

INTERR OF KIDO (31 Jan 46)

DOC 4128

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INTERROGATION OF
(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 31 January 1946, 1345 - 1600 hours

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by: Mr. Sackett

A I wish to speak more about Colonel OBATA.

Q Go right ahead.

A Colonel OBATA was the Chief of the Operations Section, General Staff Headquarters and even though he was under MASAKI who was the Vice Chief of Staff, he had no actual connection with the conduct of the war but in the leadership of young men, he was very stern and strict and he was vigorously opposed to internal participation; that is, participation of political matters by the military. He was Minister of State in the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet and he killed the attempted uprising at the termination of the war by the younger officers.

Q He was more, you would say, a regular Army man and soldier than a politician?

A A soldier.

- Q At least, he wasn't one of the men that was leading the movement for the Army to become more active in politics?
- A He is just the opposite of that.
- Q What was his attitude, however, as to the military program for expansion into Manchuria and China. Was he a leader in that movement?
- A He was not a leader but because he was Chief of the Operations Section he naturally was active in the matter of operations.
- Q You would be inclined to think he followed the orders of MASAKI in that respect?
- A Yes, because he was under the orders of MASAKI.
- Q Was he ever in Kwantung or Manchuria, to your knowledge, as an Army officer?
- A He was considered to be the foremost expert in the matter of operations and he retired quite early and because of the difference of opinion, he wasn't utilized or made to serve by the militarists.
- Q Did he participate in the Second World War after 1941, actively?
- A I don't believe he did anything.
- Q But he was somewhat in charge of operational planning for the Manchurian campaign?
- A I believe so because of his position.
- Q You wouldn't consider him one of the leading advocates of expansion into China and Manchuria?
- A Because of his position, I believe he was receiving orders to that extent from his superiors.
- Q However, he did participate definitely in the Manchurian campaign by virtue of his position?
- A Yes.

- Q You might read further in your diary as of the 19th of February - about the middle of it - where Colonel OBATA and Lt. Colonel SUZUKI are discussing the three factions in the Army. They indicate that one group was comprised of colonels and lieutenant-colonels and were connected with Dr. OKAWA. What did that group advocate?
- A I believe that they were connected with the March Incident and that they wanted to make internal reconstruction and to institute a military government.
- Q Was that the strongest and most outstanding group in the military faction or in the Army?
- A I believe that it was formed mostly by the men of the General Staff headquarters.
- Q Was ARAKI somewhat a leader of that group also?
- A I don't believe there is any direct connection with ARAKI.
- Q Do you recall the names of any colonels or lieutenant-colonels that could be said to be at the head of that group or faction?
- A I believe in addition to those already named HASHIMOTO and SHIGETO.
- Q In addition to wanting the Army to take over the political government, did that group advocate the expansion of Japan into China and Manchuria.
- A They were primarily influenced by the Manchurian problems and they did not go to the extent of dealing with the Chinese problems.
- Q You think their activities were more in the political field?
- A The group that were involved with OKAWA was or had great emphasis in the political sphere.
- Q He mentions a second group of lieutenants which he says he thought merely had a patriotic spirit. Did they have any political leaders that you recall in that group?
- A I do not know.

- Q He mentions a third group who were tied up with the TENKENTO Party led by NISHIDA.
- A He was formerly a student at the Officers Candidate School and has terminated his course there without going through it and he was very much interested in the China problem and studied it. Because of his past relationship with the Officers Candidate School, he made connection with the students there and made all sorts of plots.
- Q He was leader of a sort of radical group, would you say?
- A Yes, he is a radicalist. He is an agitator.
- Q Is that the group that did most of the plotting and caused most of the violence?
- A He was behind the scenes of the February 26 Incident and consequently he was killed. He was killed. I do not know whether by punishment or otherwise.
- Q Weren't there higher-ups in the Army that were really giving advice to that group and using that group for their purposes, such as ARAKI and MINAMI, or people of that order?
- A These groups were acting independently and had no connection with ARAKI or MASAKI. Because the younger officers group were against the profiteering of the Zaibatsu and were interested in the internal construction of Japan, MINAMI and ARAKI were great advocates of the programs of the younger officers' group and it seemed that these two felt that the younger officers were their friends.
- A In other words, ARAKI and MINAMI were using the young officer groups to accomplish their ends from time to time, were they not?
- A I don't believe they were positive to that extent. Therefore, instead of restraining the younger officers, they more or less passively let them go ahead.
- Q ARAKI and MINAMI were very popular with the younger officers and respected them and favored them, didn't they?
- A MINAMI is slightly different. ARAKI favored the younger men.

