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DOCUMENTS

*Not Admitted*

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| Necessary | Yes ( ) | No (✓) |
| Served    | Yes ( ) | No (✓) |
- II. Correct Translation:
- |            |         |        |
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| Applicable | Yes ( ) | No (✓) |
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| Yes ( ) | No (✓) |
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*6 B(1)*

NOTE: Comments with respect to any of the items above-listed will appear on separate sheets attached hereto and identified by the appropriate item number.

Not admitted  
R. 1944  
17453  
Rejected

Excerpts from  
Prosecution Witness JOHN B. POWELL's Book  
"MY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA"

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(New York, The MacMillan Company, 1945)

Shantung and Washington

Pages 75 and 76

And now to return to the subject of the Conference:

After considerable thought the State Department finally decided to invite the Chinese to send a delegation. It was the first time China had ever sat in an international conference as a "free and independent Power." This element aroused so much enthusiasm in China that the Government sent a delegation of about three hundred persons, including secretaries, stenographers, and assistants; so many in fact that Dr. Sze, the Minister, had difficulty in feeding and housing them.

Since the State Department's invitation was sent to the Peking Government, the Kuomintang regime at Canton immediately raised a tremendous howl and sent a rival delegation which sniped at the Peking delegates throughout the meeting. There was even an attempt to assassinate Dr. Sun at Canton during the conference.

The Japanese were not enthusiastic about the Washington Conference, and approached the meeting somewhat in the mood of a naughty child called to the teacher's desk for a reprimand. They were suspicious of the conference because they knew it was designed primarily to obstruct their schemes for China. But with their potential ally, Germany, out of the running and with Russia involved in a communist revolution at her very back door, the Japanese felt it would be better to attend than stay out. Japan's acceptance of the invitation was actually not received until two weeks after all the other official acceptances were in; and it was widely reported that Japan's decision to attend the conference resulted from assurances from British sources that Japan "would not be treated badly" at the meeting. However, any assurances from British circles could hardly have carried much weight, in view of the fact that one of the chief objectives of the conference, though not stated in the formal invitation, was to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Although strong opposition to the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had developed in the United States during the war, it was the opposition of the Dominion of Canada that forced Great Britain to give serious consideration to the matter of discontinuing the pact. The Canadians felt, as did Americans, that the belligerent clauses in the alliance imposed dangerous obligations on Great Britain in the event of an outbreak of war between Japan and the United States. The Canadians, due to the geographical situation of the two countries, also had experienced complications with Japan over immigration questions. Immigration complications which the United States had experienced with Japan in California in 1908 were paralleled in Canada. Thus, when American-Japanese relations became acute in 1921, the Dominion of Canada was more affected by the so-called "North American" point of view as opposed to the London "imperial" viewpoint. In consequence there developed in Canada a national demand for termination of the alliance.

Powell did not testify  
re: Finance Dept. etc.

Pages 76, 77, and 78.

Arthur Meighen, the Canadian Premier, urged the substitution of a four-Power conference on Pacific affairs, to be participated in by the United States, Britain, China, and Japan. But at the Imperial Conference in London Meighen's efforts met strong opposition not only from Lloyd George, but from Curzon, Balfour, and Lee, all of whom feared the menace of an antagonized Japan toward India and Britain's other territorial and economic stakes in Eastern Asia and the Pacific. In the hot debate which ensued the delegates from Australia, New Zealand and India sided with Britain, while South Africa favored revision rather than abrogation. But Meighen stood his ground, and ultimately brought the imperial conference around to his point of view. It was this discussion in the Imperial Conference, plus England's desire to reach an understanding with the United States on the limitation of naval construction, that paved the way for the calling of the Washington Conference.

Aside from France and Italy, which possessed naval armament of considerable strength, and also held concessions in China, the other European Powers invited to the conference--Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal--held either concessions in China or colonial territories in the region of the Pacific.

The conference in many ways was of unusual significance: it was America's initial attempt to invoke an international conference for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of questions which had long threatened war in the Pacific. Attendance was entirely voluntary in the sense that the conference was not made up of delegates representing victorious and vanquished nations, as had been the case at Versailles. The British delegation was made up of representatives not only of Great Britain but of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India.

European and Japanese delegates were astonished when Charles E. Hughes, chairman of the American delegation, announced at the opening session that the United States was prepared to stop its naval building program and, more, was prepared to scrap a number of warships which were in an advanced stage of construction. The American proposal was so contrary to professional diplomatic practice that the delegates stared at each other in wonderment, but it was a proposal which the British could hardly afford to contest, since the British Admiralty was already concerned by the American naval construction program.

