

U.S. & BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD
MANCHURIAN SITUATION

英美對東北問題態度

美國國務院之聲明及英國致蘇聯照會

附國務卿貝爾納斯之「七不」演說

(附英文原文)

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美國國務院對東北局勢聲明

一九四六年三月一日

吾人與蘇聯政府，或任何其他政府，並無關於東北「戰利品」之祕密協定或其他協定。美國政府不承認「戰利品」之解釋為包括工業或其組織要素，如東北之日本工業與設備等在內。若干時前吾人曾通知蘇聯政府，處置日本在外資產，如東北之工業等，係共同利益之問題，凡對擊敗日本會負較大負擔之盟國均與有關係。在此時期，以此工業資產作為「戰利品」而運出東北，或以中蘇兩國對管制此等資產之協定，對日本在東北之國外資產作任何最後之處置，均為不合之舉。美國政府對於任何處置日本國外資產作為賠款之問題，最近已與各有關係之政府開始討論。

美國務院公布文件

一九四六年三月三日

國務卿貝爾納斯於一九四六年二月九日訓令駐重慶及莫斯科兩大使館分別向中蘇兩國政府提出下列見解：

最近據報，中蘇兩國政府官員曾爲處置及接管滿洲之工業，進行會商；美國政府對此備極關懷。一九四五年八月十四日所訂之中蘇條約及各項協定★曾有中蘇共同管理滿洲某數鐵路幹線之規定，然是項協定并未提及對滿洲之工業亦作類似之管理。美國政府對於上項談判以迄一九四五年八月成立協定之經過，曾不時接獲通知；且承認是項協定，故照美國政府之了解，專歸中蘇政府共管之滿洲企業，只以上述各協定所涉及之鐵路爲限。

職是之故，本政府於接獲報告，中蘇正在進行談判；其結果或致成立專由中蘇共管滿洲之工業，爲之不安。

處於目前其他國籍人民未得自由進入滿境，美國人民及他盟國人民對於求取參加滿洲經濟開發未獲均等機會之情況下，本政府感覺中蘇政府舉行此種有關滿洲工業協定之談判，對於門戶開放原則殊有抵觸，此將令欲得機會參加滿洲工業開發之美國人遭受明顯之歧視，并將令與滿洲成立貿易關係之美國商業居於顯著不利地位。

對日本之賠償政策問題：與滿洲工業問題有直接關連，因滿洲工業之大部份，均屬日本在戰敗前所有。

本政府認爲日本國外資產如滿洲工業之最後處置，乃對擊敗日本會肩負重大負擔之各盟國共同利

益，所共同關懷之問題。

本政府現正準備關於日本賠償之廣泛政策綱領。以供關係各國政府之考慮，該項綱領將提議設置一盟國向日本索取賠償委員會，其主要任務為將日本國外資產就提出主張之各國間作最後之分配。是故若於此際即將日本在滿洲之國外資產作任何最後處置，無論以是項工業資產作為「戰利品」而移出滿洲，或由蘇中兩政府訂立協定管理該項資產之所有權，均屬不合。

美國政府願與中蘇兩國政府合作，以期對上列問題求得解決，并盼其他兩政府亦出以同樣之合作精神。是以如承兩政府將關於處置或管理滿洲工業或正在舉行，或計劃舉行之商談情形，或已採取之任何行動，通知美國政府，將不勝感荷。吾人並歡迎對全般問題舉行充份而坦率之討論。

國務卿本日宣市，已接獲中國外交部之覆文：略云：（自英文轉譯）蘇聯政府於一九四六年一月廿一日致一備忘錄與中國政府稱：所有日本在中國東北各省之企業，曾為日軍効力者，蘇聯均認為係蘇軍之戰利品。

中國政府認為蘇聯政府是項主張遠越國際公法與國際慣例公認之戰利品之範圍；因之兩國政府對於所涉及之根本原則，見解未能趨於一致。

在另一提交蔣委員長長春軍逃行營之備忘錄內：蘇聯政府曾稱擬以蘇聯所認為戰利品之日本企業之一部交與中國，至其餘各項企業（包括指定之若干煤礦；電力廠；鋼鐵工業；化學工業及水泥工業）則須由中蘇兩國共同經營。

中國政府方面感覺對蘇方此項建議，無同意之可能；以其越出一九四五年八月十四日中蘇協定之規定，且與中國政府對日本在華產業與企業所採之上述立場相抵觸故也。

★參閱「中蘇友好同盟條約」專冊。

英國向蘇聯抗議文

(一九四六年三月九日由英國駐蘇聯代表勞拔士遞交蘇聯外交委員長莫洛托夫，四月九日應答詢問在下院發表)

