



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360

JTF GTMO-CG

17 September 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000339DP (S)

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Khalid Al Morghi
- Aliases: Khalid Abdallah Abdel Rahman Al Morghi, Khalid Abdallah Abd Al Rahman Salim Al Mawraqi (true name), Al-Murqi, Al Ghamidi, Abu Abdullah, and Abu Abdallah
- Place of Birth: Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 29 April 1970
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia

2. (FOUO) Health: He is in good health.

3. (S//NF) Detainee Summary:

a. (S) Background and Capture Data. Unless otherwise noted, the following background notes are based solely on the detainee's statements:

- **Prior History:** Detainee served in the Royal Saudi Air Defense in Jeddah, SA. Most of the systems with which he worked were American made, the the rest were French. The systems consisted of Hawk and Patriot missile systems. (*Analyst Note: The detainee used the cover story that he worked as a civilian in the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense, Anti-Aircraft Institute in Jeddah, SA. In actuality, the detainee had gone Absent Without Leave (AWOL) from the Royal Saudi Air Defense.*)

- **Recruitment and Travel:** Following 11 September 2001, detainee read Fatwa on the Internet issued by Sheik Hamoud Al-Shi'ibi to support the Taliban through financial assistance, prayer or personal travel to Afghanistan (AF). Detainee sought the assistance of an unknown Afghan living in Saudi Arabia, who informed him to travel via Meshad, Iran (IR) to Herat, AF. Detainee departed Saudi Arabia around 29 September 2001 with \$3,200 USD. Detainee took a

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bus from Riyadh, SA, to Bahrain, where he purchased a ticket on Iranian Airways to travel to Meshad, IR. Detainee took a taxi to the Iran - Afghanistan border, where he changed taxis at the border and traveled to Herat, AF. Detainee stayed at a Taliban guesthouse for Arabs in Herat, AF, for approximately 25 days.

- Training and Activities: Detainee stated he did not work or train during his stay in Herat, AF. All he did was attend an unknown Taliban mosque. Detainee became disillusioned with the Taliban's interpretation of Islam and sought a way to return to Saudi Arabia. Detainee talked to a Mohammad Aslaam about his desire to return to Saudi Arabia. Aslaam informed the detainee that the Iran - Afghanistan border was sealed. Therefore, the detainee chose to leave Afghanistan through Pakistan, with Aslaam's assistance. Aslaam introduced the detainee to Fadl Al-Rahman, who took the detainee to Khowst, AF. Detainee paid Al-Rahman \$1,000 USD for his help. Al-Rahman took the detainee's passport and left him with Shafiz Khan, a relative of Al-Rahman, for 17 days. Detainee's passport was returned by Al-Rahman, stamped with a Karachi, Pakistan (PK), Airport Point of Entry notation, dated 24 November 2001. Detainee stated he assumed Al-Rahman traveled to Pakistan to meet a contact at the Karachi airport to arrange for the detainee's travel. Upon Al-Rahman's return, he and the detainee traveled for three days to Spin Boldak, AF, which is on the Afghanistan - Pakistan border. The detainee was left with an unknown friend of Al-Rahman for three days. Detainee then traveled by motorcycle with Al-Rahman and an unknown friend to Chaman, PK, where he caught bus to Quetta, PK.

- Capture Information: Detainee was removed from the bus at a checkpoint in Quetta, PK, and searched by Pakistan authorities. The detainee had in his possession a Saudi passport, an identification card, and approximately \$1,000 USD. (*Analyst Note: It is assessed that the detainee left approximately \$1,000 USD with the owner of the Herat guesthouse in Afghanistan in support of Al-Qaida due to the fact that he left with \$3,200 USD and cannot adequately account for the other \$1,200 USD.*) The detainee was held and turned over to US Forces.

b. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 13 February 2002

c. (S) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on:

- A Taliban safe house in Herat, AF
- Websites used to recruit personnel for the Taliban and various unidentified Islamic fundamentalist groups

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:

- (S) Saudi military security officials commented that one or more officers in a directorate of the Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters are principal suspects in the surveillance of US persons. (*Analyst Note: It is assessed that the detainee is one of the individuals mentioned.*)

