

ENGLAND

ITS POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
and DEVELOPMENT *and*
THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY

EDUARD MEYER



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BY

EDUARD MEYER, PH.D., LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN
EXCHANGE PROFESSOR TO HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 1909-10

TRANSLATED BY

HELENE S. WHITE

JOINT TRANSLATOR OF VON SYBEL'S FOUNDING
OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

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JF

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INTRODUCTION

IN offering this book to an English speaking public we feel assured that its contents will prove of value to the open-minded reader who desires an all round knowledge of the absorbing topic of the day, — the great war and the causes that led up to it. The author is a highly distinguished historian who, in undertaking this work, departs from his previous and chosen field of ancient history to discuss his present subject with engaging frankness. Concisely and clearly he places before the reader the part that England has played in history, especially in regard to the relations that the English have borne to the other nations of the world. The ripe judgment and keen insight of the thorough student of history and of world politics gives the book the claim to be the most reasonable, accurate and far seeing work that has as yet been offered to the public with regard to the development and character of the English people, as viewed from the German standpoint.

In the concluding chapter the newly created conditions and problems of world-wide concern are presented with prophetic insight and eloquent earnestness, and this in itself should make the book worth while, even if that which precedes it were of less high merit than it is.

While we fully realize that English history is a familiar subject to most American readers, we are equally convinced that there are many among them who will follow with interest a portrayal of England's development as a state, as it appears to a German historian, an *outsider* of marked ability, who judges it from the German standpoint, whereas the Americans, who, as a whole, are readers of English literature only, have practically received their impressions of England and the English people exclusively from English sources — the *insider's* favorable view of his own state and his own people.

Although the subject is treated with critical keenness in this volume, and the opinions expressed in it are based on professional knowledge of the highest order, and although the conclusions reached are a stern arraignment of the course pursued by modern England, nevertheless the restraint of the professional judgment, and the conclusions at which the searching analysis of the historian arrives, appear all too mild to the average German who, in defending his fatherland and its traditions, is fighting for his most sacred possessions, and to whom England's part in the present war seems to be that of the unrighteous money changers whom Christ cast out of the temple.

In placing this translation of Professor Meyer's "England" at this time before the American people, who are neither English nor German, we believe that it is the only book which sets forth clearly the fundamental differences between the English and German state organizations, as well as between the aspirations and views of life entertained by the two nations

as a whole. In no sense is it to be classed with the propaganda literature of the day, as it was written by the ablest living German historian, for perusal by his own people, in exposition of English conditions, past and present, and of the English national character.

THE PUBLISHERS.

September, 1916.

FOREWORD

THIS work was finished about the middle of January of the present year; the comments on subsequent events were added while the book was in the printer's hands. Now, however, still further comments seem absolutely necessary with regard to the events of the past few days.

That I did not make a mistake in my judgment of the American attitude has been clearly shown by the contrast between the two notes just sent by the American government, one to Germany and one to England,— the occasion for the former being the announcement of Germany's policy of attack by under-sea craft upon the English coast and commerce; the latter, called forth by the consequent misuse of neutral flags by English ships.

The note to England is expressed in most friendly terms, and asks that some regard be shown for the welfare of American commerce, saying that although "the occasional use of a neutral flag under stress of immediate pursuit" may seem justifiable, nevertheless the systematic misuse of the American flag should be discontinued, since "such a policy of general misuse of a neutral's flag jeopardizes the vessels of the neutral visiting British waters," and "would even seem to impose on Great Britain a measure of responsibility for the loss of American lives and

vessels in case of an attack by hostile naval vessels."

The note to Germany, on the other hand, utters a distinct threat in spite of the courteous terms in which it is expressed. It flatly denies that the American attitude has been anything but one of sincere neutrality, and then, with regard to Germany's announced policy, it goes on to say that, if in pursuance of it, "an American vessel should be destroyed or the life of an American citizen be lost, the government of the United States would be constrained to regard it as an indefensible violation of neutral rights, which would be very hard to reconcile with the friendly relations existing between the two countries"; should such a regrettable event really result "the government of the United States would be constrained to hold the German government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authority, and to take any steps which might be necessary to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

To England and her allies all things are to be permitted,—by them international law may be trampled under foot with impunity; but, when Germany will not meekly suffer this, and, in self-defense, retaliates by measures made necessary by the policy of her enemy, these are at once decried as inexcusable violations of international law, with entire forgetfulness of the fact that England had been the first to repudiate it.

The proud reply which the German government made to this note received hearty endorsement

throughout the country. In calm and dignified terms it sets forth that Germany is justified in adopting the proposed measures, and then, in friendly terms but very pointedly, it calls the attention of the Americans to their own shortcomings. If they would have their ships out of peril, they must be kept out of the danger zone, or else England must be induced to change her methods; not Germany, but England is at fault.

We are not to be intimidated by America, but on the contrary, we will persist in the measures which this struggle for existence, together with England's policy, has forced us to adopt. If America is offended at this, it can be of no great moment to us, since the attitude of the United States has been such that in the future it can hardly do us greater injury than it has in the past.

Meanwhile Japan also has laid aside the mask, and is openly stretching out a greedy hand toward China, while neither the nominal allies of the one country or the other can do aught to interfere. The Japanese policy is well defined and purposeful, and quite as unscrupulous as that of England. Japan found England useful to aid her in driving the Germans out of China and the islands of the Pacific; now it is England's turn to be dispossessed. But she is reaping only what she has sowed, and it remains now to be seen what Australia and America will say to it. But the great question confronting the future is not only whether at the end of another century there will still be any European possessions in eastern China, in the islands of the Pacific, or even in Australia, but

whether one person of European extraction may then be found within these regions.

There is yet one last comment necessary. On page 302 I had said that "English gentlemen do not shrink from any crime, not even from that of assassination, if only appearances can be preserved." When I wrote this, I was fully informed with regard to a plot made to assassinate the Irish patriot, Sir Roger Casement, a plot devised by Findlay, the British Minister at Christiania, and to be carried out by a young Norwegian, Adler Christensen, then in the service of Sir Roger. However, since at that time I lacked documentary evidence, it seemed advisable not to refer to the matter prematurely, and so the words "not even from that of assassination" were erased in the proof. Since then the whole affair has been made public through the note addressed by Sir Roger Casement to Sir Edward Grey, the instigator of the plot, and at whose behest Findlay devised it.

On the voyage from America to Norway, Sir Roger fortunately eluded his English pursuers; hardly, however, had he arrived in Christiania, on October 29, 1914, when Christensen was summoned to the British legation and questioned with regard to his employer. On the following day Christensen was closeted for two hours with the British Minister, Findlay, himself, a man who had gained an unenviable notoriety through the brutality of his conduct in Egypt. Christensen was given to understand that it would be an easy matter for him to secure for himself a comfortable and care-free future if he would undertake to make Sir Roger "disappear."

“The man who would deal him a mortal blow would never have to work again.” Findlay promised “on his word of honor” to pay Christensen five thousand pounds sterling for the delivery of Sir Roger Casement alive into the hands of the English.

But Christensen remained loyal. He made a pretence of accepting the proposition, whereupon he was given a secret address, together with a code to be used in future correspondence. From Berlin, whither he accompanied Sir Roger, he forwarded to the British Minister a number of letters that he was supposed to have filched from his employer, but which in reality Sir Roger had written for this express purpose. Later, Christensen returned to Christiania where he carried out this game of deception with great skill. On December 7th he was given the key to a rear door of the British legation, and on the 3rd of January he induced Findlay, after considerable urging, to give him the following document in Findlay’s own handwriting, a facsimile of which has been made public, and which must be quoted here as indisputable proof of English corruption.

“BRITISH LEGATION,
“CHRISTIANIA, NORWAY.

“On behalf of the British Government I promise that if, through information given by Adler Christensen, Sir Roger Casement be captured either with or without his companions, the said Adler Christensen is to receive from the British Government the sum of £5000 to be paid as he may desire.

Adler Christensen is also to enjoy personal im-

munity and to be given a passage to the United States should he desire it.

“ M. DE C. FINDLAY,
“ H. B. M. Minister.”

TO the Norwegian newspapers Findlay declared that he could make no statement with regard to the matter; perhaps Sir Edward Grey would explain. If ever Sir Edward does so, it will be interesting to learn to what subterfuges he will resort to clear himself.

This incident shows conclusively how great are the anxieties that Ireland is causing the British government, despite all the official assurances of the island's loyalty. Moreover, six Nationalist Irish newspapers have been suppressed, no Irish-American papers are permitted, and the importation and sale of arms has been forbidden by proclamation; but recruiting is as unpopular in Ireland now as heretofore, and the opposition of the political parties is as violent as ever.

At the same time the incident serves to illustrate in a most startling manner the moral depth to which the ruling classes in England have fallen. If the evidence were not indisputable, we would not believe it possible, even after all we have recently experienced at the hands of England.

Because of the loyalty of a young Norwegian sailor, Sir Roger Casement escaped the fate that was intended for him, but the Boer, General Delareij, was not so fortunate. While riding through the streets in an automobile with General Beyers, in September 1914, he was shot and killed by an Eng-

lish policeman. It was, of course, an "unfortunate accident." Surely, in this "war of humanitarian culture against German barbarism," the English are not unworthily associated with the Serb assassins and with the Russians whose diplomacy has ever resorted to means such as these.

"'Tis evident, the 'gentleman' is no Sumarai" are the words with which the Japanese admiral closes his report of the naval battle among the Falkland Islands.

EDUARD MEYER.

BERLIN-LICHTERFELDE,
February 18, 1915.

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PART I
THE CHARACTER OF THE ENGLISH
STATE

CHAPTER I

THE DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION

IT is impossible to form a correct estimate of England's part in the history of the world, or of the motives that led her into the present war, unless we call to mind the fact that English political development has proceeded in an exactly contrary course to that followed by the continental countries.

The common foundation upon which the political structure of all modern states rests is the dual organization of the Middle Ages, in which the overlord and the Estates sought their own ends along divergent paths which frequently led to bitter antagonism. Rarely indeed were they brought into harmonious co-operation through the pursuit of a common advantage, and then only after long and wearisome negotiations and intricate compromises.

Such a political organization is as far removed from the idea of centralized government as the ancients knew it, as it is from that which is finding ever-increasing development in modern times. When it could no longer adequately meet the growing demands of more highly civilized conditions,

it gradually disappeared from the continent, while the functions of government were more and more combined in the hand of the overlord. In France and Spain, as well as in the Scandinavian countries, this process brought about the monarchy, under the influence of which the national state was achieved and the foundation for the development of the modern national spirit laid. In Germany and Italy a like course of development was rendered impossible by the dominance and invulnerability of the Empire, — within its sphere of influence only local and territorial sovereignties could exist.

But everywhere the process was the same,— through a firm and enduring hold upon the finances, through the control of the administration and of the men-at-arms, the Kingship grew more and more independent of the co-operation of the Estates, which was always difficult to obtain and never to be relied upon. And so the Estates gradually lost every vestige of their former power, either as the result of defeat in a bitter struggle for supremacy,¹ or else through neglect; their consent being no longer needed, they were no longer summoned, and in time came to be a forgotten institution. Thus state sovereignty was evolved, and with it the conception of the modern monarchical form of government. Its claim and justification are based upon the fact that it not only gave the people a single centralized

¹ Only in one instance did the reverse of this process take place, and that is in the Netherlands where the Estates triumphed over the monarchical tendencies of the Spanish dominion. The dualistic organization of the Middle Ages is still to be found in the Duchy of Mecklenburg.

administration at the head of affairs, but out of the chaos of mediæval anarchy it brought law and order together with prosperity and a sense of security. As opposed to the particular interests of the Estates, the monarchy advanced and shielded the interests that promoted the common welfare of all the different classes of the population, and it is because of this, the beneficent exercise of its authority in the interest of all as against class interest, that the monarchy derived its high claim to authority by right divine. That it may be free ever to uphold the right, its power must be unlimited, and it cannot therefore be responsible to man, but to God alone.

In England also the political development seemed at first to be following the common course when the power of the feudal lords was broken in the Wars of the Roses, and the Tudor, Henry VII, seized the crown by the victor's right of battle, and set up a vigorous régime. Apparently England under the Tudors made as close an approach to the ideal of an absolute monarchy as did France under the later kings of the house of Valois (with the exception of the time of greatest disruption during the religious wars), or as did Spain under the Hapsburgs. There was, however, always this marked difference, that the English Estates in the Parliament had gained for themselves a position of greater authority than had the Estates in any of the continental countries. Although the higher nobles, together with the magnates of the Church, had isolated themselves in the exclusive Upper House, they had found an

active ally in the Lower House in a popular element that had derived its privileges from the Crown, and therefore was always eager to uphold the monarchical order of things, but nevertheless, and indeed for that very reason, strongly upheld the principle that taxes could not be levied without the consent of the taxed. Under these circumstances a standing army under the control of the Crown was not possible in England, and, because of the sense of security from foreign attack that the insular position of the kingdom afforded, the need of an army of defence was less imperatively felt there than in the states of the continent. Even the despotic Tudors could not ride rough shod over the inalienable rights of the English people, although they summoned Parliament as seldom as possible, and made more than a few of its recalcitrant members feel the heavy hand of their royal displeasure. Moreover, parliamentary authority made a great stride forward when Henry VIII undertook to free his country from the yoke of Rome; it made another when, after a first and abortive attempt on the part of Edward VI,— which was followed by the temporary triumph of Spanish Catholicism under Queen Mary, — Elizabeth, constrained by the exigencies of her position, established the Anglican Church as the national church polity, and compelled all resisting elements to yield to its authority; it made yet another when, in the bitter struggle with Spain, she appealed to the national spirit and rallied the nation to her side.

Indeed it was by these highly autocratic acts

themselves, carried out, as they were, with utmost relentlessness, that the authority of Parliament and the rights of the people it represented were strengthened. Without the firm hold upon the nation which the monarchy had obtained for itself, the English Reformation could hardly have been achieved, nor England's independence maintained against the attacks of Spain.

How the Stuarts attempted to force upon the United Kingdom of Great Britain (united under their dynasty) a despotic government patterned after the monarchies of the continent, and so provoked the people to civil war,—how this war resulted in the defeat of the Crown because the King did not have a military force under his control strong enough to defeat the national army organized by the radical elements of the country,—how the fall of the military despotism that followed, together with the dispersion of the Puritan army, was followed in turn by the restoration of the monarchy, which could not, however, shake itself free of the restraining hand of Parliament,—how, on the contrary, the attempt of Charles II to regain independence for the Crown by a closer approach between the two kingdoms of Great Britain and France brought about the very reverse of the desired object in that the dependence upon Parliament grew greater instead of less,—how James II, by his endeavor to wreck the Anglican Church, precipitated a crisis that resulted in the invasion of England by the army of William of Orange, and this gave the Opposition its opportunity to break the power of James, whose army,

on which he had relied, forsook him and went over to the enemy,—all these are familiar facts of history and need no enlargement here.

Although the crown could be conferred upon William and Mary, as it was upon their sister, Anne, also, only by overriding the rights of their father and brother, it was nevertheless formally conferred upon them by Act of Parliament, and was accepted by these sovereigns, together with stated conditions (the Bill of Rights), to which they pledged themselves in solemn ceremony. They therefore became the legally acknowledged rulers of the English people, whose loyalty they consequently had a right to claim. That these sovereigns left no heir to the throne was the final disaster in the struggle to maintain the supremacy of the Crown, for it now passed to a foreign prince. The first two sovereigns of the house of Hanover remained strangers in the land they ruled, for they had little or no understanding of its people, or of the political conditions which prevailed, and found it possible to maintain themselves upon the throne only because their presence there was a distinct advantage to certain interests for which the men at the head of affairs, and who had derived their power from Parliament, were contending.

Thus it was that in England, in contrast to political development on the continent, the sovereignty in the later political structure devolved not upon the Crown, but upon the organized Estates as represented in Parliament. Since George I understood no English and had to resort to the Latin language

when in consultation with his ministers, it was not possible for him to take part in the deliberations of the Cabinet, a circumstance through which this body grew more and more independent, until finally it emancipated itself entirely from royal control. Whereas in the reign of William III, and in that of Queen Anne also, the Cabinet had been the King's Council, it now became the executive committee of the Parliament. To be sure in all important matters, especially in those that concerned England's foreign policy, the first two Georges, who were men of energy and by no means lacking in ability, endeavored to make the royal will felt, in which they were oftentimes successful, or at least partially so.

But, in strong contrast to the policy followed by both William III and Queen Anne, the two succeeding sovereigns added to the dependence of their position by refusing every concession to the Tories, and by surrendering themselves entirely into the hands of the Whigs, the party that had set them on the throne. When at last, with the accession of George III, a king with truly national sympathies came to the throne, it was too late to stem the tide. It is true, he brought the Tories back into power, yet his attempt to realize Bolingbroke's ideal of a "Patriot King" failed utterly in spite of the honest efforts of the King, and served only to increase the confusion and add to the entanglements of odious personal intrigue by which English politics were controlled throughout the eighteenth century.

For this is what parliamentary government degenerated into from the outset. In theory, no doubt,

it fulfills the ideal of a perfect form of government, and has been lauded as such ever since the days of Montesquieu. Even yet the glamour which surrounds it dazzles not only the masses of European populations, but also those many well-intentioned men who believe that in it they behold the realization of their ideal,—the government of the people by representatives that are chosen by a majority to give expression to the public mind,—yet fail to look beyond the mere form, and so recognize the true conditions. But it has ever been thus; mere form, well-phrased, convinces the majority of men everywhere, and they are ready to swear by it.

The fact is that the English Parliament in its formative period and up to the enactment of the reforms of 1832 never was representative of the people, but was rather the organization by which a powerful aristocracy ruled. To be sure, by the enactment of the Bill of Rights parliamentary ascendancy was swung round to the Lower House, since this body was thereby invested with the sole right to levy taxes; no money bills could even be amended in the Upper House, which was limited to either accepting or rejecting them. But the right to elect the members of the Lower House rested upon privileges granted by the Crown, by virtue of which certain villages, towns and counties received representation, while many others were either not represented at all, or were inadequately represented. Moreover, the right of suffrage was exercised by free landholders only, and was therefore restricted to a small minority of the population. By such means as

these it was possible for the higher nobles, of whom, together with the Episcopal prelacy, the House of Lords was constituted, to control the Lower House, not legally but effectually and in the widest range of its activities, and so to maintain their ascendancy, both social and political. Many of the seats in the Lower House were in the direct gift of the titled members of the Upper House, since these had entire control of the rotten boroughs — those small represented districts in which there were only very few voters, in some cases not half a dozen. It has been estimated that at one time not less than 306 members of the Lower House owed their election to the votes of only 160 persons. Moreover, the nobles knew full well how to use this privilege to bring into the Lower House able men, to attach these to themselves and their class interests, and finally, by elevation to the peerage, to draw them within their own circle.

In the other boroughs the election contests were a wild farce in which any means of corruption, bribery, deception, and even open violence were resorted to without scruple,— scenes which have often been pictured in drastic colors by English writers, conspicuously so by the brilliant pen of Charles Dickens.

In the Lower House itself, ever since the days of William III, the most shameful corruption flourished,— an indirect barter of votes for the numerous government offices and for the very lucrative sinecures in the gift of the government was carried on side by side with open bribery on a vast scale.

On the other hand the sovereignty that the revolution of 1688 had transferred to the Lower House was exercised in a manner that would have done credit to the most vigorous of absolute monarchies. *Leze majesty* was in England made to apply to the Parliament, whereas it is notoriously the privilege of every Englishman to speak as slightly or as offensively as he pleases about the nominal bearer of the sovereignty—the King. Every offender against the “privileges” of Parliament, every person who dared attack the Parliament itself or its Acts, was and is still rigorously prosecuted, and is liable to severe and humiliating penalties. A free criticism of all action by the legislative body, such as is taken for granted in the countries of the continent, is not allowed even yet in England, and it behooves him who ventures to step on this forbidden ground to choose his words carefully and to weigh them well before he does so.

That its sittings were held in secret insured Parliament against control by public opinion. It is a well known fact that even to-day visitors and reporters are admitted by courtesy only, the legal restrictions being officially ignored, and that all such persons can be ejected at any moment if a member announces that he sees “a stranger” present. Moreover, to make a report of the proceedings of Parliament was not only forbidden, but was a punishable offense.

Under conditions such as these the irresponsibility of the Crown was assured; while, since the days of William III, Parliament itself has shown

so little sense of responsibility, and, by its erratic enactments, its subservience to momentary currents of opinion, as well as to caprice and personal influence, has so often embarrassed a capable administration, and prevented it from carrying out its well-planned policies, that we can but wonder that England has come forth so successfully from the foreign conflicts in which she has been obliged to engage. And, indeed, this would hardly have been possible except for her insular position, which shielded England against many a vital danger and prevented the states of the continent, with the means then at their command, from endangering her existence by attacks such as they themselves had frequently to face. It is in these conditions that we find a reason for the dangerous vacillations that mark England's policy during the reign of William III, in the war of the Spanish Succession, in the Seven Years' war, and in the Napoleonic wars, as well as for the serious blunders that were made in the early conduct of the Seven Years' war, the revolutionary wars, and at other times. Certainly in the American war of independence England suffered the full consequences of these internal conditions.

The natural accompaniment of a parliamentary form of government is the wide opportunities it offers to men of ambition and to intriguing schemers. During the reigns of George I and George II, Walpole established his party, the Whigs, on a firm foundation, and then, by a resort to any means of bribery and intrigue, maintained himself in office for two decades. Many ambitious and more or less

gifted men found it to their advantage to join his following and so to secure for themselves a share of the flesh pots; to the man who felt himself capable of higher things, there was no course open except to join the Opposition. But gradually the Opposition grew in strength, probably for the simple reason that the men in power had been at the head of affairs for so long a time; at last, foreign complications gave the opportunity to accomplish Walpole's downfall (January, 1742). And so matters went on until the close of the eighteenth century.

Most party leaders and other men of ambition either belonged to the aristocracy by birth, or were affiliated with them through close personal or family relations, and, if they followed the usual course, closed their careers as members of the Upper House. What motto they emblazoned on their banners, what measures of government they denounced with fanatical zeal as utter failures, or as schemes of ill will or of treason mattered little. The fine-sounding phrases and deep chest-tones of profound moral conviction have always been the ready resort of the orator, and the layman finds them very convincing. At the psychological moment, at an election for instance, they may turn the scales in the desired direction. If they do, they have served their purpose; indeed, nothing more is expected of them, and it is a great mistake to take them seriously.

No English statesman, when he attained to power, has ever hesitated to support the very measures which he had previously bitterly denounced, provided that they now served his purpose, whereas the

principles which he had advocated as leader of the Opposition were allowed to fall into neglect as soon as he undertook the leadership for the Government. It all resolves itself into a struggle for power, and has never been a battle for principle. I have asked a number of educated and well-informed Englishmen whether in their opinion a single one of the English statesmen of the eighteenth century, with the exception of Burke (an Irishman), really believed in the principles he advocated, except in so far as they stood for the power and renown of his country, of course, but have never received a confident affirmative in reply.

The nineteenth century, however, has seen great changes in England's political life. The reforms of 1832 did away altogether with the "rotten boroughs," and in their stead all the many towns that had grown into great centers of population in recent years were given adequate representation, and the franchise was greatly widened in other ways. Through later reform bills the franchise became more and more democratic, until, since 1885, about two-thirds of all male inhabitants of the kingdom over twenty-one years of age have the right to vote; but from a universal right of suffrage such as is in force in Germany and in other continental states, England is still far removed.

By this redistribution of the franchise the way was opened for an enormous development of the commercial and industrial interests of the country, for they gained a wide political influence by means of it. The great centers of commerce and

of industry in the North, which had hitherto suffered political neglect, now became a highly influential, at times even a deciding factor in the political life of the country. The introduction of free trade and the check this gave to the agrarian interests, that until then had been paramount in the country, were the next links in the chain of consequences. Unrestrained capitalization, commerce and manufacture, that as early as the eighteenth century had become the economic foundations of England's greatness, and had exerted a deciding influence upon the political action of the state, now received official recognition in its constitutional structure, and became the dominating factors in its political life, before which all else had to give way.

Meanwhile the people were emancipated from the restraining shackles of a narrow creed, by means of which the masses had been controlled by the English State Church, than which there has been no less edifying offspring of the Christian religion,— a sort of bastard product compounded of politics and theology, organized with great but cynical refinement for the special purpose of keeping the people in spiritual subjection to the ruling classes, to whom it afforded the opportunity of exploiting the benefices, while the spiritual welfare of the people was all but neglected. Even at the present time the State Church in England has in no way relinquished its political rights, its dominant social position, nor its revenues, and its benefices are still subjects of presentation, as in the past; their advowson belongs in part to the Crown, to Church dignitaries, and to

colleges and universities; but the larger half belongs to persons in private life, whereby the presentation of the benefices is in the hands of laymen of almost any confession of faith.

In Ireland the Disestablishment Act of 1868 deprived the English Church of its position there as the only recognized state church, but at the same time it received so great a compensation for the revenues it had to relinquish that it still controls funds and holds a position of eminence quite out of proportion to the small number of its communicants. The same is true of Wales, where the people are largely Methodists, and where the services of the English Church are as little attended as they are in the larger part of Ireland. An Act to disestablish the State Church here also twice passed the Lower House in 1913, but was lost in the Upper House. In Scotland, of course, the Presbyterian Church is the recognized church of the state; but here the laws by which other Protestant denominations, "the dissenters," suffered constraint are no longer in force anywhere, and the Catholics and Jews are as emancipated now as are any other religious sects. The Catholics of Ireland have sent so large a representation to Parliament that they have compelled consideration there, and in the great political crises the deciding vote has often been theirs.

The reforms of recent years have broken the influence which the great families and the ministry formerly exerted upon the elections, and the corruption in Parliament, the barter of votes, has ceased. But in spite of all preventive measures il-

legal influences, such as direct or indirect bribery, must still be reckoned with at the elections, and in a much greater extent than such things occur, for instance, with us. And there is little hope that in England this practice will be entirely uprooted, for the Englishman seems to have no scruples in this respect,—corrupt practices do not seem to disturb the English conscience, if only outward appearances are preserved. Nevertheless acts of bare-faced corruption such as used to take place at the polls are now no longer possible, and, generally speaking, the will of the majority finds expression in the elections of to-day. But the most important step forward lies in the fact that the proceedings of Parliament are now fully reported in spite of the prohibitory law, and consequently the attitude and vote of its members are under the control of their constituencies. The result is that the Parliament, that once was in no way responsible, is now subject to the scrutiny of the public and the electorate, and so has become responsible to the people. This has put an end to open corruption, i. e., the exploitation of a seat in Parliament for the purpose of personal aggrandizement.

By this process of development an entirely new element has been introduced into the political life of England. In the Parliaments of the eighteenth century small parties were frequently formed within the two principal parties, or else were associated with them. These then unfurled their banner in support of some principle involved in some one of the political questions of the day, and made use

of it to vanquish the men in power, hoping in this way to secure the flesh pots for themselves, or, failing of this, at least to compel consideration of themselves by a coalition. In the place of these smaller groups there now exist two well-defined parties, the Irish Party and the Labor Party, with which every Government must reckon. In the main, however, the old conditions still persist, because, through the concessions that are made to these smaller political elements by one or the other of the principal parties for the purpose of gaining their support, the condition arises that a majority and a minority stand opposed to each other, who, however, when it comes to a vote, always hold together until some vital question brings about a crisis and the defeat of the Government. This sometimes leads to the formation of a new party, as it did in connection with Gladstone's Home Rule Bill for Ireland, when a large number of the Liberals deserted him to combine with the Conservatives and form a new party, the Unionists. Generally speaking, however, in England as in America, the conviction is abroad that in parliamentary contests it is not so much the principle of the party program that must be victorious, be it ever so enthusiastically advocated, but the party itself that must triumph in order to gain and hold a political power that is only attainable when, forgetful of all minor interests, two great parties stand opposed to each other. This tendency may be ascribed to a common trait of the political character of the two nations, and one in which they differ from the nations of the European continent,

especially from the Germans; their idea of political freedom is not liberty to realize their own political ideals, but submission to the will of a majority. What is determined by the majority must receive the support of the individual, whether it coincides with his convictions or not. We will consider this subject more fully later.

This procedure finds especial favor in these two countries because there the elections are decided by a relative and not by an absolute majority as is the case with us, and therefore the deplorable final elections which so embitter our political life are dispensed with. It also makes it next to impossible for more than two candidates to be nominated in an electoral district; the campaign is planned from the outset to be a contest between two great political parties, and not, as with us, for a struggle between a dozen or more smaller groups.¹

¹ In America candidates must be residents of the district in which they are nominated, a restriction which, though not obligatory by law, is nevertheless maintained by unbroken precedent. This greatly diminishes the opportunity for men of distinguished ability to find their way into the House of Representatives of the Congress, and by far the larger number of its members arrive there through the machinations of the "wire-pullers." The election campaigns are managed for each party organization by means of its "machine," with a resort to any questionable measures, and an unscrupulous, systematically planned corruption. In the United States it is therefore the Senate, the members of which are elected by the states (two from each state and for a term of six years), that holds first rank in the estimation of the people, and is of chief importance, just the reverse of what it is with us. But in America, as

In earlier times the elections by which the Government appealed to the people for support and upon the outcome of which their continuance in office depended were comparatively rare in England; members of Parliament were free to vote upon many questions, even on questions of great moment, according to their personal convictions and without regard to party lines. But during the course of the nineteenth century this freedom has grown steadily

every one knows, no attempt is made to maintain a truly parliamentary system. The President of the United States is quite independent of Congress, although his nominations require confirmation by the Senate, and his financial policy is dependent upon the appropriations made by Congress. He is free to select the members of his Cabinet according to his own judgment, and it is their duty to carry out his wishes, and they are responsible to no one but him; whether or not they belong to the party which has a majority in one or both Houses is of no importance. Moreover, the President,—and in the individual states, the governors,—exercises the right of veto to a degree of which we in Europe have scarce an idea. The fact that he is elected by the whole people gives him an authority far greater than that held by any constitutional monarch. Generally speaking, the legislative bodies are regarded in America as necessary evils that must be endured, but whose power, at least in the individual states, must be limited as much as possible that they may do a minimum of mischief. This is accomplished in part by fixing a time limit for the sessions of the legislatures, which in most of the newer states are not allowed to be called for more than sixty days in two years (in Alabama it is only for forty-five days in four years), and further, by submitting a large number of questions to the direct vote of the people, and so making it possible to incorporate new laws into the state constitutions without the action of the legislatures.

less until at the present time the vote on every question of importance is strictly a party matter, controlled by the "whips," who see to it that rigid party discipline is maintained.

Although the bills brought in by the Government are modified and frequently much amended in consequence of their discussion in Parliament, still, on all fundamental questions the decision rests with the Cabinet, and not with Parliament, although the Cabinet finds itself compelled to show a due regard for the drift of opinions within its own party, and to make frequent compromise where they differ. As a consequence, the prestige of Parliament has waned in a measure, and that of its members, very materially. The representative in Parliament is not a free agent, but is bound to follow the instructions of the party that elected him. His constituents keep him under constant surveillance, and if he should disappoint them, he would not only have to lay down his office, but he would be a dead man politically.¹ The Parliament, therefore, is now actually in a similar position to that once held by the former bearer of the sovereignty, the King. Just as the latter, according to the official and jealously guarded interpretation of the constitution, is not allowed to hold, or

¹ This is, of course, not the case when a politician goes over permanently to the other party and begins his political career anew, it may be with pre-eminent success, as was the case with Gladstone, and before him with Sir Robert Peel, in both cases because of an honest change in convictions; and of Lord Palmerston because he followed his instinct for power. Disraeli, too, was a Liberal before he began his parliamentary career.

at least to express an opinion, but must blindly follow the advice of his ministers,¹ so now the ordinary member of parliament can not have an opinion of his own, but must render unquestioning obedience to his party leaders.

This development found its culmination when recently (1911) the House of Lords was deprived of the right of veto, a right which enabled the Upper House to take a hand in the party struggles, and to bring to nought the measures forwarded by the party in power, an interference which of course was always in favor of the Conservatives and Unionists, and against the Liberals and Radicals. With this right fell the last bulwark that stood against the achievement of absolute party domination and the nominal sovereignty of the Lower House, which, in fact, however, is the rule of a Cabinet brought into office by the vote of the people. Officially the present form of government in England is a democracy, i. e., a government by a majority of the people, or rather, by a nominal majority as shown by the returns of the elections. It is, of course, not so radical a democracy as is to be found in many of the states of the continent, or in America or Australia, since England has not as yet granted universal manhood suffrage. Moreover it must not be overlooked

¹ The exceptional position in this respect which Edward VII created for himself will receive attention later in this volume. On the other hand, his successor, George V, met with reproach during the past year because, instead of taking the initiative himself in the effort to prevent civil war in Ireland, he left it to a conference of party leaders with instructions to seek a compromise.

that although the political organization of the English state is that of a democracy, and in spite of the important political rôle that the citizen element now plays in the political life of the nation, and the great influence which capital and the commercial and industrial interests exert, the English social structure is nevertheless now, as it always has been, an out-and-out aristocracy, more so, indeed, than that of any other country in the world. This may be attributed to the fact that the old families have been wise enough to adapt themselves to the new conditions, to preserve to themselves the dominating influence, and to draw to themselves new elements from out the opposing circles, and thoroughly to assimilate these. Therefore it is that, in a measure, they still hold the reins by which the country's course is guided, and even the most radical statesmen must, in spite of themselves, conform to their demands and seek their co-operation. As yet it would be quite impossible to form a Government in which the aristocracy and the Upper House are not adequately represented by some shining titles, just as no private undertaking of a scientific or of a social nature can hope for success without such support.

As in other matters, so also does the superficial observer, and with him the general public, base his judgment of the English Constitution on its official form. Such forms, however, never represent the true character of existing institutions, but contain many antiquated clauses, the original meaning of which has been modified by a more modern interpretation, or else they have lost their meaning alto-

gether. In England, which has no constitution and where countless institutions now regarded as inviolable rest entirely upon tradition, on precedent, or on a re-construction of old statutes, this condition is in especial evidence, as it also was in ancient Rome. Meanings almost diametrically opposed to each other may be read into almost any clause of the Common Law, according to the predilections of the interpreter, i. e., according to the opinion for which the commentator desires legal support. By the provisions of the constitution the King is entitled to numerous rights and privileges,—but he is not allowed to make use of them; they have in fact, and in so far as they are not obsolete, been transferred to the Cabinet, and the sovereignty of the Crown plays no greater rôle in England than it did in the Roman Empire; or as, in the Common Law of the Middle Ages, did the sovereignty of the people, who were recognized as the official bearer of all political authority for the sole purpose of transferring that authority to the Emperor, as the representative of the people. In our times the English Parliament has had the selfsame experience, except that the process of development has as yet not reached its completion. The actual ruling body of the English state, the Cabinet, is unknown to the constitution, and, in so far as any foundation can be found for it, it rests on the provision made for the Privy Council, which still has an official existence, but has lost all significance, and is never summoned.

Practically, the feature of the English constitutional organization of to-day is that two groups of

statesmen stand opposed to each other and ready at any moment to assume the government. How these groups are formed, and who belongs to them is no one's concern but their own, and is regulated by the party leaders, who keep in touch with the currents of party opinion. The one indispensable condition is that aspirants for places in the ministry must be entitled to a seat in Parliament, some in the Lower House, and some in the Upper House, since a minister can only address the House of which he is a member. The party leader is chosen by his party, or rather by the most important group of its members, according to their own judgment, and he is the man who, when a cabinet crisis arises, is summoned by the King and charged with the formation of a new ministry. The decision as to which of the two political parties shall be entrusted with the government is given by the people in an election for the Lower House. The successful party then has the right to govern England for seven years, the length of life of a Parliament. The Parliament can be dissolved at any time, however, and a new decision at the polls called for. Such a course may be desirable for several reasons. It may be that the men in power regard the time as favorable to an increase of their majority in Parliament by means of a new election, and a consequent extension of their term in office; or, on the other hand, they may have seen their majority there gradually dwindling in consequence of subsequent by-elections in which the returns were unfavorable to their party; or their coalition with some of the smaller, more or less

independent groups, such as the Irish Party, or the Labor Party, or other extremists, is in danger of being ended; or else the current of public opinion may be setting strong against them. For the last, however, the evidence must be strong indeed, if it is to have the desired effect, for cabinets have been known to remain calmly in office even after they were fully aware that they could no longer count upon the support of a majority of their constituents, and that at the next election they would surely be defeated,— if only they retained their majority in Parliament. It has moreover become traditional to dissolve Parliament and appeal to the people when, during the rule of one party, new problems of fundamental importance arise, such as the home rule and tariff questions, and the Lords' right of veto.

Plainly then, the decision as to which of the two groups of statesmen shall direct the government for a term of years rests with the voters of the country. The majority as it is rendered at the polls makes the decision,— the subsequent nomination by the Crown and the confirmatory vote of the Parliament are merely necessary formalities. Nominally, one or the other of the two well defined parties that have faced each other for centuries must bear off the victory. In fact, however, the scales are turned by those political elements of the population that are not permanently associated with either party. Although, because of tradition, personal interests, and the viewpoint from which they regard life, the great majority of the population hold unwaveringly either to the one or the other of the two great parties, and

can see nothing but evil in the other, the two parties are yet so evenly balanced that neither can depend wholly upon its own adherents for a decision and an assured majority.¹ Between the two parties stand many men who take a broader view and do not cling unquestioningly to any one group, either because they are truly above party domination, and so judge events and conditions for themselves, or else because the course taken by the ruling party does not satisfy them, and their expectations have not been fulfilled, and consequently they want to give the other side a trial; or simply because in their opinion a change of party is beneficial and promotes the general good. Indeed these new elections have almost without fail resulted in shifting the responsibility of government to the shoulders of the former minority.

It is the minor elements therefore upon which the change of party depends. It is they who decide the election and in reality determine who is to be at the head of the English government, and so control the "play of English institutions."

¹ The same is true of the United States. During a political campaign little or no effort is spent on those states in which one or the other of the two principal parties feels assured of a majority; nor do these states receive consideration when a candidate for the presidency is to be selected, while every effort is made to win the doubtful states in which either party may hope for victory, and it is largely with this in view that the presidential candidates are chosen.

CHAPTER II

THE ENGLISH IDEA OF THE STATE AND OF FREEDOM

OF all these many changes in the mode of governing only a small part found formal expression in decisions and Acts of Parliament, while in reality they influenced the deeper meaning and structure of the constitution and its practical interpretation to a much greater degree than is apparent on the surface. Nevertheless the political life of the England of to-day still rests on the old basis and fundamental opinions that were evolved in the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century, and which have shaped political thought in England ever since.

The political life of England,—and that of America also in so far as this is built upon foundations inherited from England,—must be gauged by an entirely different standard from that by which we judge the continental states, and especially is this true in so far as the most vital issues in both the home and the foreign policy are concerned, since the political organization on the continent is the exact opposite of that in the insular kingdom. The most important and most deeply rooted difference lies in the continental idea of the state as it has been developed in its relation to the central author-

ity, the sovereign; of this the English, or we will say, the people of Great Britain have no conception. To us the state is the most indispensable as well as the highest requisite to our earthly existence, not with regard to our political welfare alone, but to the daily life and activity of the individual as well, uniting, as it does, the entire population dwelling within the utmost limits of its jurisdiction in wholesome activity for the general good; we therefore believe it to be worthy of, as well as entitled to the entire devotion of every citizen, in honorable effort to further its purposes. All individualistic endeavor, of which there is no lack with us too, as well as the aspirations of those shattered foreign nationalities that are included within the boundaries of our state, must be unreservedly subordinated to this lofty claim. On the other hand, the state, through its organ, the government, also has its high obligation to fulfill, i. e., to hold itself free and unprejudiced, above the influence of the individualistic aspirations of persons and classes, of industrial combinations and political parties, and, unaffected by these, to promote the interests and solve the problems that concern the entire nation, and to carry them to a successful issue in spite of the antagonism of all opposing elements. The state is of much higher importance than any one of these individualistic groups, and eventually is of infinitely more value than the sum of all the individuals within its jurisdiction. For it has a life apart; its mission is unending, and, in theory at least, unless it is wrecked by a force from without, its existence is

endless, encompassing, as it does, all the generations yet to come, and welding them into a great unit,—the mighty life of a nation acting its part in the history of the world.

This conception of the state, which is as much a part of our life as is the blood in our veins, is nowhere to be found in the English Constitution, and is quite foreign to English thought, and to that of America as well. To be sure, in contradistinction to the dualism of the mediæval state, the union of the will to do and the power to act for the state has been achieved in the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and in the American Republic also, where this idea, in opposition to that of the sovereignty of each individual state, came off victorious in the bloody struggle of the war of secession from which the American people emerged as a nation.¹ To the potency of this centralization of power may be ascribed the vigorous conduct of Britain's more recent foreign wars, and the pursuit of a well-defined national policy abroad. As a consequence, a strong national feeling has developed in England. In this the people of Scotland and of Wales share, at least in times of important crises, whereas in Ireland, whose official status is one of equality with the other

¹ The idea of this new oneness of the country finds characteristic proof in the use of its name as a singular substantive—"The United States *has* done something,"—whereas formerly it was customary to speak of "*These* United States" with the use of the plural form of the verb, a peculiarity of speech which is no longer used except by the fast disappearing remnant of the advocates of particularism.

members of the Kingdom, but whose real position is that of a subject kingdom exploited for the benefit of English interests, the sentiments that prevail stand in harshest contrast to this feeling.

In England it is the Parliament to which the state delegates the centralized authority, or, more accurately speaking, to a ministry that has the support of a majority in the House of Commons. This circumstance in itself precludes the possibility of a governing institution of the state that shall be superior to party bias, and representative of the people as a whole, uniting them in a common purpose. Here, as in all countries ruled by a parliament, it is ever a question of majorities and minorities with which the people concern themselves, and never one of a truly centralized authority of the state.

This explains why the English have no conception whatever of our idea of a centralized state. The German word *Staat* is untranslatable into English. There is absolutely no English equivalent to express the idea which this word conveys to us. The Britain speaks of "the Empire," which is a much more comprehensive term, for it brings to mind all the British possessions in the five continents, and therefore expresses England's position as a world power; or he speaks of "the Government," and this implies much less, for it designates only the representatives of the party then at the helm of state, while it excludes the smaller half of the population standing in marked opposition to them and antagonizing their every measure. Instead of being ruled by a centralized authority representing the

state, and superior to all party bias, England is governed by representatives of a political party. To secure a majority for his party, and so to gain for it the control of the government, is the first duty of every English statesman, and of every American statesman as well. This is the viewpoint from which all his plans are made, however dear to his heart may be his country's position as a world power, or the promotion of its interests abroad, for even the foreign policy of the country is shaded according to this consideration, and in the end is but a move in the game of politics. It is here that we find the reason for the sudden changes in England's foreign policy that have so often accompanied a change of Government; for the party in opposition, when it takes the helm, can naturally feel no compulsion whatever to carry to completion the measures of its predecessors in office, since up to this time they have been its special objects of attack. In so far as they may be considered obligations of the state, this too can have but little weight, since the state has no existence as an independent authority. Of a continuously homogeneous foreign policy there can therefore be no thought in England, except in so far as there are certain views and plans of action that are entertained by both parties alike, and which both are eager to see carried out. To these belongs the continued and complete supremacy at sea, together with the consequences which it may entail, because this is of vital importance to the entire population of Great Britain.

Just as the English have no conception of what

the word "*Staat*" conveys to the German mind, nor a word to express it, so neither do they understand, nor have they a word for our "*Vaterland*." They have become familiar with its use through contact with the Germans, and to convey the German meaning have translated it by the word fatherland. But for them this word designates the German's fatherland, and it is spoken most often in a tone slightly ironic, or with a pitying sneer in derision of German sentimentality. The Britain has a "home," but no fatherland. He has no comprehension of what the German embodies in the word fatherland, which is his highest and most sacred possession, calling forth his noblest sentiments and aspirations. To this the Britain is a stranger, and therefore it is absolutely impossible for him to understand the German national song "*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles, über alles in der Welt*." With childish naïveté he misconstrues it into an expression of the German nation's aspiration for world dominion, a thought which certainly was never entertained by the poet, Hoffmann von Fallersleben, himself, nor by the unnumbered millions of Germans who have sung it, nor by those who still sing it with enthusiastic abandon, and to whom the English interpretation of it seems incomprehensible. The British look upon it as a match for their national song "*Britannia, Rule the Waves*," and, with further childish naïveté, take it for granted that Britain's right to rule the sea is the most natural thing in the world, and must be conceded by every one as a matter of course, while the aspiration of

any other nation to a position of independence in the world, and one of importance as a national unit, is not only regarded as prejudicial to English interests, but is loudly decried as a crime against all mankind.

