than five hours. I explained to him that the state of affairs at that time indicated very grave consequences and I did not accept his request.

From March 1936 to October 15th, 1937, from September 1939 to November, 1939 and after July 1940, I was not in any official position and no public activity was undertaken by me during those periods. The incidents such as the Anti-Comintern Pact, outbreak of the China Incident, Stationing of troops in French Indo-China, Tripartite Pact and the Pacific War occurred during those periods, and so I do not think it necessary for me to state anything about those incidents.

28. My refutation against Prosecution testimony.

Prosecution's record of my interrogation and its intrinsic value.

1. The Prosecution tendered Exhibit No. 187-A onward as being the record of my interrogation. I presume the prosecution meant by this to submit to the Tribunal the record of the interrogation which the prosecutors (Colonel Morrow and Mr. Hyder) conducted of me at the Sugamo Prison. The interrogation was carried on for more than twenty times, between January 18th and March 12th, 1946, by the prosecutors, assisted by one or two interpreters each time.

The English versions of the said interrogations were stenographically recorded for the first few occasions, but this procedure was stopped later, whereas the Japanese version was not recorded from the beginning. The interpreters were not fully conversant with Japanese and there were several points over which, on account of incompetent interpretation, we failed to come to a mutual understanding. Moreover, the record of this interrogation was not read to me, nor was it even shown to me.

I was never asked to give oath or sign the statement in connection with this interrogation. The record, when presented before the Tribunal, contained quite a number of misunderstandings, complications and mistakes; more remarkable ~~was~~ its diversions from the facts, and as a whole, I cannot hold myself responsible for the contents of these statements.

2. Through the whole course of interrogation, the prosecution changed interpreters almost on each occasion, and as far as I could see, all of them were unable to thoroughly understand Japanese and the Japanese

state of affairs. The interpreters themselves seemed to have conscientiously admitted their incompetence.

As I felt uneasy of this situation, I suggested that I should write the outline, if not the details, of what were asked of me. I said that if the prosecutors were to make interrogations based on my written statement, it would not only save considerable time, but also would help to convey my idea accurately and correctly.

This suggestion was duly agreed to by the prosecution and although I had not much time to elaborate on its contents, I made a statement concerning the settlement of the Manchurian Incident after my acceptance of the post of War Minister, and also, in answer to the question of the prosecution regarding the movement of young officers, I made another statement concerning the situation of Japan at the time of the Incident and the general outline of how I acted in it. The former was handed over to Mr. Hyder and the latter to Colonel Morrow, and I asked them to let me read the English translation of those two statements when it was ready.

I think this took place on or about 11th or 12th of February 1946. There is a remark in Exhibit No. 187-C, as having been said by the prosecutor, "I will bring you a copy of this translation.", and also as my statement, "All of these are written in the document that I gave you." refer to this conversation.

However, much to my anxiety, the translation was not shown to me, and the interrogation of the prosecutors continued. Of course the interrogation, which was carried out in the same manner as before, filled me with apprehension, but since I had already presented my written statement, it did not worry me too much. I only waited for the time when a proper interrogation based on my written statement would take place.

After the commencement of this trial, the translation of the documents in question was handed to me through my defense counsel, and the prosecution submitted to the Tribunal the record of my interrogation in evidence. On that occasion, my counsel tried to explain to the Tribunal the circumstances in which the interrogation was carried out, but my impression was that the explanation was not properly understood.

My counsel subsequently tried to take every opportunity to explain this matter to the Tribunal. He once tendered a copy of this translation in evidence under a general phase, but it was not admitted on the ground that it should be submitted under the individual phase. (document)

I contend that the written statement that I made at the Sugamo Prison is indispensable to the record of my interrogation and that they should be read together. I further suggest that even in that written statement, there is a slight mistake which occurred through misinterpretation of prosecutor's question.

3. Such being the case, the record of my interrogation contained several important mistakes and, furthermore, the contents are not consistent as a Japanese sentence, some of which, I shall point out in the following:

1. The allegation that during the Manchurian Incident, I established a plan for occupation of Manchuria. (Exhibit No. 188-A 188-B, 188-C, among which 188-C is slightly better, but the other two do not make sense.)

This allegation is entirely different from the fact. That this allegation is wrong can easily be checked by comparing the date of my interrogation, my written answer to the prosecutors and Exhibit No. 188-A, 188-B and 188-C.

The real state of affairs at that time has been fully Explained in my present statement, and the statement will be supported by the evidence which has been submitted by this time and also by those which will be submitted in the future.

2. The allegation makes us believe as if the Privy Council was the party which decided the national policy. That this is wrong is quite clear even from common sense.

3. It is also a great mistake, as can easily be ascertained, in the allegation that the War Minister dictated orders to the Chief of General Staff for the dispatch of troops.

4. The date when the INUKAI Cabinet decided the outline of its Manchurian policy was not the 17th of December. This mistake arose when the Prosecutor insisted that the plenary session of the Privy Council for the deliberation of "Issuance of Bond to cover the Emergency Expense to deal with the Manchurian Incident" was on that date.

5. My statement concerning the basic principle of dealing with the Incident was confused by the interpreter with my statement concerning the fact. By this I mean our conversation relative to whether or not the document in question is still kept, regulation of Cabinet meeting, whether or not attendance at the Cabinet meeting was compulsory.

6. The allegation is that I stated that the sovereignty over
5 Manchuria rests with China. It may be so from general conception based on a map, but the fact was different, and my statement to that effect was mistaken as above shown.
7. The allegation that I directed the independence declaration of Manchuria and its subsequent recognition is entirely mistaken. This will be clarified by the allusion to the same in this statement as well as by other evidence which is to be tendered.
8. Conversations concerning the responsibility of Cabinet members, the declaration of the Foreign Minister, those who were responsible for the China Incident, and the circumstances in which I accepted the post of Cabinet Councillor were only partially recorded, and because of this, the record failed to convey the real meaning and is apt to mislead the readers. This will be clarified by documentary evidence and witnesses.
9. The extent of authority of the Supreme Command, which was in charge of the expedition, and that of the government was not thoroughly expressed in the record of my interrogation.

I merely stated an instance to show that in ordinary times, the government policy is shown to the Supreme Command by the government in order to make it a basis for the former to decide upon its movement, but by this I did not mean to specifically state the fundamental power and authority of those two organs.

When the warfare was started, or when the Supreme Command deemed it necessary from national defense point of view, it was entitled to make a direct access to the Throne, and so it can not be said that the dispatch of troops was done only when it was agreed to by the government.

2. Further refutation to other evidence of the Prosecution.

a) The Motion Picture "Emergency Japan."

"Emergency Japan" was the title of my speech which I made, in compliance with the request of the Osaka Mainichi Newspaper, on the subject of Emergency.

It was the time when Japan was unfortunate to have to withdraw from the League of Nations. An air of uneasiness prevailed throughout the country, and there was utter confusion both politically and ideologically.

I had an idea of my own, with which I wanted to appeal to my fellow compatriots. My afore-mentioned speech was to restrain the people from corrupt customs and from habits which prevailed throughout the country, and to encourage them to further their recognition of the international relations, and, by doing so, to quiet the people's mind which was apt to run to extremes.

I advocated in this speech that the real object of national defense is not in waging war, but in protecting and securing morals, and justice; that the troops of Japan should not make it their first object to blindly resort to armed force, but that they should place the first importance in securing morals, and thus I requested the self-reflection of the people over the circumstances in which they were, in order to enhance their culture.

I was not concerned in any way in the manufacture of this film. I trust the section of the War Office in charge gave necessary warning to the manufacturers to be very careful not to provoke international feeling by this film. The above intention of mine was clearly manifested in 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th and 12th reels of this film.

I have used this expression of emergency on several other occasions and other documentary evidence bearing this title of emergency will clarify what I meant by this expression.

I made a speech in the summer of 1933 in which I said, "what is needed by the people of emergency Japan is the watchword, don't reject others, don't abuse others, don't blame others, but cultivate your character." I also told the younger generations of Japan the state of mind that they should have, "don't be satisfied by finding yourself alone contented. Cooperate with and assist others in bringing about peace and welfare of the people. Don't criticize to fault of others. Be generous and broad minded. The peace of the world and your own welfare will be realized by observing the above. Be kind to foreigners and take into your consideration the welfare of the foreign countries. Let us teach the world the path of humanity to reach world peace."

I advocated these principles in connection with the expression "Emergency" and I tried to introduce this principle into the film when it was manufactured in dealing with the subject of the fundamental principle of the Japanese troops. By this I intended to show the aspiration of Japan of cooperating with the world in realizing peace on earth.

There were some minor points which, due to technical reasons and because of the intention ^{of the} manufacturer to cater to the taste of the lower standard of people, were not quite up to my original intention, but as a whole, I considered that the film was faultless. I never heard from any one that the film made any acute ~~impression~~ on the spectators. (b)

(b) My articles in "Mombu Jiho" while I was the Education Minister and my speeches and broadcasts that I made during that period were nothing but the routine work of an Education Minister, and they were not delivered in connection with any Incident in particular. The Prosecution depicted several words as being provocative, but I contend that the Incident was going on at that time and expression of that kind was quite common with the general public and there was nothing strange in that. Those speeches and articles were prepared in such a way that one can really appreciate my purported principle only when he reads through the whole text. I never considered them as giving encouragement to the expansion of the Incident or instigating aggression. Lastly, as can be seen from what I have explained, at no time did I conspire with anyone to commit nor did I commit myself personally, directly or indirectly any of the crimes charged by the prosecution. On the contrary I did every thing in my power to avoid war and the tragic consequences in which Japan finds herself today.

On this 25th day of August, 1947

At War Ministry.

DEPONENT ARAKI, Sadao (seal)

I, SUGAWARA, Yutaka, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence

DEF. DOC. #2488

of this witness.

On the same date
At War Ministry.

Witness: (signed) SUGAWARA, Yutaka (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ARAKI, Sadao (seal)

DEF. DOC. #2486

Exh. No.

DNS

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

The Opening Statement in
Defense of ARAKI, Sadao



By SUGAWARA, Yutaka

Lawrence I. Momanus

THE OPENING Statement in
Defence of ARAKI, Sadao.

If it pleases the Tribunal, we would like to present counter-evidence in refutation of the charges and assertions of the Prosecution against the accused ARAKI.

1. The charges of the Prosecution against ARAKI are as follows:

Together with all the other accused: counts 1 to 17, 27 to 32, 34 and 44.

Together with some other accused: counts 18, 19, 23, 25, 26, 33, 35, 45, 46, 47, and 51 to 55.

The Prosecution, however, points out only the following public career of ARAKI:

Minister of War (Dec. 13, 1931 --- Jan. 23, 1934)

Cabinet Councillor (Oct. 15, 1937 --- May 26, 1938)

Minister of Education (May 26, 1938 --- Aug. 30, 1939)

Chairman of National Spiritual Mobilization (Mar. 28, 1939 --- Aug. 30, 1939)

Cabinet Councillor (Dec. 1, 1939 --- Aug. 3, 1940)

Such being the case except for ARAKI's occupation of the above-mentioned positions, the charges against ARAKI for the remaining ^e prid must be clearly expressed; on the other hand in this connection the Prosecution only vaguely enumerates counts, against which, we therefore submit, no counter-evidence is necessary, but only a chart that will show at a glance ARAKI's non-involvement with such counts should suffice.

2. Evidence of his non-participation in conspiracy.

The Prosecution asserted that ARAKI participated in conspiracy, propagated aggression and instigated young officers. We will show that ARAKI is not a chauvinist, nor a Fascist, let alone an aggressionist, but a believer in KO DO (the Imperial Way), a genuine Nipponism. And the KO DO that he believed in is a moderate, unbiased course of service, and according to its so Doctrine a public road, through heaven and earth, and an

everlasting path for humanity, which is infallible for all ages and true in all places. He will further prove his ideas are not so superstitious, self-conceited and conservative as to threaten world peace; that he is a pacifist and a humanitarian; that in all his speeches, articles and actions he has been advocating this KODO for world peace, and that these speeches articles and actions have been definitely opposed to the instigation of propaganda and instruction for any aggressive war. As to HAKKO ICHIU we can clearly prove in what sense he used the phrase.

We will prove that he taught the Army to act as the Imperial forces, which meant they should carry out the Imperial virtue of benevolence, and that his motto in training the Army was: "Never be resented by the enemy in victory; be loved by the natives during your garrison."

From his experiences in World War 1, he warned the world that warfare was deteriorating to a brutal combat; that even in an inevitable defensive war he condemned the use of poison gas or bacteria as a crime, and contended that the destructive power of weapons should be limited and that war damage upon women, children and other non-combatants should be avoided at all costs. We will further prove that he did not believe, from his view of KODO, that impending political issues between Japan and such countries as China, the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States should be settled by war; that his past has been a series of struggles against

radicalism; that Japan could not escape from the world-wide confusion around 1930; that Japan was suffering from unusual and devastating circumstances which occurred one after another internally as well as externally; that he devoted himself to solving these incidents and succeeded in settling them all one by one. Fate, however, seems to have forbidden him any further efforts, for on January 1, 1934, after his settlement of the Manchurian Incident, he became seriously ill, partly from his overwork and he resigned from War Ministership. Because of his worry over the miserable destiny Japan was precipitately following, he was obliged to leave the political arena.

That, from his viewpoint of KODO he opposed expansion of operations in the China Incident, as well as the Tripartite Pact for fear lest it should lead to a World war.

All the above will be proved by documentary as well as oral evidence.

3. We will prove that it was because of ARAKI's efforts that the Manchurian Incident and the 1st Shanghai Incident were settled with the least possible damage, thus preventing them from developing into a wholesale disturbance of East Asia.

We will show that the Manchurian Incident had some factors which could have led to a great international eruption; that the Incident had broken out three months before so that it could not be returned to Status quo ante when ARAKI was appointed Minister of War, and that in Manchuria the movement for independence had been brewing because of its historical background and had swayed the entire Manchurian population.

This however, has already been proven, to some extent, in the general phase. We will however show that the measures taken by him since he became War Minister were neither aggressive nor indicative of occupation, but aimed at the protection of Japan's rights and interests and her residents, in accordance with international law and were the realization of a cabinet decision to terminate hostilities at the earliest possible date; that there were two measures to be taken to cease fire, that one (1) was to pacify disturbances by bandits, and to repulse other challenging activities and to conclude a truce and the other was to calm Japan's internal excitement and to make the nation reflect upon herself, and that (2) ARAKI succeeded in realizing these two steps perfectly. Further, that ARAKI was always prudent in dealing with establishment and recognition of Manchukuo; that he fulfilled his duty, respecting the opinions of the Foreign Office authorities and in acting accordance with the Government's principle that he not only made efforts to cease hostilities, and to prevent them from expanding into general disturbances, but that he tried to propose, despite strong opposition and even at the risk of his life, a Far Eastern peace conference with a view to establishing a foundation for peace in the East; that at his resignation on account of illness from overwork, he entrusted the Cabinet with his plan to secure peace. We will establish this fact.

We will further show that as to international relations, he always followed a principle of mutual cooperation; that he opposed a premature

Ref. Doc. 40196

recognition of Manchukuo; that after the Shanghai Incident he effected evacuation of all the military personnel despite powerful opposition; that he was the last man to agree to withdraw from the League of Nations. When he ^rlearned this to be inevitable, he tried to establish a plan for world peace in cooperation with Great Britain and the United States; that in dealing with military affairs according to the Government's policies, he respected international treaties and never trespassed beyond their limits. We shall also establish this fact to the satisfaction of this tribunal.

Further that he respected the independence of Manchukuo and wished for her, as in her declaration, to be an ideal state as an oasis of stability in East Asia, and that he had no such wild fancy as to consider Manchukuo as a puppet state.

4. We will establish the fact that ARAKI had no connection with the Army since 1936.

We will also prove that while ARAKI was Minister of War, the May 15 Incident broke out; in which not even one young army officer participated; that the February 26 Incident, however, was an illegal action undertaken by young officers to the discredit of ^{The Imperial Army} reverence for which ARAKI had always advocated; that ARAKI was much concerned about it, and that though quiet reigned for a time, after ARAKI's resignation of the post, they

disliked ARAKI's sound and moderate ideas, and at the time of the Incident they refused to see him when Minister of War KAWASHIMA asked them to do so.

We will show that ARAKI and five other generals were obliged to leave actual service assuming moral responsibility for the confusion caused by the incident, as it was the proper and expected thing to do because it should have been incumbent upon any superior officer of the army to have known and prevented it in its inception even though they were unaware of such activities; that as soon as they retired from active service, a system was enforced that a Minister of War should be appointed from the active list, which was aimed particularly at these six generals to deprive them from becoming a Minister of War, at any time in the future.

Witness TANAKA, Ryukichi introduced to the court the so-called KODO group. We will prove that there existed no such party, that such a nomination was not made, nor asserted by ARAKI or his friends, but that some one or another began to call those who were in sympathy with KODOism such as ARAKI, the KODO group. We will further show that those who rejected such KODO spiritualism, as being too unwieldy and considered above everything else

control or an all mobilization campaign system like that of Germany in World War I were called the Control group. We will establish the fact that almost all of the so-called KODO group were expelled from the Army on the pretext of liquidation after the February 26 Incident, though they had no connection with it.

We will show that the Prosecution has mistaken Gen. ARAKI as a leader of the military clique. We will prove that the world-wide fame of Gen. ARAKI was won 15 years ago by his meritorious service when he had settled perfectly the Manchurian Incident preventing it from affecting all East Asia, and we will explain by evidence and the reason why he himself who had been so famous was soon expelled from the Army and never even once organized a cabinet.

5. We will establish the fact that though Prince KONOYE asked ARAKI to settle the China Incident, ARAKI could not do so in his capacity of Minister of civil affairs.

We will show that Prince KONOYE recognized the sincere and earnest desire for peace in Gen. ARAKI, and others, who were called the KODO group when the Prince made every effort to have them try to help settle the China

DEF. DOC. #2486

Incident as they had done with the Manchurian Incident.

We will prove that cabinet councillorship was a system created by Prince KONOYE with the object of settling the Incident with the help of such prudent men as Gen. ARAKI even in his retirement and others and that he made ARAKI together with Messrs. UGAKI and IKEDA enter his cabinet after the above-mentioned renovation, as they would be useless to him outside the cabinet.

However we will further show that after his renovation of the cabinet Prince KONOYE hurriedly organized a system of The five Minister conference (Premier, War, Navy, Foreign, and Finance Ministers) which practically nullified his previous plan as Minister of Education, ^{There fore} ARAKI had no opportunity whatsoever in this capacity ^{to} make any contributions to settling the Incident even though he was a cabinet member.

We will show also that there was no truth to the fact that Education Minister ARAKI strengthened military training at schools, as he was opposed to expansion of the Incident; that he opposed banishment of some Jewish professors, and that he made an address to American NISEIs (when requested for his advice) to the effect that if there should be any war between Japan and America it was their duty as good citizens to be loyal and faithful to the U.S., and that if it afflicted them morally they should do their best to prevent any such war. We will establish the fact that he opposed elimination of English from school curriculums as it meant isolated self-complacency; that he contended that Japan's cultural agreement should be reached not only with Germany but with the whole world;

DEF. DOC. #2486

further that for the first time it was Baron Araki who provided for Christianity in the religious association law, and that in this way his deeds were always in opposition to an aggressive war.

