

df 30 1 in failure, was thanking the Japanese representatives for
2 their efforts; secondly the Japanese addressed themselves
3 to framing up a cloak to cover their attack already under
4 way, which cloak included what was in effect the fantas-
5 tic and monstrously false charge that this Government
6 was treating the Japanese outrageously by refusing to
7 surrender to them.

8 130. Question:

9 You have testified that on November 29, you pre-
10 pared for the President's consideration a draft of a
11 Presidential message to Congress advising that body of
12 the American-Japanese situation?

13 Answer:

14 Please refer to my reply to your question No. 16.

15 131. Question:

16 Did you, on the evening of November 29th, in your
17 telephonic conversation with the President, discuss such
18 a proposed message to Congress?

19 Answer:

20 I do not recall whether I discussed the proposed
21 message to Congress in a telephone conversation with the
22 President on November 29th.

23 132. Question:

24 In the preparation on the 29th of a proposed Presi-
25 dential Message to Congress did you have in mind, in any

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1 way, that provision of the Constitution which provides
2 that from time to time the President shall give to Congress
3 information as to the state of the Union and recommend to
4 the Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary
5 and expedient? (cf. Article 11, Sec.3)

6 Answer:

7 Please refer to my reply to your question No. 19.

8 133. Question:

9 If your answer to the previous question is "no" I
10 ask you why such a course was considered even to prepara-
11 tion of a message.

12 Answer:

13 In the critical situation which then existed it
14 was deemed important to give consideration to any and
15 all lines of action that might in the least be helpful
16 in meeting the situation.

17 134. Question:

18 You have testified that on Sunday, November 30,
19 Lord Halifax told you that the British Government had
20 important indications that Japan was about to attack
21 Siam and the Kra Peninsula; did Lord Halifax tell you
22 that the British had obtained this information through
23 interception of a Tokyo message intended for Hitler,
24 personally?

25 Answer:

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1 I do not recall that the British Ambassador informed
2 me of the source from which the British Government had
3 had important indications that Japan was about to attack
4 Siam and the Kra Peninsula, and I find nothing in the
5 record indicating that he mentioned the source.

6 Questions 135 and 137 are grouped in a single answer.

7 135. Question:

8 A message from the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin
9 to Tokyo, dated November 29 and decoded in Washington
10 on December 1, has the Japanese Ambassador advising
11 his Government that Ribbentrop had informed him that
12 Germany had information that America's stiff front had
13 practically ended the Washington conversations; whereupon
14 the Ambassador had told Ribbentrop that he had no
15 official word from Tokyo as to the conversations or as
16 to Japan's intentions; my question is: did this inter-
17 cepted message from Berlin to Tokyo fit in with the
18 evidence of previous intercepts, and of Ambassador Grew's
19 reports, that Japan had been keeping Hitler in the dark
20 as to the Washington conversations? (cf. Intercepts,
21 Ex. 1, Page 200).

22 137. Question:

23 Is it not clearly indicated, if not established, by
24 the Intercept from Berlin of November 29 that on that
25 day neither the Japanese Ambassador nor Hitler had

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definite information as to Japan's intentions towards the United States?

Answer:

It would seem clear from the message under reference that the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin had not communicated from his Government to the German Government at that time a report on the current situation regarding the Japanese-American conversations. The Germans had more than one way of keeping in touch with Japan. The possibility is not excluded that Hitler and also Ribbentrop had received reports from the German Ambassador at Tokyo of the progress of the conversations. Therefore, I would not wish to undertake to interpret the message.

136. Question:

November 29 was the day of the Japanese deadline?

Answer:

Tokyo's message to the Japanese Ambassador No. 812 of November 22, 1941, of which a translation appears on page 165, Exhibit 1, contains the following passage:

"There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you--

df 34

1 twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be ex-
2 changed; if we can get an understanding with Great
3 Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if
4 everything can be finished, we have decided to
5 wait until that date. This time we mean it, that
6 the deadline absolutely cannot be changed."

7 The foregoing bald confession by the Japanese Government
8 of its plan and patent movement to attack unless the
9 United States surrendered to the demands in Japan's
10 ultimatum fits in with all that I said and did following
11 that date.

12 138. Question:

13 Also intercepted, and decoded in Washington on
14 December 1, was a message from the Japanese Government
15 to its Ambassador at Berlin, dated Tokyo, November 30;
16 Therein the Japanese Ambassador is informed that American-
17 Japanese conversations now "stand ruptured-broken";
18 the Japanese Government instructs the Ambassador to
19 see Hitler and Ribbentrop immediately and to say "very
20 secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war
21 may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations
22 and Japan through some clash of arms" and to "add that
23 the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker
24 than anyone dreams"; my question is: did this message
25 and the attendant circumstances of it strengthen your

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1 convictions as to Japan's intentions? (cf. Intercepts,
2 Ex. 1, Page 204.)

3 Answer:

4 The message to which you refer was cumulative evi-
5 dence of the conclusions which I had already reached in
6 regard to Japan's intentions, and which were overwhelmingly
7 supported by the surrounding facts and circumstances.

8 Questions 139 and 140 are grouped in a single answer.

9 139. Question:

10 In fixing the deadline for November 29, Tokyo had
11 secretly advised Nomura and Kurusu that after that date
12 things would happen automatically, had it not?

13 140. Question:

14 Did you consider the message to Hitler on November
15 30, a portentous automatic happening in the crisis?

16 Answer:

17 On November 22 the Japanese Government instructed
18 Nomura and Kurusu in regard to the extension from
19 November 25 to November 29 for the deadline for the
20 conclusion of an agreement and stated that: "After that
21 things are automatically going to happen." (Exhibit
22 No. 1, page 165) The message from Tokyo to Berlin of
23 November 30, 1941 (Exhibit No. 1, page 204) was, of
24 course, in harmony with what the Japanese had in mind
25 as revealed through numerous sources.

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1 141. Question:

2 Did the President return to Washington on December 1?

3 Answer:

4 The record shows that the President returned to
5 Washington from Warm Springs on December 1.

6 Questions 142 to 145 are grouped in a single answer.

7 142. Question:

8 Did he direct the preparation of a strong note to
9 Japan asking of that Government an explanation for its
10 concentration of forces in the southern part of Indo-China?

11 143. Question:

12 Did the President on December 2, direct the State
13 Department to hand the Japanese a communication in which
14 the President stated that Japanese concentrations in
15 southern Indo-China implied the utilization of these
16 forces by Japan for aggression against the Philippines,
17 the Dutch East Indies, Malaya or Thailand? (cf. For.
18 Rel. 11, pages 778-9)

19 144. Question:

20 Was such a communication handed to the Japanese?

21 145. Question:

22 Did that communication state that the Hitleresque
23 nature of the Japanese concentrations and the broad
24 problem of American defense had prompted the President's
25 representations? (cf. For. Rel. 11, Page 779, last

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1 paragraph of text of note.)

2 Answer:

3 The President on December 2 simply directed that
4 inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador in
5 regard to the reasons for the continued Japanese troop
6 movements in Indochina. On the same day the Under Secretary
7 of State, in compliance with the President's instruction,
8 informed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu of the
9 President's inquiry. The record of the matter appears
10 in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-
11 1941, Volume II, pages 778-781.

12 146. Question:

13 Did the Japanese military concentrations and
14 military movements, known to the American Government in
15 the period November 30 - December 6, 1941, constitute
16 threats to American Pacific possessions, to the countries
17 neighboring Japan in the Pacific, and to the American
18 sources of vital materials?

19 Answer:

20 The Japanese military concentrations and military
21 movements known to the American Government in the
22 period November 30 - December 6, 1941, so far as I could
23 judge as Secretary of State, did constitute serious
24 threats to American Pacific possessions, to the countries
25 neighboring Japan, and to American sources of vital

1 materials.

2 Questions 147 and 148 are grouped in a single answer.

3 147. Question:

4 Did such threats require that the United States
5 immediately take any and all steps to meet them in con-
6 formity with the statement of the American Government
7 to Japan on August 17, 1941, to-wit: "... this Govern-
8 ment now finds it necessary to say to the Government of
9 Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further
10 steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military
11 domination by force OR THREAT OF FORCE of neighboring
12 countries, the Government of the United States will be
13 compelled to take immediately any and all steps which
14 it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate
15 rights and interests of the United States and toward
16 insuring the safety and security of the United States."

17 (cf. For. Rel. 11, pp. 556-7)

18 148. Question:

19 Did the Japanese military concentrations and move-
20 ments of Nov. 30 - Dec. 6 constitute a challenge to the
21 Government of the United States to implement the posi-
22 tion it had taken in its note of August 17 to Japan?

23 Answer:

24 The purpose of the United States, in making the
25 statement of August 17 under reference, was to tell

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1 Japan in a friendly way that if she kept encroaching
2 upon our rights and interests, we would defend our-
3 selves. This Government at that time was acutely con-
4 cerned over Japan's refusal to agree to our proposal
5 for the neutralization of Indochina, to abandon her
6 jumping-off place there, and otherwise to desist from
7 the menace she was creating to us and other peace-minded
8 nations. It wholly misrepresents the attitude of the
9 United States in the period after August 17 to allege that
10 this Government was planning any step other than that
11 of pure defense in the event the Japanese should attack.
12 Other aspects of this question, for example, where, when
13 and how we would resist the Japanese, were essentially
14 a military matter.

15 149. Question:

16 Had the Secretary of State, in September 1940,
17 informed Lord Lothian that American actions towards
18 Japan in the Pacific would be predicated upon a policy
19 of doing everything legitimately possible to help England
20 win the war? (cf. Peace and War, p. 575)

21 Answer:

22 What I said to Lord Lothian on September 30, 1940
23 in regard to this matter is accurately described in my
24 memorandum of conversation with him appearing on pages
25 574-575 of Peace and War. My comments to Lord Lothian

df 40 1 had to do with the broad aspects of the situation created
2 by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact but also had
3 special reference to the winning of the war by Great
4 Britain against Germany. At that moment Germany had
5 already overrun much of the Continent of Europe and the
6 British and the entire Allied cause was virtually hanging
7 by a thread. Every rational person realizes what would
8 have happened to this country if Hitler and his allies
9 had succeeded in their program. It was in these circum-
10 stances that I had my conversation with Lord Lothian.

11 I said:

12 "The relations between Germany, Italy and Japan,
13 each having a common objective of conquering certain
14 areas of the world and each pursuing identical policies
15 of force, devastation and seizure, have been during
16 recent years on a basis of complete understanding and
17 of mutual cooperation for all purposes mutually desirable
18 and reasonably practicable, with the result that the
19 recent announcement was part and parcel of the chain
20 of related events.

21 "I then proceeded to say that this Government has
22 pursued a definite and somewhat progressive line of acts
23 and utterances in resisting Japanese aggression and treaty
24 violations during recent years; that these acts and
25 utterances have comprised repeated aid to China, succes-

df 41

1 sive moral embargoes, abandonment of the commercial
 2 treaty, actual embargoes under law, the sending of our
 3 Navy to Hawaii, together with appropriate statements
 4 and notes of strong remonstrance against Japanese steps
 5 of aggression and constant repetition of the basic
 6 principles of world order under law. I added that I
 7 did not undertake to predict, much less to make commit-
 8 ments, as to how fast and how far this Government may
 9 go in following up the various acts and utterances in
 10 which it has been indulging; that, of course, the special
 11 desire of this Government is to see Great Britain succeed
 12 in the war and that its acts and utterances with respect
 13 to the Pacific area would be more or less affected as to
 14 time and extent by the question of what course would, on
 15 the part of this Government, most effectively and legiti-
 16 mately aid Great Britain in winning the war."

17 150. Question:

18 Had the Secretary of State in August, 1941, informed
 19 Lord Halifax that a Japanese movement into the South
 20 Pacific would constitute a danger to England second only
 21 to a German invasion across the English Channel? (cf.
 22 Peace and War 710-11)

23 Answer:

24 What I said to Lord Halifax on August 9 in regard
 25 to this matter is accurately described in my memorandum

df 42 1 of conversation with him appearing on Pages 710-711 of
2 Peace and War which reads as follows:

3 "The Ambassador made some inquiry about the amount
4 of aid this Government might give in case Singapore or
5 the Dutch East Indies should be attacked. I replied
6 that I myself have visualized the problem and issue in
7 a broader way and that issue is presented by the plan
8 of the Japanese to invade by force the whole of the
9 Indian Ocean and the islands and continents adjacent
10 thereto, isolating China, sailing across probably to the
11 mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil area,
12 to the Cape of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a
13 military despotism the trade routes and the supply sources
14 to the British. I added that this broad military occupa-
15 tion would perhaps be more damaging to British defense
16 in Europe than any other step short of the German crossing
17 of the Channel. I said that this Government visualizes
18 these broad conditions and the problem of resistance
19 which they present; that the activities of this Govern-
20 ment in the way of discouraging this Japanese movement
21 and of resistance will be more or less affected by the
22 British defensive situation in Europe and hence by the
23 question of the number of American naval vessels and
24 other American aid that may be needed by Great Britain
25 at the same time. I said that in the event of further

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1 Japanese movements south this Government and the British
2 Government should naturally have a conference at once and
3 this Government would then be able to determine more defi-
4 nitely and in detail its situation pertaining to resistance,
5 in the light of the statement I had just made."

