


CONFIDENTIAL



Minister was, in addition to his other duties:
 Member of the Council of Ministers.
 Member of the Privy Council.
 Member of the Association for Promoting Cooperation
 and Harmony.
 The Manchurians, Vice Ministers and the President
 of the General Board were Japanese.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

RESTRICTED
O.P.D., G.S.

file

OPD 091 France (3 Apr 46)

22 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE:
(ATTN: Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Lory)
SUBJECT: French Liaison Mission in Tokyo

*Memo to
Nav Dept 4/25/46
JL: HL*

1. Reference is made to the letter from the Department of State to the Operations Division, dated 3 April 1946, on the subject of the French Liaison Mission in Tokyo.

2. Attention is invited to radio CM-IN-4310, dated 20 April 1946 from the Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces, Pacific, which establishes clearance for General Pechkoff and his party and recommends water transportation.

3. It is requested that the Operations Division be furnished the names and positions of the members of the Mission and approximate sailing date, in order that General MacArthur may be informed.

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

R. L. VITTRUP
FOR R. L. VITTRUP
Colonel, GSC

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/4-2246

CS/VJ

4-2246

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DAR

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to the Aide-
740.00119 Control Japan / 4-2246
 Mémoire from the British Embassy dated April 22, 1946
 and to the Memorandum from the Department dated July 3,
 1946, on the question of supplying food and accommo-
 dations and free yen to British nationals on the
 staff of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

The War Department has informed the Department of
 State that existing directives are sufficiently clear
 to assure the provision of food and accommodations for
 non-United States nationals attached to the Staff of
 the Supreme Commander. Payment should be arranged for
 dollar costs of food and accommodations as set forth
 in the Department's note of August 3, 1946.

A method

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/4-2246

740.00119 Control

(Japan) / 4-2246

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[Signature]

[Signature]

Dis

- 2 -

A method whereby free yen is provided to British nationals on the Staff of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was explained in the Department's Memorandum of July 3, 1946.

Department of State,

Washington September 18 1946

A true copy of the signed original.

SEP 17 1946 P.M.

RS/M

JK:RHWhitman:cmh 9-13-46

JA *HL* BC *DL* A-H *HL*

Blw

NO2728

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Bombay, India, April 22, 1946

RECEIVED
JAN 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DCLN

UNRESTRICTED

SUBJECT: Transmission of Newspaper Article
Criticizing General MacArthur

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1946 APR 25 PM 2
TELETYPE BRANCH

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

The Consul General has the honor to refer to his despatch No. 2720 of April 18, 1946, entitled "Transmission of Editorial from the Times of India Criticizing General MacArthur", and to enclose copies of a strongly depreciatory news article on the actions of General MacArthur and his staff by Mr. A. Noyes Thomas, the Times of India correspondent in Tokyo. The article occupied a prominent place on the front page of this morning's issue of the Times of India. The headline of the article, "Refusal to be Hamstrung by General MacArthur", is indicative of the general tenor of the report.

Mr. Thomas is a correspondent of the News of the World, a London paper which specializes in sensational news. Many of his despatches, such as those on Indonesia, have been rather sensational and provocative in tone. The despatch transmitted herewith is typical of his work as a correspondent.

Enclosure: *attm*

Article, Times of India,
April 22, 1946, in quintuplicate

800

J. Jefferson Jones, III/mk
Original and hectograph to Department
Copy to: American Mission, New Delhi
American Embassy, London
Office of Acting U.S. Political
Adviser to Supreme Commander
for Allied Powers, Tokyo.

DCR - NE Unit

Form with fields for name, title, and date, and a stamp at the bottom that reads UNRESTRICTED.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) /
4-2246

MAY 16 1946

CS/A

JLR

Enclosure to Despatch No. 2728 of April 22, 1946 from Howard Donovan, American Consul General, Bombay, India, entitled "Transmission of Newspaper Article Criticizing General MacArthur".

TIMES OF INDIA

April 22, 1946.

Refusal To Be Hamstrung By General MacArthur

TRIAL OF STRENGTH INEVITABLE IN ALLIED COUNCIL

From A. NOYES THOMAS "The Times of India" Correspondent

TOKIO, April 21.

THE storm which has gathered over Japan during the past week as the result of a riotous meeting of the Allied Council on Friday seems likely to break or to blow over within the next month.

If these first clouds to darken the hitherto ostensibly bright first spring of General Douglas MacArthur's vaunted "one-man" military Government do not blow over, it will probably be because the Council will insist during its next one or two fortnightly meetings on fulfilling, in its own chosen way, its function as an advisory body and refuse to be hamstrung by the Supreme Commander.

If the storm does blow over—and this seems improbable at present—it will almost certainly be because the Council finds itself outmanoeuvred and rendered ineffectual while General MacArthur continues to rule unadvised and, if possible, uncriticised. Whatever the outcome, a trial of strength seems inevitable.

The Supreme Commander has publicly expressed his desire to make a success of the Commission and the Council and to obtain from them helpful advice. But also he has admitted that he does not agree with the appointment of his advisors by the four Powers, which include his own Government. He has been unequivocal in pointing out gratuitously that the Council is not in Japan for the purpose of dividing his supreme authority. And he demonstrated publicly during last week's sessions of the Council that he is prepared to be ruthless in his efforts to assure that the Council functions as he sees fit and not in the way desired by the majority of its members.

TAMMANY TACTICS

From prominent Americans here—most of them incidentally are frank in admitting their disgust with the conduct of their fellow countrymen at the Council meeting I have been able to raise only one excuse, and a lame one at that, for the introduction of Tammany tactics into international affairs. If General MacArthur is publicly criticised, they say he has the undeniable right to defend himself publicly in any way he pleases.

This, however, does not justify what can only be described as an attempt to ridicule the representatives of the great powers and to harangue a meeting of the Council. Neither does it alter the fact that what was attempted was a boorish fashion might have been achieved.

the peace in Japan. An attempt is being made, it is suggested, to undermine General MacArthur's authority. Last week's events, it is said, will lead to a repetition in Japan of the chaos arising from the divided control of Germany.

COUNCIL'S REAL AIM

The fact is that up to now there has not been any suggestion or hint by any member of the Council for Japan that there is any other intention than to seek information and to offer advice. Even the statement which raised the present storm—it dealt with the question of whether or not the purging of undesirable Japanese from Public office is being successfully executed—is claimed by the Russian authors, and believed by most observers, to have been rendered unacceptable to the hyper-sensitive General MacArthur, largely through language difficulties and translation misunderstandings. In fact all Russian items on the agenda have now been readily and voluntarily reworded by the Russians themselves to avoid the possibility of further testy outbursts by the Supreme Commander.

UNJUST SUGGESTION

It is not a secret that there are those who do not wish General MacArthur and his regime success. But to pin such motives at the present time on to the new-born Council for Japan, a body properly constituted by agreement between the four Powers under the Moscow declaration, is considered by many here, including numerous Americans, to be not only unjust but distinctly dangerous.

Certain traits of that magnificent soldier, General MacArthur, in his role of politician-statesman-administrator—high panjandrum, should now be recognised. Facts shown that so far he has been intolerant of what he interprets as interference with his so-called "Allied" policy for Japan. He has promptly and sometimes rudely rebuffed almost every piece of advice so far offered to him from any quarter, including Washington. He now apparently denies violently the right of anyone to criticise, far less censure, him without the risk of being subjected to indignities and held up to ridicule.

FRIDAY'S SESSION

The meeting of the Allied Council for Japan on Friday suffered from a severe hang-over, said an earlier message. Excesses of last Wednesday's riotous session were the cause. Gen. MacArthur, through his technical spokesman, Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney, tried to

time to hamstring the functioning of the Council thus avoiding public discussion, not to mention criticism, of his so-called "Allied" Administration of Japan. And he failed lamentably. The Council, all except the American delegation, tried to establish its right to conduct its business in the way it wished. It succeeded notably—in the face of protracted attempts by the U. S. Chairman, Brig. Gen. Marquat, to evade the issue and avoid a vote.

Laughter and loud groans greeted the re-appearance of loquacious Gen. Whitney, who, although not a member of the Council, precipitated as a witness at last Wednesday's session. On that occasion, he had mouthed, with much melodramatic gesticulating, a hour's long statement which claimed to be Gen. MacArthur's reply to the Council's first criticism—from the Russian member—but was promptly termed "filibuster" by American reporters.

UNNECESSARY TIRADE

Attempts by the British Commonwealth and Russian members, mildly supported by the Chinese, to interrupt an obviously unnecessary tirade and have the facts submitted in writing was unsuccessful. Brig. Gen. Whitney said Gen. MacArthur intended to make the situation clear "even if it takes all summer" and continued his reading of facts and statistics which already were common knowledge.

On Friday, the British Commonwealth and Russian members, again mildly supported by the Chinese, were determined to ensure that they would not again be subjected to similar tactics. They proposed that they should be empowered to control the manner in which evidence should be presented, the time it should occupy and if desired in writing.

Called by the Chairman, Brig. Gen. Whitney carried on from where he left off on Wednesday. Judging by his oratorical acrobatics and by his glares, smiles and innuendos, he might have been delivering a continuation of his piece of two days ago. But here, instead, was an unexpected defence of the "American way of life." Gen. MacArthur was a "simple American", he declared, "and very sincere". He was a "believer in goodwill, good brotherhood and co-operation."

But Brig. Gen. Whitney this time was not allowed to continue for long. He managed to carry on in the face of considerable opposition after he had referred to the raking up of sensationalism for the world's press. But when, purple in the face, he now began to talk about totalitarianism, he compelled a halt.

The British Commonwealth member asked to be enlightened on the purpose of the talk. The Russian delegate inquired quietly, "Can someone tell me why Brig. Gen. Whitney is here again?"

Brig. Gen. Whitney sat down almost immediately.

A debate followed as to whether the Council should have the right to regulate its own business and control the methods of presenting evidence.

Only the United States delegate—the Chairman—held out against this proposal. He asserted his Government would not agree to such a procedure. He fought long and hard to evade a vote obviously desired by the other three delegations. The proposal, however, was eventually placed on record in the minutes.

argued against the American press (apparently alone) the Japanese, without int

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PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
MESSAGE:

Collect

Charge Department:

Department of State

RESTRICTED

Charge to

Washington

RESTRICTED

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

APR 27 1946

12 noon

276

Tokyo

INFO: WAR DEPT CHIEF OF STAFF
For ~~Acheson~~, Political Adviser

Netherlands Mission now in Batavia awaiting per-
mission proceed Tokyo. ~~Expects~~ to occupy Netherlands
Legation property Tokyo. DEPT will therefore take
no action on URTEL 186 APR 23 pending further comment
or request from you. *740.00119 Control (Japan) 4-23-46*

*Acheson
acting
(JEP)*

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) 740.00119 Control (Japan)
/4-2346
CS/WJ 4-2346

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DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

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TELEGRAPH
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4/25/46 *WB*

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APR 27 1946

JMA

- This is a despatch I wrote in Tokyo in April 1946 which I hauled out of the files a while ago because it seemed that present thinking was coming to coincide pretty closely with views I had expressed then. (I came in for quite a little criticism over it at the time.) Marshall Green saw it and sent it to Bond and Davies. You, and possibly Mr. Butterworth, might be interested in glancing at it, though I wouldn't waste much time on it.

RAF ✓

NA
Mr. Frary

Congratulations on
being an unhonored
prophet.

SD

VWB.

You may be interested some time in reading the summary of this despatch, as well as JKE's comments upon it.

It was written by R.A.F. at Tokyo in April 1946.

mg.

~~RAF~~
~~MG~~

Attached read - it
entirely - with much interest.
It seems to me an ad-
mirable statement of our true
objectives - Japan - this

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ~~HB~~ ~~JKP~~ ~~JGV~~

DATE: May 15, 1946

FROM : JKE

SUBJECT: Tokyo's despatch "Reappraisal of United States Security Interests and Policies in Regard to Japan"

Mr. Fearey has written a thoughtful and valuable memorandum worth reading in its entirety. A report of this nature highlights the regrettable fact that in view of the reorganization of the Tokyo office, we may expect no more such frank and critical political analyses from our officers in Japan. Henceforth we must depend for interpretation and analysis upon reports written or passed by SCAP.

The theme of Mr. Fearey's memorandum is that Japan's potential threat to the United States does not lie in the recrudescence of an independent form of militant nationalism and expansionism but rather in an alliance of Japan with a potential enemy of the United States, the Soviet Union. He believes that U.S. basic policies for Japan and the course of occupation thus far have neglected this fact.

Mr. Fearey is quite ready to admit that, in spite of immigration restrictions and other unfavorable factors, there has always been more good will in Japan for the United States than for any other nation. He further states that "seven months of occupation have witnessed the revival of popularity and prestige in Japan to a point if not above at least not far below the peak of the 'twenties'." Furthermore he emphasizes the weakness of the Communist Party in Japan and the deep antagonism held by most Japanese for the Soviet Union. Nevertheless he feels that changing circumstances, particularly adverse economic conditions, could completely reverse the present pro-American, anti-Communist and anti-Soviet tendencies. His apprehension of this possibility leads to certain recommendations:

- 1) A concerted effort to improve the conduct of the misbehaving minority of the occupying forces

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- 2) Readmission

JUL 18 1946

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F.W. 740.00119 Control (Japan) / 4-2346 Confidential File

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- 2 -

- 2) Readmission to public office at a later stage of the occupation of persons excluded by the January 4 "purge" directive, not believed to merit the title of "active exponents of militant nationalism"
- 3) Development of closer cultural, educational, and tourist exchanges between the U.S. and Japan
- 4) Minimum necessary restriction of Japanese peacetime industry
- 5) Reduction of American-Japanese trade barriers
- 6) Maintenance of adequate American armed forces in the western Pacific and elsewhere to prevent Japan's domination by another power.

Mr. Fearey goes so far, in discussing Japan's future status, as to propose that Japan should be permitted "to build up defensive fortifications and forces rather than to commit itself to remain disarmed indefinitely".

There is little argument with the six suggestions noted above. The carrying out of 2) might involve some practical difficulties in the choice of individuals to be exonerated. It may be noted that no one expects the "purge" directive to remain in force beyond the actual military occupation period.