We will show by evidence that the NOMONHLIN and the CHANG KU FENG Incidents were border issues that broke out at that time, and that as he was Minister of Education he had no connection with them; that ARAKI had deep sympathy with and understanding of the Russian people, but that he was anxious to prevent Bolshevisation by the 3rd Internationale and that notwithstanding he did not make any preparations to promote aggressive action against the Soviet Union.

Def. Doc. #2486

We will clearly show that the chairmanship of the National Spiritual Mobilization Committee was only a natural concurrent position of a Minister of Education; that it was a type of spiritual elevation movement, and that the Prosecution ~~was~~ mistaken it for the chairmanship of a deliberation council under the National Mobilization law which was fundamentally different from the former.

6. We will prove that after his retirement from public life ARAKI had no connection with the current problems.

We will show that realizing a Minister of civil affairs was quite futile in solving the incident he retired from any administrative office with his resignation from the HIRANUMA Cabinet.

We will establish the fact that his councillorship in the ABE and the YONAI Cabinets was accepted in consideration of his friendship with both Premiers, in view of their earnest requests; that a cabinet councillor system had become purely nominal by that time, and that the Prosecution has confounded the Cabinet councillor system (established on Oct. 15, 1937) with the cabinet advisory council system (organized in March, 1943); that these offices were created for different objectives, and that the cabinet councillor, ~~none~~ having been accused on account of his holding this post, was an honorary post, having merely the function privately to state his opinions to the Premier without any official responsibility.

We will prove that at the formation of the YONAI Cabinet Premier YONAI asked ARAKI to be Home Minister to cooperate with him in settling the incident, but that he refused the offer on the ground that he was not

Def. Doc. #2486

sufficiently confident in view of the general trend of the time, and that thus he was not in touch with political activities.

We will show by conclusive evidence that at the formation of the 2nd KONOYE Cabinet, Premier KONOYE sent the Chief Cabinet Secretary to ARAKI asking him to be a Cabinet Councillor, that when ARAKI refused it the Premier himself visited him at his residence, that though they hotly discussed the matter for about five hours, ARAKI did not accept even that post, as he was strongly opposed to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Tripartite Pact, and that from this time their public intercourse was suspended for all time thereafter.

We will present evidence in covering conspiracy, the Manchurian Incident, the China Incident, and ARAKI's activities after his retirement, dealing with the above-mentioned six items in complete and conclusive refutation and denial of all the charges in the Indictment.

Copy of Kamin
9-9-47 for Brown 9-9-47

Chronological Summary of evidence introduced by Defence referring to ARAKI, Sadao.

(Page 17,698) Chart showing composition of Japanese Cabinets from 1928 to 1945 in which the positions held by ARAKI are shown.

Witness Takeda stated (page 19,980) he did not know that ARAKI had admitted that as early as 17 September 1931, Japan had decided that the three North Eastern provinces and Jehol should be occupied and that ARAKI had signed the order. He stated that there had been no case of disobedience of central authorities orders.

Witness Wachi stated (page 19,667) that HASHIMOTO revealed to ARAKI the plan of the October incident which was to recommend ARAKI as head of the new Government. ARAKI told this to MINAMI who ordered the military police to arrest the participants.

Katakura stated (page 19,002) that in January 1932, SPAGAKI visited Tokyo to discuss the Manchurian situation and to have the central authorities understand Honjo's will. In addition he toured Manchuria and interviewed leading Manchurians. On his return he reported that the War Ministry and General Staff understood the situation and ARAKI and the military authorities did not intend to establish an independent state.

Yoshida stated (page 18,457) that the school military training course was created independently of gymnastics in 1939 (This is as corrected by Language Arbiter on p. 18,464)

Iwamatsu stated (page 18,569) that the revisions with respect to the regulations of Youth Schools which were enforced in April, 1939, were agreed upon before ARAKI became Education Minister. He denied they had been agreed on when KIDO was Education Minister and stated that although finally decided in 1939, general agreement had been reached in 1935. That he had worked with the Minister of Education from 1925 to 1945 (page 18,539). That he was Chief Secretary and confidential Secretary to ARAKI when ARAKI was Education Minister. That it was after August 1941 that military education in the schools was enforced more strongly (page 18,540). Until then it was not compulsory (page 18,541). On becoming Minister, ARAKI discarded his uniform and diligently applied himself to his task in a civilian capacity (page 18,542). He never issued a single instruction with regard to military education (page 18,543). No important ordinance, regulation or change in military education occurred between 1935 and 1941 (page 18,544). Correction: My service was 1925 to 1942 not 1945 (p. 18,547) Correction: ARAKI never issued a single instruction with regard to military education at his own initiative (page 18,548) Correction: Order for the establishment of Youth Schools was revised April 1939 (page 18,548) Correction: Order for inspection of military drill at Youths' School was revised 1938 (page 18,548). Witness produced "A Regulation of the Ministry of War in Re Education", dated 30 Nov. 1938 - Exh. 2379 (page 18,568). Generally speaking no statement is issued (by the Ministry of Education) without the knowledge of the Minister of Education (page 18,582)

DOC NO. 620-M

WAR MINISTRY

March 31, 1933

*who requested that
put in appropriate file
of the report by whom they were requested*

Page 1

(Number of Receipt: Received by War Ministry
Army-Manchukuo Secret Receipt No. 420

Name of the office (section) of the original draft:
The Finance Section

Subject matter: Granting of Secret Service funds
of Manchurian Incident Expenses

Minister: Entrusted

Parliamentary Vice-Minister:

Parliamentary Councillor:

Secretary:

Vice-Minister:

Senior Adjutant:

Adjutant of the Assigned Task:

Finance Officer Attached to the
Secretariat:

Director of the Bureau of the
Assigned Task:

Chief of the Section of the As-
signed Task:

Member of the Section of the As-
signed Task:

Copyist of the Investigation
Draft:

Bureau or Section of the Assigned Task:

No. Secret No. 12

Year Month Day

Date Submitted:

March 31

(Blank)

(")

(")

YANAGAWA (Seal)

USHIJIMA (Seal)

SUZUKI (Seal)

CHIBA (Seal)

ONODERA (Seal)

OUCHI

KIMURA (Seal) ✓

YAMASHINA (Seal)

ARAKI

wa mishi

Minister's Secretariat:

Received: March 31

Concluded: April 10

Joint:

Director of the Bureau:

YAMASHITA (Seal)

Chief of the Section:

YAMASHITA (Seal)

Circulated after enforcement (sanction)

Director of the Bureau:

(Blank)

Chief of the Section:

(" ")

Draft sent to the Chief of the Account Section,
(Intendance Bureau (Army-Manchukuo - Secret))

Disburse and deliver the Secret Service Funds of the Manchurian Incident expenses as follows:

Army-Manchukuo Secret No. 162 - March 31, 1933

Chief of Staff of Garrison Army
in China:

Kadonari KIKUCHI
¥ 10,000

Chief of Staff of the Korean
Army:

Tomoo KODAMA
¥ 10,000

Vice-Chief of the Army General
Staff:

Jinzaburo MASAKI
¥ 20,000

Vice Minister of War:

Heisuke YANAGAWA
¥126,150

Chief of Staff of the Formosan
Army:

Kennosuke OTSUKA
¥ 2,000

Provost Marshal General

Shinji HATA
¥ 2,500

Doc. 620 M

三年
次官
委任
執行指定
牛島

大臣 大臣委		局長 主務		次官		政務 次官		參謀官		書記官		審察 審察	
經密第一二號		柳川		高級 副官		牛島		主務副官		鈴木		山科	
印		大		主務課員		木村		千葉					
長局		長局		課長 主務		課長		主務課員		木村			
長課		長課		課長		課長		主務課員		木村			
昭和三十二年 三月二十日		昭和三十二年 三月二十日		昭和三十二年 三月二十日		昭和三十二年 三月二十日		昭和三十二年 三月二十日		昭和三十二年 三月二十日		昭和三十二年 三月二十日	
了結		領受		出提		領受		號番		房官臣大		課局務主	

件名
滿洲事件費機密費交付件

受領
陸軍省
陸密受第四二〇號

政務次官
參謀官
同付
決裁
前連帶
後課名
印

起元(課名)

決行決裁後
回覽課名

主計課

陸軍省
8.3.31
主計課

No. 1

No. 2

Doc. 620 M

經理局主計課長宛達案(陸滿密)
滿洲事件費機密費左記(通支去ノ上交付スベシ)

左記

陸滿密第六二號

昭和八年三月廿一日

(印)

支那駐屯參謀長 菊池門也宛 壹萬圓

朝鮮軍參謀長 兎玉友雄宛 壹萬圓

參謀次長 眞崎甚三郎宛 貳萬圓

陸軍次官 柳川平助宛 拾貳萬六千五百拾圓

臺灣軍參謀長 大塚堅之助宛 貳十圓

憲兵司令官 秦 眞次宛 貳千五百圓

I M T F E

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: ARAKI, Sadao

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

McManis
26703



Ref. loc #2488
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)

vs

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

DEPONENT: ARAKI, Sadao

I, ARAKI, Sadao, make oath and say as follows:

1. Circumstances up to my acceptance of the post of War Minister

I served as the Chief of No. 1 Division of the General Staff from January 1928 to August 1928; President of the Staff College until August 1929; the Commander of the 6th Division in Kumamoto until August 1931, and Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education.

While I was in the service of those posts, I recognized from my experience in World War I and from my views on morality of war, as well as from the basic principle in founding our army, the necessity of disassociating our army with the old Prussian style army, and so I devoted my whole hearted attention to the education and training of troops with the final object of promoting their moral standard.

The general situation in those days was by no means eventless. On the contrary, there was every sign of potential unrest. However, my view on the current problems was always different from the opinions of the leaders of Japan, including those of militarists, and I always remained unbiased to any of the movements which were disputing against each other.

It was on August 25, 1931 that I arrived in Tokyo to accept the post of the Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education. This was an advisory position to the Inspector-General of the Department of Military Education.

The outbreak of the Manchurian Incident was known to me by the newspaper. I was told that the government had set up a non-expansion policy, and so I did not think much of this incident.

On the occasion of the October Incident, I happened to have been asked by War Minister MINAMI and Chief of General Staff KINUYA to subdue the trouble. I successfully discharged this task, but was informed nothing further as to the punishment of the people involved in this incident.

At that time, I was merely the Chairman of the committee

of the entrance examination of the Military Preparatory School and the Military Academy, a position which was to be occupied by the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education as was regulated in that Department, and which had nothing to do with the current problems.

2. Circumstances around my acceptance of the post of War Minister.

At the end of 1931, I was the senior member of the Vice-Minister class, and because of this, I was asked on December 13th by Mr. Tsuyoshi INUKAI to become War Minister. As was customary with the way it was at that time, I reported this matter to and requested direction of the Three Chiefs of Army (War Minister, Chief of the General Staff, and Inspector-General of the Department of Military Education.) The opinion of the Three Chiefs was unanimous and they instructed me to accept the post. Thus I sent in my acceptance to Mr. INUKAI and became War Minister when the INUKAI Cabinet was formally organized on the same day. Mr. INUKAI at this Tribunal testified that my acceptance was made under some extraordinary circumstances, but not only was there any uncustomary procedure in connection with my acceptance, but neither my predecessor nor any person of importance at that time informed me of such circumstances.

On the following day of my acceptance of this new post and the subsequent day, War Minister MINAMI, my predecessor, Vice-Minister SUGIYAMA, and Chief of the General Staff KANAYA, gave me the explanation of the state of affairs of Japan at that time, the outline of which was as follows:

(a) That since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, both the government and the army authorities strived to settle the trouble under non-expansion policy, but that the condition in Manchuria which had been aggravated for many years in the past, was so complicated that both the Japanese civilian inhabitants in Manchuria and the Kwantung Army were still in danger. That the function of the existing Manchurian regime had lost its grip, some of its influential personnel had absconded while the rest of them had established their own strongholds in various parts of Manchuria, and an absolute state of anarchy was revealed throughout Manchuria.

(b) That the army authorities, in view of their primary duty, was dually tasked to cope with this situation -- protection of the Japanese nationals and their rights and interests in Manchuria was one and a self-defensive means to insure the security of the Kwantung Army was the other. That the condition, as had been made clear by the second declaration of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet, was so aggravated that it was impracticable to return the Japanese troops to their original station.

(c) That Chang Sue-liang who had established in Chinchow District a stronghold for violation of peace and order in Manchuria, did not keep his promise of evacuating

all the troops under his command from Chinchow District, but that there was not the slightest indication of sincerity to show that some day he might fulfill this promise.

(d) That the fact that the Japanese force from an aspiration for peaceful settlement had returned its troops from half way of its campaign to Chinchow was utilized by Chang Sue-liang for his propaganda. He was busy propagandizing that he and his troops won the victory over this campaign and by thus instigating the fighting spirit of the troops, caused them to cross the Liao River to appear and overrun as far as the districts near Mukden. That this very much endangered the Japanese nationals and the troops in the foremost front.

(e) That while the League of Nations had not appreciated the actual situation in full, the recent councillors meeting decided to despatch a commission of enquiry and that it approved our rightful assertion of reserving our rights of pacifying bandits and other groups of turbulent elements.

The above were the outline of the actual state of affairs explained to me by those three important people of the army, and their conclusion was that if the situation was left alone, and if it should cause any damage to the Japanese nationals or should the Kwantung Army suffer any serious damage from it, the hostility would expand all over China and would result in serious international relations.

3. Determination of government policy.

When I reported these matters to Premier INUKAI, he, in his capacity of being the president of a political party, had been aware of the graveness of Japan's internal and external situations more fully than I and he told me his opinion as follows:

(a) Self-defense and non-expansion should be the fundamental policy to cope with the situation, and based on this policy, the restoration of law and order and termination of hostilities in Manchuria should be immediately realized.

(b) It should be borne in mind that Chang Sue-liang, the violator of law and order, was the man to deal with, and as such, the theatre of action must be extremely restricted, and on no occasion should it exceed the territory under his domination.

(c) Military action may be required to save the imminent danger of Chinchow District, but even doing so, a request should be first made for the withdrawal of the troops under Chang's command from that district so that the root of future evil be eliminated.

(d) To the League of Nations and other countries which were related to Manchuria by treaties, a thorough explanation should be made in order to gain their complete understanding as to the real state of affairs of Manchuria.

These opinions of the Premier were discussed at the

Cabinet meeting and were made the basic policy of the INUKAI Cabinet. In accordance with this decision, I made the necessary contact with the ministers of Finance and Navy to make preparation for the War Office to discharge its share of duty. This decision was also informed by me to the General Staff to request them to act accordingly.

In connection with this decision of the Cabinet, there was an allegation in Exhibit No. 187 and No. 188 to the effect that I made a plan for occupation of the Four Eastern Provinces. This was a mistake caused by the interpretation of an incompetent interpreter and it was entirely different from the fact. I shall relate to this matter at the latter part of this statement under 28.

I have never heard, not even as a rumor, that the Premier INUKAI had an intention of petitioning for the Imperial Command to withdraw the Kwantung Army, as was testified by Mr. Takeshi INUKAI before the Tribunal. Premier INUKAI, as clever as he was, should have known quite well that the Emperor who was an ardent observer of the Constitution would not have granted an Imperial Command for the withdrawal of troops without first having an advice of the General Staff. [I shall refute this allegation by a witness who will testify the matters concerning the Supreme Command.]

There is also an allegation by the Prosecution in Chapter 1 of Appendix A of the Indictment that after the INUKAI Cabinet was formed -- "The Japanese government which came into power on the 13th of December of 1931, and all subsequent Japanese governments adopted and continued this aggression and its gradual extension over other parts of China." That both the INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets, while I was a member of them, had never made any such policy shall be fully shown by the several speeches made by the responsible members of the two Cabinets at public occasions, and several witnesses and documentary evidence which are to be submitted before the Tribunal will corroborate this.

4. Pacification of Liao-si (West of the Liao River) District.

The Japanese government, in conformity with the above-mentioned policy, expected a peaceful settlement of the troubles in the Chinchow District through diplomatic negotiations, but almost a month had vainly passed since the commencement of the negotiation and there was not a sign of their withdrawing from the district. On the contrary, the activities of the bandits along the River Liao coast were more intensified and at the end of December 1931, the aggravated situation reached such a stage that the Japanese government had to resort to arms to wipe out the stronghold of the bandits and the lawless mobs in order to save the Japanese nationals from danger. I communicated this decision of the government to the General Staff. In the meantime, the government made a proclamation on the 27th to clarify the situation and explained to the world the difficulties that Japan was confronted with.

Dec 1931

On the 28th of the same month, the General Staff despatched to Manchuria from Korea a divisional headquarters and a brigade, the main body of which began action at the very end of the month.

The Kwantung Army by this time, in view of the daily occurrence of various casualties, had taken several measures to cope with the situation, and had several times requested without response the withdrawal of Chang Sue-liang and his men from the Liao-si District.

However, the bandit troops, upon knowing that Japan decided to take a decisive measure, fled from the Chinchow District, together with the groups under Chang Sue-liang's command. Thus, a unit of Japanese troops under command of Lt. Gen. MURO made its entry into the city of Chinchow on January 3rd, 1932, without resorting to bloodshed and the Japanese nationals were relieved.

*Chinchow
occupied*

7 Jan 32

After this campaign, the army undertook the task of maintaining law and order in that locality, leaving the rest of the activities to the diplomatic authorities. However, during the month of January, the troops of the garrison forces suffered several casualties inflicted by bandits in various parts of the locality, including an annihilation of KOGA Regiment at Chin-si, but the troops on the spot, observing the principle of non-expansion policy, endured it and did not take any counter steps.

5. The First Shanghai Incident.

The cause of expedition and the policy of the Army.

The First Shanghai Incident initiated when, in the middle of July 1932, a body of Chinese civilians assaulted a party of Japanese priests and either killed or wounded them. This incident induced a clash between the Japanese Navy and the Chinese 19 Route Army, and a great number of Japanese nationals in Shanghai as well as the navy itself were very much endangered.

The Navy authorities, in view of discharging their international duty in Shanghai as well as to save their own navy troops and protect Japanese nationals in that city, reported the case to the government and requested a detachment of army troops to Shanghai. The government knew the imminence of the situation and decided a policy of relieving the navy and protecting the Japanese nationals on the spot, and requested the army for a detachment of troops.

I consulted the matter with the Chief of the General Staff and we agreed to conform with the government policy by despatching a minimum strength of force. The Chief of the General Staff reported the matter to the Throne and upon the approval of His Majesty, the expedition was finally decided.

By this time, the situation in Shanghai had become so critical that a mixed brigade was first despatched, in accordance with the request of the navy, by a destroyer,

and this brigade was on peace time footing on account of the shortage of time. Then the UEDA Division, also in a state of being immobilized, followed the brigade. The strength of the opponent at that time was said to be about 50,000.

