

• 1311

Embassy
05/37

Tokyo, 8 March 1937.

POLITICAL INFORMATION

: Intensification of Japanese South Seas Policy

In recent years there has scarcely been one speech foreign political program, or one Diet debate that has at least suggested and in stereotyped expression brought up the problem of Japanese South Sea Policy. The reason for this was besides the life and death problems for Japan of raw materials, markets and immigration, the prestige of the Navy which maintained, as is widely known, in contrast to the continental aims of the Army, the necessity of sufficient protection of peaceful expansion in the South Seas by Japan.

It is not surprising that the present day Diet is paying more than merely traditional or academic interest in the South Seas problem when one sees that the Washington Treaty has recently expired, that the English and American new powerful naval armament is causing disgust in Japan, that the question of the world division of raw materials has reached a decisive stage as a result of the meeting of the Committee in Geneva and the concrete taking up of the German colonial and raw material problems, and that lastly, the lengthy Japanese-Netherlands East Indian trade treaty negotiations have not yet shown any satisfactory results.

The Japanese government has also recently tended to show tendencies of a certain intensification of its South Seas Policy. Several measures have been taken, which at the same time should meet the endeavors, anchored generally in the internal-political reform program for the strengthening and unifying coordination of the foreign trade policy.

In this way, the Foreign Ministry here has established a South Seas Division, and its mission is to unify and lead all official work done concerning the South Seas questions.

Moreover, the newly appointed Japanese Minister to the Hague, former Director of the East Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Ministry Kiwashima, was despatched on an inspection tour to the Netherlands East Indies before going to his new post. His activities there will scarcely be restricted to simple courtesy contacts with the NEI officials or to accelerate the Japanese-NEI Trade Treaty negotiations.

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It is perhaps better to accept the view that Kuwashima, after his return to Japan, based on his impressions gained on the spot, will suggest to the concerned governmental quarters plans to further effectively carry out various Japanese projects in the South Seas, in order to, after his arrival at the Hague, lead Japanese-Dutch relations to a new and positive phase.

The highest leading principle for the Japanese policy will be in future as in the past -- this will be emphasized on all occasions -- the absolutely friendly economic development and penetration of extremely important raw material and market regions in close and friendly agreement with the Netherlands Government.

Concerning this gradual settling of the target by the government, a Minseito M.P. who pays special attention to South Seas problems, Hyegoro Sakurai, in his interpellation, made a point that appeared to be premature and to overshoot its target. He proposed that Japan should lease eternally the Netherlands, New Guinea and other small neighboring islands and conclude a non-aggression pact with Holland. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hayashi made a reserved answer and said he would consider the proposal, and utilized the opportunity to again emphasize that Japan had no territorial ambitions concerning the NEI or the Philippines.

In the course of this debate, Hayashi in the end, touched briefly on the question of Australism immigration and promised that the government would take the initiative also in this direction.

In the Diet, and therefore in the open forum of Japan and the world, all the problems included in the concept of "Impetus Toward the South" were one after another touched upon. The expressions were renewed that Japan sees in the peaceful penetration and development of the thinly populated South Seas raw material areas where Japanese labor and capital had already widely taken hold one of the most natural ways to satisfy Japanese material necessity in the sense of a justified division of raw material and colonial areas of the world.

On the morning following the debate, a Demei report from the Hague had the effect of a cold douche. According to this report, the Dutch Government's answer to the Japanese proposal was that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact was contradictory to the general attitude and

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political tradition of the Netherlands, however, that the Netherlands Government was ready within the scope of the policy of the open door, which has always been maintained by it, to consider sincerely the Japanese proposal to acquire rights in New Guinea, provided it turns out to be legally valid.

(Signed) VON DIRKSEN

German Embassy
J. Nr. 405/37.

Tokyo, 8 March 1937.