In its practical operation the English Constitution influences every phase of public life. It is the popular belief that it secures to Great Britain the most highly developed form of government, far in advance of all others; and this was true of it at the time of its conception and of its development during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The especial feature which justified this high claim is that it protected every citizen's right of personal liberty, and bestowed upon a fractional part of the population — by no means upon all the people, as is generally believed — the right to participate in the life of the state, and so strengthened the foundations upon which the efficiency of state authority is based. To these advantages must be added the far greater degree of freedom which it secured to the industrial interests of the country, and the consequent increase in material and resources which were placed at the disposal of state and nation alike. But the English advance in state organization has long since been overtaken, and since the beginning of the nineteenth century England has fallen more and more to the rear, while it has tardily and grudgingly, and therefore ineffectually introduced the institutions which in other countries have been developed to a much higher degree.

We may find the reason for this reluctance in the

English idea of freedom that was developed in the conflict between the Parliament and the Crown, and which was begun by the higher nobles, and was then continued to its conclusion by some of these in combination with the House of Commons. In this conflict the primary issue was parliamentary privilege, but in its wider and national issues it laid the foundation for the Englishman's right to personal liberty. The Habeas Corpus Act, by which in 1678 he was protected against imprisonment without a fair trial, is the great bulwark of personal freedom, while the provisions of the Declaration of Rights, by which the supremacy of Parliament was established in 1689, gave the nation's aspirations for freedom legal form. In this struggle both parties took part, Whig and Tory alike; for the Tories are by no means wholly committed to the support of royalty, but, on the contrary, they have been known to oppose the Crown more vigorously than ever did the Whigs. If on the other hand they have frequently defended the rights of the Crown, this was at times but the winning card in the game of politics by which they hoped to promote the interests of the proprietary and agrarian elements of the population, and so to add to their own power, and by no means a disinterested desire on their part to add to the lustre of a self-sufficient monarchy. Their disaffection in 1688 decided the outcome of the Revolution and defeated James II.

The English idea of freedom is of a peculiarly negative character; it expresses itself in effort to dispense as much as possible with state authority.

Accordingly, the English seek to reduce to a minimum the claims of the state upon the citizen, as well as the interference of state authority in the life of the individual citizen, to whom they would secure the utmost liberty of action, and entire freedom to pursue his own interests in private life and in the realm of industry, an object which has been realized in a high degree and with stupendous results.

But, after all, man is a social being and cannot exist in isolation, dependent upon himself alone, but finds life possible only in well organized and united communities regulated by inviolable laws. Therefore, what the state cannot and, according to the English idea, should not do to accomplish this end must be provided for by other means. In England, and in America also, it would seem that the rights and the functions of the state have been reduced to their smallest limit, and here the abrogated state authority has been replaced by a subtle something styled "public opinion"—custom, tradition, precedent— together with an unquestioning subordination of the individual to the will of the majority.

The English and American idea of freedom differs totally from ours.¹ If on the one hand the

¹ From the moment that a well educated German steps foot upon the pier in New York until the time that he leaves from it, he feels himself under a restraint that is foreign to his nature and is irksome to him, but which he cannot escape. At every turn he comes upon established customs and dominating opinions that demand his implicit submission, and so encroach upon his sense of personal freedom in matters which he feels he should be allowed to

control of the citizen by the state has been reduced to its lowest quantity, and which according to our views is far too low, on the other hand the individual Englishman or American lives under a constant social constraint which is unknown to us, and which we would resent as absolute tyranny, and as a lack of personal freedom. To our mind the essential condition of freedom is the liberty of the in-

decide for himself. Of all the problems that America offers for solution to one who becomes thoroughly acquainted with this "land of contrasts," the strangest and most difficult for him to understand is how the people can believe themselves to be a free nation, *the* free nation in fact, while in reality they live under hourly restraint or compulsion of which, however, they are not aware, because they have been accustomed to it from youth up, and therefore accept it as a matter-of-course. There is the constraint of numberless convictions hallowed by tradition, the influence of which is felt in all daily intercourse, but above all in the sphere of religion, and which acts as a check on the free expression of opinion, and stifles independent thought. There is the constraint exercised by public opinion, or what passes for such, and which makes possible the insufferable intrusion of impertinent interviewers who daily drag before the public all the private affairs of the individual citizen and his family,—no one is secure against the possibility of finding himself at any time charged in the newspapers with the most serious offenses, pure inventions of the reporters, for which, however, there is no redress. And lastly, there is the dreadful tyranny of organized labor, and of the unscrupulous host of politicians who control state and municipality alike, and whom the average American looks upon as a necessary evil that must be endured, and so does nothing to break their power. "Politicians are despised in this country"—but they are allowed to have their way.

dividual to develop his intellectual and spiritual personality according to his own ideas,—the right to shape his views of life independently of the opinions of others, and, from the standpoint thus gained, to determine his attitude toward the events of life, and to be allowed unhindered to take an honest stand for his convictions among his fellow-men. This tendency, which is paramount in every German and in which he will not allow himself to be thwarted, and which therefore is the fundamental characteristic of the political as well as of the spiritual and intellectual life of the German people, is foreign to the Englishman and to the American as well, or, to say the least, is but meagerly developed in them. To them freedom means the right of the majority to have their way, and there is nothing left to those who think otherwise but unqualified submission. Therefore “public opinion” is the highest authority for the Englishman and the American, whereas for the German it seems to be almost the reverse, for when an argument is upheld by the statement that it is in accord with “public opinion,” or that it is “generally accepted,” he is repelled rather than persuaded, by it, and often almost unconsciously ranges himself on the opposing side. This constraining influence of public opinion is most potently felt in the spiritual and intellectual sphere, especially in that of religion, where freedom and recognition of personal convictions means practically freedom for the majority only, or for those who have succeeded in getting the upper hand, and so are accepted as being the majority, while for all others it

means intolerance of their views, and an unconditional surrender to the mind of the majority. Very slowly, and only after long continued struggle and when the futility of trying to force every one to subscribe to the same views was beyond controversy, did the idea of tolerance in matters religious gain ground in England and America, and even yet it is not as general there as in the foremost countries of the continent. It is a matter of common knowledge how largely individual freedom of conscience is still restrained by the English law, and even to a much greater degree by long established custom and by public opinion, which makes itself felt in an oppressive spiritual constraint, or at least in a demand for outward conformity to prevailing custom.

It will be profitable in this connection to relate an incident in my own early life, which confirms my opinion and by which my eyes were first opened to existing conditions in England, as well as to the English idea of freedom. Just after I was graduated, I held the position of tutor during the years 1875 and 1876 in the family of the English consul-general at Constantinople, Sir Philip Francis, a highly educated man who had studied in Germany and was a member of the radical reform party, and with whom I came into close personal relations. One day I said to him that I would like to read the "Essay on Liberty," by John Stuart Mills, to which he replied, "It isn't at all necessary that you should read it; for England that essay was of great importance, for it advances ideas that must be realized there. But for you it has little that is new; what it advo-

cates for England has been accomplished in Germany for over a century." And this is quite true. The essay discusses ideas of religious liberty and freedom of thought that have been in practice with us ever since the era of our emancipation of thought and of our classic literature, whereas in England they are not generally accepted even yet. Until very recently any one in England who openly acknowledged himself to be an atheist stood without the pale of the law, and we all know with what rigid narrowness the "keeping of the Sabbath" is still construed and enforced there.

CHAPTER III

SOME EFFECTS OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION — THE ARMY — THE REFORMS

WHEREAS the English submit to social compulsion without protest, and, in striking contrast to the Germans, actually accept it as a matter of course, and hardly realize its existence, on the other hand they are distrustful of all and every assumption of authority on the part of the state, and oppose themselves to it. This want of confidence in the state, nay, it may even be said this antagonistic attitude toward it, is but the natural consequence of the constitutional struggles between Parliament and Crown. The spirit of this long continued struggle still survives, although when it ended, a victorious Parliament had appropriated the authority of the Crown, which now serves merely to give expression to the unrestricted authority of the Parliament and of the Cabinet that is dependent upon the latter for its tenure of office. This want of confidence finds peculiar expression in the provision which makes it impossible to raise taxes in England, either direct or indirect, without the consent of Parliament; and further, in that the taxes may be levied only for a stated period of time, in part, for no longer than a year. Moreover, in contrast to our law, they can-

not continue to be collected after the expiration of this prescribed time limit except by the sanction of Parliament, a circumstance by which this body, in theory at least, is given the power to bring the entire machinery of government to a standstill.

The like is true of the army, in connection with which the distrust of the Crown, which showed itself in the constitutional struggles that occurred during the reigns of Charles II and William III, brought about some unique and bizarre situations that were not only detrimental to England's status as a world power, but to her political activity as well. This, too, is but a survival of the ancient antagonism. In theory, England is provided with an army only when outer conditions make it a necessity, viz.: when the country is at war, or on the eve of war. A standing army has ever been regarded by the English as the implement with which kings impose their tyranny upon the people, and therefore it has been but slowly and deficiently developed. Until far into the last century the army was dependent for its pay and disciplinary powers upon an annual grant by the Mutiny Act. The provision for the purchase of commissions and all advancement in the army was intended as a further check upon its control by the Crown, since this made it impossible for any but men of means to become officers. Their financial independence was supposed to insure independence of their sovereign also, because it enabled them to lay down their commissions at any time, if called upon to render a service contrary to conscience or to the constitution. This provision for the sale of

commissions was abrogated in 1871; but the spirit of independence still prevails in the army, as does also the absence of any strong sense of obligation on the part of the officers to carry out their orders with unquestioning obedience. Instead, they reserve to themselves the right to decide according to their political convictions what their military duty is. Of this we had a drastic example during the past year in Ireland when the army refused to act against the openly organized rebellion of the Orangemen of Ulster, an act of insubordination which the government had to accept, since it had no remedy at its command.

The sovereign has been deprived of every influence over the army; since the time of George II no English king has taken the field at the head of his forces, and although Queen Victoria with admirable persistence long refused to relinquish her right to appoint the commander-in-chief of the army, and to select him from among the members of her family, she was after all compelled in 1871 to acquiesce in his subordination to the Secretary of State for War. In 1904 the office of commander-in-chief of the army was abolished, and the English army and navy are now under the exclusive control of the Cabinet.

Although the ranks of the officers of the army and of the navy are largely filled by men from the moneyed classes, or else by younger sons of the nobility, and therefore command the respect of the community, it is notorious that the rank and file of the army is recruited from the lowest strata of

the population. This is but the natural and unavoidable result of the enlistment system; military service as private or non-commissioned officer is only sought either by brawling adventurers, or by men who have suffered shipwreck in life, or are unfitted by nature to earn a livelihood in other ways; or else by young men who have been overpersuaded or have been lured on by deceptive promises, and who all too often sign their contract while under the influence of liquor. All attempts to better the situation by an increase in the pay of the soldiers, and by the promise of a well-paying position in the civil service upon conclusion of their military service have proved fruitless. And this is unavoidable, because it lies in the very nature of things that where the enlistment system is in force and a man holds his life at a price, the soldier's vocation should be regarded with contempt. In England private soldiers and non-commissioned officers are excluded from society and are refused at all the better class of public houses, and it is a well known fact that army officers when off duty do not wear the uniform, and are rather ashamed of it.

An army of mercenaries can be kept together only by the most rigid discipline, and therefore it was not until well in the seventies of the nineteenth century that whipping was abolished as a punishment in the English army and navy, whereas in Germany it had been out of use for the past two generations. To supply the navy, England's main arm of defence, with a sufficient number of seamen, impressment was resorted to up to the close of the Napoleonic

wars. A commission appointed for the purpose seized such young men as seemed fitted for the service, and compelled them to become seamen,—a proceeding which was an offense to the nation's sense of personal freedom, and aroused the amazed wonder of Voltaire when he was a witness to it on his first visit to this remarkable country, but which, for instance, the author of the Junius letters regarded not only as a necessity, but as justifiable both morally and politically.

Ever since these measures have been discontinued, it has been most difficult to secure a sufficient number of men for the British army and navy. The brilliantly illustrated recruiting placards that are displayed in most public places, and that picture in glowing colors the special arm of the service that they advertise as desirable above all other employments and as an especially easy and attractive way of earning a livelihood, are viewed by the stranger in England with an amused contempt. But they are displayed to little purpose. Discipline in the service is relaxed more and more; unruliness and revolts, demands for better pay, better rations and better treatment generally, have become the order of the day, but nothing can be done to put an end to it. When the troops are to embark for over-sea service, they are not infrequently driven aboard half-seas-over and strongly guarded. That such an army cannot be fitted to meet the demands of modern warfare, which depends so largely upon every soldier's patriotic devotion to duty as well as upon a sense of moral obligation on the part of the troops to hold

together in scattered engagements, needs not to be argued.¹ Moreover, the officers generally, although not without conspicuous exceptions, are deficient both in that preparatory intellectual development and military education which would fit them to meet the problems of modern military tactics. And as for the volunteers and the militia, they are entirely lacking in this education, for their especial preparation has been merely in the nature of a popular sport in which the real military problems and demands can hardly receive any consideration. In battle, to be sure, the British troops are no cowards; but this is largely to be attributed to the self-respect and stubborn tenacity inherent in the English national character, as well as to the Britain's love of a fight of which he gives ample evidence in his every-day life, and which is no insignificant element in the national love of sport. To how great a degree not only the land forces, but the navy as well, are insufficiently fitted to meet the exigencies of modern warfare, how lacking in preparedness, and how incomplete their equipment is in spite of official assurances to the contrary, has been amply shown in all the wars that Great Britain has waged in recent years, for they have invariably begun with defeat

¹ This is well illustrated by a story told by Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe. ("Aus Meinem Leben" III, 328 f.) During the war of 1866 an English major went about looking for the Prussian encampment, but in vain, until finally he exclaimed that he could not understand how the troops could be kept together without an encampment, or how without it they could be got together to start on their onward march.

for the British. The fact is that the English are incapable of methodic and exhaustive organization, for they are not only wanting in the education that fits for it, but their political and social conditions are opposed to the close organization that is inseparable from successful warfare.

In view of the glaring discrepancy between this inefficient military organization and the constantly increasing demands made upon it for the maintenance and expansion of Britain's world empire, there has been during the last decade an ever growing demand on the part of the wise for the introduction of universal military service. But for the average Englishman this is an abomination; unlike the German, he looks upon universal military service with its demand for the entire devotion of the individual to the state for the time being, as ignominious slavery, and the end of all his much lauded liberty. If necessary, he is quite ready to pay for the demands of the state, and therefore is willing enough that soldiers shall be bought in whatever market they may be found; but to offer himself, even to the extent of his life, for the highest duty that his country and its people ask of him appears to him to be an unendurable compulsion. Even while his country is at war, he desires not to be disturbed in the ordinary routine of his life, nor in the pursuit of his own interests, and he considers it to be the business of the state to make this possible for him. Both in England and in America this deep-seated aversion to universal military service is at the bottom of all the hatred of Germany, and of the outcry against

German "militarism," and it is therefore indirectly the cause of the present war. The war between England and Germany is in fact merely a repetition of the historic struggle of a backward and outgrown form of political and national organization against one that is far in advance of it, and by which it has been overtaken and distanced, and which is both ethically and politically of a much higher order.

This condition of backwardness as compared with the states of the continent, and especially with the German form of state organization, is apparent in every department of public life. Nevertheless, even the United Kingdom could not withdraw itself entirely from the influence of the constantly advancing development of the nineteenth century and the new and far-reaching demands made by it. The parliamentary reforms of 1832, immediately preceded by the emancipation of the Catholics (1829), made an end of the brutal and irresponsible rule of the reactionaries, and opened the way for a long series of changes by which England instituted reforms that had long been in effective operation on the continent. The barbaric law by which any form of theft was made punishable by death, or at least by deportation to Australia, was modified; imprisonment for debt, so drastically pictured by Dickens and so frightful in its consequences, was abolished, and the deplorable Poor Laws, according to which, for instance, orphans or the children of paupers could actually be sold as apprentices for the sake of ridding the community of the expense of maintaining them, were materially improved. All ardent admirers of Eng-

land and her *free* institutions should reflect upon the opposition that all these reforms encountered, as well as upon the tardiness with which these humanitarian principles were put into practice.

The local government also underwent a complete re-organization. The ancient "self-government" system, by which the great landed proprietor in the capacity of justice became the legal administrator of the county, as church warden controlled the parish, and, most important of all, was also charged with the care of the poor, proved itself more and more unsatisfactory,—and the like may be said of the municipal corporations. Although in the administration of both municipal and county boroughs, the newly organized system of self-government retained the old historic foundations in their place of honor, yet it now rests on as democratic a basis as does the Parliament. The administration is in the hands of an elected Council, the ordinary members of which, the councillors, hold office for a term of three years; to these are added one-half as many aldermen, elected for a term of six years. Subordinate to the Council are the numerous permanently appointed and salaried officials, such as there are in the ministerial departments, and it is they who really transact the great bulk of official business. This form of local government has born the test of time, although it suffers under the disadvantage that important and responsible positions are often held by men little versed in the matters entrusted to them, whereas the men best fitted for these positions of responsibility hesitate to undertake them, because they

shrink from the excitement and bitterness that are inseparable from the election campaigns. This is a disadvantage from which the German municipal administration suffers less; for not only does a differently constituted election system make for better conditions with us, but the longer term of office, and the institution of a city magistracy of technically educated councillors and mayor, who are fitted for the special positions which they hold, are absolutely necessary conditions to continuity of purpose in administration and to the efficient discharge of municipal business. In the elections for our parliament, however, we too are experiencing in an ever-increasing degree the great disadvantage to which the democratic system is subject, viz., that men of a more sensitive nature are deterred from accepting political nominations because of the distasteful experiences that are inseparable from the campaign for election, while the uncertainty of the outcome makes it impossible for many men especially well qualified for the positions to decide upon a political career.

English local government suffers under still another drawback in that the numerous transactions which with us are entrusted to the local administration are dependent in the United Kingdom upon special Act of Parliament, even to so small a matter as the franchise of a street railway. But to get such measures through Parliament (by way of private bills) is not only a tedious and expensive process, but is always accompanied by a degree of uncertainty as to the outcome. Moreover, in England there is no provision made for the combination of small po-

litical districts into a larger political unit which would then have charge of the affairs and special interests of an entire section of country, as is the case with us in our government districts and provinces. The Home Rule movement in Ireland and Wales has for its object precisely such a political organization, an arrangement by which the people could manage their own affairs within limits prescribed by law, and independently of Parliament.

CHAPTER IV

ENGLAND AS A "NIGHTWATCHMAN STATE"— EDUCATION AND SCIENCE — SOCIAL REFORM LEGISLATION

IF aspirations for reform fail of consistent realization in the United Kingdom, this must be ascribed in a large measure to the English idea of personal freedom by which these aspirations are thwarted at every turn, as well as to the native opposition to any increase of state authority. This condition of affairs has found characteristic expression in the term "Nightwatchman State," which means neither more nor less than that the state's sole business is to provide conditions whereby those who live within its jurisdiction may lead an existence secure against violence and illegal interference, and by which it will be made possible for them, unhindered except by such legal restrictions as are necessary to community life, to pursue their own interests with perfect freedom, so that every man may gain for himself the greatest degree of prosperity that opportunity and his own ability place within his reach.

Such a conception of the state refutes the idea that it has an existence apart, and one of much greater value in itself than that of the individual citizens, since it unites into a civic organism the atoms of

a society that otherwise would fall apart, and lends to their existence its highest value by making it possible for them to realize ideal conditions which as individuals they could never realize. According to the English idea, the state dwindles into a sort of higher police force. To fulfill the duties that have been left to it, it must have a financial foundation, and a body of officials; it must be allowed occasionally to interfere with the absolute freedom of action desired by its citizens, since it is obliged to make some demands upon them which, though necessary, are much to be deplored. Its functions and authority are therefore to be limited as much as possible; every movement and every effort that tend toward clothing the state with wider powers are looked upon as destructive of personal freedom, and are therefore to be opposed in every conceivable way, and, if possible, thwarted. Toward foreign influences the attitude is the same, for, should a new form of state organization be established abroad and found to be good, England also might feel constrained to adopt it.

The conception of the state as it exists at present became general in England during the middle of the nineteenth century in close connection with the free trade movement and the teachings of Cobden and the Manchester School. Even so able an historian as Macaulay approved of it in all its essentials, although, while his great historical work was in progress, he evidently realized more and more the fundamental value of wider state authority, as well as the desirability of a continuity of purpose in state

policy, and that this should therefore not be subjected to the fluctuating influences of party bias. This change in the historian's views is apparent to any reader who compares his later with his earlier writings. It is due to this limitation of the state's authority that many institutions and undertakings, the organization and administration of which constitute some of the most important duties of the state in other countries, are either entirely withdrawn from government control in England, or, through pressure of circumstances, have only lately been reluctantly assumed in part by the state, and so are largely left to private enterprise.

Conspicuous among the public interests from which the English state has kept aloof is the great sphere of intellectual life,—education, science and art. Of the popular education the state was compelled to take charge if England was not to be outdistanced in this field by all the more advanced countries of the continent. When compulsory education was proposed, it met with the most violent opposition from the proprietary classes, and more especially from the capitalists, who argued that the working classes were much more useful, as well as much more contented, without the ability to read or write, an accomplishment which could only serve to awaken within them aspirations that after all could not be satisfied. This argument was accompanied by the fine-sounding phrase that compulsory education is in itself an infringement upon the personal freedom of the individual and of his right to be the master of his fate. Finally, however, although not without

vigorous agitation and violent opposition, education was made obligatory by the state in 1870 (!), and since that time numerous bills have been enacted by which the elementary schools have been systematized, state support has been provided for them, and their control placed in the hands of officials appointed by the state. Thus an end has been made of the appalling conditions to which the writings of Dickens called attention.

For the higher education however there is still a deplorable lack of systematized provision. On the one hand there are the "day schools," in charge of the parish or the county, together with the somewhat similar private schools that are patronized by the children of the lower middle class, who, while continuing to live in the homes of their parents, receive in these schools a practical technical education intended to fit them for their calling in life. On the other hand are the great public schools, conspicuous among which are the famous old foundations of Eton, Harrow and Rugby, where the sons of the aristocracy are educated to be "gentlemen," and are also fitted to enter Oxford and Cambridge. The sharp class distinctions which characterize English social life are especially marked in the sphere of education; it is still felt to be a sort of social stigma if a boy cannot afford to go to one of these public schools, but must content himself to remain at the home of his parents and attend the day school.

As for the English universities, they are, as every one knows, all private institutions either of old foundations or, as is the case with the newer col-

leges and universities, endowed with funds contributed by men of means. The state has nothing to do with them except to grant them a charter by virtue of which they become incorporated institutions with the right to confer degrees; in addition, the newer universities receive from the state a small — absurdly small — financial aid. Among the universities class distinction reigns supreme. The newer ones (Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Birmingham, Wales and London University, which has been in the throes of birth for decades) are patronized by the sons of the middle class, who here receive an education which in its essentials is much like that which the upper classes in our high schools offer, together with a purely practical technical training. Oxford and Cambridge, on the other hand, are attended by the rising generations of gentlemen that are here fitted for the higher spheres of life, i. e., they receive that general intellectual education that is traditional in England, while they perfect themselves in the sports and in the art of parliamentary debate, as well as in that of spending money with elegant ease. Really scholarly interests and pursuits are quite outside the ordinary student's sphere, nor are they expected of him.

The endeavor to re-construct the old English universities along lines followed by the universities of the continent and of America, and to transform them into truly scientific institutions for higher learning has proved futile because the necessary material is lacking both in the teaching force and in the student body. The learned celebrities who figure as mem-

bers of the faculties do not as a rule give class instruction; two or three lectures a year are all that is required of them. Indeed, there are those among them who boast that they have never lectured at all. It is therefore outside of the universities that most of the scientific and other intellectual work in England is accomplished, and by scholars who stand in no official relation to any institution of learning. That every man's knowledge and capability are not merely his personal possession, but that they impose upon him a duty toward his fellow men, and that especially those scholars who are scientific experts should pass their knowledge on to the next generation as teachers of its youth is the high idea by which all intellectual workers in Germany are inspired, and to this the English are strangers.

The natural inference would be that under such conditions England would fail to hold her own in the world of science; and this is the case. During the last few generations she has lost her leadership in the lines in which so many of her scientists have been pre-eminent in the past. The places which these leaders in science left vacant have not been filled by men of later generations; most English scholars of to-day lack a broad education, and so are content to be specialists, and fail to get the wider outlook beyond the narrow limits of their special branch into the domain of universal science.

It is not the part of wisdom therefore to induce young men from Germany or America to avail themselves of the Rhodes' scholarship to become students at Oxford or Cambridge, where they can doubtless

get an insight into the English manner of life, but can never obtain the scholarly education that the universities of their home land can offer them. Habits of luxury they do contract, however, and learn to spend money with a lavishness that is amazing to us. The least that a student in these universities can get along on with utmost, nay, with painful economy, is £200 (4000 marks) a year; students who would live in easy circumstances must expect to spend twice or three times that amount. This is the danger by which the young men who take advantage of the offered scholarship are beset, and there are many instances in which it has worked them harm.

That in England the state does practically nothing to promote the interests of science and of art no one will deny; in these spheres everything is left to chance and private initiative, and, with the abundant means at hand, some wonderful results have doubtless been achieved in this way. But what the state itself does to further these interests is far outdone by all other countries that lay claim to national culture of the highest rank, and not only by the powerful nations of ancient civilization and by America, but by so small and poor a people as the Greeks, who have done and are still doing marvelous things in science and art, and in the realm of intellect generally, and this not alone through the activity of the state, but by private enterprise and through associations for the advancement of culture. There is no other body of men in the world, having a just claim to be representative of the best there is in the way of culture in their own land, who have so little appre-

ciation of all matters of science and of art, and as little interest in them, as have the members of the British Parliament and Ministry.

The English are talking a good deal just now about their own deficiency and backwardness in science and the arts; for these shortcomings are not only making themselves felt in the intellectual life of the nation, but in the practical enterprises of life as well, and England is falling more and more to the rear in the struggle for industrial supremacy. Of well-intentioned resolutions and newly-organized societies to further these interests there are many, and funds are collected and an occasional new professorship is made possible by endowment; all with the wish to better these conditions, but to little purpose. What is accomplished usually depends wholly upon circumstances, and upon the inclination of the donor, who may be interested in Egyptology, or Chinese, or biology, and who looks upon himself as a benefactor of the community if he endows a chair in some university for instruction in the subject which is of special interest to him, with little thought as to whether or not there are students who desire this instruction, which is usually imparted by men of mediocre ability, and in the form of popular lectures.

The fault that lies at the root of these unpromising conditions is the total absence of all organized direction in such matters; this is however the only way in which something really worth while can be accomplished. Nor is there any provision made by which the young people can be led into the newer paths of instruction; for this also requires organized

direction under the control of the state, a method of procedure which the English reject with righteous indignation. How often has the advisability of acquiring a foreign language, especially German, been preached in England as absolutely indispensable, if the country would maintain its old-time pre-eminence in the industrial world. But with what result? The German language has been studied less and less in the English secondary schools and universities during the last decades, until at present it is hardly studied at all, while in America just the reverse has taken place.

The fact is that England is beginning to show the effects of her tenacious adherence to the rigid forms of an old and decrepit cultural system from which she finds it impossible to extricate herself. The familiar "Don't move from the beaten track" has been her watchword in this sphere of activity as it has been in others, and therefore all the well-meant discussions and resolutions amount to nothing. A real improvement can be accomplished only by means of a radical reform and a new structure from the ground up. Whether England can bring herself to adopt such drastic measures, time alone can reveal.

Social conditions are not much better. To be sure, much was accomplished by the reforms that were inaugurated during the third decade of the nineteenth century, and by which the appalling state of affairs in the factories and in the relief of the poor was improved; child labor was restricted, and a provision for government inspection of factories was made. In 1842 a law was passed prohibiting the

employment of women in the mines, and in 1847 the working day for women and children was limited to ten hours. In 1848 the extreme tendencies of the chartist movement were suppressed, but were immediately followed by the organization of labor in trades unions, whereby the material condition of the laboring classes was greatly bettered. When in 1868 Disraeli's reform bill greatly widened the franchise, the political status of the working classes experienced a decided uplift through the influence they had thus obtained upon the elections for the Parliament. In 1893 the Labor Party was organized as an independent political group, standing between the two great parties, and since then it has been the deciding element in many a hard fought battle in Parliament, and it has had the satisfaction of seeing its leaders take their places in a Liberal Government.

But never has there been an effort to improve the condition of the working classes by legislative act that has not met with violent protest from the moneyed classes and the interests of capital; for these look upon any such legislation as an interference with the natural course of things in general and with the Englishman's right to personal freedom in particular. I have a vivid recollection, for instance, of the vigorous opposition which Plimsoll's bill for "the sailer's load line" met before it became a law in 1875. The phrase refers to the line which marks the limit up to which the law allows a vessel to be laden; for it had been a common trick of the trade to load an old and unseaworthy vessel far beyond its capacity, and then send it to sea and to certain de-

struction, so that the insurance money, which more than covered the loss, might be collected. That this meant the sacrifice of many lives was a matter of little consideration to the shipowners; theirs was the right to do as they pleased with their ship, and the sailors were free to exercise their own discretion when they undertook the risk of sailing a vessel. It is an amazing fact that a reputable economic publication at the time argued in opposition to the bill, saying that British trade necessarily involved the annual sacrifice of a certain number of lives; that this was but the course of nature with which man could not hope to interfere; and it then went on to compute the exact money value of each life—"the commercial value of human life."

All effort to improve social conditions has met with like opposition, for England is by no means the leader in this field either, but follows far behind some of the states of the continent. Germany was the pioneer; the stupendous transformation which has been accomplished there was made possible only by the idealistic attitude of the nation toward the realization of the ideas for which Bismarck pointed the way. Germany's lead in social re-organization was followed by the other states of the continent, one after another, although not always without reluctance. Belgium, once the idealist's embodiment of all things liberal, now lags behind in the very last rank of this forward movement; and France, where capital reigns supreme, has as yet not even found it possible to enact any just tariff and personal tax legislation, while England has finally felt com-

pelled to take the first steps in this onward march.

When in 1906 a Liberal Radical Government with Lloyd George and the Labor leader, Burns, came into office, an energetic program of social reform legislation was undertaken. In 1913 there was even an attempt made to render it impossible for unreasonably large areas of land in England to be held by one landowner, and the proposed preventive legislation was along lines such as had been successfully carried out during the last decades against the same evil in Ireland, under the pressure of the Irish movement and the boycott (p. 93). Should the party really succeed in putting through a social-agrarian reform measure, and so break the dominating influence of the large landowners, this would greatly strengthen the position of the Liberals, and perhaps give them enduring political control of England.

How far England is behind Germany in the solution of the ever-present social problems is evident to every one who has traveled extensively in the two countries. The abject poverty that may be seen on every hand in the larger cities of England, the wretched way in which the poor are housed, the ragged garments in which men and women alike are seen in the streets, dirty and unkempt,— such things are unknown to us in Germany, where the poorest person would be ashamed to appear in clothing that is full of holes, out at the elbows, and with sleeves and trousers fringed with rags. German mothers or wives would patch the garments and make them presentable, if the wearer himself failed to do so,

and no woman would go about in the ragged clothing in which women may daily be seen in England. This sense of decency is but one of the many testimonials to the educational value of universal military service. Aside from this, however, there is the love of surroundings that are not only comfortable, but pleasing as well, which is inborn in the Germans and prompts them to keep their houses tidy, be they ever so humble, to make them cheery with flowering plants, to love and cherish every green bush and tree, and to plant a little garden, if this is at all possible. In the rural districts of England the people show a like appreciation of pleasing surroundings in the care they take of their homes; but the poorer elements of the city populations lack this sense altogether; their every effort is given to securing the necessities of life, and nothing is left with which to provide anything more. Any one who has visited the ugly industrial centers of England,—Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Sheffield, and similar manufacturing districts of other large cities,—where everything is black, not a spear of grass in sight, and has seen the monotonously similar houses with their many chimneys, all covered with dirt and grime, will think himself in a workingman's paradise when he sees manufacturing districts such as those of Westphalia, where every workingman has a neat little cottage with a garden.

How dissatisfied the English working classes really are, and how serious is the danger which threatens from this quarter, has been unmistakably indicated by the great strikes of the last few years,

by which traffic was brought to a standstill, the receipt and distribution of food-stuffs prevented, and the whole country brought to the verge of a temporary food famine. It would seem therefore that England may be seriously menaced from within, if the war should continue much longer, the wheels of industry be stopped, and thousands of men be out of employment. With us the state has made provision for such an emergency, and comes to the relief of all who would otherwise be in distress, as it is doing most wonderfully at present, and as it will continue to do. But of forethought such as this there is no trace in England, where the people will soon learn that if they would maintain their position of eminence among the nations, they will have to desert their old time ideals, and entirely change their attitude toward the social and labor problems that confront them.

For the idea of unrestricted freedom of action for every one, which has so long shaped all English life and has inspired the Liberals of every country with so much enthusiasm for English institutions, means virtually the dominance of capital, and the advancement of the material interests of the moneyed classes. To this idea, too, may be traced the English aversion to any form of government provision for social welfare, as well as to the assumption of any degree of responsibility on the part of the prosperous for the well-being of the community and of the poorer and more dependent elements of the population. This is the reason also why the system of old age and invalid pensions provided for by compul-

sory insurance, and patterned after the one operative in Germany, met with so much opposition a few years ago (1908). According to the English view all these matters should be left to the care of private philanthropy, which, every one will concede, has certainly rendered great and praiseworthy service in these lines. But after all, this would leave it entirely to personal inclination whether these important interests were to be looked after or not. That the state should step in and equalize the burden of responsibility so that it may be shared by all is an idea that is repugnant to the Englishman, and one which is irreconcilably opposed to his conception of the state and of his own personal freedom.

Surely no one will claim that the English are wanting in devotion to their ideals any more than are other nations, and England can point with pride to many of her sons who, with entire self-devotion and a persistence characteristic of the English, have striven to further the idealistic tendencies and humanitarian efforts of their generation. That they have accomplished much in spite of every endeavor to thwart them, and, in bitter and prolonged struggle with the opposing tendencies, have come off victorious in the end, has already been shown, and it would be but a foolish misrepresentation of facts to deny this. Nevertheless, of the average Englishman, the characteristically national type, it may be said that his chief trait is the unbridled selfishness which, sustained by the English idea of personal freedom, leads him to seek his own interests regardless of all else, and with ruthless indifference to the

rights of others to trample them underfoot, as he proceeds on his selfseeking way. And this crass egoism is transferred from private and business interests to the political struggles within the country, as well as to its relations to foreign nations and states. Another characteristic of the English, still less attractive and more dangerous, is that they do not take this stand openly and frankly, but understand excellently well how to disguise their real motives by high sounding phrases that claim for them idealistic and humanitarian intentions, and so give the impression that England and the English are ever seeking to advance the best interests of all mankind, or at least are contending for no more than their legitimate rights, while in reality the matter at stake is simply their own advantage and the power to exploit others.

The opium war with China in 1842, the bombardment of Alexandria and the occupation of Egypt, Jameson's invasion of the Transvaal, and lastly, the Boer war, are all especially drastic instances of England's humanitarian activity during the last few decades. Indeed, for three hundred years English history has been marked by the same characteristic; all the wars that were waged, all the numberless acquisitions of territory that were made, and which in part were wrested from European countries, from the civilized peoples of Asia, and from the "barbarian" races, bear witness to this. When the more conscientious men of England would not countenance these proceedings and raised a voice in protest, as, for instance, did the large minority that dis-

approved of the Boer war, it availed them nothing, and eventually they had to accept what the Government proposed to do.

This national tendency is furthered by another characteristic trait. The English mind has a natural bent toward the apprehension of the practical side of things and the immediate advantages to be derived from them; with rare and conspicuous exceptions, pure speculation and theory have little attraction for the English. The intuitive craving of the German to arrive at a consistent apprehension of the universal plan of things is quite foreign to the Englishman, as is also our propensity to meditate on the problems of life, which gives rise to so much pondering thought even among our people in the lower walks of life, and often develops in men of very ordinary ability a tendency to critical examination, together with an astonishing ability for logical reasoning, although within limitations, of course.

These national traits incline the Englishman to accept authoritative statements and whatever has the support of public opinion without question, especially if they are well phrased.¹ Now it never is

¹ This is especially noticeable in the way in which the great mass of the English people, and a goodly number of Americans also, blindly accept the statements of the Bible in their literal sense, and in which they far exceed in credulity the most orthodox Germans. This is not seldom true even of men who in other matters have a very clear and unprejudiced judgment. In their opinion, however, religion and creed are matters apart, and are not subject to the ordinary methods of reasoning. Accordingly it is an easy matter to reverse this argument and find a convenient

difficult to find some wise sounding sentence or maxim from which a reason or excuse may be deducted for almost any course of reasoning or of action, and make it appear to be almost an ethical necessity. And so it comes about that the Englishman has two sets of principles to draw upon, one of which is certain to serve him as a justification for any course of action which he proposes to pursue. That the two do not harmonize does not seem to disturb the average Englishman in the least.¹ It would be a mistake however to call this peculiarity of character plain hypocrisy; the average Englishman simply accepts what is told him, and, intentionally or unintentionally, carefully avoids a closer scrutiny of it for fear that his eyes may be opened to something that may disturb him, and perhaps shake his faith in his comfortable double system of justification. This way of dealing with the prob-

excuse for temporarily ignoring the dictates of religion and ethics when these conflict with special interests, either personal or national.

¹ This remarkable process of reasoning was laughably illustrated during the present war when, on December 16, 1914, Scarborough and Westhartlepool were fired upon by German war vessels. This occurrence roused the English to an indignant protest in which they declared it to be a flagrant violation of international law, since these places were open ports and therefore unfortified. (We have yet to learn of an instance when England refrained from an attack upon such ports if it was to her advantage.) At the same time, however, they announced that the forts of Westhartlepool had returned the fire. But I question whether the average Englishman so much as noticed this glaring discrepancy.

lems of life has one great advantage,— it banishes all qualms of conscience, a very troublesome weakness for those who would win success on the practical side of life, and one from which the English seem to be peculiarly free.

What has been said of English credulity does not, of course, apply to the most intelligent people, and especially not to the “smart” business men and the political wirepullers; these are very well aware of how little there is back of all their loudly proclaimed adherence to principle. The English have a particular word for this assumed attitude of virtue, this unctuously expressed devotion to high standards of morality; they call it “cant,” and they are quick to look through it, too. But foreigners, and especially the Germans, are deceived by it again and again, because they cannot understand how a man of honor can resort to means so unscrupulous. This was once more the experience of our diplomats in their negotiations with Great Britain just before the beginning of the present war. But to a certain class of English diplomatists it matters little what they do, if only an appearance of virtue and decorum is preserved, and when one of their especially perfidious tricks has proved successful, the English public not only accepts it, but gives them hearty applause.¹

¹ At the time when Edward VII, then Prince of Wales, was implicated with others in dishonesty at cards while playing bakkarat, his most eminent associate in this deplorable incident was awaited on his return to his home by an enthusiastic crowd of admirers, who detached the horses

The present war must have opened the eyes of even the dullest observers to what may be expected of the English gentleman and of his love of fair play and regard for moral principles and justice, unless, indeed, they are keeping them shut intentionally because, like many of the neutrals, they do not want to see things as they are.

from his carriage, and themselves dragged it to its destination. They evidently believed that he had acquitted himself as an English gentleman should, in knowing how to come off victor in the game, honestly or dishonestly; after all, why were people so stupid as to allow themselves to be cheated!

CHAPTER V

IRELAND

ONE member of the United British Kingdom has ever been the object of ruthless exploitation for the benefit of specifically English interests, and, while nominally recognized as a member on equal terms with the others, has in reality received the treatment of a mercilessly subjugated province, and been deprived of every vestige of its much-desired independence; — it is needless to mention the name of Ireland. In the treatment accorded the “emerald isle” the true nature of English humanitarianism is glaringly revealed, together with the hollowness of all the loudly proclaimed liberal intentions with which the English deceive themselves, and have too long duped all credulous foreigners.

Although Ireland first came under English domination during the reign of Henry II, it was not until the close of the sanguinary warfare waged against it with utmost cruelty by Henry VIII, and especially by Elizabeth, that the island lay prostrate at the feet of its conqueror. The English Revolution was the signal for an equally bloody uprising of the Irish, which was suppressed with terrible thoroughness by Cromwell. This conquest of the island that pro-

fects the west coast of England was by no means confined to its political subjection and the union of the two islands in one kingdom, for its first and foremost purpose was to gain possession of the land itself and to distribute this among the foreign invaders,— a sort of colonization by violence. For this reason the war against Ireland was in its widest effect one of extermination, just as were the wars against the Indians of North America, waged first by England, and later by the United States. A large part of the population was put to the sword, while thousands of children were sent to America, there to be sold as slaves.

In the provinces of Ulster, Munster and Leinster all lands were confiscated, and then parceled out among the soldiers and the immigrants that followed them; the native population was transferred to the northwestern and least fertile part of the island, and crowded together in the province of Connaught where land was assigned to the “innocent Papists,”— those of the Irish who could prove that they had taken no part in the rebellion. In the other three provinces only the laboring classes were allowed to remain, since these could not be spared.

This war of races was also a religious war; the conquerors were Protestants, and the vanquished were Catholics, whose zeal for their church was strengthened by the relentlessness of their persecution. It is a well established fact that during the two hundred years in which Catholicism was suppressed in Ireland and its adherents persecuted with utmost cruelty, the Protestant religion made prac-

tically no converts among the natives of the island. Conversion was not the object of the invaders, but quite the contrary, since every conversion would have been a distinct disadvantage to themselves, for they would have had to make concessions to these newly made fellow Protestants.

Cromwell's terrible method of settlement was but little modified at the time of the Restoration by the Bill of Settlement in 1660; but even the slight ameliorations it provided were not carried out in full, for the Protestant settlers looked upon every concession made to the Catholics and Irish as an infringement of their own rights, and as detrimental to English interests, and therefore protested against them, both vigorously and successfully. And so only a small number of those who had been dispossessed of their land received it back again; about four-fifths of the island remained in the hands of Protestants, while large domains were conferred upon English magnates and favorites of the Crown.

Later, James II made Ireland the mainstay of his endeavor to Catholicize his realm, and after the revolution of 1688, used the island as a base of operations in his attempt to regain his crown with the aid of France. The national uprising of the Irish under the flag of the legitimate King, and with the hope of winning their independence, led to the notorious Bill of Attainder, enacted by the Irish Parliament in 1689. By it the Irish paid back the English invaders in their own coin, by confiscating their lately acquired land as having never been rightfully theirs, and moreover, as having been forfeited by their par-

ticipation in the rebellion, and then restored these lands to the original owners, but with a provision to indemnify the recent English owners for their loss.¹ These measures were never carried out, however; with the victory that William III won in the battle of the Boyne (July 1, 1690), and the subsequent conquest of the entire island, the fate of Ireland was sealed. The Act of Settlement was restored, the English settlers received back the lands of which they had been dispossessed, and the provisions for toleration guaranteed to the Catholic Church and its adherents by the terms of surrender when Limerick capitulated were evaded as much as possible. The Irish received the treatment of an enslaved race having no rights whatever; but since their physical fitness made them very desirable as soldiers, they were urgently induced to recruit in England's army,—of Englishmen there always have been comparatively few in the British army aside from the corps of officers, and of this, too, Irishmen have always formed a considerable part.