6 151. Question:

7 Had the Congress, on November 13, 1941, at the
8 solicitation of the President and the Secretary of State,
9 committed the nation to keeping open the sea lanes so
10 that Lend-Lease might fulfill its function? (Cf. N.Y.
11 Times, Nov. 14)

12 Answer:

13 My view of the significance of the measure passed
14 by the House of Representatives on November 13, 1941
15 providing for the amendment to the Neutrality Act is
16 contained in a letter I wrote to Speaker Rayburn and
17 Representative McCormack on that same day.

18 In that letter I stated:

19 "The breadth of our self-defense must at all
20 times equal the breadth of the dangers which threaten
21 us. In the circumstances of today, we must be free
22 to arm our merchant ships for their own protection;
23 and we must be free, in the event of particular and
24 extreme emergency, to use these ships for the carriage
25 of supplies to nations which are resisting the world-

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1 wide movement of conquest headed in our direction.
2 This Government would, of course, use caution in
3 carrying out the power which it could exercise upon
4 the passage of the bill."

5 I also stated:

6 "The greatest intermediate objective of
7 Hitler's armed forces is to capture Great Britain and
8 to gain control of the high seas. To this end, Hitler
9 has projected his forces far out into the Atlantic
10 with a policy of submarine ruthlessness. By intimi-
11 dation and terror he would drive our ships from the
12 high seas, and ships of all nations from most of the
13 North Atlantic. Even in the waters of the Western
14 Hemisphere he has attacked and destroyed our ships, as
15 well as ships of other American republics, with result-
16 ing loss of American lives."

17 The action of Congress in amending the Neutrality
18 Act was only one factor in promoting the broad problem
19 of self-defense, the necessity of which at that time was
20 urgent and compelling.

21 152. Question:

22 In addition to the physical threat to the Philippines
23 as stated in the President's communication to Japan of
24 December 2, did the Japanese military movements constitute
25 a danger to the commitments made by Congress in author-

df 45 1 izing Lend-Lease and in re-establishing the American
2 policy of freedom of the seas?

3 Answer:

4 I would say that the Japanese military movements
5 constituted a danger to the defense of free nations
6 resisting the world-wide movement of conquest. The
7 intent of lend-lease was to assist in that defense. The
8 broad question of danger to this and to all peaceful
9 countries was Japan's military partnership with Hitler
10 for conquest. A material factor in the situation was
11 Japan's flagrant violations of American rights and interests
12 and the jeopardizing of American lives in China, which
13 portended the extension of such violations over a much
14 wider area. This Government could not afford to be
15 deluded by Japan's false claims and pretensions which
16 masked her designs of conquest, and to be oblivious to
17 our own serious dangers.

18 153. Question:

19 You have testified, have you not, that the decision
20 of the Executive, in the period November 29-December 6,
21 was not to advise Congress in a Message of the state of
22 American-Japanese relations?

23 Answer:

24 In my testimony on November 26, 1945, in reply to
25 questions by Counsel as to "what the facts and circum-

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1 stances were which led to the decision not to deliver
2 that message to the Congress prior to December 7th," I
3 set forth various considerations which influenced the
4 President and myself against acting prematurely in that
5 matter. I have also discussed this in answer to your
6 questions Nos. 18 and 19. The issue between isolationists
7 and non-isolationists was then at fever heat and its
8 line of cleavage extended through the Congress. The
9 sending of a message to Congress at this critical junc-
10 ture would have greatly accentuated that issue and would
11 have correspondingly encouraged the Japanese militarists.
12 The fact was that we had been doing our best to acquaint
13 the Congress and the public with the critical dangers in
14 the situation, and at the same time to avoid precipitat-
15 ing the crisis which the military people were anxious to
16 defer as long as possible.

17 Questions 154 to 156 are grouped in a single answer.

18 154. Question:

19 As one reason for this decision not to send a
20 Message to Congress, you have testified that Congress,
21 only a few weeks before November 29, had by only one vote,
22 sustained the Selective Service. Are you aware that the
23 vote in question was in the House on August 13, 1941,
24 three and one-half months before November 29, 1941?

25 155. Question:

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1 Are you aware that the vote had to do with the
2 matter of releasing at the end of a year's service those
3 whose service had been limited to one year in the original
4 bill?

5 156. Question:

6 Are you aware that the House took this vote in
7 ignorance of the fact that, a day or two before, the
8 President, at the Atlantic Conference, was agreeing with
9 the British Prime Minister on a course of American
10 action with relation to Japan?

11 Answer:

12 Without discussing the technicalities of the
13 selective service extension bill under consideration in
14 August 1941, it is still my conviction that the close vote
15 in the House on that bill, 203 to 202, indicated the vio-
16 lently divided character of national opinion at the time.
17 Furthermore, had the bill been defeated, the forces of
18 aggression would have been greatly encouraged and the na-
19 tions resisting aggression correspondingly discouraged.

20 In his message to Congress on this subject, July 21,
21 1941, President Roosevelt said:

22 "Today it is imperative that I should officially
23 report to the Congress what the Congress undoubtedly
24 knows: That the international situation is not less
25 grave but is far more grave than it was a year ago.

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156. Question:

Are you aware that the House took this vote in ignorance of the fact that, a day or two before, the President, at the Atlantic Conference, was agreeing with the British Prime Minister on a course of American action with relation to Japan?

Answer:

Without discussing the technicalities of the selective service extension bill under consideration in August 1941, it is still my conviction that the close vote in the House on that bill, 203 to 202, indicated the violently divided character of national opinion at the time. Furthermore, had the bill been defeated, the forces of aggression would have been greatly encouraged and the nations resisting aggression correspondingly discouraged.

In his message to Congress on this subject, July 21, 1941, President Roosevelt said:

"Today it is imperative that I should officially report to the Congress what the Congress undoubtedly knows: That the international situation is not less grave but is far more grave than it was a year ago.

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1 President in the same friendly tone agreed that the two
2 Governments should resume amicable conversations looking
3 to a peaceful understanding. Such conversations were
4 then continued in a friendly way for nearly four months.
5 I, therefore, do not see how the attitude of this Govern-
6 ment could in any way be construed as offensive or
7 unfriendly or how there can be any warrantable basis for
8 criticism of the President.

9 Questions 157 and 158 are grouped in a single answer.

10 157. Question:

11 Were you advised by anyone as to when the army would
12 be ready for war in the Pacific?

13 158. Question:

14 Were you advised by anyone as to when the navy
15 would be ready for war in the Pacific?

16 Answer:

17 The views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of
18 Naval Operations on the need of more time for prepared-
19 ness as set forth in their memoranda of November 5 and
20 November 27, 1941, were known to me at the time. Further-
21 more, the Army and Navy heads for some time had been
22 representing to me their need of more time in which to
23 strengthen the defense of the United States.

24 Questions 159 and 163 are grouped in a single answer.

25 159. Question:

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1 "Occasional individuals, based their opinions
2 on unsupported evidence or on no evidence at all,
3 may with honest intent assert that the United States
4 need fear no attack on its own territory or on the
5 other nations of this hemisphere by aggressors from
6 without.

7 "Nevertheless, it is the well-nigh unanimous
8 opinion of those who are daily cognizant, as
9 military and naval officers and as Government
10 servants in the field of international relations,
11 that schemes and plans of aggressor nations against
12 American security are so evident that the United
13 States and the rest of the Americas are definitely
14 imperiled in their national interests...."

15 I told the press on August 11, 1941, in response to
16 a question whether failure of the bill would have any
17 effect on Japan, that "the psychological effect alone
18 on many phases of the international situation would be
19 exceedingly bad, to say nothing of the actual results."

20 With regard to the President's communication to the
21 Japanese Ambassador of August 17, 1941, the President had
22 nothing in mind except a friendly approach to discourage
23 Japan from attacking us. Having participated in that
24 interview, I received no impression from the President's
25 tone or demeanor of any suggestion of a threat. The

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1 Will you advise the Committee as to who saw the
2 final modus vivendi as prepared by the State Department?

3 163 Question:

4 Will you advise the Committee as to who saw your
5 November 26, 1941, message to Japan?

6 Answer:

7 The November 25 draft of the modus vivendi was,
8 of course, seen, as were all previous drafts, by the
9 Far Eastern advisers of the Department of State. It
10 contained nothing of material substance that was not
11 contained in the November 24 draft and the revisions
12 it represented were largely refinements in the interests
13 of precision. The November 24 draft was seen by the
14 diplomatic representatives of the British, Netherlands
15 and Chinese Governments, and to the best of my recol-
16 lection by the President and the representatives of the
17 War and Navy Departments. I do not know who outside
18 the Department of State saw the November 25 draft, and
19 in any case there would hardly have been time for it
20 to have any wide circulation before the decision was
21 reached on the following day to withhold, in deliver-
22 ing our reply to the Japanese, the modus vivendi feature.
23 On this point I refer to the three successive drafts
24 of the modus vivendi which are a part of the record.
25 With regard to the 10-point proposal, it is clear

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1 from my reply to your question No. 74 that the contents
2 of the 10-point proposal were seen by all who saw the
3 modus vivendi drafts. However, I cannot say who, other
4 than the Far Eastern advisers of the State Department,
5 saw the 10-point proposal in the exact form in which it
6 was set up for delivery to the Japanese. To all of the
7 modus vivendi drafts the 10-point proposal was attached,
8 as the modus vivendi was intended only to facilitate
9 conversations with the proposals in the 10-point communi-
10 cation as a basis. Japan could not have accepted our
11 modus vivendi draft without being prepared to take as a
12 basis for further conversations a program along the
13 lines of the 10-point proposal, nor could she have avoided
14 declaring at the outset of the conversations that she
15 would pursue a peaceful course, such declaration being
16 set forth in paragraphs one and two of the modus vivendi
17 in language as follows:

18 "1. The Government of the United States
19 and the Government of Japan, both being solici-
20 tous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that
21 their national policies are directed toward
22 lasting and extensive peace throughout the
23 Pacific area and that they have no territorial
24 designs therein.

25 "2. They undertake reciprocally not to

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1 make from regions in which they have military
2 establishments any advance by force or threat
3 or force into any areas in Southeastern or
4 Northeastern Asia or in the southern or the
5 northern Pacific area."

6 Questions 160, 161, 164 and 165 are grouped in a single answer.

7 160. Question:

8 Will you advise the Committee as to who opposed
9 the sending of this modus vivendi?

10 161. Question:

11 Will you tell us who favored the sending of this
12 modus vivendi?

13 164. Question:

14 Will you advise the Committee as to who opposed the
15 sending of this message? (the November 26 message)

16 165. Question:

17 Will you advise us who favored the sending of this
18 message?

19 Answer:

20 While I, of course, consulted the military and
21 naval authorities of this Government and with the Far
22 Eastern advisers of the Department of State on all plans
23 for dealing with the critical situation in relation with
24 Japan, the responsibility for decisions, except in matters
25 which I felt should be referred to the President, rested

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1 with me, and I took no poll of "ayes" and "nays". So
2 far as I am aware, however, among the top officials
3 whose function it was to make decisions, there was no
4 dissent at any stage of our intensive consideration in
5 the days between November 22 and November 26 of the
6 modus vivendi proposal or the 10-point proposal.

7 The situation with which we were called upon to
8 deal between November 22 and November 26 was briefly as
9 follows: We had the indisputable evidence of the inter-
10 cepted Japanese message of November 22, referred to in
11 my reply to your question No.136, that the Japanese
12 Government had instructed its representatives that there
13 must be acceptance of its terms without any possibility
14 of further concessions and within a definite time limit--
15 November 29. I and my associates could not escape the
16 conclusion from a reading of the Japanese message that
17 the Japanese had decided to attack unless the United
18 States made basic concessions.

19 In our clutching at straws to see how far we could
20 go toward tiding over the situation we got up the
21 modus vivendi plan for possible inclusion as a part of
22 our reply along with a plan for a broad but simple settle-
23 ment covering the entire Pacific area. The modus vivendi
24 plan called for the participation of the Governments of
25 Great Britain, Australia and the Netherlands in connec-

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tion with the provisions in the plan for the modification of the freezing measures. We consulted those governments and also the Chinese Government which was vitally concerned. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's reaction to the modus vivendi plan as communicated to this Government was that if there was any relaxation of the embargo by this Government, or even a belief on the part of the Chinese people that such action would be taken, Chinese morale would be shattered, Chinese resistance would collapse, and the Japanese would be able to gain their ends. In the light of this serious development and of the chances being overwhelmingly against Japan's acceptance of the modus vivendi proposal, especially as we had convincing evidence that Japan was already moving forward with her military forces and had reached the jumping-off place in Indochina, consideration of all the surrounding circumstances relating to the difficulties and the imminent dangers in the situation led to a conclusion not to propose our modus vivendi draft to the Japanese.

In any event the modus vivendi plan would not have enhanced appreciably the chances of Japan's adopting our counterproposal, for what we would have offered the Japanese in the modus vivendi was mere chicken feed compared with what they were asking for, as set forth in their ultimatum of November 20. The view that Japan would not accept our counterproposal, even with the

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1 modus vivendi feature, was, to the best of my recollection,
2 shared by all the high officials in the Government who are
3 known to have expressed any views on the subject, as, for
4 example, the following instances: On November 24 Admiral
5 Stark, in a circular message, addressed, among others,
6 to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific fleet, pointed out
7 that the chances of a favorable outcome of the negotiations
8 with Japan were very doubtful and that a surprise aggre-
9 sive movement by the Japanese in any direction was a
10 probability. On November 25 Admiral Stark followed up
11 that message with a letter to Admiral Kimmel. In the
12 letter he stated that he had held up dispatch of the
13 letter pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull.
14 Admiral Stark stated that neither the President nor Mr.
15 Hull would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack
16 and that they had confirmed the view expressed in the
17 previous message regarding the gravity of the situation.
18 Secretary Stimson in his diary entry for November 25
19 stated that at a meeting at the White House the President
20 expressed the view that, "We are likely to be attacked
21 perhaps as soon as -- perhaps next Monday."

