

G-2
HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO #234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. _____
(Obtain from G-2)

PLACE Tokyo
DATE 12 Nov 1945

Division of Origin Morale

Subject: ARP measures

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Nishizawa, Nobushje, Police Affairs Section, Police Affairs Bureau,
Home Ministry.

Where interviewed Meiji Building

Interrogator A. H. Leighton

Interpreter Kildoyle

Allied Officers Present Lt. Col. Shoemaker, Mr. Bruce Rogers

Mr. David Truman

Summary: An outline of Mr. Nishizawa's career in Police work was given. During the war he was responsible for issuing orders in regard to ARP to Prefectures.

ARP plans were based on data sent from Europe and on actual experiments conducted with live bombs. When bombing became severe, in all areas directly affected, ARP system broke down and both officials and public took shelter and let cities burn. Mr. Nishizawa's office issued "advice" rather than orders, to the local civilian population.

In factories which were dispersed from large urban areas, there was a notable slacking in interest in and practice of ARP.

The Doolittle raid in 1942 had effect of improving ARP through rousing public interest. Previously people had been very lax.

When the raids became severe in 1945 people lost confidence in the leaders because their dictums proved so inadequate for dealing with the situation.

After the big raid on Tokyo, 10 March 1945, General orders went out to Osaka urging all women, children and old people to seek safety in open places, while the physically able were to remain and fight the fires.

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
Morale Division
(Pacific)

INTERVIEW

Nishizawa, Nobushige; Police Affairs Section, Police Affairs Bureau, Home Ministry.

SUBJECT

Outline of history of ARP during the war with emphasis on attitudes of the people toward such measures.

TIME

12 November 1945, 2:15 to 4:30 PM

INTERVIEWERS

Lt. Cdr. A. H. Leighton, Morale Division
Lt. Col. Shoemaker, Civilian Defense Division

INTERPRETERS

Mr. Kildoyle,
Mr. Bruce Rogers

OTHER ALLIED OFFICERS PRESENT

Mr. David Truman

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW.

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GENERAL COMMENT ON THE INTERVIEW

Mr. N. is a small man in an olive uniform, carrying a bundle of documents done up in a cloth. He was alert and anxious to be of assistance in his manner, but somewhat bewildered as to what it was that we desired. About the first half of the interview period was devoted to securing information as to Mr. N.'s curriculum vitae and in defin-

ing the various positions he had held in the Home Ministry. Attaining precision in regard to these matters gave the interpreters a great deal of difficulty.

Mr. N. seemed to be of average intelligence. Many of his statements were of an overall and general character the accuracy of which it is difficult to estimate. When he was asked for more specific details, he appeared to have difficulty recalling them.

THE REPORT

Key: L - Lt. Cdr. Leighton
S - Lt. Col. Shoemaker
N - Mr. Nishizawa

L: Did Mr. Nishizawa have anything to do with the preparation of documents on morale submitted by Koizumi previously?

N: Yes. I prepared the draft for Mr. Koizumi's approval on the section entitled "Manpower". Mr. Mizuguchi and Mr. Kimura, who came with me today, also prepared some of the other sections.

L: What education did Mr. Nishizawa have and what gov't jobs has he held?


N: I am **now** in the Administrative part of the Air Defense Section in the Police Affairs Bureau of the Home Ministry. Before the war, while a policeman, I was taking a night course in the law school of Chuo University, Kanda, Tokyo, and graduated in 1937. I transferred from the police bureau in the home ministry upon graduation to the Tokyo Police Department. (Curriculum vitae written by N as follows)

CURRICULUM VITAE

Nishizawa, Nobushige.