The English High Church became the established church of Ireland; for its support the Roman Catholics were forced to pay the customary tithe, which was collected by brutal middlemen with a resort to any form of violence, and they were also compelled

¹ Macaulay, in his interesting rehearsal of these events, gives a very one-sided picture of the conditions that prevailed in Ireland at this time. A much less partisan and very detailed account of them may be found in the second volume of Lecky's "History of England in the Eighteenth Century." The German historian Ranke also gives a brief and striking portrayal of them in his history of England.

to build the churches; numerous profitable benefices were established for dioceses in which, aside from the fatly endowed clergy, there was hardly a communicant. Catholics were debarred from teaching; if any dared undertake it, they did so at the risk of incurring the heavy penalties provided for such a breach of the law. In the disposition and inheritance of property the Catholics were subject to manifold restrictions, while the statutes abounded in various cunningly devised clauses that made it possible to deprive them of the little that was left them. How every effort was made to ruin Irish agriculture, industry and trade we will see later. The government of the country was left to the Irish Parliament under strictest supervision by the Parliament at London; the Dublin Parliament was elected exclusively by the Protestant settlers, and far exceeded both in corruption and impotence the English Parliament, until, in 1801, when the two Parliaments were merged into one, the political union of the two islands was consummated, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland established.

Under this terrible oppression large numbers of the Irish died every year from hunger and from sheer misery, while their masters looked on utterly devoid of pity; it was intended that they should perish in ignorance and privation. How absolutely appalling the conditions really were is revealed by Dean Swift in the biting satire of his pamphlets, and which culminates in the tragic advice, grounded in deepest pity but carried out in his inimically detailed and absurdly realistic style, to butcher the

children and to breed them systematically for this purpose, since thus they would be of use to humanity, and at the same time an end would be made of all their misery, as well as of the crowds of beggars who were allowed to grow up only to fulfill a useless and hopeless existence. What Swift says is the more effective since, although Dean of St. Patrick's in Dublin, he was by no means in sympathy with the Irish people, and his religious views were biased by his sincere adherence to the narrow standards of the English High Church.

The marks which this horrible state of affairs left upon the national character of this gifted, good-natured, and highly imaginative race are familiar to every one. If the Irish were originally inclined to take life easy and to give little thought to the morrow, these traits could but be deepened by the long years of oppression during which they were denied every prospect of providing an independent or definite future for themselves. The rags, the dirt and the beggary that may be seen in Ireland and in such English cities as Liverpool, where there is a large Irish laboring population, can only be equaled in southern Italy and Spain. Doubtless there are Irish traits of character that afford a partial explanation of this deplorable condition, but by far the greater blame lies at the door of England, the powerful state that should have educated this subject people to a realization of better things, but instead, actually fostered these conditions because they constitute no insignificant factor in the impotence of the race. All the more should we be inclined to appre-

ciate the humor, the light heartedness and mental elasticity that have not deserted the Irish despite the sense of oppression from which they cannot escape. They still are inclined to make the best of things, and although much given to noisy discussion and long rhetorical outbursts, not seldom of a distinctly poetical character, as well as to quarrelsome and often offensive haranguing, they are neither vindictive nor fanatical. Religious persecution also is quite foreign to their nature in spite of all their Church has suffered at the hands of the English, who resemble the Irish in this respect as little as they do in most others.

During this period of Ireland's deep distress began the exodus of her sons, which has continued unbroken for many years; some emigrated to the colonies, others to England, and still others chose to become mercenaries in the armies of a foreign prince. Many, as has already been said, accepted the terms of the English recruiting officers and fought England's battles on many a field, not seldom against their own kinsmen serving as mercenaries under the banners of France, just as did the Greeks in ancient times, and in more modern days, the Swiss. The English policemen, too, those big, sturdy, and very sensible and helpful officers of the law with whom every visitor in England is familiar, are usually sons of Erin.

Intellectually gifted Irishmen most frequently turned to journalism, and they now form a large proportion, perhaps the majority of the great editorial staff of the English newspapers. And so it

comes about that often an Irish editor, in obedience to orders from his chief, writes fulminating articles in support of a policy that is diametrically opposed to his own convictions, and which personally he detests and antagonizes. The curse of modern journalism is this insincerity of its latest form of development,— the anonymous editorial, that only too often expresses in strongest terms convictions that are not those of the writer at all,— mere exercises in style, written in support of interests, personal or political, that the paper represents. It is needless to say that fortunately there are many happy exceptions to this general rule.

Under the foreign yoke the native speech of Ireland has all but disappeared from the island; only in the northwestern part, in the county of Connaught, may it still be heard as the language of the people.¹ But this has by no means made Englishmen of the Irish; on the contrary, the difference between them is as great as ever. A bitter hatred of the English oppressor and a longing to regain his lost right to have a voice in shaping the destiny of his race fills the heart of every true Irishman. These emotions are stimulated by the love that the Irish have for their emerald isle, their romantically deep devotion to their homeland; for the Irishman, unlike the Englishman, has a fatherland.

¹ The reverse of this is true of the Celtic language in Wales and among the Gaelic populations of the Scottish Highlands. The people of these regions could not be crushed as were the Irish, and moreover, being Protestants (though in Wales not of the established church), their church services were conducted in their native tongue.

Whenever opportunity offered, the hatred of England found expression in rebellion, especially when made more hopeful by promised aid from France; at other times it found vent in insurrections that during the last few centuries became a habit with the Irish. As questionable as are the means that are resorted to at such times, we must never forget that the men who in their dire need have had recourse to them in Ireland were and are idealists and patriots inspired by high motives, and often men of charming personality. The English fiction that the Irish are subjects of the United Kingdom, and that their civic duty as such is loyalty to the British government is not accepted by the subjugated race, and never can be.

In this connection the incredible short-sightedness of England's self seeking policy toward Ireland is fully revealed. It has achieved what one would be inclined to believe impossible in that the foreign invaders, the Protestant settlers themselves have been forced into the ranks of the insurgents by the ruthlessness of English oppression. Ireland has been well endowed by nature; in spite of the excess of moisture, the great stretches of moorland, the rocky areas and the scarcity of mineral and other natural wealth (there are no coal deposits and few minerals), the country could be a prosperous one because of its advantages for agriculture and stockraising, and its industrial and commercial possibilities. But that is just what the people of the English motherland wished to prevent, for they feared Irish industrial competition, and saw in it a serious menace

to their own profits. Ireland was not to be allowed to achieve prosperity or industrial independence; it was intended that it should remain a subjugated province to be drained of everything for the benefit of England.

A like policy was adopted by England in her relations to her colonies across the sea, but without success, because of the distance which separated them from the motherland and because of the greater independence of their attitude; it therefore resulted in the loss to England of the greater part of North America. Scotland, too, was to receive similar treatment, and under William III various measures were adopted with this end in view. But Scotland was an unsubjected kingdom, strong in its sense of independence, and was not to be trodden under foot. In the union consummated in 1707 it secured for itself valuable concessions, and, above all, was placed on an equal footing with England in industrial matters. The result was that before long England was over-run with keen and closely calculating Scotch business men, who for years were a cause for bitter but useless complaint on the part of their English competitors.

Ireland on the contrary lay helpless at the feet of England, and so here the full intent of the English policy could be freely worked out. Whenever it appeared probable that Ireland was about to realize a degree of prosperity through success in some one particular field of industry, England at once stepped in and crushed the prospect. The Navigation Acts of 1663, which were but those of 1651 in a some-

what altered form, were made more stringent in 1693, and deprived Irish commerce of its former terms of equality with that of England, decreeing that the export and import trade with the colonies should henceforth be carried on only through English ports and in English vessels. In 1665 and 1680 all exportation of cattle, meats, butter and cheese from Ireland to England was forbidden. When the Irish landowners then turned to sheep raising, to which the rich meadow lands of the island were well adapted, and the woolen manufacturers of Ireland soon afterward appeared to be in a fair way toward active competition with the manufacturers of England, all exportation of woolen goods from Ireland was prohibited, not only to England and her colonies, but to any part of the world. The raw product however was admitted into England since in this way the English woolen factories could be supplied with the cheapest wool. Ireland's next move — to foster the flax growing industry and the manufacture of linen — was checkmated with an import tax, so high that it was prohibitive, on all hemp and linen goods entering British ports.

The English kings, who were also the sovereigns of the nominally independent kingdom of Ireland, were obliged in spite of any attempted remonstrance to conform their action to the English demands. And although the impotent Irish Parliament roused itself to occasional demonstrations of resistance, it could, of course, accomplish nothing. Ireland has more and better harbors than has any other country of its size in the world, and its position should make

it the natural outlet of a large export trade to western Europe and America; but the harbors lie unused and neglected, for an Irish mercantile marine does not exist, and would not be tolerated by England. In addition, and for the purpose of still greater discouragement of native industries, Ireland was flooded with manufactured wares from England of a kind such as the Irish people themselves were producing. Yet England annually drew, and continues to do so, large sums of money out of this handicapped island for the benefit of the Crown and numerous magnates and prelates, and which eventually redounded to the benefit of England, since these officials are notoriously distinguished for their absence from the country in which they hold office, and rarely set foot upon their possessions there, but spend their incomes in England.

By these combined means Ireland was systematically consigned to pauperism and desolation; and with it all, its unhappy people have to endure the open scorn and derision of their subjugators, who themselves have brought about the degradation they despise.

Now all these destructive measures not only affected the people at whom they were aimed, but, equally with the Irish, the English settlers in the land also suffered the consequences. They, too, felt their every industrial effort to be intentionally handicapped, and their indignation against the mother country was the greater because they belonged to the superior race, and by means of their possessions and their greater alertness could have pursued lucra-

tive occupations to their advantage and the betterment of their fortunes, if the law had allowed them a free hand. But considerations for a community of blood and of religion, as well as for the dictates of a wholesome policy of provident care for the nation's future, were of as little importance to England as were the dictates of humanity and decency when these came in conflict with the desire to keep the neighboring island in slavish subjection, whereby every possibility of an inconvenient competition and consequent division of profits was avoided.

And so it came about that the English settlers themselves were drawn into opposition to the motherland, and, despite all differences of race and creed, made common cause with their Irish dependents against the common oppressor. Thus a community of interests was established, and a fellow-feeling for Ireland developed that is vividly apparent in the fiery pamphlets that came from the pen of Dean Swift in the early years of the eighteenth century. He says: "The conveniency of ports and havens, which nature has bestowed so liberally on this kingdom, is of no more use to us than a beautiful prospect to a man shut up in a dungeon.

"As to shipping of its own, Ireland is so utterly unprovided, that of all the excellent timber cut down within these fifty or sixty years, it can hardly be said that the nation has received the benefit of one valuable house to dwell in, or one ship to trade with. Ireland is the only kingdom I ever heard or read of, either in ancient or modern story, which was denied the liberty of exporting their native commodi-

ties and manufactures wherever they pleased. . . . We are forced to obey some laws we never consented to. . . . We are so far from having a king to reside among us, that even the viceroy is generally absent four-fifths of his time in the government. . . . One-third part of the rents of Ireland is spent in England; which, with the profit of employments, pensions, appeals, journeys of pleasure or health, education at the Inns of Court and both Universities, remittances at pleasure, the pay of all superior officers in the army, and other incidents, will amount to a full half of the income of the whole kingdom, all clear profit to England. . . . Ye are idle! ye are idle! answered Pharaoh to the Israelites, when they complained to his Majesty that they were forced to make bricks without straw.

“England enjoys every one of those advantages for enriching a nation which I have above enumerated; and, into the bargain, a good million returned to them every year without labour or hazard, or one farthing value received on our side; but how long we shall be able to continue the payment, I am not under the least concern. One thing I know, that, when the hen is starved to death, there will be no more golden eggs.”¹

This picture of Ireland as Swift saw it is a true portrayal of Irish conditions in all their essential features up to the time of the reform legislation of the nineteenth century. In spite of the Union consummated in 1801, Ireland remained the subjugated land it had been, languishing in misery, and the scene

¹ Swift, *A Short View of the State of Ireland*, 1727.

of constant uprisings and conspiracies. Its possession was, of course, a political necessity to England, since without it the position of Great Britain as a world power would be jeopardized, as also would her maritime ascendancy. Ireland as an independent state or, worse still, as a dependency of some foreign power, would bar England from immediate access to the open ocean, and would threaten, or at least circumscribe her maritime interests, just as England had herself prevented the full development of Holland and France as sea-powers, and had destroyed the maritime ascendancy of the Netherlands altogether. Aside from this, Ireland was needed by England as the chief recruiting ground for her army; but, at the same time, the willingness of the Irish to risk their lives for a price in serving as mercenaries was a proof of their inferiority to the free Englishman who would not stoop to the despised military service. Moreover, the revenues that Ireland yielded under compulsion were a very welcome addition to the treasury of the realm, and, above all, provided a care-free existence for many of England's ruling class and for the higher nobles who, as legislators by inheritance, composed the Upper House of the Parliament.

When, at the close of the Napoleonic wars, the evils of misgovernment became apparent in the homeland also in an ever increasing degree, and the country was evidently hastening toward a crisis, the first decisive blow to the existing system came from Ireland. The political ferment in the island under the leadership of the great agitator, O'Con-

nell, assumed such dimensions that it soon became evident that another uprising of the Irish people was at hand. Some of the more discerning of the Tory leaders realized that England was in no condition to cope successfully with such a peril; even the Duke of Wellington himself admitted that it would be the part of wisdom to make concessions, and himself undertook to see them through. It was Ireland therefore that forced the Catholic emancipation in 1829, and so made the first break in the prevailing system of control, and this was soon followed by the parliamentary reforms and further reform legislation.

In this general movement for reform Ireland was not wholly neglected. In 1834 the Catholics of Ireland were released from compulsion to build the churches and from payment of the tithe to the English High Church, the tithe being henceforth levied as a charge upon the land, a sort of income tax based on landed property values. Next came the improvement of the school system, and in 1868 the Anglican Church of Ireland was disestablished, but received a large indemnity. Ireland was benefited by some of the parliamentary reforms also.

But all of these, as well as other measures of reform, were too tardily undertaken, and did not strike deep enough to be a real help to Ireland, or to lessen the bitter feeling of hatred that its people bear their oppressors. The Irish people realize that these concessions were all grudgingly made, and only because of the compulsion exercised by irresistible pressure,

and that England's attitude toward them remains unchanged.

England still draws immense sums out of Ireland every year; Ireland is still compelled to send most of her exports by way of English ports and re-laden into English vessels; the Irish harbors still are undeveloped as they were in the days of Swift, and the great international navigation companies, such as the Hamburg-American Line, are not allowed a port of entry in Ireland. The total value of Irish exports for the year 1910 amounted to nearly 63½ million pounds sterling; of this total, a proportion to the value of 52½ millions was sent to England; the other 11 millions worth of goods were shipped to foreign ports, and of these only 700,000 pounds' worth were exported direct from Irish ports, and the remaining amount, valued at 10 millions, had to be sent via England.

The chief source of Ireland's distress remained,—the wretched agrarian laws were in no way modified. By far the larger part of the land was still, as it had been, in the hands of the English aristocracy and only a small number of these landholders ever set foot on Irish soil, while by far the greater part of the Irish people themselves, seven-eighths of the population, was at the mercy of the English landlords, and almost without redress. From the small piece of land which was allotted to an Irish peasant, and which he preferably planted with potatoes, he could not provide the most meager support for his family after meeting the heavy tax demands.

And so Ireland grew more desolate with every year, while the exodus to America and to the manufacturing cities of England took on ever greater dimensions. In addition, the terrible famine of 1845, which came as the result of the potato blight, carried away a very large part of the population. While in 1840 the census showed a population of 8,177,000 inhabitants, in 1850 this number had been reduced by death and emigration to 6,696,000. This diminution has continued uninterruptedly, and Ireland is the only country of Europe where the population has grown steadily less during the course of the nineteenth century, and where, in city and country alike, the visitor may see on every hand deserted and ruinous houses that are uncared for because the entire families that once lived in them have either died out or have left home and country. In 1870 the number of inhabitants was 5,408,000, in 1900 it was 4,458,000, and in 1911 only 4,390,000.

These figures in themselves are a terrible arraignment of English rule in Ireland, and at the same time are a convincing proof that the Irish movement could never be abandoned. O'Connell's attempt in 1843 to force the repeal of the Act of Union failed, but it was followed by the Fenian conspiracies, in connection with which so many deeds of murder were committed, and which the English government found so difficult to suppress. Then came the organization of the Irish Party as a political unit in Parliament, its purpose being to obtain for Ireland an Irish administration, and therefore the establishment of an independent national

parliament at Dublin. It is actually to the advantage of this party — so strange are the results of circumstances sometimes — that the population of the island has diminished, since, as a consequence, the electoral districts in Ireland are much smaller than those of England, and therefore Ireland has a much larger representation in the Parliament of the Kingdom than it is entitled to by the size of its population.

These Irish aspirations are shared, for reasons already mentioned, by a large part of Ireland's Protestant population of English descent. The community of interests that is developed by living together in the same land and under like conditions is after all the deciding influence, and outweighs all other considerations. It is a significant fact that the foremost political leader that Ireland produced in the nineteenth century, Parnell, "the uncrowned king of Ireland," was a Protestant of English extraction. It is only a part of the people of north-eastern Ireland, the descendants of the English settlers of Ulster, with Londonderry and Belfast as the central points of their influence, who have taken a stand in marked contrast to this general attitude.

Those who have these political aspirations of Ireland at heart find great encouragement in the support, chiefly financial, that they receive from the Irish in America, who hate England bitterly as the power that drove them from their homes and their native land. In America the Irish have shown of what they are capable when given a chance. It must be admitted that many of them, especially those who

came from most primitive circumstances and were without education of any kind, became the ready tools of agitators and unscrupulous politicians who had it in their power, through the existing state of political corruption, to provide these new Americans with easy means of earning a livelihood. But, generally speaking, the Irish have done well in America, and count among their numbers there some of the ablest and most respected citizens of the western republic.

By the English, it is needless to say, these Irish aspirations were regarded as entirely unjustified, and as the extravagant pretensions of an inferior and wholly incorrigible race whose inferiority was never more apparently evinced than in the ingratitude shown for all the benefits conferred by England, as well as in the total lack of a due appreciation of the great advantages to be derived from association with so powerful a state as England, and in an insatiable desire for ever more privileges. In 1848, Queen Victoria, who naturally looked at these matters through colored glasses, wrote to her uncle, King Leopold of Belgium: "There are ample means of crushing the rebellion in Ireland, and I think it is very likely to go off without any contest, which people (and I think rightly) rather regret. The Irish should receive a good lesson or they will begin again."

It is true that murder and other deeds of violence of every description were the means to which the Irish resorted in their extremity, and these were not to be condoned from a moral point of view, and

could not be tolerated by any government. Nevertheless they achieved results in one field at least where other means had proved fruitless. The agitation for agrarian reforms, which was strenuously renewed early in the seventies of the last century, found its most potent weapon in the newly invented "boycott," that derived its name from that of the landlord on whom it was first practiced in 1880,—viz., no laborers would work for the boycotted landlord, and his tenants refused to pay their rents or any other charges; and, since there was no money to be extracted from them, any legal action against them would have proved futile. To enforce this new method and make it general, all tenants who would not conform to this national demand, but preferred to pay their rents, were terrified into compliance, some even were murdered, others had their cottages burned down, or their cattle mutilated. By these brutal means the English were at last compelled to yield.

In 1881 Mr. Gladstone's Land Reform Bill was passed. According to it the tenants and peasants were to pay a fair rent based on legally established property values, while at the same time fixity of tenure was secured to them, since the landlord could no longer evict them at his pleasure. Further modifying measures were enacted, until finally, in 1903, the tenants received the legal right to acquire property rights from the landlord by the payment of an annual interest at a moderate rate, by which in time the title to the land passed to them; for this purpose the government advanced the purchase price to the

tenants. The English landowners resisted this encroachment upon their unrestricted privileges as long as they possibly could, but yielded in the end, as they could get no money out of their tenants in any other way. Indeed, they had reason to be thankful to get even so much for property that had become almost worthless.

In order to hold the Irish Party to the Liberals, Mr. Gladstone adopted "home rule for Ireland" as a part of his program in 1886. This meant, of course, an independent parliament for Ireland, and since that time this has always been the chief issue in England's home policy, and between the political parties. It led, first of all, to the formation of the Unionist Party, and since then has more than once contributed to the overwhelming defeat of the Liberals. But the question was not thus disposed of by any means, for the Irish Party was much too powerful and influential a political element to have its demands left without consideration for any length of time. Joseph Chamberlain, by far the most able of the Unionist statesmen, attempted to crowd the Irish question into the background by proposing a gigantic plan of forming a closer political union between all the integral parts of the British Empire, and sought to accomplish this end by all the means available to a demagogue. But the English colonies were not at all inclined to relinquish either their independence or their high protective tariffs, and the great agitation for tariff protection in England, especially on food stuffs, which Mr. Chamberlain conducted on a tremendous scale, failed to accom-

plish its purpose. The election in 1906 showed an overwhelming majority in favor of free trade, and at the same time for a Liberal ministry.

This decided the Irish question also, and there was nothing left for the majority of the British people to do but to accept the inevitable. The opposition of the Conservatives, who found their main stay in the Upper House, was broken when, in 1911, the Lords' right of veto was restricted by Act of Parliament. The Orangemen of Ulster raised a vigorous protest, however, and prepared for armed resistance, aided and abetted by the Conservatives and the corps of British army officers who, as has already been related, refused to act against them. By these events the country was brought to the verge of civil war. On July 26, 1914, two thousand rifles were secretly landed in Ireland, somewhere in the vicinity of Dublin, and distributed among the Irish volunteers. When the government authorities made an attempt to deprive them of these rifles — the Irish nationalists were not to be allowed to have arms, although the Orangemen of Ulster were being plentifully supplied with them — a bloody encounter ensued. Most of the volunteers succeeded in escaping and taking their arms with them, but in one of the Dublin riots which followed, a Scotch regiment in garrison there fired two volleys into the mob, killing and wounding several persons, mostly women and children. The inquiry into this affair, promised by Mr. Asquith, and by which "the army would doubtless be fully justified and come off with honor," as he declared in the Parlia-

ment, was never undertaken, since immediately afterward the war with Germany was begun. For the same reason all action on the Irish question was deferred. There were several considerations, however, that made it very desirable to secure the favor of Ireland, and specially the good will of the hoped for Irish recruits. It was therefore deemed expedient to go through with the form of passing the Home Rule Bill and ceremoniously placing it on the statute book, but with the proviso that the Act would be suspended from operation until after the close of the war, and was not then to be in effect until Parliament had had the fullest opportunity to revise it by amendment.

By this procedure, which seems well fitted for a place in a comedy, it was supposed that Irish sentiment would be changed, and the passions that had been kindled be appeased. The leaders of the Irish Party, Mr. Redmond foremost among them, have indeed declared themselves content with it, and are now vigorously upholding the Government, especially in the endeavor to secure recruits. In the public meetings that have been held for this purpose, Mr. Redmond has pictured the atrocious conduct of the Germans in Belgium, and how this was especially directed against the Catholic Church (England being renowned for her love of it!), and how the priests were murdered and the nuns violated. The Archbishop of Mechlin, who was brought from Belgium for the occasion, sat by and wept as he listened.¹ And so England finds herself in a posi-

¹ In the severely Protestant province of Ulster no such

tion to announce to the world that all the people of the United Kingdom are standing as a unit against the common foe, in brotherly harmony, and forgetful of all former differences, their only rivalry being in their devotion to their common country. "Ireland," declared Sir Edward Grey in his speech in which he outlined the Government's policy to the Parliament on August 3, 1914, "is the only bright spot in this entire terrible situation."

In reality, however, things look very different. The Irish would still be offering open resistance to England if they were not forcibly suppressed. The country is destitute of arms and is surrounded by mines; its few ports are closed to all foreign vessels, even to those of neutral countries; the freedom of the press is restricted, and the least criticism unfavorable to England, or suspicious behavior of any kind is considered cause for legal prosecution. The press justifies this attitude in a characteristically English fashion by declaring that although freedom of speech is a fundamental and inalienable right of every citizen of Great Britain, it is nevertheless not to be tolerated that the Irish nationalists should be allowed to frustrate the will of the majority of the English people by interfering with the recruiting of soldiers in Ireland.

appeal as this was made, it is needless to say. There the men were urged to fight for England because that country had been "the only one that had dared to defy the Pope and Rome!" But this is only another evidence of English efficiency to advocate with an equally honest mien two doctrines that are diametrically opposed to each other,—a talent in which no other nation can compete with them.

Since there is not the slightest prospect of success for their cause at this time, the Irish are contenting themselves with a passive resistance, which they manifest by refusing to recruit in spite of all offered inducements, although doubtless many a man is driven to it by absolute want. The true Irishman feels it to be treason to his own land to take up arms for England's cause, and Mr. Redmond and his colleagues have lost all their former influence, and are repudiated by the great mass of the Irish people, as has been shown in the by-elections which give great majorities against them. The patriotic Irish hope for German success in the present war, since they believe that their cause will benefit by it, and that perhaps it may even help them to gain their long desired freedom for Ireland. In what measure these sentiments may influence the Irish soldiers who are at the front, it would be difficult at present to say.

Ireland is evidently still "England's Heel of Achilles."¹ That England is not blind to the situ-

¹ Under this title appeared Schiemann's translation of the most interesting parts of Sir Roger Casement's pamphlet entitled "The Crime against Ireland and how the War may right it," which he wrote before the beginning of the war, and the whole tenor of which shows a remarkably clear insight in predicting the future.

The author was at one time British consul in the Congo Country, and while there was a witness of the evil results of its misgovernment and of the frightful atrocities practiced on the natives. Later he saw a repetition of these brutal scenes in the dreadful abuse of the Putumayo Indians in the region around the sources of the Amazon. It was due to him that public attention was directed to these

ation may be inferred from the fact that no sooner had the Pope, by request of the German government, sent two high Irish ecclesiastics to minister to the spiritual needs of the Irish prisoners in Germany, than England also entered into negotiations with the Vatican for a similar purpose, although never before having manifested any such concern. A delegate to the Pope was appointed, and a fanatically devout Roman Catholic at that, in the person of the Earl of Norfolk, a descendant of the ancient family of Howards who count among their number so many martyrs to Catholicism. For England this was a most remarkable proceeding, and one at variance with the entire trend of English tradition. Since the downfall of James II England has never entered into any official relations with Rome until now, and at any other time this step would have roused a storm of indignant protest and the cry of "No Popery!" in every part of the land. But in the present great emergency and in the face of the danger that threatens from across the Irish Sea, the English grasp at any means that will serve

frightful atrocities and steps taken against them. He is an enthusiastic Irishman who is striving for the liberation of Ireland from the English yoke, and during his present visit to Germany has been working energetically for that end. He has clearly revealed the true relation which Ireland's cruel subjection by England bears to that country's greatness as a sea-power, and at the same time expresses hopes of Ireland's ultimate political separation from England, if not as a consequence of this war, still at no far distant day, whereby true freedom of the sea will be secured, and its domination by England be ended.

their purpose. This whole proceeding shows plainly enough how far different the real attitude in Ireland is from that which it is reported to be for the sake of allaying the anxiety of the public.

CHAPTER VI

THE SCOTTISH HIGHLANDS

PERHAPS the fate of the Scottish Highlands is even more significant than that of Ireland as indicative of English purpose in the domination of a conquered country. Of complaints there are none in these highland regions; their fate has been accomplished; and so the treatment to which they have succumbed has been little criticized; indeed, their peaceful condition has even been cited in praise of England.

As is well known, the Highland Scotch, the stock whose ancestors came from Ireland, were originally the dominating race in the northern kingdom of Great Britain. When later their name and authority together passed to the people of the Lowlands, who were of Anglo-Saxon descent, the distinguishing name Gael or Gaelic, was commonly applied to the Highland people of Celtic origin. With them, as with their Celtic brethren in Ireland, the ancient clan system was maintained unaltered. The members of a clan regarded themselves as bound together by the ties of kinship and the duty of revenge for an injury done to one of their kind; at the head of each clan was the chieftain, the hereditary head of the family, to whom all owed implicit obedience

together with their allegiance. The authority of the King and government at Edinburgh was therefore always comparatively slight. Moreover, a bitter enmity existed between many of these clans, and they stood opposed to each other in deadly feuds that were passed from one generation to the next, and extended through hundreds of years. For these reasons they were especially prone to be drawn into the fierce religious and civil conflicts that marked the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Whereas some of these clans held steadfastly to the Parliament and to the austere Presbyterian Church, chief among these being the Campbells of Argyle, others were firm adherents of the Stuart dynasty, and, to a small extent even attached themselves to the Catholic cause.

Their impetuous manner of attack in battle continued quite unaltered by any of the more modern methods of warfare; bare-legged, and throwing off their outer garments, they made a wild charge on the foe, wielding their broadswords with deadly effect, and so, often drove all before them in a complete rout. Thus they fought under Montrose in 1645, under Dundee in the Pass of Killiecrankie in 1689, and in the revolt for the Pretender, James III, in 1715. But because of the total absence of any united action, as well as on account of their primitive political organization, they were never enabled to reap the full benefit of their victories. When the adherents of James II were defeated by William of Orange in 1690, the government authorities got their first opportunity to gain a firm foothold in the High-

lands by building forts and laying roads. Finally the ancient enmity of the clans found vent in a terrible catastrophe when the Campbells, aided by the government at Edinburgh, treacherously fell upon the MacDonalds of Glencoe on February 2, 1692, and all but exterminated them in a bloody massacre. But still the organization of the clans and the authority of their chiefs continued much as before. In 1745 the Highlands rose for the last time in support of a Stuart, Charles Edward, who with his army of Highlanders penetrated as far into England as Derby, setting the whole country into a panic. But after their terrible defeat in the disastrous battle of Culloden on April 27, 1746, and the deadly work of the executioner that followed, the Highlanders were subjected to extreme measures of repression. They were disarmed and forbidden to wear the national garb, the tartan, under heavy penalty; or to assemble for public worship under any confession of faith other than that of the Established Presbyterian Church;¹ and, most effective of all, the hereditary jurisdictions of the chiefs were bought up and transferred to the Crown, followed by a general Act of Indemnity. And so the organization of the clans came to an end.

At the same time the English ideas of property and property rights were made applicable to the entirely different conditions that had prevailed in the clans. The hereditary head of a noble family

¹ These restrictions affected the Anglican Church in Scotland more than any other, since its communicants were decidedly Jacobite in their tendencies.

who had been the chief of a clan now became the owner of all the land that had belonged to his clan, while his kinsmen, who hitherto, as vassals and trusted servants, had enjoyed his protection, were now degraded to the condition of mere tenants with no assured rights of their own, their existence henceforth being entirely dependent upon his pleasure.

These measures were devastating in their effect, especially so since together with them English capital made its entrance into the Highlands. With the primitive methods that prevailed in the agricultural industries, the land could yield but little profit, and yet the new owners cared for it only in proportion to the money they could get out of it. Consequently they ejected scores of families from the homes that had been theirs for generations, and procured new tenants from whom they hoped to get better returns on their investments. But if the competition with foreign imports made it impossible for the agricultural interests in England to maintain themselves on a profitable basis, and ever since the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 these had been steadily losing ground, to how much greater a degree must this have been true of the mountainous districts of Scotland. So it finally came about that the proprietors preferred to use their holdings as pasture land for sheep raising; or, more preferably still, to turn them into vast parks and hunting grounds, not only for their own use (to be the owner of a great game park is deemed essential to the dignity of people of rank in England), but as

a means of increasing the income of the proprietor by letting them, as is quite customary,¹ to rich Englishmen who are either really devoted to the national sport, or think that they ought to be because it is the fashion.

And so the Highlands became entirely deserted, although at one time they had been populated by a numerous and, although very primitive, yet contented people. Instead of promoting the welfare of these Gaelic natives of the soil by well chosen regulations, and by educating them for a more advanced stage of civilization, and so protecting them in their mode of life, the British government allowed these unfortunates to be driven from their native land, and their descendants drifted into the great manufacturing cities, or emigrated to America, or, as bandits or thieves, ended their days on the gallows. Thus the country that under different circumstances might have been developed similarly to Switzerland and might now be supporting a large and prosperous population is practically a deserted land. Quite isolated, and miles apart, lie a few small hamlets of only a few houses, to which none are ever added, since the landowners do not allow the erection of new buildings. So it happens that on the shores of Lock Awe, a lake in the southern Highlands somewhat resembling the Lake of Zürich both in shape and size, and like it surrounded by rolling hills, there

¹ Likewise the enormous expense incurred for the maintenance of many a one of the country estates belonging to the English aristocracy is met by letting it to some rich tenant for a while.

is hardly a house to be seen. All told, there are five tiny villages in the region that borders on its waters. Even the roads frequented by tourists are being closed to them more and more for fear that the game may be frightened off. Between these villages stretch wide pasture lands where a few shepherds find support. Near the shores of the lake a few summer hotels may be seen and the castles that are fitted out with every luxury by their titled owners, who, it needs hardly be said, count a Highland piper among their retinue, and require their menials to wear the once despised garb of the Highlander, that has become popular again since the novels of Sir Walter Scott have roused new enthusiasm for the romance of the Highlands.¹

Nowhere may the true nature and the devastating influence of English "personal freedom," and of the English capitalist be more clearly exhibited. Only nature lovers who cannot be happy except where no human being is in sight will be enthusiastic admirers of the loneliness and beauty of the Scottish Highlands. To him who regards the earth as the dwelling place of an active and productive race, the scene is one that fills him with a deep sadness. To me it was more depressing than the devastation of Asia Minor under the Turkish yoke; for I could but reflect that the Turk knows no better, and is

¹ The ancient and bitter antagonism between the Gaelic and the Anglo-Saxon populations of Scotland is quite forgotten; the latter regard the Gaelic Highlanders as their ancestors, and are proud of the victories that these won over their own Anglo-Saxon progenitors.

therefore not capable of producing or fostering a higher state of culture. The desolation of the Highlands, however, is the work of a cultured nation, of one that claims not only a leading position among the peoples of the world, but also that its influence everywhere is favorable to the highest civilization and the best interests of mankind.

CHAPTER VII

FREE TRADE AND THE DOCTRINES OF THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL — THE AGRICULTURAL PURSUITS

WITH the abrogation of the Corn Laws in 1846 and the adoption of free trade by England, capital and commerce became the controlling factors in the national development. As early as 1842 most of the old tariff regulations had either been discarded altogether, or had at least been greatly modified, and in 1849 the Navigation Act also was discontinued. When these steps had been taken, the fate of the agricultural pursuits, that had hitherto been the chief source of the national wealth, was sealed. They had for years been growing less and less profitable, and could henceforth be continued as a practical means of support only through artificial protective measures, for the industrial and commercial activities had not only come to be the controlling interests in the life of the nation, but in the political life also they had gained a deciding influence.

The products of English soil had become quite insufficient to feed the rapidly growing population, and therefore the terrible famine of 1845, by which not only Ireland but England also suffered, turned the scales in favor of a free entry of food products

into the country. From that time forth domestic production could no longer maintain itself on a profit paying basis in face of the immense imports of cheap grains from abroad, and with every year grew less desirable as an occupation from a pecuniary point of view. The raising of grain is now almost entirely abandoned, and the sojourner in England may travel a long distance without seeing a single grain field. Live stock and garden produce can, of course, be raised to greater advantage, but even in these pursuits the domestic producers are obliged to meet an ever increasing competition from abroad.

At the present time about two-thirds (109,836 sq. km.) of the entire area of England and Wales (150,359 sq. km.) are devoted to agriculture,¹ and of this only a little more than one-fifth (23,194 sq. km.) is planted with grain and potatoes. Of the total number of industrially employed persons in England and Wales only 8.5 per cent ² are engaged

¹ Of woodland there is practically none in England. According to the data in the year book of statistics for 1914 issued by the Imperial German government and a few other data derived from the handbook of political economy from which I have taken my figures and made my computations, the forest lands in England and Wales amount to 7,626 sq. km. as against 139,959 sq. km. in Germany.

² Unfortunately in the data of the year book of statistics, agriculture, fisheries and forestry are all included under one head, and since the fishing industry employs quite a large number of men, although those engaged in forestry are a negligible quantity in England but a considerable one in Germany, the conclusion is that the percentage of persons in England that are engaged in tilling the soil is

in agricultural pursuits, including those employed in raising live stock and garden produce, as against 35.2 per cent in Germany. Naturally Ireland makes quite a different showing, with 43 per cent of all the industrially employed population engaged in some form of agriculture, largely, however, in the raising of live stock. Of the entire amount of land in use for these purposes (69,760 sq. km. out of a total area of 82,260 sq. km.), approximately one-ninth only (7,465 sq. km.) is devoted to the production of grain and potatoes. In 1913 the yield of the grain harvest in England and Wales, including wheat, barley, oats, and a very small quantity of rye, which the English like so little, amounted to 3,921,800 tons, in Ireland to not more than 1,174,200 tons, a total of 5,096,000 tons; in addition, England produced 2,941,000 tons of potatoes, and Ireland 3,799,400 tons, amounting to 6,741,300 tons in all. In the same year 30,265,700 tons of grain were raised in Germany, and 54,121,100 tons of potatoes, or approximately six times the amount of grain, and eight times the quantity of potatoes. At the same time the population of the United Kingdom, according to the census of 1910, was almost three-fourths of that of Germany (more exactly, nine-thirteenths, or $45\frac{1}{2}$ millions against 65 millions in Germany). With regard to live stock the fig-

even smaller than the given 8.5 per cent. With regard to Scotland, where very little is done in the way of farming, the year book of statistics gives no data whatever concerning the raising of agricultural products or live-stock.

ures show a very much better situation in the United Kingdom, although the amount raised is quite insufficient for the needs of home consumption. In the year 1913 England, Wales and Ireland (unfortunately here again the figures for Scotland are not at hand) raised in round numbers 10,650,000 head of beef cattle as against 20,182,000 in Germany, only 3,160,000 pigs as against 20,182,000 in Germany, but 20,750,000 sheep as against 5,803,000 in Germany.¹

The United Kingdom has therefore arrived at the stage that in ancient times was first reached by the Athenian state, soon to be followed, however, by all the other Grecian states, and in which the Italians found themselves in the second century before the Christian era, and from that time forth until the fall of the Empire,²— viz., the condition of abso-

¹ The number of horses raised in England, Wales and Ireland is 2,017,000, and in Germany 4,532,000.

² The following extract is from an address sent by the Emperor Tiberius to the Senate in the year 22 A. D.: "It is wonderful that nobody represents, That Italy is in constant want of foreign supplies, that the lives of the Roman people are daily at the mercy of uncertain seas and tempests: were it not for our supports from the provinces, supports by which the masters and their slaves, and their estates, are maintained, would our own groves and villas maintain us? This care therefore, Conscript Fathers, is the business of the Prince, and by neglect of this care the foundations of the state would be dissolved." (Tacitus, Annals III.) All the many attempts to change the economic condition of Italy proved ineffectual; when in the year 300 the Empire crumbled as a result of the civil wars, the complete desolation of the country and of the cities was inevitable.

lute dependence upon the importation of food from across the seas. The gravity of this situation together with the necessity of providing for it must in the end become the controlling factor in the national policy, and one before which all else must give way. Should an enemy succeed in cutting England off from communication by sea with its foreign food supply, as happened to the Athenians in 404 and 388 B. C., and to the Italians again and again during the period of their factional wars, the country would be lost, and would have to submit to the terms of the victor, though not a single soldier of the enemy had set foot upon English soil.

With every step in the further development of this situation the results of Great Britain's economic policy have become more and more apparent, not to English statesmen only, but to the people generally, as they realize that this is not only a vital danger that threatens their position of leadership among the nations, but that the very existence of the British Kingdom as an independent state is at stake. This is the nightmare that awaits the British slumberers at the close of their days of rejoicing and self-congratulation because of the position of supremacy they have won for themselves among the nations of the earth — the anxious thought of the future and how to provide for it — that will not let them rest in peace, for, as the danger grows in magnitude, it threatens to unsettle the very foundations of their political structure and social organization, and to compel a radical change in their order of life.

To be sure, when Sir Robert Peel turned his country's course into untried paths by the repeal of the Corn Laws and the introduction of free trade, the future seemed to hold no such corroding care. By the Napoleonic wars and the continental blockade Britain had gained full command of the sea and of the world's commerce; there was not a rival to dispute her rule, and the keenest glance into the future failed to reveal a power that was at all likely to develop the ability successfully to compete with her. The whole world, so it seemed, had accepted Britain as the mistress of the sea and had conceded to her without protest her position of supremacy among the nations of the world.

Meanwhile the English manufacturing industries had passed through a stage of enormous development, and were in no need of protection, for with the aid of the British merchant marine they were flooding the world with their products, and were finding little or no competition from the backward industries of the continent and of North America.

Therefore, when Cobden proclaimed his doctrine of free trade, it was eagerly accepted as the gospel of a new era that was to bring emancipation to mankind, and in which the mists of prejudice and past error were to vanish in the sunshine of the new day. For well did the apostles of this latest doctrine know how to present it as a scientifically established principle, good for all people at all times, and they found ready listeners, and made countless converts in every quarter of the globe. We in Germany well remember with what fanatical zeal these doctrinaire

advocates of free trade preached it in our own country, and tried to impress every one with the truth of their theory, while they belittled the opinions of those who differed with them and whom they sought to suppress as intellectually and morally their inferiors. It seemed impossible to them that intelligent beings could fail to be convinced by the reasonableness of their doctrine and so adopt it themselves, unless, indeed, they were influenced by sinister motives.

Moreover, these free trade enthusiasts were themselves so convinced of the truth of their doctrine that they rejected all historic evidence to the contrary as unscientific, and with extreme ingenuousness simply denied the fact that all political and economic systems must of necessity be conditional, and dependent upon the combined influences of all the many factors that enter into the situation and give rise to the ever changing and diversified problems of the times. Any one who entertained such opinions was regarded by the free trade advocates as a stubborn reactionary, or as an ignoramus of limited mentality, or, what is most probable, as a self seeking egoist who, under cover of belief in the older theory, was following some reprehensible object, and was therefore an impediment in the way of human progress.

The conception of the state as it was developed in the course of English political life, and which has already been discussed, was taken up by the Manchester School and systematized in a formula somewhat after this fashion: Economic activity is the

chief factor in human life, compared with which all else is insignificant; it is the duty of the state to remove all obstacles that may impede its progress, and therefore all interference on the part of the state itself should be limited to the smallest possible minimum, so that all may have fair play; in this way the ideal formulated by Bentham during the period of clarified thought will be realized,—“the greatest happiness of the greatest number.” The English conception of the state is evidently thought to be the only correct one, and all others to be either antiquated or fallacious. When these ideas have been generally accepted and acted upon, so it was believed, all cause for war, all rivalry of the nations in a struggle for existence will be eliminated; for the nations and states will then be dissolved into loosely united groups of people held together and protected by police regulations only, all of them following their own individual interests unhindered by any restrictions, and given the opportunity to attain the end for which they are striving by free economic competition.

That the objects so attained and the happiness realized are on a wholly material basis, ignoring some of the highest and most influential springs of human action, which are thereby relegated to the rubbish heap of outgrown ideas; that there is no place in this system for the most important duties of the state, and a total disregard of the individuality of each of the great states and national entities that are uninterruptedly striving with one another, during the years of peace as well as during the times

of warfare between them, and who by this mighty contention are advancing human development,— all these considerations are entirely disregarded in the doctrines of the Manchester School.

The English aristocracy adopted this doctrine in its entirety and conformed their action to it, and so maintained their ascendancy, as has already been stated. The fact is, however, that when these ideas together with free trade were put into practice, capital eventually became supreme, and all other national considerations had to give way before it; and then, unsatiated by the profits at home, it turned to the nations abroad and ruthlessly exploited them in the interest of England. If the English had succeeded in converting the states of the continent to the doctrine of free trade, their doors would all have been opened wide to English commerce and to the output of English factories, and they would then have grown more and more dependent upon Britain, until at last they would have lost all hope of ever extricating themselves from their economic dependence, while every possible danger to British supremacy among the nations of the world would have vanished.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ENGLISH ATTITUDE TOWARD OTHER NATIONS

THE purpose of this volume requires that one other English characteristic should be discussed: The attitude that the Briton assumes toward the people of other countries.

In consequence of Britain's isolated position physically, its development has been along lines peculiarly its own, and its people therefore differ from the nations of the continent much more than these do among themselves. Just as the structure of the state and the organization of its political life are unlike those on the continent, so there are other marked differences in the national customs and views of life — differences that extend down to such small things as the daily meals and their preparation in the kitchen — small matters in themselves, but by no means unimportant in their effect upon the social life of the nations and their relations to one another.