- Q And the younger men favored him, too?
- A Yes.
- Q What is the difference with MINAMI. Where does he fit into the picture?
- A The difference is that ARAKI was a person that wanted to do things. He was a follower of the Imperial Way and MINAMI was advocating strict control. The meaning of the latter's control is not clear.
- Q In other words, you mean that ARAKI favored control of the country by the military group of the country through the Emperor but MINAMI wanted to control the country and you couldn't quite tell whether it was without the Emperor or through the Emperor?
- A I don't believe it was that clear.
- Q ARAKI favored the military group running the political government but with the Emperor's system in existence?
- A Yes.
- Q And, MINAMI, you were never quite sure what he wanted to exercise?
- A MINAMI favored control by the Government.
- Q You mean, political parties as distinguished from the Army?
- A He had the intention of utilizing political parties.
- Q I thought you indicated the other day that MINAMI was an advocate of the Army taking over the political government instead of the political parties.
- A He wanted to control the cabinet by the military but not to the extent of obliterating the political parties. The two terms which I have used to differentiate MINAMI and ARAKI could not be interpreted literally because it was just so-called and the real meaning is not clear.
- Q All three of these young officer groups favored increased control of the Army over the political government, didn't they?

A Yes.

Q Did they, however, advocate or have a program with respect to Japanese expansion into Manchuria and China or was that a program of the Kwantung Army or some other such group? In other words, my question is this: As I understand it, these young officers wanted the Army to take over political control of the government. At the same time, there was this military action in Manchuria and China. Did these young officers, as part of their program, advocate that aggressive action in Manchuria and China or was that being advocated by a different group of military people; such as, for example, the Kwantung Army group?

A Naturally, there are elements of this group within the Kwantung Army but what program they will take up is not clear.

Q Well, in those days, what part or faction of the Army was advocating the taking of Manchuria by Japan. Was it the entire Army or some particular group of the Army?

A It is the group I mentioned before - the group with the nucleus in the General Staff Headquarters. The entire Japanese military did not have such ideas.

Q The Kwantung Army, as such, though, favored what they were doing in Manchuria, did they not?

A Yes.

Q Premier INUKAI was very strongly opposed to reënforcing the troops in Shanghai, wasn't he and by virtue of that stand, he incurred the enmity of these general staff leaders who wanted to advance into Manchuria and China, didn't he?

A There may have been enmity against Premier INUKAI but it did not appear on the surface.

Q You didn't believe that the General Staff officers were themselves back of the assassination of the Premier?

A It was perpetrated by the students at the Officers Candidate School and by the Naval Officers and it was not conducted by the General Staff Headquarters.

Q When you use the word "Genro", does that refer to Prince SAIONJI?

A Yes.

Q He, alone, and no one else in those days was left of the Genro?

A Yes.

Q On February 24, you indicate that Prince SAIONJI was very much concerned about the situation and that you were astonished. What did you have in mind and what was his great concern?

A Hitherto, Prince SAIONJI was an advocate of a government through political parties and because of the difficulty that he was facing, he felt that he should retire from his position as advisor to the Emperor.

Q In fact, he preferred to retire than to recommend a military man as premier?A

A Yes.

Q Was that also because he felt that the militarists were going too far in their activities in Manchuria and China?

A Yes, he had much concern for that.

Q Why was he concerned about their activities on the continent?

A Because diplomatically he was advocating friendship with Britain and America and that also he was very much worried about having trouble with the League of Nations. Especially, he was worried about the militarists getting control of the Government.

Q He had made up his own mind that these activities were in violation of the nine-power treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, didn't he.

A Yes.

Q And he so advised the Emperor that he felt that way about it, hadn't he?

A But at that time, he did not have an Imperial audience.

Q Yes, I don't mean on the occasion mentioned in your diary but to your knowledge, he had advised the Emperor of his feelings to the effect that the militarists and Japan, itself, through the militarists were violating the treaties. Is that correct?

A Yes.

- Q As a matter of fact, he had even suggested to the Emperor that the Emperor warn the militarists about their aggressiveness and ask the military men to cease and desist? Is that correct?
- A I believe so. Possibly such a thing occurred but I do not actually know.
- Q Who is this Mr. SAKATANI mentioned on March 1?
- A He was an employee of the Bank of Japan and has traveled to Manchuria. He was my personal friend and because of his trip to Manchuria, I heard about the situation in Manchuria from him.
- Q Did he have anything to say that you recall now as particularly outstanding?
- A I believe it was concerned mainly with the financial situation in Manchuria.
- Q On March 5, Baron DAN was assassinated. Who was back of that assassination?
- A It was the same group of persons that assassinated INOUE.
- Q They were motivated by the same thoughts, you think?
- A Yes.
- Q Was that the same group that caused the assassination of the Premier a little later, INUKAI?
- A No, it was the group that assassinated INOUE.
- Q Can we classify Colonel NAGATA in the same category as MASAKI and ARAKI?
- A MINAMI and MASAKI and ARAKI, HAYASHI, KOISO and NAGATA.
- Q NAGATA was on a lower level, you would say?
- A Yes.