1. July 1934 to April 1938 - Patrolman, Precinct Police Station, Tokyo Metropolitan Police. (attended Law Course, Chuo Univ. at night)
2. April 1938 - Nov 1938.- Patrolman with Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board (Headquarters)
3. Nov 1938 to Jun 1940 - Police Sgt, Precinct Police Station, ARP Sec.
4. Jun 1940 to Jul 1941 - Police Sgt, Police Bureau, Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, Arp Section
5. Jul 1941 to Dec 1943 - Asst Police Inspector, Precinct Police Station, ARP Section
6. Dec 1943 to Aug 1945 - Air Defense Hq, Police Bureau, Leader, Trng section (probably retained Rank).
7. Sept 1945 to date - Home Ministry, Police Affairs Section, Police guard sub-section

Chart of N's present Position



N: Some of the names of the officials are:

Police Affairs Section Head - Mr. Hirooka
Police Guard Section Head - Mr. Ogawa

(Mr. Nishizawa is second in charge to Ogawa)

L: What are Mr. N's duties every day now?

N: I receive orders from the occupation forces and these are passed on to the police heads in the various prefectures. The occupation forces send their directives to the Home Ministry and the orders are then separated and transmitted. Those dealing with police affairs pass through my hands for transmission.

L: What orders?

N: The police affairs bureaus is divided into three sections: Communications, Enforcement-Police Guard, Police Affairs Section. Police guard was recently incorporated into Police Affairs. The orders dealing with the Police Guard affairs come to me and I see to their transmission and enforcement.

L: You were employed in the Leaders Training Section of the Police Affairs Section. What were your duties?

N: I took care of those matters dealing with Air Defense Training; writing instructions and orders to the governors of the various prefectures.

L: Such as?

N: For instance, if a plane were to come or a raid to happen, how to use water and extinguishing materials when the alarm actually sounds. I send orders to the prefecture's governors for transmis-

- N: sion to police chiefs and leaders of ARP groups. Some of these I have written myself, but they have to be cleared through my section heads.
- L: You wrote on Air Defense Measures and Gas Masks as well?
- N: Gas Mask Instruction occurred only at the beginning of the war and since we later decided that gas masks would not be needed, instructions and orders governing their use were discontinued. Moreover, we did not have sufficient gas masks, so no use training people in their use.
- L: What orders did you actually issue?
- N: Orders changed as the war progressed. About April 1945 orders for factory and plant dispersal and evacuation were transmitted, plus orders for air raid defense of such plants. In dispersed plants the people thought that dispersal alone was sufficient and I had to give orders for continuing protection in the way of camouflage and fire prevention. Plants in Osaka and Nagoya were considered particularly vulnerable. I saw that training for fire extinguishing was continued in dispersed plants.
- S: What about enforcement of maintaining fire extinguishing equipment?
- N: There were no orders for keeping water on hand, but these were merely suggestions. Orders were issued but were more for leading the people than ordering.
- S: Was this the case in fire lanes and plant dispersal?
- N: I had nothing to do with fire lanes. That was another department (Shisetsu Kyoku), in the Home Ministry.
- L: How do the suggestions you just mentioned and previously stated orders fit together?
- N: Orders were sent from the Home Ministry, Police Bureau, to the various prefectures. From that point, through the police and fire depts. to the civilians the orders became advice, except in the case of gov't plants, fire lanes, etc.
(S - Police inspection makes such suggestions practically law)
When planes were overhead these suggestions were covered by law. General precautions before the raids were advice. The administration of laws during the raids were not my own business, but were taken care of by authorities on the spot.
- L: Where did you get information leading to the issuing of orders and advice?
- N: From experience, reading and experiments. I was sent on inspection trips through the various prefectures and wrote concerning the conditions I saw there. On my tours I visited the fire prevention units, the neighborhood associations and fire stations

and fire fighting organizations. When I saw errors occurring I attempted to correct them. At the time of building and establishing factories I was able to say what defects should be corrected for fire prevention and advised on extinguishing measures. Air raid shelters were inspected. The ideal shelter I felt should not hold more than five people, but some I saw were for more than 100, because of shortage of materials.

(They made shelters and tested them and showed results as object lessons for people.)

As I was saying, when I saw this shelter for 100 people I instructed them as to the correct procedure.

L: Tell us of some other experiences.

