

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: What in a general way, would you say
3 are the duties and the functions of G-2?

4 General Miles: The Military Intelligence Division of
5 the General Staff is charged with the collection, analysis,
6 estimation, dissemination of information primarily for the
7 Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War.

8 G-2 is a staff officer of the Chief of Staff, an
9 assistant chief of staff for intelligence.

10 Mr. Gesell: G-2 is another name for Military Intelli-
11 gence Division, is that correct?

12 General Miles: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Gesell: Now, prior to assuming your duties as
14 G-2, what had been your military experience, as far as the
15 Far East was concerned? Had you had duty in the Far East,
16 or any particular contact with Far Eastern matters?

17 General Miles: No, sir, I had never had duty in the
18 Far East.

19 Mr. Gesell: Had you ever had duty in Hawaii?

20 General Miles: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Gesell: What was the nature of that duty?

22 General Miles: I was G-3, Operations Officer of the
23 Hawaiian Department, from April 1929 until May, 1932.

24 Mr. Gesell: And who was your commanding officer
25 during that time at Hawaii?

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General Miles: I had four commanding generals during my service as G-3 in Hawaii: General Fox Connor, General Wyant, General Lassiter and General Wells.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

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Mr. Gesell: Now during the entire time you were there you were G-3, Operations, is that correct?

General Miles: That is true, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Generally, what was the nature of that duty?

General Miles: I had supervision over all war plans and defense projects of the Hawaiian Department. I was the Staff Officer in general charge of training, I prepared maneuvers, exercises of all kinds for the Commanding General.

Mr. Gesell: Had you ever had any war plans duty in the General Staff here at Washington?

General Miles: Not before going to Hawaii.

Mr. Gesell: Subsequent to that time did you have such duty, and if so, what was it?

General Miles: I did, sir. I served four years on the War Plans Division of the General Staff, from June 1934 to June 1938.

Mr. Gesell: In what capacity?

General Miles: I was the head of the plans and projects section of the War Plans Division and as such had supervision over war plans and defense projects of the three overseas departments, Philippine, Panama and Hawaii.

Mr. Gesell: How long have you been in the military service, General?

General Miles: I entered the military service in June,

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2 1901, as a cadet.

3 Mr. Gesell: When did your responsibilities as G-2 cease?

4 General Miles: I was relieved of G-2 the 30th, I think,
5 of January, 1942.

6 Mr. Gesell: Now, if the committee please, before pro-
7 ceeding with the examination of General Miles, we would like
8 to offer for the record two basic exhibits which will be the
9 subject of consideration as the examination proceeds.

10 The first, to be designated as Exhibit 32, is entitled
11 "Messages Between War Department and Hawaii from July 8 to
12 December 7, 1941."

13 I would like to explain to the committee that these
14 messages are, of course, all in the nature of radio dispatches,
15 and primarily we have assembled these messages of a warning
16 character or of an alert character. We believe this is a
17 fairly complete compilation of such messages.

18 Mr. Gearhart: What is the date?

19 Mr. Gesell: From July 8 to December 7, 1941. It has
20 been distributed to the committee and is the thin volume in
21 pink covers.

22 The title requires a slight explanation also, to orient
23 the committee to the exhibit. On November 27 there was a
24 message sent to General Short, with which of course the
25 committee is familiar, warning of the imminence of hostilities.

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2 On the same day some similar messages were sent by the War
3 Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur
4 and to the General in charge of the Panama area.

5 We have included in this group of messages the messages
6 sent to those other theaters at the same time, and their replies
7 as well, feeling that in order for the committee to have the
8 full picture it would be of interest to compare the replies
9 of other theaters to the reply of General Short to somewhat
10 comparable messages.

11 We want to point out, however, as it will appear, that
12 the messages were different in certain respects.

13 We would also like to offer at this time as Exhibit 33
14 the thick folder in pink covers entitled "Military Intelligence
15 Estimates Prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C."

16 This includes, as the index at the beginning makes clear,
17 military intelligence estimates during the period July 1 to
18 December 7, 1941, and there are some 30 in number of various
19 dates, the subject matters being indicated in the index.

20 May those be received, Mr. Chairman?

21 The Chairman: Those will be made exhibits as indicated,
22 32 and 33.

23 (The documents referred to were
24 marked Exhibits 32 and 33.)

25 Mr. Gesell: Now, General, I believe you said the Military

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Intelligence Division had the responsibility of assembling and disseminating military information. Was it also a function of that Division to evaluate the information assembled?

General Miles: It was, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Could you indicate to us briefly how the Military Intelligence Division was organized, the principal branches and functions?

General Miles: I believe, Mr. Counsel, that there is before the committee a chart of the organization of the Military Intelligence Division. Am I correct, sir?

Mr. Gesell: I believe I have seen such a chart. Would you indicate generally what the principal branches of the Division are?

General Miles: The latest chart I have is October 10, 1941. The principal branches were the Administrative branch, the Intelligence branch, the Counter-Intelligence branch, the Plans and Training branch, and the Information Control branch.

Mr. Gesell: Now what were the functions of the Intelligence branch?

General Miles: The functions, in general, of the Intelligence branch were those duties of the War Department General Staff which related to the collation, evaluation and dissemination of military information, that is positive information coming from foreign countries. I emphasize the

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2 word "positive" because in the preceding war we had designated
3 these two branches as the positive and the negative.

4 In other words, the difference between the Intelligence
5 Branch and Counter-Intelligence branch was the difference
6 between the assembly of actual information we needed on the
7 one hand and the information which the enemy was seeking from
8 us, or the potential enemy was seeking from us, and our follow-
9 ing up that information in the Counter-Intelligence branch.

10 Mr. Gesell: Now what was the general function of the
11 Plans and Trainings branch? Did that have to do with the
12 evaluation of the intelligence?

13 General Miles: No, sir. The Plans and Training branch
14 was practically entirely a branch devoted to the plans for
15 the expansion of the Military Intelligence Division, which, in
16 the years in which I was G-2, was very considerable, and of
17 the training of future officers, agents and other personnel
18 for the Division.

19 Mr. Gesell: Did the Information Control branch have to
20 do with the maintaining of security regulations and controls
21 over the information assembled?

22 General Miles: It did, sir.

23 Mr. Gesell: Was that primarily a function of the Military
24 Intelligence Division?

25 General Miles: It was a function. The security of

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2 information was a part of the general duties of the Military
3 Intelligence Division.

4 Mr. Gesell: Now did the Military Intelligence Division
5 report to any particular officer or branch of the War Depart-
6 ment?

7 General Miles: It reported to the Chief of Staff.

8 Mr. Gesell: In the collection, evaluation and dissemina-
9 tion of information was it charged with reporting to anyone
10 other than the Chief of Staff?

11 General Miles: Not strictly reporting, sir. We did
12 disseminate information to a good many people other than the
13 Chief of Staff, but we reported only directly to the Chief of
14 Staff.

15 Mr. Gesell: You mean reported in a command sense?

16 General Miles: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Gesell: Was it the responsibility of the Military
18 Intelligence Division to disseminate information to the various
19 theaters?

20 General Miles: It was, sir, if I understand it to mean
21 the overseas departments and major divisions of the Army.

22 Mr. Gesell: Was it the responsibility of the Military
23 Intelligence Division to also distribute such information to
24 the other branches of the General Staff, such as War Plans?

25 General Miles: Very definitely, sir, it was.

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The Chairman: The hour of 12 o'clock having arrived,
 the committee will recess until 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed
 until 2:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

1 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

2 Counsel will proceed with General Miles.

3 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, before proceeding, there
4 is a correction I want to make in the record.

5 In the quotation which I gave this morning I spoke of
6 September 16, 1940. I find that I took the one above rather
7 than the one below. It was October 30, 1940, so that should
8 appear correctly in the record.

9 The Chairman: That correction will be made.

10 Senator Brewster: And there is another matter in con-
11 nection with the quotation by the chairman this morning from
12 Mr. Stimson in 1932. I gathered that that was to lend support
13 to the idea that the Fleet in Hawaii did act as a deterrent
14 in the view of Mr. Stimson and possibly of his chief at that
15 time and, if so, in connection with that I would like to have
16 the records of that time, if they will secure it from the
17 Navy, showing the relative strength of the American and the
18 Japanese fleets at that time and also the strength of the air
19 forces as then developed, in order that in appraising the de-
20 terrent possibilities of the Fleet in Hawaii in 1932 and in
21 1941 we may have a complete picture.