22 Some persons, in attempting to reconstruct the
23 situation which then existed, seem to have been misled
24 by Japanese charges misrepresenting the character of the
25 10-point proposal. They seem to have completely over-

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1 looked the fact, which was subsequently disclosed, that
2 by November 26 when our proposal was delivered to the
3 Japanese, orders had already been given to their fleet
4 to sail preparatory to the attack which was later made
5 according to schedule. It was this movement to attack
6 which prompted the Japanese to start preparing their
7 utterly false and fraudulent misrepresentations, which
8 amounted to the monstrous charge, made in the worst of
9 bad faith, that they had been forced to fight because
10 our statement of policy as contained in our November 26
11 proposal was harsh and humiliating. Neither the Japanese
12 leaders who falsely pretended to be "dumbfounded" over
13 our proposal of November 26, notwithstanding the fact
14 that it was along lines we had been discussing for months,
15 nor those who supported this Japanese contention had at
16 any time claimed that the Japanese would make the least
17 concession beyond their proposal of November 20, nor have
18 they advanced any suggestion as to what further conces-
19 sions the United States would have to make, short of
20 complete acceptance of the Japanese proposal of November
21 20.

22 There was no reason for the Japanese to have come
23 to us at any stage with their demands, nor was there
24 any need for a new agreement between the United States
25 and Japan. All that was necessary was for Japan to

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1 abandon her course of aggression and adopt one of peace,
2 and the situation in the Pacific area would have ad-
3 justed itself almost automatically by the observance on
4 the part of Japan, along with other signatory powers,
5 of the Nine-Power Treaty, of the Kellogg-Briand Peace
6 Pact and other treaties and commitments, including a
7 commitment to respect the "open door" in China, to
8 which Japan was a party. Nor must also the fact be
9 overlooked that while Japan was repudiating these
10 solemn treaty obligations by taking the aggressive and
11 moving her armed forces toward us and other peaceful
12 countries, we were pleading, as a peaceful and law-
13 abiding nation, with Japan to abandon her course of
14 conquest and likewise become law-abiding and peaceful.

15 Our position, as summed up in the 10-point program,
16 was really nothing new to the Japanese. We had been dis-
17 cussing with them throughout months of conversations
18 broad-guaged principles, practical applications of which
19 were along the lines of the 10-point proposal. The
20 proposal was not presented to them in the form of demands
21 but merely as an example of a kind of settlement we
22 would like to see worked out in the Pacific area. We
23 were not bargaining with the Japanese as if we ourselves
24 had been offenders. The only issue or question to be
25 settled was whether we could prevail upon Japan to abandon

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1 her increasingly dangerous movements of conquest and agree
2 to become law-abiding and to adopt a peaceful course.
3 This was the all-important issue which the Japanese in
4 the end sought to cover up and dodge.

5 The 10-point program also summed up, so the general
6 public might understand, many of the general and special
7 benefits which might accrue to Japan if she renounced
8 a course of aggression; such as, enhancement of her
9 national security through participation in a multilateral
10 non-aggression pact and through measures calculated to
11 stabilize the situation in the Far East, including the
12 abrogation by the powers of extraterritoriality in China
13 and the giving of mutual pledges regarding respect for
14 the integrity of Indochina; and an advantageous economic
15 program; a generous trade agreement with the United
16 States, removal of the freezing regulations, an agree-
17 ment upon a plan for stabilization of the dollar-yen
18 rate. What Japan was asked to do in return was to give
19 practical application to the professions she had made
20 of her peaceful intent by agreeing to withdraw her armed
21 forces from China and Indochina, to support no regime
22 in China other than the national government of China,
23 and to agree not to interpret any agreement to which
24 she was a party in such a way as to conflict with the
25 establishment and preservation of peace throughout the

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1 Pacific area. Surely, these latter were reasonable and
2 necessary conditions for the privileges that were offered
3 to Japan. The 10-point proposal would have been highly
4 welcome to Japan if she had had any intention of adopting
5 peaceful courses. It would be a monstrous travesty of
6 the facts and an unspeakable libel on this country if
7 the Japanese warlords in their effort to disclaim
8 responsibility should be permitted to screen and shift
9 their guilt in the face of all the facts to the contrary.

10 162. Question:

11 Did you agree with Ambassador Grew, and others,
12 that the placing of the embargo upon Japan would mean
13 war?

14 Answer:

15 The general proposition regarding the effect of
16 embargoes upon Japan, especially as applicable to the
17 situation from 1938 to 1940, is set forth on page 88
18 of Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy. The important
19 fact, however, which had to be taken into account in the
20 situation at the time when this Government applied
21 freezing measures to Japan in July, 1941, was the advance
22 of Japan's armed forces so as seriously and immediately
23 to imperil the security of this and other countries.
24 At that stage, Japan was in effect brazenly demanding
25 military supplies with which to attack this and other

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1 countries to the south. The question of our self-
 2 defense had by that time become supreme with us and
 3 impelled us to refuse to furnish the invader with
 4 military supplies.

5 Questions 166 to 169 are grouped in a single answer.

6 166. Question:

7 Were you or anyone in the State Department to
 8 your knowledge consulted in regard to the military
 9 plan being drawn up by America, Britain, the Nether-
 10 lands, and China, sometimes known as the ABCD block?

11 167. Question:

12 If you were so consulted will you state who con-
 13 sulted you and what was said at the conference?

14 168. Question:

15 Did representatives of the State Department partici-
 16 pate in any of these conversations?

17 169. Question:

18 If so, state the name of that representative.

19 Answer:

20 From time to time I participated from the politi-
 21 cal angle, in discussions with the President and the
 22 leaders of the Army and of the Navy in regard to the
 23 subject of the military conversations with the British
 24 and the Dutch for joint defensive plans. No representa-
 25 tive of the Department of State participated in those

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staff conversations, but there was a Department of State representative who participated in the conversations regarding defense which were held with the Canadians. There was no Chinese participation in the foregoing conversations.

In the discussions which I held with the President and the leaders of the Army and of the Navy in regard to those conversations, as made clear above, I did not pass upon the military aspect of questions, but occasionally offered comments and suggestions as a layman. The views that I expressed were along the lines I had expressed publicly as well as in talks with diplomatic representatives. I refer you to what I said in that regard in an address on March 17, 1938 (Peace and War, pages 412-413), as follows:

"Prudence and common sense dictate that, where this and other nations have common interests and common objectives, we should not hesitate to exchange information and to confer with the governments of such other nations and, in dealing with the problems confronting each alike, to proceed along parallel lines--this Government retaining at all times its independence of judgment and freedom of action. For nations which seek peace to assume with respect to each other

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1 attitudes of complete aloofness would serve only
2 to encourage, and virtually invite, on the part
3 of other nations lawlessly inclined, policies
4 and actions most likely to endanger peace.

5 "In the present Far Eastern emergency, we
6 have consistently collaborated with other peace-
7 seeking nations in the manner I have just
8 described. I have said often, and I repeat
9 again, that in this collaboration there is not
10 a trace of alliance or involvement of any sort.
11 We have scrupulously followed and we intend
12 to follow the traditional policy of our country
13 not to enter into entangling alliances or involve-
14 ments with other countries."

15 On November 25, 1940, I gave my views to the British
16 Ambassador, Lord Lothian, in commenting upon his expressed
17 view that there should be conferences between the naval
18 experts of our two governments with respect to what
19 each would or might do in case of military outbreaks on
20 the part of Japan. I said that, of course, there could
21 be no agreements entered into in this respect, but that
22 there should undoubtedly be collaboration with a view
23 to making known to each other any and all information
24 practicable in regard to what both might have in mind
25 to do, and when and where, in case of a military move-

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1 ment by Japan in the south or in some other direction.

2 There was no suggestion on the part of any of us
3 in this Government, so far as I knew, that in the
4 military staff conversations our representatives could
5 go beyond, at the very most, making recommendations
6 which, of course, would have been subject to Congres-
7 sional approval.

8
9 **Mr. Lane:** The committee received a sworn statement dated
10 March 1946 from former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. This
11 statement was in response to inquiry by committee counsel
12 for certain portions of a diary kept by Mr. Stimson. We ask
13 that the statement and appendix thereto be spread on the record
14 at this point.

15 **The Chairman:** It is so ordered.

16 (The matter referred to is as follows:)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

AS KNOWN BY MY CURRENT NOTES AND MY
RECOLLECTION AS REFERRED THEREBY

S T A T E M E N T

by

HENRY L. STIMSON

Former Secretary of War

to the

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION

OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

S. CON. RES. 27

With Appendix

March 1946.

STATEMENT OF FACTSAS SHOWN BY MY CURRENT NOTES AND MYRECOLLECTION AS REFRESHED THEREBY

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5 The Committee already has before it my testimony before
6 the Army Pearl Harbor Board. At that time I undertook to give
7 the Board the answers to the questions which were asked me as
8 fully as I was then able, having in mind certain limitations on
9 what I then felt was proper to discuss, including particularly
10 any matters the revelation of which might in any way have jeo-
11 pardized the safety of our then pending military operations.
12 I am now able, however, to amplify in certain respects the
13 testimony which I gave before the Board.

14 The evidence which I am able to give the Committee comes
15 not only from my recollection of the events which transpired
16 preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, but I am able to refresh my
17 recollection from a contemporaneous record which I kept from
18 day to day for my own personal use. As I explained to the Army
19 Board, I had a dictograph at my house at which I dictated these
20 memoranda each morning before going to the War Department. I
21 read many excerpts from these to the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
22 This Committee last autumn asked me for my notes covering the
23 dates of November 5, 6, 7, 10, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and
24 December 2 and 7, 1941. I am attaching to this statement as an
25 appendix copies of my notes covering these dates, of matters

2 1 relevant to the Far Eastern situation and the events leading up
3 to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although these extracts speak
4 largely for themselves, they were made roughly and hastily
5 and were not revised when dictated. They therefore naturally
6 need some addition to tie them in as a connected story and
7 to give the whole picture as I saw it. It is for this reason
8 that I am accompanying them with this statement.

9 No accurate understanding can be had of the situation
10 which existed in the weeks preceding the Pearl Harbor attack
11 or of the conduct of the various individuals concerned unless
12 they are viewed in the light of the historical events which had
13 been going on for some time and which ultimately led to the
14 crisis that occurred in December and the war of the United
15 States with the Axis powers. From some of the comments which
16 have been made and given wide publicity, one receives the im-
17 pression that many people have already forgotten the trend of
18 events which were coming to a head in the autumn of 1941 and
19 the threat to our own safety which had unmistakably developed
20 in the actions of the two great aggressor nations, Germany and
21 Japan, who already in the preceding months and years had begun
22 spreading destruction and terror throughout a large portion of
23 the civilized world.

24 Japan had started on her current path of aggression in the
25 Far East as early as September 1931. She then attacked the
Chinese in Manchuria and overran that territory, flouting her

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1 obligations under the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty.
2 There then followed her attacks on the Chinese in Shanghai. She
3 invaded China in 1937, after the conclusion of the Anti-Comin-
4 tern Pact with Germany. The brutal and barbarous type of mili-
5 tary aggression for which she stood was typified by the outrages
6 committed by her army in the occupation of Nanking and similar
7 incidents, which by 1941 had become notorious events of history.
8 In September 1940, after Germany had set out on her temporarily
9 triumphal path toward the subjugation of the nations of Europe,
10 Japan concluded a military alliance with Germany and Italy and
11 placed herself formally in the camp of the Axis powers.

12 By the summer of 1941, the Japanese intentions in the Far
13 East became very clear. After Germany attacked Russia in June
14 of that year, Japan began extensive military preparations --
15 among other things, calling an additional two million men to the
16 colors. The utterances of her warlords became increasingly
17 threatening. She extended her military operations into southern
18 French Indo-China. That she was headed toward the ultimate oc-
19 cupation of Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, and thence
20 the domination of the entire Southeast Asia, was evident not only
21 from her overt acts and announcements but from certain of her
22 intercepted diplomatic messages in which her intentions were
23 expressed in more detail.

24 All of this presented a great threat to our safety and in-
25 terests. If Singapore and the Netherlands Indies should be

4 1 occupied, Japan would be strengthened by the acquisition of a
2 great fortress and a great source of natural resources in rub-
3 ber and oil, which would help her greatly to carry on her pro-
4 gram of depredation. The Philippines, which lay between Japan
5 and these British and Dutch targets, would inevitably be the
6 next victim, and at her mercy. China might easily be forced to
7 capitulate and taken out of the war. Our military advisers
8 had given the President their formal advice that, if Japan at-
9 tacked British Malaya or the Dutch East Indies or moved her
10 forces west of a certain line in Indo-China, we would have to
11 fight for the sake of our own security.