- Q He was one of the Army group that participated with the others in some degree in wanting the military to take over the Government and also favored expansion in Manchuria and China?
- A Yes.
- Q On March 9, he made a report where he states his conclusion that OKAWA was definitely tied up in the March incident. Does everybody seem to agree now pretty well that Dr. OKAWA was the plotter in the March incident?
- A Yes, as related before, anything other than that is not clear to me.
- Q At least, the Army, itself, came to the conclusion that OKAWA was back of the March incident, didn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you recall the lecture of Count KABAYAMA in the Imperial presence about his trip to the United States? What was the nature of his report?
- A He spoke about conditions in the United States. It was after the tea ceremony. It was had on the occasion of his return from the United States.
- Q Did it involve any discussion concerning the military in the United States?
- A No, it was only on non-military stories. He was a strong advocate and a strong worker for friendship between America and Japan.
- Q What was Mr. TANI's, Chief of the Asiatic Bureau, ideas with reference to Japanese activities in Manchuria?
- A I believe that as the Section Chief of the Foreign Ministry, he was very much concerned about the situation in Manchuria.
- Q Concerned in what respect? What was causing him concern?
- A His concern was that it was necessary to prevent the situation from developing into a violation of the treaties.

- Q He was another one of those members of the Government, wasn't he, that realized and made up his mind that what was going on was in violation of the nine-power treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact?
- A I don't know just how he felt about that because everything has progressed to such speedy extent - I mean, the situation developed so rapidly.
- Q Certainly the Chief of the Asiatic Bureau would have a definite opinion as to whether it was proper for Japan to keep on going into Manchuria or whether it wasn't, wouldn't he?
- A For that reason, he was very much concerned on how to explain the situation as the Chief of the Asiatic Bureau because even though he wanted to stop it, he could not and the situation kept on developing.
- Q By explaining it, whom do you mean he was under obligation to explain it to - the League of Nations or the Japanese people?
- A To explain to the League of Nations and others of Japan's position.
- Q In other words, as a member of the Foreign Office, it was embarrassing for him and others of the Foreign Office when Japan was confronted with this situation before the League of Nations, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q And they realized that Japan was subject to criticism by the League of Nations for what was going on, didn't they?
- A Yes.
- Q Did the Foreign Minister or the Foreign Office do anything positive or outstanding to stop this expansion in Manchuria?
- A At the beginning, it endeavored to a great extent and the Cabinet made a decision of preventing the development of the incident.
- Q And after making that decision, to whom did they convey their decisions and what sort of orders or directives were issued?

- A The War Minister gave the order but it was not carried out.
- Q In other words, you mean all the Cabinet, as such, got together and agreed that there should be no expansion in Manchuria and advised the War Minister to tell the General Staff. That was done, but the General Staff didn't pay attention to it? Is that right?
- A I don't know whether the General Staff didn't obey the order or the Kwantung Army did not obey the order. That is not clear.
- Q Wasn't there any remedy for such a situation where the Government agreed on a policy and directed that it be carried out and the military faction wouldn't obey orders?
- A According to the formality, the persons that did not obey orders are supposed to be made to quit or to be punished but because of the Cabinet's power at that time and the military power clashing everything did not proceed as intended it should.
- Q The Army was really bigger and more powerful than the Government in those days, wasn't it?
- A Actually, the military was stronger.
- Q Well, now, you say that you are confident that the Kwantung Army was not willing to follow the Government's policy. I would like to ask you if the Chief of Staff or General Headquarters had insisted strenuously upon the Kwantung Army following its orders, it would have done so, wouldn't it, if they had taken a positive stand?
- A I do not know if the Kwantung Army would have obeyed orders under such circumstances because of the reason of self-defense which they were more or less putting up.
- Q You mean that there was such a situation in the Japanese Army in those days that if the Staff Headquarters issued orders to the Kwantung Army, they would not pay any attention to them?
- A Because the Kwantung Army was clamoring that it was acting in self-defense such an order cannot be issued to it and as far as its effect is concerned, such an order is ^{not} determinable.