Although the people of each country and province of the European continent have their own distinctive habits and customs, these countries stand in this respect as a single group in contrast with the British Isles and America. To the average Englishman the customs and manners to which he has been accus-

tomed from youth up seem the only proper ones, and every deviation from them appears to him to be a social offence of which he disapproves the more because he himself has been accustomed to bow to the dictates of public opinion, and to regard tradition as inviolable.

The Briton therefore expects every foreigner who sets foot upon his island to conform to English customs and views of life, and one would therefore suppose that when he himself is abroad, he would adapt himself to the manners and ways of the land in which he finds himself. But not so; he sees in these but an evidence of the inferiority of all other nations and their degree of culture to that of his own, and demands as a matter of course that every one should conform to his ideas of propriety. The English, for instance are shocked when a foreigner visiting England wears a dress coat at some ceremonious or festive occasion that takes place in the day time, or, what is still more shocking, appears in anything but a dress coat in the evening, for the Englishman who lives as etiquette demands wears evening dress even when dining alone, or only with the members of his immediate family. But, on the other hand, at a state occasion such as the breakfast at Court to which the members of the congress of historians that met in Berlin in 1908 were invited, and at which guests are requested to wear full dress, the Englishmen coolly appear in frock-coats, and we are good-natured and forbearing enough to let such a disregard of our social customs pass unnoticed.

It is to demeanor such as this that the Englishman owes his reputation abroad of being overbearing and irritating, even though it may be unintentional, and he may be quite unconscious of it. But although the individual Briton gets himself disliked and into frequent difficulties by this attitude, the nation as a whole is the gainer by it, for the people of the continent, who are much used to intercourse with foreigners and to their various customs, have condoned the British lack of courtesy the more readily because it is accompanied by English gold. And so it has come about that during the last century customs as well as etiquette on the continent have become more and more Anglicised, especially so in those circles that aspire to recognition as "good society."

This is peculiarly true of Germany where long dependence upon foreign countries, and a belated achievement of political independence has made the people prone to imitate others, a tendency to which they yielded the more readily because of their native repugnance to fixed customs and forms, and their strong inclination to criticize their own institutions and to disapprove of them. Aside from all this, there is among us Germans a good-natured desire to meet the stranger half way, and to make things pleasant for him. Indeed this toadying to the foreigner, and especially to the foreigner from England, has come to be a national ailment with us, and one that so far has withstood every effort at a cure; and it is a question whether after the conclusion of the present war, we will be able to overcome it, or,

in spite of our recent bitter experience, will yield to it again, and the leading social circles will return to this aping of foreign manners.

It is all of a piece with this tendency of the British to do as they like when abroad, that they make no attempt to speak the language of the country in which they happen to be. While at home, most likely, they did not study it at all, or its rudiments only, and, as they have little ability in this direction and are very averse to exposing themselves to possible ridicule, they make no effort to use a foreign language. In this reluctance we probably see the constraining effect of the habit of past generations, for the Americans, in sharp contrast to the English, study foreign languages assiduously in their schools, and are very ready to use them as best they may, and therefore make extraordinarily rapid progress in them. The English, on the contrary, always try to get along with the use of their native tongue only, and this usually serves their purpose very well. This is especially the case in Germany where the acquisition of foreign languages is very general, and where every one is eager to perfect himself in them, and the English therefore find the people most ready to accept their language as the medium of intercourse. All this has greatly furthered the use of English as the universal tongue.

But this attitude has its darker side also, for it makes the Briton incapable of understanding and appreciating the institutions and view point of other nationalities, and he considers it quite beneath his dignity to make any attempt to do so. How greatly

it handicaps him in his commercial relations with foreign nations has become glaringly apparent ever since German industries have reached the point where they can offer serious competition to the English in this direction.

The English merchants as a rule offer in foreign markets only such goods as they themselves have been accustomed to use, and which meet their own requirements; they pay no heed to the tastes and habits of the people among whom they hope to find customers, but instead, try to impose their goods upon them whether they suit or not. The Germans, on the contrary, consult not only the habits and needs of their foreign customers, but their tastes as well, and moreover can carry on all necessary business transactions with them in their own speech. This attitude of the English is not simply the result of self-satisfaction and conceit, but may probably be traced in a much larger measure to a lack in their power of adjustment, which is inherent in the English mentality, and due, no doubt, to the rigid traditions of English culture and education, and which has taken on proportions in the national character that threaten to become fatal. The English hardly deem it possible that they might act differently or cultivate other habits, and all the warnings, speeches, and resolutions advising a change of attitude and a better preparation for commercial enterprise, such as the study of foreign languages, etc., that have been the order of the day in England during the last few decades, have had no results whatever. The Briton cannot escape from his habit.

The English show a like inability when confronted by the problems that arise in connection with the social or political institutions of foreign lands, and, failing to arrive at a correct estimate of the ideas and sentiments that underlie them, can neither inaugurate nor carry out measures best fitted to solve them. No one will question that there are many highly educated Englishmen who have a thorough knowledge of foreign countries and their affairs; and, on the other hand, it would be a fatal mistake on our part to allow ourselves to believe that there is a correct judgment to any widely extended degree in our own land concerning conditions abroad. This applies most pertinently to our impressions of England and America where the views and circumstances of life depart so decidedly from our own, and with regard to which a true appreciation is confined to a very small circle in Germany. Our daily press is by no means well posted with regard to these matters, and gives us only meager and inadequate reports, while it is not unusual to meet Germans of otherwise wide attainments who make the most surprising statements, and entertain quite absurd views in regard to conditions in England or America.

This is the fruit we are reaping as the result of the Prussian government's incredibly narrow and short-sighted policy of public instruction that, quite out of touch with the actual demands of life and its practical requirements, has neglected the study of the English language in the high schools, and even in the colleges has ranked it as a secondary require-

ment and virtually as an optional study. On the other hand English is assiduously studied in the practical arts and vocational schools, and it follows that a much greater familiarity with that language is to be found among the middle and even the lower classes of our population than in the circles that claim leadership in our intellectual life. How little distinguished for a correct appreciation of foreign conditions the members of our diplomatic corps as a whole really have been, and how inadequately their special education and preparation has fitted them to get into touch with the influential circles abroad and to get correct impressions from them, and so be enabled to influence them in turn, has received ample and regrettable proof at every step of our diplomatic activity during the last decades. In the negotiations that were the forerunners of the present war, as well as in those that are connected with its progress, this experience has been repeated.

In England, however, the information and preparation so necessary to diplomatic efficiency is lacking in a still greater degree. It is a matter of common knowledge that the foreign policy of England has been hampered, and at times has entirely miscarried, because of a want of sympathetic appreciation of affairs abroad. The English are totally ignorant of conditions in Germany, and are absolutely unable to grasp our views of life, and are therefore wholly out of sympathy with the institutions of state and the military organization that are their natural outgrowth. That they had entirely failed to reach a correct estimate of our military strength,

as well as of the efficiency of our organization, and, above all, of the lofty feeling of patriotism that is the well-spring of the German nation's strength, this latest war has amply revealed to the world.

This is not to be wondered at, however, when we consider that a man like Sir Edward Grey has been charged with the conduct of foreign affairs,—a man who, aside from a little French, knows nothing of any language except his own, and has never been outside of his native land, except once on a visit to Paris. But the situation is no better with a large majority of British statesmen,—Mr. Gladstone's is a typical case. And this is true also of most of the eminent men of England who, because of their social position, their political influence or their literary activity, have shaped the destiny of their country.

PART II

ENGLAND'S POLICY AND ENGLAND AS A
WORLD POWER

CHAPTER IX

THE BEGINNING OF ENGLAND'S POWER AT SEA — WARS WITH SPAIN AND HOLLAND

WE may now turn our attention to an inspection of the successive steps by which a definite English policy was evolved, and of the course by which England attained her supremacy at sea.

The foundation for her country's present strength at sea was laid by Elizabeth in her struggle with Spain, which was then at the height of its power as a world empire, and was seeking to extend its control to the island kingdom also, and to turn it back to Catholicism; or rather, Spain was trying to regain the influence over England that it had once held when Mary, wife of Philip II of Spain, was on the English throne. The first step in this conflict was taken when Elizabeth allied herself with the Netherlands in their revolt against Spanish oppression; another, when she brought Scotland into complete political subjection to England by her support of the party that opposed Mary Stuart; and still another, when Elizabeth sought to attach France to English interests during the period of that country's political uncertainty due to religious dissension and the factional war between the nobles.

It was at this time in their history that the Eng-

lish first ventured upon daring undertakings at sea,—the half piratical adventures of Drake and Raleigh in their bold aggressions upon the colonies and commerce of Spain, which brought about a declaration of war, and the dispatch of the Spanish Armada to British waters. This was the time also when the first, although fruitless attempt to form a settlement on the shores of America was made by the English in 1584; and in the year 1600 the East India Company was formed.

It is not to our purpose to follow the uncertain attempts and irresolute course of England's policy during the reigns of the earlier Stuarts, under whom Scotland had been united with England in a personal union. The Spanish monarchy, in close connection with the German House of Hapsburg, was still the dominating power in Europe. Neither James I nor Charles I was capable of inaugurating an aggressive English policy, the difficulties of which would have been greatly increased by the growing antagonism between the Parliament and the Crown. On the other hand, the contemptible peace policy to which Raleigh was sacrificed when James I sent him to the scaffold in 1618 to appease Spain for the attack upon her colonies on the Orinoco River, came to nought in 1624 through the failure of the King's plan to arrange a marriage between his son and a Spanish Infanta. The King's next attempt, as champion of the Protestant cause in Europe, to wrest the Palatinate from the grasp of the Hapsburgs, and so to participate in the German war, also ended in dismal failure.

Years of continued peace, however, offered the opportunity to plant English colonies in North America,—the first one in Virginia in 1607, and another on the New England shore in 1620, which soon received great additions from the Puritans who were seeking refuge from persecution at home.

While the Spanish power as a world empire was fast waning, and could be maintained only with great difficulty, more especially so since Richelieu had begun to assail it with all his resourcefulness of policy, and with the strength of French arms, another sea power was fast claiming the attention of the world. The Netherlands reached the zenith of their glory as a maritime power just at the time when England's weakness at sea compelled her to withdraw from the carrying trade of the world. On October 21, 1639, Admiral Van Tromp found the Spanish fleet off the coast of England in the vicinity of Dover, and through the connivance of Charles I, whose habitual weakness allowed him as usual to be led into a contemptible act of duplicity, this last expedition that Spain was able to send against the Netherlands was crushed.

All England felt the pressure of the Dutch ascendancy at sea very keenly in every branch of commerce and trade. In spite of their community of interests as two Protestant nations, and the analogous situation of the two countries in the antagonistic relation in which each stood to one of two royal houses allied by marriage—the house of Orange and that of the Stuarts—this commercial competition engendered in the English a bitter op-

position toward the powerful merchants of the Netherlands.

With the establishment of the Commonwealth England's vigor was first fully revealed to the world. At home the newly established government sternly suppressed every attempt at revolt within the three kingdoms, by means of the efficient army that out-matched every opponent, and to which it owed its victory. Abroad the English fleet under Blake pursued the adherents of their King, who had died on the scaffold, into every sea, and compelled the lately rehabilitated Kingdom of Portugal, as well as its Spanish adversaries, not only to refrain from giving them aid, but also to surrender the arms and ships that had found safety under their protection.

On October 9, 1651, the first of the Navigation Acts was passed that for two centuries were not only to be the fundamental principle of Britain's commercial policy, but were to shape that country's policy throughout. It prohibited the importation in foreign vessels of any but the products of the countries to which they belonged, or else these were to be brought to England in English vessels. This provision pertained to European products; all others were to be imported in English vessels only.¹ As Holland was not disposed to accept these terms, the Dutch vessels then in British ports were seized, and a piratical warfare was begun against the sea craft of the Netherlands, which soon led to a declaration

¹ After the Restoration, the Navigation Act was made to apply to Ireland also, by which the ruin of Irish commerce was accomplished, as has already been told.

of war. Cromwell, who was then Lord Protector of England, soon brought the war to a close, however, and compelled Holland to accept his terms of peace (1654), and submit to the Navigation Act.

Cromwell then renewed the war against Spain. It was begun while the two countries were still at peace by the conquest of Jamaica (1655), which England has retained ever since. The war was then prosecuted in alliance with the French, to whose aid the English owed their acquisition of Dunkirk. It was due to this alliance also that the thirty years' war between France and Spain was brought to a definite close, and the latter country was forced to conclude the Peace of the Pyrenees by which the position of dominance in Europe, so long held by Spain, was lost to her and passed to France.

This fast developing power of France, which soon received a further and tremendous impetus through the purposeful and sweeping policy of aggrandizement pursued by Louis XIV, was viewed by England with great and growing concern. But the kings of the dynasty that ruled England just after the Restoration held persistently to France at every important turn in the affairs of England, with but rare exceptions, hoping from that country to draw the strength that would enable them to hold their own against the Parliament in their struggle for a position of independence within their own realm. One permanent advantage accrued to England as a result of this policy of the Stuart kings in the predominating influence that their country gained in Portugal, whose independence was enforced by Eng-

land and France as victorious allies in their war with Spain.

The people of the Netherlands, however, were still the real rivals of the English, and in both the wars that Charles II conducted against Holland (1664-1667 and 1672-1674), he could depend upon the strong approval of his people. It was the Earl of Shaftesbury, at first the head of the Cabal Ministry (1667-1673), and later the leader of the ruthless and popular Opposition, who designated Holland as the Carthage that must at all hazards be destroyed. In spite of an immediate and victorious conflict at sea, the conduct of these wars did not redound to England's glory; the internal weakness of the administration, the prevailing resort to intrigue at Court, and the repeated quarrels with the Parliament, the very reverse of Cromwell's masterful and relentlessly despotic régime, made an energetic war policy impossible. In the first war, the government of the Netherlands under the direction of John De Witt ordered Admiral De Ruyter to sail with his fleet to the Thames, from where he threatened London and compelled England to conclude a peace. In the second war, Van Tromp and De Ruyter successfully defended the coast of Holland against a British attack upon the island of Texel.

Nevertheless the final outcome of these wars was not without some advantage to England. At the close of the first one, England held New Amsterdam, which she retained, renaming it New York, and so dislodged the wedge which Holland had driven into the new world between the two English

colonies, New England in the north, and Virginia to the south of it, in North America. During the second war, the Netherlands suffered a serious setback in the attack which Louis XIV made upon them at the same time, and so England was enabled to enforce submission to the Navigation Act, and to demand a large indemnity from Holland besides. Moreover, the natural conditions that make for power among the nations, such as England's preponderance in population, and the wealth of her resources, began to tell more and more; gradually the Netherlands sank into a position of secondary importance, and in time ceased to be a menace to England. The former rivalry between the two nations was then gradually replaced by a constantly increasing relation of friendship.

CHAPTER X

ENGLAND'S WARS WITH FRANCE — THE BEGINNING OF ENGLISH SUPREMACY AT SEA

THE closer relations between England and the Netherlands were made more desirable, and eventually became a political necessity to England, by the great strides that France was making toward a position of supremacy in the world. By land the French had already secured for themselves the place of dominance among the nations of the continent, and they now were striving to gain a like pre-eminence at sea. The French navy and merchant marine were greatly enlarged, and the harbors improved; French supremacy in the Mediterranean was secured beyond dispute; to their colonies in America they added the new territory of Louisiana, by which English colonization was hemmed in from the west; San Diego and other smaller islands in the West Indies were occupied, and the settlement of Pondichéry on the eastern coast of India established. It was this prodigious expansion that soon led the English people to recognize in France their greatest rival, with whom they would have to contend if they were to maintain their ascendancy at sea. In sharp contrast to the policy of the Crown, the popular tide of anti-French sentiment grew ever stronger

in England, and was still further swelled, not only by the fundamental differences in the political organization of the two countries, but even more so by the religious antagonism that was stimulated by the sharply emphasized Catholic attitude of Louis XIV, and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685).

All those European powers that looked upon French preponderance as a menace to their independent existence now endeavored by all imaginable measures to enlist England on their side. A decisive step in this direction was taken when the action of the Netherlands made it possible for William III to enter England with his army in 1688, by which the Opposition received their long-desired opportunity, the Stuart dynasty was driven from the throne, and, as a consequence, the great coalition against France was formed. From this time forth the policy of England has gone hand in hand with that of Holland, with the natural result that the smaller nation has followed more and more submissively in the wake of the greater. The two countries were henceforth grouped together and styled "the sea powers" by the nations of the continent.

In all the great wars that have taken place since that time one feature of England's policy has clearly revealed itself, and has remained its leading characteristic up to the present day: England allies herself with the weaker nations of the continent to give battle to the strongest. The catch-word that has been coined to meet this situation is that "the

balance of power in Europe must be maintained," which is right enough. But the English interpretation of it is that the continent is a world by itself, that England lies outside of it, and therefore is not a part of Europe at all; no one of the continental states is to be allowed to become supreme, and so become a menace to England; while the nations of the continent are destroying one another in warfare, England is to be free to follow her own interests unhindered, and so gain for herself a dominating position in the world, and then, at the close of the conflicts, take a hand in the bargaining among the nations and decide according to her own needs what the conformation of political Europe shall be.

England has therefore ever sought to combine the power of the weaker nations in a coalition, and to make use of this to accomplish her own purpose by the humiliation of her most troublesome rival. Meanwhile she has always known well how to secure all the spoils for herself, and to hold on to them, and has never felt any compunction to withdraw from a coalition without in any way fulfilling the promises she had held out to her allies, and whenever her own ends had been accomplished, or if the conquests of the alliance promised to be greater than had been foreseen, and consequently threatened seriously to unsettle existing European conditions. This rapid change of front that finds an ever ready excuse in a change of ministry has deservedly given England a reputation for faithlessness. That no dependence could be placed upon England, and no lasting compact made with her was soon discovered

by the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the pressing need of the moment frequently compelled the states of the continent to combine with England, only to discover to their sorrow what might be expected from an alliance with "perfidious Albion." By the pursuit of this unscrupulous policy, and by the absolute selfishness of her attitude, England has carried off one triumph after another, and so has constantly added to her power.

In the war that England waged in alliance with Holland, Austria and Spain from 1689 to 1697, she triumphantly asserted her independence of action, and secured recognition of her lately established form of government, crushed the overweening ambition of France, and in the naval battle of La Hogue (1692), as well as in the later encounters at sea, and despite the valorous deeds of Jean Barts and other French privateers, did immense damage to the French sea power. Then, in the Peace of Ryswick, after her own purpose had been achieved, England manifested no concern for the welfare of her recent allies, but compelled them to accept the terms of peace that she had arranged in conjunction with France. It was by the terms of this treaty that France acquired Strassburg and Alsace.

Later, in the war of the Spanish Succession, a definite end was made of French domination. Then, when Queen Anne finally ventured to assert herself, shook off the constraint that the Whigs had imposed upon her, and brought the Tories back into power, England under the control of this party not only immediately concluded a peace — so much was

politically justifiable — but played her former allies false, and secretly connived with France to obtain advantages for both. But as usual, England did not fail to secure for herself the lion's share of the spoils by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). In America she acquired Newfoundland, Acadia (Nova Scotia) and Hudson Bay from France, while in Spain she retained Gibraltar and Minorca, which gave her control of the gateway to the Mediterranean as well as a strong position within its western extent. By the re-establishment of the Dutch barrier — the right given to Holland to hold certain forts on the Belgian frontier — a limit was set to French ambition in the direction of the English coast, which had been threatened. France was compelled to demolish the fortifications of Dunkirk which had been purchased from Charles II, and to fill up the harbor. In consequence of the Methuen Treaty, December, 1703, Portugal had become an English satellite even before the beginning of the war, and had been entirely at the mercy of England's commercial methods ever since the agreement to import no woollen cloths except from that country; but from this time forth Portugal virtually sank into a condition of vassalage, and has remained in this state of dependence upon England up to the present day.

From Spain England secured the right of the *Asiento* — the contract for furnishing the colonies in America with negroes — probably the most lucrative trade of the Atlantic. Every one knows that England understood well how to make the

most of this privilege, and, not content with this alone, far exceeded it in the smuggling trade that the English merchants carried on with the African coast. In large measure it is to this slave trade that Liverpool owes its present prosperity, its streets, as the saying goes, being paved with negro skulls. The prosperous descendants of these slave traders have not turned pious only — every correct Englishman is that — but are filled to overflowing with benevolence and philanthropic devotion, as befits all *beati possidentes*. It is not necessary to review the negotiations that took place during the next few decades, since the chief events of this period were the indecisive commercial wars that England carried on with Spain, and the renewed hostilities against France in connection with the war of the Spanish Succession. Although British trade and British sovereignty at sea grew apace, of definite results there were none.

So far as the struggle between France and England was concerned, the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 was no more than an armistice, for the American problems remained unsettled, and the Americans themselves, who by this time had developed a strong feeling of self-reliance, showed as little consideration for their own rivals as did their mother country at home for hers, and, quite untroubled by diplomatic negotiations abroad, adopted a policy of territorial expansion on their own account, and by a petty but unremitting warfare attempted to break the bounds that the French possession of Canada and Louisiana set to their ter-

ritory. In addition there was the strong position that the French had gained for themselves in the Indian Ocean by the acquisition of the islands of La France (Mauritius) and Bourbon (Réunion), which the valiant deeds of Labourdonnais and Dupleix had won for France, and the further French successes in the eastern part of India, by which the few positions that England held in this region, such as Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, were seriously menaced. Although the two nations were still officially at peace, the conflicting interests of the situation soon led to violent armed encounters in which the native princes of the rival dynasties of the Deccan took sides, and in which Captain Clive gained his first brilliant victories.

It was as the result of this conflict of interests in the East and in the West that England and France faced each other in the bitter Seven Years' war, from 1755 to 1763. In this struggle the war waged by Frederick the Great in alliance with England against the greater part of Europe is but an episode, and constituted the continental war by which England meant to keep her chief adversary fully engaged by land so that she herself might be free to pursue her maritime policy undisturbed. And her aim was achieved, for it was in this war that the foundations were laid for the world empire of Great Britain, for the dominance of the English nation, and for the world-wide use of the English tongue.

The war began in the usual English way, with severe reverses, chief among them being the loss of

Minorca; and it ended in the usual English way also,—with desertion of the ally that had won England's battles for her on the continent, and so had made possible her victories beyond the seas.

But between the beginning and the end of this war lies the vigorous administration of Pitt, the great English war minister. Pitt is perhaps the most typical representative of England during this epoch of her aspiration to pre-eminence among the nations of the world. His was a masterful spirit that felt within itself the capability for great achievement, and with proud self-consciousness looked with disdain upon all rivals, who on every occasion were made to realize his superiority to themselves. In the struggles between the contending political parties, or rather between the men who were hungry for power, and in which his own power was developed, he showed himself to be quite as unscrupulous and vindictive in the means he employed to make his way upward, by a coalition first with one rival and then with another, as have most great English personalities. And he, too, as head of the administration, devoted all his energy to putting through the very measures, such as the occupation and defence of Hanover, which previously, as member of the Opposition, he had fiercely denounced. But he was above striving for personal advantage, and proof against all the temptations of sordid gain, which in the lives of so many men of renown shows itself at the decisive moment to be the mainspring of their actions. The lofty patriotism in which the measures he advocated with

glowing eloquence had their origin was not, as in the case of so many others, the result of a carefully prepared and well studied rhetorical effort — though that, too, was not wanting — but was in reality the deepest well-spring of his action, and the inspiration of his life, revealed with impulsive and therefore convincing eloquence. By the fulminating oratory with which he mercilessly beat to earth every opposition, he controlled the Parliament entirely, and won for himself the idolizing admiration of the people; with a vigorous and relentless assertion of this power he now procured the means for the conduct of the war on a grand scale. To him, therefore, England owes the creation of her world dominion.

It was during the Seven Years' war that Clive established English supremacy in India by the capture of Bengal. Together with these victories in the East, Canada also was won for England, for in the Peace of Versailles France definitely relinquished all her possessions in North America. Canada was ceded to England, and Louisiana to Spain, which in its advanced state of decadence knew not what to do with it. Thus fate decided that the North American continent was to be dominated by the Anglo Saxon race, and, as an inevitable consequence, that the French tongue should eventually cease to be the language of international intercourse in spite of the tenacity with which it clung to its place in the traditions of diplomacy, and despite the pre-eminent position that French literature held in

the world of letters; gradually it was replaced by the English language.¹

Getting rid of French rivalry in North America was not an unqualified advantage to England however, for it brought with it a new danger to the fulfillment of her desire for world dominion, and it was not long before this made itself known, and in a most vigorous manner. The Americans in Virginia, New England, and in the other English colonies held to the motherland and fought for it with apparent enthusiasm so long as they felt the pressure of French domination just beyond their own boundaries, and therefore were in need of protection. But these agricultural colonies had long since become so strong and self-sustaining that they had developed a national individuality with well defined interests of their own, together with a strong liking for independence, which they had inherited from their English forefathers. They were little inclined therefore to allow the motherland to shape their destiny, or to control their local government and commercial interests. England's narrow commercial policy, and the endeavor of the English Parliament and the English government to assert their authority, at least in form,— for the import tax on tea and other commodities amounted to little else,

¹ That the meridian of Paris (of which the meridian of Ferro is but another form) has been replaced on our maps by that of Greenwich is a parallel instance, and one equally indicative of this progressive pro-English development in international intercourse.

— had exactly the opposite effect of that which was desired, and only served to precipitate the crisis.

It was hardly a decade after the Peace of Versailles that the rupture between England and her American colonies was brought about by the famous Boston Tea Party, when the tea was thrown overboard into the harbor, and in the following year the first American Congress met in Philadelphia; in 1775 the first armed encounter took place, and in 1776 came the declaration of independence. But all the loudly decried grievances were after all but pretexts, and there can be no doubt that the American colonies would have revolted even had the English government followed an entirely different course, for the deciding influence was the American desire for absolute independence, which no form of federation in connection with the motherland would have satisfied.¹ In its widest aspect the American Revolution was a civil war, for a considerable part of the proprietary and aristocratically inclined ele-

¹ This view of the great revolutionary movement is receiving increasing recognition in America also in opposition to the usual representation, which is due not so much to the opinion of the Americans themselves as to the bias of English tradition. According to the popular idea, which is an absurd one, the responsibility for the entire situation rests upon King George III, a true hearted man, although one of decided mental limitations, and he is made to appear as a monstrous tyrant, whereas in reality he merely shared the views that were held by the great majority of the English people, and which he represented, until in the end, after the disastrous termination of the war, it was convenient to make him the scape-goat, a tendency that is usual under such circumstances.

ment in the community sided with England, and after the close of the conflict a large number of these people emigrated to Canada where the French population, animated by the old spirit of hostility toward the Anglo-Americans, now held loyally to England.

France took part in this war with a hope to regain her former position at sea, as well as her lost colonial dominion, but in spite of some early successes and although Spain made common cause with her in 1779, without definite results of any kind. England, however, took advantage of her supremacy at sea to prey upon the commerce of the other nations by privateering and by an utter disregard for the rights of neutrals, an element in warfare to which she has held ever since without any regard for the protests of other nations, and which she has introduced into the present war with utter ruthlessness. The "armed neutrality," which originated with Chararine II in 1780, now compelled England to show some consideration for the countries bordering on the Baltic, but at the same time afforded her the welcome opportunity to declare war upon Holland, and, although the Dutch triumphantly withstood the English attack on the Doggerbank, they not only lost a large part of their merchant marine, but their possessions in eastern India as well.

When peace was concluded, England relinquished Ceylon to the Dutch, but retained all her conquests on the main land of India. About this time also the British were victorious in a fierce war with Hyder Ali of Mysore, who had made an alliance with

the French. This British success eventually led to the subjugation of the Deccan, which meant the acquisition of by far the greater part of peninsular India.

It is apparent therefore that although England lost her North American colonies, she nevertheless emerged from the war with no inconsiderable profit to herself,¹ and, what was most important of all, her rivals in Europe had made no appreciable gains at any point, but had been weakened at sea, and their commerce had been demoralized. England on the other hand had not only maintained her maritime ascendancy throughout the war, but had been able to increase it, and within a few years had crowded the Dutch out of their leading position in the trade of the Baltic. Not long before this time Captain Cook had been sent on his voyages of exploration in southern seas, and in 1788 the penal colony at Sydney was established, and thus a firm foothold gained on the fifth continent.

English supremacy at sea found its greatest opportunity for development during the war maintained for twenty years against the French, at first against the revolutionary power, and later against Napoleon, with but one interval of peace enduring for little more than a year, after the Peace of Amiens. On the surface this war appeared as a conflict for principle, and was so regarded not only

¹ There were other, less important changes in territorial possessions by which England lost some of the acquisitions she had obtained in 1763, such as the recession of Senegal to France, and Florida to Spain, the latter, like Louisiana, soon to be transferred to the United States.

by men like Burke but by the great mass of the English people. It was in fact, however, a struggle for power, for pre-eminence in the world,—the last and most decisive passage at arms between England and France in their century long conflict for ascendancy, interrupted only by brief intervals of peace. It was precipitated not so much by the execution of the French King as by the French conquest of Belgium, which took place toward the close of the year 1792, and which the English regarded as an immediate danger to the security that their insular position afforded them.

By land England's conduct of the war was but a lukewarm one, and was carried on with quite insufficient means and with a display of the usual lack of military ability, until the uprising in Spain gave England the opportunity to organize and support this civil war against Napoleon with the use of her vassal-state, Portugal, as a military base, and so was enabled seriously to undermine the power of the great Emperor. Otherwise England's aid to her allies consisted chiefly in the payment of large subsidies for the further prosecution of the war.

At sea, however, the English conducted the war with all their usual vigor and ruthlessness. That Holland had become vassal to France was a welcome opportunity of which they eagerly took advantage, and Ceylon, Capeland and the Dutch possessions in upper India fell an easy prey to English greed. In the Mediterranean, Malta was taken to console England for the loss of Minorca, and her refusal to surrender it, as stipulated in the Treaty

of Amiens, was the immediate cause for a renewal of hostilities between France and England in 1803. In India the British subdued the uprising of the natives of the Deccan under Tippoo Sahib in alliance with the French in 1799, and with their defeat the dream of a French empire in India vanished forever, for, although Napoleon evidently cherished the hope of it more than once, he never found it possible to take even the first step toward its realization. All attempts of the French to maintain their independent position at sea failed utterly; in the battles of Abukir and Trafalgar the French fleets were annihilated, and Napoleon was obliged to abandon his plan for an invasion of England.

How little England was inclined to regard the rights of neutrals became apparent when in 1800 the Russian Emperor, Paul, made the attempt to revive the armed neutrality of the North European states; England at once announced this to be equivalent to a declaration of war, and promptly sent Nelson to attack Copenhagen (April 2, 1801) in the hope of forcing the entrance to the Baltic. A still more drastic repetition of this utter regardlessness of the rights of others occurred in 1807 when, after peace had been concluded between Napoleon and Alexander I, England was approached with regard to possible terms of peace. She replied with the demand that Denmark should relinquish her attitude of neutrality and attach herself to the English cause. When Denmark refused to comply, Copenhagen was immediately bombarded for three days,

from September 2 to September 5, 1807, and the entire Danish fleet was captured and carried away, although no rupture of the friendly relations existing between the two governments had taken place. Henceforth England was the only country to derive any benefit from the continental blockade, and soon became the unchallenged mistress of the seas with undisputed control of the world's commerce; thus assured against all rivalry, her industries also made wonderful strides forward.

America endeavored in so far as possible to maintain its commercial relations with Europe, but the continued inroads upon American commerce by privateering and the persistent impressment of American seamen for service in the British navy — 900 vessels were thus captured and about 6000 American seamen compelled into enforced service for Britain — finally ended in a declaration of war by the United States in 1812, after long drawn out negotiations had proved futile, and after the embargo, by which American ports were closed to all foreign shipping, had been maintained for four years, a measure that had proved suicidal to American commerce. But both by sea and by land the Americans were poorly prepared for war, and, in spite of many victories, the United States was really no match for England. Indeed, Washington, its newly founded capital was entered by the British in 1814 and partially destroyed by fire, including the capitol building itself. It was not until December 24, 1814, just at the time of the Congress of Vienna,

that peace between the two countries was concluded by the treaty of Ghent, in which everything was restored as far as possible to the state which had existed before the war.

CHAPTER XI

ENGLISH WORLD SUPREMACY 1814-1863

MEANWHILE England had fully harvested the fruits of the war. On the continent she had protected herself by establishing the Kingdom of the Netherlands into which Belgium was incorporated, and which was thus to form a barrier against any possible future attack upon the English coast by the French. This experiment proved a failure however, as is well known, for the Belgians, who are a strongly Catholic people, naturally gravitated toward France, and entertained a bitter feeling of hostility toward their Protestant neighbors of the Netherlands, with whom they had been in constant conflict for centuries, while the pressure of rival industries had still further deepened the antagonism between the two nationalities.

French interests were protected by England in so far that she would not permit the diminution of French territory to anything less than had been included within the limits of that country in 1700, and further, by preventing the restoration of Alsace to Germany. It was evidently the English intention to keep Germany's strength fettered in so far as possible, so that the latter might not develop sufficiently to become a formidable industrial rival for

England. With this purpose in view the old condition of confusion which had been crystallized in the form of the German Confederation, and which afforded a ready opportunity for interference on the part of any one of the powerful European states, was kept intact, and Prussian ambition was repressed at every point, while Austria, England's former ally, was eagerly supported in her aspirations. As is well known, in the crisis that arose in the settlement of European affairs by the Congress of Vienna, England formed a secret league with Austria and France with the intention of eventually meeting Prussia's claims for the annexation of Saxony by force of arms.

England, on the other hand, retained almost all of her over-seas conquests. In Europe, in addition to Malta, she kept the little island of Helgoland, which had been taken from Denmark, and furthermore established a British protectorate over the Ionian Islands. In America, Trinidad, which had belonged to Spain, now remained in the possession of England, as did also the half of Guiana that had been wrested from the Dutch, and that part of the coast of Honduras which the English had occupied in their conflict with the filibusters, whereas Martinique and Guadalupe were returned to France, and St. Thomas and the neighboring islands, to Denmark. In Africa Britain's chief acquisition was Cape Colony, besides which she retained the colony of Sierra Leone, and in the Indian Ocean the island of Mauritius and the Seychelles, whereas Réunion and the west African col-

onies were receded to France. In Asia the Netherlands retained possession of the Sunda Islands, chief among which was the rich island of Java; but Ceylon was not relinquished by the English, and in 1819 they added Singapore to their Asiatic acquisitions, whereupon the Dutch ceded their possessions in Malacca to Great Britain in exchange for a small part of Sumatra. From continental India the Dutch were now excluded altogether, while the French and Portuguese possessions there were restricted to a few positions that could be of but little significance in the development of the country, whereas English influence in India was constantly being broadened, chiefly by the subjugation of the Mahrattas (completed in 1818), and further by the concessions which Nepal was forced to make (1816), and by the seizure of the coast lands of Burma (1826), which was followed by the subjection of the Punjab and other native states in the basin of the Indus River (1843-1849). To this progressive territorial aggrandizement must be added the gradual settlement of Australia, the acquisition of Tasmania in 1803, and of New Zealand in 1840.

In her domination of the world Britain now had no rival. There was not a power on earth that would have ventured for a moment to entertain the idea of opposing the English at sea. Britain's empire of the seas was therefore accepted by the other nations as the decree of fate, as something unalterable, almost as a matter of course; and as for the English themselves, they regarded it as their indisputable right, a right which had been bestowed upon

them, any opposition to which was to be regarded as rebellion against the divine order of things, and as a crime against the highest interests of mankind.

But even England could not escape the depression that followed the tremendous struggle with Napoleon, and the misery was still further increased by the mismanagement of internal affairs, and by the convulsive clutch by which outgrown and decrepit institutions and privileges were retained, although they had long since been abandoned on the continent.

But as soon as Canning came into power, he gave a new turn to English politics (from 1822 onward), which was manifested by a disinclination on the part of England to be subservient to the designs of the Holy Alliance, and by the distinct purpose to follow a purely English policy under cover of the mantle of liberalism, although this harmonized but illy with the existing internal conditions. The result was an immediate re-awakening of the English spirit of enterprise. Furthermore, by giving the President of the North American republic cause in his message of December 2, 1823 to assert the principle known by his name as the Monroe Doctrine, which declared that any attempt by European governments (in which the colonial governments are not included) to interfere in American conditions, or "to extend their system to any portion of the western hemisphere" would be resented by the United States, and later, by following the example of the American republic in recognizing the independence of the Spanish-American colonies early in 1825, Canning

opened a new and extensive market for the products of British industry. Then, when the reform legislation of 1832 widened the possibilities for industrial development, and finally when the Corn Laws were repealed, and free trade was introduced, a new impetus was given to British commercial and industrial enterprise also.

Simultaneously and uninterruptedly Great Britain proceeded with the expansion of her colonial empire in every quarter of the globe,— in India and Indo-China, in Africa, in Australia, and in the islands of the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, from 1840 to 1842, she waged the shameful opium war against China, which gave her the opportunity to seize Hong Kong, and in 1839 she wrested Aden from the Turkish Empire, although at the time the relations of the two countries were absolutely peaceful, and in 1857 she completed her acquisitions in this region by adding to them the island of Perim in the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. Naturally, by such a policy of ruthless acquisition Great Britain became embroiled in war after war, first in one part of the world and then in another, so that from the year 1793 until the present time there have been but few years in which the British were not fighting somewhere, and had London, like Rome, possessed a temple of Janus, its gates would rarely have been found closed.

Since these wars were carried on with an army of mercenaries officered by men who made military service their profession in life, the mother country was little affected by them, and the English could

calmly proceed with the development of their industrial pursuits, and, quite undisturbed, enjoy the benefits to be derived from them.

Britain no longer found it necessary to interfere in the affairs of continental Europe by force of arms;¹ all that was needed now was to rouse the jealousy of one state for another, and, if feasible, to stir up internal dissensions, so that no one of these countries might gain in power sufficient to become a formidable rival for Britain. To this task the British statesmen now devoted themselves with both zeal and persistence, for which they deserve the greater credit since their total ignorance of actual conditions on the continent and of the sentiments prevailing among the different nationalities there was a constant hindrance to the success of their efforts, and led them into frequent blunders.

The past master in this art was Lord Palmerston, who at the time of the reform legislation accepted office in the Whig ministry although hitherto he had been a Tory, and in the capacity of secretary for foreign affairs now continued Canning's policy. He soon came to be both the inspiration and the strength of the Liberal ministries of which he continued to be a member up to the time of his death in 1865.

¹ There is but one exception; it is to be found in Britain's participation in the Greek war of independence, to which Canning was largely influenced by his disinclination to allow Russia a free hand in this connection. That England, as the ally of France and Russia, took part in the battle of Navarino was referred to as an "untoward event" in which the English had become involved much against their will.

He was the typical representative of the England of his day just as the elder Pitt had been representative of his country a century earlier. But that he was far from being Pitt's equal either in intellectual ability or in the weight of his personality is clearly shown by the nature of the development which England experienced while under his influence, for this was the time when the country entered upon its epoch of subservience to public opinion, and therefore of mediocrity. Since the passage of the Reform Bill England has produced but two truly great statesmen, men who were eminently self-reliant, and because of the steadfastness of their convictions could follow their own course and withstand the pressure of popular currents of opinion. The first of these, Sir Robert Peel, made the enactment of the reform measures possible by the invincible manner with which he met every hostile attack, and overcame and discarded outgrown opinions as soon as he was convinced that they were no longer tenable; the other, Disraeli, was the organizer of the new Conservative party.

Palmerston, on the contrary, sailed with the wind, and allowed himself to be borne on the currents of public opinion which he had an apt way of embodying in convenient but by no means profound phrases, that had the merit, however, of being readily apprehended by the most ordinary intelligence, and which were oftentimes characterized by a perplexing cynicism. He was therefore the very man to be popular with the people,—the warm-hearted aristocrat who was in sympathy with them. If in this respect he

went farther than did his more cautious and reticent colleagues, this but served to increase his popularity. He had a way of saying bluntly and without reserve just what all Englishmen felt and desired in their hearts, and he was little concerned as to whether or not it would give offence to benighted foreigners.

Just as he did at home, so abroad in his foreign policy also, Lord Palmerston assumed the rôle of the well-meaning, inoffensive gentleman who was disinterested enough to give good advice to the deluded people and Cabinets of other countries that had as yet not attained to the height of culture and intellectual superiority of the English, and to lead these foreign nations in the right direction, so that, as he once said, they might follow the shining example of England, though of necessity still far behind her. That these plans for other nations always harmonized with England's best interests was regarded as a happy coincidence, or, more likely, as both the evidence and the result of Britain's moral and political superiority. That the principles he advocated on one such occasion were often diametrically opposed to the counsel he had given on another, or to England's course of action, disturbed him not one whit, for he was like every normal Englishman, who always has two conflicting sets of principles at his command, either one of which may be produced as the occasion may demand, and then be proclaimed in lofty phrases, and with every evidence of absolute conviction.

In contrast to the policy pursued by the powers of the Holy Alliance, England now declared and

maintained the principle of non-intervention,— every nation's right to settle its own affairs without interference from abroad; nevertheless England did interfere unmasked in every political movement of consequence that took place on the continent. In Spain England fomented and supported the sanguinary civil war between the Carlists and the Christinos, and perpetuated the political unrest there by excluding the legitimate heir from the throne and securing it for the female line. In France any revolutionary uprising was sure of British sympathy, every newly established form of government received British recognition, it mattered little whether its nature was liberal like that of the monarchy under the "citizen King," or that of the Republic, or whether it was a newly created imperial despotism such as resulted from the usurpation by Napoleon III. In the former instances it was the liberty of the people that had to be defended; in the latter, the state of anarchy and the need of a restoration of political order called for intervention; both of these excuses served the British government as ready catchwords in defense of its policy. The aspirations for a united Italy found quick and sympathetic response in England, where the government not only granted asylum to the revolutionary agitators and other Italian political refugees, but, by diplomatic measures as well as by secretly extended financial aid and by still other means, supported the Italian movement in so far as possible without entangling the two countries in a war. In like manner, although failing of the desired result, England countenanced

the Polish insurrections, and was the abettor of the revolutionists in Russia also.

In Germany every tendency toward liberalism met with encouragement from England, as did also the aspirations of the smaller states to maintain their sovereignty undiminished; when, however, in 1848 the German people made the attempt to achieve political unity, England was found in the ranks of their opponents, while every effort to create a German navy was frowned upon by England with ever increasing enmity, and its new ensign was declared an emblem of piracy. When the Belgians revolted against the Netherlands, England intervened in support of the doctrine that every nation has the right to decide its own destiny, and in combination with France favored the establishment of the Belgian kingdom, to be held henceforth as neutral territory. But when the people of Schleswig-Holstein, who are Germans, endeavored to throw off the Danish yoke, England declared the integrity of the Danish kingdom to be necessary to the stability of European conditions, and, in alliance with Russia, compelled these German duchies to return to Danish domination.

Likewise for many decades the preservation of Turkish integrity constituted a fundamental dogma of Britain's foreign policy because it was a necessary precautionary measure, not only to protect British commerce with the Levant, but also to safeguard the importation of grains from southern Russia and from the fertile basin of the Danube. At that time this was a matter of vital importance to Great Britain, but through the tremendous increase of grain

production in India, Australia and Canada, as well as in the Argentine Republic, this precautionary policy has become less and less of a necessity to Britain. This explains the change that has gradually taken place in the English attitude toward Turkey and Russia, and which began at some time during the eighties of the last century. Up to that time it would have been fatal for England to allow a foreign power to gain control of the narrow waterways leading into the Mediterranean, and she could unfortunates were obliged to pay tribute to the Turkish Empire to a state of vassalage. This is the reason also why England looked on with indifference while the Christian subject populations of the Sultan's empire struggled for political liberty; that these unfortunates were obliged to pay tribute to the Turk and were dependent upon his despotic will was regarded as an unalterable dispensation of Providence, just as was Britain's sovereignty of the seas, or Ireland's thralldom. It explains also why England was a partner in the negotiations by which the domain of the newly established Greek kingdom was so circumscribed in extent that its political significance was dwarfed, and a full development of its power made impossible. What the Greek nation has nevertheless accomplished is astounding, and merits the highest praise.¹ It was all of a piece

¹ The ill treatment that Greece has suffered at the hands of the European powers forms one of the saddest chapters in the history of the nineteenth century. Moreover, a pessimistically inclined historian would find a most promising subject for his pen in the record of the attempts by which

with this policy also that a Bavarian prince, who was then still a minor, was placed upon the throne of Greece, and was succeeded, upon his abdication, by an entirely apathetic Danish prince who, in contrast to his predecessor, King Otho, never took any deep interest in the land whose official head he had come to be. In the despicable game of intrigue in which the diplomats at the Court of Athens were engaged, and by which the poor little country was kept in a never ending state of unrest, England took an eager hand, while the several attempts of the Cretans to gain their liberation from the Turk, and finally to achieve their union with Greece, were always suppressed with the force of British arms. It was in the further pursuit of this policy of self-interested caution that in 1840 England prevented the victorious Pasha, Mehemet Ali, then in alliance with France, from reaping the full fruits of his military successes, and with the use of the powerful British fleet compelled him to relinquish his territorial acquisitions, and confined his dominion to the limits of Egypt.