22 The Chairman: Well, the chair might state that in pre-
23 senting that memorandum from the book by Mr. Stimson he was
24 seeking to refresh the recollection of Mr. Grew, but he has no
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objection to the request of the Senator.

Senator Brewster: I think that was a very relevant matter, a very good piece to have in the record and I would like to have with it the relative strength.

The Chairman: All right. Go ahead, counsel.

Mr. Gesell: General Miles, we are discussing the organization and the responsibilities of the military intelligence division. Could you give us a little more fully a picture of the activities of that division and the manner in which it functioned?

General Miles: The military intelligence division comprised a good many activities and functions. I would say that they could be largely summarized by the statement that those functions were designed to secure, evaluate and disseminate the information, to prevent information from getting to any potential or possible enemy, and to train and expand the division for possible eventuality, even war.

During my period with G-2 the war in Europe was increasing in tempo and the situation in the Far East was certainly becoming no better, so that we were constantly branching out into activities that had not been handled by the military intelligence division in time of peace and expanding enormously our personnel to handle those activities.

Mr. Gesell: What was the size of the organization in

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Washington, roughly, at the time of the Japanese attack?

General Miles: Within the War Department I should estimate it as somewhere in the neighborhood of four hundred or four hundred fifty persons.

Mr. Gesell: There were also representatives of the division, were there not, in the various overseas departments?

General Miles: The G-2's of the overseas department, as well as those of the corps areas, were not directly representatives of the military intelligence division. They were the staff officers of their particular commanding officers, chosen by them. We had only a liaison relationship with them, if I may so express it.

The military attaches and military observers overseas, on the other hand, were directly responsible to and selected by the general military intelligence division.

The Chairman: The chair desires to call your attention to the fact that the spectators do not hear you distinctly and will you turn your voice to the microphone in front of you so that you may be heard distinctly?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. Gesell: You were discussing the attaches, General, and I gather from what you say that the military attaches attached to the various embassies and legations were directly

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responsible to the military intelligence division.

General Miles: Yes. They were selected by the military intelligence division, of course, with the consent of the Department of State. In many cases I imagine the Department of State consulted the respective Ambassador or Minister and they were while so serving, of course, members of the embassy or legation staff, but they had more direct responsibility to the military intelligence division than with G-2's of the various major commanders of the Army.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, as far as those G-2's are concerned, let us take a specific situation such as prevailed at Hawaii.

Is my understanding correct that the communication and contact between G-2 in Washington and the Hawaiian department would be through the commanding officer there rather than a direct relationship between the G-2 on General Short's staff and officers of your own division?

General Miles: That is not wholly correct, sir. The G-2 of the War Department sent out a great deal of information directly to the G-2's of the overseas department and the corps areas, what might be called technical or static information. Information, however, which would imply the decision or belief of the Chief of Staff as to a particular situation, particularly if it was very important, would

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Witness Miles;

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1 normally be and should be sent out by the War Department
 2 as such under the name of the Chief of Staff or the Adjutant
 3 General because there you are speaking directly to the com-
 4 manding General of this major unit.
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6 Mr. Gesell: In other words, G-2 in Washington kept
 7 the G-2 members of the overseas department staffs informed
 8 through the submission of basic information directly to
 9 them from time to time?

10 General Miles: That is correct. We supplied the over-
 11 seas departments with static information, revised from time to
 12 time, on countries of interest to them and also current
 13 information which affected them.

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Mr. Gesell: On the other hand, if, on the basis of that information, it was felt that some specific action should be taken that was communicated, as a matter of procedure, and practice from the War Department as such in the matters you indicated directly to the Commanding Officer, in the case of Hawaii General Short, is that correct?

General Miles: Yes, whenever this information became more than information per se and became in any sense a directive or suggestion of the War Department, then that information should be and was transmitted through command channels.

G-2 was not in the command channel.

Mr. Gesell: Then I take it the reverse was also true, that G-2, at Hawaii, for example, would transmit what you call static information from time to time to the Military Intelligence Division for it to integrate with the information already available.

General Miles: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, will counsel have the witness explain what he means by static information? It is not clear to me what that term signifies.

Mr. Gesell: Will you explain that, General Miles?

Mr. Keefe: I think I understand what the word "static" means, but as applied to this case, I do not synchronize it exactly.

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General Miles; The Military Intelligence Division maintained what was known as a digest of intelligence on the countries of the world which were of military interest to us. Those were very voluminous documents. They were divided into headings of political, economic, combat, civil aviation, and military aviation. They were loose-leaf documents, added to and changed as information came in by the transmission of the new mimeographed sheet for inclusion in the digest.

From that digest was written, in the Military Intelligence Division, estimates on these countries. Those again were rather voluminous. They were divided into political, economic, and combat. They were always revised yearly, and from time to time also when necessary, by the forwarding of loose-leaves for inclusion in the estimates.

There was also a handbook on the Japanese Army gotten out by the Military Intelligence Division, on the 14th of May, 1941.

There was another publication on the identification of Japanese aircraft, gotten out on the 24th of October, 1941; a monograph on Thailand for the same year.

All that is what I have described perhaps loosely by the use of the word static. It was more or less static information, which we kept up, however, currently, as new

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information was received.

Mr. Gesell: So we understand, General, would it be fair to say that that information was generally of a statistical and informative character, with little evaluation material contained therein? In other words, it was designed to keep the G-2's posted as to the size of the armies and movements that might be anticipated of their forces, and matters of that sort?

General Miles: Generally speaking, yes, sir. But we also, of course, expressed definite opinion, as to the efficiency of the various forces that we were discussing.

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2 Mr. Gesell: Some of those estimates are contained in
3 this document that was introduced this morning, are they not,
4 as they relate to the Far East, Military Intelligence Estimates
5 Prepared by G-2, Exhibit 33?

6 General Miles: Those are estimates of the situation
7 prepared directly for the Chief of Staff. I think it is un-
8 fortunate we used the word "estimates" twice, referring to
9 two different sets of documents. The estimates that I spoke
10 of in answer to the Congressman's question were the static
11 estimates, so-called, which were revised from time to time.
12 The estimates of the situation were our opinions of current
13 situations written for the Chief of Staff.

14 Mr. Gesell: They were distributed to all the G-2's,
15 were they, and they were not prepared with any specific re-
16 ference to any overseas theater as opposed to any other over-
17 seas theater?

18 General Miles: They were not written with any particular
19 overseas theater in mind, but they were written directly for
20 the Chief of Staff and General Staff.

21 Mr. Gesell: Of the theaters or of the overseas depart-
22 ments?

23 General Miles: No, sir, of the General Staff, the War
24 Department General Staff.

25 Mr. Gesell: Now I think there is some confusion here.

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2 I was talking still about the static information which we
3 were referring to and not about this volume, Exhibit 33.

4 General Miles: Then you are correct, sir.

5 Mr. Gesell: On the other hand, the estimates in Exhibit
6 33 were prepared not for distribution to the theaters, but for
7 the information of the General Staff?

8 General Miles: Chief of Staff and his General Staff, yes,
9 sir.

10 Mr. Gesell: Well, now, what were your particular functions
11 and duties in this organization, General Miles?

12 General Miles: I was the head of the whole organization,
13 Military Intelligence Division, responsible for its administra-
14 tion, its expansion and for its output.

15 In other words, I spoke for the Military Intelligence
16 of the General Staff. A paper would normally be prepared, we
17 will say, of the Far East estimate by the Far Eastern section.
18 That would then go for revision or comment to the immediate
19 Chief of the Far Eastern section, the head of the Intelligence
20 branch, and from that branch to me. But I am responsible for
21 and was responsible for the output of the Division.

22 Mr. Gesell: Well, now, as head of the organization of
23 course you had to give special emphasis to certain aspects of
24 its activities, and I wondered whether there was any particular
25 phase of the work of the Military Intelligence Division which

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you gave particular attention to.

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General Miles: Normally I would say that my particular attention was devoted to our output in the way of analyzed and estimated, evaluated information which we called "Intelligence", but I also had a good many other irons in the fire.

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Mr. Gesell: Now how were you organized within your Division in respect to the handling of the Far Eastern information?

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General Miles: The Far Eastern section of the Intelligence branch was at that time under Colonel Bratton. He received all information that we obtained on the Far East from our military attaches, our observers, from the State Department, from the Navy Department, other departments of the Government, and although it was drying up considerably, information from civilian companies or press in the Far East, together, of course, with the secret information that we were getting from the intercepts - magic.

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Mr. Gesell: Now to whom was he responsible?