本代辦奉敝國政府之命，通告貴政府，以據所得報告，蘇聯軍隊嘗從事搬移滿洲境內日本所有在瀋陽及其他地方之機器及設備，敝國政府爲之感覺不安。

是項報告使敝國政府不得不保留權益，并將其見解提出備案，即處置日本資產，乃凡可提出日本賠償主張之聯盟國間所當討論解決者。

在未經討論而成立協定前，敝國政府認爲此等資產所在之國家，應暫行保管，以與該國最後應得賠償抵賬，乃屬適當之辦法。

但對於由第三者片面搬移，殊難緘默，對於各國政府間自行商訂最後處置及日本產業，權利，利益及資產所有權之任何協定，交不能加以承認。

本照會并通知中國政府。

美國務卿貝爾納斯「七不」主張

(一九四六年二月廿八日在紐約海外記者會演講辭)

我們已開始明瞭戰爭已過去了，兒子，丈夫和父親都回家來了，翻開報紙來，再也不怕在死亡的名單中，發現有我們親戚家人的名字；這是何等好的事情。但是現在還不完全是在慶祝和快活的時候，鄉村和城市中的家庭，當他們吃過晚飯以後聽孩子們追述諾曼第和琉璜島戰事的時候，他們每個人的心中，還有一個沒有說出來的問題。

這一個問題，就是我們怎樣才可以確定永遠不會再有戰爭？過去在戰爭期內，我們的目標是很清楚的，我們的目標是勝利。固然，工業動員和軍事動員是最重大的問題，生產的僵局時常似乎無法打開，運輸的困難和人力的缺乏，似乎不能克服，在前綫，陸海空的聯合作戰的錯綜複雜的行動，使人聞之寒心。這些都是艱苦的工作，然而我們只要問一問：「這於勝利有幫助嗎？」勝利的共同目標使我們團結起來，使我們的努力有了目的和領導。

現在我們已到了風平浪靜的境地，我們舒暢和感激是與不安的心情混雜在一起的，我們現在的目標是永久和平，我們追求永久和平，甚至比我們以前爭取勝利更加急切。困難是永久和平的路沒有像勝利的路那樣容易看見，和容易依循。我們遇到任何一個問題，第一須要問：「這對於和平有幫助嗎？」如果這問題的答案來得很緩，或甚至沒有答案，那末我們就開始不安和恐懼起來了。我們雖然有許多事情疑慮不明；但是有幾個基本的定理；我們是很清楚的。

一個是勝利的結果，不一定就是公正而永久的和平。不過勝利已使我們有建立這一種和平的機會；我們的生命就繫於我們是否能充分利用這一個機會。

還有一件事是我們所應知的：就是我們美國人單獨無法確定世界是否將在和平中生活下去；還是在戰爭中毀滅掉？和平不是單靠我們，也要靠別人；沒有一個國家是命運的完全的主人，我們都是彼此禍福共存的。

因為我們知道了這一點：所以我們已把我們的希望繫在聯合國的旗幟上面。我們不能因為加入了一個組織而就以爲滿足，我們知道我們雖然把世界的夢想寄托於聯合國；但是除非各個會員國有信心和決心，使聯合國有生命而對於具體的案件和一切日常事務都能發揮作用，否則聯合國也將失敗。

關於聯合國首次幾個會議，各代表所發表的，都是坦白而率直，與我在負責政治家在任何私人會議裏所得到的一樣，這些初次會議的目的，僅爲設立聯合國的各個機構，但是提交安全理事會討論的那些問題中，有幾個非常迫切，甚至在理事會有機會採用臨時規則和程序之前，就需要予以解決。

在倫敦幾次會議的進行，並不是完全安靜而和平的，有人企圖利用聯合國來促進自私的國家的目標；但是在倫敦辯論中所反映的國家利益和目標的衝突，很像我們全國和各州立法中所反映的地方和特殊利益的衝突。我們當然不贊成這些利益的衝突，但是既然有了這些衝突，那末最好應該開誠佈公的發表出來，如果這些利益的衝突不在聯合國的討論會中提出來，那末這些討論會也將與現實脫離；而結果變成毫無意義的了。

當敘利亞和黎巴嫩政府提出陳訴，請求英法軍隊從它們的領土上撤退回去，而安全理事會對此陳訴討論完畢的時候，已經創立了一個極顯著的先例。理事會不曾採取正式行動，這是因爲常任理事國對決議的形式意見紛歧，但是始終沒有一個國家懷疑這個一般命題：即任何國家不得對方允許，無權留駐軍隊在對方那個獨立國家的領土上。把這個命題應用到上述懸案一節，也沒有任何國反對。美國代表斯退丁紐斯依照這個意思所提出的特殊解決方式，受到理事會大多數會員國的擁護，然而終於未被接受，因爲蘇聯認爲不够明確，予以否決。但英法政府立即宣稱：雖有蘇聯在技術上的否決，它們