But, when in 1853 Nicholas I began his intended the "concert of European powers" endeavored by a diplomacy of the grossest intrigue to get rid of the problems that at different times threatened to precipitate a European conflict. Fortunately these attempts generally resulted as they deserved,—events took their own course in spite of them, and the diplomats had their trouble for their pains. Nevertheless it must not be overlooked that a deal of suffering and much bloodshed that might have been averted were the invariable consequences of this kind of diplomacy, while of good results there were none.

war of aggression against the Turkish Empire, England at once allied herself with France to stay his sword, and proceeded against him with the immediate assistance of French arms. In the progress of the Crimean war England showed herself to be an adept in the art of making her ally's soldiers fight for the advancement of British interests, whereas Napoleon found it impossible to carry out the wider plans with which he had entered the war. To engage the Germanic powers also, and, as in the preceding century, to secure German armies to fight her battles on the continent for her, was England's further intention; but in this she failed, despite the pressure exerted by her diplomacy. The Prussian state had by this time become too conscious of its growing strength, and, in spite of much vacillation and evidence of internal weakness in its policy, had preserved sufficient self-esteem to prevent Prussia from renouncing her position among the great powers of Europe and becoming vassal to Britain. And again, both in the diplomatic and military preparations for war, England clearly revealed the weakness and confusion that are characteristic of her political organization, and showed how much of truth there is in the frequently heard English expression of "we are drifting into the war." Nevertheless, since England had once assumed the attitude that she had, this war undoubtedly served her ends.

The alluring promises with which Lord Palmerston sought to win over the nations of the continent seemed at first to meet with the desired response;

gradually, however, their true import became more and more apparent. Indeed, it was hardly possible that the absolute selfishness of England's European policy could long remain unrecognized, for her merciless procedure with regard to the peoples of more distant parts of the world, as well as her constantly increasing territorial acquisitions, made too striking a contrast to her humane sounding phrases, to judge from which one would suppose Britain's sole purpose to be the achievement of human welfare. Moreover, time revealed that although the demands that the English government made under Lord Palmerston were both high sounding and imperious, they were usually not insisted upon in the face of a courageous and vigorous resistance. Only the weak and faint-hearted were likely to suffer from open violence at the hands of England, which in the end always seemed timidly indisposed to become involved in a great war, and, in view of the internal organization, not without good reason. For reasons such as these Britain suffered a gradual loss of respect on the continent; but the deep seated aversion to the English that soon became more and more general among the continental nations, and which was greater than all political differences, is to be attributed to the influence of Lord Palmerston more than to any other cause.

The half century succeeding the fall of Napoleon witnessed the high water mark of British supremacy. During this period of her history England may well be said to have held the sceptre of a world empire even in a far wider sense than did Spain in

the sixteenth century, or than did Louis XIV, or even the great Napoleon himself. For, although British domination did not express itself in the subjugation of the other countries but left them their independence, and although England was by no means in a position everywhere and at all times to enforce her demands, nevertheless there was not a power in the world that would have dared to oppose her, whereas against the former empires half the world stood in arms. England's wishes, on the contrary, were respected by the states of the European continent and were usually carried out, while her sovereignty of the seas, and with it the control of the world's commerce, was absolute. In the other continents, aside from the North American republic and the Russian possessions in Asia, England's will was law, in so far as she desired it to be enforced, and within the limits she set for herself; nor did she find it a difficult task, whenever it was necessary, to compel obedience by force of arms.

CHAPTER XII

NEW DANGERS — FRANCE — RUSSIA — AMERICA AND GERMANY

By and by, however, clouds began to appear in the clear sky of British world domination, and then gradually gathered into a storm that threatened to break in violence. France, England's old-time rival, could of course not for a moment entertain the thought of another passage at arms with her former enemy. But that prosperous country had soon recuperated from the after effects of the Napoleonic wars; industry and commerce received a fresh impetus, and France could now turn her attention to regaining her former position on the Mediterranean, as well as to renewed efforts to secure colonial possessions, which she inaugurated by the conquest of Algeria, begun in 1830.

Although England resorted to arms in 1840 for the purpose of frustrating the French attempt to gain a preponderating influence in Egypt and in the Turkish Empire, still it was not at all likely that France would ever again become a formidable foe, able to dispute Britain's supremacy. It was not long, therefore, before a number of overtures were made with the intention of establishing a "cordial understanding" between these two great powers, both

at the time of Louis Philippe and of Napoleon III, but, it goes without saying, always with the tacit reservation that each of these cordial friends would take advantage of every opportunity to out-manœuvre the other, a part of the program which each of the participants carried out with scrupulous care. England and France therefore fought side by side in the Crimean war, whereby the French influence on the Mediterranean and in the commerce of the Levant was greatly strengthened; nor did England protest when Napoleon interfered in Italian affairs, nor did she take any steps to prevent his war with Austria, while as early as 1842 the English looked on with complaisance when the French seized a number of islands in the Pacific. From 1857 to 1860, England and France, as allies, together waged a war of aggression against China, while at the same time France laid the foundations for her colonial possessions in Cochin China and Cambodia, and took a neighborly position next to the English near the outlet of the Red Sea on the Gulf of Tadjura; she also began to extend and develop her colonial interests in Senegambia.

A much more dangerous expansion was proceeding in another quarter. Basing her claims on her protectorate of the Eastern Christians, Russia was exerting pressure upon the Sultan in the hope of gaining free access to the Mediterranean by reducing his empire to a state of complete subjection to Russia. On the Asiatic continent Russia subjugated the region south of the Caucasus, encroached upon Persia, and extended her dominions

southward from Siberia, not only toward the Amur River and China (1858-1860), but into central Asia as well, with an unwavering persistence ever since the year 1846, although a first attempt in 1839 had ended in failure. In 1867 the province of Turkestan was established, and the khanates of this region made subject to Russia. Thus the danger of Russian encroachment upon India grew more imminent with every year; the vast resources that the giant empire had at its command, and which the Russians were slowly learning to utilize, were constantly increasing its power of conquest. Consequently the Russian menace of Turkey and of Persia, as well as the Czar's eager desire for an ice-free port on one of the world's great bodies of water, from whence Russian trade could mingle with the commerce of the world, were causing the British increasing anxiety for the maintenance of their empire of the seas.

Thus it came about that the British began to look upon Russia as their most formidable opponent, and the desire to keep that vast empire within bounds became the central thought of their foreign policy. Although the armies of Britain and Russia had marched together against France at the time of the great Napoleon, the turn of affairs now led the British to behold in their one-time ally their present foe, and in their usual way they proceeded to plan how all the other states of the continent might be called to arms for a united attack upon the former ally whose power had increased all too greatly. Therefore France, Britain's rival of the past, that

by this time, however, had been sufficiently humbled, was not only allowed a free hand, but was even sought as an ally. After the Crimean war England only very seldom opposed the Emperor of France, in spite of the tension to which his restless and daringly adventurous policy often gave rise. As usual, in this war against Russia the English posed as the vanguard of European civilization arrayed against Asiatic oppression and barbarism, and were full of reproaches for the nations that would not respond to England's call.

Meanwhile two other countries had each entered on the road leading to political power and an ever increasing industrial and commercial importance: the United States of North America and Germany. Ever since the revolutionary war the new republic had been increasing its territory step by step until it had reached truly vast proportions; meanwhile the land was gradually being peopled by the continuously arriving streams of immigrants, and the industrial and commercial interests had begun to be developed. In the early forties of the past century the United States began to show a desire for Texas and the Pacific coast. This almost led to another war with England, since, in the excited state of American "public opinion," which had been purposely and artificially stimulated, a claim was made to the entire territory reaching as far north as $54^{\circ}, 40'$. However, when all the vehement talk had accomplished its purpose in the campaign for the presidential election of 1844, the Americans, after all, preferred to come to an agreement with

England, and the 49th parallel was decided upon to mark the northern boundary of the United States. The American republic then sought consolation by an attack upon her weaker neighbor in the south, and deprived Mexico of California and New Mexico.

Very soon after these events England most decidedly sounded a retreat when, by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (April 19, 1850), she abandoned her plans for an inter-oceanic canal through Central America, and discontinued her negotiations for the purchase of the necessary territory in that region, while the United States assumed like obligations. A few years later the interpretation of this treaty, as well as England's reckless impressment of Americans for service in the Crimean war, involved the two countries in serious complications, more especially so since Lord Palmerston, with his habitual haughtiness, refused to meet the Americans half way.

Meanwhile on the other side of the water Germany was making steady although slow progress toward economic strength. Her industries were being developed in a vigorous and alert spirit of enterprise, although her over-seas trade was still largely in the hands of foreign nations and of the Hanse cities. The latter had understood well how to increase their commercial importance and enlarge their fleet of merchantmen by pursuing a policy that had interwoven the interests of the great powers into its fabric, and especially by fostering amicable relations with Great Britain. This pol-

icy had, however, served to alienate these cities from the German land in which they are situated, and their relations to it came to be almost those of foreign states.

The leadership in the German economic development devolved upon Prussia, this state being compelled to assume the responsibility because of the absurd distribution of the territory which the Congress of Vienna had allotted to its jurisdiction, as well as by the political questions with which it was confronted. The deciding event was the formation of the Zollverein (customs union); its gradual extension to include every part of German territory aside from Austria was a peremptory necessity, and from it the smaller states could not, in spite of much opposition, remain permanently aloof. Moreover, the system of universal military service which Prussia had newly introduced exerted an influence by which all the people of all the provinces within Prussian jurisdiction felt themselves to be united into a single nation, proud of their national individuality and self-reliant independence. This gave the Prussian state a firm foundation, and one that made the pursuit of an independent policy possible to the government, if it had the courage to devise one and carry it through. It is all too well known how the English sought to disparage this highest achievement of the modern state, and to represent it as unworthy of a free nation, and far inferior to the system of voluntary enlistment by means of which Britain provides herself with an army of hirelings disciplined with the lash, and how this

representation found an echo in the particularism of the smaller German states, whose people were quite content in the comfort that their quiet political life afforded them.

Likewise England endeavored to retard the progress of the Zollverein, for this conflicted with her doctrine of free trade, the Englishman's cure-all, while it also set a limit to the flood of English manufactured wares pouring into Germany, and made German economic development possible. That the German aspirations for political unity met with vigorous opposition from England has already been stated. But gradually it dawned upon the English that with the methods they were employing they could never hope to prevent this economic and political progress, and they therefore began to recognize in Germany a competitor who was likely to cause them a deal of uneasiness in the future, although for the present, England could still afford to assume the mien of a generous magnate who did not grudge an insignificant neighbor his small gains.

In connection with the Crimean war Prussia showed that she, and all Germany with her, refused to be taken in tow by England and her policy, and that this German state was powerful enough to proceed on the way of her own choosing. Soon afterward, under the direction of William I, who persevered in the face of much opposition from among his own people, Prussia entered upon the course by which the national aspirations could be realized.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CRISIS AND ENGLISH RETROGRESSION 1862-1864

THUS it would appear that at the beginning of the sixties English prestige had suffered a decline, and that British influence was far from what it had been during the decades just preceding this period of her history, in spite of her material prosperity and the continued expansion of her colonial empire. The most serious disturbance to which that empire had yet been subjected, the terrible Indian revolt, had just been quelled, the East India Company practically discontinued, and the government of India organized on a reasonable basis. Everywhere new and intricate problems had arisen, and it was a question whether England would be able to solve them to the advantage of her own interests, and so preserve to herself the latent sovereignty of the world. For the conduct of a war on the continent was even more impossible to England now, with her diminutive army against the enormous military forces at the command of the continental states, than it had been in former times, unless, as heretofore, she could procure powerful allies, and these were hard to find, while nowhere, as of yore, were there soldiers to be bought at the courts of petty princi-

palities. Nor would a serious conflict at sea be free from dangers for Britain, even should her navy remain quite unscathed; for British commerce and British industry — for the very reason of their magnitude — would incur such tremendous losses thereby, and experience so great a set back, that British statesmen had good reason to shrink from such a war.

The deciding events by which the tide was turned were the American civil war and the German conflict with Denmark, and may be said to date from the year 1862 to 1864. That it would be to Britain's advantage if the American republic should be severed into two parts each filled with hatred of the other, and for years likely at any moment to fall upon each other in open hostility is too obvious to need enlargement. Should the Republic remain an undivided country, it would inevitably develop into a mighty power through the rapid increase of its population by immigration from abroad, as well as by the utilization of the "unlimited possibilities" that were enclosed within its own boundaries. More than once in the past had its truly invulnerable position inspired the United States with confidence sufficient to meet the British demands with a curt refusal, which Britain had been obliged to accept. Now the opportunity seemed at hand for England to deal this growing rival of the west a fatal blow without over much exertion on her own part, nor all too great an expenditure of treasure. The industries and the commercial cities of the northern states only were England's competitors;

the southern states were her profitable customers. Moreover, it was from this section of the country that England annually received enormous quantities of raw cotton, the manufacture of which constituted a very important source of her industrial prosperity. To these considerations must be added the sympathy which the aristocratic circles in England entertained for the southern gentry.

Thus a strong sentiment in favor of the slave states prevailed in England. So intense was this feeling that it would not be satisfied with conceding the rights of a belligerent to the Confederacy at the very outset of the war, in consequence of which the seceded states ceased to be looked upon as rebels, and their cruisers were no longer regarded as pirate craft, but as vessels of war. It demanded still more. — the official recognition of the Confederacy as an independent state, for this step would inevitably have led to an open stand in favor of the South, and therefore to a participation in the war against the North. That in this event England would be fighting to maintain slavery was an ugly side-issue which caused the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lord John Russell, many anxious doubts as to whether he ought to follow his predisposition toward an idealistic and humanitarian course, or surrender to the urgent demands for the pursuit of a conscienceless policy of self-interest on the part of England. With his usual bluntness of speech Lord Palmerston, who was then Prime Minister, placed the situation squarely before the American minister at London, Mr. Charles Francis Adams, when he said, "We

are no lovers of slavery; but we need cotton, and your Morrill Tariff (America's high protective tariff) is not to our liking at all."

This sentiment in favor of the South and against the northern states was promoted by the serious defeats that the North suffered in the early part of the war, and still further by the excitement which followed a grave violation of international law by the North through the capture of two Confederate envoys while on their way to Europe, Mason and Slidell, who were taken from the British steam packet *Trent* by the commander of a United States man-of-war on November 8, 1861.¹ The "Times," which has always been both the creator and the mouthpiece of the ruling current of public opinion, was, as has been only too often the case, on the side of the morally less worthy cause, which it advocated with its customary resort to expressions of great ethical pathos, and apparently quite untroubled by conscientious scruples of any kind. It now became the champion of the seceded states, proclaimed their right to independence, and deluged the North with vindictive abuse. Even Gladstone, who considered himself a Liberal, and who at the time was Chancellor of the Exchequer, favored the official recog-

¹ Whenever it is to her advantage, England assumes the attitude of the devoted advocate of international law, and breaks the vials of her morally justified wrath upon the head of every offender against it; when she is the gainer by its violation, however, she has never hesitated to trample it under foot. In the present war England has far outdone any breach of international law of which the Americans were guilty in 1861.

nition of the Confederacy. The moral justification for this attitude was found in the phrase that the states of the South had shown a firm determination to maintain their independence, and at the same time had proved themselves to be unconquerable; it therefore was England's duty to acknowledge the right of every nation to decide its own destiny, and to stand for it.

Although the *Florida*, a war vessel built in Liverpool for the Confederacy, was seized by the British authorities in the vicinity of the Bahama Islands soon after it had put to sea, for in this instance the violation of the law had been all too flagrant, it soon regained its freedom by process of law. In the case of the *Alabama*, however, another English built cruiser, the British authorities made no attempt to detain the vessel, but allowed her to slip to sea on July 29, 1862; hardly had she made her escape when the order came to detain her in compliance with a demand for an investigation of her status, which had been made by the American minister, the order having been intentionally delayed by the English authorities until it was too late to enforce it. When out at sea the *Alabama* was then provided with guns, ammunition and coal by two British vessels,—of course, without the knowledge of the entirely innocent British government.

At last, Lord John Russell himself was persuaded to open negotiations for combined intervention on the part of the European great powers. Russia absolutely declined; Napoleon, however, who at this time was just entering upon his Mexican

adventure, eagerly accepted the opportunity, and early in 1863 did in fact offer French mediation, which the North, of course, politely refused. This step on the part of Napoleon acted rather as a deterrent upon the English government because of the deep distrust with which it regarded the Emperor of the French. In addition, a strongly unfavorable sentiment had developed in England among the democratic masses to whom slavery was an abomination and war a horror, and this feeling was further stimulated by a vigorous agitation conducted by a part of the Liberals under the leadership of John Bright. Moreover, the United States was very fortunate in its representative at London, Mr. Charles Francis Adams, whose consummate skill in handling the interests of his country, as well as the great tact he displayed in correcting or smoothing over the blunders made by Mr. Seward, President Lincoln's Secretary of State, did much toward saving the situation for the northern states.

President Lincoln made the decisive counter-move, however, when on September 22, 1862, he issued a preliminary proclamation, to be followed on January 1, 1863, by the final proclamation by which the slaves were emancipated, for by this departure from his original intention, he made the war not only a struggle to maintain the Union, but one to eradicate slavery as well. As much as the ruling circles in England desired and tried to belittle the character and effect of this step, its influence upon the general public could not fail eventually to be a powerful one. It was altogether too

incongruous that England, the country that in 1807 had prohibited the slave trade, in 1833 had abolished slavery in its colonies, and since that time had sought to suppress the slave trade on every ocean by the pursuit and capture of all slave ships, should now turn about and participate in open warfare for the preservation of slavery in the states of the South. As late as March 27, 1863, Lord Palmerston, in his speech to the Parliament, defended the Government for the course it had pursued in the case of the *Florida* and of the *Alabama*; but on April 5, Lord Russell ordered the detention of another war vessel that was intended for the Confederate service, and which at the time was still in dock at Liverpool. At last this long continued state of uncertainty came to an end when, after frequent defeats, the North was victorious at Gettysburg on July 3, the greatest as well as the decisive battle of the war, followed immediately afterward by the surrender of Vicksburg to General Grant. On September 5, two more armored cruisers that were being built at Liverpool for the Confederacy were prevented by Lord Russell from putting to sea; the claim that they were intended for France or Egypt, and that therefore England had no right to interfere with them, proved untenable, thanks to the efforts made by Mr. Adams, and after long drawn out negotiations the vessels were finally bought by the English government in order to put an end to the matter.

To make the defeat of the English attitude complete the American government soon afterward

made all the negotiations in the matter public. There was then nothing left for Parliament to do, in spite of much violent criticism of the Cabinet for the discreditable and vacillating policy that it had pursued, but to refuse to pass a vote of censure (February 23, 1864), since this would have been equivalent to a declaration of war against the northern states, and under these circumstances the Opposition could not have undertaken the government.

This ended the matter; the British intention to support the Confederacy had come to nought, and Britain made no further attempt to interfere in the American civil war. That the outcome is not to be regarded as a triumph for America only, but also as a decided defeat for the English aristocracy and as a complete victory for democratic tendencies, has been pointed out by an American historian.¹ It was only two years later that Gladstone, the heir to Lord Palmerston's leadership in the Commons, introduced his bill for comprehensive parliamentary reforms, and although he and his bill were defeated,

¹ Brooks Adams, a son of the American minister at London, in a paper entitled, "The Seizure of the Laird Rams" (the armored cruisers that were built in the Birkenhead dock near Liverpool for the southern states), and published in the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, December, 1911, the society to which he presented the highly interesting correspondence and documents that were left him by his father. Other valuable and instructive material on the subject may be found in "The Trent Affair" and in "A Crisis in Downing Street" by C. F. Adams, another son of the American minister to England, and published in the Proceedings of November, 1911, and of May, 1914.

it was but a short time afterward that Disraeli, whose keen political insight had recognized the situation, and who also knew well how to turn it to the advantage of Conservative interests, put through a bill for still wider reforms in 1867.

Meanwhile in Germany the Schleswig-Holstein question, which had dragged on indefinitely, now reached an acute stage. In December, 1863, the armies of the German allies occupied Holstein, and on February 1 the Prussian and Austrian forces crossed the Eider, and the war against Denmark was on. The English government again did all in its power to preserve the integrity of Denmark and to prevent Prussia from taking possession of the Kiel Haven and the coast of Schleswig. The English were especially eager to frustrate the Prussian plans because they were aware of the further, and in the sight of England highly reprehensible plan to cut a canal from the mouth of the Elbe through to the Baltic, whereby Germany's naval position would be greatly strengthened, and an end would be made of the dangerous possibility of closing the Baltic by a blockade of the Sound. Therefore, while Lord Russell was again seeking an adjustment, this time as to how the demands of political moral integrity and the perfectly just German claims might be made to harmonize with the preservation of British interests, Palmerston, together with Lord Clarendon and with a resort to all that English diplomacy could offer, was doing what he could to stiffen the necks of the Danes, and at the same time to bring about another European coalition against

Germany, like the one of 1848. The entire English press was on the side of Denmark, and declared German interference in the "internal affairs" of Denmark to be absolutely unjustified.¹ All England, whose fleet in 1801 and 1807 had bombarded Copenhagen, although the two countries were then absolutely at peace, and in the Crimean war had fired upon Russian seaport towns and fishing hamlets without the slightest compunction, now was ablaze with righteous indignation because during the siege of the Düppel fortifications, the town of Sonderburg, lying just back of them, also suffered from the bombardment. Lord Shaftesbury shed crocodile tears over so great a crime, and Lord Palmerston portrayed with fiery eloquence the enormity of a bombardment of Copenhagen by the Prussians.

Thus the war against Denmark was at the same time a war against England and her domination of the world. In reliance upon the English promises privately conveyed, the Danish government declined all proffered mediation, and so lost the opportunity to retain at least a part of Schleswig in her possession. We know how finally all obstacles and dangers were overcome by Bismarck's statesmanship, and the complete separation of the duchies from

¹ Abroad this has remained the prevailing view, up to the present day. Charles Eliot, the leader of public opinion in America, in an article upon the present war that is remarkable for the arrogance and self-sufficiency of its tone as well as for the ignorance it displays, declares that Prussia made war upon Denmark for the purpose of gaining possession of the harbors of Schleswig.

Denmark was accomplished. When matters came to a final decision, it became evident how much, or rather how little England's high sounding talk and fierce threats really amounted to; all obligations of an official nature had been carefully avoided, and England now refused to give Denmark any support whatever, and withdrew entirely from the matter. The scales were turned when Prussia gained Russian favor by her attitude on the Polish question, and when it became evident that Napoleon was not at all inclined to undertake a war against the German powers, but rather hoped in this connection to find an opportunity to fish in troubled waters, and was therefore justly regarded with little confidence by England. Dependent upon herself alone, England did not find it advisable to venture a war; she might, without doubt, have destroyed Germany's over-seas commerce, but her own would have suffered incalculable loss, and for a war by land her army was quite too insufficient.

Again there was nothing for Parliament to do but to accept the situation as best it might, and it did so by giving its tardy sanction to the Government's policy with all its pitiful vacillations by a vote of thanks to the Queen for the preservation of peace.

CHAPTER XIV

SUSPENSION OF COLONIAL AGGRESSION — TENSION BETWEEN ENGLAND AND RUSSIA (1865-1881)

IN consequence of these two serious defeats of her diplomacy the prestige of England's supremacy was somewhat dimmed; they indicate the turning point in British sovereignty of the world. From this time forth, and for many years to come, England kept aloof from the affairs of the continent, and in a large measure allowed them to take care of themselves. She stood by with arms crossed when Prussia and Austria were at war, and again when the German Confederation was established. At the London Conference with regard to Luxemburg in 1867, in which England participated with great reluctance, she made the neutralization of this tiny state assume a most illusive nature by the explanation which the Cabinet gave to the Parliament, saying that, according to the agreement, the contracting powers guaranteed the neutrality of Luxemburg jointly, and against a third party only, and that should one of the contracting parties attempt its violation, the guarantee of neutrality would instantly become inoperative. During the war between Germany and France, England proclaimed

her neutrality, although this in no wise prevented the English government from allowing the very lucrative exportation of arms and other contraband of war to France. When Russia improved the opportunity that this war gave her to renounce the obligation never to maintain a war fleet on the Black Sea, which had been imposed upon her by the terms of the Peace of Paris in 1856, England not only failed to protest against this, but was obliged to sanction it at a conference held in London.

The only difficulties that seemed insurmountable were those that resulted from England's relations to Russia, and from the English purpose to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. The tension caused by Russia's advance into central Asia was constantly growing, and threatened more than once to end in war. Lord Salisbury's attempt to settle the Balkan troubles by means of a conference at Constantinople ended in utter failure early in 1877, the Sultan's checkmate to the English proposal being the proclamation of a sham constitution, whereupon he announced that in the future he could enter into no binding negotiations without the consent of the Turkish Parliament, and that therefore the conference would be to no purpose. Later, when Russia, in secret alliance with Austria, began a new war upon the Turkish Empire, England did not hesitate to offer instant opposition, and really made serious preparations for war, in consequence of which Russia modified her demands at a conference held in Berlin, and at which a compromise was effected by means of German media-

tion. As usual, England again did not fail to pocket the reward of her disinterested intervention in behalf of the Turk and of European interests in general,—the Sultan was obliged to cede Cyprus to her. Strange to say, and quite contrary to England's customary skill in handling her colonial possessions, and in spite of the apparently favorable situation of this island, England failed to utilize the advantages it offered, and did not succeed in establishing an efficient economic life upon the island. Cyprus is to the present day the most neglected and undeveloped of all the British possessions. Furthermore England made the most of the time during which Russia's hands were bound by the war upon Turkey, to interfere in the affairs of Turkestan, and to re-establish her former predominating influence there; in addition she widened the boundaries of her Indian domain by taking possession of the Khyber Pass, as well as of the passes of the Suleiman Mountains and of a part of Beluchistan, and thus strengthened her hold upon the entire country, since it gave her control of its natural boundaries.

Otherwise, during this epoch of her history, England shows traces of weariness that are usually seen in an old and gluttoned civilization, one that is no longer capable of great exertion, and resignedly accepts the inevitable, all of which are the more apparent because of the vigor and tremendous prosperity that mark the period just preceding. The restraint which is the chief characteristic of England's foreign policy at this time, and her with-

drawal from any active participation in the affairs of the continent were quite in keeping, it must be said, with the theories of the Manchester School — the “laissez aller” — the disposition to restrain, in so far as possible, all interference on the part of the state, and to leave everything to the natural development of the economic forces. That the better part of Britain's possessions in North America had separated from the motherland, as had Mexico and South America from Spain, together with the ever increasing desire for an absolutely independent home government on the part of Britain's other colonies, led men to conclude that this was but the process of a natural law, and that whenever colonies arrived at the time when they could dispense with the protection of the motherland, they separated from it just as naturally as a ripe fruit drops from the tree. With perfect sincerity the question was discussed as to whether it were not advisable for England to break her connection with the colonies of her own accord, to confer absolute independence upon them, and so rid herself of the obligations and responsibilities that their possession entailed. Britain did in fact withdraw from the Ionian Islands in 1863, and in 1856 she refused to annex the Fiji Islands, of which she nevertheless did take possession in 1874.

With this novel doctrine Mr. Gladstone was fully in harmony, himself the greatest of dilettantes in politics, and one who seemed better fitted to be a professor of orthodox theology, or of Greek, than to be the political leader of a great nation. His

knowledge and understanding of foreign lands and their peoples — in sharp contrast to his rival, Disraeli — were even less than were possessed by any one of his predecessors in office, and in the mysteries of foreign politics he was always at sea. It must be said, however, that he was an honest believer in the doctrines that he proclaimed with great eloquence. When in 1881 it came to a war with the Transvaal Republic, which under Disraeli's administration had been annexed to the British dominions in 1877, and the British arms suffered defeat at Majuba Hill, Gladstone accepted the outcome, and, in conformity to the doctrines he advocated, induced his government to recognize the autonomy of the Transvaal.

CHAPTER XV

THE PERIOD FROM 1881 TO 1901 — RELATIONS WITH FRANCE — AMERICA — RUSSIA AND TURKEY

MEANWHILE it became evident that whenever England's vital interests were at stake their consideration far outweighed the claims of any political theory. The attitude that the government had taken, together with the ever growing influence which was being exerted by public opinion, had for its inevitable consequence that, instead of being the leader in matters political, the government was now being led, and was frequently driven to pursue a course the end of which it could not foresee, while behind the scenes there were irresponsible and uncontrollable forces at work, and skillful intriguers were influencing the affairs of the state, and were exploiting them for their own benefit. There was the further drawback that the ministers of state were never chosen for their professional fitness to administer the departments of which they had charge, but were chosen because of the political services they had rendered their party, or in acknowledgment of their influence in Parliament. The business of the state was therefore in the hands

of men who had no professional knowledge of the affairs which they were conducting.

It is for these reasons that Britain usually finds herself so illy prepared to enter upon large undertakings; there is no comprehensive oversight of the available means with which to meet them, and therefore a want of unity in the direction of the state's activities. Consequently England's political conduct is characterized by irresolution and spasmodic action. As was said at the time of the battle of Navarino and of the Crimean war, England is inclined to allow herself to be controlled by events instead of herself controlling them. Usually, after long continued irresolution, she either withdraws altogether, if the timorous mood gains the upper hand, or else the government takes energetic but impulsive measures by which a war is made inevitable, but from which it does not appear clearly whether this is the result of intended and definite action, or whether the administration allowed itself to be hurried unawares and by influences over which it had no control to take an unpremeditated step,— for instance, by the action of some diplomatic agent, or by some energetic measure taken by a zealous officer, or in consequence of an agitation by the press. Generally, a reaction ensues, the war opens with a series of heavy defeats, for the reason that the necessary military measures were unexpectedly and hurriedly taken, and the defects in the organization make themselves felt at every step. On the other hand, it is in just this situation that the dogged persistence of the Englishman is revealed at its best;

once he finds himself at war, he does not allow himself to be discouraged by defeats, but fights to a finish — a quality by which in the long and wearisome twenty years' war with France some glorious results were achieved. It matters not how bitter the opposition to the government and its measures may have been,—as was the case at the time of the English Revolution,—when the critical moment arrives, the administration is not embarrassed by opposition. “Right or wrong,—my country!” is the watchword then, and all criticism is deferred into the future when that which has come to pass can no longer be undone, and, in spite of any moral misgivings, is accepted with satisfaction. While at the close of the war of the Spanish Succession, and of the Seven Years' war also, the immediate change that took place in the public mind had its origin, no doubt, in internal conditions, still it was due in no small degree to the fact that England had in the main achieved her ends, and could point with pride to rich results when she came to make peace. When the reverse of this was true at the end of the American revolutionary war, the English nation came to the conclusion that the revolting colonies were unconquerable, and that therefore it was best to concede their independence, and so avoid what might be worse.

This feature of English political life has been clearly revealed in connection with Egyptian affairs ever since the beginning of the political disturbances in 1879. Up to that time Egypt had been chiefly under the influence of the French, who had in-

roduced European civilization into the country together with its associated evil of political corruption, and who now regarded it as a part of their dominions, with the secret hope some day to carry out Napoleon's cherished plan, and, with Egypt as their base, to launch an attack upon England's empire in India, and upon her domination of the world as well. England had allowed this situation to continue until it threatened to become perilous, although in 1840 she had put an end to the tremendous political power that Mehemet Ali had obtained with the aid of France. The construction of the Suez Canal (completed in 1869), financed with French capital, was regarded by England with apprehension, and an attempt was made to prevent it, but without success. As the value of this new waterway became more and more apparent, Egypt assumed a position of tremendous importance in relation to England's world domination. When this was fully realized, England laid her hand upon the canal through Disraeli's purchase of a large number of the company's shares of stock in 1875. Soon afterward this statesman secured for England a position of influence equal to that of France in the land of the Khedive by the introduction of the Anglo-French system of "joint control" of Egyptian finances, which had reached the point of bankruptcy through unparalleled recklessness in the expenditure of the state's income.

Meanwhile the political mismanagement led to the revolt of a military popular party under the leadership of Arabi Pasha, which, after it had

seized the government, soon proved itself quite incapable of enforcing the much needed reforms. For a while England stood by as an observer; then the recently established Gladstone ministry cast to the wind the peaceful doctrine of non-intervention and the beautiful theory of every nation's right to independence and self-government, which Gladstone, as leader of the Opposition, had but lately proclaimed to the world with soul-stirring eloquence at the time that he advocated intervention in behalf of the Bulgarians and against their Turkish oppressors. Suddenly a British fleet appeared on the coast of Egypt and bombarded Alexandria on July 11, 1882. France, entirely possessed by her hatred of Germany and the desire for revenge, withdrew in a spirit of short-sighted amiability, General Wolseley took triumphant possession of the country, and made short work of Arabi Pasha's authority. Since that time Egypt has been a vassal state under control of England on the same order as are the principalities of India, although some unimportant concessions are made to the claims of France and to the sovereignty of the Sultan. When a short time afterward, the uprising under the Mahdi occurred, it soon became evident how little system there really was in the British rule, and how deplorably deficient were the means at hand. The Anglo-Egyptian forces in Kordofan were annihilated in 1883, and General Gordon was sent to Khartum to fall a sacrifice to British inefficiency in 1885. For a decade afterward the Sudan was left to shift for itself, until in 1898 General Kitchener made an end of

the Mahdi's rule, and the Sudan was then annexed, not to Egypt, but to the British dominions.

If on the one hand Britain opposed the domination of the French in Egypt, and crowded them out of the valley of the Nile, it was for the sake of placing her possession of India beyond a peradventure, for in other directions she now generally allowed the French a free hand. Republican France soon developed a well-planned and vigorous colonial policy whereby that country's resources were enormously enlarged. The conquest of Tongking was begun in 1883 and its possession successfully defended against China; Annam became a vassal state to France, the Kingdom of Siam was forced to relinquish a part of its territory into French hands, the subjugation of Madagascar was begun in 1885, and in 1911 Tahiti was annexed. In addition to all these acquisitions France proceeded with a systematic plan of conquest in northwestern Africa, for which Algeria and Senegambia served her excellently as centers of action. As early as 1881 Tunis was subjugated; in 1883 the French explorer, de Brazza, penetrated to the banks of the Congo, and the country as far as Lake Chad fell under French domination, as did also the Niger territory together with Timbuktu and the Sahara, and in 1892 Dahomey was added to the French conquests. Thus, aside from the English and German colonies that were sprinkled here and there among all these French territorial possessions, and of the Canary Islands owned by Spain, and the Cape Verde Islands by Portugal, the control of the entire northwestern

part of the African continent had passed to France, with the single exception of the Kingdom of Morocco. This was now the only remaining independent state, but was so closely pressed on all sides by French territory that it was evidently the morsel that had been reserved for the last, and it was now but a question of time when it also would become a victim to the French appetite for conquest.

England did not bar the way to this tremendous expansion of French dominion, but whenever a conflict of interests occurred, as in Siam, allowed the matter to be adjusted by treaty. The only time that England assumed a threatening attitude was in 1898 when a French expedition under General Marchand made the attempt to advance from the Congo as far north as Fashoda on the upper Nile, and so drive a dividing wedge between the British possessions in the valley of the Nile and those in equatorial Africa. In this instance only did British arms compel a surrender of French territorial aspirations.

As compliant as was England's attitude toward France, it was even more so toward North America. When in 1895 a dispute arose between England and Venezuela with regard to the boundary line between the latter country and British Guiana, the United States demanded that England should desist from enforcing her claim by a resort to arms, and compelled an adjustment by arbitration. In this connection President Cleveland's Secretary of State, Olney, construed the Monroe Doctrine in a wider sense, and so as to include within its prohibition any

armed interference on the part of a European power in American affairs, and declared that the United States would not tolerate a European power to take possession of any disputed territory in America. In 1902 England was compelled, after long drawn out negotiations, to agree to the annulment of the treaty of 1850 regarding the construction of an inter-oceanic canal through Central America, and at the same time renounced any possible right herself to build such a canal at any future time. Immediately afterward the United States effected the separation of the newly constituted state of Panama from Colombia, and then undertook the construction of the canal herself.

It was at a time somewhat earlier than this that, in order to protect the interests of California, the most independent and self-assertive state of the Union, the American republic felt impelled to extend the sphere of her influence beyond the shores of the Pacific, and in 1897 annexed the Hawaiian Islands. The war with Spain for the liberation of Cuba in 1898, and the consequent acquisition of over-seas territory (Porto Rico and the Philippines, to which were added several islands of the Samoan group in 1899), together with the establishment of vassal states (Cuba, soon followed by Panama), consummated the decisive step by which the Republic advanced beyond the confines of America, and took her place among the other nations of the world in the control of its affairs, while at the same time it required a fundamental change in the internal structure of the

American government. Thus the United States has entered upon a course the end of which no man can foresee, but from which, we may be certain, there can be no turning back. It is a step which is of as great moment to the American republic as was the conquest of Sicily, and the resulting acquisition of her first province, to Rome. Henceforth American interests will be affected by all the great questions of world politics; the immediate consequence must be that the United States will find it imperative to obtain for herself the dominating influence on the Pacific with the unavoidable result that she will be opposed by Japan. This undoubtedly was a consideration when the United States determined to construct the Panama canal, and plays no unimportant part in shaping the attitude which that country takes toward the confused state of affairs in Mexico.

As a counterpoise to the preponderating power of the Republic, Britain has developed her Canadian dominion with great energy, while at the same time she has sought to win the devotion of its people by showing great consideration for their wishes and interests, and by granting them an almost complete autonomy. By opening up large areas of agricultural lands in Manitoba, Assiniboia and Saskatchewan, and by developing the harbors on the west coast of Canada the importance of this British province has been greatly increased. In recent years there has been continuous immigration from the United States into Canada, mostly of young men of the farming population who can there obtain

much land for little money, and so find the opportunity to acquire wealth. It is a much discussed question in America whether this element of the population will eventually pave the way toward future annexation to the United States, or whether, like the French Catholic population of Canada, these immigrants and their descendants will hold loyally to Britain in grateful recognition of the stable and well organized political conditions that prevail in the land of their adoption, in striking contrast to the frequent changes and at times almost anarchical conditions that occur in their homeland. The answer to this question will be decided by the future development of the country; meanwhile the large majority by which the people of Canada in 1911 declared themselves as opposed to the proposed reciprocal trade relations with the United States is sufficient evidence to conclude that British affiliation is still paramount in Canada.

In general, England has accepted the masterful and highly independent spirit of the American policy, and has allowed the old enmity to be forgotten, although its echoes were heard until late into the nineteenth century. Since that time, however, England has shown herself willing to meet the American republic more than half way, and has been as unscrupulous as she has been skillful in her manipulation of the American press to enlist it in favor of English interests. Moreover, the harmonizing influence of a common language, a common literature, and common customs and views of life is a powerful one, and the result is that in America also

the old feeling of resentment against England and her policy of extreme selfishness has gradually died out, although at times and upon occasion there is evidence that it still lingers. To what proportions this pro-English feeling has grown, the present war has revealed all too clearly. It generally assumes a sentimental form, and expresses itself in the old adage, "Blood is thicker than water," which, though it stirs the imagination, is not upheld by the lessons that history teaches. In reality it is never sentiment, but always the hard and uncompromising demands of political and material conditions that decide the course of historical events. Such is the case in the present instance also, and it is by their common opposition to the economic development of Germany, and even in a greater measure to the political institutions of the German state, "its militarism," that England and America are united in a common dislike of Germany.

This sentiment is deepened by the inherent American opposition to a monarchical form of government, especially when it is one that is both vigorous and creative, as it is in Germany. That the American people as a whole are kindly disposed and easily touched by pity is a further consideration, and one that is emphasized by the feminizing influence of the schools that are almost entirely in the hands of women. This also accounts for the visionary American enthusiasm for a universal brotherhood of the nations, and the hope of an eternal peace, though, it must be said, these sentiments harmonize but illy with the practical policy of a nation that in the

nineteenth century acquired more land by conquest than did any other one, and that has allowed itself to be drawn into war on very slight provocation.

It is to these circumstances that we Germans must look for the reason why our many attempts to create a friendly relation between the American and the German nations, and a better understanding of each other have utterly failed in spite of repeated protestations of good will on our part, and of the recent endeavor to bring the cultural elements of the two nations in touch by an exchange of professors at the universities of the two countries. It would seem that our efforts in this direction have been harmful rather than helpful to us, in that they have been misconstrued into an admission of weakness, and have even been supposed to be prompted by sinister motives. The opportunity in time of peace to secure an influence upon the foreign press has been neglected here as elsewhere by German diplomacy.

At the outbreak of the war the true sentiment of the great body of Americans toward Germany was plainly revealed. Under the influence of a degenerate and wholly unscrupulous press they not only lent a willing ear to all the malicious slander with which our enemies overwhelmed us, but added to it. Even men of weight who had apparently been friendly to Germany, such as Carnegie and Bigelow, the "companion of the Emperor's youth," now made common cause with our bitterest enemies. Harvard University, where the exchange of professors was begun, is altogether on the side of the

Allies, and although occasionally a voice is raised in favor of Germany at Columbia University, New York, the seat of the "Kaiser-Wilhelm-Professorship," the head of this institution, President Butler, pursues the Germans with attacks of bitter calumny under guise of a proclaimed neutrality. That the action of the American government has been uniformly detrimental to Germany's cause, and to the advantage of her enemies will not be disputed by any one.

The English attitude toward America, and more especially toward France, has been determined by Britain's relations to the other two great powers, Russia and Germany. For a time Russia continued to be the dreaded rival against whom England sought to form a combination with the other powers, and, if possible, induce them to make war upon the colossus of the north. Russia's advance into central Asia, the subjugation of the khanates, her encroachment upon Afghanistan and the Pamir, the opening up of the economic possibilities of this conquered territory, and making her possession of it assured by the construction of an extensive system of strategically located railroads, together with the Russian aspiration to obtain a dominating influence in Persia, all were circumstances by which a war between Russia and England was made a constant possibility. In the end it was found advisable, however, to settle the main differences by compromise or treaty, for the dangers attending such a war were far too grave, while the remoteness of the territory and the impossibility to place any reliance upon

the conquered or partially subjugated tribes rendered the outcome too uncertain to make the venture of a war advisable.

The other cause for irritation between England and Russia, viz., the Turkish Empire, was gradually being relegated to a position of secondary importance. The changes that had taken place in grain production and in the routes by which it was transported, to which attention has already been called, were making themselves felt more and more; traffic by way of the Black Sea had become a matter of less vital importance to England, and although large quantities of grain are still imported by this route, England, in time, found herself in the position where she could drop the dogma that the integrity of the Turkish Empire constituted a European necessity. To this was added the further consideration that England had forfeited her former influence at Constantinople by Gladstone's intervention in behalf of the Bulgarians during the reign of Abdul Hamid, and by his denunciation of the "unspeakable Turk," as well as by other blunders in diplomacy. England could therefore afford to allow Russia a free hand in this direction. Austria now was Russia's chief opponent in the Balkan peninsula where the Russian policy had blocked its own way to success by first obtaining independence for the Bulgarians and then according them the treatment of an absolutely dependent state.