Political Information.

subject: Intensification of Japanese South Seas Policy

In recent years there has scarcely been one speech or one-Diet-debate ~~that has not referred to Japan's foreign policy~~ ^{on foreign political programs} that has not at least suggested and in stereotyped expressions ^{brought} up the problem of Japanese South Sea Policy. The reason for this was besides the life and death problems for Japan of raw materials, markets and immigrations ~~but also concerns the~~ ^{which maintained} prestige of the Navy, ^{as is widely known,} in contrast to the continental aims of the Army ~~conflicts with the~~ necessity of sufficient protection of peaceful expansion in the South Seas by Japan.

It is not surprising that the present-day Diet is paying more than ^{merely} traditional or academic interest in the South seas problem when one sees that the Washington Treaty has recently expired, that the English and American new powerful naval armament is causing disquiet in Japan, that the ^{question of the} world division of raw materials has reached a decisive stage as a result of the meeting of the Committee in Geneva and the concrete taking up of the German colonial and raw material problems, and that lastly, the lengthy Japanese-Netherlands East Indian trade treaty negotiations have not yet shown any satisfactory results.

mines and oilfields, at power stations, on railway transport, in agriculture, in offices and educational institutions.

Workers pledge to turn out more products than the plan calls for and they appeal to other groups to follow their examples. This movement, which in the U.S.S.R. is called the socialist competition, embraces all industrial establishments and branches of production and eventually the entire country.

Winners of socialist competitions are honored as heroes of labor. At holiday meetings they are elected to the presidium, at demonstrations they march at the front of their columns, their portraits are published in newspapers and magazine writers and poets sing their praise and from the government they receive orders and medals.

In the Soviet Union the riches of the country and the means of production are the property of the people, and every artisan who multiplies these riches contributes to the welfare of his country. This year the enthusiasm of the Soviet people is greater than ever.

2.

The Japanese government has also recently tended to show ^{tendencies of} a certain intensification of its South Seas policy. Several measures have been taken, which at the same time should meet the endeavours, anchored generally in the internal-political reform program, efforts for the strengthening and unifying coordination of the foreign trade policy.

In this way, the Foreign Ministry here has established a South Seas Division, and its mission is to unify and lead all official work done concerning the South Seas questions.

Moreover, the newly appointed Japanese Minister to the Hague, former Director of the East Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Ministry Kuwashima, was dispatched on an inspection tour to the Netherlands East Indies before going to his new post. His activities there will scarcely be restricted to simple courtesy contacts with the NEI officials or to accelerate the Japanese-NEI trade treaty negotiations. It is perhaps better to accept the view that Kuwashima ~~would~~, after his return to Japan, based on his impressions gained on the spot, will suggest to the concerned governmental quarters plans to further effectively carry out various Japanese projects in the South Seas, in ~~order to~~ after his arrival at the Hague, he will

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JIJI SPECIAL

**NEWS FROM MOSCOW
FIRST POST-WAR MAY DAY**

MOSCOW, April 24.--For the big holidays, the towns and villages of the Soviet Union dress up in their best as public buildings and dwelling houses are decorated with flags, flowers and portraits of popular Communist Party leaders and members of the Soviet Government. The holiday spirit is reflected in the happy faces of the people.

On November 7, the anniversary of the great October revolution and on May 1, huge demonstrations are held throughout the country. In Moscow a large part of the capital's population numbering many millions generally take part. The demonstrators march across the Red Square past the old Kremlin walls where they greet the head of the Soviet Government, Genissimo Stalin, and his close associates.

The May Day celebration is always preceded by a new rise in production at plants and factories, in the

(3)

lead Japanese-Dutch relations to a new and positive phase.