也一定要遵照美國決議案而行。因爲這個決議案明晰的代表理事會的意見。

這足以表明單有理事會的一個常任理事國提出在法理上的否決，在事實上，任何國家，無論是大國或小國，遵照聯合國憲章的目的與原則而行的道德上的責任，是不會因之解除的。

聯合國已經有了一個好的開端，然而這並不是說它的成功已經有了保證，意思只是說：倘使聯合國人民決心要使聯合國憲章生效，那它就會生效。

有時我國國會也犯有過與不及的嚴重錯誤，這種錯誤並非國會本身制度的錯過，這是議員或其選民的錯過，因爲他們沒有克盡他們的責任。

聯合國機構也是這樣，只有我們，聯合國人民，都能克盡我們的責任的時候，它才會成功。

如果我對諸位說今天的世界情況是健全的或可以放心，那我是不够坦白，我們的週圍還有猜疑和不信任；它們反轉過來又孕育着猜疑和不信任……。

我們已經共立信約除保衛具體規定在「憲章」目標和宗旨內的法律外，不使用武力。我們誠心守此信約，但是我們既是一大強國及安全理事會的常任理事，我們當然有責任以我們的力量使其他國家共守此約，我們也願意負起這一責任，除非各強國都準備爲保衛法律而行動，聯合國是不能防止戰爭的。我們必須在事前明白表示我們的確要爲防止侵略而行動，同時再明白表示我們將不爲其他目的而用武力。

各強國都被授予特殊的責任，因爲它們如果願意維持和平；他們是有力量來維持和平的。這種各國間的力量比重，是他們之中任何一國要破壞和平，假使其他各國能團結一致保衛憲章，那也還是不能輕易破壞的。目前各強國間的力量比重，足以防止他們中任何一國獨霸世界，這種力量的比重不能由任何一個強國的片面行動而實際使之改變，否則必將極端紊亂聯合國的整個機構。因此，我們假使要盡我們的本份來維持和平，我們必須保持我們的力量來這樣做；我們並且要明白表示我們對於保衛

憲章一定要和其他強國團結一致。

假使我們要做一個很大的強國，我們的作爲便要像一個很大的強國，以便不但可保證我們本身的安全，並且可以保持世界的和平。

我們雖然渴望普遍解除武裝，我們雖然準備參加普遍縮軍，但是如果我們單獨除去軍備，我們便不能信守我們對自身和世界的責任。保持大量職業化的常備軍，雖然和我們的傳統不合，但我們必須能夠而且準備供給在短期內便能集合的武裝部隊，我們必須同時有受過訓練的許多公民，能夠而且準備補充這些武裝部隊，毋需再有不必要的長期訓練。爲了和平我們不能允許我們的軍事配備減縮到和我們的任務不相稱的地步，而且我們必須有某種形式的普遍軍訓，其故在此。

我們這樣保持的力量不能也不會用來從事侵略，我們以一個愛好和平，★民主民族的傳統，足以保證除保衛法律外，不會使用我們的武力，我們的軍隊除非由安全理事會召令出外，要用之於戰爭，必須先得國會的同意。我們不必恐懼它的濫用，除非我們不信任人民的代表。

我深信在任何強國間，現在並沒有戰爭的理由，目前的力量比重和利害關係是這樣的，就是只要每一個國家忠實信守憲章的目標和原則；任何國家都勿需也不應該覺得他在和別國的關係中有何不安全的之感。

光是各國宣布他們并不想開戰是不夠的。希特勒就會樣說過，在某種意義上說，他確是不想開戰的，他想要全世界受一個由他指揮的全體主義政府來支配。地志在必得，假使可能的話，他想不經過戰爭而達到這個目的，假使必要的話，他使用戰爭來達到它。

要貶斥戰爭，各國必須不去做導向戰爭的事。

美國在內政或對外關係的政策上，從不承認現狀是神聖不可侵犯的。我們的民主的要義是我們相信生活和生長，相信人民有權去造成他們自己的將來。我們的傳統不是保衛反動的「武斷」，和特權

的專橫，我們和想使文明的時鐘逆轉倒行的納粹及法西斯黨徒作戰，并不是想由我們來使進步的鐘停止前進。

我們的外交必須不是消極的，惰怠的；它必須能調整和發展，以適合不斷改變的環境，它必須有創造性的觀念，建設性的提議，實際的以及有遠見的建議。雖然維持現狀並不是神聖和不可變易的，我們也不能忽視一種片面的對現狀的剝蝕。聯合國憲章禁止侵略；我們不能允許藉威逼壓迫或者如政治滲透等詭計來進行侵略。