General Miles: He was directly responsible to the Chief of the Intelligence branch, at that time Colonel Hayes Kroner. There was, however, also within that branch a situation section under Lieutenant Colonel Betts, not Brigadier General. That was in charge of information bearing on the situation in all parts of the world. I described it at that time as the heart

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2 of the Intelligence branch. It maintained situation maps
3 both for G-2 and for the Secretary of War. All special studies,
4 and so forth, emanate from this particular section.

5 Mr. Gesell: And that section would work in close coordina-
6 tion, I gather from your statement, with the Far Eastern section
7 of the Intelligence branch in the formulation of estimates and
8 studies, is that correct?

9 General Miles: That is correct.

10 Mr. Gesell: Well, now, during that time you have indicated
11 you had several sources of information. You mentioned attaches,
12 you mentioned, I believe, the Japanese intercepts, which you
13 referred to as "magic". What other sources were there?

14 General Miles: We had some observers in the field. We
15 had a mission under General Magruder in China. We had, of
16 course, the Intelligence Division in the staff of the Hawaiian
17 and Philippine Departments that were getting us information.
18 We had started a nucleus of what might be called a secret
19 service under Colonel Clear in Singapore. We had little
20 money to give him, but at least he did make progress in tying
21 in with the British Secret Service in the Far East. We
22 exchanged information, of course, with the Department of
23 State and Navy Department particularly, and several other
24 agencies, independent agencies of the Government in Washington,
25 and with the military attaches and missions, particularly

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British, at that time in Washington.

Mr. Gesell: And I gather that all of these sources were sources of information which contributed data concerning the Far East?

General Miles: They did, sir.

Mr. Gesell: What sort of liaison did you maintain with the State and Navy Departments? What were the mechanics of that and how did it function?

General Miles: I should like to go into that in a little detail. When I took over G-2 I found that a daily liaison was being maintained with the Department of State and the Navy Department. With the Department of State it was handled directly by then Colonel Magruder. During my tour of duty three other officers in succession took up this duty. They were then Colonel Betts, Colonel Montague and Colonel Sands.

In addition to that I personally knew several of the Assistant Secretaries of State and the Under Secretary of State, and at least two or three times went, at his request, to the office of the Secretary of State on intelligence matters.

With the Navy Department the same liaison existed, but more in detail. In other words, officers from my Far Eastern section visited many times a week, perhaps many times a day certain days, the corresponding officers of the office of Naval Intelligence. I was always in constant touch with the

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three officers who successively occupied that post.

Mr. Gesell: You mean in the Navy?

General Miles: In the Navy.

Mr. Gesell: Head of ONI?

General Miles: Head of ONI.

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The liaison, I think, was very close at all times. I seem to have misplaced some papers that I wrote out in respect to the time of this committee, but I can summarize it, I think, from memory.

Two steps were taken by the Military Intelligence Division during the year 1941 to increase considerably the liaison between the War Department, particular military intelligence, and the other departments of the Government here in Washington.

In June, I think -- I have the record here -- no, in July -- July 14, 1941, the Chiefs of the Office of Naval Intelligence, at that time Captain Kirk and I, requested the joint Army and Navy Board, which was then the highest coordinating military agency under the Commander in Chief, for permission to appear before it with certain suggestions and plans for integrating intelligence into that body. We did so appear on the 16th of July, with written proposals and arguments as to why we thought a greater integration of intelligence with that body would be useful.

The three proposals were that the Chiefs of Naval and Military Intelligence be made members of the Board, or alternatively, that they be made members of the Joint Planning Committee, which was the committee serving the Board, or, alternatively, that a joint intelligence committee

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co-equal with the Joint Planning Committee be established by the Joint Army and Navy Board.

These proposals were processed through the Joint Planning Committee and the general Board, and they resulted in the recommendation of the Joint Board to the two Secretaries that a joint intelligence committee be formed.

I have records of the date.

Mr. Gesell: That was a joint committee between the Army and Navy?

General Miles: That is the Joint Army and Navy Board which had been established a great many years before. The establishment of a joint intelligence committee serving the Joint Board was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on the 1st of October, and the Secretary of War on the 29th of September, and appropriate orders were issued.

The Joint Intelligence Committee members had their first meeting on the 11th of October, 1941, but did not actually function until the 8th or 9th of December.

The second step taken by Military intelligence to enlarge liaison was this:

In April of 1941, a memorandum was written by G-2 suggesting that representatives of nine departments of the Government, including War be assembled to discuss and formulate policies and means of exchanging information between

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the departments, all information which affected the policy formulation of the Government.

The Secretary approved that memorandum and wrote the letters to the other eight Cabinet members or chiefs of independent offices. Throughout that summer, meetings were held in the Office of G-2, two separate plans were drawn up, two successive plans were drawn up, and finally, I think in late August or September, but I can obtain the date, the representatives of the nine agencies signed the draft of plan.

This was approved by the various Cabinet ministers and chiefs of independent agencies, successively, during the succeeding months. The last letter that I found in the files was dated the earlier part of October, 1941, from the Secretary of Agriculture.

This plan was, in general, the establishment within each department of an officer or office specifically charged with disseminating the information received by that department to the other departments concerned and receiving from the other departments and disseminating within his own department similar information.

The plan also included certain provisions for the safeguarding of this information in the various departments.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, under the scheme you have

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2 just indicated and through the liaison that was established
3 on a more informal basis between the State and Navy, I
4 gather you had some facilities, at least for giving them
5 what information you had and getting their information from
6 them?
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8 General Miles: I think we had very complete means of
9 doing so, so far as any information was given to us. I don't
10 mean to say that we would always control another department,
11 nor did we attempt to.

12 Mr. Gesell: Now, one of the most important types of
13 information with which we are concerned here, is the magic
14 or Japanese intercepts. Are you familiar with exhibits 1
15 and 2 in this proceeding, the diplomatic and military inter-
16 cepts contained in these volumes which I show you?

17 General Miles: I have seen those volumes, yes, sir.

18 Mr. Gesell: To what extent did these intercepts come
19 to your attention as they were translated?

20 General Miles: They were brought to me and to a
21 limited number of other officers in the War Department by
22 my own officers in the Far Eastern section in lock-boxes or
23 dispatch cases to which I had a key, and I read them; put
24 them back in the dispatch case, and sent them on.

25 Mr. Gesell: It was the procedure and practice then,
I gather, for you to see all intercepted Japanese messages

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

h3

during the time that you were G-2?

General Miles: There was a great deal of what we call chitter-chat in those messages which was not disseminated. Only the messages of some importance to us were disseminated.

Mr. Gesell: Would you say that these two exhibits I have referred to contain information of a chitter-chat nature, or are these more of a type which would have come to you under the procedure, the diplomatic and military?

General Miles: These are the types of messages that were distributed.

Mr. Gesell: Have you any record, General Miles, of which particular intercepts you saw during this period?

General Miles: I have no record at this time, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Do you believe the committee would be correct in assuming that you, in all probability, saw all of the intercepts contained in these two exhibits which have been introduced?

General Miles: It is my belief that I saw them all, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now, did G-2 have the responsibility for intercepting those messages?

General Miles: No, sir; they were intercepted by Naval Communications; they first reached Naval Communications,

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

and the Signal Intelligence Service.

Mr. Gesell: The Signal Intelligence Service of the Army?

General Miles: Of the Army, which was not a part of G-2, nor was G-2 a part of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. Gesell: Now, did G-2 have, as far as the messages intercepted by the Signal Service were concerned, the responsibility for translating or decoding the messages?

General Miles: No, sir. The messages were decoded jointly by Naval Communications and S.I.S., Signal Intelligence Service.

Mr. Gesell: Then, do I understand that the messages reached G-2 from the Signal Service after they had been translated or from the Naval Communications Service after they had been translated.

General Miles: That is true, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now, to whom did these messages come in G-2?

General Miles: They came to the Far Eastern section, Colonel Bratton.

Mr. Gesell: Whose responsibility was it to determine which messages would be distributed among higher officers?

General Miles: Colonel Bratton, initially.

Mr. Gesell: Did you exercise any judgment or selection

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell
Mr. Keefe

h5

1 in that regard?

2 General Miles: No, sir.

3 Mr. Gesell: What other officers did in the Army?

4 General Miles: I think no one except Colonel Bratton
5 and his subordinates.
6

7 Mr. Gesell: Now, can you tell us who, in the War Depart-
8 ment, received the texts of the messages during this period?