12 On the other side of the world, we were faced with a
13 situation which was even more critical. Hitler, having seized
14 Norway, France, Belgium, Denmark, and Holland, had just attacked
15 Russia in June of 1941 and the Russians were fighting a des-
16 perate battle to stop the German army from overrunning a large
17 portion of her territory and her capital. In the meantime,
18 the Germans were maintaining large forces deployed on the north
19 coast of Europe as a continual threat of an invasion of England
20 which, as we know, was ill prepared to meet it. As we now know
21 from the evidence presented at the trial of the German war cri-
22 minals in Nuremburg, Hitler was planning ultimately to attack
23 the United States and was conspiring with the Japanese to aid
24 them while they attacked us in the meantime. It was then very
25 apparent to everyone who had carefully followed the course of

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1 events that we would sooner or later have to meet the threat to
2 civilization which these aggressor nations were presenting to
3 the world, and the great danger was that the nations who were
4 then fighting desperately and gallantly to stem this threat
5 would be knocked out of the war one by one before our turn came
6 and that we would ultimately be left to face the onslaught alone.

7 The American people had been slow to recognize the danger,
8 but by the autumn of 1941 it was beginning to be understood more
9 clearly. Early in 1941 Congress in the Lend-Lease Act had au-
10 thorized the furnishing of munitions to the nations fighting the
11 Axis and the shelter of our ports to their warships. In August
12 1941 the Congress passed a bill extending the draft. In November
13 1941 Congress voted to repeal important sections of the Neu-
14 trality Law, thus permitting the arming of our ships and their
15 sailing into any combat zone or belligerent port in the world.
16 On November 23, 1941, Representative Gearhart of California, in
17 a broadcast on the "American Forum of the Air", after pointing
18 out Japan's breaches of treaty obligations and her subsequent
19 aggression in China, stated:

20 "Japan's ruthlessness makes her an enemy not
21 only of China but also a common foe of all nations."

22 From some of the comments quoted in the public press, one
23 would get the impression that the imminent threat of war in
24 October and November 1941 was a deep secret, known only to the
25 authorities in Washington who kept it mysteriously to themselves.

6 1 Nothing could be further from the truth. At least one of our
2 destroyers had been attacked by German war vessels. Aside
3 from the war warnings which were sent to our military and na-
4 val commanders in the various theatres of danger, the imminence
5 of war with Japan was a matter of public knowledge and the
6 people were being warned time and time again of the danger which
7 was approaching. One need only read the headlines of the news-
8 papers during this period. For example, on October 17th the
9 Navy ordered all American merchant ships in the Pacific to put
10 into safe ports. On October 24th Secretary Knox publicly warned
11 of a "clash" with Japan and the "seriousness of the situation".
12 On November 11, 1941 - Armistice Day - the President himself
13 warned the people that the nation was facing a world war again.
14 Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, declared on that day
15 that "our people realized that at any moment war may be forced
16 upon us". During this period, day after day, the headlines
17 warned of the approaching crisis with Japan. On November 26th
18 there appeared on the front page of the "New York Times" the
19 notice that the U. S. Consulate in Tokyo had warned Americans
20 to get out of Japan promptly. On Monday, December 1st, appeared
21 the headline that "Roosevelt Hurries Back in the Crisis". In
22 Honolulu itself the papers were carrying equally sensational
23 headlines. For example, on November 30th appeared the headline
24 "Japanese May Strike Over Weekend".

25 Meanwhile we had been doing what we could to get ready for

7 1 war if and when it came. After the long period necessary to
2 lay the foundations of our ultimate enormous production, the
3 output of war materials in this country was beginning to in-
4 crease rapidly; but we were still using large quantities of it
5 under the Lend-Lease Act to satisfy the demands of the nations
6 who were already in the battle and holding off the enemy. We
7 were shipping all we could spare to England and in particular to
8 Russia, which was then in the forefront of the fight.

9 In the meantime, the War Department was doing what it could
10 to fortify the Pacific. We were giving all the material and
11 effectives that we could spare to Hawaii in particular, which was
12 in fact prior to the time of the Pearl Harbor attack reported
13 to me by the Staff as the best manned and equipped of all our
14 outposts on the Pacific, including the Panama Canal. We were
15 also doing our best to reenforce the Philippines. The effec-
16 tiveness of the airplane against a navy in narrow seas had been
17 recently demonstrated in the Mediterranean by the German air at-
18 tacks on British Naval forces, as well as by the success of the
19 British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto. We decided that
20 if a sufficient number of our bombing planes, which would be
21 able to proceed to the Philippine Islands under their own power,
22 could be gathered there, this would present a very effective
23 nucleus of a defense against the advances of the Japanese navy
24 or convoys in South Asiatic waters. Accordingly, in August
25 we started sending out to the Philippines as many four-engined

8 1 bombers as we could spare, and by December 7th we had in fact
2 gathered there some thirty-five of these ships. This was the
3 largest group of such American bombers yet in existence any-
4 where. We felt at the time that these presented a strong
5 striking force which could be used with great effect in opera-
6 tions against the Japanese navy. We underestimated, as did
7 everyone else, the effective power of Japanese aviation, which
8 asserted itself at Pearl Harbor and one day later in the
9 Philippines by its attack on our installations there, includ-
10 ing the destruction of many of the bombers themselves.

11 In mid-October the Japanese Konoye cabinet fell and a
12 new cabinet under General Tojo came into power, which all ex-
13 pected would be even more aggressive and warlike.

14 To sum up, the salient features of the situation, as they
15 appeared to me early in November 1941, were as follows:

16 1. War with Germany and Japan would ultimately be
17 inevitable.

18 2. It was vitally important that none of the na-
19 tions who were then desperately fighting Germany -- Eng-
20 land, Russia, or China -- should be knocked out of the
21 war before the time came when we would be required to go
22 in.

23 3. While we very much wanted more time in which
24 to prepare, nevertheless we felt we had a fair chance to
25 make an effective fight against Japan for the Philippines

9 1 even if we had to enter the war at that time, in view of
2 the air power that we were building up in the Philippines.

3 4. If war did come, it was important, both from the
4 point of view of unified support of our own people as well
5 as for the record of history, that we should not be
6 placed in the position of firing the first shot, if this
7 could be done without sacrificing our safety, but that
8 Japan should appear in her true role as the real aggressor.

9 During this entire period I kept in constant and close touch
10 with Mr. Hull and Mr. Knox, as well as having frequent meetings
11 with the President. In 1940 Messrs. Hull and Knox and I had in-
12 augurated regular weekly meetings in Mr. Hull's office so that
13 there would be close liaison between the three of us. These meet-
14 ings were held on Tuesday mornings at nine-thirty whenever we
15 were present in Washington and able to go. They were being
16 held during this period, in October and November 1941, as well
17 as meetings between us on other occasions.

18 Early in November we received word that the Japanese were
19 sending an additional special envoy, Kurusu, to Washington to
20 participate in the conversations that were being held. I had
21 little hope that anything would come of his proposal, in view
22 of all the information which we had been receiving as to the
23 Jap's determination to proceed with their program of aggres-
24 sion.

25 On November 6th, I had an hour's talk alone with the

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President with regard to the Far Eastern situation and his approaching conference with Kurusu, who was coming from Japan. The thing uppermost in his mind was how we could gain more time. I quote from my notes:

"The President outlined what he thought he might say. He was trying to think of something that would give us further time. He suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for six months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis."

I personally did not approve of a truce on such a basis and told him so. I felt that it would tie up our hands just at a time when it was so important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of the Philippines and our military advisers then felt that if we could accumulate enough of them there it would place us in a favorable strategic position, and I did not approve of any arrangement that would prevent our continuing this program. Secondly, it was still very important that we keep the Chinese in the war, and I believed that they would feel that such a truce was a desertion of them, and that this would have a very serious effect on Chinese morale.

On Friday, November 7th, we had the usual weekly Cabinet meeting. The Far Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our minds. Mr. Hull informed us that relations had become

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1 extremely critical and that we should be on the outlook for an
2 attack by Japan at any time. Our military advisers, while de-
3 sirable of delay, had urged military action if Japan attacked
4 territory whose security was vital to us and in this connection
5 specified American, British, or Dutch territory. The President
6 at the meeting undertook to take an informal vote of the Cabli-
7 net as to whether it was thought the American people would back
8 us up if it became necessary to strike at Japan, in case she
9 should attack England in Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies.
10 The Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would
11 support such a move. The Cabinet voted this way even though
12 only Mr. Hull and the President knew of the efforts which we
13 had been making to reenforce the Philippines with the big bomb-
14 ers and which we in the Army felt could be effective support in
15 case any attack should be made on the British or Dutch in south-
16 eastern Asia. On November 10th at a Staff meeting, General Mar-
17 shall, among other things, read us a long letter from General
18 MacArthur in the Philippines, telling us of hopeful progress
19 in the reorganization of the Philippine Army and the construc-
20 tion of airports throughout the Islands.

21 Between November 10th and 21st talks were commenced in
22 Washington between Nomura and Kurusu on the one hand, and the
23 President and Mr. Hull on the other. During this period a very
24 serious crisis developed by reason of the threatened strike of
25 the coal miners, which would have been a most serious obstacle

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1 to our preparations for defense. Not only was the President oc-
2 cupied with this but we in the War Department during this per-
3 iod were obliged to make preparations for taking over and operat-
4 ing the coal mines in case the strike should eventuate. Much
5 of my personal time was occupied during these days with these
6 preparations. Fortunately, the strike was ultimately averted
7 and the matter resolved shortly after November 20th. My notes
8 contain no reference to any developments in the Japanese si-
9 tuation during this period. It was during this period, on
10 November 20th, that Kurusu presented the Japanese proposals to
11 Mr. Hull which, among other things, demanded that we should
12 withdraw all material and moral support to China and at the
13 same time resume supplying to Japan the oil she required to
14 assist her in carrying on her war with China.

15 My notes recall to me the fact that on November 24th I
16 had a good talk with General Olmstead, who had recently been
17 promoted to be Chief Signal Officer. This department was of
18 particular interest to me because I had been giving a great
19 deal of personal attention during the past months to the develop-
20 ment of radar by the Army. I had for some time become convinced
21 of the importance of radar, both as an anti-aircraft protection
22 as well as its uses for installation in planes and ships for
23 combat purposes. We had made every effort to get as much radar
24 equipment to Hawaii as possible, particularly for anti-aircraft
25 protection; and, as the Committee has undoubtedly heard,

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1 substantial amounts of this equipment of the movable type were
2 in Hawaii and capable of operation.

3 On Tuesday, November 25th, Secretary Knox and I met in
4 Mr. Hull's office for our usual Tuesday morning meeting. Mr.
5 Hull showed us a proposal that he had prepared, which he was
6 considering laying before Nomura and Kurusu, for a three
7 months' truce.

8 At twelve o'clock on the same day, we three went to the
9 White House, where we met with the President and also General
10 Marshal and Admiral Stark. The President at once brought up
11 the relations with the Japanese. Mr. Hull said the Japanese
12 were poised for attack - that they might attack at any time.
13 The President said the Japanese were notorious for making an
14 attack without warning and stated that we might even be at-
15 tacked, say next Monday for example.

16 One problem troubled us very much. If you know that
17 your enemy is going to strike you, it is not usually wise to
18 wait until he gets the jump on you by taking the initiative.
19 In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese
20 fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full
21 support of the American people it was desirable to make sure
22 that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should
23 remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors.
24 We discussed at this meeting the basis on which this country's
25 position could be most clearly explained to our own people and

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1 to the world, in case we had to go into the fight quickly be-
2 cause of some sudden move on the part of the Japanese. We
3 discussed the possibility of a statement summarizing all the
4 steps of aggression that the Japanese had already taken, the
5 encirclement of our interests in the Philippines which was
6 resulting and the threat to our vital supplies of rubber from
7 Malay. I reminded the President that on August 19th he had warned
8 the Japanese Ambassador that if the steps which the Japanese
9 were then taking continued across the border into Thailand,
10 he would regard it as a matter affecting our safety, and sug-
11 gested that he might point out that the moves the Japanese were
12 now apparently on the point of making would be in fact a viola-
13 tion of a warning that had already been given.

14 When I got back to the War Department after this meeting
15 on that same day, I found news from G-2 that was very disturbing.
16 It indicated that the Japanese were embarking a large expedi-
17 tionary force of 30, 40, or 50 ships at Shanghai and that this
18 expedition was proceeding along the China coast south of For-
19 mosa. I at once telephoned Mr. Hull and also sent copies of the
20 report to the President.

21 The next morning, November 26th, Mr. Hull told me over the
22 telephone that he had almost decided not to make the proposition
23 of the three months' truce that he had discussed with Knox and
24 me on November 25th. The Chinese, for one thing, had pointed out
25 strong objections to the proposal, particularly the effect on the

15 1 morale of their own people. Mr. Hull stated that he felt the
2 best thing to do was simply to tell the Japanese that he had
3 no further action to propose.

4 I telephoned the President shortly thereafter and asked
5 him whether he had received the news of the new expedition
6 from Shanghai proceeding down the China coast toward Indo-China.
7 He had not received it. He was shocked by it, and at once took
8 it as further evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese,
9 that while they were negotiating with him - negotiations in
10 which we were asking for a withdrawal of their invading troops
11 in China - they should be sending a further expedition down to
12 Indo-China.