當大小國家間須有所調整時；我們要坦白地公平地就事論事；考慮調整辦法；要顧計到所有大小國家的利益；以維持這個基於各大強國團結而不為任何一國獨占的世界中之和平與安全。

毫無疑問，各國間現正有着非常重要的調整事項要求我們考慮；有些局勢在處理時極為微妙；是；只要這種在全世界各地停止用權術以取得戰略優勢，以及利用此一調整為楔，而着手進一步的，隱而不露伸展的實力，我相信還是可以找到滿意解決的。

我們必須面對一個事實，就是我們要保持「聯合國」，對於存在於任何強國間的嚴重糾紛，不能漠不關心，——不論是否要行使否決權——因為這種糾紛能够影響所有強國間整個力量的比重。

★參防美總統論「普遍軍洲的重要性」及白崇禧著「中國軍事教育軍事訓練」兩專冊

美國希望維持和所有國家的友善關係，但不希望和任何國家有排他性的協定。自然，有些問題對某些國家較之對其他國家關係更大。對許多和美洲各國間有關係的問題，情形就是如此。對德日的管制亦然，在我們和其他強國的關係中有許多問題與我們中二三國的關係較諸他人為大。我對三強，四強或五強間的會議覺得無可非議，即使是我們自己單獨和蘇聯，和英國，和法國或中國的會議，也能幫助推進強國間的協調和與小國間的和平。但即使在這些會議中，就美國而言，我們決不結黨營私對付任何國家。我們將不去割裂全世界成為各別的小集團或勢力範圍，在這個原子時代，我他決不會設法

分解這個單一而不可分割的世界。

我們公開地，愉快地；和竭誠地歡迎我們的蘇聯盟邦成爲一個不在任何國之下的大強國。我們會多次遷就它的意見，贊同許多調整辦法；並且在這樣的過程中，消除不少嚴重的疑慮，設法對他有利益。唯有不可恕饒的錯誤悲劇，才能够使彼此在未來發生嚴重的衝突。雖然我們的生活方式不同，我們人民羨慕和尊重我們的盟友，並希望在自由日益擴張，生活水準日益提高的世界中，繼續成爲友人和夥伴。

爲了世界和平，和我們彼此共同的傳統的友誼起見，我們必須明白宣告美國將保衛聯合國憲章。大小國家都已同意根據聯合國憲章，除却爲了保衛法律同憲章的目的和精神，不援用武力或以武力相威脅。

倘有人藉武力或以武力相威脅，以達到與聯合國憲章精神相違的目的，我們不願亦不能袖手旁觀。除非我們獲得其他主權國自由的認可，我們沒有權利在它們的領土範圍內駐紮軍隊。我們不應過分延長促現和平的時間，並繼續強駐我們的軍隊在弱小和貧困的國家境內。在盟國對賠償問題取得協議之前，任何國家都沒有權利把解放區或從前敵人附庸國內的敵產任意據爲己有。我們沒有也不能同意任何一國自行決定它從這些國家拿走什麼東西；我們不應該發動神經戰以達到戰略上的目的；我們不願意糊里糊塗地陷於這樣的一個局面，就是沒有一個願意戰爭；但是也沒有一個能够避免戰爭。我們不應該認爲喚起對上述可能危及和平局勢的注意，就是對那應該負責的國家或一些國家構成一種侮辱，任何國家都可能出於它的善意採取行種行動，而不充分認識這種行動的後果；我們應該願意檢討我們自身的行動，藉以保持我們在和平中的共同利益，因爲這對於我們是遠較足令我們分裂的爭執爲重要。

我們應該恢復和平時期的情形，我們必須清除戰爭所留給我們的可怕遺物；我們應讓我們的軍隊

各自歸返它們的故土，我們必須廓清製造猜疑和恐懼的場合。我們不應自欺，和誤引我們的盟國入於歧途，爲了避免糾紛；我們不應讓局勢演變成爲不可收拾的事變。

我們應該恪遵聯合國憲章，這是獲致和平的唯一途徑；我們要遵守憲章，大家應一致具有善意和互相諒解。

我們這些在戰爭最黑暗時期具有耐心和彼此信任的國家，現在也應該具有耐心和彼此信任。

沒有一國可以專有人類的智慧，也沒有一國可以自認專有便行動起來。友邦的行爲應該友邦化才對。

不負責任地談論戰爭的不可避免性，等於對我們是否效忠憲章發生懷疑；並且危害着我們在國內或國外最珍視的自由。

世界上有許多主義上的歧異；這是向來有的，但是以世界之大，儘可以容納許多意見不同的人民和許多制度不同的政府。

沒有一個人可以預觀遼遠的未來，和最後的情勢如何；但是我們作爲一共同文化的一部分，是緊地繫在一起了。

我們縱觀戰爭破壞的結果，我們應瞭解戰後建設和創立人民較高生活水準的困難工作，需要我們全力以赴。

所有大小國家，應該協力建設一個更友好和更快樂的世界；我們若不能共同努力，則我們任何人都不能獲得和平和安寧，而前途也沒有多大希望。

U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD MANCHURIAN SITUATION

1st Edition, April, 1946

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The developments in Manchuria since the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and subsequent to the entry of Soviet forces thereinto will be dealt with in a special volume which is under compilation and will be available only after a 'settlement' has been reached on the pending issues. In the meantime the reader is offered the present volume which, while shedding side-light to the topic, constitutes a theme in itself. For reference, a list of relevant publications is attached hereunder:

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U. S. State Department Statement ON MANCHURIAN SITUATION

(March 1, 1946)

We have no agreement, secret or otherwise, with the Soviet government or any other government in regard to "war booty" in Manchuria. This government does not accept any interpretation of "war booty" to include industrial enterprises or components thereof, such as Japanese industries and equipment in Manchuria. Some time ago we informed the Soviet government that disposition of Japanese external assets, such as industries in Manchuria, is a matter of common interest and concern to those allies who bore the major burden in defeating Japan and that it would be most inappropriate at this time to make any final disposition of Japanese external assets in Manchuria either by removal from Manchuria of such industrial assets as "war booty" or by agreement between the Soviet and Chinese governments for control of these assets. This government has recently initiated discussions with other governments principally concerned with reparations from Japan with respect to final disposition her external assets.

U. S. State Department Release

**ON CONTROL OF MANCHURIAN
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES**

(March 5, 1946)

The Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, on February 9, 1946, instructed the American Embassies in Chungking and Moscow to present the following views to the Chinese Government and the government of the USSR, respectively:

Current reports of discussions between officials of the Chinese Government and the Russian Government with regard to the disposition and control of industrial enterprises in Manchuria give concern to this Government.

The Sino-Soviet treaty and agreements* signed August 14, 1945, provide for joint Sino-Soviet control over certain trunk railways in Manchuria, but these agreements exclude reference to any similar control over industrial enterprises in Manchuria. It is the understanding of the United States Government, which was kept informed of the course of the negotiations which led up to the agreements of August 1945 and which has accepted those agreements, that exclusive Sino-Soviet governmental control over Manchurian enterprises would be limited to the railways dealt with in the aforesaid agreements.

It is therefore disturbing to this Government to receive reports that discussions are under way which might result in the establishment of exclusive Sino-Soviet control over industrial enterprises in Manchuria.

Under present conditions, when free access to Manchuria is not open to the nationals of other powers and equality of

* These documents, consisting of Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, and Exchange of Notes, Agreements on Chinese Changchun Railway, Dairen, Port Arthur, and relations between the Chinese administration and Soviet CIG, after the entry of Soviet forces into Manchuria, are published under separate cover with the collective title "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance."

opportunity in seeking participation in the economic development of Manchuria is denied Americans and other Allied nationals, it is felt that the negotiations of agreements between the Chinese and Russian Governments with regard to industries in Manchuria would be contrary to the principle of the open door, would constitute a clear discrimination against Americans who might wish an opportunity to participate in the development of Manchurian industry, and might place American commercial interests at a distinct disadvantage in establishing trade relations with Manchuria.

Directly related to this matter of the industries in Manchuria is the matter of reparations policy for Japanese-owned prior to the defeat of Japan.

This Government considers that the ultimate disposition of Japanese external assets, such as the industries in Manchuria, is a matter of common interest and concern to those Allies who bore the major burden in defeating Japan.

This Government is now preparing a general policy outline for consideration by the concerned Governments with regard to Japanese reparations. It will be suggested that an inter-Allied reparations commission for Japan be established, and that one of the primary functions of this commission will be the final allocation of Japanese external assets among the various claimant nations.

It would seem, therefore, most inappropriate at this juncture for any final disposition to be made of Japanese external assets in Manchuria, either by removal from Manchuria of such industrial assets as "war booty" or by agreement between the Russian and Chinese Governments for the control of ownership of those assets.

The Government of the United States desires to be cooperative with the Chinese and Soviet Governments in seeking a solution of the problems outlined above, and it hopes that the other two Governments are animated by a similarly cooperative spirit. It would, therefore, appreciate being informed of any discussion which the two Governments may be having or may plan to have or any action they may have taken, in regard to the disposition or control of industrial enterprises in Manchuria, and we would welcome a full and frank discussion of the general problem.

The Secretary of State today announced that he had received a reply from the Chinese Foreign Office, which reads in part:

The Soviet Government declared in a memorandum addressed to the Chinese Government on January 21, 1946 that all Japanese enterprises in the Chinese Northeastern Provinces which had rendered services to the Japanese army were regarded by the Soviet Union as war booty of the Soviet forces.