The highest leading principle for the Japanese policy will be in future as in the past - this will be emphasized on all occasions - the absolutely friendly economic development and penetration government and the wholly peaceful economic development and penetration of extremely important raw material and market regions in close and friendly agreement with the Netherlands Government. Concerning this gradual settling of the target by the government, a Minseito MP who pays special attention to South Seas problems, Hyogoro Sakimai, in his interpellation (~~that the policy was being pushed too rapidly~~ it appeared that) and ~~had~~ ~~overshot~~ its target.

made a point that appeared to be premature and to overshoot its target. He proposed that Japan and Holland should lease ~~eternally~~ the Netherlands New Guinea and other small neighbouring islands and conclude a non-aggression pact with Holland. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hayashi made a reserved answer and said he would consider the proposal, and utilized the opportunity to ~~again~~ emphasize that Japan had no territorial ambitions concerning the NEI or the Philippines.

In the course of this debate, Hayashi touched briefly on the question of Australian immigration and promised in the end

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economic cooperation are still progressing
they would not be completed
but reiterated that until all Russians withdraw
and the Government forces take over Manchuria.

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that the government would take the initiative ^{also} in this direction. (4)

In the Diet, and therefore in the open forum of Japan and the world, ^{all} the various problems included in the concept of "Impetus toward the South" ^{on after another} were touched upon. The expressions were renewed that ~~Japan~~ peaceful penetration and development of the thinly populated South Seas ^{raw material} areas where Japanese labour and capital had ^{already} widely taken hold — one of the most natural ways to satisfy Japanese national necessity in the sense ~~that it was~~ ^{of} a justified division of raw material areas and colonial areas of the world.

On the morning following the debate, a Domini report from The Hague had the effect of a cold douche. According to this report, the Dutch Government's answer to the Japanese proposal was that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact ~~with Japan~~ was contradictory to the general attitude and political tradition of the Netherlands. However, ^{that within the scope of} ~~the Netherlands Government was ready~~ the policy of the open door, ^{which has always been maintained by it,} to consider sincerely the Japanese proposal to acquire rights in New Guinea, ~~it would be~~ considered provided it ~~was~~ ^{sincerely} legally valid.

(turns out to be
signed. von Dirksen.)

The Council vote, a dramatic climax after two hours increasing tension, came on the French resolution to drop the Iranian question as settled. The Soviet delegate associated himself with the French resolution in order to make it a test vote on the entire question and the Council steamroller ran him down by eight to three vote against the Soviet Union.

Only the Soviet Union, France and Poland voted for the French resolution and no negative vote was necessary as the Council majority is seven out of eleven votes. Seven delegations insisted keeping the Iran issue on the program until both countries reported on May 6 whether the Red Army kept the promise to leave Iran. The effect was ^{an} eight to three defeat for the Soviet Union. As the vote was announced, the Soviet delegate tensely said that the decision to keep the Iran item on the agenda is contrary to the United Nations Charter. The Soviet delegation, he said, does not consider it possible to continue to take part in any Council discussions on the

{more}

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Eing. 30. MÄRZ 1937

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zeigende Fassung

zu unterscheiden

Druckfassung (Arbeitsexemplar)

1. Feb 1937

2. Feb 1937

3. Feb 1937

Inhalt: Aktivierung der japanischen
Südseepolitik.

Politischer Bericht.

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Von abgefragt
ist Japan

Es ist in den letzten Jahren kaum eine aussenpolitische Programmrede gehalten oder eine Reichstagsdebatte geführt worden, ohne dass das Problem der japanischen Südseepolitik darin wenigstens andeutungsweise und in stereotypen Wendungen aufgetaucht wäre. Dafür sorgte neben den lebenswichtigen japanischen Rohstoff-, Absatz- und Auswanderungsinteressen schon der Prestigestandpunkt der Marine, die bekanntlich den kontinentalen Zielen der Armee stets die Notwendigkeit eines ausreichenden Schutzes für die friedliche japanische Südsee-Expansion entgegenhält.

