

D. D. 1500-I-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
27 May 1940.

Secret

27 MAY 1940.

DEAR JO: Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph. First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against, and to tell you, that here in the Department we are up against the same thing.

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action. We believe both the Germans and Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

Your natural question may follow - well, how about Italy and the war? I can state that we have had Italy going into the war on 24 hours notice on several different occasions during the last two weeks from sources of information which looked authentic. Others have stated that it would occur within the next ten days. I have stated personally that cold logic would dictate her not going in for some time. It is anybody's guess. It may be decided by the time this reaches you. Events are moving fast in Northern France.

The above in itself shows you how indefinite the situation is.

Along the same line as the first question presented you would naturally ask - suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer is that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thoughts contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have kept very secret here.

(2) The above I think will answer the question "why you are there". It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question, and also - like you - I have been unable to get the answer.

I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I may say that so far as the Department is concerned you are at liberty to play with the gunnery schedule

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in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices for the time being and substituting others which you may consider important and which you have the means at hand to accomplish. Specifically if you want to cut short range battle practice and proceed with long range practices or division practices or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc., etc., which you think will be to the advantage of the Fleet in its present uncertain status - go ahead. Just keep us informed.

We have told you what we are doing about ammunition; we will attempt to meet any changes you may desire.

We have given you a free hand in recommending ships to come back to the Coast for docking, etc.

You ask whether you are there as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? Answer: obviously it might become so under certain conditions but a definite answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.

I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did return it might nullify the principle reasons for your being in Hawaii. This very question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores, etc., and this should help in any case.

As to the freezing of personnel: - Nimitz has put the personnel problem before you. I will touch on it only to the extent that I have been moving Heaven and Earth to get our figure boosted to 170,000 enlisted men (or even possibly 172,300) and 34,000 marines. If we get these authorized I believe you will be comfortable as regards numbers of men for this coming year. I know the convulsion the Fleet had to go through to commission the 64 destroyers and some other ships recently. I am thankful that convulsion is over. I hope the succeeding one may be as light as possible and you may rest assured that Navigation will do everything it can to lessen this unavoidable burden on the Forces Afloat.

I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental results regardless of anything else, such as -

- (a) Solving the logistic problems involved, including not only supplies from the U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.
- (b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.
- (3) (c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable.
- (d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy.
- (e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.
- (f) Security of the Fleet at anchor.
- (g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably more than just Oahu.

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You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating base but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up against.

As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, service, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet;*

I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval Academy in the West Indies, - I remember the last port I was in after a 22 month stay and where we didn't move for 6 months; and there was not even one white person in the place. The great antidote I know is WORK and homemade recreation such as sailing, fishing, athletics, smokers, etc. You can also move Task Forces around a good deal for seagoing and diversion; just so you be ready for concentrations should such become necessary. We will solve the oil situation for you for all the cruising you feel necessary.

In my letter of May 22nd I mentioned the possibility of moving some units of the Fleet to the Atlantic. This might be a small movement, or it might grow to a modified Rainbow No. 1, - modified as to assumptions and as to the distribution of the forces. In other words, a situation that we might be confronted with would be one in which the Italian and German Fleets would not be free to act, but might be free to send a cruiser or so to the South Atlantic. In such a case there would be no need to send very extensive forces to the Atlantic, and the continuance of the Fleet in the Pacific would maintain its stabilizing influence.

Units that might be called to the Atlantic, under such a modified Rainbow situation, to provide for conditions that now appear possible, would be a division of cruisers, a carrier, a squadron of destroyers, possibly a light mine layer division possibly Patrol Wing One, and possibly, but more unlikely, a division of submarines with a tender.

If you desire to have task groups visit the Aleutians, and the islands in the mid-Pacific and south Pacific somewhat distant (4) from Hawaii, the possibility of such a call being made, - for the detachment of such a force to the Atlantic - should be borne in mind.

Also, it should be borne in mind, in connection with any movements of Navy units to the southward that a situation might arise which would call for visits to French or British possessions in these areas. We will strive to keep you informed on these points as the situation changes or develops.

I believe we have taken care of your auxiliary air fields by granting authority for leases and I may add that we are asking for authority to do something permanent in this connection in bills which we now have pending before the Congress and which should be acted upon within the next two weeks.

Fleet Training has recently sent you a letter with regard to targets and target practice facilities in general. We will do everything we can to assist you in this situation and I trust that something permanent will come out of it so

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that in future situations of this kind the 14th District will be much better off.

