

EXHIBIT No. 3009

(15)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Minoru GENDA

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Minoru GENDA and I formerly was a captain in the Japanese Navy. I was appointed Staff Officer of the First Air Squadron on 1 November 1940. On 15 November 1940 I was promoted to the rank of commander. On 1 April 1941 I became Staff Officer of the First Air Fleet and remained at that position until the latter part of June 1942.
2. Early in February 1941 when the Flagship KAGA was anchored in Ariake Bay (Kyushu), I received a letter from the Chief of Staff of the 11th Air Fleet, Rear Admiral ONISHI, with whom I was personally well acquainted. In this letter he asked me to come to Kanoya at once as he wanted to see me on important business. So I proceeded to Kanoya on the following day and called on him at the Fleet Headquarters.

He then showed me a private letter which he had received from Vice Admiral YAMAMOTO, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. I do not know where this letter is at the present time but in substance it was as follows:

"In the event of outbreak of war with the United States, there would be little prospect of our operations succeeding unless, at the very outset, we can deal a crushing blow to the main force of the American Fleet in Hawaiian waters by using the full strength of the First and Second Air Squadrons and thus to preclude the possibility of the American Fleet advancing in offensive operations in the Western Pacific for some time. And it is my desire that I be given command of this air attack force so that I may carry out the operation myself. Please make a study of this operation."

Rear Admiral ONISHI then said to me: "Please make this study in utmost secrecy, with special attention to the feasibility of the operation, method of execution and the forces to be used."

I commenced this study upon returning to my ship and after a week or ten days I again called on Rear Admiral ONISHI and handed him my answer. I criticized the plan from several aspects and concluded that the attack, while extremely difficult, was not impossible. With some slight reference to my answer, Rear Admiral ONISHI prepared his views on the matter and sent them to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet.

3. At the time of the organization of the First Air Fleet in April of 1941, the only officers in the Headquarters of the said fleet who were aware of YAMAMOTO's idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor were Commander in Chief Vice Admiral NAGUMO, Chief of Staff Rear Admiral KUSAKA, Senior Staff Officer Captain OISHI and myself. From that time until the early part of September we did not undertake to draw up any concrete plan with reference to this operation.

Early in September Rear Admiral KUSAKA, Chief of Staff, summoned the Staff and ordered us to study and draft a plan for this attack and I was named Secretary for this purpose. After working for about a week aboard the AKAGI I completed a preliminary plan. While this preliminary plan was in the main similar to the Operation Plan that was actually executed, it differed from the latter in the following respects:

- A. The point of rendezvous prior to departure for the attack was fixed at Atsugishi Bay or Mutsukai Bay.
- B. There was no connection with the advance force (submarines).
- C. There was nothing concrete as to time.
- D. The air-raid plan was not worked out in detail.

4. Around the 12th or 13th of September the chart maneuvers of the Combined Fleet were held at the Naval Staff College. The maneuvers relating to the Hawaiian Operations which were carried

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out separately from the general maneuvers were, for the most part, based on the above preliminary plan, the one difference being that it made use of Hitokappu Bay as the rendezvous point.

I believe it was on the 1st of October 1941 that Vice Admiral NAGUMO summoned the Headquarters personnel of the various air squadrons and commanders, chief flying officers and squadron leaders of all the carriers to his flag ship and issued the instruction that since this fleet would receive the assignment to attack Hawaii, in the event of war, the training and study of the Fleet thenceforth should be carried out with emphasis on that point.

The last chart maneuver of the Combined Fleet was held aboard the NAGATO in the western part of the Inland Sea early in October and was carried out on the basis of the three-carrier plan.

5. At the Task Force Headquarters, the Senior Staff Officer drafted the Hawaii Operation Plan (Secret Task Force Order No. 1) toward the end of October and then took it to the Combined Fleet Headquarters for approval. On the second of November the whole of the Task Force (with the exception of the fighter plane force and the Second Submarine Squadron) rendezvoused in Ariake Bay. All unit commanders and above, together with flying officers, were summoned aboard the Flag Ship AKAGI where they were told of the duties that would be assigned to our Task Force in the event of war and that, by way of preliminary training, maneuvers would be carried out with Saeki and Sukumo as targets, and the plan for these maneuvers was explained.
6. I do not have a clear recollection as to when we received the Combined Fleet General Order Number 1 but I believe it was just after we had completed the above maneuvers. The Task Force Order Number 1 was immediately printed and a part was distributed on 17 November prior to departure from Saeki Bay to the advance force (submarines) and other necessary quarters with the date of issue of the order left in blank. The balance were distributed with the date of issue filled in and distributed upon arrival at Hitokappu Bay.

I believe that the part of the Combined Fleet General Order No. 1 pertaining to the Task Force (whether that part had been cut out from the General Order or printed as a separate pamphlet I do not recall) was as follows:

"The Task Force, keeping its movements in utmost secrecy and in accordance with a special order, shall advance into the Hawaii area; and immediately upon commencement of war it shall attack the main force of the American Fleet in the Hawaii area and deal it a mortal blow.

"Air attack is scheduled for dawn of X day (exact date to be given by a later order.)

"Upon completion of the air attack, the Task Force is to return to Japan.

"Should the negotiations with America prove successful, the Task Force is to return at once."

Although the Task Force Order No. 1 was probably the same, in the main, as the exhibit submitted in evidence by the Prosecution, I recall that communication and supply plans were attached to it.

The ships of the Task Force, upon completion of preparations, came to Saeki Bay one by one; and by the 16th all had rendezvoused there with the exception of the KAGA.

On the 17th, the ships left Saeki at intervals in scattered groups and rendezvoused at Hitokappu Bay on the 22nd. The KAGA arrived there somewhat later. The Task Force Order No. 3, which was the plan of air attack, was completed at this time and distributed to all the ships together with Order No. 1 on 24th November. This Order Number 3, I believe, was much the same as that submitted by the Prosecution.

In addition to the above orders, there was issued to the various units an order in the form of verbal instructions from the Chief of Staff pertaining to the measures to be taken under various conditions. Most of this order I drafted myself. Its principal points were the following:

- A. If, while proceeding eastward from Hitokappu Bay, the Task Force should encounter American warships, merchantmen or airplanes or neutral merchantmen, it should change direction sharply as soon as discovery is made by the patrol vessel; but advance toward the objective should

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be continued while maintaining greatest secrecy as to position. If the whole of the Task Force is discovered, turn back as though nothing had happened; but if such discovery is made on X-1 day or later, resolutely carry out the attack.

B. If all the attendant conditions dictate an assault, despatch the combat planes of the second attack corps at the same time as those of the first attack corps.

Torpedo and bomb attacks are to be carried out while the 81 combat planes maintain control of the air.

All unit commanders and flying officers of the Task Force were summoned aboard the AKAGI on 24th November for final explanation of the operation plans and consultations, and the start for the attack was made from Hitokappu Bay on the 26th.

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On this 1st day of July, 1947  
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: GENDA, Minoru (seal)

I, GENDA, Minoru hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole turth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

GENDA, Minoru