13 On Thursday morning, November 27th, the news was still com-
14 ing in of the movement of the large Japanese expeditionary force
15 south from Shanghai and eventually headed toward Indo-China,
16 with a possibility that it might be proceeding to the Philip-
17 pines or to Burma to cut off the Burma Road, or to the Dutch
18 East Indies. It seemed probable, however, that it was a con-
19 centration to move over into Thailand, from which they could be
20 in a position to attack Singapore at the proper moment; or, as
21 the President later pointed out, it might develop into an attack
22 on Rangoon and thus effectually stop the Burma Road at its be-
23 ginning.

24 Early that morning I had called up Mr. Hull to find out
25 what his final word had been with the Japanese - whether he had

16 1 handed them the proposal for three months' truce, or whether
2 he had told them he had no other proposition to make. He told
3 me that he had broken the whole matter off. His words were:
4 "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you
5 and Knox - the Army and the Navy." I then called up the Presi-
6 dent, who gave me a little different view. He said that it was
7 true that the talks had been called off, but that they had ended
8 up with a magnificent statement prepared by Mr. Hull. I found
9 out afterwards that this was the fact and that the statement con-
10 tained a reaffirmation of our constant and regular position with-
11 out the suggestion of a threat of any kind. I personally was re-
12 lieved that we had not backed down on any of the fundamental
13 principles on which we had stood for so long and which I felt
14 we could not give up without the sacrifice of our national honor
15 and prestige in the world. I submit, however, that no impartial
16 reading of this document can characterize it as being couched in
17 the terms of an ultimatum, although the Japanese were of course
18 only too quick to seize upon it and give it that designation for
19 their own purposes.

20 Shortly after this General Arnold came in with proposed
21 orders for the movement of two of our biggest planes from San
22 Francisco out across the Mandated Islands to Manila. We were
23 to arrange to have these fly high over the Mandated Islands,
24 beyond the reach of their pursuit planes, and photograph
25 them with the idea of trying to detect any naval concentrations

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1 that might be going on there.

2 Later Mr. Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred
3 with me and General Gerow. General Gerow was Chief of the War
4 Plans Division. General Marshall was absent, having left the
5 Department to attend certain Army training maneuvers which were
6 going on that day. Both Admiral Stark and General Gerow were
7 urging that any crisis be postponed as long as possible, to en-
8 able our preparations to proceed. A memorandum had been prepared
9 by General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President on this
10 subject. The opinion of our top military and naval advisers
11 was that delay was very desirable, but that nevertheless we
12 must take military action if Japan attacked American, or Bri-
13 tish, or Dutch territory or moved her forces in Indo-China
14 west of 100 degrees east or south of 10 degrees north. I told
15 them, which was the fact, that I also would be glad to have e
16 time but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the
17 United States or of backing down on any of our principles
18 which would show a weakness on our part.

19 We then discussed the messages that might be sent to the
20 commanding officers of the various theatres, including in par-
21 ticular General MacArthur, who was in the Philippines and in
22 the forefront of the threatened area. We had already sent
23 MacArthur a warning but I felt that the time had now come for
24 a more definite warning. In talking with the President on the
25 telephone that morning, I had suggested, and he had approved

18 1 the idea, that we should send out a final alert, namely that they
2 should be on the qui vive for any attack, and explaining the
3 exact situation. Ordinarily, of course, there would be no
4 reason for me to participate in the sending of any such mes-
5 sage which was the normal function of the military staff. As
6 the President himself, however, had now actually directed the
7 sending of the message, and as I wanted the message clearly
8 to apprise the commanding officers in the various areas as to
9 exactly what the diplomatic situation was, I undertook to par-
10 ticipate in the framing of this message myself. In order that
11 it should be strictly accurate, I called up Mr. Hull myself on
12 the telephone and got his exact statement as to the status of
13 the negotiations, which was then incorporated in the first sen-
14 tence of the message. My papers also indicate that I inserted
15 in the second sentence the words "BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE
16 AT ANY MOMENT".

17 This same message was sent to Commanding Office, Hawaiian
18 Department, and to the three other commanding officers of our
19 Pacific theatres or outposts, viz: Panama, the Philippines, and
20 the West Coast which included Alaska, except that in the case of
21 the message to General MacArthur in the Philippines there were
22 omitted from the third sentence from the end the following words:
23 "BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT COMMA REPEAT
24 NOT COMMA TO ALARM CIVILIAN POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT". The
25 message as sent to General Short read as follows:

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1 "COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

2 FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

3 NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL
4 PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT
5 THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE
6 PERIOD JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION
7 POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT PERIOD IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT COMMA REPEAT
8 CANNOT COMMA BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN
9 COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT PERIOD THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT COMMA
10 REPEAT NOT COMMA BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF
11 ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE PERIOD PRIOR TO
12 HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH
13 RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT
14 THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT COMMA REPEAT NOT
15 COMMA TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT PERIOD REPORT
16 MEASURES TAKEN PERIOD SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY
17 OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN
18 TO JAPAN PERIOD LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET
19 INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS

20 MARSHALL"

21 This message has been criticized as ambiguous and described
22 as a "do-don't" message. The fact is that it presented with the
23 utmost precision the situation with which we were all confronted
24 and in the light of which all our commanding officers, as well
25 as we ourselves in Washington, had to govern our conduct. The

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1 situation was admittedly delicate and critical. On the one hand,
2 in view of the fact that we wanted more time, we did not want
3 to precipitate war at this moment if it could be avoided. If
4 there was to be war, moreover, we wanted the Japanese to commit
5 the first overt act. On the other hand, the matter of defense
6 against an attack by Japan was the first consideration. In
7 Hawaii, because of the large numbers of Japanese inhabitants,
8 it was felt desirable to issue a special warning so that nothing
9 would be done, unless necessary to the defense, to alarm the
10 civil population and thus possibly to precipitate an incident
11 and give the Japanese an excuse to go to war and the chance
12 to say that we had committed the first overt act.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

13 All these considerations were placed before the commanding
14 officers of their respective areas, and it was because they were
15 thought competent to act in a situation of delicacy requiring
16 judgment and skill that they had been placed in these high posts
17 of command. One of the basic policies of the army command, which
18 has been adhered to throughout the entire war, and in most in-
19 stances with complete success, has been to give the local com-
20 mander his objective and mission but not to interfere with him
21 in the performance of it. When General Short was informed on
22 November 27th that "Japanese action unpredictable" and that
23 "hostile action possible at any moment", and that the policy di-
24 rected "should not comma repeat not comma be construed as re-
25 stricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your

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defense", we had a right to assume that he would competently perform this paramount duty entrusted to him. We assumed that when he had been warned that hostile action was possible at any moment, it would not be necessary to repeat that warning over and over again during the ensuing days. The fact was of course that General Short did receive, not only from Washington but from other sources, repeated intelligence of the impending crisis.

You will notice that this message of November 27th specifically mentions that reconnaissance is to be undertaken. This to my mind was a very important part of the message, not only because of its obvious desirability but also because we had provided the Hawaiian Department with what I regarded as a most effective means of reconnaissance against air attack and one to which I had personally devoted a great deal of attention during the preceding months. I refer to the radar equipment with which the Hawaiian Department was then provided. This equipment permitted approaching planes to be seen at distances of approximately 100 miles; and to do so in darkness and storm as well as in clear daylight. In the early part of 1941 I had taken up earnestly the matter of securing such radar equipment for aircraft protection. I knew, although it was not then generally known, that radar had proved of the utmost importance to the British in the Battle of Britian, and I felt in the beginning of 1941 that we were not getting this into production

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1 and to the troops as quickly as we should, and put on all
2 the pressure I could to speed up its acquisition. By the
3 autumn of 1941 we had got some of this equipment out to
4 Hawaii, and only a few days before this I had received a re-
5 port of the tests which had been made of this equipment in
6 Hawaii on November 19th, which indicated very satisfactory
7 results in detecting approaching airplanes. I testified at
8 considerable length with regard to this before the Army Pearl
9 Harbor Board (A.P.H.B., 4064, et seq.). When we specifically
10 directed the commanding officer at Hawaii, who had been warned
11 that war was likely at any moment, to make reconnaissance, I
12 assumed that all means of reconnaissance available to both
13 the Army and Navy would be employed. On the same day a war
14 warning was dispatched to the Commander-in-Chief of the Paci-
15 fic Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations. The standing in-
16 structions to the theatre commanders were that all messages of
17 this character were to be exchanged between the Army and Navy
18 commands.

19 I repeat that my participation in the drafting of this
20 message of November 27th was unusual, since I do not believe
21 it is advisable for the Secretary of War to meddle with mili-
22 tary staff matters. As already stated, I did so on this oc-
23 casion because I felt I was conveying a message from the Pre-
24 sident. The President had taken a momentous decision that
25 day, namely to send what I call a final alert. The Chief of

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1 Staff was away for the day, and I wanted to make certain that
2 the President's orders were carried out accurately.

3 You will note that my notes speak only of the message to
4 General MacArthur. This is evidence of what was the fact, -
5 namely that we all felt in Washington that the first and most
6 likely danger was an attack on the Philippines and that such
7 an attack would be most difficult to meet. Such information as
8 we had been able to gather as to the movements of the Japanese
9 forces indicated a movement toward the south, which might easily
10 be diverted either to Indo-China, Malay Peninsula, Dutch East
11 Indies, or the Philippines. We were correct in this inference.
12 Such an attack on the Philippines was being prepared and im-
13 mediately followed the attack on Pearl Harbor. The movements
14 of the fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor were entirely unknown
15 to us.

16 When the replies to these messages came in from General
17 MacArthur and General Short, they were checked to me by Gen-
18 eral Marshall, undoubtedly for the purpose of reassuring me
19 that our messages had been duly received. The original docu-
20 ments bear my initials, indicating that they were noted by me.

21 The first thing in the morning of the next day - Friday,
22 November 28th - I received information from G-2 of such a for-
23 midable character with regard to the movements of the Japanese
24 forces along the Asiatic coast that I decided to take it to
25 the President before he got up. I saw him while he was still

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1 in bed, and we discussed the situation. He suggested
2 that there were three alternatives, as my notes show: First,
3 to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an
4 ultimatum, stating a point beyond which we would fight; or,
5 third, to fight at once. I said that I felt that to do noth-
6 ing was out of the question and the President agreed with me.
7 As to the other two alternatives, the desirable thing to do
8 from the point of view of our own tactics and safety was to
9 take the initiative and attack without further warning. It is
10 axiomatic that the best defense is offense. It is always
11 dangerous to wait and let the enemy make the first move. I
12 was inclined to feel that the warning given in August by
13 the President against further moves by the Japanese toward
14 Thailand justified an attack without further warning, parti-
15 cularly as their new movement southward indicated that they
16 were about to violate that warning. On the other hand, I
17 realized that the situation could be made more cleanout from
18 the point of view of public opinion if a further warning were
19 given.

20 I went at twelve o'clock that day to a meeting of the so-
21 called War Cabinet - that is to say, the President, Mr. Hull,
22 Mr. Knox, Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and myself. The
23 President had been studying the latest report of G-2 as to the
24 movements of the Japanese expeditionary force, and we discussed
25 the various possibilities as to what it meant. The various

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1 alternatives mentioned were that it might develop into an at-
2 tack on the Philippines, the landing of further troops in Indo-
3 China, an attack on Thailand, on the Dutch Netherlands or on
4 Singapore, or that it might develop into an attack on Rangoon
5 and thus cut off the Burma Road at the beginning. The possi-
6 bility of an attack on Pearl Harbor was not discussed at the
7 meeting, since our thoughts were all focused on this movement
8 toward southeast Asia, which indicated a crisis in that direc-
9 tion. All agreed that if the expedition were permitted to
10 land in the Gulf of Siam it would place a strong Japanese
11 force in such a strategic position as to be a severe blow at
12 all three of the powers in southeast Asia - the British at
13 Singapore, the Netherlands in the Indies, and ourselves in the
14 Philippines. We all agreed that it must not be allowed; that,
15 if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would
16 fight; and, if the British fought, we would have to fight. We
17 realized that if this expedition was allowed to round the
18 southern point of Indo-China, this whole chain of disastrous
19 events would be set on foot.

20 We decided, therefore, that we could not just sit still and
21 do nothing. On the other hand, we also decided that we could
22 not attack without a further warning to Japan, and we discussed
23 what form that warning should take. The President suggested a
24 special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. After
25 some discussion it was decided that he would send such a letter

1 to the Emperor, which would not be made public, and that at
2 the same time he would deliver a special message to Congress
3 reporting on the danger and reporting what we would have to
4 do if the danger happened. The President left after the meet-
5 ing to keep his engagement at Warm Springs, where he was going
6 to have Thanksgiving with the children. The rest of the week
7 end was largely taken up with preparing a suggested draft of a
8 message for the President to deliver to Congress, in which
9 Secretary Knox and I cooperated with Mr. Hull and his asso-
10 ciates in the State Department.

11 On Monday morning, December 1st, the President returned
12 to Washington. I recollect that in the meantime we had re-
13 ceived evidence that the Japanese expedition which we had been
14 watching was landing in Indo-China in the neighborhood of Saigon,
15 rather than going on to the Peninsula and up into the Gulf of
16 Siam. This appeared to give us a little respite, since it in-
17 dicated that perhaps they were not going to invade Thailand at
18 once. The Russians had also made a new counter-attack against
19 the Germans at Rostov, and we thought that possibly this had
20 given the Japanese some pause.