Regarding the carrier situation, we are prepared to go along with you on whatever you decide is best after you complete your survey.

Regarding splitting the Hawaiian Detachment back into its normal type commands: - We will naturally leave this matter entirely in your hands. If a part of the Fleet is brought to the Atlantic Coast, or if the main part of the Fleet is recalled to the West Coast, it may well, in any case, be necessary to formulate a task force for retention in Hawaii different from the composition of the present Hawaiian Detachment.

This letter is rather rambling and practically thinking out loud as I have read yours. Incidentally it should be read in connection with my letter to you of 22 May wherein was outlined the possibilities of having to send some ships to the Atlantic; and which you had not received when you wrote.

I would be glad if you would show Admiral Bloch this and also my last letter - as I want to keep him informed.

Rest assured that just as soon as I can give you anything more specific I will. Meanwhile keep cheerful and with every good wish as ever

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "PENNSYLVANIA," Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

P. S. The European situation is extremely critical. Italy may act by 5 June which seems to be another deadline drawn on information which once again looks authentic. However, it still is a guess.

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No. 1

デーラー、一五〇〇アイー
「エフケ、アー、スターク」提督ヨリ「エー、オー、ウ、ター」
トソレン、ハ、一九四〇年五月二十七日附書翰

秘

一九四〇年五月二十七日

敬愛スル「ゲョー」レハ、二十日附、貴翰、只今入手
シク、貴翰ノ各項、毎ニオ答ヘスル、故致シタト思フ。
ダガ、オ、ニ、貴下ノ、当面シテ、キル、困難ハ、篤ト承知
シテ、キル、コトヲ、申上ゲ、本省、デモ、我々ハ、同じ問題
ニ、ブツカン、テ、頭ヲ、悩マシテ、キル、事、奥ヲ、貴下ニ、即
伝ヘシタイ。

何故、貴下ハ、「ハワイ」地区ニ在ルヤ

答、其レハ、貴下ガ、其處ニ居ル事ニ依リ、日本軍
ノ、東印度進駐ヲ、食ヒ止メル結果ニナルト、思惟
サレルガ、故ナリ。以前、手紙ニ於テ、私ハ、此レヲ
伊太利ノ、参戦ト、関サセテ、見タノ、デアル。其、関
係ハ、伊太利ノ、参戦ト、共ニソレガ、日本軍ガ、独自ノ
行動ヲ、執ルノニ、自由ナ、氣持ニナルカラ、ラウト、思ハ
レテ、キル、ト、イフ事、デアル。我々ハ、独伊、両國ガ、彼等
ノ、関スル、限リ、日本ハ、蘭領、東印度ニ、於テ、活躍、自
在、デアルト、日本ニ、管、カ、タ、モ、ト、信スル。
スルト、然、貴下ハ、次ノ、貴向ヲ、究スル、カ、モ、知、シ、キ
ー、ソレ、ナラバ、伊太利ト、戦争ニ、就テハ、如何ト。

私ハ信スベキ筋ノ傳ヘル所ヨリ過去二週間ニ種々ノ機
 會ニ於テ、伊太利ガ二十四時商ノ豫告ヲ以テ參戰スル
 トイフ事ヲ我々ハ承知セル旨ヲ云ヒ得ル。来ルベキ十日
 以内ニ、伊太利ノ參戰ガアルナラント述ベク者モ他ニアル。
 私自身トシテハ、冷徹ナル論理ガ伊太利ヲシテ茲ニ
 分參戰セシメ又様ニスルダラト述ベク。其レが一級ノ
 觀測ナリデアリ。此ノ手紙ガ貴下ノ手元ニ届ク頃
 マデニハトケラカニ決定シテアルカモ知レナイ。南佛ニ在
 リテハ、事態ガ急速ニ推移シツツアル。

上ニ述ベク事カラ、貴下ハ自ラ現情勢ノ如何ニ足
 メキモノナルカヲ察知し得ヨク。提起サレドモ一、莫
 向ニ關聯シテ、貴下ハ当然カウ訊ネルデアラウ。

若シ日本軍ガ東印度ヘノ進駐ヲ敢テスルトシタラ
 如何、其ノ場合ノ我々ノ執ルベキ策如何ト。私
 ノ答ハ次ノ如クデアリ。私ハ知ラヌシ、又神ノ造リ
 結フタ縁ノ地球上ノ何人トモ之ヲ貴下ニ云ヒ
 得ル者ハホナイと思フ。ホワイト・ハラス。及ビ國務
 省ニ於ケル此レニ關シテノ私自身ノ意見ガ貴下
 ノ最近ノ書^論中ニ述ベラレテアル。意向ト趣旨
 ヲ同ジリスルモノデアルト云フ事ハ承知シテアル。