In conformity with the policy of the government, I strived to settle this incident, as much as possible, in an amicable manner, and desired the Chief of General Affairs and Divisional Commander UEDA to follow this policy. This resulted in Divisional Commander's UEDA's advice to the opponent of the peaceful settlement, which will be shown in evidence in Def. Doc. No. _____. This attempt at peaceful settlement by Divisional Commander UEDA was not duly responded to, and on the contrary, it drove him into a considerable plight,

This request for peace and subsequent hesitation on the part of Divisional Commander UEDA, in immediately resorting to action, was interpreted and propagandized by the Chinese as their complete victory over Japanese forces, and the propaganda induced a situation that the Chinese force under the direct control of the Nanking Government would join the Canton 19th Route Army with whom the expeditionary force was confronted. Moreover, this new situation affected the situation in Manchuria and caused further aggravation of law and order there. Even the proposal made by the League of Nations to Japan served to enhance the spirit of the Chinese people. The situation became extremely serious, and the safety of more than 20,000 Japanese nationals was menaced. Thus China's side took advantage of the aspiration of our amicable settlement and created a new situation more dangerous to Japan.

Worried with this added difficulty, the government requested the army to immediately save this situation. It was either on the 7th or 8th of February that the advance party of the army expeditionary force landed on the spot. Divisional Commander UEDA arrived there in the middle of February and this new crisis was created at the end of the same month.

On account of this renewed request from the government, my position required me to devise measures to immediately save the situation by means of close cooperation between operational tactics and diplomacy, that was to say, the measures which were ~~compulsory~~ complying with the operational request of the General Staff on one hand, and in conforming with the ~~political~~ political principle of the government on the other.

I consulted the matter with the General Staff and agreed to their appointing Colonel Binshiro OBATA (Lt. Gen. OBATA, who became the Minister of State at the Prince KUNI Cabinet ~~in~~ immediately after the surrender) the Chief of operations Section of the General Staff. We also agreed to recommend General SHIRAKAWA as the Supreme Commander of the Expeditionary Force as the most appropriate person with sufficient faculty who would maintain close cooperation with the local

diplomatic agent to take timely measures in terminating the hostilities. Then, in accordance with the suggestion of the General Staff, further reinforcement of two divisions was decided at the Cabinet meeting.

Various preparations were made for this reinforcement and at the dawn of March 1st, the advance division of the expeditionary force made a surprise landing at Tzi-liao-kou, a strategic point at the back of the enemy. The enemy after some insignificant resistance retreated beyond the 20 kilometer line and as the retreat was in conformity with the request that the expeditionary had previously made, Supreme Commander SHIRAKAWA immediately ordered cessation of hostility on the 3rd of March. The Chinese army followed suit on the following day.

Thus, due to ingenious tactics of the operational force, the primary object of expedition was achieved and the incident was settled while the main body of the reinforcement was still on board the ship.

The government and the central military authorities, hand in hand with the activities of the diplomatic authorities, exerted to settle the whole situation upon guarantee of Chinese side for the observation of law and order in the future.

Several endurance and concession were undertaken and the Japanese troops voluntarily withdrew at the end of March to the rear line and one and one half divisions of the expeditionary force were subsequently returned to Japan. Then, through the valuable efforts of the committees of the U.S.A., Britain, France, Italy, Japan and China, plan for international security and safety in and around Shanghai was set up and a truce agreement between Japanese and Chinese troops was signed on May 5th.

By virtue of the provisions of the truce agreement (Section 3, Appendix 2), the army had the right of stationing there a certain part of its force. However, from fear that it would turn out to be the cause of future trouble and because of respect for Chinese sovereignty, and, furthermore, as the primary object of expedition had been accomplished, it was decided to withdraw, at the risk of various difficulties, all the troops from China and the withdrawal was completed by the end of May.

At that time, there were opinions among the people, however, in and out of office, that the over-all withdrawal was still premature. The opinions were regarded to be well grounded in view of past experiences, because both in Manchuria and at the early stages of the Shanghai Incident, our moderate attitude in the beginning seemed to have given cause to the enemy to make propaganda that they had won the victory, and that it succeeded to some extent in deceiving the people with a result that the over-all situation was made worse on account of this.

Nevertheless, the army, in view of its aspiration for peace, carried out the over-all withdrawal. Unfortunately, while giving a good impression among a part of the learned and well-informed classes of Chinese people, the over-all withdrawal did nothing more than to spur the Chinese general public and to create amongst them a contempt for the Japanese army. In fact, it had a harmful effect over the situation in Manchuria and gave rise to further disturbances there. I may point out here that this was the most delicate part of the policy toward China, and both the government and the army authorities had many

difficulties on this particular point.

These circumstances will be fully shown by the government declaration, proclamations made by Divisional Commander UEDA and Supreme Commander SHIRAKAWA, my several speeches made in the capacity of War Minister concerning the withdrawal of troops and also those made in the Diet sessions, all of which will be tendered in evidence.

6. Protection of Japanese nationals in and around Harbin.

HSI HSIA (a member of the Monarchiso Party) who became the Governor of Kirin Province on September 30, 1931, subsequently made declaration of independence of his Province. However, after two months of this declaration, he caused some discord with TING-CHAO and LI-TU of Harbin, and because of this conflict, the general situation in and around Harbin was reduced into confusion, threatening, at the same time, the safety of Japanese nationals residing there.

The danger became more imminent when HSI HSIA, in January, 1932, determined to conduct his subjugation campaign toward the north and started fighting on the 27th. This urgent situation compelled the Japanese nationals to request the Kwantung Army for their rescue, and the Koreans and Manchurians of the same district also frequently made the same request.

In the meantime, it happened that four Japanese were murdered, several Koreans were taken away, and about 4,000 Japanese and 2,000 Koreans were placed under extreme danger. The Kwantung Army ordered an aerial reconnaissance of the district, but the aircraft had to make emergency landing near Harbin, and the crew, who were commissioned officers of the Kwantung Army, were murdered.

The government had taken a cautious attitude toward this district, but as the situation became so serious that the government considered it necessary to take measures to restore the law and order of that district and to protect the Japanese residents.

However, while the Japanese residents were to be protected, the government made a policy that the international relations, especially the relation with the Soviet Union, should not be endangered. The Chief of General Staff, in conformity with this policy, ordered some restrictions to the Kwantung Army as to its military actions.

The restrictions rendered much difficulty to the Kwantung Army over its operation, and a corps of the Army finally succeeded, after considerable hardships, in reaching the outskirts of the City of Harbin.

As the object of this campaign was to protect the Japanese nationals in that district, and as the object was thus accomplished, the main body of the expeditionary force retraced their course without even entering the city of Harbin.

The explanatory speeches made by Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA on January 31, 1932, at the plenary session of the Privy Council and the 62nd session of the Imperial Diet,

the minutes of which will be tendered in evidence, will clarify the circumstances in which this campaign was carried out.

7. Independence declaration of Manchoukuo and its recognition; also the attitude of the Japanese central military authorities toward it.

Soon after the restoration of law and order in Chinchow, I think it was in the beginning of January, 1932, Staff Officer ITAGAKI of the Kwantung Army came to Tokyo and reported to me of the situations of Manchuria, the picture of the independence movement and Commander-in-Chief HONJO's appreciation of the general situations.

According to the reports I received, each Province of Manchuria had declared its independence and it was in such a precarious condition that a single false step would lead the whole situation into a state of chaos where each local regime held its own sphere of influence. On the other hand, there was an aspiration rapidly developing among the influential people all over Manchuria to found a new state. In fact, this aspiration was getting so irresistibly strong among them that it was almost impossible for the Kwantung Army, which was neither forcing a military administration nor was it provided with powerful strength, to maintain law and order without seriously taking this new situation into consideration. In connection with this report, I further learned the following facts: That an unanimous opinion of those who were concerned in this independent movement was to have Mr. PU-YI as the ruler of the new state; that Commander-in-Chief HONJO's opinion was to leave the matter to them and not to take any measure which might interfere with the zealous aspiration of the Manchurian people.

On hearing this report, I thought of the necessity of paying attention to the international problems which might arise out of Manchuria's independence declaration. However, I reported these informations to the Premier.

The Premier had known by that time what was going on in Manchuria and was of the opinion that the question of independence should be left alone, only he considered that the international problems as mentioned in the above should be studied.

The decision of the government on this problem was also to leave it alone to the Manchurian people and make no interference with it inasmuch as the primary concern of the government was in preservation of law and order.

In the meantime, the independence movement in Manchuria made further development and then a decision of independence was reached on February 28th among the influential people of Manchuria with an additional resolution to ask Mr. PU-YI to become its ruler. Then, the independence was declared on March 1st, and Mr. PU-YI became its President on the 9th of the same month.

The Kwantung Army, whose primary duty was to secure the peace and order in Manchuria, wished that the newly born regime would respect, as it had declared, the international treaties and regulations externally, and

would base its administration, internally, upon people's will, so that by realizing an ideal nation where King's Way is fully observed under harmonious collaboration of five races, a real happy land, free from all the unfortunate incidents in the past, should be revealed. The attitude of the Kwantung Army was that of watching its development, but not to make any interference with it.

However, preservation of peace and order and protection of Japanese nationals, which were the main duties of Kwantung Army, had to be conducted in such a way as would correspond to the ever changing situations, and so the Kwantung Army made discussions with the new regime concerning exclusively these local matters.

These reports from the Kwantung Army to the central military authorities were reported to the government by the latter as soon as they were received. The government, in view of the actual state of affairs in Manchuria, reached the conclusion that there was no alternative but to leave to the discretion and judgement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army for the preservation of peace and order in Manchuria and decided to observe the further development of the situation.

I also followed this policy of the government and carefully watched the situation so that I should not make any mistake in the future when counter measures were to be taken.

The Foreign Office viewed this problem to be a case of a domestic split of a nation and that the independence was not an infringement of the international law. Under the circumstances, all that the army could do was to follow the policy of the government and devote its efforts in successfully carrying out its original duty of preserving peace and order and securing the national defense of Manchuria.

In the meantime, the new regime gradually consolidated its foundation and so the government, with a view to avoiding further disturbances in Manchuria, decided to cooperate, whenever possible, with the new regime. The government made explanation of this new policy at the 61st session of the Imperial Diet. (Def. Doc.).

I have never heard that Premier INUKAI dispatched Mr. KAYANO as a special envoy to the Nanking Government for a friendly intercourse, as was testified by Mr. Takashi INUKAI. Even if it were true, it must have been of a private nature. Mr. INUKAI's further testimony that Premier INUKAI talked over the matter with a chief of a section of the General Staff and that the chief of the section of this talk, was relegated to other post is entirely wrong. Mr. INUKAI did not mention the name of the Colonel, but from his testimony that the Colonel was relegated to the Commander of RANAN Regiment and also from the testimony given by witness FUJITA, it is clear that he meant Colonel SHIGETO. Colonel SHIGETO was sent out of the central military authorities, together with other people, because of his having had some relation with the March and October Incidents, and because of this, he was made an object of the army's

"purging shift" of military personnel. Witness FUJITA also gave his evidence to this effect.

I had several interviews with the Premier to discuss the Manchurian problems, but never had we any friction of opinion among us. I always dealt with the matters in accordance with the fixed policies of the government, and whenever a new problem arose, I fully discussed it with the Premier and followed his decision about it.

With regard to Premier INUKAI's attitude toward the international problems, I never perceived in him any sign of an aggressive attitude. Not only the Premier INUKAI alone, but the Kwantung Army were eagerly wishing the ideal progress of Manchoukuo and that was all that they desired of this new country. This fact has already been clarified before this Tribunal by the will of late General HONJO and other evidence.

Next I shall refer to the question of official recognition of the state of Manchoukuo. Primarily this question, which was purely an international diplomatic matter, was under the charge of the Foreign Office; accordingly the Army did not take any step in this, and except those which concerned maintenance of peace and order and problems of national defense that might arise therefrom, I respected the opinion of the Foreign Minister and left everything to his care.

Manchoukuo, since its foundation, had gradually become a subject of discussion both in and out of Japan, and the House of Representatives, on June 15th, made a resolution at its plenary session that an official recognition should be given to this new state.

The government of Japan, after careful consideration of the matter, decided to follow the views of the Foreign Office, which suggested that the new state was the result of an internal split of an independent nation and that recognition of such state which acquired its legal independence would not in any way infringe international law. Necessary procedures were then taken and the formal recognition was given on September 15th, whereupon the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol was signed and an arrangement was made for the exchange of Ambassadors.

Upon this formal recognition, the Kwantung Army was tasked with new duty of garrison and joint defense of the new state. This new addition of duty meant that all the conduct of the Kwantung Army bore international nature representing the two independent countries -- Japan and Manchoukuo, and so they made it their rule to confer with the Manchoukuo authorities before they took any action in connection with the national defense and maintenance of peace and order.

Thus the situation made natural development from its foundation to formal recognition, and along with this development, Japan found it necessary to determine her attitude toward this state of affairs. The government of Japan, from her desire for the sound development of Manchoukuo as her friendly neighbour, decided to give Manchoukuo, in compliance with her request, all the necessary assistance in her power, and by doing so, to take measures to prevent activities to cause disturbances in Manchoukuo.

That Japan had neither intention of making Manchoukuo her cat's paw, nor violating international law can be easily ascertained from the speeches made by the Premier and the Foreign Minister at the Imperial Diet as well as from their answers to the interpellations at the Privy Council. This will also be seen in the speech broadcasted by Mr. Ting, Premier of Manchoukuo, on the first anniversary of Manchoukuo's foundation, in which he expressed his zealous ideal of founding a new state.

Personally I desired Manchoukuo that she would make a sound development along the line as was shown in her independence declaration, toward the goal of becoming an ideal nation, and would acquire every necessary qualification for an independent country.

In the spring of 1934, Mr. Henry Pu-Yi, Emperor of Manchoukuo, visited Japan, when I was given an audience with him for several hours. Mr. Pu-Yi eagerly and strongly emphasized his desire of establishing a happy land of ODO (King's Way) and at the latter stage of conversation, he sent the interpreter away and talked to me, vis-a-vis, by way of writing on a sheet of paper, his ambition of becoming the Emperor of whole China, thereby restoring the old Chin Dynasty, his ancestor, there.

On this occasion, I dared to give him advice and said that what the Emperor should do was to cultivate the virtue of an Emperorship, as he had declared when he ascended the Throne, and to become worthy of confidence both in and out of the country.

As this conversation will show, there was not the slightest indication that Mr. Henry Pu-Yi would have become a tool of the Japanese government; on the contrary, there was even a sign that he would take an initiative to induce the Japanese government to the direction he desired.

The development of Manchoukuo after that was not quite as it should have been, so dissatisfied with this state, I refrained from attending the 10th anniversary celebration of its foundation, and I broadcasted what I had in mind about the situation. My views and belief on Manchuria had been fully expressed in my talk with Lord Lytton and others.

As was explained in my speech at the 62nd session of the Imperial Diet, Chang Sue-liang's activities, before the formal recognition of Manchoukuo, of causing disturbances in Manchuria were carried out to such an extent that it necessitated Japan to take means to settle the situation.

10. Pacification of North Manchuria, Kholombail and Jehol.

The pacification campaign of North Manchuria, Kholombail and Jehol was somewhat different in nature, inasmuch as Manchoukuo had been founded and recognized by that time, and the military action was taken to discharge the army's duty to both Japan and Manchoukuo. In other words the campaign was an action fulfilling the army's duty as was provided in the Japan Manchoukuo Protocol, and it was nothing but a domestic affair of Manchoukuo.

Pacification campaign by the Japan Manchoukuo Allied Force over North Manchuria was executed because Ma Seng-shan who had once pledged his loyalty to Manchoukuo plotted a rebellion against it in about August 1932. Kholombail was pacified by the same force on account of the rebellion of Su Ping-wen in December, 1932 and Jehol at the end of February 1933 because of a rebellion by Tan Wanglin.

In carrying out these campaigns, I drew special attention of the General Staff to follow the government policy so that the expedition to Kholombail would not cause any bad influence over Soviet Japan relation and warfare in Jehol would not expand itself over North Manchuria. I further requested them that their action should strictly base up on the Japan Manchoukuo Protocol and utmost attention be paid in bringing about the termination of hostilities. I also requested to maintain very close contact between the War Office and the General Staff.

In Kholombail district, we were assisted greatly by the good will of the Soviet Union and succeeded in safely saving the Japanese residents, and the pacification was ended at that.

In Jehol campaign, the General Staff and the Kwantung Army made it their policy to stop the advance of troops at the Great wall line, even at the risk of operational disadvantage. There was once an occasion when the troops marched over the Great Wall, but they were immediately ordered to return. This action caused another attack of the enemy, but our troops in a drive chasing

after the retreating enemy, reached the Soo River and stopped there. Thus the policy of the government and the central army authorities was strictly adhered to by the troops of the Kwantung Army.

In the meantime, Chang Sueliang actually withdrew from all the official positions and an agreement was reached and the Tangku Truce was signed between HO YING-CHIN representative of the National Government and Major-General OKAMURA, Vice-Chief of Staff and the representative of the Kwantung Army. Further details of this will be given by witness ENDO, Saburo and TAKEDA, Hisashi.

11. Conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement.

In compliance with the request of Mr. HO YING-CHIN, Deputy Chairman of the Peking Sub-Committee of the National Government Military Committee, on May 25th, 1933, cessation of hostility was discussed between Mr. HO and Major-General OKAMURA, representative of the Kwantung Army, and the Truce Agreement was signed on the 31st of May of same year. The agreement was confirmed by the governments of Japan and Manchoukuo in due course, and thus the hostilities in Manchuria virtually ended.

The Manchurian Incident was not primarily a war in the sense of definition of international law. Therefore, there was not such a procedure as peace treaty. Only an agreement was reached at between the two parties as to several arrangements to prevent occurrence of further hostilities in the future.

Subsequently, the members of the government authorities of Manchoukuo and those of China met at the DAIREN Conference to discuss the practical routine matters concerning the maintenance of friendly relations between China and Manchoukuo. Some members of our government who were in charge of such matters also attended the conference, but as the matter did not directly concern the relations between Manchoukuo and Japan, I do not remember its details.

Thus the disturbances and hostilities which had been rampantly prevailing all over Manchuria at the time of WAKATSUKI Cabinet and which had created such a potential danger as would induce at any time to an all out clash between China and Japan were completely settled by me within one and half year of my acceptance of War Ministership to the INUAI Cabinet which succeeded the WAKATSUKI Cabinet, and, subsequently, to the SAITO Cabinet, and the mission tasked to the army of terminating hostilities was fulfilled.

12. Policies I adopted after the Tangku Agreement.

My most important mission as a War Minister of settling the hostilities having been thus accomplished, I decided to take this opportunity to establish plans to stabilize several internal as well as external state of affairs. I set up the following three main principles and determined their realization.