The Chinese Government considers this claim of the Soviet Government as far exceeding the scope of war booty as generally recognized by international law and international usage and for this reason the two Governments have not been able to reach a unanimity of views of the fundamental principles involved.

In another memorandum presented to officials of the Generalissimo's headquarters in Changchun, the Soviet Government declared that it proposed to hand over to China a part of the Japanese enterprises which the Soviet Union regarded as war booty while the remaining enterprises (including specified coal mines, power plants, iron and steel industries, chemical industries and cement industries) were to be jointly operated by China and the Soviet Union.

The Chinese Government on its part has found it impossible to agree to this Soviet proposal because it goes beyond the provisions of the Sino-Soviet agreements of August 14, 1945 and is contrary to the aforesaid stand of the Chinese Government regarding Japanese properties and enterprises in China.

BRITISH PROTEST TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

*(Communication addressed to Soviet Foreign Commissar
Viacheslav Molotov by British Charge d'Affaires in
Moscow Frank K. Roberts on March 9 and disclosed
in response to a question in the House of
Commons on April 8, 1946.)*

I have been instructed by my Government to inform the Soviet Government that they are disturbed at reports which have been reaching them to the effect that Soviet forces have been engaged in removing from Manchuria Japanese-owned machinery and equipment from factories in Mukden and elsewhere.

Those reports compel my Government to reserve all their rights and place on record their view that disposal of Japanese assets is a matter for discussion and settlement between allied nations having claims to Japanese reparations.

In the absence of an agreement resulting from such discussion my Government regard it as appropriate that the State in whose territory they are located should retain such assets on a custodian basis to be debited against that State's eventual share of Japanese reparations.

But they cannot acquiesce in a unilateral removal of assets by a third party, nor can they recognize any agreement between governments which purports to arrange the final disposal and ownership of Japanese property, rights, interests, and assets.

The Chinese Government are being informed of this communication.

U. S. State Secretary Byrnes

SPEECH OF "SEVEN NOTS"

*(An address to the Overseas Press Club, New York,
February 28, 1946.)*

We are beginning to realize that the war is over. It is good to have sons, husbands and fathers home again. It is good to open a newspaper without fear of finding in casualty lists the name of one near and dear to us. But this is not wholly a time of celebration and rejoicing. As families in their homes on the farms and in the cities settle back from the dinner table to hear the boys tell of Normanly and Iwo Jima, there is an unspoken question in every mind.

The question is what we can do to make certain that there will never be another war. During the war our goal was clear. Our goal was victory. Problems of industrial and military mobilization, it is true, were problems of the first magnitude. Production bottlenecks often seemed unbreakable, transportation difficulties and manpower shortages insurmountable. On the fighting fronts, combined land, sea and air operations were heart-breaking in complexity. These were hard tasks. Yet we were able to apply a yardstick to each proposal by asking a simple question: Will it help to win the war? The common goal of victory served to unite us and to give purpose and direction to our efforts.

Now that we have come into calmer waters, our relief and gratitude are mixed with uncertainty. Our goal now is permanent peace, and surely we seek it even more anxiously than we sought victory. The difficulty is that the path to permanent peace is not so easy to see and to follow as was the path to victory. When an issue is presented, we ask, will it help to win the peace? When the answer is slow to come or does not come at all, we grow uneasy and apprehensive. While we may be in doubt about many things, there are certain basic propositions on which we are clear.

One is that a just and lasting peace is not the inevitable result of victory. Rather, victory has given us the opportunity to build a peace. And our lives depend upon whether we make the most of this opportunity.

Another thing of which we are certain is that we Americans alone cannot determine whether the world will live in peace or perish in war. Peace depends quite as much upon others as does upon us. No nation is the complete master of its fate. We are all bound together for better or for worse.

Because we know this, we have pinned our hopes to the United Nations, and we are not content simply to take our place in that organization. We realize that although the dreams of the world are lodged in it, the United Nations will fail unless its members give it life by their confidence and by their determination to make it work in concrete cases and in everyday affairs.

. . . . to you about the first meetings of the United Nations. What has been said in these meetings has been said as plainly and bluntly as anything I have heard said by responsible statesmen in any private conference. These first meetings were intended only to establish various organs of the United Nations. But so pressing were some of the problems presented to the Security Council that they had to be dealt with before there was a chance for the Council to adopt even provisional rules of procedure.

All was not calm and peaceful at the meetings in London. There was an effort to use the United Nations to advance selfish national aims. But the clash of national interests and purposes which were reflected in the debates in London was very much like the clash of local and special interests which are reflected in our national and state legislatures. We may depreciate some of these clashes of interest. But when they exist it is better that they should be publicly revealed. If these conflicts of interest did not appear in the forums of the United Nations, these forums would be detached from reality and in the long run turn out to be purposeless and futile.