私ハ一言指摘シクイト思フ。ソレハ日本軍
 ガ萬一蘭領東印度ヘノ進攻ヲ決定スルニ至ル
 トモ合衆國ハ何等斷乎タル行動ニ出デナイト云フ
 ノカ假ニ何方ノ決定デアルトシテモ、之ハ何人ニモ憑ラ
 スベキコトデアイソナテ事ヲスレバ貴下ガハワイ地区ニ居

ルコトノ理由ヲ全ク意味ナキモノニシテ了ラカラテアル
 日本軍ハ終々如何ナル行動ニ出ルカラ知ラヌ
 又知ラヌ以上ハ躊躇シ思ヒ止マルカモ知レナイ、ソノ
 事ヲ一寸思ヒ浮バラレタイ。コソ云フ考ハ私ハ此所
 ニ於テハ極ク内密ニシテキテ可ル

(2) 上述セル所が何故貴下が其處ニ在ルヤノ實
 向ニ答ヘルモノト思フ其レハ貴下が恐レクドノ
 位 留マシカニ聞スル實向ニハ答ヘテ居ナシ
 此ノ情報ハ之ヲ得次第直クニ貴下ニ必ズオ億
 ハスル何人モ今ノ所ソレニ答ヘル事ハ出来ナイノガ
 貴下同様私モ同ジ聞ヲ免シタノダが貴下同様
 自分モ答ヲ得ル事が出来ズニ可ルノガ

私ハ切り詰メラレタ砲撃手ノ演習ノ計畫
 ノ中ニサヘモ貴下が何ヲ慥ニテ可ルカラヨク承知
 シテ可ル。私ハ本省ニ関スル限り、貴下が此分
 或ル演習ヲ省略シ貴下が重要ナリト思惟
 シソレヲ成就スベキ手段ヲミテテ可ル他
 ノ演習ト代ヘテ、貴下が適当ト見ル如何ナル方
 法ニ於テモ砲撃手豫定計畫ヲ変更スル自由ヲ
 貴下ハ持ツテ可ルト申上ケル事が出来ル。特ニ貴
 下が近距離戦闘演習ヲ止メテ、長距離
 演習或ハ分艦隊演習又ハ突動演習
 其、他對空演習等ヲ含む何テモ貴下

が艦隊ノ明確ナラザル現状ニ於テ艦隊ノ利益ニ
 ナルト思ハルル演習ヲ如クノクイト思フナラバヤリ
 給ヘ但シ必ず絶エズ我々ニ報告シテ以テ之ヲ給ヘ
 我々ハ貴下ニ彈藥ニ関シテ我々ノ為ニソフ
 アル所ヲ報知シテ我々ハ貴下ノ欲スル如何
 ナル變更ニ応ズルヤウ心掛ケル積リテアル
 我々ノ入渠其ノ他ノクモ東海岸ニ船ヲ歸航
 セシメル提言ヲスル事ノ自由裁量ヲ貴下ニ許
 シテ貴下ハ貴地ヲ交戦行動ノ基地トシ
 同地ニ在ルモノナルヤウ問フ。答、或ル條件
 ノ下ニ於テハ勿論ソウトルカモ知リスガ前述
 所カラ既ニ即承知ノ通り明確ナル解答ハ
 予ハ得ラレナイゾアル。私ハ貴下カ其度準備
 ノ目的テ西海岸ニ歸ル事ノ諸利益ニ就イテ言フ
 ルコトハ問題外ナルコトヲ実感ス。若シ貴下カ歸ル貴
 下ノハワイノ滞在ノ主ナル理由ハナクナルコトニナラウ。マサニ此
 ノ問題ガ当所テ持出サレタ。然シ中ヲトツテ入渠ノ為
 武器糧食等積込ノ為東海岸ニ船ヲ歸航ヒレハ權
 限ヲ有シテアルソシテコレハドノ道役立つ事ト思フ。
 人員、据置ニ関シ、一ニミツツハ貴下ノ前ニ人員ノ問
 題ヲ提出シタ。私ハ唯然クノ数字ヲ水兵十七万(或ハ若
 シカスルト十七万二千三百ニサヘ)又海兵三万四千ニ上昇サ
 セル為百方キヲ盡シテ来タト云フ事ヲ申上ル程度
 ニ此問題ニ觸レテ置カウ。若シ我々が之ヲ認メテ貴下ニ