9 General Miles: I have before me a confidential agree-
10 ment drawn up in G-2 dated January 23, 1941, signed by
11 Captain Hugh James, Acting Director of Naval Intelligence,
12 and myself, in which was laid down what officers or persons
13 this magic was to be distributed to, and by whom.

14 Within the War Department, the Secretary of War, the
15 Chief of Staff, the Military Aide to the President in excep-
16 tional cases only; he was, however, not an officer of the
17 War Department.

18 Mr. Gesell: That was General Watson, was it?

19 General Miles: Yes, sir, that was General Watson.

20 Mr. Gesell: Yes, sir.

21 General Miles: And the War Plans Division.

22 Mr. Gesell: The War Plans Division, or the Chief of
23 the War Plans Division.

24 General Miles: The Chief of the War Plans Division.

25 Mr. Keefe: Who was that?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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General Miles: General Gerow.

Mr. Gesell: So that list would include Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, General Gerow, and transmission to the President through General Watson?

General Miles: And myself.

Mr. Gesell: And yourself?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now, was there anyone else in the War Department who was authorized to see the intercepts?

General Miles: No, sir. I would like to point out also that General Watson received them in exceptional cases only as per this agreement and later on the messages were delivered to the White House through the Naval Aide to the President, and not the Military Aide.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, during the time that delivery was being made by the Army to the White House, who made the determination of what messages would be sent to General Watson for the President?

General Miles: That also was Colonel Bratton's duty.

Mr. Gesell: What was meant by "exceptional circumstances," particularly significant messages?

General Miles: I imagine that that was the meaning of that phrase at the time this agreement was written.

Mr. Gesell: For what period -- put it this way: When

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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did the War Department cease advising the White House and that function was taken over by the Navy?

General Miles: My recollection is the first of November, 1941.

Mr. Gesell: Did the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden, receive these intercepts?

General Miles: No, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now, what was the machinery for distributing them? Were they left with these various officials for their study, or how was it handled?

General Miles: So far as possible, the distributing officer remained in the office while the officer, whoever it was, read the message. That, of course, was not always possible, particularly the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and they were then left for him to read and he transmitted them back in the locked pouch.

Mr. Gesell: The practice was, I gather, then, for all the distributed messages, eventually to be returned to the point of distribution rather than remain in the files of the officers receiving them?

General Miles: They were never to remain in the files. They were always to be returned and burned.

Mr. Gesell: Who established that procedure?

General Miles: I was responsible for the establishment

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

of it. I don't know that I personally did it. I imagine it was done on the recommendation of Colonel Bratton who was handling them directly. I also remember the Chief of Staff was personally very much interested in the procedure and the protection of those messages which constituted so important a military secret.

Mr. Gesell: One filed copy of the messages was retained, is that not correct?

General Miles: That is correct.

Mr. Gesell: Who determined what officers and officials should see these messages?

General Miles: I hesitate to answer the question, because I don't remember that it ever arose. It was so obviously the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of War Plans Division, and the Chief of Military Intelligence Division, were the officers directly responsible.

Mr. Gesell: Well, I quite agree that they are obvious people to be on a distribution list, but the question arises whether perhaps there should not have been others on the list, as well.

General Miles: I remember no case in which that question arose, sir.

The general tendency always was to limit these messages, the distribution of these messages, the knowledge of the

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

existence of these messages, to as few people as possible.

Mr. Gesell: You didn't mention the Department of State. Am I correct in my understanding that these messages were sent to the Department of State, these magic messages, by the Navy?

General Miles: By the Navy and by the Army. We took over the distribution to the Department of State when the Navy took over the distribution to the White House, about the 1st of November. Before that we distributed to the Department of State and to the White House on alternative months.

Mr. Gesell: From November 1, 1941, the Army distributed to the State Department, and the Navy to the White House, as a general matter of practice?

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Who, in the Department of State was authorized to see these messages?

General Miles: Our distribution was directly to the Secretary of State. What handling he had within his own department, of course, we did not control.

Mr. Gesell: Was that handled in the same mechanical fashion as far as the dispatch cases were concerned and the return of the messages?

General Miles: That is correct, except that I believe the private secretary of the Secretary of State had a key.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

h10

1
2 Mr. Keefe: Might I interrupt?

3 The Chairman: The Chairman didn't understand. The
4 private secretary had a what?

5 General Miles: Had a key to the box.

6 The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

7 Mr. Keefe: It is not clear to me, this answer of the
8 witness as to the disposition of the intercepts after they
9 had made their routine delivery, delivery by the Navy and
10 the Army to these various people.

11 I think it was said that they were destroyed or burned.

12 Mr. Gesell: The testimony was, I believe, and will
13 you check me on this -- I understood the testimony to be
14 that they were all returned and burned with the exception
15 of one filed copy, which was maintained.

16 General Miles: That is true. That filed copy never
17 went on the distribution rounds.

18 Mr. Gesell: So that following distribution through
19 these precautions, you had one filed copy of all messages
20 intercepted?

21 General Miles: That is correct.

22 Mr. Keefe: What I am trying to understand is, the inter-
23 cepts that were brought back, were returned to the Army by
24 Colonel Bratton, and to the Navy by the officer in charge
25 of distribution for the Navy, those messages were burned?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe
Mr. Gesell
The Chairman

h11

1 General Miles: That is true.

2 Mr. Keefe: By the Army and by the Navy?

3 General Miles: Respectively.

4 Mr. Gesell: Those messages that were distributed
5 were duplicates of messages which were retained in the
6 file that was kept, the complete file that was kept at
7 the Army and Navy?
8

9 General Miles: That is correct.

10 Mr. Gesell: Any messages intercepted by the Signal
11 Corps were made available to the Navy and any messages in-
12 tercepted by the Navy were made available to the Army under
13 this procedure; is that correct?

14 General Miles: Yes, sir. It was a joint operation
15 of the Naval Communications and S.I.S.

16 The Chairman: What is S.I.S.?

17 General Miles: Signal Intelligence Service. If one
18 was over-crowded, the other would step in.

19 Mr. Gesell: Did I understand you to say that one copy
20 or more than one copy was sent to the Secretary of State?

21 General Miles: One copy, sir.

22 Mr. Gesell: Now, we have been discussing here the
23 distribution, have we not, of the actual translated texts of
24 the different messages; not any evaluation or summary, but the
25 actual text of the messages themselves?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: Were there any facilities under Army control
3 at Hawaii which enabled the Army to intercept these messages
4 at that point?

5 General Miles: I believe not, sir. There was a naval
6 intercepting station at Hawaii but I think not an Army. And
7 by intercepting I mean simply taking the messages out of the
8 air. I don't mean breaking the code or translating from the
9 Japanese to the English, of course.

10 Mr. Gesell: What I had referred to was the latter, the
11 question being whether or not there were any facilities at
12 Hawaii through which General Short or persons in his command
13 would have been in a position to intercept, translate and decode
14 these messages which we have been discussing the magic messages?

15 General Miles: No, sir.

16 Mr. Gesell: What steps were taken to distribute the
17 intercepted messages to the Commanding Officer at Hawaii?

18 General Miles: There were no steps taken to distribute
19 these messages to that General.

20 Mr. Gesell: Do I understand from your answer that these
21 messages as intercepted and translated were not sent to
22 Hawaii by the Army?

23 General Miles: They were not. In some cases the sub-
24 stance, of some messages, were sent to Hawaii, and almost
25 always in naval code, I think always in naval code, because

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 the naval code was considered to be more secure than the
3 Army code.

4 Mr. Gesell: Who made the decision that these messages
5 should not be sent to Hawaii as they were intercepted and
6 translated as far as the Army is concerned?

7 General Miles: That followed from the general policy laid
8 down by the Chief of Staff that these messages and the fact
9 of the existence of these messages or our ability to decode
10 them should be confined to the least possible number of persons;
11 no distribution should be made outside of Washington.

12 Mr. Gesell: Was that determination by the Chief of Staff
13 in writing or simply an expression of policy?

14 General Miles: As far as my recollection goes it was
15 simply an expression of policy.

16 Mr. Gesell: Were you consulted in connection with the
17 formulation of that policy?

18 General Miles: I do not now remember but I imagine that
19 I was.

20 Mr. Gesell: Can you state to the committee what the
21 considerations were underlying such a policy?

22 General Miles: Yes, sir. The value of that secret, the
23 secret that we could and did decode Japanese messages, in their
24 best code, was of incalculable value to us, both in the period
25 when war threatened and most definitely during our waging of

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 that war. That was the basic reason for the limitation on
3 the distribution of those messages and of the constantly
4 increasing closing in, as I might express it, on any possible
5 leaks in that secret.

