

SECRET

STATUS & LOCATION OF AIRCRAFT (LH) Cont'd.

<u>C.O.</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NO.</u>
Cpt. J. Y. Parker	2nd Obs.	Clark	O-46;	10-12 52,79)
Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank	19th Bomb Group			
Captain MacDonald	Hq & Hq Sq	Clark		
Major C. E. Combs	93rd Sq	Del Monte	B-17-D)	
Major E. O. O'Donnell	14th Sq	Del Monte	B-17-D)	12
Major Wm. Fisher	28th Sq.	Clark	B-17-D)	
Major H. Gibbs	30th Sq	Clark	B-17-D)	18

NOTE: Two planes out of commission at Clark, also three planes of 93rd and 14th Squadron at Clark.

6TH PURSUIT (PHIL. AIR FORCE)

Captain Jesus A. Villamour	6th Sq	Batangas	P-26	12
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MISCELLANEOUS

Clark)	B-18	10
Nichols)		
Neilson)		
Cabantuan	B-10	3
Clark	A-27	2
Del Monte	B-18	2

Total first line Operational Aircraft
Dec. 7th (19th Bomb, 24th Pursuit 2nd.
Obsv.) 115 or 117

All other operational tactical planes 20

Grand Total Operational ... 134 or 136

The total of Far East Air Force personnel in the Philippines on December 8th was about 8,000 of the total of U.S. Army personnel of 19,000 (45).

44. Cont'd) Journal 19 Bomb Grp. (Dec. 1, App. II) Gen. Marshall in his Biennial Report gives the number of P-40s as 107. The discrepancy is due to the fact that Table III above, is of planes operational on Dec. 8th, and excludes planes not erected or out of commission.

There is some question as to who were the commanders of the 21st and 30th Pursuit Squadrons. In O.O. No. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 1, 1941, (Dec. 18, App. II), 1st Lt. Sam M-rett is given as commander of the 30th Sq, rather than the 21st. The Bataan Roster of the 24th Pursuit Group (Dec. 27, App. II), also gives this as the status of the command, and gives 1st Lt. Wm. E. Dyess as the commander of the 21st Sq. In this narrative, however, the History of the 24th Pursuit Group has been followed.

45. Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff War Department p. 10. Gen. Marshall's report gives the figure as 8,000. This is in agreement with the rosters and reports in Documents 5, 8, 10, 15 and 30a (App. I).

S E C R E T

Of this air force total, approximately 7,500 was in Luzon. Of the personnel in Luzon, some 1,200 belonged to the 27th Bombardment Group (D) which had no aircraft. Also that part of the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment Group (E) which had reached the Philippines was awaiting the arrival of the air echelon. The 500 air force personnel outside Luzon were scattered throughout a number of bases with the largest concentration at Del Monte, Mindanao. The Philippine Army Air Force had about 1,200 (46). Total air force personnel was therefore around 9,200 including the Philippine Army Air Force.

EVENTS PRIOR TO WAR

Starting on December 2, the Japanese began a series of night and early morning reconnaissance missions over Clark Field. The plane appeared at 0530 each morning, was sighted visually, and also tracked by the radar at Iba. Following the first sighting "instructions were given to force the aircraft to land or destroy it. On the three succeeding nights it was impossible to make the interception, due to inability to see the aircraft in the dark, or the aircraft not getting close enough to be picked up by the searchlights" Accordingly it was agreed that the AAA would have its turn on the night of December 7th. But on that night no plane came over (47).

DECEMBER 8TH, 1941

December 8th was the first day of war in the Philippines. Being east of the International Date Line, this was the same as December 7th at Pearl Harbor. Also due to this further distance to the east it was still dark in the Philippines when the attack on Pearl Harbor came. First news of this attack was flashed to all units upon receipt of the report at 0330 (48). The official USAFFE warning was sent out at about 0430. Word was also received at 0630 at the bomber base at Del Monte (49). War had begun (50).

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46. Strength Report Philippine Air Force - Jan 3, 1942.
(Doc. 16, App. II).
47. History Pur. Op. Pg. 3 (Doc. 1, App. II)
48. Ibid. This news was by commercial radio and no official action was taken except to order units to stations. The official warning was received by the pursuit unit at 0445.
49. The message received at Del Monte stated "Hostilities have commenced, govern yourself accordingly". (Interview with Colonel Fry) (Doc. 8, App. II). Message received at 0330 hrs. according to Major Heald, Communications Officer. He remembers the message as: "Hostilities have begun. All airdrome alert". (Doc. 17, App. II).
50. History 24 Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II).

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

08 18

1415

PURSUIT OPERATIONS (51)

Prior to receipt of official word that war had begun, the radar at Iba reported a large formation over the China Sea headed in the direction of Corregidor. Accordingly the 3rd Pursuit, stationed at Iba, was ordered to intercept. It proceeded on the heading given in its mission order, and the radar plot showed a successful interception. At this date, however, altitude could not be read from the radar. Actually the P-40's did not see the bombers in the darkness. Therefore they returned to their base for refueling. (Chart III, App. I).

The next development occurred at 0930, with the reporting of a large formation over the Lingayen Gulf headed for Manila. The orders issued from intercept headquarters, where Major Grover and Colonel George were operating, called for the 20th Pursuit Squadron to proceed north from Clark Field and intercept in the vicinity of Rosales. Meanwhile the 17th Pursuit Squadron was sent from Nichols to patrol Clark Field and intercept any planes which might pass the 20th. But the Japs were only feinting. From Lingayen Gulf the Japs did not proceed south. Instead they swung inland directly past, and hit the army installations at Baguio which was also the summer capital of the Philippines. They also hit airfields at Cabantuan. At the time of the alert at Clark Field, the B-17s were ordered up, so they might not be caught on the ground. They landed again, however, at 1130, their landing being covered by the 20th Pursuit Squadron. (Chart III, App. I).

The last two moves on the part of the Japanese had run two squadrons out of gas and thus limited the number of squadrons which would be available for the main raids. In this they were successful. At 1130 the 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field was being regassed. The B-17s were back at Clark Field the 17th Pursuit Squadron was being gassed at Nichols. The scene was set for the main strike. (Chart IV, App. I).

There was not long to wait. At 1130 the Iba radar reported a large formation over the China Sea. For the second time during the day the 3rd Pursuit Squadron at Iba was ordered to intercept. It immediately took off, although apparently eight planes were left on the field. Again, in this attempted interception the Japanese were to show one of their tricks. Taking advantage of the limited gasoline supplies of the P-40, the incoming bomber formation feinted and then withdrew. This type of tactics had also been used in China, but for the first time United States air units came in contact with such tactics. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron remained in the air, with its gasoline steadily diminishing.

Believing that interception might not be made by the 3rd Pursuit Squadron and fearing a direct thrust at Manila and the installations there, the two squadrons on Nichols Field were both sent off, the 17th Squadron to take station over Bataan, while the 34th Squadron was placed on standing patrol over the city of Manila proper. (Chart IV, App. I).

The next report came in at approximately 1145 of an unidentified formation "over Lingayen Gulf, headed south". This raised a new problem, and the situation was met by ordering the 21st Pursuit off Del Carmen to cover Clark Field. At the time the 20th, still regassing at Clark Field was ordered up as soon as refueling was completed. But no planes reached Clark Field prior to the attack. Dust on the field at Del Carmen delayed the take off of the P-35s. The first planes of the 21st Squadron which taxied out raised such a cloud that it was necessary to wait for the cloud to settle. The delay was so great that planes of the 21st Squadron did not reach Clark Field until after the Japanese attack was completed. (Chart IV, App. I). At this juncture communications broke down and no further reports were received at Clark Field or Neilson Field concerning the incoming Japanese bomber formation. At 1215 the 20th Pursuit Squadron on Clark Field completed gassing, and the planes started to take off. Four were off the ground and five more were in process of taking off, while five more were on the ground. At either 1217 or 1220 the first Jap planes arrived. There were 54 to 72 bombers in a very shallow V of V's and above 18,000' which bombed with accuracy (52). These were followed by a number of dive bombers

51. This account follows History 24 Pur. Grp. (Doc. 1, App. II)

S E C R E T

and fighters which came in to strafe (53). The five planes of the 20th Pursuit Squadron which were in process of taking off and the five which were still on the ground were all destroyed. The four in the air, led by the squadron commander, Lt. J.H. Moore, went into combat at low altitude and shot down four of the attacking planes (54). The bomber formation laid a pattern which destroyed most of the hangars and buildings, as well as most of the B-17s and B-18s on the field. The dive bombers (probably Vals) then came in strafing and set fire to most of the planes which were in the blast pens (55). One of the first bombs made a direct hit on the radio station on the field, so that it was impossible to contact the 17th and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, still on patrol over the area of Manila and Bataan. Finally another radio did make contact with the 17th Pursuit Squadron, but it arrived over Clark Field seventy miles to the north of Bataan, after all enemy planes had withdrawn; the 21st also arrived from Del Carmen after the attack was completed. By this time the 17th Pursuit Squadron was running short of gasoline, so it landed at Del Carmen. (Chart IV, App. I).

In the absence of effective interception, the defence of Clark Field was left to the AAA. The field was defended by the 200th CA (AAA). Also a number of air corps crew members heroically went to their planes during the attack and fired the machine guns in the grounded aircraft at the attacking strafers. For outstanding heroism in such action, the Distinguished Service Cross was awarded to the following: Pfc. Joseph G. McElroy, T/Sgt Anthony Holub and Pfc. Greely W. Williams (posthumously). When the hangar in which his plane was located was set on fire, 1st Lt. Fred T. Crimmins of the 19th Bombardment Group taxied his plane into the open, only to have it destroyed by enemy strafing, he being hit and wounded (56).

Also, despite the continuous attacks on Clark Field many risked the strafing to help the casualties. Among others, several examples will be mentioned. Private Robert J. Andres secured an abandoned truck and through the midst of the bombing and strafing made seven trips between the field and the station hospital, on each trip carrying a load of wounded (57). The 19th Bombardment Group Flight Surgeon, Maj. Luther C. Heidger, stayed in the open during the attack to treat the wounded. The Chaplain, 1st Lt. Joseph F. LaFleur administered religious rites to the wounded and dying throughout the attack, and helped to treat the wounded (58). All of these were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Meanwhile, as the 3rd Pursuit Squadron was running low on gasoline, it turned back toward Iba. There it found the formation which it had been unable to intercept. Fifty-four bombers and an unknown number of strafers were attacking the field. Despite being low on gasoline the P-40's pressed home the attack. They arrived too late to prevent the bombing, but did prevent strafing. Casualties on the field were, however, heavy. All of the installations, including the radar, were destroyed. Five P-40's were shot down in the air, and eight planes on the ground were destroyed. In addition, it being impossible to land on the field, three P-40's ran out of gasoline and crash landed on the beach. The remainder of the formation landed at O'Donnell Field. Gasoline and ammunition was dispatched from stores remaining at Clark Field to supply these planes. (Chart IV, App. I).

52. "Sallys" predominated in the early attacks over the Philippines and probably constituted the bulk of this formation.

53. These were "Zekes" and possibly "Nates".

54. G.O. No. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941. (Doc. 18, App. II)

The citation granting Lt. Moore of the 20th Pursuit Squadron the Distinguished Service Cross credits him with leading his formation from the field on December 10, however, the events are those described in the History 24th Pur. Grp. and Journal 19th Bomb. Grp. (Docs. 1 and 11, App. II) as taking place on the 8th.

55. The strafing planes probably include fighters ("Zekes") in addition. Reports varied. Cf. History 24 Pur. Grp. and Journal 19th Bomb. Grp. (Docs. 1 and 11, App. II).

56. G.O. No. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II) and G.O. No. 2

Hq. Southwest Pacific Command, Lembang Java, Feb. 15, 1942. (Doc. 19, App. II).

57. G.O. No. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II).

58. G.O. No. 2, SWP.com and, Lembang Java - Feb 15, 1942. (Doc. 1, App. II)

EMPLOYMENT OF BOMBARDMENT

Information on the employment of the bombardment planes still on Clark Field is not complete. One B-17 took off at 1030 for reconnaissance of Eastern Luzon (59). All that is authoritative concerning the remaining bombardment planes is that at the time of the alert at 0930 "all bombardment was dispatched from Clark Field. The 20th Pursuit Squadron returned to Clark Field and gave the bombardment cover while they were landing" (60). Thus, at 1130, all except the B-17 which was still on reconnaissance over Eastern Luzon, and the twelve aircraft at Del Monte, were on Clark Field.

Of the total of 22 B-17 aircraft on Clark Field at the time of the Japanese attack, fifteen were destroyed. Two or three of those on the field escaped damage and were operational the following day. An additional three or four were repaired and made operational later.

The one B-17 to encounter enemy action in the air on December 8, was a plane which left Del Monte at 0930 for repairs at Clark Field. This plane was piloted by Lt. E.E. Tash (61). It arrived over Clark Field while the field was under attack, and immediately started back for Del Monte. Three enemy pursuit attacked, and the rear gunner, S/Sgt. Michael Bibin, was severely wounded in both shoulders. The first news of what was taking place to the north reached Del Monte at 1700 when Carpenter called over his radio as he came in to land, "Have been exposed to enemy, have ambulance ready" (62). One Zero was believed shot down.

SUMMARY OF RAIDS ON CLARK FIELD ANDNEA

In these two raids the Japanese had effectively destroyed the striking power of the Far East Air Force, had seriously cut down the pursuit strength, had destroyed most of the maintenance facilities for the B-17's, and had inflicted a number of casualties. Our forces had been on the alert. They had not been caught as at Pearl Harbor, with planes not loaded. But the damage inflicted was great.

Before the conclusion of the first twenty-four hours of the war in the Philippines, one more attack was launched by the Japanese - against Nichols Field and its installations. By midnight telephonic communication was reestablished from Nielson Field to the plotting board at Clark Field and operation of the air warning system was resumed. Shortly after midnight one flight of the 17th Pursuit Squadron was dispatched to intercept an enemy formation. The dust at Del Carmen again hindered the takeoff, and one pilot was killed. The remaining four aircraft did not find the enemy formation in the dark, so no interception was accomplished. Some time later, at 0315 a large enemy force appeared over Nichols Field.

The first Japanese aircraft to be shot down during the war is officially credited to 2nd Lt. Randall D. Keator of the 20th Pursuit Squadron, stationed on Clark Field. Taking off while the field was under attack, Lt. Keator's plane was attacked by nine Japanese aircraft. Despite this disadvantage he shot down one of these. Later, during the general combat over Clark Field he shot down another, making his score for the day two (62a).