八東年度ノ人員數ニ關シテハ貴下ハ安心出來ル事ト思
 フ。私ハ最近六十四隻ノ駆逐艦並其他ノ艦船ヲ就役セ
 シムルニ就イテ艦隊ガ蒙ラハルヲ得ナカク夕動搖ヲ知ワ
 テナル。私ハ夕動搖ガ終ワタフトラ感謝シテナル。私ハ次ニ
 来ル動搖ガ出來ルケ輕キ事ヲ欲シテナル又貴下ハ航
 海部ガコノ海上艦隊ガ負フ此ノ不可避ナ重荷ヲ輕減ス
 ル爲メスヤ其ノ最善ヲ盡スモノト思フ。私ハ假令ハバ次ノ
 如キ何事ニモ關セズ貴下ノ「ハワイ」滞在ガ何等カノ間
 接的或ハ附隨的結果ヲ得テレルコトヲ欲シテナク。

(1) 合衆國カラノ供給糧食ノミチナク眞珠灣ニ於ルソノ
 處置及貯藏ヲ含ム計算上ノ關係諸問題ノ解決

(2) 貴下ガ戦争状態下ニ於テナス訓練

(3) (i) 機動部隊ヲ凡ソ実行ニ得ル限ニ於テ「ミッドウエイ」
 「アリゾニヤン」「バルムラ」「ジョンストン」「サモア」一般地域
 ニ精通セシムルコト。
 (以下二頁)

(二) 陸軍トノ一層緊密ナル連絡及び陸海両軍ノ間ニ從來見ラレタリ以上ノ「ハワイ」地区ノ共同防衛

(ホ) 陸海軍ノ協同ニ依ル關係連絡問題ノ解決及び特に、空中連絡ニ重点ヲ置クコト

(ハ) 碇泊中ノ艦隊ノ安全

(ニ) 「ハワイ」隊ハ、唯「オアフ」島ダケテ「クスワト」多数ヲ以テ構成セラルヤウソノ実現ヲ強調スルコト

貴下ハ「ハワイ」ニ同地ヲ平時作戦基地トシテ開発セシムルモノニ引留メラレクノデハ「カワロ」然レトコロハ相当程度、貴下ガ直面セラレテ「カワロ」當此由來スルコト「アラウ」

艦隊能率減シ並ニ「ス」如キ大艦隊ニトワテハ不適當ナ

錨地、飛行場、諸般ノ施設、配慮、厚生條件等ニ因ルニ「ス」ノ低下ニ関レテハ、* 貴下ニ助カ出来レバ「カワロ」考ヘテ

ナル。私ハ海軍兵學校卒業後、最初ノ数年間ヲ西印度諸島ヲ過シタリ。私ハ二月間ノ滞在後ニ入港シタリ

六月間移動ニ「カワロ」最後ノ港ヲ覺エテ居ル。而モ其處ニハ白人ハ唯一人モ居ラカッタ。私ノ知ツテ「カワロ」偉大ナル解

毒藥ハ作業並ニ阻害、魚釣リ、競技喫煙自由會等ノ如キ自製ノ厚生ヲ「カワロ」。貴下又機動部隊ヲ海上

上散策、気分転換為ニ勤カスコトモ相当出来ル。但シ「カワロ」何時デモ出来ル程度ニ「カワロ」。貴下ガ必

要ト思ハレハ「カワロ」巡航、為ニ、油ヲ「カワロ」我々が解決シヨウ。

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五月二十二日附ノ書面中テ、私ハ艦隊ノ一部ヲ大西洋ニ移動セルカモ知レヌヲ述ベタ。コレハ小移動カモ知レヌニ或ハ又レハ修正セラレタ。レインボール一號即チ想定及ビ艦隊配置ニ関スル修正ヲ加ヘタ。レインボール一號ニ振テスルカモ知レヌ、換言スレバ我々が直面スルカモ知レヌ情勢ト云フノハソノ情勢下ニ於テハ伊國及独逸ノ艦隊ハ自由ニ行動ハ出来ズニ、巡洋艦ヲ一隻カソコラ南大西洋ニ派遣スルコトハ出来ルカモ知レヌト云フ様ノ情勢デアリ。斯ノ如キ場合ニハ非常ニ大規模ノ艦隊ヲ大西洋ニ送ル必要ハナシ、艦隊ノ太平洋繼續滞在ハソノ安定ニ資スル最良ノ維持スルコトナラウ。今ニモ起ルカモ知レヌ情勢ニ備ヘル為ニ斯ノ如キ修正、レインボール一號下ニ大西洋ニ召致セラレルヤモ知レヌ部隊ハ、巡洋艦一分艦隊、空母一、駆逐艦隊、若シカスルト軽水雷數、設艦隊乃至ハ哨戒飛行隊、及若シカスルト、一寸アヤシイカ附屬機件ソタ潜水艦隊ヨリ成ルモノデアラウ。