The sections of the report dealing with Japan's trade relations are particularly illuminating and deserve consideration.

As Mr. Fearey himself admits, it is unfortunate that questions of "Balance of power" need to be discussed at a time when the United Nations is being so carefully nurtured. I believe it is also unfortunate that propaganda should be permitted or encouraged that a Soviet-American war is inevitable and that Japan will be a future battleground. If, as Walter Lippmann suggests, Germany is profiting from a Soviet-British rivalry over her, it would be most unfortunate if the spectacle arose of Soviet-American rivalry over Japan.

We should

- 3 -

We should by every means encourage the strengthening of cultural and commercial ties between the United States and Japan and should endeavor to retain and stimulate the good-will still existing for us among the Japanese. Our best approach should continue to be one of positive aid in the education and democratization of Japan but not one of attempts to set the Japanese against the Russians. There are too many places in the world where the issues between ourselves and the Soviets are graver and more explosive.

The memorandum concludes with the statement that the United States should seek its security and that of the Pacific independently, but by methods which do not in any way impair the achievement of Great Power amity and the development of a working system of collective security. One can agree completely with this statement and with the underlining, which is Mr. Fearey's.

JA: JKEmmerson:mp

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, Japan, April 23, 1946

No. 384

Secret

Secret

RECEIVED
MAY 2 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~DRF~~
DCA
File
8-20-46

SUBJECT: Reappraisal of United States Security Interests and Policies in Regard to Japan

*This came to CR unclassified
A-32 from Tokyo - April 24
Classified it as secret
Mr. Low - J. H. released
War & Navy
Ch*

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1946 APR 25 AM 3 35
RECORDS BRANCH

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-2346

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum "Reappraisal of United States Security Interests and Policies in Regard to Japan" prepared by Mr. Fearey of the staff of this Mission prior to my return to Japan but delayed in typing due to shortage of clerical help.

The memorandum is summarized in its opening paragraphs.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 1 - 1946
DIVISION OF FOREIGN REPORTING SERVICES

Enclosure: *att-1118-*

✓ Copy of Memorandum dated April 17, 1946

Original, hectograph and 2 carbon copies to Department

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RAFearey:ms

JUL 18 1946

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 384 dated April 23, 1946
from the Office of the United States Political Adviser
Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Reappraisal of United
States Security Interests and Policies in Regard to Japan".

MEMORANDUM

April 17, 1946

REAPPRAISAL OF UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS
AND POLICIES IN REGARD TO JAPAN

Summary The fundamental objective of the United States with respect to Japan, toward which all policy should in the last analysis be directed, is the future peace and security of the United States and of the world. It is important to consider, therefore, whether preoccupation with the current programs of Japanese democratization and demilitarization may not have diverted attention from other, probably over the long run more important aspects of a realistically conceived United States security policy toward Japan, namely, future Japanese economic conditions, and the tendency of the Japanese in future to align themselves politically, economically and sentimentally with the United States or with a potential enemy of the United States.

It should not be assumed, as the basic policy papers for Japan and the course of the occupation thus far indicate it may have been assumed, that the Japanese military threat will revive, if it revives, in substantially the same form as before, i.e., through the efforts of an ambitious group of military fanatics to launch an independent program of Far Eastern or world aggression. Unless methods of warfare change so drastically in future as to necessitate a complete re-evaluation of the war potentials of the various nations it would seem inconceivable that Japan, surrounded, with the hoped-for unification of China, by three far more powerful nations than itself, could, by itself and of its own efforts, again presume with reasonable prospect of success to embark on a course of military expansion.

It seems clear, therefore, that Japan exists as a potential threat to United States and world security only as the ally of some other, stronger power, and that the United States will be protecting itself from an imagined threat while ignoring a real one if it fails to take account of that fact. The means by which the United States may hope to prevent the possible alliance of Japan at some future date with a more powerful potential enemy of the United States would seem to be, first, to endeavor to assure Japan economic opportunities sufficient to enable it to maintain standards of living which will not drive it into the arms of such a power and, second, to endeavor to align Japan in future, against no nation, but securely with the United States. The importance of a viable economy to the continued peaceful disposition of the Japanese

people

people having been long recognized, attention is directed toward factors which might tend to align Japan in years to come primarily with the United States or with the Soviet Union, China or Great Britain.

The current attitudes of the Japanese people toward the American, Soviet, Chinese and British peoples are of course one such factor. Examination of this question leads to the conclusion that seven months of occupation have witnessed the revival of American popularity and prestige in Japan to a point if not above at least not far below the peak of the 'twenties. While Americans are regarded with respect and even liking, the Chinese are still looked down upon, with no strong feelings either of liking or animosity, the British are little liked nor greatly respected, but are not hated, and the Russians are strongly feared and hated. Regarding future Japanese-American, Soviet, Chinese and British trade relations, while there is at least the possibility of the revival of a sizeable export trade to the United States, depending on United States trade policies, American exports to Japan are likely to be only a fraction of former levels. Trade with China may be large, that with Great Britain and the Soviet Union probably small to insignificant as in the past. Japanese political ideologies and institutions in normal circumstances are likely to have far more in common with the American, British, and possibly, Chinese systems than with Soviet doctrines.

Present indications, in short, all point to the maintenance of a friendlier attitude within Japan in future toward the United States than toward any other power. It must be recognized, however, that in changing circumstances offering sufficient provocation current pro-American, pro-democratic and anti-Soviet, anti-communist tendencies could be completely reversed. Persistently adverse economic conditions, particularly if it were felt that the United States through its demilitarization or commercial policies was largely responsible for those conditions, or the withdrawal of American forces from the western Pacific, would be the likeliest causes of such a change. Current resistance to communism is strong, but many of the factors responsible for this resistance are in process of dissolution, and balanced against them are a number of inherent characteristics of the Japanese, their amenability to discipline and centralized authority and the elements of communalism in their present mode of life, which render the adoption of the current Soviet version, a native Japanese version, or some other form of communism entirely possible at some future time in favorable circumstances. But irrespective of whether the Japanese succumb to communism or not, even a confirmedly democratic-capitalistic Japan if impelled by acute economic distress or national insecurity, possibly combined with Soviet pressure, would be likely to forego

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- 3 -

the friendship of the United States to align itself with a potential enemy of the United States if it believed it might thereby overcome the difficulties facing it.

A number of steps, the greater part for long-range rather than immediate implementation, may be proposed to prevent such an eventuality: (1) a concerted effort to improve the conduct of the misbehaving minority among the occupation forces; (2) readmission at a later stage of the occupation of a significant number of persons scarcely meriting the title "active exponents of militant nationalism", in a large proportion of cases men of outstanding ability and of pro-American viewpoint, excluded by the January 4 purge directive; (3) development of closer cultural, educational and tourist relationships and exchanges between the United States and Japan; (4) minimum necessary restriction of Japanese peacetime industry; (5) reduction of American-Japanese trade barriers; and (6) the maintenance of American armed forces in the western Pacific and elsewhere of adequate strength, and, necessarily, backed by an adequate popular determination, to prevent the domination of Japan by another power.

American foreign policy today wisely and fortunately is based upon the principles of continuing friendship among the Great Powers and the development of a system of collective security under the UNO. In no circumstances should our Japan policies be of a type to impair the success of these larger aims. The proposed measures if properly implemented, however, would not have that effect, and, pending the establishment of effective security arrangements capable of controlling the great as well as the small powers, would seem a logical and an important element of United States security planning. End Summary

I.

The fundamental objective of the United States with regard to Japan (SWNCC 150/4/A, 52/7 and other basic initial policy papers) is to ensure that that country never again threatens the peace and security of the United States and of the world. This objective, the above documents provide, is to be sought by a) limitation of Japanese sovereignty to the four main islands and certain designated outlying minor islands; (b) disarmament

and

and demilitarization, with continuing control over Japan's capacity to make war; (c) the abolition of militarism and ultra-nationalism; and (d) the reform of Japanese political, social and economic institutions along democratic lines. As of the present time, reduction of Japan to its main islands merely awaits formalization in the peace treaty or treaties; disarmament has been completed, demilitarization is well underway, and detailed plans for the long-range control of Japan's war potential are in preparation; the people show what appears to be a sincere revulsion against former militaristic and ultra-nationalistic teachings; and the way has been cleared for the construction of a democratic state.

The record of seven months of occupation, in short, is one of satisfactory progress toward the above four initial goals. It is believed, however, that realism requires that to these goals there should now be added a fifth and sixth, as important, if not more important than than any except the first of the initial four for the accomplishment of the fundamental objective of the removal of the threat of renewed Japanese aggression. While comparatively little can be done immediately toward the accomplishment of these two added objectives, it is important that they be accorded a prominent if not the leading place in our long-range planning for Japan, and that programs for the accomplishment of the first four objectives be brought into proper relation with them.

There seems little danger in the purely military field that the United States will repeat the common mistake of preparing for the next war on the basis of conditions prevailing at the close of the last. There is less evidence thus far, however, that this lesson has been fully appreciated in the political field. One obtains the impression from the above-mentioned policy papers and from the course of the occupation thus far that it has been assumed that the Japanese military threat will revive, if it revives, in substantially the same form as before, i.e., through the efforts of an ambitious group of military fanatics to launch an independent program of Far Eastern or world domination.

Unless methods of warfare change so completely in future as to necessitate a complete re-evaluation of the war potentials of the various nations (not impossible nor a factor to be left entirely out of consideration,

but

- 5 -

but sufficiently unlikely to warrant its exclusion for practical purposes for the present) it would seem inconceivable that Japan, by itself and of its own efforts, could again presume with reasonable prospect of success to embark on a course of military expansion. As has frequently been pointed out, Japan's military successes of the past 50 years have been based on a congeries of fortuitous circumstances, particularly the weakness of Russia and China, far more than they have on inherent Japanese strength. Lacking all of the important industrial raw materials except ordinary coal, sulphur and silk, stripped of its overseas possessions, and surrounded, with the hoped-for unification of China, by three far more powerful nations than itself, Japan, even if relieved of all special disabilities in the matter of armaments, could scarcely constitute an important threat. The possibility of Japan, minus its empire and with the experience of the past 8 years before it, attacking even a weakened and divided China, or of the Powers, not to mention the UNO, permitting it to regain a foothold in Korea, appears remote.

It seems clear that Japan exists as a potential threat to United States and world peace and security only as the ally of some other, stronger power, and that the United States will be protecting itself from an imagined threat while ignoring a real one if it fails to take account of that fact. Realistic appraisal indicates that the programs of demilitarization and democratization on which we are now so all-consumedly engaged will be of considerably less importance for the future security of the United States than the combination of (1) future Japanese economic conditions and (2) the tendency of the Japanese in future to align themselves politically, economically and sentimentally with the United States or with a potential enemy of the United States.

The importance of a viable economy to the continued peaceful disposition of the Japanese people has of course long been recognized, and aside from suggesting that the time would seem to be approaching when this factor should be accorded an increasingly prominent position in our planning, little will be said regarding it here. It would seem, however, that the loss of its empire, expansion, through repatriation and natural increase, of its population, destruction or loss for reparation of a considerable proportion of its capital equipment, and the doubtful long-range effect of Far Eastern

industrialization

- 6 -

industrialization on its export trade, render Japanese economic prospects uncertain at best. In this expectation, and in the light of the factors presented above, the future tendencies of the Japanese to associate or align themselves, through feelings of friendship and as a matter of practical self-interest, primarily with the United States or with some other Far Eastern power would appear the true criterion of the success or failure of our security plans with respect to Japan and, accordingly, of the entire occupation.

Speaking at the opening session of the Joint Soviet-American Commission in Korea, General Shtikov, head of the Soviet Delegation, stated: "The Soviet Union has a keen interest in Korea being a true democratic and independent country, friendly to the Soviet Union, so that in future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union". In Korea, as in Eastern Europe and elsewhere along its borders, the Soviet Union appears primarily interested in the establishment of a government "friendly" to it, and only secondarily, at best, in the construction of an independent, democratic state. The United States, while making every effort to prevent a Soviet dominated, possibly anti-American, anti-Chinese government from gaining power in Korea, has thus far shown little concern regarding the international leanings of Japan's future governments. It might be argued, for example, that this factor was accorded insufficient attention in the purge directive of January 4, which it has been held, excluded from public office for the indefinite future a significant number of leading Japanese statesmen of known pro-American outlook whose war roles were scarcely those of "active exponents of militant nationalism".

It is not suggested here or elsewhere in this paper that the United States should in any way abate its program for the demilitarization and democratization of Japan, or that it should support a policy in Japan which might impair its larger policies of friendship with the other great Powers and support of the principle of collective security under the UNO, beside which the Japanese problem is a matter of relatively minor importance. It is suggested, however, that a realistic appraisal of American security interests in this area calls for progressively increased efforts, within the limits just defined, to secure and preserve the friendship of the Japanese people and nation for the American people and nation, and to align Japan in future, against no nation, but securely with the United States.

The following section examines the relative powers of attraction of the four Great Powers for Japan, independent of any special efforts they might make to secure Japanese friendship or to promote economic, cultural or other ties with that country. The third section suggests various means whereby the United States may minimize the possibility of Japan's turning against it at some future time toward a potential enemy.

II. A. Current

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II.

A. Current Attitudes of the Japanese People
Toward the American, Soviet, Chinese
and British PeoplesThe United States

The United States traditionally has enjoyed Japanese liking and respect to a greater extent than any other nation. The determined but restrained methods of Commodore Perry and patient diplomacy of Townsend Harris; the impression, descending from those early days, that the United States, as opposed to some other Powers, harbored no ill designs against Japan; American leadership for the renunciation of extraterritoriality in Japan and restoration of tariff autonomy; American assistance after the Great Earthquake; the friendly manners and spendthrift habits of American tourists; the generally favorable impressions of returning first and second generation Japanese from the United States; admiration for American technical achievements; American movies; and, of course, a large and profitable trade all helped to create a feeling of friendship and admiration for the United States which the Portsmouth Treaty, American immigration legislation and lesser troubles shook but never destroyed.