59. Journal 19th Bombardment Gp. (Doc. 11, App. II)
 60. History 2d Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II) There was a staff meeting of FEAF at the Headquarters at Nielson Field, which was attended by Captain Harold Eads and Captain Allison Ince, and others. General Brereton also went to GHQ. This is stated by Captain Eads. Statement of Colonel Eads. (Doc. 10, App. II) GHQ, SWPA, records contain no information on the matter. A letter has been written through channels, Hq. AAF, Washington, requesting Gen. Brereton for any information but no reply has been received, cf. Reg. 10603, FEAF, Registered on 21 April 1944.
 61. Journal 19 Bomb Gp. (Doc. 11, App. II)
 62. Interview with Colonel Fry (Doc. 8, App. II)
 62a. O.C. 48, USAF/P, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II)

SECRET

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AIR SITUATION ON DECEMBER 9TH

At the close of the first day's campaign under constant enemy attack, the Far East Air Force was badly mauled. Costly losses in men and equipment had been sustained. Over a third of the pursuit were lost, while more were out of commission. Of B-17s, the operational aircraft had been reduced from 33 to 15 or 16. Moreover, the planes lost were irreplaceable. Wake Island was under attack, which cut the ferry route for B-17s which had been flown in from Hawaii. The destruction of naval forces at Pearl Harbor ended the chance that convoys might bring in pursuit directly. Finally the destruction of hangars, depot facilities, and parts indicated that maintenance constituted a major problem; but the nearest place with even partial facilities was Australia.

REORGANIZATION

During the night the high command of the Far East Air Force reorganized the tactical units. Lt. Wagner's squadron, the 17th, was transferred to Clark Field and brought to strength by transferring air-planes from the 3rd Pursuit. The rest of the 3rd was absorbed into the 34th at Nichols Field. As already noted, the third had practically been wiped out at Iba. It no longer functioned as a separate squadron from this date. At the same time the ground crews were attempting to repair the pursuit planes (63), and the B-17s at Clark Field which had not burned. The reaction of ground personnel to the bombing had been good on the whole although some had taken to the hills and did not drift in until night. Most were working feverishly to salvage planes and parts. Gun crews had stuck to their posts.

On December 9th the bombardment squadrons at Del Monte were employed as follows: One plane went on reconnaissance of the Davao Area, and then went up to Luzon, landing on the airfield at San Marcelino. The plane was damaged by fire of our ground forces while landing. At 1430 seven other aircraft took off from Del Monte for San Marcelino, and also were fired on by our ground forces while landing, but no damage resulted. Six aircraft took off on a reconnaissance mission for Catanduanes Islands, off Southern Luzon, found no enemy action, and then flew into Clark Field at 1430 to be prepared for a mission the next day. Immediately upon landing they took off because of air raid alarm, and landed after dark. From Clark Field, at 0800, one plane attempted the reconnaissance mission to Formosa, but turned back because of engine trouble, and then stayed up until after dark to avoid enemy attack on the field (64).

On the night of December 9/10, reports were received of a large enemy convoy off Vigan and another off Aparri (65). It was accordingly planned to hit them with all the available air power on the following day.

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63. History 24 Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II)
64. Journal 19 Bomb. Gp. (Doc. 11, App. II)
65. Colonel Ind's Bataan Mes. pp. 260 ff.

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H I S T O R Y

O F

30th BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)

19th BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

Period Covering

December 7th, 1941 to December 31st, 1942

L. C. H. S.

On the morning of 8 December 1941 (Philippine Time), word of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was flashed to members of the 30th Bomb Squadron, then stationed at Clark Field, Manila.

Major David R. Gibbs, the 30th's Commanding Officer, immediately ordered all crews to report to the flight line, and upon the disposal of preliminary preparations, the Squadron's B-17s, geared for action, took to the air.

Ground crews likewise were on the alert, for the Japs were expected to attack Clark Field within the next 20 minutes, according to reports received by the 30th, and everything was considered in readiness to repel the enemy when he struck.

For more than 3 hours, the 30th's planes circled Mt. Arayat, flying in and out of cloud banks, soaring over the plains of Luzon, unsuccessfully seeking traces of the enemy. At approximately noon, Major Gibbs ordered the planes to land, and as they did, they were dispersed around Clark Field. Some crews were requested to stand by their ships, with the remainder instructed to obtain a hasty meal and report to Group Headquarters for briefing.

Shortly thereafter--about 12.30 P.M.--came the Japs! A low, whistling noise, resembling wind through the trees, grew louder and louder with devastating crescendo, and a deafening explosion rocked Clark Field, signaling the beginning of the attack. Blast after blast shattered the earth and nearly everything upon it. The initial Jap formation of 54 bombers unloaded tons and tons of high explosives, following with merciless strafing.

The entire attack lasted about 40 minutes, with casualties heavy, the field torn and wrecked, and only one or two of the 30th's B-17s remaining for service. Brilliant, individual deeds of heroism characterized the efforts of officers and enlisted personnel, but they could not stem the Japs in their relentless assault.

Follow-up attacks were naturally expected, and that evening, Major Gibbs moved the 30th from the barracks on Clark Field, establishing headquarters on a small knoll in a cane field about a mile and one-half away. It was shortly thereafter that Major Gibbs, on a mission in a B-18, did not return, and the Squadron lost the first of its several war-time commanding officers.

14158

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E-21

HEADQUARTERS 3RD AIR FORCE

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

IN REPLY REFER TO:


TAMPA, FLORIDA

Lt. Col. Lucius P. Ordway
A-2 Section Army Air Force
Munitions Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel:

Inclosed is a summary of operations in the Southwest Pacific Area as I saw them. After reading over the interview which is on file there in Washington, it appeared to be a good idea to clarify and add to the report. The form admittedly is not so good, but in general includes everything that I could remember that might be of interest.

Sincerely,



W. P. FISHER
Major, Air Corps
Asst. G-3

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Report on Phillipine and Java Operations
by W. P. Fisher, Major, Air Corps.

I was assigned as a flight commander in a provisional squadron of nine combat and maintenance crews, equipped with 9 B-17D Airplanes, which was formed at Hickham Field, Hiawaii, in August of 1941. This was composed of personnel and equipment drawn from the two tactical groups stationed there. Training of this provisional squadron was carried out until the first of September at which time it was designated as the 14th Heavy Bombardment Squadron and the ground component of the 14th added to the combat echelon. The air echelon left Hicknam Field on September 5th with orders transferring it to Clark Field in the Phillipine Islands. The first stop was made at Midway Island. The flight remained overnight continuing on to Wake Island the following day. The departure from Wake Island to Port Moresby, New Guinea, was made about midnight the following night under conditions of radio silence, arriving at the destination the following afternoon. After a one day lay over for maintenance, the squadron continued on to Darwin, Australia. Another day's lay over was made there for maintenance and awaiting weatner information before the final hop to Clark Field in the Phillipines. This was the first squadron of B-17's to arrive in the Phillipines. Following arrival at Clark Field, we immediately began intensive unit tactical training in high altitude, formation flying, navigation, bombing, and gunnery. Missions at this time were scheduled from 20000 to 30000 feet.

About a month after our arrival, the 19th Group stationed at Albuquerque, New Mexico, was transferred to the Phillipine Department and, following the same route, arrived about the middle of October with two combat and one Headquarters Squadron and equipped with 25 B-17D Airplanes. Following arrival of the air and ground echelons of the 19th Group, all Phillipine Bombardment units were consolidated into the 19th Group. The organization then consisted of the 30th, 93rd, 14th, and 28th combat squadrons and a Headquarters Squadron. All airplanes and equipment were evenly divided among them, giving 8 B-17's to each combat squadron and 3 in the Headquarters Squadron. At this time, I was relieved from assignment to the 14th Squadron and given command of the 28th Squadron which had been stationed at Clark Field prior to our arrival.

By the first of December the international situation was quite grave and reconnaissance patrols were being run by both ourselves and the Japanese between Formosa and Luzon. Visual contact by the aircraft had been made several times. At about this time, the air echelon of the 93rd and 14th squadrons, consisting of the combat crews, some maintenance men, and all airplanes were sent to Del Monte on the Island of Mindanao, our alternate Heavy Bombardment Base; the 28th, 30th and Headquarters squadrons remaining at Clark Field. This was the situation that existed on December 7th when the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred. The training of the entire group was at a high state; all personnel was experienced and our equipment in good condition.

The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred about 3:00 o'clock the morning of the 8th, Phillipine time. The report of the attack was received first, of course,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

by radio news broadcast and all personnel were aware of it by dawn or shortly hereafter. All airplanes at Clark Field had been dispersed and in revetments for some time prior to this and the entire group was prepared to perform missions at any time. While awaiting orders, the first air warning was received around 8:00 o'clock that a formation of enemy bombers was proceeding in the direction of Clark Field. Immediately all flyable airplanes were taken off and flown away from the vicinity of the field to avoid their destruction. Several warnings were received during the morning of enemy formations but no attacks were made on Clark Field. At about 11:00 o'clock, we were all called back in as no further enemy aircraft were reported. After landing, orders were received to attack Air Bases on Southern Formosa at dusk. Preparations for this mission were being made when at about 12:30 a formation of 54 Heavy Japanese Bombers was seen approaching the field. No warning had been received from our radio locator stations of any enemy aircraft in the vicinity so our entire strength of aircraft was caught on the ground in their dispersed positions with the exception of one B-17 on patrol. It was later found that all communications to Clark Field had been cut by saboteurs and radio communications jammed by radio interference. The formation had been detected by the radio locators but they were unable to get warning to Clark Field.

Numerous zigzag trenches approximately 2' wide and 5' deep had been constructed by Colonel Maitland, the base Commander, in previous months in the vicinity of the hangars and working area. Also additional trenches had been constructed near the dispersed positions of the airplanes. Upon sighting the approaching formation, warning was given and most of the personnel were able to take cover in these trenches. There was approximately 5 minutes between the time the formation was first seen and the attack on Clark Field. The attack was made diagonally across the quarters and hangar area by two formations of 27 Heavy Bombers. Each 27 plane formation was in the form of a giant Vee. The bombs used in the attack varied from 100 lb bombs down to smaller fragmentation bombs and were dropped in train covering the field from the quarters area through the hangar and shop area. I estimate that approximately 300 bombs were dropped in this attack. Following the bombing attack, a formation of 10 fighters came in, individually attacking the dispersed B-17's and other aircraft with machine guns and cannon fire. This attack lasted approximately 40 minutes. Very few airplanes had been destroyed by the bombing attack which was conducted from approximately 23000' but all airplanes were completely destroyed or filled with bullet holes by the fighter attack. During this attack approximately six P-40's of the squadron stationed at Clark Field were able to get off and engage the attacking fighters. The 200th Coast Artillery (an anti-aircraft regiment) was in position to defend Clark Field and also took the fighters under fire with 30 cal., 50 cal. and 37 mm. gun fire. The damage to Clark Field from this attack was great as the hangars, shops, supply buildings and other installations were struck by bombs and numerous fires started. Personnel casualties were approximately 100 men and officers killed and 200 wounded. Nearly all of the casualties were persons who were taken by surprise and were unable to take cover in the trenches which had been provided. The Japanese intelligence apparently had been complete as they had attacked only the tactical airplanes and installations.

Operations were begun immediately and missions carried out against enemy surface vessels and convoys by the two squadrons stationed at Del Monte. Japanese landings were made at Aparri, Legaspi and Vigan and were successful. These landings were made from a small number of transports accompanied by surface vessels and under the protection of gun fire from the vessels. In each case the enemy im-

AF-5-41
DEC 41
14161

CHRON NO. 40-11-1 to 4-1132 HIST. NO.

HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST AIR FORCES
HISTORICAL RECORD

42-4-27

SUBJECT CLASS History

TITLE OF DOCUMENT 24th Pursuit Group in P.I.

DATE OF DOCUMENT 10 October, 1942.

FILE 5AF A-1. "Rosters V Bomber Command
P.I. - Java File

TYPE OF DOCUMENT

PAGES IMP. P PUB. 2

FROM

TO

Typing by T. Leach
SYNOPSIS: TRUE COPY

Checked by
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH AIR FORCE

BRISBANE, Q.
October 10, 1942.

SUBJECT: Activity of the 24th Pursuit Group in the Philippines.

On or about November 1, 1940, the 4th Composite Group in the Philippine Islands was reinforced by the 17th Pursuit Squadron of the 1st Pursuit Group, commanded by K.J. Gregg, Major, Air Corps, and the 20th Pursuit Squadron of the 35th Pursuit Group, commanded by O.L. Grover, Captain, Air Corps. At this time, the 4th Composite Group commanded by L.S. Churchill, Colonel, Air Corps, was based at Nichols Field. It consisted of the 28th Bombardment Squadron detached at Clark Field, the 2nd Observation Squadron detached at Clark Field, and the following Squadrons at Nichols Field: Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 3rd Pursuit Squadron, 17th Pursuit Squadron and 20th Pursuit Squadron, all equipped with obsolete P-26 type aircraft. During the month of May, 1941, Colonel Churchill assumed command of Nichols Field, and K.J. Gregg, Major, Air Corps, assumed command of the 4th Composite Group. The 28th Bombardment Squadron and the 2nd Observation Squadron were assigned to Clark Field.

In May, 1941, the Group was re-equipped with P-35 type aircraft destined for Sweden, but diverted to the Philippine Islands. During July, 1941, due to the conditions at Nichols Field, i.e. east-west runway undergoing construction, and north-south runway being unusable due to lack of drainage, the 4th Composite Group (less 17th Pursuit Squadron) was transferred to Clark Field. The 17th Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Iba to undergo gunnery training at that station. During the month of July, 1941, one Squadron was re-equipped with P-40B type aircraft, the other squadrons still being equipped with P-35s. At the same time, one hundred new pilots arrived from the training school in the States, and were assigned to the Group. It became necessary to train these pilots. A training unit was instigated at Clark Field and pursuit training was given. On or about August 1, Major Gregg was transferred to the F.E.A.F., and O.L. Grover, Major, Air Corps, assumed command of the Group. During September the 17th Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Nichols Field and the 3rd Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Iba for gunnery training. This movement was necessary in order to make room for contemplated bombardment reinforcements at Clark Field. Nichols Field's construction was not complete and was not satisfactory for operations. These conditions occasioned a high accident rate for the 17th Squadron.