若シ更下ガ機動部隊ニアリヌレバ又中郎太平洋洋面ニ南太平洋ハワイカラハ稍々遠イ(4)諸島ヲ視察サセ度イアラバ、斯カル召致ガナサル可能性一斯ノ如キ艦隊、大西洋派遣、為ノ一ガアルコトハニ留メテ置カレタイ。

尚又海軍部隊ノ南方ヘノ行動ニ関シ同地域ノ佛領或ハ英領訪問ヲ必要トスル情勢ガ發生スルヤモ知レヌヲ銘記シテハアラヌ。我々ハ情勢ノ變化發展ニ心ジ

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テ貴下が是等諸事ヲ承知スル様ニ努力スベシトモ
我々ハ貴下ノ補助飛行場ニ對シテハ借地許可ヲ與
ヘルコトニ依ツテ配慮シ来ソタモノト信ズルト共ニ我々ハ我々
ガ現在議會会ヲ審議中デアリニ週同後ニ効力ヲ發ス
ベキ法律案ノ中ニコノ問題ニ關シテ何カ恒久的ノ處置
ヲ為スコトヲ當局ニ要請中デアリテ附テ加ヘルコトトモ
来ル。

艦隊訓練部ハ最近貴下ニ標的及ビ一般標的
訓練設備ニ關スル書面ヲ送ツタ。我々ハ此ノ情勢ニ
於テ貴下ヲ援助スルニ為シ得ル限リヲ盡ス考ヘテアル
ニテ將來ノ種ノ情勢ニ於テハ亦十四管区ハ一層目上
面カ良クテ
ル様ナ何カ恒久的ノモノガコレカラ生ズルモノト信ズル。
空母情勢ニ關シテハ貴下ガノ調査ヲ完了セラレテ後
ニ最善ト決定セラレタリニ關シテハ、何デモ同調シテ行
ク用意ガアル。

コノワイ分遣隊ヨソノ正規ノ指揮系統ニ分割スルコト
ニ關シテハ、当然我々ハコノ問題ヲ全面的ニ貴下ノ手
ニ委ネル。若シ艦隊ノ一部ガ大西洋岸ニ持ツテ来ラレタ
ル或ハ艦隊主力ガ西海岸ニ召還セタレタ時ハ、兎モ角モ
現在ハコノワイ分遣隊ノ編成ト別個ニコノワイニ殘シテ
置クベキ機動部隊ヲ編成スルコトガ大イニ必要デアラウ
コノ書面ハ非常ニ散漫トモノテ私が貴下ノ手紙ヲ讀ミテ
時ニ全ク独リテ考ヘ出シタモノデアリ。訂ラズモコレハ若干ノ
艦船ヲ大西洋ニ送ラネバナラヌモノ生ズル可能性ヲ略

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述セル六月二十二日附貴下宛書面而モ貴下ガ書カ
レタ付ニホモダ受ケ取ラナカソクアノ午紙ト閣下ニテ讀
ンデ頂キ度イ。

若シ貴下ガコノ書面並ニ前回ノ書面ヲゴロソク提督
ニ傳見セ下サルテラハ欣ビニタマエアイ、自分ハ彼ニモ絶ニス
知ラシテ要道キ度イノダカラ。

私ハ一層特殊ナトハ何ゾトモアシ出来得ル限リ速ニ必
ズ貴下ニ傳知ラセスル考ヘデアス。傳見ス氣向多ク
ヲ新リテ、敬具

署名ベテイ。

ハワイ島具珠港合衆國軍艦ニベシルブアニア号
合衆國艦隊司令長官

提督丁・オリケヤードソン机下

ニ伸ヨロソクハ情勢ハ全ク危機一發デシ、イタリ
ハ今再ビ確實ト思ハレル情報ニ現レタ今一ツノ期
日ト考ヘラレル六月五日迄ハ行動ヲ起スカモ知レス、然
シソレハ尚一ツノ想像ニ止マル。