The period of growing American opposition to Japan's unfolding plan of aggression after 1931, culminating in 4 years of war, inevitably affected these sentiments. By early 1941 American aid to China, motivated, as it was pictured to the people, by no discernible American interest except an unreasoning antagonism for Japan, came to be regarded, with considerable justification, as the only factor preventing the realization of Japan's continental aims and the termination of the long and costly China War, of which virtually the entire population was by that time heartily sick. The freezing in July 1941 was portrayed an unprovoked act of war upon a peaceful nation. After Pearl Harbor, Americans were painted in the worst possible light, and even the most rational elements could not help but be affected by the mass slaughter of civilians in the fire raids and were **at a loss** to understand why the atomic bomb, if it had to be used at all, could not have been first dropped on some less densely populated area. Although Japanese informants state that all through this period a substantial residue of pro-American feeling remained, it had undoubtedly been pretty thoroughly submerged by the

time

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time of surrender, and the wildest rumors circulated prior to the entry of our forces regarding the treatment to be expected at our hands.

The past 7 months' occupation have witnessed the revival of American popularity and prestige to a point if not above at least not far below the peak of the 'twenties. The upward climb began with the exemplary behavior of our troops during the first stages of the occupation.* In striking contrast with what had been expected, the efficient but kindly manners of these troops recalled and confirmed to the Japanese their former impression of America and Americans. The occupation policies, unfolding in a series of business-like and enlightened directives, immediately commended themselves to the vast majority of Japanese, while General MacArthur's popularity with the masses of the people, unusual in an occupation general to say the least, has been exceeded even by few Japanese national heroes. The enlightened handling of the Emperor problem, the liberal new constitution, the consideration accorded Japanese food and health problems, and the obviously greater alertness, imagination and effectiveness of the occupation authorities and lower officials than of his own Government and its lower officials have afforded the average Japanese with convincing evidence of American forbearance, understanding and efficiency not likely to be soon forgotten.

At the same time it would be foolish to believe that all animosity has disappeared or that the Japanese like to have their country occupied and their every move controlled by an alien conqueror. Nor has the behavior of our troops, now generally younger replacements, everywhere maintained the high standards set by their more experienced predecessors during the earliest stages of the occupation. While the majority of our forces have continued to conduct themselves well, a sizeable minority, attracting attention out of all proportion to their numbers, have created the most unfortunate possible impression. The drunkenness, reckless driving, indiscriminate annoyance of women, hold-ups, black market operations, and continually foul language and general bad manners of these troops have made many Japanese wonder what Americans are like after all. However, in comparison with the arrogant to brutal behavior of their own troops, which the Japanese people, particularly in the urban areas, had endured for years and with whose far greater excesses abroad they are now familiar, the bad manners and petty to serious annoyances of a portion of our forces are considered minor burdens. Indeed, GI failings appear

more

* - Except for a penchant for expropriating policemen's swords.

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more keenly felt by better type Americans than by the Japanese, who if the matter is mentioned will frequently rise to the defense of the GI, stressing the good behavior of the majority and youth, idleness and homesickness of the erring minority. The past two months, moreover, have witnessed a noticeable improvement as a consequence of the stricter enforcement of traffic and black market regulations and expansion of Special Service and Red Cross entertainment facilities. There seems little doubt but that the friendliness and efficiency of the majority of GIs, today as in the early days of the occupation, are occasioning more pro-American feeling than the minority are taking away.

The Soviet Union

The traditionally friendly feelings of most Japanese toward the United States have been paralleled by an almost universal fear and dislike of Russia, beginning with the threat of Russian encroachment even before Commodore Perry's first visit and extending through the long years of Russo-Japanese rivalry and open conflict in Manchuria and Korea. The Soviet Union's unprovoked attack on an already beaten Japan, as most Japanese view the matter, last August, after Japan had revealed its weakness to the Soviets by seeking their good offices for the conclusion of peace, and the reported ill-treatment, including deportations to Asiatic Russia, of the Japanese population stranded in Manchuria and northern Korea, have added notably to anti-Soviet feeling. Soviet leaders are regarded as completely unscrupulous, while the Russian people, believed brash and loud like the American but without the latter's redeeming features, are considered to possess only the thinnest veneer of civilization. Knowledge of Soviet military achievements against Germany is small, with the result that Soviet military prowess is less highly regarded than the American. Japanese on several occasions to the writer's knowledge have informed Americans of their willingness and even active desire to join the United States in what they consider its inevitable war with the Soviet Union. The strongly anti-communist sentiments of the bulk of the population are to an important extent attributable to the association in the popular mind of communism with Russia, which frequent protestations of its independence of Soviet control and support by the Japanese Communist Party have been unable to dispel. There seems no question in short of the strongly anti-Soviet attitude of the Japanese people at the present time.

China

Japanese popular feeling toward China remains substantial as during the past 8 years. Belief in the superiority

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superiority of the Japanese over the Chinese race remains unshaken though latent, with continued puzzlement over the stubborn refusal of the Chinese to recognize the advantages which might have occurred to both under Japanese leadership. As in the past, there is little hatred or even dislike of the Chinese, but rather condescension mixed with a vague feeling of kinship and common destiny born of long historical association. The general feeling is that China has adopted a reasonable and lenient attitude toward her defeated neighbor, and that no insurmountable obstacles exist to the establishment of friendly commercial and other relations in the not distant future. The implications for Japan of Chinese long-range industrial, commercial and military development are only vaguely foreseen, with the feeling that such development will be slow and in the meantime almost anything may happen.

Great Britain

Japanese feeling toward Great Britain also appears to have undergone little change since pre-Pearl Harbor days. The British are considered to have committed in former days every sin of which the Japanese are guilty, and now to be frantically attempting with American aid to hold their empire together and regain lost power and prestige. As in the case of Russia, British military achievements in the European war are little known, and whereas American defeats in the early part of the Pacific War have been fully atoned for in Japanese eyes, the Japanese-British war record remains as written at Hongkong, off the Malay Coast with the sinking of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, and at Singapore. Traditional British reserve and superiority of manner, which always rankled with the Japanese, and the known strongly anti-Japanese feelings of British Commonwealth peoples, are other factors which prevent the development of a pro-British attitude.

At the present time, in short, Americans are regarded by the Japanese with respect and even liking; the Chinese are still looked down upon, with no strong feelings either of liking or animosity; the British are little liked nor greatly respected, but are not hated; and the Russians are strongly feared and hated. Evidences of a general anti-foreignism, applicable to Americans as to all other peoples, are seldom encountered under present conditions but must be presumed to persist in some degree.

B. Future Japanese-American, Soviet, Chinese and British Trade Relations

United States

Japan and the United States have long carried on one of the largest and most complementary trades in the world

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world. The United States remained Japan's principal foreign source of supply throughout the pre-war decade, and until 1937, when it was surpassed by Manchukuo and Kwantung, was also its leading foreign market. Japan during the same period ranked third among foreign countries as a market for United States exports, and second as a source of imports. Only the United Kingdom and Canada took our exports in greater volume and only Canada was more important in our import trade. The friendly relations which existed before 1931 between Japan and the United States can be attributed in considerable measure to the size and mutually advantageous nature of this trade.

There seems little prospect of a revival of the Japanese import trade from the United States on its former scale, but there is at least the possibility that the Japanese export trade to the United States will recover its previous size. In all likelihood, it is true, the sharply downward pre-war trend of Japan's silk export business to the United States, still making up from half to two-thirds of our total imports from Japan at the end of the late decade, will continue with the expansion of American nylon production. A strong consumer preference for nylon over silk hosiery, and prospects of successive nylon price reductions, as formerly with rayon, to a point well below silk, bode ill for the natural product in this its last stronghold, silk having been almost completely replaced by rayon for broad goods, its former principal use, by the end of the 'thirties. The demand for former secondary Japanese exports to the United States, however, (fish and fish products, cotton goods, chemicals and industrial oils, china, porcelain and earthenware, teas, hat bodies, and canned fruits in approximately that order during pre-war years, followed by a wide variety of miscellaneous manufactured products) will probably continue, unless affected American producers, aided by lingering war hatreds, successfully revive their efforts of the pre-war decade to place these products under increasingly severe tariff and quota restrictions. If permitted, there is reason to believe that exports of Japanese low-cost but serviceable manufactures, which met a definite demand among American low income consumers, and also high quality silk textiles, lacquerware, silverware, wood-block prints, pottery, jewelry and other items embodying Japanese artistic skill, effectively advertized by returning occupation personnel, might increase to a point where they would entirely offset the decline in the silk trade.

Regarding Japanese imports from the United States, 39 per cent of such imports in 1935 were war materials, notably petroleum, iron and steel, copper, machinery and vehicles, with the percentage rising to 80 per cent in 1940. The termination of Japan's war program and re-

restriction

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striction or destruction for security purposes of a number of its heavy industries will of course greatly reduce the demand for this class of products. Further, Japanese imports of American cotton, which during the early 'thirties comprised (at about 2 million bales) approximately half of American exports to Japan but which thereafter declined both relatively and absolutely to about 900,000 bales or 14 per cent of our total Japanese exports, are unlikely to regain their former levels. While the reduction was due in part to war causes, principally the desire to conserve foreign exchange for military purchases, it was also attributable to the development of other, cheaper sources of supply, principally in Brazil, Peru, India, China and Africa, to which Japanese cotton manufacturers will probably return. Japan's purchases of American cotton are likely to be confined in greater part, as in the years just before the war, to the long staple variety, mainly from the Imperial Valley in California, used in the manufacture of high grade cloth. And even for this type of cotton Egypt exists as an alternative source of supply.

A third factor tending to the same conclusion is the virtual completion during the pre-war and war years of Japan's basic industrial structure. American machinery, building materials, and technical advice and assistance which contributed so heavily in past years to Japanese industrialization will no longer be needed. And with its own basic industries sufficiently developed--iron and steel, petroleum refining, chemicals etc.--Japan will no longer be dependent upon the United States for various processed materials necessary to the normal operation of its economy and important in the pre-war trade. Reconstruction needs may create a significant demand for American construction timbers, lumber, iron and steel and certain types of machinery, but such demand will be temporary at best. It must be concluded that in the absence of a deliberate buy-American program designed to promote the sale of Japanese products on the American market Japanese imports from the United States in future will be only a fraction of former levels, and its exports to the United States will resume their former totals only if American tariff and quota restrictions on Japanese manufactures are substantially reduced.

Soviet Russia

Japan's trade with the Soviet Union has been very small. The trade with European Russia has been about on a par with that with Switzerland, and that with

Asiatic

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Russia, mainly Japanese machinery, paper and iron for Soviet furs and fish, has about equalled that with Iraq. While increased industrial development in Asiatic Russia may result in a somewhat larger exchange there is little possibility of the trade becoming important to either country.

China

China until the early 'thirties ranked second, behind the United States, in both Japan's import and export trade, but after that time, due to the separate classification of Manchukuo, boycotts, and other essentially political factors, was superseded by Manchukuo and India. China, however, now including Formosa, exists as a natural market for Japanese low-cost consumer and capital goods, and as a logical source of supply for a substantial proportion of Japan's metal and fiber requirements and tropical fruits from Formosa. With the gradual development of Chinese manufacturing and market potentialities there would seem no valid reason why a large and mutually beneficial trade should not redevelop between the two countries, unhampered by political factors or war as in the past. There is even the possibility that Japanese investment capital may eventually be readmitted to a strong and united China no longer fearful of Japanese economic or military penetration, forming a further economic tie between the two countries.

Great Britain

Japan's trade with Great Britain during the pre-war decade was larger than with any other European country, slightly larger than that with Germany. In 1936 3 per cent of Japanese imports from foreign countries came from Great Britain, chiefly machinery and parts, woolen tissues and yarns and iron goods, and 5 per cent of its exports, mainly tinned and bottled foods, silk tissues, knitted goods and toys, were directed to that country. While not unimportant, the trade has not been large enough to constitute a significant bond between the two countries, and, indeed, has been more than offset in this respect by the highly competitive nature of British and Japanese exports in third markets, notably India. Indications are that with the resumption of normal commercial relations Japanese-British trade will be reconstituted of approximately the same size and composition as before.

It would appear, in short, that while there is at least the possibility of a sizeable export trade from Japan to the United States, depending on United States trade policies, American exports to Japan will be only a fraction of former levels. Trade with China should be

large,

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large, that with Great Britain and the Soviet Union small to insignificant.

C. Degree of Similarity or Dissimilarity between the Japanese and the American, Soviet, Chinese and British Governmental Systems

The trend of development under the occupation thus far has been toward a governmental system deriving its essential elements from the American and British systems. The Japanese Government's recently published draft constitution based on these systems apparently has met with the approval, at least in principle, of the great majority of the people, and, already bearing the approval of General MacArthur, if not of the FEC, appears likely to form the basis of Japan's governmental system for the foreseeable future. The Japanese Communist Party is an active and vociferous element on the current political scene, but with every opportunity to advance its cause under conditions normally favorable to the spread of communist doctrines, has attracted only a small proportion of the population. Not only the propertied classes but also virtually the entire farming population, tenant and free, show strong resistance to communism. Japanese political ideologies and institutions, in short, appear likely to have far more in common with the American, British and, possibly, Chinese systems than with Soviet doctrines.

III.

Present indications, as revealed in the greater liking and respect of the Japanese people for American than for other foreign peoples, in possibilities for the revival of a substantial American-Japanese trade, and in the essential similarity between the American and nascent Japanese political philosophies, all point to the maintenance of a friendly attitude within Japan toward the United States in future. It must be recognized, however, that in changing circumstances offering sufficient provocation current pro-American, pro-democratic and anti-Soviet, anti-communistic tendencies could be completely reversed. Persistently unsatisfactory economic conditions, depriving Japan of the living standards to which it believed its industry and skill entitled it, would be the likeliest cause of such a change, particularly if it was felt that the United States, through its demilitarization or commercial policies, was largely responsible for these conditions. Withdrawal of American forces from the western Pacific would be another. The combination of these two factors, or either alone, might lead to a growing acceptance of communist doctrines in Japan and the gradual incorporation of Japan in the Soviet sphere. In sufficiently unfavorable circumstances Japanese rearmament with Soviet aid might eventually result.