On October 1, 1941, the 4th Composite Group, less 3rd, 17th and 20th Squadrons was transferred to Clark Field and the 24th Pursuit Group was activated at Clark Field. The 24th Pursuit Group consisted of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 3rd Pursuit Squadron, 17th Pursuit Squadron and 20th Pursuit Squadron. During the month of October, 35 new pilots just graduated from the training schools in the States arrived and were assigned, bringing the Group to full T/O officers' strength. It was necessary to train these pilots for duty in combat units.

During the month of November, 1941, the 21st Pursuit Squadron and the 34th Pursuit Squadron arrived from the United States. They were part of the 35th Pursuit Group. They were attached to the 24th Pursuit Group for duty and administration pending the arrival of the remainder of their Group. On December 1, 1941, the Pursuit units were as follows:

a. Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 24th Pursuit Group, Clark Field, commanded by Lieutenant W.D. Putnam.

DOC. No. 1

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removed

- b. 3rd Pursuit Squadron, Iba, commanded by Lieutenant H.G. Thorne, equipped with P-40Es.
- c. 17th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Boyd D. Wagner, equipped with P-40Es.
- d. 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant J.H. Moore, equipped with P-40Bs.
- e. 21st Pursuit Squadron at Del Carmen, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Sam Marrett, equipped with P-35s.
- f. 34th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant W.E. Dyess, partially equipped with P-40Es.

Airdromes available to pursuit were: Nichols Field, Nielson Field, Clark Field, Iba, Rosales, Del Carmen; under construction O'Donnell, San Fernando, Ternate. Other commercial fields in the Islands were unsuitable for fully loaded pursuit aircraft.

Communications for aircraft warning: The aircraft warning system consisted of native air watches, who relayed their reports over the telephone to the 5th Interceptor Headquarters at Nielson. The reports were then relayed via teletype to the plotting board at Clark Field. One R.D.F. set was installed at Iba, one set in process of installation 60 miles west of Aparri and the third set was en route to Legaspi for installation. Delay in time for the relaying of messages due to telephone communications was from five to twenty-five minutes.

From November 15, due to the tense international situation, all pursuit aircraft were fully loaded, armed and on constant alert 24 hours each day with pilots available on 30 minutes notice. On December 6, General Brereton held a conference and stated that war was imminent. At this time all units were placed completely on the alert with all combat crews, enlisted men and officers constantly ready for duty.

On the night of December 7, the status report had shown:

The 3rd Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission;

The 17th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40 Es in commission;

The 20th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission;

The 21st Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-35s in commission;

The 34th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission,

giving the Group a total of 54 P-40Es, 18 P-40Bs and 18 P-35s in commission.

The 34th Squadron received their last P-40E from the Depot on the evening of December 7. This squadron was unable to slow time all of the engines, boresights or check guns.

During the period November 30 to December 6 all squadrons were undergoing intensive training in interception and gunnery. The squadrons were doing training in conjunction with bombardment in day and night interception in coordination with the anti-aircraft.

Throughout the gunnery camp at Iba an extreme amount of difficulty was experienced in malfunctioning of the guns due to improper adjustment and mal-installation. In order to properly function it was imperative that all gun installations should be modified.

During the period December 2 to December 6, for four consecutive nights an enemy aircraft was sighted over Clark Field at approximately 5:30 a.m. After the first sighting, instructions were given to force the aircraft to land or destroy it. On the three succeeding nights it was impossible to make the interception, due to inability to see the aircraft in the dark or the aircraft not getting close enough to be picked up by the searchlights. On the fifth morning all aircraft were kept on the ground and the anti-aircraft alerted for the interception; however, no aircraft were located. During the same period enemy aircraft were tracked over Iba by the radar set.

On December 8 approximately 3:30 a.m. the commercial radio station at Clark Field intercepted a message from Pearl Harbour, reference the attack there. Unable to verify this interception no official action was taken other than notifying the Base Commander. However, all units were ordered to constant stations.

At approximately 4 a.m. the radar at Iba reported a formation of unidentified aircraft approximately 75 miles off the coast leading towards Corregidor. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron was dispatched for the interception. No interception was accomplished. However, the tracks on the plotting table showed that the interception was successful and the formation of unidentified aircraft swung off to the west going out of range of the radar. This interception was hampered by darkness and a lack of altitude data from the radar, i.e. it is thought that the pursuit went underneath the formation of unidentified aircraft. At approximately 4:45 official confirmation that a state of war existed was received. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron returned to Iba, landed, regassed and went to Stations.

At approximately 9:30, a large force of bombers over Lingayen was reported heading towards Manila. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was immediately dispatched for the interception over Rosales. The 17th Pursuit Squadron was immediately dispatched from Nichols Field to cover Clark Field. The interception was not successful. The bombers proceeded on a course until approximately 30 miles north of Rosales then made a turn to the northeast and proceeded to Baguio, bombed Baguio and Tagayaran and departed for the north. At the time the 20th took off all bombardment were dispatched from Clark Field. The 20th returned to Clark Field and gave the bombardment cover while they were landing. Both the 20th and the 17th then landed, regassed and went on the alert.

At approximately 11:30 a large formation of bombers was reported over the China Sea headed for Manila. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron was dispatched for the interception. Uncertainties of time and place factors, due to the delay in communications, making it doubtful whether the 3rd would accomplish the interception, the 17th was dispatched to cover Bataan, and the 34th was placed on standing patrol over Manila. At approximately 11:45 an unidentified report was received of a bombardment formation over Lingayen Gulf, headed south. The 20th not having completed gassing was not able to take off to investigate. At approximately 11:45 the 21st Pursuit Squadron was dispatched to cover Clark Field. At 12:15 the 20th completed gassing and was ordered to cover Clark Field. At 12:20 54 bombers and an undetermined number of dive bombers attacked Clark Field. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was in the process of taking off when the attack came. Four of their aircraft had cleared the ground. Another five were destroyed in the process of taking off by the bombardment. The remaining five were destroyed by strafing after the bombardment attack. The unidentified plot mentioned above proved to be the bombardment formation approaching Clark Field. Communications break down prevented proper identification. At the time of the attack on Clark Field four squadrons of pursuit were in the air and the fifth in the process of taking off. Due to a direct hit on the center of communications at Clark Field, ground-to-air control was destroyed and thus no control could be maintained of the fighters in the air.

The 3rd Pursuit Squadron, which had been dispatched for the interception over the China Sea, failed to make the interception and was notified of another raid approaching Iba, by the ground station at Iba. The radar set at Iba was plotting the approaching raid and relaying to the central plotting room at Nielson airport. However, due to a breakdown in communications these plots were never received at Nielson. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron returned to Iba and as they were circling the field 54 enemy bombers and an unknown number of dive bombers accompanying them approached the field. These were immediately attacked by the 3rd Pursuit Squadron. In the ensuing engagement one bomber and a number of strafers were claimed to have been destroyed. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron lost in the air five P-40s and although not preventing the bombardment of Iba, did prevent the strafing. After the withdrawal of the enemy, three additional aircraft (P-40s) were forced to crash land on the beaches due to their gas supply being exhausted. The remainder of the squadron proceeded to O'Donnell airport and landed; they remained there until ammunition and gas were dispatched from Clark Field to reload and regas this squadron. The installations and aircraft on the ground at Iba were completely destroyed by enemy bombardment. There were approximately eight airplanes on the ground at the time of the attack which were out of condition due to maintenance, engine change etc.

The 17th Pursuit Squadron over Bataan proceeded towards Clark Field but upon arrival there the enemy had withdrawn. The 17th, unable to contact the ground station, proceeded to Del Carmen and landed. The 21st Squadron was greatly delayed in taking off due to the excessive amount of dust on the field, and made no interception. The 34th Squadron patrolled Manila area and landed at Nichols Field at the completion of the mission.

AF-5-41
DEC 41
Aug 42 141

10-41 -
CHRON NO. 6-44 D-10521ST. NO.

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH AIR FORCE
HISTORICAL RECORD

SUBJECT CLASS Communications

TITLE OF DOCUMENT Record of an interview with Major Heald, Communications Officer, Fifth Air Service Command.

DATE OF DOCUMENT 15 May, 1944. FILE NO. Interview

TYPE OF DOCUMENT Statement PAGES _____ IMP. _____ PUB. S

FROM _____ TO _____
Typed by C. Lutton Checked by _____

EXTRACT

RECORD OF AN INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR HEALD, COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER,
FIFTH AIR FORCE SERVICE COMMAND.

15 May, 1944.

When the Fifth Air Base Group came to the Philippines about 15 November 1941, it was transferred from Manila to Mindinao where an airdrome at Del Monte. Lieut. Heald with nine men from the 19th Bombardment Group Hdq. Sq., and a large mobile radio truck, proceeded to Del Monte with the Fifth Air Base Group arriving at that base 1st December 1941. Base communications were set up and radio communications established from Del Monte back to Clark Field and Nielson Field during the week from 1 December to 8 December 1941.

At the time of the attack upon the Philippines, Lieut. Heald received the first message radioed to Del Monte from General Headquarters, which he immediately related to Captain Gee (now Lieut Col) then adjutant of the Fifth Air Base Group. This was signed "MacArthur" and was received at approximately 0630 and it read; "Hostilities have begun. All Airdromes alert". Five minutes later another message arrived from Lieutenant Colonel Eubank with about the same wording.

During the latter part of December 1941 and all of January 1942, Lt. Brownwell made daily reconnaissance flights in a P-40 over Davao harbour which fell to the Japanese the first week of the war.

This information (visual only as he had no photographic equipment) was sent by radio to General MacArthur - Great quantities of supplies and ships of all sorts were visible on the bay and in the harbour. At the time of the naval battle in Macassar Sts., 1 February to 6 February 1942, approximately fifty ships were in Davao Harbor - i.e. destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers, and cargo vessels. Several attempts were made by the enemy to follow Lt. Brownwell and locate the strip from which he operated, but he always managed to elude them and land on a strip that could not be found.

There were no radio communications between strips on Mindanao. The only means of communication was over the Philippine Commonwealth telephone lines which were very unsatisfactory.

(5257-3)
Sullivan
recovered

r16

15 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR LT COLONEL DUNCOMBE

Subject: Organization of the Far East Air Force

1. Inclosed herewith is the material you requested concerning the organization of the air force in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war.

2. Inclosure No. 1 is a copy of a 4 August 1941 order stating that the Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East "will operate directly under" the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East. Inclosure No. 2 is a 14 November 1941 order merely changing the name of the Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East to "Far East Air Force."

3. Inclosure No. 3 is a chart showing the relationship of the principal air and ground commanders in the Philippines to General MacArthur. Inclosure No. 4 is a chart giving in more detail the organization and location of the various air units in the Philippines. Inclosure No. 5 is a list of air force commanders in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war. The inclosures referred to in this paragraph have been recently prepared on the basis of records on file in the AAF Historical Office, Headquarters Army Air Forces and records in the possession of the Adjutant General.

/s/ Joseph B. Mitchell
Lt. Colonel GSC

f15

1 5 Incls

- 2 1. Cy of order dtd 4 Aug 41
 3 2. Cy of order dtd 14 Nov 41
 4 3. Chart air & gd comdrs in the Phil
 5 4. Chart Orgn of FEAF
 6 5. List of Air Force comdrs.

7 - - - - -
 8 Chron. No. 41-8-4 D-1034 Headquarters, Fifth Air Force
 9 Historical Record

10 Subject Class - Organization - Units

11 Title of Document - Redesignation of Air Force

12 Date of Document - 4 August 1941 File No. USAFFE 300.4

13 TYPE OF DOCUMENT - General Order

14 (Typed by C. Lutton)

15 TRUE COPY

16 HEADQUARTERS

17 UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

18 Manila, P. I.

19 4 August 1941

20 GENERAL ORDERS.

21 NO. 4.

22 The Philippine Department Air Force as now constituted,
 23 Brigadier General Henry B. Clagett (O-2152), United States
 24 Army, Commanding, and such other units and installations as
 25 may be assigned to it, are hereby constituted as the Air

f16

Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East. It will operate directly under the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, except for routine administration and supply, which will continue through Headquarters Philippine Department.

By Command of Lieutenant General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND

Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry,

Acting Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Carl H. Seals

Colonel, A. G. D.,

Acting Adjutant General.

TRUE COPY

/s/ Manning J. Dauer

Capt. Air Corps.

Chron No. 41-11-14 D-1051 Headquarters, Fifth Air Force

Historical Record

Subject Class - Organizations - Units

Title of Document - General Order

Date of Document - 14 November, 1941 File No. USAFFE - G. O.

(Typed by C. Lutton) E X T R A C T

HEADQUARTERS

United States Army Forces in the Far East

f17

Manila, P. I.

14 November, 1941

GENERAL ORDERS)

No. 28)

1. Pursuant to authority contained in letter, War Department, October 28, 1941, File AG 320.2 (10-20-41) MR-M-AAF, to this headquarters, effective November 16, 1941, the following changes in Air Force Units of the command are announced:

- a. The Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East is effective this date, redesignated as "Far East Air Forces".
- b. Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, United States Army Forces in the Far East, effective this date, is redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Far East Air Force.

* * * * *

By command of Lieutenant General MacARTHUR

E. K. SUTHERLAND

Brigadier General, GSC,

Chief of Staff

Official:

Carl H. Seals,


Colonel, A. G. D.

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7 DECEMBER 1941


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UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
FAR EAST

ORGANIZATION OF THE FAR EAST AIR FORCE
AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR



* 24th OBSERVATION SQUADRON, DID NOT ARRIVE. DIVERTED TO AUSTRALIA.

Incl IV 10

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1 Commanders of Air Force Units in the Philippines at the
2 Out break of the War.