CHAPTER XVI

GERMANY'S PROSPERITY AND HER COLONIAL POLICY — THE ENGLISH IN AFRICA — JAPAN AND CHINA

MEANWHILE the German Empire had been attaining a position of constantly increasing importance. As soon as the nation was united, and the shackles of political limitation had fallen away, its native vigor and spirit of enterprise asserted themselves to a remarkable degree. At first the buoyancy consequent upon immediate success in newly tried spheres of industry gave rise to a laxness of conscience in business enterprise that, in 1873, resulted in a financial crash from which the economic conditions of the country recovered but slowly. But this served the German nation as a lesson; under the widely comprehensive guidance and inspiration of the government the people now entered upon a course of self-training that led to so high a standard of business rectitude that certain products of German industry intended for the exhibit at the World's Fair at Philadelphia in 1876, and which were ranked as "cheap and poor" by the German Imperial Commissioner, Reulaux, still compared favorably with articles of the same kind that were

produced in other countries a number of years later, and proved their superiority in open competition.

This development was due in great measure, and in fact was made possible only by the wonderful transformation that was brought about in economic conditions by the customs tariff adopted in 1879, and which Germany owes to Bismarck's persistent effort in the face of bitter opposition from the doctrinaire advocates of free trade, and from those elements in the population that were on principle opposed to any further extension of the authority of the Empire, and of the functions of the state in general. It was by this measure, which placed the country on an enduring economic basis, that Bismarck finished his great and self-imposed task of establishing the German Empire. It is due to his foresight that Germany accomplished what Britain neglected to do, viz., to maintain a vigorous agricultural production at the same time that the manufacturing industries were taking their great strides forward, and thus secured to the German Empire self-supporting conditions by which its independence of other nations is assured. How great is Germany's debt on this account alone to this wise statesman, and how shortsighted and misleading was the doctrinaire advice of the free-trade advocates, is now sufficiently apparent to be recognized by even the dullest. Had Germany continued to follow Caprivi's policy instead of returning, as it did, to the course laid out by Bismarck, we would now have found it impossible to maintain the present war, and

England's purpose to starve Germany out would have proved successful.

Tariff legislation was followed by social reform legislation in 1881. From this time forth the material welfare of Germany has advanced with leaps and bounds, and is enjoyed not only by the leading classes, as is the case in England, Belgium, and other industrial countries, but is shared by the entire population. Indeed, the country's prosperity has been increasing in a measure that is not only a surprise to other nations, but far surpasses the expectations of even the best informed Germans themselves. The plane of social life has been raised throughout, and yet, in the main, this has continued wholesome; the facilities for intercourse and the entire railroad system have been developed to a point where they may serve as models of perfection; previously insignificant towns have grown into flourishing business centers; and, although the population increased from nearly 41 millions in 1871, to 65 millions in 1910, emigration, that had reached quite considerable proportions, has practically ceased during this period. Germany is not only able to feed and employ her entire population, but can offer so attractive an existence to her people that they have no desire to leave their native land.

The development of Germany's commercial capabilities has kept pace with the degree of her industrial prosperity and general welfare. The number of sea going vessels rose from 4519 in the year 1871, of which 4372 were sailing craft, to 4850 with

a remaining number of only 2752 sails in 1913, while the tonnage went from 982,000 in 1871 to 3,000,000 in 1913, an increase to three times the former capacity. Hamburg has become the principal seaport on the European continent, having outstripped Antwerp, Rotterdam and Liverpool, and is now exceeded in importance only by New York and London. This commercial development made a German navy an imperative necessity, and one which the nation had long realized. After a first and fruitless attempt in this direction had been made in 1848, Prussia undertook the construction of a war fleet on a very modest scale. Although Germany had reason to be proud of the ensign she had unfurled upon the seas, still her navy was kept within very narrow limits for fear that its support might prove too great a drain upon the material resources of the Empire, or that the nation's defense by land might be weakened for the sake of the desired strength at sea. It was for reasons such as these also that the government entered but timidly and with many misgivings upon the long wished for policy of acquiring for Germany some of the little remaining territory of the world that was still open to colonization, and so making a beginning toward an extension of Germany's influence and power into world affairs. There was, moreover, a large and influential element in the Reichstag which was wholly opposed to this policy, and which placed entire faith in the doctrine of free trade and in the lessons that were supposedly to be learned from England's weariness of colonial enterprise. Never-

theless, in 1884, Bismarck decided to acquire for Germany the colonial territory now known as German Southwest Africa, Togoland, Kamerun, German East Africa and a part of New Guinea, although an earlier movement to gain a footing for Germany in the Samoan Islands had been defeated in the Reichstag in 1880.

Thus, from a country weakened by internal political dissension, and from a nation that had been regarded askance by most of the other great nationalities of the world, Germany had developed, over night as it were, into a powerful and aspiring empire, and its people into a nation whose standing in the world was worthy of the respect it demanded and which it could at any time enforce. England began to realize more and more that this newly established power was destined to be her chief competitor. That Germany's voice in continental matters was the deciding one, and that her efficient army was the compelling element in the enforcement of a continuous state of peace in Europe, and that consequently England could no longer gather in her customary harvests from the continental conflicts which she had found so advantageous to the expansion of her empire were conditions that had to be accepted. In fact, England had found herself in a position where she had reason to be grateful to Germany for the mediation by which at the Congress of Berlin the war that was threatening with Russia had been averted. It was indeed exasperating that there was no way of getting at this firmly established German state, conducted so efficiently by its thoroughly or-

ganized and purposeful government in spite of the welcome illusion entertained by its antagonists, that the Empire was being kept together only by force, and that the smaller states, as well as the great body of the people, were eager to throw off the Prussian yoke, and so escape from the irksome duty imposed by the Prussian institution of universal military service. To a belief in this illusion, which apparently had its origin in the wrangles so usual among the political parties in Germany, the English were especially inclined because of their inability to understand the conditions prevailing in foreign lands, or to appreciate the motives and circumstances by which the people there are influenced.

England was the more disposed to be resentful of the great progress that German industries and commerce had made, because the English themselves had lost the ability to adapt themselves to the new demands by discarding antiquated methods and customary ways of doing things, and adopting more modern ones. But there was little that could be done about it; the preventive measure that was resorted to had just the opposite effect of that which was desired. It had been hoped that if all imports from Germany were marked with the distinguishing label, "Made in Germany," the English purchasing public would discriminate against them, but the astounding result was that this but increased their sale, and therefore their importation also.

But now Germany began to manifest the intention to step beyond her own confines by adopting a colonial policy of her own beyond the seas, which

would necessarily be followed by an expansion of her war fleet. In the eyes of the English this constituted a trespass upon the domain which they had reserved to themselves; and that was more than could be borne. Germany, therefore, was now to be denied privileges such as France had received, and which indeed had been conceded by England as an offset to Germany's growing power. Similar privileges also had been bestowed upon the King of the Belgians by the Congo Conference in 1885, at the time that the Congo Free State, that political bastard, was born. England therefore now suddenly discovered that all the territory to which Germany laid claim, or to which she aspired, or was likely to aspire at any future time, was already within British jurisdiction, based on well grounded claims, and that this territory especially could not, for most valid reasons, patent to every unbiased mind, be relinquished to Germany for colonization, much as England regretted this. Openly to throw down the gauntlet to Bismarck was more than England cared to do, however, and so there was nothing to be done eventually but to withdraw the English objections, and, with a sour mien, to wish Germany God-speed on her new ventures at colonization. But again Britain did not fail to carry off a prize herself. She acquired the southern part of New Guinea — the western part was Dutch territory — and secured recognition of her claim to Walfish Bay, a harbor just in the middle of the coastline of German Southwest Africa. From this time forth the Germans encountered English oppo-

sition, even more than they had before, in whatever they planned or undertook, even if it was no more than the acquisition of a coaling station.

To be sure, better relations between the two countries developed during the regrettable administration of Caprivi who, as the outspoken opponent of any kind of German colonial policy, acted upon his maxim of "the less we have of Africa, the better for us," and so pursued a course that was highly pleasing to the English. In 1890 he relinquished Uganda and Witu to England, and resigned Germany's claim to Zanzibar in exchange for Helgoland and a corner in Southwest Africa. That this occasion was not utilized to secure at least Walfish Bay for Germany is to be ascribed to a lack of interest, or to a want of skill on the part of her envoys. In the treaty by which Germany obtained possession of Kamerun, England's claims to the entire territory of the upper Nile were recognized, which gave great offence to France, while in the subsequent negotiations with France in regard to the Hinterland of Kamerun, Germany's interests were represented with quite as little skill. At a somewhat later date, and while engaged in the Boer war, England agreed to Germany's long desired acquisition of the Samoan Islands (1899), although at the same time a number of these islands passed into the possession of the United States. A short time previous to this, Germany had purchased the Canary Islands from Spain.

Otherwise the chief result of Germany's entrance into the competition for colonial acquisition was a

re-awakening of England's spirit of colonial enterprise. The period of her weariness in this respect was past; the practical interests of the day had triumphed over the theories of the visionaries, and there was now abroad in England a constantly growing realization of the incalculable value that attaches to a political connection, even of the loosest sort, with extensive and ever more richly developing colonial dominions. Such relations are especially advantageous to the trading interests of the mother-country, for England's colonies not only afford a market for the products of her manufacturing industries, but provide her with a source from which to draw raw materials, and, most important of all, they furnish her with the most indispensable necessities of life. The waning current of public opinion was therefore now met by the demand for a "greater Britain," a catchword coined by Sir Charles Dilke, and meant to convey the idea of a close union of all the English speaking dominions with the English motherland in a harmonious political fraternity. This thought was later taken up by Chamberlain, and advocated by him with great zeal, but with little result.

Meanwhile England did what she could to secure for herself as much as possible of that portion of the world's territory that was not already in the possession of one or the other of the civilized nations; in other words she now sought to supplement her colonial empire, which already comprised Canada, Australia, India, and many of the islands of the Pacific, by the addition of an African realm

also. Leaving Capeland in 1890, Cecil Rhodes began his adventurous project by the conquest, first of Bethuanaland, and then of Matabeleland, and then, proceeding to the hinterland of Portugal's coastland territory of Mozambique, took possession of the vast interior region now known as Rhodesia, and extending northward to the lakes of Central Africa. There was but one hindrance to the realization of Britain's ambitious desire to control the whole of the African continent from Cape Town to Cairo, and to connect these two extremes by a great continental railroad system,—this hindrance was the barrier which the Congo Free State together with German East Africa formed directly across the continent. But most inconvenient of all, and at the same time most alluring, were the Boer republics enclosed on all sides, as they were, by British colonies, and rich in diamond and gold mines. All the world knows how on January 1, 1896, Jameson made a raid on the Transvaal in a bold attempt to subdue it, and, when this had ended in defeat, how the English government made the Uitlander question the excuse for a declaration of war against the Dutch republics, which after a long and brave resistance were conquered and forced to accept British rule.

Meanwhile another nation had made its entry as a great power into the affairs of the world—the Empire of Japan. To rid themselves of the stifling encroachment of the Europeans, the Japanese had come to the daring determination themselves to acquire the culture of the West, which they did in an

amazingly short time, and then, having learned all they desired from these intrusive foreigners, emphatically to show them the door. The time had now arrived when Japan could feel that her days of schooling were at an end, and that she could begin to make use of her newly acquired ability. In 1894 the war with China was undertaken by which, through the terms of the Peace of Shimonoseki (1895), Japan obtained the sovereignty over Korea and Formosa together with the harbors of Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, on either side of the entrance to the Gulf of Pet-shi-li. This was an encroachment upon Russian spheres of interest, and was therefore met by a protest from Russia with the result that Japan was compelled to return the two seaports to China, one of which, Port Arthur, was occupied by the Russians themselves a few years later (1898).

In her attitude toward Japan Russia had the sympathy of France, and of Germany also in the belief that she was thus serving the common cultural interests of Europe against aggression by the yellow race. This introduction of sentiment into politics is probably the most serious blunder that has been made in Germany's policy since the Empire has been founded; its consequences were revealed in the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and again in Japan's participation in the war against Germany. Nor was the blunder righted either by Germany's occupation of Kiao-Chow, or by her participation, not only with the other great powers of Europe but with Japan herself, in quelling the Boxer rebellion.

CHAPTER XVII

EDWARD VII AND THE HATRED OF GERMANY

RARELY in the history of mankind has a period of political development brought about so great a transformation as did the nineteenth century. That Africa had become a factor in European politics, and above all, that two newly developed great powers, the United States and Japan, had made their entrance into the affairs of the world and, in close connection with this event, the manifold questions of policy that arose in relation to the Chinese Empire, had widened the horizon of the entire world of politics, and offered wholly new problems for its solution. The narrow relations and circumscribed viewpoint to which Europe had been accustomed were now relegated to the background, and politics of world wide interest absorbed the attention of the great powers, and determined their attitude toward one another.

In the course of this new development England had for the time being been crowded out of her position in the front of the stage. Russia had assumed the leading rôle in eastern Asia, although England had taken possession of Wei-hai-wei as an equivalent to the Russian occupation of Port Arthur. In Persia and central Asia, toward eastern Turke-

stan and Tibet, Russia was extending her influence more and more, and England could do nothing to prevent it, while her hope that Germany might be persuaded into an alliance against Russia was doomed to disappointment. In September, 1898, Germany did, however, enter into a treaty with England, by the terms of which the Germans secured the right to purchase the Portuguese territory in Africa — an empty promise, since, as England's vassal state, Portugal could do nothing without English consent. Nevertheless, by her participation in the treaty, Germany abandoned the anti-English policy she had adopted in connection with the Peace of Shimonoseki and at the time of the Jameson raid upon the Transvaal. At the same time she maintained her traditional relations of friendship with Russia, although these, too, were by no means entirely free from friction, and, what was most important of all, she held unwaveringly to her steadfastly maintained peace policy. Then, in 1899, the fierce Boer war broke out, in which England's lack of organization as well as her military weakness were even more conspicuously revealed than they had been in her former wars. Equally conspicuous was the total lack of political conscience displayed, and the wholly inhuman manner of her warfare. The concentration camps in which the Boer women and children were confined were purposely so located, as some of the British officers highest in command freely admitted, that the great mass of those that were detained within them were necessarily doomed to perish miserably, the intention being thus

to exert pressure upon the men in the field, and at the same time to lessen the numbers of the coming generation that might prove dangerous to British rule.

In her war with the Boers England discovered how little she was in favor with the rest of the world, and how bitter were the feelings which the arrogance of her attitude had engendered in the other nations, for among them all there was not one whose sympathies were not with the Boers. The Germans were never forgiven for their attitude in connection with this war, although the German government, in compliance with the pact of 1898, maintained a strict neutrality, which was a bitter disappointment to the Boers, who had hoped for German assistance. On the other hand the much greater spirit of enmity which the French exhibited — for they still remembered Fashoda — was quickly forgotten by England. But at all events, Britain had no friends to rely upon, and so consoled herself for this necessary dependence upon herself alone with what comfort she could derive from her “splendid isolation,” as the newly coined phrase expressed it.

But on January 21, 1901, the aged Queen Victoria died, and her son, Edward VII, took her place upon the English throne. This brought about a complete change in the state of affairs. In the long years during which as Prince of Wales he had played the sorry part of a figurant, and had never been expected to reveal any sign of possessing an opinion of his own, he had adapted himself to the situation with great skill, and had utilized the time

to enjoy life to the utmost. As King of England, however, he showed the world what may be accomplished by a strong personality when placed in a position of supreme eminence, and how, through one man's masterful influence, the natural development of events may be arrested and directed into an entirely different channel. What no one had supposed possible, he found it within his power to accomplish,—once more an English sovereign assumed the leadership in determining his country's destiny, and shaped its policy in a measure which no other English monarch since the reign of William III had even attempted. That the English people, ever jealously watchful to guard against an infringement of their constitutional rights and of the powers of Parliament, accepted this new turn of affairs without any show of resistance, may be laid to King Edward's wonderful tact and ability to keep his own personality in the background, and to avoid every occasion for friction — everything that would openly conflict with established tradition.¹ By his skillful management of the sovereigns of Europe, whom he met during his frequent sojourns at the watering places of the continent or upon his family visits,

¹ The nearest parallel, to my knowledge, that history affords is King Agesilaus of Sparta who, after his country had been deeply humiliated, was able persistently to direct its policy in a similar manner. The Spartan king however had the advantage of being commander in chief of the army, and therefore was in full control of it, and he also had the right to express his opinion both to the national council and to the people themselves, whereas the King of England has none of these privileges.

King Edward gained the friendship of foreign nations, and secured such alliances as were desirable, and the British ministers found themselves obliged to relinquish the conduct of Britain's foreign policy into his hands, in spite of any misgivings they may have had as to the constitutionality of this proceeding, since they themselves were in no way fitted to undertake such personally conducted negotiations.

As a ruler, Edward VII stands forth as an ideal figure in history,— a man of large ideas, and one who was able to hew his own way to the accomplishment of his purpose. He was endowed with a keen native discernment, was highly intelligent, cool and calculating, but entirely devoid of any appreciation of the moral forces by which human life is controlled. To him these were no more than convenient phrases with which dullards might be duped, and that served the wise as cloaks with which to cover their naked egoism; and this egoism he held to be the mainspring of human action. It is for this reason, his total disregard of all the deepest sources from which are drawn the influences that govern the history of mankind, that King Edward's life work has resulted in failure despite the keenness of his calculations; for the course into which he guided his country will not lead to power and renown, but to ruin.

That the political situation demanded a war with Germany, that England's future could not be free from danger, nor her power assured without the humiliation of Germany was the controlling thought that Edward VII infused into England's policy. This prince of German extraction, whose mother

tongue was German, the fruit of a marriage that at the time of its consummation was hailed by the Germans with greater joy than had any other, the uncle of the German Emperor, has proved to be the most dangerous foe that Germany has had to contend with during the past few generations. Whether his attitude was the result of honest conviction and a truly patriotic sentiment for his English realm, or whether it resulted from purely personal motives, or, perhaps, from a blending of both, who will attempt to say? Certain it is that in the policy he followed, he had the support of a strong current of public opinion in his own country, and that during the years of his reign this swelled to ever greater proportions, until it controlled by far the greater part of the British public. The old antipathy to Russia receded more and more into the background, and in its place arose the fear of Germany, and consequent spirit of enmity toward the German people, which finally grew to be the dominating political sentiments of the English nation.

Should we ask how this spirit of enmity received its first impulse, we would probably be told that its immediate occasion was the congratulatory telegram that the German Emperor sent to President Krüger in January, 1896, at the time that the Jameson raid was successfully repulsed by the Boers. This telegram was of far wider significance than attaches to a mere expression of sympathy; it could but be construed, both at home and abroad, as an announcement to the world that Germany was inclined to protect the independence of the Boer republics and

to defend them against an unwarranted attack from abroad, if need be by a resort to arms. In England it was therefore received by a spontaneous and mighty outburst of popular wrath against Germany, which vented itself in violent invectives against the German Emperor. There can be no doubt that the tendencies which the telegram indicated were strongly approved by a large part of the German nation. There was a feeling of moral indignation abroad in Germany at England's ruthless breach of the peace, and any energetic measures which the government might have taken in disapproval of this gross violation of political rectitude, and of the cruel attack of the greater upon the smaller nation, would have found as ready a response from the German people at this time as at a somewhat earlier date had been evinced in connection with Russia's base interference with the Bulgarians. But just as then Bismarck stubbornly refused to yield to the tide of popular sentiment and, quite in opposition to it, fostered friendly relations with Russia, so now the German government showed no inclination to follow up the Emperor's telegram with any corresponding action, but on the contrary, sought to maintain, or rather re-establish cordial relations with England. Accordingly the treaty with England, by which Germany gained the right to purchase Portugal's African possessions, and of which mention has already been made, was negotiated in September, 1898. Furthermore, the German government declined to support the French in their contentions with England regarding the Fashoda expedition

(1898), and preserved an attitude of strict neutrality during the Boer war. The German Emperor, moreover, made his customary visit to England, quite undeterred by the offensive treatment that the British press had accorded him, believing his visit would mitigate the resentment against Germany and regain for her the British favor. Indeed he even went so far as to advise the English with regard to their military operations, a circumstance with which he acquainted the public in 1908.

Occasions for a conflict of national interests and consequent political tension such as that in 1895 have been of frequent occurrence in the course of history without leading to a continued feeling of national antagonism, or to war. England herself has had the experience many a time. Moreover, in France the indignation against England on account of the Boer war manifested itself in a much more pronounced manner than it did in Germany,—indeed it went so far that Englishmen were insulted on the Paris Bourse. Why, we cannot fail to ask, why did the English tide of resentment against Germany not subside as did that against France?

The determining factor in the situation created by the Emperor's telegram was that it was the first and at the same time a most emphatic indication that henceforth Germany meant not only to take a hand in the affairs of the European continent,—to this England had become accustomed,—but in those of the world beyond as well, and demanded consideration for her interests there, together with a willingness to listen to her views. This was an encroach-

ment upon England's sphere of influence, and it is probably to be regarded as the decisive step by which Germany made her entrance into world politics. The demand then made was never withdrawn by Germany, but, in spite of her conciliatory attitude, has ever since been persistently maintained. If on the one hand South Africa was relinquished to Britain, Germany on the other hand took a much more active part in Eastern affairs from this time forth (1895); in 1898 she obtained Kiau-Chow from China, and a little later gained possession of the Caroline and Samoan islands, while in 1900, in connection with the international adjustment of Chinese affairs, Germany compelled the recognition of the principle of the "open door" in China. Of even greater moment, in all probability, was the careful cultivation of cordial relations with the Turkish Empire, a policy which may be ascribed to the Emperor, who with far seeing judgment adopted it at the very beginning of his reign.

The fraternal relations with Austria made it possible for Germany to reach beyond that country to gain a footing in territory that hitherto had been regarded as within the domain of Russia, or of the powers of western Europe. Before long German influence came to be the dominating one at Constantinople, and the development of the Sultan's army was entrusted to German officers. By the construction of the Bagdad railroad Germany established herself in the more distant East, and in this, Britain saw a future menace to her own position of dominance on the Persian Gulf and the Indian

Ocean. Everything was done, therefore, that English ingenuity could suggest to prevent the Germans from extending this railroad beyond Bagdad to the sea, and, as a means to that end, England seized Kuwet to the west of the mouth of the Euphrates. Furthermore, when the German Emperor visited Jerusalem and Damascus in November, 1898, he did so as the open friend and protector of Islam. Now, by the orthodox Summite Mohammedans the Sultan is regarded as the Caliph, the religious head of all Islam, a position of influence which he magnified by means of a skillfully devised and highly successful propaganda, and which he emphasized the more with every year that saw the political power of his empire crumble. Through this medium the German influence could be extended at least indirectly to the people of a large part of the British dominions, and of the French and Russian as well, since these realms count among their subjects vast numbers of Mohammedans, aside from the fact that the Sultan was, nominally at least, the suzerain of Egypt.

In 1905 Germany also entered into friendly relations with Abyssinia, however with no enduring result, since the German withdrawal from Morocco in the following year was construed by the entire Oriental world as a surrender, and as an evidence that Germany was not powerful enough to extend effective protection to these distant lands. Furthermore, the German government did not find it advisable to give the Turks any material aid when in 1904 England opposed their plan to increase the

railroad facilities of their country by adding to the Mecca railroad a branch line with a terminal at Akabah, on the east arm of the Red Sea. The Turks therefore felt compelled to abandon the construction of the railroad, and at the same time had to look on with what patience they could command when the whole of the Sinai peninsula was annexed, nominally to Egypt, but in reality to the British dominions.

To these numerous causes for irritation there was now added the supreme source of England's annoyance in the constantly growing development of the German sea power, the especial work of William II, and one which he carried to completion with brilliant success. With unyielding resolution he broke away from the Prussian tradition according to which the enlargement of the war fleet was looked upon as a menace to the efficiency of the German land forces; for Germany had grown strong, and was now not only capable of maintaining her land forces on a plane that made them superior to all others, but also of providing herself with a defence at sea sufficient to meet all present demands. By arguments both spoken and written, and more especially by the arrangement and distribution of convenient tables which presented a comparison between the German war fleet and the fleets of other countries, and showed its state of backwardness in a striking and convincing manner, the Emperor won his people over to his way of thinking.

When in 1895 the canal which connects the North Sea with the Baltic was completed, the preliminary

condition requisite to Germany's possession of a war fleet was provided in that the harbors on the east and those on the west coast of Germany were made directly accessible to each other by a waterway passing through German territory alone. The little island of Helgoland, that at the time of its acquisition had appeared as an almost worthless possession,—indeed the Germans had reason to be thankful that it did not belong to them while they were at war with France, but instead was owned by England, since this made its capture and use as a base by the French fleet impossible,—was now fortified and turned into an impregnable defence for the German fleet when in the North Sea, a circumstance by which the canal which connects this sea with the Baltic is practically projected far out into the sea. The year 1900 saw the first extensive naval legislation enacted, and the plan for the foundation of a German navy drawn up. This was not only consistently carried out, but was greatly broadened at intervals in later years, until Germany's war fleet attained proportions that corresponded in magnitude to the importance of her merchant marine, and came to be the second largest in the world, although a second that was still far behind the powerful British navy.

All these measures were viewed by the English as being aimed directly at themselves, and as a constantly growing menace to the maintenance of their world dominion. And that there was reason for this view is not to be denied, since the absolute control of the seas, which Britain claimed as hers by

right, could no longer be maintained if the German fleet became sufficiently powerful to defend German interests at sea in defiance of Britain. In conjunction with the fleets of other nations it might even prove more than a match for Britain's naval force, both in numbers and efficiency.

How Britain's supremacy at sea might be assured to her for the future assumed the proportions of a question of life and death in the eyes of the English, and rightly so, for it is not only the condition upon which the continued hold upon their vast empire abroad depends, but the safety of the homeland is involved in a still larger measure. This danger to the mother country is two fold, for, should the German war fleet become powerful enough to overmatch the British, the Germans might not only be enabled to land an army on British shores, but they could cut Britain off from her source of supplies, which would soon bring her to her knees before her foe. Therefore no effort must be left untried by which this threatening danger might be averted.

The first step in this direction was the enlargement of England's navy, which not only kept pace with that of her prospective adversary, but far exceeded its increase not only in the number of vessels but in their destructive efficiency also, as shown, for instance, in the dreadnought type first constructed in 1905. At first England was content with her "two power standard" of efficiency, viz., the British war fleet was to be maintained on a basis equal in strength to that of the combined fleets of any two of the great powers, the combination

against which this precautionary measure was first directed being that of the Russian and French fleets. In time, however, the English became convinced that even this would not suffice, and that they must be sufficiently prepared to cope successfully with any possible combination of foes at sea. This not only proved a serious drain upon England's financial resources and upon the ability of the people to bear the constantly growing burden of taxation,—so wealthy a country as England is could have endured this drain well enough, despite the frequently heard sighs of regret,—but it became a question whether Britain could furnish seamen in sufficient numbers to man so large a war fleet; for in this respect, too, England was showing her age and inability to adapt herself to new conditions. The number of available British seamen has been growing less with every year; even the vessels of the English merchant marine are manned in large measure by foreigners, of which by far the greater number are Norwegians, although there are some Germans, while the firemen are all negroes. The men of England have grown too demanding and fond of ease and the comforts of life, and so the later generations of Englishmen have been as little inclined to fill these places as they have those in many other strenuous callings in life. Moreover, the British sea-captains, as well as the larger employers of labor in England, prefer to hire foreigners because they are not only willing to work for a lower wage, but at the same time are more willing and better workers. To return to the old method

of procuring seamen by impressment was not possible, and to allow the British war fleet to be manned almost wholly by foreigners involved altogether too great a risk, a reason for which alone England saw the time approaching when she would be compelled to call a halt in the enlargement of her war fleet. The only way out of this dilemma, or at least the one that commended itself above all others, was through an agreement between England and Germany according to which neither country would enlarge its war fleet beyond a certain percentage of its present strength; another proposition was that at stated intervals of time both countries were to observe a "fleet-holiday year," during which there was to be a total cessation of naval construction. Both of these proposals came to nothing, although Germany manifested a willingness to consider them. The truth is that no independent great power can afford to bind itself in such a manner with regard to questions of vital importance to its own independence, and to surrender the control over its own action and means of warfare to a foreign power, even aside from the fact that England's customary duplicity made it almost a certainty that at the convenient moment that country would find an excuse in any one of her code of ethics to withdraw from the agreement, with the disadvantages all on the side of Germany.

To all these reasons for anxiety another was added through the inadequacy of the British land forces, for these were but just sufficient to carry on England's frequent colonial wars, to keep Ireland

in subjection, and to maintain the necessary garrisons and reserves at home. The militia and the volunteer corps that had been organized and their development attempted as a defence for the homeland, out of which they may not be sent, did not attain the desired proportions in spite of the enthusiasm which had been aroused for them throughout the country. The alarming conviction therefore gained ground that England was in no way capable of withstanding the vigorous attempt of a strong foe to invade her territory, and a constantly growing feeling of insecurity took possession of the people.

The "German peril" was the spectre that made every Englishman quake, and which yet he could not banish. In numberless pamphlets, tales of fiction, sensational plays, and moving pictures the terrors of a German invasion of England were vividly portrayed, and, in imitation of the French, the Germans were represented in the entire popular and school literature, down to the very copy books used by the little children, as bloodthirsty barbarians who did not shrink from any crime or deed of cruelty. The British government did all within its power to heighten this impression and to spread it throughout the country; an avaricious press, that was well aware of the trend that public opinion was taking and was quick to recognise in it an opportunity to make money, now both catered to it and controlled it, and dished up to the gullible public one imaginary and soul harrowing tale after another, until the timid were so frightened that their hair

stood on end. The paper that was especially adept at this was the "Daily Mail," owned by an unscrupulous journalist, Harmsworth by name, who, after having failed in other journalistic attempts, made a financial success with this publication, and then acquired others, chief among which was "The Times." That later, as Lord Northcliffe, he became a peer of the realm is in itself evidence sufficient to conclude that he is in close touch with the government and has earned its gratitude.

But the climax was reached when air craft were developed into a new and startling means of warfare, the effects of which no one could foresee, and Germany began to build her Zeppelins in 1908, for then English terror knew no bounds. There were constantly recurring reports in the daily papers of how German airships had been seen flying over English coast towns; when the London people went to bed their imagination pictured their city under a night attack by air craft, and when the frightened dreamers awoke in the morning they wondered why the Germans had not arrived over night. There were even people in England, and among them a number of men well known in intellectual circles, who kept a supply of canned food on hand in anticipation of the famine that might result should their country go to war. Meanwhile the number of those who raised a voice in favor of Germany grew constantly less in England, while in every German who came to the country a spy was suspected, or at least an enemy in disguise, not excepting even the always large number of German clerks and waiters em-

ployed in England, for these, the English were aware, were still connected with the German army as reservists, and therefore the imagination suggested all manner of possible and impossible services that they might be rendering their country in this capacity. The fear of espionage and the amateur search for spies took on dimensions such as were not surpassed even in France, for the English public knows absolutely nothing about military matters, and so the silliest inventions and the wildest fancies of an hysterical imagination found full credence.

It appeared, therefore, that if matters really stood as they seemed, there was but one course open by which war might still be averted,—England must again follow the example set her by the states of the continent and adopt their system of universal military service. This step had long been advocated by military authorities, such as Lord Roberts, for instance, but, as we have seen, it was not only contrary to English tradition, but it struck a blow at the very foundation of the Englishman's system of state organization and of his ideas of personal freedom; if, after all, this measure would have to be resorted to, the England of tradition would indeed be a thing of the past. The only other remaining way out of the difficulty was the course which Edward VII adopted and carried to completion, viz., the war against Germany must be begun at once, before it was too late, before Germany was fully prepared; and, since Britain was not strong enough to undertake the struggle unaided from

abroad, the first step to be taken was to seek allies for her among the nations of the continent.

Repetition does not strengthen an argument; nevertheless it cannot be overemphasized that in the circumstances cited above lies the real reason for the hatred of Germany and the cause of the world-wide war that England has incited against her. The other reasons that one hears mentioned, such as Germany's stupendous economic development, the conflict of colonial interests, the anticipation of the rich profits that England would derive from her commerce should Germany's commerce and the German fleet be destroyed, did all doubtless enter into the situation, but England had accepted these, and would have continued to accept them in the future. The truth of the whole matter undoubtedly is that the time had arrived when two distinct forms of state organization must face each other in a struggle for life or death, one of the two being retrograde and sterile, while the other was far in advance of it and full of creative possibilities. In the present war Germany — i. e., the German state together with the form of organization peculiar to it, and the idea that underlies it — will be crushed so completely that it can never recover from its defeat, or else England, if she would play any part whatever in the world's future, must rebuild her political structure from the ground up, and adopt a state organization such as prevails on the continent, and which has found its fullest development, and therefore its highest efficiency in the German state.

Beyond question, therefore, the war with Ger-

many is very popular with the English people, and is welcomed by them as the break in the unendurable tension under which they have lived for years. That in England, as elsewhere, there are people of distinction, and many of them, who fully appreciate Germany and the culture for which it stands is certain, while instances of warm friendship between individual Germans and Englishmen are of still more frequent occurrence. But the unspoken condition under which alone these kindly sentiments might endure has always been that Germany must eventually change her attitude, as well as the character of her state organization; or else it was believed that the latter, together with the German form of military service, was at heart as thoroughly detested by the German people themselves as by the English, and was endured by compulsion only, although the Germans dared not confess it,—an illusion which the English eagerly cherished. Another interpretation of the situation, and one with which we have grown familiar through its recently very frequent appearance in print, was that the originally fine German character has been corrupted by the writings of men like Treitschke, Nietzsche, Bülow and Bernhardi,—a remarkable idea, and one in which the ignorance of the English, and of other nations as well, regarding the true condition of affairs in Germany is fully revealed. But on the other hand the number of Englishmen who really deplore the war are very few at present, and of these by far the greater proportion do so because they appreciate the seriousness of the situation, and

realize far better how terrible a danger England has incurred, than does the English government itself, or than do the men who are responsible for English "public opinion."

Moreover, the English are misled in their calculations by overlooking one great factor in the situation,—they undervalue the moral element, indeed they overlook it altogether, and are quite incapable of understanding or appreciating it. The present but unexpressed thought by which English opinion is moulded is that if England had the gigantic power that Germany possesses, she would make use of it at once to fall upon her neighbors and ruthlessly despoil them of their possessions, and if Germany has so far failed to do so, it is not, as they believe, because of any true desire for peace, but rather because the Germans have as yet not felt fully prepared to carry their plans to a successful termination, and fear to show their hand prematurely. That Germany has so long been the preserver of peace is therefore, in their estimation, but an evidence that her sinister intentions are even more far reaching than if she had struck sooner, by which England is more than justified in attacking her at once, before she can carry them into effect.

Such has been England's way always. But Germany is not to be gauged by the English measure. As incredible as it may appear to the English, it is nevertheless a fact that peace has ever been and still is the prevailing desire of the German people, as well as of their government, and, above all, of their ruler. Germany desires no more than that

she may be secure against any hostile attack from abroad,— therefore she bears the weight of her gigantic armor not only willingly but gladly. She would live at peace with all the world, but only on condition that in the peaceable competition between the nations as fair play shall be accorded to her people as is enjoyed by the others, and that they may have the privilege of advancing their interests just as freely as do the other nations, but which has hitherto been jealously denied them. In her foreign relations Germany has given evidence of her peaceable temper again and again; her emperor, William II, has more than once willingly withdrawn claims to which he was justly entitled, and has entered into negotiations and accepted terms that were of very questionable advantage to Germany, even to a point of leniency where, in the opinion of a large number of his people, he had yielded more than was advisable. Now, to be sure, we Germans realize that we cannot be too grateful to our Emperor that he gave this repeated proof of his desire for peace, since it led to the wholly united and firm resolve of the German people to stand together to the last breath in this war that has been forced upon them, a resolve which they have lived up to most gallantly.

With the English also William II made every possible effort to maintain peaceable relations, to revive the old-time feelings of mutual friendliness, and to dissipate their distrust of Germany. The Emperor's attempts in this direction were followed by other manifestations of the German nation's friendly disposition,— delegations of working men's

associations, of magistrates, of clergymen and of men of letters and science visited back and forth between the two countries, and were feasted and toasted with fine speeches. On these occasions we Germans went to the verge of sacrificing our national dignity in the avowal of our peaceable intentions, until it became a question seriously discussed at home whether it were not advisable to make a public protest against this procedure by an open announcement of the nation's real attitude. A like course was followed with regard to other countries; even in France, and especially in America no effort was spared to convince the people of the German nation's peaceable and friendly sentiments. But nobody believed these protestations, and they only reacted to our disadvantage in that they were construed into attempts to curry favor abroad, and as indications of a mean spirit of toadyism for which the other nations despised us, while our foes regarded them as admissions of weakness and fear on our part, and so felt encouraged to begin the attack upon us without further delay. By this time, it is to be hoped, the eyes of the German people have been opened, and they realize how greatly they demeaned and injured themselves by this well meant but wholly impolitic course of action, the fruits of which, as shown by the attitude of the neutral nations even more than by that of our openly declared foes, have given us a bitter but much needed lesson. The time when such an attitude on our part was possible, and even deemed advisable, is past, and,—may it never return!

We can but conclude that the reason why our intentions were doubted and our assurances disbelieved, is to be found in the circumstance that outside of Germany no one has any idea of how fully the German people realize the great responsibility they have assumed through the institution of universal military service and the national strength that arises from it, or in how large a measure this sense of responsibility is the controlling element in the action of the German government, and that it is in a still higher sense the guiding influence by which the Emperor's every thought and deed are inspired. In a state such as England there is no conception of what true responsibility means, for the formal responsibility of the ministry which is passed upon by a vote of the Parliament, and, in case of an accusation, is determined in the House of Lords by a long and wearisome procedure that is complicated by the introduction of all manner of personal and party questions, does not enter into our consideration here.

All true responsibility must necessarily be of a purely moral nature, accounted for before the tribunal of a personal conscience, and the sense of it is in no way deepened by a legal responsibility, but, on the contrary, is lessened by it. Now in England there is no one who bears the burden of such responsibility. The King does not, for he has no voice in state affairs, and can only indirectly influence the destiny of his realm by the sort of skillful manœuvring in which Edward VII was so great an adept. Although the ministers of state are re-

sponsible to their party, they are not so to the state as a whole, and when they lose the support of the majority in Parliament, they retire, and their places are filled by new men whose business it then is to carry on the government as best they may. Moreover, on all important measures the decision rests with the Cabinet, and there it becomes a question of majorities and minorities, whereby each individual member is shielded from criticism, and is relieved of all personal sense of responsibility. Furthermore, it is in the very nature of things that a corporate body cannot be the bearer of true responsibility, for responsibility shared is not responsibility at all. In England, therefore, politics in a measure assume the character of a game that doubtless has its charms and at times becomes highly interesting, the outcome of which, however, is entirely dependent upon a thousand possibilities and the combination of a variety of forces, which it is quite impossible for the leading statesman either fully to recognise or to control.

In a strongly monarchical government on the other hand, like that of Prussia or of the German Empire, the final decision in every measure that the state undertakes rests with the sovereign, who therefore assumes full responsibility for it, both in what is done and in what is left undone, and no one can relieve him of it. Although he may be following the advice of his prime minister absolutely, still, by giving his consent to a measure, the sovereign makes it his own act, and he therefore must bear the responsibility for its consequences. In this personal

element lies the tremendous advantage that a monarchical form of government has over any other, in that it unites in one person the power to act for the state together with the undivided responsibility to conscience for the consequences of the act. Of this highest conception of monarchy and its consequent tremendous moral superiority to any other form of state organization, the English, and the Americans especially, have not the faintest idea; therefore they believe in childish naïveté that they have reason to look down upon our splendidly creative monarchy as upon a less advanced form of government which, in the evolutionary development of state organization, has long since been overtaken and distanced by their own.

That our sovereigns have realized this great responsibility that their position entails, and have shouldered the full weight of the burden that it imposes, has been manifested by all of them ever since the days of Frederick William I; Frederick William IV succumbed to it. This in itself is sufficient reason why it is quite impossible, from a moral, not legal standpoint, that a German sovereign should precipitate his country into a war by which the lives of thousands of his people will be sacrificed, unless the highest interests of the state are at stake, and if it can be avoided without loss of honor. The restraint and desire for peace that William II has evinced have surely not been indications of weakness or of faint-heartedness,— this has been so conclusively proven by the present war that even those who were inclined to doubt it must now be

convinced,—but, on the contrary, were the result of a full appreciation of the great responsibility which rests upon him, and which is heightened by the realization of how gigantic are the means at his command. “Neither our own people nor the people of other lands have formed any correct estimate of the high national spirit and conscientious devotion to duty that form the guiding motives of our German rulers and their ministers, in the control of their country’s affairs,” said Bismarck in his speech on February 6, 1888.

In consequence of their failure duly to appreciate the moral factor, the English under Edward VII made still another miscalculation, and in quite a different direction from the one we have so far followed. Because of it, they underestimated, nay, totally disregarded the moral and physical power of endurance of which the German people are capable, as well as their sense of national unity, and their unswerving devotion to the fatherland; for this reason alone the English could form no correct idea of the potency of Germany’s means of warfare. The opportunity to become acquainted with them, and so learn to value them correctly, was open to the English, but they failed to take advantage of it, preferring, instead, to remain disillusioned and continue in their belief in conditions as their fancy had painted them, just as did the French in 1870.

Had the English had any clear conception of Germany’s giant strength, of the inexhaustible numbers of her people, of her ability to feed them all, of her great economic possibilities, of her financial strength,

of her perfectly organized system of defence, of her complete command of all that science and technical skill can offer by way of aid, of the exalted spirit of devotion by which the German nation is inspired, and which knows no weakness when once it has been roused,—had they had any adequate appreciation of the dangers which England would encounter in combat with this German resourcefulness, they might yet have hesitated to undertake the struggle, in spite of all the allies they could marshal to their side. As it is, the English have jeopardized the very thing they were so eager to secure against any peradventure of the future, for in this titanic struggle which England has brought about, the integrity of the British Empire is at stake, and the future alone can tell in what condition it will emerge from it.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE AND THE ALLIANCE WITH JAPAN — MOROCCO

IMMEDIATELY after his accession to the throne Edward VII brought the Boer war to a close by compelling his ministers to grant terms that were acceptable to the vanquished, and then, by making some concessions to Ireland, pacified that island also in a measure. When so much was accomplished, the King of England turned to the task which he had set himself to be his life work. The first and greatest obstacle to be encountered was the opposition between English and Russian interests,—the English, in their desire to thwart Russia in her encroachment upon Manchuria, Persia and in central Asia, having but just asked aid of Germany, and been refused. At that time, therefore, Russia was still regarded as Britain's chief rival, and the English press overflowed with bitter criticism of the greed for territory, and of the political misrule of this state so opposed to European culture, and still so barbarous.

The course which commended itself to England was first, to accomplish the humiliation of the giant empire to a point where its government would welcome an agreement with England, and then to change

about and combine with this one-time enemy in alliance against the friend of former days, the friend that had fought shoulder to shoulder with England in the Seven Years' war and at Waterloo. For this change of front the British public had to be prepared, and this was done by means of the propaganda against the Germans, as has been described.

Japan's aspiration to power offered England the first opportunity to enter upon her proposed course of action. On January 30, 1902, England formed an alliance with Japan to continue for ten years; by its terms Japan secured recognition of her desired position in eastern Asia, and each of the two allies agreed to aid the other if, while engaged in war with another power, it were to be attacked by a second foe.¹ By this treaty Japan felt she had obtained backing sufficient to justify her in a war upon Russia, and this was promptly begun with the attack upon Port Arthur on February 8, 1904, just as Russia was about to re-open her Balkan policy, and to instigate new disturbances within the Turkish Empire. The outcome is known to every one. By the terms of the peace that was brought about by American mediation, Russia beat a decided retreat in Asia, while the defeat she had suffered led to the great Russian revolution which, although it

¹ Subsequently the treaty was so modified by England that its terms did not apply to the United States, whereby Japan was left to face that country alone in case of a war between the two,—a conflict that in all likelihood will be the next great war, and one which may not be far distant, —while England was left free to determine upon the course she would pursue in that event.

was suppressed, nevertheless resulted in a change of government, in form at least, from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy.

Meanwhile England had made use of the time during which Russia was prostrated by the war to come to an agreement with France, Russia's ally. On April 8, 1904, a treaty was concluded between the two countries. By its terms, a number of colonial differences were adjusted (with regard to the fishing rights along the coast of Newfoundland, which France relinquished, and with regard to Siam, Senegambia, etc.), and France desisted from her demand that England should withdraw from Egypt at the end of a stated time, and to offset this, England consented to the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco. An understanding with Spain was also foreshadowed in the treaty, whereas the strong German interests in Morocco were absolutely ignored; that these were to be crowded out was evidently the fully intended, though unexpressed purpose of the treaty.