- Q Who was running the Army in those days, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army or the Chief of Staff in Tokyo? Who had final authority in the Army?
- A In the matter of operations, it is the Chief of Staff.
- Q Of the whole Army in Tokyo?
- A Yes, of the entire Army.
- Q The truth of the matter is that when the Cabinet, through the Minister of War, requested a limiting of the activities in Manchuria to the Chief of Staff in Tokyo, the Chief of Staff in Tokyo never did convey that directive on to the Kwantung Army, did they?
- A I believe that the policy of the Cabinet should have been transmitted to the Kwantung Army.
- Q But it wasn't, was it?
- A I do not know but I believe it was transmitted.
- Q You think the Chief of Staff in Tokyo directed the Kwantung Army to cease and desist and they refused to do so?
- A I do not believe they refused. It is because the new situation developed out there and therefore new events seemed to take place so that old events are more or less put in the shadow.
- Q Well, yes, I agree with you that a situation can arise on the spur of the moment where the Kwantung Army has to decide but over three or four years' expansion in Manchuria - certainly that was a program or general policy which the Chiefs of Staff in Tokyo had something to do with, didn't they?
- A Because the situation has been developing consistently, the Chiefs of Staff were swept away by the situation.
- Q In others words, the Chief of Staff in Tokyo never did take positive steps to stop the Manchurian Incident. He permitted it to go along and develop, didn't he?
- A I believe he did stop it to a certain extent but it was more or less swept away by the situation.

- Q Well, if the Staff Headquarters in Tokyo really wanted to stop all military activity in Manchuria, it could have done so, couldn't it?
- A It was unable to stop it because a new situation has developed.
- Q They never tried to stop it very hard, did they?
- A I believe that it had endeavored to stop it.
- Q Do you mean to say that under Army procedure, if the Staff Headquarters wanted to stop the expansion into Manchuria, it couldn't have issued an order and brought that about if it wanted to?
- A That is not clear to me.
- Q Certainly, when the Japanese Army moves in and conquers a whole section in China, somebody is responsible for the activity. Those things don't happen without someone being in favor or in control of the situation. If anyone is responsible or in control, it would be the Staff Headquarters in Tokyo.
- A Yes, the Chief of Staff in Tokyo would be in that responsible position.
- Q In other words, the Cabinet or Government indicated through the War Minister that they wanted this expansion stopped by the Chief of Staff but the Chief of Staff never stopped it. Therefore, we must conclude that the Chief of Staff was responsible for the expansion in Manchuria - right or wrong.
- A Yes, from the standpoint of this possibility, that is true.
- Q In other words, they ignored the wishes of the Cabinet and permitted this to take place. One of the people that would have to accept responsibility for what happened there would be MASAKI, wouldn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q And perhaps his superior, Prince KANIN?
- A Yes.

- Q You indicate that as between those two, MASAKI was much more the superior and you would place more responsibility for what happened on him than you would on Prince KANIN.
- A Yes, actually MASAKI was handling the matter and Prince KANIN does not have much responsibility.
- Q When the Cabinet learned that the staff headquarters were paying no attention to their wishes or desires, what, if anything, did they do?
- A I don't believe anything special has been done.
- Q The truth of the matter is they were afraid of the Army.
- A Yes, and they were swept away by the news that certain enemy troops had concentrated in certain places in Manchuria and to leave the situation alone would mean the defeat of Japan.
- Q There isn't anything unusual about the Chinese putting up a battle when the Japanese troops are expanding into Manchuria, is there? That would be natural, wouldn't it?
- A Consequently, the situation developed.
- Q Well, they have a situation where the facts speak for themselves. Japan ended up by taking over Manchuria. Somebody was responsible for that coming about in the Japanese Government. You indicate the Government wasn't responsible because they were opposed to it. Who was responsible. Would you say it was the Chief of Staff in Tokyo and the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army who were the responsible parties for the Manchurian situation?
- A Yes.
- Q And they accomplished the taking over of Manchuria with the full knowledge on the part of the Government, at least, that it was in violation of the Japanese treaties, wasn't it?
- A I do not know whether it was considered actually as a violation of the treaty. That extent is not known.