- 3 1. Far East Air Force (Nielson Field) - Maj Gen L. H. Brereton
4 2. 5th Interceptor Command (Nielson Field) - Brig. Gen.
5 H. B. Clagett
6 3. 24th Pursuit Group (Clark Field) - Maj O. L. Grover
7 3rd Pursuit Squadron (Iba Field) 1st Lt. H. G. Throne
8 17th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field) - 1st Lt.
9 B. D. Wagner
10 20th Pursuit Squadron (Clark Field -
11 1st Lt W. B. Dyess
12 34th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field -
13 1st Lt S. H. Marett
14 4. 5th Bomber Command (Nielson Field) - Lt. Col E.L.Eubank
15 5. 19th Bombardment Group (H) (Clark Field) - Lt Col. Eubank
16 14th Bombardment Squadron (Del Monte Field) -
17 Maj. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr.
18 28th Bombardment Squadron (Clark Field) -
19 Major W. P. Fisher
20 30th Bombardment Squadron (Clark Field) -
21 Maj D. R. Gibbs
22 93rd Bombardment Squadron (Del Monte Field) -
23 Maj C. E. Combs
24 6. 27th Bombardment Group (L) (Nielson Field) Maj J. H. Davies
25 16th Bombardment Squadron - Capt. W. G. Hipps

f19

- 1 17th Bombardment Squadron - 1st Lt H. F. Lowery
 2 91st Bombardment Squadron - 1st Lt W. E. Eubank
 3 7. 2nd Observation Squadron (Nichols Field) - Capt. J. Y.
 4 Parker
 5 8. Far East Air Service Command (Nielson Field) - Col.
 6 L. S. Churchill
 7 9. Philippine Air Depot (Nielson Field) - Lt Col W. H. Amis
 8 10. 5th Air Base Group (Del Monte Field) Maj R. T. Elsmore
 9 11. 20th Air Base Group (Nichols Field) - Maj W. H. Maverick
 10 12. 36th Air Base Group (Nielson Field)
 11 (It is believed that this was only a small de-
 12 tachment. The bulk of the group and its equipment
 13 went to Australia and never reached the Philippines.
 14 The detachment commander is believed to have been
 15 Capt. Waller.)
 16 13. Clark Field - Maj M.J. Daly
 17 14. Del Carmen Field - 1st Lt S. H. Marett
 18 (Lt Marett is also listed above as the Commanding
 19 Officer of the 34th Pursuit Squadron of the 24th Pursuit
 20 Group.)
 21 15. Del Monte Field - Maj R. T. Elsmore
 22 (Maj Elsmore is also listed above as the Commanding
 23 Officer of the 5th Air Base Group)
 24 16. Iba Field - 1st Lt H. G. Thorne
 25 (Lt. Thorne is also listed above as the Commanding

f20

1

Officer of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron of the 24th

2

Pursuit Group)

3

17. Nichols Field - Maj W. H. Maverick

4

(Maj Maverick is also listed above as the Commanding

5

Officer of the 20th Air Base Group)

6

18 Nielson Field

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(This field was not an operational field. It will

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be noted that only headquarters units, or units which

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did not have their planes or equipment are listed

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as being stationed at this field.

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1 Mr. Morgan: We have a series of communications from
2 the Federal Communications Commission, dated February 11,
3 1946, and again February 14, 1946, and again February 18,
4 1946, concerning the matter of Federal Communications
5 Commission monitoring at Hawaii for a winds execute message.
6 Inasmuch as this question came up during the interrogation
7 with respect to this matter, we would like to have these
8 communications, which are from Mr. G. E. Sterling, Assistant
9 Chief Engineer, spread on the record at this point.

10 The Vice Chairman: They will be spread on the record
11 at this point.

12 (The series of communications referred to are as follows:)
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 11, 1946.

Mr. Seth Richardson

General Counsel

Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee

Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Morgan

Dear Sir:

Replies have been received from all officers who were in charge of the Commission's activities in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, in which they all state that they were not requested by any representatives of the military authorities in Hawaii to monitor for the "winds" execute message prior to December 7, 1941.

Copies of their statements are attached to this communication.

Sincerely yours,

(sgd) G. E. Sterling

G. E. Sterling

Assistant Chief Engineer.

Attachments

- - - -

February 7, 1946

From: Supervisor H. A. M. A.

1 To: Chief, R. I. D.

2 Subject: "Winds Messages"

3 My memorandum dated February 4, 1946, contained a
4 blanket denial that any request to monitor for the so called
5 "Winds Messages" was received from the Army or the Navy
6 prior to December 7, 1941.

7 This is a repetition of that denial with the added
8 statement that Col. Bicknell did not contact me (or any
9 member of my staff) between November 28 and December 7, 1941,
10 to request that we monitor for the "winds Messages" by
11 making intercepts of Japanese radio transmissions.

12 /s/ Lee R. Dawson

13 - - - -

14 RADIO INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

15 February 4, 1946 609 Stangenwald Bldg.

16 Honolulu, T. H.

17 From: Supervisor, H. A. M. A.

18 To: Chief, R. I. D.

19 Subject: "Winds Messages"

20 I, Lee R. Dawson, Supervisor, Radio Intelligence
21 Division, Federal Communications Commission, Hawaiian
22 Monitoring Area, do hereby affirm and state that the
23 following statements are true to the best of my knowledge and
24 belief:

6

1 Defense Operations Section of the Federal Communications
2 Commission in the Hawaiian Islands from November 1, 1940, to
3 December 7, 1941.

4 (2) That no request was received by me or by any
5 member of my staff from the Army or the Navy prior to
6 December seventh, 1941, to monitor for the so called "Winds
7 Messages".

8 /s/ Lee R. Dawson

9 - - - -

10 Feb. 5, 1946.

11 From: Earl A. Nielsen,
12 Kealahou, T. H.

13 To: Chief, R. I. D.,

14 Subject: "Winds" Messages.

15 I, Earl A. Nielsen, affirm and state that to the best
16 of my knowledge and belief no request to monitor for "Winds"
17 messages was received by me from the Army or the Navy prior
18 to December 7th, 1941. I was employed as Assistant Monitoring
19 Officer at HA-2, Hawaii National Park from July 1st, 1941
20 thru December 7th, 1941.

21 Earl A. Nielsen

22 - - - -

23 February 5, 1946.

24 Mr. George E. Sterling,
25 Federal Communications Commission,

1 Washington, D. C.

2 Dear Mr. Sterling:

3 I am writing to confirm our telephonic conversation of
4 last night regarding matters pertinent to the Pearl Harbor
5 Investigation. As you know, I was Inspector in Charge of
6 the Engineering Department's Field Division office in
7 Honolulu from November 1940 to December 1945. At no time
8 prior to December 7, 1941 was I contacted by G-2 of the Army,
9 or by any other government office, with a request that my
10 department make recordings or monitoring runs of radio
11 broadcasts for the purpose of intercepting the so called
12 "winds" message from Japan.

13 As I now recall, I was told by one Frank Santos, who
14 operated a pleasure fishing boat out of Honolulu, that he
15 had aboard a fishing party on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
16 Amongst the fisherman were some Army officers who became
17 exasperated when their craft was strafed by the Japs because
18 they thought the planes were our own and they were making their
19 practice runs a bit too realistic. I was personally
20 monitoring the 2638 kc band that morning and heard Santos
21 ask the Coast Guard station NMO for permission to enter the
22 harbor. It was apparent from the conversation from NMO that
23 personnel at the station did not realize that we were being
24 attacked at the time.

Yours truly,

(sgd) John H. Homsy

P. S. I trust that you can read this letter which is written at my bedside.

73

JHH

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

RADIO INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

HONOLULU 1, T. H.

SECRET

VIA CLIPPER AIRMAIL

February 7, 1946.

From: Assistant Supervisor, HA-P, Honolulu, T. H.

To: Chief, Radio Intelligence Division

Subject: February radiogram O72007 BUSY SHIP

In your message of February 7, 1946 it was requested that a written statement be prepared by Mr. Dawson, Mr. Wagner and Mr. Klima concerning a "so called" request to the Honolulu office of the FCC for intercepts of Japanese transmissions containing "winds messages" between November 28, 1941 and December 7, 1941.

I make the following statement:

I, Tom B. Wagner, Assistant Supervisor, HA-P, can not recall any request made by Col. Bicknell, G-2, Honolulu, Hawaii, or other military personnel between November 28, 1941 and December 7, 1941 to the FCC for Japanese intercepts

6

1 containing "Winds Messages". No written record can be found
2 in the HA-P files for such a request.

3 Such a request as this would require a clearance from
4 the FCC office in Washington, D. C. before such information
5 could be furnished Col. Bicknell. No record of such a
6 request can be found.

7 Tom. B. Wagner

8 - - - -
9 Federal Communications Commission
10 Engineering Department
11 Radio Intelligence Division

12 February 6 1946

13 To: Chief Radio Intelligence Division

14 From: Monitoring Officer in Chg.

15 Unit HA-3

16 Koloa Kauai TH

17 Subject: Army/Navy monitoring requests re: Japanese winds
18 message prior Dec 7 1941.

19 Ref: Relative information requested Chief's Radiogram.

20 This unit was placed in service March nineteenth 1941.

21 The unit was located, temporary set up, at Lihue Kauai.

22 Relocation of the unit to the National Guard Armory

23 Hanapepe Kauai was completed April first 1941.

24 The only office of military representation on the

25 ISLAND OF KAUAI KNOWN BY THIS UNIT WAS BUILT BY THE U. S. ARMY

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 The commanding officer was contacted in person by
2 myself, and information given as to our location, our aim
3 and purpose in monitoring, and service rendered.

4 As officer in charge of this unit between the dates of
5 March nineteenth 1941 and that of December eighth, 1941, and
6 cognizant of all requests made for service at this unit by
7 either the U. S. Army or Navy during this period, can state,
8 that to the best of my knowledge neither the U. S. Army
9 or Navy made a request for the monitoring of Japanese
10 broadcasts for the interception of "winds message".

11 This unit's official case record file substantiates
12 the above statement.

13 /s/ Theodore H. Tate
14 Theodore H. Tate
15 Monitoring Officer.

16 - - - -
17 War Department
18 Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service
19 Field Division
20 February 5, 1946.

21 From: Waldemar M. Klima, P. O. Box FF, Kekaha, Kauai, T. H.
22 To: Mr. George E. Sterling, Chief, R ID, Washington 25, D C
23 Subject: Your request re the Winds message.

24 This afternoon I received the following message by
25 telephone from the HA-3, RID, unit near Koloa, Kauai, T. H.

1 "Chief wants airmail statements from you and Klima
2 regarding whether Army and Navy requested you to monitor
3 for winds message from Tokyo prior to December 7th

4 The message was apparently a paraphrase by King
5 Wagner of HA-P of Busy's message received from Washington.

6 My statement follows:

7 I am sufficiently certain to state that I personally
8 did not receive a written, telephoned, or verbal request from
9 any representative or any of the military agencies (Army,
10 Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, or Marines) on Oahu to
11 monitor for a "Winds message" or any other specific or general
12 monitoring request in the period of a week prior to December
13 7, 1941. Neither am I aware of any such request having been
14 received by any one of the other HA-P or HA-1 staff
15 members. No announcement of such a monitoring request was
16 made verbally or in written posted form by the officers in
17 charge of monitoring activities in the Punchbowl in
18 Honolulu, T. H.

19 (signed) Waldemar M. Klima

20 Waldemar M. Klima

21 - - - -
22 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

23 Washington 25, D. C.

24 February 14, 1946.

1 General Counsel
2 Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee
3 Washington, D. C.

4 Attention: Mr. Morgan

5 Dear Sir:

6 I have previously furnished you with statements received
7 from responsible representatives of the Federal Communications
8 Commission, who were on duty in Hawaii prior to December 1941,
9 in which they stated that they had not been contacted by
10 Colonel Bicknell for the purpose of engaging in monitoring
11 Japanese broadcast transmissions for the purpose of
12 intercepting the "WINDS" message.

13 I now enclose an affidavit made by an employee of the
14 Federal Communications Commission, Mr. A. Prose Walker, in
15 which he states that Colonel Bicknell on two occasions
16 approached him for the purpose of ascertaining if he had any
17 knowledge of Japanese radio stations under surveillance by
18 the FCC, one of the inquiries being directed specifically
19 to the "WINDS" message.

20 It is very difficult for me to understand why Colonel
21 Bicknell should make affidavit to the effect that he did
22 contact FCC representatives for the purpose of intercepting
23 the "WINDS" message when our own employees in responsible
24 positions indicate they have no knowledge of such a contact.

25 It is also difficult for me to understand why Colonel

1 Bicknell endeavored to ascertain information from Mr. Walker
2 on the same subject on two occasions.

3 I am also enclosing the original sworn statement made
4 by Mr. Lee R. Dawson, a copy of which was furnished you
5 with the other papers. Mr. Dawson was, prior to December 7,
6 1941, and continues in charge of our Monitoring Activities
7 in Hawaii.

8 Very truly yours,

9 /s/ G. E. Sterling

10 G. E. Sterling

11 Assistant Chief Engineer.

12 Enclosures

13 - - - -

14 February 13, 1946.

15 To: Mr. Sterling

16 From: Mr. Walker

17 I recall that on two occasions I was approached by
18 Army personnel relative to any interceptions which the FCC
19 had made of Japanese transmissions prior to or on December
20 7, 1941. Before the departure of Colonel G. W. Bicknell,
21 Assistant A. C. of S., G2 C. I. D., from the Hawaiian
22 Department, I have a vague recollection that he asked me if
23 I had any knowledge of the Japanese radio stations under

24 surveillance of FCC monitoring stations in Hawaii. My reply

WARD S. PAUL, WASHINGTON D C

1 not present in Hawaii at that time, having arrived on March
 2 2, 1942. I probably referred him to Mr. Dawson. I do not
 3 recall that any mention was made of the "WINDS" message.

4 I entered on duty as Chief, Technical Operations
 5 Section, RID, on July 7, 1944. Sometime during either July
 6 or August of that year, I had lunch with Colonel G. W.
 7 Bicknell and he again mentioned the subject of the FCC
 8 intercepting any messages on or prior to December 7, 1941.
 9 I recall that during this conversation he specifically
 10 mentioned the "WINDS" message. Having no knowledge whatever
 11 at that time of such a message, my answer to Colonel Bicknell
 12 was that I knew nothing about it.

13 /s/ A. Prose Walker

14 Sworn to and subscribed before me this 13th day of February,
 15 1946.

16 /s/ Helen A. Marston

17 Notary Public

18 - - - -

19 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

20 Washington 25, D. C.

21 February 18, 1946.

22 Mr. Seth Richardson

23 General Counsel

24 Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee

25 Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Morgan

Dear Sir:

There is submitted herewith additional information received from the Supervisor of the Hawaiian Monitoring Area of the Radio Intelligence Division, relative to Colonel Bicknell's affidavit relating to the "WINDS" message.

Very truly yours,

/s/ G. E. Sterling

G. E. Sterling

Assistant Chief Engineer.

Enclosure

- - -

Federal Communications Commission

Radio Intelligence Division

Honolulu, I, T. H.

February 11, 1946.

From: Supervisor, Hawaiian Monitoring Area

To: Chief, Radio Intelligence Division

Subject: Col. Bicknell's Affidavit.