1. Stabilization of the domestic state of affairs which had been in absolute Chaos since the beginning of Showa Era.
2. Complete purification of the Army to make it base itself on the principle of the foundation of the Imperial Army.
3. Improvement of foreign relations, through which to secure peace of the world, and of the Far East in particular.

In June 1933, when the Imperial Diet was ended,

I set forth to establish practical plan to execute these principles.

The first thing I intended to do was to purify the public mind by dispelling from Japan all the evil causes accumulated since World War I, paying at the same time special attention to the internal as well as external state of affairs and to the specific feature of Japan's national character. The best way to accomplish this task was to let the people appreciate the virtue of benevolence of His Majesty the Emperor. One of the practical plans to this purpose was to petition to grant a general amnesty and to release both the right and left wings of criminals, political and other criminals with exceptions of those whose nature of crime was particularly atrocious and give them warm warning not to repeat the same folly.

Secondly, I intended to stabilize the mind of people of rural district and fishing villages by establishing means of relieving them from the extreme poverty in which they were at that time.

Thirdly, I thought it necessary to device fundamental measures to settle the confusions and disturbances in political and ideological circles.

My fourth intention was find means to secure the original character of the Imperial Army whose reason of existence was in practicing morals, and let it thoroughly understand the fundamental principles of founding the army, so that the occurrence of ominous incidents, which had been rather frequent in the past, would be prevented in the future.

Fifthly, Japan at that time was confronted with several difficult international problems. I considered it of urgent necessity to solve all of those problems by making utmost concession that we could afford, while making full assertions on what we had to assert. What Japan needed then was to determine the minimum extent of her self-existence and protect her from being affected by the hitherto precarious state of affairs in Europe.

Under these circumstances, what should have been done before anything else was to secure peace in the Far East, and in order to do so, I determined to hold an international conference among the countries interested in Far Eastern affairs. My intention was first to establish peace in the Far East and on the Pacific upon thorough deliberation upon pending matters among the participants of this international conference, and then make it the corner stone on which to secure the world's peace.

The matter was, however, too grave to be decided instantaneously. I spent the whole of July and August in studying practicability of this plan as well as in preparation of initial matters. In September, I prepared a basic suggestion for this plan, and suggested to the Premier to make a definite plan based on my suggestions, so that it may be presented to be deliberated upon at the Imperial Diet.

Petitioning the amnesty seemed to me the most difficult problem. On this question, I gained approval of the Navy Minister, and the suggestion was put to the Premier as an agreed opinion of both Navy and Army.

There were several oppositions to amnesty to be granted on the criminals of extreme right and extreme left wings. I maintained that however wrong they may have been, their misconduct had arisen from their passion to apprehend the future of their country and community.

It was the unfortunate circumstances in which they were brought up or their narrow prejudice that had driven them to blindly rush to such an extreme ideal, and that they were also the valuable subjects of His Majesty to whom His virtue of benevolence should equally be extended. I insisted that this was the characteristic of the feature of our national polity, and endeavoured to realize it.

The question having developed thus far, Premier SAITO ordered the people of the government in Charge of this type of work to study the practical side of this plan, and, apart from this, he successively held conferences among the ministers who were related to the subject matters of the plan. Five Minister Conference concerning foreign affairs and national defense was often held and another Five Minister Conference concerning rural district problems being a part of domestic political problems was also frequently held. I attended to these conferences together with Mr. MITSUCHI, Minister of Railways.

Both of these conferences met more than twenty times and the gist of the plan was thoroughly discussed by the end of the year. There were several matters of which even definite plans were set up.

The basic study of the plan showed due progress and a communique in the form of a memorandum was given on matters concerning foreign affairs and national defense in October 1933, whereas some very important decisions were reached concerning rural district problems which were part of the problems for the domestic council.

My intention was to establish definite plans for all the subject matters by the end of January 1934, when the Imperial Diet was expected to be convened, and to present them to the Diet for deliberation. This, the government, army and Diet will seek for the stabilization of internal affairs by their respective function, and these efforts, combined with the activities of the diplomatic branch would induce the whole situation to opening the Far Eastern Peace Conference. This was my intention and I did my best for its realization.

As I devoted my whole attention after conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement to this matter, I had not much interest in other problems and even when I had some objection or different opinion on some matters, I usually let them go at that.

On the First of January, 1934, while the plan was in the midst of deliberation, I fell in serious illness and was confined to bed. However, as I most eagerly wished to execute this plan at any cost, I recommended General HAYASHI as my successor, and I resigned from the post of War Minister.

By that time, the essential portion of my plan was still being discussed, part by part by the respective Cabinet Ministers and it was not yet ready to be presented to the Cabinet meeting. Such having been the case, when I was resigning from my post, I sent to the Premier this suggestion of my plan, together with a letter, expressing all my views and beliefs, and asked him to expedite opening of the Cabinet Meeting for this plan.

Unfortunately, not only the general situation failed to develop as I had expected, the internal condition of the army authorities made radical change. Dissatisfied with this state, I decided to avoid being materially involved in any of the official matters. My successor, General HAYASHI, after four months' tenure of office, had to resign for personal reasons and recommended me as his successor, but because of this

dissatisfaction, I persistently declined its acceptance.

In the meantime, things made a complete turn over to the worse, and after two years from the time of my resignation, the 2.26 Incident made myself and other senior members of the army leave altogether from active service.

For two years from my resignation from the War Ministership to retirement from active service, I occupied the post of a War Councillor, but not a single enquiry of important nature was made to me, and so there is nothing to state about this period. Further, this was the period.

When the internal condition of the army was in absolute Chaos, and as I was always placed outside its central circles, I did not know the helm of military affairs at that time. All of these state of affairs will be shown by documentary evidence and witnesses.

13. International Treaty Problems.

Diplomatic affairs were not under the charge of the War Minister. As the War Minister, I only attended to what matters were under my charge and disposed of them in accordance with the policy determined by the government and so I did not know much of the diplomatic matters,

Decision of a diplomatic affair was usually done upon investigation and opinion of the Foreign Minister. When it had an important bearing upon other department of the government, the Minister of such Department was consulted, and when it was sufficiently important as to be related to all Departments in general way, it was usually discussed at the Cabinet meeting. Otherwise, most of them were disposed of by the decision of the Foreign Minister.

With regard to international treaties in connection with the Manchurian Incident, WAKATSUKI Cabinet had already declared execution of right of self-defense, and the Premier and Foreign Minister of INUKAI Cabinet also several times declared continuation of this right of self-defense.

I was told that our action was within the limit of action for self-defense, about which every signatory of the Non-Aggression Pact had reserved her right of execution, and a prominent scholar of international law defined, "The act of self-defense is conducted until pressure by violence and menace is removed." Moreover, there was a reservation made by Japan on December 10th 1931 at the Councillors' Meeting of the League of Nations, and was approved by the Councillors, of the right of subjugating banditry troops and lawless elements. The army acted within the extent of this right based on the policy determined by the government.

As for the problems concerning independence of Manchoukuo and its subsequent recognition, Premiers and Foreign Ministers of INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets gave explanations at the Imperial Diet and the Privy Council. They said that the independence was a natural result of internal split of a nation conducted by her own people and that the Nine Power Treaty had not provided any restriction on such action. They further said that the independence was realized upon the basis of the historical background in Manchuria. They quoted several opinions of some of the scholars of international law and said there were several instances in which existence of foreign troops contributed toward realization of independence.

These explanations convinced all other members of the cabinet and the army continued its action in conformity with this fixed policy until execution of the right of self-defense was no more required. As far as I remember, all of these details were contained in the Views of Japanese Government which were submitted to the plenary session of the League of Nations.

The relation with the League of Nations had already been considerably aggravated before INUKAI Cabinet, perhaps due to lack of proper explanation of the situation. It was immediately prior to the formation of INUKAI Cabinet that the League of Nations decided to dispatch its Enquiry Mission. This decision was quite satisfactory to us and INUKAI Cabinet hoped that the Mission would reach accurate recognition of the situation based on the actual state of affairs. The army also expected that the Enquiry Mission would make an unbiased conclusion toward peace by having contact with the actual state on the spot and its historical back-ground.

As I have stated above, the policy of INUKAI Cabinet toward Manchuria was in immediate restoration and subsequent maintenance of peace and order, and it aimed at improvement of international relations by giving cooperation and correct understanding to the problems among nations.

The army, also in conformity with this policy, minimized its military action and devoted its efforts in immediately bringing about the termination of the hostilities. The manner in which the army settled the Shanghai Incident was a good indication of this policy of the army and its overall withdrawal from Shanghai served to improve, more or less, Japan's international relations. Encouraged with this fact, the army continued to concentrate its effort on this point.

The independence of Manchoukuo and its formal recognition was studied, as was stated in the above, by both the INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets. By keeping a watch on the result of this study and on the prerequisite for peace and order in Manchuria, the both cabinets followed the natural growth of this movement and when convinced of its healthy progress, decided to give formal recognition. The army, in conformity with this policy of the government, strived to prevent actions to disturb the peace and order, which had barely been restored after several uprisings, and to discharge its new task of joint defense of the state of Manchoukuo.

With regard to the League of Nations, I knew that the government had tried to obtain its understanding by tendering them written views of the government on the complexity of the character of the Incident and its suggestions for the means of maintaining peace in the future. When Mr. MATSUOKA was dispatched by the government as its plenipotentiary, the government had decided its policy of staying with the League at all costs in order to seek for a proper understanding, and I think Mr. MATSUOKA was instructed accordingly.

The army, also in conformity with the government policy, strived to bring about the situation in which Japan could stay with the League in order to give them right understanding. However, there were continued disturbances and unrest in several parts of Manchuria and before these hostilities had been settled, the resolution of the plenary session of the League of Nations was reached. The hope of Japan's getting a right under-

standing from the League having been thus frustrated, Japan had no alternative but to withdraw from its in accordance with the provisions of Article I and 3 of its regulation. Nevertheless, Japan declared to the world by an Imperial Rescript and a government communique her determination of collaborating with the world. This will also be testified by documents and witnesses.

14. My views and thoughts on external affairs.

While I was in the office, the external affairs did not come directly under my jurisdiction, and accordingly, I could not bring into practice my views on those matters. All I could do was to discharge the duty of the army in accordance with the fixed policy of the government. But in order to clarify the ground on which my actions toward the international problems were based, I feel it necessary to state herewith my fundamental ideology on international problems and the subsequent steps that I undertook at that time.

(a) Relation with the Soviet Union.

I had been in Russia for many years and was one of those who had a dear feeling toward and a good understanding of that country. My article on the Monthly magazine "Russia", correctly conveyed my true sentiment.

Nevertheless, I could not advocate the world Bolshevization policy of the Third International. My opposition to this principle and guard against it was more intensified when in 1923 and 1932, members of the communist party plotted an assault on the person of His Majesty the Emperor.

In fact, from the end of TAISHO Era (about 1923) to the earlier period of SHOWA Era (about 1931), Japan was thoroughly subjected to clandestine activities of the communist party manifested in the form of a labour conflict and other political struggles of evil nature, and the existence of the country was endangered as it never had been before. A publication of Mr. Bezedovsky, a Soviet ambassador in Japan in 1926 and 1927, explaining the details of such activities gave a deep warning to the world. I took it as the weakness in the ideological phase of Japan, and did not take it so seriously as to consider that it strained the relation between the Soviet and Japan.

I may say that I am not inferior to the communist party in the passion of relieving the poor class of people, which, I understand, is one of the assertions of that party. However, my belief is that if the administration under the Emperor based on the original doctrine of this country is realized, not only the poorer class of people, but the whole people in general can enjoy better welfare without being forced to anything. This was clearly manifested in the message of one of the Emperors who said, "Should there be a single person among the whole population who is not given his proper place, We are to blame for that." I believed that neither violence nor crafty measures was required in giving welfare to the people. My opinion was if the Soviet Union believed in communism, that was their affair and we had no reason to interfere with it. Every country is entitled to follow its own policy in accordance with the internal condition of that country. This having been my conviction, my opposition to the Third International did not go as far as to advocate interference with the Soviet Union.

I felt at that time the necessity of taking self-defensive measures against the menace of eastward infiltration of the Soviet influence and of very active policy of the Third International of bolshevizing the whole world, but never had I felt the necessity of preparation of any positive military action against the Soviet Union, to say nothing of taking such action.

To cope with this menace of the Soviet Union, there may have been several researches and suggestions among the people whose duty was to deal with such matters, and I believe those in charge of the matters would have devised measures within the extent of their duty, but I have the reason to believe that such device should not have exceeded the extent of research. The research alleged by the prosecution to have been made by KAWABE and KASAHARA would have been one of their opinions as members of the General Staff, but whatever it may have been, it had no relation with me. As far as I knew, no positive plan of the responsible authorities against the Soviet Union existed. On the contrary, the fact was that the army had once placed much expectation in the alleviating change of the policy of the Soviet Union.

To the conclusion of that Non-Aggression Pact, I was not necessarily opposing in the sense of principle, but I seriously and carefully listened to the public opinion that before signing such pact as the Non-Aggression Pact, all the pending problems between the two countries ought to be settled upon the sincerity of both parties, as otherwise, the pact is destined to fail and is apt to leave cause for future trouble.

I cannot admit the conclusive remarks of the allegation tendered in evidence by the prosecution against myself. When I pointed out the obscurity of the borders of Outer Mongolia, it was not from an aggressive intention toward Soviet as it was a defensive precaution. This can be easily ascertained from the other parts of the sentence around that expression.

I sincerely hope that that good Russians will peacefully display their rich natural gift.

(b) Relation between China and Japan.

With regard to the relation between China and Japan, we have been told since we were children how eagerly our seniors of high ideals and experiences endeavoured, since MEIJI Era, to secure the firm and healthy independence for China our good and friendly neighbour, and thereby to bring happiness to the people of our friendly nation. Such expression as DOBUN DOCHU (same character and same race) and SHINSHI HOSHA (relation between lips and teeth, and wheels and axis) were often used to denote how the relation between China and Japan should be. This was where my original conception of China was formed, and I believe it was the same with all the people who had some interest in China. My article on the magazine BUNGEI SHUNJU entitled "To President Chiang Kai-shek and appeal to my brethren" expresses my view and conception in this matter.

I advocate that the cooperation of China and Japan should be based up on the promotion of Oriental culture which is further based on the union of eastern and western culture. I expressed this opinion of mine in 1925, when I had a chance of talking to some of the Chinese people in Shanghai who are now engaged in

important works as leaders of that country. As for the means of bringing about the perfect independence over China, I had an occasion of giving my personal suggestion to President Chiang Kai-shek in the spring of 1932, through the staff of the Chinese Legation in Japan.

China is destined to be our friendly neighbor. I most sincerely wished a perfect independence of this country, but never had I dreamed of her split. This is the reason why I always quote the Outer Mongolian as a sinking problem for comparison.

I viewed the Manchurian Incident as a kind of explosion of a situation which had been induced to the flashing point by variegated historical background and the complicated state of affairs of Manchuria at that time, and the explosion resulted in the independence declaration by the people of Manchuria. In other words, it was the natural result, caused by the influence of the mass of people, which could not have been stopped by the strength of a limited number of people, without first correcting its cause. If China wanted to get rid of this sinister incident, she should have devised adequate measures immediately after World War I and for a person like myself who was tasked to deal with this incident from its half way mark, the first necessity was to put an end to the hostilities. I considered that if Manchuria should turn out to be an ideal happy land, whether politically independent or not, and gained approval of the world, its relation with China and peace in the Far East for that matter could be somehow readjusted in the future and I dealt with this matter along the line of this train of thought. What I really had in mind was to welcome the creation of an ideal happy land on a part of Chinese soil in anticipation of rehabilitation of its mother land.

When I saw the Manchurian people who had been under the hard pressure of living, I could not help praying for realization of an ideal happy land of ODO (King's Way) as had often been talked of by the leaders of Manchuria. It would not have been myself alone, but all the people of broader views who had the same opinion as above. The main thing was to bring peace immediately between China and Japan and let the world recognize the fact. Readjustment of relations between China and Manchoukuo could be easily accomplished then.

With this view in mind, I considered as War Minister that what was required most urgently was to terminate hostilities. This was the reason why I evacuated all the Japanese troops from Shanghai, and advocated after the Tangku Truce Agreement, and opening of a Far Eastern Peace Conference. This will be proven by witness and documents.

The Marco Polo Incident occurred four years after the Tangku Truce Agreement. It would hardly be necessary to say that this incident had not any relation with the Manchurian Incident. I acceded to the request of Premier HONOE, accepted the post of Cabinet Councillor and Education Minister in his cabinets. The object of the Premier was to let me find means to terminate the China Incident. I did my best to comply with the request of the Premier, but my power was not strong enough to bear any fruit in this line.

As the occasion of Nanking campaign, I opposed the act of occupying the capital of the opponent. I thought it was detrimental to the sentiment of the people of both countries in the future. This was why I lamented over the occupation of that city. It was the time when I thought of the poem of seven steps of Tsao Tzu-kian.

It is my belief that if the leaders of China and Japan and the leading countries of the world should have had a little deeper appreciation of the relations between China and Japan, the Marco Polo Incident would not have made such development as it did.

It was from the same views that before the occupation of Canton and Hankow, I made my suggestions and opposed the military action against those cities. However, then I was not a member of army authorities, nor was I keeping contact with the actual state of affairs and so my hopes were not fulfilled. I have never dreamed of aggression of China and never acted accordingly. In fact, I placed my utmost importance in cultural and spiritual unity between China and Japan.

(c) Relations with the U.S.A. and Britain.

I am not a so-called pro-Anglo Saxon) nor am I, of course, an anti-Anglo Saxon. I am a Japanese. I can not bear the sight of Japan being held in contempt by others or being induced to destruction. Moreover, I am of the opinion of obeying His Majesty the Emperor and bringing about peace and welfare upon the basis of the original doctrine of Japan. I believed so and I have practiced so. I trust this was not an opinion formed from the so-called divine-inspiration or by a dogmatic ultra-nationalist, on the contrary, I trust it is a most humane principle agreeable to the world's omnipresent natural law. With this principle in mind, I did not try to cater for the current trend of making omnipotence of Germany and Italy. Because I did not do so, I was sometimes blamed and abused to be a pro-Anglo Saxon. It has not been my practice to flatter or fawn upon others. I was sometimes unscrupulous in commenting upon what seemed to me wrong, and warned about the same, but I was never reluctant in praising what I believed to be right. Above all, I cannot help feeling grateful throughout my life to the obligation under which I was once placed. In such an occasion, I always expressed my gratitude whatever the reason for the obligation may have been. It was in this sense that I opposed the suggestion that the monument of Commodore Perry in KURIHAMA should be removed. I expressed similar nature of opinions on several occasions. It was one thing I could not understand why, because of my above belief and attitude, should I have been called during the war by the opportunists and by those who were obsequious to the current trend to be an unpatriotic Pro-Anglo Saxon.