A most significant precedent was established when the Security Council finished its discussions of complaint of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments requesting withdrawal of French and British troops from their territories. The Council

did not take formal action because of a difference among the permanent members as to the form of the resolution, but no one questioned the general proposition that no state has a right to maintain its troops on the territory of another independent state without its consent, nor the application of this proposition to the pending case. The particular form of resolution to this general effect, which was presented by the United States representative, Mr. Stettinius, was supported by most of the members of the Council. It failed of acceptance, however, because the Soviet Union vetoed it on the ground that it was not definite enough. But the British and French Governments immediately announced that, notwithstanding the technical veto of the Soviet Union, they would act in accordance with the American resolution as it clearly represented the views of the Council.

This indicates that the mere legal veto by one of the permanent members of the Council does not, in fact, relieve any state, large or small of its moral obligation to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The United Nations got off to a good start. However, that does not mean it is an assured success. It simply means that the Charter will work if the peoples of the United Nations are determined to make it work.

At times our Congress may make serious errors of omission and commission. Such errors are not the fault of the Congress as an institution. They are the fault of its members or of their constituents who fail to measure up to their responsibilities.

So it is with the United Nations. It will succeed only as we the people of the United Nations measure up to our responsibilities.

I should be lacking in candor if I said to you that world conditions today are sound or reassuring. All around us there is suspicion and distrust, which in turn breeds suspicion and distrust.

We have covenanted not to use force except in the defense of law as embodied in the purposes and principles of the Charter. We intend to live up to that covenant. But as a great power and as a permanent member of the Security Council we have a responsibility to use our influence to see that the other powers live up to their covenant. And that

responsibility we also intend to meet. Unless the great powers are prepared to act in the defense of law, the United Nations cannot prevent war. We must make it clear in advance that we do intend to act to prevent aggression, making it clear at the same time that we will not use force for any other purpose.

The great powers are given special responsibilities because they have the strength to maintain peace, if they have the will to maintain peace. Their strength in relation to one another is such that no one of them can safely break the peace if the others stand united in defense of the Charter. Present power relationships of [the great powers prevent] domination of the world by any one of them. Those power relationships cannot be substantially altered by unilateral action of any one great state without profoundly disturbing the whole structure of the United Nations. Therefore, if we are going to do our part to maintain peace in the world, we must maintain our power to do so, and we must make it clear that we will stand united with the other great states in defense of the Charter.

If we are to be a great power we must act as a great power, not only in order to ensure our own security but in order to preserve the peace of the world.

Much as we desire general disarmament, much as we are prepared to participate in general reduction of armaments, we cannot be faithful to our obligations, to ourselves and to the world if we alone disarm. While it is not in accord with our traditions to maintain a large professional standing army, we must be able and ready to provide armed contingents that may be required on short notice. We must also have a trained citizenry able and ready to supplement those armed contingents without unnecessarily prolonged training. That is why, in the interest of peace, we cannot allow our military establishment to be reduced below the point required to maintain a position commensurate with our responsibilities, and that is why we must have some form of universal military training.*

Our power thus maintained cannot and will not be used for aggressive purposes. Our tradition as a peace-loving,

* See President Truman on "Universal Military Training" and "Military Education and Training in China" by General Pei Ts'ung-hsi.

democratic people should be an assurance that our force will not be used except in the defense of law. Our armed forces, except as they may be called into action by the Security Council, cannot be employed in war without consent of the Congress. We need not fear their misuse unless we distrust the representatives of the people.

I am convinced that there is no reason for war between any of the great powers. The present power relationships and interests are such that none need or should feel insecure in relation to the others as long as each faithfully observes the purposes and principles of the Charter.

It is not enough for nations to declare they do not want to make war. Hitler said that. In a sense he meant it. He wanted the world to accept the domination of a totalitarian government under his direction. He wanted that without war if possible. He was determined to get it with war if necessary.

To banish war, the nations must refrain from doing the things that lead to war.

It has never been the policy of the United States in its internal affairs or its foreign relations to regard a *status quo* as sacrosanct. The essence of our democracy is our belief in life and growth and in the right of the people to shape and mould their own destiny. It is not in our tradition to defend the dead hand of reaction or the tyranny of privilege. We did not fight against the Nazis and Fascists who turned back the clock of civilization in order that we might stop the clock of progress.

Our diplomacy must not be negative and inert. It must be capable of adjustment and development in response to constantly changing circumstances. It must be marked by creative ideas, constructive proposals, practical and forward looking suggestion. Though a *status quo* is not sacred and unchangeable, we cannot overlook a unilateral gnawing away at the *status quo*. The Charter forbids aggression and we cannot allow aggression to be accomplished by coercion or pressure or by subterfuges such as political infiltration.