Following my return this date from an exploratory survey trip around the island of Hawaii I have reviewed the correspondence between your office and HA-P during my absence and I believe the following message will shed some

.3

1 In the first place, there is absolutely no evidence on
2 hand to bear out Col. Bicknell's statement that he (1)
3 contacted the local FCC intercept station in Hawaii, (2)
4 requested them to monitor for "winds messages" and (3) that in-
5 tercepts were furnished him but were not what he was looking
6 for. If Col. Bicknell had contacted HA-P he would normally
7 have talked to either Mr. Wagner or myself. Neither one of
8 us remembers any such call. If a request had been received
9 by any of the HA-P staff to monitor for "winds messages" it
10 would certainly have been brought to the attention of either
11 Mr. Wagner or myself and such an unusual request would
12 certainly have remained in our memories.

13 Furthermore, if such a request had been received calling
14 for the release of intercepted material, authorization would
15 first have been obtained from your office before such
16 release was made. Attention is called, in this regard, to
17 the fact that the Navy made a request that HA*P participate
18 in a direction finder problem during the latter part of
19 November 1941 and that your office was immediately notified
20 and authority requested before bearings were released to
21 the Navy.

22 With regard to the third point, I should like to ask
23 what kind of intercepts we are supposed to have furnished
24 him. I believe that we could show quite clearly that no
25 intercepts were furnished Col. Bicknell. I suspect that,

1 if pressed on this point, he would describe the translations
2 of the JZI intercepts which we furnished the Office of Naval
3 Intelligence from May through December 1941. I refer to the
4 Japanese propaganda broadcasts which we recorded and which
5 were translated by ONI translators. Copies of these
6 intercepts were furnished the FBI and the Office of Military
7 Intelligence. No request for special monitoring with regard
8 to these intercepts (or any other) was received from either
9 the ONI or the MID during the period between November 28
10 and December 7, 1941.

11 One other point comes to mind. You will remember that
12 when I arrived in Washington during July 1943 on special
13 detail, I reported verbally to you that Lt. Col. Henry
14 Christian Clausen of the Judge Advocate General's Department,
15 Army of the United States, had contacted me in Honolulu
16 just prior to my departure and had specifically asked if
17 Col. Bicknell had not requested us to do some monitoring
18 just prior to December 7, 1941. Lt. Col. Clausen was very
19 vague as to just what monitoring Col. Bicknell asked us to
20 do and made no claim that the request had been to monitor
21 specifically for the "winds message". Both Mr. Wagner
22 and I answered Lt. Col. Clausen in the negative and said
23 then, as we do now, that we could recollect no such request
24 from Col. Bicknell.

1 during July 1943 that I first learned that there was any such
2 thing as a "winds message". I am absolutely certain that no
3 request to monitor for such a message was received at HA-F
4 prior to December 7, 1941.

5 /s/ Lee R. Dawson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Cy 9
WLC16

1 Mr. Morgan: We have a telegram, dated August 16, 1941
2 in five sections, from former Ambassador Grew, to the State
3 Department. This telegram includes the substance of tele-
4 grams sent to the British Foreign Office by the British
5 Ambassador reporting his conversation on August 11 with the
6 Japanese Foreign Minister. The release of this document
7 has been cleared with the British, and we would request that
8 it be spread on the record at this point with the observation
9 in a note from the State Department liaison officer, dated
10 January 9, 1946, that he indicates:

11 "The British Government has agreed to the use of the attached
12 telegram No. 1235 from Tokyo August 16, 1941. It points out
13 an error in section 2, paragraph (A), fourth line from the
14 bottom, where 'Germany's policy' should read 'Japan's policy'."

15 And, as indicated, we would like to have this spread on
16 the record.

17 The Vice Chairman: It will be spread on the record at
18 this point.

19 (The telegram referred to is as follows:)
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21
22
23
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25

14190-A

TEM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED Shanghai & N.R.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Toyko via
Dated August 16, 1941

Rec'd 9:20 p.m. 17th
FROM DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

c
File
W.A.K.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1235, August 16, 3 p.m. (SECRET)

Following is the (?) telegrams sent to Foreign Office by the British Ambassador reporting his conversation on August 11, with the Japanese Foreign Minister.

"The strong representations to Minister for Foreign Affairs today in regard to spokesman's statement impugning the veracity (?) assurances as to the absence of any British aggressive designs against Thailand. The statement is that such assurances could not be accepted "(?) (?)" was not only calculated to inflame opinion in Japan, but was definitely offensive and I trusted that His Excellency would warn the spokesman of the need of greater (?) in making public statements in the present delicate state of Anglo-Japanese relations. I added that after a public statement of this kind, it was clear from what source the Japanese press received its inspiration for its attacks on my country.

Minister for

SEP 2 1941

FILED

740.0011 P. W./448

PS/VB

14190z

-2- 1235, August 16, 3 p.m. from ^{Toyko via} Shanghai & N. H.
(SECTION ONE)

Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to pass
on my remarks to Director General of Bureau of In-
formation.

GREW

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CORRECTED COPY

c 1419-0-C
filed
MAY 17 1941

LET
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI
AND N. R.

Dated August 14, 1941

Rec'd. 11:10 p.m., 17th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1235, August 14, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

I proceeded to say how regrettable it seemed to me to be that the Japanese Government should continue to place more reliance on reports (probably emanating from interested quarters) in preference not only to my own assurances but also to the public declaration made by yourself in the House of Commons. Assuming that the Japanese Government were sincere in their desire to avoid trouble over Thailand, such rumors appeared to me to be fantastic and I made an earnest appeal to His Excellency to place his cards on the table and give me some idea of the nature and the source of the reports on which they were acting. If His Excellency would deal with the matter thus frankly, I was prepared to be equally frank in explaining the point of view and intention of His Majesty's Government.

Two. Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that if things were to be prevented from going from bad to worse,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 17 1941
11

SEP 2 1941

FILED

FW740.0011 P.M./448

PS/H

14190-D
-2- 1235, August 14, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO) From Tokyo.

worse, a frank interchange of views was essential and he then mentioned several examples of the reports which were creating so much concern in Japan and invited my comments:

(A) Concentration of British troops on Thai frontier. Japanese reports were to the effect that large bodies of British troops had been concentrated ready for an immediate incursion onto Thai territory. I replied that this was a gross exaggeration: such British units as were on the Thai frontier were there purely for defensive purposes--as indeed were all our forces in Malaya and Burmah--with Germany's policy steadily pushing southwards, it was an elementary precaution that the British border defences should be adequately manned.

(B) Report that the WARSPITE was in the Gulf of Siam.

NPL

GREW

-2- #1235, August 14, 3 p.m., from Tokyo (SECTION THREE)

Malaya conveyed an impression of aggressive intentions and had proved most disturbing to the public mind in Japan. Their effect was simply to increase the pressure on the Japanese Government to hasten and augment their own preparations to defend the sphere in which Japan had a vital interest. He made a strong plea for the adoption of a calm and unprovocative attitude on the part of all concerned in handling the present delicate situation, promising to do his best in this direction if the British authorities would do their part. I explained that our authorities in Malaya had to think of the morale of the local population, which might well be affected by Japan's steady advance towards our frontiers were it not for public assurances that all necessary measures had been taken for the defense of British territory. Nevertheless I shared the opinion expressed by His Excellency that in such matters "silence is golden" and promised to impart his representations on this point to you.

GREW

HBN

14190-6

-CORRECTED COPY-

TK
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A).

Tokyo via Shanghai
and N. K.

Dated August 14, 1941

Rec'd 10:50 a.m., 17th.

Secretary of State
Washington



1235, August 14, 3 p.m., (SECTION FOUR).

Three. I then reverted to the signs of Japanese pressure on Thailand, quoting reports of concentration of Japanese troops along the Thai border and giving him recent examples of mendacious Japanese press attacks and allegations against us. His Excellency replied that only ^{quite} weak Japanese units had proceeded to the Thai frontier and that I would be surprised if I knew how small was the Japanese force which had landed in Indochina. (I abstained from asking for figures for fear of a request referring to our strength along Thai frontier).

Four. A long conversation then ensued on the economic position as regards Thailand, particularly as regards rice, rubber, and other materials which it was now more vital than ever for Japan to secure from that country. His Excellency observed that Netherlands East Indies under British influence had
decided

FW 740.0011 P. 4/48

PS/LOC

FW 740.0011 P. 4/48

-2- #1235, August 14, 3 p.m., (SECTION FOUR),
from Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R.

decided to join in the freezing of Japanese assets, with the result that it is now more than ever essential for Japan to satisfy her urgent needs in such markets as were open to her. Japanese-Thai trade had recently showed a natural tendency to increase owing to the difficulties of trade with third powers and the Japanese Government felt that they had a serious grievance against us for our attempts to induce Thailand to stop the export to Japan of even such a vital foodstuff as rice. I was able to show that in this respect His Excellency was laboring under a complete misapprehension, adding, however, that we were equally determined that our own right to purchase reasonable supplies of rice, rubber, et cetera, in Thailand, should not be interfered with by Japanese agencies. On His Excellency's charge that the surest way to ease the economic situation as regards Thailand would be to induce the Netherlands East Indies to lessen the restrictions on exports to Japan, I suggested that he was putting the cart before the horse and that the allaying of British and Netherlands East Indies apprehensions in regard to Japan's intentions in Thai

CSB

GREW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI
FROM AND N. R.

Dated August 16, 1941

Rec'd. 10 a.m., 18th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1235, August 16, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

should be the prelude to any overhauling of the economic restrictions imposed in the Netherlands East Indies or elsewhere.

Five. I took the opportunity to say that the main point of our economic restrictions on trade with Japan was, I believed, to bring home to the Japanese Government the fact that in our view Japan's successive southward advances had now reached a point at which words and protests were useless and deeds were necessary to bring it home to the Japanese Government and public how close they were to the danger zone. In denying that Netherlands East Indies action in this matter had been due to British pressure or influence I said that I assumed that the above considerations had also weighed with the Netherlands East Indies Government who must feel themselves threatened equally with us by the Japanese action in Indochina. I did not need to inform His Excellency

-2- 1235, August 16, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from Tokyo.

Excellency that the lifeline of our communications with Australia and New Zealand ran through the Netherlands East Indies ~~(~~the~~)~~ ^{thus creating} a common problem of defense. When he inquired "defense whom" and I replied "against Japan" His Excellency merely smiled and shook his head.

Six. In conclusion we agreed that the main difficulty lay in the suspicions which each power entertained of the intentions of the other, though I did not fail to ridicule the apprehensions of a power which had been steadily advancing southwards until it had reached a point 1500 miles from Tokyo. Minister for Foreign Affairs reasserted that this advance was necessitated solely by Japan's determination to bring her war with China to a successful conclusion and he could only regret our apparent inability to accept his formal assurances that the advance into South Indochina was neither directed against us nor connoted any Japanese intention of attacking Thailand. We also agreed that our conversation might have been useful as tending to dissipate unnecessary misunderstandings and that it would be desirable to have similar frank discussions from time to time.

Seven. While apologizing for the length of this telegram I am anxious to convey to you as correct an
impression

1419-K

-3- 1235, August 16, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from Tokyo.

impression as I can of the character and views of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs. The conversation lasted for an hour and a half and touched on many subsidiary points which were useful for our mutual understanding though perhaps unnecessary to report by telegram".

Sent Department, via air, mail to Shanghai.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GREW

GW.

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WLC17

1 Mr. Morgan: At various places throughout the transcript
2 various requests have been made for information with respect
3 to "water-tight integrity of major vessels" located at Pearl
4 Harbor. In order to bring together at one place all communica-
5 tions relating to this matter, we would like to have spread
6 on the record at this time the following communications from
7 the Navy Department:

8 11 December, 1945.

9 Another one dated December 11, 1945.

10 One dated 3 January 1946.

11 And a final memorandum dated 29 January 1946.

12 This will enable us to have at one place all of the communi-
13 cations with respect to the condition of "water-tight integrity
14 of major vessels."

15 The Vice Chairman: They will be spread on the record at
16 this point.

17 (The communications referred to are as follows:)

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1 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
2 OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
3 WASHINGTON

4 11 December 1945

5 MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. William D. Mitchell.

6 1. With further reference to my memorandum to you
7 dated 11 December 1945 the subject of which was "Conditions
8 of water-tight integrity of major vessels", there is attached
9 hereto a table showing the scheduled inspection of ships at
10 Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941. It
11 will be noted that this table does not contain all of the
12 ships which were at Pearl Harbor on December 7; the explanation
13 for this is, the ships which are not shown were not scheduled
14 for inspection during the period October - December 1941.

15 /s/ John Ford Baecher

16 John Ford Baecher,

17 Lt. Comdr., USNR.
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

11 December 1945

MEMORANDUM:

To: William D. Mitchell.

Subject: Condition of water-tight integrity of major vessels.

1. Pursuant to your request concerning the above matter, the following information has been obtained and is submitted:

(a) An examination of the logs and records of the major vessels at Pearl Harbor indicates that only one vessel did not have an equivalent of the condition "all water-tight openings below the third deck closed" at the time of the attack. That vessel, the USS California, had ten inner and outboard voids open for maintenance work. Its remaining water-tight openings below the third deck were closed.

(b) The logs of the USS Oklahoma and USS Arizona were destroyed. However information has been obtained through Commander Fuqua, the Damage Control Officer of the Arizona, that on his ship all water-tight doors below the third deck were closed. This was also the condition that prevailed in the USS Oklahoma, according to information stated by the commanding officer of that ship.

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(c) Material conditions of readiness referred to as conditions "Baker" or "X-Ray" or "Yoke" are higher than the minimum. The minimum requirements are considered to be those prescribed by Navy Regulations, that is, that all water-tight openings below the third deck be closed from 1600 to 0800.

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(d) According to the best available analysis in the Navy Department, the USS California is the only ship that might have been saved from sinking by the closing of manhole covers that had been left open for maintenance.

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(e) The USS Pennsylvania was in dry dock and is not included within the above general statement concerning the conditions of water-tight integrity that prevailed at that time.

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2. If more specific and detailed information on these matters is desired, an attempt will be made to locate and have present necessary witnesses.

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/s/ John Ford Baecher

John Ford Baecher,

Lt. Comdr, USNR.

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(c) Material conditions of readiness referred to as conditions "Baker" or "X-Ray" or "Yoke" are higher than the minimum. The minimum requirements are considered to be those prescribed by Navy Regulations, that is, that all water-tight openings below the third deck be closed from 1600 to 0800.

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2. If more specific and detailed information on these matters is desired, an attempt will be made to locate and have present necessary witnesses.