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- (S//NF) Detainee admits to leaving Saudi Arabia on September 29th to join jihad in Afghanistan. Detainee claims he met ISN-336 in prison in Pakistan and used his cover story in fear that he would be sent back to Afghanistan and be killed if he told his true story. *(Analyst Note: There are a number of detainees who left Saudi Arabia and arrived by various means in Meshad, IR, in order to cross the Afghanistan border. According to ISN US9SA-000005DP, he had set up an Al-Wafa cover story for Al-Qaida members traveling in September 2001 through Iran and across the border into Afghanistan. It is assessed that in order to participate in this well-traversed route, a facilitator/recruiter is required.)*
- (S//NF) Detainee has lied concerning his military service by saying that he was a civilian defense worker. He has been identified by the visiting Saudi delegation as a captain in the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces who went AWOL.
 - (S) Detainee has had access to American-made weapons systems.
 - (S) ISN US9SA-000199DP, Jabd-Al-Rahman Ma'ath Thafir Al-Umari, is another detainee from Saudi Arabia who went AWOL. This detainee was in the Royal Land Forces. *(Analyst Note: The two could have been recruited at the same time by the same individual for their expertise, which could be used to sabotage the US systems.)*
 - (S) According to detainee's passport, he departed Saudi Arabia on 2 November 1998 and returned on 26 March 2001. *(Analyst Note: It is assessed that the detainee had attended an Al-Qaida run training camp during this period of time.)*
 - (S//NF) Detainee admits to traveling to a number of countries:
 - France from September thru December 1998
 - Indonesia for one week
 - Canada in 1982 or 1984 with his father on a business trip
 - UAE, twice in 2001, to purchase computer software and hardware and then to resell it in Saudi Arabia for a profit *(Analyst Note: Al-Qaida uses the purchase and resell method of business as a way to launder money and secure funds.)*
 - Saudi authorities believe that the detainee did not visit these countries but did, in fact, visit Afghanistan while still on active duty. They also feel that the detainee is somehow connected to Al-Qaida.
 - (S//NF) Detainee in on Saudi Arabia's Watch List by Ministerial Decree as of 28 December 2001 for his trip to Afghanistan.
 - (S//NF) There were two other aliases that were not in the detainee's file that the Saudi delegation provided.
 - (S) Detainee admits to staying at an Al-Qaida run safehouse in Herat. This safehouse had been set up for those jihadists exiting Iran into Afghanistan, who planned on traveling through Kandahar to Kabul to train with the Taliban.
 - According to ISN US9SA-000080DP, Fahad Al Sharbani, recruits traveling from Iran to Afghanistan stayed at the Taliban safehouse in Herat, AF, awaiting further transportation, approximately a 2-day wait. They would then be transported by car to Kandahar and then to Kabul, where they would go to another safehouse and wait to be taken to the front lines.

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e. (S) Intelligence Value: JTF GTMO has determined that this detainee is of medium intelligence value to the US. It is likely this detainee is capable of providing information on the following topics:

- Taliban Safe House in Herat, AF
- Extremist recruitment using the Internet
- Two year gap on passport from 2 November 1998 to 26 March 2001


4. (S) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee's overall behavior has been generally compliant and non-aggressive. He has been involved in a few instances of speaking with detainees in other cellblocks. Detainee has tried to be helpful to the guards and provide his fellow cellblock members aid with their prayers.

5. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 24 February 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

6. (S) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Summary: JTF GTMO believes that this detainee is a member of Al-Qaida or its global terrorist network. He traveled a known ingress route from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan. There is a time gap of 14 months on his passport, and he is believed to have a connection to Al-Qaida by the Saudi Intelligence Community. He traveled to a safehouse in Herat, AF, that was a known transit point to front lines in Kabul, AF. Detainee has demonstrated at least some level of commitment to jihad by his activities, and he has had some level of combatant training while serving in the Saudi military. He does not appear to have participated or directly supported terrorist acts, or to have been a key member of a terrorist network. Detainee has been cooperative during interrogations, but his veracity may be questioned. It has been determined that the detainee poses a medium risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention.


JAY W. HOOD
Brigadier General, US Army
Commanding

CF: CITF-GTMO