When adjustments between states, large or small, are called for, we will frankly and fairly consider those adjustments on their merits and in the light of the common inter-

ests of all states, large and small, to maintain peace and security in a world based on the unity of all great powers and the dominance of none.

There are undoubtedly vitally important adjustments which will require our consideration. Some of these situations are delicate to deal with. I am convinced, however, that satisfactory solutions can be found if there is a stop to this maneuvering for strategic advantage all over the world and to the use of one adjustment as an entering wedge for further and undisclosed penetrations of power.

We must face the fact that to preserve the United Nations we cannot be indifferent—veto or no veto—to serious controversies between any of the great powers, because such controversies could affect the whole power relationship between all of the great powers.

The United States wishes to maintain friendly relations with all nations and exclusive arrangements with no nation. Naturally, there are some problems which concern some nations much more than other nations. That is true in regard to many problems related to inter-American affairs. That is true in regard to the control of Germany and Japan. In our relations with the other great powers there are many problems which concern two or three of us much more than the others of us. I see no objection to conferences between the Big three or Big four or Big five. Even conferences between ourselves and the Soviet Union alone, conferences between ourselves and Britain alone, or conferences between ourselves and France or China alone, can all help to further general accord among the great powers and peace with the smaller powers. But in such conferences, so far as the United States is concerned, we will gang up against no state. We will do nothing to break the world into exclusive blocs or spheres of influence. In this atomic age we will not seek to divide a world which is one and indivisible.

We have openly, gladly and wholeheartedly welcomed our Soviet ally as a great power, second to none in the family of the United Nations. We have approved many adjustments in her favor, and in the process resolved many serious doubts in her favor. Only an inexcusable tragedy of errors could cause serious conflict between us in future. Despite the

differences in our way of life. our people admire and respect our allies and wish to continue to be friends and partners in a world of expanding freedom and rising standards of living.

In the interest of world peace and in the interest of our common and traditional friendship, we must make plain that the United States intends to defend the Charter. Great powers as well as small powers have agreed under the United Nations Charter not to use force or the threat of force except in the defense of law and the purposes and principles of the Charter.

We will not and we cannot stand aloof if force or target of force is used contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter. We have no right to hold our troops in the territories of other sovereign states without their approval and consent freely given. We must not unduly prolong the making of peace and continue to impose our troops upon small and impoverished states. No power has a right to help itself to alleged enemy properties in liberated or ex-satellite countries before a reparation settlement has been agreed upon by the Allies. We have not and will not agree to any one power deciding for itself what it will take from these countries. We must not conduct a war of nerves to achieve strategic ends. We do not want to stumble and stagger into situations where no power intends war but no power will be able to avert war. We must not regard the drawing of attention to situations which might endanger the peace as an affront to the nation or nations responsible for those situations.

It is quite possible that any nation may in good faith embark on a course of conduct without fully appreciating the effects of its conduct. We must all be willing to review our common interests in the peace, which are so much more important to all of us than the differences which might divide us.

We must get back to conditions of peace. We must liquidate the terrible legacy which the war has left us. We must return our armies to their homelands. We must eliminate the breeding grounds of suspicion and fear. We must not deceive ourselves or mislead our allies. To avoid trouble, we must not allow ourselves or mislead our allies. To avoid trouble, we not allow situations to develop into incidents from which there is no retreat.

We must live by the Charter. That is the only road to peace. To live by the Charter requires goodwill and understanding on the part of all of us.

We who had patience and gave confidence to one another in the most trying days of the war must have patience and give confidence to one another now.

No nation has a monopoly of virtue or wisdom, and no nation has a right to act as if it had. Friendly nations should act as friendly nations.

Loose talk of the inevitability of war casts doubt on our own loyalty to the Charter and jeopardizes our most cherished freedoms both at home and abroad.

There are ideological differences in the world. There always have been. But in this world, there is room for many people with varying views and many governments with varying systems.

No one foresees the far distant future and the ultimate shape of things to come. But we are bound together as part of a common civilization.

As we view the wreckage of the war we must realize that the urgent tasks of reconstruction, challenging tasks of creating higher standards of living for our people, should absorb all our constructive energies.

Great states and small states must work together to build a friendlier and happier world. If we fail to work together there can be no peace, no comfort and little hope for any of us.

英對東北問題之態度

美國國務院之聲明及英致蘇聯照會
附國務卿貝爾納斯“七不”演說

U. S. & BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD MANCHURIAN SITUATION

Statement & Release of the U.S. State Department
and British Protest to Soviet Government

with

State Secretary Byrnes' Speech of
"Seven Nots"

With Chinese Translations

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