18 /s/ John Ford Baecher

19 John Ford Baecher,

20 Lt. Comdr, USNR.
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emg 8

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

3 January 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. William D. Mitchell

1. With reference to your memorandum of 11 December 1945 referring to the memorandum to you of the same date from Lt. Comdr. John F. Baecher entitled "Conditions of Water-tight Integrity of Major Vessels," it is believed that the further memorandum to you from Lt. Comdr. Baecher of the same date (11 December 1945) with enclosure "Compilation of Inspection Schedules Applicable to Vessels Present at Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941," together with the first mentioned memorandum constitutes the desired response to the inquiry concerning the "inspection" charge.

2. There has also been compiled a statement dated 20 December 1945 from the logs of the various ships of inspection that occurred on 5 and 6 December 1941. A copy of this compilation is enclosed herewith since it bears on the same question.

3. With reference to the inquiry concerning the names of persons from the various ships "who could testify about each vessel," it is believed that the best witnesses would be the Senior Surviving Officer from each vessel along

1 with that ship's Damage Control Officer. In addition to
 2 those officers, the names of whom are listed on the "Report
 3 of Senior Surviving Officers and Damage Control Officers",
 4 also enclosed herewith, Captain Leslie A. Kniskern, attached
 5 to the Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.,
 6 who made a study and analyzed the damage to vessels at Pearl
 7 Harbor, may have something to contribute in the way of testi-
 8 mony, if the same is desired. Many of these prospective
 9 witnesses are located at points far distant from Washington and
 10 none of them have as yet been interviewed since the scope of
 11 any preliminary interview has not yet been determined.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 4. It will be appreciated if you will give
 13 advance notice in the event you desire to call any of these
 14 individuals as witnesses, or if you desire them to be prelim-
 15 inarily interviewed by the Navy representatives.

16 /s/ John Ford Baecher

17 John Ford Baecher

18 Lt. Comdr. USNR

19 - - - -

20 A. Arizona

- 21 1. SSO: Ellis H. Geiselman, Capt., USN.
- 22 2. DCO: Samuel G. Fuqua, Capt., USN.

23 B. California

- 24 1. SSO: Joel W. Bunkley, R. Adm., USN.
- 25 2. DCO: Marjor N. Little, Capt., USN

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

- 1 C. Maryland
- 2 1. SSO: John M. Haines, Capt., USN.
- 3 2. DCO: Wm. S. G. Davis, Capt., USN.
- 4 D. Nevada
- 5 1. SSO: Francis W. Scanland, Commodore, USN.
- 6 2. DCO: George C. Miller, Capt., USN.
- 7 E. Oklahoma
- 8 1. SSO: Thomas D. Cullins, Capt., USN.
- 9 2. DCO: W. M. Hobby, Lt. Comdr., USN.
- 10 F. Pennsylvania
- 11 1. SSO: C. M. Cooke, Jr., Vice Admiral, USN.
- 12 2. DCO: Wm. E. Stock, Comdr., USN.
- 13 G. Tennessee
- 14 1. SSO: Charles E. Reordan, Capt., USN.
- 15 *2. Ass't. DCO: Robert R. Moore, Comdr., USN (Ret.)
- 16 H. West Virginia
- 17 1. SSO: R. H. Hillenkoetter, Capt., USN.
- 18 2. DCO: J. S. Harper, Capt., USN.
- 19 * DCO deceased.

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20 December 1945

22 Inspections made on U. S. Battleships which were at Pearl
 23 Harbor on 7 Dec 1941. These inspections occurred on 5 or 6 Dec
 24 1941 as designated.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON D. C.

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USS ARIZONA

No log received for Dec 1941.

USS CALIFORNIA

5 Dec 1941

1149 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

6 Dec. 1941

1020 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

Made monthly inspection of all indices of smokeless powder on board; conditions normal.

USS MARYLAND

5 Dec. 1941

0710 Food inspection.

6 Dec 1941

0800 Made daily visual examination of all smokeless powder samples, violet paper, and test for local heating of magazines on board ship; conditions normal.

1330 By order of the Commanding Officer, Lt (jg) Nelson H. Randall, C-V(S) USNR, was suspended from duty for a period of five days from and including this date for improper performance of duty as Communication Watch Officer failing to deliver a despatch to the Commander Battleships Battle Force. The Commanding Officer further ordered that, due to the exigencies of the service

1 Lt (jg) Randall is restored to duty for the duration
2 of the Annual Military Inspection and Damage Control
3 Practice of this vessel on December 8, 1941 and Decem-
4 ber 9, 1941.

5 USS NEVADA

6 5 Dec 1941

7 No inspections.

8 6 Dec 1941

9 0705 Food inspection.

10 0900 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder
11 samples; conditions normal.

12 USS OKLAHOMA

13 No log received for Dec 1941.

14 USS PENNSYLVANIA

15 5 Dec 1941

16 0800 Food inspection.

17 1150 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder
18 samples; conditions normal.

19 6 Dec 1941

20 0833 Landing force left the ship to be inspected by Commander
21 Battleship Division TWO. 1045 Landing force returned.

22 USS PENNSYLVANIA

23 6 Dec 1941

24 1155 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder
25 samples; conditions normal.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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USS TENNESSEE

5 Dec 1941

1010 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

1445 Secured boiler number 8 after having conducted tests on safety valves.

6 Dec 1941

0745 Commenced embarking Landing Force for Annual Military Inspection.

1130 Landing Force returned aboard. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

USS WEST VIRGINIA

No log received for Dec 1941.

- - - -

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

R#16

WASHINGTON

29 January 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. In response to the suggestion in the Record of Proceedings page 7236 that the Navy would make a further check in respect of the logs of certain battleships that were at Pearl Harbor concerning water-tight integrity, it is thought advisable to first refer to the several memoranda previously

1 forwarded counsel on that subject.

2 Three previous memoranda with enclosures on this
3 subject have been forwarded to counsel, two being dated 11
4 December 1945 and one 3 January 1946. The enclosures were
5 dated October, November and December 1941 and 20 December
6 1945.

7 2. One of the 11 December 1945 memoranda forwarded as
8 an enclosure a table showing the schedules of inspections of
9 ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December
10 1941. This memorandum was referred to in the Record of Pro-
11 ceedings at pages 4436-4439 and the enclosure became Exhibit
12 #69 your investigation.

13 The second memorandum dated 11 December 1945 referred
14 to information which had been obtained regarding water-tight
15 integrity of major vessels, including that only one vessel,
16 the U S S CALIFORNIA, might have been saved from sinking
17 if certain manhole covers had not been left open for mainten-
18 ance work. This memorandum was quoted in the Record of Pro-
19 ceedings at pages 7233-7235, and the enclosure at pages 7237-
20 7239.

21 It is noted that the memorandum of Mr. William B.
22 Mitchell to Admiral Colclough dated 11 December 1945 which is
23 quoted in the Record of Proceedings at page 7235, referred to
24 only one of the two Navy Department memoranda to him of that
25 date, and dealt with the question of the names of prospective

15

1 witnesses concerning the "inspection charge". This memorandum
2 of Mr. Mitchell was a response to one of the Navy memoranda
3 of 11 December 1945, quoted in the Record of Proceedings at
4 pages 7234-7235, in which the Navy had previously volunteered
5 to furnish the names of witnesses if such were desired by the
6 committee or counsel, and it did not refer to the other Navy
7 memorandum of 11 December bearing on the "inspection charge".

8 The Navy memorandum of 3 January 1946 referred to
9 the Navy memoranda of 11 December 1945, and enclosed a state-
10 ment of mention in the logs of the major vessels at Pearl
11 Harbor of inspections on 5 and 6 December 1941 and also a
12 list as prospective witnesses of the names of Senior Surviving
13 Officers and Damage Control Officers of the several major
14 ships sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor.

15 A perusal of the Record of Proceedings does not dis-
16 close that the Navy memoranda of 11 December 1945 forwarding
17 the schedule of inspections which became your Exhibit #69, or
18 the Navy memoranda of 3 January 1946, or the list of pros-
19 pective witnesses enclosed therewith in response to the mem-
20 orandum of Mr. Mitchell printed in the Record of Proceedings
21 at page 7235, have been incorporated in the record. Such
22 incorporation may be appropriate in order to make the record
23 complete.

24 3. With respect to the further check to be made by the
25 Navy referred to in the Record of Proceedings at page 7236

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1 witnesses concerning the "inspection charge". This memorandum
2 of Mr. Mitchell was a response to one of the Navy memoranda
3 of 11 December 1945, quoted in the Record of Proceedings at
4 pages 7234-7235, in which the Navy had previously volunteered
5 to furnish the names of witnesses if such were desired by the
6 committee or counsel, and it did not refer to the other Navy
7 memorandum of 11 December bearing on the "inspection charge".

8 The Navy memorandum of 3 January 1946 referred to
9 the Navy memoranda of 11 December 1945, and enclosed a state-
10 ment of mention in the logs of the major vessels at Pearl
11 Harbor of inspections on 5 and 6 December 1941 and also a
12 list as prospective witnesses of the names of Senior Surviving
13 Officers and Damage Control Officers of the several major
14 ships sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor.

15 A perusal of the Record of Proceedings does not dis-
16 close that the Navy memoranda of 11 December 1945 forwarding
17 the schedule of inspections which became your Exhibit #69, or
18 the Navy memoranda of 3 January 1946, or the list of pros-
19 pective witnesses enclosed therewith in response to the mem-
20 orandum of Mr. Mitchell printed in the Record of Proceedings
21 at page 7235, have been incorporated in the record. Such
22 incorporation may be appropriate in order to make the record
23 complete.

24 3. With respect to the further check to be made by the
25 Navy referred to in the Record of Proceedings at page 7236

1 and supplementing the 20 December 1945 enclosure forwarded
2 with the memorandum of 3 January 1946, the logs of the U S S
3 CALIFORNIA, MARYLAND, NEVADA and TENNESSEE have been examined
4 for any record of any inspections, and for any references
5 concerning water-tight integrity precedent to or in prepara-
6 tion for any inspections on 5, 6, and 7 December 1941, with
7 negative results.

8 /s/ John Ford Baecher

9 JOHN FORD BAECHER

10 Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 Mr. Morgan: We have a communication from Commander Baecher
2 dated April 8, 1946, directed to Mr. Richardson, as follows:

3 "WASHINGTON

4 8 April 1946

5 MEMORANDUM

6 To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

7 1. In response to your request for the infor-
8 mation, official notification to the Navy Department of the
9 air raid on Pearl Harbor was received by Radio Washington
10 from Radio Honolulu at 1850 GCT (1350 EST), 7 December 1941,
11 by dispatch as follows:

12 NPM 1516

13 AOF2 1830 OF3 OF4 OF5 0

14 FROM CINCPCAC

15 ACTION CINCLANT CINCAF OPNAV

16 AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NOT DRILL

17 2. At 1930 GCT (1430 EST), 7 December 1941, an
18 ALNAV message was sent by the Secretary of the Navy to all
19 ships and stations reading "Execute WPL-46 against Japan".

20 John Ford Baecher

21 Commander, USNR."
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 We have a further communication from the War Depart-
 2 ment with respect to reels of microfilm received from
 3 General MacArthur's headquarters, and we ask that that
 4 communication, dated 28 February 1946 concerning that matter
 5 be spread on the record.

6 (The communication referred to is as follows:)

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11 WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C
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1941, giving the substance of an article published in the Telegraph and Mail.

5. A memorandum related to the "draft" submitted by Ambassador Nomura to the Secretary of State on 12 May 1941. The draft itself appears at page 420 of Volume 2 of Foreign Relations.

Although none of the above items would appear to be helpful to the Committee, the War Department will of course furnish them if the Committee so requests.

/s/ Harmon Duncombe
HARMON DUNCOMBE
Lt. Colonel, GSC

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Cy 11

1 Mr. Morgan: Pursuant to a request made by Senator
2 Ferguson at page 522 of the record we have the following
3 pertinent portion from a communication received from the
4 Navy Department dated April 5, 1946:

5 "In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record
6 of Proceedings, Page 522), which is referred to in Item 4 of
7 your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there is forwarded herewith
8 a copy of the document containing information of the Japanese
9 plans leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor based on
10 information obtain subsequent to 7 December 1941, that was pre-
11 sented to the Secretary of State, the Honorable James F. Byrnes,
12 during the latter part of October."

13 We request at this point that the entire memorandum be
14 spread on the record.

15 The Vice Chairman: It will be so spread on the record.

16 (The memorandum referred to is as follows:)
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RECONSTRUCTION OF JAPANESE PLANS

LEADING UP TO THE

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR.

(BASED UPON INFORMATION OBTAINED SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DECEMBER 1941)

The following summarization has been prepared on the basis of reliable information obtained from various sources subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although this summary does not represent a resume of Japanese Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1, it will be apparent that heavy reliance has nevertheless been placed upon that document, a translation of which is submitted under separate cover.

The Japanese Naval High Command completed preparations during the summer and fall of 1941 to carry out a projected 2-phase plan of conquest and consolidation in the Asiatic-Pacific theatre. The essence of the plan lay in the element of surprise in a sudden attack which at one fell swoop would cripple the major potential opposition - the American Fleet maintained at Pearl Harbor. Following the crippling of this opposition weapon, coincident with the seizure and occupation of land masses desired for the economic, political, and military reasons that together determined the borders of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Phase 1 of the campaign would be completed, and Phase 2 - the consolidation of these gains by the seizure of neutralization of outer areas, together with the continued attrition of the enemy forces and his lines of

AH 2

1 supply - could be carried out to ensure the permanence of
2 the new Empire.

3 The Japanese fleet, which had been in training over a per-
4 iod of years for combat fleet operations, was in a state of
5 readiness by the summer of 1941. By late August of 1941, there
6 is evidence based on information believed to be reliable,
7 that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet ordered all
8 fleet commanders and their key staff members to Tokyo for war
9 games* preparatory to a final formulation of operation
10 plans. The final games reportedly got underway on 2 Septem-
11 ber 1941, with most of the high ranking officers participating
12 on one of the three teams that were organized: the "N" (Nippon)
13 Team, "A" (America) Team, and "E" (England) Team.

14 During the afternoon of 3 September, 50 copies of an
15 outline of conditions under which the games were to be held
16 were prepared and contained the heart of Operation Order No. 1.
17 These plans must have been under development for several months,
18 as extensive preliminary planning was indicated.