- Q At least, there were many individuals in the Government that thought it was, including the Emperor?
- A Yes.
- Q Wasn't there any precedent in Japanese politics for the Emperor to come forward and do something about a situation which the political Government was opposed to; for instance, the political Government was opposed to the Manchurian incident and the Army didn't follow their wishes.
- A I believe that the Government cautioned the Army in that respect.
- Q But when the Army didn't pay any attention to the Emperor's wishes, wasn't there any precedent for the Emperor taking stronger measures than just requesting this action on their part?
- A I believe that the Emperor could not take such a positive step because the Army was explaining the situation to their own favor.
- Q Isn't this a true situation. In the final analysis, the Army really was deciding Japan's foreign policy?
- A Consequently, so.
- Q And if you are looking to fix personal responsibility, we would have to look to Staff Headquarters and Chiefs of Staff for the individuals who determined and carried out the foreign policy of Japan in those days. Is that correct?
- A Yes, it becomes so.
- Q That situation, I take it, exists partly because it hadn't been very many years before that the Army had been in absolute control of Japan and the democratic or semi-democratic form of government was not very strong yet and was fearful of the Army, and in the final analysis, give in to the Army. Is that a fair statement?
- A Yes.
- Q So if you would ask who really did rule Japan in 1930 to 1935 it was really the Army, wasn't it, as to foreign policy?
- A Yes.

- Q The Foreign Office and Foreign Minister could express their wishes and desires with reference to foreign policy and so could the Cabinet but whether or not that was carried on depended on the whims and desires of the Army?
- A Yes, it became so.
- Q You would agree with me then, wouldn't you, assuming that it was wrong or illegal for Japan to go and take Manchuria in violation of the nine-power treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the individuals who committed that wrong, if that is a wrong, would be among others the Chief of Staff in Tokyo and the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army?
- A Yes, and those men responsible are ISHIWARA in the Kwantung Army and the Vice Minister in Staff Headquarters.
- Q I think I asked you once before - is ISHIWARA still living?
- A Yes.
- Q On March 25, you had some conversations with Mr. EGUCHI, the Vice-President of the South Manchurian Railway. Would you say that he was one of these leaders that advocated the expansion in Manchuria?
- A He was not a radical and agitator but because of his position as Vice-President of the Manchurian Railway, I believe he followed the Army.
- Q In other words, he was one of the participants along with the Army group of Japanese expansion throughout Manchuria, was he not?
- A I believe he was utilized in that respect. I believe he was one of the persons connected with Mitsubishi.
- Q And again assuming that it was wrong for Japan to go into Manchuria, you would have to conclude that he was one of the men that participated in that wrong, wasn't he?
- A I don't believe Mr. EGUCHI is such a man. I believe he was just merely utilized.
- Q What was the connection of Mitsubishi with the Manchurian enterprise?

- A It has no direct connection. I was just relating the past connection of this person.
- Q The Manchurian Railroad was owned principally by the Japanese Government, was it not?
- A Yes.
- Q And the activities of the railroad in Manchuria were acts of the Government, were they not?
- A It was under the supervision of the Government.
- Q And when the railroad was expanded throughout Manchuria in later years, that was a Japanese Government activity indirectly through the Manchurian Company?
- A Yes.
- Q Who in the Japanese Government had the final authority to decide the activities of the Manchurian Railroad Company?
- A I do not know who it was under. It changes occasionally - like it goes under the Foreign Minister or to the Ministry of Over-seas Affairs.
- Q Was it a corporation having stock like other corporations?
- A Yes.
- Q And when there came a time to elect a president of the corporation by the voting of stock, who, in the Japanese Government or what Department decided how the stock would be voted with reference to the election of that particular president?
- A That is determined by the Cabinet.
- Q In other words, if there was to be an election of officers in the Manchurian Railroad, the Cabinet, as a group, would decide how the Government stock in the corporation would be voted with reference to the candidates?
- A The minute details of that matter, such as stocks and things like that, is handled by the ministries that are supervising it like the Foreign Ministry, the Finance Ministry, or the Ministry of Over-seas Affairs.

Q You mean the actual voting of the stock as a mechanical proposition but I mean as to how it is voted and for whom it would be voted. Is that determined by the Cabinet at a cabinet meeting?

A That is done by the Chief Supervisor.

Q Chief Supervisor of what?

A Chief Supervisor of the Manchurian Railroad in the Foreign Ministry or in the Finance Ministry.

Q Then that one particular man or individual could determine who was going to become President of the Manchurian Railroad?

A The Presidency is decided by the Cabinet.

Q In other words, in order to be President of the Railroad Company, the Cabinet had to approve?

A Yes

Q Then did the Cabinet, after agreeing to a certain individual for president, have anything to do with the policy or activities of the company or was that left entirely up to the president and the other officers of that Company?

A I do not know much about the operation but I believe that it generally was left to the President.

Q There isn't much question but what the Army had something to say about the activities of the Manchurian Railroad, is there?

A I believe that the Army had powerful influence in Manchuria.

Q How did the Army exercise its influence and control over the railroad company? By what method?

A I believe that the supervising commander had power because of the military transportation that is being conducted and because it was a war won.