6 Mr. Gesell: Well, now, I have been discussion Hawaii
7 with you. I take it your answer would be the same as to
8 other theaters, that these messages were not being sent by
9 the Army to any other overseas area commanders?

10 General Miles: That is true, sir. It applies to all
11 of them.

12 Mr. Gesell: Do you recall ever having received any
13 instructions not to transmit the messages to Hawaii, let us
14 say?

15 General Miles: I do not.

16 Mr. Gesell: Do you ever recall any discussion with anyone
17 concerning the advisability of sending such messages to Hawaii
18 as they were intercepted and translated?

19 General Miles: I do not.

20 Mr. Gesell: Do you ever recall any request having been
21 made of G-2 by anyone, a commander in Hawaii or elsewhere,
22 asking that such information be transmitted?

23 General Miles: No, sir, I do not.

24 Mr. Gesell: Then I am to understand from your answers,
25 am I, General, that the question of the distribution of these

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 messages to the Commanding General or anyone on his staff
3 at Hawaii was not, to your recollection, discussed by anyone
4 in your presence or requested or suggested by anyone in your
5 presence?

6 General Miles: That is true, sir, to the best of my
7 recollection.

8 Mr. Gesell: And can you give us any further information
9 as to what officer was primarily responsible for the decision
10 to so limit the distribution?

11 General Miles: I regarded it as an important policy which
12 I knew emanated from the Chief of Staff.

13 Mr. Gesell: Would it be fair to say that this magic in-
14 formation was the most reliable and authentic information which
15 the War Department was receiving as to Japanese intentions and
16 activities?

17 General Miles: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Gesell: To your knowledge was anyone in responsible
19 position in the War Department organization at Hawaii advised
20 of the fact that we were in a position to intercept, decode
21 and translate these messages?

22 General Miles: To the best of my knowledge and belief
23 no one was advised. That, sir, was the essence of the secret.
24 Not so much what we were getting from these messages but the
25 very fact that we could decode and translate these messages.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: And it was for those reasons that I understand you to say that the decision was made not to send the text of the messages or any summary therefrom to the overseas commanders?

General Miles: That was the primary consideration, as I understand it, for that fixed definite policy of the War Department.

Mr. Gesell: Would you say that it was one of the responsibilities of the Military Intelligence Division to keep the overseas commanders advised as to matters which might be important to them in gauging the potential activities of the enemies or potential enemy?

General Miles: In general, yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: The obligation or responsibility to disseminate information and the obligation to safeguard information then in this instance acted opposite to each other, did they not?

General Miles: Generally speaking, yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: I gather from what you say that you resolved that in favor of the closest type of security over the messages translated?

General Miles: I think that is hardly a complete answer, sir. It must also be borne in mind that a great deal of this information did not directly apply to the overseas departments unless and until it became more than information and entered

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 the realms of an estimate of the situation which called for
3 military action on the part of those high commanders, and
4 that was a function of the command, in other words, of the
5 Chief of Staff himself. A great deal of that information was
6 of great value to us in Washington, to all departments of
7 the Government that were within the distribution list, as in-
8 dicating the course of diplomatic relations with Japan.

9 But it was not considered at that time that the commanding
10 Generals of the overseas departments should know from day to
11 day the course of those diplomatic negotiations. The essence
12 of what they should know was any situation which would call
13 for a military decision on their part or the part of the Chief
14 of Staff.

15 Mr. Gesell: Now, that appraisal of the situation carries
16 with it, does it not, General Miles, a perhaps unusually high
17 degree of responsibility in the General Staff here to send
18 appropriate messages to the area commanders warning them of
19 impending developments to the extent that they were known to
20 the General Staff?

21 General Miles: Yes, sir. It was a matter of great re-
22 sponsibility to notify the overseas departments, which were
23 our great outposts of the moment, when war became -- certainly
24 when war became imminent, or the moment when any part of the
25 war plans, so carefully drawn up in the preceding years, should

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 be put into effect.

3 Mr. Gesell: I wonder if you quite understood my question.
4 I take it that responsibility, in the general sense, is always
5 present in the Chief of Staff. My point was rather that under
6 these circumstances, having reached the decision, for the
7 reasons you have indicated, not to transmit information to
8 the area commanders, and knowing that you had information which
9 the area commanders did not have, you were confronted with
10 possibly even a higher degree of responsibility in that regard,
11 were you not?

12 General Miles: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Gesell: Now, some of these messages, General Miles,
14 were not of a diplomatic nature, they were of a military nature,
15 were they not, some of the magic intercepts?

16 General Miles: I believe that is correct, sir.

17 Mr. Gesell: Now, does your testimony apply equally to
18 messages of that character as compared to messages of a general
19 diplomatic character?

20 General Miles: Yes, sir. Had we obtained through magic
21 any information of a purely military character that should
22 have been transmitted to the overseas departments, I think
23 steps should have been taken to transmit that information in
24 some secure way, providing always it did not come within
25 the realms of command responsibility.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: You say you think some steps should be taken in those circumstances to transmit the messages?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, referring to Exhibit 2, copy of which is handed you, will you turn to page 12. There is there a message sent from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated September 24, 1941, which was translated on October 9, 1941, reading as follows:

"Strictly Secret.

"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines in so far as possible:

"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

"Area C. East Loch.

"Area D. Middle Loch.

"Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers,

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell.

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2 we would like to have you report on those at anchor,
3 (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys
4 and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly.
5 If possible we would like to have you make mention of
6 the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside
7 the same wharf.)"

8 Do you recall seeing that message at the time it was
9 intercepted and translated?

10 General Miles: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Gesell: I ask you whether that is not the type of
12 message which carried a special military significance to such
13 an extent, taken under your previous testimony, that it should
14 have been sent to the Hawaiian Department?

15 General Miles: If that message were taken alone, Mr.
16 Counsel, it would carry that military significance. It is, of
17 course, primarily of naval interest. It should always be
18 remembered that it was well-known to everyone in the Intelligence
19 Departments of the two services that the Japanese were follow-
20 ing as closely as they possibly could the movement of all of
21 our warships.

(6)
22 I remember on several occasions going to Admiral Kirk's
23 or Admiral Wilkerson's secret room in the Navy Department and
24 looking at his big map of the positions of the Japanese warships.
25 Everybody was doing it. Furthermore, it is rather interesting

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 to note that in that same volume, if one counts the number
3 of messages similar to this which was sent to Hawaii or
4 eliciting information from naval movements in Hawaii, which
5 were translated before the 7th of December, we find 24 of
6 them, of which only 4 were received in the month preceding
7 Pearl Harbor. Similar messages concerning naval movements
8 in Panama, however, there were 20, and there were 5 in the
9 month preceding Pearl Harbor. Similar messages regarding
10 the Philippines, there are 56 in the book, 16 received in the
11 month before Pearl Harbor.

12 So that my answer to that question is that this message
13 taken alone would have been of great military significance
14 but it was not taken alone unless you look at it by hindsight,
15 which focuses all right on the event which did happen. It
16 was one of a great number of messages being sent by the
17 Japanese to various parts of the world in their attempt to
18 follow the movements of our naval vessels, a matter which we
19 knew perfectly well they were doing, and which we ourselves
20 were doing in regard to the Japanese.

21 Mr. Gesell: Why do you say this message is of great
22 military significance standing alone?

23 General Miles: That would indicate they were interested
24 in one place and one place only and it is the detail of Pearl
25 Harbor.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: It is really, is it not, looking at it as
3 one message alone, and, if you will, from hindsight, a plan
4 for laying out what amounts to a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor?

5 General Miles: That is exactly what it looks like now,
6 sir, now that we know Pearl Harbor was bombed.

7 Mr. Gesell: You say there are similar messages in this
8 book which were intercepted prior to December 7. Will you
9 find me one such message, General?

10 General Miles: Concerning Hawaii?

11 Mr. Gesell: Or concerning any other point in which the
12 Japanese were interested. Will you find me one message which
13 is similar to this one?

14 General Miles: Well, if you mean similar in dividing
15 the harbor into sections, there are no such messages that I
16 know of, but all of the messages here from page 2 to page 16
17 in this book, all are concerned with information requested of
18 or received by the Japanese on movements in Hawaii.

19 Shefner
20 follows.
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3:15PM

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: Well, you recognize, do you not, General, that this message, looking at it now in the cold light of this hearing room, is quite different than just a ship movement message, is it not? They are not anxious to find ship movements. They did not even want to know much about the ships that are at the wharves. They want to know the ones that are at anchor.