Current

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Current opposition to communism in Japan is to be attributed primarily to decades of anti-communist teachings and repressions, to the essential contradiction of communism and the Emperor institution, to long habits of obedience to an elite and privileged few, to the attachment of the farming class to their hereditary plots and traditional mode of work and life, to the resistance of large numbers of Japanese Buddhists and Christians to communist-atheist associations, and, as earlier mentioned, to the association of communism with Soviet Russia. Most of these impediments, however, are already in process of dissolution, and balanced against them are other factors, notably Japanese unfamiliarity with and lack of attachment to French or Anglo-American concepts of liberty and democracy and amenability to discipline and centralized authority, which render the adoption of the current Soviet version, a native Japanese version, or some other form of communism entirely possible at some future time in favorable circumstances. Irrespective of whether the Japanese succumb to communism or not, however, even a confirmedly democratic Japan if impelled by acute economic distress or national insecurity, possibly combined with Soviet pressure, would be likely to forego the friendship of the United States to ally itself with a potential enemy of the United States if it believed it might thereby overcome the difficulties facing it. Realistic attention to American interest requires that this possibility be recognized as the most likely if not the only manner in which Japan might again be ranged against the United States in war, and that appropriate steps, within the limits of our larger policies, be taken to prevent such an eventuality. Such steps, the greater part for long-range rather than immediate implementation, might be as follows:

1. A Concerted Effort to Improve the Conduct of the Misbehaving Minority Among the Occupation Forces

As earlier stated, the commendable conduct of the majority of American troops in Japan is offset to an important degree by the deplorable behavior of a sizeable minority. Continuation of this state of affairs during an extended occupation, during which the continued presence of our forces is likely in any circumstances to be increasingly resented, would significantly and, it would seem, unnecessarily reduce pro-American tendencies among the people. The principal sources of the difficulty seem to the average observer to be the youth and inexperience of the troops and military police, the leniency with which both serious and minor offenses are treated, and the presence of a substantial percentage of negro troops who, whatever the underlying causes, are responsible for a disproportionate share of the

disturbances

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disturbances*. If, as appears to be the case, only young replacements are available, it would seem that they might be given a clearer understanding of the reason for their being here and of the importance of their task. If this policy were supported by stricter punishments for the violation of existing regulations, by the inclusion among prohibited acts of practices now condoned which have no place in a military occupation directed to serious purposes, and, if at all feasible, by reduction of the proportion of negro troops, it is believed conditions might be markedly improved.

2. Readmission at a Later Stage in the Occupation of Persons Scarcely "Active Exponents of Militant Nationalism" Excluded by the January 4 Purge Directive

A memorandum of comment prepared by the writer December 5, 1945 prior to the issuance of the so-called "purge" directive of January 4 contained the following paragraph:

"It would seem that a clear distinction should be drawn, which is not drawn in the proposed directive, between Japanese who initiated or actively supported aggressive policies before Pearl Harbor and those who accepted important positions in government or industry, or in an organization such as the IRAA, after the outbreak of war. In Japan, as in our own and other countries, many patriotic persons assumed responsible positions and actively supported the war effort after Pearl Harbor who before that time had deprecated and done everything within their power to reverse the trend toward war. It seems wholly illogical, and contrary to American interest, to brand such persons 'active exponents of militant nationalism' and to exclude them indefinitely from public office".

Whether or not the unexpectedly sweeping exclusions of the directive were required to eliminate from Japanese government former militarist elements remains a debatable question. While a good many persons, at least in the upper ranks, who might have been described as "active exponents of militant nationalism" were undoubtedly removed and excluded by the order, the most apparent result of the directive was the elimination of most of the country's more capable leaders of conservative

* - The writer has been unable to check information recently provided him on good authority that upward of 80 per cent of the recorded offenses of occupation personnel have been by negroes, comprising slightly less than 10 per cent of the occupation forces. The same informant stated that present schedules call for an increase in the proportion of negro troops to 15 per cent, because of the greater difficulty of obtaining white replacements.

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or rightist point of view. This would seem unfortunate for two reasons. First, many of these leaders were of the type described in the paragraph quoted above. Their replacement by men of almost uniformly low caliber, frequently of very doubtful "liberality" and as often as not more enthusiastic supporters, in lesser positions, of the war program than the men whose places they are taking, has and will continue to handicap the successful execution of plans of Japanese reorganization and reform. Second, while it may well be that Japan would be better off if organized on socialist or even communist rather than capitalist principles, and we would not wish to obstruct the people's absolute freedom of choice in the matter, it would scarcely seem in American interest, in the light of what has been said earlier in this paper regarding the desirability of closer American-Japanese than Soviet-Japanese ties in future, for the United States actually to assist leftist against rightist elements in the struggle for power, unless this should be an unavoidable consequence of some essential occupation purpose. The London Economist of March 4 in appraising the effect of the January 4 directive, particularly the blanket exclusion of former IRAA leaders, stated: "The result is a large reduction in moderate and conservative political life. General MacArthur is in the peculiar position of having done more than any one man to weaken the Japanese right". It is believed that this was an undesirable result of the directive which the effective removal and exclusion of former "active exponents of militant nationalism" from public office need not have entailed.

It is not suggested that individual exceptions be made to the proscribed categories detailed in the directive and subsequent Government orders, such a course being subject to several obvious disadvantages. It is suggested, however, that the directive and subsequent orders be re-examined by the occupation authorities and Japanese government at a later stage in the occupation, say in a year or two, with a view to lifting the bar on certain less culpable categories, particularly those whose war activities were confined to the post-Pearl Harbor period. Such action, supportable entirely on the basis of the contribution it would make to the promotion of responsible democratic government in Japan, would at the same time permit the return to government of former liberal pro-American elements now idle and, in some cases, in danger of becoming embittered opponents of the occupation policies.

3. Development of Closer Cultural, Educational and Tourist Contacts Between the United States and Japan

Pro-American sentiment in Japan might be promoted through a well defined and continuing program designed

to

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to provide as many Japanese as possible with knowledge of American institutions, customs and thought. Of the many ways by which this object might be sought the attraction of large numbers of Japanese students to American institutions for a part of their education, and of tourists for shorter periods, and the translation on a larger scale of American books into Japanese are a few. There is an intense demand for American books, magazines and movies in Japan today which is being most inadequately met. While not all Japanese students in the United States have returned to Japan favorably impressed, the great majority who were not deliberately indoctrinated against the United States before coming have done so. Elimination as soon as practicable of the discriminatory features of our Japanese immigration legislation could be expected to have a most significant effect.

4. Minimum Necessary Restriction of Japanese Peacetime Industry

Inadequate levels of production and employment in Japan in future, tending to drive that country into the arms of any power which it believed might help it to better its position, would constitute a far greater danger to future United States and world security than the retention by Japan of certain essentially peacetime industries important also in war. Strictly armament industries and the aircraft, artificial petroleum and a very few other industries primarily of wartime use and not important to the normal operation of the Japanese economy should, of course, be prohibited or restricted, but limitation beyond that point would be more likely to imperil more than to promote lasting peace.

5. Reduction of American-Japanese Trade Barriers

Japan's success or failure in finding adequate foreign markets will be the principal determinant of its future economic viability and, accordingly, very likely also of its continued peaceful disposition. Reduction of American tariff and quota restrictions on the importation of Japanese products into the United States would have the double effect of assisting Japan to secure the markets it requires, as much by the force of our example on the trade policies of other countries as by the increased opportunity on the American market alone, and of promoting Japanese friendship toward the United States.

Except for silk, on the free list, most Japanese exports to the United States during the pre-war decade were subject to severe tariff or quota restrictions or

both

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both. The justification advanced for our, in fact if not in theory, discriminatory trade policy toward Japan was that without this protection American wage scales and living standards would be jeopardized by the competition of "sweated" Japanese labor.

Examination of the actual facts of the case reveals the patent absurdity of this charge. The less than ten per cent of Japan's exports to the United States during the pre-war decade which could be considered substantially competitive with American products never amounted in value to more than 15 to 20 million dollars worth of goods a year, compared with an average annual total volume of American imports from all points of 2.4 billion dollars and an annual average value of American production of 34.2 billion dollars*. In spite of their relatively small volume, however, Japanese low-cost but serviceable products supplied a definite demand among our low income groups, which frequently could not afford the more expensive American article and, if denied the Japanese product, simply did without. Japanese higher cost silk goods, jewelry, wood-block prints and other products embodying Japanese artistic taste were also in considerable demand, but enjoyed a very limited sale because of the almost prohibitive duties which they bore. The relatively small total injury done a few American producers by the relaxation of existing restrictions on Japanese imports into the United States would seem, in short, to be greatly outweighed by the benefit to large numbers of American consumers and the important contribution which such action would make toward the achievement of American objectives in Japan.

6. Maintenance of American Armed Power in the Western Pacific

Fully as important as feelings of popular attachment, similarity of political and social ideologies or economic factors in determining the relative power of attraction of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain for Japan in future will be their relative military strength in the western Pacific. Particularly if Japan refrains from building up military defenses of its own in accordance with Chapter II of the proposed new constitution, it will be keenly aware of the relative power positions of these countries in its vicinity. It seems highly unlikely that it will be willing, if an alternative offers, to depend for its security solely on the consultative machinery and military forces of the

UNO

* - A detailed analysis of the degree of competitiveness of Japan's pre-war exports to the United States with the products of American industry will be found in a study "American-Japanese Trade in the Pre-War and Post-War Eras" (E-187) prepared by the writer in October 1943.

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UNO while that body's ability to control the Great Powers with which Japan is surrounded remains limited at best. While these Powers maintain an approximate balance of power in the region, all pledged to the support of Japanese territorial and administrative integrity, Japan would have neither need nor opportunity to adopt other means for its defense. If, however, the United States should ever evidence incapacity or lack of determination to protect Japan from foreign encroachment this balance would be destroyed and the Japanese, of their own accord or under pressure, could be expected to move toward a rapprochement with the other principal power in the area, to comprise a formidable potential military threat to the United States. The Japanese as a nation have always shown a strong "international gregariousness", and are likely to start looking at a fairly early date for some country or group of countries smaller than the UNO with which they can align themselves.

Reason for the maintenance of American forces in this region, it should be recognized, is not to keep down a disarmed and in any event not inherently powerful Japan, but to prevent threatening alterations of the status quo of the above type. It might be strongly urged, though the future alone can tell, that this task would be facilitated, and the prospect of lasting peace in the Pacific promoted rather than impaired, if Japan, with its in any event limited striking power, were to be permitted, after providing satisfactory evidence over an extended period of its peaceful intent, to build up defensive fortifications and forces rather than to commit itself to remain disarmed indefinitely. In the latter circumstance the burden of its defense is likely merely to be shifted to neighboring powers. These would be required to extend the area of their military responsibility or concern by a considerable area, particularly the United States, and into closer armed contact with each other than might otherwise be necessary.

American foreign policy today wisely and fortunately seeks as its primary objectives continuing friendship among the Great Powers and the development of a system of collective security under the UNO. Balance of power theories are the very negation of these objectives, upon which hope of lasting peace depends, and it is a matter of regret that a paper on the subject of future United States security interests and policies in the Pacific should have to have reference to such theories.

Nevertheless we merely defeat our purpose by blinding ourselves to the world we live in while we labor to create the world we seek. There has not yet been developed, nor is there indication that there will for some time be developed, machinery whereby one or more of the Great Powers can be effectively restrained by the peaceloving nations

of

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of the world if bent on war except by war, and then only if the balance of forces is favorable to the latter. In such a situation it would seem only sensible for the United States to seek independently of the above two principal means (Great Power amity and the development of a working system of collective security), but by methods which do not in any way impair their achievement. to safeguard its security and the security of all peaceloving nations of the Pacific. It has been the writer's purpose in this memorandum to indicate the most effective independent safeguards and how they may be established.

Robert A. Fearey

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

73

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION: FE
INFO:
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OFFICE OF
ASIAN AFFAIRS
APR 23 1946
3:15 AM
Department of State

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No paraphrase necessary.

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Tokyo via War

Dated April 23, 1946

Rec'd 6:33 p.m., 27th

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Information	✓
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SEA	
PI	✓

SECSTATE

185, April 23

MEMO TO MR. CHAPIN 4/29/46
MEMO TO MR. MACDONALD E 4/29/46
APR 20 1946
DIVISION OF JAPANESE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. In addition to duties in connection with Allied Council, functions of new diplomatic section (REDEPTEL unnumbered, March 162142 Z and our 182, April 19) are as follows:

(A) To make recommendations on policies concerning foreign relations of Japan and Korea.

(B) To make recommendations concerning establishment of foreign diplomatic missions and consular offices in Japan and Korea and maintain contact with such foreign diplomatic missions and consular offices as are established in Japan. (Relationships of foreign diplomatic and consular officials with Jap Govt are conducted through SCAP and the diplomatic section is to be the SCAP section charged with conduct of SCAP's relations with such foreign officials).

(C) To collect, correlate and maintain in useable form information on international affairs relating to Japan and Korea, and from time to time inform and advise SCAP on such of the aforementioned information as may be pertinent to conduct of his duties.

(D) To maintain a branch of section in Yokohama for purpose of performing consular functions, and supervise such other agencies of United States Dept of State as may be established in Japan.

(E) To maintain

SECRET

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/4-2346

Confidential File

44

SECRET

-2-#185, April 23, from Tokyo via War

(E) To maintain contact with United States Dept of State as follows:

- (1) Submit opinions and recommendations to Dept of State through SCAP and War Dept on special subjects when such opinions and recommendations are requested by Dept of State through War Dept.
- (2) Send such reports and information as may be appropriate to Dept of State through SCAP and War Dept.
- (3) Communicate directly with Dept of State on routine matters of interest to that Dept, such as personnel, accounts, consular matters, transmittal of publications, press analyses, copies of directives et cetera and receipt of informational material".