Das weit mehr als nur traditionelle oder akademische Interesse, das der gegenwärtige Reichstag den Südseefragen widmet, erscheint nicht überraschend, wenn man sich vor Augen hält, dass vor kurzem der Washingtoner Vertrag abgelaufen ist, dass die gewaltigen neuen Seerüstungen Englands und Amerikas Japan beunruhigen, dass die Frage der Weltrohstoffverteilung mit dem Zusammentritt des Genfer Ausschusses und mit der konkreten Inangriffnahme der deutschen Kolonial- und Rohstoffprobleme in ein entscheidendes Stadium gerückt ist und dass schliesslich die langwierigen japanisch - niederländisch-indischen Handelsvertragsverhandlungen noch immer zu keinem befriedigenden Endergebnis geführt haben.

An das

Auswärtige Amt,

Berlin.

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P. 1 Japan P. 3 Japan

Auch die amtlichen japanischen Stellen haben in letzter Zeit Ansätze zu einer gewissen Aktivierung der Südseepolitik erkennen lassen, indem sie einige Massnahmen ergriffen, die gleichzeitig den im allgemeinen innerjapanischen Reformprogramm verankerten Bestrebungen um eine Verstärkung und einheitliche Zusammenfassung der Aussenhandelspolitik entgegenkommen sollten.

So wurde im hiesigen Aussenministerium unlängst ein Südseereferat eingerichtet, dessen Aufgabe es ist, die Arbeit sämtlicher mit Südseefragen befasster Regierungsstellen einheitlich zu leiten.

Ferner wurde der neu ernannte japanische Gesandte im Haag und frühere Leiter der Ostasien-Abteilung des Aussenministeriums Kuwashima vor Antritt seines neuen Postens zunächst auf eine Erkundungsreise nach Niederländisch-Indien entsandt. Seine Tätigkeit daselbst wird sich kaum auf eine blosse höfliche Fühlungnahme mit den niederländisch-indischen Behörden oder auf den Versuch einer Beschleunigung der japanisch - niederländisch-indischen Handelsvertragsverhandlungen beschränken. Es spricht vielmehr manches für die Annahme, dass Kuwashima bei seiner Rückkehr nach Japan auf Grund der an Ort und Stelle gewonnenen Eindrücke den hiesigen Stellen Vorschläge für eine wirksamere Verfolgung der verschiedenen japanischen Südseuprojekte unterbreiten wird, um dann mit seinem Eintreffen im Haag gewissermassen eine neue aktiverere Phase der japanisch - niederländischen Beziehungen einzuleiten.

Oberster Leitsatz für die japanische Politik soll hierbei nach wie vor - dies wird bei jeder Gelegenheit betont - die ausschliesslich friedliche wirtschaftliche Erschliessung und Durchdringung lebenswichtiger Rohstoff- und Absatzgebiete in engem, freundschaftlichen Einvernehmen mit der Niederländischen Regierung sein.

Über

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Über diese schrittweise Zielsetzung der Regierung scheint Hioguro Sakurai, ein Abgeordneter aus den Reihen der Minseito, die den Südseeffragen besondere Aufmerksamkeit schenkt, im Verlaufe einer Reichstagsinterpellation dieser Tage voreilig hinausgeschossen zu sein, indem er eine Dauerpachtung Holländisch-Neuguineas und der benachbarten kleinen Inseln durch Japan und den Abschluss eines japanisch-niederländischen Nichtangriffspaktes empfahl. In seiner zurückhaltenden Antwort sagte Premier- und Aussenminister Hayashi Prüfung dieser Vorschläge zu und nahm Gelegenheit, nochmals zu betonen, dass Japan keinerlei territoriale Ziele - sei es in Niederländisch-Indien oder auf den Philippinen - verfolge.

Im Verlauf derselben Debatte kam Hayashi schliesslich noch kurz auf die australische Einwanderungsfrage zu sprechen und stellte eine Regierungsinitiative auch in dieser Richtung in Aussicht.