21 On Tuesday, December 2nd, Secretary Knox, Sumner Welles,
22 and I met with the President, as Mr. Hull was laid up with a
23 cold. The President went step by step over the situation, and
24 I felt sure that he had made up his mind to go ahead with the
25 message to Congress and possibly the message to the Emperor.

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1 We also learned that he had asked the Japanese through the
2 State Department what they intended by this new occupation of
3 southern Indo-China and had demanded a quick reply. We were
4 watching the situation in the Far East very carefully. I was
5 in frequent conference with General Marshall and with General
6 Miles of G-2 and also General Gerow of the War Plans Division
7 of the General Staff. We were particularly concerned with sup-
8 plies which were on the way to the Philippines and additional
9 big bombers which we were trying to fly over there, some of
10 which were scheduled to start at the end of the week. I gave
11 up another engagement in order to stay in Washington over the
12 weekend.

13 On Sunday, December 7th, Mr. Knox and I went to Secretary
14 Hull's office at ten-thirty in the morning and talked the whole
15 matter over. This was the day on which we knew that Japanese
16 were going to bring their answer, and Mr. Hull said he was cer-
17 tain that the Japanese were planning some deviltry; and we were
18 all wondering where the blow would strike. The messages we were
19 receiving now indicated that the Japanese force was continuing
20 on in the Gulf of Siam, and again we discussed whether we
21 would not have to fight if Malay or the Netherlands were at-
22 tacked and the British or Dutch fought. We all three thought
23 that we must fight if those nations fought. We realized that
24 if Britain were eliminated it might well result in the destruc-
25 tion or capture of the British fleet. Such a result would give

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1 the Nazi allies overwhelming power in the Atlantic Ocean and
2 would make the defense of the American republics enormously
3 difficult if not impossible. All the reasons why it would be
4 necessary for the United States to fight, in case the Japanese
5 attacked either our British or Dutch neighbors in the Pacific,
6 were discussed at length and at my request Mr. Hull and Mr.
7 Knox dictated their views. These views are attached to my
8 notes of that day as submitted herewith.

9 I returned to lunch at my home. At just about two o'clock,
10 while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me on the
11 phone and told me that the Japanese were bombing Hawaii. My
12 notes for the remainder of December 7th speak for themselves
13 and need no comment.

14 Summary of my Views as to the

15 Responsibility of members of the Army

16 My views as to these responsibilities are stated at length
17 in my final official report made under the Joint Resolution of
18 Congress approved June 13, 1944, after the Army Board and the
19 Judge Advocate General had made their investigations and reports
20 to me. Many of the discussions on this subject indicated a fail-
21 ure to grasp the fundamental difference between the duties of an
22 outpost command and those of the Commander-in-Chief of an army
23 or nation and his military advisers. The outpost commander is
24 like a sentinel on duty in the face of the enemy. His funda-
25 mental duties are clear and precise. He must assume that the

1 enemy will attack at his particular post; and that the enemy
2 will attack at the time and in the way in which it will be
3 most difficult to defeat him. It is not the duty of the out-
4 post commander to speculate or rely on the possibilities of
5 the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead of his own.
6 It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to
7 make the best possible fight that can be made against him with
8 the weapons with which he has been supplied.

9 On the other hand, the Commander-in-Chief of the nation
10 (and his advisers) - particularly of a nation which has been
11 as habitually neglectful of the possibility of war as our own
12 - has much more difficult and complex duties to fulfill. Un-
13 like the outpost commander, he must constantly watch, study,
14 and estimate where the principal or most dangerous attack is
15 most likely to come, in order that he may most effectively
16 distribute his insufficient forces and munitions to meet it.
17 He knows that his outposts are not all equally supplied or
18 fortified, and that they are not all equally capable of defense.
19 He knows also that from time to time they are of greatly varying
20 importance to the grand strategy of the war.

21 For all these reasons he is compelled to give constant
22 and close attention to the reports from all his intelligence
23 agencies in order that he may satisfactorily solve the innum-
24 erable problems which are constantly arising in the performance
25 of the foregoing duties.

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1 During those days in November 1941 we at the War Depart-
2 ment had been informed and believed that Hawaii had been more
3 generously equipped from the nation's inadequate supplies
4 of men and munitions than either of the other three important
5 Pacific outposts, and we believed that with the fleet at hand
6 there it was more capable of defense. We also knew that the
7 Philippines was by far the least capable of defense, although
8 we were working vigorously to get it into a position to put
9 up a hard fight. We also knew that a disaster there would
10 have an incalculably bad moral effect on account of our
11 relations to the Filipinos - wellknown throughout the Far
12 East, - and our pledges given for their protection. Finally,))
13 we had received these specific warnings of a Japanese expedi-
14 tion being on its way to a commanding position from which it
15 would attack the Philippine Islands.

16 From the foregoing I believe that it was inevitable and
17 proper that a far greater number of items of information com-
18 ing through our Intelligence should be collected and consi-
19 dered and appraised by the General Staff at Washington than
20 those which were transmitted to the commander of an outpost.
21 General Short had been told the two essential facts: (1) A
22 war with Japan is threatening. (2) Hostile action by Japan
23 is possible at any moment. Given those two facts, both of
24 which were stated without equivocation in the message of
25 November 27th, the outpost commander should be on the alert to

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1 make his fight.

2 Even without any such message, the outpost commander
3 should have been on the alert. If he did not know that the
4 relations between Japan and the United States were strained
5 and might be broken at any time, he must have been almost the
6 only man in Hawaii who did not know it, for the radio and the
7 newspapers were blazoning out those facts daily, and he had a
8 chief of staff and an intelligence officer to tell him so.
9 And if he did not know that the Japanese were likely to strike
10 without warning, he could not have read his history of Japan
11 or known the lessons taught in the Army schools in respect to
12 such matters. Under these circumstances which were of general
13 knowledge and which he must have known, to cluster his airplanes
14 in such groups and positions that in an emergency they could
15 not take the air for several hours, and to keep his anti-air-
16 craft ammunition so stored that it could not be promptly and
17 immediately available, and to use his best reconnaissance
18 system, the radar, only for a very small fraction of the day
19 and night, in my opinion betrayed a misconception of his real
20 duty which was almost beyond belief.

21 In the next place, having made these mistakes and dis-
22 regarded the whole tenor of the warning message to him, he
23 then sent a reply message to Washington which gave no adequate
24 notice of what he had failed to do and which was susceptible
25 of being taken, and was taken, as a general compliance with the

1 main warning from Washington. My initials show that this mes-
2 sage crossed my desk, and in spite of my keen interest in the
3 situation it certainly gave me no intimation that the alert
4 order against an enemy attack was not being carried out. Al-
5 though it advised me that General Short was alert against sabo-
6 tage, I had no idea that being "alerted to prevent sabotage" was
7 in any way an express or implied denial of being alert against
8 an attack by Japan's armed forces. The very purpose of a fort-
9 ress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was
10 the commander of that fortress. Furthermore, Short's state-
11 ment in his message that "liaison" was being carried out with
12 the Navy, coupled with the fact that our message of November 27th
13 had specifically directed reconnaissance, naturally gave the
14 impression that the various reconnaissance and other defensive
15 measures in which the cooperation of the Army and the Navy is
16 necessary, were under way and a proper alert was in effect.

17 With the aid of "hindsight" I believe now that to a staff
18 officer whose specific duty was to make dead sure that the
19 warning order was being intelligently and thoroughly put into
20 effect, the lack of detail in the reply should have suggested
21 the importance of a follow-up inquiry and I have so stated in
22 my final official report of August 1945.

23 With the further aid of such "hindsight" and in the same
24 official report, I also reached the opinion that the War
25 Plans Division of the General Staff would have placed itself and

1 the safety of the country in a sounder position if it had trans-
2 mitted to General Short more information than it did. The no-
3 velty of the imminence of war and the fact that our outpost
4 commanders were untried in their positions now indicate that
5 more details and repeated emphasis would have been a safer po-
6 licy. Also there seems to have been a lack of coordination in
7 the General Staff in respect to the method in which the warnings
8 against sabotage were sent, which would not have occurred later
9 in the war after the Staff was fully organized.

10 Yet none of these things in my opinion alter in any ma-
11 terial degree the responsibility of General Short for the com-
12 plete absence of a real alert, which he had been directed to
13 take in the message of November 27th, and for the placing of his
14 defense in a more helpless position than it was before that
15 alert message was sent. After all, he was the man upon whom
16 the country had a right to rely for the defense of Hawaii, and
17 he had been sufficiently warned.

18 I have tried to review these various responsibilities with
19 fairness to both the outpost commander and the Staff officers
20 at home. I am particularly led to do so because of the diffi-
21 culty of reproducing now after the lapse of more than four years
22 the background and atmosphere under which the entire Army was
23 then working. Our General Staff officers were working under a
24 terrific pressure in the face of a global war which they felt
25 was probably imminent. Yet they were surrounded, outside of

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1 their offices and almost throughout the country, by a spirit
2 of isolationism and disbelief in danger which now seems in-
3 credible. A single incident gives striking evidence of this.
4 During the very last week before the Pearl Harbor attack there
5 was made a most disloyal and almost unbelievable attack on
6 the chief work of the Staff. For months the General Staff had
7 been laboring over the construction of a strategic and tacti-
8 cal plan for the fighting of a global war in case it should
9 eventuate. The making of such a plan is the highest and most
10 important duty of a general staff, - the chief purpose for
11 which it exists. It is also naturally the most highly secret
12 paper in the possession of the government. On December 4, 1941,
13 the Chicago Tribune published practically in full a copy of
14 that plan. The impact of such a blow was very severe. It
15 involved implications which stretched far and suspicions
16 (happily not fulfilled) of disloyalty in the Army itself. The
17 officers of the Army were then trying to do their duty in the
18 deadening, if not actually hostile, atmosphere of a nation
19 that was not awake to its danger. We are now engaged in passing
20 judgment upon their actions in the wholly different atmosphere
21 of a nation which has suffered some of the horrors of the
22 greatest and most malignant war in history. In my opinion, it
23 would be highly unjust to them if this complete difference of
24 atmosphere was not given the weight which it deserves.

25

1
2 STATE OF NEW YORK)
3 COUNTY OF NEW YORK) ss:
4

5 HENRY L. STIMSON, being duly sworn, deposes
6 and says:

7 I have prepared the foregoing statement, and
8 the same is true and correct to the best of my recollection,
9 information, and belief.

10
11
12 /s/ Henry L. Stimson
13

14 Sworn to before me this
15 19th day of March, 1946.

16 /s/ Thomas DeRosa
17 Attorney & Counsellor at Law

18 Office Address: 32 Liberty St., N.Y.C.

19 Residence in Bronx County

20 Bronx Co. Clks No. 3, Reg. No. A-33D7
21 N.Y. Co. Clks No. 9, Reg. No. 439D7
22 Commission expires March 30, 1947

23 S-E-A-L
24
25

Wednesday, November 8, 1941

Matters are crystallizing on both sides of us now and the Navy is meeting with big losses in the Atlantic and Japan is leading somebody to us who, I think, will bring us a proposal

MR. STIMSON'S NOTES

A P P E N D I X

to

STATEMENT

of

HENRY L. STIMSON

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Wednesday, November 5, 1941.

Matters are crystallizing on both sides of us now and the Navy is meeting with big losses in the Atlantic and Japan is sending somebody to us who, I think, will bring us a proposal impossible of acceptance. I spent part of the morning reading matters - secret reports - on the latter matter.

Thursday, November 6, 1941.

Then I left for the White House conference and had about an hour's talk with the President - on the whole a good talk. He was apparently in very good feeling. We talked about the Far Eastern situation and the approaching conference with the messenger who is coming from Japan. The President outlined what he thought he might say. He was trying to think of something which would give us further time. He suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for six months, and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis. I told him I frankly saw two great objections to that: first, that it tied up our hands just at a time when it was vitally important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of the Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would feel that any such arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him that it has always been our historic policy since the Washington conference not to leave the Chinese and

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1 Japanese alone together, because the Japanese were always
2 able to overslaugh the Chinese and the Chinese know it. I
3 told him that I thought the Chinese would refuse to go into
4 such an arrangement.

5

6

Friday, November 7, 1941.

7 Cabinet meeting this afternoon. The President opened with
8 telling the story of Lincoln and his Cabinet - how he polled
9 the Cabinet and found them all polling NO and then he said,
10 "The Ayes have it." With that he started to have what he
11 said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on the
12 question of the Far East - whether the people would back us up
13 in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics
14 should be.* It was a very interesting talk - the best Cabinet

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16 *Note: See Statement page 11 as to this Cabinet meeting.

17

18 meeting I think we have ever had since I have been there. He
19 went around the table - first Hull and then myself, and then
20 around through the whole number and it was unanimous in feel-
21 ing the country would support us. He said that this time the
22 vote IS unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull made a good
23 presentation of the general situation. I told them I rather
24 narrowed it down into a following-up the steps which had been
25 done to show what needed to be done in the future. The thing

1 would have been much stronger if the Cabinet had known - and
2 they did not know except in the case of Hull and the President
3 - what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we
4 are to pitch in.

5
6 Monday, November 10, 1941.

7 In the second place he (General Marshall at a Staff
8 meeting) read us a long letter from General MacArthur in the
9 Philippines, telling us of the progress of the reorganization
10 of the Philippine Army and the construction of airports through-
11 out the Islands. This was very interesting to me.