It was finally agreed that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would be abandoned, and Japan was persuaded to accept a 5:5:3 naval ratio with the United States and Great Britain. A compensation for Japan was the agreement that the United States would not increase or continue its construction of fortifications on naval and military positions west of the 180th meridian. American naval experts did their best in private to prevent the limiting of our fortifications on naval positions in the Western Pacific, and also to prevent the curtailment of the United States naval building program, but they fought a losing fight.

All of the agreements, resolutions, and proposals at the conference were more or less linked together around the central document, which was the Nine-Power Treaty with China, upon which all commitments depended, including the major issue of limitation of naval armament and curtailment of construction on naval bases in the Pacific area. The Nine-Power Treaty came to be known as the "Chinese Charter of Liberty," because it put an end to the old sphere-of-influence doctrine which had obsessed Europe and Japan, and for more than a quarter of a century had threatened

Page 78

reunification of China. Aside from the Nine-Power Treaty, the Washington Conference also adopted other measures concerned with the future development of China as a unified state. The Japanese were forced to withdraw their troops from Shantung Province and restore the former German interests at Tsingtao, including control of the port and railway running into the interior of the province, to Chinese control. The conference also approved a resolution to send a delegation to China to investigate the relinquishment of extraterritoriality, which had hampered the development of modern Chinese courts and had infringed upon the sovereignty of the country. It also was recommended that steps be taken to assist China in modernizing her currency and her fiscal system, and finally the Powers agreed to withdraw their postal agencies from China and consented to the calling of a conference to revise the Chinese tariff, leading in the direction of tariff autonomy. Also of importance from the standpoint of Russian interests in the Far East, the Japanese were forced to withdraw their troops from Siberia, where they had been stationed since World War I.

202-D-2 Not Admitted

辯論文書二〇二D2

機事側證人ジョン・ビー・ポーウエル著

「支那滞在二十五年」よりの抜萃

(一九四五年、マツクミラン會社、ニューヨーク)

山東と華府

(七五頁及七六頁)

翌又會議の問題に歸することにしよう。

熱慮の結果、國務省は支那側に對し代表派遣を勸請することに決した。

支那が「自由且つ獨立せる國家」として國際會議に席を有したのはこの

時が最初である。この事が原因となつて、支那に多大の熱意を

喚起することとなりその爲政府は、書記、速記者、助手等を含む約三百

名を代表したが、その數があまりに多かつたので大臣施博士は給食及び

住宅問題に困難した程であつた。

國務省の勸請狀は北京政府に對して發せられたものであつたので、廣東の國民黨政權は直ちに喧々囂々の聲を揚げて、敵對代表を派遣し、この會議中終始一貫して北京代表を攻撃したのである。

又この會議中、廣東に於ての森博士を暗殺せんとの企てすらあつた。

日本側はワシントン會議に熱意を持つてゐなかつた。そしていたづらつ子が叱られるに先生の机に呼びつけられたといつた様な氣持で會議に對した。彼等はこの會議が元々日本の支那に對して抱く企圖を妨害せん爲に企てられたものであることを知つてゐたので、會議に對し熱意を持つてゐた。然し乍ら、各國に遅れてはゐるが將來は同盟國たるべき強道を控え、又直ぐ襄口には共產革命に卷込まれた露西亞を控えてゐるので、日本側はこの會議に参加しないのであるよりも参加する方が得策であると感ずたのである。この勸請に對する日本の受諾書は他の公文受諾書が全部入つてから二週間後に漸く届いた。而して日本の會議参加決定は、日本は會議に於て「苛酷な待遇は受けをいであらう」といふ英國筋の保證の結果に基いて爲されたものであるといふことは廣く傳へられたところである。然しながら、この會議の主要目的の一は、公式菜肉狀には書かれてはをらないけれども、日

英同盟の廢棄にあつたといふ事實を思ひ合せるとき、英國側の如何なる保証も大して當に在るもので在り得る筈が無かつたのである。

戰爭中、合衆國には、日英同盟の繼續に對する強硬な反對が盛んになつて來てゐたが、之は英領カナダの反對であり、大英帝國に對し協定打切り問題に慎重熟慮を爲さしめた。

カナダ人は、アメリカ人が感ぢたと同様に、その同盟條約中の交戦國條項は日米間の國交斷絶の際に英國に危險なる義務を賦課するものであると感ぢた。カナダ人は又之等二國の地理的地位の關係上、民間題で日本との間に紛糾を経験してゐた。一九〇八年カリフォルニアで經驗された日米間の紛糾と同様のものがカナダで起つたのである。斯の如く一九二一年日米關係が緊迫化して來た時に、英領カナダは、ロンドンの「帝國主義的」見地と對立すると云はれる所謂「北米的」見解に一層影響された。その結果としてカナダに於ては同盟終了への全面的な要求が高まつた。