General Miles: The question is what?

Mr. Gesell: Would you consider this a ship movement report?

General Miles: No. It is primarily a message dividing up the waters of Pearl Harbor into convenient areas for reporting the presence of ships, United States warships.

Mr. Gesell: There is no other message like this in this exhibit, is there, General?

General Miles: I have not found any, sir, similar to this in the sense of dividing any particular waters, although I think you will find in the Philippines messages questions of currents in Subic Bay, I remember a message if my memory is not at fault, and other naval information which might lead one to expect an attack in Philippine waters.

Mr. Gesell: Would it be a fair statement to say that one of the functions and responsibilities of a properly organized and functioning military intelligence division

4-2

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

would have been to single out this message, recognize its difference from the other message and attempt to evaluate its significance?

General Miles: Yes, sir, but we did not give it the significance at that time that it now has in the light of subsequent events.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, do you recall any discussion of this message with your staff, any review or critique of its importance?

General Miles: I do not. I recall discussing, I think, this message or certain such messages with my naval colleague, to whom they particularly applied even more than to the Army.

Mr. Gesell: Admiral Wilkinson you are referring to?

General Miles: Admiral Wilkinson after he joined; Admiral Kirk before.

Mr. Gesell: And what is your recollection of those discussions?

General Miles: My recollection is not very specific. I think that my naval colleagues agreed that it was perfectly normal for the Japanese to be searching in all areas for the position of our ships and certain specific information about the harbors occupied by our ships, or the waters.

Mr. Gesell: But this is neither of those. This is he

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

specific location and situation of the ships in a particular harbor, is it not?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now, do you recall discussing this message with Admiral Wilkinson or any of your other naval colleagues?

General Miles: I do not specifically recall discussing this message.

Mr. Gesell: Now, this message that was translated on October 9th and sent on September 24th was followed by other messages, was it not, messages translated prior to December 7th which indicated that the Japanese were implementing and following the pattern laid out in this particular message.

I refer, for example, to the one of November 15th on page 13 of the exhibit, where there is a message setting forth the code to be used in designating the various areas, and to another message on that page stating, under date of November 15th, translated December 3rd:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

Do you recall seeing those messages?

General Miles: I believe I saw both of those messages,

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

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2 sir.

3 Mr. Gesell: Now, do you recall finally on this subject,
4 General Miles, seeing the message on page 15 of this exhibit
5 from Honolulu to Tokyo, under date of November 29th, trans-
6 lated December 5th, which had this --

7 Mr. Gearhart: Pardon me. That was from Tokyo to Hono-
8 lulu, wasn't it?

9 Mr. Gesell: From Tokyo to Honolulu, yes.

10 Mr. Gearhart: You had it just the reverse.

11 Mr. Gesell: Thank you, Congressman Gearhart.

12 Containing this single sentence:

13 "We have been receiving reports from you on ship
14 movements, but in future will you also report even when
15 there are no movements."

16 At page 15 of the exhibit do you recall that message?

17 General Miles: I believe I saw that message, sir.

18 Mr. Gesell: Now, those three subsequent messages which
19 I have just directed your attention to gave added signifi-
20 cance, did they not, to the message translated on October 9th
21 to which I first called your attention?

22 General Miles: They did, sir.

23 Mr. Gesell: Did those added messages lead to any dis-
24 cussion or further consideration as to the appropriateness or
25 desirability of sending specific information on this subject

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

2 to Pearl Harbor?

3 General Miles: Not that I remember, sir.

4 Mr. Gesell: Now, I noticed and I am sure the committee
5 and all of us have noticed here, General Miles, that many
6 significant military messages and, indeed, other significant
7 messages in this magic category were not translated until
8 after December 7th although sent often substantial periods
9 of time before that date. You have noted that in looking
10 at some of these exhibits, have you not?

11 General Miles: I have, sir.

12 Mr. Gesell: Now, I understood you to testify that the
13 responsibility for translating the messages was placed in
14 the Signal Corps of the Army as far as the Army intercepts
15 were concerned?

16 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

17 Mr. Gesell: Now, what steps did you take, if any, to
18 encourage a more prompt and expeditious translation of
19 these messages as they were intercepted?

20 General Miles: I remember no specific steps which I
21 took. The S.I.S. was not under my direction. I do remember,
22 however, discussing the matter and finding that it was pri-
23 marily a question of personnel and of very markedly increased
24 traffic. It took time to decode the cryptic messages, it
25 took time to translate from Japanese into English. The

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 S.I.S. and naval communications, like all other branches of
3 the Army and Navy at that time, were much limited in per-
4 sonnel and in facilities.

5 Mr. Gesell: You say you recall discussing this matter
6 with someone or you simply recall the conditions that pre-
7 vailed? I did not quite understand you.

8 General Miles: I recall discussing the matter to the
9 extent of arriving at the opinion that was the situation in
10 naval communications and S.I.S. I do not specifically re-
11 call the exact incident of any particular discussion.

12 Mr. Gesell: Well, now, it was perfectly apparent during
13 these latter months before the attack that the situation be-
14 tween us and Japan was becoming more and more critical, was
15 it not?

16 General Miles: That is true, sir.

17 Mr. Gesell: All of you in G-2 would have been more and
18 more interested in the prompt interception and translation
19 and examination of these magic messages as they came in?

20 General Miles: That is true, sir.

21 Mr. Gesell: Well, now, under those circumstances and
22 seeing as we do here from the messages that those translated
23 before the seventh contained vital diplomatic and military
24 information, it would seem to me to have been appropriate to
25 take some steps to assure a prompt translation of the

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

2 messages, or do I understand you to say that you simply in-
3 quired as to the reason but you took no steps to facilitate
4 the prompter translation?

5 General Miles: I assured myself that the men and facil-
6 ities were doing all that they could do to get those mes-
7 sages out promptly. I was not able to furnish them with any
8 additional specialists, nor with any additional equipment.

9 I do not like to go into the details of even the fact
10 that I knew about the methods we used; I cannot.

11 Mr. Gesell: No, we do not expect you to.

12 General Miles: But I think it is safe to say that they
13 are not easy to reproduce.

14 Mr. Gesell: Well, was any effort made to get additional
15 manpower of this specialized type that may have been required?

16 General Miles: I think that manpower was being provided
17 as fast as the two services could provide it. It had to be
18 very specially trained manpower.

19 Mr. Gesell: Do you recall ever having discussed with the
20 Chief of Staff the desirability of increasing the forces and
21 facilities for the interception and translation of these mes-
22 sages?

23 General Miles: No, sir, I do not recall bringing that
24 matter up to the Chief of Staff.

25 Mr. Gesell: Turning to this exhibit 2, which I believe

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

2 is still before you, General Miles, I want to direct your at-
3 tention to certain messages which were sent prior to the seventh
4 but translated subsequent to the seventh.

5 There is a message on page 17, for example --

6 The Chairman: May I ask, when you say "sent" you mean
7 sent from --

8 Mr. Gesell: Sent from Tokyo to Honolulu.

9 The Chairman: Sent from Tokyo to Honolulu?

10 Mr. Gesell: Tokyo to Honolulu or Washington, a Japanese
11 message.

12 The Chairman: They are all Japanese messages?

13 Mr. Gesell: They are all Japanese messages.

14 On page 17 the message of November 24th, where Tokyo was
15 advised concerning mine laying operations outside Pearl
16 Harbor, the maneuvering activities of the U. S. Fleet and
17 the time that the vessels lay in harbor.

18 On page 19 the message of November 28th where Tokyo was
19 advised that there was usually one cruiser in the waters
20 south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the en-
21 trance of the harbor.

22 The message on page 20 of December 1st where more de-
23 tailed information concerning Fleet maneuvers in operational
24 areas was given, with schedules of departures and return of
25 battleships.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 The message on page 21 of December 2nd, where Tokyo
3 asked for information concerning barrage balloons and anti-
4 mine nets.

5 The message on page 22 of December 3rd where an agent in
6 Honolulu sent detailed information concerning land signals
7 to be given by flashing lights, ads in newspapers, and so
8 forth.

9 The message on page 26 in December, an urgent request
10 for information as to movements of ships in and out of Pearl
11 Harbor since the 4th of December.

12 The message of December 6th, on pages 27 and 28, where
13 Honolulu gave Tokyo further information concerning barrage
14 balloons and stated:

15 "I imagine that in all probability there is consider-
16 able opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise
17 attack against these places."

18 And further stated:

19 "In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo
20 nets."