Q In other words, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, for example, could control the activities of the Railroad Company by virtue of the military situation?

A I believe so.

- Q Well, there again, in the final analysis if there was to be an extension of the lines or an expansion of the railroad throughout Manchuria, in the final analysis the Army would decide whether that was to be done or not, wouldn't it?
- A Yes, the Army has the right of expressing its opinion there.
- Q As a practical matter, the Army decision would be the one that would be adopted, wouldn't it?
- A Yes, I believe so.
- Q No matter what sort of activity we talk about insofar as Manchuria is concerned, the responsibility for what took place always comes back to the Army, doesn't it?
- A I believe it would be so.
- Q Isn't there anything in the Japanese Constitution or in the Japanese laws that require the staff headquarters of the Army to carry out the wishes and recommendations of the Cabinet or other such Government officials?
- A I don't believe there is any regulation or law to that effect.
- Q In other words, the situation is one where the Cabinet or high government officials have to use persuasion on the Army but can't tell the Army what to do?
- A Yes, it only can persuade them but there are no laws or statutes to make them.
- Q That applies in peace time - not only in case of war?
- A That is right.
- Q In other words, I can see how there might well be a difference when an Army is fighting as to the amount of control the Army has and in times of peace when it is not engaged in military operations.
- A Even during peace-time, the Chief of Staff is independent of all encumbrances but is indirectly connected with the War Minister.
- Q But even the War Minister can only make recommendations to the Staff Headquarters and they can be ignored by Staff Headquarters if they didn't see eye to eye with the War Minister. Is that right?
- A Yes, the Staff Headquarters can refuse the recommendation of the War Minister.

- Q Who selects the Chief of Staff in the Japanese Army?
- A It is done by the recommendation of the War Minister.
- Q You mean the War Minister recommends someone to the Emperor and the Emperor appoints the Chief of Staff?
- A Yes.
- Q Who has the power and authority to remove a chief of staff?
- A The War Minister.
- Q Can he remove him at will - at his pleasure - or does he have to bring charges against him and have a trial?
- A He has the right of making him resign against his wishes but from an actual standpoint, it is very difficult.
- Q In other words, when the Cabinet sought to limit the activities in Manchuria and asked the War Minister to convey that thought to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff didn't comply, the War Minister, theoretically at least, could have removed the Chief of Staff for disobeying?
- A But the War Minister cannot make him resign just on the assumption that he disobeyed his order because the Chief of Staff has the authority of being an independent organ.
- Q In other words, the failure to follow orders or instructions of the War Minister is not a grounds for removing the chief of staff? Is that right?
- A Yes, that alone is very difficult to make him resign.
- Q If the War Minister tells the Chief of Staff to do something and the Chief of Staff says, "No, I won't do it", and that isn't grounds for removing the Chief of Staff, what would be grounds for his removal?
- A I believe that he can only be made to resign for personal reasons like being incapable in that particular capacity or something like that.
- Q The mere failure to follow orders is not grounds because the Chief of Staff has the final say on war questions. Is that right?
- A Yes.

- Q So, all the Cabinet can do is to make recommendations insofar as war activities are concerned through the War Minister to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff decides independently and of his own volition as to what decision is made?
- A Yes.
- Q The same applies to the Emperor? He can only make recommendations directly or indirectly to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff doesn't have to follow them if he doesn't want to?
- A The Emperor has the habit of agreeing to everything the Chief of Staff brings forth.
- Q The Emperor didn't do so at the final conclusion of this last war, did he? He told the Chief of Staff what to do insofar as ending the war was concerned. Isn't that so?
- A Yes, the Emperor has such a power.
- Q In other words, he did have the power to stop the Chief of Staff from proceeding with the Manchurian situation but he didn't see fit to go so far as to exercise it under those circumstances. Is that a fair question?
- A The Emperor is working under the constitution of ^amonarchy system and agrees to what the Government and Chief of Staff say. If the Emperor gives his own will to be imposed, he would become a despot.
- Q The Cabinet apparently, in those days, indicated that they desired the Manchurian activities suppressed and the Emperor indicated that those were his wishes but under your system of government, if the Chief of Staff in his own sound judgment feels differently about that, he is under no obligation to follow those recommendations.
- A If there were sufficient reasons on the part of the Chief of Staff, then the Emperor can only comply.
- Q Well, then, when the Emperor took the stand he did at the conclusion of this last war, really in that one action, he was acting as a despot, wouldn't you say?
- A No, that is not so. At the conclusion of the war, the Cabinet was undecided in its decision whether to prosecute or end the

war and requested the Emperor to make the decision, at which time, the Emperor made the decision. If the Cabinet agreed to carrying on the war, the Emperor's situation would have been very difficult.