2. It appears at present that there will be no substantial change in our method of communications to or receiving communications from Dept either by telegraph or mail except in connection with policy matters covered by E (1) above. General MacArthur states that he is entirely agreeable to suggestions in Dept's unnumbered telegram of March 162142 Z and both SCAP and this office are in full concurrence as regards Dept keeping procedures as simple as possible in order to avoid burdening General Headquarters, War or State with unnecessary complexities and to expediting of business. It is General MacArthur's concept that, in addition to duties in connection with Allied Council and such advisory duties as he assigns to political adviser, section should handle in usual way, subject to emergencies of local conditions, all State Dept and Foreign Service matters such as would normally fall upon an office or mission which eventually will develop into an Embassy. While cognizant of eventual desirability of reestablishment of consular and foreign offices in Japan, it is felt that Yokohama

branch should

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45

SECRET

-3-#185, April 23, from Tokyo via War

branch should for time being continue without any formal change in status, and under our general supervision continue to perform routine American consular duties as a branch of diplomatic section, its communications with Dept to be through 8th Army as heretofore.

3. We are to be given access by SCAP to any information which Dept may desire and may forward to Dept by such desired publications, press analyses, staff sections reports and reviews et cetera. The weekly report on political party developments properly lies within functions of government section and will be discontinued so far as this section is concerned. In the light of voluminous press analyses and other data prepared by SCAP in mimeographed form and forwarded to Dept, there would seem to be no need for weekly press telegram which we previously submitted. It is understood that SCAP furnishes War Dept daily telegraphic report of activities and also a comprehensive monthly review. Assembly arrangements can be made for Dept to receive copies of these reports from War Dept and there accordingly may be no need for our continuing weekly political and economic telegraphic review which we previously submitted. This review, however, can be continued if Dept desires and our staff personnel problems are solved. Our suggestion would be that after consultation with War Dept in regard to receipt of SCAP reports, Dept may wish to review its information requirements and inform us what specifically is desired from us within general framework of our functions.

4. Above indicates urgent need for full review of personnel needs and qualifications. Work in connection with council will be heavy and, in addition to requiring major portion of my time, will mean almost full time for Bishop and part time for Sebald and possible on other auxiliary officer. Service is in hospital with slight case jaundice and is expected to remain there for about six weeks. We are in urgent need of an executive officer and it would be very helpful if Johansen could be instructed to come at once without awaiting completion of arrangements for coming of his family.

ATCHESON

SECRET

MJF

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

4.2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION COPY

~~ACTION-FE~~
INFO:

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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DSH-S-D

8519

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 25 1946
8:10 AM
Department of State

PLAIN

Tokyo via War

Dated April 23, 1946

Rec'd 4:01 p.m., 24th

Action	
Information	
FE	✓
CA	✓
JA	✓
SEA	
PI	✓

SECSTATE

187, Twenty-third

Allied Council.

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
W. W. C. [Signature]
4/25/46
APR 25 1946
H.B.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

In response to inquiries by press correspondents I have made statement orally as follows:

"There is no question of my replacing General Marquat who has functioned in a most admirable manner. My assignment to the council was a step resulting from the establishment of the diplomatic section of SCAP which in turn developed from a plan initiated before my recent visit to the United States and had been delayed by the extension of my stay at home. General MacArthur's Headquarters, State Dept, War Dept, and Navy Dept comprise a team; the members of that team, in uniform and out, have been working together successfully and wholeheartedly for the furtherance of United States policy and its coordination with the policies of our Allies, which are fundamentally same objective. It is my intention to work with my colleagues on Allied Council in all sincerity and good will for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the Council was created. I believe that Council will be a constructive factor in the situation and will be of assistance in the great task in which General MacArthur is engaged.

ATCHESON

EHL

PLAIN

FILED
APR 30 1946

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-2346

6548

Handwritten initials

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

Collect

Department of State

UNRESTRICTED

Charge Department: XX

Washington

Charge to

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,

APR 23 1946

TOKYO.

267 TWENTY-THIRD

FOR ATCHESON, POLITICAL ADVISER.

French Emb here requests that following personal message from General PECHKOFF, Head of French Liaison Mission with Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, be delivered to General MacArthur:

QUOTE Just arrived in Washington on my way to Tokyo where I have been appointed by the French Government as head of the French Liaison Mission with you, I wish to let you know my deep gratification at my present assignment. Remembering your gallant participation in the first world war in France, and fully aware of your profound sympathy for my country in her last ordeal, I rejoice at the thought of cooperating with you in the service of common cause of our two nations. END QUOTE

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) /4-2346

740.00119 Control (Japan) CS/VJ 4-2346

DCR NE Unit
Handwritten initials

APR 23 1946 P.M.

UNRESTRICTED

TD:FCdeWolf:mrk 4/19/46

Handwritten signature

Handwritten initials

TELEGRAPH DISTRIBUTION

APR 23 PM 3 39

RECEIVED DIVISION OF

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

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ACM -H

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
London

Dated April 23, 1946

Rec'd 12:12 p.m., 23rd

SECSTATE

4387, Twenty-third



British press over past 10 days has devoted more comment to control of Japan with particular reference to elections and food situation there.

NEW STATESMAN for April 20 in commenting on elections says they have had expected result in a triumph of conservatism. Paper says that in new Diet Liberal and Conservative parties as successors of Seiyukai and Minseito "will form with the predominantly Conservative Independents a solid reactionary bloc in control". After pointing out that Socialists have won less than a fifth of seats and only a handful of Communists have been returned paper concludes "this election seems to be not so much an expression of the Japanese peoples will as a reflection of the continuing power of the old party machines under American suspicions."

ECONOMIST of same date expresses somewhat contrary view and says that in spite of tiny poll for Communists it would be uncorrect to style election a Conservative victory. Writer states "not only have the Socialists secured a solid increase but the Liberals and Progressives are not conservative in any use of the word customary in Japan. Japanese conservatism had its roots in the militarism of the army and navy and of the feudal landowners who were the backbone of both. Their direct influence has for the time being been eliminated by total disarmament and by General MacArthur's various measures of demilitarization. The new parties have full political control much fuller than

the power

MAILED
APR 24 1946

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740.00119 CONTROL(JAPAN)/4-2346

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-2- #4387, Twenty-third, from London

the power enjoyed by them during the period of parliamentary rule in the twenties and it is not to be supposed that they have completely lost the liberal outlook which was theirs at that time. True, it is liberalism of the American stamp in its combination of free politics and free enterprise but it is not militarist and will not seek to revive Chauvinism."

REYNOLDS NEWS for April 21 has second article in series by Owen Lattimore devoted this time to discussion of Jap food situation and expressing definite belief that there is no need to send food to Japan. Lattimore reports seeing no undernourishment on streets of Tokyo and says that actually the Japs are better off than the people they have been overrunning and gouging for last few years. He claims that "the old gang" in which he includes civilians as much as military hope to preserve essential structure of their political supremacy and for eventual comeback as most powerful trading and manufacturing nation of east Asia. To do this they want to prove that Japan cannot feed itself, that it must import the largest possible quantities of industrial raw materials in order to manufacture the largest possible line of export goods in order to buy food. Socially and politically Jap landlords are said to belong to the old gang and are trying to prove that it is the peasant who is hoarding grain. By compelling Japs to undertake drastic currency revaluation MacArthur is said to have partly frustrated old gang. Lattimore recommends following further steps breaking land values placing ceiling on rents combined with moratorium on rural debts which would force landlords to begin selling land which peasants should be assisted to buy. He concludes "it is more constructive to give the peasant an incentive to produce more than it is to give the landlord power to squeeze higher rental out of the peasant."

Cornelius Ryan writes in April 16 DAILY TELEGRAPH that Japanese food problem is largely of her own making. He claims Jap officials and people lack initiative and apparently desire to get things done and must be continually prodded by Military Government. He says "very gently General MacArthur has been leading the Japanese people on

to a new

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-3- #4387, Twenty-third, from London

to a new path of life. The milling masses have willingly followed him. Now the people are looking to the Supreme Commander to help them in this problem of food and the demobilization of the American forces in Japan has been so rapid that there are not enough men to stand behind the Japanese and keep goading them into action." Ryan gives example of situation around Sendai where only by continual prodding of US Military Commander were Jap officials forced to take necessary action to bring in increased supplies of fish. He claims Japs do not seem to be able to do anything for themselves and that to Jap people General MacArthur is the answer to everything. Ryan says: "He has treated them coldly, sometimes sternly, but always justly. Today, however, with the occupation forces continually being whittled down as more and more men return to civilian life the problems before the Supreme Commander are becoming more difficult and more complex. Will the elections that have given the Japanese a new Diet which in its turn may give them a new Cabinet prove to be also the beginning of a new sense of responsibility for the well being of the country?"

Jack Percival, special correspondent of NEWS CHRONICLE cables from Tokyo April 21 that General MacArthur's rule is resulting in giving Japan an American flavored constitution. Japs are said to have accepted American libraries, radio programs, films, news services, police and educational systems with open arms. However, it is charged that General MacArthur has on more than one occasion shown he resents criticism either from his own staff or outsiders. Five examples are given to bolster this charge:

(1) Advice of MacArthur on October 10 that he considered Allied Control plan unacceptable but he would "try to make it work."

(2) Statement to Four Power Allied Council in Japan that it was not appointed to divide his supreme authority but only to advise.

(3) Refusal to consider advice of Far Eastern

Commission

PLAIN

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-4- #4387, Twenty-third, from London

Commission on postponing elections.

(4) Negative replies alleged to have been given to 3 out of 4 suggestions of Council at its first meeting.

(5) Fact that questions requesting information concerning many thousands of war guilty Japs still in official positions allegedly "drew a filibustering reply from the head of the Military Government who gave members of the Council a session long harangue against their frequently expressed protests." Council members are said to admit openly that "unless there is a change in MacArthur's attitude they will be held up to world ridicule despite the fact that the terms of reference to the Council were drawn up by the great powers after the Moscow Conference."

Sent to Department as 4387; repeated Supreme Allied Commander Tokyo via Army channels.

MJF

GALLMAN

PLAIN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

JA - Mr Long
DCR

TO : *W* - Mr. Acheson
FROM : FE - Mr. Vincent
SUBJECT:

UNDER SECRETARY
APR 23 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE: April 23, 1946

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
APR 29 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

General Pechkoff called at noon today accompanied by Ambassador Naggiar (French representative on the Far Eastern Commission) and a member of his staff. We had about an hour's conversation, most of which dealt with conditions in Japan and the general operation of the machinery for the control of Japan.

With regard to his trip out and any other matters related to his mission, I told General Pechkoff that we were desirous of being as helpful as possible. He told me that he thought arrangements for his trip out were about complete. He planned to fly to Manila and from Manila to take a French cruiser to Yokohama. I did not tell him that General MacArthur indicated in a recent telegram that he thought General Pechkoff should come out by water rather than air. Since General Pechkoff seemed to be so sure of air transportation I got in touch with the War Department after his departure and I believe that we will be able to arrange for the General to get out by air as he plans. A telegram from General MacArthur will be required but it is believed that once the situation is explained to him he will agree to air transportation for General Pechkoff since the space comes from the State Department allocation. If I meet with any difficulty in the matter which I can't handle myself, I may call on you for support.

I have known General Pechkoff for some time and am glad that he is going to Tokyo. I think he will serve a useful purpose there. His military career should commend him to General MacArthur. He knows George Acheson well. And he has had experience in dealing with Russians. With these things in his favor and being detached from the Allied Council, he should be able to do much good and needed work in softening up the rough edges.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-2346

CS/LF

740.00119 Control
(Japan) 4-2346

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J.C.V.

MAY 14 1946

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DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
. INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION ~~FE~~ ^{JA}
INFO:
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Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 25 1946
8:10 AM
Department of State

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Action	
Information	
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PLAIN

Tokyo via War

Dated April 23, 1946

Rec'd 4:01 p.m., 24th

SECSTATE

186, Twenty-third

SCAP requests assent of Netherlands Govt to use of Netherlands Legation property in Japan by the Allied Forces. Property now occupied by caretakers furnished by Swedish Legation. Reply of Netherlands Govt urgently requested.

DIVISION OF JAPANESE
rel. to Tokyo 4/25/46
APR 25 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ATCHESON

EHL

PLAIN

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-2346

FILED
APR 30 1946

Ambassade de France
aux Etats-Unis

JCW/GS

NO 270

DIVISION OF JAPANESE
AFFAIRS
TRANSLATION
MITTED TO
NAVY DEPT
MAY 27 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~JA~~
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file
Washington, D.C.

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DISTRIBUTION OFFICE
MAY 27 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DC/R

L'Ambassade de France aux Etats-Unis présente

ses compliments au Département d'Etat et a l'honneur de lui faire
savoir ce qui suit:-

Se référant à ses communications antérieures à ce
sujet, l'Ambassade désire porter à la connaissance du Département
d'Etat que le Général de Corps d'Armée PECHKOFF, Ambassadeur de
France et Chef de la Mission française de Liaison auprès du
Commandement Suprême allié au Japon, accompagné de M. Jean
BRIONVAL, Conseiller d'Ambassade, du Colonel VALLIER, Conseiller
Militaire, de M. RICAUD, Conseiller Economique et de M. Roger
PIGNOL, Secrétaire de la Mission, ont l'intention de quitter les
Etats-Unis le 30 avril 1946 pour rejoindre Manille par la voie des

740.0019 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-2446
740.0019 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-2446
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airs.
Dist. *M*

Les membres de la Mission comptent terminer le

voyage à bord du croiseur français "EMILE BERTIN" qui quittera

Département d'Etat

Manille le 6 mai et arrivera au Japon le 11 mai.

Washington, D. C.

-2-

/...

L'Attaché Naval près cette Ambassade se mettra en rapport avec le Département de la Marine pour demander l'entrée dans les eaux japonaises pour le navire français et préciser les conditions d'amarrage de l'"EMILE BERTIN" à son arrivée./.

L'Ambassade saisit l'occasion de la présente note pour renouveler au Département d'Etat les assurances de sa très haute considération.



Washington, le 24 avril 1946.

JcW

APR 27 1946

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-2446

The Acting Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Secretary of the Navy a translation of a note dated April 24, 1946 received from the French Embassy regarding the personnel and transportation of a French Liaison Mission with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo. There is also enclosed as of possible interest, a copy of a memorandum addressed to the War Department requesting that the substance of the note received from the French Embassy be transmitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Enclosures:

- 1. Translation of note from the French Embassy dated April 24, 1946.
- 2. Memorandum to the War Department.