19 On 5 September, it is known that Pearl Harbor plans were
20 under discussion and the Japs apparently expected to catch
21 all major U. S. Fleet units in the Pacific in Pearl Harbor,
22 as well as units which they believed were recently transferred
23 from the Atlantic. "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the
24 units participating in the attack on Hawaii and one AKAGI-class

25 *See Appendix I.

AH 3

1 aircraft carrier and one SORYU-class aircraft carrier were
2 estimated as sunk.

3 On 6 and 7 September, "N" Team debated the best means of
4 assaulting Pearl Harbor. Captain Kurojima (Deputy Chief of
5 Staff) and Rear Admiral Ito (Chief of Staff) differed as to
6 the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on
7 Hawaii. Ito was in favor of an early landing but Kurojima won
8 the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistic problems.

9 These early sessions apparently were confined primarily
10 to two general problems: first, the details for a surprise
11 raid on Pearl Harbor; and second, a schedule for occupying,
12 Malaya, Burma, N.E.I., the Philippines, the Solomons, and
13 Central Pacific Islands, including Hawaii. The conferences
14 and games were ended about 13 September. At the end of
15 September, the Main Body of the Jap Fleet moved to Saeki and
16 four revisions of Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 were
17 made while NAGATO (Flagship) was at Saeki, although no major
18 changes are indicated.

19 The actual operation plan itself - Combined Fleet Top
20 Secret Operation Order No. 1 - has since been recovered and
21 is reproduced in its entirety under separate cover. The ob-
22 jectives of the campaign strategy, the outline and sequence of
23 operations planned, and the organization of the naval forces
24 allotted to each phase of the operations were set forth in
25 the Operation Order, and are analyzed below.

AH 4

OBJECTIVES:

The general aims of the entire campaign were predicated on the desires for military conquest and security, and enhancement of the Empire by the occupation of areas rich in natural resources:

"1. In the east, the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of operation and supply lines to the Orient will be cut.

"2. In the west, British Malaya will be occupied and British lines of operation and supply lines to the Orient, as well as the Burma Road, will be cut.

"3. Enemy forces in the Orient will be destroyed, bases of operations will be seized, and areas with natural resources will be occupied.

"4. Strategic areas will be seized and developed; defenses will be strengthened in order to establish a durable basis for operations.

"5. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated.

"6. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will to fight."

OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS:

For the accomplishment of the objectives stated above, it was contemplated that operations would be carried out in two phases - the First Phase, comprising conquest of the American Fleet and occupation of areas desired, in large part,

AH 5

1 for economic reasons (the Philippines, British Malaya,
2 Netherlands East Indies); the Second Phase, comprising con-
3 solidation of these gains by mopping-up operations, estab-
4 lishment of advance bases for defense of the occupied ter-
5 ritory, and the continued attrition of enemy forces and lines
6 of communication. The conquest or neutralization of areas
7 deemed of strategic importance primarily from the point of
8 view of military security was to occur during the Second
9 Phase, no definite plan being provided initially for the
10 chronology of those operations. Apparently both the precise
11 timing of that portion of the campaign and the determination
12 of which of these strategic areas (listed as Eastern New
13 Guinea, New Britain, Fiji, Samoa, Aleutians and Midway; Anda-
14 man Islands, strategic points in the Australia Area) would be
15 seized and which merely neutralized, were problems to be
16 worked out in detail following the completion of the occupa-
17 tion of the areas desired for their economic value as in-
18 tegral portions of the new Co-Prosperity Sphere, and to be
19 solved "as quickly as operational conditions permit."

20 A. Occupation: "First Phase Operations"

21 Basically, at this initial stage of the war, the Im-
22 perial Navy had four missions to fulfill:
23
24
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AH 6

1 (1) The destruction of the American Fleet in the
2 Hawaiian area.

3 (ii) The maintenance and extension of control over
4 the Central and South Pacific, to deny these waters to
5 any force which might menace the flank of the forces
6 driving southward.

7 (iii) The support of army invasion of the Philippines-
8 N.E.I.-Southeast Asiatic areas and the destruction of
9 Allied naval forces therein.

10 (iv) The protection of the North, both against thrusts
11 by the United States from the Aleutians and also against
12 a possible attack by the U.S.S.R.

13 Aside from the considerably inferior air power and the
14 relatively few scattered surface fleet units possessed by
15 the Allies in the Asiatic-N.E.I. area, the only obstacle of
16 consequence was the American Fleet and air-power based at
17 Hawaii. While Japanese land-based air and surface task groups
18 could suffice to support the amphibious landings in the Phil-
19 ippines-N.E.I.-Asiatic area, a major Japanese task force,
20 built around a carrier striking group, was essential to conduct
21 a surprise attack on the American Fleet. Accordingly, the
22 following general allocation of Japanese forces* was planned
23 for the first Phase operations.

24 (1) For the Pearl Harbor Attack:

25 * See Appendix 2 for allocation of Japanese Task Forces.

AH 7

1 The Striking Force under the Commander in
 2 Chief, 1st Air Fleet, comprising 2 fast battleships, 6
 3 first-line carriers (with a maximum of 400 planes of all
 4 types), 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 16 destroy-
 5 ers plus,

6 The Advance Expeditionary Force under the
 7 Commander in Chief, 6th Fleet, comprising 1 training
 8 cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 20 fleet submarines, and 5
 9 midget submarines.

10 (11) For the Invasion of Wake and Guam (and of
 11 Rabaul if conditions warranted):

12 The South Seas Force under the Commander in
 13 Chief, 4th Fleet, comprising 4 heavy cruisers, 3 light
 14 cruisers, 1 training cruiser, 12 destroyers, 16 sub-
 15 marines.

16 (111) For the Invasion of the Philippines-N.E.I.-
 17 Malaya:

18 The Southern Force under the Commander in Chief,
 19 2nd Fleet, comprising 2 battleships, 2 small aircraft
 20 carriers, 11 heavy cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 52 de-
 21 stroyers, 16 submarines.

22 (1v) For the protection of the High North:

23 The Northern Force, under the Commander in
 24 Chief, 5th Fleet, comprising 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light
 25 cruisers, 2 destroyers

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(v) In Reserve:

The Main Body under the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, comprising 6 battleships, 2 light cruisers, 8 destroyers.

The operations of these forces during the First Phase were to be divided into three periods:

(a) First Period Operations:

Operations from the outbreak of war until the main body of the invasion army had been landed in the Philippines. To end about X plus 20.

(b) Second Period Operations:

Operations after (a) and until the main body of the invasion army had been landed in British Malaya. To end about X plus 40.

(c) Third Period Operations:

Operations after (a) and until the completion of the occupation of the Netherlands East Indies.

(1) Central Pacific Operations:(a) Attack on Pearl HarborAssumptions by the High Command:

It is clear from a study of the operation plans that the Japanese High Command made the following assumptions about the American Fleet:

(a) That the main body of the United States Pacific Fleet would be at anchor within Pearl Harbor, or at least in

AH 9

the Hawaiian area.

(b) That a fast carrier force could be moved from the Empire across the Pacific to the north of Midway, within striking distance of the main islands of the Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by American defensive reconnaissance.

(c) That should assumption (a) or (b) be in error, a reserve group of heavy units could sortie from the Inland Sea to give support to the carrier striking force in a decisive engagement against the American Fleet. The other task forces of the Japanese Fleet - the Southern Area Force, Northern Area Force, South Seas Force - would also be available. Implicit in the plan is the assumption that in the event of such an engagement, the combined strength of the bulk of the Japanese major fleet units could defeat the American Fleet.

(d) That a powerful carrier air strike directed against the American forces based in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were effected, achieve the strategic result of crippling the American Fleet, and the tactical result of destroying the American land-based air to permit the Japanese striking force to withdraw without damage. While the latter assumption does not appear explicitly in the copy of the Japanese Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 recovered in the Philippines, it is logically implicit in the plan, and probably was a feature of the Japanese Operation Order issued by the striking force

AH 10 1 Commander. The seizure of air superiority is part of the
2 classic Japanese naval doctrine.

3 The four assumptions outlined above were well grounded.
4 As espionage network in the Hawaiian Islands, together with
5 uninterdicted cable communications between Hawaii and Japan,
6 undoubtedly aided the Japanese in establishing their basic
7 hypothesis - namely, that the bulk of the American Pacific
8 Fleet would be waiting at anchor at Pearl Harbor at the time
9 of their surprise attack. The feasibility of a surprise
10 attack prior to a declaration of war was, of course, borne
11 out by events.

12 (1) Diplomatic Deception:

13 The operation plan providing for the outbreak
14 of war and the attack on Pearl Harbor was published on 5 No-
15 vember 1941 as Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1,
16 and Y day (8 December, Japanese time) was set in Combined
17 Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 2 on 7 November 1941. At
18 the same time, the Japanese envoy Mr. Kurusu was en route to
19 Washington to join the Japanese Ambassador in conducting con-
20 versations with the American Government. On 7 November -
21 the date that Y day was set - a "leading Japanese and reliable
22 informant" visited the American Ambassador in Japan reportedly
23 at the request of Foreign Minister Togo and urged repeatedly
24 that, whether or not Japanese concessions were deemed in-
25 adequate by the United States, it was "of the highest importance

AH 11 1

2 that the Washington conversations be continued and not per-
3 mitted to break down." These conversations were continued
4 throughout November and until the actual launching of the sur-
5 prise attack. While it is true that Operation Order No. 2,
6 setting Y Day, was not sufficient by itself to effect the launch-
7 of the attack on that day, it was sufficient to despatch the
8 various Japanese task forces to their scheduled pre-invasion
9 rendezvous points (Takan Bay in the Kuriles for the Pearl
10 Harbor Striking Force; Mako in the Pescadores for the main
11 body of the Philippines Force, etc.) and have the Fleet com-
12 plete its basic preparations for an attack on that day. And
13 it seems evident, from a study of such available subsidiary
14 orders as were issued during November 1941 by certain of the
15 task forces involved in the plan, that the supplementary orders
16 that were to cause the task forces to move forward to their
17 attack positions and were to specify pre-cisely the time for
18 the outbreak of war, were to be issued almost as inevitable
19 concomitants of the initial decision embodied in Operation
20 Orders Nos. 1 and 2. While a radical change in the diplomatic
21 situation might have caused the plan to be abandoned, it seems
22 probably that nothing short of complete American acceptance of
23 the Japanese terms in their note of 20 November 1941 would have
24 been regarded as sufficient to cancel the plans already set in
25 motion. In any event, the continuation of diplomatic nego-
26 tiations by the Japanese after their task forces were already

AH 12 1 en route to their final goals must be deemed nothing short
2 of deception.

3 (11) Radio Silence:

4 The Striking Force, as it moved north to the
5 sortie point in the Kurles, and thence, to the eastern Pacific,
6 was operating under strict injunctions to main radio silence
7 to help assure the secrecy of its movement and mission.

8 (111) Radio Deception:

9 The 1st Combined Communications Unit was di-
10 rected to maintain deceptive traffic to simulate the presence
11 of the main strength of the Japanese Fleet in the Inland Sea.
12 At the same time, the early December movements of the Japanese
13 units en route to the south were not conducted under complete
14 radio silence - possibly because the element of surprise for that
15 part of the campaign could not be preserved by silence since
16 Allied visual observations could be made of those movements
17 and possibly because of the belief that the ability of Allied
18 intelligence to trace the southward movements of the Southern
19 Force, and only those movements, would further bolster the
20 effectiveness of the strategic surprise desired for the opera-
21 tions of the Striking Force.

22 Composition of the Forces Attacking Pearl Harbor:

23 Striking Force

24 Commanding Officer: Commander in Chief, 1st Air Fleet -
25 Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo.

AH 13

Battleship Division #3 (1st section) (HIEI, KIRISHIMA)

2 battleships

Carrier Division #1 (KAGA, KAGI)

Carrier Division #2 (HIRYU, SORYU)

Carrier Division #5 (SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU)

6 aircraft carriers

Cruiser Division #8 (TONE, CHIKUMA)

2 heavy cruisers

Destroyer Squadron #1 (ABUKUMA, 4 destroyer divisions)

1 light cruiser

16 destroyers

Plus 11 train vessels

Advance Expeditionary FleetCommanding Officer: Commander in Chief, 6th Fleet,

Vice Admiral Mitsumi Shimizu.

(ISUZU, YURA)

2 light cruisers

(KATORI)

1 training cruiser

I-class submarines (including Submarine Squadrons #1,

#2, #3: (I-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 20,

22-24, 68, 69, 74) 20 submarines

Midget submarines

5 midget submarines

Plus 6 train vessels.

Execution of the Operation

The Striking Force assembled at Takan Bay in Etorofu

Island (Kure) on 11 May 1942, and on 12 May 1942

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AH 14

1 the attack on or about 27 November, following a course to the
2 eastward and then southward, as indicated on the captured track
3 chart appended (see Appendix 3). Of the 11 train vessels al-
4 lotted in the Operation Plan, reliable information suggests that
5 only 3 tankers and 1 supply ship actually accompanied the Force.
6 Apparently also, 3 submarines of the Advance Expeditionary Force
7 (submarine fleet) accompanied the Striking Force - the other
8 submarines having proceeded from the Inland Sea independently
9 the Striking Force. During the fast voyage to their destina-
10 tion 200 miles due north of Oahu, the vessels of the carrier
11 force were kept fueled successfully, albeit with considerable
12 difficulty in many cases. Upon arrival at their destination,
13 about 200 miles due north of Oahu, the carriers launched
14 their aircraft, which rendezvoused further south and then
15 flew in for a coordinated attack. Three waves of these
16 carrier aircraft were employed, commencing at 0747 and
17 ending at 0936, local time; the first attack was on various
18 airfields, followed by attacks on the warships in Pearl Harbor.
19 Following the successful completion of these surprise attacks,
20 the carrier force withdrew to the Empire, taking a circuitous
21 route to Hashirajima and arriving on 23 December. En route,
22 Carrier Division #2 (HIRYU, SORYU) and Cruiser Division #8
23 (TONE, CHIKUMA) were detached as a small reinforcement group
24 for the Wake Island operation. Losses sustained by the
25 Striking Force during the Hawaiian operation reportedly

AH 15

1 totalled 29 aircraft.

2 Until the completion of the surprise attack on Hawaii
3 by the Striking Force, the "Advance Expeditionary Force" of
4 submarines was under the command of the Striking Force Com-
5 mander. The precise movements of the participating submarines
6 prior to the actual attack are not clear, although some in-
7 formation suggests that the bulk of those units left the
8 Empire in late November. So far as is known, the functions
9 allotted the submarines in Operation Order No. 1 were carried
10 out as planned, viz:

11 (a) Until X-3, submarines were to reconnoiter important
12 points in the Aleutians, Samoa, Fiji, and Tutuila, and were
13 to observe and report on any powerful American forces dis-
14 covered.