It was my consistent ideal that war should not be waged to satisfy meaningless desire. Except for some special occasions, war in apt to leave behind it certain after math of personal feeling. Japan had never fought against the U.S.A. or Britain. On the contrary, it was my belief that Japan had been under the obligation of those two countries for the past ten years in connection with the crisis that Japan had been confronted with. Britain in particular was our ally for many years in the past, and to the U.S.A. while we had much to owe her financially, there was not the slightest friction of feeling.

Only there had been a slight unpleasant feeling between the two nations in connection with the racial problem and the Washington Conference. However, even on these matters, I think there was sufficient understanding among the people of learning and fame in the U.S.A. and Japan. Furthermore I did not take it any more than as a mere political problem, in which there was not the slightest factor of danger for the relations between the two countries.

To be quite frank, the relation between the U.S.A. and Japan after the Manchurian Incident had not always been a pleasant one. Of course each party must have had its own reason to remain so, but the main thing was hinged upon sentiment and misunderstanding, and I believed it was not so deeply rooted as would completely destroy the friendly relation which had existed between the two countries.

PART III

During the time of the Manchurian Incident, I was one of those who was worried over the general situation of the world. I had had sincere faith in Britain's refined diplomacy and the U.S.A.'s power of enforcement, and to those I placed much expectation to save the world from the deteriorated situation.

I expressed my opinion to many of the well-informed people of learning and fame in both Britain and America and wanted to adjust through those people the application of the functions of the League of Nations, and also, more importantly, to prevent the explosion of the general unrest which was then prevailing all over the world. I believed I was doing much good for the sake of world peace, and I repeatedly warned them that unless steps were taken in the line as I suggested, the situation in Europe was suggestive of a world war.

It was also from my fear of the above that I desired of those people an improvement of the method of application of the functions of the League of Nations, based more upon the actual facts than anything else.

It looked to me that the U.S.A. had maintained an indifferent attitude having stayed outside the realm of the League of Nations, and therefore, was in a position to make calm and unbiased judgment of the world's state of affairs and Britain was also, in my opinion, in the same position, because of her rich experience in dealing with important international problems. The rest of the countries were, I thought, too busy in rehabilitating their damages of World War I to do anything else.

Japan had been recognized as having the power of maintaining the security of the Far East, and so I considered that much would be contributed to the world's peace if those three countries, Japan, U.S.A. and Britain, discussed the basic policy of peace in the world without prejudice and bias.

Because of this conviction, I had deliberate discussions over the world's state of affairs since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident with Sir Lindley and other successive British Ambassadors to Japan and Major-General Piggot, British Military Attache and others. I also appealed to the learned American people to call their attention to the situation of the East. Mr. Raleigh, lecturer of the Oxford University was another person whom I had hearty discussion. I also appealed to a mass of foreigners in my speech at Karuizawa in the summer of 1934.

In these speeches and discussions, I frankly pointed out the points on which I thought there should be a self-reflection and reconsideration on the part of the U.S.A. and Britain. It had not been my practice to flatter, nor was it my habit to commit myself to anything unreasonable, to say nothing of abuse of armed force.

It had been my belief that the world peace could only arise when people based their conduct upon warm-heartedness and justice of natural law, restricted their selfish desires and conceded to others to the utmost to such an extent as would not impair their self-existence.

At the time when the question of importation of Siamese rice was much discussed in Japan, I insisted that we should endure some economical disadvantages to accede to the request of Siam so that we could express our appreciation of the warm friendship that Siam had shown us for many years in the past. I explained this to the people of rural districts in order to gain their understanding over the question.

When we had an occasion of negotiating with Lancashire in connection with our exportation of cotton piece goods, I insisted that we should make the possible best concession in the negotiation and should not effect any undue pressure upon Lancashire, and that all international problems should be settled from a wider point of view. This conduct of mine was always based upon the belief that I have stated in the above.

It was my opinion that in facing the activities of the League of Nations or fulfilling the provisions of international treaties, Japan should always stand on this belief, that by no means, should she lose sight of her ultimate object by selecting means. I advocated from the same belief that those who had power should be right and those who were right should have power. The idea of power to power principle was one thing I detested most.

I believed that all of these assertions could be fully understood by Britain and America, and heartily desired that by understanding them, they would contribute to the peace of the world. I feel ashamed of being even alluded to be a person of world domination or of aggression and expansion.

My Ideas

In 1895, I was much instigated with an incident known as "Three Power Interference" which resulted in Japan's retrocession of Liaotung, and it caused me join the army to defend the motherland.

I participated in the Russo-Japanese War when I was a Lieutenant. At the World War I, I was with the Russian Army at the eastern front of Europe and had ample opportunities of witnessing the true nature of war among the civilized countries.

This experience effected much the views of war which I had had by that time, and became the second epochal period on the history of my ideology. The essence of my new ideology was that war, if inevitable, should be the war of human being, not the struggle among beasts. I came to have a new idea as to weapon, style of fighting and equipments for national defense, and with a view to lessen the war damages, have made an appeal of this idea to the people both in and out of Japan for the past twenty years.

In parallel with the above advocacy, I speculated over the basis of peace, namely, the means with which to avoid the occurrence of war. I came to the conclusion that the existing international treaties alone were not only virtually insufficient to avoid war, but they sometimes caused war, and I intended to improve this shortcoming.

There were numerous causes of war, but economic pressure, menace on self-existence, denial of the specific feature of a nation and racial prejudice constituted their principal part and so far as they were not completely eliminated, war was unavoidable. The method of maintaining peace by way of keeping certain balance of armament among the nations was nothing but a camouflaged peace, which was easily broken by a miscalculation on the part of a nation over the balance of her armament and that of other nations. Once the peace was broken, the scale of equipment and installation for war and the selected arms of precision would give cause to a boundless calamity. I, therefore, considered it the duty of a civilized nation to go a step forward to study the fundamental cause of war, and have taken every possible opportunity to propagate this idea to the people of the world.

There was another point to be considered. After World War I, a disruption took place in the world of thought dividing the whole world into three ideological circles, and each circle contested with another beyond the barrier of economy and living.

I perceived a danger of inducement to war in this conflict of thought. I drew attention of the people to the necessity of securing a fundamental ideal for establishment of peace, and in order to achieve this purpose, I advocated the amalgamation of eastern and western culture, enhancement of the spirit of mutual concession, and, in order **heighten the sense of sympathy**, and advocated KODO (Imperial Way).

Thus, I endeavoured to harmonize the interests of the world to avoid the potential calamity, but unfortunately most of the countries of the world were indifferent to this advocacy because of their lack of recognition of this fundamental ideal and each rushed forward to expand its influence into the world according to its long entertained or newly harboured ideal.

After the World War I, two movements took world offensive with the support of armed force, one was the World Bolshevizing Movement and the other was the Nazism as a totalitarian nation. Japan's attention was drawn to this and the necessity of self-defense impressed her. I personally considered that the most effective self-defense could be carried out by promoting the sense of morality and justice.

Primarily, my views of peace or views of life do not admit territorial expansion. Amalgamation of a nation which had its own race and history was one thing I definitely rejected. I said it was one thing to protect the land of their ancestors and it was quite another to expand it. I considered that the land other than its own could be developed as a source of raw materials under the principle of mutual help. That was why I objected to the amalgamation of Korea and although I was abroad when it took place, I sent a letter to my senior, expressing my views, and insisted that Japan should cooperate with Korea by respecting its civilization.

Such having been my views, I can clearly declare that never in my life have I entertained an idea of aggression, to say nothing of world domination.

If I may be allowed to express my views, such ambition as territorial expansion is nothing but an infantile glory which is far from the permanent welfare.

With regard to Manchuria, I accepted the post of War Minister when Manchuria was in a turmoil of disturbances. My whole-hearted attention was devoted to nothing but terminating the hostilities. Only as I was so deeply impressed with the miserable conditions in which the Manchurian people were, I took a sympathetic view on establishment of a happy land of King's Way (KODO). Further, I was favourably impressed when, after the foundation of Manchukuo, upon zealous aspiration of Manchurian people, the leaders of that new country made Confuciasm, a doctrine originated in China, their principle of creation of the happy land. The complicated international problems of Manchuria had not slipped out of my mind, but since an independence had been declared, I wished from the sense of morality, its realization of the happy land.

However, as time passed, it did not develop in the way as I had hoped and several petitions and bitter criticism of the Manchurian people reached my ears. Worried over this state, as I have stated in the above, I declined to go over to Manchuria to celebrate her tenth anniversary of independence and did not attend the celebration held in Japan.

I have already stated that my views of war, nation and peace, which I had had since my participation in World War I, were definitely opposed to imperialism, exclusive egoism and coercion control principle. My conduct was always coherent to this principle. I feared that the manners in which powers, after World War I, dealt with Germany were potential of future trouble. Pressures which all the countries which won victory over Germany, (including Japan) conducted upon this defeated country as well as the attitude of newly awakened Germany toward the world were quite precarious from a standpoint of world peace, and because of my afore-mentioned views, I expressed my desire, whenever I could, for mitigation of such stringency.

Historically, the strained situation of Japan in the past may have been a consistent series, but as far as I was concerned, I had my own ideal as above and because of this ideal, I disassociated myself with the movements before and after my tenure of War Minister. I went my own way in accordance with my ideal, and did not take any action in concert with the people who had different views. On the other hand, I endeavoured to propagate my international morality and belief throughout the world.

15. Armament and my policy in directing the Army.

The equipment and strength of our army was so poor that it was not even as good as that of Poland. In 1921 the army authorities desired to raise the standard of armament to only half of the whole strength of the Japanese Army to that of powers at the time of World War I. For this necessity, a bill

of approximately 460 million yen as running expense for ten years was presented to the Diet and was duly approved. However, the payment of the whole amount was successively postponed and in 1931; that was a year before the Manchurian Incident, the sum of 360 million yen was still left unused. That is to say, not even one quarter of the original plan was accomplished.

I had my own view toward the establishment of army and war, which I had harbored since World War I. I believed in the necessity of modern equipment for an independent nation, but I had never dreamed of completing armament for the sake of waging war. I regarded the army as a symbol of morality and placed more importance on the spiritual element of it. I felt the necessity of a completion of armament, but I never considered its completion in connection with the preparation for aggression. On the contrary, my opinion was just the reverse. However, I could not bring this ideal of mine into practice, having been disturbed by the necessity of settling the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents.

It was also from this ideal of mine that in 1932 and 1933, I conceded the sum of 15 million yen and 10 million yen respectively from the Army budget to the Navy and cooperated with the Finance Office and Navy Office. I thought it would be detrimental to the credit of Japan if army and navy contended each other on a matter of a small amount of budget and if, because of this, the Navy Minister should resign from his post. As far as the army was concerned, securing the country under complete unity of army and navy was its first moral duty and an accomplishment of this mission was considered by it much more valuable than a monetary value of ten or fifteen million yen.

The army budget in 1932 and 1933, excluding the budget for the Manchurian Incident, was about one hundred and seventy million yen each and there was not any virtual increase in comparison with those of preceding years. On the contrary, 1933 showed some decrease. New installations and equipments which had to be provided to cope with the incident were paid by appropriating the budget of the following year. Under such circumstances, any positive preparation of war was impossible.

The army budget for the Manchurian Incident while I was War Minister was one hundred and forty or fifty million yen each for the two successive years. After the recognition of Manchoukuo, the army was added with task of Manchurian national defense by the provisions of the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol. Also, there was some reinforcement of railway guard troops in compliance with the extension of railways to be guarded, but this did not involve any material increase of expense. In attending the joint defense of Manchoukuo, the military installations in Manchoukuo were limited to those of a defensive nature, and nothing was established by way of offensive action.

Establishment of railway lines, unification of communication systems and exploitation of natural resources were the reasonable necessities for a new state on her way to development, also from the necessity of maintaining law and order. It was nothing more than an ordinary step that a newly born nation should take, and Manchukuo merely did it. It is definitely wrong and groundless to accuse that Japan made Manchuria a militaristic base for aggressive war. To further support this, the military installations in Manchoukuo were limited to those of defensive nature.

As I have stated before, my view of war and view of national defense, which I had harbored since World War I, was fundamentally different from those of other people. Therefore, armament of powers did not attract my attention and I could not approve any imperialistic policy or immoral equipment, whether militaristic, ideological or economic. The armament was also carried out under this consideration.

In the administration of military affairs, I abolished discrimination in treatment between the rich and the poor. I also denounced the system of paying money to become a cadet and equalized the opportunity in military service. Because of this change, some of the college students who wanted to become cadets, may have desired some preparatory military knowledge out of their desire for enlightenment. I contend that this cannot be called militarization of education.

I also decided a policy which I believed to be the basic conditions of purification of the army, intended for the improvement of the treatment of war wounded.

Since this was my principle even in armament, I can definitely say that there was not the slightest truth in the testimony of witness OUCHI that during my tenure of office as War Minister, I militarized the school education.

The guiding principle for my direction of the army was firstly to make an army of morality based upon the principle of founding the army and secondly to let it display its characteristics as an army which observed the Imperial Way. In order to realize this, refer to my purging the aftermath of several disastrous incidents in the past. This was the reason why I conducted shifts of several of the military personnel. I did my best in quieting the young officers who had been dissatisfied with the situation and the May 15 Incident, there was not one participation in it of any army officer and I am proud to say that throughout my tenure of office as War Minister, there was not a single case of any such unlawful action.

I further endeavored to eliminate the Prussian type from the army. I insisted that the troops should nourish the virtue of the army to such an extent that they would not cause a grudge of an opponent, and to win the favor and respect of inhabitants wherever it might be stationed. Our army in those days was apt to be ideologically confused with the Prussian army and such conception needed correction. I, first of all, wanted some of the members of the cabinet to understand this spirit and with it to rectify the common misconception that the armament was for the sake of waging war. I determined that this must be thoroughly understood by the whole public and whenever possible, expressed my views in speeches and other writings.

With regard to the strained situation of Japan, I requested strong reflection of the people over the current problems and requested them to place their first importance in promotion of morality.

The real meaning of my speech entitled "Emergency Japan" which was offered in evidence by the prosecution can be proved by many other speeches bearing "emergency" in their titles. If the whole of this speech is read without prejudice, I believe the real intention of mine will be understood. The process of manufacture of this film and the impression that this film gave to the spectators will also be a good indication to the intention with which I made this speech.

All of these speeches were made with a view to introduce my moral view which I gained through my experience in World War I.

What underlies the Imperial Rescript granted by the late Emperor MEIJI to the army and army personnel is the sense of sincerity. The present Emperor showed in his Imperial Rescript granted when he ascended the Throne that the true principle of foundation of Japan was based upon the spirit of benevolence. I advocated that the army should observe the principle of these Imperial Rescripts and should exert their best to discharge its duty. My intention was to enhance, by my advocacy, the virtue of benevolence of the Emperor among the people, and this was, I thought, the first step to let the troops completely become aware of the true spirit of the Imperial army. By their efforts, I believe I succeeded, even to the slightest degree, in removing the imperialistic thought from the army and also from the people and prevented them from egoistical conduct.

16. Military discipline during the Manchurian Incident.

The Manchurian Incident arose from what had been vitally important to Japan. As the ultimate object of this incident was to bring peace and welfare to both Japanese and Chinese nationals, the officers and soldiers of the Japanese troops at the front as well as the general public in Japan were sympathetic towards the Manchurians and other people on the spot. The hostilities were not of the nature of a declared war, and so all the captives were immediately released and were given assistance to engage in peaceful work.

Those who were in distress were given relief funds. These facts were made clear by the report of those who inspected there. There was not a single case of massacre or violence, nor was there any report made to that effect. Lord Lytton's Report admitted this fact.

The incident which was reported by the Chicago Tribune as having occurred near SENKINSAI was nothing but a minor skirmish between our small squad and a body of local bandits. This was exaggerated and made a subject of propaganda as was the usual practice with the Chinese people, and the propaganda was reported by Mr. Powell and was inserted in the paper as it was. This was clear by the testimony of Mr. Powell himself, and same may be supported to some extent by the protest of the Japanese consul. The skirmish was too small to be reported to me, so I did not know of it.

17. The circumstances under which I became the Cabinet Councillor of the First Konoje Cabinet.

Since my withdrawal from active service in March 1936, I had not been quite satisfied with the state of affairs and was leading a life of a retired man. During that time, there was an occasion when, at the outbreak of the China Incident in July 1937, I was extremely worried about the situation and suggested to Prince KONOYE my view on means of bringing about peace.

It happened in September 1937 that Prince KONOYE who was the Prime Minister at that time sent for me. When I saw him, he was very much worried about the China Incident and asked me if I had any idea as to means of saving the situation. It was the time when the Second Shanghai Incident had broken out and the situation was really serious.

I told him that if a frontal clash between China and Japan should take place, it would not only be against the policy of our country, but would also cause a great difficulty for Japan from the operational viewpoint. I suggested that he should ask Lt. Gen. OBATA's opinion about those matters, but he told me that he had had Lt. Gen. OBATA's opinion already and that from his opinion he was more convinced of the graveness of the situation. He said that it was the reason why he came to me and wanted my unreserved opinion for saving the situation.

I told him that as the state of affairs had developed to such an extent as that, it would require a person with strong influence among military circles, not a retired soldier like myself, to settle the affair. I added that in any case, Prince KONOYE would require a great deal of resolution to cope with the situation.

In the meantime, Premier KONOYE set up a system of Cabinet Councillor and about ten people including myself were appointed the Cabinet Councillors. The object of this organization was to seek for suggestions to check the expansion of the incident and to settle it.

18. The functions of the Cabinet Councillors and my suggestions to the Premier.

The Cabinet Councillor was not organized into a regular system of a council. Its members were to make their individual suggestions to Premier KONOYE and the Council had no recognized right of resolution. The Councillors were to meet regularly once or twice a week. However, it was to hear the latest informations from the government or to exchange each other's views, and not to discuss any fixed agenda.

As the KONOYE Cabinet did not place much importance in this system, the Cabinet Council was gradually reduced to a nominal existence and the Councillor an honorary post for which no pay or other form of treatment was given. At the time when this system was established, the China Incident had considerably expanded and the troops had reached somewhere near Nanking.

I submitted my opinion to the Premier saying that to attack and subsequently occupy the capital of China would only make the whole situation more serious than ever and would create a considerable hindrance over the readjustment of China-Japan relations in the future. I suggested that peace should be wrought before this campaign took place.

All the Councillors were of more or less the same opinion, and the government authorities seemed to have done their best in endeavoring to save the situation. However, what was lacking with the government authorities was a resolute determination to push through their policy, whereas the military action which was under the direction of the Supreme Command gained more influence every day and resulted in the further aggravation of the situation.

I think it was around this time that a peace negotiation was made through the good offices of Mr. Trautman, German Ambassador in China. All of the councillors were looking forward to the success of this negotiation, but the repeated efforts on the part of the Japanese government were frustrated. The Councillors did not participate in the deliberation of this peace negotiation and accordingly were not informed of its details. However, they eagerly expected the government, in an abstract manner, to accomplish this negotiation, until it proved in vain on the 16th of January.