- Q What was the attitude of the Chiefs of Staff at the end of the war? Were they in favor of accepting the terms or fighting on?
- A The Chiefs of Staff wanted to continue the war but because the Cabinet became more in favor of terminating the conflict and because the Emperor made the decision, they saw that everything was decided by the Emperor and the Chiefs of Staff accepted the Emperor's decision.
- Q At the end of the war, couldn't a situation exist where the Cabinet was divided and the Emperor made up his mind that the war should be ended, and the Chiefs of Staff were opposed but the Emperor told the Chiefs of Staff he wanted the war ended, wouldn't the Chiefs of Staff say "Alright, we will do what the Emperor wants?"
- A Yes.
- Q Back in December 1933, the Cabinet wasn't even divided and it was in favor of retrenching in Manchuria. The Emperor was also of the opinion but the Chief of Staff didn't feel that way about it, it would seem to me that that was a situation where the Emperor might much more readily have told the Chief of Staff what to do because he had the Cabinet behind him one hundred per cent, whereas at the end of the war, the Cabinet was divided. Where is the distinction?
- A Because in the case of the termination of this conflict, the life of the Nation was at stake while in the Manchurian situation the situation was not that grave.
- Q In other words, it is a matter of degree as to the importance of a situation as to how far the Emperor will go in exerting his influence? Is that right?
- A In the case of the Manchurian Incident, the Cabinet did not actually strongly oppose it and so it appeared that the Cabinet was actually approving half of what was going on.

- Q Well, they did, through the War Minister, ask the Staff Headquarters to retrench in Manchuria, didn't they?
- A Yes.
- Q You couldn't very well say that evidenced an attitude on the part of the Cabinet in favor of what the Army was doing in Manchuria. Certainly, the Chief of Staff would have to construe the Cabinet was not in favor of what was going on, wouldn't he?
- A The situation is a totally different one in which the life of the Nation is at stake.
- Q I understand the distinction made. The true situation is that in the case of the Manchurian Incident, the Emperor and the Cabinet felt that what was going on in Manchuria was not right and that it was in violation of the Nine-power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. They expressed the desire to the Army that they retrench but the Cabinet and the Emperor were not sufficiently concerned about the violation to take the forceful type of action they did at the end of the war. Is that right?
- A Yes, consequently it becomes so. I believe that he was more or less swept away by the explanation given by the military.
- Q The truth of the matter is that when the life of the Nation was at stake at the end of the war, due to the turn of events, that was a much more critical situation insofar as the Emperor and the Cabinet were concerned than the mere violation of the treaties during the Manchurian days. It is all a matter of degree of importance, I presume?
- A Yes.
- Q I think we can fairly say from our discussion, can we not, that the Emperor and the Cabinet did not honestly feel that the violation of these treaties was of sufficient importance to take a strenuous and real strong, and firm stand with the Army?
- A I believe that the Army has cleverly explained the situation as "self-defense".
- Q But there were thinking people in those days that knew better even in the Cabinet, and the Emperor was concerned as to whether self-defense really applied. Is that right?

- A Yes.
- Q Was Lt. Colonel SUZUKI the Grand Chamberlain?
- A He was a member of the Military Affairs Bureau.
- Q Who was the Grand Chamberlain in those days?
- A Same name but he was an Admiral.
- Q I see, Lt. Colonel SUZUKI was in the Bureau of Military Affairs?
- A Yes.
- Q On April 13, you talked with Lt. Colonel SUZUKI with reference to the Army's attitude toward the South Manchurian railroad. Do you recall what he had to say with reference to the Army's attitude toward the Railroad?
- A I believe the matter discussed was the changing of the Director of the Manchurian Railroad. He was worried that a change of the Chief of the Directors of the Manchurian Railway would weaken the influence of the Army and that the hold which ARAKI has in keeping down the Army elements would become loose and ARAKI would lose faith.
- Q I don't quite understand your answer. Can you say that again?
- A It dealt with the matter of changing the Chief Director of the Manchurian Railway. The Army had a policy of not changing the Director of the Manchurian Railway and the changing of the Chief Director of the Manchurian Railway through the Cabinet would bring forth discrepancies in the assertions of ARAKI and ARAKI would be discredited. ARAKI would loosen his power and influence among the military.
- Q In other words, you mean that there was a proposed change in one of the Directors of the Railroad and the Army didn't want it and if the Cabinet forced it, ARAKI, being Minister of War, and participating in that change, would become unpopular with the Army. Is that right?
- A Yes.