## 辯護側文書 二〇二―D―二 續き七六七七及び七八頁

カナダ首相アーサー、マイエンは北米合衆國、英國、支那、及び日本  
の参加に成る太平洋事情についての四大列強會議の交替を提案した。  
然しロンドンの帝國議會に於てマイエンはロイド、チヨーチがらのみならず  
カーゾン、バルフォア、及びリイより強く反對された、彼等は印度  
及び英國の東亞細亞及び太平洋に於ける他の領土的及び經濟的危機に對  
する反抗的な日本の脅威を恐れたのである。續いて激論が展開され、オ  
ーストラリア、ニュージーランド及びインドの代表者連は英國側のその  
提案に賛成した。一方南アフリカ聯邦は廢止より寧ろ改正で行きたいと  
いふ考へであつた。然しマイエンは彼の見解を固執し帝國議會を結局彼  
の見解に近いところまでもつて行つた。ワシントン會議を開催するに至  
らしめたものは、並びに海軍建造上の制限につき北米合衆國との理解を  
結ばんとする英國側の希望と共に帝國議會に於けるこの討論だつた。  
強力な海軍軍備を保有し、支那に於て租界を所有せるフランス、イタリ  
アとは別に、他の歐洲諸列強國は、支那にその租界を、或ひは太平洋海



域に植民地領土を所有せるオランダ、ベルギー、ポルトガルをこの會議に勸誘した。

この會議は種々なる點で通常とは異つた意義を持つものであつた。これは太平洋に於て長い間脅威となつてゐた戦争といふ問題につき、實際的な會議に於て平和的解決を見出さんとの願ひから出たアメリカの最初の試みであつた。

その會議への出席と否とは、ヴェルサイユ條約の場合の如き戰勝國及び戰敗國の代表者から成るものではないといふ意味に於て、全く各國の自發隨意であつた。英國代表は、大英帝國の代表者のみならず、カナダ、オーストラリア、ニュージーランド及びインドの代表者から成つてゐた。議長アメリカ代表チャールズ・イー・ニューエスはその開會に當つて、北米合衆國は海軍建造計劃を中止せんとしてゐるのみならず、建造中の多數の軍艦の解体する準備をしてゐると發表したので、歐洲及び日本の代表者はビツクリさせられた。アメリカ側の提案は、普通の職業外交的のものとは、およそ反對のものであつたので、代表は何れも驚きの目を

みはつた。然しそれは、英國海軍省は既にアメリカ海軍建造計劃に關係

して居つたので英國にとつては殆んど争ふ餘地のない提案であつた。結局、次の事即ち、日英同盟は廢棄されるであらう。日本に對し北米合衆國及び大英帝國との間に五五三の海軍濫比率を承認せしめるといふ協定が成立した。而して日本に對する代償として北米合衆國は一八〇度子午線以西に於て海軍、陸軍共、その要塞の建造を擴大又は繼續を行はな

ないとの協定が成立した。アメリカ海軍專家は秘かに西部太平洋に於て海軍裝艦建造の制限を妨害し、又北米合衆國海軍建設計劃の削減をも防止せん爲、その最善の努力を爲した、が然し彼等は遂に失敗した。

會議に於けるすべての協定、決議及び提案は、海軍々備の制限、及び太平洋洋域に於ける海軍基地の建造の削減といふ様な主要問題を含む總ゆる公約の根據であり、其れに依據されて居つた支那との九ヶ國條約と多かれ少なかれ關聯を有して居た。九ヶ國條約は「中國自由憲章」として知られるやうになつたがそれは歐洲及び日本をそれ迄惱まして來、且つ二十五年以上にり支那分割を脅威して來たからである。九ヶ國條約とは別に、ワシントン會議は統一國家としての支那の將來の發展に關して他の方策を採つた。

日本はその軍隊を山東省から撤退せしめられ、又山東省に於ける、港灣及び、内地に通ぜる鐵道（及び港灣）の支配權を含む前ドイツ國の權益を支那支配下に返還せしめられた。會議は亦近代的支那法廷の進歩に干渉し中國の主權を侵害して來た治外法權の廢止に關して調査する爲に、中國に代表を派遣するといふ決議を承認した。通貨及び財政組織の近代化に關して中國に對して、その援助を與へんとする方策が推められ、結局諸列強國は各々其の郵便機關を中國より撤去する事に意見の一致を見

て、關稅自主權確立の方向に向つて中國關稅を改正すべき會議を召集せんと案を承認した。亦極東に於けるロシヤの利害に關する見地から重要な事は日本國が第一次世界大戰以來シベリヤに駐屯せしめて來たその兵力を撤退させねばならなくなつた事である。