So wurden vor dem Reichstag und damit vor dem Forum der japanischen und Welt-Öffentlichkeit sämtliche Fragen, die im Begriff "Drang nach dem Süden" zusammengefasst sind, nacheinander angeschnitten, wobei erneut zum Ausdruck kam, dass Japan in der friedlichen Durchdringung und Erschliessung der schwach besiedelten und bereits weitgehend von japanischer Arbeitskraft und japanischem Kapital erfassten Rohstoffgebiete der Südsee einen der natürlichssten Wege zur Befriedigung seiner nationalen Bedürfnisse im Sinne einer gerechten Verteilung der Rohstoffquellen und Besiedelungsgebiete der Welt sieht.

Etwas wie eine kalte Dusche wirkte allerdings eine am Morgen nach der erwähnten Reichstagsdebatte aus dem Haag eingegangene Domeimeldung, wonach die zuständigen niederländischen Regierungsstellen sich zu den japanischen Vorschlägen dahin geäussert haben sollten, dass der Abschluss eines Nichtangriffs-

paktes

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paktes der Gesamthaltung und der politischen Tradition der Niederlande widerspreche, dass aber die Niederländische Regierung im Rahmen der von ihr stets aufrecht erhaltenen Politik der offenen Tür bereit sei, japanische Anträge auf Erwerbung von Rechten in Neu-Guinea ernstlich in Erwägung zu ziehen, falls sie sich als gesetzmässig erwiesen.

gez. von Dirksen.

上
大
使
館

東京一九三七年（昭和十二年）三月八日

J.
N.v.
405/
37

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37

政治的報告

内容、日本、南洋政策、殖民化

Def Doc. 1311

内容、日本、南洋政策、積極化
最近数年間、行ひた外交政策、プロクラム、ラボ、ヤタ演説或
六議会、討論の日本、南洋政策、問題が大き、暗ニカルカ
或ヒハヌキユリキタ言ヒ迴レテ提出サナイコトハ一度モナカフタソノ
タムニハ日本ニ取フテ生命ニ關ル事、重大十原群販賣及ビ特
民糾察、外既ニ海軍、威信カ左ウケタデアタ海軍半周
知、如ク陸軍、大陸ニ於九目標ニ付シテ日本、南洋ニ於九
平和的十抗張、タメニ充分十擁護、必要ヲ対抗セテキル
最近「ワニシト」條約の滿期テ、効力ヲ失フタリ英國及びアチ
カーナ強大十新ラニ海軍之備、日本ヲ安ニサセアキルコト、世界
に於ケル原料分配、問題カジユネーカ、委員會加集会レ
ト共ニ又フト久、殖民地、原料問題、自大体、取り上ケルコト
ト共ニ決定的十段階ニヘラコト又最後ニ長引キタル日本ト蘭
印、貿易協定交渉、今ナ何等満足ス、最取戻、成黑ニ
達シテナヨトコレラノコト見レバ、現在、議会が進傳統的ナ或
六學問的十关心以上モナラ南洋問題ニ擇ケテキルコト。

日本ノ政府ナニ局モ亦最近、南洋政策ヲ或ハ方法ノ實地化シヨウトスル契機ヲキレテキル即ナ尙局ノ二・三、处置ヲ請ひタ加シ、同時ニ日本内政上、一般的改良計画ニワカル事、先づ貿易政策、強化ト統一の集中ヘ、努力ニ邁合ス可也。

No. 1

大蔵館

東京一九三七年（昭和十二年）三月八日

政治的報告

内客　日本、南洋政策、領地化

最近数年間、行方外交政策、アフロ・タウルス、モーリヤ、演説或
議會、討論で日本、南洋政策、問題が少しも暗示せられ
或は及ぼさざりか、吾に提出せられて一度モナカフランツ、

タヌハ日本、取テ生命之間へ程重大、軍隊販賣及び轉
民糾合、外ニ既ニ海軍、國信以左ウケル、アフロ・タウルス、海軍半島
知、如ク、軍事、大陸ニ於ク心目釋ニ被矣、日本、南洋二種志
平野の大増長、タヌハ充實、擁護、阿爾テア对抗、其事。