Thus, the Councillors, whose duty from its inception had been nullified, became a mere nominal existence. The Councillors are charged with atrocities in Nanking, but they had neither authority nor duty of controlling such an incident as that.

19. The circumstances in which I became Education Minister and the state of affairs during my tenure of office.

Prince KONOYE, from his sincere apprehension over the situation, and desiring to devise counter means against it, determined at the end of May to reshuffle his Cabinet, and selected as ministers the following members from the Cabinet Councillors. General UGAKI was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mr. IMEDA, Minister of Finance and concurrently Minister of Commerce and Industry; and myself Minister of Education. He then appointed Lt. General ITAGAKI as War Minister. I had some expectation on this renovated Cabinet, but Premier KONOYE, after the renovation, made it his practice to confer on current problems only with the Five Minister Conference comprising of Minister of War, Navy, Foreign and Finance, other Ministers were not invited to the discussions.

At that time, military operations were in progress, and as the operation was under control of the Supreme Command, the Cabinet had no authority to check it. Thus, while the Premier was shilly-shallying, military action gradually developed and it reached as far as Wuchang, Hankow and Canton. During this time, the members of the Cabinet other than those of the Five Minister Council were not immediately informed of the latest state of affairs.

Under the circumstances, my position was merely the chief of education administration, which was entirely outside the realm of current affairs, and all I did was to promote education and its administration.

20. My work as Minister of Education.

The Ministry of Education, as one of its fixed duties, shared with the Ministry of Home Affairs the task of keeping surveillance over the General Spiritual Mobilization Organization. Consequently, the Minister of Education had to write on magazines and make broadcasting in connection with educational matters, as one of his routine works. The drafts of articles or broadcastings were usually prepared by the staff of ministry in charge of such works and the Minister was only to make them public. The work was executed along the customary line. I do not think there was anything which was planned with specific intention or new from the customary practice.

Excerpts of some of my books were tendered to the Tribunal as prosecution evidence. To those I contend that if the whole book had been read, instead of excerpts, what I was aiming to explain would have been understood.

At the earlier period of my tenure of office as Education Minister, there were some in the Ministry who were inclined toward flattery or fanatically pleaded over the true principle of the fundamental policy of our country; there were some who were inclined to agree with the Nazi ideology; on the other hand, there were still some submerged elements in schools who observed communism.

This situation required competent persons who could regulate this confusion, and this was why I conducted personnel shifts among the Education Office Staff.

I also appointed competent people who could cope with confidence with the request from the military authorities and other government branches so that the evil practice of being obsequitous to such requests could be eliminated.

At that time, the Education Council had already been established (in 1937). This was the highest institution for the renovation of education system and it comprised as the Councillors the most prominent persons of learning and experience, both in and out of office. All the important problems of education were deliberated at this Council and the government policies on education were decided upon by resolution in it.

The inception of advocacy for compulsory education at the Youths School dates back to the beginning of the TAISHO Era when it was only a Supplementary School.

In 1937, the Educational Administration Council made a report, in answer to the inquiry from the government about the question of Youths School. In January 1938, at the time of my predecessor, compulsory education was formerly decided at the Cabinet meeting. Then the question was again deliberated on by the Education Council and according to its reply in July of the same year, it was arranged that an Imperial Ordinance be given in April 1939 for its enforcement. This new system was to give equal opportunity of education to all people and help to develop their natural gifts. It is entirely wrong to interpret this change as militarization of education.

The education system in Japan since the MEIJI Era had been formed after European and American style. While the system had a certain extent of popularity among the public, it offered more opportunity to the well-to-do class of people, and the poorer classes

of talent and faculty found difficulty in developing their natural gifts. I had to conceive that the state was contrary to our original program to let everyone gain his proper place, when the Educational Council submitted its decision that the education in the Youths School should be made compulsory. I took this opportunity to develop the education of the working class of youths, and to give to those who showed good result in the Youths School ample opportunity to develop their talent.

The most serious apprehension of Japan at that time was the disturbance of ideological circles. There was a time when communism widely spread among the people and once it became the tide of public opinion; then there was a time, later, when people followed Nazism of Fascism. This trend gave rise to complications between the liberalism which had also existed at that time, and caused a terrible state of chaos.

The several unfortunate incidents which arose from the current situation at that time were due to disturbance of thoughts on the part of the people. On the other hand, the rise of the Nippon spirit tended to create dogmatic nationalism, which from its lack of ubiquity, was apt to fall into extreme rightist and was pregnant of much danger. The cause of this defect was due to the fault of perfunctory education which had a tendency of making the people lose sight of ideological independence and lofty ideas. In order to reform this, I advocated that the imperial virtue of benevolence and tolerance, which had been the basic spirit from the time of the foundation of our country, should be borne in mind and cultivate in it an ubiquitous character which was welcome in all the modern civilized countries of the world. Imperial admonition was my guiding principle when attending to this work, inasmuch as the imperial admonition was teaching us the basic principle of humanity with His Majesty's generosity, and I considered that was the code that the people should observe. This principle which had been the basic spirit from the time of the foundation of the Empire was entirely different from militarism, not only was it just the contrary to militarism, but it was the one essentially required for the correction of the defect in ideological circles at that time.

21. Military Training in Schools

The history of physical exercise in military style which was eventually turned into military training dates back many years ago, but I am not going into its detail now. I had heard some conflict between the education institutions and the military authorities with regard to military training in schools, but neither of the parties had my sympathy, inasmuch as the whole conflict seemed to be due to their narrow view.

It was quite natural that the school education placed its importance in cultivating the spirit of discipline and cooperation by training. But as the result of the training depended on the character of the person who was in charge of training, there were instances that the training was executed in excess of the above object. On the other hand, there were several cases where, on account of lack of proper understanding on the part of the school authorities, liberalism was regarded as synonymous to a sloven life and students were left at an irregular and slatternly existence. Another fearful tendency was communistic ideology, which, combined with some of the political plotters caused deterioration of studently spirit by abetting them into the habit of disdaining such virtues as discipline, moderation, cooperation

and diligence, all of which were indispensable to promotion of the culture of a nation.

At the earlier period of my Education Ministership, these fearful tendencies were gaining influence, much to my regret. There were frequent occasions where students were arrested and detained at the police office on the charge of disturbing public orders. These types of students were given to slander the training in schools as being militarization of school education. There were some even among the teachers and professors who encouraged students toward such tendency.

I changed the system of training in school in such a way as would observe moderation between the above two extremes and with it I exerted to promote the lofty ideal of the students.

The reformation of the system of the Youths School was an act of equalizing the right and duty of education. By the reformation, there was not an increase of hours to be allotted for training and there was not the slightest sign to show that the education was militarized.

Military training in schools was a part of the school education and from the viewpoint of educational administration it should not have exceeded this category. This was my principle in coping with this training, and so any request from the army authorities which had attempted to bring it out of this category met my refusal.

There were occasions when in compliance with the request of students and school authorities, the use of modern weapons was introduced in training, but this decision was an autonomous disposal of the school authorities as against the students' request, and not by the request of the Education Ministry.

While I was Education Minister, I placed importance on cultivating the moral element rather than promoting the skill of combat. This moral element was to serve to reveal the Emperor's virtue of benevolence.

Defense Document No.

That is to say, by training I taught students to cultivate their morals rather than to cultivate the habit of depending on armed force.

23 . National Spirit General Mobilization

The National Spirit General Mobilization system had been established at the time of the First KONOYE Cabinet and its object was to heighten the national spirit against the state of affairs after the outbreak of the China Incident. It had been established before I became the Education Minister.

Its central executive organ was of civilian establishment formed by people of learning, fame and experience and had been placed under the charge of the Departments of Home Affairs and education. Its main object was the improvement of people's daily life and restraint of spirits.

Later, there was a tendency that the policy of this central executive organ was apt to become dogmatic. The HIRANUMA Cabinet, desiring to lead its policy properly, established a committee system with the chairman of committee to be selected from among the cabinet ministers, to set up a basic policy, and all the people of learning and experience both in and out of office were requested to make deliberation so that the committee could submit its opinion to the government.

In my capacity of being the Education Minister, I was recommended to the chairmanship of this committee, but most of the actual work was handled by the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet. The committee and staff included many civilians, especially women and deliberated upon renovation and curtailment of daily living.

However, for all of its primary objective, the discussion was apt to indulge in current problems, diverting from its original course of cultivating the fundamental character of the people to be worthy of associating with the modern world.

What was most urgently required under the circumstances was to ask the people to make a severe introspection over their daily mode of living, let them concentrate upon cultivation of spirit of endurance and improvement of their daily life, let them respect the social morality and help them to bring about efficiency in their work.

In order to realize the above, I established a day of self-introspection. I decided the first day of every month to be called the "Serving Day" and requested the people to lead a life of restraint on this day. There was an opinion at that time that in view of the current situation, the 7th of every month, the day of the outbreak of the China

Defense Document No.

Incident would be a better day for "Serving Day". However, my opinion was that the "Serving Day" was to be disconnected with the current state of affairs. My intention was to use this day for permanently promoting the basic standard of living of the people, and in order to get the people to understand this principle, I made the first day of every month the day for self-introspection. Thus I tried to keep away from having everything dragged away from the influence of the current situation.

I wish to add that the National Spirit General Mobilization was entirely different in nature from National General Mobilization and Student Mobilization. The National Spirit General Mobilization was merely a part of daily life renovation movement.

24. International problems while I was the Education Minister.

My duty as Education Minister was limited in, mainly, education administration, and the general international problems were outside the scope of my work. I have no recollection whether such matters as Premier Konoye's declaration of the Establishment of the New Order or Foreign Minister ARITA's declaration was debated at the Cabinet Meeting.

My disassociation with the international problems was more conspicuous at the time of the HIRANUMA Cabinet. In fact, I know nothing about those matters at that time, inasmuch as all the important problems were discussed and decided at the Five Minister Conference.

Japan-German Culture Agreement was first proposed to me by the Foreign Office and then Japan entered into this agreement. The agreement concerned in culture only and had not any political significance in it.

Exchange of boys between Germany and Japan was planned and executed before my acceptance of Education Minister ship. The first party of this returned home after my assumption of post. I did not see in this party anything more than an ordinary social visit of a tourist party. I wanted to send a similar party not to Germany alone, but to all other civilized countries, but could not realize it.

Khasan and Nomonhan Incidents were reported to the Cabinet Meeting as being mere skirmishes between the border garrisons of both countries. Education Minister was not concerned in disposal of such incidents. Only one thing was clear that the government desired amicable settlements and the army acted from beginning to end in conformity with this policy. That was why those incidents did not become serious subjects of discussion at the Cabinet Meeting.

I did not know anything about the Tripartite Pact and the Wan Chin-wei government. I did not even know how they were discussed or made. As for the stationing of troops in French Indo-China and the problems concerning

Defense Document No.

Lesser South Group of Islands and Hainan Island, I had not the slightest idea of what was going on.

25. Cabinet Councillor at the ABE and YONAI Cabinets.

It was quite a long time after the formation of the ABE Cabinet that I was asked to become a Councillor of that Cabinet. (I think it was in December 1939).. I had known that a Cabinet Councillor was merely a nominal post and that I could not be of any material use to that Cabinet, so I first declined to accept it but the Premier was so persistent that I had to accept it after all. The ABE Cabinet resigned en bloc after two months of my acceptance of this post, and so I had not even chance of talking to the Premier.

When the YONAI Cabinet was formed, I was asked to become its Home Minister. However, my view was as I have stated in the above, and furthermore, the state of affairs was so aggravated at that time that I considered it was impossible for anyone except those who held strong influence over the military authorities, to exercise effective administration to cope with the situation, and so I refused to accept it.

Then I was asked to become its Cabinet Councillor, but as my view was unchanged since the ABE Cabinet, again I declined to accept it. But when I was persistently asked by him to list my name among the Councillors only for the name's sake, I could not very well refuse it and became its Cabinet Councillor.

As my assumption of post had taken place under such circumstances as the above, I remained its nominal member and actually did not do any work. I did not even know what was going on in the cabinet. It was, however, conceivable that both the ABE and YONAI Cabinets were opposed to the Tripartite Pact and that they were eager to put an end to the China Incident.

26. My attitude toward the Second KONOE Cabinet.

It was in September 1940, about two months after the formation of the Second KONOE Cabinet that Mr. Tomita, Chief Cabinet Secretary unexpectedly visited me and asked me to become a Cabinet Councillor of the Second Konoé Cabinet.

I had been told that the establishment of the Grand Rule Assistance Association and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact were going to be disclosed shortly. These were the two important domestic and foreign problems, over which I had had serious apprehensions for sometime in the past. Since those two problems were decided to be realized, it meant that my apprehension did not mean to remain mere apprehension, but to develop into something very serious. I decided that I could not assist the Cabinet which was to commit those mistakes. In fact, the things were so serious that I thought I had to take a very careful consideration about it. I confided these considerations to Mr. Tomita and told him that I could not

Def Doc No. 2483

Defense Document No.

acceded to his request.

On the evening of the same day, Prince KONOE visited me at my house and repeated his request. We had a hot discussion for more than five hours. I explained to him that the state of affairs at that time indicated a very grave consequence and did not accept his request.

From March 1936 to October 15th, 1937, from September 1939 to November, , 1939 and after July 1940, I was not in any of the official positions and no public activity was undertaken by me during those periods. The incidents such as Anti-Comintern Pact, outbreak of the China Incident, Stationing of troops in French Indo-China, Tripartite Pact and the Pacific War occurred during those periods, and so I do not think it necessary for me to state anything about those incidents.

28. My refutation against Prosecution testimony.

Prosecution's record of my interrogation and its intrinsic value.

1. The Prosecution tendered Exhibit No. 187-4 onward as being the record of my interrogation. I presume the prosecution meant by this to submit to the Tribunal the record of the interrogation which the prosecutors (Colonel Morrow and Mr. Hyder) conducted on me at the Sugamo Prison. The interrogation was carried out for more than twenty times, between January 13th and March 12th, 1946, by the prosecutors, helped by one or two interpreters each time.

The English version of the said interrogations were stenographically recorded for the first few occasions, but this procedure was stopped later, whereas the Japanese version was not recorded from the beginning. The interpreters were not fully conversant with Japanese and there were several points over which, on account of incompetent interpretation, we failed to come to a mutual understanding. Moreover, the record of this interrogation was not read for me, nor was it even shown to me.

I was never asked to give oath or sign the statement in connection with this interrogation. The record, when presented before the Tribunal, contained quite a number of misunderstandings, complications and mistakes; more remarkable were their diversions from facts, and as a whole, I cannot hold myself responsible to the contents of these statements.

2. Through the whole course of interrogation, the prosecution changed interpreters almost in each occasion, and as far as I could see, all of them were unable to thoroughly understand Japanese and the Japanese

state of affairs. The interpreters themselves seemed to have conscientiously admitted of their incompetence.

As I felt uneasy of the state, I suggested that I should write the outline, if not the details, of what were asked to me. I said that if the prosecutors were to make interrogations based on my written statement, it would not only save considerable time, but also would help to convey my idea accurately and correctly.

This suggestion was duly agreed to by the prosecution and although I had not much time to elaborate on its contents, I made a statement concerning the settlement of the Manchurian Incident after my acceptance of the post of War Minister, and also, in answer to the question of the prosecution for the movement of young officers, I made another statement upon the situation of Japan at the time of the Incident and the general outline of how I acted in it. The former was handed over to Mr. Hyder and the latter to Colonel Morrow, and I asked them to let me read the English translation of those two statements when it is ready.

I think this took place on or about 11th or 12th of February 1946. There is a remark in Exhibit No. 187-C, as having been said by the prosecutor, "I will bring you a copy of this translation.", and also as my statement, "All of these are written in the document that I gave you." refer to this conversation.

However, much to my anxiety, the translation was not shown to me, and the interrogation of the prosecutors continued. Of course the interrogation, which was carried out in the same manner as before, filled me with apprehension, but since I had already presented my written statement, it did not worry me too much. I only waited for the time when proper interrogation based on my written statement would take place.

After the commencement of this Tribunal, the translation of the documents in question was handed to me through my defense counsel, and the prosecution submitted to the Tribunal the record of my interrogation in evidence. On that occasion, my counsel tried to explain to the Tribunal the circumstances in which the interrogation was carried out, but my impression was that the explanation was not properly understood.

My counsel subsequently tried to take every opportunity to explain this matter to the Tribunal. He once tendered a copy of this translation in evidence under general phase, but it was not admitted on the ground that it should be submitted under the individual phase. (document)

I contend that the written statement that I made at the Sugamo Prison is indispensable to the record of my interrogation and that they should be read together. I further suggest that even in that written statement, there is a slight mistake which occurred through misinterpretation of prosecutor's question.

3. Such being the case, the record of my interrogation contained several important mistakes and, furthermore, the contents are not consistent as a Japanese sentence, some of which, I shall point out in the followings :

1. The allegation that during the Manchurian Incident, I established a plan for occupation of Manchuria. (Exhibit No. 188-A, 188-B, 188-C, among which 188-C is slightly better, but the other two do not make sense.)

This allegation is entirely different from the fact. That this allegation is wrong can easily be checked by comparing the date of my interrogation, my written answer to the prosecutors and Exhibit No. 188-A, 188-B and 188-C.

The real state of affairs at that time has been fully explained in my present statement, and the statement will be supported by the evidence which has been submitted by this time and also by those which will be submitted in the future.

2. The allegation makes us believe as if the Privy Council was the party which decided the national policy. That this is wrong is quite clear even from common sense.

3. It is also a great mistake, as would easily be ascertained, of the allegation that the War Minister dictated orders to the Chief of General Staff for the dispatchment of troops.

4. The date when ^{the} INUKAI Cabinet decided the outline of its Manchurian policy was not the 17th of December. This mistake arose when the Prosecutor insisted upon that the plenary session of the Privy Council for deliberation of "Issuance of Bond to cover the Emergency Expense to deal with the Manchurian Incident" was on that date.
5. My statement concerning the basic principle of dealing with the Incident was confused by the interpreter with my statement concerning the fact. By this I mean our conversation relative to whether or not the document in question is still kept, regulation of Cabinet meeting, whether or not attendance to the Cabinet meeting was compulsory.
6. The allegation^{is} that I stated that the sovereignty over Manchuria rests with China. It may be so from general conception based on a map, but the fact was different, and my statement to that effect was mistaken as above.
7. The allegation ~~that~~ directed the independence declaration of Manchuria and its subsequent recognition is entirely mistaken. This will be clarified by the allusion to the same in this statement as well as by other evidence which is to be tendered.

8. Conversations concerning the responsibility of Cabinet members, the declaration of the Foreign Minister, those who were responsible for the China Incident, and the circumstances in which I accepted the Cabinet Councillor were only partially recorded, and because of this, the record failed to convey the real meaning and is apt to mislead the readers. This will be clarified by documentary evidence and witnesses.

9. The extent of authority of the Supreme Command, which was in charge of expedition, and that of the government was not thoroughly expressed in the record of my interrogation.

I merely stated an instance to show that in ordinary time, the government policy is shown to the Supreme Command by the government to make it a basis for the former to decide its movement, but by this I did not mean to specifically state the fundamental power and authority of those two organs.