15 (b) One element was to patrol along the route of the
16 Striking Force in advance of the movement of that Force - en-
17 sure the undetected approach of the carrier group to its
18 destination.

19 (c) Until X-5, the remaining submarines were to sur-
20 round Hawaii at extreme range while one element approached and
21 reconnoitered without being observed.

22 (d) On X day, the function of the submarines would be
23 to "observe and attack the American Fleet in the Hawaii Area;
24 make a surprise attack on the channel leading into Pearl Harbor

AH 16

1 and attempt to close it; if the enemy moves out to fight he
2 will be pursued and attacked."

3 Prior to the attack on X Day, the force of I-class sub-
4 marines took up scouting positions in several allotted patrol
5 sectors covering the waters in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor,
6 while the 5 midget submarines were launched as a Special At-
7 tack Force to conduct an offensive attack against American
8 warships within the Harbor and to prevent the escape of the
9 fleet through the Harbor entrances during the scheduled serial,
10 strike. Available data indicates that only two of the five one
11 subs penetrated into the Harbor; none of the five inflicted
12 any damage on American units, and none of the five rejoined
13 the Japanese Fleet. American naval units accounted for 3,
14 possibly 4, of the total, and the 5th beached itself at Oahu.

15 During and after the attack, submarines outside of the
16 Harbor area remained on patrol to oppose any possible sortie
17 of American warships. The following is a translation of an
18 extract from the "Report of the I-69's Operations off Pearl
19 Harbor, 8-10 December 1941" (Tokyo time), written by the
20 Commanding Officer of the I-69 (flagship of Submarine Di-
21 vision 12) and presents a picture of the operation as exper-
22 ienced by one of the Japanese units on patrol:

23 "During daylight on December 8 (December 7 Honolulu
24 time), the I-69 was cruising submerged, engaged in surveill-
25 ance in Scouting Sector D (about 17 miles southwest of Pearl

AH 17 1 Harbor). Immediately after the attack upon the enemy by the
2 Striking Force and the Special Attack Force, we were able
3 to hear easily, by means of submarine sound detectors, ex-
4 plosions of bombs and torpedoes, and upon hearing the south
5 of depth charges, I judged that the Special Attack Force
6 was engaged in heavy fighting.

7 "At 1400 radio orders from the Commander of Submarine
8 Forces were received, assigning the I-69 to a surveillance in
9 the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area (a circle with
10 a radius of 8.5 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the
11 center). The orders further specified the annihilation of
12 the remaining enemy forces.

13 "After sunset we surfaced, in an attempt to assist as much
14 as possible, but during the night we sighted five destroyers.
15 While submerging, we received a close-range depth-charge
16 attack. . . At 0015 on the 9th (Tokyo time) we surfaced, making
17 certain that no enemy patrol boats were within close range. On
18 a course obliquely to the west, and at battle speed, we hur-
19 riedly recharged batteries.

20 "We sighted 2 patrol vessels on our port quarter and
21 beam respectively, each about 5 kilometers away, and in about
22 30 minutes we reversed course. Pearl Harbor shone red in the
23 sky, like a thing afire. It was already dawn."

24 In the post-attack phase, the I-class submarines main-
25 tained their positions for some time, and at least one of the

AH 18

1 group - the I-7 - launched its aircraft to conduct a reconnai-
2 ssance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain the status of the American
3 fleet and installations. The operation plan had provided, in
4 the event of the virtual destruction of the American Fleet at
5 Pearl, that one Submarine Division or less would be placed be-
6 tween Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic and in
7 fact at least one submarine - the I-17 - was despatched for
8 the Oregon coast about 14 December.

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APPENDIX 1.

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UMPIRES

3

Naval General StaffRankOfficial Duties

4

NAGANO, Osami

Admiral

5

FUKUTOME, Shigeru

Rear Admiral

Head of First Section (War
Planes and Operations).

6

7

UOZUMI, Jisaku

Captain

Member First Section.

8

YAMAMOTO, Chikao

Captain

Head of Sub-Section, First
Section.

9

10

MAYUZUMI, Harue

Commander

Member Sub-Section, First
Section.

11

12

TAMURA, Saburo

Commander

Member Sub-Section, First
Section.

13

14

SANAGI, Tsuyoshi

Commander

Member Sub-Section, First
Section.

15

16

UOZUMI, Yorichi

Commander

Member Sub-Section, First
Section.

17

18

Navy Ministry

19

TAKATA, Toshitane

Captain

Member of Military Affairs
Bureau.

20

21

SHIKI, Tsuneco

Commander

Member of Military Affairs
Bureau

22

23

TOIBATA, Kurie

Commander

Member of Office of
Military Supply.

24

25

AH 19

1

FUJII, Shigeru

Commander

Private Secretary to
Navy Minister (Admiral
SHIMADA, Shigetaro).

2

3

4

N-TEAM

5

Combined Fleet

6

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku

Admiral

CinC Combined Fleet

7

ITO, Swichi

Rear Admiral

Chief of Staff.

8

KUROJIMA, Kameto

Captain

Deputy Chief of Staff.

9

GOTO, Shigeru

Commander

Staff Adjutant.

10

ISOBE, Taro

Commander

Staff Engineering Officer.

11

SUGI, Toma

Commander

Staff Gunner Officer.

12

SASAKI, Akira

Commander

Staff Air Officer.

13

WADA, Yushiro

Commander

Staff Communication Officer.

14

NAGATA, Shigeru

Commander

Staff Navigation Officer.

15

WATANABE, Yasuji

Commander

Staff Operations and Plans
Officer.

16

17

ARIMA, Takayasu

Commander

Staff Torpedo Officer.

18

SEIMI, Ichiyoshi

Commander

Staff Supply Officer.

19

OTA, Kanai

Commander

Meteorologist Attached
to Staff.

20

21

1st Combined Communications Unit (Radio Intelligence)

22

KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro

Rear Admiral

Commander.

23

ARISAWA, Naosada

Commander

Deputy Chief of Staff.

24

E-TEAM

25

Second Fleet

AH 20	1	KONDO, Nobutake	Admiral	Commander.
	2	YANAGIZAWA, Kuranosuke	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff.
	3	OISHI, Tamotsu	Commander	Staff Navigation Officer.
	4	<u>Fourth Fleet</u>		
	5	INOUE, Semi	Vice Admiral	Commander.
	6	<u>Fifth Fleet</u>		
	7	HOSOGAYA, Boshiro	Vice Admiral	Commander
	8	<u>Eleventh Air Fleet</u>		
	9	TSUKAHARA, Nishizo	Vice Admiral	Commander
	10	KUSAKA, Jinichi	Rear Admiral	Chief of Staff.
	11	<u>A-TEAM</u>		
	12	<u>Third Fleet (Amphibious Forces for Southern Invasions)</u>		
	13	TAKAHASHI, Ibo	Vice Admiral	Commander.
	14	ISHIHARA, Majime	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff.
	15	<u>Sixth Fleet</u>		
	16	SHIMIZU, Mitsumi	Vice Admiral	Commander.
	17	KANOAKA, Tomojiro	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff.
	18	<u>First Air Fleet (Carrier Fleet)</u>		
	19	NAGUMO, Chuichi	Vice Admiral	Commander.
	20	KUSAKA, Ryunosuke	Rear Admiral	Chief of Staff.
	21	GENDA, Minoru	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff.
	22			
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APPENDIX 2

OPERATIONAL TASK FORCES

MAIN BODY (Commander in Chief Combined Fleet) (Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto)
 (3 Battleships, 2 Light Cruisers, 8 Destroyers)
 Battleship Division #1 (2 Battleships) (MUTSU, MICHIO) (Note: MICHIO is likely a typo for MICHIO or similar)
 Battleship Division #2 (4 Battleships) (ISE, HYUGA, FUJIO, YAMASHIRO)
 Cruiser Division #9 (2 Light Cruisers) (KIRAGAMI, CI)
 8 Destroyers (Names uncertain)

STRIKING FORCE (Commander in Chief 1st Air Fleet) (Vice adm. Chuichi Nagumo)
 (4 Battleships, 6 Aircraft carriers, 2 Heavy Cruisers,
 1 Light Cruiser, 16 Destroyers)
 Battleship Division #3 (1st Section) (2 Battleships) (HARU, HIRISHIMA)
 Carrier Division #1 (2 Aircraft carriers) (KAGA, MAGI)
 Carrier Division #2 (2 Aircraft carriers) (HIRYO, SORYU)
 Carrier Division #5 (2 Aircraft carriers) (SHOKAKU, SUIKAKU)
 Cruiser Division #8 (2 Heavy Cruisers) (TONA, SUIKAN)
 Destroyer Squadron #1 (1 Light Cruiser, 16 Destroyers) (ABUKUMI,
 Destroyer names uncertain)

SOUTHERN FORCE (Commander in Chief Second Fleet) (Vice adm. Nobutake Kondo)
 (2 Battleships, 2 Small aircraft carriers, 12 Heavy Cruisers,
 7 Light Cruisers, 52 Destroyers, 16 Submarines)
 Battleship Division #3 (2nd Section) (2 Battleships) (KONGO, HARUNA)
 Carrier Division #4 (1st Section) (2 Small Aircraft carriers)
 (Probably SHOKU and RYUJO)
 Cruiser Division #4 (4 Heavy Cruisers) (ATAGO, TAKAO, MAYA, CHOKAI)
 Cruiser Division #5 (3 Heavy Cruisers) (HAGURO, MYOKO, NACHI)
 Cruiser Division #7 (4 Heavy Cruisers) (MOGAMI, MIKUMA, KUMANO, SUZUYA)
 Cruiser Division #10 (1 Heavy Cruiser, 3 Light Cruisers) (ASHIGARA,
 KULU, KINU, NAGARA)
 Destroyer Squadron #2 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (JINTSU,
 Destroyer names uncertain)
 Destroyer Squadron #3 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (SENDAI,
 Destroyer names uncertain)
 Destroyer Squadron #4 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (NAKA,
 Destroyer names uncertain)
 Destroyer Squadron #5 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (NATORI,
 Destroyer names uncertain)
 About 16 Submarines (Names uncertain)

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APPENDIX 2

JAPANESE TASK FORCES (continued)

SOUTH SEAS FORCE (Commander in Chief 4th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inoue)

(4 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 12 Destroyers, 16 Submarines)
KASHIMA (Light Cruiser)
Cruiser Division #6 (4 heavy Cruisers) (AOBA, FURUTAKA, KINUGASA, KAKO)
Cruiser Division #18 (2 Light Cruisers) (TENRYU, TATSUTA)
Destroyer Squadron #6 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (YUBARI, Destroyer names uncertain)
About 16 Submarines (Names uncertain)

NORTHERN FORCE (Commander in Chief 5th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Boshiro Hosokaya)

(2 Light Cruisers, 2 Destroyers)
Cruiser Division #21 (2 Light Cruisers) (TAMA, KISO)
2 Destroyers

ADVANCE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (Commander in Chief 6th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Mitsumi Shimizu)

3 Light Cruisers (KATORI, IZUZU, YURA)
about 26 Submarines

ATTACHED FORCES (Training)

Carrier Division #4 (2nd Section) (2 Small Aircraft carriers) (Probably HOSHO and ZUIHO)
Miscellaneous Vessels.

Cy 12
WLC

1 Mr. Morgan: Consistent with a request made by Senator
 2 Ferguson for information regarding reports of Japanese air
 3 reconnaissance over the Philippines or other U.S. possessions
 4 in the Pacific prior to December 7, 1941, we have from the
 5 Navy Department a communication dated 8 February 1946
 6 concerning this matter and transmitting enclosures. We
 7 would request that the letter of transmittal and the enclosures
 8 be spread on the record at this point.

9 The Vice Chairman: They will be spread on the record
 10 at this point.

11 (The letter of transmittal and enclosures are as follows:)

12
 13
 14
 15 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 16 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
 17 WASHINGTON

18 1083A
 R#119

8 February 1946.

19 MEMORANDUM

20 To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

21 1. In response to Senator Ferguson's request for in-
 22 formation regarding reports of Japanese air reconnaissance
 23 over the Philippines or other U.S. Possessions in the Pacific
 24 prior to December 7, 1941, the following references are given:

25 a. " . . . Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunago Retired, in

1 interview published in Hochi States Japanese should face
 2 future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy repel
 3 air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers
 4 encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over
 5 Guam total sixteen times this year without sighting single
 6 American plane x American air power Far East negligible x
 7 prior retirement Matsunaga served twelve years as aviator
 8 Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Director
 9 Japan airways." (Narrative Statement, page 239; NCI
 10 exhibit 12).

11 b. Dispatch from Marine detachment, Wake Island to
 12 ComFOURTEEN, dated 25 November 1941, stating that on 24
 13 November 2115 hours the Pan-American clipper sighted four
 14 Japanese sea planes about 1000 miles east of Guam, flying
 15 south at an altitude of 10,000 feet. (Narrative statement,
 16 page 392; Hewitt exhibit 27, page 127).

17 c. Dispatch from GovGuam, 240610, dated November 24,
 18 1941. Copy attached.

19 d. Extract from the interrogation of Captain
 20 Takahashi. Copy attached.

21 2. It is possible that support was given to the
 22 belief that Japanese air reconnaissance was being made
 23 throughout the Pacific (over all Allied Island possessions)
 24 by a report of such reconnaissance over the Gilberts, given
 25 in a dispatch originated by the naval attaché at Singapore

1 on 22 November, paraphrase of which is made in the Hewitt
2 exhibit 27, page 14T. Copy of dispatch #220228 is attached.

3 /s/ John Ford Baecher

4 Lt. Comdr. U S N R

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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ALUSNA SINGAPORE

OPNAV

RRR

23 NOVEMBER 1941

221814

CINCPAC

CANNING/REEGAN

CINCAF

RRRR

J ALLEN

22#228CR#124

DEPENDABLE REPORTS WERE OF RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER GILBERT ISLANDS ON NOVEMBER 15 BY MONOPLANE WITH TAPERED WINGS, SINGLE TAILFIN, TWIN ENGINES. NEXT DAY REPEATED BY MONOPLANE FLYING BOAT SILVER COLOR NUMBER OF ENGINES UNOBSERVED.

DISTRIBUTION:

1.....ACTION

2#OP FILE.

18/11.....12.....13.....FILE 16R

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