最近、ワシントン條約の満期を幼少ラ夫ク、英國及ヒアリ
カ、強大、新之、海軍、備か日本ヲト安ニせしモルコト、世界
於ク、牽制分配、問題が、逐々、奪取、會合、集合、
ト共ニ、之、殖民地、屬地問題、其大体の、取引、凡て
ト莫ニ決定的、手段、入ラシト又の、前、長引キタル日本、蘭
印、貿易協定、交渉、今、何等、構成、モ最古ノ成墨、
達シテ、在、見出、現在、議會の、唯傳統的、或
ヒ、實業的、圖心以上、モ、南洋問題、攝かテモルニト、
驚、エリ。

日本ノ政府、吉高、而、取進、南洋政策、或、方法、領地化
シ、シテスル、契機アリテ、忠即テ、吉高、ニ、處置ヲ講じ
タガ、之、同時、日本内政上、一般の、改良計画ニ、アシテ
平洋貿易政策、藩紀本統的、往來、ヘ、努力ニ適合、可也
トナリ。

No. 1

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No. 2

左紙ニテ最近当地、外務省ニ南洋局が設置サレ、ソノ任務ハ
南洋問題ニ關係スル總て、政府内、部署、仕事ヲ統一的
指導スルニトニアル。

更ニヘイク駆在、新任日本公使以前外務省、東亞局、
局長ウタ川島ハ新任任務ニ着ケテ先ア蘭印ヘ調査旅
行ニ派遣セタ、彼、其處テノシ勧ハはシア蘭印當局ト、軍事
儀礼上、接觸モトシ。又日本トア蘭印、貿易協定交渉
促進企テニ上手ナイテアラウヒレロ次、帝ニ取ル方か確カト、即チ
川島ハ日本、歸申シタ、現在ニ得タ印象从フ基ニ色ナ日本、
南洋ニ於乞討画ヲ更ニ有効ニ續行スルタニ当地、政府高官
ニ提案オヌシテアロウ然ニテ彼ハヘイクニ到着シテ後日本ト
オランダニ關係、新ニヨリ積極的手段皆ニ導入スル如ク
トコリ、諱日本、政策ニトワツキ上命題ハ何時、機會ニモ強調
サレテ先カ以前ト同様オランダニ政府ト、堅密対親善的一
致、下ニ於乞非常ニ重要土庫封及ヒ販賣区域、全ノ平和的
十經濟的開拓及ヒ港湾アフル等ニ及ル、民政完、代議士ア南
洋問題特ニ注目シ先鋒井兵五郎ハ最近、或ル議會演
說六ノ政府、漸進的十目的設定ヲ名ニ過ヤテ、來リ越エテシテ
格ニ見エル、即ナ彼ア蘭領ニヨリモアトヨニ近接スルヤサイ島
々ヲ日本加恒久的ニ保リ受ケ日本トオランダ下、間ニ不可侵條
約ヲ結フ、斯ニ提案オヌシテアロウ、首相兼外相、林ハ之ニ對
スル控ヘ日十合併ニ於乞ニコト、提案ヲ吟味スルコト約レ更
ニヨリ機會ニ日本ハ蘭領印度ニヨリ「フィリピン」ニセヨ何等ノ領
土の目的ヲ追究スルモカナシトモウ一度強調シタ。