When the warfare was started, or when the Supreme Command deemed it necessary from national defense point of view, it was entitled to make a direct access to the Throne, and so it can not be said that the dispatchment of troops was done only when it was agreed by the government.

2. Further refutation to other evidence of the Prosecution.

a). The Movie Picture "Emergency Japan."

"Emergency Japan" was the title of my speech which I made, in compliance with the request of the Osaka Mainichi Newspaper, on the subject of Emergency.

It was the time when Japan was unfortunate to have to withdraw from the League of Nations. An air of uneasiness prevailed throughout the country, and there was utter confusion both politically and ideologically.

I had an idea of my own, which I wanted to appeal to my fellow country people. My afore-mentioned speech was prepared for this purpose.

The principal object of this speech was to restrain the people from the corrupted customs and from habits which prevailed throughout the country, and to encourage them to further their recognition of the international relations, and, by doing so, to quiet the people's mind which was apt to run to extremes.

I advocated in this speech that the real object of national defense is not in waging war, but in protecting and securing morals, and justice, that the troops of Japan should not make it their first object to blindly resort to armed force, but that they should place the first importance in securing morals, and thus I requested the self-reflection of the people over the circumstances in which they were, in order to heighten their culture.

I was not concerned in any way in the manufacture of this film. I trust the section of the War Office in charge gave necessary warning to the manufacturers to be very careful not to provoke international feeling by this film. The above intention of mine was clearly manifested in 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th and 12th reels of this film.

I have used this expression of emergency in several other occasions and other documentary evidence bearing this title of emergency will clarify what I meant by this expression.

I made a speech in the summer of 1933 in which I said, "what is needed by the people of emergency Japan is the watchword, don't reject others, don't abuse others, don't blame others, but cultivate your character." I also told to the younger generations of Japan as the state of mind that they should bear, "don't be satisfied by finding yourself alone contented. Cooperate with and assist others in bringing about peace and welfare of the people. Don't criticize others' fault. Be generous and broad minded. The peace of the world and the welfare of your own will be realized by observing the above. Be kind to the foreigners and take into your consideration the welfare of the foreign countries. Let us teach the world the path of humanity to reach the world peace." (.

I advocated these principles in connection with the expression "emergency" and I tried to introduce this principle into the film when it was manufactured on the subject of essential principle of the Japanese

troops. By this I intended to show the aspiration of Japan of cooperating with the world in realizing peace on earth.

There were some minor points which, due to technical reasons and because of the manufacturers intention of catering to the taste of the lower standard of people, were not quite up to my original intention, but as a whole, I considered that the film was faultless. I never heard from any one that the film gave any acute feeling to the spectators.

(b) My articles in "Mombu Jiho" while I was the Education Minister and my speeches and broadcastings that I made during that period were nothing but a routine work of Education Minister, and they were not delivered in connection with any Incident in particular. The Prosecution depicted several words as being instigating, but I may contend that the Incident was going on at that time and the expression of that kind was quite common with the general public and there was nothing strange in that. Those speeches and articles were prepared in such a way that one can really appreciate my purported principle only when he reads through the whole text. I never considered them as being encouraging to the expansion of the Incident or instigating aggressionism.

On this 25 day of August, 1947

At War Ministry.

DEPONENT ARAKI, Sadao (seal)

I, SUGAWARA, Yutaka, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At War Ministry.

Witness: (signed)

SUGAWARA, Yutaka (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ARAKI, Sadao (seal)

Wfy + Mr Kemar
9-9-47

Statement of Evidence Introduced by Prosecution
on the Defendant
GENERAL Sadao ARAKI.

The Evidence concerning this Defendant consists of:-

1. Illegal acts, or preparations for illegal acts by the Japanese Government whilst he held responsible office.
2. Writings by him.
3. Speeches by him.

As far as 1 is concerned, it is considered that the only periods during which he can clearly be held responsible for actions by the Japanese Government are from December 13th, 1931 to January 23rd, 1934, when he was War Minister, and May 26th 1938 to August 30th, 1939, when he was Minister of Education. His responsibility is clear during these two periods, both according to the Japanese Constitution and on his own admissions during interrogation. It is clearest of all during his tenure of the War Office, for then he was not merely responsible, together with four other Ministers, as War Minister for sending troops abroad (this on his own admission), but in addition (as he has stated) because it was he who proposed to the Cabinet certain illegal and aggressive acts. For these then his responsibility is crystal clear. Also he has stated that, whilst he was Education Minister, the Prime Minister, Foreign, Navy and War Ministers brought important questions of foreign policy before the full Cabinet and that, as a member of the Cabinet, he could be held responsible for a statement made by the Japanese Government.

The bellicose and aggressive nature of some of his writings and speeches are also as plain as could be and it is therefore, suggested that too much of an attempt should not be made also to seek to hold him responsible, merely on account of the position he held, for what occurred when he was a Supreme War Councillor from January 1934 to March 1936 and a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council on China from October 15th, 1937 to May 1938 (when he became Minister of Education) and from August 1939 (when he ceased to be Minister of Education) until August 3rd 1940. It is very difficult to pin responsibility on the holder of either of these positions, though the second is relevant as showing that he was regarded as an expert on China and that, as such, his responsibility for Japanese actions in China, when he was a responsible Minister, is all the greater. The worst outrages committed by the Japanese forces in China whilst he was a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council on China (notably the Rape of Nanking in December 1937), cannot have been unknown to him. His continued tenure of this position and subsequent acceptance of office in the government responsible for such a barbarity throws light on his probable attitude to similar events.

The evidence against ARAKI in chronological order is as follows:-

- A. Exh. 103 (page 686) Biography of ARAKI
- Exh. 102 (page 685) List of officeholders in the Imperial Japanese Government.
- Exh. 164 (Page 1635) ARAKI was Director of Black Dragon Society (Koku-Honsha) founded December 20th, 1920. Idea of Society was to foster nationalist spirit.
- Exh. 2219 (page 15841) Interrogation of ARAKI in which he states that as a member of the Cabinet and according to the Constitution he could be held responsible for a statement made by the Japanese Government. Also that in his view violation of treaty rights was sometimes unavoidable.

B. Evidence relating to events during his tenure of the office of War Minister (December 13th 1931- January 23rd 1934).

INUKAI's testimony (page 1551) that his father appointed ARAKI War Minister in view of his knowledge of the feelings of the younger officers "There would be no ^{diff} between him and them".

INUKAI testimony (page 1548) that in December 1931, the War Ministry was of opinion that Manchuria should not become an independent state. In January 1932, as a result of changes of personnel, this opinion ceased.

INUKAI testimony (page 1489) that ARAKI, as War Minister, was unable to check young officers who were motivating force in Manchurian Incident, but INUKAI believed ARAKI endeavoured to check incident.

INUKAI testimony (page 1541) that superior officers in War Ministry at time of Manchurian Incident appeared to have no power to control army.

INUKAI testified (page 1547) that his father's attempt to negotiate peace by the despatch of a special secret emissary to General Chiang in December 1931 during the Manchurian Incident was kept secret from ARAKI.

INUKAI testified (page 1481) that, as War Minister in his father's Cabinet, ARAKI opposed the then Prime Minister's attempt to reduce the Army Budget.

Exh. 187a-188a

(page 2216) Collections of admissions of the accused ARAKI giving details of Cabinet and Privy Council meetings. The decision to occupy four provinces Dec. 17th, 1931.

" 931

(page 9368) On Jan. 16th 1932 Japan promises always to maintain open door policy in Manchuria and states she has no territorial ambition in Manchuria.

" 2221

(page 15844) Interrogation of ARAKI in which he admits sending troops to Shanghai in Feb. 1932.

" 57

(page 2767) Feb. 18th 1932, Declaration of Independence of Manchuria.

" 1871

(page 2784) Interrogation of ARAKI. Stated that Cabinet meeting of February or March 1932 discussed administration Committee to set up Manchukuo as independent state. Kwantung Army submitted request to ARAKI who transmitted it to Premier. Could have refused. ARAKI War Minister at time.

" 222

(page 2817) March 1st 1932. Cabinet meeting re foreign relations with Manchukuo. Plan for gaining control of customs by tactful means in order not to create unfavourable influence on Japan's foreign relations.

" 226

(page 2834) Message from C-in-C Kwantung Army to War Minister ARAKI, (message suggested policy re whole of Manchukuo be left mainly to Kwantung Army), 3 April, 1932 regarding unification of execution of Manchurian policies of War Ministry and Kwantung Army re Chientao question and asking for instructions. ARAKI agreed in principle. Stated instructions relating to Supreme Command would be issued to Chief of Staff.

" 223

(page 2825) ARAKI War Minister at time of Cabinet decision, 11 April 1932, concerning Empire's practical assistance and guidance towards new states of Manchuria and Mongolia.

" 161

(page 1479) Affidavit by INUKAI's son. His father's disagreements with the military and murder on May 15th, 1932.

Exh. 227

(page 2844) June 4th 1932. Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army sent a telegram to Vice-Minister of War, KOISO, concerning the taking over of the customs houses in Manchuria, including that of Dairen. Strict secrecy was to be observed. This action was taken in order to acquire revenue.

" 228

(page 2846) Telegram from War Minister ARAKI to C-in-C Kwantung Army concerning tact to be exercised in relation to official recognition of Manchukuo. June 10th, 1932.

" 1104

(page 10081) Affidavit of Henry L. Stimson. On June 23, 1932, Stimson heard from Grew that the press had cabled a statement of Gen ARAKI, Minister of War, that the resolution of the League and Japan's statements with respect to Manchuria before Manchukuo was set up, were not binding on Japan.

" 701

(page 7506) July 14th, 1932. Extract from report by KAWABE, Japanese Military Attache in Moscow, states that if diplomacy does not solve the obstacles, it is necessary to be ready to appeal to arms against USSR, China and the United States. He also stated "A Russo-Japanese war in the future is unavoidable".

" 702

(page 7512) July 15th, 1932. Lt. Col. Randa (military attache to Turkey) sent a message to Lt. Col. KAWABE whilst in Moscow en route from Tokyo to Istanbul. The message stated that preparation for a war against Russia would be complete by the middle of 1934. However no definite hostilities will be opened when they are completed. Russian war is necessary to consolidate Manchuria.

" 225

(page 2829) ARAKI War Minister, 12 August, 1932, when Cabinet decision made to establish aviation rights in Manchuria to meet demand of national defence.

OKADA testified (page 1891) re Cabinet meeting attended by Emperor on September 13th 1932, which discussed recognition of Manchuria by Japanese Government.

" 241

(page 2972) ARAKI attended Privy Council meeting on 13 September, 1932 concerning signing of protocol between Japan and Manchukuo. His position was War Minister. ARAKI stated in answer to question at Privy Council Meeting that so far no budget had been provided for Manchukuo but Japan War Ministry had programmes in which Manchukuo would be able to defray a part after 1939. In 5 years she will be able to defray the necessary expenditures, but now national defence of Manchukuo is that of Japan.

" 934

(page 9387) Sept. 15th, 1932, Japan recognised independence of new state of Manchuria.

" 229

(page 2899) Interrogation of ARAKI. Admitted his agreement with Foreign Minister concerning Manchurian independence and admitted attending meeting where decision to recognise Manchuria was made. (Sept. 15th, 1932).

" 440

(page 5039) Protocol of alliance between Japan and Manchukuo (Sept. 15th 1932).

" 230

(page 2902) Novr. 3rd 1932. Letter from Vice War Minister YANIGAWA to Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, KOISO, concerning the forwarding of an outline for guiding Manchukuo.

" 375

(page 4683) Nov. 19th 1932. Contract of underwriting the subscription of the Manchukuo Government's National Founding signed by HOSHINO.

" 174

(page 1808) Nov. 21st 1932. MATSUOKA, Japanese representative at the League of Nations, declared "We want no more territory".

- Exh. 610A (page 6698) Chicago Daily Tribune for Nov. 25, 1932, included article by John Powell (China charges Japanese kill 2,700 in Manchuria". Nov. 1932.
- " 611A (page 6698) " " "
- " 231 (page 2919) Dec. 9th, 1932. Cabinet decision re telegram and telephone enterprises in Manchuria. To be joint enterprise but highest military organs of Manchuria must obtain approval of highest Japanese Military organs when intending to inspect or make demands.
- GOETTE (page 3741) testified on Jan. 3rd, 1933 the Japanese captured the city of Shanghai. The pretext for the attack was the alleged throwing of a hand grenade by a Chinese.
- " 966 (page 9483) Jan. 5th, 1933. Memorandum by Secretary of State Stimson stating Japanese Ambassador told him Japan had no territorial ambition south of the Great Wall. Stimson reminded Ambassador of his statement a year previously that Japan had no territorial ambition in Manchuria.
- " 746 & 747 (pages 7720 and 7727) Feb. 13th 1933, Japan declined USSR proposal for a non-aggression pact.
- " 192A (page 2269) Feb. 22nd. 1933. In the name of puppet Manchukuo the Japanese sent an ultimatum to the Chinese requesting the withdrawal from Jehol Province of all Chinese troops in 24 hours.
- " 59 (page 513) Feb. 24th 1933. The League of Nations made a report condemning Japanese actions in Manchuria.
- " 933 (page 9383) Feb. 25th 1933 Stimson endorsed League's findings.
- " 192A (page 2270) Feb. 25th 1933. Hostilities began owing to Chinese refusal to comply with Japanese ultimatum to withdraw from Jehol within 24 hours.
- LIEBERT testified (page 8480) that in March 1933, Foreign Exchange Control Law was passed.
- " 442 (page 5038) "Economic Construction Programme of Manchukuo". ARAKI WAR Minister at time - March 1, 1933.
- " 192A (page 2270) March 2nd 1933. Province of Jehol fell into Japanese hands.
- " 65 (pages 513 and 684) March 27th 1933. Japan gave notice to leave League of Nations.
- " 2222 (page 15845) Interrogation of ARAKI in which he admits being present at special Cabinet meeting in March 1933 which decided to withdraw from the League of Nations.
- LIEBERT testified (page 8322) that on April 6th 1933, the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company law was passed.
- " 381 (page 4709) On April 11th 1933, according to the "Business Report" of 1938, it was decided that the raw opium in the custody of the Government of Korea was to be temporarily transferred to the Government of Manchukuo.
- " 193 (page 2272) May 31st 1933. Tangu Truce concluded. Established demilitarised zone in north-east part of Hopei. Chinese National Army to withdraw south and west.
- " 148A (pages 1176 and 3155) Critical Period for Japan (Film) and bellicose running commentary by ARAKI. June 1933.

- Exh. 233 (page 2927) Cabinet decision 8 August 1933 regarding fundamental policy of Japanese Empire in discussing Manchuria based on spirit of Japanese-Manchurian protocol to develop Manchuria as independent national with indivisible relations with Japan. Positive Japanese guidance in all important matters. ARAKI War Minister.
- " 384 (page 4733) Oct. 25th 1933. By order of Manchukuo Government laboratories and factories were established for narcotics at Harbin, Mukden and Chengteh.
- " 752 (page 7753) Dec. 20th 1933. OKUSHI, Chief of Japanese Korean Army HQ., submitted report to Vice War Minister General YAMAGAWA reporting surveys made in preparation for attack on Russian territory in area of Soviet Manchukuo frontier.
- " 234 (page 2933) ARAKI army Minister at time of decision at Cabinet Conference 22 December, 1933, concerning preparation in enforcing monarchy in Manchuria.
- " 760A (page 7828) Article by ARAKI "Japan's Mission in the Showa Era, 1933" concerning ambiguity of Mongolian position in the East and that she should be given independence. Clarification of Japan's determination to crush any country that turns against the Imperial Way.
- Note: ARAKI resigned War Office January 23rd 1934.
- C. Evidence relating to events whilst he was a Supreme War Councillor January 1934 - March 1936.
- " 670 (page 7331) ARAKI's speech concerning need for the maritime provinces - Siberia and Zabaikalye. - heard and testified to in affidavit of Tekebe Rokuzo, 1933 or 1934.
- " 703 (page 7515) General USHIROKU's affidavit re preparation for war against Russia 1935.
- " 668 (page 7332) SEMYONOV's affidavit stated ARAKI informed him in 1936 of heavy industrial plan for development in Manchuria prior to war with USSR with view and ultimate aim the territory east of Lake Baikal.
- Note: ARAKI ceased to be a Supreme War Councillor in March, 1936.
- D. Evidence relating to events between October 15th 1937 and May 1938 whilst he was a Member of the Cabinet Advisory Council on China:-
- " 2216 (page 15832) Interrogation of ARAKI in which he stated that the Army and Navy were in favour of aggression in China although Konoye was opposed to it and that sending forces overseas was possible only with the consent of the War, Navy, Finance and Foreign Ministers and the Premier
- " 2217 (page 15833) Interrogation of ARAKI, in which he stated the Cabinet Advisory Council was established in October 1937 to advise on the situation in China, that he was appointed a member almost at once, that he remained a member until he was appointed Minister of Education, that he was again appointed almost as soon as he ceased to be Minister of Education, that it was compulsory to attend meetings and that he attended all the meetings once a week.
- " 239 (page 2960) ARAKI was Cabinet Councillor at time of Cabinet decision re establishment of heavy industry in Manchukuo. Oct. 22nd 1937.
- " 206 (page 4483) Rape of Nanking Dec. 1937. ARAKI member Cabinet Advisory Council on China.
- " 208 " " " " " "

Exh. 310 (page 4483) Rape of Nanking Dec. 1937. ARAKI member Cabinet Advisory Council on China.

- " 311 " " " "
- " 312 " " " "
- " 313 " " " "
- " 315 " " " "
- " 316 " " " "
- " 317 " " " "
- " 318 " " " "
- " 319 " " " "
- " 320 " " " "
- " 321 " " " "

" 328 (page 4558) YOSHIZAWA was shown telegram from American Embassy re Nanking situation. He stated the matter had been laid before the Cabinet.

" 719A (page 7560) Extract from "Manchurian Confidential Files 1938". Re establishment of meteorological service in Mongolia in preparation for war with Russia. Also extension of military service for troops in Manchuria - 1938.

" 770 (page 7871) Extract re air line connection between Japan and Germany in 1938.

Note: ARAKI ceased to be a Supreme War Councillor on being appointed Minister of Education in May 1938.

E. Evidence relating to events whilst he was Minister of Education May 24th 1938 - August 30th 1939.

" 2218 (page 15837) Interrogation of ARAKI, in which he stated that while he was education Minister, the Prime Minister, Foreign, Navy and War Ministers brought important questions of foreign policy before the full Cabinet meeting.

OUCHI, Professor at Tokyo Imperial University gave evidence about military lectures by army officers at the University (page 943). A demand for these had been refused in 1927, later, as a compromise they were introduced on a voluntary basis and, upon the insistence of the War Ministry, such training became compulsory in 1938, when ARAKI was Minister of Education. Previously when he was War Minister in 1931, he had unsuccessfully demanded compulsory military training in the University. This training was conducted in all schools by regular army officers, who made every effort by lectures, training and propaganda to inspire a militaristic and ultra-nationalistic spirit in the students. They taught that the Japanese were superior to other races, that war was productive, that it was Japan's destiny to rule the Far East and thereafter the whole world and that the progress of the nation required the students to be prepared for aggressive warfare.