12
13 Friday, November 21, 1941.

14 I talked to the President about the question (danger) of
15 poison gas in the Philippines. We have learned that the Japan-
16 ese have used it on the Chinese at Ichang, where they killed
17 some 700 Chinamen and disabled about * - I don't want to be

18
19 *Note: Blank in notes.

20
21 caught without gas in the Philippines. And yet we have been
22 afraid to send it for fear it would leak out and be miscon-
23 strued during these negotiations. But I thought the time had
24 come when we ought to not delay any longer and I told the Pre-
25 sident so quietly and privately after the conference and he

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1 agreed with me. So when I got back I called in General Gerow
2 in the absence of General Marshall and told him to look up all
3 the facts and get ready for the possible shipments with the
4 idea that it should be done so that it would not come out in
5 the press.

6
7 Monday, November 24, 1941.

8 I had a good talk with General Olmstead, whom I have re-
9 cently promoted to be the Chief Signal Officer on General
10 Mauborgne's retirement. He is doing very well and outlined to
11 me the work of reorganization of his office which he has ac-
12 complished. It was very good.

13 Note: This conference was on the subject
14 of the use of radar as a defense against
15 surprise attacks. See Statement page 17.

16
17 Tuesday, November 25, 1941.

18 This was a very full day indeed. At 9:30 Knox and I met
19 in Hull's office for our meeting of Three. Hull showed us the
20 proposal for a three months' truce, which he was going to lay
21 before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safe-
22 guarded all our interests, I thought as we read it, but I don't
23 think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, be-
24 cause it was so drastic. In return for the propositions which
25 they were to do; namely; to at once evacuate and at once to

1 stop all preparations or threats of action, and to take no
 2 aggressive action against any of her neighbors, etc., we were
 3 to give them open trade in sufficient quantities only for their
 4 civilian population. This restriction was particularly appli-
 5 cable to oil. We had a long talk over the general situation.

6
 7 Then at 12:00 o'clock we (viz. General Marshall and I)
 8 went to the White House, where we were until nearly half past
 9 one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark and my-
 10 self. There the President, instead of bringing up the Vic-
 11 tory Parade*, brought up entirely the relations with the

12
 13 *This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic
 14 plan of national action in case of war in Europe.

15
 16 Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be
 17 attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese
 18 are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the
 19 question was what we should do. The question was how we
 20 should maneuver them into the position of firing the first
 21 shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a
 22 difficult proposition.* Hull laid out his general broad

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 24 *See Statement pp. 11 and 14. Our military and naval advi-
 25 sers had warned us that we could not safely allow the

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Japanese to move against British Malaysia or the Dutch East Indies without attempting to prevent it.

propositions on which the thing should be rested - the freedom of the seas and the fact that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy of world aggression. The others brought out the fact that any such expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malasia. I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps towards an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on preparing that. When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that an (A Japanese) expedition had started. Five Divisions have come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had embarked on ships - 30, 40 or 50 ships - and have been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the President of the message from G-2.

Wednesday, November 26, 1941.

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1 Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had
2 about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that
3 Knox and I passed on the other day to the Japanese but to kick
4 the whole thing over - to tell them that he has no other pro-
5 position at all. The Chinese have objected to that proposition
6 when he showed it to them; that is, to the proposition which
7 he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving to the
8 Japanese the small modicum of oil for civilian use during the
9 interval of the truce of the three months. Chiang Kai-shek
10 had sent a special message to the effect that that would make
11 a terrifically bad impression in China; that it would destroy
12 all their courage and that they (it) would play into the hands
13 of his, Chiang's, enemies and that the Japanese would use it.
14 T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has asked to see me
15 and I called Hull up this morning to tell him so and ask him
16 what he wanted me to do about it. He replied as I have just
17 said above - that he had about made up his mind to give up the
18 whole thing in respect to a truce and to simply tell the Ja-
19 panese that he had no further action to propose.

20 A few minutes later I talked to the President over the
21 telephone and I asked him whether he had received the paper
22 which I had sent him over last night about the Japanese having
23 started a new expedition from Shanghai down towards Indo-
24 China. He fairly blew up - jumped up into the air, so to
25 speak, and said he hadn't seen it and that that changed the whole

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1 situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part
2 of the Japanese that while they were negotiating for an en-
3 tire truce - an entire withdrawal (from China) - they should be
4 sending this expedition down there to Indo-China. I told him
5 that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2 and
6 through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got another
7 copy of the paper I had sent last night and sent it over to
8 him by special messenger.

10 Thursday, November 27, 1941.

11 A very tense, long day. News is coming in of a concen-
12 tration and movement south by the Japanese of a large Expedi-
13 tionary Force moving south from Shanghai and evidently headed
14 towards Indo-China, with a possibility of going to the Philippin-
15 es or to Burma, or to the Burma Road or to the Dutch East Indies,
16 but probably a concentration to move over into Thailand and to
17 hold a position from which they can attack Singapore when the
18 moment arrives.

19 The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find
20 out what his finale had been with the Japanese - whether he
21 had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or
22 three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday he would,
23 he broke the whole matter off. He told me now that he had
24 broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have washed
25 my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox -

1 the Army and the Navy." I then called up the President. The
2 President gave me a little different view. He said they had
3 ended up, but they ended up with a magnificent statement pre-
4 pared by Hull. I found out afterwards that this was not a re-
5 opening of the thing but a statement of our constant and re-
6 gular position.

7 General Arnold came in to present the orders for the move-
8 ment of two of our biggest planes out from San Francisco and
9 across the Mandated Islands to Manila. There is a concentra-
10 tion going on by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands and
11 these planes can fly high over them, beyond the reach of their
12 pursuit planes and take photographs.

13 Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and
14 General Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I
15 feel his absence very much. There was a tendency, not unnat-
16 ural, on the part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more time. I
17 said that I was glad to have time but I didn't want it at any
18 cost of humility on the part of the United States or of re-
19 opening the thing which would show a weakness on our part. The
20 main question has been over the message that we shall send to
21 MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi alert, or the
22 first signal for an alert, and now, on talking with the Pre-
23 sident this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he ap-
24 proved the idea that we should send the final alert; namely, that
25 he should be on the qui vive for any attack and telling him

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1 how the situation was. So Gerow and Stark and I went over the
2 proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully; finally
3 got it in shape and with the help of a telephone talk I had
4 with Hull, I got the exact statement from him of what the si-
5 tuation was.

7 Friday, November 28, 1941.

8 Pursuant to my instructions G-2 had sent me a summary
9 of the information in regard to the movements of the Japanese
10 in the Far East and it amounted to such a formidable state-
11 ment of dangerous possibilities that I decided to take it to
12 the President before he got up. I told him there was an im-
13 portant coalition of facts and that I thought he ought to read
14 it before his appointment which he had made for us at 12:00
15 o'clock, when the so-called War Cabinet was to meet him - Hull,
16 Knox, myself with Stark and Marshall. He branched into an
17 analysis of the situation himself as he sat there on his bed,
18 saying there were three alternatives and only three that he
19 could see before us. I told him I could see two. His alter-
20 natives were - first, to do nothing; second, to make some-
21 thing in the nature of an ultimatum again, stating a point be-
22 yond which we would fight; third, to fight at once. I told
23 him my only two were the last two, because I did not think
24 anyone would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with
25 me. I said of the other two my choice was the latter one.

1 When we got back there at 12:00 o'clock he had read the
2 paper that I had left with him. The main point of the paper
3 was a study of what the Expeditionary Force, which we know
4 has left Shanghai and is headed South, is going to do. G-2
5 pointed out that it might develop into an attack on the Philip-
6 pines or a landing of further troops in Indo-China, or an at-
7 tack on Thailand or an attack on the Dutch Netherlands, or on
8 Singapore. After the President had read these aloud, he
9 pointed out that there was one more. It might, by attacking
10 the Kra Isthmus, develop into an attack on Rangoon, which lies
11 only a short distance beyond the Kra Isthmus and the taking of
12 which by the Japanese would effectually stop the Burma Road
13 at its beginning. This, I think, was a very good suggestion
14 on his part and a very likely one. It was the consensus that
15 the present move - that there was an Expeditionary Force on
16 the sea of about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing
17 somewhere - completely changed the situation when we last dis-
18 cussed whether or not we could address an ultimatum to Japan
19 about moving the troops which she already had on land in Indo-
20 China. It was now the opinion of everyone that if this expe-
21 dition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo-
22 China and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at
23 Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all
24 of the three Powers, Britian at Singapore, the Netherlands,
25 and ourselves in the Philippines. It was the consensus of

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1 everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we discussed
2 how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into
3 the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also
4 agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight.
5 And it now seems clear that if this expedition was allowed to
6 round the southern point of Indo-China, this whole chain of
7 disastrous events would be set on foot of going.

8 It further became a consensus of views that rather than
9 strike at the Force as it went by without any warning on the
10 one hand, which we didn't think we could do; or sitting still
11 and allowing it to go on, on the other, which we didn't think
12 we could do; - that the only thing for us to do was to address
13 it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain
14 line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The President's
15 mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from
16 himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good
17 results at the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons
18 this did not seem to me to be the right thing now and I pointed
19 them out to the President. In the first place, a letter to
20 the Emperor of Japan could not be couched in terms which con-
21 tained an explicit warning. One does not warn an Emperor. In
22 the second place it would not indicate to the people of the
23 United States what the real nature of the danger was. Conse-
24 quently I said there ought to be a message by the President to
25 the people of the United States and I thought that the best

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1 form of a message would be an address to Congress reporting the
2 danger, reporting what we would have to do if the danger hap-
3 pened. The President accepted this idea of a message but he
4 first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his letter to
5 the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not pub-
6 licize a letter to an Emperor in such a way; that he had better
7 send his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a se-
8 cret thing, and then make his speech to the Congress as a se-
9 parate and a more understandable thing to the people of the
10 United States. This was the final decision at that time and
11 the President asked Hull and Knox and myself to try to draft
12 such papers.

13
14 Tuesday, December 2, 1941.

15 Dr. Alfred Sze and Dr. T. V. Soong came in to see me on
16 their own request. I think Soong was anxious to have some one
17 present as a witness to get me to corroborate what I said to
18 him some time ago about our intentions to fortify the Philippines.
19 I told him simply that I knew what a difficult situation the
20 Generalissimo was in and it was very presuming for me, sitting
21 here in comfort, to ask him to be patient when he was in the
22 middle of such anxieties and responsibilities there. Neverthe-
23 less I told him that that was, I am sure, the course that he
24 should take. I said, I can only say that there is no change
25 in the American policy from what I said to Dr. Soong some

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1 time ago and he can report that to the Generalissimo and tell
2 him that I also counsel him to have just a little more pa-
3 tience and then I think all things will be well. Apparently
4 that was all they wanted for they at once got up and thanked me
5 and went away. I warned them, of course, that they should not
6 in any way make public or leak about what I had said to them.
7 I called in Marshall and told him what had happened and asked
8 him to remember what I said.

9

10 I left for the White House conference at 12:00 o'clock
11 and there were present there just Knox, Sumner Welles and my-
12 self, as Hull is laid up with a cold. The President went step
13 by step over the situation and I think has made up his mind to
14 go ahead. He has asked the Japanese through Sumner Welles
15 what they intend by this new occupation of southern Indo-
16 China - just what they are going to do - and has demanded a
17 quick reply. The President is still deliberating the possi-
18 bility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us
19 are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite
20 settled, I think, that he will make a Message to the Congress
21 and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country.
22 He said that he was going to take the matters right up when
23 he left us.

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Sunday, December 7, 1941.

1 Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their
2 answer to Hull, and everything in MAGIC indicated that they
3 had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish
4 something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged a conference
5 with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull
6 is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and
7 we are all wondering where the blow will strike. We three
8 stayed together in conference until lunch time, going over the
9 plans for what should be said or done. The main thing is to
10 hold the main people who are interested in the Far East to-
11 gether - the British, ourselves, the Dutch, the Australians,
12 the Chinese. Hull expressed his views, giving the broad pic-
13 ture of it, and I made him dictate it to a stenographer and I
14 attach it to the end of this. Knox also had his views as to
15 the importance of showing immediately how these different na-
16 tions must stand together and I got him to dictate that and
17 that is attached hereto. Hull was to see the Japanese envoys at
18 one o'clock but they were delayed in keeping the appointment and
19 did not come until later - as it turned out, till 2:00 o'clock
20 or after. I returned to Woodley to lunch and just about 2:00
21 o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me
22 up on the telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me,
23 "Have you heard the news?" I said, "Well, I have heard the
24 telegrams which have been coming in about the Japanese advances
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1 in the Gulf of Siam." He said, "Oh, no. I don't mean that.
2 They have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii." Well,
3 that was an excitement indeed. The messages which we have been
4 getting through Saturday and yesterday and this morning are
5 messages which are brought by the British patrol south of Indo-
6 China, showing that large Japanese forces were moving up into
7 the Gulf of Siam. This itself was enough excitement and that
8 was what we were at work on our papers about. The observer
9 thought these forces were going to land probably either on
10 the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still
11 in Indo-China, or on the western side, where it would be the
12 Kra Peninsula, or probably Malay. The British were very much
13 excited about it and our efforts this morning in drawing our
14 papers was to see whether or not we should all act together.
15 The British will have to fight if they attack the Kra Penin-
16 sula. We three all thought that we must fight if the British
17 fought. But now the Japs have solved the whole thing by at-
18 tacking us directly in Hawaii.