- Q It is another example of the fact that the Army in the final analysis controlled the operations of the South Manchurian Railroad, didn't it.
- A Yes.
- Q In a general sense, the South Manchurian Railroad was controlled by the Japanese Government but in the final analysis, it was controlled by the Army?
- A Yes.
- Q On April 21, you mention, again, conversation with Lt. Colonel SUZUKI whereby he stated he prepared a plan concerning the relief of farming villages. I have two questions to ask you: What was the farm problem in those days and what did Lt. Colonel SUZUKI, being in the Bureau of Military Affairs, have to do with the farm situation?
- A Around that time, there was a world depression and the Japanese farmers received a great blow from it and the prices dropped immensely. The farm problem became more and more grave and the Japanese Army is constituted mostly from the persons coming from farms and farming villages and many stories about the hardships of the families reached the ears of these Army men who came from the farming villages. So, the officers that were in charge of these soldiers began to worry a great deal. Therefore, the War Minister took great interest in the problems of the farm.
- a
- Q Normally, that would be/matter for the concern of the Minister of Agriculture, wouldn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q But because of the Army personnel being recruited from the farmers, principally, they took an interest in the situation?
- A Yes and among the militarists there were movements or stories to the effect that the hardships and the plight of the farmer was due to exploitation of the Zaibatsu and as a result of that, there was much discontent among the soldiers. That is why the War Minister took such a great interest in it.
- Q Is the Bureau of Military Affairs under the War Minister as distinguished from the Staff Headquarters?

- A War Ministry. There is another explanation given - that the political parties were in collaboration with the Zaibatsu in making the farmers suffer and these things began to make life unpleasant among the younger officers and they felt that these matters must be handled by the military rather than the political parties.
- Q In other words, the War Minister was interested in running Japan for the benefit of the Army primarily and not for the public at large? Is that fairly true?
- A It was for the intent of speedily cooling off the feeling among the militarists.
- Q In other words, there was a strong feeling in the Army circles that the farmers were being oppressed and not taken care of properly. Also, that the Zaibatsu and wealthy people were getting more than their share of attention and he was trying to devise a program in order to pacify that feeling. Is that a fair statement?
- A Yes.
- Q On April 23, he submitted to you some plans, one of which involved a plan with reference to the Far East. What was that plan and what was the attitude of the Foreign Office through Colonel SUZUKI in that respect?
- A I have no recollection as to the contents.
- Q He also apparently submitted a plan with reference to Japanese foreign policy. Do you recall what that plan was?
- A I have no recollection of that. I had those plans but they were burned.
- Q Did they pertain to what the War Minister thought should be done in Manchuria and China?
- A I believe that the first plan included the problem of Manchuria.
- Q Do you recall what their program was at that stage?
- A I cannot recall - and the last plan included the problem of the farming villages.
- Q That was the one that was mentioned as the Showa Era Restoration.
- A Yes.

Q That is the same plan about which you talked with him earlier according to your diary and which we discussed?

A Yes.

Q Don't you remember as to what his ideas were as to what Japan's foreign policy should be in those days?

A I believe that SUZUKI was for amity and friendship with the United States and Britain.

Q What was his personal attitude with reference to the Manchurian situation?

A I believe that he had the opinion that he wanted to make Manchuria an independent state.

Q Under Japanese control?

A I think so.

Q Could we add him to our list at about the level we put Colonel OBATA?

A I believe he is not much different from OBATA.

Q On April 24, you had a discussion with reference to the reorganization of the Imperial Household Ministry. What was the situation that was creating the need for reorganization there?

A There is no accurate significance here. I believe that because the situation changed the Imperial Household Ministry must be changed to make it conform with the situation.

Q Why was it necessary to have a change in the Imperial Household Ministry. Why couldn't it have continued as it was? What was the reason for the need of the change?

A I think that the reason primarily was that the Imperial Household was composed mostly of old men.

Q Was the Army group advocating a change in the Household Ministry because they couldn't get along with them or didn't like the way they did business?

A This had no relation to the Army.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Lt Fred Suzukawa, 0-2030605
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 27 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred J. Suzukawa
2nd Lt AUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8 day of August, 1946.

[Signature]
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~we~~) Henry Sackett, _____,
and _____,

certify that on 31 day of January, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~us~~) Marquis Koichi Kido, and according to Lt. Fred Suzukawa, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place
8 August, 1946
Date

[Signature]

Q Technically, the Army had no relation with a lot of things, in my opinion, but they were exercising influence, nevertheless. Is this another situation where they tried to control the Household Ministry?

A No, that cannot be true.