740.00119 Control (Japan) 4-2446

True copy of the original

740.00119 Control (Japan) 4-2446

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APR 26 1946

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4-25-46

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~~SECRET~~

April 25, 1946

To: Operations Division
 War Department General Staff

From: Office of Far Eastern Affairs
 State Department

Subject: French Liaison Mission in Tokyo *me*

Reference to your memorandum of April 22, 1946 there is enclosed a translation of a note dated April 24, 1946 received from the French Embassy regarding the personnel and transportation of a French Liaison Mission with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo. The Department would appreciate having the substance of this note transmitted to General MacArthur, together with the information that the Department has available for the month of April air transportation accommodations for this mission to Manila.

A copy of this memorandum together with a copy of the note received from the French Embassy is being dispatched to the Navy Department.

Enclosure:

Translation of note
 from the French Embassy,
 dated April 24, 1946.

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 4-25-46 *MB*

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740.00119 CONTROL
 (JAPAN)/4-2446

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4-2446

740.00119 Control (Japan-1)

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(TRANSLATION)

No. 270.

The Embassy of France in the United States presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to inform it of the following:

Referring to its previous communications on this subject, the Embassy wishes to make known to the Department of State that Lieutenant General Pechkoff, Ambassador of France and head of the French Liaison Mission near the Supreme Allied Command in Japan, accompanied by Mr. Jean Brionval, Counselor of Embassy, Colonel Vallier, Military Adviser, Mr. Ricaud, Economic Adviser, and Mr. Roger Pignol, Secretary of the Mission, intend to leave the United States on April 30, 1946, to fly to Manila.

The members of the Mission are counting on completing the trip on board the French cruiser "Emile Bertin", which will leave Manila on May 6th and will arrive in Japan on May 11th.

The Naval Attaché of this Embassy will get in touch with the Navy Department in order to request admission into Japanese waters for the French vessel and to determine the exact conditions for mooring the "Emile Bertin" on her arrival.

The Embassy avails itself of the occasion of this note to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its very high consideration.

Washington, April 24, 1946.

Department of State
Washington, D.C.

~~JCV~~
~~JKP~~
DCIR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 24, 1946

SUBJECT: French Liaison Mission to General MacArthur

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Roger Pignol, Secretary of the French Liaison Mission

Mr. Lory, JA

COPIES TO: FE: Mr. Vincent
Mr. Penfield
WE: Mr. Bonbright

1-1493

Mr. Pignol, Secretary to the French Liaison Mission to General MacArthur called this morning at his request and left the attached note.

Mr. Pignol stated that it was the desire of the French Mission to arrive in Tokyo as quickly as possible as there were French economic matters that must be taken care of. He also stated that the French Government desired, because of prestige, to have a French warship in Japanese waters since certain other nations had warships stationed there. He added that the Mission would be able to live on the warship while accommodations were being prepared by General MacArthur for the Mission. I told Mr. Pignol that I would present this request to the appropriate authorities, but that since this was an unusual procedure for transporting a Mission to Japan it might take considerable time before a final decision could be given.

I stated to Mr. Pignol that it was the wish of General MacArthur that the Mission travel directly from the United States to Tokyo by water as this would give SCAP ample time to prepare accommodations. I also told him that there was a possibility of making arrangements to transport the Mission by air directly to Tokyo sometime in May if adequate ship accommodations were not available. Mr. Pignol said that he would see General Pechkoff at lunch and at that time he would talk with the General and get his views regarding methods of transporting the Mission to Japan.

JA:HLory:PM:MS

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 740.00119 Control
4-2446
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D. J.

JCW/GS

NO 270

L'Ambassade de France aux Etats-Unis présente
ses compliments au Département d'Etat et a l'honneur de lui faire
savoir ce qui suit:-

Se référant à ses communications antérieures à ce
sujet, l'Ambassade désire porter à la connaissance du Département
d'Etat que le Général de Corps d'Armée PECHKOFF, Ambassadeur de
France et Chef de la Mission française de Liaison auprès du
Commandement Suprême allié au Japon, accompagné de M. Jean
BRIONVAL, Conseiller d'Ambassade, du Colonel VALLIER, Conseiller
Militaire, de M. RICAUD, Conseiller Economique et de M. Roger
PIGNOL, Secrétaire de la Mission, ont l'intention de quitter les
Etats-Unis le 30 avril 1946 pour rejoindre Manille par la voie des
airs.

Les membres de la Mission comptent terminer le
voyage à bord du croiseur français "EMILE BERTIN" qui quittera
Manille le 6 mai et arrivera au Japon le 11 mai.

Département d'Etat

Washington, D. C.

.../

-2-

/...

L'Attaché Naval près cette Ambassade se mettra en rapport avec le Département de la Marine pour demander l'entrée dans les eaux japonaises pour le navire français et préciser les conditions d'amarrage de l'"EMILE BERTIN" à son arrivée./.

L'Ambassade saisit l'occasion de la présente note pour renouveler au Département d'Etat les assurances de sa très haute considération.

Washington, le 24 avril 1946.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 5/1/46

TO : *OR*

FROM : TD - Mr. de Wolf

SUBJECT :

It is understood that the French Liaison Mission is leaving on May 2, 1946, for Tokyo. Accordingly, the attached message from General MacArthur was telephoned on this date to General Pechkoff's Secretary.

Francis Colt de Wolf
Francis Colt de Wolf *[Signature]*

TD:MRKohlepp

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION: TRC

INCOMING TELEGRAM

INFO:

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JWM -W

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OFFICE OF TRANSPORT
AND COMMUNICATIONS
POLICY
8020
APR 26 9
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

From: CINCAFPAC Tokyo

To : War Department

Nr :: Z 32992

24 April 1946

To Wash State Dept Z32992.

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Reurad State serial 267. Please pass following message to General Pechkoff "Thanks for your cordial message. My heartiest welcome awaits you in Tokyo. MacArthur".

End

267 not identified in WDCMC

ACTION: G-2 (State)

MC IN 62564

(24 Apr 46) DTG 241157Z se

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MAY - 9 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

memo to the Embassy 5/1/46
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DIVISION
Copy in ID
APR 29 1946
9:30
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
File Kdew

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-2446

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to the memorandum from the French Embassy dated April 19, 1946, requesting that there be transmitted to General MacArthur a personal message from General Pechkoff, Head of the French Liaison Mission with the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, and quotes hereunder the text of General MacArthur's reply to General Pechkoff's message:

"Thanks for your cordial message. My heartiest welcome awaits you in Tokyo."

Department of State,

Washington, May 2 1946

DCR - NE Unit

Anal. *WJ*

Re: *KW*

Dis: *WJ*

TD:FCdeWolf:mrk 5/1/46

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/4-2446

CS/VJ *Japan 74-2446*

GRV/mew
MAY 2 1946 P.M.

WJ
WJ
WE

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
JCR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 25, 1946

SUBJECT: French Liaison Mission to General MacArthur

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Brionval
Colonel Vallier
Mr. Pignol

JA: Mr. Lory

COPIES TO: FE: Mr. Vincent
Mr. Penfield
WE: Mr. Bonbright

1-1403

Mr. Brionval, Colonel Vallier, and Mr. Pignol of the French Liaison Mission to Tokyo called this afternoon at their request. Mr. Brionval stated that General Pechkoff, head of the Mission, had expressed his urgent desire that the Mission would be granted permission to proceed by air to Manila and from Manila to Tokyo aboard a French cruiser. Mr. Brionval stated however, that if it was impossible to make such arrangements the Liaison Mission would of course proceed directly to Tokyo from the United States. I stated that their request would be promptly submitted to the War Department and that the War Department would immediately present their request to General MacArthur and that upon receipt of a reply from SCAP I would at once communicate with them.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) /4-2546
740.00119 Control (Japan)
CS/VJ-2546

MAY 3 1946

FILED

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 25, 1946

SUBJECT: French Liaison Mission to General MacArthur

740,00119 Central Japan / 4-2546

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Brionval
Colonel Vallier
Mr. Pignol
JA: Mr. Lory

COPIES TO: FE: Mr. Vincent
Mr. Penfield
WE: Mr. Bonbright

FW 740,00119 Central Japan / 4-2546

Mr. Brionval, Colonel Vallier, and Mr. Pignol of the French Liaison Mission to Tokyo called this afternoon at their request. Mr. Brionval stated that General Pechkoff, head of the Mission, had expressed his urgent desire that the Mission ~~would~~ be granted permission to proceed by air to Manila and from Manila to Tokyo aboard a French cruiser. Mr. Brionval stated however, that if it was impossible to make such arrangements the Liaison Mission would of course proceed directly to Tokyo from the United States. I stated that their request would be promptly submitted to the War Department and that the War Department would immediately present their request to General MacArthur and that upon receipt of a reply from SCAP I would at once communicate with them.

M
JA:HLory:als

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 24, 1946

SUBJECT: French Liaison Mission to General MacArthur

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Roger Pignol, Secretary of the French
Liaison Mission
Mr. Lory, JACOPIES TO: FE: Mr. Vincent
Mr. Penfield
WE: Mr. Bonbright

* * * 1-1403

Mr. Pignol, Secretary to the French Liaison Mission to General MacArthur called this morning at his request and left the attached note.

Mr. Pignol stated that it was the desire of the French Mission to arrive in Tokyo as quickly as possible as there were French economic matters that must be taken care of. He also stated that the French Government desired, because of prestige, to have a French warship in Japanese waters since certain other nations had warships stationed there. He added that the Mission would be able to live on the warship while accommodations were being prepared by General MacArthur for the Mission. I told Mr. Pignol that I would present this request to the appropriate authorities, but that since this was an unusual procedure for transporting a Mission to Japan it might take considerable time before a final decision could be given.

I stated to Mr. Pignol that it was the wish of General MacArthur that the Mission travel directly from the United States to Tokyo by water as this would give SCAP ample time to prepare accommodations. I also told him that there was a possibility of making arrangements to transport the Mission by air directly to Tokyo sometime in May if adequate ship accommodations were not available. Mr. Pignol said that he would see General Pechkoff at lunch and at that time he would talk with the General and get his views regarding methods of transporting the Mission to Japan.

JA:HLory:PM:MS

JCW/GS

NO 270

L'Ambassade de France aux Etats-Unis présente
ses compliments au Département d'Etat et a l'honneur de lui faire
savoir ce qui suit:-

Se référant à ses communications antérieures à ce
sujet, l'Ambassade désire porter à la connaissance du Département
d'Etat que le Général de Corps d'Armée PECHKOFF, Ambassadeur de
France et Chef de la Mission française de Liaison auprès du
Commandement Suprême allié au Japon, accompagné de M. Jean
BRIGNON, Conseiller d'Ambassade, du Colonel VALLIER, Conseiller
Militaire, de M. RICAUD, Conseiller Economique et de M. Roger
PIGNOL, Secrétaire de la Mission, ont l'intention de quitter les
Etats-Unis le 30 avril 1946 pour rejoindre Manille par la voie des
airs.

Les membres de la Mission comptent terminer le
voyage à bord du croiseur français "EMILE BERTIN" qui quittera
Manille le 6 mai et arrivera au Japon le 11 mai.

Département d'Etat

Washington, D. C.

.../

-2-

/...

L'Attaché Naval près cette Ambassade se mettra en rapport avec le Département de la Marine pour demander l'entrée dans les eaux japonaises pour le navire français et préciser les conditions d'amarrage de l'"EMILE BERTIN" à son arrivée./.

L'Ambassade saisit l'occasion de la présente note pour renouveler au Département d'Etat les assurances de sa très haute considération.

Washington, le 24 avril 1946.

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

52

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION: ~~FE~~ ^{JA}

INFO:

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~~No~~ paraphrase necessary

9879

Tokyo via War

Dated April 26, 1946

Rec'd 6:33 p.m., 27th.

SECRET

SECSTATE

192, April 26th.

Action	
Information	
FE	✓
CA	✓
JA	✓
SEA	
PI	✓

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 28 1946
8:15 AM
Department of State

~~JA~~
Filer
6-6-46

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
Tokyo 5/20/46
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. Associated Press reports Far Eastern Commission has laid down policy that the United States should send only enough food to Japan to safeguard Allied occupation forces. Question of food policy is on the agenda for the third meeting of the Allied Council scheduled for April 30. In the absence of a directive and in so far as the Council is concerned, I have been prepared to meet this question in Council by presenting views as follows: "There is strong question in my mind as to how far the Council may properly proceed in a substantive discussion of the amount of food which the United States sends to the occupation forces for Jap consumption for the purpose of safeguarding the occupation forces and the occupation in Japan. If the occupation forces were not taking steps, such as provision of necessary food, supplies, to preclude in so far as possible starvation, hunger and unrest (*) concerned with the distribution of contributions by various countries. The burden falls upon the United States and there is no question but that it is far better for the United States to send food than to have to send large numbers of additional troops. It seems to me therefore that in the absence of governing policy directive stipulating that the Jap people are to be limited in their

See
correction
appended

per capita

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JUN 8 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FILED
JUN 6 1946

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-2646
Confidential File
LRC

53

SECRET

-2- #192, April 26th., from Tokyo via War

per capita food consumption, the question of how much food United States sends to safeguard the occupation forces and the occupation is not one which properly comes before the Council. Certainly the question whether the United States might send some of this food to other countries is entirely outside the Council's purview".