在ホーリー島近傍地、外務省ニ南洋局の設置せしソ、任務ハ
南洋問題ニ關係スル總務テ、政府内、部署、仕事ヲ統一的
指導スルニシテ。

更ニヘレバ、駐在、新任日本公使以前、外務省、東京局、
局長ウツ川島ハ新任任務ニ當、前二者ノ蘭印ヘ調査二旅
行ニ派遣セシム、其處アリ活動ハ洪吉蘭印書局ト單ニ
儀式上、接觸アモトセバ、又日本ト蘭印、貿易協定交渉
往進ラ金ナニ事ナシテアラウムレシ次、稀ニ取ル方か確カナ。即
川島ハ日本、蘇聯アラ、現在ハ印度ニ其基ニハヨリナ日本、
南洋ニ於乞計画ア更ニ有効ニ續行スルタニ当地、政府書局
ニ接寧キタス、テ、トロウ然ニテ彼ハアヘグニ到着シテ後日本ト
オランダノ關係、新シヨリ種種的十段階ヲ導入スルモア
ト、クル第日本ノ政策ニトフニ至る命題ハ何時、機會ニモ強調
せしテ本ルが此前ト同じホセオランダノ政府ト、駕帝室ヲ親善の一
致、下ニ於乞非常ニ重要ノ原持乃ニ貿易已成、全ノ平和的
ナ經濟的開拓及ビ漁業アル望ニシテル。民政完、代議士ニ南
洋問題、特ニ重視其先期事件、即ハ最初ノ、或ル議會演
說大半、政府、將進附日附註定ト名ト置ケラ、來ク熱シテ
精ニ見エル。即ナ彼ハ蘭領、ニヨリセレトコニ宣擇スルヤサリ烏
ニテ日本が恒久的ニヨリ掌握日本トオランダ間ニ不可侵條
約ヲ結ブ事ニ提案アシタナカワリ、首相兼外相、林ハラニ付
スル權ヘ且十倍合併ニ於キコノ提案アリ味ヌルコトヲ約シ更
ニニノ機會ニ日本ハ蘭領印度ニシテクルビンニセヨ何等ノ鐘
土の目的ヲ追究スルモノナニトモウ一度強調シタ。

Def. 190c. 13 11

ノ、討議、間ニ林ハ最後ニオーストラリア、移民問題ニ簡單ニ言及シコト方向ニ於キニ政府がアリテナシウラ取合トヲ約束シタ。

斯ク如ク議会ヲ前ニシテソレ故ニ日本ト世界ニ分開、市場ニ南方ヘ、進出トヨフ概念ニ集結セテキル全問題が次第觸レシタ。ソ、津日本ハ人口、稀薄ナ既ニ日本ノ勞働力ト日本、資本ヲ広汎ニ捉ヘシテ先南洋、原料地域ヲ平和的ニ渗透シ開拓スルヲ古里ノ原産地ト殖民地帶ヲ正當ニ分割スルトヨフ意図、於ケ日本、國民的必要ヲ満足サセルタメ、壘堅自然的方法、ワドニ見做ストヨリ改カズアリシタカアタ。

乍然上述ノ議会討論カアフタ御朝ツヘイク等、次、希ナ同盟情報ハ冷水落シタ務ニ作用レタコ、情報ニヨリ日本、提安第二対スルオ立場、答ハ不可侵條約諱語ハオ立タレ、全般的態度ト政治的傳統ニ矛盾スルト、併シ「立場」政府ハ何時モ保持シテ毛門開放、政策、件内ニ於ケテニヨリ二種別判別取得、日本、申込ミラシカ清律的ニ妥当テル限り眞歛ニ赤慮也スル用意アル事ナシ述ヘキモアラタ

フラン・デイルセン（署名）

No. 3

Def. 190c. 13 11

2. 討議會二林の最後三ヶ月スよりヤレ、殖民問題は簡單
三言及シコト一方向ニ於テモ政府が不思議ナクシテ取リトヨリ來
シタ.