By this agreement the "entente cordiale" between France and England was effected; the bitter hatred of England that the Fashoda contentions had inflamed anew, and that at the time of the Boer war had found expression in the press, and had burst forth in passionate manifestations of popular wrath, now began to cool off. In its place the dream of the French to revenge themselves upon Germany was revived, and grew ever stronger. By connivance, as well as by open participation, the French government stirred up a feeling of ani-

mosity toward the Germans, just as was being done in England; through the press and in the schools, as in every other way by which the people could be reached, the Germans were maligned, and their bloodthirsty conduct in the war of 1870 portrayed, together with the ill treatment that Alsace-Lorraine had suffered at their hands, until this slander of the German nation attained amazing proportions.

Germany's countermove to the agreement between England and France was the Emperor's visit to Tangier on March 31, 1905, for this served as the occasion to recognise the independence of the Sultan of Morocco, which was sharply emphasized for the benefit of the world at large. The consequent diplomatic negotiations led to the Conference of Algenciras early in 1906. Here Germany's views were supported by Austria alone; even Italy, the third member of the Triple Alliance, assumed a more than doubtful attitude, for the government of that country had been previously won over by English and French promises that Italy would be allowed a free hand in Tripoli; henceforth her relations to her official allies grew gradually less cordial. With an evident desire to excuse this attitude of the third member of the Triple Alliance, Chancellor von Bülow wittily alluded to it as early as January 8, 1902, in his speech to the Reichstag as an "extra tour."¹ The actual result of the conference, therefore, was that French supremacy in Morocco was established, although very thinly

¹ The German expression for "cutting in" during a dance. Translator.

veiled by the formal wording in which it was expressed. The interests of the German mercantile firms in Morocco were recognised, however, and were promised protection. This result of the conference was looked upon, and rightly so, not only as a retreat on the part of Germany, but as a definite defeat. By the whole world it was regarded as such, but more especially so by all the governments of the Orient, to as remote a land as Abyssinia.

As soon as the entente was concluded, arrangements were made for the co-operation of the British and French military forces in case of war with Germany. To this end plans were laid for an advance of the two armies into Belgium as soon as the British troops should have landed at Calais and Dunkirk, with the intention of proceeding through that country on the way to the Rhine provinces. At the time of the Algeciras conference negotiations had been begun by the British military attaché at Brussels and the Belgian General Staff for the purpose of making definite arrangements for Belgian co-operation with the French and English allies, and for a mutual and precise knowledge of the military plans made by each of the countries, and of the means of warfare at their command. These negotiations were not dropped when the conference was over and peace was again assured, but were continued into the month of September, 1906. A copy of an official note found by the Germans when they occupied Brussels, a facsimile of which has been published, gives exact information with regard to these arrangements. Nominally they were to be en-

forced in case of a violation of Belgian neutrality by the Germans; in fact, however, it is quite as obvious that at the outbreak of the war the Allies would have found a reason for entering Belgium with their troops, as that, by making this agreement, Belgium had ceased to be a neutral state at all. As it was, the Belgians forthwith proceeded to strengthen their fortifications at Liege, Namur and Antwerp, in which they were aided by both England and France, these fortifications being open at all times to inspection by the army officers of either of these countries. It was evidently intended that they were to form bases for military action against Germany in the anticipated war.

Meanwhile Russia had arrived at the point where she was ready to enter into the English schemes. Her defeat in the war with Japan had made it impossible for her to carry out her plans with regard to eastern Asia. Therefore, as soon as the internal disorders were somewhat subdued, Russian attention turned westward again to satisfy that impulse for expansion by which Russian politics have been controlled ever since the time of Peter the Great, and more especially so since the reign of Catharine II. The old plans with regard to Persia and Constantinople were now revived. In Persia frequent revolts among the mountain tribes against their oppression by the government had finally led to the granting of a constitution in 1906, and immediately afterward to conflicts between the Shah and his Parliament, by which Russia was furnished with the welcome opportunity to intervene, and occupy

Tabriz, in 1906. Here, however, the Russian advance came in conflict with England's claim to supremacy over the region bordering on the Persian Gulf, and to maintain which she had taken possession of the port of Bushire. On the other hand, a renewal of Russian interference in the affairs of the Balkan peninsula would undoubtedly lead to a conflict with Austria, who had Germany at her back. The conviction, therefore, gained ground in Russia that "the road to Constantinople lay by way of Berlin," and that a war with both the Teutonic powers would have to be incurred, if her cherished plans were to be carried out.

Russia also was therefore quite ready to fall in with the English designs. On August 31, 1907, both powers signed the convention by which their differences with regard to their claims in Tibet and Afghanistan were adjusted, and their separate spheres of interest in Persia definitely limited. By this arrangement all other nations were prevented from gaining any foothold in that country, which was thus reserved exclusively to English and Russian domination. This did not, however, prevent these two great powers from encouraging the constantly recurring revolts and the state of anarchy under which this unhappy country languished, for this condition of affairs afforded repeated and convenient opportunity for their intervention.

By this agreement the alliance between Russia and France was widened, and became the "Triple Entente," to counterbalance the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria and Italy. It was pur-

posely always spoken of as an understanding, and never as an alliance, for neither the British Ministry nor the King of Great Britain is empowered to enter into so formal an engagement as an alliance, since this entails the assumption of obligations by the nation, and therefore requires the consent of the Parliament, the nominal sovereign power in England. The less the government concerned itself with it, the more this fiction was officially upheld,—the “conversations” with the representatives of the continental powers were mere informal discussions in which a provisional agreement to meet certain assumed situations was outlined, by which England, however, was in no way bound, but on the contrary, both the country and the Parliament were left free to act in the matter as they might deem best in the future. Under these circumstances the existence of an alliance, especially one of an aggressive nature, could be disclaimed at any time, as, indeed, it was with solemn asseveration whenever it seemed advisable.¹ In the meantime all requisite arrangements could be made as occasion seemed to demand, so that when the time was ripe for action, the desired measure could be placed before the Parliament and the people,—whose opinion had meanwhile been moulded in the manner that has been described,—as a completed fact. There was then little left for Parliament to do but to acquiesce in the decision that had already been made, just as in the

¹ “The Triple Entente was not an alliance; it was a diplomatic group” (Sir Edward Grey in his speech to the Parliament on August 3, 1914).

nominal monarchies in which there is a fully developed parliamentary government, the sovereign, or the president in France, affixes his signature to whatever measures the ministry places before him.¹

¹ The position which the English Parliament occupies with respect to England's foreign policy is analogous to that which the Roman comitia (officially the sole power that had the right to declare war and to enter into alliances) occupied with respect to the Roman Senate, and later, during the years of the Republic's agony, to the generals, who were quite independent in their action. Nothing falls wider of the mark than the opinion which prevails in America, that in England and France the right to decide for war or for peace lies in the hands of the people acting through their representatives, whereas in Germany and Austria the people are forced into war by an irresponsible monarch. The exact reverse of this is true, aside from the fact that in England and France, and in Russia also, the people are in favor of the present war as a direct result of the systematic manner in which the three governments have been inciting their people against their present foes. Whether by a free vote of the people, if that were a possibility, they would have declared for war is doubtful nevertheless.

CHAPTER XIX

THE ENCIRCLING OF GERMANY — BELGIUM — AGADIR — THE BALKAN WAR

EDWARD VII and his ministers made strenuous efforts to persuade still other states to join the alliance against the Germans, and so to complete the encircling of Germany. With Belgium they were wholly successful, and with Italy partially so, in spite of her official adherence to the Triple Alliance. Italy made her position more secure by entering into agreements with France, England and Russia (Oct. 24, 1909), while the wording of the treaty constituting the Triple Alliance was so altered that Italy was not bound to participate in a war. Practically this was the end of the Triple Alliance, even though nominally it was renewed, and Italy avers that it still is in force. But at the outbreak of the war Italy assumed an attitude of friendly neutrality toward the Allies, and more especially toward France, and would in all probability have sided with them altogether if the German arms had not met with such immediate and eminent success. So far, therefore, Italy has hesitated to enter the conflict, although her attitude has made it possible for the French to withdraw their troops from the Italian frontier, while it compelled Austria to

keep a strong force in the Alps, and Italy's attempts to secure Trient and Trieste were renewed.

Of support from Portugal, her vassal state, England felt practically assured from the outset, and at one time it appeared that in spite of some misgivings on the part of the government, the services of Portugal's army of hirelings would be sold to England, and that the German vessels interned in the harbor of Lisbon would become Portugal's easy prey. At present, however (February, 1915) the peace party seems once more to be in control. On the other hand, Portugal's attitude had the effect of greatly stimulating the pro-German sentiment in Spain, where, in addition to the native antagonism that exists between the Spaniard and the Portuguese, the smart still lingers from the blow that England dealt Spain with the capture of Gibraltar. Besides this, there was the tension between France and Spain on account of Morocco, and above all else, the effect of the anti-Catholic policy that the French Republic has followed in contrast to Germany's friendly disposition toward both the Catholic Church and the Pope.

In America the sentiment was entirely in favor of England. From the very beginning of the war the anti-German feeling manifested by the vast majority of Anglo-Americans has not only become intensive, but is elemental in its nature. The appeal made by the German Emperor to President Wilson, asking that the influence of the United States be exerted to secure a more humane mode of warfare, and one more in keeping with the demands of inter-

national law, was answered, or rather refused with offensive curtness. In spite of all the humanitarian and peace-loving sentiments that are constantly on the lips of the Americans, they are quite content to accept the English method of making war upon the German people by an attempt to starve them out. The British consul at New York was allowed to carry on an enlistment bureau for the English service. There can in fact be no doubt that the government of the United States is wholly on the side of Germany's enemies, and gives them whatever support is compatible with the preservation of a nominal neutrality, while at the same time the American people are making money out of the war. Should the United States openly declare war against Germany, the situation would hardly become more serious for us, since in reality the Americans can do us but little harm.

Moreover, this anti-German attitude will be little changed by the course of the war, nor will it be affected by England's illegal interference with neutral trade, but on the contrary, this is much more likely to add to the American dislike of the Germans because they are not inclined meekly to submit to this interference, and do what they can to oppose it. There is reason, however, to hope for better things from the West where a strong anti-Japanese sentiment prevails, and from the Irish element in America, which is bitterly resentful of English methods, and above all from the German-Americans, who, under the influence of the present war, have been roused to a stronger sense of solidarity, and polit-

ically have, in a measure, combined with the Irish. In the congressional elections on November 3, 1914, the Democratic party, now in power, did in fact suffer serious defeat in consequence of their combined opposition. It is therefore possible that the pressure exerted by these elements in the American population may affect the future attitude of the United States toward the belligerents as the war progresses, and induce the government to take a truly neutral stand, equally impartial to both sides, in spite of its strong disinclination to do so.

The attempt that Edward VII made to win Austria over to a co-operation with his plans, and to estrange her from Germany, proved utterly futile. The Netherlands refused quite as firmly to enter into the English schemes, in spite of the pressure that England can bring to bear upon the Dutch coast and commerce, and above all upon the colonial possessions of the Netherlands. In April, 1906, the British military attaché, Colonel Barnardiston, notified the Chief of the Belgian General Staff that "at the time ¹ he had little hope of either support or intervention from Holland." And as matters then stood, they remained. This attitude on the part of the Netherlands prevented the British from making a landing at Antwerp, their nearest point of approach, since to reach this port they would have had

¹ The word "actuellement" was subsequently inserted into the sentence by the Chief of the Belgian General Staff. This is of especial significance, since it indicates that the hope to secure the co-operation of Holland had not then been abandoned.

to pass through the mouth of the Scheldt, which belongs to Holland. When in 1908, and again in 1911, the Netherlands made plans to fortify Flushing in order to be able to make their neutrality effective, England revealed how little was really meant by her officially proclaimed and high sounding resolve to recognise and protect the rights of neutral states. Since the proposed fortifications were for the purpose of defending the Netherlands against an English invasion, an immediate and indignant protest was raised by England against the execution of these plans for Holland's protection, and the Dutch government was not allowed to carry them out. This is but another illustration of the English interpretation of neutrality, which is nothing more nor less than that the country in question is expected to hold with England, and that although all other nations are to be debarred from crossing its frontiers, its territory is to be open to an entry by the English at any time.

With Denmark, British diplomacy had better success, as might have been expected, since its ruler is closely related to both the English and the Russian royal houses, and since the conflict regarding North Schleswig still keeps alive the feeling of resentment against the Germans that has been strong among the Danes. In 1911, so far as can be learned, a plan for the landing of British troops on the coast of Jutland was not only taken into consideration, but its immediate execution was for a time seriously contemplated. But at that time an outbreak of hostilities was avoided, and when in

August, 1914, the anticipated war had become a reality, Denmark had decided upon an attitude of strict neutrality, which has been maintained in a highly creditable manner by closing the Sound to the vessels of all the belligerents.

Japan, however, was to be included in the alliance against Germany, as the ultimatum issued on August 17, 1914, stated that by her treaty of alliance with Great Britain Japan was obligated "to insure to eastern Asia a firmly established and enduring peace." Although England had declared war against Germany and had attacked her colonies, Germany was nevertheless regarded as the disturber of the peace, because, forsooth, she was inclined to defend her colonial possessions, and sent her war vessels to oppose the depredations of the British raiders. As a result of her "entente" with Britain, Japan now entered into relations with Russia also. On July 3, 1910, these two countries came to an agreement with respect to Manchuria, and at the same time Japan was allowed a free hand in Korea, followed by its prompt and unqualified annexation to the Empire of Japan.

In May, 1910, Edward VII died, and his son, George V, who followed him upon the throne, is neither fitted by nature, nor is he inclined to maintain the rôle that his father played in English politics; as a consequence, the political leadership has again devolved upon the Cabinet. Therefore the reign of Edward VII, although a very interesting one, was nevertheless but a fleeting episode in the history of Britain's internal politics. But for her

foreign policy, on the contrary, it was an epoch-making decade, with consequences far reaching in their effect. After the death of King Edward the Liberal Asquith Cabinet, with Sir Edward Grey as Minister for Foreign Affairs, continued his policy, and held to its consequences.

Meanwhile the negotiations with regard to Morocco dragged on, and were made more intricate by a war between two brothers who were battling with each other for the control of the country that was fast slipping from their grasp. This state of affairs played into the hands of France and gave her the opportunity to gain a complete ascendancy in the land, and to displace German influence altogether. Hereupon Germany again manifested her disapproval, and dispatched a gunboat to the harbor of Agadir on July 1, 1911. Germany made no claim to territory in Morocco, if for no other reason than for the sufficient one that as the protector of Islam she could ill afford to annex any Mohammedan territory; all that Germany desired was a sufficient indemnification for the claims she had relinquished. If, therefore, Germany and France had been left to settle the matter between themselves, it would soon have been adjusted. But behind France stood England, encouraging her to opposition, and taking advantage of this opportunity to take a bold stand against Germany, and peremptorily to deny her the right to acquire any harbor on the Atlantic Ocean, — not so much even as a coaling station. As a consequence, the excitement in France over “*la geste d’Agadir*” grew ever greater, and for weeks an out-

break of hostilities seemed daily imminent. England not only planned to land her troops in Denmark, but made all the preliminary arrangements for sending an army of 160,000 men to Belgium. On this occasion Ostende and Zeebrügge were chosen as ports for the landing of the troops, and the Belgians were informed that this army "would land on their shores even if Belgium did not ask aid of Britain."¹ Eventually, however, an amicable settlement was reached on November 4, according to which Germany withdrew from Morocco, while France ceded to her a part of the Kamerun hinterland and two small sections of territory reaching to the Congo. This outcome of the negotiations was looked upon both at home and abroad as a decided defeat for the Germans, who had allowed themselves to be intimidated by England and France.

In the meantime Russia had again assumed a more friendly mien toward Germany. During a visit that Nicholas II made at Potsdam in 1910, it was agreed that neither Germany nor Russia would become a party to an alliance inimical to the other, which was in no way an inconsistency, since, according to the terms of both the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, these were to be defensive only, and moreover, from an official standpoint the latter was no "alliance" at all. In August, 1911, while the Morocco question was still unsettled, an agreement favorable to Germany was reached in regard to the Oriental railroads. A little later England

¹ This document also was found in Brussels, and a facsimile of it has been published.

took a corresponding attitude, and toward the close of the year 1913 entered into negotiations that were to lead to an understanding with respect to the Bagdad railroad, as well as to the adjustment of other differences. On July 15, 1914, it was announced that the German Ambassador at London and the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, had signed an agreement which disposed of these affairs. But this was all a ruse; it mattered little how many concessions were made to Germany for the sake of deluding her into a sense of security, for with the outbreak of the anticipated war these would of course all be nullified.

For the preparations for war had never been abandoned, but were being vigorously pushed. On the occasion of the visit made by the President of the French Ministry, Poincaré, to St. Petersburg in 1912, France agreed to increase the strength of her army by re-instituting the three years' term of military service, and in January, 1913, just after Poincaré had been made President of the Republic, the French Chambers adopted the measures necessary to this step. At the same time Russia obtained another large loan from France ($2\frac{1}{2}$ milliards of francs in five-year instalments), in return for which Russia pledged herself to build a number of strategically advantageous railroads in Poland, for the purpose of facilitating the quick transportation of troops to the German frontier. Russia also undertook to rebuild her fleet, which had been practically destroyed in the Japanese war and in the subsequent revolution.

By these measures France became vassal to Russia; for, if she would not lose the vast sums she had loaned, she would be compelled to follow unquestioningly the lead of Russia in her foreign policy, and to go to war at her behest. At a somewhat earlier date England had come to an understanding with France with regard to the disposition of their war fleets, according to which the defence of the Mediterranean was assigned to France with the use of Malta as a base, while the British fleet was thus left free to be permanently concentrated near the shores of the British Isles. From the other and more distant naval stations all war vessels were either withdrawn entirely, or the number remaining was reduced to a minimum. By concentrating her fleet in the Mediterranean, France left her coasts on the Atlantic Ocean and on the English Channel wholly unprotected against an attack by the German fleet; in other words, England undertook the defence of these coasts with her fleet. With the consummation of this arrangement the close alliance between the two states was openly acknowledged despite the manifold official denials. England had pledged herself so deeply for France that a withdrawal was unthinkable.

On November 22, 1912, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, and the French Ambassador at London, Paul Cambon, exchanged similarly worded documents declaring that the conversations between the military and naval experts of the two states were not to be construed as constituting an obligation by which the freedom of action

of either state was to be restricted in any way, and "that, for instance, the present disposition of the British and French fleets was not based on any obligation by which the two fleets would be expected to act together in the event of war." By this shrewdly devised course of action it was intended to give the distribution of the naval forces of the two countries the appearance of being most inoffensive in its intentions. But who could be so easily duped as not to recognise in it a moral obligation of the strongest kind, since it brought about a situation between the two states that was wholly untenable without their mutual support of each other? In answer to a possible objection raised by the Ambassador, Sir Edward Grey made the further statement that in case of "immediate danger of an unprovoked attack by a third power" upon either Great Britain or France, the government of the threatened state would have to ascertain at once whether it could rely upon the other for support. Therefore, should such a situation actually develop, negotiations must immediately be set afoot with regard to joint measures to be taken, and as to the advisability of making an effort to preserve the peace. Should the decision be for war, the plans of the two general staffs must immediately be taken into further consideration. This diplomatic achievement excellently displays the true nature of the Entente,—upon the surface, no more than the harmless discussion of measures that might be taken under certain contingencies,—in fact, however, a binding agreement by which two states are firmly

united through the assumption of definite obligations. It needs no vivid imagination to picture to one's self the furtively knowing look that was exchanged between the two diplomats at the same time that they exchanged documents.

Meanwhile the negotiations with Belgium were still under way. It was in vain that Baron Greindl, the Belgian representative at Berlin, sent his government a warning on December 23, 1911, with regard to the disclosures, as perfidious as they were naïve, that had been made by Colonel Barnardiston at the time that the Entente Cordiale was concluded,¹—a warning to show that Belgium was in quite as much danger of a French invasion supported by Britain, against which precautionary measures must be taken, as it was of a violation of its territory by Germany.² This warning remained unheeded by

¹ See page 246.

² "The danger from France does not menace us from the South only, by way of Luxemburg; it threatens us along our whole common border. This conclusion is not based upon conjecture, but upon positive evidence. The design to surround Belgium from the north doubtless forms a part of the combined plans of the Entente Cordiale. If this were not the case, there would not have been so great an outcry made both in Paris and in London over our intention to fortify Flushing; there was not even an attempt made at the time to conceal the reason for the evident desire that the Scheldt should remain unprotected. The object in view undoubtedly was to keep the way open for a British garrison to be transported to Antwerp, the ultimate purpose being to secure a base of operations in Belgium for an offensive directed against the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, and thus to sweep us into the current of the war, which would have proved no difficult task."

the Belgian government, which gladly welcomed every suggestion from the powers of the Entente, of whose ultimate victory not the slightest doubt was entertained. That they might have a strong army to depend upon, the Belgians now also adopted the system of universal military service through legislative enactment on May 28, 1913, with a fifteen months' term of service. English and French officers were constantly traveling back and forth through the country, and their presence in the Belgian fortifications was a common occurrence even before the beginning of the war. The Belgian government furnished the British General Staff with all the material necessary for a detailed description of the military topography of Belgium,¹ so explicit, indeed, that it filled four volumes, which, when printed (1912-1914), were trustfully handed over to the British officers. During the course of the war these books fell into the hands of the Germans, and did them good service in the conduct of their military operations.¹ It would seem, therefore, that Belgium invited the fate that overtook her.

Meanwhile Germany's reputation abroad suffered another setback through the events that were transpiring in the Turkish Empire. Here the frightful

¹ Belgium, Road and River Reports prepared by the General Staff, War Office, 4 voll., 1912-1914.

² There were also found a large number of copies of the formularies for levying requisitions to be furnished to the British General Staff, and which had been printed in advance and marked with the stamp of the British Legation. A facsimile was published in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of November 5, 1914.

oppression by the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, who lived in daily terror of assassination, had resulted in a thoroughly organized military conspiracy, in the granting of a constitution, and finally to the deposition of the Sultan (1908-1909). The adoption of this constitution gave Bulgaria the opportunity to renounce her allegiance to the Sultan, and to constitute herself an independent kingdom, while it compelled Austria to decide upon the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two provinces that in 1878 had been placed under her administration; at the same time, and with an amazing degree of shortsightedness, Austria relinquished the sanjak of Novipazar to Turkey. That this act of annexation, which after all was but a mere matter of form, roused a storm of fiery indignation in both Russia and her protégé, Serbia, and that the war which threatened in consequence was averted only by the firm stand that Germany took in behalf of her ally, are matters of common knowledge. Against the firmly welded alliance of the two central powers Russia and her partners dared not yet venture a war.¹ Serbia was compelled to demobilize, and on March 31, 1909, agreed to withdraw her objection to the annexation, and henceforth "to live on a friendly footing" with Austria.

Two years later, in the fall of 1911, Italy under-

¹ In a speech made on September 11, 1914, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill, declared that the present war "would have been undertaken in 1909 if Russia had not then so far humiliated herself as to retreat before the German threats."

took her long planned step to gain possession of Tripoli and Barka, and to this end made war upon the Turks, who were not at the time in a position to offer an effective resistance. And again England did not fail to get a share of the spoils, for on this occasion she seized the Libyan port of Solum, 250 km. west of Alexandria. These events determined Russia to proceed with her old plans, and to carry them to completion. In March, 1912, the Czar brought about the alliance between Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro, by which it was hoped to put an end to Turkish rule in Europe, with the reservation of Constantinople and the Dardanelles for Russia herself. Bulgaria was to have the lion's share in the distribution of the spoils of this contemplated war, whereas Servia, the chief representative of Russian interests in the Balkan peninsula, and Montenegro also, were to receive but meager portions. The unexpressed but very evident intention was that these two states were to get their reward at the expense of Austria. These plans were frustrated, or at least greatly modified, by the participation of Greece in the war, and by the skillful and far-seeing statesmanship of Venizelos, the Greek Premier, as well as by the course which the war took. By far the heaviest burden of the war fell upon Bulgaria, and she succeeded, although not without a heavy sacrifice, in forcing the Turks back upon Constantinople; this success would hardly have been possible, however, without the aid of Greece, whose fleet prevented the transportation of the Sultan's troops from Asiatic Turkey to the European

front. But soon the old wrangles over Macedonia divided the allies; the Greeks held Salonica, allied themselves with Servia, and drove the Bulgarians back. Meanwhile the Rumanians entered Bulgaria, made sure of a gain in territory along their southern frontier in the Dobruja, and compelled the Peace of Bucharest (August 10, 1913). Russia had not been in a position to lend her aid, and so the world-wide war was still postponed; there was now nothing for her to do but to make the best of a bad situation, and therefore to abandon the hopes that had been entertained with regard to Bulgaria. Nevertheless the Russian attitude in these events revealed both her sympathy for Servia and her deep-seated distrust of Bulgaria, in which, from the Russian standpoint, she was quite justified, for the Bulgarians were striving to achieve a true independence, as free from oppression by the Czar as by the Sultan. For these reasons Bulgaria began to incline toward Austria and the Triple Alliance, for she realized that she had been betrayed by Russia.

By these conflicts Austria felt herself touched in the most vital interests of her empire; there was nothing left for her to do but to mobilize, which she did toward the end of 1908. Otherwise, however, Austria remained passive; and again she failed to seize Novipazar, and so drive a wedge between Servia and Montenegro, which would have made her mistress of the situation, but at the same time might have precipitated Europe into a general war. Instead, Austria turned her attention to energetically conducted negotiations with the other great

powers concerning the reconstruction of affairs along the Adriatic. The result was the birth of the principality of Albania, the worthy offspring of the "European concert of powers," a political changeling, at whose birth stood the wrangling great powers seeking a compromise between their perplexities and their jealousies, and in which each one hoped to outwit the other. For a long time the outbreak of the great European conflict seemed imminent, but still both sides hesitated to undertake it, and so the mediatory endeavors on the part of both Germany and England proved successful. For the next few months appearances seemed to indicate that the stage of acute irritation had passed, and that there was a prospect of a return to the old relations of friendliness. In the Balkan peninsula the inflamed passions were subsiding, and conditions were becoming more stable, as was indicated by the close relations into which Bulgaria and Turkey soon entered in spite of the fact that the Turks had retaken Adrianople. England, as has been said, opened the way to an agreement with Germany, the British Ministry expressed cordial sentiments, and Lord Haldane came to Berlin on a mission of peace. From English official circles downward an effort was made to repress the anti-German feeling among the English people, and the way seemed again clear for a renewal of Germany's earnest endeavors to make peace a certainty. The official expression of this desire by the German Ambassador was supplemented by numerous deputations and associations, in speeches and at banquets.

On the part of Germany and of Austria this attitude was one of absolute sincerity. In both these countries the people realized how much was at stake, and preferred to be overlenient rather than to assume the responsibility for precipitating the gigantic struggle of the nations, if it could be averted. But with England and her allies it was all pretense, for while the official protestations of friendship and of a desire for peace were being made, the preliminary arrangements for war were being unremittingly continued, and were now nearing completion. The defeat suffered by the Turkish armies that had been trained by German officers was everywhere regarded to be synonymous to a defeat of the Germans themselves. The inferiority of their methods, of their organization, of their military efficiency, that supposedly had degenerated into mere drill, of their guns even, seemed now to have been proved beyond question, and was triumphantly proclaimed in numberless articles in the English, French and Russian press.

In the Turkish Empire too, German prestige had suffered a severe blow; the mistake that Germany had made in expecting the ultimate victory of the Sultan's armies was to her political disadvantage; the Turkish government now turned for support to the powers of the Entente; from France a large loan was obtained; and there was very little good will for Germany at Constantinople. Even so slight a favor as a request from the German government to share in the results of the excavations made by the German Oriental Society, although based on pre-

viously made conditions, was refused. In December, 1913, Germany suffered another serious diplomatic defeat when, in consequence of objection from Russia, she was compelled to refrain from her purpose of sending General Liman to Turkey as instructor. It appeared, therefore, that the time was ripe for beginning the war. Germany's disposition to yield a point was of course not believed to be rooted in a sincere desire for peace — no one within the territory of the three allied powers had the slightest faith in that — but was construed as a confession of weakness, and that in spite of her alliance with Austria, and nominally with Italy also, Germany lacked confidence to grapple with her foes.

CHAPTER XX

THE PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR WAR — THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD WAR

IN April, 1914, the King of England, accompanied by his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Grey, went on an official visit to Paris. There they met the Russian Ambassador, Iswolski, the chief representative of Russia's aggressive policy,— aside from the energetic Grand Duke Nicholas, who controlled the weak-willed Czar altogether and terrorized him unsparingly,— and together they laid the basis for a military agreement between England and Russia, analogous to the one existing between England and France, and supplementary to the measures established by the alliance between Russia and France. Through negotiations concluded at St. Petersburg on May 26, this agreement received definite form.

The British and the Russian fleets were to enter into close relations with each other, and were to exchange information with regard to their own organization and latest technical equipment, as well as with regard to what had been learned concerning other fleets. By a similar arrangement to that which had been made for the disposition of the British and French fleets, the Russian fleet was now also to co-operate with the British navy according

to a definitely and previously established plan, although the two would necessarily be separated by distance. Russia's part in the intended operations was to force a passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and to this end her fleet was to be allowed to use the British and French harbors in the western Mediterranean as bases. The British were to hold as large a part of the German fleet as possible in the North Sea, and so give Russia an opportunity to land her armies in Pomerania, a measure which was to be facilitated by the dispatch of British transport ships into the Baltic "before the beginning of hostilities." For the rest, reliance was placed on the hope of being able to compel Denmark and Holland to join the alliance against Germany. These plans were frustrated by the inferiority of the Russian navy and by the watchful alertness of the German fleet, as also by the inactivity of the British, who dared not venture a bold attack upon the well protected position of the German fleet for the purpose of utterly destroying it, by which, however, a large number of their own vessels would necessarily be sacrificed.

Naturally the convention with Russia carried as little official obligation with it as did the similar agreement with France. This furnished Sir Edward Grey with an ostensible reason for the cool effrontery with which he denied the existence of an alliance with Russia when he was questioned concerning it in Parliament, and just as he had done on a previous occasion, a year earlier, with regard to the French agreement, he now declared that in case

of war between the European powers "there were no agreements existing by which the free decisions of the English government, or of the Parliament to determine whether or not Great Britain should be a participant would be either hampered or restrained; nor were there any such negotiations now in progress, and, so far as he could judge, it was not at all likely that any would be undertaken; should any such agreement be concluded, however, it would, in his opinion, have to be submitted to the Parliament, and this would in all probability be the case." The absolute untruthfulness of this statement was recognised and publicly arraigned in the "*Manchester Guardian*," but with no further result than to elicit a renewed denial in the semi-official press. Both the Parliament and "public opinion" were more than willing to be duped; evidently there was a perfect mutual understanding with regard to the situation.

In Russia the same game of duplicity was carried on. There was no longer even an attempt made to conceal either the hatred of Germany or the preparations for war.¹ In this respect the Russian press,

¹ I cannot refrain from quoting in this connection from a conversation that took place at the time that the International Congress of Historical Sciences met at London during Easter week of 1913. When the Russian delegation invited the Congress to meet for its next session, in 1918, at St. Petersburg, an eminent Russian savant with whom I was on most friendly terms said to me: "We thought we would risk the invitation although by that time we shall have been at war with one another; but I trust that five years hence we shall all be friends again." At that

usually so fettered, was allowed a free hand. Under Russian encouragement the Servian agitation in Croatia proceeded vigorously despite all official protestations to the contrary. Among the Ruthenians also disturbances were fomented, and no effort was spared to incite them against Austria. Furthermore, a ruthless espionage was being conducted, in the face of which Austria remained absolutely passive. Nevertheless, when in July of 1914 the German Ambassador referred to these matters in conversation with Minister Ssasonow, the latter declared: "The information with regard to a Russo-Anglican naval convention, that has ostensibly been concluded, exists only in the fancy of the 'Berliner Tageblatt'" (which had at once published an account of it) "and in the moon." At this very time the President of the French Republic, Poincaré, and his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Viviani, were in St. Petersburg for the purpose of carrying the negotiations still further, and to re-emphasize the intimate relations existing between the two states; but, naturally enough, among the toasts that were ex-

time I looked upon this expression of opinion as one of extreme pessimism, although I was aware that the speaker was a pan-Slavist. Since then, however, my thoughts have recurred to it again and again, and it now seems to me to be an evidence of the nature of Russian sentiment at the time, and of how much publicity had been given to the plans of the Russian government. In its first half the prediction has been fulfilled; but its second half, I venture to say, will never be realized; for, should we live to the age of Methuselah, we will not all meet again in an international congress.

changed on this occasion there were none that were not of a most harmless and friendly nature.

As has been learned from subsequent publications, the German government was far better informed of this state of affairs than we in Germany at first knew, or had any reason to know in the face of the inconceivable reticence observed by the government at the outbreak of the war. It would now appear that it would have been to our advantage if the German government had done as Bismarck did on similar occasions in so masterly a manner, and had placed all the evidence it possessed before the public, and called the world's attention to it. This would have made Germany's position and her relations to neutral nations an entirely different one from what it is to-day. The German Emperor did, however, express himself very frankly with regard to the situation in the speech which he made at the launching of the *Bismarck* on June 20, when he alluded to the grave dangers by which Germany was beset from all sides, and then quoted Bismarck's words, "We Germans fear God, but nothing else in the world," with an increasing emphasis toward the end of the phrase. It is quite remarkable that these words, spoken as they were by the Emperor, and which should therefore have left hardly a doubt in the minds of his hearers that the world-wide war was at hand, did not at the time make a deeper impression upon his people. But we Germans believed in peace, and would not believe otherwise; we could not conceive it possible that England, holding the decision in her hand as she did, would

force us into a war with half the world against us, for without her co-operation, or at least without her explicit promise of a definitely friendly attitude, Russia and France had not ventured upon a war in the past, nor would they have done so now.

It would appear that before the outbreak of the war the Allies had fixed upon the spring of 1915 as the most auspicious time for them to begin it; by that time, it was expected, their preparations would be complete, in a measure at least.¹ Meanwhile the Russians began the "trial mobilization" of their army in Poland, which gave them the opportunity to mass a tremendous body of troops on their western frontier, some being called in from as distant parts of the Empire as Siberia and eastern Asia. A naval parade to be conducted on a gigantic scale furnished England with the excuse to concentrate her fleet off Portsmouth in the Spithead. All would then be in readiness, and the negotiations could be set afoot by means of which the war could be precipitated at any time when the propitious moment had arrived.

But on June 28, 1914, the crime at Sarajevo hastened the fatal day. Although Austria had long endured the Servian agitation and the Russian espionage, and almost without active resentment, the time had now come when she must act, or else

¹ In his celebrated pamphlet Frobenius designates the year 1916 as the "fateful year for the German Empire," viz., the year that had been decided upon as the one for beginning the war. Considering the measures that were resorted to in the spring and summer of 1914, it would appear that the intention was not to wait until that time.

abandon all hope of a future. At the trial that followed, all the complexities of the plot were unraveled, and the complicity of the Servian government was established beyond a doubt. Austria therefore delivered an ultimatum to Servia on July 23, with a time limit of two days in which to receive the reply. When this proved to be an evasion, the Austrian representative at Belgrade was recalled, and took his departure on the evening of July 25, and on July 28 Austria's declaration of war followed.

The nature of the conditions which Austria had made, and with which she peremptorily demanded absolute compliance, was such that Russia was forced to choose between the alternatives of abandoning her Servian protégé, or of going to war for her sake. By advising the Servian government to yield, and at the same time accepting Austria's declaration that the integrity of the Servian territory would be respected, Russia would have abandoned the position she had taken in recent years, and would have returned to the old standpoint of 1876 and 1877, since it would have been a virtual recognition of Austrian supremacy in the north-western section of the Balkan peninsula. On the other hand there could be no doubt that this was a matter of vital importance to Austria, and that she could no longer tolerate the Servian agitation that, in imitation of the example set by Russian politics, had resorted to the dagger, the bomb and other criminal means to secure its ends. Not only did Austria realize that this evil must be utterly up-

rooted, but also that, as instigator of the entire situation, Russia must be regarded as the real evil doer, and the Servians but as the ready and willing tools.

If Austria could not have done otherwise than she did, it was not to be expected that in the end she would yield, and more especially was this true in consideration of the unscrupulous attitude that Russia had assumed in this connection, as in all others. Nevertheless, it seems, the war party was not at once predominant; but on the contrary, the current of opinion that inclined toward seeking some kind of adjustment maintained itself for some time side by side with the one for war,—how sincerely it was meant is, however, a question. Even now the efforts to avoid war received the earnest support of the German government. The German Under-Secretary of State went so far as to assure the British Ambassador, on the evening of July 26, that the expected and hurried return of the German Emperor from his summer trip¹ in the North was not due to any action on the part of the German government, which was rather disposed to regret it, “since it was likely to give rise to disturbing rumors.”² England also manifested a desire for peace by suggesting a conference of the powers in

¹ In order to make it clear to the world that Germany was not a participant in the negotiations, nor making any military preparations, but was merely a watchful observer of the course that events were taking, the German Emperor had not allowed the murder of the Austrian Crown Prince to prevent him from starting on his journey, nor had he discontinued it.

² English Blue book, No. 33.

which England, France, Germany and Italy were to participate for the purpose of suggesting a basis of mediation. This proposition was of course unacceptable, since it would have entailed a deep humiliation for Austria, and for Germany as well, if the Hapsburg monarchy, the state that had been deeply injured, and whose very existence was being gravely imperiled, were to appear before a court of the European powers virtually in the rôle of defendant, on an equal footing with Servia, the state whose hands were stained with murder, and there allow herself to be driven to make concessions. Therefore, on July 27, Germany rejected the proposal made by the English, and at the same time directed their attention to the circumstance that if the Russians were mobilizing not only in the south, on their Austrian frontier, but in the north as well, Germany would feel compelled to resort to counter measures.¹ Furthermore, it was stated that Germany viewed the conflict between Austria and Servia as a local matter in which she could not interfere, but in which Austria must be allowed a free hand. Austria took a similar stand, declined the proposed conference, as well as the suggestion made by England for further negotiations on the ground that the Servian reply was not complete, as she also did the proposal of a direct exchange of opinions between the Russian and the Austrian governments. And then, to leave no doubt as to the

¹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 43, 55 (toward the close), 67, 71, 81, 84. German White book, Appendix 12.

finality of her decision, Austria declared war on Servia.

The result was that the Russian government now gave the official order for mobilization in her southern military districts, which practically, however, was already well under way, and on July 29, its formal announcement was received at Berlin. The German government expressed regret to England that Austria had made so immediate a decision,¹ but did not remit its efforts in concert with the English to seek an adjustment through mediation.² In its further action the German government prevailed upon Austria not to break off her negotiations with Russia, and on July 30 forwarded to Vienna the English proposal, suggested as a basis for possible future negotiations, that after her armies had entered Servia, Austria should there dictate her terms. At the same time the German government called attention at St. Petersburg to the circumstance that the Austrian mobilization was directed against Servia and not against Russia, that, moreover, Austria did not desire acquisition of Servian territory, that there seemed therefore to be no reason at present for interference on the part of Russia, and that in Germany the Russian championship of Servia's cause after the terrible deed at Sarajevo could not be comprehended.³

¹ English Blue book, Nos. 75, 76.

² *Ibid.*, Nos. 46, 60, 67-69. German White book, Appendix 13-16, 19.

³ German White book, Appendix 19-23a, as well as in the main text.

The final decision lay in the hands of England. Had she declined to support her associates of the Entente by declaring that she would not tolerate a war in Europe, and that they who violated the peace would find her opposed to them, even if only by the observation of a stern and truly non-partisan neutrality, we may be almost sure that the Russian war party would not have succeeded in the endeavor to hurry France into the war, for the French would have realized all too well that it would be they who would have to bear the brunt of it, and Russia would then have been compelled to modify her demands. Then, too, the possibility would have remained that by their concerted action England and Germany might have been successful in their efforts at mediation, while in the meantime Germany could have influenced Austria to temper her procedure against Servia.

But it was soon revealed that all the negotiations and proposed conferences were but shams, suggested for the sake of gaining time in which to complete the preparations for war,¹ and to weaken the German and Austrian position both from a military

¹ On July 29 the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir G. Buchanan, reported that he had told the German Ambassador that "the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ssasonow) gave me (the British Ambassador) to understand that Russia did not wish to hasten the outbreak of the war by an immediate crossing of her frontiers, and that it would require at least a week or more before the mobilization could be completed. Meanwhile we would all have to work together to find a way out of the dangerous situation." English Blue book, No. 78.

and a moral standpoint. The members of the Entente understood one another perfectly, and both in Russia and in France there was a due appreciation of how much was really meant by Lord Grey's attempts to preserve the peace, and by his equivocal declarations. During the night of July 30 a decision was reached at St. Petersburg. A report made at the time by the Belgian chargé d'affaires there, and which later fell into the hands of the Germans, gives this account of it: It had been impossible during the two preceding days to distinguish between the true and the false among the rumors concerning the intention of the Russian government; "the one thing that has been indisputably established is that both here and at Vienna the German government has spared no effort to avoid a general conflagration." These efforts were frustrated, however, by the determination of the Vienna Cabinet not to withdraw a single demand, as well as by the Russian distrust of Austria. "This morning an official communiqué to the press announces that the reservists in a certain number of provinces have been called in. Any one who is familiar with these official Russian communiqués, and is aware of how much they always withhold, will realize that this means a general mobilization." "At the outset, England intimated that she would not allow herself to be drawn into the conflict; Sir George Buchanan made this statement openly. To-day, St. Petersburg is convinced, indeed the assurance has been received, that England will stand by France. This promise of English co-operation is

of great significance, and it is largely due to it that the war party here has gained the upper hand,"—principally for the reason, as is enlarged upon later, that because of Russia's weakness by sea, England's support was indispensable. "In the Cabinet counsel that took place yesterday, a difference of opinion was still evident; the order to mobilize was delayed; but since then a marked change has taken place; the war party is now predominant, and early this morning, at 4 o'clock, the order for mobilization was given."

It was the English attitude therefore by which Russia was influenced to decide upon war. A number of telegrams passed between Berlin and St. Petersburg (July 28 to 31) in the hope still entertained by the German Emperor that by a direct appeal to the Czar, peace might yet be preserved. Although the replies received from the Czar bore a favorable tone as a whole, and were accompanied by a request that the Emperor continue his mediatory endeavors, they contained the expression that "a dastardly war has been declared against a weaker nation, and the indignation which it has aroused in Russia, and which I fully share, is a tremendous one." But even before the formally delivered declaration, saying that "Russia is far removed from harboring any desire for war" and that "as long as negotiations with Austria in regard to Serbia are in progress the Russian armies will take no belligerent action" (July 31, 2 P. M.), was received, the information was at hand that, beyond a doubt, a general mobilization of the Russian forces

had been ordered, and that it was therefore directed against Germany as well as against Austria. Knowing this, it would have been a fatal mistake to have waited longer; with every hour of hesitation Germany was losing ground in the military situation by which she was confronted. An ultimatum was therefore dispatched to Russia, and when this remained unanswered, the order for mobilization was given on August 1, at 5 P. M., and war was declared.

That France was Russia's ally and would join her in the war was never for a moment doubted, and was fully confirmed by the French reply to the German note of inquiry sent to France at the same time with the ultimatum to Russia, asking whether France intended to remain neutral; for the answer was that France would do what her interests demanded of her.

The more real the danger of war became, the more earnest grew the efforts on the part of the German government to continue the friendly relations that had apparently been established with England in the concerted endeavor at mediation which had just been made, and to secure a promise of neutrality from the English government. The fact is that, in spite of all they knew and had experienced, neither the German Foreign Office nor the men who shaped Germany's diplomacy could as yet believe that England, or to be more correct, the British Cabinet, had long ago determined upon its course of action, and was now deliberately bringing about the war for which it had so long made

preparation. On July 29, Sir Edward Grey very frankly said to the German Ambassador, as quoted in the English Blue book, that "he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve peace, which we are making in common with Germany, failed."¹ But even this was evidently not understood in its full meaning in Berlin, although it was practically equivalent to a declaration of war. The truth is that the Germans were not used to the custom that prevails throughout England, and is followed even in private intercourse, and according to which discussions such as this abound in all manner of general and aimless remarks, while the chief thought, and the one that alone is of significance, is only casually mentioned and in a most cordial manner, even though it is absolutely antagonistic to all that is desired by the other party to the discussion. This accounts for Germany's many and continued attempts by far-reaching concessions to secure from England a promise to remain neutral, but which was always politely but persistently refused.