19 As soon as I could finish my lunch, I returned to the
20 office and began a long conference which lasted until 6:00
21 o'clock. The news coming from Hawaii is very bad. They seem
22 to have sprung a complete surprise upon our Fleet and have
23 caught the battleships inside the harbor and bombed them se-
24 verely with losses. They have also hit our airfields there
25 and have destroyed a great many of our planes, evidently before

1 they got off the ground. It has been staggering to see our
2 people there, who have been warned long ago and were standing
3 on the alert, should have been so caught by surprise. At
4 4:00 o'clock McCloy had the Chiefs of the Arms of the Services
5 in his room and I went in there and made them a little pep-up
6 talk about getting right to work in the emergency but most of
7 the time was spent in conference with Marshall, Grenville
8 Clark, Miles, Patterson, McCloy, and their assistants, Lovett
9 and General Gullion, the Provost Marshal General. The main
10 subject that we were talking about was the form of a declara-
11 tion of war. Grenville Clark had drawn up a copy based largely
12 on the Woodrow Wilson one. We all thought that it was possible
13 we should declare war on Germany at the same time with Japan,
14 but that, of course, is an open question. There will be no
15 doubt about declaring war on Japan now, I think. The President
16 has set a conference at the White House at 8:30 this evening,
17 in which the Cabinet had a conference and then a conference at
18 9:00 to which the Leaders of the House were coming.

19 When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my
20 first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and
21 that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our
22 people. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of
23 the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. For I feel
24 that this country united has practically nothing to fear; while
25 the apathy and divisions stirred up by unpatriotic men have

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1 been hitherto very discouraging.

2 Our meeting with the President in the evening was in the
3 Oval Room in the White House. He sat behind his desk and we
4 in a semi-circle in front of him. He opened by telling us
5 that this was the most serious meeting of the Cabinet that
6 had taken place since 1861 and then he proceeded to enumerate
7 the blows which had fallen upon us at Hawaii. Before he got
8 to that, Knox who sat next to me told me with a rather white
9 face that we had lost seven of the eight battleships in Hawaii.
10 This, however, proved later to be exaggerated. Steve Early
11 sat near the President and dispatches were brought in every
12 few minutes during the meeting. The President had hastily drawn
13 a draft of a message to Congress which he then read to us
14 slowly. It was a very brief message, presenting the same
15 thoughts which he actually presented the following day in his
16 finished message to the Congress.

17 After the talk with the Cabinet which lasted for at
18 least three-quarters of an hour, the leaders of Congress who
19 had been waiting below came in. I can remember the following
20 as being present: The Vice President, Senators Barkley, Con-
21 nally, Austin, Hiram Johnson, perhaps George; Representatives
22 - Speaker Rayburn, Sol Bloom, Eaton of New Jersey, Joe Martin;
23 possibly others. The President began by a very frank story
24 of what had happened, including our losses. The effect on
25 the Congressmen was tremendous. They sat in dead silence

1 and even after the recital was over they had very few words.
 2 The President asked if they would invite him to appear before
 3 the Joint Houses tomorrow and they said they would. He said he
 4 could not tell them exactly what he was going to say to them be-
 5 cause events were changing so rapidly. We didn't finish until
 6 after eleven o'clock, when I returned to the office and stayed
 7 there until after twelve.

8 On my return to the office from lunch I had started mat-
 9 ters going in all directions to warn against sabotage and
 10 to get punch into the defense move. Marshall had sent out
 11 word of the attack to all of the Corps Area Commanders and
 12 all our people throughout the world, particularly in the Philip-
 13 pines. I ordered all the officers thereafter to appear in uni-
 14 form and I found that others had ordered the armed guards out
 15 over the War Department Building and additional guards over
 16 my house. We offered a guard to the White House but it was
 17 thought better there to have the F. B. I. This same activity
 18 went on during the intervals of my visit to the White House.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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PROPOSED STATEMENT FOR PRESIDENT BY HULL

(See Record, December 7)

The Japanese Government, dominated by the military fire-eaters, is deliberately proceeding on an increasingly broad front to carry out its long proclaimed purpose to acquire military control over one-half of the world with nearly one-half its population. This inevitably means Japanese control of islands, continents and seas from the Indies back near Hawaii, and that all of the conquered peoples would be governed militarily, politically, economically, socially and morally by the worst possible military despotism with barbaric, inhuman and semi-slavery methods such as Japan has notoriously been inflicting on the people in China and Hitler on the peoples of some fifteen conquered nations of Europe. This would virtually drive and force all free and peaceful peoples off the high seas.

At this moment of serious, threatened and imminent danger, it is manifest that control of the South Sea area by Japan is the key to the control of the entire Pacific area, and therefore defense of life and commerce and other invaluable rights and interests in the Pacific area must be commenced within the South Sea area at such times and places as in the judgment of naval and military experts would be within sufficient time and at such strategic points as would make it most effective. In no other way can it be satisfactorily determined that the Pacific area can be successfully defended.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

More than ever is the cohesive, closely related world movement to conquer and destroy, with Hitler moving across one half of the world and the Government of Japan under the military group moving across the other half of the world by closely synchronizing their efforts and collaborating and co-operating whenever to their individual or their mutual advantage.

This at once places at stake everything that is precious and worthwhile. Self-defense, therefore, is the key point for the preservation of each and all of our civilized institutions.

... we are almost certain to be next, being that practical...
... If the above be accepted, then any serious threat...
... is the British or the Dutch is a serious threat to the United...
... States; for it might be stated any threat to any one of the...
... three of us is a threat to all of us. We should therefore be...
... ready jointly to act together and if such understanding has...
... not already been reached, it should be reached immediately...
... otherwise we may fall individually one at a time or...
... may be left out on a limb...
... I think the Japanese should be told that any agree...
... ment in a direction that threatens the United States will be...
... met by force. The President will want to reserve to himself...
... just how to define this. The following are suggested...
... about it. Any movement into Thailand, or any movement into

56A

SUGGESTION BY KNOX

(See Record, December 7)

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3 1. We are tied up inextricably with the British in the
4 present world situation.

5 2. The fall of Singapore and the loss to England of
6 Malaya will automatically not only wreck her far eastern posi-
7 tion but jeopardize her entire effort.

8 3. If the British lose their position the Dutch are al-
9 most certain to lose theirs.

10 4. If both the British and the Dutch lose their posi-
11 tions we are almost certain to be next, being then practical-
12 ly Japanese surrounded.

13 5. If the above be accepted, then any serious threat
14 to the British or the Dutch is a serious threat to the United
15 States; or it might be stated any threat to any one of the
16 three of us is a threat to all of us. We should therefore be
17 ready jointly to act together and if such understanding has
18 not already been reached, it should be reached immediately.
19 Otherwise we may fall individually one at a time (or somebody
20 may be left out on a limb).

21 6. I think the Japanese should be told that any move-
22 ment in a direction that threatens the United States will be
23 met by force. The President will want to reserve to himself
24 just how to define this. The following are suggestions to
25 shoot at: Any movement into Thailand; or any movement into

56B

1 Thailand west of 100° East and South of 10° North - this in
 2 accordance with the recommendation of the British and Dutch
 3 and United States military authorities in the Far East; or
 4 any movement against British, Dutch, United States, Free
 5 French, or Portuguese territory in the Pacific area.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Mr. Lane: At this point, Mr. Chairman, I ask to have spread on the record those interrogatories submitted to former Secretary Stimson by Senator Ferguson which were not answered as explained in former Secretary Stimson's letter of transmittal covering the interrogatories which he did subsequently answer. The letter of transmittal, the interrogatories and answers thereto will be our next offer.

The Chairman: It is so ordered.

(The interrogatories unanswered referred to are as follows:)

C3-A

March 6, 1946

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2 The Joint Committee on The Investigation of the Pearl
3 Harbor Attack being advised that the former Secretary of War,
4 Henry L. Stimson, is unable to appear before the Committee
5 because of illness, I submit the following questions to Mr.
6 Stimson to be answered fully, completely and under oath, and
7 it is to be understood that the questions and answers are to
8 be made part of the official record as if taken in open
9 hearings.

/s/ Homer Ferguson

HOMER FERGUSON

U. S. Senate

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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15 1. In your testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board,
16 you stated that you had memoranda and records of what took
17 place at certain meetings relating to Japan and American rela-
18 tions during 1941. Will you please furnish for the Committee
19 copies of these memoranda and records so far as they disclose
20 the Far East Situation between November 1 and December 8, 1941?

21 2. Did the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, have
22 knowledge of what was taking place between you and other Cabinet
23 members and the President in relation to the Far Eastern Situa-
24 tion?

25 3. On the 25th of November, 1941, you had a conversation

df2

LC

1 with the President wherein he stated that hostilities with Japan
2 might start perhaps next Monday, and that you had a discussion
3 with him at that time as to what we should do in relation thereto.
4 Will you please give us in detail what was said by you and by
5 the President at that time.

6 4. Having appointed a Board under the statute to investigate
7 the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, how do you account for the fact that
8 after the Board had completed the examination of witnesses you
9 appointed Major Clausen to complete the investigation?

10 5. Will you give us the details as to those with whom you
11 discussed this matter and the conversations?

12 6. Did you have Major Clausen investigate our policy in
13 the Far East as far as the Secretary of State's office was con-
14 cerned?

15 7. If not, will you tell us why not?

16 8. Did you have Major Clausen investigate our policy in
17 the Far East as far as the White House was concerned?

18 9. If not, will you tell us why not?

19 10. Why did you not have the Board appointed to investigate
20 this matter consider the so-called Clausen affidavits?

21 11. Was all Magic, that is, intercepted Japanese messages,
22 furnished to you?

23 If not all magic, were the messages furnished to War Plans
24 and Chief of Staff delivered to you?

25 Will you tell us what Japanese messages you did discuss
with the President?

df 3

1 Will you state what discussion you had with the President
2 on the following Japanese Messages:

3 #985 Page 204, Exhibit 1

4 #986 Page 206, Exhibit 1

5 #865 Page 208, Exhibit 1

6 #844 Page 195, Exhibit 1

7 12. Did you discuss these Magic messages with the
8 President?

9 13. I call your attention to the messages in Exhibit 2
10 and ask if you saw these messages prior to December 7, 1941.

11 14. I call your attention to the message on page 12 of
12 Ex. 2 and ask you if you saw that message.

13 15. I ask you what evaluation you placed on the messages
14 on pages 12, 13, 14 and 15 of Exhibit 2.

15 16. Did you discuss the messages asked about in the
16 previous 3 questions with any person? If so, give us the
17 details of the discussion.

18 17. Did you ever discuss with Secretary Hull why he de-
19 cided not to send the Modus Vivendi?

20 18. Did he ever tell you why he decided to send the note
21 of November 26, 1941, and not the Modus Vivendi? If so, will
22 you state what he said?

23 19. Upon what conversations was it based and what was
24 the reason for it?

25 20. I show you Exhibit 45 and ask you to explain in detail

df 4
1 why this language was used in that memorandum: "be sure that
2 the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to
3 the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations."

4 21. I call your attention to Exhibit 45 and ask you
5 whether it was originally intended to send this message dis-
6 cussed in this Exhibit to General Short?

7 22. Isn't it true that a message was only to be sent to
8 General MacArthur and that you had discussed with the President
9 this message only to General MacArthur?

10 23. Did you ever discuss with Secretary Hull the Modus
11 Vivendi? Give us details of your conversation.

12 24. Did you advise for or against sending that proposal?
13 If so, tell us what was said.

14 25. Did Secretary Hull ever tell you why he sent the
15 note of November 26 and not the Modus Vivendi? If so, give
16 us the conversation.

17 26. Exhibit No. 36 in the present Investigation entitled
18 "Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary,
19 General Staff), subject: FAR EASTERN SITUATION signed by L. T.
20 Gerow, Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff,
21 contains the following statement: "The Secretary of War
22 directs that the following secret, first priority, message be
23 despatched by cable, radio, or telegraph (whichever method is
24 the most secure from the view point of secrecy) to each of
25 the following:

lf 5

1 Commanding General, Hawaiian Department

2 Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command

3 There then follows the message sent by the War Department to
4 General Short on November 27, 1941, signed "Marshall" being
5 Number 472, which is set forth on page 7 of Exhibit 32.

6 When you directed that this despatch be sent to the
7 Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, did you intend to
8 cause him to alert the Hawaiian Department against hostile
9 Japanese attack in the Hawaiian area?

10 27. Exhibit No. 46 in this Investigation is a copy of
11 General Short's reply to the message from General Marshall re-
12 ferred to in the preceding interrogatory. This reply reads
13 as follows:

14 REPORT DEPARTMENT ALERTED TO PREVENT SABOTAGE PERIOD
15 LIAISON WITH NAVY REURAD FOUR SEVEN TWO TWENTY SEVENTH
16 SHORT

17 This Exhibit containing General Short's reply bears the nota-
18 tion -

19 "Noted H L S

20 (Stimson)"

21 The H L S appearing to be your initials placed on the original
22 War Department radiogram in your handwriting.

23 When you read General Short's reply did you consider that
24 it was an adequate and responsive answer to the War Department's
25 message of November 27th signed: "Marshall," number 472,