斯ク如ク議會ヲ前ニシテソシ故ニ日本ト吾爾ノ公開ノ席場テ
南方ヘ進軍トヨア概念ニ連絡サシテ是ニ全問題が次第觸
セタソ、深日本ハ人口、稀薄薄十既ニ日本ト之勞働カト日本、
資本が在汎ニ提ヘシナル南洋、稟耕地國ヲ平和的ニ満足
シ間接元トヨア事界、稟耕產地ト殖民地帶ヲ正當三分割
入ルトヨア意味ニ於テ日本、國民的必要ヲ満足サセリナメ、
是堅自然的方法、一ワトヨ見微久下ニシテ改憲ノ原由ヲシ
タリナツタ

乍然上述ノ議會討論が高麗王朝ヘシテ以降、次第
同體情報ニ冷水ヲ浴セシキ作風レタコ、情報ニシハ日本
提案第二社不ウオシナム事例、會ハ不可侵條約諱結ハ
ナシケレ、全般的能シ度ト政治的傳統ニ矛盾スル事
オラホト政府ハ何時モシテ某ノ事半門戸開放、政策ノ件内
於テ高麗ニシテ於ケル權利取得、日本、中華ニシテシカ
法律的ニ毎當アル限り無欽ニ才慮也スル事萬アルコトヲ
述ベ是ノアタマタ

アスギン、デイビッドセント（四書五

No. 3

①

四) 四川(重庆+吉安) 市場調査

貿易大通器

J. N. 405/37

出荷量

18/11 - 1

新嘉坡、香港、上海、天津、南京、杭州、

日本、印度、英國、法國、德國、俄羅斯、

美國、巴西、智利、秘魯、哥倫比亞、

委內瑞拉、厄瓜多爾、巴拿馬、哥斯大黎

加、尼加拉瓜、薩爾瓦多、洪都拉斯、

尼加拉瓜、哥斯大黎加、薩爾瓦多、洪都

拉斯、尼加拉瓜、哥斯大黎加、薩爾瓦多、洪都

拉斯、尼加拉瓜、哥斯大黎加、薩爾瓦多、洪都

拉斯、尼加拉瓜、哥斯大黎加、薩爾瓦多、洪都

2

丁巳年夏月
王國維書

文選二
日本國上一
般改定
計画

左様ニシテ近づキ。又洋船ガ二隻、日本船一隻、

1920-1921
Sept 15

更ノハシタ駐在、新任日本公使、以前外務省、東西同

詔書に於て御内閣の事務を司る所は、其處にて、内閣ハ、決して、蘭

3

定交渉、遂道、全ノルマントンノアラムシテ
本ノ馬、方加羅ノソ、シテ、
ノハナニ、日本ヘ帰ツテ、政在ヲ得
シテ、即キ其ニ、

卷之二十一

日本の後、日本ト打合せ、
日本ト打合せ、日本ト打合せ、

此後，我便開始研究
#HKAIR

1. $\text{N}_2 + \text{O}_2 \rightleftharpoons 2\text{NO}$
2. $\text{H}_2 + \text{Cl}_2 \rightleftharpoons 2\text{HCl}$
3. $\text{C}_2\text{H}_2 + \text{Cl}_2 \rightleftharpoons \text{C}_2\text{H}_3\text{Cl}$
4. $\text{CH}_4 + \text{Cl}_2 \rightleftharpoons \text{CH}_3\text{Cl} + \text{HCl}$

又如《周易》之卦象，皆以自然之物象为喻，如乾卦之“天行健，君子以自强不息”，坤卦之“地势坤，君子以厚德载物”，等等。

4

卷之二

ヨリ提安がす吟味して之を約二更に日本八蘭領印度ニセキ
フイリツヒニセキは等々領土的目的を追究スルモハナイトヨ
モウ一度強調毛シ

斯，如讀今之故日本一國，亦猶

左方へ進出ト云々機知を盡絶せしも全圖近づく

ト日本一の本テ、広汎、技術、材料也或

是中國人對外貿易的主導者

此處故入トニルが改メテモ「モジル」スルアリ。

上述、講会討論がアツ々翌朝、ハクレ登一次、林同盟情

日本、拉手サニ付入、大ニシテ、シテ、ハ、不可シキ事無シ。

Ref/loc 1311 - 5

(σ_{max}) $\leq \sigma_{\text{min}}$

オーバーラップする全数を計算するためには、各個の確率を乗算する。
各個の確率は、各個の確率を乗算する。

⑤

Russia

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