The Germans were fully aware that on account of the obligations that England had assumed with regard to France, she could not allow the German fleet to make an attack upon the French coast along the English Channel, which was left undefended by French war vessels, according to the Anglo-French naval agreement. And it was realized quite as well that England would resent it as a trespass upon her

¹ English Blue book, Nos. 87, 89, 102.

interests, if the forced passage of troops through Belgian territory that the German military authorities were planning, and in which they were fully justified by the practical breach of neutrality of which Belgium herself had been guilty, were carried into effect. The offer was therefore made that when the time for making terms of peace had arrived, Germany would respect the integrity of French territory, and furthermore that the German fleet would make no attack upon the French coast, and eventually even that Belgian neutrality would in no way be violated; but all without the slightest effect. On July 30, Lord Grey absolutely refused to enter into any agreement by which England would be bound to refrain from participation in the war.¹ On July 31, he informed the French Ambassador that he had "not only definitely declined to agree that England would remain neutral, but this morning he had gone so far as to say to the German Ambassador that if France and Germany were to become involved in war England would necessarily be drawn into the conflict."² On August 1st the German Ambassador asked him "whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, Great Britain would remain neutral," and that he (Grey) replied that he "could not say that," that he did not think Great Britain "could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone." Further Sir E. Goschen says: "The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate con-

¹ English Blue book, Nos. 85, 101.

² English Blue book, No. 119.

ditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.”¹

² *Ibid.*, No. 123. Compare the German White book, appendix 33-36, and “Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung” of September 5. At the outset the Ambassador believed that a promise of English neutrality could be obtained if Germany would declare that in case France remained neutral, she would make no attack upon French territory, provided that England would guarantee French neutrality. But when the German Emperor in a telegram to King George intimated that such an agreement would meet with his approval, the reply that was immediately sent by the King said that there must be some misunderstanding. These circumstances plainly reveal how little was really meant by the proposition that Lord Grey made to Berlin on July 30 (English Blue book, No. 101), and for which, in the introduction to the Blue book (P. VII), he takes so much credit to himself as an evidence of his honest desire for peace, “If the peace of Europe could be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, his own endeavor would be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggression or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and England, jointly or separately. He had desired this and worked for it, so far as he could, through the Balkan crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object, their relations sensibly improved. The idea had hitherto been too utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis . . . be safely passed, he was hopeful that the relief and reaction which would follow might make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the powers than had been possible

In other words, England had long been bound to France by an agreement, and therefore, in spite of all her apparent endeavors to obtain an adjustment, declined to consider every proposal that was made by which the war might have been averted or restricted. England wanted war. The situation is clearly stated in a letter addressed by Charles Trevelyan, Under-secretary of State for Education, to his constituents when he resigned his position at the same time that his father, Sir George Trevelyan, Lord Morley and Mr. Burns left the Cabinet. He frankly says that if France had violated Belgian neutrality "we would not have rushed into war, but would have contented ourselves with a protest." "The German offer to refrain from an attack upon the French coast on condition that we would remain neutral shows that Germany had by no means assumed an attitude that would not admit of an adjustment. But we were not in the mood for it. We had already taken the other side."

On August 2, Lord Grey took the decisive step. As based on a decision of the Cabinet he announced to the French Ambassador: "I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all protection in its power." To this he added, as he naturally would: "This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving hitherto." These were however mere conventional phrases without any true significance whatever.

the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

The ancient illusion was to be kept up even now. On the following day Lord Grey submitted the matter to Parliament. He gave the necessary information with regard to the declarations that had been exchanged on November 22, 1912, which, he stated, were in no way binding, and then proceeded in a like manner with regard to the announcement he had made to the French Ambassador on the day before, and which he assured Parliament was as yet not to be regarded as a declaration of war, and left that body entirely free to act. Of the agreement made with Russia he said not a word, and quite as little, no one will be surprised to learn, about the one with Belgium. To the long continued injuries inflicted upon Austrian interests he made no allusion, nor did he mention the perilous position into which Germany had been brought, whereas the new intimacy with France, entered into since the old differences were laid aside, was sharply emphasized, together with the moral obligation not to desert this newly acquired friend. To this was now to be added the German entry into Belgium, which was about to be undertaken, and came to pass on the evening of the same day. The Parliament was further informed that the British fleet was already mobilized,—it was then assembled in the Spithead, off Portsmouth, for the ostensible purpose of a naval parade,—and that the mobilization of the army

must be begun at once. Any allusion to the circumstance that by making certain declarations to France and Russia, or even by announcing her purpose of observing a strict neutrality, England might have averted the war was avoided with evident intention. Instead, Lord Grey declared that in the war that had been begun England could not remain neutral. And in this connection the underlying motive with which England entered the war comes to the surface in the partially veiled intimation of the financial advantage which she was to gain from it, when Lord Grey added: "For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores and our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer if we stand aside." The Parliament of course accepted these representations and sanctioned what had been done. On the following day (August 4) the British Ambassador at Berlin again questioned the German government concerning its intentions with regard to Belgium, and when he was informed that the order for the entry of the German army into Belgium could no longer be countermanded, he at once announced the British declaration of war against Germany, at 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day.

It would seem that the British government would gladly have delayed participation in the war for some time, for in the meantime the army equipment could have been vigorously pushed, and England would then have entered the war at a time when Germany was fully engaged in the conflict, and

therefore had already been somewhat weakened. England would then graciously have extended aid to her allies, and, with little sacrifice to herself, have destroyed Germany's commerce and seized her colonies. The entry of the German army into Belgium rendered this course impossible to her. It must be admitted that at the same time it furnished England with a ready and popular pretext for participating in the war, and we know all too well to what extent she made use of it to her advantage, both at home and abroad. The moral indignation with which she clothed her pre-conceived purpose of entering the war was the more readily assumed because, in his speech to the Reichstag on August 4, the Imperial Chancellor openly and candidly admitted that the German occupation of Belgium was a violation of international law. The additional statement that the German government was at the time aware of the French intention to occupy Belgium (England's purpose to participate in this action could not at the time be disclosed since England had not as yet declared war) was at first discredited by every one except those whose sympathies were wholly with the Germans, while Germany's position of extreme peril, by which she was justified in grasping at any means of defense against the murderous attack upon her from all sides, was recognized quite as little. How much regard for her agreements with other nations, and for their neutrality, England has shown in the past, we have already seen, and it has again been revealed in the present war.

After the representations that had been made at Berlin by the British Ambassador, Sir E. Goschen,¹ the German diplomats were not prepared for England's declaration of war, in spite of all that had preceded it, and were both painfully surprised and depressed by it. The German nation felt differently about it. There can be no doubt that when we first learned of it, and realized all that the gigantic struggle in which we were about to engage would demand of us, the German people were deeply affected. In the beginning we, too, could hardly believe that all our attempts to convince the English of the peaceful nature of our intentions had been in vain, and that all the courteous and conciliatory messages that we had received from them, especially in response to our most recent overtures, were all mere empty phrases. Then we set our faces grimly to the task

¹ It is worthy of notice that the two ambassadors who delivered the British declaration of war at Berlin and at Vienna were both of German origin, Sir E. Goschen, a descendant of the well known publisher who lived at the time of the classical period of our literature, and Sir M. de Bunsen, a grandson of the renowned friend of Frederick William IV, who, as representative at London played so disastrous a rôle in diplomacy, and in which he was as much of a dilettant as he was in historical science, and who felt highly flattered when the English aristocracy welcomed him in its circles and accorded him almost the treatment of an equal. The King of Great Britain also is of German extraction. The question suggests itself whether, in spite of their naturalization, these men will be suspected of being German sympathisers, and so be subjected to treatment similar to that which the Prince of Battenberg and so many others have received.

before us, fully recognising at last that an open foe is far preferable to a perfidious friend. If it must be, we would battle for victory with this latest revealed foe also, and, in this struggle with a world in arms, the moral and physical force of our nation should be steeled and strengthened as never before.

And again the German Emperor was fully in sympathy with his people. When in the evening of the day on which the British declaration of war was received, the windows of the British Embassy were stoned, and which, according to the testimony of trustworthy witnesses, was provoked by the bravado of some of the employees of the Embassy, who shouted "Hurrah!" out of the windows, and threw copper coins into the street, with the taunt that they were intended to defray the costs of the war, the Secretary of State, von Jagow, made excuses for this demonstration. "The German Emperor, however," I quote the words of Sir E. Goschen, "sent an adjutant to me on the following morning with the message: 'The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrence of last night, but at the same time to tell you that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now divest himself of these titles.' I could add," continues Sir E. Goschen,

“that the message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.”¹

For a time the idea was entertained in wide circles in Germany that England had been hurried into the war through the machinations of unscrupulous politicians, that a large number of Englishmen, although swept along by their feelings in the excitement of the moment, would soon awaken to a realization of what was involved, and disapprove of it, and that a pro-German sentiment would then set in by which the Government would find itself opposed in its measures after the same manner that it had been by the strong Opposition that developed at the time of the Boer war. Gradually, however, we discovered that this too was an illusion. The number of voices in England that were raised in our favor, or at least, against the war, it would not have been difficult to count,—some of them have already been alluded to. Among the English savants, too, and at the universities, where hitherto closer relations with Germany had been so frequently both sought and fostered, only few voices friendly to Germany were heard, and many of the men who hitherto had been counted among her staunchest friends were now to be found with her most zealous opponents. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the war upon Germany is highly popular in England throughout all the various grades of her population, and that the conviction that it was not only a necessity, but was inevitable, is practically universal among her people. Not on Servia's account, nor for the sake

¹ English Blue book, No. 160.

of Belgium, was it undertaken; but because Germany's ruin was believed to be a necessary condition to the preservation of England's position of dominance in the world. "Only children," writes a highly intelligent Italian, "will now or in the future speak of this war as a French or a Russian war, whereas history and men will recognize in it a struggle to the death between England and Germany, fought out on French and Russian soil." This aspect of it is strikingly revealed in the manner in which Austria, the nominal instigator of the war, once this was decided upon, immediately receded into the background, even before the negotiations with regard to the war had been concluded. The nations, and especially their governments, are not fighting Austria, nor because of Austrian aggressions on the Balkan peninsula, but against the German Empire and the German nation, and deplore the fact that Austria has remained their faithful ally.¹ As a nation we grasped this situation at once; and at the present time there is a consciousness abroad among the German people, from the highest to the lowest station in life, that England is their deadly foe, and that it is England who has

¹ After the war with Germany had begun Russia still allowed her ambassador at Vienna to remain at his post for the purpose of continuing the negotiations with Austria, until, on August 6, the latter country put an end to this absurdity by declaring war against Russia. England did not declare herself to be at war with Austria until August 12, and then with the accompanying explanation that by declaring war upon Russia, Austria was also practically at war with Russia's ally, France.

forced upon them this conflict which is to decide whether they are to be or not to be,—this battle for their national existence and for all that is of highest worth to them.

CHAPTER XXI

ENGLAND'S CONDUCT OF THE WAR — THE MORAL DECADENCE OF THE ENGLISH

To speak of the course that the war will take would be out of place at this time, for as yet the end can in no way be foreseen. At the outset England has sent her allies into the field; she herself could send but a relatively small army to Belgium and France, the trained army of mercenaries with which up to the present time she has fought her wars. Contrary to all expectation the British fleet has remained inactive, whereby all the proud threats in which the British indulged before the war began, as for instance that the day after war had been declared the German fleet would have ceased to exist, were proved to be but vain boasts. The course pursued by the British fleet stands in striking contrast to the spirit of enterprise shown by the German vessels, and by the many splendid and surprising results of their activity. By this attitude of her fleet Great Britain virtually admits the danger of her position. She dares not risk the destruction of a large number of her war vessels in a great and decisive battle with the German fleet, well protected as it is by its sheltered position, not only because Britain's supremacy at sea would be imperiled

through a possible reduction in the strength of her sea power below that of the French,¹ and especially below that of the Americans, but above all because the British fleet must remain adequate to the task of insuring safety to Britain's import trade. Should this be tied up, or even restricted in a measure sufficient to cause a food famine, British resistance would be broken. Therefore the British fleet is fully employed in securing to England the control of the ocean routes, and above all, of the open sea to the north of Scotland. To these demands that are made on the fleet must be added the necessity of pursuing the German cruisers, a purpose for which the British fleet alone was evidently deemed insufficient, since the co-operation of the Japanese was accepted, and for which Britain was obliged to extend thanks to them for the victory in the battle of the Falkland Islands, the most humiliating testimony to Britain's inadequacy that she has yet been forced to render.²

¹ The inactivity of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, augmented, as it is, by British vessels, can only be explained in a similar manner. Its first duty is to insure safety to the intercourse with the African possessions, and secondly, to hold Italy in check. An attack upon the Austrian coast and fleet could therefore not be ventured. Whether an attempt to force the Dardanelles with a view to protecting the Suez Canal will be made, remains to be seen.

² Since then England has however lowered her national dignity even to a greater degree; for at the very time when her First Lord of the Admiralty was boasting to Parliament that Britain's sovereignty of the seas had never been as absolute as at the moment, orders were being issued to the British merchant marine to lower the

Whether the future will bring about a change in this respect, and the British naval authorities will decide upon a vigorous attack, and what dimensions the war at sea will then assume, no one can foretell.

Of one thing we may be certain, however, which is that, as the war progresses, England will greatly increase her strength by land, until far beyond anything she has hitherto accomplished in this direction. The appeal to the national spirit has met with a wide response, especially from among the upper classes, and although the results of the efforts to obtain recruits have not fulfilled the high hopes that had been entertained of them, and the men of Ireland are evading service in the British army as far as possible, nevertheless it would be a grave error to value lightly the armies that are now being trained in England. Through her desire to attack and destroy militarism abroad, England will find herself compelled to adopt the very institution she is supposed to be fighting, for whatever may be the outcome of the present war, certain it is that its inevitable consequence for England will be the introduction of the universal military service she abhors.

In other respects England has so far conducted the war in the manner traditional with her; her allies are fighting for her with all their available strength, while the British forces that can be sent to the front are both small in numbers, and are exposed as little as possible. To this end England went begging national emblem in fear of an attack by German submarine boats, and fly in its place the flag of a neutral nation.

among all the nations of the earth for troops to aid her. And again, as of old, although she annexed Egypt, subjugated the Boers, and is now compelling them to fight against the Germans in East Africa, and views with cold indifference the subjugation of Finland by violence, England still poses as the liberator and defender of the small states, and as the noble champion of the independence of the nations.¹ While pretending to be battling against a violation of neutrality by Germany, England is at the same time seeking with every means at her command, by the pressure of her powerful fleet, by the restraint of their commerce, as well as by direct threats, to coerce the neutral states into a combination with her in a war that does not concern them, and is, in fact, opposed to their interests. As yet her results have been meager; even the Portuguese, as used as they are to obey the commands of their English lords, still seem to hesitate despite their evident willingness. This is but another evidence of the loss that English prestige has suffered, principally through the inactivity of the British fleet, fur-

¹ "Should I be asked what we are fighting for," said Premier Asquith to the Parliament on August 6, "my answer would be in two sentences,—in the first place, to fulfill a solemn international pledge (Belgian neutrality). . . . And secondly, we are fighting in defense of the principle—in these days when force, material force, at times seems to be the dominating factor in the development of mankind,—for the principle that small nations shall not be crushed at the pleasure of a strong power by which they are overwhelmed in defiance of international fidelity and trust." This is a true specimen of real English "cant."

thermore through the exploits of the German vessels, and, by no means least, through the wonderful results achieved by the German submarine boats.

Japan, on the contrary, grasped eagerly at the opportunity, in conformity to her alliance with Britain, to drive the Germans out of their positions on the Pacific Ocean. And the Japanese would like to go very much farther, and assume the protection of British and French interests in Asia, but the question would then arise as to how much they would be willing to relinquish in the end. Whereas hitherto England has held herself to be the champion of the white race against all others, and although the Briton looks with haughty disdain upon all men of color,—in India, for instance, refusing social equality to Hindoos even of the highest culture,—the English now combine with the Japanese, and set them on the Germans, indifferent to the fact that by so doing they are not only violating the principles they advocate, but are educating to efficiency the future foe from whom they will have the most to fear for their empire of the seas, just as they are also willing to turn the European continent over to Russian dominance. Nor is England ashamed, any more than is France, to let loose against the Germans all manner of foreign races,—yellow, brown and black hordes, down to the most brutal negroes. The two nations who look upon themselves as the vanguard of culture and morality in this war against the modern Hun are truly worthy of each other!

In other directions also England's methods in the present war have been in harmony with her usual

disregard of all standards of humane consideration, only that now, in correspondence with the magnitude of the present conflict, this exceeds even its ordinary limits. All German colonies are being destroyed in so far as this is possible through English agency, and thus numerous centers for a wide and beneficent service in the interest of civilization are being blotted out. Moreover, Britain is not content with paralyzing her enemies' commerce and capturing their merchant vessels, but holds up all neutral shipping on the high seas, to search for and capture German citizens. Neither has she hesitated to violate the mails to and from Germany. She interferes with the trade of neutral nations at her pleasure, detains their ships, declares to be contraband whatever it is to her advantage to consider as such, and altogether proceeds with an utter disregard of international law and of the obligations she assumed through international agreements. And the neutrals submit to all this, although not without an occasional sigh of regret; of them all, only the Americans venture to make a half-hearted protest when the results are too severe on their pocketbooks, but only to be put off with fair words and a few crumbs of comfort. But even they submit meekly when vessels plying between the United States and its island possession, Porto Rico, are stopped by the British, and any Germans that may be found on them are seized and carried off to Jamaica or to the Bahama Islands. And this is what the Americans call neutrality! Although the other nations are little inclined to admit it, it is daily being demonstrated that Germany's war

against England is at the same time a war for the liberation of the seas, and for the true independence of nations.

But the worst that the war has revealed is the appalling lack of conscience that England displays, and the terrible decadence of the English character. How much lying and empty phrasing is masked behind the display of high motives that the English parade before the world, how little they really mean by their frequently quoted "love of fair play" as soon as their own advantage is at stake, how disreputable the individual Englishman often is who outwardly passes for a perfect gentleman, the world has long been learning; but the depth of moral baseness that they have shown in connection with this war, no one would heretofore have believed possible. In the masses, even of the more educated, this is excusable, for they believe what is told them, and know no better; but all the more heavily does the responsibility for it rest upon the leading classes — the statesmen, the writers, the press, and to some extent even with the higher army officers. We have discovered that English "gentlemen" do not shrink from any crime, if only outward appearances can be preserved. Lord Haldane openly declared that in the spring of 1914, when he was the British Secretary for War, and came to Berlin, ostensibly on a mission of peace, and accepted the honors that were bestowed upon him there as the messenger of peace, that in reality he went there "not to pave the way for more amicable relations, but to learn all that he could from the German military organization which

might prove useful to England." This is probably false; but all the more significant is the fact that the noble Lord eagerly claims to be the perpetrator of a contemptible action for the sake of gaining popular favor in England, and one of which he was not even guilty.

The hideous dum-dum bullets, such as the British have long been using in their wars with "savage" peoples, are being supplied to the army in great quantities. The judges in England set aside every idea of right or of justice with a smile of cold indifference when dealing with a German in the discharge of their official duties. German men who have been domiciled in England for decades, some having been in the public service there,— at the universities, for instance, are apprehended, separated from their families, and crowded together in concentration camps, such as were used in the Boer war (p. 215),¹ or are placed on detention ships in the Ports-

¹ Winston Churchill, now Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty, who was war correspondent for the "Morning Post" during the Boer war, wrote at the time: "There is but one way in which the opposition of the Boers can be broken, and that is by the most severe measures of suppression,— we must kill the parents in order that their children may have respect for us." Kitchener carried this doctrine into effect in the most cruel manner. In the concentration camps 54,326 children and 38,022 women were crowded together; of these, according to the British figures, 14,000, and according to those of the Boers, 20,000 perished. English newspapers published in November, 1901, reported of these camps that "the mortality is greater than during an epidemic of cholera," and that of every 1,000 persons, an average of 383 died.

mouth harbor. And in the face of these deeds of their own, the English are making a great and appealing outcry over the alleged brutalities of which the Germans are supposed to have been guilty on hostile territory. The terrible and barbarous methods that were resorted to in this war almost at the outset are due to the English even more than to the French. They compelled us to take measures of reprisal to which we had recourse with great reluctance, such as that of interning the English who were domiciled in Germany; they have brought our soldiers to the point where they look upon their British opponents as their mortal foes, with whom they therefore fight in a spirit of bitter hatred quite foreign to them when in battle with the French or Russians. Since the Germans cannot be vanquished in open warfare, the great endeavor of the English is to cut them off from all food supplies, and so to subdue them by famine. The "humane" Americans seem to find this method of procedure quite in the natural order of things, but they nevertheless raise a cry of protest at the injuries inflicted upon their interests when we meet the English intention to starve us out by declaring that we will destroy the merchant vessels that are taking food to England. The evident intention is not only to annihilate the power of the German state, but to destroy the entire German people as well, and above all else, their industries, their factories, and their cities. With malicious satisfaction the English technical journals, such as "The Engineer," are portraying to their readers the large profits that will accrue to Britain from such a result.

The most despicable of all, however, is the fabric of lies that the English have been weaving, and have spread over the world. It reveals a moral degeneracy from which one turns with disgust. No calumny is too despicable, no lie too unreasonable to serve their purpose. That the very next day may prove it false does not in the least deter them, for once having been set afloat, it has done its mission, and the mass of the British public is too ignorant and too credulous to allow an opinion once formed to be corrected by a later and truer statement of facts. At the same time the total want of general information, and the consequent inability to understand other nations that prevails among the English people is drastically revealed. Momentarily the English have achieved most astounding results by this procedure to which they have had resort; but in other countries there is even now a gradual awakening to the truth, and the day must come when in England also the eyes of the people will be opened. Then, when it is too late to mend, they will realize that, aside from the moral wrong, the greatest injury inflicted by this system of calumny has been to themselves and to their country's reputation.

PART III

THE NEW WORLD CONDITIONS AND THE
PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE

CHAPTER XXII

THE NEW WORLD CONDITIONS AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE

WHILE the final negotiations about Sicily were being concluded between Rome and Carthage, before they went to war about that island in the year 264 B. C., the Carthaginian said to the Roman tribune: "What are you thinking of that you are willing to go to war with us about an island? You have no fleet, you are inexperienced in the conduct of a war at sea; without our permission you dare not even venture to wash your hands in the sea." But the Roman answered: "We have always made it a practice to learn from our enemies. We have frequently altered our method of warfare and our army organization from the ground up,—we did this a little at a time; do not therefore force us to go to sea, for, once we are driven to it, we shall soon have more and better ships than you have, and shall then conquer you by sea as well as by land." This prophecy was immediately fulfilled when Duilius won the victory in the first battle at sea, and again in many later encounters upon the water.

This is precisely the situation in which Germany finds herself to-day with regard to England, with the exception, however, that in the war about Sicily,

Rome was the aggressor, whereas in the present conflict Germany is the one that has been forced against her desire to engage in it. Whether the outcome will bear out the similarity — who will venture to prophesy?

Then Hannibal took charge of the war against Rome, and not only dealt her one staggering blow after another, but also succeeded in forming a powerful coalition against her, with the intention of destroying this Italian state, and forcing Rome back again into the unimportant position that she had held in past centuries. In seeking to explain why Rome nevertheless bore off the final victory, Polybius draws a comparison between the character of the two states. "The Carthaginian constitution," he says, "was originally and in its main features a well regulated one. The Carthaginians had a king, the Counsel exercised the functions of an aristocracy, and the people were given the rights to which they were entitled. But at the time of Hannibal the Carthaginian state had already passed the zenith of its power, whereas Rome was then at the height of its development. Carthage had arrived at that stage of her history when most of the important matters of state were submitted to the people for decision (a fully developed democracy, therefore), whereas in Rome the Senate, composed of the ablest Romans, was in control. Consequently the decisions of the Romans, and the measures they adopted were superior to those of the Carthaginians, and therefore they eventually conquered them." For this achievement it was greatly to the advantage of

the Romans that they possessed an abundance of material, especially the necessaries of life, or at least had easy access to them, as Polybius points out, "So far as the conduct of the war is concerned," he then continues, "the Carthaginians were, of course, better equipped and better trained for the war at sea, whereas for the war on land the Romans were far better prepared. For to this, the Romans devoted themselves with great ardor; the Carthaginians, on the contrary, neglected their foot soldiers, and made provisions only for their horsemen. The reason for this is that the Carthaginians employed foreigners and mercenaries, whereas the Roman soldiers were natives and citizens. The fortune of the Carthaginians therefore depended upon the mood of the mercenaries they hired, while the Romans placed their dependence upon their own valor, and upon the support of their allies. Even though the Romans might lose at the beginning, they would nevertheless continue without loss of zeal, which the Carthaginians would not; for the Romans were fighting for their fatherland and for their children; their courage knew no abatement, therefore, and they fought to the end, even to the sacrifice of their lives, until the foe was vanquished. Because of the valor shown by their warriors in the conflict at sea, they were victorious there also, despite their lack of experience; for at the critical moment the courage of the ship's soldiery is of higher value than is technical experience."

We need not follow this parallel in its particulars. The divergences, mainly due to the great

changes that have taken place in the methods of warfare, are apparent to every one. But quite as evident also is the fact that the decisive elements in the two situations are identical.

The analogy between the present war, between England and Germany, and the Punic wars must claim the attention of every student of history, and has been frequently commented upon by historians, without as well as within our own land. In the ancient conflict, however, the theater of war was confined to the narrow limits of the Mediterranean countries, whereas the one of to-day well nigh encircles the globe. Furthermore, Hannibal's invitation to all the peoples and states of the ancient world to combine with him against Rome, for its destruction, did not receive the wide response that England's efforts to gain allies for a world war against Germany have found. How completely in other respects the analogy is borne out, in the struggle of the state whose greatest strength is by sea with the one whose main dependence is upon its land forces, as well as in the utterly different structure of the two state organizations, the careful reader will have recognised.

The Punic wars are the turning point in ancient history. With them the ancient system of state organization begins to crumble, and at the same time the development of ancient civilization has reached its zenith, and henceforth slowly but steadily declines, until it ends in the dead level of complete disintegration and primitive conditions. Again the similarity of events and of the historic situation is

plainly and undeniably evident. What may be the relations and circumstances that will develop at the close of the present gigantic struggle, the manner of whose termination no eye can foresee, and in what condition the individual states and nations will emerge from it, no one would be rash enough to prophesy, and as often as this question may be asked of the future on either side of the firing lines, just so often would it prove vain to venture an answer.

We Germans are firmly convinced that we shall endure to the end, and, undismayed, shall carry the war to a successful termination. But whether it will then be possible to solve all the stupendous problems by which the world will be confronted, who can say? In other words, will England's tyrannous supremacy at sea be broken, and a true freedom of the seas be secured, with a consequent free intercourse between the nations, or will the general exhaustion be so great that no more than a temporary adjustment can be made, and the map of Europe in no wise be changed? Should this be the case, the peace that will follow the war will be no more than a prolonged armistice, only a period of waiting until the final solution must be reached.

But of so much we may be certain,—the world in which we shall find ourselves after peace has been concluded will be totally different from the one with which we have been familiar, even should there be no outward change, no shifting of the old-time boundary lines. For this war that England has brought about is not only the greatest war in the history of mankind, but it is the most epoch making

event of modern history. The world as we knew it before August 1, 1914, has ceased to be. What precedes that date seems to belong to a remote past, so far removed from us that we can hardly realize that we had a share in it; we have suddenly been called upon to adjust ourselves to a new world, and to force our minds into wholly new channels of thought. In addition to the new problems that the war has brought with it, many old ones have been revived,—problems that we had supposed were disposed of, never to disturb us again, but which now urgently demand adjustment. The responsibility which this places upon us,—upon the government, upon each one of us individually, and upon the people as a whole, is a stupendous one, and one which no one can realize without anxious misgivings. But in this we are not alone, for the other nations, those that forced this war upon us, deliberately planned and began it, will discover that for them too it will become a struggle for existence, or at least for their political position in the world.

This is pre-eminently true of England, the instigator of the war. The English set it afoot because they believed continued peace to be incompatible with the preservation of their position of dominance in the world. But it has developed that the very dangers that it was hoped would be averted by the war are still clamoring at England's heels, and that her world dominion and her empire of the seas are menaced to-day as never before, not even during the time when anxious fear of Napoleon's threatened domination would not allow William Pitt to

rest in peace, and hastened his early death. Whatever may be the issue of a great battle at sea, the belief that Britain is invincible upon the water has been shattered; the fear of her fleet is waning, and the achievements of the submarine boats have proved her floating iron giants to be vulnerable. For the first time in a period of two hundred years England has had her coasts attacked and bombarded by an enemy's vessels. She has been compelled to close her ports to foreign vessels, and to restrict her ocean routes in a measure that heretofore would hardly have been deemed possible. The few German cruisers and raiders have inflicted considerable damage on British trade, and have carried the fear of them to India's distant shores and into the Pacific. While England plans to starve the Germans into submission, the prices of grain have advanced to a much higher level in Great Britain than they have in Germany, and the fishing industry, upon which the British are very dependent for food, is lying prostrate. As little as they may be disposed to admit it, there can be no doubt that the anxious question frequently suggests itself to the men of England who bear the responsibility for the welfare of its people, whether they will find it possible to supply the British Isles uninterruptedly with at least the minimum of necessary imports, especially if Germany should decide to adopt the plan proposed by Admiral von Tirpitz, and announce a blockade of the British coast, and then proceed ruthlessly against all merchant shipping destined for British ports, a proceeding in which Germany is fully justified by

England's total disregard for the demands of international law.

To these anxious cares another is added by the manifest unrest in various parts of the British Empire. That the Irish question has again reached an acute stage has already been mentioned. The Irish are persistently refusing to enlist in the British army, and the authorities in England feel compelled to keep a strict guard upon the island, to suppress all freedom of speech and of the press, and have again resorted to the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, that time hallowed institution for safeguarding the personal freedom of every citizen of Great Britain. Irish patriots, both at home and in America, are cherishing the hope that Ireland may find her opportunity to sever her relations with England, if not in this war then in a following one; and since, if accomplished, this step would be the death blow to England's dominance at sea, Ireland might then hope that her independence would prove an enduring one.¹

In South Africa the Boers have again taken up arms, and although they have suffered defeat, it is clearly to be seen from the nature of the English reports that as yet they are not entirely subdued. How matters stand in India no one outside of the initiated few in government circles has any idea. But the most significant event in this connection is the uprising of Islam against Britain, together with Turkey's participation in the war, and the conse-

¹ See note, page 98, referring to a pamphlet by Sir Roger Casement.

quent menace to Britain's supremacy in Egypt and her control of the Suez Canal, the main artery of supply to the British Kingdom. And even should England and her allies be the victors in the war, these dangers will not be lessened for that reason, but on the contrary, they will become even greater. For aside from the fact that the end of the war will by no means assure the end of this political ferment, England will then have to cope with the new situation which she herself will have created in delivering the whole of the European continent, together with a large part of Asia, over to Russian domination, and at the same time having raised Japan to a position of power at sea in both the Pacific and Indian oceans, by which this island empire of the East will but have had its appetite whetted for further conquests. The inevitable consequence, and one which English statesmen must fully realize, will be that not many years after the present war is over, England will be at war again, not only with Russia, but with Japan also, in a conflict that in all likelihood will assume even greater proportions than the one in which she is engaged at present.

And for him who views the world's history in its entirety, there looms up behind all these problems of the future the haunting thought that the analogy between the present and the Punic wars may persist to the end, and that with the outbreak of this war modern civilization may have reached its turning point, and the future will witness its gradual decline. The fact is that the indications point that way in whatever direction we may look for evidence.

International law has been annihilated by England; and although the attempt may be made to rehabilitate it when the war is over, who is credulous enough to believe that in the future it will prove more enduring than it has proved in the past? From the outset, the present war has been characterized by brutality such as no war of the nineteenth century has shown. The reason for this is to be found in the systematic and malicious slander of the Germans, begun while the nations were still at peace by the officially conducted propaganda among the French soldiers, by which they were given the impression that the Germans give no quarter in battle, and, when established in an enemy's country, deport themselves like barbarians there. A further reason is to be found in the practice of the French soldiers, when in action, of throwing down their arms and displaying the white flag, and then, when the German soldiers move forward with the expectation of finding no further resistance, suddenly firing upon them,—a trick which the English officers were quick to learn from the French, and to accept as an established military ruse, and to teach their soldiers. In addition, there was the demoralizing effect of the wholly irresponsible and untrustworthy behavior of the Belgian people, many of whom not only participated in the fighting clad as civilians, but treacherously fell upon the German soldiers, while in their quarters and unarmed, to destroy them, frequently perpetrating the most cruel mutilations.

Dispelled for all time are the dreams of those well intentioned visionaries who hoped for a day when

the nations would be at peace forever, and all their disputes would be settled at the bar of an international tribunal of arbitration by which war would be made impossible,—dreams that have been so widely entertained in America where the people have become effeminate in their sentiments in recent years. The Hague peace conferences instituted at the suggestion of the Czar — how great a travesty in the world's history! — and the palace in which they were held, are a satire on the times, and subsequent events have fully justified Germany in her disinclination at first to participate in this empty farce.

Instead of continuous peace, a series of long and sanguinary wars will mark the century upon which we have but just entered, unless, indeed, Germany should bear off a decisive victory now, and could then stand for peace throughout the world, as for forty-three years she has stood for peace in Europe, much to the chagrin of England and her allies. But in any case, the dominating circumstance by which coming events will be most strongly influenced will be the impassible gulf that has opened between England and Germany, and their feeling of bitter enmity for each other. So far as we can scan the future, a reconciliation is not possible; we Germans can never forget how England has served us.

After the confused cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century, and in marked contrast to it, the nineteenth century developed a strong sense of individualism among the nations; they grew strongly conscious of their distinct existence as nations, and of the power that is inherent in national unity. But

in more recent years there seemed to have arisen in conjunction with the free expansion of the individual nationalities, a desire for co-operation among the peoples of the world, under fixed international regulations, and in vigorous but friendly competition. This disposition toward combined action among the nations may be regarded as the necessary complement to their well defined individualism, and seemed to promise an enduring and harmonious progress of universal culture. But this, too, was a dream that has vanished. The era of internationalism is past and will never return. It will be replaced by a period of vigorous and ruthless assertion of national ambition,—the struggle of the nations with one another,—not in friendly rivalry now, however, but in a much wider field, and by force of arms.

We Germans have all too long given ourselves over to the hallucination that by our well meant overtures of friendship we might arouse an honest reciprocation of our sentiments among the other nations, and, by overcoming all prejudice, secure the recognition of our equal position among them,—the recognition of our right to a free exercise of our national vigor within limits set by a just regard for the rights of others. But at last the scales have fallen from our eyes; not only has the onslaught made upon us by our open enemies convinced us that we have been pursuing an illusion, and hoping for the impossible, but the attitude of the neutrals has tended even more toward undeceiving us. This is perhaps the bitterest disappointment we have yet ex-

perienced; but we are men, and will face the truth, and know how to bear it. Henceforth the welfare of our own people and the measures necessary to its preservation shall be our sole care. To the dictates of conscience we will give ear, and it will be our first duty to quicken it and keep it ever on guard; but to return to the paths of internationalism, and again sacrifice interests of great importance to ourselves for the sake of it, would be a crime against our own people.

But that the highest interests of civilization must suffer when the nations are thus isolated through the intensity of their individualism will be apparent to every one. Science and art will be affected the most of all. The international organizations that were instituted for their advancement are dissolved, and the ties that have thus been severed can never again be restored. Personal relations of friendship between individual savants and artists from among even those nations that are now at bitter enmity with one another will, we hope, be renewed; but anything more than this can never, in so far as we can foresee, be re-established. The gulf which yawns between the nations cannot be closed within the lifetime of the present generation.

And in this connection we cannot refrain from deploring the terrible gaps that the war has torn in the ranks of the entire younger generation, and therefore also among the young men upon whom the future of the intellectual life of the nation depends. Quite beyond the power of our reckoning is the toll of sacrifice in this respect that we have paid, and to

which we are daily adding,—promising young scientists, and men in the fulness of their intellectual powers, whose names are everywhere honored for the services they have rendered mankind. Of Austria and France, and Russia also, this is quite as true, and even England will learn what the war entails when once her volunteers are fighting at the front. In deep sorrow and with anxious misgivings for the nation's intellectual future, we scan the lists of the missing from day to day. How can that which has thus been destroyed ever be replaced!

There is yet another resemblance in which the parallel between the present epoch in history and the corresponding one in ancient times would appear to be maintained, and perhaps the one in which the similarity is most significantly apparent. The immediate, and at the same time the most disastrous result of Hannibal's war, and of the subsequent wars that Rome waged with the Macedonian powers in the eastern Mediterranean region, was the emancipation of the Orient. Up to this period of time the Hellenic form of culture, that had developed from the Greek, had extended unrivaled throughout the entire civilized world as far east as the Indus toward the south, and northward to the Aral-Caspian steppe, while its influence penetrated even farther, and made an enduring impression upon India and central Asia. As a result of the Roman conquests, that part of Asia east of the Euphrates severed its connection with the West, and ere long this political reaction was followed by a corresponding return to the earlier form of culture,—the re-awakening of the peo-

ple of the Orient and of its civilization. Rapidly the movement spread — to Syria and to Egypt; the re-invigoration that Judaism experienced as a result of it, is historically its most significant consequence. But the deepest inroads it made were within the Roman Empire itself, and upon the development of western culture. Steadily the movement pressed onward, until eventually it culminated in the advance of the Arabs into Spain, the south of France and Italy, and later in the acquisition of Constantinople, the Balkan peninsula and Hungary by the Turks, and therewith reached the limits beyond which it could not penetrate.

At present there are indications that a similar movement is under way, but, like all else at this time, on a much larger scale. Until toward the close of the nineteenth century, western civilization was pressing forward with such persistence that there was reason to believe it would ere long encompass the world; even in China, whose homogeneous culture had maintained itself uninfluenced for three thousand years, it made an effort to gain a foothold. The first interruption to its onward march was through the rise of the Japanese, the nation of the East that accepted the outward forms and acquirements of western culture for the purpose of keeping its empire free from the interference of Europeans, or at least with the intention to be rid of them in time, and so to preserve its national independence, that rested on an entirely different basis. This seemed quite acceptable to the western world, and, by recognizing Japan as a great power, this

eastern empire was welcomed into the circle of states whose entire structure was based on European ideals of culture. Their purpose to divide the world among themselves was by no means relinquished, however, and we have seen in this brief outline that we have been following, with what energy it was being carried out in recent years.

How different is the prospect of the future that the present war has opened to our eyes! Everywhere we see evidences of Asia's intention to sever its connection with Europe. Japan is openly reaching out to grasp the power that will give her the dominating influence in the Pacific and Indian oceans, while her endeavor to acquire supremacy in China no longer encounters opposition from Europe. Nevertheless, as has already been said, the inevitable consequences will be a war with America on the one hand, and with Europe and Australia on the other, upon the outcome of which the future of these countries will depend. In India a strong current of sentiment is setting steadily toward liberation from the British yoke, and it will not be turned aside, no matter what may be the issue of the present war, but on the contrary, it will bide its time and will take advantage of the earliest opportunity, when England's hands are tied, to accomplish its object.

But of supreme significance is the participation of Islam in the present conflict. The Turks have begun the struggle for the preservation of their empire, knowing full well that its end is at hand if Germany and Austria meet with disaster. The

Holy War which has been declared as a far reaching call to the Moslem world, is meeting with increasing response; even the Shiite Persians are taking steps toward freeing their land from English and Russian oppression, and are grasping at this, their last opportunity, to regain their national independence. How affairs will shape themselves if this Mohammedan uprising is productive of results,—whether, in the first place, the Turkish Empire under the régime of the Young Turk party will find physical and intellectual force within itself sufficient to allow of its reconstruction on foundations that will be enduring, no one can foretell. But of this we may feel certain,—if the present Islamitic movement succeeds, the day will have dawned for a new era of history for Asia Minor and Egypt, but not for them alone!

To the dangers by which civilization in Africa is being threatened, but a brief allusion will be made. Not only is a valuable achievement of much labor, and an agency for the dissemination of western culture being wantonly destroyed in the war of annihilation that England is waging against the German colonies in Africa,¹ but through the ruthless

¹ On the other hand, the terrible deeds that were perpetrated in the Congo Free State — another bastard product of the “concert of European powers” — under the misrule of the now so much lauded Belgians, were not only viewed with indifference, but actually protected by the English and French, until the Irishman, Sir Roger Casement, exposed their ghastly cruelties, and made it impossible to refrain from taking at least some outward measures to do away with the worst of them.

conflict in which the white settlers there are engaged, the unrest among the natives is being promoted. Their smouldering opposition to the white race, and the awakening sense of their own power is stimulated in even a greater degree, however, by the shameful fact that England and France have transported, not only the Caucasian and semi-Caucasian races of north Africa, but all the Negroes whom they could procure, to fight for them on the battle fields of Europe in the great conflict by which the fate of the European nations is to be decided. It is quite possible that consequences of a terrible nature may eventually result from this step, and that the European colonies, together with the rule of the white man in Africa, will be as much a thing of the past at the close of another century, as were the Greek colonies and Greek rule in Bactria and Persia in the second century B. C.

Should England and her allies carry off a decided victory, the results, although different, will be even more disastrous to the progress of western culture. For in that event both Europe and Asia will be delivered over to Russian domination. The Russians are not an integral part of the European world of culture however, despite the veneer of its civilization that they have laid on, but, on the contrary, are distinctly opposed to it, as the leaders of the nation have always declared; not only do they have nothing in common with it, but to assail it is regarded by them to be their mission in the world's history. At present they are again revealing their true attitude in the relentless oppression of the Germans,

Fins and Poles who are domiciled within the Russian Empire. The whole world is aware of what Russian supremacy in Europe would mean; the English and the French know it too, as eagerly as they would appear to have forgotten it. There can be no doubt that where Russia treads, all true culture and all national freedom are crushed under foot.

Whatever may be the outcome of the war, its unalterable consequence has been an immeasurable loss in those influences that make for the highest cultural interests of the race, and this sacrifice will continue even into the remote future. That we Germans have been thoroughly roused to a national self-consciousness, and have become absolutely united as a nation, that a wonderful impetus has been given to the idealistic side of our national life, and a mighty wave of self-sacrificing devotion to all that is highest has swept our land, we fully appreciate as splendidly ennobling to our people, in spite of all the misery and heart-ache we see on every hand. But when weighed in the balance with all that has been lost to mankind and to the progress of civilization through this war, the gain is far outweighed by the sacrifice. And the responsibility for all this, that world conditions reached such a pass, is England's! Hers is the crime of having plunged the world into a war brought about by the English statesmen who followed the course laid out for his country by Edward VII, and for which they will be called to account before the tribunal of history!

Even with regard to our internal organization our

nation and our state will be called upon to solve wholly new problems, and undertake wholly new tasks. The old differences and antagonisms on which the conflict of interests and of the political parties was based, will, in a large measure, recede into the background, or will at least take new forms, or be re-adjusted, and new questions of tremendous importance will take their place. But in this respect, too, it is impossible to pierce the veil that hides the future, and to foretell that which will come to pass. Yet even now every German must clearly discern that if the German nation would maintain its position in the world, there are three things that we must cleave to as the inviolable basis of our independent and vigorous existence, and which must therefore be placed beyond the power of political parties,—our military organization; our economic organization, together with protection for our agricultural industries, for by these the necessities of life are assured to us, and we are made independent of supplies from abroad; and lastly, a virile monarchical government placed beyond the influence of party strife, and wholly independent to act, that it may be free to combine and utilize in creative activity all the forces of which the nation is capable. For the beneficent results of this activity we had every reason to be grateful when the outbreak of the war found us fully supplied with material, and thoroughly prepared, while every day that the war continues gives us renewed evidence of its efficiency.

THE END

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