" 974 (page 9537) May 30th 1938, American Embassy informed Japanese Government that American missionary property at Nantungchow had been bombed by Japanese planes.

" 975 (page 9538) May 31st 1938. Similar American protest re bombing of American chapels at Haichow and Shaiho.

- Krh. 976 (page 9540) June 10th, 1938. American protest re occupation by Japanese troops of American residences in Soochow Hospital.
- " 980 (page 9554) June 28th 1938. American protest re attack by Japanese planes on American Baptist Mission at Pingtu, Shangtung.
- " 671A (page 7336) ARAKI statement in Domei Press printed in "Japan Advertiser" re Japan's determination to finish with China and USSR, will carry fight on for more than a decade. July 11th 1938.
- TERESHIKIN testifies (pages, 7776, 7777 and 7782) that on July 29th and 31st and August 1st and 2nd, 1938, the Japanese attacked Russian troops in the Zaosenaya Hill area.
- " 981 (page 9555) August 16th, 1938. Grew made emphatic representation to Foreign Minister UGAKI re Japanese attacks on American property at Wuchang.
- " 982 (page 9556) Aug. 26th 1938; American State Department press release announced American protest re attack by Japanese planes on a commercial plane of the China National Aviation Corporation which endangered American pilot's life.
- " 972a (page 9511) Sept. 22nd 1938; Japan's refusal of invitation by League of Nations.
- " 973 (page 9531) Oct. 3rd 1938; Protest by Grew to Konoye concerning continuous Japanese breach of assurances as regards American interests in China and principle of open door being maintained. Demanded prompt action. Konoye stated he would comply with Grew's request.
- " 457 (page 5207) Oct. 6th 1938. Grew protests to Konoye re Japan's trade monopoly in Manchuria and forcing of United States enterprises to withdraw.
- " 972D (page 9512) Oct. 12th 1938. Japanese Foreign Office spokesman stated Japanese operations were merely undertaken to destroy important points of hostile machinations against Japan and reiterated her regard for rights of third powers.
- " 616A (page 6802) Oct. 26th 1938. Japan objected (though without effect) to the shipment of Chinese war supplies through French Indo-China.
- " 983 (page 9557) Oct. 31st 1938. Grew informed Japanese Government re bombing of a mission at Tungpeh, Honan and resultant death of an American child and wounding of two American nationals.
- " 271 (page 3640) ARAKI attended in his capacity as Education Minister Privy Council meeting of 2 November, 1938, concerning termination of relations between Japanese Empire and the League of Nations.
- " 1291 (page 11695) On 3 Nov. 1938, an official declaration was issued by the Japanese Government stating that Japan had practically achieved her end in China, with the National Government reduced to a local regime, and the main territory conquered, but would fight on until it is completely destroyed. Japan's aim is a new order in East Asia and that other powers should realise Japan's intentions and change their attitude to suit the situation. ARAKI was Education Minister and member of the Government.
- " 984 (page 9558) Nov. 7 1938. Fresh protest by Grew against violations of "open door" in China.
- " 2223A (page 15847) Speech by ARAKI in 1938 on the fifteenth anniversary of the issuance of the Imperial Rescript on the awakening of the national spirit.
- " 987 (page 9565) Novr. 19th, 1938; Japanese reply to American demand re open door.

- Exh. 989 (page 9577) Nov. 19th 1938. American statement that Japanese reply represented a denial of American demands.
- " 589 (page 6573) Privy Council meeting of 22 November 1938 attended by Minister of Education ARAKI concerning cultural agreement to enlighten cultural relations between Japan and Germany. Japan approved the proposal.
- " 990 (page 9590) Nov. 24th 1938. Protest by Crew on recent measures at Chinese Maritime Customs at Canton.
- " 135 (page 1018) Amendment to ordinance on education Nov. 30th 1938 (ARAKI Education Minister)
- " 616A (page 6803) Dec. 9th, 1938. Foreign Ministry stated it had no objection to the bombing of the Yunnan Railway.
- " 381 (page 4709) Excerpt from the document "Business Report of 1938" states that on Dec. 12th, 1938, suggestion was submitted to Cabinet that the quantities of raw opium should be shipped or transferred to the Governor General of Formosa (MINAMI) Kwantung Leased Territory and the Governor of Manchukuo and the acreage of poppy-growing necessary to produce the required quantities of opium should be decided upon after consultation with the authorities concerned. Plan approved (page 4901) for use of surplus cocaine in Formosa and Manchukuo.
- " 972H (page 9527) Dec. 22nd 1938. Statement by Konoye re Japan's resolve to exterminate the Kwantung Government and establish a new order in the Far East. Visualised unification of Japan, China and Manchukuo.
- " 381 (page 4709) Suggestion concerning the growth of opium acreage necessary for poppy cultivation in Manchukuo etc. submitted to Government on Dec. 12th and passed by Cabinet on Dec. 22nd.
- " 991 (page 9592) Dec. 30th 1938. Further protest by Crew.
- " 461 (page 5268) Jan. 1939. Tokyo Gazette gave details of programme for economic development of China.
- " 420 & 422 (pages 4870 and 4874) Jan. 12th and 14th 1939. Reports by U.S. Treasury Attache re camouflaging of Japan's narcotization policy.
- " 385 (page 4745) Jan. 29th, 1939. Letter from American Consul-General at Mukden to Secretary of State re financial importance of opium and narcotics traffic to Government of Manchukuo.
- " 613A (page 6733) Feb. 10th 1939. Japanese seized Hainan Island, French, British and American Ambassadors made representations about it.
- " 500 (page 6094) Telegram from OTT dated 18 February 1939, to state Secretary reveals the Japanese Cabinet had decided upon an intensification of the Anti-Comintern Pact in opposition to Anglophile group (ARAKI was Education Minister at time).
- " 491 (page 6037) "Minutes of the Privy Council Meeting - Protocols re participation of Hungary and Manchuria in the Anti-Comintern Pact". ARAKI Education Minister. Ministers of State present. Extracts read. Extension of pact to include Manchuria and Hungary agreed unanimously. Feb. 22nd 1939.
- " 864 (page 8803) March 8th 1939. Amendment of Military Service Law promulgated.
- " 992 (page 9598) March 11th, 1939. Crew drew attention to anti-American restrictions in Tientsin.
- " 38 (page 6577) March 23rd 1939. Cultural co-operation agreement with Italy.
- " 494 (6046) March 27th 1939. Spain admitted to Anti-Comintern Pact.
- " 103 (Page 686) March 28th 1939. ARAKI appointed President of General National Mobilisation Committee.

- Exh. 985 (page 9560) March 30th 1939. Protest by Grew concerning continued disregard of American property and lives in China.
- " 512 (page 6145) March 31st 1939. Japan seized Spratley Islands.
- " 730 (page 7964) Affidavit of RODZAEVSKY stated ARAKI promised in March 1939 to render any help in activating the anti-Soviet work of Russian Fascist Union which was supported by Black Dragon Society.
- " 417 (page 4866) April 1st 1939. Report of Treasury Attache at Shanghai established two "Persian" opium ships as Japanese. Route was Dairen to Shanghai.
- LIEBERT testified (page 8804) there was a further revision of the Military Service Law.
- " 155 (page 1315) April 5th 1939. Motion Picture Law passed. Instituted control and censorship of motion pictures.
- " 424 (page 4878) April 5th 1939. Report of U.S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai revealed establishment of General Opium Amelioration Bureau for enforcement of opium monopoly under cover of opium amelioration work.
- " 433 (page 4926) April 14th 1939. AIDE Memoire from U.S. Ambassador re the "Narcotic Drug Traffic in Occupied Areas in China".
- " 995 (page 9604) May 11th 1939. Grew protested once more re indiscriminate bombing of U.S. nationals and property in various parts of China
- " 614 (page 6791) June 5th 1939. Telegram from German Ambassador re Japan's desire to participate in war against England and France at favourable time.
- " 1003 (pages 9617 and 9618) On June 15th and 25th British Ambassador protested against indignities inflicted on British nationals in Tienstin.
- " 426 (page 4894) July 21st 1939. Report of U.S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai concerned distribution of narcotic drugs for medicinal and scientific purposes being granted monopoly by Japanese authorities.
- LIEBERT testified (page 8402) that on July 26th, 1939 was promulgated the ordinance concerning control of certain businesses in the event of general mobilisation.
- " 428 (page 4899) August 8th 1939. Report by U.S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai on the Formosan cocaine factory, revealing its production and monopolistic nature.
- LIEBERT testified (page 8298) that on August 16th, 1939 the Coal Sales Control Regulation was promulgated. This indirectly made producers of certain industries manufacture products desired.
- Note: ARAKI ceased to be Minister of Education when the HIRANUMA Cabinet resigned on August 30th 1939.
- F. Evidence was given of the following occurrence in August 1941:
- " 667 (page 7309) ARAKI's talk with ISHIWATA in August 1941 concerning the failure in 1922 to take last stroke in the Siberian campaign. Regrettable it should not have been perfected due to lack of resolute Cabinet policy.

14 Mar 1947

MEMO--RE DEF. DOC. 565

Re Item 8 of the affidavit as to the regard in which General ARAKI was held.

ARAKI stated that he decided on the occupation of the four provinces of North China shortly after he became Minister of War (13 Dec 1931). Ex. 188-A, p. 4.

"Q. When did you decide in your own mind that the four provinces under Chang Hsueh-liang should be pacified and occupied?

"A. Soon after I became War Minister."

(R. 2217.)

And from Exhibit 188-C,

"Q. Did the Cabinet agree that you should occupy those four provinces with the Army?

"A. Yes, and the soldiers would not have been able to move without a Cabinet approval, as appropriations would not have been available."

(R. 2221-2222.)

(NOTE: For his speech in the film, "Critical Period for China," see Exhibit 148-A. R. 3155-3188.)

18 March 1947

MEMO TO: Mr. D. L. Waldorf, Chief of Investigation Division
FROM : Mr. D. N. Sutton
SUBJECT: Two books referred to in testimony of MAEDA,
R. 1027 at page 1037.

If not already in our files, will you please procure copies of and have scanned the two following books:

- (1) "Fundamental Principles of the National Polity," published in May 1937.
- (2) "The Way of National Subjects," published in March 1941.

Each of these books is referred to in the testimony of MAEDA, Exhibit 140, R. 1027 at page 1037, and are likewise referred to in the cross examination of YOSHIDA, R. 18,497.

CC: Mr. Frank S. Tavenner Jr.

Mr. Higgins

"BRIEF"

NAME: ARAKI (General Baron Sadao) FILE: 58
Age: 69
Interrogated: Yes

COUNTS OF INDICTMENT:

OUTLINE:

War Minister of INUKAI Cabinet which adopted Mukden Penetration, and of SAITO Cabinet which followed and completed occupation of the three (3) Eastern Provinces and Jehol.

Sent supporting troops to Shanghai in the February, 1932 Incident there. Proposed and received Cabinet approval to set up Henry Pu Yi as head of the Manchukuo government. Recognition of the state to be built around Kwantung Army.

One of the responsible Cabinet members for the recognition of the independence of Manchukuo on 15 September 1942.

Responsible Cabinet member for withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations. Subsequent order seeking to sway public opinion in favor of this withdrawal.

Rabid militarist, nationalist, and propagandist.

Minister of Education under KONOYE and HIRANUMA.

YEAR	INCIDENT	PARTICULARS	WITNESS	DOCU- MENT	INTERRO- GATION
Aug 1929)		General Commanding 6th		Exh.115	
Aug 1931)		Division.			
Aug 1931)		Chief of General Affairs		Exh.11	
Dec 1931)		Dept. of Inspector General of Military Training.			

BRIEF, Cont'd., ARAKI, (General Baron Sadao)

YEAR	INCIDENT	PARTICULARS	WITNESS	DOCU- MENT	INTERRO- GATION
18 Sept 1931	1	(Mukden Incident)			
13 Dec 1931		ARAKI became War Minister because of the October (Tanaka Incident (1931) because 11 Mar. MANAMI was not well P.7) liked by the Nationalist Organization.			
13 Dec 1931) 23 Jan 1934)		War Minister under INUKAI and SAITO		Exh.115	18 Jan, P.3 19 Jan, P.1 7 Feb, P.1 8 Mar, P.6
1931		Believed natural resources of Manchuria necessary for existence of Japan. (Actions adopted Mukden Incident)			6 Feb, P.4 18 Feb, P.3
Dec 1931		Suggested and secured necessary money;		703	7 Feb, P.9 11 Feb, P.8
17 Dec 1931		Proposed and received approval of Cabinet and Privy Council (Emperor present) of his plan to occupy and pacify the three (3) eastern provinces (Manchuria) and the province of Jehol.		703	5 Feb, P.6 7 Feb, P.7 8 Feb, P.4 11 Feb, P.9 13 Feb, P.1
		Occupied these provinces		703	8 Feb, P.4 13 Feb, P.1,2
Dec 1931		Relations between Nationalist Organizations and the War Minister (under ARAKI) became close. (Tanaka 11 Mar, P.6)			
		Vice Minister of War maintained close contact with all Nationalist Organizations by instructions from the War Minister (ARAKI) - ARAKI aided these organizations.			(Tanaka 11 Mar, P.7)

BRIEF, Cont'd., ARAKI (General Baron Sadao)

YEAR	INCIDENT	PARTICULARS	WITNESS	DOCU- MENT	INTERRO- GATION
		ARAKI brought pressure on the newspaper to come over to favor the Manchurian Incident.	(Tanaka Incident.)	11 Mar.P.9)	
		ARAKI forces KOISO to transfer one million yen from the Kwantung army fund to the Tokyo Ministry for use as secret funds - to aid Nationalist Organizations.	(Tanaka)	11 Mar.P.7)	
Feb. 1932	4	On request of the Navy Minister, ARAKI conferred with the Cabinet which agreed that the Army would send supporting troops to Shanghai. Object - drive away from Shanghai or disarm the Chinese 19th Route Army.			19Feb P.1-2 20Feb P.1
	4	Fifteen thousand troops were sent, another division went later.			19Feb P.1
15 May 1932		Battle concluded and agreement reached.			19Feb P.2
1 Mar 1932	8	Proposed and received approval of Cabinet setting up Henry Pu Yi as head of Manchukuo Government. Cabinet discussed and did send to Manchukuo various governmental Japanese officials to help in the organization of Manchukuo.			21 Feb P.2
4 Apr 1932	8	Policy suggested by CINC of Kwantung that Manchurian Governmental Affairs should be controlled by the Kwantung Army according to desires of the Cabinet - was agreed upon by ARAKI.		607	
May or June 1932		Foreign, War, (ARAKI) and Navy Ministers decided to have Manchuria			

BRIEF, Cont'd., ARAKI (General Baron Sadao)

YEAR	INCIDENT	PARTICULARS	WITNESS	DOCU- MENT	INTERRO- GATION
		recognized as independent government			8 Mar.P.2
Aug 1932	7	Foreign Minister proposed withdrawal to Cabinet and received unanimous approval. At this meeting Cabinet approved contents of the Treaty later to be made with Manchuria, giving Japan certain superior rights.			8 Mar.P.1, 3-4 8 Mar P. 4,5
15 Sept 1932		Japan recognized the independence of Manchuria.			8 Mar.P.2
10 June 1932	8	Directive from ARAKI recommending formal recognition of Manchukuo as independent state. It states that the organs of the government will be built around the army and measures will be taken to promote the Country's welfare and develop its industries. "It is too early to take over the administration of the railways."		645	
17 Mar 1933) 27 Mar 1933)	10	Cabinet decided that Japan should withdraw from the League of Nations. Special Committee from Cabinet (including ARAKI) appeared before Privy Council. Privy Council and Cabinet (Emperor present) agreed unanimously that Japan should withdraw from the League of Nations.			12 Mar P.3 8 Mar P.6 12 Mar P.5
27 Mar 1933	10	Japan did withdraw from the League of Nations.			12 Mar P.5

BRIEF, Cont'd., ARAKI, (General Baron Sadao)

YEAR	INCIDENT	PARTICULARS	WITNESS	DOCU- MENT	INTERRO- GATION
14-16 June 1923		Order concerning propaganda to be distributed by the army to sway national opinion toward Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations.		619	
Oct. 1933		General.		Exh.115	18 Jan.1934
Jan. 1934		Member Supreme War Council		Exh.115	19 Jan P.2
1935		Created Baron for meritorious service.		Exh.115	
26 Feb. 1936	15	ARAKI urges revolting officers to commit suicide for participation in the Feb. 26 Incident.		600	
March 1936	15	Resigned from Supreme War Council after Feb. 26 (1936) Incident.			19 Jan P.2 22 Jan P.1 23 Feb P.2
15 Oct. 1937) 28 May, 1938)		Cabinet Advisory Council (to advise on situation in China).		Exh.115	22 Jan P.2 12 Mar P.7
26 May 1938)		Minister of Education under KONOYE and HIRANUMA.		Exh.115	18 Jan P.4 19 Jan P.1 22 Jan P.3 7 Feb P.1 13 Feb(M) P.3
	29-30 31-32 and 34	(Incident) 29-30-31-32 and 34 occurred.			
28 Mar 1939		Appointed President of the General National Mobilization Committee (Cabinet).		Exh.115	
Dec 1939) Aug 1940)		Cabinet Advisory Council.		Exh.115	22 Jan P.3

29 March 1946

To: Executive Committee
From: Elton M. Hyder
Subject: Summary of Interrogation of General (Baron)
Sadao ARAKI

At your request I herewith submit the following digest of the interrogation of General ARAKI.

- I. Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Inspectorate General of Military Training (August 1931 - December 1931).
- II. War Minister under INUKAI and SAITO (13 December 1931 - January 1934).
 - A. Planning and Occupation of Manchuria (December 13, 1931) (Incident One).
 1. General ARAKI decided in his own mind soon after becoming War Minister (Dec. 13, 1931) that the Four Provinces (Mukden, Heilunkiang, Kirin and Jehol) under Chang Hseuh-liang should be pacified and occupied.
 2. As War Minister, ARAKI consulted the Prime Minister, Navy Minister, Finance Minister and Secretary of the Cabinet on his proposed military budget to pacify and occupy these provinces. All agreed at this preliminary conference.
 3. Agreement having been reached, the Prime Minister took the request for the budget to the Emperor, who in turn requested the Privy Council to discuss and pass on the advisability. The Privy Council and Cabinet with the Emperor present approved on or around December 17, 1931, the proposed military budget to be used to pacify and occupy these Four Provinces.
 4. Everyone present knew these Four Provinces were a part of China.
 5. The decision of pacification and occupation was embodied in ARAKI's order to General Headquarters.
 6. The Four Provinces were occupied by Japanese troops and an Armistice was arranged in May 1933.