21 And, finally, the message on page 29 of December 6th,
22 where Honolulu reported:

23 "It appears that no air reconnaissance is being
24 conducted by the fleet air arm."

25 Now, with those messages in mind is it fair to state that

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Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

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2 if facilities had been available for the more prompt trans-
3 lation of these intercepted messages we would have had more
4 than ample data in our hands to indicate that there was to
5 be a surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor?

6 General Miles: Those messages would certainly have in-
7 dicated the strong possibility, if not actual probability,
8 of such an attack.

9 I think I failed to state, sir, that it was not only a
10 question of personnel and facilities here in Washington for
11 the decoding and translation of those messages, but also
12 very definitely out in the field. Those messages had to be
13 picked out of the air by intercepting stations. They were
14 not all picked up by the same station. There was no one sta-
15 tion that could have picked them up.

16 In fact, I understand now that the best intercepting
17 station for the few messages emanating from Japan itself
18 was Manila.

19 Now, some of those intercepting stations had teletype
20 facilities by which they could promptly transmit the message
21 intercepted to Washington. Some did not. Some of the mes-
22 sages were received in Washington by air mail.

23 So we had not only a question of personnel and facilities
24 and a very rapidly growing traffic to handle it in Washington,
25 but also the actual intercepting of the messages in the field

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

and the transmission of those messages to Washington.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel one question? Those messages that you read last are messages that were sent from Tokyo or Honolulu and were not translated or decoded until after Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Gesell: That is right. They are all Japanese messages which were not in translated form available, as far as these records show, prior to the attack.

Senator Lucas: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Counsel does not want to leave the impression that all the messages referred to are in that category, because there were several that were translated before.

Mr. Gessell: I took it Senator Lucas referred to this last bit of reading and not the first messages I have discussed.

Senator Lucas: That is right.

The Chairman: Let me ask counsel whether he has indicated in his questions how far back prior to Pearl Harbor these messages went out that were not translated until after Pearl Harbor? Did you indicate that?

Mr. Gesell: I have indicated in most instances the date that the message was sent out. I think the ones to which I referred were all sent subsequent to November 24, 1941.

The Chairman: And prior to the 7th of December?

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: And prior to the 7th of December.

3 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, in that connection I
4 think it might be helpful if counsel will be kind enough to
5 point out, the first one on page 16 of the exhibit, dated
6 November 24, 1941, shows that was translated December 16, 1941.
7 That is what counsel has in mind, is it?

8 Mr. Gesell: That is correct.

9 The Vice Chairman: And running all the way through this
10 exhibit to page 31 it shows messages received and translated
11 from a few days to a few weeks after they were received.

12 Mr. Gesell: That is correct; and quite a number on the
13 8th and the 10th and the 11th and some of them later than that.

14 General Miles: In the desire to make the record accur-
15 ate it might be pointed out, I think, that certainly the mes-
16 sage on page 26 from Tokyo to Honolulu, which was dated Tokyo,
17 December 6th, could not possibly have been translated even
18 with the best facilities until early in the morning of the
19 seventh. Tokyo on the 6th -- yes, it might be on the 5th,
20 that is right. And from there on the messages are dated the
21 6th of December.

22 Mr. Gesell: General, I meant to ask you --

23 Mr. Gearhart: That is Tokyo time on the 6th?

24 General Miles: Tokyo and Honolulu.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: I meant to ask you, General, a little earlier. After the war started did the War Department change its procedure in respect of transmitting to the area commanders information from these magic sources?

General Miles: I believe not, sir; not to my knowledge. That was always regarded up to the termination of the Japanese war as a very important vital military secret.

Mr. Gesell: Now, I wish to read a paragraph to you from your affidavit given to Colonel Henry C. Clausen under date of August 16, 1945 and ask if you will give to the committee a fuller statement concerning the matters covered in this paragraph. The paragraph reads as follows:

"Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 8 August 1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944, I wish to add that I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called 'Magic', or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brig. General Russell A. Osmon and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke, of G-2, War Department, transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1 the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of
2 that form of information or intelligence in the period
3 preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that
4 instruction."
5

6 General Miles: That statement is literally correct.
7 I regret that it was worded that way because it has been
8 twisted out of its meaning entirely and I think very unfairly
9 to the Chief of Staff.

10 What happened, of course, was preceding that I appeared
11 before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in early April 1944, when
12 we were in the midst of our war with Japan. We were ap-
13 proaching the crisis, if you like. We had not landed in
14 Leyte, we had not fought the battle for the Leyte Gulf. We
15 were in the midst of a great war and this was a military
16 secret of incalculable value to the United States in that war,
17 the secret that we could break that code and were breaking
18 that code. It might well have been worth to us many thousands
19 of valuable American lives. I knew that perfectly well.

20 I am sorry I mentioned the Chief of Staff because under
21 no conditions would I have appeared before the Army Board
22 or any other group and intimated in any way the existence of
23 that secret without specific authority of the Secretary of
24 War or the Chief of Staff.

25 Now, when I made that affidavit to Colonel Clausen the

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

situation had changed entirely. The war with Japan was over; Japan had surrendered. Colonel Clausen came to my headquarters in Boston with the written authority from the Secretary of War to take my testimony on any and all subjects.

He suggested, however, that the affidavit which he himself wrote from the conversations that he had had with me, all under oath, he suggested that my affidavit, which became part of his record, be tied in with my testimony before the Grunert Board, the Army Board, and I think he drafted or maybe I drafted that paragraph that the counsel has just read.

That, gentlemen, is the whole situation there. I was not ragged by the Chief of Staff or in any way suggesting that I should do anything to cover up anything other than this vital military secret that we were all guarding with the greatest of care.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: General Miles, the Army Board held top secret sessions at which magic information was discussed by a number of witnesses. Were you called to testify in the top secret sessions relating to magic?

General Miles: I was not.

Mr. Gesell: You were aware that such sessions were held, were you not?

General Miles: Not at that time, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, General Miles, I want to turn to another subject. You referred to your liaison with the State Department, which I gather was maintained by you and by officers acting under your direction, and you indicated that information was transmitted in both directions, that G-2 gave information to the State Department and the State Department gave information to G-2.

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: I want to ask you some specific questions concerning information which may or may not have been given by the State Department to G-2. The first question has to do with the modus vivendi, which I believe you have become familiar with, at least sitting here waiting for your turn to testify. Do you recall whether or not the Department of State discussed with you, or officers acting under your direction, the question of the modus vivendi, and whether or not that should or should not be submitted in a note to the

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Japanese Ambassadors?

General Miles: I have no recollection of any such occurrence. I feel very sure that I would have remembered it had I been consulted, and I feel very certain of being able to make the statement that I was not consulted.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, you were not advised, were you, in any way, when the decision was reached by the State Department to send the 10-point note and not to send the modus vivendi on November 26, 1941?

General Miles: I was not, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Did the Department of State advise you, to your recollection, that they had received information from various representatives in South American countries to the effect that the Japanese representatives to those South American countries had been sounding out South American governments as to their attitude in the event of war between the United States and Japan?

General Miles: I have no recollection of that, sir. I would have to check the records to see if it was ever transmitted through my liaison officer from the State Department.

Mr. Gesell: The exhibit in evidence indicates that at least some of that information was sent to military authorities, and I wondered if it had been a matter of any

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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discussion, or had come to your attention specifically?

General Miles: I do not remember at this time having those matters brought to my attention.

Mr. Murphy: Will counsel state what exhibit that is?

Mr. Gesell: Exhibit 31.

With respect to the message to the Emperor, do you recall any consultations or any information coming to you from the State Department concerning that message?

General Miles: I do not.

Mr. Gesell: Would you have been the officer that the State Department would have been most likely to consult under the liaison conditions which prevailed at that time, or did that come under the province of that other department of the General Staff?

General Miles: The liaison, Mr. Gesell, was maintained for the exchange of information. It did not, of itself, include any provision for consultation with the Military Intelligence Division by anyone. Generally speaking, the Military Intelligence Division was not consulted on the actions or decisions arrived at by the State Department.

Mr. Gesell: Do you know whether other officers of the War Department were consulted in that connection?

General Miles: I only know through listening to testimony that I have heard in this room.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: Do you recall whether or not the War Department, and specifically the Military Intelligence Division, was consulted or whether its opinion was asked by the Department of State or the President, as to the appropriateness of applying embargoes and freezing orders against the Japanese?

General Miles: I can recall no action on which the Military Intelligence Division was consulted by the Department of State in those matters.

Mr. Gesell: Do you recall discussing those problems in memoranda submitted to the Chief of Staff?