2. The question of food policy was placed on the agenda at the request of the British Commonwealth member (an-Australian). We understand that question was raised in the Far Eastern Commission by the New Zealand representative. The wording of the item on our agenda is: "An inquiry about Allied food policy in Japan in relation to the present world shortage of food stuffs and the standards of food consumption prevailing in other defeated countries". The purpose of the inquiry here I believe is clearly to raise the question whether food for Japan provided by the United States should not be allocated to some other country. I submit my opinion that the question of the distribution of food provided by the United States alone outside the scope of any international agreement is not subject to decision or determination by any other than United States Govt. Certainly determination of the question of how much food should be sent to Japan by the United States to safeguard the Allied occupation forces is one solely for determination by the United States. I submit further that, over and above the paramount question for preventing unrest and most serious military as well as political difficulties, we are under moral obligation to do what we can to prevent hunger and starvation in this country. I am mindful of remarks made some time ago by a SCAP spokesman pointing out that the islands of Japan are in a sense analogous to a huge concentration camp. There is no barbed wire fence around these islands but we are in a military occupation here and, at this stage, our efforts to revive manufacture of exports to exchange for imports of food are necessarily restricted to channels which the United States has set up. Thus the Japs are not yet

free to

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SECRET

-3- #192, April 26th., from Tokyo via War

free to trade abroad (before the war they had to import from 15 to 20 percent of their foodstuffs) or indeed to utilize all of their own resources. While the progress and purposes of the occupation will eventually place the responsibility solely upon the Japs to provide for themselves, that time has not come and our obligation has not ended. We are indeed trying Jap war criminals for failure to provide sufficient food to American and other allied internees and prisoners of war.

3. If actions of the United States Govt pertaining to security of its forces are to be subject to review at the direction of an allied body acting on the basis of political considerations, the opportunities for embarrassment and hindrance to our executive administration of the occupation might become so increased as to endanger seriously our position here.

4. Adverse propaganda by interested foreign representatives and others may easily obscure and distort realities of the situation and adversely affect our position in the eyes of the American public. There is no question here whether we should be harsh or should be soft on the Japs. Our occupation authorities are faced with a serious and concrete military problem, not to mention important political considerations having definite bearing upon our long range objectives. As a means of clarifying position here and of offsetting propaganda adverse to our policy and position, it is suggested Dept furnish the press with pertinent facts and considerations inherent in the situation and which support our position.

Please see

SECRET

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SECRET

-4- #192, April 26th., from Tokyo via War

Please see radios exchange between General MacArthur and War on subject of food needs in connection with occupation. References are: from War Dept to SCAP W 80091, WARX 89675, WAR 98126, WAR 98710, WAR 97085; from SCAP to War Dept CA 56217, CA 56674, CA 56727, CA 57156, C 58100, CA 58445, C 59377, C 59880.

This telegram sent with concurrence and approval of General MacArthur.

UM
//
ATCHESON

(*) Being serviced
NOTE:

C-58100	is	CM-IN-4686	(21 Feb. 46)	CAD
C-58445	is	CM-IN-729	(4 Mar 46)	CAD
C-59377	is	CM-IN-6667	(31 Mar 46)	G 2 (State)
C-59880	is	CM-IN-2836	(13 Apr 46)	Gen. Echols
CA-56674	is	CM-IN-1128	(6 Jan 46)	CAD
CA-56727	is	CM-IN-1571	(8 Jan 46)	CAD
CA-57156	is	CM-IN-5689	(25 Jan 46)	CAD
CA-56217		NOT IDENTIFIED IN WDCMC		

MJF

SECRET

545-4619

DCR



WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

BY AUTHORITY OF A.O. OF S., OPD

WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority 750131
By DR/SH NARS, Date 3-6-75

26 APR 1946
Date
File
5-15-46
Initials

OPD 000.7 (19 Apr 46)



MEMORANDUM TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE:
ATTN: Office of Far Eastern Affairs

SUBJECT: Boundary Between United States and Russian Zones North of Hokkaido

letter to Mr. Dinsmore 5/6/46

1. Reference is made to inclosed letter from Mr. Herman H. Dinsmore which contains certain questions with reference to the boundary between the U. S. and Russian zones north of Japan. As indicated in the War Department reply, also inclosed, it is considered that the questions and their implications are of primary interest to the Department of State and it is suggested that the questions ~~will~~ be forwarded to that Department.

2. For your information it is pointed out that, based on advice rendered in memorandum of 9 November 1945 from the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the War Department, Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces, Pacific was directed at that time to take no action to raise the question of the boundary between Kuriles and Hokkaido. A further directive was given to avoid any action which commits the U.S. to any particular boundary line if the question is raised by another party. No other War Department instructions have since been issued on this subject.

3. No instructions have been issued by the War Department concerning the employment of the army forces in the Pacific in the specific area in question and the War Department knows of no instructions which Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces, Pacific has issued to his forces limiting their operations in that area.

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

R. L. Vittrup
FOR R. L. VITTRUP
Colonel, GSC

- 2 Incls
- 1. Cy of ltr from Mr. Herman H. Dinsmore to S/W dd 19 Apr.
- 2. Cy of WD reply to ltr fr Mr. Dinsmore

DCR - NE Unit

na. *SH*

Re

Uat.

Dist.



MAY 15 1946

Confidential File

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-2646

~~TOP SECRET~~

DC/R ROUTING SLIP

FROM Bombay

NO. 2736

ACTION 1JA

COPIES TO: 1 ME

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3 War. 1 encl

(13)
17 Copies

No. 2736

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL

Bombay, India, April 26, 1946

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
MAY 21 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: Criticism in Press of American Policy in Japan.

1-1055

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
MAY 17 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 10 1946

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate General's despatch no. 2728 of April 22, 1946, entitled "Transmission of Newspaper Article Criticising General MacArthur", and to enclose a copy of an editorial entitled "Misgivings About Japan", which appeared in the Times of India on April 25.

The editorial is critical not only of General MacArthur's administration, but of American policy in the occupation of Japan. It points out that, although the decision that post-war control of Japan should be largely an American responsibility was agreed to by the British Commonwealth Governments, it could never have been visualized that the control would be handled in the "splendid isolation" devised by General MacArthur. The editorial goes on to say that General MacArthur's mind appears to be obsessed with the "curiously undemocratic predilection to maintain the absolutism and prestige of his own personal authority as ultimately supreme in Japanese affairs". Mention was made in the editorial of the news reports which have appeared recently in the Bombay press to the effect that the Japanese economy under the General's administration was being geared with that of the United States. The editorial states that "Japan is being firmly bound to the chariot wheels of America's economic juggernaut", and that such a development is bound in the long run "to lead to trouble". It is also alleged in the article that the impression is gaining ground that the re-organizing of Japan is being "more speedy than thorough".

This editorial is an excellent example of the sniping at General MacArthur which has taken place recently in several Bombay newspapers, and particularly the Times of India. In this connection it is well known that the Times of India is, to say the least, amenable to direction of editorial policy by the Government of India. It is not known, of course, if editorials regarding the Japanese situation, such as the one

enclosed

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(Japan) / 4-2646


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 13 1946
DIVISION OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

AIR MAIL

-2-

enclosed, constitute an example of the specific direction of editorial policy by the Indian Government. As the Department has been informed, ownership of the Times of India has recently changed hands, and 80% of the stock of the newspaper is at present in Indian hands. At least up to the present, however, this change in ownership has not been reflected in a change in editorial policy.

Respectfully yours,



Howard Donovan
American Consul General

Enclosure: *MVA*

Editorial entitled "Misgivings
About Japan", Times of India,
April 25, 1946 (in quintuplicate)

800

J. Jefferson Jones, III:edem:fp

Original and hectograph to the Department
Copy to American Mission, New Delhi
American Embassy, London
Political Adviser to General MacArthur, Tokyo

RESTRICTED

Enclosure to Despatch no. 2736 dated April 26, 1946 from Howard Donovan, American Consul General, Bombay, India on subject of "Criticism in Press of American Policy in Japan."

TIMES OF INDIA
April 25, 1946

Misgivings About Japan

A long time has to pass for the post-war world to be free of crises. Affairs affecting Indonesia seem now to be well on their way to a settlement, and it is to be hoped that the problems of India and of Egypt will follow suit. Meanwhile the critical meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the "Big Three" and of France is under way in an endeavour to tackle the knotty problems of the European Continent and its peace settlements. Until after May 6, at the earliest, it is unlikely that all will be well in regard to Persia. Yet even if the atmosphere does happily clear in these matters there are still others, no less complicated, looming on the international horizon. The Palestine Commission will shortly report, and its conclusions can hardly be expected to please everybody, if anybody. Perhaps further ahead—but nevertheless clearly approaching—are serious considerations arising out of the Allied administration of Japan as solely conducted by General MacArthur. To any on-looker it must seem a remarkable contradiction in terms that whereas confusion is rife over the handling of Germany because of different methods adopted by the four Powers in charge of different parts of that country, there seems likely to arise no less misgiving over the future of Japan, whose control has been monopolised by a single direction.

That the post-war control of Japan should be left largely in American hands was a decision taken soon after Japan declared war and was naturally a bilateral understanding between the British Commonwealth and the United States Governments. That such control would be handled in the "splendid isolation" devised by General MacArthur, who operates very much according to his own sweet will, could never have been visualised. The latest storm in the tea-cup of the new Allied Advisory Commission in Tokio is more a symptom of general dissatisfaction than a crisis in itself. One of the troubles seems to be a tendency on the part of General MacArthur to become seized of Japanese conceptions of "face". While determined efforts were made over the last six months to strip the Emperor of Japan of all vestiges of absolutism and divinity, it was decided to retain the "Son of Heaven" as an institution on the grounds that he represented the one stable political element in the country's life. This decision was generally accepted as wise, but concurrently General MacArthur's mind appears to be obsessed with the curiously undemocratic predilection to maintain the absolutism and prestige of his own personal authority as ultimately supreme in Japanese affairs. Suspicion is on the increase that his adamant resistance to any direct Allied check on the exercise of his personal authority has other motives than what is conceived to be the most effective way of purging and democratising Japan. News messages from our Special Correspondents in Tokio, which have been published both in our ordinary news columns and on our commercial pages, supply an increasing flow of evidence that the whole economy of Japan is being firmly bound to the chariot wheels of America's economic juggernaut. A one-way development of this sort in the economic sphere is bound in the long run to lead to trouble. The United States cannot on the one hand demand the relaxation of world trade barriers in return for temporary economic assistance to war-ravaged countries, while with the other it deftly seeks to sew Japan into an economic pattern of its own.

The impression is gaining ground that, behind a facade of dramatic *fiats*, the reorganisation of Japan is being more speedy than thorough. It is wishful thinking, and at best inadvertent deception, to suggest that a country which has had two generations of totalitarian "thought control" can be rushed by devotees of the American way of life—whether political or economic—to a practical appreciation of democratic processes. There is good reason to doubt the wisdom of the occupying Powers, both in Germany and Japan, in promoting democratic structures too rapidly. Apart from the fact that a true understanding of democracy requires some years of intensive education, particularly of the younger generation, democracy as a creed can all too easily be discredited by the inescapable grimness of conditions which the enemy countries have to face. Democratic liberties which are little understood can arouse no appreciation amongst peoples whose economic life inevitably remains either disorganised or grimly limited and who in defeat abruptly find themselves hard put to it to find food and clothing. We have little doubt that it is recognition of this which inspired General MacArthur to make unreasonable demands for food and other imports to Japan. It may very well be part of his policy to try and make the Japanese people feel that they are no worse off and, if possible, better off under democratic auspices.

Enclosure to Despatch no. 2736 dated April 26, 1946 from Howard Donovan, American Consul General, Bombay, India on subject of "Criticism in Press of American Policy in Japan."

TIMES OF INDIA
APRIL 25, 1946

Misgivings About Japan

A long time has to pass for the post-war world to be free of crises. Affairs affecting Indonesia seem now to be well on their way to a settlement, and it is to be hoped that the problems of India and of Egypt will follow suit. Meanwhile the critical meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the "Big Three" and of France is under way in an endeavour to tackle the knotty problems of the European Continent and its peace settlements. Until after May 6, at the earliest, it is unlikely that all will be well in regard to Persia. Yet even if the atmosphere does happily clear in these matters there are still others, no less complicated, looming on the international horizon. The Palestine Commission will shortly report, and its conclusions can hardly be expected to please everybody, if anybody. Perhaps further ahead—but nevertheless clearly approaching—are serious considerations arising out of the Allied administration of Japan as solely conducted by General MacArthur. To any onlooker it must seem a remarkable contradiction in terms that whereas confusion is rife over the handling of Germany because of different methods adopted by the four Powers in charge of different parts of that country, there seems likely to arise no less misgiving over the future of Japan, whose control has been monopolised by a single direction.

That the post-war control of Japan should be left largely in American hands was a decision taken soon after Japan declared war and was naturally a bilateral understanding between the British Commonwealth and the United States Governments. That such control would be handled in the "splendid isolation" devised by General MacArthur, who operates very much according to his own sweet will, could never have been visualised. The latest storm in the tea-cup of the new Allied Advisory Commission in Tokio is more a symptom of general dissatisfaction than a crisis in itself. One of the troubles seems to be a tendency on the part of General MacArthur to become seized of Japanese conceptions of "face". While determined efforts were made over the last six months to strip the Emperor of Japan of all vestiges of absolutism and divinity, it was decided to retain the "Son of Heaven" as an institution on the grounds that he represented the one stable political element in the country's life. This decision was generally accepted as wise, but concurrently General MacArthur's mind appears to be obsessed with the curiously undemocratic predilection to maintain the absolutism and prestige of his own personal authority as ultimately supreme in Japanese affairs. Suspicion is on the increase that his adamant resistance to any direct Allied check on the exercise of his personal authority has other motives than what is conceived to be the most effective way of purging and democratising Japan. News messages from our Special Correspondents in Tokio, which have been published both in our ordinary news columns and on our commercial pages, supply an increasing flow of evidence that the whole economy of Japan is being firmly bound to the chariot wheels of America's economic juggernaut. A one-way development of this sort in the economic sphere is bound in the long run to lead to trouble. The United States cannot on the one hand demand the relaxation of world trade barriers in return for temporary economic assistance to war-ravaged countries, while with the other it deftly seeks to sew Japan into an economic pattern of its own.

The impression is gaining ground that, behind a facade of dramatic *fiats*, the reorganisation of Japan is being more speedy than thorough. It is wishful thinking, and at best inadvertent deception, to suggest that a country which has had two generations of totalitarian "thought control" can be rushed by devotees of the American way of life—whether political or economic—to a practical appreciation of democratic processes. There is good reason to doubt the wisdom of the occupying Powers, both in Germany and Japan, in promoting democratic structures too rapidly. Apart from the fact that a true understanding of democracy requires some years of intensive education, particularly of the younger generation, democracy as a creed can all too easily be discredited by the inescapable grimness of conditions which the enemy countries have to face. Democratic liberties which are little understood can arouse no appreciation amongst peoples whose economic life inevitably remains either disorganised or grimly limited and who in defeat abruptly find themselves hard put to it to find food and clothing. We have little doubt that it is recognition of this which inspired General MacArthur to make unreasonable demands for food and other imports to Japan. It may very well be part of his policy to try and make the Japanese people feel that they are no worse off and, if possible, better off under democratic auspices.