N: I had many. I instructed on measures to be taken to prevent air raid shelters from being built close by large buildings which might crush and prevent escape from the shelters.

L: What experiments were undertaken?

N: There was an air raid research bureau in the Home Ministry and the results of their experiments were published.

L: What experiments?

N: They studied the effects of bombs on windows; the safe distances from various types of bombs considering weight of bomb and type of shelter. The Bureau dropped bombs on shelters several times for experiments near Haneda Airfield, and my opinion on the experiments was that they were very much in agreement with actual results of the explosions of concussion bombs. In one case a well-constructed shelter only seven meters from a 130 kilo bomb remained intact and the people survived. This agreed with the findings of the experiment.

L: During what period were the experiments carried on?

N: Summer, 1943.

L: Where?

N: In the vicinity of Tokyo, but fairly far from the city. Naturally, in uninhabited places, but near enough to be convenient to the research bureau in Tokyo.

L: Were the results published?

N: Not in newspapers, but the principal findings were sent to the prefectures.

L: Shortly before, you mentioned the tendency in dispersed factories for the ARP to slacken. When was this?

N: So desu, ne. About January, 1944, and we realized that there was slacking happening.

L: How long did this tendency last?

N: Inspectors were sent out and after inspections things improved slightly, but it was impossible to visit all the plants, therefore ARP was only 80% as good in dispersed plants as those which remained.

L: How about the ARP in factories in the cities?

N: These are only my own ideas. I did not inspect personally, usually, but was very much interested in results. I would say that even in cities precautions were not 100% up to Japanese standards. One of the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ reasons precautions were not 100% effective was that factories were busy with production and even if the advice and regulations from the officials were not followed, that only thing that would happen would be a lot of argument and talk.

S: A law promulgated in 1937, revised in 1941 and 1943, gave the prefectural governors a free hand in some ARP matters. Did the early raids in 1942 and 43 cause these revisions?

N: The first law in 1937 was too simple, and was gradually changed. On December 8, 1941, it was decided to enforce it. After raids, from time to time as the result of experience gained, the law was revised, but not so much because of the raids as because of the experience gained. Some revisions occurred after reading information on experiences of the bombing, from London and Germany.

S: As time went on, was there a change in people's attitude and observance of the law?

N: At first the people ignored the law, and even toward the end people were lax in its observance.

S: Was there any period when people paid more attention than at another time?

N: In 1942, after the first raid, people began to realize that Japan could be bombed, and paid more attention to precautions.

S: How about toward the end of the war?

N: The air raids were so large the people lost confidence in the leaders because the raids exceeded so far the scope of the laws and the dictums of the leaders.

S: In 1943, did the people remain to protect their homes or did they flee?

N: No raids in 1943.

S: How about comparison of the early raids with the late ones as to people remaining behind?

N: The first raid of any size toward the end of 1944 was not as big or as bad as people thought it would be and they thought if they followed instructions they would not have to flee or hide and bury things. In fact, they stood out and watched the raids. But, toward the end of the war, they figured that if they stayed around during the raid they would be killed, so they all took shelter and let the city burn.

S: How about the first big raid? Did people stay or flee?

N: After the March 10th raid, the first big one, the air raid General Headquarters notified Osaka about tactics which needed changing. That advice was about care of women, children and old people and stated for them to take shelter immediately upon announcement of a raid or to run to open spaces. But, the people in charge of actual air raid defense work were to carry on as previously.

S: Did the volunteer fire fighters and the neighborhood associations usually stay around to extinguish blazes or did they take shelter?

N: Almost all ran away. I feel even in the first raid the fire dept. and police were also unofficially thought to have left their posts during raids. This fleeing increased as the raids continued.

Nr. Nishizawa was asked if he could come again on Wednesday, 14 Nov 1945, at 2:00 PM and would he bring more details. Something on manpower and absenteeism was requested, plus copies, if possible, of orders sent from the Air Defense General Headquarters to the prefectural governments: 1) before 1945, 2) instructions during 1945.