General Miles: I do.

Mr. Gesell: I notice, referring to Exhibit 33, a series of memoranda on that subject. No. 7 of July 25, 1941, particularly paragraph 9, and item No. 9, memorandum of August 16, 1941 --

Senator Lucas: Mr. Counsel, if I may make a suggestion, it seems to me that is important enough to have it read into the record at this time. It will be done sooner or later.

Mr. Gesell: Very well, I will read the paragraphs to which I refer.

On Item 7, paragraph 9 of the memorandum of July 25, 1941, signed by you, General Miles, addressed to the Chief of Staff, and copies apparently were distributed to the

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Secretary of War and other officers, the 9th paragraph reads as follows:

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4 "Effective economic sanctions against Japan imposed by
5 us, today, would not, in the opinion of this division, force
6 Japan to take any steps in the way of aggressive action
7 which she does not plan to take anyway, when a favorable
8 opportunity arises, nor would they precipitate a declaration
9 of war on us by Japan. Such action on our part need not
10 and should not distract our attention from the main theatre
11 of operations. On the contrary, by adopting such a policy,
12 we will be able to conserve for Britain and for ourselves
13 supplies which from the viewpoint of our national defense,
14 are being worse than wasted when we place them in Japanese
15 hands."

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WARD A. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.
16 Item 9, the memorandum for the Chief of Staff, dated
17 August 16, 1941, reading paragraph 6, which is another
18 memorandum signed by you, which was distributed to the Presi-
19 dent, the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War,
20 the Chief of Staff, the War Plans Division, Office of Naval
21 Intelligence and General Embick, reads as follows:

22 "Considering all of the above, this division believes
23 that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the
24 application of ever-increasing military and economic pressure
25 on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time, the

Witness Miles

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 1 best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities
 2 in the Pacific area, and of the eventual disruption of the
 3 Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong 'power
 4 diplomacy' by the United States is clearly indicated."

5
 6 Item 16 of September 23, 1941, signed by you, and
 7 distributed to the President, the Secretary of State, the
 8 Secretary of War, reading from paragraph 7, states:

9
 10 "This division still believes as stated in IB-112
 11 dated August 16, 1941, that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis
 12 Japan, including the application of ever-increasing and
 13 economic pressure on our part offers the best chance of
 14 gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread
 15 of hostilities in the Pacific area, and also the hope of
 16 the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The
 17 exercise of increasingly strong 'power diplomacy' by the
 18 United States is clearly indicated."

19
 20 The memorandum of October 2, 1941, item 17, to the
 21 Chief of Staff, again sent to the President, the Secretary
 22 of State, the Secretary of War, and others, this one being
 23 signed by Hayes A. Kroner of your staff, refers to this
 24 matter in several paragraphs, and I am reading from paragraph
 25 10, the following:

"This division is of the opinion that neither a con-
 ference of leaders, nor economic concessions at this time

Witness Miles

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would be of any material advantage to the United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw from the Axis were obtained from Japan prior to the conference. The immediate objective of the United States is to weaken Hitler in every way possible. A Japanese guarantee not to attack Russia in Siberia would free Russia, psychologically, and militarily for stronger opposition to Hitler. With this in mind, a definite condition precedent to such a proposed conference should be a complete withdrawal by Japan from the Axis and a guarantee, backed by substantial evidence of sincerity not to attack Russia in Siberia."

There is then a discussion again of your position concerning economic sanctions in the same terms as before.

"Item 28:" --

Item 28, December 5, 1941, to the Chief of Staff, reading just prior to paragraph 7 thereof, an unnumbered paragraph as follows:

"Our influence in the Far Eastern theatre lies in the threat of our naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan, we could launch a serious offensive her by naval and air forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia. But such an attack would fall

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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1 short of a major strategic offensive, because it could not
2 be decisive within a reasonable time, and still more, because
3 it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than
4 toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis."

5 That again was signed by you, and sent to a number of
6 officers.

7 And tab A --

8 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, might I inquire what
9 exhibit counsel is reading from?

10 Mr. Gesell: Exhibit No. 33.

11 Senator Ferguson: What do you mean by tab A?

12 Mr. Gesell: Oh, that tab A, is attached to the last
13 memorandum I read, item 28.

14 Now, those statements, and I believe there are others
15 in this exhibit, General Miles, indicate that you were
16 preparing memoranda supporting the idea of economic sanc-
17 tions over a period of months preceding Pearl Harbor, and
18 that this memoranda, while addressed to the Chief of Staff,
19 were also distributed to the President and the Secretary
20 of State. I wondered if you could give us a better idea
21 of the circumstances under which the question of economic
22 sanctions was reviewed by you, and why these memoranda
23 were prepared?

24 General Miles: These memoranda were prepared in the
25

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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face of a constantly increasing diplomatic crisis, and accurately express our then views as to what we believed should be the general policy of the United States vis-a-vis Japan. We arrived at that conclusion from long study of the Military Intelligence Division as such of the economic psychological factors of Japan, and, rightly or wrongly, they were our views as to the best means of gaining what we then assumed to be and what has transpired to be the national objective.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, might I just clear the record?

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

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Witness Miles

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2 Senator Ferguson: The reason I was not able to identify
3 the exhibit is I thought counsel was referring to a pamphlet
4 with tabs on his pamphlet. I saw him reading from a pamphlet
5 with tabs, and I have not received such a copy. I inquired
6 from counsel what it was. I have just received a copy so
7 I know now what he was talking about.

8 Mr. Gesell: Senator, I am sure there is a misunderstanding.
9 The items I was reading from are shown in the index of the
10 copy. The tabs I was referring to are not the tabs on the
11 copy you have.

12 Senator Ferguson: That is what I wanted to explain. I
13 thought you were referring to the book you had having tabs,
14 and I thought that you were referring to those tabs.

15 Mr. Gesell: I understand.

16 Senator Ferguson: I could not identify Exhibit 33,
17 because my Exhibit 33 had no short tabs, and I now see that
18 the other members of the committee have them with tabs on.
19 I have been unable to get such a copy.

20 The Chairman: There is supposed to be one for each
21 member, but it seems that all the members do not have tabs
22 on their copies, and therefore the Chair suggests that the
23 tabs be furnished to all members.

24 Mr. Gesell: I believe we have one for each member of
25 the committee.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 I was inquiring, General, whether those views, as
3 expressed in these memoranda at the time, were solicited
4 from you as the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff by the Chief
5 of Staff, the Secretary of State, or the President, or whether
6 they were submitted by you voluntarily, so to speak, giving
7 your position on an important subject?

8 General Miles: They were certainly not solicited by
9 the President or the Secretary of State. I am not sure whether
10 they were solicited by the Chief of Staff or not. It was a
11 matter of routine for the Military Intelligence Division to
12 prepare such memoranda for the Chief of Staff in situations
13 in which it would appear that it might be useful to him.

14 Mr. Gesell: In other words, you were giving him the
15 considered views of your department on matters of moment in
16 the Japanese relations?

17 General Miles: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Gesell: Now during this period were you consulted
19 at all in connection with the question of the need of getting
20 a delay, or obtaining a delay through negotiations or other-
21 wise, so that the maximum military preparations could be made?

22 General Miles: I knew that it was the desire of the
23 War Department Chief of Staff, Secretary of War, that we
24 obtain as much time as possible to increase particularly the
25 forces in the Philippines, particularly the air forces in the

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Philippines.

3 Mr. Gesell: Did you participate in the drafting of
4 the joint memorandum of November 5 which Admiral Stark and
5 General Marshall submitted to the President? Are you familiar
6 with that memorandum?

7 General Miles: I have seen that memorandum, and so far
8 as my recollection goes, I am fairly certain in saying I had
9 no part in its drafting.

10 Mr. Gesell: Your participation in that matter then was
11 confined to making an estimate of the possibility of Japanese
12 advance in the area of China which was under discussion at
13 that time?

14 General Miles: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Gesell: Were you consulted at all in connection
16 with the joint memorandum which General Marshall and Admiral
17 Stark sent to the President under date of November 27? Are
18 you familiar with that memorandum?

19 General Miles: I would like to refresh my memory. Can
20 you refer to it, or let me see it?

21 Mr. Gesell: That is Exhibit 17. Perhaps this would be
22 an appropriate place to adjourn, Mr. Chairman. The witness
23 can be shown that over the recess.

24 The Chairman: Yes. The committee will stand in recess
25 until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:00 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed
until 10:00 o'clock a.m., Friday, November 30, 1945.)
- - - - -