Enclosure to Despatch no. 2736 dated April 26, 1946 from Howard Donovan, American Consul General, Bombay, India on subject of "Criticism in Press of American Policy in Japan."

TIMES OF INDIA
April 25, 1946

Misgivings About Japan

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56

ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM
CORRECTION

ACTION: FE
INFO:
S
U
C
A-H
A-C
EUR
DC/L
ITP
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FC
A-B
SA/M
DC/R

JB
Paraphrase before communicating to anyone.

SECRET

SECSTATE

Information	
FE	✓
CA	✓
JA	✓
SEA	
PI	✓

9879

Tokyo via War

Dated April 26, 1946

Rec'd 6:33 p.m., 27th

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 29 1946
8:15 AM
Department of State

JA

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
APR 29 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

192, April 26,

On page 1, paragraph 1, line 17, delete "to" and please insert the following correction....." which would adversely affect the occupation from military as well as political point of view, it would be logical for members of the council to offer advice in the matter. The reverse however is true. The United States is sending this food to the occupation forces as actually to USAFPAC rather than to SCAP--for the purposes mentioned. The food is being provided by the United States alone, not through an International Organization".....

TELEGRAPH SECTION

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SECRET

NB

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

57

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

JA

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 30 1946
6:10 AM
Department of State

CORRECTION

ACTION: ~~FE~~
INFO:

- S
- U
- C
- A-H
- A-C
- EUR
- DC/L
- ITP
- ESP
- SPD
- FC
- A-B
- SA/M
- DC/R

ROB
No paraphrase necessary

Action	
Information	
FE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CA	<input type="checkbox"/>
JA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SEA	<input type="checkbox"/>
PI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

9879

Tokyo via War

Dated April 26, 1946

SECRET

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
APR 30 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECSTATE

192, April 26.

On page 1, paragraph 1, line 17, delete "(*)" and please insert the following correction....."which would adversely affect the occupation from military as well as political point of view, it would be logical for members of the council to offer advice in the matter. The reverse however is true. The United States is sending this food to the occupation forces as actually to USAFPAC rather than to SCAP--for the purposes mentioned. The food is being provided by the United States alone, not through an International Organization".....

TELEGRAPH SECTION

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

NB

SECRET

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 29 1946
8:15 AM
Department of State

*JA file
5-13-46*

JA

ACTION: FE

S INFO: ME -H
No paraphrase necessary

9877

Tokyo via War

Dated April 26, 1946

Rec'd 6:32 p.m., 27th.

A-H
A-R
FC
OFS
DC/R

SECRET

Action	JA
Information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SEA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
PI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

SECSTATE

191, April 26

#13 OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
APR 29 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Reference final paragraph DEPTTEL State serial
26 April, 2:23 p.m., DTG-222120Z April 22 3 p.m.
regarding communications from this office please
see paragraph two of our 185, April 23. There is
no change in communications procedure including
address except as regards comment on policy matters.

ATCHESON

MJF

SECRET

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) 4-2645

Confidential File

MAY 13 1946

FILED

No. 2913

April 27, 1946

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
 Tel. Tokyo 4/27/46
 APR 27 1946
 Dept. Dutch Embassy
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir,

With reference to my note No. 2675 of April 17 I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that Mr. W. L. Kamper's name has been added to the list of members of the Netherlands mission to General MacArthur's General Headquarters.

Miss K. Borgman Brouwer will accompany the mission as secretary and Corporal B. Boerboom will be the driver of the mission's automobile.

It would be appreciated if clearance for the above mentioned persons could be obtained.

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Ambassador

Rumrill

SEP 11 1946

FILED

CS/VJ

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
 /4-2746

740.00119 Control (Japan)
 4-2746

DCF NE Unit
msd
W

The Honorable
 The Acting Secretary of State
 Washington, D. C.

ER
JH

JA

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM, SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
MESSAGE:

Collect

Department of State

RESTRICTED

Charge Department:

Paraphrase before commu-
nicating to Government
Agencies.
Washington
RESTRICTED

Charge to

MAY 17 1946
6 jr

5084

AMERICAN CONSUL,
BATAVIA, JAVA.

173

Please notify following members of Netherlands
GOVT Mission for Japan, now in Batavia, that SCAP
has granted them permission to proceed to Tokyo:
Lieutenant-General W. Schilling, Consul-General J.B.D.
Pennink, Lieutenant-Commander L. Brouwer R.N.N.,
Lieutenant s.g. W.J. de Bruin R.N.N.R., W.L. Kamper,
Miss K. Borgman Brouwer, and Corporal B. Boerboom.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/4-2746
aw

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
MAY 21 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Acheson
Acting
(jcp)

DCR NE Unit
md
W

CS/VJ

740.00119 Control (Japan) /4-2746

MAY 17 1946

MAY 17 1946
SM

JA:HLory:mls
5-14-46
HB

jcp
FE

NOE
jk

Emb
A-H

MAY 17 1946

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your notes of April 11 and April 27, 1946, informing the Department of the appointment of a mission to represent the interests of the Netherlands in Japan and requesting that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan be informed of the appointment of this mission.

The Department has been informed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers that approval has been given for this mission to proceed to Tokyo. As it is understood the members of the mission are now in Batavia, the Department has instructed the American ^{General at} Consul in Batavia to notify the members of the mission that they have been granted permission to enter Japan.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

DCE NE Unit

For the Secretary of State:

His Excellency

Mr. A. Loudon

Ambassador of The Netherlands

JA:HLory/pm - 5/15/46

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-2746

CS/WJ

740.00119 Control (Japan) / 4-2746

General at requests by telegram

CR MAY 17 1946

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten initials and stamps]

*No reply required.
meeting held Monday,
& I have returned SWB*

WAR DEPARTMENT
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*Stone -
Require reply?*

*Did you
give WBS report*
APR 30 4 24 PM '46
OFFICE OF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
STATE DEPARTMENT
4-8

27 April 1946

file

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-27 46

The Honorable William Benton
The Assistant Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary:

General MacArthur's Chief of Civil Information and Education, Brigadier General Ken R. Dyke, has sent his Executive Officer, Major Edwin D. Dodd, back to the United States for the purpose of assisting the Civil Affairs Division in recruiting key civilian advisors and administrative personnel for his Section.

To coordinate this action with the State Department, Major Dodd will accompany Captain Beauchamp and Mr. Roland Segalini, personnel representatives of my Division, to your office 29 April 1946 to consult with Mr. William Stone on matters relating to this recruitment.

Sincerely yours,

O P E Echols

O. P. ECHOLS
Major General, USA
Director, Civil Affairs Division

740.00119 Control (Japan)
FILED / 4-29-46
AUG 19 1948
CS/V

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Cat. *W*
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DIVISION OF
GENERAL SERVICES
GRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION: EUR

INFO:

S

U

A-H

A-R

FE

FC

OCD


DC/R

JSP -P-X

Paraphrase before communicating to anyone.

SECRET

SECSTATE



10189

London

Dated April 29, 1946

Rec'd 2:51 p.m.

Handwritten signature

4573, April 29, 6 p.m.

Embassy has learned from member of his family that A.D.F. Gascoigne has been appointed senior British political representative in Tokyo and he will leave for Japan at end of week. Gascoigne has just returned from Budapest where he was British political representative. He served in Tokyo from 1931-1934.

GALLMAN

DM

SECRET

740.00719 CONTROL (JAPAN) 4-2946

Confidential File

FILED
MAY 6 - 1946

58

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 1 - 1946
DIRECTOR
Department of State

JA
File
5-28-46

ACTION: ~~FE~~

INFO:

S EG -W -M
U No paraphrase necessary

173

Tokyo via War

Dated April 29, 1946

Rec'd 11:49 a.m., May 1st

A-C
A-H
EUR
DC/L
ITP
ESP
FC
DC/R

SECRET

Action	JA
Information	
FE	✓
CA	
JA	✓
SEA	
PI	✓

DEPARTMENT OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
Tokyo
MAY 1 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECSTATE

195, April 29.

1. SCAP has received from War Dept by telegraph text of Far Eastern policy statement on US food shipments to Japan. We are concerned over the wording of the first paragraph of the policy statement, especially the reference to the Allied Council:

"Except to the extent that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, with the advice of the Allied Council for Japan, determines."

In context this reference to the Council would seem to imply granting of a controlling voice to the Council in this matter of food supplies and consequent limitation upon the authority of the Supreme Commander alone to determine measures necessary for the safety of the occupation forces. The wording of the statement also appears to imply a change in the terms of reference for the Council as set forth in the communique of the Moscow conference. Under B(96) of the communique control function of the Council or its members are strictly limited and the category of matters on which members of the Council exercise some control do not include the particular question at hand.

The question whether the terms of reference for the

SECRET

Ed
no list
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUN 5 1946

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) 4-29-46

Confidential File
LRC

59

SECRET

-2-#195, April 29, from Tokyo via War

the Council can be so altered seems to me of utmost importance. I respectfully submit my opinion that change in the terms of reference for the Council can only be effected by unanimous agreement on a governmental level among the 4 govts whose agreement at Moscow December 27th 1945 created the Council. I may add that if this policy statement of the Far Eastern Commission is permitted to stand with the concurrence of the US, it will provide an opening wedge, inevitably to be followed by others, to divide the administrative responsibility of the Supreme Commander as the sole executive authority for the Allied powers in Japan. I believe that such division would undermine the occupation, would work great harm to American interests and American prestige, and would in the end nullify the announced objectives of all the allies in this country.

2. As regards the question of the Allied Council's relationship to the matter of food supplies for Jap consumption sent to this country to safeguard the occupation, please see my telegram No. 192, April 26.

3. It would be very helpful to me, both as chairman and US member of the Allied Council, if Dept could conveniently keep me currently and adequately informed in regard to pertinent activities of the Far Eastern Commission.

ATCHESON

MJF

SECRET

FORM DS-516
5-13-47

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CHARGE SLIP

FILE NUMBER	DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	CHARGE TO-	DATE OF CHARGE
740. 00119 Control (Japan) / 4-2946	To Tokyo T-319. 5721146	L Punyon	5-19-46
			17

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CHARGE SLIP

FILE NUMBER	DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	CHARGE TO-	DATE OF CHARGE	CLERK'S INITIALS
119 Control (Japan) / 4-2946	To Tokyo T-319. 5721146	L Rumyan	5-19-51	MKB
			176	332

*6/19
Carter*

DC/R ROUTING SLIP

FROM Takya

NO. 397

ACTION 1 JA - 1 set ends

COPIES TO: 1 FE

1 OA

1 JK

5 OCD - 1 set ends

1 EUR

1 FI

1 DA

3 War - 1 set ends

1 Navy - 1 set ends

(15) 13

16 copies



UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, April 30, 1946

RESTRICTED

No. 397

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FOREIGN
REPORTING SERVICES
MAY 1 0 1946

SUBJECT: Inaugural Meeting of Allied Council for Japan

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 371, April 15, 1946, subject "Inaugural Meeting of Allied Council for Japan", and to forward as an accompaniment five copies each of the "Summary of the Proceedings of the First Meeting Allied Council for Japan" and "Verbatim Minutes of the First Meeting Allied Council for Japan." It will be noted that both summary minutes and verbatim minutes are to be prepared for each formal meeting of the Council. Copies will be forwarded by this Mission to the Department and to interested Missions immediately upon receipt from the Secretariat of the Council.

At General MacArthur's request, I am, as Chairman of the Council, forwarding copies of these and related documents to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission in Washington.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

RECEIVED
1946 MAY 9 9 46 AM '46
740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 4-30-46
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JUN 1 1946
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Accompaniment:

Five copies each, as listed.

- Original and hectograph to Department
- Copies to: American Embassy, Moscow
- American Embassy, London
- American Embassy, Nanking
- American Legation, Canberra
- American Legation, Wellington
- American Mission, New Delhi

500
WJSebald:jwb

DCR NE Unit

Row

Col

Dist

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
~~Eastern~~
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Copy given to Major Starnes 5/11/46 file JEP
April 30, 1946.
(war Dept telegram retained)

EUR - Mr. Hickerson ✓
FE - Mr. Vincent ✓
JCV. OK ASK JEP

The attached War Department telegram from General MacArthur suggests that the number of Soviet officials in Japan be limited to the present number of approximately 285 persons. General MacArthur points out that the number is sufficient for all legitimate purposes and is fantastically out of proportion to the number of officials from other countries in Japan.

Some time ago at the request of the Secretary, the State, War and Navy Departments worked out a set of regulations for the control of the entry of foreigners into Japan. These regulations were telegraphed to General MacArthur with the suggestion that he, as SCAP, might care to put in regulations along the lines suggested. General MacArthur replied that he concurred with the suggested regulations and made suggestions for three minor changes which were accepted by the State, War and Navy Departments. It is understood that he plans to put these regulations into effect immediately.

In view of the large number of Russian officials already in Japan it is believed that the State Department can concur in the recommendations made by General MacArthur in the attached War Department message.

We must be prepared, of course, to have the Soviet Government react rather strongly to the inauguration of the proposals suggested by General MacArthur as well as the proposed regulations for the entrance and exit of persons into Japan. In view, however, of the extremely strict regulations enforced by the Soviet Government in the Balkans, I do not feel that General MacArthur should be deterred from inaugurating any reasonable controls and limitations as to the number of foreign officials in Japan.

In any recommendation we make to the War Department we should make it clear that the question of entrance and exit and the number of foreigners in Japan, is a matter for General MacArthur to decide himself as Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, and it is not therefore a question for either the War Department, State Department or the United States Government itself, to decide.

FILED
MAY - 9 1946

[Signature]
Elbridge Durbrow.

EE:EDurbrow:GP

CS/WJ

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)

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